

AID 1025-1 (7-71) (FACE SHEET)
NONCAPITAL PROJECT PAPER (PROP)

(Sequence No. 493-9)

I. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION

1. PROJECT TITLE Civil Police Administration		APPENDIX ATTACHED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
3. RECIPIENT (specify) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> COUNTRY <u>Thailand</u> <input type="checkbox"/> REGIONAL <input type="checkbox"/> INTERREGIONAL		2. PROJECT NO. (M.O. 1095.2) 493-11-710-119
4. LIFE OF PROJECT BEGINS FY <u>1977</u> ENDS FY <u>1974</u>		5. SUBMISSION <input type="checkbox"/> ORIGINAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REV. NO. <u>2</u> DATE <u>3/22/72</u> CONTR./PASA NO.

II. FUNDING (\$000) AND MAN MONTHS (MM) REQUIREMENTS

A. FUNDING BY FISCAL YEAR	B. TOTAL \$	C. PERSONNEL		D. PARTICIPANTS		E. COMMODITIES \$	F. OTHER COSTS \$	G. PASA/CONTR.		H. LOCAL EXCHANGE CURRENCY RATE: \$ US <u>1=120</u> (U.S. OWNED)		
		(1) \$	(2) MM	(1) \$	(2) MM			(1) \$	(2) MM	(1) U.S. GRANT LOAN	(2) COOP COUNTRY	
											(A) JOINT	(B) BUDGET
1. PRIOR THRU ACTUAL FY	68,426	8,674	4452	1,748	1680	54,290		3,714	-		31,423	594,159
2. OPRN FY 1972	4,800	1,310	528	142	80	3,297		33	18		5,255	83,700
3. BUDGET FY 1973	5,451	1,000	396	211	194	3,780		460	228		5,200	90,000
4. BUDGET +1 FY 1974	4,086	800	312	200	178	3,040		40	16		4,500	100,000
5. BUDGET +2 FY												
6. BUDGET +3 FY												
7. ALL SUBQ. FY												
8. GRAND TOTAL												

9. OTHER DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS

(A) NAME OF DONOR	DESCRIPTION OF GOODS SERVICES	(C) AMOUNT
Germany	Survey of Traffic pattern in Bangkok	
Australia	Survey of Aviation Division Maintenance	1,800

10. ORIGINATING OFFICE CLEARANCE

1. DRAFTER Philip D. Batson	TITLE ASST. Director, Pub. Aff. Sec.	DATE 3/17/72
Charles J. Molfetto	Program and Reports Officer	3/17/72
2. CLEARANCE OFFICER Rey M. Hill	TITLE Director, USOM/Thailand	DATE 3/21/72

IV. PROJECT AUTHORIZATION

1. CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

2. CLEARANCES

BUR OFF.	SIGNATURE	DATE	BUR OFF.	SIGNATURE	DATE

3. APPROVAL AAS OR OFFICE DIRECTORS

SIGNATURE _____ DATE _____
 TITLE _____

4. APPROVAL AID (See M.O. 1025.1 VIC)

SIGNATURE _____ DATE _____
 ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

NONCAPITAL PROJECT PAPER (PROP)
Civil Police Administration Project
(Revised FY 1972-FY 1974)

A. The Project Goal

1. Goal Statement

One of the goals of the Third Five Year (1972-1976) Economic and Social Development Plan of the Royal Thai Government (RTG) is to provide security for the people of Thailand. The role of the Thailand National Police Department (TNPd) in the attainment of this goal is to provide protection against crime and communist terrorism and subversion. The project goal is the achievement of a balanced general law enforcement agency capable of establishing and maintaining internal security throughout the Kingdom.

2. Measurement of Goal Achievement

A decrease in insurgency levels in populated areas and a reduced rate of crime throughout the Kingdom.

3. Assumptions of Goal Achievement

- (a) External support for the insurgency will not increase to a degree which will hamper RTG efforts to respond.
- (b) RTG military forces will perform their mission of attacking large armed insurgent bands in unpopulated base areas.
- (c) The RTG will increase TNPd manpower and provide funds in support of a modern efficient police institution.
- (d) Causes of crime and insurgency will be combatted by effective RTG administration of economic and social programs.
- (e) TNPd undertakes active measures to counter-insurgent recruitment and efforts to expand into populated areas, in conjunction with overall RTG counter-insurgency strategy.

