

001.39

0012405



TransCentury Corporation  
1789 Columbia Road, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20009-2894

TELEPHONE: 202 328-4400

CABLE: TRANCEN

TELEX: 197863/892790

LOUIS L. MITCHELL, PRESIDENT

28 November 1983

Mr. Frank Pavich  
USAID/Mogadishu  
Somalia

Dear Frank:

Attached is the original and two copies of TransCentury's report under Contract Number 649-0122-0123-C-00-4001-00, Project Number 649-0122, 649-0123.

Per our discussions with Messers Cohen and Nelson yesterday, general distribution of the report will be under USAID label, changing the Title Page, Table of Contents and pagination; and, deleting the Introduction and Annex 3.

For Ernie Barbour, Mike Phoenix and Julia Taft, I thank you for the logistical and personal support you and your office afforded all of us during our analysis.

My best wishes,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'L. Mitchell', written over the typed name.

Louis L. Mitchell

PD

brochure - 62  
↳ arranged on back

REFUGEE SETTLEMENT IN SOMALIA  
A NATIONAL ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

62

Mogadishu, Somalia  
November 1983

TransCentury  
Washington, D. C.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page No.</u>
Preface	i
Summary	ii
Introduction	1
I. Conclusions	5
II. Recommendations	18
III. Strategy	35
Epilogue	

## Preface

The refugee population in Somalia is among the country's most valuable resources. The population in camps and family numbers living and working outside the camps are comprised of experienced and motivated herds people, farmers, artisans and children largely destined for similar trades. And, the vast majority are ethnically and culturally Somali. The extent to which these people are productively integrated into the economic life of Somalia is directly proportional to their contributions for sustained national growth. The extent to which they are isolated in camps is directly proportional to their drain on national and international resources. Refugees in Somalia are not a problem - they are a resource; they are an opportunity for national development. Therefore, for purposes of sustained national economic growth, creative and aggressive policies for productive settlement are mandatory. Settlement policies and expenditures must focus upon national and regional plans - not upon particular camps and contingent areas. Ad hoc and uncoordinated development investments must be discouraged. Diverse and fragmented expatriate technical assistance must be placed into regional and national plans.

Development investments by the Government of Somalia and international bodies must replace expenditures for care and maintenance. Such replacement must be planned now and executed. In 1978-80 the Government of Somalia faced an emergency crisis. Today an emergency opportunity confronts us. The Government and people of Somalia and international donors must grasp the opportunity.

Integration within the national economy will take time. It must be carefully phased during which time declining levels of care and maintenance efforts should continue.

## SUMMARY

### Conclusions

1. Spontaneous settlement and repatriation have been a continuing process since 1980.
2. Declining commodity imports from international donors since 1981, and predictable future declines, are positive stimuli for enhancement of national growth.
3. International donor assistance to the care and maintenance of refugee populations is a constraint to national development efforts.
4. A comprehensive and effective national settlement policy and strategy for implementation has not been achieved, and present settlement efforts are isolated from national and regional priorities.
5. Settlement policy and strategy must avoid recipes for planned poverty.

### Recommendations

1. The national settlement plan should be integrated into regional and national development priorities.
2. The national settlement plan should initially identify available land resources and design and implement appropriate analyses for settlement.
3. The plan must facilitate spontaneous, voluntary settlement through incentives, as distinct from Government controlled and orchestrated settlement. Any Government intervention or assistance must be decentralized and regional.

4. When refugees leave their camps for voluntary and spontaneous settlement, they must lose their identity as refugees and become settlers.
5. Commodity imports for camp food rations should be terminated by a fixed year and phased declines planned accordingly.
6. The National Refugee Commission (NRC) should be transformed into the National Economic Opportunity Commission to serve new settlers and indigenous families alike.

## INTRODUCTION

The Somali Government's refugee policy has moved toward endorsement of refugee settlement with full donor support during the past two years. The Government recognized the possibility of settling some refugees in Somalia in an official statement issued in March 1983 (Annex I). The statement was expanded in October 1983 by a Government proposal to establish viable communities of refugees on new or unused land (Annex 2).

This report is about refugee settlement in three sections: Conclusions, Recommendations and Strategy. It has been prepared by TransCentury Corporation under contract with USAID/Somalia. Ernest Barbour and Michael Phoenix conducted an eight weeks study of refugee camps in the Hiran, Gedo, Lower Shebelli and Northwest Regions to assess strategies for the settlement and integration of refugees into the economic life of Somalia. The survey was conducted in Somalia from October 4 to November 25, 1983. Julia Taft, Special Consultant to TransCentury, and Lisa Wiggins and Louis Mitchell from TransCentury, Washington, collaborated with the Barbour/Phoenix team November 10 - 25 in preparation of the report. The original terms of reference are attached as Annex 3 to this report.

