



**International  
Contraceptive  
Social  
Marketing  
Project**

TRIP REPORT

Ghana

May 8-18, 1981

Submitted to:

AID/Office of Population  
Family Planning Services Division

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**Ghana**

May 8-18, 1981

Prepared by ICSMP Consultant:

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## **EDITOR'S NOTE**

Contraceptive social marketing programs are also known as commercial retail sales (CRS) programs, contraceptive retail sales (CRS) programs, commercial distribution of contraceptives (CDC) programs, or sometimes simply social marketing programs. In these reports the term CSM is generally used, except when a specific project has adopted one of the above terms as, or as part of, its project name.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ICSMP Consultant Ralph Susman visited Ghana from May 8-18, 1981 for the purpose of assessing the current status of the CSM project in Ghana. In particular, Mr. Susman was directed to identify the obstacles which have prevented the program from operating effectively in the recent past and to recommend steps for their resolution. Of primary importance in this consultancy was to determine whether the Memorandum of Agreement, which formed the contractual basis for the program but has since expired, could be renegotiated, and if so how the new agreement should be structured.

It is the opinion of the consultant in this report that the major obstacle to effective management and operation of the program is the current controlling agency, the Ghana National Family Planning Program. The apparent problems of the GNFPP are pointed out in detail in this report and range from specific institutional deficiencies to the broader aspects of economic policy and conditions in Ghana at present. Despite the broader economic problems plaguing the country, it is the conclusion of the consultant that given a new management and control system, the CSM program in Ghana could be revived and could make a valuable contribution to family planning efforts in Ghana.

## I. BACKGROUND

A contract for the conduct of a Commercial Retail Sales (CRS) of contraceptives project was awarded to Westinghouse Health Systems on June 30, 1976 (AID/pha-C1145). Due to certain bureaucratic issues in Ghana, implementation of the contract was delayed almost one year, and the Westinghouse Project Manager did not take up residence in Accra until June 12, 1977. The original contract, scheduled for completion June 30, 1979, was extended through April 30, 1980.

The CRS Project operated by Westinghouse Health Systems was to carry out its work under the general supervision of the Ghana National Family Planning Programme Secretariat (GNFPP). The GNFPP Secretariat, charged with planning and coordinating all family planning activities in Ghana, is funded by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and works with the Ministries of Health, Information, Labor and Agriculture. The GNFPP established and presently operates a network of family planning clinics. It also carries out training programs for field workers from the various ministries.

The Westinghouse Health Systems contract did not contain a specific mechanism for the transfer of operational control of the project to a local entity at such time as the Westinghouse/USAID contract ended. During the final six months of 1979, the Westinghouse resident Program Director made numerous approaches to the GNFPP, putting forth a series of alternative approaches to the transfer of project control and management to a local entity.

Following rather prolonged consideration, the GNFPP Secretariat, in March, 1980, designated two of its staff members to concentrate on CRS Project management. The Westinghouse CRS Project Director undertook to provide orientation and familiarization about project activities for the two GNFPP designated CRS program managers. At about the same time, Westinghouse sub-contracts with the project distributor (DANAFCO) and advertising agency (LINTAS:GHANA) were terminated and new distribution and advertising contracts were concluded by the GNFPP with these two organizations.

By the time the Westinghouse Health Systems/USAID contract expired, (April 30, 1980) several key matters had been attended to by the Westinghouse Project Manager.

- o The two GNFPP project management designees had been provided with lengthy verbal briefings and a detailed and extensive briefing letter (dated March 17, 1980). (See Appendix 1.)
- o A contract was drawn up and signed by GNFPP and DANAFCO. Ltd. specifying the scope of work and prices for the continued printing of packaging materials, the packaging of commodities and their distribution and sale.
- o Approximately one year's supply of project printing and packaging materials were purchased in England and arrangements made for shipment to Accra. This was necessitated by the fact that such project materials were exhausted and none was available in Ghana. The shipment, which arrived in April 1980, included paper, board, inks, printing plates, cutting dies, etc. Upon arrival these materials were transferred to the DANAFCO Ltd. Warehouse.
- o It was estimated that the fresh shipment of printing and packaging materials would, based upon prior sales experience, be sufficient for the printing of the following quantity of packaging:

SSS Colored Condom - 6 units per box	200,000 boxes
Floril (orals) - 1 cycle per box	155,000 boxes
Coral (foam tablet) - 6 units per box	620,000 boxes

SSS Dispensers - 10 boxes each	20,000 dispensers
Floril Dispensers - 24 cycles each	7,000 dispensers
Coral Dispensers - 10 boxes each	62,000 dispensers

- o Funds generated by sales of CRS commodities during the period of the Westinghouse contract were deposited in Barclays Bank of Ghana Main Office in an account called "USAID Commercial Marketing Program." At the time of Westinghouse USAID contract expiration (April 30, 1980) these funds amounted to Cedis 91,431.90 or U.S.\$33,248.33 when calculated at the official rate of Cedis 2.75 = U.S.\$1.00. Additional funds generated by sales in May, June and July 1980 were deposited to the account by DANAFCO, and as of August 13, 1980 the account contained Cedis 125,963.60 or U.S.\$45,804.95.
- o In-country stocks of contraceptives were sufficient for the orderly continuation of the project. Neo-Sampoon tablets, whose stock was somewhat depleted, were reordered and a shipment of 1,700,000 tablets was already en-route by sea as of August, 1980.

## II. CURRENT SITUATION

In order to respond to the mandate of this consulting mission, it is necessary to provide an overview of the present situation in Ghana. This necessarily includes the overall economic situation as well as other relevant matters.

For some considerable time, Ghana has experienced a substantial economic slide. The reasons for this are quite complex but related to internal political and bureaucratic factors as well as such external factors as the price of oil, world market prices for cocoa (the main export crop), etc. Protracted bureaucratic malaise had led to an exacerbation of existing problems and to further strains upon the social, economic and political institutions of the country. A few examples will serve to illustrate the scope of the problem.

- o Inflation at present is estimated at 150 percent.
- o The Government continues to print new money which has no form of underlying support, thus contributing to a debasement of the currency and further heightening inflation.
- o There are numerous examples of police and other civil servants assigned up-country who have refused to work or staged incidents due to long-standing non-payment of wages.
- o In various parts of the country teachers, nurses and other Government employees are not able to cash their paychecks as banks refuse to honor Government checks.
- o Due to neglect of the transportation infrastructure many roads around the country are impassable because of deep rutting, collapse of the road base, washout of small bridges and culverts, etc. This not only prevents the delivery of necessary supplies, including gasoline, to smaller villages and towns but conversely causes great difficulty in shipping agricultural produce to market and thus denies Accra of certain needed agricultural foodstuffs.
- o As a result of Government pricing policies for cocoa coupled with the problems of transportation, many cocoa growers are either not planting new cocoa trees to replace older and less productive ones or are clandestinely shipping large amounts of cocoa beans across the borders into neighboring countries where they receive a better price in convertible currency, and where they can buy consumer goods and basic supplies. This clandestine movement of a substantial portion of the cocoa crop denies the Government of Ghana the

opportunity to earn hard currency via sales on the world markets.

- o Chronic shortages of essential drugs and supplies are evident in hospitals both in Accra and elsewhere in the country. There have been recent instances in which major hospitals in Accra had exhausted all supplies of anesthetics, for example.

The currency situation is a very real problem for nearly everyone; particularly for companies doing business abroad where goods must be purchased with "hard" or convertible currency. The Ghanaian Cedi must be classified as one of the most overvalued currencies in the world. The official exchange rate is set at 02.75 = U.S.\$1.00. It is worth noting, however, that - as might be expected in such a situation - there is an active "grey" market as well as a flourishing "black" market in both currency trading and the purchase of goods and services. The present "grey" market yields about ₵15.00 to the U.S. dollar while the "black" market trades the Cedi at the rate of 30 to the dollar. The continued erosion of the value of the Cedi has direct relevance for the project in terms of the commodity pricing structure, diminished value of cash assets on hand, purchase of necessary services and general overhead. This will be discussed in the main body of the report.

One important and predictable consequence of high inflation in tandem with greatly debased currency is the imposition of price controls on many key items. Such price controls, which are almost impossible to enforce, inevitably encourage the development of a secondary or "black" market. Thus, for example, one finds the shelves of many shops nearly empty of basic items such as matches, soap, batteries, etc. In part, this is due to absolute shortages of such items. In large measure, however it is due to the policy of price controls. Almost as soon as a shop receives a shipment of batteries, for example, the street traders who sell at real or "black" market prices buy up all the batteries at the controlled price and sell them in the market stalls openly at the "black" market price. The chronic shortage of almost everything produces a profound effect upon the society and the availability and distribution of goods and services. This situation impacts an activity such as a CRS Project in a number of different ways, all of which must be taken into account in determining price, calculating net return, and assuring that the contraceptive commodities are made available to intended consumers.

As a result of the severely stagnated economy, high inflation, debased currency and Government inertia, a number of important international companies have either substantially reduced their activity or have entirely terminated their operations in Ghana. In recent months, Lufthansa, Firestone and Alitalia have totally ceased operations and it is likely that other companies will follow. Deterioration of the commercial infrastructure also affects a CRS activity. It virtually mandates, that all goods and supplies for the conduct of the project be imported. This in turn necessitates greater costs, longer lead time and more administrative effort connected with import permits, etc. Spare parts for the printing press which DANAFCO used for the CRS Project, for example, must now be imported from Lagos at substantial cost, following the official permit by the Government to pay for the parts in hard currency. Such chronic economic difficulties also mean shortage of spare parts for vehicles as well as scarce supplies of gasoline, both of which undermine the effective service capacity of the project and the ability to expand its distribution network.

### **III. ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE GHANA CRS PROJECT**

#### **A. Expiration of the Memorandum of Agreement**

The Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of Ghana and USAID expired March 31, 1981. Since that time, there has been no contractual basis for operating the CRS Project.

