INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT OF FOOD FOR WORK AND FEEDER ROADS PROGRAMS IN BANGLADESH

Submitted to:

USAID/Dhaka

May 1987

Submitted by:

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

During the course of this study, the MSI team received generous support and valuable participation from numerous organizations and individuals. USAID and CARE provided transportation assistance, translation services, and valuable inputs to study design. The Local Government Engineering Bureau (LGEB) assisted us in arranging site visits and obtaining cooperation from local officials. Computer support for the secondary data analysis was made available to us at no cost and on a priority basis by CARE. We especially wish to thank Lowell Lynch, Robert Sears and Gene George from USAID/Dhaka and Stafford Clarry, Andrew Sales and Sultan Miah from CARE/Dhaka for their technical guidance, experience, responsiveness, and interest throughout the study.

Other participants in the field who made very useful contributions in various ways were: Turra Bethune, Olivier Carduner, Golam Kabir and Maniruzzaman with USAID and Himangshu Choudhury with CARE. In particular, Kabir's indepth knowledge of FFW was particularly valuable to the team and he helped greatly in shouldering much of the burden of field logistics. Olivier and Manir both contributed significantly to the written output of the report and Himangshu helped to facilitate CARE's support. Finally, a word of appreciation to Mochlas Uzzaman who assisted with secondary data analysis.

MSI Washington staff contributed significantly to the preparation of the study beginning with task definition and orientation of the field team during team planning meetings and continuing through the finalization of the study findings in this report. Lawrence S. Cooley, President of MSI, guided this process and contributed substantively to the analysis of the field results. Timothy Alexander, Research Associate, compiled background and reference materials for team orientation and was responsible for overall editing of the final report.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AO	Allotment Order
BD	Basic Democracies
BDG	Bangladesh Government
cft	cubic feet
DC	Deputy Commissioner
DO	Delivery Order
DRR	Directorate of Relief and Rehabilitation
DRRO	District Relief and Rehabilitation Officer
FFW	Food for Work
LGEB	Local Government Engineering Bureau
MRR	Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation
PIC	Project Implementaton Committee
PIO	Project Implementation Officer
SAE	Sub Assistant Engineer
Tk	Taka
UP	Union Parishad
UZP	Upazila Parishad
WFP	World Food Program

MEASUREMENTS

1 seer = 2 pounds
1 maund = 80 pounds

1 US $ = 13.30 Taka

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study was designed to examine institutional aspects of Food for Work and Feeder Roads Programs in Bangladesh. Specifically, the study was designed to:

* identify the institutional bottlenecks limiting performance of the current Food for Work Program and recommend practical measures for overcoming these bottlenecks;

* determine the institutional impact of CARE's efforts on management at the Upazila and Union levels, and recommend ways in which that impact can be enhanced; and

* investigate the institutional feasibility of delegating responsibility for upgrading and/or maintenance of Feeder Roads to the Upazila level and recommend an approach for undertaking such delegation on a pilot basis.

The study was carried out in late 1986 as a "collaborative program evaluation" in which key operational personnel from USAID, CARE and the relevant government agencies participated with MSI staff as active members of the study team. This participation included involvement in the development of study questions and research methods, collection and analysis of field and secondary data, and interpretation of findings.

The methodology employed in this study included intensive field investigation of a stratified random sample of 12 Upazilas. This sample was deliberately structured to include one high performing and one low performing Upazila in each of CARE's six sub-office areas. "High performance", for this purpose, was defined on the basis of timely completion of approved road work and utilization of authorized wheat allocations over the two year period 1985-86. In addition to assessing performance and institutional impact of the Food for Work Program, these same Upazilas and their respective Zila headquarters were studied in connection with their ability to manage decentralized Feeder Roads. The purpose of this portion of the study was first, to identify issues concerning the appropriateness of decentralizing management responsibility of Feeder Roads improvement and maintenance from the Zila to the Upazila level; and second, to present recommendations for the design of a pilot experiment in Upazila management of the Feeder Roads program.

Information gained from the sequence of field interviews was evaluated and augmented by analysis of secondary data drawn from a national random sample of 58 Upazilas. This data was used in connection with the Food for Work portion of the study to test the observations of the field teams concerning the characteristics of high performing and low performing Upazilas and to suggest other factors which might explain these performance differences. The secondary data was also used to draw some general conclusions about the

efficiency of the Program and the impact of CARE's efforts on that efficiency.

The Final Report of this evaluation study is divided into six chapters. Chapter One, Preparation and Organization of the Study, includes a discussion of the relationship of the study to pending decisions and a description of the methodology employed. Chapters Two and Three, Historical Development of Local Government Institutions in Bangladesh and The Process of Planning and Implementing CARE FFW Schemes, present key background and descriptive information on the nature of local government and the operations of the FFW program. Chapters Four, Five and Six are the main substantive chapters of the report and discuss respectively the issues of institutional bottlenecks, institutional impact and institutional feasibility. Each of these chapters is divided into findings, conclusions and recommendations. Annexes to this document include a variety of supplementary and statistical information supporting the report's basic findings as well as a bibliography listing the key documents identified or used in carrying out the study.

On the subject of institutional bottlenecks, the study argues that there are twenty-two factors which have contributed in one way or another to reducing the efficiency and performance of the CARE FFW program. The report suggests that while several of these factors are endemic to the program, many others are subject to improvement, and specific recommendations are made for addressing certain of the most important of these difficulties. The chapter also outlines the characteristics ostensibly associated with high performance in certain Upazilas and suggests criteria for site selection and institutional development interventions based on these criteria.

The discussion of institutional impact begins by noting that the FFW program generally lacks a clear mandate and strategy for institutional development and that in the absence of such a mandate and strategy, institutional development objectives have often been sacrificed to other development and accountability considerations. Two simple models are presented -- one for addressing institutional change strategies and another for articulating institutional development objectives -- and CARE's implicit institutional development strategy is evaluated in terms of these two models. It is recognized that CARE's efforts have generally concentrated on systems (guidelines) and skills (training) to the relative neglect of organizational structures and incentives, and that the neglect of these latter factors may have limited the effectiveness of past institutional development efforts. Nevertheless, CARE's contribution to improving technical capacity at the Upazila level has been real and tangible. Chapter Five closes with several recommendations for expanding the institutional impact of future FFW efforts.

The chapter on institutional feasibility of decentralized Feeder Road activities explores separately the issues related to road improvements and road maintenance. For each type of effort, it examines the pros and cons of a Zila versus Upazila locus for the key functions involved -- planning, implementation, and supervision. The chapter concludes that it would be extremely inefficient to

decentralize to the Upazila level responsibility for road maintenance; development or improvement of long, continuous roads; oversight and scheduling of heavy equipment; and it recommends that tendering for contractual services continue to be a Zila level activity. Less problematic are the decentralization of road selection and supervision activities, and the chapter provides specific recommendations on how a pilot project might be designed to build upon the respective strengths of Zila and Upazila management. Somewhat paradoxically, the chapter suggests that the feasibility of decentralization to the Upazila level declines with increases in the level of resources available to finance road activities until funding is sufficient to enable the Upazilas to own their own road roller machinery.

The charts presented below summarize the report's major findings, conclusions and recommendations regarding institutional bottlenecks, institutional impact and institutional feasibility.

SUMMARY MATRIX FOR CHAPTER FOUR

FINDINGS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Secondary data analysis indicates that FFW earthworks performance is lower in Upazilas that have large land areas and many unions.	1. For Upazilas with large land areas and many unions, the PIO does not have sufficient resources to supervise and monitor FFW projects.	1. Provide a technical assistant and a motorcycle to the PIO. (R1)
2. Secondary data analysis reveals a high positive association between an Upazila's timely completion of CARE structures and its earthwork performance.	2. Sound Upazila management practices lead to high performance on all development activities. There is not a tradeoff due to borrowing of staff.	2. Form a coordinating committee to include the UNO, PIO, and Upazila Engineer to plan staffing. (R1)
3. High-performing Upazilas on earthworks schemes tended to have a well-educated Upazila Chairman. Most UNO's avoid involvement in FFW.	3. Upazila performance on Food for Work projects is highly dependent upon the motivations and competence of the Upazila Chairman and the PIO.	3. Increase internal and external accountability by respectively upgrading the role of the UNO in FFW and creating incentives for the Upazila Chairman to improve FFW performance. (R1)
4. Many CARE roads were missing the signboard at the starting point and many laborers were unaware (as were some PIC members), of FFW wages.	4. There is low public awareness in many unions of subproject wheat allocations and prescribed fixed wages. Not all PIC members actively participate.	4. Distribute union announcements of quarterly allocations for development assistance to the mosques. Distribute FFW guidelines to all PIC members. (R2)
5. Secondary data analysis shows the Upazila estimates of work completed to be nearly identical to the percentage of wheat spent for each project.	5. CARE's FFW performance measures are more accurate indicators than the Upazilas' own estimates and should serve as the basis for reimbursement.	5. Conduct a more extensive study comparing CARE with BDG estimates of FFW performance using larger samples and more independent variables. (R3)
6. Many unions have loosely formed PIC Committees, have chairman who are preoccupied with politics, and begin the FFW work season late.	6. There is a reduced urgency in many unions for CARE road reconstruction with the expansion of WFP activity and the Rural Maintenance Program.	6. Consider alternative uses of USG food aid for expansion of bridges and culverts, the Rural Maintenance Program, or water resources projects. (R4)

SUMMARY MATRIX FOR CHAPTER FIVE

FINDINGS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1.A. CARE/FFW program goals have evolved and proliferated over time, beginning with the provision of employment and income; later including infrastructure development; and recently institutional development. 1.B. Trade-off and conflict among FFW program goals have tended to limit achievement of institutional development objectives. 1.C. The need to minimize misuse of program resources revealed by a USAID audit in 1981 has complicated the issue of institutional development.	1. The lack of a clear and agreed upon institutional development mandate, objectives, and strategy is a significant factor limiting institutional development impact of CARE/FFW.	1. Key parties involved in FFW (USAID, CARE, MRR, and LGEB) should collaboratively set institutional development goals and a strategy for goal achievement. Strategy components might include: a) Goals and objectives for enhancement of strategic, technical, administrative, and communications capacity; and a mechanism for insuring agreement on performance indicators; b) further training for officials, especially at the national level to build greater system coherence; c) pilot experiments in collaborative approaches to project monitoring; d) establishment of added incentives for improved performance; e) examination of organizational barriers to improved performance; f) assessment of how skills and resources transferred in conjunction with FFW could also be used to benefit other development activities of UZPs.(R1)
2.A. CARE has performed a leading role in the design and implementation of information systems, procedures, schedules, standard formats, and other inputs for each stage of the FFW program system, particularly project planning and implementation. 2.B. Formal and informal training of local officials and staff, particularly the PIO, have measurably increased professional competence.	2. Key components of CARE's implicit institutional development strategy include the development of systems and guidelines for project planning and implementation, and the dissemination of these systems through OJT and Formal Training. CARE's training methods have had a positive impact on institutional capacity and performance at the Upazila level.	2. CARE's training efforts (including circulars, OJT, and formal training) should continue on regular basis for the other actors in the program. (R2)

FINDINGS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
3.A. The nature of current earthwork projects (i.e. predominantly road reconstruction) limits the need for comprehensive planning.	3.A Certain modifications to current systems and procedures could result in greater institutional impact, although perhaps at the expense of other FFW program goals.	3.A. If CARE wished to build additional planning capacity at the Upazila level, considerations should be given to alternative uses of U.S. food aid for expansion of bridges and culverts, the Rural Maintenance Program or water resource projects. (R3)
3.B. CARE's monitoring system is often perceived as an external imposition limiting self-management, local accountability, and the acquisition of monitoring skills by local officials.		3.B. Consideration should be given to experimentation with new collaborative monitoring systems in high performing Upazilas. (R4)
3.C. While the Final Reports produced by CARE contain much information of value to management at the Upazila level, this information is organized and presented in ways that are not useful to [illegible] Upazila staff.		3.C. OJT efforts and formal training should include explicit attention to assisting local officials in utilizing information from the Final Reports for improved management of FFW. (R5)
4.A. The role of the PIO is an inherently difficult one as a result of: dual accountability to elected and civil service officials; understaffing; relatively low rank of the PIO; lack of transportation and general absence of rewards for positive performance.	4.A. CARE's implicit institutional development [illegible] assed systems [illegible] atively little attention has been devoted to organizational structures and incentives. This omission has significantly limited CARE's institutional development impact.	4.A. Strengthen PIO position with additional resources or transfer responsibilities or position itself to another office, such as the Upazila Engineer. (R6)
4.B. Widely-held perceptions that scheme selection is determined more by political than technical considerations undermines use of planning tools such as maps and plan books.		4.B. Actively experiment with new incentives for efficient and effective performance, including delegating additional authority to high performing Upazilas; reducing wheat allocations to low performing Upazilas, and publicizing examples of exemplary performance through newsletters and the media. (R7)
4.C. While CARE circulars clarify program procedures, many local officials find that the circulars increased their workload and reduced their flexibility in operational and contractual matters.		

SUMMARY MATRIX FOR CHAPTER FIVE CONTINUED

FINDINGS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
5.A. Relatively few resources are currently available for Upazila level financing of infrastructure development other than FFW.	5.A. There has been little evidence of transfer of systems and skills from the FFW program to other local development activities.	5.A. A small task force of selected Upazila officials should be convened to advise CARE and the BDG of ways in which management systems and procedures can be adapted for use in other development activities. (R8)
5.B. Relatively little attention has been devoted to promoting the use of FFW planning and management systems for other infrastructure projects at the Upazila level.		5.B. Training programs and government guidelines should increasingly encourage the adaptation and use of FFW systems to other development activities. (R9)

SUMMARY MATRIX FOR CHAPTER SIX

FINDINGS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1A. Zila Parishads are better suited to plan structural improvements to Feeder Roads than are Upazila Parishads, while Upazilas are better suited to plan incremental improvements than are Zilas. 1.B. Structural improvements are more important to the development of transportation networks, than are incremental improvements. 1.C. Zila management of road rollers is the only administrative alternative for better utilization of road rollers if Upazilas cannot afford their own.	1. Planning considerations strongly disfavor decentralization of responsibility for Feeder Road improvements (provided that the funding level is sufficiently large to undertake structural, as opposed to incremental, improvements yet not large enough to enable Upazilas to afford their own road rollers.	1. Responsibility for Feeder Road improvements should be retained at the Zila level. However, if a decision is taken to decentralize the administration of Feeder Road improvements on a pilot basis, the following recommendations are offered to ameliorate the identified weaknesses and build on the strengths of the Upazilas, as well as take advantage of available Zila resources: a. Ensure that pilot scheme encompasses all the Upazilas in a given pilot Zila. (R1) b. Establish a Zila tender committee, chaired by the Executive Engineer and with all of the Zila's engineers as members, to plan the use of road rollers by different Upazilas and to serve as an organizer of the tendering process. (R2) c. Institute a two-year planning cycle so that scheme selection is made the first year, permitting the Zila committee to formulate work plans, roller schedules, and tender advertisements during the rainy season of the second year. (R3) By this planning process, the availability of the road roller could be guaranteed as part of the tender advertisement. (R4) d. Set rental fees for roller equipment at the national level to reflect real costs of operating equipment. (R5) e. Establish monitoring system for contractor performance. (R6) f. Require that participation in training courses become part of the prequalification process for contractors. (R7)
2.A. The scope of collusion and other anti-competitive practices prior to and during the tendering process is greater at the Upazila level than at the Zila level due to fewer bidders and less political heterogeneity. 2.B. Contractors' cost-accounting and quality assessment capabilities are not currently being used to capacity.	2. Implementation considerations moderately disfavor decentralization of responsibility for Feeder Road improvements (as some underdelivery of quality of work and uncompetitive behavior would be common to both administrative levels, but the scope for containing these practices would be greater at the Zila level).	
3.A. No significant difference was found between the Upazila and Executive Engineers skill level regarding technical supervision of road building. 3.B. Significant constraints on the Upazila Engineer's time during the dry season was found, particularly in large Upazilas with numerous projects; yet the Upazila Engineer's capacity appeared to by typically underutilized from July to October.	3. Supervision considerations disfavor decentralization of responsibility for Feeder Road improvements (since the available manpower capacity is already strained in a number of Upazilas under current planning procedures).	

SUMMARY MATRIX FOR CHAPTER SIX CONTINUED

FINDINGS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
4.A. Small-scale and spatial dispersion of maintenance activities complicate their scheduling and management even more than is the case with improvement activities.	4. The indivisible and less contractable character of road maintenance, in conjunction with the small-scale and spatial dispersion of such activities, necessitates integration of its planning, implementation, and supervision which does not appear to lend itself to decentralization.	4.A. Responsibility for capital-intensive road maintenance should be retained at the Zila level until funding attains a magnitude which warrants the Upazilas to own their own road roller equipment. (R10)
4.B. Road rollers, the costliest and least divisible of resources involved, is as essential to road maintenance as it is to roadway improvements.		4.B. Transfer responsibility for the maintenance of type A Feeder Roads to the Zila Parishads. (R11)

CHAPTER ONE: PREPARATION AND ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

I. Background

Two different project interests prompted USAID/Dhaka to commission this institutional assessment. One such interest is the Mission's longstanding involvement in the Food For Work Program (FFW), and the other is their interest in continued involvement in Feeder Road activities, a road improvement and maintenance program which had been going on in three of the country's twenty-eight former districts.

Food for Work

A Food For Work program has been operational in Bangladesh for ten years. The national program consists of one component supported by the World Food Program (WFP) and bilateral donors (about 50%), a second component supported by the government's own resources (about 15%) and a third component supported by USAID through CARE (about 35%).

The stated objectives of the USAID involvement in FFW are three-fold: 1) Relief (that American grain become food for the rural poor), 2) Economic development (provision of infrastructure leading to sustainable growth), and 3) Institutional development (strengthening local government institutions' ability to fulfill their designated functions).

These three objectives have been paralleled by a sequence of evaluations or impact studies which have included the following:

* in 1979 a study was conducted to investigate the extent to which the program had reached target beneficiaries and had met employment objectives;

* in 1983 (with a follow-up in the spring of 1986) the program's economic development impact was assessed;

* and in late 1986 this study focused on the institutional constraints on the program, as well as its institutional development impact.

Among the factors prompting the timing of this study are a desire on the part of USAID to assess the institutional benefits derived from CARE's intensive technical support to the program; a desire to reduce the shortfall between the amount of grain authorized and that actually utilized; and indications that the efficiency of the program is not improving over time as expected.

Feeder Roads

Feeder Roads may administratively and technically be regarded as the next step up from the rural dirt roads built under FFW. In accordance with the government's general decentralization policies, consideration is being given to placing the responsibilities for these roads with the Upazila Parishads. There have been some doubts, however, about the appropriateness of decentralizing this function, and further inquiry and clarification has been deemed helpful.

It was thought appropriate to include a study of the feasibility of feeder road decentralization with the FFW institutional assessment study since the Upazilas would be the focus of both Feeder Roads and FFW programs and many of the same key actors would need to be interviewed and their operational capacity assessed.

II. Preparation

The major activities of the study team are presented in Annex 1 in the form of a weekly agenda of activities. This agenda is further detailed in the following paragraphs.

Washington TPM. Pre-field preparatory activities consisted primarily of the compilation of reference materials and mobilization of the field team during a five-day Team Planning Meeting (TPM). Part of the TPM was devoted to the presentation of background information, including briefings by guest speakers on CARE FFW monitoring procedures and local government structures in Bangladesh. Most of the TPM was spent reviewing the consultancy scope of work and planning the study methodology. In keeping with the MSI approach to evaluations as "decision-driven", the assignment terms of reference were refined to reorient the research agenda more closely to identifiable pending management decisions, as shown below:

	Management Decisions	Decision Makers	Scope of Work Questions
1.	What improvements to CARE/USAID FFW system are necessary to eliminate disparities between grain authorized and that utilized?	USAID CARE/B	What are the causes and remedies of shortfalls between the level of grain authorized and that utilized in the CARE/USAID FFW Program? (Institutional Bottlenecks)
2.	How can AID maximize the institutional development impact of $8 million paid over 5 years to CARE?	USAID CARE/B	What has been the impact of the CARE FFW Program on improving the operational efficiency of local government institutions, e.g. district, Upazila, and unions? (Institutional Impact)
3.	In areas of the country where the saturation point has been reached in terms of the ability to utilize FFW in rural road construction, what other types of projects can the BDG sponsor through FFW?	USAID BDG CARE/B	What alternatives to road projects can the BDG sponsor that meet the FFW project criteria of labor-intensive low skill requirements, and grain payments to laborers? (Institutional Feasibility)
4.	What crucial variables should the BDG consider in the design of the pilot experiment in the decentralization of Feeder Road reconstruction and maintenance to the Upazila level?	USAID BDG	What conditions are necessary to enable the Upazila administrations to assume responsibility for Feeder Roads? (Institutional Feasibility

Three central issues emerged from the examination of the study scope of work: institutional bottlenecks, institutional impact, and institutional feasibility; which led to the organization of this report. Each of the non-background chapters of this study have sought to address the key management issues associated with one of these areas of research.

Dhaka TPM. A one-day TPM was conducted in Dhaka for members of the USAID Mission and host country institutions actively involved in the FFW and Feeder Roads Programs (see Annex 2 for Dhaka TPM participants list). A collaborative approach to issues definition, field research and debriefings was thought beneficial as the study issues were complex and difficult for outsiders to understand without adequate participation by the personnel closest to the programs and institutions under study. Further, it was felt that if important agency staff were actively involved, the probability was increased that the study recommendations would be reasonable and acted upon.

III. Methodology

Two partly incompatible methodological concerns emerged during the Dhaka TPM. One concern was that the study be as broad-based as possible in order that the research findings have relevance to national-scale management issues. The other concern was that the survey probe as deeply into the grass roots level as possible. In particular, it was suggested that the focus should be lowered beyond the Upazila to the Union level, and to the actual workings of the Project Implementation Committees and their relations with the laborers themselves. Given the time constraints, both concerns could not be completely accommodated simultaneously. Nevertheless, the following strategy was adopted to pursue both concerns as far as practical considerations would allow.

- While the focus of the assessment would remain on the Upazila level since this is the focal point for the administration of the Food For Work Program, an effort would be made to visit schemes from different Unions within each Upazila surveyed. Further, an attempt would be made to interview Project Implementation Committee members and laborers.

- The originally planned number of 8 Upazilas to be visited was expanded to 12 despite the realization that this would delay report-writing.

- The criteria for selection of Upazilas to be surveyed was performance in completing approved road work and utilization of authorized wheat allocations. One high and one low performing Upazila were selected from each of the six CARE sub-offices to secure a nationwide geographic sampling. The 12 Upazilas are listed in Exhibit 1-1 and they are located as shown on Exhibit 1-2.

Exhibit 1-1

MSI TEAM SITE VISIT SCHEDULE

CARE Sub-Office	District	Upazila	1984-86 FFW Performance	Dates Visited	Field Team
Dhaka	Narayanganj	Rupganj	High	October 25	Teams 1&2
	Narayanganj	Bandar	Low	October 23	Teams 1&2
Mymensingh	Mymensingh	Muktagach	High	October 27-28	Team 1
	Mymensingh	Phulpur	Low	October 29-30	Team 1
Khulna	Jessore	Monirampur	High	October 27-28	Team 2
	Jhenaidah	Kotchandpur	Low*	October 29-30	Team 2
Comilla	Brahmanbaria	Brahmanbaria	High	November 3-4	Team 1
	Comilla	Matlab	Low	November 5-6	Team 1
Rajshahi	Nawabganj	Nachole	High	November 4-5	Team 2
	Nawabganj	Nawabganj	Low	November 2-3	Team 2
Rangpur	Dinajpur	Ghoraghat	High	November 10-11	Teams 1&2
	Dinajpur	Kaharole	Low	November 12-13	Teams 1&2
	Rangpur	District Headquarters		November 11-12	Teams 1&2

*Low performance in 1984 and 1985, high performance in 1986.

MSI TEAM SITE VISITS



- The issues to be investigated with the key actors would range from factual information on performance and procedures to an assessment of their motivations and access to resources.

- Semi-structured questionnaires for each key actor (included as Annex 3) would be used to generate insights rather than formal statistics. Each interview was a new iteration leading to discovery of new lines of inquiry and abandonment of others.

- The insights generated through the interviews were also to inform a statistical analysis of secondary data from a sample large enough to be of national significance. Bivariate and multivariate analyses were to be performed on a set of 20 variables for a sample of 60 Upazilas (listed in Annex 4) to shed further light on the determinants and predictors of FFW performance.

