CBIRD REVISITED

An in-depth evaluation of the effects of a Development Program Grant on Save The Children Federation's program in Colombia and Honduras

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SUMMARY

This report represents the results of a three week AID-sponsored evaluation of Save the Children Federations (SCF) application of the CBIRD approach to development in Honduras and Colombia as conceived and implemented through SCF's 1.2 million dollar Development Program Grant. The evaluation examined whether or not SCF achieved the purposes of the DPG and assessed the impact of three CBIRD projects, one in Honduras and two in Colombia.

Addressed through a process and outcome evaluation of SCF with regard to the DPG, a process and outcome evaluation of the CBIRD approach and an impact evaluation of the three CBIRD projects, these questions result in the following report structure: I. The Effects of the DPG on SCF Programs; II. How does CBIRD work? Process Evaluation of the CBIRD Approach; III. Outcome Evaluation: What Have Been the Project Achievements of SCF/CBIRD Programs; (Productivity and Social Infrastructure and Welfare Projects); and IV. Impact Evaluation: Who Benefits and for How Long.

The major findings in each section are summarized here:

Section I

1. At SCF headquarters, DPG monies served to stimulate awareness and legitimize SCF as an existing and capable development assistance organization. More concretely, the monies allowed for the hiring of new staff who developed an overseas program and set up accounting systems. (Their technical and administrative expertise resulted in the acquisition of thirteen OPG's.)

2. At the country level, DPG monies enabled the initiation of planning, reporting and evaluation systems. Project reporting systems and midpoint evaluations of ongoing OPG's, in turn, helped generate additional OPG's. As illustrated in the review of the CBIRD process, these evaluations were isolated as critical factors in the success or failure of the CBIRD approach.

Section II

1. Although structurally conceived as a bottom-up rather than top-down approach, and entailing community planning/decision making involvement as the key to success, CBIRD's significance lies in outside generation of innovative ideas, strong leadership and intervention in the planning and implementation of significant projects. This particular kind of top down promotes bottom up participation insofar as it fosters community identification with behavioral commitment to the ideas proposed.

2. The second factor responsible for CBIRD's promoting bottom up development is the rational feedback that communities obtain through planning, reporting and evaluation mechanisms. When objective information on set goals, necessary timing and resource inputs, and progress indicators are channeled back to the community, individuals can then attribute events (progress) to their actions and perceive themselves as the actors rather than passive recipients of development assistance.

Section III

1. Reviews of the productivity projects (e.g., sorghum cooperatives, credit and consumer cooperatives and women's enterprises) indicate a variety of problems - some of which, as management and supervisory difficulties, could be controlled. Problems less responsive to future SCF intervention include transportation and market difficulties.

2. The record for social infrastructure projects (e.g., schools, health clinics, roads, sanitation and water works) is particularly impressive. Extensive community participation and commitment to these projects may have been due to distinct and tangible needs and to the straightforwardness of their solution. In other words, individuals could affect, observe and control the resolution of their needs.

3. The effectiveness of SCF's welfare projects in addressing health and nutritional problems is questionable. Except for a successful childcare center in Sibundoy, Colombia, health and nutrition related projects were absent or inadequately staffed. Again, further training material and human resource investments may reduce these problems.

Section IV

1. While some segments of the population benefit from memberships in cooperatives and credit associations, evidence reveals that the poorest segments (women heads of households and the landless) are not reached by such projects.

2. It was observed that the CBIRD approach stimulates changes in individuals' awareness of themselves, their social relations and fosters the process toward community self-management. Facilitating this internalization is a degree of 'healthy failure,' yet repeated failure, particularly at the implementation stage, may counteract the community's sense of control over the environment.

3. CBIRD does possess potential for expansion to neighboring communities or to different groups within the community as long as planners can learn from the successes and failures of previous projects. As a means for linking communities to local and national government agencies, CBIRD serves a catalyst function provided the active and effective presence of other agencies and their cooperation with SCF representatives.

In sum, it appears that CBIRD's particular successes are due to the possibility of flexible adaptation at the local level, commitment by both SCF staff and community participants, and the realization, effected through rational feedback in the planning and evaluation processes, that individual involvement permits one to change and control his/her environment. At the same time, environmental, market, staff inadequacies, insufficient country cooperation, and the frequent absence of technical expertise or access to technologies inhibit the successful evolution of the CBIRD approach. Formally addressing these problems, by tightening the structure and implementation of CBIRD, may adversely affect the very flexibility and interaction which underline CBIRD's success. Future SCF programs attempting to control for these problems as well as advancing to more comprehensive and technologically sophisticated projects will have to balance both structure and individuality.

In 1975 the Agency for International Development (AID) awarded a Development Program Grant (DPG) of 1.2 million dollars to be allocated over a three year period to Save the Children Federation/Community Development Foundation (SCF). The DPG had a twofold purpose:

1) to improve SCF's capabilities to plan, design, manage and evaluate grossroots level community based integrated rural development programs, and

2) to enable SCF to initiate and expand programs in six developing countries.

AID awarded DPGs to SCF and other private voluntary organizations to strengthen these organizations' professional capacities so that they could have a critical and creative role in helping implement the Agency's development priorities. Overall, the DPG granted to SCF was to assist in SCF's transition from a children's relief organization into a development assistance foundation. The DPG served to increase the effectiveness and scope of SCF's development projects and expand the use of the Community Based Integrated Rural Development (CBIRD) approach to development. In retrospect, these objectives were accomplished: the basic support monies legitimized and strengthened SCF's still new development assistance orientation. More importantly, DPG funded support activities (planning, reporting and evaluation) were critical to the success of programs in the field.

Overlapping the 1975-1978 DPG monies were several AID funded Operational Program Grants (OPG) presented to SCF in 1976 and beyond. While the DPG was to help U.S. headquarters make the transition into development programs, the OPGs were to activate SCF programs at the country level. Because both grants partially overlapped (and each was

supplemented with monies from other sources), because SCF headquarters designed program plans based on CBIRD approach which country offices then adapted and implemented, a dual tier process emerged: CBIRD at U.S. headquarters and CBIRD at the country level; DPG and other monies at headquarters and DPG, OPGs and other monies at country level. This dual tier process had, however, a single, independent outcome: the success of country level development programs using CBIRD.

This past March, a little more than a year after the DPG ended, AID organized a team to undertake a three week long in-depth evaluation of CBIRD as conceived and implemented through the DPG.[1/] The team was to answer the following questions:

1) Did SCF achieve the purpose of the DPG, and how did the DPG affect SCF?

2) How successful had SCF been in applying and institutionalizing CBIRD in Honduras and Colombia?

3) What was the impact (tentatively) in rural recipient communities of three CBIRD projects, one in Honduras and two in Colombia?

1/ The team was chaired by Dr. George Beloz, AID Development Officer. Participating on the team at various times were John Wingerton, Alejandro Corpeño, John Grant, Antonio Rodriguez, and Richard Redder, all SCF staff. This report would not have been possible without their insights, reflective analyses and patience. Their ideas enriched the report. The author, however, is solely responsible for its contents and any errors of ommission and/or misinterpretations. I am also grateful to Janet Self and Ilsa Schumacher, ICRW research staff, for their critical advice and help in the preparation of this report.

The questions can be addressed through a:

- process and outcome evaluation of SCF with regard to the DPG.[2/]
- process and outcome evaluation of the CBIRD approach in Honduras and Colombia.
- tentative impact evaluation of three CBIRD projects, two in Colombia and one in Honduras.

The evaluation's scope of work was field oriented. We spent most of the three weeks in-country and only three days at SCF's headquarters. Reflecting this emphasis, this report expands on the process, outcome and impact evaluation of CBIRD in Honduras and Colombia (objectives two and three above).

What Effect Did the DPG Have on SCF?: Process and Outcome Evaluation of SCF

Before the evaluation began, the methodological approach assumed independence between the two effects; that is, unless proven otherwise by the information gathered through the evaluation, the success of SCF with regard to the DPG was to be seen as independent from the success of CBIRD at the country level. This working assumption required the ability to obtain separate evidence of the effects of the DPG on headquarters, which was not possible for at least three reasons.

