

MANAGEMENT REVIEW

OF

PL 480 - TITLE II

LAOS

by

The Operations Appraisal Staff  
of the  
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## A. Introduction and Scope

The PL 480, Title II program in Laos contains both a government-to-government program and a Voluntary Agencies (VolAg) program. Almost all recipients of the government-to-government program and half of the recipients of the VolAg program are refugees.

The first large feeding program in Laos came in January, 1961, when A.I.D. undertook to feed those left destitute after the December 1960 battle. In January, 1961, the first Meo and other tribal refugees began to arrive in Vientiane. The hill people have been on the move ever since. As recently as June of this year, 13,000 people moved into the Pakse area after the enemy attacked and took Paksong 50 kilometers to the east.

Over the years, it is estimated that 750,000\* refugees have been aided in one way or another. Today, some 250,000 refugees are receiving aid, ranging from marginal food supplements to almost total dependence on aid-provided food.

The primary food in the diet of the Lao people is glutinous (sticky) rice while that of the hill tribes is nonglutinous hill rice and corn. The logistics of feeding large numbers of refugees dictated the same ration for both the Lao and the hill tribes, i.e., glutinous rice supplemented by canned meat (mainly water buffalo). Both of these commodities are procured in Thailand with some rice purchased in Laos.

In 1969, USAID/Laos made a policy decision to introduce PL 480, Title II commodities in the Laos refugee feeding program in lieu of a portion of the locally procured rice and meat. It was felt such substitution (amounting to 20% in caloric and 30% in protein supplement terms) would serve two purposes: better nutrition and a reduction in dollar drain. This policy change meant sharply increased requirements for Title II commodities reflected in the government-to-government Transfer Authorization (TA-0606 (June, 1970)), and in the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) Annual Estimate of Requirements (AER) for 1971. By June, 1971, the expanded Title II program for feeding refugees was being initiated in most of the refugee areas.

Prior to traveling to Bangkok and Vientiane, our team conferred with Food for Peace and East Asia officers in Washington and reviewed all recent reports on the A.I.D. program in Laos. Our team then reviewed the operations of the USAID/Laos Transportation Office in Bangkok, Thailand, where the Title II commodities arrive from the United States. We spent 24 days in Laos, departing on July 11. We visited all the major areas of

\* There is considerable double counting in this figure. Some hill tribesmen have had to move three times, and each time they are counted as a new refugee.

Laos which are open to the A.I.D. program: Ban Houei Sai, Savannakhet, Pakse, the Vientiane Plaine, and site 272, distribution point for the tribal people still in the mountains surrounding the Plaines des Jarres. We had extensive conversations in Vientiane with Government of Laos officials, resident Americans, and American voluntary agency representatives.

We discussed our major findings with senior officers of USAID/Laos and CRS before leaving Vientiane. Since our return, we have made further studies of the material gathered during our stay in Laos and talked to officials in AID/W.

#### B. Policy Considerations

In our review of Title II activity in Laos, two issues of a policy character presented themselves. The first concerns the validity of the use of Title II commodities in the refugee feeding programs in Laos in lieu of the former exclusive distribution of glutinous rice and canned meat, both of which are indigenous to the region. The second issue involves the desirability of and prospects for a more rapid transference of administrative responsibility for the refugee feeding program to the Government of Laos (RLG).

In the first issue, the advantages of limiting the refugee feeding programs, which should under virtually all assumptions be considered temporary, to traditional and regionally indigenous foods, are numerous. When ocean freight and Thai transit costs are included, the cost ratio between Title II and traditional foods is approximately three to one; the local foods, when purchased in Thailand, are delivered to the Laos border, requiring minimal RLG and USAID overhead costs; local foods are available at short notice and procurement can be promptly responsive to changes in need; they are the traditional foods and create no new demands and/or adaptation problems; the transition from dependent to self-reliant status can be effected much more readily; and procurement in Thailand creates a favorable response in that country while minimizing the adverse reaction when that procurement is curtailed. Lastly, assuming that the problems associated with ocean shipments and transshipments in Thailand would be reduced to those goods consigned to VolAgs, the difficulties encountered, e.g., losses, broken containers, etc., would be sharply lessened. Nutritional consideration provides the only substantive justification for the Title II commodities. This factor is important for maternal-child health (MCH) and school feeding VolAg programs which will probably continue for the indefinite future, but of much less importance in temporary refugee feeding. A strong case indeed can be made for limiting Title II deliveries and use to continuing VolAg activities serving institutional needs.