IV. Organization

The assessment team consisted of a permanent core of eight members with temporary assistance from another four. In order to cover the targeted number of 12 Upazilas the team split up into two groups of 4-6 persons, each group being allotted a vehicle. In order to homogenize their approach the two groups visited the first two Upazilas together. The interviews were conducted in pairs consisting of one Bangla and one English speaker. One of the pairs in either group would have primary responsibility for covering Feeder Roads issues, including a separate visit to the Executive Engineer at the local Zila Headquarters.

The secondary data analysis was initiated after the first two waves of field interviews, and the variable list was determined based on the information obtained from these interviews.

For each Upazila visited, the team would continue interviews until they felt they understood the efficiency of operations and obstacles present. The length of stay per Upazila ranged from as little as six hours to as long as four days and averaged 1 1/2 days. The following interview sequence was followed for each Upazila investigated:

a) Semi-structured interviews with Upazila officials at the Upazila Office;

b) Semi-structured interviews with union chairman enroute to their union, and Feeder Road contractors at their building sites;

c) Unstructured interviews with laborers and PIC members along FFW roads;

d) Follow-up interviews with selected officials at the Upazila Office.

The findings and observations of the study were tentatively summarized in the field and more formally evaluated in plenary sessions held upon return to Dhaka. An original draft prepared by the study team was submitted to USAID/Dhaka upon conclusion of the team's field investigations. Following MSI normal procedures, USAID/Dhaka mission comments were solicited and received. Major revisions were then made to incorporate the comments of USAID/Dhaka as well as other changes made by the MSI Washington staff.

CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS IN BANGLADESH

The purpose of this chapter is to provide historical background information on the development of local government institutions in Bangladesh in order to provide a context for the study and to aid in better understanding the functions and operations of these institutions. The discussion will attempt to cover certain themes of local government that have particular relevance to the development process. Particularly relevant are the following: structures and functions of local government institutions, scope of development-related activities, central versus local control of institutions, and the balance of elected and non-elected members. Discussion will be limited to local government in rural areas, as urban local government falls outside the scope of this assessment.

I. The British Period

Local government institutions have existed in the Indian subcontinent in the form of panchayats or village councils since time immemorial. It was not, however, until the British period of colonial rule that local institutions began to take on the shape and functions of present-day institutions. Even so, today's institutions have gone through many stages of change and growth.

The first step taken under the British Raj toward local self-governing institutions was an act passed in 1870, the Chowkidari Panchayat Act. This act created a non-elective council to maintain law and order in village communities. The council, comprised of appointed members, did have tax raising powers but these were infrequently exercised and the act eventually became inactive.

The next act, the Bengal Local Self-Government Act of 1885, created a three-tier system not unlike today's structure. It consisted of district boards, local boards and union committees. The union committees, comprised of several villages, were made responsible for the construction and maintenance of local schools, roads, and ponds. They were given no powers of financial control, however, and functioned, as did the local boards, as mere agents of the district boards whose chairman were district magistrates. As such they did not, in actuality, represent local interests, but constituted an extension of the center's official interests to the grass roots level.

This system remained until the implementation of the Village Self-Government Act of 1919 which replaced the three tiers with two: union boards and district boards in rural areas. This act followed a major reform-minded report, the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918, which strongly recommended introducing a greater popular element in local bodies. District boards were then constituted to have two-thirds elected members (including after a time the board's president) and one-third nominated members. The membership varied from 16 to 70 depending on the population and size of the district.

District boards had a number of specialized committees which looked after such subjects as finance, public works, health and sanitation, education and so on. These committees were headed by qualified officers such as the district engineer and the district health officer who supervised staff members posted below the thana and union levels.

The District boards received income from three sources--government grants, assessments on roads and public works, and fees from ferries, fairs, and other facilities operated by the district.

The responsibility for specific functions of the union boards varied: some functions were compulsory, some optional and the rest were exercised only at the discretion of higher government levels. For example, the maintenance of a rural police force was compulsory, but municipal and welfare functions were optional. Nonetheless, union boards invariably undertook works of sanitation and public health, provided drainage, constructed wells and tanks, and built roads and bridges.

Similar to the district boards, one-third of a union board's membership was nominated, while the remaining two-thirds was elected. Membership size varied from six to nine. An average sized union board consisted of about 10 villages with an area of 10 to 15 square miles and a population in 1919 of 10,000.

II. The Pakistan Period

The system of district and union boards continued during the independent period of Pakistan, which began in 1947. It lasted until the Basic Democracies scheme (BD) was introduced in 1959 by President Ayub Khan. This scheme expanded the elective element on the boards: a president and vice president were to be directly elected at the union level and all district board members were to be elected by adult franchise. The latter, in turn, would elect a chairman and vice chairman, but the central government retained some control by reserving supervisory powers to appoint a chairman if the elected one proved unsatisfactory.

Under the President's Order creating the Basic Democracies, major changes were made in the system which resulted in the following: (1) a union council for a union (consisting of several villages) in rural areas; (2) a thana council for a thana in East Pakistan (called tehsil councils in West Pakistan); (3) a district council; (4) a divisional council; and (5) provincial development advisory councils for East and West Pakistan.

As with the pre-1947 period, a BD union council typically covered an area of 10 - 12 square miles and a population of 10,000. Two-thirds of the members of the council were elected, with one-third nominated until 1962 when nominations were abolished at the union level.

The BD system provided for the election of 40,000 representatives nation-wide. Called Basic Democrats, these representatives were to serve at the lowest level of the system, as union counselors, but they were also to comprise an electoral college to elect the president of the country. Some were also elected by their fellow Basic Democrats to serve at tiers above the union level. For instance, after 1962, all chairmen of union councils or parishads became members of the thana councils in place of official, non-elected members.

The district council consisted of an equal number of elected officials and nominated non-official members: the latter were nominated by the union parishad chairman. The deputy commissioner was designated the ex-officio chairman of the district council. In this way, an indirect system of elections was introduced which provided for a limited measure of popular participation in government policy making and functions at the local level.

The BD system worked reasonably well in the western wing but in East Pakistan the system gained little acceptance politically and, as a result, became a target for mismanagement and corruption. The system also contributed indirectly to the further alienation of the eastern wing from the rest of the country and prepared the way for the liberation period.

III. The Bangladesh Period

Local government was one of the first areas to receive the attention of the new government following independence on December 16, 1971. Within two months, the new government under a President's Order dissolved the old local bodies but then reconstituted them under the control of government officials in place of the former elected representatives. In 1973 the elective principle was reintroduced at the union level with chairmen, vice chairmen and members being elected on the basis of adult franchise. In 1976 further changes with respect to membership were made under a new local government ordinance, but the functions and status of the local bodies remained essentially unchanged throughout the 1970s.

In 1980, under the government of President Ziaur Rahman, an effort was made to revive village level local government. Gram Sarkers (village governments) were constituted with elected chairmen and members with additional members being appointed from women, peasant and landless groups. These bodies were invested with wide ranging functions but were largely ineffectual as they had few resources and no taxation powers.

Upazila Administration

After taking power in March 1982, the new government of Pre Ershad introduced fundamental changes in the realm of government. The hallmark of these changes was the decentraliza powers, functions and resources to the local, namely Upazila. This level, formerly called thana (in Bengali, "police statio the subdistrict (Upazila is the Bengali word for subdistrict), between the district and union levels. There are currentl Upazilas in Bangladesh each averaging 250 square miles a population of 200,000.

The Local Government (Upazila Parishad and Upazila Admi str Reorganization) Ordinance of 1982 provides the legal framewo local government at the Upazila level. This Ordinance, as well Resolution of Government handed down also in late 1982, sets ou measures to be taken to effect changes envisioned at the Upa including "upgrading" Upazila administration and decentrali government authority to that level.

The Resolution divided government functions at the Upazila l two areas: "transferred" and "retained" subjects. Transfe subjects - development or nation-building departments - were to bec the responsibility of the Upazila parishad (UZP). Retained subject regulatory functions such as police and revenue - were to remain responsibility of the central government as were developme activities that were national or regiona in scope. Government Upazila Parishad is described as dual administration because integrates the exercise of the popular will by elected representati with the normal business of government executed through li ministries. (See Exhibit 2-1 for the organization of the UZP show the offices under transferred and retained subjects.)

These changes increased the authority of retained subje officers at the Upazila level by reducing the control function higher levels of government. This is reflected most clearly in t establishment of a treasury and accounts office at the Upazila and the vesting of Upazila officers with powers to withdraw and disbur funds. Also under the new system, the Upazila no longer has to wa for higher authorities to approve and release funds. Furthermore, Upazilas are authorized to prepare and execute their own schemes, th can proceed without the sanction and approval of higher level off cers. Although this is how the system is now structured to work, the government finds that Upazilas are not functioning properly (e if they are channeling most resources to one activity) then t government can exercise sanctions in the form of withholding central provided funds.

As a means of strengthening the Upazila parishad as a k government institution, the parishad has been empowered to coordina all activities within the Upazila. Thus, retained subject officer are "answerable" to the UZP. This means that the parishad can ca for a report from any central government officer and it is incumbe upon that officer to furnish a report. Transferred subject officer are even more closely tied to the UZP: they are "accountable" to th

ORGANIZATION OF UPAZILA ADMINISTRATION



UZP for the full range of their activities including their personal conduct. Officers involved with the Food for Work roads program (FFW), chiefly the project implementation officer (PIO) and to a much lesser extent the Upazila engineer, fall into the latter category. The engineer plays a much greater, and the PIO a lesser, role in construction of FFW culverts and small bridges.

For both sets of officers (but more so for the transferred subjects cadre) responsibilities toward the UZP can conflict with their sense of loyalty to their own departments. In personnel matters (i.e. promotions, transfers etc.), for instance, these officers are evaluated by their departmental supervisors at the district level. Thus, an officer may choose to pay greater attention to his department and de-emphasize his responsibilities to the UZP. One expert suggests that a way around this problem is for a line ministry evaluation to take into account personnel evaluations by the UZP chairman in order to compel officers to better balance their responsibilities. 1/

The 1982 Ordinance provides for two categories of UZP membership: the representative members and the official members. The representative members include the chairmen of all the union parishads within the Upazila as well as the chairmen of any city governments (paurashava). The official members consist of most of the officers in charge of development activities in the Upazila. In addition, members include three women members and a member at large, all of whom are appointed and, the chairmen of Thana Central Cooperative Associations. (See Exhibit 2-2 for Upazila parishad membership).

To carry out its development responsibilities the UZP receives funding from three sources. The major source is grants from the central government which are listed in the Annual Development Plan (ADP). This Plan indicates the resources to be used by the Upazila according to each line ministry. According to government guidelines, 2/ the sectoral allocation of FFW resources should not exceed 40 percent of the total ADP allocation, yet it appears that these resources consistently comprise more than 50 percent of the Upazila's development resources.

1/. Larry Schroeder, "Decentralization in Rural Bangladesh," Asian Survey Vol. XXV, No. 11, November 1985, pp. 1134-1147.

2/. Planning Commission, Ministry of Planning, Government of Bangladesh, Guidelines for Upazila Parishads, July 1985, p. 5.

Exhibit 2-2

Upazila Parishad Membership

Chairman

Voting Members
- Representative Members:
  - Union Parishad Chairmen
  - Paurashava Chairmen
- Appointed Members:
  - Three women
  - One-at-Large
- Chairman, Thana Central Cooperative Association

Non-Voting Members
- Upazila Nirbahi Officer
- Health & Family Planning Officer
- Education Officer
- Agriculture Officer
- Engineer
- Cooperative Officer
- Livestock Officer
- Fishery Officer
- Social Welfare Officer
- Rural Development Officer
- Mass Communication Officer
- Revenue Officer
- Officer-in Charge, Police Station

Source: Schroeder, op. cit., p. 1143.

A second source of funding is income the Upazila can raise on its own through its taxation powers. A third source is funds placed with the Upazila by various agencies of the central government for execution of schemes not otherwise transferred to the Upazila. These latter sources are normally considerably less, however, than the government's ADP funds.

In order to encourage the planned use of its financial and other resources, the Upazilas have been advised by the government to prepare comprehensive Five Year Plans based on actual local needs. Apparently, however, such plans are being drawn up in only a small number of cases.

A further modification in the Upazila system took place in May 1985 when elected representatives took over as chairmen in place of Upazila nirbahi officers (UNOs), government officials of the administrative cadre. This change gave primacy to the elected officials, and many chairmen have worked since to consolidate their political positions, using whatever resources lay at hand. The role of elected chairmen along with the continuing operations of the Upazila parishad will, over time, be critical to institutionalizing the procedures and practices of the Upazila system. In turn, FFW as a significant portion of the development resources available to the Upazila, is playing a central part in that institutionalization process.

Union Parishads

There are nearly 4,500 union parishads in Bangladesh which constitute the lowest level of local self-government in the country. Each represents a population of 10,000 - 20,000. A union parishad is divided into three wards each of which elects three members. A voter casts his vote for four preferences, three for members of the ward and one for the chairman of the parishad. Thus the parishad includes ten elected members; in addition, two women members are nominated along with two members from among small landholders, making a total of 14.

The Local Government Ordinance (Union Parishads) of 1976 lists 40 functions of rural development that union parishads (UP) are authorized to perform. Because of limited financial resources and the lack of qualified manpower, however, the unions actually carry out few of these functions. One important role the UPs do have is identifying and implementing FFW schemes on behalf of the UZPs, particularly as these amount to a significant proportion of the Upazila's total development resources. The establishment of the Upazila as the key local government institution has also increased the importance of the UP chairmen as they are the principal voting members of the UZP. Further, they are the only members of the UPZ who can initiate and pass a no-confidence motion against the UPZ chairman.

Zila Parishads

In early November of 1986, the government announced that it was reconstituting the zila parishads (ZPs) or district councils. Few details were given with the announcement, but such a step is bound to have significant, perhaps far-reaching implications for the UZPs. Some of the functions and responsibilities currently being undertaken by the UZP may pass back to the ZPs, whose functions were diminished by the decentralization reforms of 1982. Any further realignment of authority will need to be monitored closely to determine what impact it may have on the Upazila Parishads.

IV. Summary

This chapter has sought to review the evolution of local government institutions in Bangladesh to aid in the understanding of constraints operating on the FFW program and to examine functions of local government that might be strengthened as a result of FFW operations. The brief historical retrospective suggests that the decentralization initiative of 1982 may be seen as both enhancing and limiting the potential impact and efficiency of FFW. Decentralization benefits FFW by bringing greater authority to the local levels of BDG responsible for the FFW project cycle: roadway earthwork scheme identification, prioritization, design and implementation. Decentralization and the system of dual administration may also be seen as constraining FFW efficiency and impact by introducing ambiguities and tensions between the "transferred" and "retained" divisions of responsibility under the direction respectively of the Upazila chairman and the UNO. Chapter Four explores further the issues of institutional bottlenecks impeding FFW.

The historical retrospective also suggests that FFW has the special potential to assist the central government's recent efforts to decentralize additional authority to the Upazila level and to strengthen local government capacity to achieve development and relief aims. By channeling resources that comprise a major share of funds allotted to Upazila and Union Parishad members, FFW enhances the leverage of local officials to fulfill their designated functions. By the design and installation of systems for carrying out FFW construction, CARE technical assistance can help build local government capability to plan and implement public works as well as other development or relief projects. Chapter Five examines in detail the impact of the FFW/CARE program on these institutional development goals.

CHAPTER THREE: THE PROCESS OF PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING CARE FFW SCHEMES

This chapter presents the step-by-step process whereby CARE-sponsored FFW schemes are identified, designed and carried out. Though there are descriptions of the FFW process available (i.e., government guidelines, CARE booklets), none of these documents includes a concise description of the process in layman's terms and in its broader outline. The purpose of this chapter is chiefly to assist in better understanding the issues raised and discussed in the substantive chapters that follow. In addition to learning from orientation and interviews during field visits, resources used in drafting this chapter include the instructions issued by the Directorate of Relief and Rehabilitation (DRR) for implementation and monitoring of FFW projects in 1986-87, CARE's Operational Plan for FFW, and booklets prepared by CARE for training of various actors in the process. This chapter, which focuses on the process with respect to earthworks, begins with the first step in the process - describing how wheat allocations are made - and then goes on to discuss the steps in project identification and selection, scheme implementation, monitoring and reporting and, finally, scheme completion.

Although Food For Work is the largest program, FFW is only one of seven program administered by CARE in Bangladesh. Other major programs include Women's Development, Primary Health Care, and Integrated Agriculture. CARE/Bangladesh operates 17 field offices, and employs 17 foreign staff and 1,100 Bangladesh nationals. Of these, only 6 field offices and 300 Bangladeshi employees, as well as the 17 expatriate staff, are involved in FFW.

The CARE FFW program system differs from those of the BDG and the WFP in several respects. CARE FFW is the most developed of the three systems for programming and managing food resources and has served as a model for the BDG and WFP in the establishment of a uniform system for carrying out FFW. As CARE was the first to develop detailed procedures manuals and training materials, particularly for the planning and implementation stages of the project cycle, operating guidelines adopted by the DRR were borrowed heavily from CARE. CARE has a more extensive system of field offices than WFP and has instituted more rigorous monitoring procedures than either BDG or WFP.

I. Earthworks

Allocation of Wheat

Each year, usually in late October, the Bangladesh Government (BDG), CARE and USAID decide on the upcoming year's wheat allocation, This wheat is granted under Title II of U.S. Public Law 480 and usually amounts to 100,000 to 120,000 metric tons (MT) a year. Using a formula which takes into account an Upazila's population size and chronic distress level, an allocation is determined for each Upazila. In addition, the FY87 wheat allocation to selected Upazilas has been increased based on superior performance in utilization of wheat in

prior years. Conversely, Upazilas have been informed that they are liable to lose part of their allocation if their performance is poor. To date, however, no Upazila has been penalized for falling short of its FFW objectives.

Though most of the resources allocated are wheat supplies, some cash payments are allowed. In the earthworks program, cash payments cannot exceed 10 percent of total resources. Cash is intended for use only in exceptional circumstances such as the following:

a.) areas where migratory labor must be used because local labor is not available. Cash is necessary in these cases as laborers are unable to process the wheat or transport it home, and

b.) project sites located in remote areas with insufficient grain stock, where the cost of transporting the additional wheat required for schemes is considered prohibitive.

In addition to actual cash payments, Taka (Tk.) payments in cheque form are also allocated for carrying costs and contingency funds. The purpose of this arrangement is to provide greater control of payments in the system. The DRR allots carrying costs funds (cost incurred from moving wheat to the project site from the depot) to each Upazila on a straight taka per MT basis. Contingency funds are provided at the rate of Tk. 30/- per MT with a minimum of Tk. 500 and a maximum of Tk. 3,500 per project in the case of CARE schemes. Contingency funds are used for such needs as printing forms, making project signboards, purchase of stationery and meeting the incidental costs of the Project Implementation Committee (PIC). This payment in Taka is made through an account payee check to each Upazila.

Project Identification and Selection

Knowing what its wheat allocation is, each Upazila can then decide which schemes and how many to undertake. The number nationwide averages approximately five separate schemes per Upazila per year. In the sample the team visited, the range of schemes undertaken was from four to 24. The process is begun with each union parishad (UP) in the Upazila preparing proposals for schemes within its union and then lobbying for their acceptance at the Upazila parishad (UZP) meeting where schemes are selected.

In deciding which schemes to select, the UZP's first concern is to ensure that the full allocation is utilized among the limited number of schemes. This is not normally a problem, however, as demand usually exceeds supply. The next hurdle is to reach agreement among the unions on the choice of schemes. This is usually achieved by consensus with political considerations weighing more heavily than socio-economic concerns in the final selection. In this process, it is frequently suggested that a chairman will often put his own political image and reputation before what might be best for the area's welfare

or development. The larger the number of unions in an Upazila, the greater the competition for schemes.

Once the schemes are selected they are entered into the Upazila's Plan Book, a yearly planning document. This Book is supposed to be prepared on the basis of the Upazila's Five Year Plan which theoretically should already have identified and listed the FFW schemes to be undertaken. Very few, if any, Upazilas have been able to establish for themselves a five year planning cycle with the result that FFW schemes are selected on a year to year basis.

After the schemes have been selected, the Upazila project implementation officer (PIO), with possible assistance from the Upazila engineer's staff (i.e., sub-assistant engineer [SAE] or supervisor), completes a pre-survey of each scheme site. This is done to determine the standard to which the road will be built or improved (most schemes are the latter) and the amount of earth which will have to be moved. The amount of wheat required to pay for this work is computed using the official average cost of 53 seers[1/] (1 seer = approximately 2 lbs.) per 1000 cubic feet (cft) of earth moved.

Once the Upazila pre-survey is completed, CARE engineers visit the site to undertake their own pre-survey, to verify the design and cost estimates of the Upazila pre-survey. Where changes are deemed necessary, CARE engineers suggest modifications to be made in the Upazila pre-survey. At this stage, adjustments in the selection or size of schemes are made, if necessary, to ensure a match with the Upazila's total allocation.

CARE pre-surveys 100 percent of its schemes in collaboration with the Upazila staff and a union parishad representative in order to monitor use of resources and methods of scheme execution. In contrast, WFP performs post-surveys on nearly 100% of their roadway earthworks, but does not conduct pre-survey measurements. The DRR undertakes only a few pre- and post-surveys, and has adopted only nominal monitoring procedures. Also, CARE used to formally approve FFW schemes, but this responsibility now rests with the UZPs. It could be argued, however, that CARE's pre-surveys amount to approval as the DRR bases its final allotment orders to each Upazila on CARE's findings.

Scheme Implementation

For each scheme in each union, a project implementation committee is formed, appointed by the union parishad. This PIC is headed by the UP chairman (mandatory in CARE schemes, not in others) and is made up of UP members, although it can also include outsiders. From among the PIC members, a secretary is appointed to help the chairman in

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1/. The figure of 53 is actually taken from the government guidelines for 1986-87 and represents a 10 percent increase over the previous year. Unless otherwise stated, examples given in this chapter refer to 1986-87.

preparing and keeping accounts and documents. In CARE schemes, if a road scheme overlaps two or more unions, a separate PIC is formed for each road segment in each union.

Once formed, the PICs mobilize laborers, gang leaders (called sardars) and work supervisors to begin the scheme's execution. A gang will normally have about 20 - 25 laborers with one leader, and a supervisor will oversee four to five gangs. The payment rates per 1000 cft of earth moved are as follows: gang leaders are paid 2.5 seers (i.e. 5 lbs.) of wheat, supervisors are paid .5 seers (i.e. 1 lb.), and laborers are paid an average wage rate of 50 seers. Thus, by adding the rates for all three - gang leaders, supervisors, and laborers - an average of 53 seers is reached.

The PIC may vary the wage rate to laborers according to the type of soil (i.e. hard/soft) or the distance over which earth must be moved (referred to as lead and lift), though technically these factors have been, in the government's view, figured into the average wage rate of 53 seers per 1000 cft. There is no upper limit to the wage, but for each scheme the average wages paid to laborers should equal 50 seers and under no circumstances should they be less than 45 seers, according to government guidelines for the coming work season.

After a certain amount of work has been done, pit measurements indicating the amount of earth moved are taken and recorded in a measurement book (Measurement and Payment Ledger) by the PIO or the designated Upazila scheme supervisor. Earth moving work is coordinated with a schedule of wheat requisitions so that payments can be made at least once a week to laborers, gang leaders and supervisors.

Wheat requisitions are made through Delivery Orders (DO) which are issued in the following way. In order to make payments, the PIC prepares a written request for a specific amount of wheat. The PIO or one of the engineer's staff, if he is assisting, makes a site visit to verify the wheat requirements. This is done, in part, to satisfy the UZP chairman and the UNO who are responsible for scrutinizing scheme measurements, payments and work progress records before approving requisitions. The PIO then processes the request and presents it to the UZP Chairman in the form of a Commodity Request Form. If all is in order the Chairman furnishes the requisition by signing the Form which then authorizes the Upazila Food Officer to issue a DO for a specific amount of wheat. The DO goes to the Officer-in-Charge of the godown, the local grain depot, who instructs his staff to measure the approved amount and turn it over to the PIC.

PIC members are authorized to verify the wheat's weight if they feel it is necessary. After taking receipt of the wheat they arrange for its transportation to the project site. Fifty percent of the carrying costs are covered by the sale of empty gunny sacks used to move the wheat to the depot with the balance provided by BDG, as discussed above.