First, the effects of the DPG on headquarters combined or "mingled" with the effects of the OPGs and parallel philosophical

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2/ Process evaluation attempts to understand what the program is and how it works; outcome evaluation attempts to assess the success of a program and impact evaluation, the intended and unintended effects of the program on society.

developments within SCF, events all which occurred between 1975 and 1978. At the time SCF received the OPG monies, the process of change from a relief to a development assistance organization already was underway. This idea, planted in the 1960s, had germinated in 1972 with the election of a new president and had taken concrete expression in a 1973 international field manual. While the OPGs can be seen as a direct consequence of the DPG they, in turn, helped legitimize headquarters' new image as a professional development agency. Second, the support nature of the DPG grant made it difficult to find independent indicators of its effects. How can one establish increased professionalism without resorting to some measure of professional performance? In the case of SCF, the direct measure of professional performance was (and is) the success of CBIRD at the country level. A third reason, the little time spent at headquarters, precluded finding less obvious, independent indicators of the effects of the DPG on SCF.

We were better able to trace the effects of the DPG, separate from those of the OPGs, at the country program level than isolate the DPG effects on the organization as a whole.

At headquarters, DPG monies were used mainly to hire professionals (staff and consultants) with expertise in development programs and in administration. Additionally, DPG monies enabled undertaking activities supporting the implementation of field projects. Main among them were the development of one and three year implementation plans (following AID's logical framework matrix) and the design of reporting and evaluation systems. Field and headquarters' staff received training in the CBIRD approach, including these support activities, in three international

training workshops, financed with DPG monies.[3/]

Annex 1 shows DPG disbursements for headquarters over the life of the grant. In the first year of the DPG grant, 72 percent of the funds went directly to design and support activities (i.e., travel and per diem of regional directors, program department staff). In the following fiscal years, the proportion (not the amount) of DPG funds spent in program design/support activities decreased by more than half, while the proportion spent in salaries increased to about 40 percent of the total. The remaining DPG monies were taken up by two new activities: program planning and training.

Interviews with staff was the main source of information to assess the effects on headquarters of these DPG funded changes in staff and activities. The consensus opinion of staff at headquarters is that DPG monies had a fundamental impact in the growth of the organization: new staff members and consultants, hired through the DPG, developed a systematic overseas program plan and set up an effective accounting system at headquarters. The result was a substantial increase in the level of professionalism of SCF. This technical and administrative expertise was particularly critical in designing strong OPG proposals, especially in the first year of the DPG grant. The result was the AID granting of thirteen OPGs to SCF. If the ability to obtain OPGs is taken as a measure of success, SCF indeed achieved the purpose of the DPG. Lastly, according to the staff interviewed, the DPG, as well as

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3/ The first International Directors Workshop, held in 1975, exposed staff to the CBIRD approach and taught country directors to develop three year implementation plans with a budget and one evaluation format. The second workshop, held a year later, was organized to review the CBIRD implementation process. In 1978, the CBIRD methodology was reviewed in a third workshop which was held to facilitate communication and cooperation between staff from all programs.

the OPGs, reinforced at headquarters the change in SCF's image from a charity to a development organization. By granting these awards, AID recognized the capability of SCF to undertake development work.

This evaluation can give an independent assessment of the effects of the DPG on SCF only through the programs studied in Colombia and Honduras. Since the same funding source awarded SCF both the DPG and the OPGs, obtaining OPGs does not constitute independent evidence to assess DPGs effects on SCF. The next sections assess the success of CBIRD in these countries, by evaluating the process, outcome and impact of CBIRD in three projects with rural communities, two in Colombia and one in Honduras.

Field Approach

The effects of the DPG in enhancing SCF's capabilities to plan, design, manage and evaluate country development programs is described in the reports SCF submitted to AID as required by the grant. The structure of these reports follows AIDs logical framework matrix where a given objective is outlined with the purpose, a given output and the necessary resource inputs for its achievement. Thus, objectives, outputs and resources are spelled out in detail and quantified. Evaluation is then based primarily upon a quantitative measure of output, and success is determined by the distance between a given objective and an achieved outcome.

The limitation of this method of operation and evaluation is that the significance of achievements for the initiating organization as well as the recipient community cannot be determined. In other words,

what does it mean to have 65 (rather than 35) individuals participating in a cooperative; or to have the cooperative process and sell 250 bushels of apples (rather than 125 bushels) per day? More importantly, who are those participating and who benefits from selling the apples?

Also lacking in this method of evaluation is an identification and analysis of those factors which shape the success and failure of a program, i.e., the why of the effective mobilization and sustained participation of individuals in a project. Without an understanding of the significance of factors behind these numbers and their impact on the community, it is difficult to identify those key elements necessary for success; each project, therefore, becomes isolated unto itself and the possibility for replication is reduced. Ultimately, to assess the significance of the CBIRD approach the log frame method of evaluation needs to be complemented by an evaluation that goes beyond measurements of performance.

In looking for a complementary method for evaluation, it might be helpful to briefly review what CBIRD is. There have been several recent attempts to define, describe and analyze the CBIRD approach to development (SCF 1973 manual; Brandt and Cheong, 1979; Vollbrecht, 1977). From an extreme point of view one could ask whether CBIRD is a framework for development or simply a means of obtaining funding; if it is a framework, what are its essential elements and how does it unfold?

Generally speaking, CBIRD is an adaptable framework for integrated community development. This integration is achieved through what is called horizontal and vertical means. Vertical means refers to the link between

the individual and available local and national resources through community committees, and is operationalized by the local institutions created during the CBIRD process. Horizontal integration refers to the participation of all members of the community, their sustained involvement and the design and activation of community committees. As an approach to development, CBIRD takes small clusters of villages as its operational base; it utilizes and adapts to the kind and amount of locally available resources. At the project level, CBIRD plans by sector.

Setting apart CBIRD as a distinct approach, and considered integral to its success, is the involvement of local individuals in the decision making process. (This process includes needs assessment, planning, data gathering, project selection, implementation, training and evaluation, and termination.) Local individuals also engage in extensive interaction with community leaders and the project personnel, which again underlines the importance of community participation.

Thus, in terms of analyzing the process of CBIRD and those outcomes attributable to the CBIRD framework, the method used had to yield information on the process of decision making, the extent of community participation across sex, age and income levels and the likelihood that process and institutions would survive SCF's departure. To grasp processes, we relied mostly on intensive interviewing of project staff and participants and used social psychology literature on group formation and decision making to frame, analyze and validate this field information. To make assessments direct, on-site observation and interviewing were validated and complemented by analysis of project documents and independent studies of these or similar projects. Field information was always compared to

systematic findings from secondary sources. While gathering the information, a conscious attempt was made to have the situation define itself. This was done in order to minimize observer biases.

Limitations to the Methodology. A host of limitations are inherent to a retrospective, in-depth evaluation based on observation and unstructured interviews.

1) At the project level, it is difficult to separate the effects of the CBIRD model approach from the effects of ongoing or unexpected environmental, social and economic events, as well as changes introduced by other agents or by products of SCF interventions. For instance, increases in agricultural productivity could have been due to changes in weather rather than to SCF providing technical assistance to farmers through the DPG. Alternatively, these increases could have been due to increases in farmers' motivation to produce because of the social support provided through the technical assistance rather than the technical assistance *per se*.

2) The potential for generalization of project findings is hindered by small sample sizes (i.e., three case studies) and the lack of standardization in the method. Added to these overall limitations are the following:

(a) the process of development takes time and this timing varies with the cultural "life-cycle" of the community as well as the nature of the development intervention. SCF intervention outcomes (failures or successes) at one point may reverse over time because of the internal pace of the development process.

(b) the information generated through interviews was taken at face value. There was neither time nor resources to run independent checks on answers to specific questions. Left as there are, the recollections of events from SCF staff and participants may be influenced by recall distortions and/or a desire to present the "best side" to outside evaluators. This "biased" data then, in turn, affects the legitimacy of the evaluation.

(c) the evaluation sites themselves, selected by SCF, were chosen with the knowledge that they represented particularly successful cases in the Latin American region. Again the possibility for generalization of the findings to other areas may be limited.

(d) most importantly, the short time spent combined with the nature of the tasks as well as social pressures to see the project achievements in the field, did not allow interviewing non-participants or non-beneficiaries of SCF projects.

Whatever sense of finality the findings may assume throughout the report, they are valid representations of the situation studied, given time and respondent constraints, and only suggestive of events in other similar situations.

