

# PROBLEMS OF WAR VICTIMS IN INDOCHINA

## Part II: CAMBODIA AND LAOS

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### HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS  
CONNECTED WITH REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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# PROBLEMS OF WAR VICTIMS IN INDOCHINA

## PART II: CAMBODIA AND LAOS

TUESDAY, MAY 9, 1972

U.S. SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 9:50 a.m., in room 2228, New Senate Office Building, Senator Edward M. Kennedy (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Kennedy and Fong.

Also present: Dale S. de Haan, counsel; Jerry M. Tinker, staff consultant; and Mrs. Dorothy Parker, assistant to Senator Fong.

Senator KENNEDY. The subcommittee will come to order.

If the decade of death and devastation we have brought to Vietnam has taught us any single lesson, it is that the road to peace is not the road of wider war.

And now, because President Nixon has once again so clearly failed to learn that lesson, the United States and the world community of nations have this morning entered a new and far more deadly and dangerous era in the Indochina war.

The mining of Haiphong Harbor is a senseless act of military desperation by a President incapable of finding the road to peace. Again and again in the tragic history of American involvement in Vietnam, President Lyndon Johnson wisely resisted the siren call of the military planners for the mining of Haiphong. Now, President Nixon has succumbed to that foolhardy proposal, and the mines are being dropped.

In a sense, the dropping of the mines is the most vivid demonstration we have yet had of the total failure of the President's plan to end the war in Indochina and the bankruptcy of his unfulfilled plan for peace. For years, we have known the vast international risks of mining Haiphong, and the negligible military benefit it can bring on the battlefields of South Vietnam.

What sense does it make to challenge the Soviet Union in the coastal waters of Indochina, when we ought to be challenging the North Vietnamese at the peace table in Paris?

What sense does it make to mine Haiphong in North Vietnam when weeks and months will pass before the action can have any possible effect on the current offensive in South Vietnam?

What sense does it make to adopt a military course of action on the war with a maximum of potential confrontation with the Soviet Union and a minimum potential gain in Indochina?

It was 4 years ago this spring that President Johnson began to implement the fragile decisions that had the first real possibility of leading us out of Vietnam. And now, by some cruel irony, in the fourth year of the Presidency of Richard Nixon, in spite of all the promises we have heard to end the war, we are witnessing one of the most drastic steps in the entire history of the escalation of the war. At this crucial time of crisis in Vietnam I believe that history and the American people will record that President Nixon has taken a terribly wrong and ill-conceived turn.

It never had to be this way. After tens of thousands of American lives have been lost and tens of billions of dollars have been spent, after hundreds of thousands of North and South Vietnamese have been killed, after millions of civilian victims have felt the awful horror of the war, the world is ready for peace in Indochina, and all the President can find to give us is more war.

The President who promised peace is bringing wider war. And now, because of his blindness on the war, more Americans and North and South Vietnamese troops will die, more innocent men and women and children will be killed and more American prisoners will be taken, and all our hopes for reconciliation with the Soviet Union are placed in jeopardy.

I yield to none in my condemnation of the invasion from the North. But I also know that the way to the peace table lies clearly at the entrance to the conference table in Paris, and not at the entrance to the harbor of Haiphong. So long as we have a President who is imprisoned by the war, so long as we have a President whose only reflex is the belligerence and aggression we heard last night, so long as we have a President whose only real goal is the pursuit of the phantom of military victory on the battlefield, we shall never have peace in Indochina.

The hearing today continues the subcommittee's public inquiry into the problems of the victims of the war in Indochina. Yesterday, we reviewed the fast deteriorating situation in Vietnam. Of special concern this morning, is the situation in Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam.

In early 1969, Laos became the principal target of a "no holds barred" air war over Indochina. Until recently, when the focus of the Indochina war again shifted to Vietnam, a rising number of refugees and civilian casualties told us of the intensity of the conflict—and the devastating impact the air war was having on the civilian population in Laos.

Although some limited progress is being made in meeting the needs of the Laotian war victims, there is, I feel, a continuing tendency on the part of our national leadership to underplay the serious dimensions of people problems throughout Indochina. We noted yesterday, for example, that it took 6 months for our Government to approve Saigon's request for little more than \$1 million to help care for over 700,000 orphans in South Vietnam. And the casual approach of our Government to the needs and the impact of 1 million new refugees in that devastated country, is distressing to this subcommittee and all Americans.

But nowhere has our sense of national priorities overseas, and the traditional humanitarian concerns of the American people, been more

distorted than in Cambodia. Estimates put the number of Cambodian refugees, over the last 2 years, at more than 2 million. Civilian casualties have numbered in the thousands. The public record suggests that our Government has not only rejected all appeals for help, but that it is the policy of our Government not to become involved with the problem of civilian war victims in Cambodia. Given the vast amounts of military hardware we are pumping into that country—hardware which helps create these war victims—our policy towards the people problems of Cambodia defies understanding.

But the President has told us that the bloodbath will continue. He told us last evening that the peace long promised the American people is nowhere in sight. He told us that Vietnamization has failed. He told us that we will try, again, to do from the air what we could not do for the past decade from the ground. We will have more war because we have missed the opportunities for peace—because we continue to play great power games over the future of Indochina rather than allowing the peoples of the area to sort out their own future.

And so, as we meet this morning, Indochina's regional crisis of people escalates. Each day of war will bring another day of human suffering. More civilians become casualties or die. More children are maimed or orphaned. More refugees flee devastated villages and towns—in North and South Vietnam and in Laos and Cambodia.

And until this tragic war finally ends, this subcommittee will regrettably—but with determination—continue to make the case that the civilian population and the plight of war victims throughout the region must be a matter of vital concern to the United States.

Before welcoming our witnesses, I would like to recognize Senator Fong.

Senator Fong. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Since you have brought up the question of what President Nixon said last night, I want to say that the President had no alternative except to do what he did—to order the mining of the ports of North Vietnam and the interdiction of shipping to these ports for the purpose of denying the North Vietnamese the supplies needed for the waging of the war.

I have long advocated the mining of Haiphong. I think the President has done everything a President could do to bring this war to an honorable conclusion. But, with every proposal, he has been rebuffed, with insolence and intransigence. Imagine what would happen to the 17 million people of South Vietnam if North Vietnam conquered them. What a bloodbath we would see. Imagine what would happen to 65,000 American soldiers in South Vietnam if North Vietnam conquered South Vietnam and held them hostage. I do hope that the people of America will support the President in this move to protect our men, to curtail the war and to prevent a bloodbath in South Vietnam.