B. The Project Purpose

1. Statement of Purpose

- (a) Develop and institutionalize law enforcement elements capable of:

- (1) effectively protecting populated areas from terrorist activities, identifying and neutralizing the insurgent infrastructure, blocking infiltration routes, preventing new insurgent organizational efforts, and preventing and combatting criminal activity;
- (2) effectively coordinating these efforts in combination with the employment of military civilian para-military forces to suppress active insurgency in accordance with the overall RTG plans, and isolate insurgents from community contact.

2. Conditions Expected at End of Project

The para-military element of the TNPDP currently consists of 10,500 Border Patrol Police (BPP) officers and men and 2,700 Special Action Forces (SAF) personnel under the command of the Provincial Police. This specialized element has a total of 476 officers, 3,100 non-commissioned officers and 9,424 constables. Approximately 20 percent of the BPP personnel and 50 percent of the SAF's are currently deployed in areas where there is little or no significant insurgent activity. In addition to the deployment weakness, there is a shortage of 3,462 personnel to meet jointly (PS/TNPDP) approved TO&E requirements; serious equipment shortages (individual equipment, weapons to consist of assault rifles*, mortars and ammunition*, radios and vehicles), and the need to reorganize into a single command for CI operations.

At the end of the project it is expected that there will be 60 company sized units (201 officers and men) deployed in critical areas, trained and equipped to meet acceptable standards of operational effectiveness.

Public Safety and the TNPDP have determined that there are 300 police tambon stations and 200 amphoe (district) police stations located in critical areas which require priority assistance to meet Thailand's rural law enforcement/counter-insurgency needs. Currently, these stations are understaffed; personnel are not trained CI operations; equipment and weapons are inadequate in numbers and suitability for the mission the rural stations have. (individual equipment, assault rifles*, vehicles and radios).

*The RTG will provide seven thousand assault rifles. To allow additional time for the TNPDP to build up its own ammunition supplies through direct means, USOM support for normal ammunition requirements will extend through FY 1972, and in FY 1973, as a transitional measure USOM will consider limited ammunition support for special situations, including new initiatives or to alleviate unusual depletions of ammunition made necessary by sharply increased counter-insurgency actions.

At the end of the project, these priority amphoe and tambon police stations will be fully manned with trained personnel and equipped (in accordance with jointly approved TO&E) to significantly contribute to the overall RTG effort.

3. Basic Assumptions

- (a) External support to the insurgency will not increase substantially.
- (b) Population movements from rural to urban Thailand will not seriously affect the development of the TNPD into a modern police institution during the life of this project. It should be noted, however, that the TNPD must take population movements into account in planning intermediate (3-10 years) and long range (10-20 years) development.
- (c) The TNPD will continue to implement necessary changes to modernize management and administrative practices at all levels.

C. Statement of Project Outputs

	Prior Years Summary	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	Total
1. Trained and equipped personnel assigned to approximately 300 Tambon Stations in priority areas.	1,500	2,000	2,000	2,500	8,000
2. Trained and equipped personnel assigned to Border Control and Mobile support companies.	6,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	9,000
3. Reorganization of 54 existing Special Action Forces (SAF) Platoons (50 man units) into 14 companies (201 men each and deployed into priority areas.	N/A	14	-	-	14
4. BPP Operational Elements re-organized into companies (201 men), trained equipped and re-deployed.	14	15	15	16	60
5. A parachute aerial reinforcement company (230 men) and other supporting elements, staffed, trained, equipped and deployed.	3	1	-	-	4

	Prior Years Summary	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	Total
6. Border Security Volunteer Teams (30 man units) established, trained, equipped and deployed.	25	5	15	15	60
7. Amphoe police station in priority areas reorganized, retrained and equipped.	N/A	100	100	-	200
8. Tambon Stations in priority areas staffed, trained and equipped.	*238	150	100	50	538
9. Trained medical aid-men assigned to police operational units.	1,000	300	300	300	1,900
10. TNPB personnel completed training at CI Training Centers.	3,500	4,000	4,000	4,000	15,500
11. Police National Operational Center established.	-	1	-	-	1
12. Effective Police Regional Coordination Centers activated.	-	9	-	-	9
13. Police Operations Centers established at priority Amphoes and all BPP company levels.	14	100	100	46	260
14. A self sustained increased air-lift capability by better management, improved maintenance capability (in-house or contract), and increased input of aircraft capacity, with fixed wing aircraft to be utilized wherever possible.					See Course of Action Section

*Figure represent only tambols in high crime rate and insurgent threatened areas which can be treated during the PROP life. Approximately 200 other tambols in less threatened areas have been equipped by USOM and manned by TNPB. This leaves approximately 400 more stations of lesser priority to be treated as necessary during subsequent period.