How Does CBIRD Work?: Process Evaluation of the CBIRD Approach

The basic elements of the CBIRD approach were discussed above. For present purposes let it be reiterated that key to CBIRD are the notions of flexibility, adaptability, "integration," and widespread community participation. Success is dependent upon effective and sustained mobilization of the

population and the efficient expansion of local structures. In essence, CBIRD is a "bottom-up" strategy. In theory, local individuals are involved at every stage of the development process; indeed they are said to define the content of these stages: needs assessment, planning, data gathering, project selection, implementation, training and evaluation, and termination.

The organizational structure to implement CBIRD in the field (at least in the cases studied) include a field office director, who manages a country office in the capital city and is responsible for overseeing both the development programs and the sponsorship fund raising mechanism in the visiting high impact program areas (HIPs). There are three each in Honduras and Colombia.[4/] In each high impact area there is a field coordinator who manages the area's programs and sponsorship fundraising. In the words of SCF, "To the villagers the field coordinator is the program." He has an office with a program and administrative staff varying in size between three and ten. The community committees follow and are the structures linking the participants with the local and country resources. They have elected officers and are headed by a president.

In the chain between the U.S. office and the individual participant or recipient, the director is the liaison between headquarters, the host country institutions and the project area; the coordinator is the link between the community committees and the director, and the committees

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4/ The HIP areas visited in this evaluation were Pespire in Honduras and Sibundoy and Ubaque in Colombia. They are described in Annex 2.

(through their representatives) link the individual participant, through the chain, with the U.S. office.

Given a formal structure dictating bottom-up planning, the critical question then becomes: Are the project ideas responding to the felt needs of the community or is the community being told what its needs are by the field coordinator, local government agencies or other area officials?

In order to answer this question a thorough analysis of the initiation, dissemination and follow through of project ideas and needs is necessary. If community participation in decision making is the critical factor to the success of CBIRD, every stage of this involvement must be examined. In view of constraints in length, only the following stages will be considered and presented as illustrative of the entire process: 1) needs assessment, 2) planning and evaluation and 3) community processes.

1. Needs assessment and generation of project ideas: "Bottom up" or "top down?"

In exploring the process of idea generation in several different projects, we discovered that one cornerstone to a successful project was not the origin of an idea but the participants' behavorial commitment obtained through rational feedback, not at the decision making stage but, rather, during the operational stages of a project. In this regard, participants were told what to do and why. Through this feedback process, individuals gained understanding and feelings of control over their environment.

Taking a closer look at idea generation and need assessment there are a number of factors which affect the possible sources of the idea. These are: (1) the clarity and pervasiveness of the felt need; (2) the

degree of complexity of the task, and (3) the innovativeness of the project idea. In instances where one or more of these factors pre-empted the generation of an idea at the local level, community participation was nevertheless pervasive. This section will examine each of these factors in detail.

With regard to the first factor, the clarity and pervasiveness of the felt need, it appeared that the greater presence of these factors, the less the community seemed to need outsiders or intervening mechanisms to generate and decide on the project idea. The need for water is Pespire's (Honduras) most clear and pervasive need. It is not a problem of lack of water but management of water from the rainy season and of inaccessibility by the lack of infrastructure. El Rincón de los Limones is a small village (21 households) in the foothill of a mountain in Pespire, where community committees and administration councils, organized by SCF (under the DPG), never worked out. Despite this lack of organization, the community approached the SCF's coordinator in 1976 to ask for help in setting up a piped water system to bring water down from the mountain. SCF provided the pipes and the cement, the community set up an ad hoc water committee and, within the year, sixty men built an impressive water system that goes to each household. The need was salient and pervasive, the task straightforward.

The second factor affecting the source of ideas is the degree of complexity involved in a given task. It was observed that greater complexity was coupled with a greater number of outsiders intervening in the project generating process. As illustrated, consider the reorientation of an OPG in the valley of Sibundoy, Colombia in 1978. After a mid-point evalua-

tion based on an essessment of the felt needs of the community, the OPG program was switched from an emphasis on a highly successful social infrastructure development scheme to an emphasis on productive activities. The latter certainly are more complex than the former and seem to have required more outside intervention in the generation as well as in the implementation process (i.e., technical assistance and project supervision). INCORA, the government land reform agency, in 1976 purchased 8,000 hectares of land from the Capuchin religious order to initiate works to drain the valley. In 1970, INCORA decided to transfer these lands to individuals in the native Kamza and Ingra Indian tribes. As of today, 1,500 hectares have been transferred to individuals (4 to 10 hectares) and groups. Conversations between the SCF director and the regional head of INCORA resulted in the idea of offering an abandoned 53 hectares farm to the Kamza and Inga communities. By 1977, this farm was transformed into the Nokanchipa Training Center, a model agricultural training and livestock experiment institution. Although not fully operational, the Center has an SCF paid administrator who manages day to day operations. An administrative committee of seven representatives manages larger scale projects of investments above 20,000 pesos.[5/]

The SCF coordinator is the president of this committee. It also has a seven-member advisory board that includes representatives of government agencies. The Training Center's impressive 5 year plan was developed by SCF, INCORA and SENA-- the National Institute of Training, with agreement from the committee.

5/ At the time of our visit, approximately 39 Colombian pesos = US$1.00.

Similarly, the SCF Social (WID) Coordinator, trained by INCORA, upon conversations with the Regional Head of INCORA, proposed to a Women's Club (already in existence for more than a year) the idea of requesting land. The Jabutillama association was organized in 1979. Ten women will develop 55 hectares (45 collectively and the rest individually); SCF organized the women through a PACT funded collaborative project between SCF, the Colombian Federation of Coffee Growers and World Education. INCORA has granted a loan of 995,000 pesos. Upon learning this, a second women's club recently requested the same from INCORA. Seven women have formed the community enterprise Butaramán and requested 21 hectares of land where they will raise livestock and sell milk byproducts. (According to SCF representatives, women leaders, trained as a result of the PACT funded project, fostered the development of these enterprises.)

The third factor seems to be the innovativeness of the project idea. This factor is critical since it is innovative projects that seem to have among the best chances of promoting social change in traditional communities and reaching the poorest subgroups by redistributing resources in the absence of structural reforms. Outside "intervention" in the generation, planning and/or implementation of an idea increases with its innovativeness.

SCF field programs are striking in their inclusion of concepts representative of new directions in development assistance. The projects we visited in Honduras and Colombia were in the forefront of incorporating women in development and appropriate technology concepts. The women's enterprises, cited above, are examples of the women in development emphasis.

There is little question that women's ownership of land will promote social change. Furthermore, their collective management of farms and livestock production will challenge the traditional division of labor by sex. Examples of appropriate technology, Lorena stoves, fishponds, water catchment tanks and roof tile production are very visible in Honduras.

Another, perhaps more interesting technology example, is the case of the Nokanchipa Training Center. When drawing the Center's plans, INCORA first wanted to engage in commercial cultivation of the land, using tractors and paid labor. In a second planning meeting with the approval of the community committees, SCF representatives re-oriented these plans. Rather than hiring labor, the Center will train community groups who will work on the cash crops. Forty percent of the economic returns will go to the Center and the rest to the groups. An Appropriate Technology International consultant, brought to the Center by SCF, further convinced the community that, given the muddy terrain, ox drawn plows were more efficient than tractors.

How do these novel, experimental ideas become successfully incorporated in the projects? Lengthy discussions with SCF field personnel resulted in the following key elements: new ideas need 1) an outside "catalyst" who introduces the idea (in the Latin America case, these were brought by SCF through three DPG funded international conferences); 2) their adoption by the field coordinator, and 3) effective leadership combined with trust between SCF field coordinator and the community. These elements probably help counteract one of the constraints that Brandt and Cheong (1979) saw in the application of CBIRD in Korea: that the basic goals of the donors may be incompatible

with those of the recipients. The key role of the field coordinator assumes a new dimension: he/she is the "gatekeeper" for the community's access to innovations.

Is it then that, in at least some cases, the CBIRD approach defines rather than responds to the needs of the community? Or does the CBIRD approach involve "top down" planning/decision making rather than "bottom up"? "Top down" generation of ideas, strong leadership, and outside intervention in the planning and implementation of the projects coincides with those projects that may have a significant social and/or economic impact.