I want to welcome you, Mr. O'Connor and Ambassador Sullivan, and to thank you for taking the time at this critical period in world history and of crisis in Indochina to come here again to inform the members of this subcommittee and the public of the current situation in Laos and Cambodia.

As I have previously stated, with the massive six-pronged invasion by North Vietnam, using troops, tanks, armored vehicles, missiles,

and artillery, the mask of hypocrisy has been torn from the war in Vietnam.

Not only the people of South Vietnam, but the people in Laos and Cambodia have been the innocent and unfortunate victims of this horrendous aggression on the part of the North Vietnamese.

In Laos and Cambodia, as in South Vietnam, the people are fleeing from their homes. But for this North Vietnamese aggression, there would be no refugees in this area and no refugee problems with which the peoples of the world and this subcommittee would be concerned.

I am much impressed with the courage and determination of these people not to fall into the hands or control of the North Vietnamese. Some of these people have been forced to flee not once, but time and time again. Even after they had worked hard and were hopefully being resettled in what they prayed would be a safe area, they have again been faced with the ugly reality of the North Vietnamese Army closing in upon them.

I understand that there are approximately 100,000 North Vietnamese troops in Laos—aiding and abetting the Communist Pathet Lao. Or, are they now called the Lao Peoples Liberation Army?

I am much impressed with what our Government is doing to alleviate the suffering of the quarter of a million or so refugees generated by the North Vietnamese aggressors.

The follow-up review of the refugee relief program in Laos, prepared by the Comptroller General in response to Senator Kennedy's request, showed that AID has increased its pre-Nixon contribution for fiscal year 1969 of \$8,423,000 to \$16,284,000 for fiscal year 1972. That is almost double what AID contributed in fiscal year 1969 to alleviate refugee suffering, to help resettle the refugees, to educate them, and to develop their economy:

Public Law 480 commodity assistance has increased from \$800,000 in fiscal year 1969 to \$1,400,000 in fiscal year 1972. The contributions of other government agencies apparently have also been increased.

Especially in view of the vastness of the problem, I am most impressed with the GAO report as to the AID program.

The GAO report, at page 10, notes "the high priority assigned refugee affairs" by AID and credits AID for many improvements in the program since the previous GAO reports. I should like to hear from you, gentlemen, on your plans to further improve this program.

Incidentally, I find nothing in this report to substantiate newspaper reports that AID is financing any military activities. The GAO report points out that AID has financed some assistance such as food and medical services for military and paramilitary personnel and their dependents. These people, too, are victims of the North Vietnamese aggressors—they, too, need help.

I feel the only humane thing, the only moral thing, is to feed these people, too, and to see that they, too, receive much-needed medical services. Whether that assistance be with AID funds is not the most important consideration.

The vital thing is that these people, too, are human; these people, too, are hungry; these people, too, are sick and wounded—these people, too, need help. Whether that help comes from AID funds or DOD or CIA funds is a secondary consideration.

In any event, apparently the payment of this needed assistance is being taken over by the other agencies involved.

With respect to Cambodia, the refugee problem seems to be very different from that in South Vietnam or Laos. The North Vietnamese invasions have resulted in Cambodians fleeing from Communist controlled territory, and Cambodians fleeing from combat activity and air strikes. Apparently, the Cambodians return to their homes as soon as possible or are taken care of by their families.

The United States has no specific program for assisting refugees in Cambodia. That is solely in the control of the Cambodian Government.

I am, nonetheless, struck by the absence of hard data as to the number of refugees and of war related casualties. The GAO report cites data furnished by Cambodian Government officials, but concludes that the number of refugees in Cambodia is largely conjectural and that their investigators found no basis for assessing the reliability of any overall figures on refugees in Cambodia. Nonetheless, I feel the GAO report has served a useful purpose in describing the conditions of the refugee centers which were visited.

The Cambodian Government, according to the GAO report, indicates it is taking into account the Cambodian tradition of families caring for their own in time of need and not counting on government, strangers, or foreigners indefinitely to assume that burden.

This is an admirable tradition—so rarely found today in the so-called developed or modern parts of the globe.

As long as the size of the burden is not beyond the Cambodians' own capacity to deal with in a traditional manner, I feel we should not rush in and help destroy that admirable tradition of self-reliance. From everything we now know, families and friends do take care of the largest part of these displaced people. That group that cannot be handled in this manner whatever the reason might be, are apparently also receiving some individual assistance as a result of the Cambodian Government's efforts, in keeping with the general standard of living in Cambodia.

According to the GAO report, apparently the Cambodian Government had not as of October 1971 requested humanitarian assistance from the United States. While the Cambodian Government effort is not fully coordinated, I feel that unless requested by the Cambodian Government or the international organizations, we should not interfere with the operations of this independent government's activities.

I see no reason for our having a guilt complex about the refugees—we have not created them. The United States is prepared to help these people meet their needs regardless of the fact that we did not cause the distress, but only when their government indicates such help would be useful and necessary.

On the other hand, I am most anxious to learn from you and the field representatives I understand you were to have here today, exactly what the refugee picture is in Laos and Cambodia as of this time.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Senator Fong.

We welcome this morning the Honorable Roderic L. O'Connor, Coordinator for Supporting Assistance, Agency for International Development; the Honorable William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,

Department of State; Major Curtis G. Cook, USAF, Assistant for Laos and Cambodia, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, and accompanying them are Mr. Jack L. Williamson, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Refugee Affairs, USAID Mission to Laos; and Dr. Patricia A. McCreedy, Public Health Advisor, Project Manager, Public Health Division, USAID Mission to Laos.

Ambassador Sullivan, you may proceed.

**STATEMENTS OF HON. WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND HON. RODERIC L. O'CONNOR, COORDINATOR FOR SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ. CURTIS G. COOK, U.S. AIR FORCE, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; DR. PATRICIA A. McCREEDY, PUBLIC HEALTH ADVISOR, USAID MISSION TO LAOS; JACK L. WILLIAMSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR REGIONAL AFFAIRS, USAID MISSION TO LAOS; ANDREW F. ANTIPPAS, EMBASSY, PHNOM PENH; THOMAS J. CORCORAN, DIRECTOR FOR LAO AND CAMBODIAN AFFAIRS; ROBERT BLACKBURN; AND ERNEST L. KERLEY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, and Senator Fong, once again I am privileged to appear before this subcommittee to discuss refugees and war victims in Indochina. Our proceedings are overshadowed by the tragic events which are occurring in the Indochinese States and by the mounting toll of refugees and civilian victims who have been caught up in the war. Once again I commend this subcommittee and its staff for bringing these facts before the conscience of the world and for emphasizing the hardships which war visits upon innocent civilians.