With respect to the second point cited above, two interdependent targets can be expected to gain importance in the coming months: first, the curtailment of overall USAID direct-hire American staff, and the transference, wherever and whenever possible, of administrative responsibility to the RLG for operations within its span of competence. The team believes the refugee program holds considerable promise for serving both these targets. Certain facets of the refugee program such as the airborne operations will require a major U.S. role so long as such operations are necessary. But the virtually exclusive USAID role in the management of the program could, we believe, be gradually reduced over time with a corresponding advancement of overall U.S. objectives in the country.

The team strongly suggests that both of these issues--interrelated as they are--be given fresh consideration by AID/W and the USAID/Laos.

### C. Major Findings

1. Except for problems associated with ocean shipment, port clearances and transshipments in Thailand, the Title II operations in Laos--an integral part of the refugee support program--are "clean" in the sense that they are free of any signs of diversions, wastage, or other significant losses. Recipients qualify under the eligibility rules set forth in A.I.D. Regulation No. 11 and applicable Manual Orders. While opportunities for improvement exist as discussed in this report, the USAID in Laos is deserving of high marks for its administration of this important activity.
2. The administration of the government-to-government component of the Title II program in Laos is almost entirely a U.S. staffed and managed effort. While this undoubtedly contributes to the absence of problems encountered elsewhere it perpetuates a need for U.S. direct-hire personnel well beyond that necessary if management were gradually transferred to RLG authorities. The team believes some steps could be taken in this direction even under existing circumstances.
3. In recent months, USAID/Laos had adopted a policy of substituting Title II food for part of the refugee ration of glutinous rice and canned meat purchased in Thailand. The previous policy was relatively easy to implement: each refugee received 15 kilos of glutinous rice and a canned meat supplement every month. The substitution policy, so long as it is in effect, is more complex in its implementation and creates the need for the issuance and dissemination

of clear and uniform instructions to field personnel, both U.S. and RLG, who are responsible for or participate in the administration of the distribution effort. Such instructions are currently lacking.

4. Port clearances and transshipments in Thailand create a major problem for the Laos program. Cumbersome and time-consuming customs procedures and other difficulties were reported to sometimes cause lags of months between the arrival of Title II commodities in Thailand and their subsequent arrival in Laos. Breakage and/or spoilage are the inevitable consequences of these delays. The team gathered that political considerations militated against proposed requests to Thai authorities for more expeditious handling of these transiting goods.
5. The Voluntary Agency activity in Laos, made up almost exclusively of the CRS, has recently expanded its operations--normally limited to institutional feeding--to include the refugee feeding services on the Vientiane Plaine. The CRS program is skillfully and efficiently operated.

D. Recommendations

This report recommends:

1. That AID/W and the USAID/Laos revise the recently adopted plan to introduce Title II foods in all refugee and other feeding programs in Laos by limiting such commodities to wheat flour for the noodle factory and to Voluntary Agency institutional feeding.
2. That the USAID/Laos explore and exploit all opportunities to transfer to RLG authorities the administrative responsibilities for refugee feeding programs, whether using Title II commodities in whole or in part.
3. That the USAID/Laos prepare, in consultation with the RLG, a schedule of operating instructions to all U.S. personnel engaged in refugee feeding operations providing guidance in matters of frequency of distributions, size of rations, reports, and other matters bearing on the efficient conduct of the program. Such instructions should be concurred in by the RLG and be also used by RLG personnel associated with the program.
4. That USAID/Laos should provide more frequent communication with, and more complete guidance to, field personnel not only through written instructions but by regular field visits of the USAID/FFP officer to Area Coordinators and their staffs.

5. That the USAID and Embassy in Laos solicit the support of the Embassy in Bangkok in the effort to gain Thai agreement on a new procedure for the expeditious handling of Title II goods transshipping Thailand en route to Laos.

E. The Government-to-Government Program

1. Description

a. Magnitude

The PL 480, Title II program in Laos (government-to-government) is an integral part of the refugee feeding activity in that country and must be considered in that context. Prior to the issuance of TA-0606 in May of 1970, Title II distributions in Laos had been limited to relatively modest tonnages of cornmeal, bulgur, and vegetable oil. Tonnages of these items distributed in FY 68, for example, had been 900, 740, and 130 tons, respectively. In FY 69 distribution figures show 3,600, 300, and 70 tons for the same commodities. These amounts were divided between refugee feeding and various special requirements, e.g., a burned out village. Prior to the expanded Title II deliveries, all major supplies for refugee feeding were made up of glutinous rice and canned meat purchased in Thailand with Supporting Assistance (SA) funds.