Due to newly-developing Government policies and organization regarding settlement, and due to findings in the field, the original terms of reference have been modified as follows:

Task 1

The present organizational context within Central and Regional Government Ministries and Departments in camp areas is established by Government policy and well known to all international donors. Potential interrelationships and organizational structures are presently under active discussion within the Government, and between the Government and international donors. As an outsider to these discussions, TransCentury focuses this report upon conclusions regarding overall settlement issues, proposes recommendations, and outlines a possible strategy for settlement to enhance national developmental goals.

As to the subtasks under Task 1, we conclude that:

There are no refugee areas which can become centers of growth and absorb the total area's refugee population;

There are many refugee areas where small numbers of refugees will settle in adjacent areas and enhance local resources to become more productive growth centers;

All camps should be phased out as refugee camps within a scheduled time frame. Some camps with supportive infrastructure will remain to become growth centers for some families. However, the majority of refugee populations in all camps must be encouraged through realistic incentives to move to other growth areas.

TransCentury has assessed potentials of refugee settlement in sectoral categories under which all categories of Task 2 fall: agriculture, livestock, small enterprises and rural infrastructure.

The terms of reference methodology has been followed explicitly. This report represents the terms of reference product, as modified, and proposes a strategy for refugee population settlement and specific sectoral recommendations.

The Barbour/Phoenix team was given an intensive two-day orientation in Washington before departure and read relevant reports, articles and reference material available in Washington and Mogadishu. Representatives of national, regional and local levels of the Somali Government, international organizations, international donors, private voluntary organizations, private companies, USAID and refugee and local populations were interviewed during the study. The team traveled by road and air to most parts of Somalia where refugees are presently located or could potentially settle.

Many persons contacted during the study were generous in providing information and sharing insights. Officials of international and private voluntary organizations were extremely helpful. Particular thanks are due USAID/Mogadishu; specifically, Frank Pavich, Isabelle Blanco and William Keefe who provided effective logistical and programmatic support and shared their experiences creatively and timelessly.

- 5 -  
I  
CONCLUSIONS

A. Conclusion One

Spontaneous settlement and repatriation have been a continuing process since 1980.

Originally there were an estimated 1.3 million refugees of which 700,000 moved to camps. Today the working number in camps is 500,000. These estimates and others of lower magnitude have served well to determine appropriate levels of emergency food imports - and have been important figures for rations planning. However, of equal importance for future settlement planning, spontaneous settlement and repatriation account for 800,000 persons. A total 62% settlement and repatriation and 30% from camps since 1980, without Government or international donor settlement intervention, demonstrates that optimistic projections can be realized in the future.

Another indicator of spontaneous settlement is that the camps' refugee population is estimated at 60% children, 30% women and 10% men. The number of men in camps at any given time varies in accordance with the season and outside employment opportunities. An unknown, but obviously significant number of adult

males leave their families in camps and herd animals or work outside the camps. Some men have wives and children in more than one camp and live a few months with each in turn.

One must conclude, therefore, that there are already optimized productive employment opportunities for men outside the camps. One might also assume that available camp services and food provide a secure base for large numbers of families as the men entrepreneurially, and presumably successfully, realize economic gains elsewhere.

However, interests, skills and experience of men working outside and women inside camps is unknown. It is generally assumed that most men and women were herders, 15% sedentary farmers and 15% occasional farmers with rudimentary farming skills. More precise data on interests, skills and experience are required in order to further encourage voluntary settlement adequately - or to establish settlement strategies of any nature.

8. Conclusion Two

Declining commodity imports from international donors since 1981, and predictable future declines, are positive stimuli for enhancement of national growth.

The figures are a matter of record. In 1981 rations distributions were based upon 700,000 refugees in the camps; in 1982, 650,000 and in 1983, 530,000. Planning figures for 1984 approximate 450,000. International donor predilections indicate further, and even more radical, decline after 1984.

Declines in import quantities to feed camp-based refugees are an incentive for settlement programs. However, more importantly, declines should be viewed as a positive stimulus for increasing the number of persons in the nation's productive work force - especially women. Women are essential participants in Somalia's economy, and to exclude thousands of them through camp isolation adversely affects the national economy.

Traditionally, in times of crisis, nomads have secured temporary refuge areas for their dependents. Camps now provide such refuge and as long as they are available with commodity support, families will take advantage of them, constraining economic productivity for the nation.

C. Conclusion Three

International donor assistance to the care and maintenance of refugee populations is a constraint to national development efforts.

Consider four points.

First, as can be demonstrated worldwide, extended expatriate involvement within a sovereign nation's government and cultural milieu emasculates the initiative, pride and resourcefulness of that nation's policy-makers and civil service. Further, extended expatriate involvement tends to create self-styled, but unwarranted, foreign "experts" who often become burdens for policy makers and operational personnel and, at least on occasion, slow implementation processes.

