

LIBERIA

IMPACT STUDY

(LIS)

CIVIL SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

669-0124 /68

PD-AAN-548

ISN- 32426

GRANT ; \$1,826,000

Duration: 1974 - 1979

Initial Funding: 1973

**Monrovia
April 1982
(LIS)-1-82**

Preface

This report presents the findings or results of a retrospective impact study of the Civil Service Development Project. It focuses on the social, economic, political and technological impacts of the project on public administration reform in Liberia.

The information presented in this report is based on a review of documents related to the Civil Service Development Project and historical and current data on the Liberian Civil Service and the Civil Service Agency. The views and opinions of government officials knowledgeable about the project, the current status of the civil service or some aspect of the history of the civil service in Liberia also provided valuable source data in assessing the overall impact of the project.

Because of the similarity in the general goals and purpose of both the Civil Service and the Institute of Public Administration projects, the majority of the GOL Officials and personnel interviewed could not resist the tendency to compare the two projects and to a certain extent, to discuss both projects as one and the same. As a result, the views and opinions of these officials regarding the impacts of both projects on public administration development in Liberia were somewhat similar. There were many instances when middle level personnel in government Ministries and Agencies compared the training efforts of the IPA project and the testing efforts of the Civil Service Development project as having no impact or merit because both were unrelated to the duties and functions of their jobs as well as the development of their careers in government service. However, there were also some difference of opinion in the overall assessment of the impact of the Civil Service Development Project in comparison to the IPA project.

Executive Summary

The Civil Service Development Project #669-0124 was a joint cooperative effort between the governments of Liberia and the United States of America, through the newly created Liberian Civil Service Agency and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) representing the United States Government. Through a USAID contract with the California State Personnel Board (CSPB) the USG provided 162 man-months technical assistance advisory services, or 4 fulltime Personnel Management Specialists, 5 man-months of short term consultants, 60 man-months of administrative assistance in the form of administrative staff training, \$55,000 worth of commodities, provided training at the Masters degree level to twenty senior staff members of the CSA, interships or working attachments at various state government organizations in California, and classroom and on-the-job training at the CSA in Monrovia, Liberia.

The GOL through the CSA provided the personnel (staff of the CSA), the travel cost to and from the USA for the twenty senior staff members of the CSA, logistical support to the technical assistance team in the form of seven vehicles and two secretaries, and incremental budgetary support from \$209,000 in 1974 to \$611,000 budgeted for 1979 (the last year of the project).

The above inputs from the USG and the GOL were for the accomplishments of several objectives namely: (1) the establishment and implementation of a position classification and pay plan covering an estimated 20,000 positions in the Liberian Civil Service, (2) the establishment and implementation of a personnel testing system whereby government employees would compete on the basis of merit for positions in the civil service; (3) the establishment and implementation of an integrated salary schedule showing grades and salary ranges within the grades/class to ensure equal pay for equal work; (4) the development and implementation of a salary-setting system based upon surveys of employment, budget and revenue projections, cost of living and problems in recruitment and retention; (5) production and maintenance of a service-wide roster and personnel transaction system to ensure that the civil service is staffed by qualified employees; (6) the production of procedures and policies manuals covering all personnel functions for which the CSA is responsible; (7) the training of the senior staff of the CSA; (8) the establishment and continued existence of a Civil Service Board of Appeals to ensure a safe and secure atmosphere under which civil servants are motivated to produce quality work and where they can go to seek redress against maladministrative practices (such as illegal dismissal, unwarranted suspensions and withholding of benefits, sick or annual leave) by the administrative heads of GOL Ministries/Agencies.

In retrospect, the review of the literature related to the CSA in general and the project in particular tends to indicate that the project has made tremendous strides in institutionalizing the Liberian Civil Service. To quote a CSA source document: "After 45 years of struggle to live up to the standard of a Public Personnel Management System based on merit and fairplay, as opposed to a system based on political patronage, the CSA in 4½ years can now boast the beginnings of a Modern Public Personnel Management System." Consequently, the project accomplished the framework of what it set out to do. Its purpose was to create, through the new Civil Service

Agency, an organizational system and institutional capacity in the GOL for effectively developing and administering GOL policies for civil service management and improvement in collaboration with other government organizations. Through continued cooperation and collaboration with the Bureau of the Budget and the Ministry of Finance, Personnel Action Notices (PAN--a document which gives an indication of personnel transactions originating in each Ministry/Agency) are channelcd through the CSA. This ensures that appointments to new positions and promotions to higher positions are processed according to civil service policies and procedures rather than through a system based on patronage. Cooperation and collaboration with other government Ministries/Agencies in the areas of recruitment, testing, salary adjustments and employees benefits continues to make a major impact on civil service reform in Liberia.

In retrospect, the impact in political terms has been considerable, as evidenced by new policy decisions which resulted from the project as early as 1974. Key decisions resulted in the classification of positions and related pay shedules and the establishment of the personnel roster/records system -- a systematic approach in maintaining an inventory of the manpower resources in each government organization. Such information provides for better utilization of information for high level officials of GOL to undertake realistic planning and to avoid overstaffing.

The greatest change brought about by the project according to the CSA sources is the change in the attitude of political and social scientists and observers who thought that Liberia's social structure could not permit a Civil Service System based on merit. These observers are surprised (today) at the substantial progress now being made toward the achievement of a merit civil service. Liberians are slowly adjusting to the notion that one cannot get into government unless fully qualified and that one must meet the examination requirements before being employed.

However, these accomplishments and major strides were not made without experiencing tremendous setbacks and problems. From the onset of the project, the technical assistance team lacked logistical support in the form of housing, furniture, and transportation equipment. It took some time to sort out allowances, fringe benefits, etc. these for advisors, which resulted in the slow start of the project activities. In addition, since the CSA senior staff was being trained at the time of the arrival of the contract team, the team had to perform line functions rather than advisory/staff functions at the onset of the project. Personality conflicts between contract team's Chief-of-Party and the Director-General of the CSA was also evident during the early months of the project. This resulted in the recall to the US of the Chief-of-Party and the subsequent appointment of a new Chief-of-Party.

There were also problems inherent in the administration/implementation of a new and rather radical idea like civil service reform in a government accustomed to a patronage system. Most Ministries/Agencies bypassed the CSA in recruiting and employing people and refused to cooperate with the CSA in responding timely and promptly to requests for information necessary to develop and implement functions of the

CSA. Middle level employees who were supposed to be the beneficiaries of the project, misunderstood the rationale behind the establishment of the new CSA and felt that the CSA was "out to get them" (i. e. their jobs and their salaries). Top level officials felt that the CSA was encroaching on their authority to hire and fire employees for "their" Ministry/Agency and they refused to cooperate with the CSA in implementing the new position classification and pay plan. In fact, top officials refused to accept the new titles for positions recommended by the CSA and to allow older employees to sit for CSA examinations. It was common practice (and still is) for employees and potential employees to seek Executive Commissions for higher positions, rather than go through the civil service procedures for promotions and appointments.