The main distinctiveness of the CBIRD approach is that this particular kind of "top down" approach promotes "bottom up" development. It fosters the community's identification with the idea and their behavioral commitment to the project. "Top down" ideas are perceived as felt needs, projects become community property, and progressive "bottom up" decision making develops.

Aside from continuous, face to face interaction of the field personnel with the community and the trust that develops between them, two important elements that promote the community's commitment to SCF projects are planning and evaluation.

2. Planning and evaluation: commitment through rational feedback.

According to an evaluation of PVOs in Honduras, SCF is the only PVO that undertakes professional level planning and evaluation, which is reinforced by the reports required by headquarters (Cáceres, n.d., p. 157). AID's logical framework matrix, in more or less complex form,

was used to draw three and one year plans in country offices and in the three HIP offices we visited. All plans included objectives, inputs, outputs and measurable indicators. For the Honduras' field coordinator, the main advantage of planning is that it prevents the community from stopping midway. For the USAID Mission director in Colombia, CBIRD provoked cultural change (thereafter affecting economic development) by teaching the beneficiaries how to work with government agencies and, through the planning process, how to manage assets and "do things by themselves."

The Honduras' SCF country director was originally hired in 1976 to design and undertake evaluations. He designed a system of self-evaluation which has been applied three times, twice to community representatives through regional meetings and once to the community committees in each village. The evaluation assigns points to indicators under three stages in the process towards self-sufficiency: development of human resources capabilities, project achievements and development of the capacity to institutionalize services. Each time, community representatives evaluated their communities in these categories and were given immediate feedback on their results and those of other communities. Results were plotted in bargraphs and the performance (growth) of communities was compared. These examples clearly show that local individuals are involved in planning and evaluation.

Fatalism or the feeling of powerlessness is often described as a prevailing attitude among the poor in Latin America. The provision of rational feedback, through planning and evaluation, promotes community commitment and elicits feelings of mastery or personal control over the environment which are incompatible with fatalism. Objective information on the goals set, the timing and resources required, the indicators of

progress, and the progress being made enables community participants to attribute events (progress) to their actions and perceive themselves as actors rather than passive recipients of development assistance. Planning and evaluation also make both the development agency and the community accountable to each other.

The argument here is that this rational feedback, rather than "bottom up" planning/decision making, is the main contribution of the CBIRD approach. The ability to decide between tractors and ox drawn plows seems far less critical than the ability to attribute the progress made on the Nokanchipa farm to one's actions.

The Honduras' self-evaluation results show a consistent pattern over time: for both high impact areas in the three categories, the highest ratings were given in the second evaluation (July 1977) and the lowest in the third (January 1978). The evaluation document attributes these results to biases in the application of the measurement instrument (the third evaluation was carried out in the communities and women, who according to the director are more optimistic, participated for the first time in the second evaluation.) While this may well be the case, the fact that no action was taken on the evaluation results could in part be a function of the high commitment of SCF field workers towards their programs. Higher commitment lowers the probabilities that the decision maker will change courses of action; commitment increases the motivation to adhere to original decisions (Jannis and Mann, 1977, pp. 279-285.)

3. Leadership styles and community participation.

In his analysis of SCF's operations in Honduras, Cáceres (n.d.) states that SCF field coordinators prevent full community participation

in decision making because their leadership derives from traditional sources of power. These leaders' relations with the local elites and the source of their leadership reinforces traditional patterns of domination.[6/] He argues that CBIRD fosters community organization and increases popular participation in planning and implementation. The community's participation in planning is, however, restricted to the distribution but not the control of resources; likewise, the community acts upon the decisions but does not engage in autonomous decision making. There are no established mechanisms in the CBIRD model for the transition from traditional to community leadership. Cáceres, nevertheless, recognizes (and this he stressed when we interviewed him) the effectiveness of these traditional leaders in executing the programs with the community.

The dilemma between program effectiveness and full participation is real and not easily resolved. Leadership styles and the effectiveness of leaders depends on situational factors as well as on the characteristics of the leader. One of these situational factors is task difficulty. Experimental evidence reveals that the greater the complexity or difficulty of the task, the greater is the need for decision making to rest in the hands of a few, and the greater is the probability that strong leadership will emerge (Jones and Gerard, 1965). Moreover, task oriented leaders will be more effective the more complex is the task (Shaw, 1971.)

[6/] With one exception, the field coordinators we met were natives of the area and either former majors or teachers. Emerging leaders in the community committees also tend to be teachers (something that concerns the SCF staff in the country).

The level of task difficulty facing these communities also affects the ability of the community groups to solve their problems through cooperative organization. Cáceres mentions the case of a sorghum cooperative where the impending hunger due to the drought and pests (grasshopper) led members to sell the grain outside the cooperative rather than to the cooperative who had advanced payment, and would have stored the sorghum for higher market prices later in season. We saw a similar case during a meeting of the sorghum cooperative in San Juan Bautista, attended by between 20-25 people. The cooperative's president had been recently attacked while keeping watch over stored sorghum and sorghum was stolen. There was no apparent solution to the problem. The cooperative could not afford a "watchman" as well as a keeper, and the president wanted to resign. If they sold the stored sorghum at current market prices they would lose considerable income. The "no win" situation blocked the only alternative: to cooperate and volunteer watch over the sorghum in pairs.

What Have Been the Project Achievements of SCF/CBIRD Programs?: Outcome Evaluation.

a. Productivity Projects

The sorghum cooperatives in Pespire, Honduras. The sorghum marketing cooperative, organized by SCF, currently has 15 branches benefiting a total of 929 members. The cooperative replaces the local intermediary and advances part of the payment to the farmer. It capitalizes by storing the grain until the market price of sorghum increases. The farmer receives higher prices per load through the cooperative, and some technical assistance (e.g. fertilizers). In 1976, at the time of the Zuñiga et al

study, the cooperative had 8 branches. A two year (1975-76) comparison of productivity differentials between cooperative members and non-members resulted in the following outcomes attributable to the cooperative:

(a) an increase in the average area cultivated by farmers. While in 1975, the cooperative member cultivated an average of 1.54 blocks of land and the non-member an average of 1.85, the following year the member cultivated an average of 2.39 blocks versus 1.86 for the non-member (it would have been useful to know the number of members who had increased production since increases in the average could have been due to increased production of a few members.[7/]

(b) an expansion in the use of herbicides -- 46% of the members compared to 26% of non-members used herbicides.

Today, on the average, about 40% of the cooperative members have not repayed their loans, at least in part because of last year's low market prices (L20 versus L30 the load in 1978).[8/] There are, however, variations between branches. The branch of San Juan Bautista with 138 members has approximately 35% delinquent members (they sold the 1979 harvest at L26 the load and paid the farmer L5 in advance and L14 at time of selling). The branch of San Antonio de Padua, with sixty-five members, has only two delinquent members, while in 1979 each member received L17 instead of L19 per load. However, they may have produced more per farmer. The standard explanation is that San Antonio de Pauda has relatively more successful programs because their physical isolation has encouraged self-

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[7/] 1 block = 1.43 hectares

[8/] One lempira (L) = US$0.50; one load = 2,000 quintals

reliance. Reinforcing this hypothesis, Brandt and Cheong (op.cit.) and Cáceres (op.cit.) argue that CBIRD works best in relatively isolated areas which optimize the utilization of resources. Alternatively, this village's better performance may be a function of time; initiated in 1973, San Antonio de Pauda was the first community chosen to implement CBIRD.

The credit and consumer association in Sibundoy, Colombia. As a result of the mid-point evaluation, a credit association with OPG funds was started late in 1978 to serve the Kamza farmer. Operating with a working capital of 613,000 pesos, it has benefitted fourty two members. The average loan size is between 5,000-25,000 pesos, and it requires the following: collateral in the form of land or property or a third party guarantee to an association; short term (6 months) loan at commercial interest rates (18%); enforced 10% savings which now get 8% interest rates; and the donation of one working day per month at the Nokanchipa Training Center. It now provides minimum technical assistance through an agricultural extensionist, hired by SCF. Marketing assistance is planned for the future. The credit association has granted individual loans to only twelve members, and between three to four women's groups have benefited from the association. None of the member households are landless or women headed. It was too soon to evaluate the association's performance.