Second, expatriate assistance worldwide or in Somalia is expensive. Whether individual salaries are high or low, expatriate support systems are extensive, including overhead costs in their respective home offices, as well as support systems for coordination and monitoring and evaluation by bilateral and multilateral funding agencies in country and in those agencies' respective headquarter offices in Bonn, Geneva, Rome, New York, Washington or elsewhere.

Third, sustained international care and maintenance of refugees provides supplementary support to refugees, discouraging initiatives for productive pursuits elsewhere. The refugee population is entrepreneurial, but entrepreneurial skills are wasted to the country by passive receipt of assistance from external resources.

Fourth, food aid diminishes local food prices, has a negative effect upon an area's producer price structure and can actually curtail production. In Belet Uen, for example, large areas of rainfed and flood-irrigated land went out of production, in part or wholly because of sale of rations on local markets. Obviously, rations can be sold cheaper than producer costs permit.

Therefore, international donor assistance in the care and maintenance of refugees constrains indigenous personnel achievement. It diverts fiscal resources which could be better applied to national development efforts. Such assistance is a disincentive for refugee's productive initiatives. And, donor food aid negatively affects local food pricing structures and production.

It is in the interest of the Government of Somalia to free and mass all resources upon development - upon national economic

growth. All available donor assistance should be focused upon development, rather than subsidizing low living standards, and adversely affecting crop production.

D. Conclusion Four

A comprehensive and effective national settlement policy and strategy for implementation has not been achieved, and present settlement efforts are isolated from national and regional priorities.

Spontaneous settlement continues as an on-going process and dedicated, if sometimes quixotic, ad hoc settlement projects are underway or planned. However, present settlement efforts are weak in magnitude, fuzzy in particulars, costly, and unsupported by clearly defined national policies. A comprehensive and effective national policy and strategy must be achieved as quickly as possible.

Quickly, to optimize the skills and experience of refugees as a developmental resource to accelerate economic growth; and, quickly, while international donor interest and commitment are still high. Continued delays in achieving a comprehensive policy and strategy will constrain the refugee resource opportunity and mute donor interest and commitment for investment expenditures

Further, the policy and strategy must be an integral component of national and regional priorities. The National Five Year Plan 1982-86 sets forth a national development strategy. It is primarily a public investment plan with heavy emphasis on donor

support of the capital program. Donor supported projects are paramount, supplemented by commodity support. Emphasis is placed upon settlement of new lands, irrigation, increased crop production, improved range management, expanded livestock production, and to a limited extent, upon rehabilitated and new industrial capacities. There is also emphasis upon substantially greater private sector activities. The total planned development cost for the five year period is SoSh 33.6 billion, or approximately US \$2 billion. The following chart shows investment percentages by sector.

Agriculture, Rural Development and Water Resources	65%
Mineral Resources and Industry	11%
Economic Infrastruction	10%
Social Sectors	9%
Other	5%

The 1982-86 plan has been revised for 1984-86, and although copies were unavailable for the TransCentury Team, the revised plan apparently has similar focus. Therefore, the National Plan must become the cauldron for refugee settlement policy and strategy. Settlement can become one leavening agent for economic growth.

At present, there are numerous refugee development-settlement projects planned or in process in areas contiguous to camps. However, they are miniscule and pilot by nature, and in most cases can accommodate but a fraction of the refugee camp population. But, even more important, none are supported by definitive policy; and none are coordinated or integrated into regional or national plans.

Refugee settlement must not be regarded as an appendage to regional and national development. It must not proceed in isolated pockets. Settlement must be fashioned and sculptured into regional and national development fabrics.

E. Conclusion Five

Settlement policy and strategy must avoid recipes for planned poverty.

There is scant information available in Somalia from which one can determine minimum subsistence potential with regard to any economic opportunity. For instance, does 0.5 hectares of irrigated land offer a subsistence opportunity for a family of six; or, does 1.0 hectare? What about dry land; how much? In the livestock sector, how many animals and of what variety are optimum for subsistence?

Too many variables are present to skew accurate calculations and projections: type of irrigated land, water quality and quantity, soils, crops planted, weather, prices and markets...; type of livestock, available fodder, grazing land, location, prices and markets... However, some information can be gleaned from extant and forthcoming reports and studies. A current German study indicates that an optimum rainfed land holding would measure 12 HA which under an integrated farm system would include six hectares cropped annually, three left fallow, and three set aside for forestation and animals (at one animal, 250 kg/HA). It is possible that such a farm system would yield net income above subsistence levels, but the extent of rainfed land available would indicate such a system to be feasible.

The point is that careful analysis must be made of available areas, prior to settlement, so that relevant incentives become part of settlement. The drought settlement mistakes of 1974-75, such as Dujuma, must not be duplicated. And, whereas settlement schemes in a given area must not de facto penalize local residents, below-subsistence level settlement must be avoided. Planned poverty is an abortive settlement process.

