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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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TO - WASHINGTON

TO AID A- 28

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FROM - BARACAS

SUBJECT - NONCAPITAL PROJECT PAPER (PROP)
Public Safety

REFERENCE -

Attached airgram "NONCAPITAL PROJECT PAPER (PROP) Public Safety" is being forwarded as a matter of record. It is presently anticipated that the Public Safety component of the AID program will be phased out on June 30, 1971.

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OTHER AGENCY

Enclosures: Airgram TOAID A-29 of 4/7/71.

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DRAFTED BY AID Affairs Officer	OFFICE USAID	PHONE NO. 124	DATE 4/6/71	APPROVED BY: DCH: F. J. Devine
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AID AND OTHER CLEARANCES

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TO - WASHINGTON **BOAID A-29**

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April 7, 1971

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Mail Room

FROM - **CARACAS**

SUBJECT - **NONCAPITAL PROJECT PAPER (PROP)
Public Safety**

REFERENCE -

NONCAPITAL PROJECT PAPER (PROP)

Country: Venezuela

Project: 529-11-710-022

SUBMISSION DATE: March 5, 1971 Original REVISION No 3

PROJECT TITLE: PUBLIC SAFETY

U.S. OBLIGATION SPAN: FY62-through FY 74

PHYSICAL IMPLEMENTATION SPAN: FY62 through FY74

U.S. LIFE-OF-PROJECT FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS:

U.S. DOLLARS: \$3,490,000

U.S. OWNED LOCAL CURRENCY : None

COOPERATING COUNTRY CASH CONTRIBUTION: \$7,000,000 est.*

OTHER DONOR: NONE

OTHER AGENCY

* Since commodities are not involved, the program does not operate under a project agreement. Therefore, cooperating country's contribution must be estimated. We believe estimated GOV contribution of \$7,000,000 for participant training and police equipment is a conservative estimate.

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DRAFTED BY
H. Salsola

OFFICE
Public Safety

PHONE NO. DATE
60 **3/5/71**

APPROVED BY:
H. André Weismann, AID Affairs Officer

AID AND OTHER CLEARANCES
JR Charlton
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A. SUMMARY DESCRIPTION1. Necessity and Justification

The Public Safety project was initiated in FY 1962 when severe threats to internal security existed. Well organized subversive elements had brought about a wave of violence in Venezuela, heretofore unknown, that posed serious threats to the democratic government. Kidnappings and even assassinations took place frequently - the latter directed principally at the police and the military. Businesses and commercial establishments, often those of North American interests, were bombed and burned regularly. All of this was a dangerous threat to the stability of the government and to social, political, and economic development. An atmosphere of lawlessness prevailed that made development of the country most difficult. At that time the civil security forces, in terms of equipment, organization, training - even in terms of morale - were ill equipped to deal with the situation. As a result, at the request of the GOV, a program of assistance to the civil police forces was agreed upon. The over-all objective was that of improving the internal security capability of the police forces so as to produce a climate conducive to political, social, and economic growth.

During the nine-year span of the Public Safety program, the security forces have increased their capability, democratic elections have been observed, and the development of the country continues.

The GOV pacification program which liberated hundreds of political prisoners appears to have been successful. Some of them left the country, others returned to a quiet life, a few are again working in their political organizations, including the Communist Party (PCV), and still others have either gone underground or have not been heard from. It is believed that most of them have retained their ideology and, in due time and if the conditions are right, they could resume their insurgency efforts. However, this is not a serious problem at this time. There is a definite need for continuation of U.S. assistance to the city and state police forces so that they will be better coordinated, their operations and training made more uniform, and the police protection to commerce improved upon. Assistance will also be provided to the National Guard to (1) improve their capability to accomplish their police mission and (2) provide direction to the municipal police.

2. Targets, Changes in Situation and Results Expected.

During the first years of the program the stated project goals were:

- (a) An extensive training program - both local and U.S. Training - for immediate impact and to bring about some increased police capability as early as possible.
- (b) The establishment of a unified command center that would coordinate the efforts of the many independent civil police forces - especially during emergency situations.

- (c) Expansion and modernization of the laboratory of the Investigative Police (PTJ) as a support element needed by the police forces.
- (d) Establishment of a good identification and criminal records bureau which was another support element greatly needed by the police; and
- (e) The creation of a national academy that would centralize the training of the various police groups.

The first four of these objectives, insofar as concerns their establishment and development, have been achieved. Over 570 Venezuelan police officers have been trained in the States; and over 16,000 have been trained locally, however, about 80% of those that received training have left the police for various reasons. A good police laboratory and a good records and identification bureau have been established. These are efficient and well-organized, constitute an important support arm of the police forces, and definitely have improved police capability. The last of the original targets has not yet been attained. Although training exists in all police forces, and is generally adequate in methods and substance due to Public Safety efforts, there is not yet a national police academy that centralizes police training.