During implementation, official guidelines issued by the DRR (drafted with assistance from CARE and WFP) are to be followed by PIC and Upazila staff. These guidelines address such issues as correct

payment of wages, managing carrying costs, and posting of signboards. Each scheme, for instance, must have at least one signboard posted for the duration of the work. The signboard's purpose is to identify the scheme, the funding donor, the PIC responsible for scheme execution, the amount of wheat allocated, the scheme's physical size (i.e. total length in the case of roads), and the proper wage rates for payment to laborers. The last condition is perhaps the most important as it is intended to protect the laborers against underpayment.

Work on schemes generally starts around the beginning of the calendar year and is completed by the end of April. A nationwide deadline of May 10 (for 1986-87) is imposed on DOs, which means that no wheat can be released from storage depots after that date.

Scheme Monitoring and Reporting

The PIO is responsible for making site visits each time a DO is requested. During these site visits, wage payments are checked by measuring pits and interviewing laborers. This information is checked against the PIC's last report in the measurement book.

CARE staff make surprise visits directly to project sites to interview laborers about their last payment and verify that work is being completed as designed. The visits are decided by selecting a random sample with the result that some schemes are not visited at all during implementation while others might be visited twice. Reports citing problems/recommendations are made based on these visits and forwarded to the concerned parties (i.e UZP, DC, RR Ministry, USAID, CARE Hdqtrs.).

The PIO is responsible for making monthly reports which show the percentage of the project completed. This report is forwarded to the District Relief and Rehabilitation Officer (DRRO) who in turn sends it on to DRR/Dhaka. The DRRO is responsible for making occasional site visits to verify report accuracy.

Scheme Completion

As soon as possible after the completion of a scheme, the PIO (often with assistance from the engineering staff) undertakes a post-work survey or measurement of the scheme. The findings are recorded in the scheme's files and attested to by the UZP chairman. If necessary, a final DO is prepared by May 10 for final payment by May 15. A final scheme report is submitted by each PIC to the UZP chairman by May 31.

A final report called the project closure report is prepared by the PIO based on information in PIC and Upazila records (i.e. measurements, payments, DO issuances, wheat withdrawals, monitoring visits) and the PIO's post-survey. Copies are then forwarded to the concerned parties (i.e. UZP, DC, DRR, CARE). With the copy to CARE, the UZP attaches a summary record of pit measurements and workers' payments.

CARE undertakes its own independent post-surveys in collaboration with the PIO and a union parishad member on a randomly selected sample of 20 percent of all its schemes. These findings are forwarded to the concerned parties to evaluate along with the Upazila's post-survey results.

The wheat that is used for schemes during the year is BDG wheat. Donors reimburse the government for the wheat expended according to certain formulae that are based on accountable and proper methods of wheat payment. For instance, in CARE schemes the reimbursed amount is determined by two estimations: a) an estimate of the total amount of work completed based on CARE's 20 percent random post-surveys and b) an estimate of the actual wages paid on completed schemes based on the national average of wages reported by laborers during CARE monitoring visits.

II. Structures

As emphasis during the evaluation was placed on earthworks, the discussion in this chapter has dealt in detail with the earthworks process. The process with respect to structures (i.e. small-scale bridges and culverts) closely resembles that for earthworks insofar as the principles of planning and implementation are concerned. Two broad differences, however, set structure schemes apart from earthwork schemes. First is the use of cash instead of wheat as the method of payment. Cash is used because structures projects are invariably more costly than earthworks schemes and because contractors, who are often used to implement structures projects, will only work for cash. The second difference is the option to use a contractor to implement a scheme. When contractors are used, checks similar to those for PICs are followed, such as site visits and surveys by Upazila staff, to ensure that schemes are properly carried out.

CHAPTER FOUR: INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES IN FOOD FOR WORK

Each year, according to CARE estimates, the 315 Upazilas in Bangladesh involved in CARE Food for Work activities fail to utilize approximately 10 percent of their CARE wheat allocations, fail to complete approximately 20 percent of the approved road work, and fail to pay approximately 10 percent of the fixed wage to the workers for CARE road schemes (see Annexes 4 and 5). These percentages vary greatly among the Upazilas and vary also from one year to the next; however, improvements in these performance indicators from 1976 to 1986 have been disappointingly small. Since USAID reimburses the Bangladesh Government only for wheat used for approved purposes, these performance shortfalls translate to more than 30,000 metric tons of wheat per year not reimbursed by USAID.

In this chapter, we examine problems at the Upazila and union levels in planning, implementing, and monitoring earthwork schemes under the AID/CARE Food for Work Project and recommend changes in FFW policies and procedures that may offer practical solutions to these institutional problems. Specifically, this chapter addresses the following research questions:

A) What institutional obstacles exist in the Upazilas and unions that hinder the process of FFW scheme selection and planning?

B) Why do some Upazilas and unions not take delivery and use all of the FFW wheat for which they are authorized?

C) Why are many road schemes unable to be completed after all of the wheat allocated to the scheme has been spent?

D) Why are some FFW laborers paid more and others paid less than the fixed wage (in seers of wheat per 1000 cft of earth moved)?

E) What characteristics, if any, can be found in Upazilas that perform well that are not found in those that perform poorly?

F) What organizational or procedural changes at the Upazila level might help to eliminate bottlenecks in the FFW program system?

I. Findings

Exhibit 4-1 lists, in order of importance, the major factors contributing to shortfalls in FFW scheme selection and planning, wheat utilization, road completion, and wage payments. These institutional bottlenecks are elaborated further below.

Exhibit 4-1

AID/CARE FFW ROAD SCHEMES
INSTITUTIONAL BOTTLENECKS

A. Scheme Planning and Selection (why roads are hastily planned/designed)

1. Reduced urgency due to road saturation and the Rural Maintenance Program
2. Absence of a strong Upazila Selection Committee and/or a 5-year plan
3. Political roadblocks to scheme approval and pre-occupation with politics
4. Absence of a strong Union Parishad and motivated U.P. Chairman
5. Delays in the printing and distribution of annual FFW guidelines from MRR

B. Wheat Utilization (why wheat allocations are not 100% withdrawn/spent)

1. Late start due to low-lying, flooded area and/or wage negotiations
2. Shortage of laborers in high wage rate Upazilas if no overpayment
3. Shortage of laborers due to crop diversification and use of HYV seeds
4. Early finish (without completion) due to early onset of the rainy season
5. Reduced urgency due to road saturation and the Rural Maintenance Program
6. Work stoppages due to BDG review of schemes involving cash payments
7. Shortage of wheat, land disputes, political elections, other priorities

C. Road Completion (why road schemes are not 100% completed as planned)

1. Inadequate supervision resulting from a) insufficient staff available to the PIO, b) insufficient transportation available to the PIO, c) low PIO incentives, d)remoteness of unions, e) failure of PIC chairmen to involve PIC members in supervision, and f) higher priority assigned to WFP roads or general schemes in Upazilas and unions where most FFW wheat is not AID/CARE wheat
2. Wheat loss resulting from a) low public awareness of FFW scheme allocations and fixed wage rates, b) common preferences for cash payments, and c) absence of proper checks and balances on the FFW activities of the Upazila Chairman, the PIO, and the union chairmen.
3. Insufficient allowances for carrying costs and lead & lift distances
4. Overpayment to laborers due to adverse soil conditions (hardened clay)
5. Overpayment to laborers in high wage rate Upazilas in industrial areas
6. Delays in the issuance of delivery orders (DO's) by Upazila officials
7. Sandy soil erosion after pre-survey and before post-survey measurements

D. Wage Payment (why wage payments are less than 100% of the fixed rate)

1. Wheat loss resulting from a) common preferences for cash payments, b) low Upazila average daily wage rates, c) missing signboards, and d) inadequate supervision and monitoring
2. Irregular wheat distribution to the laborers by the PIC and gang leaders
3. Unstable CARE measurements and inaccurate reporting by the laborers

Scheme Selection and Planning.

Although each Upazila is responsible for selecting and designing the roads to be built under the FFW Program, it is the Union Parishad that must prepare proposals for schemes in its union and lobby for these schemes at the Upazila Parishad meetings. The study found a general absence of advance planning at both the union and Upazila levels despite the competitive nature of the scheme selection process (where fewer than one half of the unions in a typical Upazila receive CARE wheat in a given year). Upazila Selection Committees tend to be loosely formed and sporadically convened, and Upazila Five-Year Plans tend to exist in draft form if at all.

Union Chairmen complain that the FFW scheme selection process has become more political since decentralization of the government in 1984, arguing that schemes lacking sound economic justification are often selected over more suitable proposals for road reconstruction due to political favoritism. Although these practices are not new and were not found in all Upazilas, several of the Union Parishad members interviewed in this study indicated that they were now less inclined to prepare detailed proposals for their schemes because of a general perception that decisions would be made on grounds other than the technical merits of the proposal. With the introduction in 1985 of World Food program (WFP) FFW activities and the Canadian-sponsored Rural (Women's) Maintenance Program in Upazilas with CARE roads, and with the shifting emphasis towards bridges and culverts, there was some indication that many unions have, however, become less dependent on CARE FFW wheat and less willing to seek means of influencing the Upazila Chairman to obtain approval for their proposed earthwork schemes.

The study team found the presence of a strong Union Parishad and motivated UP Chairman to be a key predictor of good FFW performance. Problems within the Union Parishad often consist of personality or political conflicts unrelated to Food for Work; however, pre-occupation with politics at both the union and Upazila levels in 1985 and 1986 appears to have adversely affected many FFW activities, particularly scheme selection and planning. Some Upazila Chairmen admitted to having spent "too much" of their time in the past year outside of their Upazila, campaigning in Dhaka, attending conferences, etc. Finally, the team received numerous reports of (but did not observe) delays within the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation in the printing and distribution of annual FFW guidelines (drafted in English and Bangla by CARE) and in the issuance of allotment orders (AO's) to the Upazilas.

Wheat Utilization.

The study team visited several Upazilas that were experiencing difficulties each year in spending their CARE wheat allocations, including Bandar and Matlab Upazilas in Dhaka and Comilla districts. It also examined wheat utilization in relation to various Upazila characteristics as part of the secondary data analysis. These findings suggest that late starts, due primarily to flood problems in

low-lying areas, account for more of the shortfalls in wheat expenditure than early finishes forced upon the Upazilas by early onset of the monsoon.

Since earthwork cannot begin until earth is made available on at least one side of a proposed CARE road, low-lying unions in flood-prone Upazilas are at a disadvantage each FFW work season. Other Upazilas and unions experience late starts caused by protracted wage negotiations (despite prescribed fixed wages), shortages of laborers in high wage rate areas, land disputes, shortages of wheat, and poorly organized Project Implementation Committees stemming from a reduced urgency surrounding Food for Work. Of these other causes of late starts, only the chronic shortage of laborers in industrial areas and the reduced urgency in unions with road saturation or more alternatives to CARE relief offer plausible explanations for the consistent failure of many Upazilas to spend their entire CARE wheat allocations in 1984, 1985, and 1986.

In addition to early rains, shortfalls in the utilization of grain allotments were found to be caused by work slowdowns created by an unanticipated loss of laborers and work stoppages brought about by the discovery of unauthorized cash payments being made to laborers. There seems to be a compression of the dry season of high unemployment in areas with heavy use of high-yielding variety seeds and diversification of winter crops. Where the FFW season begins to overlap with new harvest periods, the laborers abandon their FFW activity in favor of the more critical agricultural chores. In the case of payments to the workers in cash rather than wheat, the practice is permitted for a small percentage of schemes, but only with approval by the BDG. Work may not continue on the scheme in question until BDG approval is received, at which point there may be little time left to complete the road (and monetize the wheat) before the cutoff date for wheat withdrawals in May.

Road Completion

Inadequate supervision of ongoing road work emerged as the leading factor contributing to problems at the Upazila and union levels in completing planned earthwork with the CARE wheat allocated to each subproject. Most of the Project Implementation Officers (PIO's) interviewed were clearly overworked and understaffed, and many complained about being unable to supervise many ongoing FFW activities without adequate transport. None of the PIO's personally used the bicycles that were provided to their office by USAID; instead, they would use their own motorcycle (if they owned one) or that of the Upazila Engineer when available. If no motorcycle was available to them on a given day, most PIO's seemed to put off their supervisory duties until the next day.

Those PIO's assigned to Upazilas with large land areas cited the remoteness of many unions from the Upazila Office and expressed much frustration over the enormity of the (monitoring) task. When asked how they determined how much work was completed, some PIO's admitted that they simply looked at how much wheat was spent and reported the same percentage of work completed. Comparing the PIO's in high-

performing CARE FFW Upazilas with those in low-performing Upazilas, a clear difference was observed in their level of motivation and job satisfaction. The PIOs associated with high FFW performance typically appear to take their jobs more seriously, try harder to "make do" with the resources available to them, and claim to be happier with their jobs.

At the union level, inadequate supervision of CARE road work also results from failure of the union chairmen to actively involve all of the members of the PIC, and from greater attention being paid to WFP or general schemes in localities where CARE wheat represents a small percentage of the total wheat allocation.

Diversions of wheat by Upazila and union officials continue to create bottlenecks in the Food for Work system and hinder efforts by other groups or individuals to complete FFW roads as planned. Based on the team's sequence of field interviews in twelve Upazilas and secondary data analysis, but not based on any detailed audits, the MSI team estimates that while losses occur at various points in the FFW system, the greatest diversions most commonly occur at the Upazila level. Many of those interviewed suggested that most of the misuse of CARE wheat stems from preferences for payments in cash rather than wheat; the general absence of an effective system of internal checks and balances on the FFW activities of the Upazila chairman, the PIO, and the union chairmen; and low public awareness of total scheme allocations and prescribed wages. In most cases, these wheat losses are accurately reflected in CARE's post-survey estimates of work performed and wages paid for selected schemes; however, in two of the Upazilas visited, the team found high levels of loss of CARE wheat and FFW performance problems not reflected in CARE's high ratings for both Upazilas on 1985-86 earthwork performance. Union chairmen in these two Upazilas explained that while close attention is paid to their FFW structures and rural maintenance(RMP) activities, less vigilance is given to FFW earthwork schemes in their unions. They described an array of pre-survey and other techniques to show high performance"on paper".

The team received frequent complaints of insufficient allowances by CARE and the BDG for carrying costs (transporting the wheat from the storage depots to the laborers) and for "lead and lift" problems (long distances from the earth pits to the work site in flooded areas). Local officials in high-performing as well as low-performing FFW Upazilas explained that allowances for carrying costs do not take into consideration multiple modes of transport nor regional variation in transport costs.

Laborers in some Upazilas are required to pick up their weekly wheat payments at remote storage sites, thereby assuming their own carrying costs and preserving high completion rates for the Upazila. In other Upazilas, local officials and PIC members attributed their failure to complete roads to overpayments to the laborers required because of high average daily wage rates or because of hardened clay soil which is difficult to move. There is some evidence, however, that overpayment to laborers may not be a major obstacle to FFW road completion. Two of the Upazilas visited, Rupganj and Brahmanbaria,

were able to complete over 90 percent of their CARE roads despite having to exceed the FFW wage rate to compete with the high prevailing wage rate.

Other explanations for road completion problems that appear to have some validity include delays in the issuance of delivery orders (DO's) by Upazila officials and erosion of sandy soil a) after the pre-survey but before work begins, and b) after work is completed but before the post-survey. Although only the signatures of the Upazila Chairman and Finance Officer are required on the DO's, these documents tend to get held up at the Upazila headquarters and issued late. Some Upazila Food Officers complain of having to back-date their logs when Upazila and union chairmen rush to withdraw FFW wheat before the BDG cut-off date in mid-May.

The MSI team visited several recently completed CARE roads in unions with sandy soil problems and found that, although severe erosion had occurred, it did not appear to prevent reasonably accurate measurement of the amount of earthwork performed (as illustrated by the photographs in Exhibit 4-2, showing three views of a CARE road completed in May 1986 in Nawabganj Upazila). Although major sections of these roads were missing, mostly due to water erosion, their overall dimensions were clear. However, secondary data do show a consistent tendency for areas with sandy soil to have low CARE road completion rates, leading the team to believe that the explanation has some validity. Where road surfaces are reduced in height by erosion and compaction, the original dimensions of the reconstructed road would not be apparent.

Wage Payment

Losses or diversions of wheat appear to be the principal cause leading to underpayment of wages for FFW road reconstruction. This problem is exacerbated by a preference among workers for daily payments in cash rather than weekly payments in wheat, a willingness to accept lower wages in high distress areas, missing signboards on many CARE roads, and inadequate supervision and monitoring. Several Upazila officials with long histories of FFW involvement indicated to MSI interviewers that it used to be common place to complete 100 percent of the work using only 75% of the allotted wheat because of a willingness among laborers to accept lower wages. (See also the 1981 study entitled "Food for Work: An Evaluation" by the Institute of Nutrition and Food Science, Dhaka University). In recent years, however, the strong preference for cash over wheat has diminished, and average daily wage rates have risen dramatically in many districts, making it very difficult to misappropriate wheat and still complete 100 percent of the work.

Distribution of the wheat at irregular intervals to the laborers by the PIC and gang leaders, and variability at the Upazila level in CARE's estimates of wages paid are two other explanations for wage payment problems in Food for Work. Although union officials often spoke of advance payments being made to the workers, those laborers whom we interviewed did not attest to any advance payments, and some

Exhibit 4-2

SANDY SOIL EROSION
NAWBGANJ UPAZILA

Close-up
View



Medium
View



Distant
View



claimed to have never received their final payment. In any event, CARE's estimates of wages paid appeared to be less reliable at the Upazila level than their estimates of work performed.

In some cases, CARE's estimates are based on only one visit to one road in the Upazila. It is important to note, however, that the variability of these estimates at the Upazila level does not threaten their representativeness at the national level, unless there is a consistent tendency to under-report or over-report wage payments. The team's findings suggest errors in both directions with no consistent reporting bias.

Characteristics of High and Low Performance

Results from the secondary data analysis were used to help identify characteristics of high-performing and low-performing Upazilas (see Annex 6 for listing of Upazilas used in the secondary data analysis). Three indicators of Upazila performance, drawing upon CARE and BDG data sources, were used in the analysis, as shown in Exhibit 4-3. For a sample of 58 post-surveyed Upazilas (after dropping two Upazilas from the sample because of missing data), the percentage of CARE wheat spent in the 1985-86 work season averaged 89 percent while the percentage of work completed averaged 71 percent using CARE's estimates, and 87 percent using the Upazila's estimates. The percentage of wheat used in road-building, defined below, averaged 73 percent among the Upazilas surveyed according to CARE, versus 98 percent according to the BDG.

Exhibit 4-3

UPAZILA PERFORMANCE ON FFW/CARE ROADWAY EARTHWORKS FOR A SAMPLE OF 58 UPAZILAS

Upazila FFW Performance Indicators	Data Sources	
	CARE	BDG
% CARE Wheat Spent 1985-86	89%[1]	NA
% Work	71%[2]	87%
% Spent Wheat Used in Road Work	73%[3]	98%

Notes:

1. Percentage of CARE Wheat Spent 1985-86 derived from column 7 of the CARE Country Report.

2. Percentage of Work Completed is determined by multiplying Columns 8 and 9 of the CARE Country Report; or the percentage of road work completed as reported by the Upazila Chairman, times the CARE estimate, expressed as a percentage, of the accuracy of the given Upazila's completed work reports. These CARE accuracy estimates are based upon the 20% sample post-survey measurements conducted by CARE in collaboration with the PIO and a Union Parishad member.

3. Percentage Wheat Used in Road Work is determined by multiplying Columns 8 x 9 x 10, divided by Column 7 of the CARE Country Report. This represents the percent of Work Completed (Columns 8 x 9), times the percentage of the fixed wage paid to laborers, divided by the percentage of wheat spent (Column 7) to construct a ratio to show the percent of wheat used in road-building (and conversely, the percentage of wheat lost either due to overpayment of laborers or misappropriation).

Across CARE sub-offices, the percentage of wheat spent was lowest in Dhaka (76 percent) and highest in Mymensingh (96 percent). The percentage of spent wheat used in road-building, on the other hand, was highest in Khulna (86 percent) and Dhaka (81 percent) and lowest in Rangpur (58 percent) and Rajshahi (68 percent), using CARE's post-survey estimates.

Exhibit 4-4

UPAZILA PERFORMANCE ON FFW/CARE ROADWAY EARTHWORKS
BY CARE SUBOFFICE

Suboffice	No. of Upazilas	Mean % of Allotted Wheat Spent	Mean % of Spent Wheat Used in Road Work
Rangpur	11	90.64	57.67
Rajshahi	12	87.25	68.14
Comilla	7	89.86	73.61
Mymensingh	11	95.73	74.18
Dhaka	6	76.33	80.57
Khulna	11	89.73	86.13

Data on numerous Upazila characteristics, listed in Annex 7, Table 1, were correlated with the three measures of Upazila performance, as shown in Exhibit 4-5 on the following page. Overall, the most controversial conclusion reached from the secondary data analyses was that CARE estimates of the percentage of work completed and the percentage of wheat used in road work appear to be more valid measures of Upazila FFW performance than the Upazilas' own estimates; and that CARE estimates, not those of the Upazilas', should therefore probably be used for the purpose of reimbursements to the BDG. Several findings led to this conclusion. First, the cross-tabulations lent support to many of the team's observations and research hypotheses when the Upazila characteristics are related to CARE's estimates of earthwork performance. Yet, none of the expected patterns appear when the Upazila characteristics are related to the Upazila's estimates of their performance. Second, the Upazila's estimates of road work completed are nearly identical to the percentage of wheat spent as indicated by the r=.99 correlation and the similarities of the first and fourth columns of the correlation matrix presented in Exhibit 4-5 on the following page. This appeared to substantiate the testimony noted earlier, that some PIOs admitted that reports of road completions were often based on how much wheat was spent. Consequently, the team is inclined to place more confidence in CARE's estimates of Upazila performance and the remaining discussion of findings is therefore based on CARE data for the three performance measures.

By far the most important and statistically significant pattern to emerge from the secondary data concerning institutional capacity at the Upazila level is the strong positive association between performance on CARE structures and performance on CARE road schemes. An Upazila's timely completion of CARE bridges and culverts in 1985 and 1986 correlates positively with the percentage of CARE road work

EXHIBIT 4-5

SIMPLE (PAIR) CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDEPENDENT (DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS) AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES (INDICATORS OF UPZ PERFORMANCE) FOR SAMPLE OF 58 UPAZILAS

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	DEPENDENT VARIABLES				
	CARE ESTIMATES			UPAZILA ESTIMATES	
	CARE WHEAT SPENT	WORK COMPLETED	SPENT WHEAT USED IN ROAD WORK	WORK COMPLETED	SPENT WHEAT USED IN ROAD WORK
Number of Unions	.1074	-.0568	-.1118	.0967	-.0396
Land Area (Sq.Mi.)	.2438	.0862	-.1341	.2326	.0102
Population (1981 pop. in thousands	.1279	-.0503	-.1415	.1136	-.0335
Total Wheat Allotment 1986-87 (MT)	.1262	-.0533	-.2165	.1067	-.0632
CARE Wheat Allotment 1985-86 (MT)	.1395	-.0145	-.1423	.1210	-.0621
Number of CARE Roads	.2011	-.0232	-.1353	.1930	.0145
Number of WFP Roads	.1760	-.0209	-.1797	.1757	.0864
Percentage of Fixed Wage Paid	-.0647	.0624	.4422**	-.0799	-.1125
Number of 1985 CARE Structures	.1334	.2642	.2352	.1021	-.1339
Upazila Level of Distress	.0474	-.0970	-.1893	.0568	.0853
Average Daily Wage Rate 1986	-.0617	.0485	.1880	-.0724	-.0618
PIO Technical or Non-Technical	-.1449	-.0338	.1182	-.1608	-.1401
Ratio of CARE Wheat to Total Wheat	.0264	-.0150	.1379	.0257	-.0210
Performance on Structures[1]	.1403	.4400**	.5012**	.1348	-.0002

Minimum pairwise N of cases: 37 1-tailed Significance: * - .01 ** - .001

Notes:

1. See Annex 7, Table 4, Notes 1-4 for method of computing "Performance on Structures" variable.

completed (r=.44, p<.001) as well as with the percentage of CARE wheat used properly (r=.50, p<.001) in the same Upazila. This encouraging pattern suggests that an Upazila which performs well on one infrastructure activity is likely to perform well on another, and that staff involvement in earthworks or structures does not hamper performance in the other area of activity. In our sample of 58 Upazilas, those that completed all of their CARE structures on time in both 1985 and 1986 spent an average of 96 percent of their 1985-86 wheat allocation, of which 98 percent was used properly, resulting in 94 percent road completion (see Annex 7, Table 4). By contrast, those Upazilas that were unable to complete all of the CARE structures in 1985 and again in 1986 spent an average of 88 percent of their 1985-86 CARE wheat allocation, of which only 67 percent was used properly, resulting in 68 percent of road completion.