The beneficiary of the association's largest loan -- of 120,000 pesos -- is a consumer cooperative, headed by a former Kamza governor and a teacher. At the time of our visit, the cooperative was facing management problems, most probably due to lack of administrative experience. The ten members of the cooperative had contributed 500 pesos each and the president had loaned the space to set up the cooperative. After paying the

interest rate, the first year's earnings (20,000 pesos) were distributed between the individual members without saving anything for investment/ repayment of the principal. The members need cooperative management training and some supervision.

Women's enterprises in Honduras. In January, 1977, an SCF (female) intern with interest in appropriate technologies, organized a women's cooperative in San Juan Bosco. With a L8000 loan from SCF, twenty-one members started production of mango puree in May of that year. Additionally, they received around U.S.$10,000 in donations from OPG and SCF monies. Under the intern's supervision and with some technical assistance in food preservation, the women produced 360 boxes of mango puree in the first year working 8 to 10 hours per day for 40 days. They sold all their production through a contract with a large distributor and grossed earnings of L11,300 (net earnings of L3,300). 75% of these earnings were distributed between the members who had been paid an hourly wage of L0.25. On the average, each member ended up receiving almost L5.00 per day (minimum wage is L3.00). Through interviews, we learned that these women had never before earned money.

In 1978, the women almost doubled production at 85% of the original cost but sold only half of it. Among the possible reasons for this are that with increased production, the quality of the product was affected. The women have been unable to obtain a refractometer that is essential to standarize the cooking time of large quantities of produce. In addition, the loss may have been caused by consumers preferring jellies to purees (which was a novel way of processing the mango), the Tegucigalpa market unable to absorb more than the first year's production, or the puree

being too expensive. Also, transportation costs for distributing the product substantially increased the market price of the puree. The women, however, associate the beginning of difficulties in their enterprise with the departure of the SCF intern. SCF representatives did try to provide alternatives such as diversifying production, (planting of papayas) or establishing a bakery. According to Zuñiga (1979) nothing succeeded because the women were not interested in alternatives to mango production. With financial assistance of SCF, they are now considering both producing mango in a different fashion (drying it out) for the Tegucipalga market and, cheaper packaging (from a glass jar to small plastic bags) to open access to closer markets. The women need technical assistance in the packaging process, and particularly in marketing.

In the isolated village of San Antonio de Pauda, twenty-six women organized a bakery in 1979. They work twice a week, from 7 a.m. - 12 p.m. The bread is sold locally, whereas before the community could not purchase bread in the local streets. With an initial investment of L0.67 per woman (L16 in total), they have netted earnings of L400 -- which they have fully saved in one year of operation.

b. Social Infrastructure And Welfare Projects

In SCF terminology, social infrastructure includes public works or physical infrastructure improvement projects ("infrastructure") as well as the provision of social services and training in those areas associated with basic needs ("welfare").

The schools, health clinics, roads, sanitation and water projects built with SCF and SCF/OPG funds are outstanding, particularly when one learns of the significance of in-kind contributions made by the communities. This

seems to be the case especially in Sibundoy, Colombia, where the OPG mid-point evaluation assessed (for the first time in SCF documents) the costs of projects and showed the substantial savings obtained through community contributions. During the first year-and-a-half of the OPG grant, the Kamza Indian families contributed the equivalent of U.S. $41,318 in labor costs; four and a half kms. of roads were constructed, with the contribution of 1600 person days of labor, at total costs of less than U.S. $7,000 per km, and a number of schools were built at a cost of less than U.S. $6,500 per school.

The social welfare record is not as impressive. Malnutrition is apparent in both countries, and health posts are frequently without staff or very inadequately staffed. Nutrition education programs seem non-existent. In Pespire, we were told that nutritional programs were planned for the near future. Perhaps more is being done in one or both countries, but this was not obvious from the field trip. The lack of indicators further makes it difficult to assess the social welfare record. What is clear from the statistics included in Annex 2 is the need for these programs.

We found the salient exception to this social welfare record in Sibundoy. In Las Cochas, SCF and ICBF (the Colombian Institute of Family Welfare) set up a child care center for Kamza children. The idea of the Center originated in the surveys SCF carried out for OPG evaluation. Traditionally, women work in the field side by side with the men and leave children theoretically under the care of the older children, but in reality, many times unattended. SCF contributed with the plot and U.S. $19,000 (of which, $10,000 were OPG monies). ICBF contributed U.S. $35,000 and trained bilingual Kamza teachers. SCF funds the center's yearly opera-

tions which, for the first year (the center opened in July, 1979), are estimated around U.S. $10,200.

The Center attends to 100 children between 3 months and 7 years old, between 7:30 a.m. and 5 p.m. and gives them free lunch. The children are chosen among the poorest households, and it is expected that the Center will have a positive impact on child nutrition. A salient fact about the Center is the level of competence and innovativeness of the teachers. Creative programs, novel teaching aids and a stimulating physical environment impress the visitor.

On the other extreme, in Ubaque, we saw the repetition of a traditional mistake with women's programs. In the middle of nowhere, in a women's club session, the teacher's lesson for the day was how to bake chocolate meringues. The teacher had not received training and was working in a community where, according to the field coordinator, the development of women's programs was a slow process because of traditional attitudes toward women.

c. Productivity, Infrastructure and Welfare Projects: A Mixed Record.

"Traditional" infrastructure (schools, roads, health posts, etc.) projects work in Honduras and Colombia. This success appears to be directly related to the community's behavioral commitment to the projects and CBIRD's ability to elicit this commitment and organize the community. The indicator of the commitment is self-help, which makes these projects highly cost effective. Strong leadership and the communities' physical isolation probably contribute to this success, and the lack of natural resources and difficulty topography do not seem to stand in the way.

It is harder to assess if innovative infrastructure projects (i.e., the fishponds and Lorena stoves) succeed. These projects require thorough evaluation, including cost-benefit analyses. For instance, the efficiency of using scarce water for a fishpond rather than a vegetable garden should be assessed in terms of cost in cash and time inputs, family consumption of fish or vegetables, and unanticipated effects -- such as the possibility that, without fish, the stagnant waters of the fishponds may spread malaria. The measure of success for these innovative projects should not be if they work or not, but to isolate and understand factors leading to their success or failure and their intended and/or unintended effects.

In summary, as examples in this section show, the record of the productivity projects does not equal that of the traditional infrastructure activities. Unlike infrastructure activities, the success of productivity projects requires behavioral commitment and a host of other factors. Droughts affecting the production of sorghum, the physical distance to market increasing the costs of the mango puree, and the lack of experience/training leading to mismanagement of the consumer cooperative in Sibundoy are only some of these factors. Strong local leadership may both contribute to the success of the project in terms of economic outputs but perpetuate skewness in the distribution of economic returns. Welfare projects share many difficulties with production activities and seem to require, at the minimum, trained personnel for their success. The child care center in Sibundoy further suggests that quality welfare undertakings require significant material and human resource investments.

Who Benefits And For How Long?: Impact Evaluation

The beneficiaries of SCF/CBIRD projects. After visiting the six or so households in Pespire who were benefitting from the installation of the

Lorena stoves and the fishponds, George Beloz, team chairperson, made the observation that these families did not seem to be "the poorest of the poor." They all owned some land and few cattle, and their houses had one or two wall partitions (of newspapers or burlap).[9/] This is not to say that they were well-to-do. Children and adults showed signs of malnutrition. Malnutrition was most evident in the household the team visited which was headed by a widowed woman who owned land and cattle, and living there with her three daughters and grandchildren. The household residents' signs of malnutrition could perhaps be corrected if a nutrition program were related to the Lorena stove being constructed in the household.

In 1976, SCF sponsored a socioeconomic survey of Pespire to provide systematic evidence of who were the beneficiaries of the sorghum cooperative organized by SCF (Zúñiga et al, 1977). A random sample of 192 heads of households in the municipality of Pespire indicated that 79 were members (41 percent of the sample) and 113 non-members of the cooperative. Members and non-members were natives of the community or were born in a neighboring village.