Yesterday the subcommittee discussed Vietnam where the most violent fighting is now occurring as a result of a massive North Vietnamese invasion. Today we are to discuss Laos and Cambodia where fighting has been significantly reduced as the North Vietnamese forces have concentrated the full fury of their efforts in South Vietnam. However, the history of the past year since my last appearance before this subcommittee has not been a calm one for either Laos or Cambodia.

In Laos the North Vietnamese attacked in unprecedented numbers and with particular brutality at the end of last December. Using for the first time heavy artillery that included the 130 millimeter cannon, considerable numbers of tanks, and occasional forays by Mig aircraft, the North Vietnamese drove the Lao defenders from the Plaine des Jarres and threatened Long Tieng in the north of Laos. In the south of Laos the North Vietnamese have taken over all of the Bolovens Plateau.

These two actions produced the bulk of the refugees who were forced to flee the war during the past year. Despite these two fairly

large dislocations, by February of this year the number of refugees throughout Laos has decreased by about 25 percent from last June's alltime high of 317,000. Resettlement efforts have gone reasonably well, although the Lao Government faces the unresolved problem of what to do with the displaced mountain peoples of northern Laos. Mr. O'Connor and members of the mission in Laos will be prepared to discuss these events in greater detail.

In Cambodia, as Senator Fong has indicated, the refugee situation is substantially different from that in Laos. Although the North Vietnamese control roughly one-third of the territory of the Khmer Republic and although an estimated 2 million people have at one time or another been displaced by this invasion, there are only a limited number of persons who live in refugee camps or in a conspicuous refugee status. This circumstance results from the way in which the Khmer population has reacted to the war. From the basis of their expanded family system the Khmer have absorbed most of the displaced persons into their households in Phnom Penh and the larger provincial capitals.

Consequently the visible refugee population is small and the Khmer Government takes considerable pride in attempting to cope with it through its own institutions and its own organization. The Khmer have received external assistance in the form of goods and services, particularly from Japan, to aid them in this task. They have, however, made a point of refraining from asking the United States for assistance in this field.

Mr. O'Connor, in his statement, will comment in more detail on these matters. Mr. Antippas, who has come from our mission in Phnom Penh and who has responsibility within that mission for following the refugee problem, is prepared to supplement Mr. O'Connor's remarks.

Mr. Chairman, if you agree, I should like to introduce Mr. O'Connor, who has a prepared statement to read which will cover both Laos and Cambodia.

Senator KENNEDY. Very well.

Mr. O'CONNOR. Mr. Chairman, I gather you want to start on Cambodia. And I have a brief statement on Cambodia, and a brief summary statement on Laos.

Senator KENNEDY. Before we start, perhaps I could ask a question of Major Cook.

The President talked last evening about the 20,000 civilian casualties that had been inflicted on the South Vietnamese by the recent invasion. I was wondering if you could give us any information to elaborate on that—where they were, and how those figures were reached. We heard yesterday from administration personnel, and we heard nothing about it. I am just wondering how those figures were reached so fast.

Major Cook. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I have no information on that.

Mr. SULLIVAN. I have some limited information, Mr. Chairman. Between 7,000 and 7,500 were killed, according to the estimates, and around 14,000 were wounded.

Now, these civilians are mostly in the two towns that were taken under very heavy shelling attacks by the North Vietnamese. One is

the city of Quang Tri and the other is An Loc. These casualties are at this moment estimates, but they are the best estimates that we could arrive at in a rather chaotic situation.

Senator KENNEDY. What do you estimate to be the number of civilian casualties in the north—the number of people who have been killed by American bombing?

Mr. SULLIVAN. In North Vietnam?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. SULLIVAN. We have no solid basis to make an estimate.

Senator KENNEDY. You should be able to make an estimate. You must have aerial surveillance of villages and towns that have been hit. We saw this morning on television that boats have been accidentally hit. We have heard the charges by the North Vietnamese of accidental bombing. What assessments are you making about this? Or are you?

Mr. SULLIVAN. We are having a debate on the North Vietnamese figures. The figures that they gave, for example, in the bombing of Haiphong, as I recall it, were 18 civilians killed at Haiphong.

Senator KENNEDY. You mean our estimate is that 18 civilians were killed?

Mr. SULLIVAN. No; this was the North Vietnamese statement as to what they lost in that particular bombing, the bombing that took place a couple of Sundays ago.

Senator KENNEDY. There is no aerial surveillance of the damage done by the U.S. bombing of the North?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes; there is photographic surveillance which follows. I think, for example, the city of Hanoi has been almost 50 percent evacuated by the direction of the North Vietnamese Government.

Senator KENNEDY. Are they somewhere out in the countryside?

Mr. SULLIVAN. They are out in the countryside.

Senator KENNEDY. Isn't that where most of the bombing is going on, though?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Not in North Vietnam.

Senator KENNEDY. Where is it going on?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Against military targets, mostly petroleum installations, railroad crossings, and places where there are stockpiles of military equipment.

Senator KENNEDY. And there is no bombing of villages or communities?

Mr. SULLIVAN. The North Vietnamese Government has dispersed its people away from these targets as best they can.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, we always seem so willing to talk about the wounded and the civilian casualties caused by the North Vietnamese, which is continuing, but when it comes to what is happening to the civilian population of North Vietnam under U.S. bombs we are never able to get satisfactory information. We hear a great deal about how refugees have been created by the recent North Vietnamese offensive but, a year ago, we didn't hear how refugees were being created by the American invasion in Cambodia. We can't have it both ways. We can't hear the President tell of refugees who have been created by the offensive sweep of North Vietnamese forces into South

Vietnam and not ask—what about the offensive sweep of the United States and South Vietnamese forces into Cambodia last year.

Certainly, that is one of the reasons that many of us are rather chary about evaluations and the way figures are reached. It always seems, at least from my point of view, to be rather one sided. No one is trying to make a brief about the violence and terrorism perpetrated by the North Vietnamese, or the Viet Cong, or trying to excuse the murder of civilians at Hue. But when we deplore that kind of violence, such as the killing of innocents in Hue, we also ought to deplore the killing by assassination through the Phoenix program, too.