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Prior
Years
Summary FY 72 FY 73 FY 74 Total

15. Modern management and administrative practices institutionalized throughout the TNPd.

Basic Assumptions as related to Outputs

- (a) The RTG will provide funds to install, operate and maintain equipment.
- (b) The TNPd will assign equipment and trained personnel to meet requirements in priority areas as specified above.
- (c) Participant returnees are assigned to positions in which training received is utilized.
- (d) The TNPd will implement modern management and administrative practices at all levels of command.

D. Statement of Project Inputs

The inputs indicated below are for planning purposes only. These figures are subject to revision in accord with actual annual appropriations made available for project use by the RTG and AID. Figures are in thousands of dollars (or dollar equivalents), except as noted.

1. <u>U.S.G. Inputs</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>Total</u>
Advisor and Support Staff	1,310	1,000	800	3,110
Contract Personnel	13**	350	40	403
Air Maintenance Contract	20	110	-	130
Participants	142(31)	211(97)	200(89)	553(217)
<u>Commodities</u>				
*Individual equipment	1,000	-	500	1,500
Weapons	300	200	-	500

*Based on jointly developed TO&E's, the TNPd is critically short of assault rifles and individual field equipment. Although their regular budget provides for approximately 1,000 assault rifles a year and about 5,000 units of individual equipment, based on current police strength, there is an immediate requirement for 7,000 additional assault rifles and 20,000 additional units of individual equipment. To help meet this requirement, TNPd and USOM officials have agreed in principle that:

1. The U.S.G. should provide \$1.5 million toward the purchase of individual equipment.
2. The RTG should provide 7,000 additional assault rifles.
3. The RTG should provide replacement support for individual equipment.

This TNPd/USOM agreement is now under consideration by other agencies of the RTG.

**JZT Contract #AID-493-559, Amendment #2, funded for \$283,000 in FY 1971 to cover first year of operation from February 1, 1972 to January 31, 1973.

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>Total</u>
Ammunition	373	200	-	573
Communications equipment	360	500	460	1,320
Vehicles including aircraft and spare parts	800	2,500	1,700	5,000
Miscellaneous equipment	322	200	220	620
Medical supplies	<u>160</u>	<u>180</u>	<u>160</u>	<u>500</u>
TOTAL	4,800	5,451	4,080	14,209

2. RTG Inputs

Additional trained personnel	(5,862)	(4,200)	(6,000)	(16,062)
Additional trained Border Security Volunteers	(300)	(450)	(300)	(1,050)
Air Maintenance Contract	2,000	2,000	2,250	6,250

Commodities

Individual equipment	330	330	330	990
Assault rifles and other weapons	500	500	500	1,500
Ammunition	250	500	500	1,250
Vehicles and spare parts	500	500	500	1,500
Helicopter (replacement)	1,000	-	-	1,000
Miscellaneous equipment	200	200	200	600
Medical supplies	<u>425</u>	<u>720</u>	<u>1,000</u>	<u>2,145</u>
TOTAL	5,205	4,750	5,280	15,235

() = number of personnel.

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Basic Assumptions Related to Inputs

- (a) U.S. will continue to provide funds for advisory services, training and material, in the amounts as specified in this PROP, to achieve the project purpose. In the event U.S. inputs are not available in the amounts estimated as scheduled above, additional time will be required to achieve the end conditions projected in this PROP.
- (b) The RTG will authorize increase in TNPDP manpower in quantities set forth in para D, 2, above.
- (c) The RTG will procure services, equipment and supplies in the category and amounts indicated above.

E. Rationale

The prior year PROP which described the Civil Police Administration Project is outdated in terms of present USOM areas of concentration and current RTG concerted action of coordinating Thai National Police unit action against insurgents, terrorists, and criminal elements threatening the security of the Thai society. Therefore an amended PROP is prepared in order to document how this USOM concentration of support and new Thai National Police Department (TNPDP) action influences future plans for project implementation.