With the USAID decision in CY 69 to introduce Title II commodities in lieu of a portion of the rice and meat (a 20% substitution of caloric and 30% of protein inputs) the TA negotiated in May of 1970 increased total Title II tonnages from 3,970 tons in FY 69 to 8,456 tons in FY 70. The expanded list included wheat flour, non-fat dried milk (NFDM), wheat-soya blend (WSB), and corn-soya-milk (CSM). In addition to these foodstuffs, 1968, 1969, and 1970 saw distribution of cotton cloth under Title II of 385,000, 200,000, and 518,000 square meters, respectively. This was provided for refugee clothing. Table I gives this data in tabular form.

TABLE I

Government-to-Government Program  
PL 480 Commodities

<u>Commodity</u>	(Metric Tons)		
	<u>1968</u> <sup>4/</sup>	<u>1969</u> <sup>5/</sup>	<u>1970</u> <sup>6/</sup>
Cornmeal	900	3,600	2,500
Wheat Flour	--	--	4,000
Bulgur	740	300	400
NFDM <u>1/</u>	--	--	360
WSB <u>2/</u>	--	--	328
CSM <u>3/</u>	--	--	328
Vegetable Oil	<u>130</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>540</u>
 Total (metric tons)	 1,770	 3,970	 8,456
 Cotton Bales	 --	 --	 179 <sup>7/</sup>
Cotton Cloth (meters)	385,000 <sup>7/</sup>	200,000 <sup>8/</sup>	517,920
 <u>1/</u> NFDM - Non-Fat Dried Milk			
<u>2/</u> WSB - Wheat Soya Blend			
<u>3/</u> CSM - Corn Soya Milk			
<u>4/</u> TA-8604, October 19, 1967			
<u>5/</u> TA-8604 (Amendment No. 1), March 22, 1968			
<u>6/</u> TA-0606, May 27, 1970			
<u>7/</u> TA-8603 - August 17, 1967			
<u>8/</u> TA-9605 - February 26, 1969			
<u>9/</u> TA-1607 - June 30, 1970			

b. The Ration

In recent years, the refugee ration in Laos has been 15 kilograms of glutinous rice a month with a supplement of some tins of canned meat. The decision in 1969 to substitute Title II foods for 20 percent of the calories and 30 percent of the protein was not initiated until late summer of 1970. Full implementation had not been accomplished at the time of the AG/OAS review in June, 1971. The Mission has worked out theoretical substitution rates for Title II commodities vis-a-vis Thai glutinous rice and canned buffalo meat. But, in practice, the calculations of the nutritionists are subject to the judgement of the Area Coordinator, availability of supplies, and transportation.

c. The Cotton Program

TA-1607 provides that Title II will provide Laos with 518 thousand meters of cotton cloth for refugee clothing. The ration has been three meters of cloth for each adult. The Ministry of Social Welfare (MSW) has established a cut-and-sew operation at Ban Houei Sai and is in the process of establishing one at Thakhek.

The AG/OAS team reviewed the operation at Ban Houei Sai where the MSW provides the work area and daily supervision of the project. The area refugee coordinator and area community development advisor monitor the project. The refugee coordinator also provides logistical support, i.e., replacement parts for sewing machines, etc. The cloth is stored at the USAID Supply Management Branch (SMB) warehouse and SMB maintains receipt and withdrawal records on all cloth movement.

All work is performed in the MSW-provided building. Currently three cutters and fifteen sewers are employed. An average day will have twelve sewers on hand each producing an average of five suits per sewer.

USAID furnishes eight sewing machines and, in addition, there were nine individually/privately owned machines on hand.

d. Warehouses

Warehouse space is limited and the implementation of the new policy introducing increased amounts of Title II goods requires that a survey be made of all field warehouses to determine whether they are adequate. In Savannakhet there are both an SMB warehouse and an Office of Refugee Affairs (ORA) warehouse, each of which issues PL 480 commodities. To consolidate effort and standardize procedures, the ORA warehouse should be placed under the jurisdiction of the SMB. The former, in its present condition, is not suitable for the storage of any PL 480 food, other than cooking oil.

e. USAID/Laos in Bangkok

USAID/Laos has established a transportation (TRP) office in Bangkok to arrange for the shipment of Title II commodities into Laos after customs clearance. This office maintains movement records only and has no responsibility for the commodities. Physical control of the commodities is in the hands of the Thai port

authorities while in Bangkok, with trucking contractors (Express Transportation Organization) from Bangkok to the Laotian port of entry, with Lao port authorities in Thanaleng, and with trucking contractors (Lao Transport Association) from port of entry to the first USAID destination.