The newly returned CSA senior professional staff also experienced problems in implementing the new civil service system. They had been trained to overcome the inherent ills in a system based on personal loyalty, nepotism and favoritism and were very enthusiastic and ready to assume greater responsibilities and participate in decision-making in order to effect the necessary changes. However, many of their proposed strategies for dealing with the situation were changed and exceptions made without any explanation on the part of the Director-General. As a result, they became frustrated by the CSA's inability and unwillingness to utilize their skills; some of them resigned and some were appointed to political positions in other Ministries/Agencies. These problems were compounded by the CSA's inability/failure to communicate its goals and policies to its beneficiaries in a way that would enlist their enthusiastic support. All of these factors combined to create disenchantment with the new CSA that reduced staff effectiveness as well as public support.

Lessons Learned - The Civil Service Development Project used as its strategy a short term approach to bolster existing public sector institutions. According to key informants, this strategy was worthy and should have also been utilized for the IPA project. It was felt that a major impact would have been made if administrative/management improvement through civil service development and management training, research and consultancy, and information services, had been conducted under an umbrella of human resources planning, development and utilization for improved public sector performance. In other words, a project related to administrative reform and efficient and effective government operation through training, testing placement and promotions for GOL employees, would go a long way in combatting existing administrative ills and malpractices instead of creating new projects and structures which in the long run can't be supported by the GOL. It was also felt that even though much accomplished in the 4½ years of the project, most of it was done in such haste as to make its impact unfelt. The potential beneficiaries were not properly oriented and inducted into the new system--too many new changes were going on at the same time which resulted in confusion and hostility.

Today, however, the Civil Service Agency is a force to be reckoned with and its authority is falling in line with that of the Budget Bureau and the Ministry of Finance in government employment compensation and employees fringe benefits or conditions of service.

Background

The existence of a civil service system in Liberia dates back to the 1930's. According to the Special Committee on Government Operations (SCOGO) report "Manpower and Training for the Public Service", the civil service was referred to as the "classified" civil service. This service provided for seven (7) classes of positions and attached salary limits to some of them. Out of the seven classes, four (4) classes (1,2,3,4) were classified in an "employee group" with the distinction between classes being made solely on the basis of specified salary levels. The other three (3) classes were categorized in an "administrative group" which included: Chief Clerks of bureaux, Chief Clerks of departments and chiefs of bureaux within the Civil Service.

The Civil Service Act was very comprehensive in subject matter coverage and one of the main provisions of the Act was "that no person shall be certified for original appointment to those positions in the Government of Liberia covered by that Act, unless he/she first pass a competitive examination." Exception to this requirement was made for college graduates who could get admission to class two of the "employee" group or class one of the "administrative group" without taking the examinations, while stenographers and bookkeepers holding certificates or diplomas from recognized business schools, were also exempted from competitive exams. They were, however, required to sit a special entrance exam for class two positions in the "employee group".

Rules and Regulations governing the classified civil service, published in 1936, covered partisanship, classification, examination, certification, appointment, reinstatement, salary schedules, leave of absence, attendance and other matters. However, the Civil Service Bureau was restricted to only two functions (1) examining for the classified civil service and (2) scheduling annual vacations for those employees in the classified service. The classified civil service covered only a small part of the total public service, i.e. not more than 3,000 employees out of a possible total of 10,000-12,000 government employees and officials. It was also restricted largely to lower-level office-clerical type positions. Most higher level managerial, administrative, professional and technical positions appeared to be outside the classified service as a matter of practice, if not law.

The Civil Service Bureau's administration of examinations for the classified service was not very well developed. These exams were given four times a year in Monrovia and once a year in the several counties of Liberia and were developed, conducted and rated by one person, i.e. the chief examiner. After rating the exam papers, the chief examiner would set up the register of eligibles and certify eligibles for appointments at the request of the various departments. Between October 1, 1963 and October 31, 1969 a total of 1,493 persons were examined for the classified service employee group. 1,008 persons passed the examination and 549 eligibles were appointed to the four classes of the employee group. Promotional exams to higher classes in the classified service were also developed by the chief examiner. The scheduling of annual vacations for the classified service was for the most part disregarded by the government's departments and bureaux. Consequently, the status and prestige of the

civil service with particular reference to the "classified" civil service; was considered very low. In the meantime it embraced low level clerical type positions and better educated and more able Liberians looked down on it. Even those government officials holding higher level jobs in the departments and bureaux were reluctant to become "civil servants".

Prior to 1973, a number of serious problems hindered the civil service from performing at a satisfactory level. The most critical problem had to do with the work attitude of the public service employees. This negative attitude towards work was exemplified by unauthorized tardiness, absence from duty without excuse, lack of a personal sense of responsibility for doing a fair day's work, for carrying out official instructions or for performing at a satisfactory level of quality. Employees also lacked the motivation to qualify for better jobs or where they became qualified, to apply for promotion to better jobs. The majority of the employees lacked the motivation to improve their qualifications to the point where they would actually be qualified for the jobs they presently held. These negative attitudes were also practiced by the higher level government officials who failed to provide examples of prompt and regular attendance at work, hard work and dedication to duty for their subordinates. It was found out that several inter-related causes gave rise to the conditions prevailing in the civil service. These were:

- (a) a lack of self discipline and a sense of personal responsibility towards their official duties on the part of some employees;
- (b) the lack of specific job qualifications in many cases, i.e. some employees were assigned to work they lacked the skills to do. This was because no qualification requirements were established for the job involved or no qualified Liberians could be recruited for the work. Sometimes, it was because no valid examining or selection device was available or used to recruit these employees;
- (c) The existence of serious overstaffing and insufficient work to keep everyone busy in some offices;
- (d) the failure to make promotions to better jobs depend primarily on merit;
- (e) the feeling on the part of many employees that the acceptance of greater responsibility or more difficult work, or the improvement of one's qualifications of job performance, was not rewarded normally by an increase in pay or rank;

- (f) a feeling held by many that government pay in general was inadequate and inequitable; that it bore no consistent relationship to work, or merit; and that some other benefits (such as pension) that would make it important and worthwhile to remain and advance in government, were lacking;
- (g) that strong on-the-job supervision was lacking because there seemed to be no knowledge of the concept of supervisory responsibility by the bosses; and
- (h) the belief that department heads and supervisors did not possess sufficient authority to discipline employees and make it stick, especially with the respect to those employees who had sponsorship or recourse outside the department where they worked.