The Royal Government of Thailand (RTG) is experiencing disruption of its planned program of economic and social development because of increased insurgency, banditry, and other criminal actions.

Since FY 1957 the RTG and USOM have cooperated in a program designed to increase the efficiency of the Thai National Police Department (TNPDP) through modernization of equipment, training of personnel and restructuring of the police organization. However, beginning in FY 1965, as a result of increased external communist pressures and increased insurgent activities (e.g., assassination of RTG officials, attacks against government installations and disruption of lines of communications) the previous project goal was redefined to include and emphasize the development of TNPDP capability to counter internal subversion, insurgency, and banditry.

Authorized police manpower was increased from approximately 55,000 officers and men in FY 1965 to the present level of 76,708 with an additional expected increase of 5,862 men in 1972. At the same time the TNPDP budget was increased from B729.8 million (\$36.5 million) in FY 1965 to B1,684.8 million (\$84.2 million) in FY 1972.

During this period, USOM inputs increased from a total obligation of \$11.7 millions (period of FY 1957 to FY 1964) to \$70.2 millions (period FY 1965 to FY 1971). Major inputs, consisting of advisors, participant training and equipment were focused on the creation of a Police Aviation Division, expansion of the Marine and Highway Police as well as on the improvement of mobility and communication capability of Provincial and Border Patrol Police. It is now time to reappraise the allocation of manpower and equipment in terms of current priorities.

The TNPD as a centralized national police force has a dual responsibility for law and order enforcement and for counter-insurgency and anti subversion activities. Since 1965, as the problem of insurgency increased, the law enforcement and CI missions have become diffused and layered throughout the various TNPD Divisions with minimum consideration given to integration. This is exemplified by the Provincial Police quick reaction units, the Special Action Forces (50 man units). Through FY 1971, fifty four (54) units had been organized, staffed, trained, equipped and deployed. Although these units have, on occasion, been used in CI and crime suppression operations they have too frequently been dispersed or left in static positions. This not only militates against a coordinated CI effort, but also diminishes police effectiveness in the area of regular law enforcement.

A major constraint on TNPD development of operational effectiveness in the next three years will probably be the Thai capacity to effectively utilize the capital inputs, which would be justified by the security situation. This holds for both the field operational considerations as well as for the administration of operations and maintenance budgets, material and manpower.

Given the structure of existing forces and expected increases, inherent in these constraints are limitations in capacity to:

1. Train,
2. Deploy manpower and equipment as and where needed,
3. Make needed management and strategic divisions relative to national roles and missions.
4. Focus on police operational priorities within the existing governmental structure including rules and regulations.

Mobile and Border Control forces have as a primary mission C.I. and border control to include quick reaction for all TNP elements and a secondary mission of remote area law enforcement and general reserve and support for all other police elements. Currently there are 10,300 personnel assigned, organized and functioning, which represents about 66% of authorized strength. The shortage of manpower is most acute in the junior officer and NCO levels.

Operational effectiveness is particularly inhibited by the lack of suitable weapons, shortages in field and individual equipment, inadequate dependent housing and law pay. Additional communications and transportation will also be required as these forces continue to expand. This project will focus on these critical deficiencies.

There are 654 Amphoe and 1,185 Tambon police stations in Thailand. Their primary mission is to maintain law and order to include bandit suppression and regular police services; a strong secondary mission is to conduct C.I. operations as required to maintain law and order. All Amphoe stations have trained manpower and equipment for adequate law and order enforcement under normal conditions. However, better organization of forces, adequately trained manpower and more efficient equipment will be needed if the Police are to cope with increased insurgency levels. While all Amphoes require some reorganization and training, approximately 200 require priority treatment in reorganization, training and selected commodity inputs. The Amphoe is the critical link in the implementation of Provincial Police (PP) policy and directives into effective law enforcement activities in the rural areas. The Amphoe is, at the same time, one of the weakest echelons in the PP, particularly in counter-subversion/insurgency operations. Amphoe police do not have the capability to collect, process, and utilize intelligence which will help identify, locate and neutralize the insurgents.

Within these 200 priority Amphoes are 249 non-decreed Tambon police stations which will receive royal decrees which officially authorizes budgets for manpower, training and equipment. Priority will be given to meeting all Tambon station needs in critical Amphoes over those in non-critical Amphoes, which may include new construction for approximately 50 stations even though some previously built Tambon stations in non-critical areas remain unmanned.