As a result of improvement of the security forces and the attainment of certain original objectives -- at least one of which (training) was somewhat of a crash objective -- together with a changing situation and a continued need for improvement, new objectives have been established. They are (1) greater use of the Caracas internal security unified command and extension of this concept to other cities; (2) more centralization of the programming and standardization of police training; (3) improvement of the capability of the National Guard to handle its police mission; and (4) improved coordination and more uniformity of operation between the many police forces of the cities and states of Venezuela, which, although politically responsible to the Ministry of Interior, are operationally independent forces.

Public Safety considers the latter two goals especially important to internal security and to accomplishment of the over-all Public Safety objective for the reasons that follow.

The most serious breakdown in law enforcement is in the interior (states and cities) where the civil police forces, principally due to instability and political influence, have failed to progress as have the national police agencies with which Public Safety collaborates. About 80% of the police were replaced after March 1969 when COPEI party took over the government leadership.

The GOV, by assigning National Guard officers to command the police, has started to unify the police within a few states, and improvements can be observed in some states for job security and less political interference in police matters. The National Guard leadership in the police and the pacification program as well as other social improvements has changed the internal security situation for the better, and it has also increased the GOV requests for Public Safety technical assistance.

The National Guard, although under the Ministry of Defense and militarily oriented and structured, devotes an estimated 80% of its time to civil police duties. These police duties, however, are principally related to such matters as forestry control, frontier control, industrial protection, external control of prisons, and law enforcement in less populated areas. Except during emergencies it takes no active part in law enforcement in the towns and cities. At 16 cities National Guard officers have been assigned as Police Commanders. In the cities where they have met with success with the assistance from Public Safety, they have started to improve the capability of the loosely knit police agencies of the interior of Venezuela. At a few states the National Guard officers have reorganized the municipal police into a state police system. Recently, by Presidential decree, the municipal police have been authorized to assist in traffic control and enforcement of traffic laws. Public Safety has been recommending this move. The National Traffic enforcement detachments were placed under the command of National Guard officers, improvements have started but there is so much to be done in traffic education of drivers and pedestrians that this will take several years to cut down or hold to a reasonable level the high rate of traffic accidents with deaths or injuries. (NOTE: While statistics are not available, the police believe that the rate is nearing the ratio of countries which have greater population, greater number of cars and higher number of persons killed and injured due to traffic accidents). The National Guard is a stable respected organization and, if sufficiently trained along police lines, could do much to improve internal security in the interior. Public Safety has convinced the National Guard high command to increase the subjects and number of hours in police training for the officers and guardsmen.

3. Minimum Levels of Output and Achievements Expected.

The over-all objectives, that of giving the civil police forces a good internal security capability, is quite important to the future and progress of Venezuela. Nevertheless, this goal-- and this is also true of the individual targets established to attain this goal -- does not lend itself to development and stages in exact quantitative terms. A requisite for continued U.S. contribution and participation is the continued need for a productive use of U.S. technical assistance and sufficient self-help measures -- in terms of interest, implementation, funds, and equipment -- to maintain a satisfactory measure of progress in established goals.

Continuation of the program for an estimated three additional years is justified, provided the GOV continues to want and to use U.S. technical assistance satisfactorily, and continues to provide adequate self-help measures. This will depend upon the report of the Public Safety Evaluation team of February 23, 1971. The basis for this is a current estimate that the subversive threat to internal security, although substantially reduced since the inception of the program, is latent. There is a need for the protection of industry, commerce and the people; the city and state police, for the most part, are just developing after less than two years of police experience due to the high rate of turnover. The GOV, from the President, the Ministers, and the Governors down to the Police Commanders, want to improve the police; they believe in law and order with justice and Public Safety is being called upon to assist. Hopefully, the police will reach the level that they can carry on their operations without outside assistance within the three-year period.

4. Plan of Action

At this point in the report, it should be brought out that Venezuela, in contrast to most Latin American countries that have only two or perhaps three major police organizations, has a large number of independent forces under separate Ministries. The National Guard, with an important civil police responsibility is responsible to the Ministry of Defense. The Judicial Technical Police (PTJ), a national plain clothes force that investigates common crimes, is under the Ministry of Justice. The Traffic Police, with traffic responsibility and also national in scope, is responsible to the Ministry of Communications. The Metropolitan Police, which polices Caracas and the surrounding areas including Petare, is administered by the Governor of the Federal District. In addition, the cities and states throughout Venezuela have their own police forces which, although they have a political connection with the Ministry of Interior, actually operate independently, and are responsible to their respective governors and prefects. The Public Safety program cooperates with all of the above mentioned forces.