The SCOGO report cited the above noted causes which could easily account for the work habits and attitudes of the employees making up the classified service. It was also felt that those causes gave rise to the subsequent low status and prestige of the classified service.

In light of these problems, the Civil Service Bureau in its 1963-1964 annual report, recommended among others, the following:

- increase the staff and budget of the bureau;
- provide training scholarships for personnel of the bureau;
- create personnel offices in the various departments and bureaux of government;
- set up civil service agencies in each of the nine (9) counties in the country;
- establish a disciplinary board for the civil service;
- increase the cooperation between the several departments and the Civil Service Bureau;
- establish an in-service training program for civil servants;
- set up a job classification system;
- equalize the salaries paid for equivalent work in the various departments and bureaux;
- provide a system of awards to employees; and
- establish a career service program.

In addition to the problem of work attitudes in the public service, the SCOGO report went further in identifying three specific problems relating to public personnel management in Liberia: (1) selecting personnel for appointment and promotion; (2) classifying and setting pay for jobs; and (3) providing pensions.

At the time, the great majority of appointments to the public service were not made through the competitive examining process nor through any other system of objective selection (competitive or non-competitive). Even though the Civil Service Act provided that no person shall be certified for original appointment to positions in the

government covered by the Act unless he/she first passed a competitive exam, most agency or department heads never referred to the competitive exams as a criterion for selecting their staff. As a result, many unqualified people were hired on the basis of political, family, or personal preferences; or in a paternalistic manner or a casual haphazard fashion.

In regards to classifying and setting pay for jobs, it was noted that even though the Civil Service Act provided for seven (7) classes of positions and attached salary limits to some of them, the Act did not actually provide a position classification or pay plan. In practice, the provisions were not enforced. There was little equity or rational relationship in pay as among different kinds and levels of government jobs, among different departments of government or between government and the private sector. This practice led to the loss of employees from one department to the other without compensating benefit to the public service; to lack of ambition and poor morale of many employees; to misutilization of the scarce supply of trained people; and to other inevitable and harmful effects.

Of course, it was generally felt by most government employees and officials that the prevailing pay levels were inadequate as well as inequitable; i.e. the head of a cabinet department was paid \$6,000 per annum as compared to \$15,000 per annum paid to ambassadors. Such low salaries at the executive levels left practically no room for adequate salaries at intermediate and lower echelons, especially for higher-level professional and managerial personnel. The existence of this condition of service carried with it several adverse effects, i.e. it placed a heavy strain on honesty, fairness, and industry of public employees. Because of the low salaries, public employees found it necessary to devote the greater part of their energies and talents to outside employment/enterprise in order to maintain some standard of living. Not only did this detract from the efficient performance of their government jobs, but serious conflict of interest between public duty and private benefit resulted and was tolerated.

The third "purely personnel" problem identified by the SCOGO report had to do with the provision for pension. According to law, a pension for a retired cabinet officer was \$1,000 per annum. Provisions were also made for a few other high government officials including former legislators, Supreme Court Justices, ambassadors and military officers, to receive statutory pensions. Others were granted pensions by private bills passed by the Legislature or by Executive Decision of the president. Others were said to be more or less either allowed to remain in government employment and "retire on the job" after they were no longer able to render effective service, or were given special appointments. But, by and large, the majority of regular government employees were not covered by a pension systems of any kind. Because of the disregard to a person's service to government for 25-30 years without the benefit of a pension, it was a common practice for government officials in high offices to use the authority or special advantages of their offices for their private gains. In some extreme cases, officials accepted bribes, gifts or favors to influence or expedite official actions. Because of the lack of a reasonable pension scheme, the civil service was again hampered in attracting and retaining competent personnel.

In light of the above status of the Liberian public service, the Special Commission on Government Operations (SCOGO) presented some guidelines for developing a modern merit public service which includes the following broad principles:

- Competence - the level of competence in the public service should be at least as high as that achieved by any other large employer in the country.
- Ethics - the public service should live up to high standards of ethical conduct and avoid those situations where public duty conflicts with private interest.
- Merit - selection for and advancement in the public service should be based on merit.
- Stability - the public service should possess stability and continuity at all levels despite changes in political superiors.
- Job Security - the public service should provide good individual job security to competent, hardworking and ethical employees but such security should be relative and not in conflict with the public interest.

A number of elements were also presented as an action plan in putting the above principles to practical solution and they include among others, the following:

- A classification, grouping or standard titling of position in such a way as to indicate the kind and level of education, training or previous work experience needed. The proper internal alignment of salaries and wages, the comparison of salaries with those paid by other employers; and the normal order of advancement from one position to a more difficult or responsible one in the same field.
- Minimum qualification requirements for (1) each position or each class of positions; or (2) career entry to the public service. The qualification requirements should take into account the duties of the position, the skills normally available in the labor market, in service training programs provided, and the operation of the internal promotion program, among other factors.
- Recruiting, examining and selecting procedures which reach all the manpower resources of the country, (and the best and most economical foreign resources when necessary) and which apply the established qualification requirements in a fair and effective fashion in selecting the best qualified and most promising persons from among all candidates.

- A placement system which assures not only the sound initial placement of new employees in accordance with their qualifications, but also provides for followup and remedial placement.
- A promotion system which provides for the fair and objective consideration of the maximum practical number of eligible employees for promotion opportunities which arise, and which assures that selection for promotion is based on merit.
- Provision for reprimands, suspensions, demotions and removal of employees for disciplinary reasons or unsatisfactory performance; and for an objective appeals and grievance system for employees against adverse management decisions or actions.
- Provision for transfers of employees among different agencies or levels of organization to meet the needs of the public service;
- Fringe benefits such as retirement, group life and health insurance, vacation and sick leave, paid holidays and employees compensation for job-connected injuries and sickness.
- An orderly method of making necessary retrenchment in the workforce.

2. The Project

A. Rationale

Although there had been a civil service system in Liberia since the 1930's, not much attention was given it during the early phases of Liberia's development. Major deficiencies in the civil service system included nepotism, lack of a uniform salary plan, lack of a system for recruiting, selecting and promoting civil servants based on merit and fair play as well as a lack of security or job tenure. These were the characteristics of a government service based on the "patronage and spoils" system of administration which granted rewards and support to those who were unflinching in their loyalty to the President. Of course, these rewards were in the forms of appointments to high level civil service positions and in some cases, cash handouts. Salaries paid to government employees depended on nepotism and favoritism rather than merit or seniority and had little resemblance to job responsibilities or performance. In addition to these maladministrative practices, the civil service was administratively weak and inefficient. Chronic absenteeism and tardiness was rampant in government departments and bureaux. Poor performance on the job, a generally negative attitude towards government jobs also characterized the civil service. This was due in part to low and inadequate salaries paid to government employees and the lack of qualifications and skills to perform simple tasks of routine office practices (typing, filing, records keeping etc). The motivation/stimuli to aspire to positions of greater responsibilities based on merit rather than patronage was also lacking in the civil service. Furthermore, tenure of service in the civil service was not rewarded with a pension except in special cases.