Members tended to be married more frequently than non-members (58.2 percent versus 49.5 percent) and, significantly, only two of the twenty-five women heads of households identified in the sample (13 percent of all heads) were members of the cooperative. The emerging evidence in both rural and urban areas of the developing world consistently shows that women headed households are significantly poorer than male headed households (Buvinić, Youssef and Von Elm, 1978; Kossoudki and Mueller, 1980, among others).

9/ The 1974 housing census shows that 43 percent of the households in Pespire have fewer than two "rooms."

Members' households had more individuals residing in the household (an average of 7.58 individuals versus 6.61 in non-member households) and slightly more male than female residents. On the other hand, non-member households had more female than male residents -- a finding which in a survey carried out in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, was a main reason for the income differential between women and men headed households. The former female households were poorer than the male headed ones because they had more women residents who were not contributing with secondary earnings to the household (Merrick and Schmink, 1978).

Housing construction standards were similar for both members and non-members of the SCF sponsored cooperative; 90% of them had earth floors, roof tiles (94) and wood or cane and mud walls (65%). Ninety-four percent of the households had no sanitary installations and only 10% had piped water. The number of pregnancies and the infant mortality rate were high for both groups. The average number of pregnancies was 7.6 pregnancies per woman and 16 out of every 100 children born were stillborn or died before they were five years old.

While more members of the cooperative rented land (58% versus 45%, probably a result of the cooperative), the land tenure pattern of small landowners was similar for members and non-members: 58% of those interviewed did not own land and more than a third of those who owned land, only cultivated between 1-4 blocks. The data, however, seemed to indicate that while more members than non-members owned between 5 and 12 blocks, more non-members owned 17 or more blocks.

The reported average yearly earnings at the time of the survey (September of 1976) were of L673 per household for members and L494 for non-members. For members, the range varied between L18 and L1,803 with the majority (43%) showing earnings between L118 and L318. For non-members,

their reported yearly earnings varied between L12 and L2,231 ; 49% had earnings between L12 and L212 Zuñiga et al (1977) conclude that members had somewhat higher earnings than non-members, perhaps as a function of increased production (p.64).

A household earnings and expenditures survey carried out by the government of Honduras in the same year of the Zuniga et al's study estimated that the yearly earnings of poor families were below L2,000 in the country as a whole (comprising 79.7% of all families), and below L600 in rural areas.

While the earnings reported by Zuniga et al seem unrealistically low, even for the South, it is clear that in 1976 the cooperative program of SCF was reaching the very poor but probably not the poorest. The land tenure and earnings data suggests that the wealthier members of the community did not participate in the cooperative program but neither did the poorest; it further indicates that a particular subgroup among the poorest, women heads of household, were not being reached.

One could argue, however, that reaching the poorest takes time; that the community base expands over time to include the poorest. Our questioning of the members of the Sibundoy, Colombia credit association, the Sibundoy consumer cooperative, and the aqueduct committee in Ubaque, Colombia, suggests that this is not the case. According to our interviews, these associations, all of which involve capital formation/circulation do not include the poorest (women heads of households, the landless). The "trickle down" approach may not function within the poor, as it does not work across socioeconomic groups. In their analyses of SCF's South Korea program, Brandt and Cheong (1979) conclude that in that program it was not

possible to promote self-sustaining rural development and redistribute wealth at the same time. The former was accomplished, the latter not, which leads them to question if CBIRD works on the "hard cases." The Pespire findings indicate that the CBIRD model is applicable to the hard cases but that it does not guarantee reaching the hardest ones.

CBIRD may be currently reaching some of the poorest with the productivity projects for the (landless) women. This is seen in Honduras where we were told and saw that the projects reaching the poorest were the mango puree factory in San Juan Bosco and the bakery association in San Antonio de Padua, both "women in development" projects.

The institutionalization of CBIRD. The institutionalization of the CBIRD approach in country can be seen as taking two forms: internalization of the process by the community resulting in the community's ability to effectively manage/control their environment and secondly, institutionalization at two levels. Institutionalization is seen in the spread of the model to other communities or to different groups within the community (horizontal effect) and the incorporation of the model by government and other agencies (vertical effect).

Internalization of the CBIRD approach implies changes in individuals' awareness of themselves and their social relations from being passive recipients of aid to main actors in the development process. The training component in CBIRD and the behavioral commitment CBIRD evokes from the communities are two necessary components of the process towards self-management. In the communities we visited, it was impossible to assess if self management had been internalized. It is too soon, and even if this were not the case,

the task of assessing self and social change is well beyond the scope of any short term study. Two issues, however, may bear relevance to this process of internalization, and they lead to contradictory hypotheses or suggestions. It can be argued that while a certain degree of failure is healthy, repeated or significant failures, particularly at the initial stages of implementing CBIRD, may effectively counteract the community's growing sense that they master the environment and have control over events. The greatest danger facing CBIRD is not related to the process itself, but to the parent organization. Resources of private voluntary organizations are neither indigenous nor permanent, and the risks of resource interruption are very high (Van Sant and Weisel, 1979). The case in point is the Nokanchipa Training Center where the failure to get the second OPG proposal funded has meant interruption of most activities. (The formation of community-managed financial institutions that would ensure funding continuity is unrealistic in the short run and for those projects which require substantial investments.)

On the other hand, Sommer (1977) in the case of all private voluntary organizations and Brandt and Cheong (1979) in the case of SCF programs, raise the issue that private voluntary organizations tend to have risk aversion (there is a pressure to succeed in projects) while risk free programs will not lead to social change (i.e., internalization). If both statements are true, "balancing" risk taking and risk free programs can become an art form.

The issue of horizontal institutionalization is related to the above. Horizontal institutionalization means applying CBIRD on a larger scale and this entails experimentation and learning from failure as well as from success. The examples of this form of institutionalization in the field

were the recent extension of the programs with the Kamza community in Sibundoy to the neighboring community and, within a community, the extension of land distribution programs to women. If implemented, the first example in particular may be a good case to test some of the issues of the application of CBIRD on a larger scale. (Women programs tend to be managed parallel to rather than integrated with other programs and therefore are not good tests of horizontal institutionalization.)

The case of vertical institutionalization assumes very different forms in the two countries studied. In the case of Colombia, vertical institutionalization is taking place. Linkages between the community committees and the country development agencies have been established and are reflected in the fact that the majority of programs are colloborative endeavors between SCF and one or more local/national government agencies. The AID Mission Director in Colombia singled out as a main achievement of SCF its success in teaching native communities how to work with government agencies. But, there does not seem to be any government agency that could currently substitute for SCFs functions. In discussing plans for developing programs with the community, the regional director of INCORA made clear the central role of SCF in "absorbing the social costs" (organizing the community and providing needed social infrastructure) while INCORA would provide credit and technical assistance.

In Honduras, SCF has good relations with government agencies (Cáceres, n.d.) but in Pespire it acts quite independently because few government agencies extend services to that area of the country. SCF has a longstanding working relationship with the Ministry of Health, formalized in a 1976 agreement, and develops short term collaborative working relation-

ships with other PVOs for specific tasks. Otherwise, it operates independently and in some cases, as in San Antonio de Padua, is the main agency working locally.

A necessary condition for vertical integration is the active presence of other agencies in the area. For it to be successful, it may also require a comparable degree of effectiveness. In the case of Honduras, Cáceres (n.d.) mentions that the high impact program of SCF may displace government agencies who have problems in disbursing funds quickly. The community prefers working with SCF, which displaces any possibility for vertical integration.

There is another, more subtle, example of how CBIRD has been institutionalized in Honduras and Colombia. In the process of implementing CBIRD, SCF has sponsored socioeconomic surveys or diagnoses of the high impact areas. Zuñiga et al's survey of Pespire and an SCF sponsored census of the Kamza community in Sibundoy, are the only comprehensive studies which exist in the country and have been utilized by other agencies in the development of programs.

What Independent Effects Did the DPG Have on SCF?: Outcome Evaluation of the DPG Through CBIRD

To trace the effects of the DPG on the implementation of CBIRD, the nature of DPG expenditures at the country level was examined. Annex 2 gives a rough breakdown of expenditures for Honduras for fiscal years 1977 and 1978. In both years, community and staff training accounted for about half of locally available DGP funds. Training programs offered included "motivation" courses and planning and evaluation as well as other practice-oriented courses such as cooperative marketing, terracing, and administration, community staff (e.g., field workers) and support services accounted for approximately 30% of remaining DPG money directly available

in-country. In Honduras, the DPG monies were used to:

1) design the self-evaluation system and undertake the three community evaluations. The application of these evaluations ceased when DPG monies ran out;
2) devise a project reporting system, simpler than the one suggested by headquarters but still with sufficient information (including "in kind" contributions) to enable community organizers to obtain and manage funds as well as plan for and evaluate outcomes. The project reporting system, adopted in both countries, is key in allowing efficient disbursement of funds; and
3) design a motivational training system using a videotape and a moving library.