The field medical service has the mission to provide the TNP with a capability for emergency medical assistance and routine first aid to the police, their dependents, and villagers in remote areas. A field medical service staff and training facility is now functioning and has the capability to train 320 medics per year. TNP requires approximately 3,000 medics and currently has approximately 1,000.

RTG and USOM inputs will, in the main, be focused in areas determined to be critical because of the insurgent threat. However, it is also important that efforts continue to develop the TNPD into an increasingly modern police institution. Without adequate support from other elements such as Aviation Division, Marine Police, Crime Suppression Division, Education Bureau, Finance Division, Railway Police and Highway Police, the effectiveness of the C.I. oriented police units would be minimized. USOM assistance in institution building will primarily consist of advisory services, and participant training.

Training

Purpose: To provide institutionalized training for all elements of the TNPD with specific attention focused on special and advance counter-insurgency skills and in-service training. With USOM assistance, the TNPD has developed, staffed and equipped 14 training facilities with an output capability of approximately 17,000 trainee annually. The Education Bureau currently operates nine training schools which include, the Police Officers Cadet Academy, the Detective School, the Non-Commissioned Officers School and five recruit training schools. In addition, it provides guest lecturers and approved curricula for the five counter-insurgency training centers operated by PP and BPP and all in-service training conducted by the TNPD.

The following are weaknesses within the TNPD training system:

- (a) Classes are too large for effective instruction. Classes range from 90-120 students.
- (b) Curricula and lesson plans do not fully meet police requirements.
- (c) Limited permanent instructor cadre.
- (d) Inadequate training in leadership and management.
- (e) Formalized in-service training is minimal and generally given on an ad hoc basis at provincial and district level.

Police Aviation Division:

Purpose: To provide an airlift capability to support all TNPD elements.

The Police Aviation Division (PAD), which was decreed in 1969, has developed into an important support element to police units located in remote areas or engaged in counter-insurgency operations. To provide this support, the PAD has an airfleet consisting of 45 helicopters and 11 fixed wing aircraft. It has increased its personnel strength from 73 officers and men in 1967 to its current strength of 410. In addition, the PAD has a major repair depot at Don Muang Airport Headquarters in Bangkok; also, 10 up-country landing and hanger facilities.

The PAD maintenance capability has not kept pace with its development of facilities, flight crew manpower and operational capability. PAD efforts to develop an "in country" maintenance capability have fallen behind schedule because the TNPD could not provide sufficient qualified personnel to be trained as mechanics and the low wages that police mechanics receive under the RTG Civil Service regulations failed to retain them. To provide necessary maintenance support and training, the TNPD with USOM assistance has contracted with Air America. During the first two years of this contract, the direct maintenance aspect has been successful at relieving the problem of keeping aircraft flying. USOM input to this contract is \$110,000 per year. To date, the total USOM support for PAD maintenance efforts amounts to 2.7 million dollars.*

In addition to the shortfall in maintenance capability, there also exist some weaknesses in the management of assets and operational capability.

*In previous years, USOM's dollar support by year was as follows:

	<u>(\$000's)</u>
1966	715.0
1967	374.0
1968	385.5
1969	1,223.0
1970	(110.0)
1971	<u>(110.0)</u>
Total	<u>2,697.5</u>

() FY 1969 funds used for funding contract AID/105 in the amount of \$110.0 in FY 1970 and in FY 1971 - not additive.

Metropolitan Police Bureau (MPB)

Purpose: To develop the Metropolitan Police Bureau (MPB) into a modern urban police force able to cope with criminal and social problems inherent in large metropolitan areas.

The Metropolitan Police, a force of approximately 8,400 officers and men, is responsible for maintaining law and order in the twin cities of Bangkok and Thonburi. As a result of the industrial and commercial development that has occurred in the area during the last decade, the population has increased from 1,577,000 to 2,130,000 in 1970. Security of the capital city and its population is a necessary part of national security. It is the heart of the nation in all respects.

Communication Division (CD)

Purpose: To provide an independent, self-sustaining, unified telecommunication capability among the elements of the TNPD to fully support a modern police institution having a counter-insurgency capability.