Between 1950 and 1961, Liberia achieved remarkable economic growth. In order for Liberia to sustain this growth trend and to develop simultaneously, it became recognizable that institutions and people capable of administering the operations of state should be developed. Effective administration and its accompanied efficient administrative machinery was considered a pre-requisite for social, economic, and technological development.

In 1971, President Tolbert began an accelerated rate of socio-economic and technological changes in an effort to speed up development in Liberia. It was recognized immediately by his administration that for speedy development to be carried out, it was necessary to have a competent and dedicated civil service workforce. Civil service reform became a cornerstone of his development program.

In 1973, a Public Employment Act was enacted which also amended the Executive Law and created the new Liberian Civil Service Agency. The new civil service law was seen as the first step toward a civil service merit system. According to the Act, the purpose of the Civil Service Agency is to increase the efficiency of the public service, to secure for deserving employees a reasonable tenure of office and an opportunity for advancement according to merit and seniority and, to place the personnel employed by the government on a competitive merit system.

Although the government of President Tolbert formed the new Civil Service Agency (CSA) in an effort to ensure the presence of qualified personnel in government, the CSA lacked the modern personnel management techniques, procedures and systems to devise and implement government-wide personnel reforms. Once this was recognized, negotiations for technical assistance towards the implementation of civil service development efforts, (i.e. implementing the concept of equal pay for equal work, merit selecting and promotion and employees right to appeal) became the next major task.

B. Planning the Project

When President Tolbert assumed office in 1971, he recognized the changing needs of Liberia's development efforts and also the need for an efficient and dedicated corps of public workers; the development of a civil service system in which people would be appointed to positions in government on the basis of "what they knew" was the principle behind the enactment of the Public Employment Act. To achieve this goal, the administration of President Tolbert felt it would be necessary to improve the quality of government service.

With that in mind, Tolbert appointed Dr. John Payne Mitchell, former Secretary of the Department of Education, as the head of the new Civil Service Agency. Tolbert mandated Mitchell to develop a first-rate modern civil service system for Liberia and Mitchell advocated a service in which an attractive, and secure atmosphere for public service would exist. Mitchell also advocated a service in which government employees would be motivated towards greater productivity against the background of equal pay for equal work.

How did Mitchell and Tolbert aim to accomplish the development of such a system for a country which had been accustomed to a patronage system for the most part of its history? The existing staff at the CSA was ill-equipped to operate a modern personnel management system. The status of the civil service was too low to attract qualified and highly motivated personnel and of course, the pay was inadequate while attractive conditions of service of employment were lacking.

The first major move towards achievement of the civil service system based on merit and fairplay was the enactment of the new Civil Service Act. This Act spelled out the basic principles of a merit civil service and laid the foundation for the development of a new and more responsive system. In particular, the law called for the CSA to develop and establish uniform salary scales based on a position classification system, a merit hiring, promotion and tenure system among others, to alleviate some of the major deficiencies existing in the civil service at the time.

For two years (1971-1973) the government of Liberia (GOL) negotiated with the government of the United States of America (USG) for technical assistance in the development of the new civil service of Liberia. To assist the GOL in its efforts towards civil service reforms, the USAID and the GOL initiated the Civil Service Development Project. The purpose of this project was to create, through the new Civil Service Agency, an organizational system and institutional capacity in government for effectively developing and administering government policies for civil service management and improvement. This would be done in collaborating with other government organizations in the forefront of administrative reform efforts. This project was part and parcel of USAID's efforts to assist the government of Liberia in establishing and improving the institutions which support the achievement of national development plans and programs. The need for a civil service capable of supporting plans and programs for socio-economic and technological development, hardly needs emphasis.

C. Project Implementation

In 1973 USAID approved a \$1,862,000 four year grant to GOL for the purpose of developing the Civil Service Agency. In September 1974, USAID entered into a contract with the California State Personnel Board (CSPB) to provide technical assistance to the CSA for the creation of a basic system of personnel management, including classification standards, testing methodology and recruitment procedures. The CSPB provided up to four full-time technicians, short-term consultants, backstopped GOL/CSA participants, and supervised on-the-job training for the participants upon completion of their training in the U.S. Specifically, CSPB as represented by its 4-man fulltime technical assistance team, and short-term consultants, were responsible for the following:

- To develop and implement a standardized Classification and Pay Plan covering all positions subject to the Civil Service Act of 1973 (approximately 20,000 positions);
- To develop and implement an examination system for the civil service of the GOL based on merit and selection principles and the specific needs of the GOL;
- To develop multiple-choice objective test for civil service classes with emphasis given to entry-level and sub-professional classes;
- To establish within the CSA, a capability to administer, evaluate and revise an on-going merit selection program;
- To develop and implement an integrated salary schedule and to construct and implement a salary plan based on equity, duties and responsibilities and individual performance;
- To develop and implement a system to make recommendation to the President regarding appropriate salary levels for civil service classification;
- To establish and maintain a servicewide roster, a personnel transaction system and a comprehensive body of rules for the operation of the personnel system;
- To create and disseminate comprehensive manuals of policy and procedures for internal CSA use and for the guidance of Ministries and Agencies;
- To provide professional training for 19 members of the Civil Service Agency staff; to provide on-the-job and classroom training in personnel management principles and practices to CSA staff members; and to provide training in personnel transactions, procedures, and personnel management and the principles and practices to personnel officers and clerks of Ministries and Agencies; and
- To establish and put into operation the Civil Service Board of Appeals a grievance procedure and appeal process for the civil servants.

Expected Results or outputs of the project were: (1) return of the participants of the Masters degree program; (2) on-the-job training in Testing, Classification, Pay, Research, and Records; (3) design, development and conduct of training courses for other government personnel in Personnel Management; (4) production of manuals and procedures covering the new CSA functions; (5) development of records and reporting system to cover CSA regulatory and service requirement; (6) develop and implement personnel tests and examinations.

Duration -The Civil Service Development Project had a life span of four years which was extended by six months. The contract with the CSPB,

initially for two years, was also extended to the four years life of the project and later to the 4½ years of the project (September 1974-Feb. 1979).

Target Group - The direct beneficiaries of the Civil Service Development Project were supposed to be the 20,000 plus Liberian civil servants who, by virtue of "the new civil service," would be working under a more equitable system. Supposedly, they would be able to compete on the basis of merit and capability for promotion, be recruited for positions involving greater responsibilities, and on the whole would enjoy a system whereby they would be entitled to equal pay for equal work. Potential employees of government would also benefit from the project by having access to a more objective system of selection which would broaden their opportunity for employment. The Government of Liberia was expected to benefit from the project by boasting a more uniform and reliable administrative mechanism for personnel administration, whereas the people of Liberia would benefit by having a more effective and efficient government.