Accountability for unissued commodities under this PL 480 program rests with the SMB, but SMB might not have physical access to the goods for several months from the time they reach Bangkok. As a result, shipments lose identity making physical reconciliation difficult and because first-in first-out procedures are not strictly observed, infestation and spoilage are frequent.

Because Thai officials require the number of units removed from customs to be equal to the number that arrived in port, TRP arranged for the movement to Laos of this same number. This has resulted in the shipment of broken cans of cooking oil, spoiled commodities, and empty bags.

f. In-Laos Logistics

Under the provisions of TA-0606, the USAID is authorized to provide transportation of Title II commodities within Laos. In addition to transport costs, the following charges are paid by the USAID Controller out of the Special Account (Section 609 of the Foreign Assistance Act):

- (1) Demurrage charges for storage of commodities at Laotian port of entry.
- (2) Storage at Warehouse KM-14 and Warehouse 9.
- (3) Cost of rebagging cornmeal.
- (4) Cost of processing flour and NFDM into noodles.
- (5) Cost of producing clothes from cotton cloth.

Note: While the RLG has legal title to the funds in the Special Account, the USAID Controller, by agreement with the RLG, makes all disbursements from the Account.

## 2. Team Comments and Recommendations

### a. Use of Title II Foods in Refugee Feeding

The team discusses under Section B, above, entitled "Policy Considerations," the case for limiting Title II foodstuffs to wheat flour for the noodle factory and other foods to the Voluntary Agency program. We re-iterate here our belief that attempts to introduce these Title II foods into the refugee feeding program in lieu of regionally indigenous sticky rice and canned meat is both excessively costly and, given its temporary character, nutritionally unjustified. Once the fighting stops, it is to be expected that present refugees will either return to their original home areas or resettle permanently in new locations. In either case, they will soon resort to locally-produced traditional foods.

The team attempted to make some analysis of comparative costs involved in the substitution plan being carried out in Laos. It found that the price of glutinous rice in Thailand is currently at one of its lowest levels in recent years. The last USAID/Laos purchase was at approximately \$68.00 a ton delivered to the Thailand border or approximately 7 cents per kilo. In previous years, the price has been as high as \$150 per metric ton. The Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS) price in the United States for the Title II commodities is more than that of the glutinous rice, e.g., wheat flour, \$103; bulgur, \$101; WSB, \$189. The total FAS value of TA-0606 is stated as \$1.37 million, but ocean freight adds \$0.5 million, and that from Bangkok to Laos, another \$0.25 million. The average delivered price of a kilo of Title II commodities is, therefore, approximately three times the current price of a kilo of glutinous rice.

In the light of this cost analysis plus the assumed temporary period for the refugee feeding program, it is hard to find any realistic basis, either economic or political, for the import of costly U.S. foods for this refugee operation.

On the other hand, assuming, as we do, that the VolAgs may very well continue their institutional feeding program into the indefinite future, the prospects for long-term operation and meaningful social benefit are excellent. Under these circumstances, we believe the VolAg use of nutrient-concentrated foods is warranted.

Recommendation No. 1: That AID/W and the USAID/Laos revise the recently adopted plan to introduce Title II foods into all refugee and other feeding programs in Laos by limiting such commodities to wheat flour for the noodle factory and to Voluntary Agency institutional feeding.

b. Preponderance of American Program Management

The refugee feeding programs in Laos, of which the Title II operations are a part, is virtually a wholly U.S.-administered operation. Given the wide range of functions performed by USAID personnel in connection with one aspect or another of the refugee problem, it is almost impossible to make any kind of an exact determination of the U.S. man-years engaged in refugee feeding activity. But a rough estimate of U.S. direct-hire personnel primarily occupied in refugee feeding seems to indicate an extraordinarily high personnel cost--a cost which could be significantly reduced by the assumption by RLG of an increasing share of work now being done by Americans.