Even subsistence-level settlement is questionable. By definition, subsistence levels in any economic sector fail to contribute to economic growth. Not only should planned poverty be avoided, but also settlement should yield returns for area development. Settlement plans should focus on investment returns rather than minimum maintenance needs. Economically viable settlement is highest priority; and special services infrastructures (schools, clinics, etc.) should receive low priority and, usually, should not burden settlement expenditures.

Furthermore, settlement should not be viewed as sedentary placement; rather, settlement as varied economic self-sufficiency and beyond. Most refugee families, as their close and distant kinsfolk in Somalia, come from a nomadic, mobile, and rural heritage. They are, by temperament and practice, risk-takers who appreciate the transitory nature of success and failure. Herding,

farming, trading and small business are their economic portfolios. Therefore, wherever they plant their roots, from there shall one or more member of the family entrepreneurially, if intermittently, seek out new opportunities. Diversified income strategies are traditional, creative subsistence, and will continue so long as economic gain in but one sector presents limited returns. Refugee settlement, therefore, is dynamic and will not be constrained by a particular location; which in turn is an economic plus for national development.

In this regard, it is noteworthy that an undetermined number of male refugees have joined their kin in employment in the Gulf States - a further testimony to mobility and a potential asset for national growth. Remittances from such temporary emigration are projected to rise from \$20-100 million during 1982-86. In fact, the value of earnings of the estimated 150,000 - 200,000 Somalis working in the Gulf States amounts to four times the total income generated in Somalia by wage earners. Remittance value returned to Somalia is estimated at 75% of total Somalia wage income. Assuming sustained incentive policies, such as the bonus scheme (January 1983), which provides 33% above the official exchange rate for worker remittances, mobile refugees outside of Somalia participate in national growth wherever they are settled.

Finally, costs for settlement must not be predetermined; for instance, a predetermined per family cost. Settlement sectors and areas will vary immensely as will costs. Expenditures must be allocated on the basis of anticipated returns from particular specific settlement.

## II RECOMMENDATIONS

A comprehensive and effective national settlement policy and strategy are presently under discussion within the Government of Somalia and between the Government and international donors. The following recommendations pertain directly to evolving policies and strategies and are offered for consideration by the Government of Somalia and international donors.

### A. Recommendation One

The national settlement plan should be integrated into regional and national development priorities.

The National Five Year Plan (1982-86) as revised (1984-86) singles out agriculture (land development, crop production) and livestock (increased production) as top priorities. Therefore, settlement planning should focus upon these two sectors. Complementary sectors include rural infrastructure (especially roads) and small private enterprise development (primarily agribusiness related). The following charts illustrate the potential for settlement in each of the four refugee regions over a three year period. The totals are broken down into four sectors of development:

livestock and related; agriculture and related (including poultry and fisheries); small enterprises; and labor employment.

It was estimated that of total persons settled nation-wide over an indefinite period, 35% would be settled in the livestock sector; 30% in the agriculture sector; 5% in the small enterprise sector; and 10% through labor employment. This leaves 20% of total refugees not formally settled.

These estimated national averages were adjusted for conditions in each region. A higher than average number of persons could expect settlement in the agriculture sector in Qorioley, for example. In the Northwest the agricultural potential might be lower than average, but the livestock potential higher than average.

The reader should bear in mind that these figures are illustrative only. Even so, they form a basis for more precise planning as settlement programs are developed.

SETTLEMENT POTENTIAL  
ILLUSTRATIVE 3-YEAR PERIOD

NORTHWEST

SECTOR OF SETTLEMENT	NUMBER OF PERSONS SETTLED									
	YEAR 1			YEAR 2			YEAR 3			3-YEAR TOTAL
	In Region	Out of Region	Total	In Region	Out of Region	Total	In Region	Out of Region	Total	
LIVESTOCK & RELATED	1,500	500	2,000	4,000	1,300	5,300	8,000	2,000	10,000	17,300
AGRICULTURE & RELATED	500	1,000	1,500	1,000	3,000	4,000	2,000	4,000	6,000	11,500
SMALL ENTERPRISES	900	100	1,000	1,800	200	2,000	2,800	200	3,000	6,000
LABOR EMPLOYMENT	2,000	-	2,000	4,000	-	4,000	4,000	-	4,000	10,000
TOTAL	4,900	1,600	6,500	10,800	4,500	15,300	16,800	6,200	23,000	44,800

SETTLEMENT POTENTIAL  
ILLUSTRATIVE 3-YEAR PERIOD

HIRAN

SECTOR OF SETTLEMENT	NUMBER OF PERSONS SETTLED									3-YEAR TOTAL
	YEAR 1			YEAR 2			YEAR 3			
	In Region	Out of Region	Total	In Region	Out of Region	Total	In Region	Out of Region	Total	
LIVESTOCK & RELATED	2,000	1,000	3,000	3,000	2,000	5,000	5,000	2,000	7,000	15,000
AGRICULTURE & RELATED	1,000	600	1,600	1,000	1,500	2,500	2,000	3,000	5,000	9,100
SMALL ENTERPRISES	400	100	500	1,000	300	1,300	1,500	300	1,800	3,600
LABOR EMPLOYMENT	1,000	500	1,500	2,000	1,000	3,000	4,000	1,000	5,000	9,500
TOTAL	4,400	2,200	6,600	7,000	4,800	11,800	12,500	6,300	18,800	37,200