The end product of this project was expected to be, a government employment system based on merit and not patronage, where an ordinary person could get a government job if he/she possessed the minimum qualifications and successfully passed the examination requirements.

The direct cost of USAID's contribution to support the Civil Service Development Project was a grant of \$1,826,000 through which the contract with the CSPB provided the following:

- 162 man-months of technical assistance advisory services or four(4) fulltime personnel management specialists;
- five(5) man-months of short term consultants
- sixty(60) man-months of administrative assistance in the form of administrative staff training;
- \$55,000 worth of commodities; and
- training twenty(20) senior staff members of the CSA at the Masters degree level at the California State University at Sacramento in the USA.

The contract also provided for the twenty(20) senior staff to receive apprenticeship training or working attachments with various state government organizations in California. In addition, these staff members were also provided classroom and on-the-job training at the CSA after their return from the United States.

The GOL's contribution consisted of the following:

- travel costs to and from America for the twenty(20) senior staff members of the CSA to be trained in the USA;
- logistical support to the technical assistance team in the form of seven(7) vehicles and two secretaries; and
- incremental budgetary support ranging from \$209,000 in 1974 to \$611,000 budgeted for 1979 (the last year of the project.)

3. Achievements and Failures

The most significant achievement of the Civil Service Development Project was the institutionalization of the concept of the Civil Service System based on the principles and practices of merit and fairplay as opposed to one steeped in patronage and malpractices. For forty-five (45) years, the Civil Service of Liberia was nothing more than the documents signifying its purpose and functions. Today, it is a force to be reckoned with in relation to its qualified employees it can afford to pay for the development of its socio-economic and technical growth.

At the end of the project, the following achievements had been made:

1. A position classification plan covering 139 separate classes in the employee categories was established. An estimated 18,000 positions out of a possible 20,000 were covered by the plan developed during the project. The positions classified fell in four major categories: (1) Clerical Category, (2) Administrative Category, (3) Fiscal and Professional Category, and (4) General Category. The Clerical Category includes seven different types of work under the following general headings and positions titles.

1/ General Clerical:

- Clerk I
- Clerk II
- Senior Clerk
- Supervising Clerk

2/ Secretarial-Stenographic:

- Secretary
- Executive Secretary

3/ Clerical Accounting:

- Accounts Clerk
- Senior Accounts Clerk

4/ Central Files:

- File Clerk
- Senior File Clerk

2. Personnel Testing System

A testing system was established and had become fully operational by the end of the project. It was applied to all civil service employees both at the entry level (with the exception of college graduates who were exempted by Presidential Decree) and at the promotional level. Fifty-seven separate examinations were created and 12,000 persons have been tested since the inception of the project.

3. Salary Plan

An integrated salary schedule, showing grades and salary ranges within grades, was adopted. A salary administration plan was also approved and agreed to by the Budget Bureau and the Ministry of Finance. The Bureau of the Budget also mandated that all agencies use the approved salary schedule in their budget presentations.

4. Salary-Setting System

Based upon surveys of employment, budget/revenue projections, cost of living, and problems in recruitment and retention, a salary-setting system was developed, recommended to and approved by the President. This plan enabled qualified civil servants to enjoy salaries commensurate with job responsibilities and duties.

5. Service-wide Roster and Personnel Transaction System

A service-wide roster of about 18,000 government employees was developed up until the end of the project. In addition, a Personnel Transaction System equipped with proper forms and procedures was also developed and was operating within all Ministries and Agencies of the GOL.

6. Manuals of Procedures and Policies covering all personnel functions for which the CSA is responsible (i.e. classification selection procedures) was also developed and became operational in the CSA.

7. Training of selected staff

(5) Typing-Office Secretarial:

- Clerk typist
- Senior clerk typist

(6) Field Interviewing:

- Survey interviewer
- Senior survey interviewer

(7) Computer Operations:

- Computer operator

(2) Positions within the administrative category include:

- Directors
- Supervisors
- Chief of Units
- Research officers/assistants
- Administrative assistants
- Professional administrators (below the Assistant Minister's rank)

(3) The Fiscal/Professional Category includes among others, the following positions:

- Engineers
- Accountants
- Auditors
- Consultants
- Architects
- Geologists
- Surveyors
- Professional nurses

4. The General Category includes positions of:

- Messenger
- Driver
- Driver helper
- Aids, Binders

A 1981 project report by the Division of Research and Records of the Civil Service Agency cited the following statistics on the various categories of positions described above. They are:

<u>Category</u>	<u>%of aggregate service</u>
1. administrative	10.5
2. fiscal/professional	11.6
3. clerical	13.3
4. general	64.6

Twenty-three senior members of the CSA were trained in Public Administration at the Masters degree level in the U.S.A. At the end of the project, nineteen had completed their studies and were working at the CSA. However, one resigned after completing a four year personnel services contract with the CSA and two dropped out of the Masters program before its completion. A total of twenty professionally trained Liberians were left to manage the new CSA

8. Grievance Procedure and Appeal Process for Civil Servants

A seven-man board of appeals was appointed and was operational during and after the life of the project. The procedure for filing and hearing appeals was published and used by employees of the GOL.

Despite the major achievements made by the project in institutionalizing the civil service of Liberia, it suffered a series of setbacks and failures during the course of its work. These problems fell under the following broad categories:

- Contract Team Relations with USAID - Because USAID failed to provide logistical support to the contract team members after they arrived in Monrovia, most of their professional time was spent arranging logistics (i.e. finding some place to live, clearing household effects from the Freeport and in general, getting acclimatized to life in Monroiva). One member of the

team had to undergo surgery a few months after arriving in Monrovia. Of course, this state of affairs culminated in the project getting off to a slow start and a loss of professional time and energy.

-Contract Team Relations with CSA and the GOL Ministries/Agencies

The CSA headquarters in 1974 was at best marginal in terms of facilities and staff. The counterpart setup between the contract team and the CSA senior staff was limited to the point of being lacking. At the inception of the project, there were 15 professional staff at the CSA, in addition to the five who were undergoing training at the Masters degree level in the U.S.A. However, only two of the 15 were fulltime employees of the CSA. The other 13 were parttimers college students. With this group; working on an average of only 10 hours a week, the burden of work on the contract team and their two counterparts was too heavy. Six out of the 13 parttimers graduated in Dec. 1974, but only two continued to work for CSA. The other four left for more fertile grounds. Out of the four fulltime professionals, one departed for the two-year MA degree program. This left only the fulltime professionals as counterparts to assist the contract team in program design, implementation and production. The responsibility for carrying out line functions landed squarely in the laps of the contract team at the very beginning of the project. Personality conflicts between the Chief-of-Party of the contract team and the Director-General of the CSA were evident during the early months of the project. Of course, the Chief-of-Party was recalled to the U.S.A. and one of the team members was appointed Chief-of-Party.

