

PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY

1. USAID: USAID/Kenya
2. Project Number: 615-0147
3. Project Title: Rural Development - Vihiga
4. Key Project Dates: (a) Project Agreement Signed FY 71  
(b) Final Obligation FY 76 (TQ)  
[(c) Final input delivered FY 77 ]
5. Total U.S. Funding(Life of Project): \$1,733,000
6. Evaluation No: PAR/PES 77-10
7. Period Covered by Evaluation: From 3/76 to 12/76
8. Date of Evaluation: September 26, 1977
9. Action Decisions Reached at Evaluation Review:

	10. <u>Officer</u>	11. <u>Date</u>
a. Letter to GOK on deadline for submitting claims for reimbursement	Controller	October 5
b. Issue final PES	Project Manager	October 30
c. Letter to GOK on action toward roads maintenance	Project Manager	November 14
d. Project Completion Report	Project Manager	November 15

12. Signatures:

Wilbur E. Scarborough, Project Manager

*Wilbur E. Scarborough*  
Charles J. Nelson, Mission Director

*Charles J. Nelson*

Date: November 15, 1977

Date: *16 November 1977*

### 1.3. SUMMARY

On December 31, 1976, USAID/Kenya support and assistance to the Vihiga/Hamisi Special Rural Development Program (SRDP) terminated. The Vihiga SRDP was one of six such efforts undertaken in Kenya in recent years, five supported in part by external donors and one supported in its entirety by the GOK. The purpose of the Vihiga SRDP--to test new rural development methods, techniques, systems and program combinations, as a prototype for national or regional replication--was, in general, achieved.

Several components of two Vihiga sub-projects, i.e., labor-intensive roads and rural industries, have been replicated regionally and/or nationally by the GOK; and lessons learned from the less successful Vihiga SRDP sub-projects have been instrumental in improving the design of GOK development programs addressing agriculture extension, crop production credit, and livestock health (cattle dips).

Several major problems were encountered during the life of this project:

(A) While the emphasis on experimentation was explicit in SRDP documents, it is doubtful that this was clearly understood or accepted by the target group or by the GOK at either the field or headquarters level. Most GOK personnel expected a major development impact to flow from SRDP. Failure of the SRDP to attain this perceived objective resulted in substantial disillusionment with the program.

(B) The GOK attitude towards SRDP cooled early in the program, resulting in a shift of emphasis and resources from the division to the district level. This shift in focus was partially responsible for several sub-project shortfalls that occurred when critical staff and necessary resources were withdrawn from the divisions.

(C) Florida A&M University (FAMU) contract AID/AFR-801 had to be terminated on June 30, 1975, by AID because the contractor was unable to support and retain qualified personnel on the project. The original three-man FAMU team was not replaced with the planned two agricultural technicians, i.e., extension specialist and evaluator/economist, that PP Revision No.5 proposed at the request of the Ministry of Finance and Planning. As a result USAID could not assist the GOK in implementing and critically evaluating the extension demonstration, cattle dip/artificial insemination, rural roads and tea credit sub-projects.

(D) Overall GOK supervision and coordination of the several Vihiga/Hamisi SRDP sub-projects was the responsibility of the District Area Coordinator. Unfortunately, because of recurrent illness, he was unable to adequately perform this function during the life of the project. The Coordinator's staff thus functioned at a relatively low level of efficiency and effectiveness and could not provide the administrative/logistical support the AID-funded sub-projects required.

14. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

This terminal project evaluation is initiated in accordance with USAID/Kenya project phaseout procedure and AID's requirement for final evaluations. Major sources of data used in this evaluation included previous PAR's; project correspondence and interim reports; PP Revision No.5 Rural Development - Vihiga; Edward O. Harmon Jr. and Tom Zalla USAID-sponsored evaluation of the Vihiga SRDP; Final Contractor Reports (Development Alternatives Incorporated, Partnership for Productivity, and Near East Foundation); SRDP Second Overall Evaluation of Special Rural Development Program - 1975 (Institute for Development Studies (IDS), University of Nairobi), and discussions with senior GOK officials of MOA, MOFP, MOW, and the University of Nairobi.

15. DOCUMENTATION TO BE REVISED AND/OR PREPARED AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION

- Project Paper (PP)                       Logical Framework  
 CPI Network                       Financial Plan                       PIO/T  
 PIO/C                       Project Agreement  
 Other - Project Completion Report

16. EVALUATION FINDINGS ABOUT EXTERNAL FACTORS

There were no substantive changes in project setting which had an impact on the project.