SETTLEMENT POTENTIAL  
ILLUSTRATIVE 3-YEAR PERIOD

GEDO

SECTOR OF SETTLEMENT	NUMBER OF PERSONS SETTLED									
	YEAR 1			YEAR 2			YEAR 3			3-YEAR TOTAL
	In Region	Out of Region	Total	In Region	Out of Region	Total	In Region	Out of Region	Total	
LIVESTOCK & RELATED	1,500	500	2,000	2,000	1,000	3,000	3,000	2,000	5,000	10,000
AGRICULTURE & RELATED	3,000	-	3,000	4,000	1,000	5,000	5,000	1,500	6,500	14,500
SMALL ENTERPRISES	500	100	600	1,000	200	1,200	1,000	200	1,200	3,000
LABOR EMPLOYMENT	2,000	-	2,000	3,000	-	3,000	5,000	-	5,000	10,000
TOTAL	7,000	600	7,600	10,000	2,200	12,200	14,000	3,700	17,700	37,500

SETTLEMENT POTENTIAL  
ILLUSTRATIVE 3-YEAR PERIOD

QORIOLEY

SECTOR OF SETTLEMENT	NUMBER OF PERSONS SETTLED									3-YEAR TOTAL
	YEAR 1			YEAR 2			YEAR 3			
	In Region	Out of Region	Total	In Region	Out of Region	Total	In Region	Out of Region	Total	
LIVESTOCK & RELATED	200	300	500	500	500	1,000	700	800	1,500	3,000
AGRICULTURE & RELATED	1,450	-	1,450	3,000	500	3,500	4,500	500	5,000	9,950
SMALL ENTERPRISES	100	-	100	200	100	300	400	200	600	1,000
LABOR EMPLOYMENT	500	-	500	500	150	650	600	200	800	1,950
TOTAL	2,250	300	2,550	4,200	1,250	5,450	6,200	1,700	7,900	15,900

8. Recommendation Two

The national settlement plan should initially identify available land resources and design and implement appropriate analyses for settlement.

There are enormous areas of unused or underutilized rainfed, irrigated and irrigable land available in Somalia. Extensive reports on land and agricultural potentials have already been completed by the World Bank and other donors. The Government of Somalia - through its line ministries - has access to large amounts of information and has already established at least some regional priorities. It is beyond the scope of this report to set forth analyses of data available, but it is clear that at least 200,000 HA of irrigable and 2,000,000 HA of rainfed land are immediately available in the South. Rough cost estimates for developing irrigable land, rehabilitating rainfed land, and developing new rainfed land are \$10,000/HA, \$300/HA and \$600/HA respectively. However, detailed analyses of discrete areas for specific settlement are unavailable.

Therefore, the Government should prioritize specific land offerings for settlement and appropriate analyses implemented. The Australian integrated farm system research probably should be optimized. And, analyses should not focus solely upon refugee

settlement. Some areas may be identified where rainfed land rehabilitation, or other types, would benefit indigenous families.

Whereas social services infrastructure should not burden analyses, road infrastructure and small enterprise potential should be included. For instance, informed reports indicate that the major constraint upon the 2,000,000 HA of rainfed land available is road infrastructure; and, wherever substantial areas of new or rehabilitated land become productive, small agri-business enterprises are certain to be established.

C. Recommendation Three

The plan must facilitate spontaneous, voluntary settlement through incentives as distinct from Government controlled and orchestrated settlement. Any Government intervention or assistance must be decentralized and regional.

Spontaneous voluntary settlement has been functioning well throughout the past several years. Such experience must be the foundation for the future. Central government controlled and orchestrated settlement plans are expensive for the government, stimulate antipathies, are cumbersome and generally fail throughout the world. A prime example is Indonesia where the government, with extensive World Bank support, has tried to move families from the Island of Java (77% of the population; 10% of the land area) to outer islands. A separate ministry was established for the settlement program. After hundreds of millions of dollars expenditures, the results have been dismal and cost-ineffective. Yet spontaneous, voluntary settlement has proceeded and proceeds almost unnoticed.

People in Somalia - whether refugees or not - as people traditionally throughout the world, move to settle where there are opportunities. Opening economically sound opportunities in agriculture, livestock, small enterprises and labor employment will encourage and stimulate movement and settlement of the refugee population.