Other associations shown in Exhibit 4-5 include a tendency for Upazilas with large land areas to spend a higher percentage of their wheat allotment than smaller Upazilas (r=.24). While this finding may appear to indicate that Upazilas with large land areas tend to be high performers, the secondary data analysis further found a tendency for wheat losses (presumably due to misappropriation or post-survey measurement error) to be highest in Upazilas with large total wheat allocations (r=.22), high percentages of wheat spent (r=.21), high chronic distress levels (r=.19), and low average daily wage rates. A forward stepwise regression of road completion and wheat losses on Upazila characteristics yielded three statistically significant predictors of Upazila performance on CARE FFW road schemes: (1) CARE structures performance (positive relation) , (2) chronic distress level (inverse relation), and (3) total land area (inverse relation).

Exhibit 4-6 merges field observations with findings from the secondary data analysis into a single set of characteristics of high-performing and low-performing Upazilas on CARE FFW road schemes. The MSI team found the typical high-performing Upazila to have a team-oriented management approach, a well-educated Upazila Chairman, a high sense of self-reliance, a dedicated PIO with fairly high job satisfaction, wheat losses of under 20 percent, timely completion of all CARE structures, a high ratio of CARE wheat allocation to total wheat allocation, a small land area with fewer than ten unions, and a low chronic distress level. The typical low-performing Upazila, on the other hand, had wheat loses of over 40 percent, problems completing at least one CARE structure each year, a low ratio of CARE wheat to total wheat allocation, a large land area with at least ten unions, and a high chronic distress level (indicating a low-lying, floodprone area).

Exhibit 4-6

CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGH AND LOW FFW PERFORMANCE*

Typical High Performance Upazila	Typical Low Performance Upazila
Team-Oriented management approach	Less-educated Upazila Chairman
Well-educated Upazila Chairman	Wheat losses over 40%
High sense of self-reliance	Low CARE structures performance
High job satisfaction of the PIO	Low ratio of CARE wheat to total
Wheat losses under 20%	Large land area with many unions
High CARE structures performance	High chronic distress level (WFP)
High ratio of CARE wheat to total	
Small land area with few unions	
Low chronic distress level (WFP)	

*High FFW performance defined as 90 percent or higher work completion and wage payment rates; low FFW performance defined as work completion and wage payment rates below 70 percent.

II. Conclusions

As indicated by the national performance figures shown in Annexes 4 and 5, and noted at the outset of this chapter, most Upazilas are not low performing on CARE FFW projects. Moreover, many of the institutional obstacles discussed above are, in the view of the study team, a result of the complex, multi-layered and management-intensive nature of the FFW program itself. Food for Work can be characterized as a resource-driven program wherein proposed road schemes are submitted in order to obtain wheat, not necessarily to create vital transportation links between villages and/or centers of economic activity. After ten years of FFW road reconstruction, and with increasing support for appurtenant structures and routine road maintenance, there appears to be a reduced urgency in many unions for new CARE roads. Furthermore, with the entry of WFP into CARE FFW Upazilas and a shortened period of high unemployment caused by improvements in winter crop production, there may be a reduced urgency in many unions for CARE wheat as well.

The above qualifiers notwithstanding, this assessment found several areas for possible improvement. The study found little, if any, UNO involvement in Food for Work, and excessive burdens on the PIOs who have insufficient resources to perform their tasks without the assistance of the staff of the Upazila Engineers. Excessive burdens on the PIOs are especially acute in Upazilas with large land areas and many unions. Lacking a system of checks and balances at the Upazila Office, performance of Food for Work becomes largely dependent on the skills and motivations of the Upazila Chairman and the PIO. In the Upazilas where the Chairman is a well-educated individual sincerely interested in the well-being of his constituency, and where the PIO is a well-trained and highly motivated individual, our limited sample suggests that FFW performance appears to be consistently high.

In other Upazilas where supervision at the Upazila and union levels appears to be inadequate, FFW performance is consistently low.

The evidence presented above suggests that CARE's estimates of the percentage of work completed and the percentage of wheat used on road work are more valid measures of Upazila performance than the Upazila's own estimates. CARE estimates of the percentage of the fixed wage paid appear to be less representative of wages paid at the Upazila level than wages paid at the national level. The primary cause of unreliability at the Upazila level of CARE estimates of wages paid appears to be that monitoring checks are made at very few project sites within a given Upazila. In addition, various techniques sometimes used to deceive pit measurement, and low public awareness of the prescribed fixed wages contribute to inaccuracy in the CARE estimates.

The high positive association between an Upazila's timely completion of CARE structures and its earthworks performance suggests that there is no tradeoff due to borrowing of staff. Consequently, management practices are likely to be the most critical factor in improving FFW performance.

The secondary data analyzed also showed a consistent tendency for areas with sandy soil to have low CARE road completion rates. This led the study team to conclude that sandy soil can cause a post-survey measurement problem, such as in the Rajshahi District. Another inference drawn from the secondary data was that CARE estimates of Upazila performance were too high under some suboffices.

III. Recommendations

Based on the findings and conclusions presented in this chapter, we recommend the following organizational and procedural changes at the Upazila level to help eliminate bottlenecks in the Food for Work program system:

1) Increase internal accountability and supervision at the Upazila Office by a) strengthening the role of the UNO in Food for Work; b) providing a technical assistant to the PIO ; c) providing a motorcycle to the PIO; and d) experimenting with incentives for the Upazila Chairmen to improve FFW performance.

   Several options exiwst for increasing internal accountability at the Upazila Office. Requiring the signature of the UNO on FFW wheat Delivery Orders and providing a technical assistant to the PIO are two actions that could be readily taken in this direction. More complicated, but potentially more effective actions include forming a committee to review and coordinate the engineering needs of the Upazila each month (for example, the UNO, the PIO, and the Upazila Engineer), or reorganizing the Upazila administrative structure to merge the offices of the PIO and the Upazila Engineer. New incentives to improve the Upazila

Chairmen's external accountabilityfor FFW that could be tested include delegating additional authority to high-performing Upazilas and reducing wheat allocation to low-performing Upazilas.

2) Increase public awareness of, and encourage public participation in, Food for Work activity at the union level through quarterly announcements of union FFW allocations.

Annex 8 shows an English translation of a public announcement of all local development activities sent to each union in Rupganj Upazila on a quarterly basis. This announcement is first read in the mosques and then posted at meeting places throughout the union. There is some evidence to suggest that most union chairmen will fully support the activity after itial resistance, and that the impact of these announcements would be significant.

3) Conduct a more through study of CARE performance measures to test for regional positive or negative bias; and expand the secondary data analysis to include more post-surveyed Upazilas and more variables such as winter crop production.

Testing the accuracy of FFW performance measures was not a primary task of the MSI study team, and statements about potential biases in these measures clearly require further exploration. This might be accomplished by expanding the secondary data analysis to include all post-surveyed Upazilas and adding variables that the current study was unable to include due to time constraints. Winter crop yields per hectare and the percentage of soil in the Upazila that is sandy soil are two such variables.

4) Consider alternative uses of USAID/CARE wheat to expand a) construction of bridges and culverts; b) the Rural Maintenance Program; and c) water resources development projects.

If the results of USAID's Road Saturation Study should find road saturation in certain areas of Bangladesh, USAID may wish to consider alternative uses of USG food aid wheat. It is recommended that increased emphasis be placed on appurtenant structures and USAID participation in the Rural (Women's) Maintenance Program as these activities are highly successful and not yet close to their saturation points in any locality. Interview respondents frequently stated preferences for re-excavating canals and tanks with FFW wheat as in past years; but CARE would need more hydrological expertise to oversee these and other water resources development projects.

CHAPTER FIVE: INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE FFW PROGRAM

I. Background

Research Issues

The FFW program represents by far the largest single resource available for programming and use at the Upazila level in Bangladesh. The program is national in scope and has a long history of operation on a massive scale. At least as importantly, the program has included a substantial and sustained effort to develop and implement a systematic approach to project planning, project management, resource allocation and expenditure control. This effort to develop and employ consistent and responsible management systems has been particularly pronounced in the portion of the program funded by USAID and implemented with the assistance of CARE, and considerable administrative resources have been devoted to this task.

The current efficiency and performance of the CARE/FFW program were explored in some depth in the previous chapter. This chapter assesses the extent to which the considerable efforts that have been devoted by CARE to improving program and project management have resulted in improved capacity to implement the FFW and other public sector programs at the local level. The present policy of the Bangladesh Government to decentralize additional authority and responsibility to the Upazila level make this issue of institutional impact timely as well as important.

In addressing the issue of institutional impact, this chapter examines four critical questions:

* What are the program's institutional development objectives?
* What is the program's strategy for reaching those objectives?
* How effective has the program been in reaching its objectives?
* How can the program's institutional impact be enhanced?

The chapter opens with a discussion of the effect on institutional development of conflicting program goals and the lack of a clearly defined strategy for strengthening local government capacity. Major accomplishments of the CARE/FFW program are then assessed in terms of five critical dimensions of institutional change. Factors limiting the scope of institutional development are next considered. The chapter concludes with several recommendations for enhancing the institutional development impact of the program.

Framework for Assessment of Institutional Development Impact

A modified version of one widely used model for assessing institutional change efforts, the McKinsey and Company Seven "S" model, is depicted below in terms of five major elements: strategy, systems, skills, structure and incentives. This model suggests that institutional development efforts most plausibly begin with a clear articulation of an institutional development strategy that aligns institutional structures, skills of key individuals, operating systems and incentives with one another and with overall institution building and other programmatic goals. As suggested by the model's interactive nature, institutional development can begin with any element of the model in an effort to influence the other key elements; equally importantly, the model suggests that failure to attend to any one of the key dimensions of institutional change can effectively undercut efforts to build institutional capacity. CARE's approach to institutional strengthening of Upazila management capacity can be analyzed in terms of the manner and extent that it addresses these five critical dimensions of institutional change.



A second model useful for setting institutional development goals and evaluating institutional impact is presented in the Harvard Institute for International Development ARIES Strategic Overview paper. This model distinguishes four categories of institutional capacity: strategic, technical, administrative, and communications. Strategic capacity refers to the ability of management to establish goals, set priorities, become more efficient, manage change, and become more sustainable and independent. Technical capacity refers to the ability of institutions to establish financial information systems and plan for short, medium, and long term activities; it also encompasses competence in specialized fields, such as the ability of engineering agencies to carry out construction projects. Administrative capacity is the ability to manage human resources and develop systems for effective internal communication and coordination. Communications capacity refers to the ability of an institution to receive and impart information effectively and learn from its own experiences and those of others, including its clients. This model will also be used in assessing the institutional impact of the CARE/FFW program.

II. Findings

CARE's Implicit Institutional Development Strategy

The institutional development objectives of the CARE/FFW program in Bangladesh are neither clearly defined nor firmly established, a fact which can best be attributed to the evolution and proliferation of the program's goals over time. When CARE's involvement began in the mid-1970s, the principal goal of the program was to provide employment and income for the rural poor and landless population. This goal has remained, but subsequently an additional objective was established and given priority, namely the strengthening and extension of the country's rural infrastructure. Then, in the early 1980s, a third program goal of promoting institutional development was introduced.

In the context of the FFW program, it appears that what was meant by this third goal was that the institutions involved with carrying out FFW schemes (especially the Upazila and Union Parishads) would develop through their association with the program a greater capability in planning and implementing this program and other comparable activities. Although never clearly stated as such, an implicit goal seems to have been that these local organizations and individuals would be able to take on increased responsibility for the program such that one day they would be able to manage, without outside assistance, most if not all aspects of the program in an effective and efficient manner. This goal received greater impetus with the government's decentralization policy in 1982 which gave to Upazilas Parishads (UZPs) greater authority and a broader mandate to carry out development.

Complicating the issue of institutional development was the need to minimize misuse and abuse of program resources exposed by an audit in 1981. Little if any attention has been given to the consistency among the program's three goals or to the implications of the increased concern for accountability following the 1981 audit. If these goals lack consistency, it can be expected that progress toward their achievement will be uneven and that the better defined and more "incentivized" goals will advance farther, and perhaps at the expense of, other program goals. This appears to have happened in Bangladesh with the two earlier goals making greater progress than the third (less defined) goal of institutional development.

Consistent with the lack of clearly articulated institutional development objectives is the absence of a defined strategy for carrying out institutional development through the CARE/FFW program. Nonetheless, several sets of activities have been undertaken under the program which, taken together, constitute the elements of the program's implicit institutional development strategy.

The key activities or elements in CARE's implicit institutional development strategy include the development of uniform systems and guidelines for project planning and implementation and the dissemina-

tion of these systems through formal training and on-the-job skill development of key officials involved in the program.

Conspicuously absent from this strategy are any systematic efforts to assess or affect organizational structures or incentives. Moreover, those systems development and training activities which have taken place have often been motivated more by concern for consistency and external accountability than by a definite strategy for building capacity at the local level.

While the factors noted above have significantly limited the scope of institutional development under the program, there have nevertheless been several major accomplishments in recent years. The remaining pages of this chapter attempt to describe the program's most significant institutional development effects, along with the factors which have limited the scope of these efforts.

Institutional Development Effects of FFW

Design and Installation of Systems

CARE has been at the forefront in developing systems for planning and implementing public works at the local level in Bangladesh. These systems, which include mechanisms for administering donor resources as well as national government resources, have involved the design and implementation of procedures for:

- planning and approval of infrastructure projects;
- project design and proforma preparation;
- project implementation;
- project monitoring and reporting; and
- final reviewing and accounting.

For each of these areas, particularly project planning and implementation, CARE/Bangladesh has developed procedures, standard formats, training materials, data requirements and other key inputs. Manuals have been developed and standard operating procedures gradually institutionalized over time. In a number of cases the systems developed with CARE assistance have been adopted for use in those FFW schemes operated by WFP and/or BGD -- a further testimony to their utility and value.

CARE has made a particular contribution at the planning stage through its assistance in the drafting of the government circulars on implementation of FFW schemes. Though these circulars deal specifically with implementation procedures they also constitute a planning tool as they set out schedules to follow as well as other information useful for planning purposes.

For training purposes CARE has developed several booklets, two of which cover planning: Food for Work in Upazila Development Planning and Program Basics of Food for Work. The latter represents practical points relating to such topics as scheme research and proforma preparation which stress the importance of accurate design. It is clear from field interviews that, given their practical nature, these

points are readily absorbed during training. The former booklet treats planning on a more general, abstract level and its message has less impact during training judging from field interviews. It contains a useful summary of an appropriate planning strategy, however, outlining the steps to be followed in the process. It also presents the importance of such planning tools as maps and Plan Books.

Though CARE's efforts at institutional development have been less focused and deliberate at the implementation stage than at the planning stage, there is nevertheless substantial evidence of positive impact of CARE's systems and procedures at this stage as well. An evident understanding and familiarity among those interviewed with the instructions circulars issued through the MRR for project implementation represents a clear case of institutional impact. These systems are widely used by local officials with minimal outside supervision, and appear to be generally accepted as being both appropriate and professional.

CARE's monitoring system, on the other hand, is viewed by many of those interviewed by the team as a major obstacle to achieving institutional impact. The present system, developed after an audit revealed wide-scale abuses in the FFW program, amounts to a rigorous set of procedures intended to set high standards that minimize misuse and misappropriation of FFW resources. Because of this purpose there is no effort at present to transfer this system or the overall monitoring function to Upazila officials. Thus, while it could be argued that a rigorous monitoring system (like sytematic procedures for project planning and implementation) could contribute substantially to local management capacity, the current use of the system to enforce external accountability has had the effect of diminishing the extent to which local officials feel accountable to their constituency for the efficient and proper use of FFW resources.

CARE information systems, however, could have significant ancillary benefits as means of assessing institutional performance for individual Upazilas or for the country as a whole. A major activity during implementation and a part of the monitoring system is the series of records kept and reports written at various stages and levels. Examples at the PIC level, for instance, include the Commodity Request Form (CRF), Muster Rolls and the Measurement and Payment Ledger. At the Upazila level examples include the CRF, site visitation reports, the project closure report and monthly status reports. Other reports are prepared at the district and central levels. In addition, there is a parallel series of reports prepared by CARE which provide information that can be checked with information in government reports at various levels.

While the chief purpose of these reports is to ensure accountability in the program's use of resources, they also contain much information that could be used to gauge institutional development and performance in the program over the years. In CARE's Supplemental Plan prepared earlier this year, several indicators were identified to show institutional development. Two indicators appear as Columns 6 and 11 in CARE's Chart of FFW Accomplishments (See Annex 5), the percentage of schemes implemented as approved and the percen-

tage of program resources spent on approved activities. Over the past four years the general trend reflects increasing percentages which can be interpreted to mean that some institutional impact is taking place, at least as shown by figures that have been aggregated at the national level.

These national level figures are based on figures kept for each scheme and Upazila. At the end of each work season CARE prepares a Final Report based on a number of sources of information, mostly reports prepared during the course of project design and implementation. These Final Reports are sent to each Upazila Chairman where CARE has a project. Although these reports contain much information of potential management value at the Upazila level, not all of this information is organized and presented in ways that are useful to or understood by the Upazila staff. For example, certain of the PIOs interviewed were unable to follow the sequence of figures and did not understand what each column meant. One PIO, for example, noticed a note about the signboard at the bottom of the report. In his confusion, he concluded incorrectly that the monitoring team had found something amiss with the signboard and that as a result his Upazila would be penalized in next year's allocation.

Training

As part of the FFW program CARE has provided formal or on the job training (OJT) to many of the local officials involved in administering the program. Most of this training has emphasized dissemination and institutionalization of the systems described above.

The Project Implementation Officer (PIO) plays a critical role in the implementation of the FFW Program and has been a focal point for much of CARE's effort to improve local efficiency and capacity. The PIO is posted at the Upazila and it is through his office that FFW resources are channeled. His position was actually established by the BDG at the encouragement of donor agencies early in the FFW program as no such office existed for the implementation of FFW schemes. Thus, the creation of the position of PIO itself represents a clear example of institutional impact taking place at an early stage in the program.

Over the past two years, CARE has provided formal training for the PIOs in earthworks and structures. The emphasis in the first year was on earthworks, in the second on structures. Both of these sessions proved popular among the participants; a common comment made by participants after the sessions was that the sessions should have been longer.

During the second session, held for six days at a time over the period from August to October 1986, 89 percent of the PIOs who were expected actually attended (413 of 463). Among the subjects covered in training were planning, design and survey techniques of earthworks; earthwork proforma preparation; survey techniques, construction practices, and procedures for structures; and procedures for estimating and ensuring stability of structures. The participants were tested before and after training. Out of a possible score of 30, the average score before training was 17.54 or 53 percent. After

training it increased to 27.51 (92 percent), suggesting a solid gain in learning among the PIOs. Of further note is the test performance of the non-technical PIOs (i.e., ones without a technical diploma). Their scores improved even more than the technial PIOs.

An additional contribution of CARE to the development of the PIOs is provided by the informal on-the-job training (OJT) imparted by CARE technical staff during their pre-surveys of schemes. According to several of the PIOs interviewed, a positive effect of this training has been more frequent field visits to check on how schemes are progressing. Another is the use by the PIO of the CARE-drafted instructions on implementation of FFW schemes. According to field interviews with PIOs, these instructions have greatly helped them with their job responsibilities by providing practical steps for proper and efficient execution of schemes.

When asked to evaluate the training they had received, the PIOs interviewed in the field felt that formalized training had been a useful supplement to OJT and the government's implementation instructions (guidelines). It was also the observation of the study team and of many knowledgeable observers that the level of professional competence among PIOs had increased measurably in recent years. Thus, the finding here is that the PIOs have experienced a considerable amount of knowledge and skill transfer through the OJT and formalized training provided through CARE.

In addition to the PIO, there are a number of officials at both the Upazila and union levels who play important roles in FFW. As in the case of the PIO, these officials have been exposed to CARE-sponsored training, though the amount of exposure has varied depending on the particular role played by the officer in question.

At the Upazila level, officers other than the PIO involved with FFW include the Upazila Chairman, the UNO, the UE and his staff. For these officers and staff the two most important capacity building techniques have been formal training and familiarization with instruction circulars. OJT has been less important for these officers with the exception of the UE's staff.

At the union level, exposure to improved methods of project planning and management has been greatest in the case of the Union Parishad Chairmen and somewhat less in the case of the Project Implementation Committee (PIC) Secretaries and the ward members. The Chairmen receive both formal training and OJT while ward members and the PIC Secretary are usually familiar with the guidelines and receive some OJT through visits of the PIO and CARE staff.

Formalized training of persons involved in FFW has been intensified by CARE over the past two years. The most recent training sessions were held between mid-November 1985 and the first week of January 1986. Participants included the Upazila, officials mentioned above and Union Parishad Chairmen.

The training sessions were held at CARE's sub-offices and were led by CARE staff including administrators, program staff and engi-

neers. The sessions focused on FFW procedures including the roles of Union Parishads and PICs, supervision and monitoring of FFW schemes, and construction procedures.

Participants came from 315 Upazilas and over 3,000 unions. Of a total of 5300 expected participants, 4700 or 90 percent actually participated. This high participation rate reflects not only the importance of FFW for Upazila programming but the considerable interest the participants have in FFW. During field interviews for this assessment, a number of Upazila and union officials were interviewed who had undergone this training and invariably they commented they had found the sessions helpful in better understanding their respective roles. Though these sessions are more properly described as orientation than as training and were limited to one day each, they appear to have contributed to the uniformity of procedures for earthworks in accordance with CARE standards and in this way have contributed to institutional capacity and performance.

Before turning to a discussion of the factors limiting the impact of CARE's institutional development impact, a more general observation about institutional impact at the Upazila level can be made. Analysis of secondary data reveals a significant correlation between an Upazila's performance and the proportion of its wheat coming from CARE. While various interpretations of this data are possible, the evidence would seem to suggest either that CARE has managed to select the best managed Upazilas in which to work or has made a genuine contribution to program management at the Upazila level.

Factors Limiting Institutional Impact

As noted above, CARE's institutional strengthening activities have had a considerable effect in enhancing the level of skill of those local officials planning and implementing the CARE schemes. Although this skill enhancement has primarily concerned knowledge and application of CARE procedures, its effect on improving consistency and professional standards has been real and tangible.

The view was widely expressed that the main value of formal training was realized when such training was provided in conjunction with clear published guidelines and effective OJT. It was also asserted and observed that skill transfer has been much more effective regarding project planning than regarding project implementation and monitoring, presumably as a result of the collaborative manner in which planning is done.

Several factors have significantly limited the impact of CARE's institutional development efforts. As noted earlier in this chapter, the lack of a clear institutional development mandate, objectives and strategy have had a limiting effect. The desire to maximize grain distribution, infrastructure development, and proper use of resources have also had retarding effects on the delegation of responsibility and development of capacity at the local level. It is noteworthy, for example, that the CARE monitoring system and "surprise site visits" during implementation are regarded almost entirely as external interventions. Among the criticisms of such visits was that CARE staff,

when finding irregularities with a scheme, are alledged often to note such irregularities in their reports without seeking out local leaders or other individuals to ask for their explanation. Such occurrences contribute to the notion that local individuals are not responsible for the program and, perhaps more importantly, waste the opportunity to impress on local officials the value of, and techniques for, effective monitoring and control of resources.

The intent of the above remarks is not to suggest that it is inappropriate to maintain a significant audit function as part of the FFW program. Rather, the above remarks are intended merely to point out possible trade-offs among the FFW program's several goals, and to suggest that the institutional development objective may have been sacrificed in certain cases to other program needs and objectives. Experience also indicates it is often possible to minimize the losses involved in such trade-offs simply by becoming more conscious of the institutional development consequences of the program's operational and procedural arrangements.

As noted above, CARE's implicit institutional development strategy has stressed systems and skills. Relatively little attention has been devoted to organizational structures and incentives, and these factors have significantly limited the program's institutional impact. Although many of the factors related to organizational structures and incentives are beyond and outside CARE's mandate or influence, it may nevertheless be useful to recount several of the most salient of them.