In Sibundoy, Colombia, DPG monies enabled SCF to:

1) design and apply the mid-point evaluation of the OPG;
2) develop, on the basis of this evaluation, a proposal for a second OPG from AID. This proposal included the five year plan for the Nokanchipa Training Center, developed in conjunction with local government agencies during lengthy sessions; and
3) organize twice-a-year country evaluation sessions with community representatives of the various high impact areas.

Ubaque is the only high impact area visited that has not received DPG monies directly. The program in Ubaque was initiated in 1978, when the DPG grant was phasing out. According to SCF staff, there were two indirect effects of the DPG funded activities on the Ubaque program. First, the DPG funded

mid-point evaluation helped in choosing Ubaque as a new HIP area. Second, SCF staff, trained through DPG monies, helped develop the planning and evaluation systems which has enabled the Ubaque SCF office to write proposals for funding by agencies like PACT, ATI and IBM.

In the three areas, directly or indirectly, DPG funds allowed SCF staff to design and implement planning, reporting, and evaluation systems. This evaluation has argued that these "support" activities are critical to the success or failure of the CBIRD approach. Planning, reporting and evaluation provide the community with the rational feedback that promotes first, the community's commitment to the projects and second, elicits feelings of individual mastery over the environment which leads to self-management -- CBIRD's ultimate objective. Planning, reporting and evaluation additionally provide the needed data to develop proposals for funding by AID and other agencies.

Planning, reporting and evaluation activities, undertaken by SCF under The Development Program Grant, directly contributed to the successful implementation of CBIRD in the communities visited in Honduras and Colombia. We can conclude that SCF successfully achieved a main purpose of the DPG, that is, to improve SCF's capabilities to plan, design, manage and evaluate CBIRD programs in the field.

Issues and Suggestions

1. The analysis of the CBIRD process suggests that development ideas with potential to have significant socioeconomic impact on the rural poor (i.e., innovative ideas) will, more often than not, be generated outside the rural community. It also suggests that responding to the community's "felt needs" may be neither practical nor essential to the success

of development projects promoting community participation. What emerges as a critical element of "bottom up" development is participants' commitment to the project, obtained in part through planning and evaluation. The role of planning, reporting and evaluation as rational mechanisms to promote participatory development cannot be overemphasized.

SCF should intensify the undertaking of planning, monitoring and evaluation in the field and engage in systematic reviews, recording and analyses of these efforts.

2. If providing of rational feedback to participants is an important element of "bottom up" development, larger scale development projects may be able to strengthen usually weak participatory components by including planning, reporting and evaluation. SCF's field experience can be essential to ensure successful implementation of planning and evaluation on a larger scale. It is important, therefore, that SCF (and other PVOs) keep records of the experience of implementing these and other innovative ideas.

3. More generally, the ability to try out or experiment with innovative ideas on a small scale is or should be one of SCF's (and other private voluntary organization's) main contributions to development assistance work. The implementation of innovative ideas is risky and may lead to failures. However, when they succeed, they tend to produce significant social or economic impacts. Experimentation, however, should always be accompanied by careful recording and sound evaluation. Evaluations should be carried out to isolate and understand the factors leading to these projects' success or failure and assess their unintended as well as intended effects. The main criterion to evaluate innovative projects should not be their success but the degree of understanding of the factors contributing to the projects'

outcomes -- successes and failures. These evaluations should try to provide insights on how innovative projects can combine risk taking (and the probability of failure) with successful project outcomes needed for the community to develop feelings of mastery and control over events.

Sponsor agencies should develop special criteria for funding, monitoring and evaluating experimental projects. Funding should cover extended periods and be responsive to unexpected budget requests. Monies for evaluation should be integral to the project, and the sponsor agency should devote staff time to monitor and learn from the project implementation.

4. Participatory development seems to be affected by the complexity of the project task which, in turn, affects leadership styles and cooperation between participants. As the project record reviewed here shows, SCF's productivity projects are more difficult than infrastructure ones and require stronger leadership and more outside intervention. The evidence suggests that fostering community participation should be achieved in the initial stages through planning, monitoring, and evaluation rather than by trying to minimize leadership and/or outside intervention. SCF's productivity projects, in particular, require extensive outside technical assistance in areas ranging from cooperative management to marketing. These projects also need close monitoring, particularly where they are under traditional leadership, to ensure equal distribution of the economic returns. The project section of this report gives additional suggestions for the individual projects visited.

5. In Honduras and Colombia, CBIRD appears to reach the poor majority but not the poorest. To reach the latter, projects have to have specific targets which implies, at the very least, knowing who the poorest are and

what they do. The evidence shows that landless rural men and women and women headed households are two of the poorest subgroups that can be reached by modifying current programs and/or designing new ones. Even if SCF's goal is not to reach the poorest groups, (in fact, in many cases it may be impossible or too costly to do so) SCF's staff should be aware of who and where the poorest are. This question should be incorporated in all planning and evaluation exercises and formats.

6. SCF shares with other agencies implementing community based development programs many problems, only some of which have project-related solutions. Little can be done at the project level about structural socio-economic constraints the poor face. However, problems such as strong leadership promoting effectiveness but at the same time undercutting community participation, rapid disbursements affecting success but also institutionalization, commitment to the project and the need for termination, are solvable dilemmas. They require reflection and careful analysis on a project as well as a program basis and technical solutions. But, formally addressing these problems may adversely affect the very flexibility and interaction which underlie approaches like CBIRD. SCF and other similar agencies will have to achieve a clever balance between needed structure and individuality.

ANNEX I

SAVE THE CHILDREN FOUNDATION (SCF) HDQT

DPG - Money



DPG - MONEY/SCF

	Hdqt. SCF f/y '75	Hdqt. SCF f/y '76	Hdqt. SCF f/y '77	Hdqt. SCF f/y '78	Honduras-SCF in country f/y '77	Honduras-SCF in country f/y '78
Technical Advisor Consultant	9.7%	10.5%	11.9%	12.4%	16.6%	3%
Program Planning	-o-	9.1%	11.4%	5.0%	4.7%	5.4%
Program Design	71.9%	20.8%	14.6%	7.9%	-o-	-o-
Training	-o-	11.5%	20.4%	14.9%	47.2%	59.1%
Support Services	-o-	4.7%	2.7%	17.5%	-o-	-o-
Salaries	14.8%	43.6%	39.1%	42.2%	31.4%	32.3%
Total	$8,039.90	$160,346.73	$237,198.56	$253,279.86	$25,21300	$21,756.86

LATIN AMERICA - IN-COUNTRY DPG MONEY

	F/y 1976	F/y 1977	F/y 1978	F/y 1979
Total Latin America	$ 2,292.83	$ 12,864.47	$ 26,318.28	$ 4,037.11
Colombia				
Total	n.a.	n.a.	$ 21,660	$ 10,599.00
Honduras				
Tech.		16.6%	3%	
Program Plan		4.7%	5.4%	
Training		47.2%	59.1%	
Local Staff/ Support		31.4%	32.3%	
Total		$ 25,213.00	$ 21,756.86	

SCF-HONDURAS - IN-COUNTRY DPG MONEY



Source: Hdqt. SCF
In-country SCF Staff - Colombia
Honduras

ANNEX 2

COLOMBIA

The Sibundoy Valley area includes 5 towns and various settlement in the southwestern state of Putumayo. It is a high, river plain (7,500 (7,500 ft. alt.) near the source of the Putumayo River. The area is fertile, allowing for both warm and cold crops but prone to heavy rains (2,000 - 4,000 mm. annually), periodic flooding with high erosion and fairly rapid deforestation. The land comprises 23,000 hectares, 9,000 in the valley and 13,000 in the hill and mountain areas.