The general approach is a program of technical assistance, provided by a staff of U.S. advisors, that involves all the above mentioned security forces and includes assistance in almost all normal phases of police activity. Commodities are not involved. The U.S. financial contribution, during the nine years the program has existed, averages \$300,000 per year for U.S. Advisors, participant training, and other costs. Due to a reduction in the number of advisors during the remaining years of the program, U.S. costs will average about \$ 243,000 per year for the same three elements. The U.S., therefore, provides only technical assistance and financial assistance in participant training with a staff of U.S. advisors that has been reduced from twelve to a present staff of ~~four~~ advisors of four. The GOV, on the other hand, partially funds participant training by paying all international transportation of participants. It also funds all equipment and commodity purchases necessary for the achievement of targets and general improvement of the police. The exact amount of equipment purchases cannot be determined since the program does not operate under a Project Agreement, but it is conservatively estimated that, since the inception of the program, the GOV has purchased in the

United States over \$6,500,000 in needed police equipment.

Another input of the GOV that is of considerable importance, but requires little financial support, is that of making administrative, organizational, and operational changes that are agreed upon and that improve police capability. The inputs of both governments are designed to give civil police forces a good internal security capability. These inputs are channelled through individual targets and goals, which are changed as improvement is made and conditions change.

B. SETTING OR ENVIRONMENT

1. As mentioned, the program originated nine years ago when an extreme state of lawlessness and insurgency existed in Venezuela and, at the request of the GOV, a program of assistance was initiated to give civil security forces the capability to contain this threat. Individual targets have been established and modified, as the occasion requires, that hopefully will attain the ultimate goal of providing police forces the capability not only to contain the threat but to hold it to an irreducible minimum. Obviously this is closely related to, and necessary to, the general development and growth of Venezuela in an orderly fashion. Original goals and targets were directed, because of the emergency situation, towards improvement of the individual police organizations, as described under A-4, "Plan of Action". Current goals are directed more towards coordination of efforts of the various police forces, centralization of efforts, interchange of information and facilities, and, where possible, the consolidation of independent forces.

2. As to economic, social, legislative, and administrative obstacles in the path of the goals: first, there is no serious economic problem. The national and Metropolitan Police forces, and the interior forces to somewhat lesser degree, enjoy far better governmental financial support than that usually found in LA countries. Funds for operations and equipment are in most cases adequate. The nearest thing to a social problem is the fact that the police of the interior are generally from the lower classes and have a poor public image. This is not true to any great degree, however, of the national and Metropolitan Police organizations, who have an adequate budget and more capable personnel. As concerns administrative problems, again we must differentiate between the police of the interior and those of the national and Capital forces. Police officials of the interior are in most cases unqualified political appointees whose tenure of office is short. Poor administration is prevalent in those forces. The national and Metropolitan Police organizations, however, provide a career service and, in most but not all cases, administrators are educated people with fairly good administrative capability. Even in the latter two organizations, however, officials are occasionally replaced for political reasons - a factor which does not help the administration of these agencies. The legislative factor could, however,

be an important "roadblock" in the attainment of objectives. The elimination or reduction of political influence in the police of the interior and consolidation of any independent forces require legislative action. The present GOV administration, which took office in March of 1969, does not have control of Congress and is having difficulty in its attempts to get new legislation. At the present time, there is no certainty that legislation in regard to the police services would be approved.

3. It is repeated that current objectives are directed towards centralization, coordination, interchange of facilities, and, if possible, even the consolidation of the major police forces, and the alleviation of the problem of instability, poor administration, and political influence in the police forces of the interior. The GOV administration is interested in reforms related to these goals, and in two instances consolidation of police forces has been achieved. A third consolidation is now in progress. Also, a program designed to centralize and coordinate the training and operations of the interior police has been initiated. Mitigating factors, however, are difficulty in securing new legislation and a natural tendency on the part of the independent police forces to retain their present status.

4. A bright spot in the picture, that adds considerable justification for the program, is the fact that it is truly a program of technical assistance that is sought after and utilized by the cooperating agencies. The current GOV administration has publicly announced its desire to reorganize and improve the police services. Police officials and administrators, in order to bring this about, are relying on Public Safety assistance. It is not an exaggeration to state that the staff of U.S. advisors is, at the present time, extremely hard pressed in its attempts to comply with the number of requests for help that it receives. Public Safety must shift its personnel and their assignments frequently in order to keep all going activities covered and at the same time respond to additional requests that originate from the various police organizations. There is no question that cooperating agencies are seeking assistance and in most cases utilizing it well.