USCM inputs in the past, in the development of TNPD telecommunications capability, have consisted of large quantities of commodities (more than 12,000 radio terminals over a period of 6 years). Direct Hire Advisors and contractor personnel (numbering 70 individuals in 1969, including military and contract personnel), assisted in completion of necessary installation and repair functions for the TNPD in the rapidly expanding telecommunications system. Currently the USOM input is one direct hire technician. It is noted that there is a rapidly expanding in-country capability for support of such installations (private sector).

The CD now emphasizes maintenance management, logistical support procedure, and communication procedure. Improvement in these areas is required in order to achieve a coordinated operation among all elements of the TNPD.

Quartermaster (QM)

Purpose: To establish a viable TNPD Quartermaster serving all police elements.

Currently the QM services the Metropolitan Police and PP regional commands. The other elements such as BPP, Aviation, Signal Highway etc., have their own logistical support element. The

vertical organizational structure of the TNPDP inhibits the QM from providing proper logistical support (supply, automotive repairs and weapon repairs) to elements of the PP, as a result its functions are limited to the servicing of regional headquarters.

Intelligence

Purpose: To provide a capability to collect, process and utilize intelligence which helps identify, locate and neutralize the subversion/insurgent threat.

Special Branch (SB) of the TNPDP is charged with the responsibility of suppressing covert subversive activities throughout Thailand. USOM has provided advisory services, equipment and participant training since 1959. This support has assisted the SB in the development of a significant intelligence capability. However, the SB has the following deficiencies: inadequate coordination with other TNPDP elements, inadequate training, in-sufficient manpower and faulty deployment of personnel to field assignments.

F. COURSE OF ACTION

1. General

During the next three years U.S. assistance will focus on raising the operational effectiveness of the TNPDP in line with jointly determined priorities: First - Develop the TNPDP as a responsible national institution for maintaining law and order. USOM will provide advisory service, participant training and selected commodity support which would upgrade overall police performance. Second - Improve the specialized capabilities of the TNPDP to deal with; (1) insurgency movements, including detecting and eliminating subversive elements in the Thai society, (2) low-level forms of violence by small, para-military, dissident bands.

USOM will direct its assistance in such a way that would encourage the Thai National Police Department (TNPDP) to take a more active role in dealing with the insurgency movement. The insurgent threat, at present, is largely a localized phenomenon found in a limited number of areas in Thailand. It manifests itself in most cases in the form of relatively

small-sized bands of insurgents, involving comparatively few armed and disciplined individuals. In order for the police to be able to respond to this threat effectively, they would be encouraged to enhance their intelligence/Special Branch capability for detecting and monitoring subversive and insurgent activities; to improve their capability to exercise the police function of interrupting CT contact with the rural populace at district (amphoe) level and below; and to rationalize and improve the police specialized reaction capability as a supplement to their regular law and order activities. In supporting the TNPd for this purpose, USOM will, in addition to advisory and training assistance, consider providing such essential items of equipment and material as the police can effectively employ for dealing with insurgency, violence and subversion problems.

In support of elements of the TNPd which are normally not directly involved in counter-insurgency activities USOM would provide advisory and training assistance. On an agreed exceptional basis and when clearly defined, USOM will consider augmenting the TNPd's own equipment procurement program with support to these elements which is consistent with the kinds and amounts of equipment USAID normally provides to countries not seriously threatened by insurgency problems.

2. Policy, Planning and Coordination

The TNPd cannot, of course, effectively allocate resources to support national priorities unless they have the closest coordination and cooperation with other security organizations such as the Thai Army (RTG) and the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD). In order to establish an environment in which this coordination can take place and to implement a system of priorities it is understood the TNPd plan is as follows:

- (a) A police National Operations Center will be organized, staffed, and equipped to:
 - (1) Develop policy recommendations and operational doctrine for overall police operations to include Communist Terrorist (CT) suppression, bandit suppression, intelligence, and border control.
 - (2) Establish priorities for resource allocation to include manpower, material, and budget support

as well as to effect and coordinate the use of police national reserve forces and support mechanism such as the Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit (PARU) and Police Aviation Division (PAD).