It should be noted that the language in the Memorandum of Agreement signed by USAID on July 3, 1980 clearly anticipated both an expansion of the CRS Project under the stewardship of the GNFPP and its continuation beyond the March 31, 1981 expiration date.

Page 3, item 12 of the Agreement states that:

"It is agreed that meetings will be held every six months between the GNFPPS and USAID to review CRS program status and to plan future actions. In addition, ad hoc meetings can be called at any time at the initiation of either party" (see Appendix 2).

On December 4, 1980 Lawrence R. Eicher, Project Manager HPN, USAID/Accra wrote a letter to S.K. Kwafo, Deputy Executive Director of the Ghana National Family Planning Program Secretariat (GNFPPS) wherein he stated the following:

"Please also advise me when the GNFPP plans to convene its semi-annual review with DANAFCO and Lintas. Such a review should be most advantageous to all parties" (see Appendix 3).

It is worth noting that despite this letter and the expressed understanding that such a semi-annual review would be held, no positive action was ever taken by the GNFPP up to the time GNFPP allowed the Memorandum of Agreement to expire (March 31, 1981).

Further, some weeks prior to the above noted letter, Eicher had written to the GNFPP reminding them that the Memorandum of Agreement for the CRS Project would expire on March 31, 1981 and that as such there was a need to meet for the review and determination of GNFPP plans for the next phase of the project. The letter was positive in tone and clearly indicated the intent of USAID to continue its support of the project (letter on file in Accra).

Despite repeated reminders to the GNFPP executives, however, Eicher never received a reply to his letter, and no review of the project was ever carried out. It may be said therefore, that as the result of GNFPP inaction, the record remained incomplete as to GNFPP intentions up to the time the project was allowed to expire.

#### B. Present Situation at the GNFPP

As noted earlier in the Background section, the GNFPP was given the mandate to plan and coordinate all family planning activities in Ghana. In addition to its planning and coordinating role, it set up and presently operates a network of family planning clinics and carries out a number of training programs for field workers from various ministries. It is the conclusion of this consultant that there has long been bureaucratic competition between the GNFPP and the Ministry of Health on matters related to policy and operational leadership of population matters in Ghana. Whether or not the GNFPP has sufficient numbers

and quality of staff to carry out the planning and coordinating function of its mandate is doubtful, however, there is substantial evidence, that the GNFPP has demonstrated neither the managerial skills nor the programmatic understanding to effectively carry out an operational activity such as the CRS Project.

The Secretariat of the GNFPP is headed by Dr. A.A. Armar whose Deputy is Mr. S.J. Kwafo. Armar maintains total control of all decision making in the Secretariat. His Deputy, Kwafo, is a Deputy in name only, having no authority in any area of GNFPP activity. It may be useful to provide some illustration of the management style of the GNFPP. On July 16, 1979 Raymond Martin, Population Officer USAID/Accra wrote to Armar on the subject "Future Structure of the Retail Contraceptive Sales Program." A major portion of the letter was concerned with the recruitment of an experienced marketing executive from the commercial sector who would be trained by the Westinghouse Project Director John Hayes to be his replacement upon the transfer of project control from Westinghouse to the GNFPP. Martin made clear the view of USAID that such a person should be recruited by the Westinghouse Project Director subject to approval by the GNFPP. The letter is quite clear in stating that the project sales manager to be recruited would be a key person for the future success of the project. The letter goes on to say that "...he would essentially take responsibility for the functions now performed by Mr. Hayes" (see Appendix 4).

This same letter concludes with the following paragraph:

"We hope the suggestions offered in this letter will be useful to you in your planning and decisions. Because of the urgency of designating a product sales manager who will have sufficient time to work alongside Mr. Hayes prior to the termination of the Westinghouse contract, we would hope that you would make the necessary decisions by the end of this month so that an orderly restructuring of the CRS program can begin promptly."

Despite the sense of urgency indicated in the Martin letter, it was not until more than one month later, August 20 to be precise, that Armar responded, and his letter was not responsive to the request for decisive and prompt action as requested in the Martin letter. (See Appendix 5.)

It is also worth noting that despite the sense of urgency conveyed in the Martin letter of July 16, 1979, which resulted in an imprecise and unhurried response dated August 20, 1979, no action of a definitive nature was undertaken by the GNFPP until February 27, 1980. On this date a letter whose subject was titled "Continuation of the Retail Sales Programme Project Started by Westinghouse," was sent to Hayes, The letter, signed by Mr. H.K. Acquaye, GNFPP Assistant Director for Administration, on behalf of the Executive Director, stated that E Osei-Kissih of the GNFPP staff was to be assigned as a liaison person between the GNFPP and and DANAFCO and would understudy Hayes during the transition period. Kissih was to work under the supervision of Acquaye. The letter then asks Hayes to "brief Mr. Kissih on the status of the project and make available to him all relevant documents on the project prior to your departure in mid-March" (see Appendix 6).

Thus it is that the letter from Ray Martin of July 16, 1979 finally culminated more than seven months later in the designation of a GNFPP staff member who lacked marketing and management experience, and has always considered his CRS activity to be a kind of "second job" over and above his regular GNFPP assignment for which he was not being compensated. It is noteworthy that the assignment of this successor came only three weeks before Hayes was due to leave Ghana.

A further indication of GNFPPs inability to manage and poor staff work occurred following its takeover of the CRS Project. GNFPP announced to USAID/Accra that its own clinic stocks of orals were substantially depleted and they had an urgent need for 900,000 cycles of orals. The USAID Mission, wishing to be helpful and supportive of the GNFPP, air shipped 900,000 cycles to Accra to cover the GNFPP requirements. At this same time, however, the CRS Project (now controlled by GNFPP) had 287,400 cycles of orals at the DANAFCO warehouse from which they could easily have borrowed older stock (dated August 1976) thus obviating the necessity for an expensive air shipment.

Other problems are found in inventory, distribution and financial records at the GNFPP, all of which are so poor as to obviate any possible use for effective planning and program evaluation. For example, on January 2, 1981 a letter was sent from Eicher to Kwafo at the GNFPP on the subject "Data Requirements On

Contraceptives for USAID Annual Budget Submission." In this letter, Eicher asked for information on three items concerning the CRS Project:

- o January 1, 1981 stock levels of difference types of contraceptives including a breakdown, if possible, to show stocks held in central storage and those held in regional warehouses;
- o Projected sales of different contraceptives by year, from 1980 through 1985;
- o Projected procurement requirements by year, from 1980 through 1985, which is available by calculation based on (1) and (2).

It is important to note that paragraph one of the letter tells the GNFPP that the USAID Budget Submission, including contraceptive procurement, is due again in Washington in February. Eicher asked that the data be provided by February 2, which meant a four week lead time.

In response to the Eicher letter of January 2, the GNFPP sent a letter with attachments on March 10th signed by E. Ossi-Kissih for the Executive Director. Paragraph one states that:

"We have up till now not obtained the up-to-date figures from the regional depots, where they have been received however, they are quite negligible (sic)."

The fact is that the GNFPP had no idea of what stocks it held up country and had very incomplete data on the level of activity going on. The letter goes on to say,

"It is hoped therefore that the figures obtained from the Central Stores will help in the exercise."

and proceeds to inform that

"Note must also be taken of the fact that a greater portion of the contraceptives are stored either at the Secretariat Stores or the DANAFCO warehouse in Accra."

The facts revealed by the enclosed inventory statement, however, plainly showed that the GNFPP did not know with any real precision what stocks it was holding or where they were (see Appendix 7).

In response to the request to furnish projections of sales through 1985, the GNFPP submitted data which projected the following (see Appendix 8).

For the period 1982 through 1985 increases were anticipated to be:

Orals	15% per year
Colored Condoms	10% per year
Plain Condoms	15% per year
Neo Shampoo	50% per year

In the course of a meeting with the GNFPP staff on May 11, 1981 this Consultant asked about the apparent optimistically high level of projected increases in sales and asked if GNFPP could furnish some basis or formula which they utilized to derive the projections. We were told that the information was not immediately available but that it would be found and made available. Despite two further contacts with the GNFPP the information was not provided. It is not unreasonable to conjecture that someone simply chose a figure for each type of commodity and projected that same annual percentage increase over the four year period. Surely there are no data generated by the CRS Project nor any other evidence to support such projected increases in sales. Further problems with respect to stock management and control are worth noting:

- o In the commodity and procurement requirement report sent to Eicher, the GNFPP showed zero stock of the Panther or plain condom as of January, 1981. Likewise, the DANAFCO stock report shows zero stock of plain condoms as of this same date. Yet when this Consultant inspected the commodity storage facility at the GNFPP Secretariat it was found that GNFPP was holding 66 cartons of 6000 pieces each, or a total of 396,000 plain condoms. This stock had in fact been there for some time but had simply been "overlooked" by the GNFPP and thus never transferred to DANAFCO for packaging and subsequent distribution and sale.
- o The same GNFPP report referred to above showed stock of Neo-Shampoo (brand named "Coral") as 435,680 pieces as of January, 1981. Yet the DANAFCO production report for the month of January shows almost total depletion of this

very popular commodity with only 1,610 pieces remaining to pack. It is hard to imagine that the GNFPP was holding such a large stock of Neo-Sampoon tablets and yet not making them available to DANAFCO for packaging and distribution at a time when there is a great demand and products are in short supply on the shelves of shops and in the stalls. Furthermore, it is difficult to understand where, and how, the GNFPP would store such a sizeable shipment in their otherwise limited facilities.

- o During the course of this consultant's visit, a GNFPP staff member indicated that GNFPP had "borrowed" 100 cartons of "Coral" and that these had been withdraw funds. According to the Memorandum of Agreement all net revenues from the CRS Project are to be placed in the project account and the specific uses to which these funds may be put are spelled out in the Memorandum of Agreement (Items 5 through 10).