17. EVALUATION FINDINGS ABOUT GOAL

The goal of this project was to contribute to the development of a broad national capability to formulate and execute national economic development programs in the rural areas.

In part as a result of lessons learned from the highly centralized SRDP concept, the GOK has shifted to a decentralized planning concept of rural development, incorporating the SRDP local level decision-making process into a nationwide District Development Program. Further, flowing from AID assistance to the SRDP has been the decision by the Ministry of Finance and Planning to establish and implement a new Management Information System (MIS) in two pilot districts in Kenya. The Ministries of Works, Agriculture and Cooperative Development have adopted and/or integrated techniques or programs developed in SRDP, i.e., utilization and publication of labor-intensive rural road construction methodology and systematology manual, initiation of rural access roads labor-intensive program, National Cattle Dip program, Crop Production Inputs program (AID-sponsored Agriculture Sector Loan I, IADP/IBRD).

However, the Mission acknowledges that except for the contribution made by the successful rural labor-intensive roads sub-project, the AID-sponsored Vihiga/Hamisi SRDP, overall, had minimal impact on the achievement of the project goal.

#### 18. PROJECT PURPOSE

"To test new rural development methods, techniques, systems, and program combinations as prototypes for national or regional replication."

The original concept of establishing truly controlled experimental laboratories in the form of SRDP's never materialized because of a combination of factors, including an ill-defined concept of controlled experimentation, local pressures and bureaucracy. Most of the 26 originally conceived Vihiga SRDP sub-projects have continued to exist, primarily because they are part of normal ongoing GOK programs. In the Rural Roads sub-project the objective became one of providing local employment and building roads per se rather than being experimental in nature. Basically, the Vihiga SRDP sub-projects have not provided significant data as set forth in the project purpose. More specifically, only one of the original sub-projects, the Rural Roads sub-project, has been carefully monitored and managed within the concept of controlled experimentation.

Nonetheless, and as noted immediately below, Vihiga results have to some fair extent been drawn on and, as appropriate, replicated. While there have been project problems, there has also been a fair amount of "learning by doing"--in large part which the project was all about.

With reference to the overall SRDP, it was the finding of IDS, University of Nairobi, that "...few projects have emerged from SRDP which Government has been able to replicate or could consider now replicating in future in other areas of Kenya." (Page 20-2, IDS SRDP Evaluation.)

#### 19. OUTPUTS AND INPUTS

Major output successes of the Vihiga/Hamisi SRDP were: (a) the development and testing of replicable techniques and systems for labor-intensive rural road construction and maintenance by constructing 58 Km of roads; (b) the substantial increase in tea production by approximately 1,000 target smallholder farmers as a result of credit made available to each loanee for planting one acre of tea; (c) the development and testing of programs to assist small rural businessmen and establish rural industries utilizing the PFP to provide advisory and input assistance, and (d) the creation of decentralized, district level planning structures.

Several significant difficulties surfaced during the life of this project:

(A) Although PP Revision No. 5 provided that sub-project designs include an experimental format, the GOK decision not to assign a U.S. extension specialist and an evaluator/economist as originally planned resulted in less than adequate administrative technical support being provided to the Cattle Dip/A.I., Extension Crop Demonstration and Tea Credit sub-projects in the last year of the project.

(B) During the project life PFP provided advisory and management inputs to the Keveye Village Polytechnic including an improved training program for 25 mechanics and 13 leather craft workers bringing the total number trained to 89 and 28, respectively. While a very high percentage of mechanics found employment, it is estimated that only 50 percent of the trained leather craft workers are gainfully employed.

(C) The project provided a full-time U.S. Rural Development Program Analyst to assist develop the Kenyan staff capability and some progress was made in this direction. This progress has been largely a result of the efforts of the U.S. technician. During the last two years of his assignment, however, this technician was often forced to devote considerable time and effort to thwarting office bureaucratic pressures and problems. This resulted in reduced efficiency.

Major technical and administrative project inputs were provided by four AID contractors:

(1) FAMU - Contract terminated June 30, 1975, because contractor was unable to support and retain qualified personnel on project.