- (3) Effect coordination with other TNPd elements, the Thai Military, and CSOD.
- (b) Each PP region headquarters will further develop and refine its functional capability to operate a police coordination center to:
- (1) Identify in concert with the Army, Department of Local Administration (DOLA) and other police elements the requirements for police operations in the region.
 - (2) Establish in concert with other interested RTG organizations a system of priorities to effectively focus manpower, material, and budget support on priority problems.
 - (3) Coordinate police operations with other interested RTG organizations.
- (c) Each BPP operational headquarters will further develop and refine its functional capability to operate a police operations center to: command, control, support and train TNPd's Mobile Support and Border Control units.

3. Police Operations

It is planned that: A single organization for mobile support and border control will be created comprising all PP elements now charged with support responsibilities, specifically including the BPP and SAFs. SAF platoons will be reorganized into company-sized units and redeployed to insurgent threatened areas for as long as required. This mobile force will have a primary mission of CI and border control, and a strong secondary mission for remote area law enforcement and reserve support of other police elements. A single line of reserve/ reaction capabilities will be developed from the Muban (village) to the national level of operation.

There is a need at the Changwat (province), Amphoe (district), and Tambon (cluster of villages) levels to increase the outpost police capability to meet emergency situations. Each level will develop the capability to form regular police men (personnel already in place) into small units to meet emergencies such as riot and crowd control, natural disaster relief, bandit suppression operations, defense of their stations, etc. Sections will be organized, trained, equipped, and supported to perform special duties, during emergencies, but be tasked with regular police duties when conditions are normal. TNP mobile support and general reserve forces will be committed if the emergency grows too large or continues too long for the permanent police force to handle. The police will be considered in three deployment categories: permanent, semi-permanent, and temporary.

Conceptually, the semi-permanent forces will reinforce the permanent forces in critical areas, maintaining security until such time as the permanent forces can be strengthened enough to maintain control. Temporary forces (such as mobile support companies) may be shifted to new priorities or, depending on the requirements at that time and place, these units may be absorbed into the permanent forces at the Tambon and Amphoe levels.

In view of changing roles and missions, on-site surveys will be made to determine the soundness of current police deployment and organization. Border control and mobile support units, specifically, will be surveyed and redeployed on a case by case basis to meet Thailand's current border control and rural law enforcement needs consideration will be given to the proper balance of static and mobile forces in each priority area.

4. Training

In view of the many training requirements that exist because of new roles and missions, expected annual increase in manpower, new command and control structures, and re-training cycles, continued priority will be given to staffing and supporting the TNP C.I. training system, and to develop an in-service training capability. A system of awards and incentives to attract and retain qualified training personnel will be presented by the TNP to the Civil Service Bureau for approval and implementation. The system will initially include a high level of participant training. An effort will be made to select the best available personnel from within the TNP for this training.

The USG will endeavor to provide full-time direct-hire and contract training specialists to support this activity.

Participant training and selected commodities are also expected to be provided.

To resolve the existing weaknesses in the TNPD training system the following actions would be taken:

- (a) To improve the effectiveness of instructions, the number of students per class would be reduced by making more classrooms and instructors available. The RTG, by Royal Decree, has authorized the creation of four additional police recruit training schools. In addition, the TNPD has under consideration a plan to divide the student bodies at the present schools into two groups whereby one group undergoes academic training while the other group is on field exercises.
- (b) Curricula and lessons plans will continue to be revised and up dated to meet current police requirements.
- (c) To improve the leadership and management capability within the TNPD a leadership course is now included in curricula of the CI Training Centers. In addition, the TNPD intends to construct a Police College for the training of senior and mid-level officers. In the interim such training will be conducted at borrowed facilities.
- (d) Formalized in-service training will be conducted at the CI Training Centers and at provincial and district police headquarters based on standard approved lessons plans.

5. Intelligence

The Special Branch of the TNPD is charged with the responsibility of suppressing covert subversive activities throughout Thailand. During the life of this PROP, USOM proposes to provide advisory services and selected participant training in order to up-grade the operational effectiveness of this organization. Top priority will be the further development of the police capability to collect, process, and utilize intelligence which will help identify, locate, and neutralize the subversive/insurgent threat. The coordination of intelligence operations with Provincial Police and Border Patrol Police Organizations will be emphasized. Detailed operating instructions, with sufficient training to impart

skills, awareness, and motivation down to the lowest level will be developed. Personnel from the hundred priority Amphoe and fifty Mobile Support and Border Control companies will be trained to utilize all sources of information, evaluate and select targets, and implement operations to neutralize those targets.