The most important problem the project had to deal with had to do with those inherent in the implementation of a rather new and radical idea like civil service reform in a government accustomed to a patronage system. It was alright for GOL and USAID to bring technicians to the CSA to draft laws, plans and proposals for a civil service based on merit, but they would have to do it without the blessings and cooperation of the government Ministries and Agencies. This was the impression key informants provided during interviews. Most toplevel government officials were unconcerned about the CSA and what it had set out to do. As far as they were concerned, the image of a "do-nothing civil service" was still existing. Ministries and Agencies continued to bypass the CSA in recruiting and promoting their staff. They refused to cooperate with the CSA and its staff in supplying the data necessary to develop the plans and proposals for the new Civil Service System. The opinion of the majority of toplevel officials as well as some middle-level officials was that Liberia's social structure was not geared towards the acceptance and implementation of such a system and that it wouldn't work. With that kind of attitude, it was no wonder that the civil service experienced a "crisis of confidence" immediately after the Coup of April 12, 1980.

The project however, tried to elevate interest in civil service reform by launching publicity campaigns at the outset of the project through television, radio, newspaper and magazine articles, training seminars, as well as personal visits to high level GOL officials. But, some policies which were adopted tended to lead to resistance. Most Ministry

and Agency heads felt that the Director-General of the CSA, through the new Civil Service Rules had given himself enormous power and influence. In effect, it was felt that this was a usurpation of power.

Existing government employees were not given automatic civil service status and were required to take written tests to qualify for this status. Of course, this requirement didn't endear the CSA to these employees who felt that the CSA was out to "get their jobs". Most of them resisted the idea because they already held the positions for which they would be tested and saw no reason why they should take the exam. Views expressed by some middle level key informants about the examinations bordered on the philosophical: one sat for the civil service exams as a matter of course; one was recruited to jobs on the decision of the boss (meaning head of Ministry/Agency); one was promoted or given salary increment by maintaining good relation with the boss. Most of these employees had taken the Civil Service benefits, a standardized salary scale for all positions, and equal pay for equal work.

The new civil service during and after the project also maintained records on more than twenty thousand civil servants through out Liberia; had conducted research projects for the international agencies, embassies and institutions both in the public and private sector; and had bestowed civil service status only on persons who had met civil service requirements. In addition, it had increased its examination activities (twice weekly in Monrovia and once a year in each of the nine counties in Liberia) and was instrumental in the appointment of a seven member Board of Appeals which served to create a more secure atmosphere for employees by checking against arbitrary dismissals.

The above were considered to be a major contribution to the overall impact of the Civil Service Development Project, both from the USAID's point of view and the Civil Service Agency standpoint. However, the views of key informants regarding the impact of the project were also discussed and these views differ according to the level of personnel existing, i.e. top, middle and lower level personnel in GOL, new entrants into the civil service system, and employees with long tenure of service in GOL.

In discussion with top level key informants (e.g. Ministers and Directors of autonomous Bureaux) concerning their familiarity with the project, most of them claimed ignorance about the project to develop the Civil Service Agency. They knew of the existence of the Civil Service Agency but this knowledge was limited to the functions of the Agency dealing with examinations, leave scheduling and lately, the processing of personnel action notices. Most of these key informants felt that even with limited functions the CSA in retrospect had not made much of an impact on civil service reform because public employment and promotion was still by and large politically exam one time or another during their tenure with the GOL and they all felt that it was virtually unrelated to their job duties. They also felt that passing the exam did nothing for their careers in the GOL, neither did they see any tangible results in terms of increase in pay or rank. This led to anxiety and confusion in addition to resistance. Strategies geared toward easing transition and gaining greater employee and administration acceptance were suggested

no Mitchell and Tolbert, but no action or agreement came out of it. The new Civil Service was forced down peoples' throats.

4. Impact

A. General

In retrospect, the Civil Service Development Project created a tremendous impact on the development of public administration in Liberia. An institution was created which finally recognized that the civil servants of Liberia would be hired on the basis of competition and merit and would be treated equitably in terms of equal pay for equal work. The project had the full backing and support of the President of Liberia whose constant intervention and propinquity for speed hastened the accomplishments of the major objectives of the project and their implementation.

The CSA in 1979 was proud to note that much had been accomplished as a result of the project. In particular, the CSA was proud that "after a 45 year history of struggle to rejuvenate itself against an institutional image of a mere rubber stamp and a latent symbol of personnel management, it could now boast an agency that is the custodian of a system in government where merit and competence are the bases for entry and promotion in the Civil Service". In addition, the CSA through the project, has made a major impact in standardizing recruitment and certification policies throughout GOL; i.e. government employees could now boast of increased salaries and based rather than merit based. In practice, most toplevel officials of the GOL continued to bypass the CSA during and after the project, in employing and promoting those employees they wanted to employ or promote.

In the end-of-tour report of the contract team chief-of-party, it was noted that the Ministries and Agencies were continuing to hire people prior to their qualification in the Civil Service Exam, as well as continuing in the practice of requesting Executive Commission for position within the civil service. On the other hand, top government officials noted that since the authority of the CSA in regards to employing personnel was limited to clerical and low-level administrative staff, they (top level officials) had the sole responsibility and the authority to hire and promote those who they felt were needed for the functioning of the organizations.

On the other hand, statistical evidence supports the increased response of public servants to qualify. During the duration of the project, 3,307 existing and potential employees of government registered for one or another of the civil service examinations in Monrovia alone. Of that number 2,792 persons sat for the examinations; 1,323 personnel action notices were also processed during that period. This means in effect that the GOL was well on its way in recruiting, examining and staffing its Ministries and Agencies with qualified personnel. In addition to the above, the CSA continued to attract grudging cooperation which was based on fear since the CSA had strong presidential support. Nowwithstanding, Ministries/Agencies increased their request to the Civil Service Agency for qualified persons to fill vacancies that occurred in the clerical category of their Ministries/Agencies.

To summarize, the Civil Service Development Project had a positive overall impact on the civil service reform, considering the short duration of the project, the status of the civil service before 1971 and the current status of the Civil Service System of the GOL. Much was accomplished in a short period of time because of the tireless efforts of the CSPB and the commitment of the CSA staff to install a personnel system based on merit.

The new CSA continues to struggle for administrative reform despite severe pressures from within as well as without. According to the Director-General, the fight which started a decade ago, will continue as long as responsible officials in government continue to support the efforts of the CSA for public administration improvement in Liberia.

