


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UNITED STATES
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

THE
INSPECTOR
GENERAL



Regional Inspector General for Audit
NAIROBI

AN ASSESSMENT OF
USAID/TANZANIA'S AGRICULTURE RESEARCH
PROJECT (621-0107)

AUDIT REPORT NO. 3-621-84-01

OCTOBER 27, 1983

AN ASSESSMENT OF
USAID/TANZANIA'S AGRICULTURE RESEARCH
PROJECT (621-0107)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

The Tanzania Agriculture Research Project (No. 621-0107) was authorized in FY 1971. A project paper revision and an amendment to the Project Assistance Completion Date (PACD) extended the project to September 30, 1983. Life-of-project costs were about \$8.5 million while expenditures totalled \$7.4 million as of July 31, 1983.

The purpose of the revised Agriculture Research Project was to increase Tanzania's capacity to determine agriculture research priorities and implement programs, improve crop varieties, produce breeder seed, and recommend suitable cultural practices to farmers.

The initial contractor for the Agriculture Research Project was the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture. The contract period was from November 1, 1976 to October 31, 1979, but was extended to September 30, 1982. On October 31, 1982, a one-year contract was executed with the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center to provide continuity during project transition.

In August 1982 a follow-on project, Farming Systems Research (FSR) (No. 621-0156), was authorized. The FSR project's three-point strategy was to introduce a farming systems approach, maintain continuity in basic food crops commodity research programs, and improve the natural agricultural research management system. AID's total life-of-project costs for FSR are \$8.3 million. As of July 31, 1983, \$3 million had been obligated of which only \$26.8 thousand had been expended. The PACD for FSR is September 30, 1986.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of the audit was to determine whether (a) the Tanzanian Government (TanGov) was effectively and efficiently using AID-provided resources; (b) contractor performance was in compliance with the terms of the contract; (c) applicable laws and regulations were being complied with; (d) the program was meeting its stated goals and objectives; (e) concerned USAID/Tanzania personnel were effective in program monitorship; and (f) the intent of Congress was being followed.

Our review included an examination of project documents and discussions with project officials. We also visited the major food crop research station at Ilonga.

Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

The Agriculture Research Project failed to fully meet most of its stated objectives. The principal reasons for the lack of accomplishment were:

- overly ambitious project design,
- inadequate contractor performance,
- lack of TanGov inputs, and
- absence of aggressive USAID monitorship during the initial phase of the project.

The Agriculture Research Project was plagued with difficulties from the start. These difficulties ranged from a significantly delayed start due to an inability to select a suitable contractor, to a lack of technical assistance and an insufficient number and placement of participants. In our view, the follow-on Farming Systems Research Project has not been implemented on a solid foundation, and its success, therefore, is questionable. Accordingly, we recommended that the lessons learned from the project under review be applied to the FSR, taking into account the TanGov's ability to support the project (pages 2-5).

Other matters requiring management attention are summarized below and detailed in the following sections of this report:

- Improved management was needed over project commodities. We were unable to verify the integrity of about \$2.7 million in expenditures made for commodities (pages 5-7).
- TanGov agreed-to contributions to the project were unknown. We could not determine if \$4.3 million including costs borne on an "in-kind" basis had been provided as required by the grant agreement (pages 7-8).
- The participant training program was not adequately monitored. Also the TanGov provided an insufficient number of long-term participants. Trained personnel were a key component in attaining project objectives to direct and conduct research (pages 8-10).
- Technical assistance disciplines were not provided by contractor. Sufficient basic research skills, on-the-job training and guidance could not be furnished to the Tanzanian staff (page 10).

BACKGROUND

Introduction

Tanzania, the largest country in East Africa, is roughly equal to the area of Texas and New Mexico, and has a population of about 17.5 million. The United Nations has listed Tanzania as a least developed country. The main thrust of AID's development strategy in Tanzania is directed towards increasing food availability throughout Tanzania by (a) increasing agriculture production and (b) improving resource management. The project's development efforts are in close agreement with the agricultural policy of Tanzania.