At our meeting with the GNFPP staff presided over by Kwafo (May 11, 1981) several matters concerning project finances were raised. First, we asked for a report on the current balance in the project account. After a brief delay, Kissih produced a report entitled GNFPP Commercial Account - Balance as at 30th April 1981 (see Appendix 9). The balance shown on the initial presentation is Cedis 166,214.80. When we reminded the GNFPP staff that the initial input from Westinghouse was Cedis 125,963.60 and the DANAFCO had made subsequent payments, they acknowledged that the record was not accurate. Following a further delay additional data were added (in longhand) to the financial report showing additional amounts of Cedis 7,831.50 (check number 485433 dated 9 October, 1980); Cedis 32,369.70 (check number 344428 dated 17 November 1980); and Cedis 13,458.00 (check number 916062 dated 30 March, 1981). Absent from their report was a DANAFCO payment of Cedis 2,768.40 (check number 276133 dated 2 March, 1981). Thus, the balance is Cedis 219,874 if one accepts the GNFPP data as given or Cedis 222,642.40 if one adds the March 2 payment made by DANAFCO but not shown on their report.

We then asked about project disbursements made by the GNFPP under the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement. We were not able to obtain a statement of expenditure; however we were advised by the GNFPP that they have made no disbursements for any purpose other than a small amount for transport of commodity shipments from the port at Tema. After some discussion and estimation it is assumed that these transport costs were about Cedis 9,000. We

cannot be sure that this estimate is correct or that there were not other debits. It is apparent, however, that the CRS Project financial record-keeping by the GNFPP is grossly inadequate.

We asked the GNFPP on May 11 if all of the funds were in a checking account or if any of the funds were put into an interest bearing account so as to enhance the financial and programmatic capability of the project. The GNFPP reported that all of the funds were held in the project checking account which is non-interest bearing. We suggested that the GNFPP might wish to consider putting the bulk of funds into an interest bearing account and keep a lesser, operating balance in the checking account. This suggestion was met with total silence, giving us little hope that it would be given serious consideration or acted upon positively.

A further point is relevant in this discussion of financial management. The Westinghouse CRS Account check for Cedis 125,963.60 was sent to Kwafo on 4 December, 1980. Yet the balance report form GNFPP (Appendix 9) records the check as of February 26, 1981 which is nearly three months later. No satisfactory explanation is provided for this somewhat curious delay.

Given the extremely high inflation rate estimated at 150% accompanied by the progressive debasement of the currency, it is not effective management for the GNFPP Executive Director to allow all of the funds to remain in a non-interest bearing account. Even if one accepts the lesser project balance of Cedis 219,874 and converts that amount at the official rate it means that the CRS Project has generated U.S.\$79,954.18 (rate of Cedis 2.75 = \$1.00). However, if one considers that prices for goods and services such as printing, advertising, etc. reflect more nearly the unofficial but accepted "black market" exchange rate, one sees that the project funds do not have a "real" value of \$79,954.18 but are likely worth something closer to \$7,329.13.

This discussion of project funds, their management and effective utilization to advance the project leads us to another and most important area.

### C. The Use of Project Funds for Advertising and Promotion

The Memorandum of Agreement under which the GNFPP operated the project contains three provisions highly relevant to any review of any GNFPP conduct of the CRS Project, including the proper use of project funds.

- o Page 1, item 4 states: "It is agreed that the GNFPP will contract with private or non-governmental firm(s) or organization(s) to operate the program, prepare packaging materials, package and distribute the contraceptives, promote and advertise the program and perform any other functions considered desirable for the maintenance and expansion of the program."
- o Page 2, item 7 states in part that: "USAID hereby provides concurrence for expenditures from the special account for the following categories of activity... advertising, both product specific and generic-promoting the practice of family planning; marketing research and sales evaluation; promotional efforts to expand the number of retailers of contraceptives, retailer training."
- o Page 2, item 9 states: "Because of the potential of commercial channels to reach people not served effectively by other contraceptive delivery systems, it is agreed that proper emphasis shall be given to advertising and other promotional efforts to make contraceptives readily accessible throughout the country."

Despite the written and signed agreement concerning the importance of advertising and promotion to the success and expansion of the CRS Project, the GNFPP has consistently refused to spend any money on advertising and promotional activities. In the course of our meeting with the GNFPP staff on May 11th, we raised this issue of non-activity in these two important areas. In response to our inquiry, Kwafo, speaking for the GNFPP, stated that they purposely did not advertise but rather "kept a low profile" and counted on "word of mouth." Given the fact that the Government of Ghana has a positive population policy and supports the CRS Project activity, one wonders why a "low profile" would be necessary. Further, since there is such a great shortage of all goods throughout the country, it seems inconceivable that the GNFPP would choose to adopt a "low profile" and "word of mouth" approach to advertising and promotion.

There a number of possible reasons for the failure of the GNFPP to live up to the provisions of the Memorandum of Agreement and specifically items 4, 7, and 9 (see Appendix 2):

- o A fundamental lack of understanding about the concept of a CRS Project, including the necessary know-how in basic marketing and project management.
- o A resentment and even mistrust of profit-making companies such as Lintas: Ghana, the advertising agency, and DANAFCO Ltd.
- o A concern that a dynamic and highly successful CRS Project might somehow outshine the less than dynamic GNFPP run clinic program.
- o Managerial indifference based upon a sense of having been forced to take on an activity which the GNFPP does not understand, did not want, and does not believe in.

It can readily be seen that the GNFPP, for various reasons, has not carried out any advertising or promotion even though the Memorandum of Agreement specifically requires and encourages such activities, and the project has suffered as the result of such failure. While the costs of advertising and promotional activities were constantly rising in the climate of Ghana's high inflation, the GNFPP allowed the project funds to sit in the bank, gaining no interest, and eroding in purchasing power month by month.

Let us now look at a major consequence of such inaction and mismanagement from the standpoint of product availability.

D. GNFPP and the relationship with DANAFCO Ltd.

DANAFCO Ltd. was selected as the CRS Project distributor under the Westinghouse contract. This company, one hundred percent Ghanaian the past four years, is part of a larger group of Danish owned or controlled companies, and has been operating in Ghana for more than 21 years. DANAFCO is both a manufacturer, importer and distributor of such products as anti-malarials, vitamins, vermifuges, petroleum jelly, and a line of Cheeseboro-Ponds cosmetics and toiletries. The company maintains four in-country warehouse/distribution points at various locations in Ghana in addition to its central storage warehouse

in Accra. DANAFCO's nationwide distribution capability is further enhanced by its maintenance and operations of a complete in-house printing facility, thus enabling the company to produce all CRS packages, instruction leaflets, etc. The DANAFCO central warehouse, where the CRS commodities are stored, is clean, dry, secure, air-conditioned, and superior to anything found on the African continent. DANAFCO has a well-maintained fleet of large and small trucks and thus has the capability of moving supplies to distant points in the country as well as moving new shipments from the port at Tema to its warehouse and packaging facility in Accra.

The contract between the GNFPF and DANAFCO, Ltd. requires that GNFPF authorize any packaging and distribution activities. Yet for some considerable time the GNFPF has failed to act decisively on the matter of authorizing distribution. As can be seen in Table 1, there has been a progressive downturn in the sales of CRS commodities, brought about entirely by the persistent refusal of the GNFPF to authorize greater distribution (and in the case of plain condoms, by withholding the CRS in-country stock of 396,000 pieces from DANAFCO).

TABLE 1

Cumulative Sales of CRS Commodities: August, 1980 - April, 1981

	<u>Floril Brand Orals</u>	<u>Panther Brand Plain Condoms</u>	<u>SSS Brand Colored Condoms</u>	<u>Coral Brand Tabs. (Neo-Sampon)</u>
August, 1980	None	2,611	224	7,552
September	None	2,705	224	9,921
October	None	2,705	341	10,689
November	None	2,705	451	10,689
December	None	2,705	1,232	10,689
January, 1981	None	2,705	3,176	10,689
February	None	2,705	7,070	10,689
March	None	2,705	11,620	10,732
April	None	2,705	11,710	10,732

Source: DANAFCO Ltd, Stock and Sales Reports

The data in Table 1 take on added relevance when one considers that the absence of sales activity is not related in any way to an absence of stock. The CRS Project commodity stock held by DANAFCO as of May, 1981 was as follows:

Coral	122 cartons x 2,880 tablets	58,500 packets of 6 tablets each
Floril	474 cartons x 10 x 50 cycles	287,400 cycles
	84 cartons x 10 x 60 cycles	
SSS	22½ cartons x 60 x 100 condoms	22,500 packets of 6 condoms each

In addition to the stock of commodities, DANAFCO was also holding a substantial supply of materials for the packaging of two commodities. As of May, 1981 there were sufficient materials to produce 155,000 packets of Floril (orals) and 200,000 packets of Coral (Neo-Sampoon spermicide tablets).

DANAFCO has reported that it simply cannot get the GNFPP to approve any new packaging and distribution despite numerous approaches to GNFPP. To illustrate, DANAFCO wrote to the GNFPP about the possibility of reducing the number of colors on Floril packs because of printing problems and difficulty in obtaining special parts, which must be imported, for the printing machine. They have never received a reply to their request. Similarly on 19 March, 1981 DANAFCO wrote to the GNFPP requesting an increase in its profit margin due to substantially increased overhead costs related to inflation. At the time of this consultant's visit in mid-May no reply had been received.

DANAFCO reports a serious problem of not knowing to whom they are to report or with whom to discuss their plans or concerns. Letters and calls to both Armar and Kwafo remain either unanswered or are answered at a very late date in a manner totally unresponsive to the content of the request.

According to the Managing Director of DANAFCO they are vastly undersupplying their primary market because they are not permitted to pack and distribute. Further, there are no stocks of CRS commodities in any of the DANAFCO up-country warehouses even though DANAFCO reports no problem in making such

rural deliveries and states that its four rural distribution warehouses are regularly supplied with other DANAFCO products on average of twice per month.