The role of the PIO is inherently a difficult and awkward one. He is caught in a dual accountability structure between the (elected) UZP Chairman and the (Civil Service) UNO. A relatively low grade official, the PIO is officially attached to the UNO's office. In most of the Upazilas visited, however, the PIO had developed a much closer relationship with the Chairman whom he saw as his real boss. In turn, the Chairman appeared to appreciate the importance of the PIO as it is through the latter's office that a considerable amount of the Upazila's resources are channeled; and it is the Chairman's initiative, in fact, that often accounts for the close relationship.

The UNO as the Upazila's Senior Civil Servant has a critical role to play in ensuring the proper and efficient use of FFW resources. However, the PIO's dual responsibility to both the UNO and the UZP Chairman can make the PIO a point of friction in the relationship betwen these two, a relationship that is already often a difficult one for various reasons.

The PIO's relationship to CARE is similarly ambiguous with CARE serving as both trainer and overseer.

Not only can the PIO create tensions at the top level of the Upazila but among other Upazila staff as well, primarily the technical staff of the Upazila Engineer (UE). Every year a struggle ensues at the beginning of the dry season as Upazila Engineers and PIOs vie for the use of the former's technical staff. In most Upazilas visited the PIO wins out through the Chairman's intervention. By issuing an

office order, the Chairman is able to assign the UE's staff to the PIO for earthworks as well as structures. Though this is supposedly on a part-time basis, it usually amounts to much more time and creates resentment on the part of the UE, particularly as he is superior in grade and rank (and often, education) to the PIO.

In field interviews, the UEs estimated that 15 to 75 percent of the time of their SAEs is spent working on FFW. If the PIO is non-technical (true of about 25 percent PIOs nationwide) he is even more dependent on the UE's technical staff and in such cases the likelihood of tension and friction is even greater. Based on field visits, even technical PIOs tend to be stronger in carrying out administrative responsibilities and, despite training, less capable on technical matters. For instance, they normally lack knowledge in hydrology and surveying skills, both of which apply to earthworks. This finding reinforces the impression that the PIO position, existing on its own and somewhat isolated, is a weak link in the larger institutional system of the UZP.

In addition to the structural problems, the PIO finds himself understaffed and over-extended. He has only one clerk-cum-typist to assist him with a very heavy workload. In addition to FFW, he is also responsible for disaster relief in the Upazila and other programs such as test relief and the Vulnerable Feeding Groups Program. His workload has increased further with WFP recently moving into Upazilas that formerly had only CARE programming.

Several PIOs interviewed remarked about the long hours they keep, particularly during the dry season. One said that in order to cover both his office duties and field visits he came to the office at 8:00 a.m. and usually worked until 7:00 p.m. Others concentrated their field visits on certain days and left the others for office work which regularly included weekends. One said that his office work was so heavy he estimated he spent 90 percent of his working time in the office on paper work. Many of those interviewed said the prevailing workload, role ambiguity and lack of clear incentives for improved performance made them reluctant to take on new management responsibilities or introduce new management systems.

Also contributing to the low job satisfaction of the PIO is the absence of appropriate transportation to enable the PIO to visit sites and supervise scheme implementation. In the few places in the field where the PIO had a motorcycle, job performance seemed generally to be better.

The most visible sign of PIO job dissatisfaction is the month-long pen-down strike (Oct. 15 - Nov. 15). The strike started with "pen-down" two hours a day but this was later increased to four hours a day. The PIOs had ten demands among which increases in pay, rank and status were considered to be the most important. Their actions, in turn, provoked an equally heated retort from the Upazila Engineers' Association (see Annex 9 for list of PIO demands and the response by the Upazila Engineers Association).

Thus, though both positive and negative developments have taken place with respect to the PIO position, on balance only a limited amount of institutional integration has taken place with respect to the PIO's role and responsibilities in the Upazila system.

Among the other major actors involved in applying and transferring new skills, systems and approaches are the Upazila Chairman and the other members of the UZP. Interviews conducted by the study team indicated that the receptivity of these officials to the improved systems and guidelines introduced through the CARE/FFW program differed considerably based on the nature of the respondent's circumstance and incentives.

In general, the Upazila Chairmen in Upazilas where FFW was the chief priority during the dry season were found to be very much in favor of clear program guidelines. These individuals indicated that such guidelines strengthened their hands in ensuring that schemes were implemented in an efficient and timely fashion. Such Chairmen often viewed their own political standing as closely linked to an orderly and successful FFW program. Others in the Upazilas, however, -- those closer to the actual implementation, such as the SEA's, the Food Officers, and PIC Chairmen and, to some extent, the PIOs, -- were more ambivalent in their support. On one hand, they welcomed the circulars for the direction they provided in their work but, on the other hand, found the circulars to increase their workload and substantially reduce their flexibility in operational and contractual matters.

Additional factors limiting the institutional impact of CARE's efforts to promote the use of improved planning approaches concern the nature of recent FFW road building activities, the decision making process, and the planning techniques proposed by CARE. Given the extensive road building which has been undertaken during 10 years of the FFW program and the approaching "saturation" in some parts of the country, the majority of recent schemes have involved road reconstruction rather than new road construction. As a result, many of the systems and considerations involved in comprehensive planning (including, for example, estimation of socio-economic benefits) are less applicable than in the past.

Given the primacy of elected officials under recent decentralization decrees, several of those interviewed commented that decision making concerning the selection of schemes is now widely perceived as being determined more by political than technial considerations. Once again, such perceptions mitigate against the application of systematic planning procedures. The net effect of these considerations is the fact that (at least as perceived by those interviewed) such planning tools as maps and Plan Books are rarely used.

There is also a disparity of views concerning the nature and appropriateness of the planning techniques promoted by CARE. Although CARE's training programs and publications place considerable importance on an integrated and comprehensive approach to planning, it is a widely held view that CARE's field teams tend to adopt a rather narrow technical focus when conducting OJT and participating in actual

project planning activities. In particular, it was suggested that such socio-economic factors as proximity to social services and work places, and the wishes of local people, were infrequently taken into account in such planning. It was also suggested that many aspects of the planning process are typically carried out in a less than fully collaborative manner. As with the issue of monitoring, these emphases by CARE may reflect a legitimate desire to maximize the technical quality of the schemes undertaken. Once again, however, such accomplishments may be having the inadvertent consequence of limiting somewhat the institutionalization of new methods -- especially where these approaches conflict with the mandate, opinions and incentives of local officials.

Ideally, the improved systems and procedures introduced through the CARE/FFW program would be used for the planning and management of other local projects as well. While there is little doubt that the project planning and management systems and procedures introduced by CARE represent a major advance over those otherwise practiced in rural areas of Bangladesh, the extent to which these systems and approaches have been applied to other programs appears to have been relatively limited to date. In part, this lack of "technology transfer" seems to be a consequence of the factors noted above concerning local organizational structure and incentives. In addition, however, this transfer has been impeded by the fact that few resources have so far been available to the Upazila for undertaking other types of public works activities, and relatively little effort appears to have been made to expose a cross-section of local officials to these techniques or to encourage them to apply these techniques to other activities.

III. Conclusions

The FFW goal of institutional development suffers from not having been one of the program's original goals. CARE has had to cope with the challenge of promoting a new goal along with its efforts to achieve earlier objectives, an undertaking made more difficult by inconsistencies that exist among these goals. This may explain the fact that while CARE has given attention to furthering institutional development in its basic programming documents (e.g., its 1986 operational plan) it has yet to evolve a well-developed and clearly-articulated strategy for institutional development.

This absence of clearly defined goals and an articulated strategy for institutional development have limited the program's institutional impact. Moreover, possible trade-offs and conflict among the program's goals have received limited attention with the result that the (less defined) institutional development objective has tended to suffer. What has taken place in I.D. is a result of some conscious effort (training and CARE's contributions to government's instruction on procedures, etc.) and some ad hocism (established procedures that predate the I.D. goal).

Several conclusions emerge from the information on institution impact obtained by the team and presented on the preceding pages. Though the PIO is a key actor in the FFW program through whom a

considerable proportion of Upazila resources flow, his ambiguous position in the Upazila limits the degree to which he can be an agent of institutional growth. He himself has benefitted professionally from CARE training efforts but the spread of those benefits to the institution of the Upazila have been diffused by the place he occupies in the system. Some appropriate adjustments or modifications to his position could make him a more effective officer able to contribute more effectively to institutional development. His position might be continued as it is but strengthened through additional resources. Alternatively some of his responsibilities might be transferred to other offices or, further, the position itself might be moved and attached to another office, such as the UE's.

Other actors (i.e., UZP Chairmen, UNO, UE and his staff) have benefitted from various CARE-sponsored training inputs, though the degree of impact has been limited in certain instances by the particular circumstances involved. This training has been particularly significant where it has resulted in those significant Upazila officers having an enhanced sense of their own capability. Professional growth of this type is consistent with and reinforces government efforts to institutionalize decentralization at the Upazila level. As a large number of Upazila staff appear to have benefitted from these training interventions, it is likely that other actors not yet exposed would profit from the same inputs.

CARE's efforts to further institutional impact at the planning stage have met with limited success. The positive impact of training inputs in planning has been muted by several factors including the limited need for planning in road reconstruction schemes and the low priority accorded to planning at the Upazila level.

CARE's efforts to promote institutional development during the implementation phase of projects have been limited by the use of a monitoring system designed to serve other objectives. This system insures accountability and helps to address donor concerns, but its external, non-transferable character does little in the way of institutional development. The perception at the Upazila/union level is of an alien structure that places heavy demands of compliance on the staff of local institutions. While the system in its present form may further program goals of providing food and employment to the rural poor and building rural infrastructure, in this case the promotion of these goals may be at the expense of the third goal of institutional development.

That institutional impact which has taken place as a result of CARE's involvement in the FFW program appears to have been concentrated in those Upazilas that can be identified as high performance. A related conclusion is that among high performers where greater impact has taken place through training etc., there is also less dependence on CARE's technical assistance and monitoring. In terms of the ARIES model of institutional capacity, CARE's implicit institutional development strategy has sought to enhance local government capability primarily by strengthening technical systems and skills and has given limited attention to strategic, administrative, and communicative capacity-building.

IV. Recommendations

1.

The first, and in many ways perhaps the most important recommendation of this portion of the study is that the key parties involved in FFW (USAID, CARE, MRR, LGEB) meet together to agree on a set of institutional development goals and a strategy for achieving those goals.

This strategy should include tangible indicators of success or progress, a set of milestones, a schedule, identification of actions to be taken and responsibilities for taking these actions, details of any supplementary resources needed to carry out the strategy and a procedure for monitoring and evaluating progress. This will entail a refinement of the program's aims by clarifying current practices which have advanced I.D. and by adding new initiatives to quicken the pace of I.D. Illustrative of the items to be included in such a strategy are the following:

a) A procedure for establishing concurrence on institutional development goals and objectives to enhance each of four categories of institutional capacity: strategic, technical, administrative, and communications, and a mechanism for insuring agreement among parties at all levels of government concerning the performance indicators to be used to measure institutional development in the program. As part of this effort, greater emphasis needs to be placed on making Upazila-level performance indicators more reliable so that Upazila Parishads would be able to monitor their progress more closely and in this way enhance their own institutional capability to manage and improve the FFW program and other programs like it.

b) identification of additional training to be undertaken, especially at the national level, to familiarize officials with local-level functions and responsibilities and thus build greater coherence in the overall system.

c) steps to making the monitoring system more transferable or collaborative. This could be initiated on a pilot experimental basis in certain high performance localities.

d) practical measures to strengthen the incentives for good management. Currently few incentives exist for efficient management of the program, which contributes to the view of the new planning and management systems as onerous and of limited utility. Consideration should be given to adding new incentives such as highlighting through the media or newsletters high performing Upazilas and those that demonstrate other forms of progress in meeting I.D. goals.

e) explicit consideration of organizational barriers to improved performance and suggestions as to how aspects of the existing organizational structure and resources could be modified to increase institutional performance and capacity.

f) specific recommendations as to how skills and procedures transfered in conjunction with FFW could also be used to benefit other programs of UZPs.

2. CARE's training efforts (including circular, OJT and formal training) should continue on a regular basis for the other actors in the program.

As program procedures change from year to year, officials and staff will need to be kept informed of those alternatives, but eventually some separation should be made between those who are experienced in the system and those who have recently entered the system. In addition, new formal training is recommended for those who have not received training including PIC Secretaries and ward members.

3. If CARE wishes to build additional planning capacity at the Upazila level, consideration should be given to alternative uses of U.S. food aid for expansion of bridges and culverts, the Rural Maintenance Program, or water resource projects.

In the past, CARE has devised planning systems for use by local officials to improve program management. However, if a goal of the FFW program is to enhance local government capacity to undertake planning, the program could be revised by changing the type of projects implemented to increase the need for and role of comprehensive planning.

4. Consideration should be given to experimentation with new collaborative monitoring systems in high performing Upazilas.

Active participation in program monitoring could heighten local officials' appreciation of the value of systematic and timely management information, and equip them with a system for obtaining such information. Any such collaborative effort should focus not only on the generation of monitoring information, but also the use of that information to influence operational decisions.

5. OJT efforts and formal training should include explicit attention to assisting local officials in utilizing information from the Final Reports for improved management of FFW.

   CARE should review its wealth of data gathered during implementation through the record keeping and report writing system to identify indicators that might be used over time to measure institutional impact. Some might include those that CARE and WFP have generated for Upazila performance measurement for 1986-87 such as timely submission of proforma, use of the sign board, maintenance of PIC reports and timely submission of closure reports. CARE should also evaluate whether all the information that it sends to the Upazila after project completion is useful and self-explanatory and, to the extent possible, it should seek feedback from the Upazilas in order to make Final Reports more useful to local officials. Once key indicators of performance are identified or instituted, CARE training courses should be modified to include use of this information by Upazila officials.

6. Strengthen the position of the PIO with additional resources or transfer responsibilities or the position itself to another office , such as the Upazila Engineers.

   Appropriate adjustment could entail the assignment of a technical assistant and motorcycle to the PIO; establishing a process for coordinating the use of UNO, PIO and UE staff in FFW; or consolidating the office of the PIO with that of the UNO or UE.

7. Actively experiment with new incentives for efficient and effective performance.

   New incentives that could be tested include delegating additional authority to high performing Upazilas; reducing wheat allocations to low performing Upazilas; and publicizing examples of exemplary performance through newsletters and the media.

8. Convene a small task force of selected Upazila Officials to advise CARE and the BDG on ways in which FFW management systems and procedures can be adapted for use in other development activities.

9. Training programs and government guidelines should increasingly encourage the adaptation and use of FFW systems for other development activities.

CHAPTER SIX: FEASIBILITY OF FEEDER ROAD DECENTRALIZATION.

This chapter examines the potential for effectively implementing a Feeder Road maintenance and improvement program at the Upazila level in the near future, specifying the resources and skills needed, and indicating new experimental elements to be included in future Upazila based pilot schemes.

I. Background.

As described earlier in this report, the latest major reorganization of the administrative tiers in Bangladesh took place in 1982/83. As part of this reorganization the administrative units termed Districts were deconcentrated so that their jurisdictions were made to correspond to the geographical areas of the former sub-divisions. Thus, three districts (Zila in Bangla) were created where previously there had been one larger unit .

Roads that connect Upazila (sub-district) Headquarters and designated growth centers to the arterial road system became the responsibility of the Zila Parishads (District Councils) and were know as Zila Roads. Approximately two years later, funds ceased for road activities. Since then, the Zila Parishads have been in what has been described as a state of "suspended animation" signifying that they only had administrative and regulatory functions, but no investment or development prerogatives until further decisions as to their future role were determined by the government.

Following this development, portions of the road network have been redesignated as Feeder Roads and classified as types A and B. Type A was defined as those that connect the Upazila headquarters with the national or regional highway network in the most direct routing. The type B Feeder Roads are those that connect the growth centers to the national or regional highway network, or to the Upazila headquarters, in the most direct routing. Both types, however, are eventually supposed to reach the same technical standards, namely a crest width of 24 feet (7.3 meters) and a bituminous surfaced pavement width of 12 feet (3.7 meters). Responsibility for improving type A Feeder Roads has been given to the Road and Highways Department of BDG which was judged to be the organization most capable of performing the work in the shortest possible time.

The Zila Parishad road system evolved as an intermediate network between the rural road system in the countryside and the national and regional highway system. With the initiation of the planning commission's classification system, certain rural roads were upgraded in category to Feeder Roads and certain Zila Parishad roads (or portions of these roads) were not classified as Feeder Roads. Road segments so classified lead from the interior of the countryside up to a growth center or Upazila headquarters, then on to the national and regional highway system. The classification system does not consider the portion of the road that extends beyond the Upazila

headquarters or growth center as a Feeder Road even though it could be part of a continuous road stretch. Another example of Zila Parishad roads not being classified as Feeder Roads is where there are two roads leading to a growth center or Upazila headquarters from the national or regional highway system. In these instances, only the most direct route is considered to be a Feeder Road and the other road is classified as a Rural Road. Although technically not type A Feeder Roads, these less direct routes often fall under the jurisdiction of the Roads and Highway Department.

The administrative status of the type B Feeder Roads has remained in limbo. The Planning Commission has recommended their transfer to the responsibility of the Upazila, but no administrative directive has been issued to this effect. Meanwhile, the donors have expressed their belief that it would be technically and managerially inappropriate to effect this transfer of authority and certain key individuals in the Ministry of LGRD and other elements of BGD seem to share this position. The intention of this chapter is to provide further input to the ongoing debate.

Prior to the first visit to the field, the team had acquired from official documents the following expectations regarding the division of responsibility for the local road network: a) type A Feeder Roads were exclusively maintained by the Road & Highways Department; b) type B Feeder Roads were, by default, maintained by the Upazila through the Office of the Upazila Engineer (UE); and c) the Project Implementation Officer, as the person responsible for FFW earth-works, held responsibility for the remaining local rural roads. However, it soon became evident that the road classification system instituted by the Planning Commission and adopted in donor planning was not necessarily used or accepted by the principal officers involved with roadway planning at the Upazila level.

The team encountered several instances where the Road & Highways Department had been persuaded to do work on a section of a type B Feeder Road, while elsewhere the Upazila was improving a type A Feeder Road with their own funds. More typically, one would find the PIO in charge of improving the Upazila's type B Feeder Roads with FFW resources, while the UE supervised the laying of a herring bone bond on a rural road (or even upgrading such a road with a bituminous surface) with Upazila funds.

In view of the situation encountered during the field trips it became necessary to re-specify some elements of the scope of work. According to the statistics provided by LGEB, 100% of the type B Feeder Roads in the visited Upazilas were dirt roads. Although these statistics on closer inspection were found to be not quite up to date, they nevertheless convey the fact that this type of Feeder Road is still overwhelmingly constructed solely of earth. From the main body of work of this study, it was concluded that the Upazilas have the technical and organizational capacity to improve and maintain such roads and have been exercising it for many years. Therefore, since the Upazila Parishads are already maintaining dirt roads, the Feeder Roads aspect of this study was revised to focus on the feasibility of Upazila-level management of <u>bituminous</u> roads.

It is hard to imagine that sufficient national-level funds can be made available to upgrade and maintain more than a fraction of the roadstock designated as type B Feeder Roads in the near future. Even in the case of type A Feeder Roads, which evidently have higher national priority, it will take 32 years to reach full coverage at current levels of funding. This generalization is likely, however, to vary greatly by region in cases where intensified area-specific donor involvement is envisioned.

The definition of "maintenance" varies widely, ranging from simple repair work to construction activities, and sometimes even to adjunct activities such as tree planting, alterations to the surrounding hydrological systems, legal regulation of the type and/or volume of traffic, etc. In this chapter the term "improvement" refers to upgrading dirt or herring bone bond roads to bituminous surfacing, and the term "maintenance" refers to the activities necessary to retain the qualities of such a road.

In trying to describe "the Upazila potential" for effectively implementing a Feeder Road maintenance and improvement program in the near future this report will not discuss effectiveness according to any "ideal" standard, but rather in relation to the effectiveness of the only currently existing institutional alternatives.

II. Findings

The findings under the Feeder Road component of this institutional assessment study will be discussed in this chapter under the headings of Improvements and Maintenance, respectively.

Improvements

For purposes of discussion with Upazila and executive engineers, the study team identified 14 functions that would potentially be involved in upgrading Feeder Roads to bituminous surfacing. These are listed in Annex 10 together with the necessary equipment, appropriate skill level and estimated time involved for each of these functions. Rather than elaborating on these 14 functions, this presentation will focus on those elements that appear to be critical to Feeder Road decentralization: planning, implementation and supervision.

Planning

Three crucial elements of planning must be considered in determining the appropriate administrative locus for such an activity. These elements are the identification and prioritization of the road stretches to be upgraded; the need for optimal utilization of the most critical resources for implementing the upgrading; and the establishment of suitable funding levels. The first two elements will be discussed separately, while the third impinges on both discussions.

With regards to selection of road stretches for upgrading, it was evident from the little road building which several Upazilas already had initiated that Upazila priorities did not correspond to those of the Planning Commission. There were several examples of Upazilas giving other than type B Feeder Roads priority with their scarce resources. With adequate funding, prioritizing becomes an issue of sequencing the investment. However, under the more likely circumstance of inadequate funds, prioritizing becomes a crucial issue. In such a case one has to judge whether the necessary needs assessment and decision making can most adequately be done at the Upazila or the Zila level.

One would expect that the Upazila would be in a better position to assess local road investment needs than the Zila Parishad. The relevancy of this argument depends, however, on whether one is talking from the perspective of incremental improvements or the perspective of making structural changes to the road network.

Incremental improvement is normally the type of road improvement currently going on at the Upazila level. It is characterized by the tendency first to consolidate the hard surface roads of the Upazila headquarters itself, and then gradually to radiate out from there and/or make spot improvements to the weakest links in the most trafficked thoroughfares (e.g., access ramps to bridges). A structural change, on the other hand, would generally occur when the whole stretch of road, for example, from one growth center to another, is upgraded from earth works to all-weather status. Because of the removal of seasonality as a constraint on revenue generation, this would typically be followed by the establishment of one or several bus routes, which often results in a radical drop in transportation costs for people and goods alike. This in turn tends to increase the volume of traffic flow and alter its pattern from a reliance on long-distance rickshaw hauling.

At low levels of total allocations for type B Feeder Roads, only the Zila Parishads are currently in a position to instigate structural changes. If these funds were distributed to all the Upazilas, it would be virtually impossible, even by pooling the given resources for a few locations, to finance the improvement of long contiguous road stretches. The Zila Parishad, at least in theory, is able to concentrate the available resources on a few structural changes rather than spread them out on many incremental changes.

Even if funding were at a level which would allow the Upazila to finance long contiguous road stretches, the Zila would still be in a better position to plan such activities. Usually only the Feeder Roads connecting growth center to Upazila headquarters would fall under the same Upazila. Most of the Feeder Roads connecting growth center to growth center, and all those connecting Upazila headquarters to Upazila headquarters, cross at least one Upazila border thereby raising problems of cooperation, synchronization, burden sharing and benefit estimation which would not have to enter into decision-making at the Zila level in the same way.

The perception of the Upazila's comparative advantage in planning incremental improvements was also challenged by many of those interviewed, not from the perspective of resources but that of incentives. It was suggested to the study team that the new powerholders in the Upazila might be more likely to follow their own personal interests in deciding on road-investments than to analyze what would make most economic sense for the Upazila as a whole. There is also, however, some evidence to suggest the contrary view. To gain and maintain political power in the new Upazila, political leaders are typically required to provide tangible benefits to their constituencies. Sometimes such benefits are provided directly through relations of employment, whether it be through land ownership or control of other productive resources. But usually such direct control in itself would not suffice to maintain an adequate base of political support. Thus, many argue, politicians are required to respond to the interests of their most powerful and influential constituents, and political decisions regarding road improvement investments would have to cater to local economic interests comparable to those likely to be taken into account in more conventional economic analyses.

This Bangladeshi version of "What is good for General Motors is good for the U.S." appears to hold true even in cases where opposition forces claim that the incumbent Upazila Chairman came to power through undemocratic means. The Upazila Chairman cannot effectively exercise his power without the acceptance of at least the majority of the Union Chairmen (who can initiate and pass a no-confidence motion against him). A number of those interviewed noted that even the Chairmen who were accused of having won by questionable means generally exhibited post-election consensus and populist behavior in an attempt to build up a local constituency.