The Tanzania Agriculture Research Project (No. 621-0107) was authorized in FY 1971 with a life-of-project cost of about \$2.7 million. Because of implementation difficulties in locating a suitable technical assistance contractor and recruiting qualified personnel, project implementation was delayed more than four years. In December 1977, a project revision increased AID's life-of-project total costs to approximately \$8.5 million, and extended the total life-of-project to 12 years (FY 71-82). In August 1981, the Project Assistance Completion Date (PACD) was further extended to September 30, 1983.

The purpose of the Tanzania Agriculture Research Project was to increase the TanGov's capability to (1) determine agriculture research priorities and implement programs; (2) improve crop varieties; (3) produce breeder seed, and (4) recommend suitable agricultural practices to farmers. The 1977 project revision provided for additional technical assistance, long-term training, commodities and other costs, and covered the impact of inflation on the project's elements.

The initial contract for the Agriculture Research Project was signed in October 1976 with the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) based in Ibadan, Nigeria. The original contract period was from November 1, 1976 to October 31, 1979, and the estimated cost was \$2 million. The contract was extended to September 30, 1982 with an extension cost of \$558.6 thousand. The objective of the contract was to provide assistance to the TanGov to strengthen the agricultural research program.

A one-year contract was executed on October 1, 1982 with the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) based in Londres, Mexico. The estimated cost was \$249 thousand. The aim of the contract was a stop-gap measure to provide continuity to on-going maize research and land development activities and to provide the follow-on project (Farming Systems Research)

contractor sufficient time to identify technicians to take over these duties.

A follow-on project, Farming Systems Research (No. 621-0156), was authorized in August 1982 and has a PACD of September 1986. The project's three-point strategy is to: (a) introduce a farming systems approach to redirect research priorities toward farmer-identified production constraints and to improve available research recommendations for increasing production; (b) maintain continuity in the basic food crop commodity research programs (maize, sorghum and grain legumes) while integrating trained Tanzanian scientists into the implementation and direction of the research; and (c) improve the national agricultural research management system by better planning and budgeting procedures and institutionalizing a system of establishing research priorities according to farmers' needs. AID's total life-of-project costs for Farming Systems Research are \$8.3 million.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of the audit was to determine whether (a) the TanGov was effectively and efficiently using AID-provided resources; (b) contractor performance was in accord with the terms of the contract; (c) applicable laws and regulations were complied with; (d) the program was meeting its stated goals and objectives; (e) concerned USAID/Tanzania personnel were effective in program monitorship; and (f) the intent of Congress was being followed.

Our review included an examination of project documents, discussions with USAID/Tanzania officials, and conferences with concerned TanGov and contractor personnel. We also visited the major food crop research station at Ilonga.

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Agriculture Research Project Failed To Fully Meet Most of Its Stated Objectives and the Lessons Learned Should be Applied to the Follow-On Project

The Agriculture Research Project failed to meet most of its objectives by the PACD of September 30, 1983. Thus, lessons learned from the Agriculture Research Project should be applied to the follow-on Farming Systems Research Project to improve its chances for success.

The Agriculture Research Project Grant Agreement stated that the purpose of the project was "to develop the capacity to plan, organize and administer an agricultural research system

for maize, sorghum, millet and food legumes." To achieve this purpose, eleven interrelated activities were to be accomplished. Each activity and its status are summarized in Exhibit 1.

The principle reasons for less than full accomplishment of objectives were (a) an overly ambitious project design; (b) poor contractor performance; (c) reluctance or inability of the TanGov to plan, internally support, and implement national agricultural activities; and (d) a less than aggressive USAID/Tanzania monitorship of the project during the initial phase of implementation.

The first reason was caused, in our opinion, by unrealistic assumptions. For example, the revised project paper stated:

"The project is under implementation with no particular problems foreseen in the future" and "Financing of activities should pose no particular problem for the TanGov."

Worldwide inflation since 1975 was widely known (at the time of project paper preparation) to have increased the cost of supplies and equipment for research, and when combined with a chronic shortage of foreign exchange posed serious challenges to Tanzania.

The second reason for a less than full project accomplishment was inadequate contractor (IITA) performance. The most significant shortcomings in this area were the absence of technical assistance in the most critical discipline, and an unbalanced research effort on cowpeas which represented the majority of the contractor prepared publications.

The third reason was the TanGov's failure to provide the agreed-to inputs. The TanGov was either unable or reluctant to provide either the required number of qualified participants in a timely manner, or the recurring budgetary support.