#### E. Summary of Current Status of Project

The present status of the CRS Project may be characterized as follows:

- o The GNFPF allowed the Memorandum of Agreement with USAID to expire on March 31, 1981.
- o Prior to expiration of the agreement with GNFPF, the project generated little distribution and sales activity even though there is a clear demand for the product and ample purchasing power to pay for the contraceptives.
- o There are considerable supplies of contraceptives and packaging materials in the DANAFCO warehouse but their distribution has been impeded by GNFPF inaction virtually from the outset of their stewardship.
- o The GNFPF has consistently refused to make use of any project funds for advertising and promotion.
- o GNFPF financial and commodity record-keeping demonstrates a lack of management competency to operate an activity of the size and scope of the CRS Project.
- o GNFPF policy and decision-making with respect to the CRS Project has been in a state of near paralysis almost from the start. The GNFPF executives appear unresponsive and indifferent to requests from USAID, DANAFCO and Lintas:Ghana.
- o The GNFPF has failed to live up to any of the provisions of the Memorandum of Agreements and thus the project has accomplished little following the departure of Westinghouse Project Director Hayes.

### IV. OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE PROGRAM CONTINUATION

#### A. Overview

The foregoing section has described the current status of the CRS Project and indicated the internal management problems of the GNFPF. It also provides an overview the general economic situation in Ghana in which the project was

operating. Identification of obstacles to effective program continuation requires (1) an identification of the various principal actors or institutions and (2) an assignment of their importance as part of the "problem" and their role in any solution.

As discussed earlier, the failure of the GNFPP to manage the CRS Project efficiently and in accordance with the provisions of the Memorandum of Agreement constitutes the principal obstacle to effective program continuation. It must be recognized, however, that GNFPP management deficiency does not operate in a vacuum. The agency has a Board comprised of representatives from several Ministries as well as the Planned Parenthood Association of Ghana. In addition, it should be remembered that the GNFPP is funded by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and has ongoing and shared activities with the Ministry of Health. To some considerable extent, the management problems of the GNFPP reflect the larger bureaucratic and management stagnation occurring at all levels in the Government of Ghana.

Any consideration of the relative importance of the various individuals or agencies in effecting a solution must necessarily take account of the bureaucratic arrangements and the various competing interests which must be served.

Without any doubt, the Ministries of Finance/Economic Planning and Health are the key agencies in bringing about an effective continuation of the project. It is possible but not altogether likely that the Executive Director of the GNFPP would allow the CRS Project to come under different sponsorship. However, whether or not the Ministries of these two key agencies would be willing to act expeditiously and with resolution to bring about the necessary changes in project sponsorship is, at this time, a matter of uncertainty.

The issue of removing the CRS Project from GNFPP control can easily get caught up in larger bureaucratic competition involving (1) the GNFPP and the Ministry of Health; and (2) the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance/Economic Planning. In short, the principal actors in bringing about effective project continuation are the Executive Director of the GNFPP, together with senior officials in the Ministries of Finance/Economic Planning and Health. The willingness of these various participants to take the immediate and

necessary actions however is in part related to other bureaucratic interests, relationships and priorities which these agencies have defined.

Identifying remedies to these obstacles must inevitably take into account these bureaucratic realities in the GOG. The remedies, too, must inevitably involve participation from important segments of the private sector, notably DANAFCO, LTD., and Lintas:Ghana.

B. The GNFPP Perspective

Discussions held on several occasions with executives and staff of the GNFPP were informative and revealing. Three basic questions were asked of the GNFPP: (1) what reason or reasons are there for the progressive run-down of the project as seen by the diminution of distribution and sales; (2) what caused the Memorandum of Agreement to expire on March 31, 1981, without any prior negotiations for a new agreement to continue the project; and (3) what plans might they have for a Phase II CRS Project if a new agreement is negotiated.

To the first question, no comprehensive explanations were provided. The only "reasons" provided for the run-down of the project, which includes withholding authorization for DANAFCO to distribute and refusal to carry out advertising and promotional activities were: 1) the fact that Hayes "did everything himself and did not train a replacement;" and 2) that DANAFCO, Ltd. does not have sufficient sales points in Accra and is short on sales distribution activities in the North of the country.

That John Hayes did "everything" must be seen in the context that he was the on-site Project Director responsible for planning, organizing, staffing and directing a new activity under the extremely difficult circumstances of little institutional support and a fair amount of non-cooperation. The record is abundantly clear that Hayes did everything possible to recruit and train a suitable replacement. Hayes did his best to provide the necessary orientation and briefing to the GNFPP staff members designated to coordinate project activities following his departure at the end of the Westinghouse contract.

Regarding allegations about the limited distribution network of DANAFCO, Ltd., it must be said that they were prepared to carry out such distribution as their agreement stipulated and expand distribution as desirable and feasible. DANAFCO distributes to 100% of the pharmacies in Accra. It also delivers to other types of outlets including the Ghana National Trading Corporation. Increasing the number of distribution points both in Accra and up-country was never seriously explored by the GNFPP with DANAFCO. In fact, the GNFPP withheld authorization from DANAFCO to distribute to an already commodity-short market among its regular distribution outlets.

It is this consultant's opinion that without the excellent efforts of DANAFCO there would have been no project once the GNFPP assumed sponsorship and overall management control of the CRS Project.

As to the second point, no reasons were given by the GNFPP for allowing the Memorandum of Agreement to expire without continuous discussions. As mentioned earlier, a letter from Eicher to the GNFPP in the fourth quarter of 1980 reminding them of the need to review the project and discuss actions to be taken prior to the March 31, 1981 expiration of the Memorandum of Agreement received no reply. It can be surmised that the GNFPP executives assumed that USAID would overlook the project termination date and that things would just continue on as they were.

To the third point, there are no clear plans of GNFPP at present for a Phase II project in terms of marketing, advertising or distribution. GNFPP seems to feel that Accra and near urban areas are adequately covered by clinics and regular (high price) outlets and thus appear to indicate an interest in concentrating CRS activities in rural areas. The possibility of a rural/urban mix for a Phase II project was suggested, and there was agreement that this might be a useful approach. However, it was clear that the GNFPP executives and staff had no idea of the implications of such a rural/urban mix in terms of marketing, promotion, advertising, logistics, etc.

The GNFPP suggested that they did not require the participation of DANAFCO, Ltd., and could carry out the project, including the launch of rural distribution, with their own resources. All that was needed was for USAID to provide

sufficient vehicles. It should be noted that GNFPP has not been able to carry out its present rural supply responsibilities, is unsure of what supplies are held in rural depots and has only sporadic communication with the regional depots (see Appendix 7).

It is clear that there has been no cumulative learning experience on the part of the GNFPP Secretariat executives and staff. The CRS Project is for them a simple extension of the clinic program. Added to this is resentment towards DANAFCO and Lintas:Ghana, apparently centered around an ideological hostility to profit-making organizations, although GNFPP grudgingly admitted that DANAFCO takes all the risks, incurs all the expenses and really makes the project run. The concept of social marketing, including the interests and roles of government and the private sector, were defined and spelled out in discussions with the GNFPP; however, this consultant remains unconvinced such discussions will result in a change of attitude by or effectiveness of the GNFPP with regard to CRS management.

### C. The DANAFCO Ltd. Perspective

The obstacles as seen from the perspective of the distributor are very specific.

- o Unresponsiveness of GNFPP to inquiries and requests made by DANAFCO for program activities.
- o Undersupply of the market due to GNFPP, failure to authorize new packaging and distribution requests.
- o Failure of the GNFPP to invest any funds in advertising and promotion activities.
- o The failure to develop a new pricing structure for CRS commodities based upon existing marketplace costs for consumer goods and food, and taking into account retail prices for contraceptives sold in the pharmacies when they are available. (The effect of Ghana's rampant inflation has been to undermine the intrinsic value of the CRS products whose prices were set several years ago.)

DANAFCO raised the need for change in their profit margin based upon steeply rising costs such as gasoline, replacement parts for vehicles, and rising salaries for staff and general overhead costs. DANAFCO wrote to the Executive

Director of the GNFPF on March 19, 1981 requesting a renegotiation of its profit margin. During the GNFPF meeting on May 11 (nearly two months after the DANAFCO request) this consultant was told that a letter from GNFPF officially requesting a change in the CRS commodity price structure had been sent to the Ministry of Finance "about ten day ago" and that a response was expected "in about ten days to two weeks." The proposed new pricing structure, however, was not arrived at with any participation by DANAFCO nor had the GNFPF officially responded to the March 19th request. (It should be noted that well informed Ghanaians both in and out of government indicated that an estimation of ten days to two weeks for the Ministry of Finance reply was not realistic and that the time would be considerably longer.)

DANAFCO executives are also specific and to the point concerning remedies which preclude GNFPF involvement in Phase II of the CRS project:

- o USAID contract directly with DANAFCO to carry out all packaging and distribution activities.
- o USAID contract directly with Lintas:Ghana for advertising or promotion activities or DANAFCO would contract with Lintas:Ghana for its services.
- o The development of an urban/rural mix with increased distribution be accompanied by appropriate advertising and promotional activities. Rural areas targeted for possible expansion of the Project should include Korforidua, Hohoe, Brong-Ahafo (USAID Primary Health Care Project are) and either Wenchi or Techiman.
- o A two-tier pricing structure be considered in which, at least initially, there would be a price differential between the urban and rural areas, with urban prices being slightly higher. (It was agreed by DANAFCO that this had some merit and needed to be further considered in the drawing up of a new pricing structure for a Phase II project.)

Along with the organizational and managerial efforts of WHS Project Director Hayes one must give substantial weight to the contribution made by DANAFCO, Ltd., to any success which this project has achieved. As indicated earlier, this is a very well run organization whose records on distribution are excellent and whose management has the capacity to plan intelligently, based upon a careful evaluation of accumulated experience and data.

#### D. The Lintas:Ghana Ltd. Perspective

The obstacles as seen from the perspective of the advertising agency are brief and to the point.

- o GNFPP's absence of managerial skills and a failure to understand the conceptual basis of a CRS activity.
- o Refusal of the GNFPP to undertake any advertising or promotional activities despite Lintas' regular prodding. (It is worth noting that all advertising ceased as of January 1, 1980 with the exception of 90 billboards already in place and contracted for through March 31, 1980).