(2) PFP - PFP contributed in a highly satisfactory manner to the project in a number of important areas. During the project's last two years, PFP served as the administrator for the AID-sponsored SRDP evaluation/collection team and was responsible for the monitoring of the utilization of project vehicles, facilities and manpower. Secondly, PFP was responsible for advisory services, including training, related to the Keveye Village Polytechnic for which AID provided a leather tanning facility and financial support to the auto mechanics training section. PFP also provided management advisory services to small business enterprises and individuals. More specifically, PFP provided (a) an extension service to 700 small businessmen, and (b) assisted in forming rural trade committees through which short-term credit was provided to 86 small traders; provided handicraft training and marketing assistance to 166 women and stimulated establishment of new local industries including a small sugar mill refinery and the extraction of papain latex from papaya. The focus on assistance to women's groups is reflected in PFP advisory assistance in both management and marketing activities for the Chango Women's Society in which 130 women are directly involved in the production of pottery, banana fiber products and foodstuffs. A second major thrust

is the Kakamega Cottage Industries Society of Women in which 27 women have been trained in the production of pottery, jewelry and tie-dye fabrics. An OPG has been approved covering PFP's rural enterprise extension service.

(3) DAI - Rural Development Program Evaluator/Analyst (Peter Weisel)

The Program Evaluator/Analyst arrived at the project site in late 1972. Recruitment and filling of this position was a result of USAID's wish to ensure that a continuous evaluation capability was in place at Vihiga; the position had previously been filled by an Institute of Development Studies Research Fellow. During the nearly two years that the Program Evaluator/Analyst was in Vihiga, he produced a series of reports and "discussion papers" including maize promotion and loan programs, small farmer credit, an analysis of grade cattle, planning strategies for the Vihiga SRDP, and an analysis of cultural practices vs. Mexican 142 bean yields. The GOK saw a wider application for Dr. Weisel's analytical abilities and, in August 1974, formally requested USAID to assign him to the Ministry of Finance and Planning. The USAID agreed to this, and for the project's last two years, the incumbent served as the principal advisor within the Rural Planning Unit, Ministry of Finance and Planning, for the purpose of enhancing the staff capability to collect and disseminate the results of the SRDP's and other rural development programs. Working with a small staff of three Kenyan program officers and a UN advisor, the incumbent was responsible for the continuing evaluation of the entire SRDP. He also developed a Management Information System (MIS) which contributed to the decentralization of planning to the local level. In addition to preparing the basic documentation he devoted much time to changing the attitude of Government officials in favor of the decentralization planning concept. He also worked closely with a small group of District Development Officers (DDO's) as well as with other MOFP planning officers. His duties also included the design and monitoring of the activities of the AID-sponsored data collection/evaluation team in the Vihiga SRDP which compiled the first detailed and systematic study of the impact of feeder roads on low-income smallholder farmers. The incumbent also generated several reports and project evaluation documents.

(4) NEF - Rural Roads Engineer (Robert Bartolo)

The incumbent served as the project engineer of the labor-intensive roads sub-project. He was responsible for designing and developing replicable techniques and systems for labor-intensive rural roads construction. However, because of home leave and lengthy contractual negotiations, he was out of Kenya during the period February 21, 1975, to September 1, 1975. In his absence, unfortunately, his GOK counterparts did not adhere to the work plan or schedule, thus invalidating the experimental aspects of the road construction work accomplished during much of the reporting period, although some 12 km. of road was actually constructed. However, the incumbent estimates that 70 percent of the planned road construction of 58 km. was successfully accomplished under his supervision at a cost of approximately K.Shs.300,000. More importantly, he successfully designed a system and methodology for labor-intensive

road construction which has been documented and published as a guide for future rural roads construction by the GOK and possibly other countries. The incumbent also provided useful advisory services in connection with the GOK's rural access roads program.

20. EVALUATION FINDINGS ABOUT UNPLANNED EFFECTS

This project did not have any substantive unplanned effects.

21. CHANGES IN DESIGN OR EXECUTION

Does not apply.

22. LESSONS LEARNED

A number of lessons were learned with respect to the Vihiga project. First, "experiments" are different from other development projects--they have to be run under carefully controlled conditions, and each step has to be fully documented. Further, the Vihiga project involved the interaction of several ministries, and yet USAID dealt primarily with only one, the Ministry of Finance and Planning. That Ministry proved itself unable to control the operating ministries, particularly in terms of documentation required and emphasis on the experimental nature of the project.

A third lesson learned was that when GOK project objectives change, USAID should reassess its own position in the project. Clearly, the GOK expectations over the outcome of the SRDP program changed during the life of the project, and the USAID should have followed up with the GOK on their interest in continuing or revising the Vihiga SRDP. (To some extent such USAID/GOK dialogue did occur--i.e., prior to project approval in 1971, at a time when several changes were under consideration--and during later evaluation; but, with hindsight, more frequent re-evaluation, and changes as appropriate, would perhaps have been in order.)

23. SPECIAL COMMENTS OR REMARKS

None