Finally, USAID/Tanzania's less than aggressive monitorship during the initial phase of the revised project's implementation contributed to the project's marginal performance. We found little evidence of Mission activity to resolve the many serious problems being experienced by the project. An April 1981 combined AID and Contractor prepared Project Evaluation Summary (PES) went so far as to state:

"The USAID and Ministry of Agriculture should assume a greater support/monitoring role in the implementation of the program. This will minimize operational difficulties and promote mutual trust."

The USAID has since improved its monitoring performance. During the past two years there had been a high level of mission involvement with the Tanzania Agriculture Research Organization (TARO)^{1/} and other elements of the TanGov to resolve problems and to support and monitor implementation.

A follow-on project, Farming Systems Research (FSR), was started in FY 1982, at which time \$3 million was obligated. We believe that the lessons learned from the Agriculture Research Project should be applied to the FSR project because of the marginal track record of the 12-year old Agriculture Research Project and the similarity of some project goals. Our limited review of selected FSR project targets showed that a number of them were already several months behind schedule.

TanGov officials told us that, in their view, FSR should be re-designed into station development, to create knowledge, followed then by a project specifically designed to use that knowledge. Further, the contractor's chief of party told us that he doubted whether even 50 percent of the FSR's stated project objectives would be obtained due to staff shortages.

The Agriculture Research Project's achievements since 1971 have been less than satisfactory. USAID/Tanzania officials expressed confidence that many of the unfinished tasks would be reached before the revised PACD of September 30, 1983. We do not agree and a post audit follow-up supported our view.

Conclusion, USAID/Tanzania Response, RIG/A/N Comments and Recommendation

The recently implemented FSR project is behind schedule, and is being built on a less than solid base. We believe that the FSR project should use the lessons learned from the Agriculture Research Project to enhance its implementation. The application of lessons learned should also take into consideration the TanGov's ability to support the project.

In response to our draft report USAID/Tanzania stated that they did not believe that our finding fully reflected the contractor's views or those of the TanGov. They felt the comments were taken out of context. The USAID did agree, however, that unless the current funding situation is resolved, the FSR objectives cannot be obtained. USAID/Tanzania also pointed out that the FSR project paper identified problems encountered on the Agriculture Research Project and discusses how the FSR plans to deal with those problems.

^{1/} TARO is a recently created national research authority which coordinates and directs the various agricultural research programs.

RIG/A/Comments

We agree that the FSR project paper addresses problems encountered on the Agriculture Research Project. However, we strongly believe that particular emphasis should be placed on lessons learned from the Agriculture Research Project because as stated earlier, our limited review of selected FSR project targets showed that a number of these targets were already several months behind schedule. To illustrate the point: Several long term training participants have not been processed for training nor has a team leader and eight long term technicians arrived in country. These same failings surfaced during the audit of the Agriculture Research Project and are discussed later in this report. If lessons learned from the project under review had been considered in the implementation of FSR then the same problems would probably not have reoccurred. We also believe that, since only two of 11 planned activities were fully accomplished by the Agriculture Research Project, a special effort should be made to ensure that these mistakes are not repeated on the follow-on project. Accordingly, we have revised the recommendation contained in our draft report to specifically detail actions which we think should be taken to enhance implementation of the FSR project.

Recommendation No. 1

USAID/Tanzania apply the lessons learned from the Agriculture Research project to the Farming Systems Research Project, taking into consideration the TanGov's ability to support the project. Specifically, USAID/Tanzania (a) obtain a firm assurance from the TanGov that it (i) will provide the required number of qualified participants for the FSR project in a timely manner and (ii) will provide adequate budget support; and (b) insure that the contractor provides the required disciplines of technical assistance in a timely manner.

Improved Management Was Needed Over Project Commodities

There was no management control system in place to account for project commodities. Also, storage practices over AID-financed commodities needed improvement.

As of May 31, 1983, AID had earmarked \$2.5 million to the Agriculture Research Project for commodities. The commodities

consisted of station machinery development, irrigation, workshop tools, general equipment and spare parts. The contract also contained a commodity component in the amount of \$210,000.