Sound economic opportunities begin with incentive policies. Examples include: land tract size sufficient for profitable farming; producer prices which correspond favorably with producer costs; and, appropriate leasehold arrangements such as those under Law 1973 of October 1975, which intend to transform traditional land use into a system with provisions for transfer and inheritance of leases.

Incentive policies must be supported by economic infrastructure - producer-market access roads and available water for people and animals - and by subsidized inputs for a sufficient period to allow the settler to become self-sufficient. In service sectors, training would be an important input, such as mechanics, construction trades and accounting.

Development of economic infrastructure will enhance agricultural and livestock activities, which in turn will generate small agribusiness enterprises and employment opportunities will expand.

D. Recommendation Four

When refugees leave their camps for voluntary and spontaneous settlement, they must lose their identity as refugees and become settlers.

We recognize and are empathetic to the sensitive issues surrounding the question of when does a refugee cease being a refugee? and, the related question of citizenship - both of which are addressed by the Government's statement released in October 1983 (Annex 2). However, we suggest that in terms of Somalia's peoples' history and tradition; in light of the past several years of spontaneous settlement experiences; and, in view of attendant costs, refugee status should transfer to one of settler status on departure from refugee camps. Citizenship does not necessarily apply to the settler, except as Government policy permits, but refugee care and maintenance ceases and the settler becomes a productive contributor within a particular region to national development.

If appropriate analyses and plans are executed, per Recommenda-

counterproductive); but, they should not include housing or components of social infrastructure.

E. Recommendation Five

Commodity imports for camp food rations should be terminated by a fixed year and phased declines planned accordingly.

The vast majority of refugees come from traditions and ancestry of risk-taking and mobility. They are entrepreneurs in the classic sense, literally persons who undertake. It is for this reason, at least in part, that the camp milieu has been and will continue to be an attractive, if temporary residence. Most of the adult male workforce has departed the camps for economic pursuits fraught with traditional risks. Women and children remain in camps for the security afforded by food and services. No longer do the crisis proportions of starvation and sickness prevail, due to the highly successful relief efforts of the Government of Somalia and international donors. But, food and services security provide a spring board for male income-generation activities. It is probable that large numbers of women, children and physically disadvantaged males would stay in camps indefinitely while husbands and fathers engaged in productive activities elsewhere. Therefore, in addition to opening opportunities and incentives for settlement outside the camps, there must be a disincentive for prolonged habitat in the camps.

The Government of Somalia and international donors must decide the chronology, but ration support must terminate after phased declines, and camp-based refugees must know and understand the time frame for termination.

Concomitant to food commodity import phase-downs, refugees must be given opportunities to express their future interests in terms of potential settlement area and sector. Either passive or active survey instruments could be applied. However, clearly identified and analyzed opportunities must be established by policy first - so survey respondents have definitive alternatives from which to choose.

F. Recommendation Six

The National Refugee Commission (NRC) should be transformed into the National Economic Opportunity Commission to serve new settlers and indigenous families alike.

The NRC was established in response to the enormous influx of refugees for whom the Government had no structure or resources. With international donor assistance, principally UNHCR, the NRC has and will continue to fulfill its mandate. However, as the refugee population decreases and settlement is encouraged, a new opportunity evolves for NRC, the nation and its people. The opportunity consists of optimizing NRC's on-line organizational structure to become brokers of technical and financial investments for new settlers and indigenous families alike. Somalia's rural population with or without new settlers remains among the poorest in Africa. National development goals focus upon the rural sector. A National Economic Opportunity Commission would broker development resources to the rural population. Credit and numerous other services - fledgling though they may be - exist throughout the country. However, as elsewhere, linkages between existing services and consumers are fragile and poorly utilized. Government and international donor support to such services are also weak, because, in part, consumer clients are sparse. As broker, the National Economic Opportunity Commission would provide effective service-consumer linkages and

stimulate expanded Government and donor support for services rendered.

A major goal of the Commission would be to generate new and rejuvenate old private enterprises in all development sectors (crop production, marketing, livestock, poultry, fishing, small agri-business) through its brokerage role. Further, it would design and implement vocational (construction trades, etc.) and other skill training (production skills for seasonable farm labor, etc.) for its rural clients and broker sectoral line ministry training resources.

At central government levels the Commission would act as advocate for policies which support entrepreneurship such as: equitable producer prices and marketing regulations; and, credit for working capital with liberalized collateral requirements.

At central government levels through line ministry technical resources, in the light manufacturing and through agri-business sectors and at local levels, the Commission would broker and stimulate research or potential private enterprises within appropriate technologies such as:

- coconut oil and copra
- fiber-based industries

- dik-dik domestication for meat export
- rabbit production - pelts and meat
- tanning industry improvements, including use of acacia bark substitution for imports
- improved oil extraction techniques (coconut, sesame, orange, lemon, demon grass) by expellers and steam distillation
- solar-dried chilies and beans (now imported)
- tomato catsup and sauce (now imported)
- new vegetable introduction such as yams and cassava for eating and for starch and glucose which could be exported
- caustic soda from banana bark and coconut oil (now imported) for soap manufacturing
- plaster of paris; and chalk (now imported) from gypsum
- trash fish into meal for cattle and poultry
- cashew nuts
- cotton production

The list could be expanded endlessly in terms of present or potential opportunities. Technology and knowledge on the above and other possibilities is immediately available. But, again, appropriate linkages are absent.