I don't know how many Americans know about the estimated 48,000 civilians of the Vietcong infrastructure who have been killed by American-sponsored assassination teams. But I just think we ought to be evenhanded in trying to evaluate the impact of the war by both sides in human terms. We ought to condemn the brutality, the killings and the violence that has been perpetrated by the North Vietnamese—but there has been a lot on our side, too.

There are these antipersonnel bombs [illustrating] that throw thousands of little pieces of shrapnel into people and tear their flesh. When we review the various American weapons being used, the antipersonnel weapons—and every year the list grows with every kind of weapon imaginable to tear the flesh of human beings—I think we have to try and reevaluate what these weapons do in terms of human beings. We ought to be more realistic and assume that there were more than 18 people killed by the recent bombing of Haiphong. I saw a different figure than that. I can't put my finger on it right now. But it is considerably higher than 18.

But we are supposed to be here listening to you Mr. O'Connor.

MR. O'CONNOR. Mr. Chairman, I have a brief statement on the situation in Cambodia as we see it today.

Mr. Chairman, as Ambassador Sullivan has indicated, the situation in Cambodia is quite different from that prevailing in Laos and Vietnam.

SENATOR KENNEDY. You were very kind to provide it for us in advance, and I appreciate it. I want to thank the Department for making available your statement to us in advance.

Are you going to go into the Cambodian section of your statement?

MR. O'CONNOR. Yes. I submitted two statements, one on Cambodia and one on Laos. On Laos I would prefer to give you at this point a very short summary—to make a very short summary of the statement I have submitted. I did not summarize the Cambodian statement. I can attempt to do so.

SENATOR KENNEDY. No; we can go through that.

MR. O'CONNOR. Mr. Chairman, as Ambassador Sullivan has said, in Cambodia most displaced persons tend to congregate in Phnom Penh and have generally been able to find temporary shelter with relatives and friends. Some have had to construct makeshift housing in and around the capital. Relatively few persons—some 15,000, according to our latest information—are housed in refugee camps or official resettlement areas.

Our best estimate is that since March 1970, about 800,000 additional people have come to Phnom Penh on their own. However, reliable statistics are extremely difficult to find. Most people do not ordinarily

report their movements to the authorities. As the February 2 GAO report to this subcommittee points out on page 2, "The total number of refugees in Cambodia is largely conjectural. There is no system for enumerating refugees, and they are moving continually."

Senator KENNEDY. You estimate 800,000 refugees in Phnom Penh. What about outside the city? There must be more outside.

Mr. O'CONNOR. We estimate there are some additional refugees in the province capitals also, Senator. But our real problem here is that the kind of fighting that has been going on in Cambodia has been very fluid, and the families leave their homes, and very often within a week, 2 weeks, or 3 weeks, they move back. So, there is a constant ebb and flow in the movement of people which neither Cambodians nor we are able to keep track of. That is why I think the GAO phrase is quite correct, the total number at any given time is indeed conjectural.

If I may continue, over the 2 years since the war spread to Cambodia, we estimate that the Cambodian Government and private groups have dispensed a minimum of 400 million riels for aid to refugees and the injured. (This is the equivalent of \$2.7 million at the current rate of 150:1 and over \$7 million at the exchange rate which prevailed until October 1971.) This includes funds expended by the Ministry of Social Action, Labor and Employment; the General Commissariat for Veterans; the Directorate for War Victims; the Khmer Red Cross; and private donations in local currency from religious and charitable groups. We estimate that of this amount well over a million dollars can be attributed to expenditures for civilian casualties and victims of the war. In addition, there has been over \$4 million worth of donations in kind, as Ambassador Sullivan has said, chiefly medical supplies, from Japan and 13 other countries.

The Directorate for War Victims gives food for 10 days and clothing, if needed, to each refugee after which time he is expected to provide for himself or depend on relatives. The vast majority are said to be self-sufficient within 10 days. If a refugee is sick and unable to work, however, the Directorate continues the food ration. With regard to civilian casualties, the Directorate pays 5 thousand riels, lump sum, to a civilian war widow, all of whose children are minors. If any of the children have reached majority, they are expected to provide for the family without assistance from the Directorate. The Directorate pays 2 thousand riels to a civilian or a soldier whose wife is killed by military action and for a child so killed. Fifty riels per week are paid to the hospital in which a wounded refugee is held and the wounded refugee receives a payment of 1 thousand riels when he leaves the hospital.

In attempting to assess the condition of the refugees and the effectiveness of ongoing programs, our mission had a number of conversations in Phnom Penh with the UNDP (United Nations development program), other international agencies, and the Cambodians, in one of which I personally participated in January. As a result, all parties agreed that, because of the paucity of data, a study was needed to determine the conditions and problems encountered by refugees and displaced persons in Phnom Penh, where the largest number of people have gathered. The UNDP agreed to undertake such a study within the context of its ongoing programs and available staff.

This study was completed just a few weeks ago. It produced no evidence that the refugees who are able to live with relatives and friends are in urgent or dire need of assistance. It found that the shift in population has not brought on serious unemployment although it may have lowered per capita income.

Senator KENNEDY. Would you make this study available to the committee?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Yes, sir. We have got it in an unofficial translation. It is a preliminary look by the UNDP within the context of its ongoing program and its available staff. It is still under consideration by the Cambodian Government. I can submit it here for the record with the understanding that it is an unofficial translation from the French, so it may not be totally accurate. [For the complete text, see Appendix I.]

Senator KENNEDY. That report is obviously more recent than our GAO report. The GAO report was submitted on February 2. But the GAO states:

Our observations and interviews with numerous refugees living outside of refugee camps generally confirmed that the lack of a sufficient food supply rapidly was becoming a serious problem. All but two of the refugees that we interviewed stated that it was very difficult to obtain sufficient food for their families.

So, the GAO makes a rather serious indictment of the food problem, for example.

And, I see in the Washington Post of April 6: "Refugees from the countryside have streamed in, poor and often pitiful." The population in Phnom Penh is said to have more than doubled. Survivors still mill around small dispensaries waiting for meager handouts of clothing and other items. Civilian casualties were cited to be in the hundreds.

So, we are most interested in your report, because the descriptions we have read are not as satisfactory as you have mentioned. So, we would be interested in having the UNDP study.