Prior to our arrival at the main research station at Ilonga, no physical inventory of commodities had been taken since 1980. But one was undertaken during our visit and was subsequently completed. Project files contained no supporting documentation such as receiving reports. Accordingly, although the physical inventory had been taken, there was no book inventory with which to compare it. Thus, we were unable to verify the integrity of about \$2.7 million in expenditures for commodities. USAID/Tanzania officials told us that there was no mission policy regarding the taking of inventories.

The grant agreement stated that the contractor (IITA) would be responsible for inventory and recordkeeping of all AID-funded commodities. However, this responsibility was not included in the contract.

A prior audit report^{1/} noted that a book inventory of farm and laboratory equipment did not exist at the site (Ilonga) and that it was not possible to verify the project's inventory practices. The similarity of adverse conditions pertaining to commodities at that time as well as during this review indicated the need for improved management over commodities by all concerned.

Some equipment stored outside was showing signs of rust. Unless preventive measures are employed the useful life of AID financed equipment will be shortened. USAID/Tanzania officials stated that oil was recommended as a rust preventive for equipment when open storage was used. We agree with the USAID that a light coat of oil would deter rust.

Conclusion and Recommendations

A system for inventory control needs to be established and project commodities need to be accounted for. USAID/Tanzania should assure that AID provided commodities are properly stored and protected from the effects of the elements.

Recommendation No. 2

USAID/Tanzania assist TARO to (1) establish an inventory control system, and (2) account for project commodities.

^{1/} A.R. No. 3-621-80-07, Review of the AID Program in Tanzania, dated February 8, 1980.

Recommendation No. 3

USAID/Tanzania ensure that AID-provided commodities are adequately stored and protected from the elements.

TanGov Agreed-To Contributions To Project Were Unknown

USAID/Tanzania did not know with any precision the value of the TanGov agreed-to contributions to the project. Host government contributions to the project were not documented. This same issue applied to the FSR project.

The grant agreement specified that the TanGov provide resources not less than the equivalent of \$4.3 million including costs borne on an "in-kind" basis. USAID/Tanzania officials stated that they believed that the TanGov had met the requirements especially when taking into consideration land, buildings (in-kind) and contributions generated from the sale of PL 480 Title I commodities. USAID/Tanzania officials also stated that the contractor submitted informal reports containing these data. We were unable to locate any documentary proof from any source to support the USAID's claim that the TanGov had made the agreed-to contributions.

The TanGov's difficulty in providing its required inputs is well known. To illustrate: An April 1981 Project Evaluation Summary stated:

"...Tanzanian Government contributions to maize research have increased annually, but the total research effort at Ilonga and other substations has not been sufficiently supported from the budget."

Further, a contractor mid-year report dated in June 1982 stated the following regarding the lack of TanGov support:

"...problem areas were 1) insufficient funds for research and budget definition; 2) lack of sufficient data processing equipment; and 3) lack of irrigated land to assure reliable breeding programs."

The grant agreement also included a provision whereby the TanGov would contribute to a Trust Account a sum of Tanzanian Shillings 21,600 per year for each fully funded AID technician. The Trust Account was to be used to support development projects in Tanzania. We found that the TanGov's payments to the trust fund were delinquent in the local currency equivalent of \$15,063. USAID/Tanzania had sent six follow-up letters requesting payment to the TanGov. These letters went unanswered.

Conclusion and Recommendation

TanGov contributions to the project could not be determined with any precision. The host government should be required to support its inputs to the project and such inputs should be documented. USAID/Tanzania should work with the TanGov to develop an acceptable report format, establish due dates for the reports and to accurately document and verify the contributions.

Recommendation No. 4

USAID/Tanzania, establish procedures to monitor the agreed-to TanGov contributions to the FSR project.

Participant Training Files Were Incomplete

Participant training files were incomplete and did not contain sufficient data to depict what progress students attending universities were making. The absence of these data did not permit adequate monitorship of courses taken and planned, problems encountered, academic achievements, and possible program extensions. Accordingly, corrective action, if required, could not be initiated on a timely basis.

The Academic Enrollment and Term Report Form AID 1380-69, (Term Report), is the vehicle used to provide information on students. The form is submitted by participants at the end of each school term. Comments are to be made by the participant, the participant's advisor, AID/W (S&T/IT), and possibly the contractor before being sent to the USAID for its use.