The remedies suggested by Lintas:Ghana Ltd. are also brief and to the point.

- o The CRS Project should be run either by Lintas:Ghana Ltd. or DANAFCO, Ltd. via a direct services contract. This recommendation includes some provision for the participation of GNFPP in an advisory role "if necessary".
- o The CRS Project should expand its urban (Accra) distribution base where possible and undertake rural distribution using a two tier pricing structure with the slightly higher urban prices being used to offset the rural distribution costs.
- o An immediate resumption of advertising in Accra and in the rural areas.

#### E. A Composite Perspective By Ministry of Health Staff

Some obstacles as seen from the perspective of several Ministry of Health professional staff are as follows.

- o The CRS Project required management expertise beyond that which is present at the GNFPP.
- o The GNFPP has many responsibilities with its other activities and is not really sufficiently staffed to be able to manage the CRS Project.
- o The GNFPP Secretariat did not really understand the requirements of the CRS Project as it is outside their experience.

- o The management style of the GNFPP Executive Director tends to produce a paralysis of decision-making and does not allow for delegation of authority.

Possible remedies as seen from the perspective of some Ministry of Health professional staff include:

- o Placing the primary responsibility for running the project on the distribution organization with the overall policy supervision residing within the Ministry of Health.
- o Having USAID contract directly with both the distribution organization and the advertising agency.
- o Establishing an advisory committee or board made up of interested and knowledgeable people from the Government (MOH), the community and other parties.

#### F. Summation of Obstacles and Remedies Identified

##### 1. Obstacles

Following discussion with representatives from the responsible agencies and other interested parties, it is now possible to focus on the obstacle(s) around which there is a consensus of opinion.

It can readily be seen from the foregoing that the principal obstacle to effective program continuation is the GNFPP Secretariat.

The general state of bureaucratic inertia in Ghana was also construed as an obstacle to the project. It must be said, however, that the excellent and determined efforts by Hayes in consort with DANAFCO, Ltd. and Lintas: Ghana Ltd. found the means to move the project steadily ahead. The CRS Project experienced the full weight of bureaucratic inertia and the impact of rampant inflation and economic stagnation only after control of the project was planned with the GNFPP.

## 2. Remedies

Remedies suggested from various parties center around removing the project from GNFPP control. With the exception of some staff of the Ministry of Health, there is consensus on the point of moving the project as far from direct control by any government agency as is possible. Several suggestions were made for a direct contract with DANAFCO, Ltd., for distribution services and a further contract with Lintas:Ghana Ltd., for advertising and promotional activities. One variation is to contract directly with DANAFCO who in turn will subcontract to Lintas for advertising services. There is general agreement about the need for some advertising activity, perhaps only simple "reminder" advertising in which the consumer is told that the project is active and products are available.

There is also agreement on the desirability of expanding the project distribution base to include some rural areas as well as a total evaluation of and change in the commodity pricing structure.

Finally, it must be seen that the central remedy to the continuations, orderly expansion and success of the CRS Project is the presence of an effective management team. Competent management possessed of the necessary professional skills and able to make timely decisions is the absolutely indispensable ingredient to the continuation and success of the CRS Project.

## V. CONCLUSIONS

With the CRS Project presently in a dormant state there has been ample opportunity to review the entire history of the activity from its inception under Westinghouse Health Systems though GNFPP control and to the present situation in which the Memorandum of Agreement for the operation of the project expired on March 31, 1981. The conclusions and recommendations which follow result from an extensive review of documents, letters, inventory files, sales data and other relevant written records as well as numerous meetings and interviews with persons in Ghana who have been involved in the CRS Project or have a contribution to make by virtue of their knowledge of the local situation. It should be mentioned that discussions were also held with John Hayes,

Westinghouse Health Systems, Columbia, Maryland who was the on-site project director when the activity begun.

The conclusions presented must necessarily be seen against the backdrop of near paralysis of the government decision-making process and the concomitant economic stagnation in the country. These two factors impact upon the project in numerous ways, all of which necessitate the presence of a skilled management team. Problems caused by shortages of gasoline and spare parts to keep delivery vehicles running, internal communications breakdown, frequent water supply failure, near total absence of packaging and printing materials on the local market and rampant inflation in tandem with other chronic shortages and a flourishing "black market" in goods and services all produce strain on the management of any activity in Ghana.

With all of the above in mind, however, it must be said that the CRS Project was in an advantageous position. The reasons for this conclusion center on the following:

- o Due to USAID support, the project has had the necessary commodities to supply the market and the necessary printing supplies and packaging materials imported from abroad.
- o The chronic shortage of all imported and many domestic goods has created market shortages with many inflated Cedis competing for scarce goods and supplies. During this entire time the CRS Project has had the capacity to supply a substantial proportion of the demand as well as to increase its distribution and sales.
- o The project under Westinghouse Health Systems built a solid operational base centered upon the strength and competence of DANAFCO, Ltd., the distributor, and Lintas:Ghana, Ltd., the advertising agency.
- o Government policy along with community attitudes create a positive environment for the acceptance and use of family planning products. The incentive to use contraceptives for purposes of child spacing and limiting family size has been strengthened by the atmosphere of economic stagnation and shortages, including staple foods products.

As reported elsewhere in this report, this project, which started with considerable hope and strong leadership, ultimately came to a total halt under GNFPF control. The possible reasons for GNFPF non-performance have been explored elsewhere in this report and do not warrant repetition. It suffices to say that the GNFPF was not entirely cooperative with the project when it was under Westinghouse management and the GNFPF was exercising its role as the principal government agency to coordinate population activities. The project under direct GNFPF control resulted in a progressive run-down of its distribution activities and a total absence of advertising and promotion. Not only did the project fail to expand but it failed to supply the market which had been developed prior to its takeover.

## **VI. SPECIFIC CONSULTANT ACTIVITIES TO PROMOTE EFFECTIVE PROGRAM OPERATIONS**

As the Memorandum of Agreement has expired, and given the weight of evidence against any continuation under GNFPF control, it was not possible to return the project to effective operation. In fact, as noted earlier, the project has not been effectively operating for some considerable time. Steps taken during this consultancy in this regard fall into three categories:

1. Decisions taken to preserve the physical assets of the project so that a restart is possible with minimum delay;
2. Decisions taken to convey to executives at the GNFPF, MOH and elsewhere in Government as well as to DANAFCO and Lintas that USAID is concerned about the project and serious in its intent to restart a CRS Phase II activity if possible;
3. Specific recommendations made for action to be undertaken by the Mission in order to set the stage for a possible project restart under improved operating circumstances.

As to the first category, the following was done:

- o GNFPF was informed that it must return the "borrowed" 100 cases of Neo-Sampoon and 100 cases of orals to DANAFCO as soon as its next shipment arrives.

- o GNFPF was informed that 66 cartons of 6000 each Panther plain condoms they had withheld from the project were to be given to DANAFCO to hold with other CRS commodities in their warehouse. (DANAFCO was contacted and asked to pick up this consignment.)
- o It was suggested to GNFPF that the bulk of CRS Project funds be placed in an interest bearing account until such time as they are required.

With respect to the second category recommendations, the following was accomplished:

- o Informed the GNFPF that unfortunately as the Memo-randum of Agreement was allowed to expire the GNFPF could no longer "borrow" from CRS stocks held by DANAFCO nor authorize the movement or transfer of such stocks.
- o Authorized DANAFCO to pay no further funds to GNFPF for project sales activities after March 31, 1981.
- o Instructed Lintas:Ghana, Ltd., not to print dispenser boxes for the SSS condoms. These dispensers were found to be very costly and unnecessary. Furthermore, the files document the fact that there was an understanding quite some time ago to cease making such dispensers. Even so, GNFPF had requested dispensers to be printed and manufactured. Lintas:Ghana agreed that it was desirable to conserve the expensive and imported hard-board to prepare point of sale materials.
- o Authorized DANAFCO, Ltd., to package remaining stock to the extent that packaging and printing materials are on hand.

Category three activity centers around a detailed briefing with the Mission Director and others, following which a briefing was arranged in the office of Ambassador Smith on May 18 attended by the Ambassador, Mission Director, Project Manager (HPN) and this consultant. At that briefing, a report of the findings was presented, including the present status of the project, its funds, inventory, etc. Available options for USAID to consider along with their implications were discussed and debated.

Subsequently a recommendation was accepted that the appropriate Ministries be approached about the possibility of moving the project from under GNFPF

control. It was likewise accepted that the optimum model was a direct contract with DANAFCO, Ltd. to operate the project. A contract for advertising services would be effected through DANAFCO or directly with Lintas:Ghana, Ltd. Finally, it was accepted that this project model would probably benefit from the creation of an advisory committee.

The meeting with Ambassador Smith and the Mission Director produced a clear agreement on next steps. It is hoped that the Mission will be successful in persuading the Ministries of the merit of a new approach to operating this important activity.

## **VII. RECOMMENDATIONS**

In view of the information obtained from all sources, including the USAID Mission in Accra, and considering the present status of the CRS Project, the following recommendations are deemed appropriate in order to return the project to effective operation.

1. The USAID Mission in Accra, with whatever assistance is necessary from the U.S. Ambassador, make representations to senior officials in the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning to permit the CRS Project to be restarted under new auspices which preclude any control by the GNFPP.
2. The restructured project should operate under a contract between USAID and DANAFCO, Ltd. DANAFCO should have total day-to-day responsibility for the management of all marketing, distribution and sales activities; including printing and packaging.
3. As part of a restructured project, prompt attention should be given to appropriate advertising and promotion activities. A contract could be drawn between USAID/Accra and Lintas: Ghana Ltd., for specific services. An alternative, which would likely be acceptable, would entail a sub-contract for advertising from DANAFCO, Ltd., to Lintas: Ghana, Ltd.
4. An advisory committee should be constituted to provide general recommendations and information on broad matters of community attitude, possible new marketing opportunities, means by which the project can better serve the community, etc. The composition of such a body should be a matter of discussion involving the

USAID/Accra Project Manager (HPN) and the Managing Directors of DANAFCO and Lintas: Ghana.