C. STRATEGY

1. Alternative Approaches or Techniques

a. Technical Assistance Projects.

The established approach is a broad program of technical assistance, through a staff of U.S. technicians, that emphasizes training, administration, and operating procedures. In the early stages of the program, this was directed towards over-all improvement of the various police entities and, in the present and future stages, more towards coordination and centralization of police efforts. We see no alternate U.S. approach that would be practical. Without this assistance, the Venezuelan police organizations might eventually reach the desired state of proficiency, but it would be by a longer and more arduous road.

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Also GOV police officials have stated that if U.S. assistance is not forthcoming, they will look elsewhere for it. If another country were to assume this responsibility, continuity would be disrupted and probably some progress lost, at least temporarily. We would also lose the influence which has been established by Public Safety.

b. Cooperating Country Leadership

The GOV administration has publicly and on several occasions indicated its intention to improve, to reorganize in some cases, and to coordinate the police forces. At sixteen cities National Guard officers are now the Police commanders and they have started the reorganization and improvement of the police forces. Thus there is no doubt that the GOV administration has interest in and will support police reforms.

Leaders and administrators of the national police forces and the Metropolitan Police are in most cases capable administrators, have an interest in improving their forces, and look to U.S. advisors for assistance in doing so. The real problem, insofar as concerns leadership, is found in the police agencies of the states and cities, where political factors and decisions often take precedence over desires to provide leadership and good administration. However, at some states improvements have been observed with the appointment of National Guard officers as Police Commanders.

c. Cross Relationships

The Public Safety program has no clearly defined cross relationships with other projects, sectors and programs. The Public Safety program does, however, help to promote stability and create a climate which permits other projects and programs to advance in an orderly fashion. Therefore, it has a broad relationship to other projects and sectors.

Relations between the Public Safety program and the military assistance program might be described as cross relationship although the nature of the two programs is similar as both collaborate with security forces. There are close working relations between Public Safety and U.S. military advisors, to which factors of economy, administration, and coordination are related.

D. PLANNED TARGETS, RESULTS AND OUTPUTS

1. The situation of violence and lawlessness that brought about the program of assistance to the civil police forces has been described in A. SUMMARY DESCRIPTION. It is expected that the end result or ultimate goal of the program will be a situation wherein the security forces can maintain daily law and order and internal security, and hold insurgency and subversive threats to an

irreducible minimum; or a situation where they, without outside assistance, can take over all the activities initiated to give them this competence.

2. The program anticipates a number of individual results and outputs when the ultimate goal of an acceptable degree of police competence is reached. These include:

- a. Greater use of the Unified Command Center and the extension of this concept to other areas of the country.
- b. The centralization and greater uniformity of police training.
- c. The improvement of the National Guard's ability to carry its police administration and command responsibilities.
- d. A greater coordination and more uniform operations among the various independent police forces, especially those of the interior and, where possible, the consolidation of forces in the respective states.
- e. Improve police protection to industry, commerce, and other installations.

E. COURSE OF ACTION

1. During the first years of the project, which was initiated in FY 1962, concentrated training courses were given individual police forces throughout the country as a means of giving some increased capability to the police as rapidly as possible in order to meet the emergency situation. Later a more broad program was developed that provided "across the board", technical assistance to police groups. As the police became trained, they also became better equipped as the GOV made large purchases of police equipment based principally upon Public Safety suggestions. Equipment and training had a definite impact. A good police laboratory and an equally good records and identification bureau, as sorely needed support arms of the police, were developed in the Investigative Police (PTJ). An outstanding achievement that added substantially to police capability was the creation of a unified command center located in the headquarters of the Metropolitan Police. This placed representatives of the military and the different police agencies in the same operations room, each with communications directed to his own organization. At several states police officer/instructors were trained; they in turn are now training police recruits and holding in-service police training courses. These were some of the principal activities that took place between FY 1962 and FY 1970.