III  
A STRATEGY

The proposed strategy has four components: goal; what is to be accomplished; method for goal achievement; time frame; and cost. The strategy applies to four regional areas in which refugee camps are located as delineated in the illustrative charts under Recommendation One. By reference, the illustrative charts are also part of this strategy section.

A. Goal

The goal is for camp-based refugee persons to voluntarily and spontaneously settle in Somalia or repatriate themselves beyond Somali borders.

B. Methodology

The methodology is based upon voluntary and spontaneous settlement through offerings of viable economic opportunities and incentives either on lands or in businesses contiguous to present camp areas, or on lands or in businesses out of the particular

regions; and, through disincentives to remain dependent in camps by phased-down ration levels leading to termination of all rations and services.

The methodology has three distinct phases.

1. Phase One: Analyses

Comprehensive analyses will be made of immediately available or potential rainfed or irrigated land in areas contiguous to present camps, and in more distant areas as determined by the Government of Somalia. Analyses will include all pertinent data related to successful agricultural and livestock enterprises including roads infrastructure, water and present or potential market centers, and attendant costs for land and infrastructure rehabilitation or development. Possible agri-business opportunities will also be identified. Analyses will also include potential upgrading of indigenous peoples' land and attendant costs.

The end product of analyses will be clearly defined sectors of opportunities, in specific locations, and quantification and qualification of settler populations integrated within regional development plans.

The analyses will be performed by an agency of the Government of Somalia with assistance from international donors. Local currency costs will be financed by the Government of Somalia and foreign exchange costs by one or more international donors.

Three expatriate teams are envisaged with overall responsibility assigned to one as the master team. All existing data will be analyzed and computerized systems designed for short and long-term monitoring and updating.

Skill composition of the teams will include agronomy, soil science, irrigation, animal science, agri-business, engineering, and computer and social science. Estimated foreign exchange for the analyses based upon a three person-year effort, amounts to \$450,000. The analyses will be completed within a six month period.

## 2. Phase Two: Promotion

The analyses will be packaged for promotion by the Government of Somalia among refugee camp populations and among indigenous persons already living in target areas. Passive survey processes and instruments will be designed to solicit refugees and indigenous persons' interests and compatibility with the offerings.

### 3. Phase Three: Settlement

Simple contractual relationships will be made between refugee families and the Government of Somalia for refugees to become settlers and accept responsibility for the land (or other) offerings. They will be accepted as settlers and be responsible for moving and settling themselves on offerings beyond the camps (except for those few who will remain on adjacent lands, utilizing the camp location as a growth center).

Estimated costs for Phase 3 will include phased-down but continued rations and camp services. Other costs will be borne by the Government of Somalia and regular development assistance, and no expatriate refugee assistance is envisaged.



D. Settlement Costs

Total costs to implement the proposed strategy for settlement cannot be estimated prior to Phase 1 and 2 completion. However, present refugee service expenditures by international donors should be coordinated and co-mingled with other bilateral and multilateral development assistance planned and available for obligation. Refugee settlement is a development resource for national growth and should not be seen as an appendage.

At the same time, predetermined cost allocation by refugee family, or by other common denominator must be avoided. It is possible that significant numbers of refugees will choose voluntary repatriation. It is also possible that significant numbers will choose settlement in rainfed areas where rehabilitation can be executed at low per hectare cost. It is also possible that significant numbers will spontaneously settle without reference to opportunity offerings - as have over 60% already.

-41-

EPILOGUE

Today  
We sit at tables of foreign hosts;  
Food and water brought  
To once parched lips.

Tomorrow  
Alone, or with cousins and kin,  
We follow  
Our herds, learn a trade  
Or plant the land with seed.

We're called  
By the wind,  
Which sculptures bold relief in sands  
Of our land,  
Molding the tough, the dark, the sinewed  
With wisdom:

From years of the many  
Tender calves;  
From years of the scorched  
Barren range.

We face  
Our destiny,  
Horizons of strength, resiliency,  
Nobility,  
Of ancient heritage;

While blazing sun,  
Brilliant stars,  
And endless plains  
Now smile on foreign folly  
To appreciate.  
To understand.

Cilmi Curraaf  
1983

- 42 -

ANNEX 1

PRESS RELEASE OF SOMALI GOVERNMENT'S POLICY ON THE VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION AND VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES.

TRANSLATED VERSION:

The Council of Ministers, in its session of 19/3/83, formed a sub-committee to study the question of the future and the the destiny of the refugees who are at present in Somalia.