The most critical resource in upgrading the current type B Feeder Roads to bituminous surface is the 7-10 ton road-roller. It is certainly more scarce than manpower resources (even including engineers or drivers), and is not only the costliest, but also the least divisible of all the resources involved.

In practical terms the critical role of this major piece of capital equipment has at least two different implications: 1) a rational planning process requires the maximum utilization of the available roller stock, and 2) it is inconceivable that stationing of big road-rollers at the Upazila level will make economic sense in the foreseeable future. Based on these premises three different organizational models for controlling road-roller usage are considered briefly below: "privatization", a "random request" model and a "decentralized Zila planning" model.

Since maximal utilization of the given roller stock should be a prominent goal for whatever institution Feeder Roads are eventually administered under, it is natural to consider privatization of road-roller ownership as a means for providing the kind of incentive structure needed to assure optimal utilization of scarce resources. Moreover privatization has been the conscious policy of the government for a number of years now and has met with success in several fields.

Nevertheless, private ownership and rental of road-rollers is likely to take a very different shape than, for example, the privatization of the fertilizer trade. Given limited mobility, high unit costs, and limited effective demand (due to limited resource allocation for the purpose) of road rollers, such an attempt will most likely end up as a series of "natural monopolies". (It is unlikely that any donor or other source of financing will be willing to set up two or more competing private capitalists renting road-rollers within the same limited area, and achieving less than full utilization).

If such natural monopolies were established, the private capitalist would want to set the rent of his equipment at a level which maximizes profits rather than one which would secure close to full capacity utilization.

The traditional way of rectifying this skewed incentive structure is introducing public price control. However, not only is the history of this type of intervention not very encouraging in Bangladesh, but it would defeat much of the original purpose of considering privatization of this field.

The "random request" model is actually a euphemism for the current procedures. At present the organizational arrangements are such that the executive engineers at the Zila level control the only road-rollers (and also other crucial equipment such as cement-mixers or vibrator-rollers) which officially are available for Feeder Road Improvement and Maintenance. In practice, road-rollers can also sometimes be secured from other organizations such as the Road & Highways Department or the Water Development Board, but this is officially frowned upon. The rollers are, at the request of the Upazila, allocated to those private contractors who have won a road construction tender bid from them.

These requests are not coordinated in any systematic way. Thus, it may occur that the Executive Engineer receives two or more requests for the roller for overlapping periods, which might even coincide with his own plans for using the roller. At the current level of funding (nominally zero because no government funds are allocated to type B Feeder Roads, which therefore have to be squeezed from other accounts) these "random requests" do not pose an insurmountable problem because there are so few of them. It appears obvious, however, that it would not take a very big rise in effective demand on the roller stock for the inefficiences of the "random request" model to show in a glaring way; they would result in an increasing number of requests not being met while, at the same time, there would likely be periods where the rollers would stand idle.

In contrast, it should not pose any organizational problem to keep the roller busy around the clock during the dry season under the auspices of the Zila Parishad, or the "decentralized" Zila planing model, funds permitting. It is also conceivable to combine the identifying and prioritizing advantages of the Upazila with the scheduling capacity of the Zila. If committed requests about "where and how much" roller-work is needed in the coming dry season could be

generated by the Upazila prior to the season's commencement, there is no reason why the Executive Engineer at the Zila level should not be able to plan a schedule which would approximate the capacity utilization level which would be attainable if the Zila had the full responsibility for a Zila- wide incremental improvement plan. It is noteworthy, however, that the efficiency of roller usage would nevertheless be less than would be the case for a Zila based "structural change" plan because of the added time spent going from site to site.

Implementation

In the improvement of type B Feeder Roads, (i.e. upgrading of dirt roads to all weather hard surface) the contractor is the implementing agent. A "contractor" is a legal status attainable through pre-award screening and involves the payment of annual fees in order to remain eligible for bids on public tenders. Contractors are listed in different categories corresponding to the value of undertakings they are allowed to bid on. Usually, only the top category is relevant for Feeder Road improvement activities. This category is qualified to undertake tasks from about 5 Lakh Taka upwards. The Upazilas visited during this study typically had one or two dozen contractors listed in this category.

To assess the feasibility of decentralization of Feeder Roads to the Upazila level it was necessary to gain an idea of what characterizes this central actor. Perceptions were drawn from interviews conducted with contractors during field visits; and from accounts by Upazila engineers and other engineers experienced in dealing with contractors.

In the organization function, it appears that the contractor rarely brings any specialized technical knowledge to bear. If such knowledge is needed it is usually bought, often from civil servants. Contractors' cost-estimation abilities are also low. Most contractors are unable to make realistic cost calculations, except for such cases where the contractor is a producer/supplier of materials (e.g. an owner of a brick factory). This seems to be less a reflection of their professional potential of these individuals than of the actual working of the system: in the tender bidding of the Upazila level, work and cost estimation are very much a given, and contenders for contracts have to take these estimations, if not as absolutes, then at least as reference points from which there are only a few degrees of freedom.

The contractor's two most important qualifications are as a labor organizer and as one who has access to equipment. Some well-established contractors have their own medium sized equipment, such as a cement-mixer and tar-boiler, but most have only hand-tools. To a large extent they are dependent on the public sector for the heavier equipment, particularly for road-rollers.

The typical source of rentals for rollers is the Executive Engineer at that Zila Headquarters. However, in the majority of the Zila offices visited, the Executive Engineers are not yet able to allocate

such equipment because, even if they have been allocated a road-roller, its arrival is still uncertain, frequently due to a lack of spare parts.

In principle, two criteria are applied when screening applications from contractors to bid on major local public enterprises: experience and credit-worthiness. These criteria are not, however, always applied fully or equally. Certain of the contractors interviewed had gained experience in such ventures through working for relatives. Others, however, seem to have gained their position as approved contractors through family reputation or other connections without any particular experience.

More important for understanding the behavior of contractors is the system for establishing credit-worthiness. It was the team's distinct impression (from sources other than the contractors themselves) that often contractors are not worth as much in terms of liquid assets as the pre-qualification process is supposed to assure. A substantial proportion of these individuals appear to have gained the necessary credit-rating by being able to pool the resources of relatives, patrons and friends in a bank-account for the short period during which the assessment is taking place. With scant liquid assets, and no institutional insurance mechanisms, the contractors relevant for Feeder Road activities are pre-disposed to act as risk avoiders in their professional capacities.

Socially, such contractors typically belong to the rural elite; though not necessarily to the faction politically in power. Whereas the award of contracts cannot be characterized as a simple "spoils system", many of those interviewed argue that position in the local political network is very important in lobbying for contracts. Moreover, it was suggested to the team that contractors with close political or personal relations to "the powers that be" can often become almost immune to supervisory control by the Upazila Engineer. If, however, such individuals are not affiliated to the ruling faction the contractor may be vulnerable to financial extortion, which he will only be able to recuperate through under-delivery in the quality of his product in terms of materials, design or type of labor utilized.

Underdelivery of quality is potentially the greatest flaw in the contracting system in the Feeder Roads program. Whether due to unrealistic underbidding of the official cost-estimates, or due to non-reimbursable cost elements during the bidding or the implementation phase, underdelivery is often the contractors' only way to secure an award and at the same time recoup his expenses plus a reasonable profit margin. Frequently, this margin can not be covered by the officially allocated profit rate of 10% (+1% for establishment, tax, and sundries). Besides underdelivery, other types of non-competitive behavior range from pre-bidding collusion among the contractors to physical barriers and threats to competitors making bids.

While anti-competitive behavior could plausibly exist at either the Zila or Upazila level, the much larger number of entrepreneurs available at the district level would ostensibly work against the chances of effective collusion. How the Zila Parishad is likely to

perform with the elected Members of Parliament as ex-officio members is yet to be seen; but it is reasonably argued by many that higher visibility and more differentiated constituencies might work in the direction of allowing more effective competition.

Supervision

The third aspect of Feeder Roads decentralization concerns the necessary supervision of implementation. This will in due course become the responsibility of either the Upazila or the Executive Engineer, depending on whether Upazilas or Zilas are given jurisdiction.

There seem to be two issues at stake in comparing the capacity of Upazila and Executive Engineers to fulfill the supervisory task, namely 1) the quality of their technical know-how, and 2) its availability, i.e. whether they have sufficient time and auxiliary manpower to apply it.

The prevailing opinion encountered by the team prior to its field interviews was that the generally more senior Executive Engineers were more experienced in, and capable at, providing supervision than were their counterparts at the Upazila level.

Engineers' formal educational background is usually either a bachelors degree from one of the country's engineering faculties or a diploma from the Polytechnic Colleges of the various districts.

Of the country's 64 Executive Engineers 67% hold a degree, while the remaining 33% hold a diploma. Of the 460 Upazila Engineers the proportion of college graduates is roughly comparable (i.e. 60%). Interviews in 12 Upazilas and 10 Zila Headquarters did not support any definite differences in educational preparation between the two groups.

It was the team's distinct impression that the skill levels of the Executive Engineers (with regards to roadworks specifically) were more heterogeneous than those of the Upazila Engineers. A number of the Executive Engineers interviewed appeared to be significantly more competent in this field than most Upazila Engineers, and nearly as many seemed to be less competent.

Other indicators that also support the contention that there do not appear to be significant differences in technical skills between the two groups of engineers include the following:

- the quality of the road improvement work executed by the Upazilas does not look significantly different from that previously done by the districts;
- the technical faults which could be identified in such contractual work (steep shoulders, lack of compaction, low quality materials) stemmed less frequently from lack of technical knowledge on behalf of the supervisor (the Upazila

Engineer) than from other circumstances (land disputes, the contractual system itself, negligence in supervision, etc.);

- o currently the Executive Engineers' advice does not seem to be much sought after by the Upazila Engineers, and when it is, such advice usually concerns the building of bridges and buildings. In no cases that the team could identify was such advice sought about road construction.

A specific exception to this generalization is the case of the Executive Engineers posted in the former district Headquarters. These sites are still the command nodes of the Local Government Engineering Bureau and the most competent Executive Engineers are usually posted there.

Given the time constraints on this consultancy, no attempt was made to a apply a rigorous methodology of time measurement, either for the current demands on the Upazila Engineers' time, or for the potential future demands from Feeder Roads activities. The more impressionistic approach used was first to talk with the Engineer about his current work schedule, what hours he kept, how much was paperwork vs. fieldwork, what kind of work was predominant in which season(s), etc. to get an understanding of his work, preoccupations and sense of job constraints. Interviewees were then presented with a labor profile graph representing a theoretical estimation of the demands on an "average" Upazila Engineer's time and were asked to explain how and to what extent their own workloads differed from the profile.

The responses are summarized in Exhibit 6-1 which shows in part the variability in current perceptions of workload (the dots indicate different Engineers' estimation of their work volume for a given month) and in part the seasonality of this workload to indicate the trend. A solid line has been drawn through the median of these points. The graph indicates a peak in the workload in the beginning of the calendar year and a trough during the rainy season months of July, August, and September.

An estimation of what kind of workload the decentralization of Feeder Roads would entail for the Upazila Engineer is difficult to ascertain and, with the funding level as an unknown, it is entirely speculative. To have a frame of reference for such estimation, the consultants tried to estimate the number of man-days which would be required from the Upazila Engineer should he be put in charge of the construction of a 1 kilometer bituminous Feeder Road with one structure (like a 20 ft. bridge). According to rough estimations, the surveys (hydrological, topographical, and soil), design, estimations (of quantities & costs) and activities in connection with the tendering procedures would add up to about 62 days of the Engineer's time, not counting time for supervision, payments or legal disputes.

Only two Upazila Engineers were asked for their estimates of such a task and they estimated 24 and 32 days respectively. The important source of difference between their estimates and the team's estimate was the estimation of the time necessary for surveys. Where the team

Exhibit 6-1

TIME REQUIREMENTS FOR UPAZILA ENGINEERS USING PRESENT SCHEME CYCLES

(in days)



• UPAZILA ENGINEER ESTIMATES OF MONTHLY WORK VOLUME FOR A GIVEN MONTH

——— MONTHLY MEDIAN OF ESTIMATED UPAZILA ENGINEER WORK VOLUME

– – – MAXIMUM TIME UPAZILA ENGINEERS CAN WORK PER MONTH WITHOUT WORKING OVERTIME OR REDUCING QUALITY OF WORK

had allocated 29 days for this task, the engineers had estimated 4 and 12 days respectively. Neither estimate can be said to be right or wrong since they are expressions of how the respondent would plan to do the work themselves, but they begin to suggest some work forecasting parameters as well as to provide some indication of what would happen if the responsibility for Feeder Roads were decentralized. Rather than go through a series of rigorous surveys, the Upazila Engineers are apparently inclined to take advantage of local knowledge (with regard to traffic density, hydrology, soil compaction times, etc.), thereby saving a lot of time at the possible expense of some precision.

As Exhibit 6-1 indicates, the work pressure as perceived by the Upazila Engineers varies considerably. One source of variability is naturally the individual engineer's efficiency, but a more important factor seems to be the scheme intensity, which in turn is a combination of how many unions there are in the Upazila (in our sample it ranged from 4 to 24) and how much funding is available for engineering works. Thus, the Upazilas with only a handful of unions and no donor-funded projects could undoubtedly absorb new Feeder Road responsibilities. Conversely, it was hard to imagine that the large Upazilas with a lot of externally funded engineering activities would be able to handle additional burdens without major difficulties or supplementary personnel.

There does, however, seem to exist considerable scope for better utilization of the Upazila Engineers' time even without abandoning existing responsibilities. Currently, the Upazila Engineer is underemployed from the end of June until late October/early November when the Annual Development Fund figures are released. The standard justification given for this is that it isn't worth planning, designing or otherwise preparing schemes in the rainy season before funds have been allocated. However, these allocations have been more or less the same for each of the three years since the Upazilas were constituted. Confronted with this well recognized fact, Upazila Engineers confirmed the fact that the real cause for this delay is not the release of the funds, but rather the prolonged political decision making process concerned with agreeing on what schemes are to be funded. If this political process could be rescheduled to take place in the preceding dry season, the rainy season could be fully utilized by the Upazila Engineer for design and other preparatory activities which don't necessitate a presence in the field. This in turn would release more time in the subsequent dry season for supervisory activities in connection with expanded responsibilities for Feeder Roads.

Maintenance

A number of the findings discussed in the previous section under improvement also hold true in the case of maintenance. One point, however, is so central that a reiteration is warranted: the fundamental role of the road roller.. This equipment is essential to both improvement and maintenance of bituminous roads.

The two important characteristics about the roller as compared to the other necessary resources are its cost and its indivisibility. In fact, maintenance is probably an even more capital-intensive activity than improvement since relatively less earthwork is normally needed in the former case. Moreover, the small scale and dispersion of these activities complicate their management even more than is the case with improvement activities.

Having the roller go to a number of places for a short duration within the same work season necessitates much tighter and demanding scheduling than is required with improvement activities. Further compounding the difficulty of managing maintenance activities is the fact that, at currently feasible levels of funding, the economies of scale of maintenance activities make them much less "contractable" than improvement activities. In order to accommodate the diminutive scale and dispersion of the maintenance operations in an economically efficient manner, it would appear they have to be planned, implemented and supervised by a single authority. In practice, only the supply of materials to maintenance has been contracted out, while for improvement activities it has been possible to contract out all the implementation activities on a wholesale basis.

In this context it might then be asked whether it would not be feasible to contract out the whole responsibility for maintenance activities according to some "management by objectives" agreement. Given the unpredictability of such a commitment and the risk aversity of the rural contractors, it was the team's impression that few contractors would bid on such a tender; and should such a contract be awarded, a minimum incident (e.g. a convoy of heavy relief trucks tearing up the road in an emergency) could bankrupt the contractor the first time it happened.

The findings and arguments presented above only relate to the capital intensive road roller operations and the activities operationally integrated with them. Economically, there should be no objections to decentralizing those labor-intensive maintenance activities (primarily earth work) which can be separated and executed independently of the roller activities. However, such a splitting of functionally dependent operations can easily lead to an uncoordinated use of resources.

III. Conclusions.

The feasibility of decentralizing the improvement of Feeder Roads to the Upazila level has been explored from three different perspectives, namely that of planning, implementation, and supervision. It was found:

1) that planning considerations speak strongly against decentralization - except at the current low levels of funding when only incremental improvements of the road stock are feasible;

2) that implementation considerations speak more moderately against decentralization. Some of the flaws in the contractual system cannot be easily corrected at either level but will have to seek redress at the national level;

3) that supervision considerations disfavor decentralization since significant constraints on the available time of the Upazila Engineers already exists during the dry season.

4) that the given funding level will affect the relative importance of the findings: up to some threshold level, the higher the funding level the stronger the argument against decentralization to the Upazila level.

In short, it may be feasible to decentralize the administration of type B Feeder Roads to the Upazila level, but not very advantageous -- except at the current minimal level of funding.

The conclusions presented above extend to road maintenance as well, despite the prevailing perception that the smaller funding level for maintenance activities can be managed most appropriately at a correspondingly smaller planning jurisdiction. Instead, the team found that the capital intensity of most maintenance activities, in conjunction with their small scale and dispersion, necessitated an integrated management approach which does not appear to lend itself to decentralization.

IV. Recommendations

According to the scope of work, the recommendations springing from this chapter are not intended to address the question of whether it is feasible to decentralize the administration of Feeder Roads to the Upazilas. Rather, the scope of work assumes such an administrative decision and requests recommendations to inform the design of possible decentralized pilot schemes.

Before presenting such recommendations, it should be stressed once again that this study has only addressed the question of bituminous Feeder Roads. The improvement and maintenance of dirt Feeder Roads, which constitute the bulk of the Feeder Road network, are already effectively administered by the Upazila Parishads, notwithstanding continuing doubts in specific cases about who has the legal obligation to conduct such activities.

A second point is somewhat paradoxical. The scope of work calls for recommendations on the design of a donor-financed (and hence relatively well-funded) decentralized Feeder Road scheme. It is noteworthy, however, that an increase in funding (up to a certain point) weakens the case in favor of decentralized planning and management of Feeder Road activities.

The following recommendations suggest means for decentralizing road improvements to the Upazila level on a pilot basis in ways which ameliorate the most obvious weaknesses of the Upazila management

system and incorporate several benefits of the Zila system. In order to do this effectively, it is important that:

1) The sites selected for the pilot scheme not be individual Upazilas scattered throughout the country. Instead the pilot scheme should encompass all the constituent Upazilas of a given pilot Zila.

One aspect of the Feeder Road administration where the Upazila may gain by relying on the Zila authorities is the tendering process. The identification of the proposed schemes and financial commitment for them would remain the Upazila's prerogative, and the legal responsibility would continue to rest with the Upazila (born witness to by the signature of the chairman). Yet several advantages could be gained by placing the technical evaluation and selection of the best bid in a different forum. If such a forum were created at the Zila level, it would strengthen the operation of a free competitive market, partly by encouraging the participation of as many competent bidders as possible, and partly by limiting the possibility for parochial political pressure on the process in general and the Upazila Engineer in particular. Therefore we suggest:

2) that the organization of the tendering process become the responsibility of a Zila tender committee with the Executive Engineer as Chairman and all the Zila's Upazila Engineers as members.

Such a division of functions between a political site selection and financial allocation on the one hand and a technical tender evaluation on the other needs a wider time frame than the current annual planning cycle allows. Therefore we suggest:

3) that a two year planning cycle be instituted so that the political decision making in the Upazila for a particular construction season is completed at the end of the previous season, thereby allowing the tender committee to draw up comprehensive Zila work schedules and prepare tender advertisements during the rainy season.

One of the main strengths of the Zila having the responsibility of Feeder Roads was its better position to plan and schedule the maximal use of the limited roller stock. This advantage could be incorporated into an Upazila-based planning system through the above-mentioned centralized tendering procedures by ensuring:

4) that the availability of rental rollers be guaranteed as part of tender advertisement.

Furthermore, in order to decrease the moral hazard involved in the control of the road rollers, to encourage efficiency in the use of road rollers, and to provide adequate funds for equipment maintenance and replacement, it is also suggested:

5) that the rental fees be determined at the national level and reflect the true costs of operation and depreciation.

A number of the pressures on, and opportunities for, contractors to incur non-reimbursable costs would be alleviated through the recommendations above. But it would be extremely cumbersome, if not impossible, to foresee and prevent every such cause for sub-standard contract fulfillment. Ex-post sanctions are therefore suggested as an appropriate supplement, if not complete substitute, to bureaucratic regulations on conduct. It is therefore suggested:

6) that a database, maintained by national road inspectors, be established at LGEB HQ to monitor the track-record of road contractors, with the purpose of eventually disqualifying the ones who don't perform up to acceptable standards.

In order to accelerate the growth of professionalism it would help if a special effort were made to inform the corps of contractors about existing and new procedures and rules and regulations concerning their role, and to improve their technical understanding of materials, structures and cost-accounting. It is therefore suggested:

7) that participation in training courses become part of the prequalification process for contractors.

The two year planning cycle recommended above will in many scheme-intensive Upazilas be a prerequisite for absorbing new Feeder Road responsibilities. It would allow the demands on the Upazila Engineer's time to be spread more evenly over the year, thus releasing time from planning and design activities to be used for supervisory activities during the construction season. Even if the above recommendation of a two-year planning cycle is not accepted on the grounds mentioned above (i.e. enhancing roller utilization), we suggest it be accepted for reasons of manpower capacity utilization.

As stated above, the team did not find any consequential differences between the engineers at the Upazila and Zila level with regards to their technical capability in doing survey and supervision work on roads. However, this finding does not preclude the fact that there might be considerable scope for improving these overall capabilities.

Comparatively, the scope for improvement seems greater in survey techniques than in supervision, but a more specialized study of training needs will be required before the content of a training course can be identified. It should also be noted that leveling and other survey equipment was generally absent in those Upazilas which had not benefited from any donor financed engineering projects. It is therefore recommended:

8) that necessary equipment be supplied, particularly survey levels and soil testing equipment, and associated skills be upgraded through training courses as one of the first steps in a pilot scheme.

Finally, it is recommended:

9) that the responsibility for capital intensive maintenance activities be retained at the Zila level until the level of activities and funding attains a magnitude which warrants the Upazilas owning their own equipment.

If, as recommended here, the responsibility of maintaining type B feeder roads is retained at the Zila level, it will probably make administrative and economic sense:

10) that the responsibility for the maintenance of type A Feeder Roads be transferred to the Zila as well.

ANNEX 1

WEEKLY SCHEDULE
BANGLADESH INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT
FFW AND FEEDER ROADS

Week 1

Orientation in Washington at MSI.
- Briefings by MSI staff, AID/W staff, outside experts
- Reading of background materials
- Planning of study approach, logistics etc on TPM lines

Week 2

Meetings in Dhaka: CARE, AID, Ministry of Local Govt., Ministry of Relief & Rehab.
- Agreement on mgm't decisions, questions, and strategy
- Identification of secondary data

Selection & notification of Upazilas
Logistics
TPM
Drafting of Field Questionnaire

Week 3

Continued collection and review of background materials
2-member team visits to 2 Upazilas
Review of initial data collection and refinement of Field Questionnaire

Week 4

2 teams visit 2 Upazilas each
Further review of data collected and further refinement of questionnaire
Secondary data collection in Dhaka commences

Week 5

2 teams visit another 5 Upazilas
Analysis of field and secondary data begun
Drafts initiated of first chapters of report

Week 6

Completion of field visits
Analysis of all data
Debriefings:AID, CARE, Ministry of Local Gov't, Ministry of Relief & Rehab.
Preparation of Draft Report
Departure from Dhaka

ANNEX 2

TEAM PLANNING MEETINGS PARTICIPATION

WASHINGTON TEAM PLANNING MEETING
MONDAY - FRIDAY SEPTEMBER 21 - OCTOBER 3, 1986
MSI OFFICES, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Timothy Alexander, MSI
Edward Connerley, NASPAA
Lawrence Cooley, MSI
Peter Downs, AID
Richard Fehnel, NASPAA
Jonathan Hodgdon, MSI
Allen Jones, MSI
Michael Loft, MSI
Mohammed Rashiduzzaman, Glassboro State College

DHAKA TEAM PLANNING MEETING
SUNDAY OCTOBER 19, 1986
SHERATON HOTEL, DHAKA

Ziauddin Ahmed, PD., IRWP, LGD
S. M. Badiul Alam, DTE. of R. & R.
Sadrul Ameen, USAID
Syed Serajul Arafeen, Min. of LGRD (LGEB)
MD. Ashraf, DTE. R. & R.
Olivier Carduner, USAID
Himangshu Choudhury, CARE
Stafford Clarry, CARE
R. N. Hassan, Min. of LGRD (LGEB)
Wahida Haque, World Bank
Jonathan Hodgdon, MSI
Motlbe Hassain, DTE. of R. & R.
Allen Jones, MSI
Golam Kabir, USAID
F. A. Kahn, Min. of LGRD (LGEB)
Michael Loft, MSI
Lowell Lynch, USAID
Sultan Miah, CARE
Michael Sackett, WFP/Dhaka
John Scollin, WFP-Consultant
Quamrul I. Siddique, Min. of LGRD (LGEB)
Gene George, USAID
Manir Uzzaman, USAID
P. Winnubst, WFP/Chad

ANNEX 3

FIELD QUESTIONNAIRES

Questions for Upazila Chairman.