We reviewed contractor maintained files for 13 participants. There were no files for four participants and no AID Form 1380-69 in seven other participant files. The two remaining files had three and two Term Reports, respectively. Contractor personnel were unable to explain the whereabouts of the missing files or why the training folders were not maintained properly.

We also reviewed the USAID's files for four participants in training. Three of these files had no Forms AID 1380-69 and one file had only two reports covering training since December 1980. USAID/Tanzania officials stated that monitoring and follow-up was the contractor's job. We disagree. Handbook 10 in the section on Monitoring Training Programs and Follow-up specifies:

"The Mission Training Office receives periodic progress reports about the Participants..., evaluates them,... maintains accurate and complete records and statistics on its Participants."

Conclusion and Recommendation

The revised Agriculture Research Project Paper provides \$1.5 million for long-term training which reflects a sizeable amount of USAID/Tanzania total project costs. We believe that the long-term participant training program is an important factor in the accomplishment of project objectives. USAID/Tanzania and contractor monitorship of participants' academic progress provides an opportunity to track the success of those participants and, when required, to initiate corrective action.

Recommendation No. 5

USAID/Tanzania develop and implement a procedure to ensure the receipt and use of the Academic Enrollment and Term Report for all long-term participants.

TanGov Provided an Insufficient Number of Long-Term Participants

The TanGov provided only about one-half the number of long-term participants which were to receive training. This shortfall impacted negatively on the project by denying the proper skill levels and disciplines with which to direct and conduct research.

The project agreement specifically provided for 67 participants to be trained to receive a Bachelor, Master, or Doctorate degree. AID provided a total of \$1.5 million for this training.

We found that at the time of our audit 23 participants had returned from long term training. Seventeen of these returnees were actively engaged in project activity. Six have left the project. An additional 13 participants were still in training. Thus, only 36 of the 67 planned participants will receive long term training. The successful candidates were to be utilized to direct the research. The following table shows the impact by skill level:

<u>Degree Proposed</u>	<u>SKILL LEVEL</u>	
	<u>Number of Participants Planned</u>	<u>Actual*</u>
Ph.D	10	4
M.S.	46	16
B.S.	<u>11</u>	<u>16</u>
Totals	<u>67</u>	<u>36</u>

*Returned plus In Training

The grant agreement commented on the lack of university graduates which had contributed to the lack of trained personnel available for research. USAID/Tanzania officials stated that some delays were due to the unacceptability of participants' credentials by U.S. universities.

Conclusion

The project did not reach its stated objective to provide trained staff largely because the TanGov had not provided the required number of qualified participants. As a result, even though there are more trained people available, there remains an insufficient number of trained Tanzanians able to operate an effective food crop research program. We believe that this failure to meet the training objective to be an important lesson learned which should be considered in the implementation of the FSR project. We make no recommendation for corrective action since we addressed this matter in Recommendation No. 1 of this report.

Technical Assistance Disciplines Were Not Provided By Contractor

The contractor failed to provide the level of effort required in the disciplines stipulated in the contract. As a result, the project's technical staff could not furnish sufficient basic research skills, on-the-job training and guidance to the Tanzanian staff.

The Agriculture Research Project sought to provide timely technical assistance which, when implemented, would provide technical information to enable Tanzanian officials to formulate policy decisions regarding a national research program.

A listing of technician staffing comparisons is presented in Exhibit 2. Our analysis shows that no sorghum agronomist had been assigned, nor had anyone been assigned in the area of Information and Training. The 1981 Project Evaluation Summary stated that the contractor could not recruit the required expatriate personnel for the sorghum and millet, and agricultural economics sections at the early stages of the project.

Conclusion

The contractor failed to provide the required disciplines of technical assistance which impacted negatively on project implementation. USAID/Tanzania should ensure all required disciplines of technical assistance are brought on board in a timely manner. Nothing can be done to correct this problem for the Agriculture Research Project but the lessons learned could be very useful in the implementation of the FSR project. We have addressed this matter in an earlier section of this report. Corrective action is contained in Recommendation No. 1 of this report.