The TNPD plans to provide additional manpower to the Special Branch (SB) to meet its current requirement. In addition, the SB will study its current deployment of manpower and attempt to assign more agents to field operations.

To the extent required it is planned that USOM will provide direct hire personnel to the SB and will support training opportunities for TNPD personnel in the U.S. and other countries.

6. Aviation Division

U.S. direct hire personnel will assist the PAD to improve the management of its assets by modernizing its management and administrative practices, so that timely support can be provided to all TNPD elements. Advisory services will support the development of a training system for PAD personnel in order to improve the operational capability, up-grade maintenance management and up-grade repair capability utilizing in-service training opportunities.

The maintenance of aircraft involves highly technical skills which are currently limited within the PAD. To meet this problem, USOM and the RTG approved the extension of the Air America contract, AID/ea-105, for the third year (February 1, 1972 to January 31, 1973). The contract provides for improving TNPD's capacity for the training of the police mechanic personnel who are expected to perform field maintenance and the repairs of aircraft up to depot level. The contractor will utilize on-call third country and Thai civilian personnel for this activity. A major aspect of the contract services, however, will be direct maintenance of aircraft in recognition of the fact that police personnel cannot be retained in sufficient numbers to perform all necessary functions

Before the expiration date of the present contract, the TNPD will finalize other contractual arrangements which will provide an effective air maintenance service. If these arrangements prove

to be adequate and the RTG inputs of new aircraft are of a type based on the most efficient and economical combination of aircraft (reflected in the Royal Thai Aviation Division Public Safety Report dated September 21, 1968), USOM will consider including in the equipment category of its assistance additional aircraft in FY 1973 and FY 1974.

To improve the operational capability of the PAD, USOM plans to provide short-term pilot instructors to train PAD pilots (five are planned with one to be qualified as instructor) to operate the two Caribou aircraft now in PAD inventory. USOM will also plan to support the training in the U.S. of two pilots each year over the life of the project, in instrument flying.

7. Metropolitan Police Bureau (MPB)

The TNPB plan is to assign an additional 4,000 men and provide necessary equipment to the MPB in order to combat the increasing crime rate in metropolitan Bangkok. USOM inputs would be one direct hire advisor over the life of the project, if required, who will assist TNPB/MPB leadership in the modernization of management and administrative practices, in the reorganization of the MPB and assisting in the implementation of the Five Year Development Plan. This will be accomplished by in-service training for senior and mid-level officers of the MPB. To assist in developing modern management skills, selected MPB staff members will be trained in the U.S. probably two each year.

8. Quartermaster (QM)

USOM intends to continue, if required the support of one direct hire advisor and to send QM officers to the U.S. or other countries for training. The advisory effort will focus on developing TNPB self-sufficiency in Quartermaster area through improving supply management skills of senior officers in the QM, utilizing on-the-job and formalized training opportunities. Efforts will continue to establish a unified logistical system.

9. Communications Division (CD)

The primary effort now is to develop the institutional capacity of CD for the effective use of the vast amount of commodities it controls. Having contributed toward building a basic

framework, USOM's commodity inputs in the future will be limited to specialized or unusual requirements of counter-insurgency programs.

It is expected, if required, that one direct hire U.S. advisor will participate in team studies and advice on ensuing improvement action program. This advisory effort will be in the areas of planning, network equipment design, technical improvements, procurement, installation, maintenance, administration, logistics and operational support, training of personnel, and management of the overall telecommunication function. The objective of the U.S. advisory service will be to mold the TNPd facilities into a unified telecommunication system.

USOM intends to support training for selected participants in the U.S. or elsewhere.

10. Other Supporting Police Elements

USOM experts, if desired, to provide advisory and participant training support to assist in modernizing the management and administrative practices, through on-the-job training, of the following police elements: Highway Police, Railway Police, Marine Police, Crime Suppression, Scientific Crime Laboratory and Criminal Records Office.

11. TNPd Headquarters

In this area, also, USOM would expect to respond to a request to continue USOM advisory services to assist in modernizing the management and administrative practices, through on-the-job training, of the following TNPd Headquarters elements: Inspector General, Research and Planning Division, Secretariat, Finance, Welfare, Legal and Technical Divisions. Training opportunities in the U.S. or possibly elsewhere will also be provided by USOM.

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