The committee, whose role would be only advisory, should have representation from the Government preferably the Ministry of Health); the Retail Pharmacists Association; the medical faculty of the University Teaching Hospital (preferably someone concerned with community medicine) the Executive Directory of the Family Planning Association of Ghana; the retail sales trade; and perhaps a midwife or nurse involved in MCH or community health care and a lawyer. The USAID/Accra Project Manager (HPN), along with the General Manager of DANAFCO and Lintas would sit on the committee in an ex officio capacity.

5. At such time as the appropriate governmental authorities give permission to restart the project under new auspices, appropriate negotiations should be undertaken to make the Cedis generated by project sales but held in an account under GNFPP control available as required for the support of advertising and/or promotional activities. Such use is fully consonant with provisions of the Memorandum of Agreement under which they were accrued and retained.
6. At such time as appropriate, governmental authorities give permission to restart the project under new auspices, USAID/Washington and The Futures Group should provide a consultant who will undertake the following activities in cooperation with appropriate organizations/individuals in Accra:
  - o Participate in the drafting of a new Memorandum of Agreement.
  - o Participate in the design of a new marketing program to include urban distribution as well as a phased expansion into several rural areas. The new marketing program would include measurable goals, market penetration targets and the development of a new pricing structure.
  - o Initiate the development of an appropriate advertising and promotion program.
  - o Assist the Mission in its task of interpreting the project and its goals to Government officials and others.
  - o Participate in the design of appropriate reporting forms and mechanisms designed to assure accountability and information flow.

- o Participate in discussions on commodity planning and stock control in order to provide the basis for timely and efficient commodity projection reports.
  - o Assist the Mission on the design of an appropriate mechanism through which project net receipts will be channelled for purposes of supporting appropriate project activity.
7. USAID/Washington (or The Futures Group) provide the necessary assurance of continued support of the project in terms of contraceptive supply and printing and packaging materials.

A consideration of the above recommendations related to the restart of the CRS Project and its return to effective operation must necessarily include two further elements. The first of these concerns the participation on a regular basis of the USAID Accra Mission. There is no doubt that genuine interest translated into ongoing involvement increases the chance for project success. Such involvement allows USAID to ascertain quickly if any political or bureaucratic problems are developing which might require intervention. There are many other reasons for demonstrating Mission interest in an activity, and they are all too well known to require elaboration at this time.

The Ghana CRS Project has considerable potential both as a learning experience in the operation of population activities as well as providing a vital and much needed service to the Ghanaian people. In the opinion of this Consultant, the Mission is not presently staffed in a manner likely to provide sufficient Mission involvement in the CRS Project. There is but one professional, Lawrence Eicher, assigned as Program Manager for all Health, Population and Nutrition activities. Eicher is a very hard working, dedicated and competent professional, but he is stretched very thin to say the least. A restart of the project must necessarily involve additional time from Eicher in the start-up phase as well as some ongoing participation in the activities of the project. Perhaps the Mission Director might be persuaded that this is an important and priority activity.

The second element to be considered is that which concerns the attitude of key officials in the Ministries of Health and of Finance and Economic Planning to the changes we are proposing. Thus, for example, what should be done if the necessary permission to remove the project from GNFPP control is withheld?

A further possibility might be a ministerial proposal to place project control within the Ministry of Health but have DANAFCO carry out the distribution, printing and packaging - a model not unlike the former situation, except that the MOH is substituted in place of the GNFPP.

In the first case, where the GOG would not allow for the project to operate except as under the GNFPP, the recommendation must be to terminate CRS activities in Ghana. To do otherwise would be irresponsible given the demonstrated non-performance of the GNFPP. A final wind-up of project affairs could be carried out within a very short time and with minimal cost.

In the second case, where the possibility of MOH involvement might arise as a substitute for the role previously played by the GNFPP, the answer is not quite so clear cut. There is a high degree of probability that the orderly management of the project would suffer as the result of MOH bureaucracy. The key issues would be the kind of a project agreement negotiated and amount of freedom allowed to the distributor and the advertising agency. Intense discussion and negotiation would be required should this option be proposed as the only acceptable solution. The possibility of project termination should be maintained as a real option in this instance. Negotiations on such an option might be helped by the participation of an outside CRS consultant.

#### **VIII. PERSONS INTERVIEWED**

Mr. Lawrence R. Eicher, Project Manager, HPN, USAID/Accra

Larry Saiers, Deputy Mission Director, USAID/Accra

Mr. Gerald Zarr, Mission Director, USAID/Accra

Ambassador Smith, U.S. Embassy, Accra

Mr. Barney Heidemann, Managing Director, DANAFCO, Ltd.

Mr. A.E. Boateng, Accountant, DANAFCO Ltd.

Mr. H. Osafo Acquaaah, Production Manager, DANAFCO, Ltd.,

Mr. S.K. Kwafo, Deputy Executive Director, GNFPP

Mr. H. Acquaye, GNFPP

Mr. E. Osei-Kissih, GNFPP

Mr. J.O. Obetsebi-Lamptey, Managing Director Lintas:Ghana, Ltd.

Mrs. Gladys Azu, Executive Secretary, Planned Parenthood Association of Ghana

Dr. Jay Aboagye-Atta, Deputy Director of Medical Services, Ministry of Health

Dr. Joseph Otoo, Health Planning Unit, Ministry of Health

Dr. Peter Lamptey, University Hospital Faculty of Medicine (community  
medicine)

Dr. Esther Boohene, Ministry of Health

Mr. Boakye, Finance Director, DANAFSCO Ltd.

### FINAL NOTES

Upon arrival in Accra information was provided that Dr. A.A. Armar, Executive Director of the GNFPP, had been in and out of the hospital for several months and would likely not be available for meetings. His condition was shrouded in a curious silence; however, reliable sources reported that he was not seriously ill and that, in fact, he was in rather good condition. Nonetheless, despite our attempts to see him, Armar refused to arrange a meeting to discuss the project. It should be noted, for the record, that on one occasion he dropped in at the Mission offices to bid farewell to the departing Health Officer, but after a formal introduction to this consultant, he immediately departed.

Finally, a note of appreciation to three men whose experience and understanding contributed much to any success which this consulting assignment achieved. My sincere thanks to Art Danart, USAID/Washington, Larry Eicher, USAID/Accra and John Hayes, at Westinghouse Health Systems.

March 17, 1980

The Ghana National Family Planning Programme  
Accra

Dr. A.A. Ammar  
Mr. S. Krafu  
Mr. H. Acquay  
Mr. O. Kissah

Gentlemen:

The following will serve as both a "position report" and a recapitulation of the conversations we have had regarding the future of the Ghana Retail Contraceptive Sales Project, now that it is about to be taken over in its entirety by the National Family Planning Programme Secretariat.

**SALES:** At the end of its first twelve months of sales (Jan. 1, 1979 - Dec. 31, 1979) the program had cumulative sales as follows:

PANTHER plain condoms	1,395,600	units
SSS coloured condoms	520,080	units
FLORIL oral contraceptive	104,106	cycles
CORAL foaming tablets	293,820	units

On a monthly average basis, sales were:

PANTHER plain condoms	116,300	units
SSS coloured condoms	43,340	units
FLORIL oral contraceptive	8,668	cycles
CORAL foaming tablets	146,910	units (2 months sales only)

January 1980 sales were such as to indicate that these average monthly sales would continue, and very likely increase.

February sales were a bit disastrous. My failure to order adequate supplies of printing materials (paper, cardboard, inks, plates, etc.) resulted in our being for all practical purposes "out of stock." Our customers requested and ordered our products but we couldn't supply them. Steps have been taken to remedy this situation, as described below.

**MATERIAL PROCUREMENT:** It is my understanding that commodities for the various programs of the National Family Planning Secretariat will continue to be supplied free of charge by the U.S. Agency for International Development. I can see no reason for separating or differentiating between commodity supplies for the CFS Program and the Clinic Program, for example. As the need for commodities for any program becomes apparent, the USAID Population Officer should be consulted and requested to order. Actually, the procurement process for commodities as I have observed it appears to be satisfactory, and to operate well.

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However, the procurement of material for printing of boxes, dispensers and other printed items utilized in the CRS Program poses some problems. The CRS Program generates adequate funds to cover costs of such materials, but the funds are in cedis, which gives us an immediate exchange problem. Conceivably as Ghana's economy improves, the securing of foreign exchange for such purchases will become less difficult.

Meanwhile the Agency for International Development has agreed to supply a quantity of such materials from funds still remaining in the Westinghouse Health System's contract. I have just completed the purchase of a quantity of paper, cardboard, printing inks, printing plates and package cutting dies which should be sufficient for printing and packaging needs for from 18 to 22 months, at present rates of sales. This material will arrive in Ghana prior to the end of March, and will be stored on the premises of DANAFCO, LTD., your printer, packager and distributor.

The printed materials needed - and the parties doing the printing- are:

Packages for SSS, FLORIL and CORAL	Printed by DANAFCO at their Accra headquarters.
Dispensers for packages of the above products	Printed through LINTAS:GHANA LTD., under sub-contract.
Instruction sheets for the above products	Same as above.
Shipping carton wraparound labels for all products	Same as above.

The reason for the division of work above is that the DANAFCO printing presses are not large enough to handle the printing of the dispensers nor the wraparound sheets. Instruction leaflets for the products can be inexpensively printed outside of DANAFCO, and leaves their press free for package printing.

Under the working agreement you will have with DANAFCO, you will be able to order packages at any time, and in any quantity desired. Simultaneously, of course, dispensers, inserts and wraparounds should be ordered through LINTAS:GHANA. Mr. Osapo-Acquah at DANAFCO has been most helpful in calling attention to approaching shortages of packages in the past, and I'm sure will continue to do so.

PACKAGING: Little comment is required here. DANAFCO has done an excellent job of "pacing themselves" in their packaging efforts so as to avoid outages of any product, and to assure adequate supplies being delivered to the warehouse stores at Hohoe, Koforidua, Nsasi and Takoradi. It is a process of monitoring and projecting sales, so that adequate supplies are always on hand.