Mr. O'CONNOR. Senator, if I could speak to the food problem directly, this is an area, of course, that we keep very careful track of in Phnom Penh particularly from the economic point of view, and particularly in terms of rice stocks which have to come down from Battambang.

Today there really have been no shortages of food, Senator, and certainly not of rice in Phnom Penh. And this is an area which we watch very often—actually every day for all these reasons, inflation, and the evidence of need and dislocation.

I am not suggesting for a minute that there may not be some problems in the distribution of those foodstuffs, that there may not be some people in an overcrowded area that are not getting as much as they should. To some extent I suspect that is inevitable, and I don't want to say that that doesn't happen. What I can say is that the basic supply of food, to our almost daily observation, and observation of prices, have remained really quite stable over the last 6 months.

Senator KENNEDY. Does this study go into the shortages in the provincial areas as well, and what is being done to establish food centers in those areas?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Primarily this study is centered in Phnom Penh because it was the feeling of virtually all of us there that that was the heart of the refugee problem, and where most of them were located.

Senator FONG. How much control do you have over the refugee relief work in Cambodia?

Mr. O'CONNOR. What control do we have, sir?

Senator FONG. Yes.

Mr. O'CONNOR. Basically we do not have any control other than persuasion. The program and the funds that I have recited to you are coming from the Cambodian Government's own budget, and it is managed by their own officials. It is managed in three or four different agencies, and there may be some lack of coordination. Obviously, we do have, Senator, a substantial degree of influence in Phnom Penh on this matter.

Senator FONG. But the direct control comes from the government?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Yes, sir; it does.

Senator FONG. Is there a feeling there that the U.S. presence should not be felt too much, and that they had better rely on Japan and other countries?

Mr. O'CONNOR. I think the situation on that is this. There are a number of countries that are helping Cambodia in their war effort, including some Asian nations. But there are a substantial greater number of nations, both in Europe and Asia, that are hesitant to assist in the military effort that are more than interested in assisting in this kind of humanitarian effort. So, I think it is those nations, which include Japan very notably in this particular case, to which the Cambodians have turned, and, it seems to me, quite wisely so.

If I may continue, the UNDP report noted that the influx has, however, put a strain on public facilities in the city. The UNDP therefore recommended intensive efforts by the Cambodian Government to insure that the present water supply system in Phnom Penh is maintained at sufficiently high standards to prevent epidemics and to increase garbage collections as a general preventive health measure. Increased public health surveillance was recommended to guard against outbreaks of plague or cholera. And I might say that there has been no real evidence of the existence of any such plagues. And we want to keep it that way.

With reference to medical services, the UNDP found that, although the quantity of hospital beds in Phnom Penh to treat civilian casualties was found to approach international standards—that is, approximately one bed to 200 population—these facilities are frequently inefficiently utilized. Present stocks of standard medicines are reported to be satisfactory, but more trained physicians and nurses are needed. And I think that is an observation you can make about almost any country in the world. The UNDP advised the Cambodian Government to seek help from appropriate international bodies—such as the World Health Organization and the International Red Cross—or bilateral donors in a nurses' training program.

To help those who have had to construct makeshift housing in and around Phnom Penh, the UNDP recommended that the Cambodian Government provide assistance with materials for low-cost, self-help type housing and pointed to the possibilities for increased importation of these commodities under the American Aid program.

Senator KENNEDY. Just on this point—the adequacy of medical stocks—the GAO study is quite to the contrary. It points out on page 49:

We are advised by the Minister of Public Health and several public health doctors that there is a very serious shortage of all types of pharmaceutical products in Cambodia. . . . At one of the public health hospitals we visited in Phnom Penh, we observed an example of the critical need for medicines. The hospital director advised us that, in the preceding two months, they had experienced an alarming mortality rate among small children . . . from gastric disorders which, if not treated, would result in death. It could be treated, but no medicines were available. . . . The hospital advised us that at the time the mortality rate was about 15 percent.

And on page 51 the GAO says: "Conditions at the hospital were appalling."

That is about the strongest language I have ever read in a GAO report. It goes on to say:

Conditions in the maternity wards were also crowded. Mothers of newborn babies, some less than 12 hours old, were lying on folding cots in the hallways. . . . Hospitals were very poorly equipped. The laboratory contained virtually no equipment. . . . We observed one ward which contained about 200 patients. The ward consisted of two areas—one was an outside walled area where about 100 patients stayed day and night, (the ground was used for sleeping)—and the other was a large room 20 by 80 feet which contained a hundred more patients. . . . The room was dark. . . . No ventilation.

And they talk about another hospital, the Preah Monivong Hospital—a major military hospital, not under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Health, and which did not treat civilian war-related casualties.

But, throughout, have rather different conclusions than your report.

Mr. O'CONNOR. Senator, the GAO report, of course, was filed in February, and I believe they were in the field in September and October. And that is perhaps 8 or 9 months earlier than the UNDP report, which was made about 3 weeks ago. There is an 8 month gap there. I am not suggesting that every hospital and every dispensary is filled with precisely the right amount of medicines. All I am reporting to you, sir—as I pass on the text of the report that the UNDP filed—is that they are talking specifically about Phnom Penh, and I am not talking about the hospital you are talking about, that the GAO refers to. All I am reporting to you is that there are adequate supplies of medicine generally. I did make the point that in all cases the distribution of both food and medicine may not be as good as it should be.

Senator FONG. Mr. O'Connor, what control have you over the hospitals and dispensaries?

Mr. O'CONNOR. We don't have any control over that, sir. We are in a position to make some supplies available under our program when they are requested. To date they have not been.

Senator FONG. So, you actually have no direct control over anything in Cambodia?

Mr. O'CONNOR. No; sir.

Senator FONG. All you have is a mission there to advise, is that correct?

Mr. O'CONNOR. That is right, sir.

Senator FONG. Is that the extent of what our mission can do?

Mr. O'CONNOR. That is the extent of what our mission can do in these areas, yes; sir.

Senator FONG. In other words, when you see a problem, you advise them as to how it could be improved, but you have no control over the situation?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Yes; Senator. One of the reasons why we encourage the thought of trying to get an international agency to do this kind of a survey is for the very reason that I mentioned before. There are 13 outside donors or other countries, and Japan, giving aid now in this humanitarian field. And it has seemed to us that in the beginning an effort to internationalize support was justified. We are a very important aspect, but we are not the only unilateral source of all wisdom and supplies.