B. Political/Policy Impact

According to documentary evidence on the CSA and the Civil Service Development Project in particular, the project was tremendously successful in its impact on the political scene. As early as 1971 when President Tolbert took over the reins of government and began to accelerate technological, economic and social changes in an effort to speed the development of Liberia, he immediately recognized the necessity of a competent and dedicated workforce. Thus, civil service reform became a cornerstone of Tolbert's development program. To achieve the goals of speedy development, a civil service system which emphasized an attractive and secure atmosphere for public servants, was called for. In this service, government employees would be motivated towards greater productivity against a background of equal pay for equal work. The development of the Liberian Public Personnel Management system through the CSA and staffed by Liberians trained to operate a modern civil service system, was a major policy decision in Liberia.

Because of the Civil Service Development Project, the institutional capacity to operate the system has been built. It provides for effective and accurate central personnel record keeping; a personnel system to treat public employees fairly in matters of pay, benefits, and discipline; and one that is determined and encouraged to fill positions in government on the basis of merit as opposed to loyalty, patronage and nepotism.

An Executive Ordinance issued by President Tolbert in 1974 made it imperative for all personnel transactions in the form of personnel action notices (PAN) originating in each Ministry/Agency to be channeled through the CSA, Bureau of the Budget and the Ministry of Finance. Before 1974, this document was only processed through the Bureau of the Budget and the Ministry of Finance. The Executive Ordinance made it difficult for any GOL Ministry/Agency to make civil service appointments or promotions without the participation of the CSA.

Another major policy decision which resulted from the project was the establishment of a Board of Appeals through which employees can channel their grievances and seek redress against administrative ills and maladministration by their supervisors/administrative heads. The establishment of this Board served to ensure that civil servants are treated fairly by GOL and that a secure atmosphere, under which employees will be motivated to be highly productive, was provided.

In addition to the above, a system of recruitment and selection which attracts qualified people for public service, is also an indicator of political impact. Through periodic testing of candidates, only those qualified and meeting the minimum requirements for jobs, are hired to carry out GOL functions. An eligibility file is maintained out of which qualified persons can be identified and referred to ministries, agencies, and bureaux to fill vacancies in government.

In regards to the implementation of the position classification and pay plan, four major decisions have governed its administration: (1) no GOL employees would lose his/her job as a result of the new CSA; (2) those employees earning less than the minimum rate for the class of jobs they were performing, would be eligible for salary adjustment provided they passed the test for the position they occupied; (3) those employees who earned more than the maximum rate for their class would have their salaries frozen until such time as their salary rate was within the appropriate range; and (4) people seeking jobs in government would have to meet a minimum standard (both of education and experience) for the position they sought. However, those already in government would be allowed to qualify for civil service status in their present position or compete for promotion if they had only the necessary experience.

From the above indicators, the project was supported from the very beginning at the highest political level in the country. Furthermore, speedy development was the order of the day and the efforts put forth by the CSA, the CSPD, USAID, and the GOL supported to a large extent the political decision to create a Civil Service System based on merit and fair play.

C. Economic Impact

How much has the Civil Service Development Project contributed to the increased income, saving, productivity and improved performance on the job of the civil servants and other beneficiaries? The response to this question by the key informants varied (again) according to the level and status of the officials and the personnel involved. For those civil servants in clerical positions prior to the project, the economic impact of the project in terms of increased income, was low. They were required to sit and pass the civil service exams and qualify for civil service status in order to justify the salaries they were receiving. If those salaries exceeded the maximum rate for the class of work they were doing, the salaries were frozen. If the salaries paid to this class of employees were less than the minimum required for the class, these employees would be eligible for salary adjustments. However, there were no records to show how many employees were affected by the salary adjustments and the frozen salaries. Key informants at this level in the civil service felt that whatever salary increment they received was "across the board" rather than salary adjustment because they were making less than the job they were performing required. There were many instances when key informants referred to employees whose salaries were frozen as those who had neither the competence, qualifications or tenure of service to be awarded those salaries in the first place. But since it was the policy that no government employee would lose his/her job because of the classification and pay plan, and neither would salaries above the minimum be reduced, these employees with frozen salaries were in fact the beneficiaries of the Civil Service Development Project.

For those entering the government during and after the project, their salaries were more attractive than for those who entered prior to the project. This was due to the function performed by the Civil Service Agency in making salary recommendations to the President based on data related to the cost of living, prevailing levels of compensation in Liberia and fiscal and economic considerations. This could be interpreted to mean that the project had a positive economic impact on the beneficiaries in terms of increased earning. The fresh college graduate in 1972-1974 would expect to be paid a monthly salary of \$150-\$350 if he/she was employed by the GOL. Today, depending on his/her qualifications, skill and experience, he/she can expect a salary up to \$700 a month depending on the position and the pay rate for the position. Advanced degree-holders have also benefitted from the project in terms of increased income. The minimum annual salary of those employees with a Masters degree was \$10-11,000 at the close of the project whereas it was \$6,000 in 1975.

It terms of improved performance, savings and productivity, this is not applicable because the system has not been refined to the extent that job performance evaluation is an integral part of staff development in the GOL. Also, there is no mechanism to measure productivity and savings as the GOL continues to be overstaffed and inefficient. According to Civil Service Agency's sources, the administrative and clerical costs of operating government ministries/agencies is high in comparison to productivity.

In its 1974 annual report, the CSA stressed its concern about the lack of diligence on the part of public personnel which resulted in the loss of 2,141 working days exemplified by absence from duty without excuse. Tardiness also accounted for another 2,045 days at the cost equivalent to five years aggregate time lost. It was felt that the above evidence contributed to a considerable slow down in pace of national development and that many opportunities for increasing production levels in government were being squandered. To remedy this, an alarm was sounded for punctuality and regular attendance on the job but, according to key informants, improved performance and increased productivity are not obvious. Secretaries continue to perform poorly on civil service exams as well as on the job. One report noted that 68% of secretaries failed to attain the minimum passing grade on the civil service test "which phenomenon accentuates the necessity for an improvement in the standards of clerical training institutions, most of whose standards are below the minimum set for passing by the CSA". The CSA 1974 annual report cited the following test statistics in support of poor performance on tests as well as on the job.

Grand overall total number of personnel tested for the period January 1972 - Sept. 1974

<u>Grand Overall Total</u>	<u>Grand Total Passed</u>	<u>Grand Total Failed</u>
2,141*	758	1,343

*(includes 20 disqualifications)

The Civil Service Agency also conducted examinations for non-government employees in 1974 and the figures are as follows:

<u>Categories</u>	<u>Eligible</u>	<u>Ineligible</u>	<u>Total</u>
Secretary	1	12	13
Clerk/Typist	-	74	74
General Clerical	20	56	76
Bookkeeper	22	34	56
Accountant	14	22	36
Grand Totals*	<u>103</u>	<u>337</u>	<u>440</u>

A total of 185 government employees sat for the Civil Service Exams from Jan. - Sept. 1974. 46 were eligible for positions in the categories quoted above while 139 failed and were proven ineligible.