DISTRIBUTION: Up to this point, DANAFCO's sales have been such that they have not had to make any special effort to secure product distribution.

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The products have sold out practically as fast as they were able to pack them. However, things may change, and from time to time special efforts may be necessary. For example, a canvassing by mail or by personal call of the many small private maternity or general clinics in Ghana could generate sales. A number of these are already customers, but many are not. The petrol companies might be approached with the idea of stocking condoms and foaming tablets at service stations.

Perhaps the best way of determining the need for such efforts is a monitoring of sales, and observation of where and to whom the products are selling.

PRICING: I have felt for some time that our prices are too low. While one of our objectives is to make contraceptives available to all Ghanaians regardless of their economic means, we have had rampant inflation in Ghana during the entire time of the CRS Program, and people are accustomed to paying more. In addition, I believe that people often equate a low price with low quality. (This is particularly true in the case of FLORIL, where other oral contraceptives are selling for \$12 to \$14 a cycle, next to our product at \$ 1.00.)

A price increase would not only result in more income for the CRS Program, but would also be more of an incentive to DANAFCO, whose income from the program is directly related to price.

I have suggested leaving PANTHER where it is, at \$ .05 per unit. SSS, however, should be raised to \$1.00 per package of six, to put it on a par with CORAL. FLORIL should probably go to \$3.00 per cycle.

This is, of course, a decision you will have to make in the future. Present package designs are such that no price is indicated, so that any price change can be handled by advertising or other announcement.

ADVERTISING: The experience of the Ghana CRS Program during the past year can best be described as a "text-book case." When advertising was heaviest, sales went up. When advertising slackened off, sales declined.

Because of political and economic problems in Ghana during the past year, advertising was unfortunately sporadic, making measurement difficult. However, SSS sales provided an illustration of the point made in the paragraph above. During the months of September, October and November 1979 we ran a relatively modest campaign for SSS. This consisted of the placing of some 90 billboards throughout Ghana, and a light schedule of newspaper ads in the Daily Graphic. SSS sales were 51,420 units in September - 69,300 units in October - and 113,560 units in November.

I would thus recommend that you consider a steady, consistent advertising effort from now on. I have asked LIFEMAS:GHANA to prepare some material which I'm sure they will be happy to discuss with you. Program income is such that a consistent campaign is feasible, and I have even suggested

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that advertising content be divided between the promotion of the concept of family planning and the promotion of the products available for it, rather than be a straight product promotion as much of our earlier advertising was.

And finally, in closing, may I say that it has been a pleasure knowing and working with each of you. My time in Ghana has been such that I hope that AID in Washington will see fit to send me back here from time to time as a visitor and observer.

Cordially,

JOHN D. BAYES  
Resident Manager

*BEST AVAILABLE COPY*

between

The Government of Ghana  
and

Government of the United States of America

1. This Memorandum of Agreement is made and entered into on the 3rd day of July 1980 between the Government of the United States of America acting through the U.S. Agency for International Development Mission to Ghana (hereinafter known as USAID) and the Government of Ghana, acting through the Ghana National Family Planning Programme Secretariat (hereinafter known as GNFPFS) and will remain in effect through March 31, 1981. This Memorandum, including the Project Grant Standard Provisions Annex (attached), spells out the terms governing cooperation between the GNFPFS and USAID for the continuation and expansion of the Retail Contraceptive Sales (RCS) program after the March 31, 1980 termination of the A.I.D. contract with Westinghouse Health Systems.
2. The GNFPFS has determined that the RCS program has made a substantial contribution to the expansion of the infrastructure for delivery of contraceptives to those choosing to practice family planning; accordingly it is agreed that the program will be continued and strengthened.
3. It is recognized by the GNFPFS and USAID that the RCS program constitutes an integral part of the GNFPFS. The GNFPFS therefore will be responsible for overall policy making, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the program. Furthermore, it is recognized by the GNFPFS and USAID that the program is to a large extent a commercial marketing venture. It is agreed therefore that the continued successful implementation of the program should rely primarily on the private sector for the routine daily management of the project.
4. It is agreed that the GNFPFS will contract with private or non-governmental firm(s) or organization(s) to operate the program, prepare packaging materials, package and distribute the contraceptives, promote and advertise the program and perform any other functions considered desirable for the maintenance and expansion of the program.
5. It is agreed that the ultimate objective is that the program should be self sustaining and financed completely by the sales revenues and that every effort should be made toward that end. Accordingly all local currency expenses of the program will be financed by the program. USAID will consider providing contraceptives free of charge subject to annual agreement between the parties for this purpose, until the program can be completely self-financed. Under the Westinghouse contract,

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A.I.D. provided all printing plates, inks, paper for packaging and cutting dies that are estimated to be required through mid-1981. The GNFPPS agrees that it will use its best efforts to obtain future printing and packaging supplies locally and/or obtain the foreign exchange to import them. If supplies are unobtainable locally, and if the GNFPPS shows reasonable evidence of their efforts to obtain foreign exchange without success, USAID, subject to the availability of funds, may consider supplying these inputs. It would be expected in that case that cedis generated by the sale of contraceptives would be made available for other local costs of the GNFPPS which would otherwise have been supported by USAID.

6. Under the Westinghouse contract, sales proceeds were paid into a Westinghouse controlled cedi account named USAID Commercial Marketing Program. It is agreed that the GNFPPS will establish a special account into which future revenues of the program will be deposited. Westinghouse will close out the USAID Commercial Marketing Project account and any balances will be transferred to the GNFPPS for deposit in its new special account. Since local currency was generated by the sale of contraceptives granted to the GNFPPS and are owned by the GNFPPS subject to USAID agreement for their use USAID agrees that these funds will be used for the broad categories of expenditures listed in the next paragraph.

7. It is agreed that sales revenues will be applied first to cover all local expenses of the operation of the RCS program. USAID hereby provides concurrence for expenditures from the special account for the following categories of activity: program management, purchase of contraceptives, printing and packaging materials, printing and packaging, and other supplies and activities essential for the continuation of the program; advertising - both product specific and generic promoting the practice of family planning; marketing research and sales evaluation; promotional efforts to expand the number of retailers of contraceptives, retailer training.

8. The use of sales revenues for types of activities not covered in the above list will require USAID's written concurrence which can be provided by an exchange of letters between the GNFPPS and USAID.

9. Because of the potential of commercial channels to reach people not served effectively by other contraceptive delivery systems, it is agreed that proper emphasis shall be given to advertising and other promotional efforts to make contraceptives readily accessible throughout the country.

10. It is agreed that funds should not be permitted to accumulate in the special account beyond the balance needed for the prudent financial management of the RCS program. If revenues exceed

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
requirements of the RCS program, it is agreed subject to USAID concurrence that the GNFPFS will utilize funds to develop new or strengthen other existing GNFPFS mechanisms for the distribution of contraceptives, especially to the rural population. If the costs of the program exceed sales proceeds, the GNFPFS agrees that it shall provide promptly all additional funds and other resources required for the punctual carrying out and operation of the program.

11. The GNFPFS will provide to USAID on a monthly basis a sales report, stock report, and printing and packaging report. On a quarterly basis, the GNFPFS will provide a summary of deposits and disbursements from the special account.

12. It is agreed that meetings will be held every six months between the GNFPFS and USAID to review RCS program status and to plan future actions. In addition, ad hoc meetings can be called at any time at the initiation of either party.

Attachment: Project Grant Standard Provisions Annex

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Executive Director  
Ghana National Family Planning  
Programme Secretariat

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Director  
U.S. Agency for International  
Development

Date: 26.6.80

Date: 3 July 1980

USAID Clearances:

- MWeiss: (draft)
- MSolloway (draft)
- PRM (draft)
- DLavintow (draft)

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

APPENDIX 3

December 4, 1980

Mr. S.K. Kwafo  
Deputy Executive Director  
National Family Planning Program  
P. O. Box M.76  
Accra, Ghana

Dear Mr. Kwafo:

Please find enclosed the Westinghouse check on the Commercial Retail Sales (CRS) program, totalling \$125,963.60 which this office just received. I know these funds will be very helpful in furthering the good work under the CRS program.

Please also advise me when the GNPPP plans to convene its semi-annual review with Danafo and Lintas. Such a review should be most advantageous to all parties.

Sincerely,

Lawrence R. Eicher  
Project Manager  
Health, Population & Nutrition

Enclosure:  
Check for \$125,963.60

Clearances:  
HPN:MSWeiss\_\_\_\_\_

DIST: DIR  
PRM  
CAF  
CHRON

HPN:LRBicher:jf  
12-4-80

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

July 16, 1979

Dr. A.A. Armar  
Executive Director  
National Family Planning Program  
P. O. Box M.76  
Accra, Ghana

Dear Dr. Armar:

Subject: Future Structure of the Retail Contraceptive  
Sales Program

This letter follows up on our recent discussions about organization of the RCS program. I have discussed these questions with the Mission Director, Controller and other USAID officials so that these ideas represent in effect a USAID proposal.

As you know, we believe strongly that the best form for the commercial program is to place responsibility for its management within the private sector, retaining the minimum government control necessary to ensure that government policies and priorities are followed. We believe this approach to be the most effective because the kind of experiences and expertise required are most likely to be found in the private sector. In addition the kind of incentives necessary for a successful commercial venture are most likely to be found in a private sector program.

The mandate of the GNFPF Secretariat to promote and coordinate a variety of family planning activities in both the public and private sectors lends itself well to the kind of RCS program that we envisage. It would enhance the GNFPF's overall program and its impact with a successful RCS program. The day to day management burden carried by the Secretariat would be kept to a minimum. It would, however, provide for the required government control of the commercial program.

We suggest that the program be conceptualized with three main functions: (a) policy control, (b) day to day management of operations, and (c) financial management. With respect to overall policy control, we would assume that the Ghana Government would retain ultimate responsibility. Although the

private sector would implement the program, it will serve public objectives and the government therefore must exercise ultimate responsibility for major policy issues and approval of advertising, pricing, packaging design, distribution patterns, expenditures of funds generated by sales, and employment of key personnel. The GNFPP Secretariat could contract with the private firm or firms implementing the program to spell out clearly the kinds of clearances and approvals needed from the government.