Senator FONG. The international agencies have gone in there. Are they doing the same thing that you are doing, just advising?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Yes, sir; that is approximately what they are doing. They have their own Red Cross. And that Red Cross has been in touch with the International Red Cross.

Senator FONG. Do they furnish supplies from time to time?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Yes; sir. And other nations have been giving humanitarian aid, as I mentioned, in the total amount of about \$4 million.

Senator FONG. How do they know what aid to give?

Mr. O'CONNOR. One of the reasons for this report was to try to ascertain, not just for our purposes, but for the purposes of the international community, if you will, what was needed, what kind of supplies might be needed, and where there were shortages, housing supplies, and the like. And as I note in my report further on down, the Cambodian Government is at this moment reviewing this report and looking at the UNDP recommendations, and will come up, we hope, with their own findings and presumably requests from the international community.

Senator FONG. Is it in connection with these supplies that we find the Cambodian Government is loathe to deal with us?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Is loathe to deal with us?

Senator FONG. Yes; that they would rather look to Japan and the other countries.

Mr. O'CONNOR. I think loathe would be too strong a word. But I think that they do know that there are other donor nations that would prefer to confine their aid to the purely humanitarian area. And it is logical that they should turn to them for this kind of aid.

Senator FONG. Yes; I agree.

Senator KENNEDY. The GAO report mentions that the war effort has been the main preoccupation of the Cambodian Government. And because they realize that the United States is the sole source for necessary military assistance, they tend to ask for military aid first. Of course, we willingly give them guns and bombs on a bilateral basis, never worrying about internationalizing that. It is interesting to me that we are always ready to internationalize the programs to look after refugees and civilian war casualties, but we can't do it in terms of military aspects.

Mr. O'CONNOR. There is nothing we would rather see than an internationalization of the Cambodian military effort. Instead, we have seen substantial success in terms of the economic program—they have internationalized that. And I think it is not at all surprising to suggest that Cambodia does set high priority on the war effort.

Senator KENNEDY. Have you, or have any of the representatives of the agencies in Cambodia, had conversations with any Cambodian officials which would indicate that they have a desire for medical supplies.

Mr. O'CONNOR. Have the Cambodians indicated that to any of the agencies over there?

Senator KENNEDY. Well, specifically to Robert Blackburn, who was the second Secretary, on June 1, 1971, in the U.S. Embassy. Did he ever receive a request from a Cambodian official for medical supplies?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, Mr. Blackburn is in the room today. And I think he might be able to clarify that.

Senator KENNEDY. Alright.

Mr. BLACKBURN. On that date a representative from the Minister of Health, who is the ministry's representative to the Cambodian Red Cross, did come to see me. But he asked specifically if we would facilitate his contact with the American Red Cross, which we did, and sent it to the Department, and asked the Department to inform the American Red Cross that the Cambodian Government was interested in—

Senator KENNEDY. What sort of thing did he want?

Mr. BLACKBURN. He didn't have any specific items in mind. I asked him that.

Senator KENNEDY. Was he looking for television sets, or machine guns, or medical supplies?

Mr. BLACKBURN. He was looking for medical supplies for civilian casualties in civilian hospitals in Phnom Penh.

Senator KENNEDY. And he called on you for help and assistance?

Mr. BLACKBURN. Yes.

Senator KENNEDY. What did you tell him?

Mr. BLACKBURN. I asked him what sort of specific items he had in mind, so that the Red Cross would have some idea of what he wanted. I asked him if he had contacted the International Red Cross, which has a resident representative in Phnom Penh. And I am told there that the International Red Cross Societies are prepared to respond if they feel that the International Red Cross has received such a request or general appeal.

And he said that he had.

But I checked later and found that he had not made a specific request.

I asked him if he had contacted any other agencies to suggest that they make contact with their respective Red Cross societies.

And he said he had not.

And I suggested that he do so.

Senator KENNEDY. Did you ever think that this might be an area where the United States might be more responsive—in trying to help and assist him? Did you ever take the matter up with anyone else in AID, to indicate that a fellow had come to see you and told you there

was a need for medical supplies to look after civilian casualties? Did you ever ask yourself, is there any way we can help him?

Mr. BLACKBURN. Yes. I made a report of this conversation.

Senator KENNEDY. Who did you report to?

Mr. BLACKBURN. To the Department of State and the Ambassador.

Senator KENNEDY. What did they say?

Mr. BLACKBURN. I simply don't recall whether they did or did not contact the Red Cross. If they did, I have no idea what the Red Cross' response was.

Senator KENNEDY. Did you contact them solely for the purpose of trying to get some help from the Red Cross, or did you say, here is a guy from the Cambodian Government that needs some medical supplies to use for civilian casualties, what can we do to help?

Mr. BLACKBURN. I simply reported the conversation.

Senator KENNEDY. Did you recommend that he might get help from some of the "socialist" countries?

Mr. BLACKBURN. I suggested that as long as he was making an approach to the American Red Cross, that it would perhaps be useful if he could make an approach to other Red Cross societies. And I specifically mentioned socialist countries and Great Britain and Japan.

Senator KENNEDY. Now, at some point after that, I understand a Dr. Pheng Kanthel wrote to the Red Cross in the United States. His description of the hospitals and medical needs of Cambodia, Mr. O'Connor, are substantially those of the GAO report. It is quite different from what your report evidently shows. But even so, here is what your report (the UNDP report) says at the end—which should not be overlooked—that:

medical assistance should absolutely be planned for and provided as these people do not have the means to go elsewhere for medical attention. . . . The furnishing of pharmaceuticals for use in the work of these teams should be effected on a regular and continuous basis.

The tone of this part is somewhat different from the optimistic description you mentioned before.

Mr. O'CONNOR. Senator, I am not hiding anything. I reviewed the text. And it is not my report, sir, it is the UNDP report.

Senator KENNEDY. That's right. We are just trying to get an idea of what the conditions are in these hospitals. We had read the description of the GAO, and we have heard your comments here, and we have read from the UNDP report. We will let the record stand.

In any event, they have hospitals in Phnom Penh—both civilian and Military—that are overcrowded with sick and wounded. "People have fled from the insecure rural areas, taken refuge in the capital, whose population has increased from 600,000 to 2 million."