It is probably true, as suggested elsewhere in this report, that the absence of serious abuses in the program may be traceable, at least in part, to its almost complete American administration. But the team believes there is an excessive allocation of U.S. direct-hire manpower to the program and this could and should be reduced without risking serious administrative deterioration. To the extent the first recommendation made above was implemented, the ability of the RLG to assume a greater share of overall administration would be further increased.

Recommendation No. 2: That the USAID/Laos explore and exploit all opportunities to transfer to RLG authorities the administrative responsibilities for refugee feeding programs, whether using Title II commodities in whole or in part.

c. The Need for Standard Field Instructions

Prior to the introduction of Title II commodities into the refugee feeding program in Laos, the absence of written instructions for both the U.S. and the RLG program staffs, while hurtful, was not critical. The greater complexity which the Title II commodities introduced makes standard, written, and fully distributed instructions essential for efficient operations.

Discussion with USAID field staff indicated the consequences of this lack of standard instructions. Some of the Area Coordinators (ACs) said they had heard of the new policy for substituting Title II foods for rice and canned meat, but they did not know how to apply it. In one case, the AC did not know there was such a policy.

USAID/Laos has published a "Mission Order" (June 21, 1971) which gives a brief description of the purposes of PL 480, Title II and the responsibilities of various Mission officers under the law. The "Order" ends with an exhortation that all Mission officers "study carefully" the 1570-1571 series of the A.I.D. Manual Orders. Questioning in the field did not reveal any familiarity on the part of field officers with these two Manual Order series. In any event, M.O. 1571 is an extremely complex series, a great deal of which does not apply to the program in Laos, and it is doubtful that any great gain would result from sending copies to the ACs and their Title II officer.

This problem is only underscored by the wide differences in the distribution of edible oil in the various provinces. In one region, edible oil is being distributed at the rate of one can to every 50 persons but only if they are distant from a market and have recently moved into their current village. In another region, each family of more than five received a can of edible oil monthly with smaller families dividing a can between two families. In still another province, the officer-in-charge of Title II commodities was waiting for instructions before issuing oil.

Variation was also noted in the number of kilograms issued in the case of "disasters." In the "rat invasion," originally the ration was eight kilograms (four of cornmeal and four of bulgur); it was later decreased to six kilograms on the basis that the people "did not need that much." In the case of the burned village, the ration was eight kilograms. In both cases, the size of the ration was determined in the field but was orally discussed with and approved by Vientiane.

The above examples make it clear that there is a need for written instructions tailored to the needs of the Laos program. The Lao society is an oral one, but this does not mean that American instructions should be almost totally oral. Exhortations to read A.I.D. M.O.s 1570-1571 is not a substitute for such instructions.

With this lack of standardized practice and procedures on the part of the USAID, it is, of course, impossible for the RIG to assume its proper function with respect to these refugee feeding programs.

Recommendation No. 3: That the USAID/Laos prepare, in consultation with the RIG, a schedule of operating instructions to all U.S. personnel engaged in refugee feeding operations providing guidance in matters of frequency of distributions, size of rations, reports, and other matters bearing on the efficient conduct of the program. Such instructions should be concurred in by the RIG and be also used by RIG personnel associated with the program.

d. Vientiane Field Communications

An essential concomitant of standardized and written instructions for the guidance of the ACs and their staffs is the periodic visits of USAID headquarters staff, especially the FFP officer, to the field locations for the purpose of both monitoring operations and maintaining an appropriate level of personal dialogue and consultation. The team was told that a variety of difficulties had prevented the satisfaction of this requirement in the past. The team wishes to emphasize the importance to be attached to such visits. While an especial degree of personal dedication and professional skill was manifested by many of the USAID field staff, liaison with and guidance from the senior USAID/FFP officer plays a crucial role in maintaining the quality of program operations.

Note: To illustrate our point, we might mention that during the team's visit to field posts in Laos, a number of suggestions were put forward, involving relatively simple steps to improve the management of various elements in the program. All of these suggestions were such that they should have been proposed and their implementation insured by visiting senior personnel from the USAID headquarters.

Recommendation No. 4: That USAID/Laos should provide more frequent communication with, and more complete guidance to, field personnel not only through written instructions but by regular field visits of the USAID/FFP officer to Area Coordinators and their staffs.

e. The Thailand Transiting Problem

The team gained the impression from its talks in Bangkok and in Laos that there is much reluctance in U.S. circles to raise the difficulties attendant on Title II transshipments through Thailand with Thai authorities. The team recognizes the reasons for this reluctance yet cannot condone a no-action policy in the face of the problems involved. One way to resolve a large part of the problem would be to discontinue Title II goods in the refugee feeding program as proposed in this report. If such goods were limited to VolAg programs and the full ration of rice and canned meat--Thai products--was restored, the prospects for a satisfactory negotiation of the problem with Thai authorities would be greatly improved.