2. In order to add further to police capability and to reach the ultimate goal, the following activities are now initiated and will carry on for an estimated three additional years:

a. The Unified Command Center will be better equipped and given added capability. Attempts will be made to extend the concept of a unified command, on a less sophisticated basis, to other cities of the Republic. At Maracay and Coro the command centers have been organized and equipped; at other cities they plan to establish the centers.

b. The police of the interior -- the cities and states -- will be better coordinated and their operations and training made more uniform. It has already been agreed that this activity will be conducted through the National Guard (FAC) in cooperation with the Ministry of Interior, to which the interior forces owe some political allegiance. In FY 1971 this concept was supported by the Minister of Defense who gave his approval for a National Guard ranking-officer to head this activity. Public Safety provides an advisor to this activity, and progress continues to be made. Training in a uniform manner was provided to these agencies through mobile training teams controlled by the Ministry. Phase two of training was started in FY 1970, Public Safety now trains officer-instructors through mobile training teams. Their purchases of equipment will be standardized and controlled by the Ministry. Also, Public Safety in providing assistance to this activity, will urge the Ministry to stabilize the interior forces and give them job security through decree or legislation.

c. The National Guard will be given a better capability to accomplish its police mission. Although the Guard is militarily structured and oriented, Public Safety estimates that 80% of its duties are of a civil police nature. It has a highly important internal security and civil police role, and is the only national uniformed police agency. Traditionally, however, it has considered itself a military institution. In recent months, due to Public Safety influence, it has begun to recognize the need to train and to orient its personnel along civil police lines. Its recruit training course of six months now has approximately 300 hours devoted to police materials, most of which were supplied, and in some cases taught, by Public Safety. Its mobile (emergency) unit has been trained in riot control along civil police lines. Additional civil police orientation, training and methods are necessary, and this must be an objective for the rest of the life of the program. Again, this is done through technical assistance in training and general police procedures. It should be pointed out, too, that both AID Public Safety advisors and U.S. military advisors collaborate with this organization in a highly coordinated cooperative manner.

d. Better coordination between police organizations, consolidation of forces, wherever possible, and common use of facilities that exist only in one particular organization. This is an important activity that will continue to be throughout the life of the program, and will be accomplished through technical assistance. Thus, the large number of forces have been reduced by at least two. Further unification of police forces, however, may meet legislative and political resistance. Some improved coordination has been brought about by the Unified Command Center, the creation of an inter-ministry security committee, the assignment of National Guard officers to command the police forces, and an interchange of instructors. Also some success has been noted in getting other police agencies to utilize the police laboratory and the identification and records bureau of the Investigative Police (PTJ), and send police officers from the interior for training to the Metropolitan Police. There is much more to be done, however, in this particular activity. Public Safety advisors will continue to encourage this in their daily contacts with police officials, and in their reports to and contacts with the Ministerial and other high level GOV officials.

3. The inputs of the U.S. government, in carrying on the activities enumerated above, are technical assistance by a staff of U.S. advisors, and participant training. Contracts and commodities are not involved. In other words, the U.S. provides only personnel and some financing of participant training. The U.S. staff, which at one time totalled twelve advisors who provided technical assistance to four national police organizations, the Metropolitan Police, and to the many city and state forces through the Ministry of Interior, carry on all the activities related in this report that are directed towards the objectives listed. They are hard pressed to cover this much territory and any reduction in the staff would cause a corresponding reduction in the assistance provided. The input of the GOV, financially, is that of international transportation for participants and the purchases of police equipment -- primarily firearms, communications equipment, vehicles, and records and laboratory equipment -- required to improve police capability. Another GOV input is that of administrative, procedural, and organizational changes required to attain goals and bring about improvement.

Generally speaking, police officials of the National and Metropolitan Police organizations, knowing that A.I.D. gives no commodity or direct financial support but provides only advice, nevertheless look to Public Safety for that advice. They frequently ask for technical advice, and they are usually specific in their requests. As a result, some administrative reforms have been achieved and more are expected.

There has been no legislative action in respect to the police forces, however, and there is no assurance there will be. However, by Presidential decree, the municipal police were authorized to enforce traffic laws. Moreover, in March 1971 as a result of the political and civic outcry against the kidnappings legislation for a Military Court system is expected; timely trials are demanded.

National Guard Police Commanders of the interior have been seeking technical assistance; the short tenure of office of the Chief is no longer a problem.

Another input of the GOV is the appropriate use of the 570 returned participant trainees. In the national and Metropolitan Police organizations, there has been only a small loss of participants, and, generally speaking, they are used well. A substantial number of returned participants hold key positions in these organizations, and a good number serve as instructors. The situation is different in the interior, however, where again political influences and turnover in personnel has made the participant program much less effective.

4. The scale of the program, we believe, is determined principally by the size of the U.S. staff. The program, as stated before, is a program of technical assistance to several different police organizations under four different ministries. Additional activities could probably be absorbed and implemented by the GOV, but this would require a large U.S. staff. With the reduction of Public Safety to four advisors it has been necessary to establish new priorities and decrease the technical assistance to the Investigative Police (PTJ) and the Metropolitan Police.

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