That is the Cambodian estimate. To quote further:

In the provinces, also, people have flocked into urban areas whose medical facilities are destroyed. . . . We appealed to the Red Cross organizations of friendly countries through the good offices of the CICR. The war is going on, [and] casualties are increasing steadily, resulting in an alarming, rapid decline of our medical, clothing and food stockpiles, although we did receive a large number of aid from friendly countries. . . . We urge that this organization [the American Red Cross] send us in the shortest possible time such drugs as antibiotics, vitamins, anti-malarial and such medical articles as dressing materials, surgical equipment, clothing and food. . . . We did approach the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, but no response has yet been obtained.

That is Dr. Kanthel writing, who is "Representative, Ministry of Public Health in Khmer Red Cross." The letter is dated August 17, 1971.

And then, tragically, we see a response in February of this year—6 months later—from the American Red Cross. I will make both letters a part of the record. In the response they said: "We have on hand in our warehouse a stock of 6,433 bottles of vitamin tablets called 'Chocks'. The total is about 385,900 tablets." They then indicate they are willing to send those tablets, if they can get clearance through the Cambodian Government, and that was all!

(The letters referred to follow:)

#### MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Pheng Kanthel, Representative Ministry of Public Health in Khmer Red Cross; Col. William Waugh, Deputy Chief, MEDTC Forward; Robert R. Blackburn, Jr., Second Secretary, U.S. Embassy, Phnom Penh.

Pheng Kanthel called for an appointment and upon arrival said he wished to contact the American Red Cross to seek medical equipment and supplies for the civilian casualties in five civilian hospitals in Phnom Penh. I asked if he had requested such assistance through ICRC representative here and he said he had but that only a little aid had been forthcoming. (Comment: Mr. Leonard Isler, ICRC, later confirmed my impression that Pheng Kanthel has not recently made any specific request. Apparently the July 1970, general appeal for aid by the Red Cross constitute "a request".) I asked if he has tried to contact any other Red Cross associations through other embassies here. He said he had not. I asked if he had discussed the problem with the WHO representative whom I understood were in Phnom Penh. He said he had not but that he understood they provided technical assistance rather than the sort of supplies he was interested in. I finally asked if he had any specific items in mind. Pheng Kanthel said he did not and repeated the general need for supplies and equipment.

I said that it would be up to the American Red Cross to decide if they wished to give any assistance and I would inform the Red Cross that Pheng Kanthel was interested in discussing his needs. I noted that there was little possibility of our aid program including the sort of supplies and equipment he was interested in. I said I strongly recommended that he seek assistance through other embassies including those of the Socialist countries as it was clear that he was seeking humanitarian assistance for civilian casualties. I specifically mentioned the Soviet Union, Japan, and Great Britain. During the conversation, Colonel Waugh explained that the assistance in the military field could relieve pressure on the civilian hospitals for medicines and medical equipment, but Pheng Kanthel did not seem interested.

Comment: I have the impression that he has been launched by the Minister, that he hopes the Red Cross will provide everything he needs—even though he has no idea what he needs. I will inform the American Red Cross that there is this interest but I do not recommend that we take any further action.

KHMER RED CROSS  
Phnom Penh, August 17, 1971.

Mr. SAMUEL KRAKOW,  
Director International Services

Dear Mr. KRAKOW: We thank you for your letter of 10th April 1968 in which you told us about the American Red Cross willingness to offer our Organization a humanitarian aid consisting in medicine and other medical supplies. This aid was deeply appreciated by our management board and enabled us to engage in various humanitarian activities for the benefit of our people. When we met in Vienna at the time of the International Conference an encounter which will always remain vivid in my memory. I was able to realize how devoted you were to the cause of the American POWs in the hands of Vietnamese communists. Despite all interventions and those, equally numerous of Mr. ANDRE DURAND the then Delegate General for Asia who is a personal friend of mine, we did not

manage to convince our enemies who refused to comply with stipulations of the Geneva Convention. This was in our eye a moral disaster. Furthermore we were penalized so to speak by the communists who labelled us as pro-American. That obliged us to temporarily withdraw from the Organization. Such was our lot following the Vienna International Conference.

Since 18th March 1970 date of Prince SIHANOUK's legal destitution communists aggression against Cambodia generated serious medico-sanitary problems. Hospitals of Phnom Penh both civilian and military are over crowded with the sick and wounded. People have fled from insecure rural areas taken refuge in the capital whose population has increased from 600,000 to 2 millions. In the provinces also people have flocked in urban areas whose medical facilities are destroyed by the aggressors either kill or wound the medical staff and the civilians population. We have appealed to Red Cross Organizations of friendly countries through the good offices of the CICR. The war is going on casualties are increasing steadily resulting in an alarming rapid decline of our medical, clothing and food stockpiles although we did receive a large number of aids from friendly countries.

Confronted with this grave situation, I am taking the liberty here to request you kindly to approach the American Red Cross and urge this Organization to send us in the shortest possible time such drugs as antibiotics, vitamins, antimalaria etc., . . . and such medical articles as dressing materials, surgery equipment, clothing and food. The delivery of these item will best be made at the Phnom Penh river port. We sincerely hope your friendly and urgent intervention with American Red Cross will help us assume our responsibilities. We did approach the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh but no response has yet been obtained.

With the anticipated thanks of the Khmer people to the American people and Red Cross, I am, Mr. Krakow.

Yours very sincerely,

DR. PHENG KANTHEL  
*Representative Ministry of Public Health in  
 Khmer Red Cross.*

FEBRUARY 25, 1972.

DR. PHENG KANTHEL,  
*Representative Ministry of Public Health in Khmer Red Cross,  
 Phnom Penh, Khmer.*

Dear Dr. KANTHEL: For a variety of reasons, I have been greatly remiss in my correspondence with you, but I think you should know that we have had many meetings on the subject of our continued relationships with your Society. We are quite aware of the problems you are facing, and particularly those affecting refugees in your country, and you are undoubtedly well aware of the considerable interest in their welfare which has been the subject of both public and congressional inquiries. I have seen the report of a recent government survey on this subject, and I am under the impression that both the United Nations Developmental Program and the International Committee of the Red Cross are also conducting surveys on the refugee situation.

The purpose of this letter really is to assure you of our continued concern and to repeat our willingness to try to provide certain medical and other supplies to assist you in your program efforts.