With respect to day to day management operations, we suggest that the private sector is best equipped to perform this function. The private sector is most likely to have the relevant experience, to be able to recruit the best expertise, and to manage most efficiently the technical operations. Government's operational procedures and decision making processes are simply not appropriate for successful management of commercial operations.

A key person for the future success of the RCS program will be the product sales manager. He would essentially take responsibility for the functions now performed by Mr. Hayes. We suggest this person be on the staff of one of the sub-contractors, possibly Lintas, with salary paid for by proceeds of the program. The Westinghouse contract could cover his salary until January, 1980. If agreeable to you, the product sales manager should fit the job specifications outlined in Mr. Hayes letter to you of June 12, 1979. This person would be recruited by Mr. Hayes, subject to the approval of the GNFPP Secretariat. USAID and the private sector agency employing him should also concur in the selection. Although for convenience he would be on the Lintas payroll, he would be required to consult with the Secretariat on policy issues and major program decisions according to a protocol specified in a GNFPP/Lintas contract.

The remuneration of the project sales manager is an important matter. The difference between public and private sector salaries and benefits hopefully will not create a problem. We feel strongly that to attract the type of talent required to manage a successful commercial operation, it is advisable to offer prevailing private sector salaries and benefits.

Such a person should be employed as soon as possible in order to interact with Mr. Hayes as long as possible prior to termination of the Westinghouse contract January, 1980.

Dr. A.A. Amma

- 3 -

With respect to financial management, under the present arrangement proceeds from sales are paid into an account in the name of "USAID Commercial Marketing Program". Withdrawals must be approved by Mr. Hayes, Westinghouse headquarters, and AID/Washington.

We would suggest that upon termination of the Westinghouse contract, an account be established in the name of the Ghana Government with a designated official of the GNFFP Secretariat given the authority to withdraw funds for RCS program costs at the request of the product sales manager. Since these funds would be generated by sale of AID provided commodities, we would have to retain audit rights to this account. We would also expect to approve in advance the broad categories of commodities and services that could be purchased from these funds. This might be done on an annual basis. In any case, the agreed upon procedures would be spelled out in an agreement between the USAID and the GNFFP Secretariat, and presumably in an agreement between the Secretariat and Lintas.

Assuming that a new AID population/family planning project will be requested and approved to follow up on the terminating Population Program Support project, it is likely that AID would be able to continue to provide the contraceptives and other foreign exchange costs associated with the RCS program. We are reasonably confident that a program more or less as described in this letter would merit continued AID support.

We hope the suggestions offered in this letter will be useful to you in your planning and decisions. Because of the urgency of designating a product sales manager who will have sufficient time to work alongside Mr. Hayes prior to the termination of the Westinghouse contract, we would hope that you would make the necessary decisions by the end of this month so that an orderly restructuring of the RCS program can begin promptly.

Sincerely yours,

Raymond Martin  
Population Officer

cc: Art Danart, DS/POP/FPSD  
AID/W

DIST: DIR  
A/AD  
CON  
C&R  
CHRON

Clearances:  
A/AD:MSZak (draft)  
CON:GSmith (draft)  
DIR:IDCoker (draft)

HPN:RMartin:jf

In case of reply the number and date of this letter should be quoted.

My Ref. No. GNP/C.2/12 Vol.2

Your Ref. No. \_\_\_\_\_



REPUBLIC OF GHANA

APPENDIX 5

P.O. Box M.76.....  
Ministry Branch Post Office  
Accra

20th AUGUST, 1979..

**ACTION COPY**

Dear Mr. Martin,

**SUBJECT: FUTURE STRUCTURE OF THE RETAIL CONTRACEPTIVE SALES PROGRAMME**

Thank you for your letter of 15th July on the above quoted subject. It seems to me that your letter clearly sets out a convenient functional framework for the conceptualisation of a Retail Contraceptive Sales (RCS) component of the Ghana National Family Planning Programme.

We have noted the preferences of your Mission in the matter and think that we understand and could accommodate the underlying general principles in an agreement if one were to be drawn up for the continuation of the RCS programme after Mr. Hayes' departure.

Details of the identification, selections and engagement of a successor for Mr. Hayes will have to be examined in the light of the observations I made when I last discussed the matter in your office last week: We shall need some further clarification of the statement, "This person would be recruited by Mr. Hayes, subject to the approval of the GNFPF Secretariat", since the procedure for obtaining the needed approval is very important.

With regard to financial management I should say that an acceptable formula respecting policies of our Governments should be possible. We think that the remuneration and fringe benefits for the Sales Manager should be agreed upon in the light of (a) prevailing practice in the private sector and (b) any general policy guidelines which may emerge following on-going examination of national wages policy generally.

Finally, I should say that in light of the likelihood of Mr. Hayes not being able to stay beyond January 1980 we get together and take a decision on the future of the RCS Programme as soon as he returns to Ghana.

Yours sincerely,

*[Signature]*  
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR  
(DR. A.A. ARMAR)

MR. RAY MARTIN,  
PROGRAM ADVISOR,  
USAID,  
ACCRA.

ACT: HPN  
INF 0: 012  
AD  
HPM CHON EF

23 AUG 1978  
USAID/GHANA

# NATIONAL FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMME

6.

*In case of reply the  
number and date of this  
letter should be quoted.*

My Ref. No. NFP/S2/12 TJ

Your Ref. No. \_\_\_\_\_



REPUBLIC OF GHANA

P.O. Box...M...76,...  
Ministry Branch Post Office  
Accra

.....27th February,.....19 80.

## APPENDIX 6

Dear John,

### CONTINUATION OF THE RETAIL SALES PROGRAMME PROJECT STARTED BY WESTINGHOUSE

Following the discussion between the Executive Director of this Organisation and officers from USAID (Ghana) and yourself on 19th February, 1980 it has been decided to assign Mr. E. Csei-Kissih to liaise between this organisation and DANAFCO LTD. and to understudy you during the transitional period. Mr. Kissih will however work under the supervision of Mr. Acquaye, Assistant Director (Administration).

With the assigning of Mr. Kissih as liaison officer it would be appreciated if you could brief Mr. Kissih on the status of the Project and make available to him all relevant documents on the Project prior to your departure in mid-March.

Yours sincerely,

for: EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR  
(H.K. ACQUAYE)

MR. JOHN HAYES.

# NATIONAL FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMME

In case of reply the number and date of this letter should be quoted



P.O. Box 772  
Ministry Branch Post Office  
Accra

My Ref. No. FE/A. 7/2

Your Ref. No. \_\_\_\_\_

10th March 1981

REPUBLIC OF GHANA

APPENDIX 7



MR. LAWRENCE R. EICHER,  
PROJECT MANAGER,  
USAID MISSION TO GHANA,  
P. O. BOX 1630,  
ACCRA.

DATE READ 3/4/81

**ACTION COPY**

Dear Mr. Eicher,

DATA REQUIREMENTS ON CONTRACEPTIVES FOR  
USAID BUDGET SUBMISSION

Please find attached herewith, the information required on the above mentioned subject. The delay which has been due to unavoidable circumstances is deeply regretted. In fact most of the delay has come about as a result of communication difficulties and as a matter of interest, we have up till now not obtained the up-to-date figures from the regional depots, where they have been received however, they are quite negligible.

It is hoped therefore that the figures obtained from the Central Stores will help in the exercise.

Note must also be taken of the fact that a greater portion of the contraceptives are stored either at the Secretariat stores or the Danafco warehouse in Accra.

Yours faithfully

for: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR  
(S. OSSU-KISSIE)

cc.

ACT: HPL  
INF: DIR  
AD  
PRM  
COU  
CHRO  
R

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COMMERCIAL PROGRAMME

8.

FLORIL

January 1, 1981 stock	-	298,500 MC	
Estimated CY 1981 Sales	-	117,156 "	
" " 1982 "	-	134,129 "	15% increase
" " 1983 "	-	154,248 "	15% "
" " 1984 "	-	177,385 "	15% "
" " 1985 "	-	203,998 "	15% "

SSS CONDOM

January, 1981 stock	-	108,000 PCS	
Estimated CY 1981 Sales	-	272,000 "	
" " 1982 "	-	80,058 "	10% increase
" " 1983 "	-	96,888 "	10% "
" " 1984 "	-	106,588 "	10% "
" " 1985 "	-	111,249 "	10% "

PANTHER CONDOM

January, 1981 stock	-	Nil	
Estimated CY 1981 Sales	-	1,140,000 PCS	15% increase
" " 1982 "	-	1,311,000 "	15% "
" " 1983 "	-	196,650 "	15% "
" " 1984 "	-	226,147 "	15% "
" " 1985 "	-	260,088 "	15% "

CORAL FOAMING TABLET

January, 1981 stock	-	435,680 PCS	
Estimated CY 1981 Sales	-	648,000 "	(To be supplied from Secretariat's lot)
" " 1982 "	-	912,000 "	50% increase
" " 1983 "	-	1,368,000 "	50% "
" " 1984 "	-	2,052,000 "	50% "

G. N. P. P. COMMERCIAL ACCOUNT

DATE	PARTICULARS	DEBIT	CREDIT	BALANCE
3 : 11 : 80	CASH TO OPEN ACCOUNT		50.00 ✓	50.00 ✓
11 : 12 : 80	CHEQUE FROM DANAFCO		40,201.20	40,251.20
26 : 2 : 81	CHEQUE FROM U.S.A.I.D.		125,963.60 /	166,214.80
		chqs. No 485433 - ₱7831.50 " " 344428 - ₱32369.70		₱40201.20
MARCH		chq. No $\frac{10}{3}$ 916002 ₱13,458.00		13,458.00 <hr/> ₱53,659.20

BALANCE AS AT 30TH APRIL 1981 - ₱166,214.80

59