There are 23,000 inhabitants. Sixty one percent are white settlers and 39% are two main indigenous Indian tribes, the Kamas and the Ingas. The Indians have access to mountain lands but almost none in the valley. Eighty three percent of the inhabitants are engaged in farming. Seventy two percent of the farms over all are less than 5 hectares, and of the Kama population, 65% of the families farm less than 3 hectares and 14% of the Kama households are landless. In 1970 a land redistribution program was initiated to redistribute valley land to the Indian population; to date, 1,500 hectares have been distributed. Land ownership is highly skewed; nationally 10% of landowners hold 80% of land area.

Malnutrition is rampant in the area, with 50.3% families receiving only 56% of daily calorie requirements with conditions significantly worse for children. Infant mortality nationally is 97/100 and a SCF sample study in Sibundoy showed that in 86% of the families, 3 or more children had died before age two. There is one doctor available per 7,666 people.

There is almost no access to either potable water, sanitary disposal or electricity. Literacy is significantly lower than the national average, 49.2% and 81% respectively. Eighty five percent of children have some primary school, though drop-out rates are high.

HONDURAS

The district of Pespire, comprising 87% of the area of Choluteca Province, has a population of 20,000 in 9 villages and 4 satelite villages. It is a fairly dry region (between 60-80" rain annually) and has distinct wet and dry seasons, meaning crop possibilities are limited by access to water. The land is fertile and seventy percent of the inhabitants live by farming. Of these farmers, 50.5 percent rent land. Fifty eight percent of the Pespire population is landless as compared to the national rural average of 33%. Seventy five percent of the farms are smaller than 12 blocks.

Pespire has a high incidence of malaria. Less than 10% of households have access to potable water. According to a SCF sample survey, only 2% of households have latrines and only 20% have sanitary and garbage facilities. Malnutrition and digestive diseases are the most significant health problems. Twenty percent of the inhabitants have goiter and 85% of population (especially children) are calorie deficient. Ten percent of children die before reaching age six. Nationally, children under 5 account for 45% of all deaths. Seventy two percent of the children have attended some school and 56/100 of the adult population can at least write their name.

The general conditions for the rural populations in Columbia and Honduras are similar, yet of Colombia's 25.2 million population, only 26% is rural while, in Honduras, of the 3 million population, 68% is rural. Nationally, Colombia and Honduras present very different levels of development and human resource pool. Colombia is 64% urban based, 69% of the labor force is engaged in non-agricultural activities (e.g., manufacturing; services), constitute 74% of GDP, 81% of all Colombians are literate. Honduras, on the other hand, has only 3 million people, 32% of which are urban. Thirty-seven percent of the labor force is engaged in non-agricultural production (yet contribute 70% of GDP). The literacy rate in Honduras is 52%.

Colombia has a large pool of highly trained professional and technical personnel; over 2 million people or 8% of the population is university trained. Five percent of the Honduras population is university trained, yet with a population of 3 million, this creates a professional reserve pool of only 150,000 individuals.

AREA SPECIFIC INDICATORS

	Sibundoy, Putumayo - COLOMBIA	Pespire, Choluteca - HONDURAS
Population	23,000	19,336 (8.7% Choluteca)
Town distr.	4 towns	9 villages/4 satellite villages
Households		3,355
	39% Native population 350 households - Kamsas 923 HH - Ingas	
Occupation	83% farmers	70.3% farmers
Educ. Adult	49.2%	56/100 write name - 15/100 3 years school 72.2% attend same
Educ. Child.	85% attend some prime school	Most attend some// high drop rate
Health	50.3% families - 56% cal req.	> 10% access to water 2% families - latrines (SCF sample) 20% families - Sanitation/Garbage
	High incidence malaria 1 doctor/7,666 pop. 43% of infant mortality - respiratory disease	20% Goiter 85% (esp. child.) Cal. deficient 10% children die age 6 years
Mort.	86% families. 3 or more children died age 2	
Land	Medium fertile land generally	General Coffee region/fertile land
	High River Platue (alt. 7,500 ft.)	
	Flood periodic // 2,000-4,000 mm. rain/annual 9,000 hect.//13,000 hect./mt. hill	60 - 80" rain/annual
	High erosion//Deforestation	
Farm Size	Total 72.4% < 5 hect.	75.3% < 12 61.7% farms < 8 blocks
	Kamsas - 76.% < 5 hect.//40% < 2 hect.	
	- 14.36% landless/other	58% landless
	71.% < 0.50 hect. (ownership)	50.5% farmers rent land

LAND DISTRIBUTION IN SIBUNDOY, COLOMBIA

Overall 1973 land distribution

hect.	Families	%	Areas
0-5	2,606	72.4	4,068
5-10	424	11.8	3,217
10-50	527	14.6	13,498
> 50	44	1.22	3,916
	72		462
Total	3,672	100.%	25,165

LAND DISTRIBUTION IN KAMSAS HOUSEHOLD

Range Area hect.	Families	Area	% fam.	% area	Average
0-5	71	25.70	20.82	3.25	0.36
0.51 - 1.0	67	65.05	19.65	8.22	0.97
1.01 - 2.00	57	101.55	16.72	12.84	1.78
2.01 - 3.00	36	192.75	10.56	13.00	2.85
3.01 - 5.00	28	121.00	8.21	15.30	4.31
5.01 - 10.00	22	171.75	6.45	21.73	7.81
More 10.00	11	203.00	3.23	25.66	18.45
No info/no land	49		14.36		
	341	790.8	100.00	100.00	2.71

Censo Ayuda Estudiantil Nov. '76.

LAND DISTRIBUTION IN PESPIRE, HONDURAS

(SCF sample survey - 1974)

58%	-	landless
42%	-	land access

Population with land access		
37.%	-	1-4 blocks
24.7%	-	5-8 blocks
13.6%	-	9-12 blocks
24.7%	>	12 blocks

NATIONAL INDICATORS

Population/Human Resources

	Colombia	Honduras
Total	25.2 million	3 million
Growth rate	2.3%	2.7%
Rural	36.%	68.%
Urban	64.%	32.%
Age distr.		46.% less 16 years
Labor force		
Ag.	31.%	63.%
Manuf./Serv.	69.%	37.%
GDP		
Ag/GDP	26.%	30.%
Manuf./Serv./ GDP	74.%	70.%
Income	bottom 50.% pop - 10% income	bottom 50.% pop - 13.% income. Rural per capita - 20.% National average
Education		
Literacy	81.%	52.%
Primary	106.%	81.%
Second.	35.%	13.%
Univ.	5.%	5.%
Primary rural	65.%	
Complete	10%	

HEALTH/INDICATORS

	Colombia	Honduras
Access to potable water	64% (rural 23%)	40% (Choluteca 10%)
Access to Sanitation		20%
Access to electricity	33%	27% urban
Doctors/population	1,820	3,300
Life expenctancy	62 years	57 years
Over all Cal.% required	94%	94%
	Putumayo 50.3% families - 56% cal.	15% Adequate//85% cal. deficient
Health Problem	(1) Malnutrition Malnutrition directly cause 16% of child. deaths	(1) Malnutrition
	(2) Typhoid/digestive diseases	(2) Gastritis/digestive 7.3% deaths
	(3) Tuberculosis	(3) Tuberculosis
	(4) Malaria 3/1,000 - 1970// 80/1,000 - 1960	(4) Malaria 78% country infested
Mortality		
Crude death	90/1,000	146/1,000
Infant mort.	97/1,000	117/1,000
Age 1 - 4 children mort.	90/1,000	140/1,000
	Countries w/similar income levels 54-57/1,000	Children under 5 45% all deaths

LAND RESOURCE INDICATORS

	Colombia	Honduras
Density/Arable	109/Km^2 arable land	104/Km^2 arable land
Farm land	3% total area	
	25% of farm/high erosion	
Forest	48% total area	45% total area
	Rapid deforestation	
Rainfall	250 - 300" average year round	68 - 80" average Dry/wet season: April/Oct. - wet Oct./Nov. - dry
<u>Farm/ag. land</u>		
Farm size	25% < 1 hect.	
	62% < 5 hect.	66% < 2.5 hect.
<u>Land access</u>		
	3% owners own 55% land	Top Quintil own 60.6% land
	Top 10% own 80% land	33% Rural - landless
	Bottom 10% own 0.2% land	Bottom Quintil own 5% land

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