EXHIBIT 1

AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PROJECT

ACTIVITIES AND STATUS

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Status</u>
1. Fully developed research station and substations including appropriate equipment and facilities to permit quality food crop research programs to be carried out.	Irrigation system was not installed, research facilities were incomplete, and all equipment had not been received. A problem with spare parts and repairs caused some equipment to remain inoperable.
2. Plans, budgets, administrative and management techniques and coordination procedures developed to permit effective management, administration and coordination of the food crops research system.	Committee not fully established and there were internal conflicts between parastatals. More trained personnel were needed. The Farming Systems Research project will aid in the accomplishment of this activity.
3. For each of the four ecological zones at least one new, highly yielding variety of maize developed and tested and two local varieties improved.	Variety development and testing was occurring in three zones but not in the fourth.
4. For the major sorghum/millet areas of Tanzania at least one new, high yielding variety of both sorghum and millet developed and tested, and two local varieties of each improved. This will include short-term varieties for seasons of delayed rainfall.	Twenty-five village trials were conducted in crop year 1982-83 and one variety was released in 1983.
5. For three ecological zones at least one new variety of food legumes developed and tested and two local varieties improved.	Accomplished

6. A package of practices available for use for each recommended variety of each food crop being researched.

Legume package was published, and a package for maize recently completed. No packages for sorghums/milletts were available.

7. Trained Tanzanians capable of managing and conducting food crop research which will continue to maximize production.

Thirteen participants still in training.

8. An in-service training program in both research and extension developed and in use.

First workshop conducted in May and another in July 1983 but neither research nor extension has training program developed.

9. Established/reinforced linkages to appropriate national institutions, regional/international research institutes and foreign universities.

A similar activity was included in Farming Systems Research Project.

Shifting responsibility for this activity among several TanGov offices resulted in little being accomplished.

10. Improved linkages to seed multiplication farms involving continuous contact and the provision of sufficient breeder seed to meet seed farm demands.

Accomplished. Farms were capable of producing more seeds than the country needs, although a problem in anticipating needed seed quantities existed.

11. A feedback system from farmers and villages through an annual program of village trials covering both varieties and agronomic practices.

An informal system existed. The need for such a system is a major reason for the Farming Systems Research Project.

EXHIBIT 2

AGRICULTURE RESEARCH PROJECT

TECHNICAL STAFFING

<u>Technical Position</u>	<u>Person - Months</u>	
	<u>Planned</u>	<u>Actual</u>
Project Coordinator	72	72
Maize Agronomist	48	60
Maize Breeder	60	60
Legume Agronomist	48	58
Legume Breeder	48	48
Sorghum Agronomist	69	0
Sorghum Breeder	72	32
Production Economist	36	26
Information/Training	24	0
Technical Specialist	<u>0</u>	<u>30</u>
Total	<u>477</u>	<u>386</u>

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

	<u>Page</u>
<u>Recommendation No. 1</u>	5
USAID/Tanzania apply the lessons learned from the Agriculture Research project to the Farming Systems Research Project, taking into consideration the TanGov's ability to support the project. Specifically, USAID/Tanzania (a) obtain a firm assurance from the TanGov that it (i) will provide the required number of qualified participants for the FSR project in a timely manner and (ii) will provide adequate budget support; and (b) insure that the contractor provides the required disciplines of technical assistance in a timely manner.	
<u>Recommendation No. 2</u>	6
USAID/Tanzania assist TARO to (1) establish an inventory control system, and (2) account for project commodities.	
<u>Recommendation No. 3</u>	7
USAID/Tanzania ensure that AID--provided commodities are adequately stored and protected from the elements.	
<u>Recommendation No. 4</u>	8
USAID/Tanzania, establish procedures to monitor the agreed-to TanGov contributions to the FSR project.	
<u>Recommendation No. 5</u>	9
USAID/Tanzania develop and implement a procedure to ensure the receipt and use of the Academic Enrollment and Term Report for all long-term participants.	

APPENDIX B

LIST OF REPORT RECIPIENTS

	<u>No. of Copies</u>
<u>Field Offices:</u>	
USAID/Tanzania	5
REDSO/ESA	2
<u>AID/Washington:</u>	
AA/M	1
AA/AFR	5
AA/PPC	1
LEG	1
GC	1
IG	1
OPA	1
AFR/EA	2
PPC/PDPR	2
FM/ASD	2
PPC/E	1
S&T/DIU	4
S&T/IT	1