The team believes the Embassies and USAIDs in both Laos and Thailand should be concerned with the problem. A full consultation between them should be able to produce a proposal for submission to Thai authorities that would significantly reduce the losses now being incurred.

Recommendation No. 5: That the USAID and Embassy in Laos solicit the support of the Embassy in Bangkok in the effort to gain Thai agreement on a new procedure for the expeditious handling of Title II goods transshipping Thailand en route to Laos.

3. Voluntary Agency Programs

a. Description

Although there is a very limited World Vision program in Laos, the CRS program represents the bulk of the VolAg activity in Laos. Until recently, the CRS program has been a modest one--supplying Title II foods to some 50 institutions, maternal-child health centers, and schools. Table II below shows that the volume of food received more than doubled in FY 1971 reflecting an agreement by CRS, the RIG, and USAID that the refugees in the Vientiane Plaine which previously had been recipients of the government-to-government program be transferred to the CRS program. FY 72 will be the first year in which CRS will feed the Vientiane refugees for a full year; the FY 72 AER calls for over 1,000 metric tons for the refugee project as compared to a total of 152.5 metric tons received for all programs in FY 71.

The CRS refugee project is distinctive among Lao refugee projects in that most of the villages will have adequate land to achieve the goal "of ending the feeding program after the first good crop." This project provides a monthly distribution of the following Title II commodities:

Oil	1/2 can to families of five or under 1 can to families with over five members
Rolled Oats	1 lb. per person
Bulgur	2 lbs. per person
Wheat Soya Blend	2 lbs. per person
Corn Soya Milk	1 lb. per person

Three kilos of noodles and ten kilos of glutinous rice are added to the above monthly ration. The noodles are manufactured from food stock of the government-to-government projects, while the rice is purchased in Thailand with SA funds. Thus all three programs that support the refugees are folded into one project.

b. Team Comment

The CRS programs in Laos appeared to be well managed; there were set procedures for the release of commodities; the size of the ration was defined in the case of each project, and record keeping exceeded the requirements of M.O. 1571. With exception of the refugee projects, the CRS programs conform to the normal Voluntary Agency programs found in other countries.

In view of the favorable situation with respect to the CRS operations the team makes no recommendation with respect to the VolAg program in Laos.

TABLE II

Catholic Relief Services Program  
PL 480 Commodities Received

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Fiscal Year</u>		
	<u>1969</u> M.T.	<u>1970</u> M.T.	<u>1971</u> M.T.
Wheat Flour	20.5	11.4	29.0
Bulgur	21.0	26.1	37.0
Rolled Oats*	--	--	6.2
Rolled Wheat*	5.1	1.8	--
NFDM <u>1/</u>	3.0	8.0	20.1
WSB <u>2/</u>	--	--	16.3
CSM <u>3/</u>	16.2	9.3	23.3
Vegetable Oil	9.2	12.0	20.6
Total (metric tons)	75.0	68.6	152.5
Total Recipients	26,900	24,500	55,200

\* Rolled oats substituted for rolled wheat

1/ NFDM - Non-Fat Dried Milk

2/ WSB - Wheat Soya Blend

3/ CSM - Corn Soya Milk

The project composition of the CRS program in June, 1971, is shown in Table III, below.

TABLE III

<u>Type</u>	<u>No. of</u> <u>Projects</u>	<u>No. of</u> <u>Recipients</u>
Maternal-Child Health	12	4,100
School Feeding	16	4,500
Orphanages and Child Boarding Centers	16	1,700
Hospitals and Pediatric Centers	6	500
Leprosariums	5	1,950
Refugee Villages	27	26,900 plus

DISTRIBUTION

Coordinator, Bureau for Supporting Assistance (3)  
Director, USAID/Laos (3)  
Office Food for Peace (3)  
Office for Private Overseas Programs (1)  
Inspector General, Foreign Assistance/State (2)  
Auditor General (1)  
Director, Office of Inspections and Investigations (1)  
Director, Office of Audit (3)  
Area Auditor General, EA (1)  
Resident Auditor, Vientiane (1)