At a meeting held on 24th March, 1983, the Council of Ministers studied in-depth the recommendations of the sub-committee. The Council gave due consideration to the seriousness and the sensitivity of this issue during their in-depth study of the recommendations of the sub-committee. The Council also took into consideration the request from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to the Government of the Somali Democratic Republic for the Government's policy concerning the voluntary repatriation and voluntary settlement of the refugees.

The Council of Ministers, after having given due consideration to the report and recommendations of the sub-committee, and taking into account the importance of the issue, decides as follows:

1. The Government of the Somali Democratic Republic has no objections to any refugee returning to his homeland if that is his or her sincere wish.
2. The Government of the Somali Democratic Republic agrees to accept any refugee who wishes to settle in Somalia.
3. That UNHCR takes full responsibility for the cost of repatriation and also guarantees the safety and security of the refugees who wish to return to their homeland.
4. That UNHCR continues to provide all necessary support and financial assistance for those refugees who wish to settle and also provide additional financial assistance in order to make the settlement activities a success.
5. The Government, with the help of and in consultation with UNHCR, will prepare accurate records of refugees who wish to return and also on those who wish to settle.

43

ANNEX 2

THE GOVERNMENT'S CONCEPT OF REFUGEE SETTLEMENT IN SOMALIA

(A paper distributed at a UNHCR meeting on 5/10/83)

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The bulk of the refugees from Ethiopia fled into Somalia between 1978 and 1980 and were given asylum by the Somali Government. During subsequent years the flow of refugees slowed down. The international community extended generous assistance, from the beginning, to enable the Government to set up 35 camps. In 1983 approximately half of the refugees live in these camps. The rest are in urban centers and rural areas and little is known about their conditions.

Towards the end of 1981, a census was undertaken to determine the number of the refugees in the camps. In early 1982, the UN General Assembly sent an inter-agency assessment mission, led by Mr. Goundry, to Somalia. Based on the 1981 census, it was then agreed, between the members of this mission, donor community and the Somali Government, to use 700,000 as a planning figure.

2. THE NEW SETTLEMENT POLICY

The Somali Government granted asylum to the refugees from Ethiopia on purely humanitarian grounds with the view that the causes that had led to their flight from home would be solved within the shortest possible time. As a result, various temporary facilities were put at their disposal. The Government's policy, at that time, was that the only durable solution for the refugees would be voluntary repatriation to their country of origin. However, experience has shown that, at the moment, there are minimum prospects of the refugees voluntarily returning home. As a result of this, and again on humanitarian grounds, the Somali Government feels that it is necessary to review the temporary conditions in the camps under which refugees are living.

It is against this background that in March 1983, the Government issued a new policy statement. The statement, inter alia, states that in addition to voluntary repatriation as a durable solution to the refugee situation, the Government has agreed to create settlements for refugees. The explicit objective of this policy is to bring about a better quality of life and a sense of community, while the refugees are waiting for conditions to become ripe for voluntary repatriation. Even if chances for voluntary repatriation are seen to be minimal, the question of complete integration and citizenship will have to be postponed until such time that the Somali Government and the international community feel that

a high degree of self-sufficiency has been achieved and the refugees themselves indicate a desire to change their citizenship.

3. DUPLICATIONS OF THE SETTLEMENTS

1. In our opinion, settlement is the development of viable communities on new or unused land through the introduction of the refugees. This will provide rapid material gains in areas suited to creative agriculture and commercial activities, since the refugees seem to be staying longer than expected.

2. The programme will include the provisions of water, educational and health facilities, land preparation and irrigation if necessary. The up-keep and administration will be provided for until such time that the refugees are in a position to manage their own affairs.

3. Several distinct phases are involved: (a) preparation of the land and refugees; (b) the transfer and installation of the settlers; and (c) the continuation of support until the refugees become self-sufficient. The settlers should be encouraged to be involved in these phases as much as possible so that they can smoothly take over the management of their own affairs when the time comes.

4. It will therefore be necessary to develop dynamic leadership preparation of settlers to improve their conditions of living through their own efforts, with co-operative organisations or credit unions. Consistent efforts will be needed to educate and organise the settlers in order to develop local responsibility and to decrease dependence on outside aid. To achieve these, the community development approach must be emphasised.

4. CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS

1. Refugees should not be relocated outside their respective regions, unless there are compelling reasons.

2. Thought should be given to ways of including the national population around the settlement, especially with regard to schools, health facilities and irrigation, to mitigate any friction that might arise by the creation of two levels of quality of life during the establishment of settlements.

3. Where camps satisfy the necessary requirements of a viable settlement, there will be no relocation of the refugees. In some cases it will be necessary to relocate some of the refugees and only in a few cases will all the refugees in a camp be relocated.

4. If some of the camps are classified as potentially viable, they will be transformed to settlements after the necessary strengthening of infrastructure is done.