1 a) What was your position before you were elected chairman? b) Are there any vacancies in positions attached to your office? If so, which?

2. What are the chief differences in how the Upazila operates before and after the chairman's election (improvements/drawbacks)? How do you find working with the UNO (talk about respective roles)?

3. Have you attended meetings of the District FFW Steering Committee? Last one?

4. Please describe who is important for FFW schemes in this Upazila - in selection? implementation? monitoring? How is each important?

5. What transportation does the PIO have? the Upazila engineer?

6. Do you supervise the PIO? In what capacities?

7. a) Have you received a booklet of instructions for project implementation and monitoring? b) How widely used is it? c) Do these guidelines lead to smooth programming or do they create problems? Elaborate which?

8. Did the PIO distribute this booklet to the Union Chairmen?

9. a) Does the Upazila have a five year plan? b) What are the different types of projects planned and what are the resources for each? c) What schemes other than roads would you like to see wheat spent on? d) Does the Upazila have a planning officer? If so, who?

10. What are your program priorities during the upcoming dry season?

11.a) CARE is involved in FFW in the following ways: scheme design, verification and monitoring. To what extent has its involvemnt at each stage been a) helpful, b) irrelevant, c) harmful? In what ways?

b) What actions are taken by you or the Upazila staff after you receive a report from CARE following one of their site visits? c) Do you receive specific suggestions from CARE about solving problems during implementation (i.e. signboard correction/ proper payments/ adherence to specs etc.) d) Should CARE's general project approach be adopted by other development offices at the upazila (i.e. health/education etc.)?

12. What will it take for the Upazila to manage these functions without CARE's help?

13. a) If CARE left the scene would its procedures in design and monitoring continue to be followed by the upazila? b) Do CARE procedures result in better quality (design/workmanship) schemes? c) Are CARE procedures favored those for other schemes (i.e. WFP)? If so, why?

14. a) Has any training been conducted for anyone involved in FFW projects. b) Who and has it made a difference? c) How?

15. For high performer: a) Can you use a higher wheat allocation that you are getting now? b) Would you like a higher allocation? c) For the last two seasons CARE's statistics show that you have been able to do almost as much work as you had planned. This is often not the case in other upazilas - how has this been possible?

16. For poor performer: For the last couple of seasons CARE's statistics show that you have not been able to do as much work as you had expected - what do consider to be the reasons for this?

Questions for UNO.

1 a) How long have you been UNO of this Upazila? b) What was your position before you were elected chairman? c) Are there any vacancies in positions attached to your office? If so, which?

2. What are the chief differences in how the Upazila operates before and after the chairman's election (improvements/drawbacks)? How do you find working with the Chairman (talk about respective roles)?

4. Please describe who is important for FFW schemes in this Upazila - in selection? implementation? monitoring? How is each important?

5. What transportation does the PIO have? the Upazila engineer?

6. Do you supervise the PIO? In what capacities?

7. a) Does the Upazila have a five year plan? b) What are the different types of projects planned and what are the resources for each? c) What schemes other than roads would you like to see wheat spent on? d) Does the Upazila have a planning officer? If so, who?

8. What Upazila programs do you spend most of your time on during this season? Which is you first priority? How about during the dry season?

9.a) CARE is involved in FFW in the following ways: scheme design, verification and monitoring. To what extent has its involvemnt at each stage been a) helpful, b) irrelevant, c) harmful? In what ways?

10. a) If CARE left the scene would its procedures in design and monitoring continue to be followed by the upazila? b) Do CARE procedures result in better quality (design/workmanship) schemes? c) Are CARE procedures favored those for other schemes (i.e. WFP)? If so, why?

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13. For poor performer: For the last couple of seasons CARE's statistics show that you have not been able to do as much work as you had expected - what do consider to be the reasons for this?

Interview with the PIO

1) How long have you been the PIO at this Upazila? Can you describe your previous experience as a PIO?
2) What is your academic training? Do you consider yourself to be a technical or a nontechnical PIO?
3) For which of your activities are you supervised by the Upazila Chairman and for which by the UNO?
4) What staff are available to help you perform you duties as PIO? Is this sufficient?
5) What transportation is available to help you perform your duties as PIO? Is this sufficient?
6) What proportion of your time is spent on CARE road projects versus other FFW projects? Would you say about half of your time, more than half, or less than half?
7) How do you supervise schemes when there are many projects going on at the same time? For which projects do you enlist the assistance of the Upazila Engineer or his staff? How do you request his assistance? Are these requests always approved?
8) How do CARE FFW projects differ from other FFW projects in terms of your own roles and responsibilities? (Ask separately for design, supervision, and monitoring)
9) If you were free to do so, would you follow CARE's implementation and monitoring guidelines for other (non-CARE) FFW projects? Why or why not?
10) To what extent has CARE's involvement in scheme design, including design verification, been a) helpful, b) irrelevant, or c) harmful? In what way? How about CARE's involvement in scheme monitoring and reporting?
11) In your opinion, do CARE's design requirements result in better designed or better quality roads for reconstruc-
tion under this Upazila? Why or why not?
12) If CARE were to cease performing pre-survey and post-survey visits to this Upazila, would CARE's survey procedures
most likely be continued or discontinued in this Upazila? What would it take for the Upazila to manage these functions without CARE's help?
13) Do you consider MRR's written guidelines for implementing and monitoring FFW projects, copies of which are provided to you each year, to be very useful, somewhat useful, or not very useful? In what way or why not? Are they too detailed, about right, or too brief?
14) Have you participated in CARE-sponsored PIO training sessions held at the CARE sub-offices? When and for how long? How would you compare the value of these training sessions to the value of the written guidelines? Do you feel that more classroom-type training sessions are needed? Why or why not?
15) Can you help us to identify two unions to visit in this Upazila - one union that you feel has a high level of interest in CARE road reconstruction, and one that you feel has lower interest or has more difficulty in submitting pro-formas or completing work on schedule?
16) If it were up to you how to use the wheat allocation for construction projects, would you continue to use most of it for road reconstruction or would you shift more of it for use in constructing embankments, canals, bridges, or other projects? Which ones?
17) Why do you feel that this Upazila has had consistently (high/low) performance on CARE FFW projects since 1984? What are the reasons that some unions in the Upazila fail to utilize all of their annual wheat allocation for earthwork schemes?
18) Have you attended any meetings of the project technical sub-committee?
19) After a CARE monitoring visit, we understand that CARE sends a report of their findings to the Upazila. What actions, if any, are taken? Does CARE suggest specific corrective actions to be taken?
20) What are the major problems encountered during implementation? (e.g., land disputes, availability of earth, local wage rates)

9) The government is considering giving the Upazilas the responsibility for feeder road improvement and maintenance.
Below we have listed some different functions which usually are necessary to upgrade a feeder road to acceptable standard.
Let us discuss how this work could best be done if it became the responsibility of the Upazilas.
To what extent could you yourself manage these functions - and how?
- and to what extent would you need outside help, - and from whom?

a) Surveys: Topographical, Subgrade survey(soil density & CBR survey), Hydrological (for bridges & culverts)
b) Design of pavement and design of structures (prepare design chart for variable sub grade CBR for pavement, and design chart for variable height and span of bridge)
c) Drawings for designed road pavement and bridges/culverts.
d) Quantity and cost estimation.
e) Specification and tender document preparation.
f) Tendering
1. How many contractors do you have enlisted for Upazila work?
2. Can you name one or two you have recently used on road construction? [if so see if we kan visit them or have them sent for[if possible the issues listed in form B should be discussed with them]
3. What classifications of contractors do you use, and what are the financial criteria?
4. By what procedures did you establish this enlistment?
5. Do the contractors rely on their own equipment or can they secure it from other sources?
6. Does the Upazila have any equipment of its own?

10) In order that we get a picture of the timing of feederroad activities Mr. Kahn/ Mr.Arafeen should sit down with a S.A.E. and identify the latest completed contractual roadworks and fill out the following:

a) Type of road:
b) Length of road:
c) Date tender was invited:
d) Date tender was opened:
e) Date tendercommittee made recommendation:
f) Date work was awarded:
g) Date of scheduled completion:
h) Date of actual completion:
i) Was there any overrun?
j) If so - why? and in what items?

INTERVIEW WITH FOOD OFFICER

1. How long have you been the Food Officer for this Upazila? Where where you working before you were posted here? How long?

2. What staff do you have working for you in this office? Are there any vacancies (positions not filled) in this office? Who is your immediate supervisor? Do you report to the UNO?

3. Could you describe your responsibilities under the FFW Program? Which of these responsibilities consumes most of your time?

4. From whom do you receive FFW requistions for wheat? Whose signatures appear on these requisitions? The UNO? What form do these requisitions appear on? May I see one?

5. What accounting of FFW wheat requisitions do you keep? Are you sometimes asked to back-date requisitions made after May 10th? If so, is this a problem for your record keeping?

6. Who normally takes delivery of the wheat? Is this always the case? Do they check the quantity and quality? How? Where there any complaints filed this year? Why and by whom?

7. How many requistions are normally made for one FFW road scheme and in what proportion? Does this number and proportion vary greatly from one PIC (union) to another?

8. How is the wheat transported from the LSD in most cases? Do transport problems exist in this Upazila, as far as you know? How are transport costs paid for? Is there always some wheat lost to cover these transport costs in this Upazila? How often?

9. How many storage go-downs can be found in this Upazila? What is the total storage capacity? Are there any problems with the storage of wheat? Have you ever run out of stock?

10. CARE records show that a significant quantity of wheat never reaches the LSD in many Upazilas. Why do you think this happens? Can you suggest changes to the FFW wheat disbursement process that might reduce local misappropriation?

Questions for Union/PIC Chairman:

1. a) How long have you been Chairman of this Union? b) What did you do before you were elected Chairman?
2. What are the chief differences in the upazila's operation before and after an elected chairman (improvements/drawbacks; elicit opinion of UZ chairman) ?
3. a) Has Upazila's importance to unions changed since the formation of Upazilas? If so, how? b) Has CARE played any role in the growth of the upazilas? If so, has that influence been felt at the union level?
4. What criteria are used to select schemes to forward to the upazila (how are competing interests served)?
5. What aspects of your work are supervised by Upazila staff and which aspects by CARE? Possible improvements in supervision?
6. a) What was the composition of this past year's PIC(s) and how often did they meet?
   b) Were there other PICs formed - under what auspices? Was their composition different? (how? better?)
7. To what extent do Upazila staff assist in the implementation of schemes in your union (i.e. SAE/PIO site visits, etc.)? Is there a difference in assistance between Care projects and non-Care projects? How so?
8. Are there purposes or projects in your Union that you would rather spend your wheat allocation on other than roads?
9. CARE's FFW procedures differ from other donors' procedures. Do you think that these procedures result in better (greater use, longer lasting) road schemes? Would you advise using similar procedures for other FFW projects?
10. Can you explain why some Unions' PICs seem to have high performance in FFW and others have lower performance? By performance we mean submitting proforma and completing work on schedule.
11. Have you seen Government's written guidelines for implementing and monitoring FFW schemes? Would you say they were very useful, somewhat useful, or not very useful?
12. a) Following a CARE monitoring visit they send a report to the Chairman/PIO. What actions are taken/can be taken? b) Do you receive specific suggestions from CARE about solving problems during implementation?(i.e. correction of signboard, proper payment to workers, adherence to design specs.)
13. a) What are major problems you encounter during project implementation? (eg. land disputes, availability of earth, local wage rate) b) What are consequences if you finish project on time, within resources etc? If you don't finish project? (rewards - penalties)
14. If CARE stopped its involvement but allocations remained the same what would happen to the FFW program? If CARE ceased to perform would its procedures continue to be used?
15. Have you received CARE-sponsored training in scheme preparation? When and for how long? Did you benefit? Could it be better?

ANNEX 3

DRAFT LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

October 20, 1986

To
Upazila Chairmen
_____ Upazila Parishad
_____ District
_____

Subject: Letter of Introduction

Dear Mr. Chairman:

A group of engineers and social scientists will be visiting your Upazila on or about _____ to collect data on behalf of USAID in connection with a study entitled "FFW Institutional Assessment Study". They would like to talk to the following people in your Upazila regarding Food for work and other construction activities.

Upazila Chairman

Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO)

Upazila Engineer

Project Implementation Officer (PIO)

Upazila Food Officer

Union Parishad Chairmen (Selected Unions)

Pic Chairmen (Selected Unions)

I would appreciate it if you would lend this team your close cooperation and all necessary assistance. Upon their arrival at your Upazila headquarters, they will be contacting you.

CARE/AID FFW PROJECT
UPAZILA PERFORMANCE DATA 1985-86

NAME OF UPAZILA	A % OF WHEAT CARE FFW	B # OF '86 CARE SCHEMES	C % OF WHEAT WITHDRAWN	D % OF [illegible] FIXED	E % OF (D) ACCURATE (CARE POST-SURVEY	F % FIXED RATE PAID CARE MONITORING
Rupganj	38	5	93	[illegible] 97)*	105	198
Bander	38	3	78	[illegible]	N/A	101
Muktagacha	57	4	97	[illegible]	N/A	91
Phulpur	38	5	94	[illegible] 38)	40	89
Monirampur	57	4	98	[illegible]	N/A	93
Kotchandpur**	42	2	100	[illegible]	N/A	92
Brahmanbaria	57	8	93	[illegible] 33)	105	198
Matlab	38	7	86	[illegible] 49)	57	97
Nachole	46	3	100	[illegible]	N/A	96
Nawabagnj	40	7	100	89 (51)	69	83
Ghoraghat	86	2	93	[illegible]	N/A	90
Kaharde	35	2	100	100 (71)	71	245
National Average	1034		92	90 (73)	81	92

* CARE's estimate of earthwork accomplished in parentheses
** Low performance 1984 and 1985, High performance 1986

CARE-Bangladesh
Integrated Food For Work Project
Accomplishments
FY '76 - FY '86

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
FY	Number of Scheduled Projects	AO[1] Amount (MT)	Amount of AO[1] Drawn from LSD (MT)	Amount of AO[1] spent (MT)	% of Approved work completed	Amount loss due to wheat reported spent in excess of work done (MT)	% of spent	Amount of wheat loss due to under-payment (MT)	Total Amount of Wheat Reimbursed (MT)	% of spent[2]	Amount of resources lost due to non-use (MT)	% of AO	Amount of resources lost due misuse (MT)[3]
76	552	63156.00	54062.00	51052.00	67.80	8241.00	16.00	Not incl. in caln.	42811.0000	83.86	12104.00	19.00	8241.00
77	1160	102855.30	78461.00	77472.00	64.40	11268.00	14.50	Not inc. in caln.	66204.0000	85.50	25383.30	24.70	11268.00
78	1020	109999.25	98338.00	96347.00	78.00	10356.00	10.70	Not incl. in caln.	85991.0000	89.30	13652.25	12.40	10356.00
79	1158	120387.55	109949.00	108605.00	78.80	13721.00	12.60	Not incl. in caln.	94884.0000	87.40	11782.55	9.80	13721.00
80	913	121398.51	105396.00	104123.00	75.00	12833.00	12.30	11012.00	91290.0000	77.00	17275.51	14.20	23845.00
81	1027	139152.68	117428.00	114161.00	65.00	26097.00	22.90	As per Audit‡ 11013.00	As per Audit‡ 80278.0000 88064.0000 77051.0000	67.50	24991.68	18.00	37110.00
82	936	102067.66	92204.00	90754.00	83.00	5986.78	6.60	18967.53	65799.0000	72.50	11313.66	11.00	24955.00
83	1200	104333.26	99785.00	98923.00	86.60	6586.39	6.70	19274.67	71061.9344	71.80	5410.27	5.20	27861.00
84	1152	118310.09	109666.86	107954.34	74.60	19744.47	18.30	14113.80	74096.0700	68.60	10355.75	8.75	33858.27
85	1209	134426.12	123517.61	121420.93	76.80	18224.76	15.00	11807.19	91388.9700	75.30	13005.19	9.67	30031.96
86	1034	115158.46	107799.70	106048.09	89.65	19246.69	17.85	8878.71	77922.6845	73.48	9110.37	7.91	29877.02
GRAND TOTAL	11361	1231244.88	1096607.17	1076860.36	-	154305.09	14.33	-	827487.6589	76.84	154384.53	12.54	251124.25
RABI SEASON	2591	21539.12	-	17337.00	-	-	-	-	17337.0000	-	-	-	-

‡ As per Audit, deduction of 22,025 MT for underpayment/cash payment in FY '80 and FY '81 ; deduction distributed equally.

1. AO = Allotment Orders, Food For Work wheat allotments to the Upazilas by the Bangladesh central government made jointly with CARE.
2. Column 11 shows the percentage of wheat used as authorized according to CARE estimates. Note that the national average for 1986 matched the estimate made by the MSI study team for the 58 upazilas used in the secondary data analysis.
3. Column 14 shows in metric tons the annual amount of wheat estimated lost due to misappropriation. Roughly 30,000 metric tons were estimated lost in 1986.

ANNEX 5

ANNEX 6

LIST OF SECONDARY DATA UPAZILAS BY CARE SUB-OFFICE AND DISTRICT*

COMILLA

Comilla
Rebidwar
Homna
Muradnagar

Brahmanbaria
Sarail

Chandpur
Faridganj

Noakhali
Noakhali

Laximpur
Ramgati

DHAKA

Dhaka
Savar

Gazipur
Gazipur

Manikganj
Ghiar

Munshiganj
Ga[illegible]ria
Se[illegible]ajdikhan

Narayanganj
Rupganj

Narsingdi
Belabo

KHULNA

Khulna
Daulatpur
Terakhada

Bagherat
Bagherat

Jhenaidah
Jhenaidah
Kaliganj

Magura
Magura
Mohammedpur

Narail
Narail
Kalia

Kushtia
Kushtia

Meherpur
Meherpur

MYMENSINGH

Mymensingh
Phulpur

Netrakona
Barhatta

Kishoreganj
Bajitpur
Kishoreganj
Nikli

Jamalpur
Jamalpur
Sarishabari

Sherpur
Jhenagati
Sherpur

Tangail
Shakhipur

RAJSHAHI

Rajshahi
Puthia

Natore
Ralpur

Natore
Naogoan
Badalgachi

Nawabganj
Shibganj

Pabna
Sujanagar

Serajganj
Belkuchi
Shahjadpur
Ullapara

Bogra
Adamdighi
Galitali
Shariakandi

RANGPUR

Rangpur
Badarganj
Kaunia

Gaibandha
Gaibandha
Palashbari
Sughata

Kurigram
Kurigram
Ullipur

Dinajpur
Kahrole
Parbatipur

Thakurgaon
Pirganj

Panchagarh
Rebiganj

* Index: **SUB-OFFICE**, District, Upazila

ANNEX 7

FFW SECONDARY DATA ANALYSIS OUTPUT

TABLE 1
INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES
USED IN THE SECONDARY DATA ANALYSIS
OF SAMPLE OF 58 UPAZILAS

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	N	Mean	Std Dev	Minimum	Maximum
Number of Unions	57	11.75	4.22	4.00	21.00
Land Area (sq.mi.)	58	108.29	45.31	40.00	233.00
Population (1981) (pop.in thousands)	58	240.28	94.79	105.00	477.00
Total Wheat Allotment 1986-87 (MT-metric tons)	58	1154.12	454.12	516.00	2310.00
CARE Wheat Allotment 1985-86 (MT-metric tons)	58	406.29	171.86	186.00	905.00
Number of CARE Roads	58	3.83	1.71	2.00	9.00
Number of WFP Scheme Roads	58	4.83	3.29	0.00	14.00
Percentage of Final Wage Paid	58	92.76	18.13	61.00	198.00
Number of 1985 CARE Structures	58	2.21	1.56	0.00	6.00
Upazila Level of Distress (Low: 1.0-1.1; Medium:1.2-1.3; High:1.4-1.5)	58	1.22	.14	1.00	1.50
Average Daily Wage Rate 198 (Takas per day)	37	26.70	6.33	15.00	45.00
PIO Technical or Non technical (Technical=1,Non-technical=0)	58	1.16	.37	1.00	2.00
Ratio of CARE wheat to Total Wheat	58	35.40	5.00	16.39	47.55

DEPENDENT VARIABLES	N	Mean	Std Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Percentage of CARE Wheat Spent (CARE estimate)	58	89.16	14.38	35.00	100.00
Percentage of Work Completed (CARE estimate)	58	70.93	17.56	28.21	100.00
Percentage of Spent Wheat Used in Road Work (CARE estimate)	58	72.66	17.01	28.50	100.00
Percentage of Work Completed (UPZ estimate)	58	87.22	14.65	33.00	100.00
Percentage of Spent Wheat Used in Road Work (UPZ estimate)	58	97.75	2.66	91.36	102.33

TABLE 2

CROSS-TABULATION OF THE PERCENTAGE OF WHEAT SPENT BY CARE SUB OFFICE

Care Suboffice	# of Upazilas	Mean	Std. Dev
COMILLA	7	89.8571	7.9462
DHAKA	6	76.3333	28.1117
KHULNA	11	89.7273	11.9674
MYMENSINGH	11	95.7273	6.8131
RAJSHAHI	12	87.2500	10.8135
RANGPUR	11	90.6364	16.5667
FOR ENTIRE SAMPLE	58	89.1552	14.3842

TABLE 3

CROSS-TABULATION OF THE PERCENTAGE OF SPENT WHEAT USED IN ROAD WORK BY CARE SUBOFFICE

Care Suboffice	# of Upazilas	Mean	Std. Dev
COMILLA	7	73.6142	5.7297
DHAKA	6	80.5711	13.2241
KHULNA	11	86.1260	11.9891
MYMENSINGH	11	74.1796	16.6748
RAJSHAHI	12	68.1388	5.7465
RANGPUR	11	57.6689	23.9158
FOR ENTIRE SAMPLE	58	72.6571	17.0095

TABLE 4

PERFORMANCE ON CARE STRUCTURES 1985-86
USED AS PREDICTOR OF ROAD WORK PERFORMANCE

Levels of Performance		% CARE Wheat Spent & Performance on Structures[4]		% Spent Wheat Used Used in Road Work & Performance on Structures[4]		% Road Work Completed & & Performance on Structures[4]	
	# of UPZs	Mean	Std Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Low[1]	40	88.1750	15.8177	67.9432	16.8864	66.7020	17.6203
Average[2]	13	89.4615	11.6592	77.4742	8.8590	75.0569	11.4979
High[3]	5	96.2000	5.4037	97.8440	4.0738	94.0780	8.1426
Entire Sample	58	89.1552	14.3812	72.6571	17.0095	70.9347	17.5598

Notes:

1. Low (Completion Problems 1985 & 1986)

2. Average (Timely Completion 1985 or 1986)

3. High (Timely Completion 1985 & 1986)

4. Performance on structures calculated by assigning a score of 1 to low-performing, 2 to average-performing, and 3 to high-performmning Upazilas in the sample of 58 Upazilas

ANNEX 8

Public Notice Example (in English)

DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN DAUDPUR UNION OF RUPGONJ UPAZILA
(March '86 to August '86).

Dear Brothers and Sisters,

Aschalamu Alaikum. You will be happy to know that the Upazila Parishad has approved a number of schemes for the Daudpur Union to be implemented during the period of March '86 to August '86 as recommended by the Daudpur Union Parishad. Necessary amount of wheat and money has also been alloted. If you become aware of these schemes and the respective allotment you will be able to participate in the development activities of your area and can help the Project Implementation Committee or the contractor. As a result, development activities can be strengthened. With these in mind, I am presenting you a list of schemes in the following chart. If you observe any irregularity in these development activities, please bring it immediately to the note of the union parishad chairman or ward members for action.

I would like your continued support so that I can serve you in producing similar lists of development activities which will be approved by the Upazila Parishad for your union. Khuda Hafez, Bangladesh Zindabad.