In summary, the economic impact of the project on increased income may be assumed to have been positive. However, the impact on improved performance, productivity and savings borders on the negative. In fact, there has been no indications of an impact being made on improved performance, productivity and savings.

*(reflects government employees also)

D. Social Impact

The Civil Service Development Project created opportunities for career growth and development and upward mobility in the Civil Service Agency for its professional staff. As early as 1975, the Civil Service Agency had an organizational structure designed for career growth and upward mobility of its professional staff.

As part of its staff development responsibility, the CSPB trained 20 senior staff members of the CSA at the post graduate level under a joint program with the California State University at Sacramento. Each senior staff member, in addition to the graduate program, participated in a three months, full-time plus six months part-time internship program with a California State government agency. In addition, each received classroom and on-the-job training in Liberia in the specialized areas of Public Personnel Administration. During the duration of the project, these professional staff were in positions ranging from Assistant Director-General of CSA to Senior Staff Analyst in each of the four main functional divisions of the CSA. The opportunities were available to gain expertise in one or all areas of Position, Research, Leave and Pension, and General Administration. The institutional capacity exist at the CSA in each of the specialized functions outlined and at no time was one function sacrificed for another like it was at the IPA. Each professional at the CSA had similar qualification and experience, but there was variation in their areas of interest, which resulted in outward migration of the majority of the staff after they had fulfilled their four year contract. To date, there are only six out of the original twenty staff trained to staff the CSA. The CSA lost the majority of its staff to the USA where 50% of the staff presently are. In addition, one was appointed to manage a government-acquired private firm in Liberia and three were appointed to various positions in Ministries and parastatals in Monrovia.

There was not sufficient evidence in support of career development and upward mobility in government Ministries/Agencies as a result of this project. The most that can be said is that employees transferring from one Ministry/Agency to another invariably transferred to a higher position with the accompanying salary increments. The migration or transfer from job to job was practiced on a massive scale. In order to curb this practice, CSA in its 1981 annual report recommended that "poaching in the public service be discouraged by making it mandatory for employees trained by a given ministry/agency to fully uphold the terms of contractual agreements, civil service laws and civil service transfer procedures".

From interviews conducted with key informants at the middle level of GOL, the opportunities for career growth and development and upward mobility in their ministries/agencies continue to depend more on their personal relationship with the head of the organization than on the CSA procedures. There were not many cases cited by GOL officials interviewed where employees already in the organization advanced to positions of higher responsibilities. Most of these selected for higher positions were recruited from outside the organization. To date, the CSA Division of Records and Research has registered a total of 27,114 civil servants of which 2,194 were processed as transfers and new appointments.

In 1978, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare alone made 122 new appointments and the Ministry of Finance promoted (from within) 18 persons. 27 employees resigned from the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Agriculture dismissed 22 employees. The 1981 records also showed a total of 283 promotions, 119 transfers (from one Ministry to another but in the same class), 1,366 salary changes (it is assumed that this figure is the result of the PRC Decree to increase the salary of the lowest paid GOL employee), 302 dismissals, 764 abandonment/resignation, 29 deaths, 7 demotions and 3 retirements. Other figures gleaned from this report include the processing of 2,421 PANs carrying 7,191 persons; a total of 5,901 positive actions were taken on the PANs, 1,276 negative actions, 314 rejections and 256 provisional appointments

In essence then, some opportunities for career growth exist according to the CSA figures but whether it is all due to the project is debatable.

E. Impact on Women

The Civil Service Development Project provided training at the Masters Degree Level for twenty-three senior staff members of the CSA. Of the twenty-three, two dropped out of the program before acquiring their Masters Degree. Unfortunately, the two dropouts were women; one left her studies to get married, the other fell short of the academic standard required for a Masters Degree and had to be dropped by the University. Out of the remaining twenty-one who completed, seven were females or 33%. Statistics were not available on the number of females who participated in the administrative training conducted by the CSA. However, observations showed that the majority of personnel officers/directors in government Ministries/Agencies were females. At present, the number of female staff at the CSA is or in excess of its male colleagues. The present Director-General, the Director of Selections, the Director of Research and Records and the head of the Testing and Evaluation Unit, are all women. But of these, only one was trained under the project. The other women trained for the project have all moved on to the US except one who is currently in charge of a USAID-funded rural communications program with the Liberian broadcasting system. On the whole, the impact on women in the CSA project was 1% higher than the IPA project. If the two women had not dropped out, it would have been higher. But of course, the impact on men was greater.

F. Other Impact

The project resulted in the following unplanned outputs:

- Special testing for the National Police Force
- Proposal for Insurance for Civil Servants.
- Organization study for the Ministry of Finance's Fiscal and Banking group.
- Recruitment for African Development Bank.
- Analysis of the University of Liberia proposed faculty salary increases.

-Testing for Correctional Officers.

Currently, the CSA is involved in a series of management consultancy efforts and its views are always considered by the Ministries of Planning and Education in matters related to the Program Planning and Teacher's Schools Certification.

5. Lessons Learned

A. Design Lesson

The strategy upon which the Civil Service Development Project was designed, was trustworthy. A short term approach was used to bolster the existing CSA. Key informants felt that this strategy over a longer period of time, could have resulted in a better overall impact of both the CSA and the IPA projects. In other words, develop the CSA first, ensure its smooth operation and then use the same strategy and develop the functions of IPA as part of the CSA or whatever is involved in human resources development utilization.

B. Implementation Lessons

Even though the project was highly supported by President Tolbert Ministries and Agencies heads continued to hire and fire people without going through the proper civil service channels. A lot of political pressure was put on the CSA for exceptions to the regular employment procedures. Most often than not, the merit principle was sacrificed on the alter of politics and favoritism.

The President was a prime mover in that direction. Of course, it became increasingly apparent that for civil service reform to really take effect, a greater and continuous commitment to change was needed at the highest level of government. In fact, it still is and the CSA is breaking its back to continue in this worthwhile effort. The fact that this practice continues today whether on a greater scale or not, is proof enough that reform needs continuous and staunch support from all levels-not only the top.

The contract team noted in its end-of-tour reports that if the new policies, procedures and regulations of the new CSA were applied in the beginning only to new people entering the system, this might have led to greater acceptance and a more successful program. Requiring everyone already in the system to meet "minimun job requirements" before competing for promotions and passing written tests before they can get salary increase, was asking for too much too soon. No consideration was given the old adage "old habits die hard". Next time, it is hoped that this kind of thing will be alleviated or minimized.