LIST OF DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES
Daudpur Union

Sl No.	Name of Project	Alloted Tk.	Alloted wheat/ rice	Disbursed Tk.	Disbursed wheat/ rice	Name of Contractor & PIC Chairman
1	Daudpur Union Community Centre	27000	-	-	-	Nazim & Co.
2	Daudpur Putisa Govt Primary School	80055	-	-	-	Ahmed Rashid PIC Chairman
3	Upazila Football Leaque	8000	-	-	-	Rafiqul Hasan
4	Bagpara Irrigation Drain Construction	19399	-	19399	-	Afshar Uddin
5	Tree Plantation Project	3000	-	3000	-	Rafiqul Hasan
6	Nurunnessa High School	10000	-	10000	-	Nazuml Haque
7	Krishak Shramik High School	5000	-	5000	-	Afsar Uddin
8	Deboi Senior Madrasha	2500	-	2500	-	Rustam Ali
9	Deboi Kabirajbag Senior Madrasha	7500	-	-	-	Samsuddin Ahmad

10	Beldi Senior Madrasha	7500	-	-	-	Rafiqul Hasan
11	Chair & Bench Procurement Project	7500	-	-	-	Do
12	Khaspatina Sahir Alir Bari-Fo.Ma.Rastha	2000	-	2000	-	M. Iman Ali
13	Choripara-Kanggila Rd	3000	-	3000	-	Rafiqul Hasan
14	Kamal Kati Khoisha Rd	4000	-	4000	-	Nazmul Munir
15	Thana Parishad Road (Patina-Mirabox's Hs)	2000	-	2000	-	Mazam Ali
16	Bagla (Mollah's Hs.) Hankurnu (Mollah's Hs.) Road	6000	-	6000	-	A. Hamid
17	Tanbeldi-Beldi Madrasha Road	3000	-	3000	-	Afsar Uddin
18	Pinglan Rajun's Hs.-Rajun's House	5000	-	5000	-	Rafiqul Hasan
19	Majhipara-Kalane Primary School	4000	-	4000	-	Do
20	Digliar Tag-Thaboi Rd	1000	-	1000	-	Do
21	Shemulia-shemultala Road	3000	-	3000	-	Do
22	For the Women Road Maintenance Crew	3312	-	3312	-	Rafiqul Hasan
23	RCC Pipe Project	2022	-	2022	-	Do
24	Beldi Bazar-Khoisha Road Construction	-	37500 KG	-	37500 KG	Mazam Ali
25	Land development for Agla Primary School	-	3830	-	3830	Altaf Hoscan Sc.
26	Land development for Beldi Darul Hadisia Madrasha		6400	-	6400	Afsar Uddin
27	Land development for Beldi Orphanage	-	3830	-	3830	Rafiqul Hasan
28	Land development for Hafizia Furkania Madrasha	-	3830	-	3830	Rustam Ali
29	Land development for Krishak Shramik High School	-	6400	-	6400	Afsar Uddin
30	Land development for Debai Kazirag Senior Madrasa	-	6400	-	6400	Rafiqul Hasan
31	Land development for Nurunnesa High School	-	6400	-	6400	Iman Ali
32	Relief project for Beldi Orphanage	-	6624	-	6624	Orphanage Suptd.
33	VGF Project	-	6500	-	6500	Rafiqul Hasan
		215788	91644	78233	91634	

Faithfully
Majibur Rahman Bhuiyan
Chairman
Upazila Parishad, Rupganj
Narayanganj

ANNEX 9

দাবী ও সুপারিশ সমূহের সারসংক্ষেপ

(ক) দাবী সমূহ :

১। ১-৭-৭৭ ইং তারিখ হতে ৬২৫/- ১৩৩৫/- টাকার স্কেল প্রদান এবং নিয়োগ লাভের ৩ (তিন) বৎসর পর ৭৫০/- ১৪৭০/- টাকার সিলেকশন গ্রেড যথাসময়ে টাইম স্কেল প্রদানের ব্যবস্থা ত্বরান্বিত করুন।

২। উপজেলা প্রশাসন চালুর তারিখ হতে "উপজেলা প্রকল্প বাস্তবায়ন অফিসার" পদটিকে ১ম শ্রেণীতে উন্নীত করুন।

৩। বাস্তব ভিত্তিক নিয়োগ বিধি প্রণয়নের মাধ্যমে পদোন্নতির ব্যবস্থা ত্বরান্বিত করুন।

৪। বি,সি,এস (প্রশাসন) এ্যাসোসিয়েশন গঠন করুন।

৫। সুতন্ত্র অফিসের ব্যবস্থাসহ সুপার ভাইজার, হিসাব সহকারী, চেইনম্যান ও শ্রমিক নিয়োগের ব্যবস্থা করুন

৬। নন-টেকনিক্যাল পি,আই,ও দের যোগ্যতার ভিত্তিতে অন্যত্র নিয়োগের ব্যবস্থা করুন।

৭। উপজেলা প্রকল্প বাস্তবায়ন অফিসারদের উপজেলা পরিষদের সদস্যভুক্ত করুন।

৮। উপজেলা প্রকল্প বাস্তবায়ন অফিসারদের ব্যবহারের জন্য ১ (একটি) করে করে মটর সাইকেল প্রদান।

৯। অন্যায়ভাবে মামলায় জড়িয়ে পড়া পি,আই,ওদের বিষয় বিভাগীয় পৃষ্ঠ তদন্তের মাধ্যমে নিষ্পত্তির ব্যবস্থা করুন।

১০। উপজেলা প্রকল্প বাস্তবায়ন অফিসারগনকে শিক্ষা সফরে বিদেশ পাঠাবার ব্যবস্থা করুন।

(খ) সুপারিশ সমূহ :

১। আগামী অর্থ বছর হতে প্রতি উপজেলায় ১টি করে কাজের বিনিময়ে খাদ্য কর্মসূচীর অধীনে নির্মিত ও পুনঃনির্মিত রাস্তা পাকা করার ব্যবস্থা গ্রহন করুন।

২। কাজের বিনিময়ে খাদ্য কর্মসূচীর অধীন প্রকল্প সমূহ বাস্তবায়নে শ্রমিক মজুরীর নিম্নতম হার প্রতি হাজার ঘনফুট মাটির জন্য ৫০ সের হতে বাড়িয়ে ৬০ সের করুন।

৩। শ্রমের পরিবহন খরচের নিম্নতম হার প্রতি মাইলে ৩·৫০ টাকা হতে বাড়িয়ে ৫·০০ টাকা করুন।

ANNEX 9

TEN DEMANDS OF PIOS (TRANSLATION)

1. Salary scale shall be @ Taka 625 - 1335 per month with effect from July 1, 1977. After completion of three years service, PIOs shall be placed in the selection grade of Taka 750 - 1470 per month with provision made for service tenure.

2. The PIO position shall be upgraded to first class status (i.e. first class gazetted officer) with effect from the inception of the Upazila system.

3. The establishment of a Service Rule will be linked to the PIO position in order to allow for promotion to higher grades.

4. The introduction of B.C.S. (Administration, Relief) Cadre for PIOs.

5. Independent office space will be arranged for all PIOs as well as the provision of additional staff such as a Supervisor, an Accounts Assistant, Chairman and Peon.

6. Non-technical PIOs to be transferred from the FFW program to other programs based on their qualifications.

7. Approval of PIO's membership in the Upazila Parishad.

8. The provision of one motorcycle for each PIO.

9. To investigate and resolve all cases filed against PIOs.

10. To send PIOs abroad for training.

ANNEX 9

The news published in the daily Ittefaq on 04.12.86
by the Bangladesh Upazila Engineers Association
refuting the threat of strike of the PIOs

THE DAILY ITTEFAQ

Thursday, December 4, 1986

"মহামান্য রাষ্ট্রপতি সমীপে উপজেলা প্রকল্প বাস্তবায়ন অফিসার (পিআইও)দের বিভিন্ন দাবী ও ধর্মঘটের প্রেক্ষিতে 'উপজেলা প্রকৌশলী সমিতি'র বিনীত বক্তব্য"

"কাবের বিনিময়ে খাদ্য কর্মসূচী" উপজেলা পরিষদের নিকট সরকারের একটি 'হস্তান্তরিত বিষয়' (Transferred Subject)। উক্ত ৯-দফা দাবীর মধ্যে উপজেলা প্রকৌশলীর অধীনস্থ উপ-সহকারী প্রকৌশলী, নকশাকার, সার্ভেয়ার, কার্ড সহকারী প্রভৃতিসহ ২০ জন কর্মচারীদের চাকরি আত্তীকরণের মাধ্যমে বাস্তবায়িত হইতেছে। কাজেই এই কর্মসূচী বাস্তবায়নে উপজেলা প্রকল্প বাস্তবায়ন অফিসার একাই উক্তির অবতারণা এ ধরনের ভুল বিভ্রান্তিকর ও ভিত্তিহীন। এ প্রসঙ্গে উল্লেখ্য যে, উপজেলা প্রকৌশল সেট-আপের কর্মচারিগণ বিশেষভাবে দুশ্চিন্তাগ্রস্ত এবং গত দুই বৎসর উপরে পরী পূর্ত ও খাদ্য কর্মসূচী বাস্তবায়নে অতিরিক্ত দায়িত্ব বর্তমানে যথেষ্টভাবে চালু কাজের ক্ষতি-গ্রস্ত হচ্ছে। কর্মসূচীর বাস্তবায়ন সম্ভব হইতেছে। প্রকাশ থাকে যে, উপজেলা প্রকৌশল সেট-আপের কারিগরি জ্ঞান ও দক্ষতাকে কাজের বিনিময়ে খাদ্য' কর্মসূচী বাস্তবায়নের ক্ষেত্রে প্রয়োগ করার প্রয়োজনীয়তা বিশেষভাবে অনুভূত হওয়ায় ত্রাণ ও পুনর্বাসন মন্ত্রণালয়ের 'পাত্র নং-আর আর ডি/সিসি-এসি-১-৩০/৮৫'৩০৮(৬০০) তারিখ ১২-১-৮৫-এর মাধ্যমে এই কর্মসূচীতে উপজেলা প্রকৌশলীর সক্রিয় অংশগ্রহণের জন্য নির্দেশ দেওয়া হইয়াছে। কাবের বিনিময়ে খাদ্য কর্মসূচীর মাধ্যমে বাস্তবায়িত প্রকল্পসমূহ উপজেলা পরিষদের সার্বিক উন্নয়ন পরিকল্পনার অংশ বিধায় উক্ত কর্মসূচী বাস্তবায়নে উপজেলা প্রকৌশলীর সক্রিয় ভূমিকা অনস্বীকার্য। এ প্রসঙ্গে উল্লেখ্য যে, উপজেলা পরিষদ ম্যানুয়েলে (১ম খণ্ড, পৃষ্ঠা-৬০) প্রথম উপজেলা প্রকৌশলীর 'চার্টার অব ডিউটিজে' উপজেলা পরিষদের সাংগঠনিক সকল প্রকার উন্নয়নমূলক কার্যক্রমের পরিকল্পনা ও বাস্তবায়নের দায়িত্ব উপজেলা প্রকৌশলীর উপর ন্যস্ত করা হইয়াছে। প্রকাশ থাকে যে, বর্তমানে উপজেলা পরিষদের কাবের বিনিময়ে খাদ্য কর্মসূচীর আওতায় পাকা কাজের (রীড/আরসিসি) প্রকল্প চিহ্নিতকরণ ও বাস্তবায়ন উপজেলা প্রকৌশলীর দায়িত্বে ন্যস্ত হইয়াছে এবং দায়িত্বপ্রাপ্তগণ তাহা সুষ্ঠুভাবে সম্পন্ন হইতেছে এবং দায়িত্বপ্রাপ্তগণ তাহা সুষ্ঠুভাবে সম্পন্ন করিতেছেন। উপজেলা পরিষদ সমূহে সাধারণতঃ মাটির কাজের প্রকল্প বাস্তবায়নের জন্য বাংলাদেশ সরকার (General) কেয়ার ও বিশ্বখাদ্য কর্মসূচী হইতে খাদ্য বরাদ্দ করা হয়। কেয়ার ও বিশ্বখাদ্য কর্মসূচীর নিকট হইতে প্রাপ্ত সম্পদের দ্বারা বাস্তবায়িত প্রকল্পগুলি যাহা পরিবেশ এনভায়রনমেন্ট ও ইকোলজি-এর জন্য উপজেলা প্রকৌশল সেট-আপ ছাড়াও উক্ত সাহায্য প্রতিষ্ঠান দুইটিরও অনস্বীকার্য ভূমিকা রহিয়াছে। এখানে আরও উল্লেখ্য যে, বিশ্বখাদ্য কর্মসূচী (WFP) সমগ্র বাংলাদেশে তাহাদের মোট বরাদ্দের সর্বমোট ২৫ ভাগ মাত্র উপজেলা পরিষদগুলির মাধ্যমে দান করে ও বাকী ৭৫% খাদ্য সাহায্য বাংলাদেশ পানি উন্নয়ন বোর্ডের মাধ্যমে বাস্তবায়িত হয়। উপজেলা পর্যায়ে "কাবের বিনিময়ে খাদ্য কর্মসূচীতে" সফলতার হার উপজেলার মাটির কাজের প্রকল্পের সংখ্যা ১০ হইতে ১২টি মাত্র। উপজেলা পরিষদের উক্ত প্রকল্পগুলি শুধু বাস্তবায়ন উপজেলা প্রকৌশলীসহ সমগ্র কারিগরি কর্মচারী/কর্মচারীদের সহিত আলোচনার মাধ্যমেই উক্ত কাজসমূহ বাস্তবায়িত হয়।

প্রকাশ থাকে যে, এই কর্মসূচীতে ধরা উপজেলা প্রকৌশলীর অংশগ্রহণ ও তাঁহার ব্যবহৃত যন্ত্রপাতি (Levelling Instrument) ব্যবহারের মাধ্যমে কাজের মান উন্নতকরণ ও গতি ত্বরান্বিত করা সম্ভব। সুতরাং প্রকল্প বাস্তবায়ন অফিসারদের ১০ দফা দাবীনামার ৩ নং দাবীতে নূতনভাবে সুপারভাইজার ও চেইনম্যান নিয়োগের যে প্রস্তাব রাখা হইয়াছে তাহার আদৌ কোন প্রয়োজন নাই বরং ইহা সরকারী সীমিত সম্পদের উপর চাপ সৃষ্টিই করিবে মাত্র এবং উক্ত কাজে উপজেলা প্রকৌশলীর উন্নতর কারিগরি জ্ঞান ও অভিজ্ঞতা কাজে লাগানোরই একমাত্র সুযোগ কৌশল মাত্র। প্রকল্প বাস্তবায়ন অফিসারগণ মূলতঃ ডি, ডি, এও, পরবর্তীতে সাহায্য ও কাবের বিনিময়ে খাদ্য কর্মসূচীর পদ বিভাজনের কারণে নিয়োজিত আছেন। এই সকল কাজ বাস্তবায়নে উপজেলা প্রকৌশল সেট-আপ সরাসরি জড়িত। এ প্রসঙ্গে উল্লেখ্য যে, উপ-সহকারী প্রকৌশলী (শিক্ষা) উপজেলা পরিষদের ম্যানুয়েলে দেওয়া বর্ণনানুযায়ী অনুযায়ী শিক্ষা বহির্ভূত প্রকল্প সমূহে (Project Post) উপজেলা প্রকৌশলীর তত্ত্বাবধানে কর্মরত আছেন। প্রকল্প বাস্তবায়ন অফিসারগণও কারিগরি শিক্ষা ও ব্যতিরেকে উক্ত উপ-সহকারী প্রকৌশলীর (শিক্ষা) সমমর্যাদার বিধায় তাহারাও প্রকল্প চলাকালীন সময়ে উপজেলা নির্বাহী অফিসারের হাতে অফিসার ছাড়াও উপজেলা প্রকৌশলীর তত্ত্বাবধানে দায়িত্ব পালন করিতে পারেন। ইহাতে উপজেলা পরিষদসমূহ "কাবের বিনিময়ে খাদ্য কর্মসূচী" বাস্তবায়নে কারিগরি ও প্রশাসনিক দিক হইতে অধিকতর শক্তিশালী হইতে পারে। কর্মসূচীতে প্রকল্প বাস্তবায়ন অফিসারদের সম্পৃক্ততার প্রয়োজন নাই বলার জন্য সরকার তাহাদের চাকুরী উপজেলা প্রকৌশল সেট-আপের অন্তর্ভুক্ত করিয়া পুনরায়ত্তে উপজেলা প্রকৌশলীর পদে সম্পৃক্ততার ব্যবস্থা করিতে পারেন।

অতএব, ১০ দফা দাবী আদায়ের জন্য প্রকল্প বাস্তবায়ন অফিসারগণ গত ২২-১১-৮৬ তারিখে প্রবর্তন কর্মবিরতির মাধ্যমে যে বিশৃঙ্খলার সৃষ্টি করেন এবং আগামী ১৭ ও ১৮ই ডিসেম্বর তারিখে পুনরায় কর্মবিরতি আহ্বান করিয়াছেন তাহা উহার ও তাহাদের স্বার্থের পরিপন্থী বলিয়া আমরা মনে করি।

বাংলাদেশ উপজেলা প্রকৌশলীর সমিতির পক্ষে--

মোঃ আবদুস সহীদ,
সাধারণ সম্পাদক।
বাংলাদেশ উপজেলা প্রকৌশলী সমিতি ও
উপজেলা প্রকৌশলী, আটোপকরা, বরিশাল।

মোঃ আলাউদ্দিন,
সভাপতি।
বাংলাদেশ উপজেলা প্রকৌশলী সমিতি ও
উপজেলা প্রকৌশলী, কলাপাড়া, পটুয়াখালী।

ANNEX 9

Translation from Bengali

THIS NEWS PUBLISHED IN THE DAILY ITTEFAQ ON 04.12.86 BY
THE BANGLADESH UPAZILA ENGINEERS ASSOCIATION REFUTING
THE THREAT OF STRIKE OF THE PIOs

'Food For Works Programme' is a transferred subject of the Government to the Upazila Parishad. The programme is mainly being implemented with direct involvement of 26 staff of the Upazila Engineers which include Assistant Engineers, Draftsman, Surveyor and Works Assistants. It is mentioned that only the Project Implementation Officer is involved in the implementation of Food For Works Programme (FFWP) in addition to their normal functioning. It may be mentioned that the employees of the Upazila Engineering set-up are specially trained and since they are experienced in implementing Rural Works and Food for Works for 2 decades, it has now been possible to implement the large scale Food For Works Programme. It may also be indicated that in recognition of the necessity to utilize the technical knowledge and skills of the Upazila Engineering set-up, the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation issued instructions for the active involvement of the Upazila Engineer in implementation of FFW Programme vide Memo No. RRD/PC-AC-1-35/85/306(460) dated 12.09.85. Since Food For Works Programme is a part of the over-all development programme of the Upazila Parishads, the active involvement of the Upazila Engineer in implementing this programme cannot be denied. It may be mentioned that as per 'Charter of Duties' of the Upazila Engineer as laid down in the Upazila Administration Manual (Vol.I - Page 40), the responsibility of planning and implementation of all the development activities of the Upazila Parishad has been vested with them. It may further be mentioned that planning and implementation of the structure schemes (bridge/culvert) under FFWP of the Upazila Parishads are being handled smoothly by the Upazila Engineers and this has been highly appreciated by the donor agencies. For implementation of earth work schemes, foodgrain is provided to the Upazila Parishads by the Government (for General Schemes), CARE and World Food Programme (WFP). For field supervision and monitoring of implementation of schemes out of resources available from CARE and WFP, there are personnel from those two agencies in addition to the Upazila Engineering set-up. It may also be mentioned that out of total allocation of WFP, only 25% goes to the Upazila Parishads and the remaining 75% food assistance is channelled through the Bangladesh Water Development Board(BWDB). In average, the total number of earth work scheme under FFWP in a particular upazila is about 10-12. Smooth implementation of such schemes of the Upazila Parishads takes place through integrated participation of the Upazila [illegible] including the Upazila Engineer.

It may be mentioned that it is possible to improve the speed and quality of implementation of FFW schemes with direct participation of Upazila Engineer by using Levelling Instruments and other equipments of his office. So, there is no need for the proposed recruitment of Supervisor and Chainman as per item 5 of the 10 point Charter of Demands of the Project Implementation Officers, which will create unnecessary pressure on the limited resources of the government and also that this is a technical plea for not using the higher technical capability and experience of the Upazila Engineers in FFW activities. The Project Implementation Officers are mainly engaged in distribution of wheat for VGF, test relief, general relief, and FFW Programme while the Upazila Engineering set-up is directly involved in implementation of such schemes. It may be mentioned in this connection that the Sub-Assistant Engineer(Education) which is a Project Post under the Ministry of Education has been working under the supervision of the Upazila Engineer as per the organogram included in the Upazila Parishad Manual. The Project Implementation Officer who is equivalent to the Sub-Assistant Engineer (Education) in relation to their technical education and skill can also work under the supervision of the Upazila Engineer in addition to working as a staff officer to the Upazila Nirbahi Officer. If this is adopted, implementation of FFW schemes of the Upazila Parishad may be strengthened more from technical and administrative points of view. Government may consider the question of inclusion the Project Implementation Officer under the Upazila Engineering set-up for ensuring phase-wise promotion of them to the post of Upazila Engineer.

So, we consider the strike observed by the PIOs on 29.11.86 and fresh call for strike on 17th and 18th December for materialising their 10 points Charter of Demand as illegal in the context of development and national interest.

Sd/- 04.12.86

(Md. Abdus Shahid)
General Secretary
Bangladesh Upazila Engineers Association
and
Upazila Engineer, Agailjhara, Barisal

Sd/- 04.12.86

(Md. Alauddin)
President
Bangladesh Upazila Engineers Association
and
Upazila Engineer, Rupganj, Narayanganj

ANNEX 10

EQUIPMENT, SKILL LEVEL & TIME SPAN ESTIMATIONS FOR VARIOUS ASPECTS OF FEEDER ROAD IMPROVEMENT

Functions	Equipment	Skill level	days
1. Traffic data Collection/Assessment	-	Graduate Engr. either UE or XEN.	7
2. Engineering Survey	Level, tape/chain, prismatic compass, plain table etc.	Surveyor or SAE with two skilled labors as chainman/ staff man.	2 days in field 3 days in office work for one km survey.
2a. Subgrade survey (soil density and CBR survey)	Laboratory equipments like density test and CBR test.	UE or XEN if trained for laboratory works.	15 days for one km
3. Hydrological survey for bridges and culverts.	Level, tape ranging rods etc.	UE or XEN	One day in field and one day at office for expected one structure per km.
3a. Sub soil investigations and laboratory tests for samples collected from different layer for bridges usually above 30/40 ft. span.	Boring equipments soil lab equipment etc.	Private consulting firms.	5 days in the field and 20 days at lab and office for an average set of 3 borings of approximately 40 to 50 ft. depth.
4. Design of pavement and design of structures (prepare design chart for variable sub grade	-	do	3-4 months work for a medium level A/E firm.

EQUIPMENT, SKILL LEVEL, & TIME SPAN ESTIMATES FOR VARIOUS ASPECTS OF FEEDER ROAD IMPROVEMENTS

Functions	Equipment	Skil - level	days
CBR for pavement and design chart for variable height and span of bridge).			
5. Drawings for designed road pavement and bridges/culverts.	Drafting table and drawing equipments.	Draftsman supervised by UE.	15 days for one km road and one structure.
6. Quantity and cost estimation.	-	(XEN prepare rate schedule from district level) UE.	10 days.
7. Specification and Tender document preparation.	-	UE	5 days.
8. Tendering	-	UC/UE	25 days.
9. Tendering evaluation	-	Tender, Committee (UE, UNO and finance officer).	2 days.

Functions	Equipment	Skill level	days
10. Award of work	-	UC	One day.
11. Supervision	Transport M/C, road equipment (i.e. road rollers, mixer vibrator etc.) water pump.	XEN/UE and SAE.	Work period 1 km 6 months 1 structure 6 mos to 17 months.
12. Payments		XEN/UE and SAE and UC UZ finance officer UNO.	5 days for each progress payment.
13. Final A/C, Disputes etc.	-	XEN/UC/UE	3-5 days.
14. Maintenance period.	-	UE/SAE	One year/six months few visit to the sites.

Note: XEN or UE must have 2-3 years of experience in road construction work.

ANNEX II

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