We have on hand in our warehouse a stock of 3,433 bottles of vitamin tablets called "CHOCKS". The total is about 385,900 tablets. Before these can be shipped to Khmer, we must have your Society's acceptance of the shipment, with a statement regarding duty-free entry. If you feel these vitamins would be of use to you in your medical program, please let us know. Upon receipt of the above-mentioned statement, we will arrange for the prompt shipment of these supplies to your Society.

Kindest personal regards.

Sincerely,

SAMUEL KRAKOW.

(Subsequent to the hearing, the following letter was submitted:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,  
BUREAU FOR SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE,  
Washington, D.C., May 16, 1972.

HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees, Committee on the Judiciary,*  
*U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.*

Dear Mr. CHAIRMAN: As suggested during the May 9 hearings of your Subcommittee, I am writing to clarify the record concerning actions taken by the Department of State pursuant to discussions held on June 2, 1971 at Phnom Penh between Mr. Pheng Kanthel, of the Ministry of Public Health of the Khmer Republic, and Robert Blackburn, Jr., then a Second Secretary at the American Embassy in Phnom Penh.

The request made by Mr. Pheng during the discussion, as Mr. Blackburn reported in a memorandum of conversation, was that the Embassy help facilitate communications between his Ministry and the American Red Cross (ARC). Mr. Blackburn suggested to Mr. Pheng that such contact would appropriately be made through the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) resident at Phnom Penh. Nonetheless, Mr. Blackburn the same day initiated a telegram to the Department of State reporting a resume of the conversation and Mr. Pheng's request. On June 8, 1971, Embassy Phnom Penh was advised by cable from the State Department that the ARC had been informed of Mr. Pheng's request and that the ARC recommended that Mr. Pheng work through the ICRC.

During subsequent discussions between an officer of the Department and Mr. Samuel Krakow, Director of The Office of International Services, ARC, we learned that Mr. Pheng had written to Mr. Krakow on August 17, 1971 requesting ARC assistance for Cambodia. The letter was delivered to the ARC by the Khmer Washington Embassy and neither our Embassy at Phnom Penh nor the Department had knowledge of it before it was mentioned by Mr. Krakow. Mr. Krakow said the ARC had the request under active consideration and was checking with American pharmaceutical firms to determine whether "presentation" medicines might be available for Cambodia. At the same time, however, Mr. Krakow said the letter from Mr. Pheng was non-specific in detail and gave no description of the problems in Cambodia nor of the magnitude of need.

The Departmental officer suggested the ARC might undertake a survey in Cambodia to clarify areas of specific need, and Mr. Krakow was receptive to this idea, as was ARC President George M. Elsey when I personally discussed this matter with him on the telephone last fall. At about this time, however, we learned that the UNDP at Phnom Penh was planning to undertake the survey described during the hearings May 9 and so advised the ARC, which decided to hold its Cambodian plans in abeyance pending the completion of the UNDP survey.

We have sent a copy of the UNDP survey to the ARC and are advised that it will be studied to determine areas for possible action by the ARC.

I hope this information will clarify the record.

Sincerely yours,

RODERIC L. O'CONNOR.

Senator KENNEDY. Somebody is giving a brushoff to a desperate plea for medical supplies, and I think it is outrageous, absolutely outrageous.

Contact was made with our Embassy requesting medical supplies—whether through the Red Cross or whatever—and the need was made known, but there was a complete failure to follow up on that request. I find that shocking!

Mr. O'CONNOR. I don't know what the state of the record is in terms of going through the American Red Cross. You have one report, and Mr. Blackburn gave you a different version of the same report.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, tell us what was done by way of followup. Is that the way the Department of State does things: when someone comes to you and talks about the tragic need for medical supplies, you

simply write a memo without any kind of followup? Do you just let it go and file it upstairs, and that is the end of it?

Mr. O'CONNOR. That report did not come to me.

Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Blackburn is here—can you tell me what followup was made? I understand you told the Ambassador, and you also told the State Department. We have representatives of the State Department here this morning. I want to know what followup took place.

Mr. BLACKBURN. Perhaps they can speak as to their end. I was in Phnom Penh. I don't know.

Senator KENNEDY. Who can give this information to us?

Mr. SULLIVAN. We have our Cambodian desk officer here.

Senator KENNEDY. While he is on his way up, I would like to read from yesterday's Washington Post:

Among the "essential items" approved by AID to underwrite Cambodia's economic survival last year were 1,700 Italian motor scooters, valued at \$660,000, more than \$100,000 worth of color movie film, and other professional movie equipment.

Will you tell me why the scooters got in and medical supplies did not?

Mr. O'CONNOR. I read that article, and I read those specific items. And I can assure you that all the three articles you refer to there were in no sense authorized, or paid for by AID. Those same three items have appeared in newspaper articles for some time. And there is no truth in that, sir.

Senator FONG. You mean you dispute the Washington Post?

Mr. O'CONNOR. I am afraid I do, sir.

Senator FONG. That is sacrilegious!

Senator KENNEDY. I want to find out what happens in a case where a representative of the Cambodian Government comes in and asks for some help or assistance. The Embassy indicates that it thinks the best route is through the American Red Cross. We know he was steered to other sources—other countries. I want to hear what happened to his request, and why we didn't respond.

Mr. CORCORAN. We received this request in order to pass it onto the American Red Cross, and we did pass it on to the Red Cross.

Senator KENNEDY. Continue.

Mr. CORCORAN. We have heard no more about it.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you follow it up at all? Do you just pass the buck? Is there any humanitarian aid in the budget?

[Long silence.]

Mr. O'CONNOR. Senator, as I pointed out in my statement, a good deal of our AID program generates local currency. And that local currency is available to the Khmers to put in their budget in any way they wish. So, in that respect any kind of humanitarian assistance they feel that they need and fund out of their own budget is made available to them out of the counterpart funds from our overall AID program.

In addition to that, of course, a good many of the items that come through our commodity import program are for civilians—if not medicines. We have stayed away from them through a long history of having difficulty with the efficient distribution of pharmaceuticals—

although they do contribute to their standard of living, particularly in the cities.

Now, there is no question, sir, as I said in my statement, at the end of it—I have not had a chance to read it—that we are watching what is happening in this area, and we are looking at the food supplies, the medical supplies. The WHO is in that area now in Phnom Penh—

Senator KENNEDY. Before leaving this—and then we will let you continue—I just want you to know my deep sense of frustration over this. I simply can't understand how a request of this sort—for needed medical supplies for refugees and victims of a war which we help fuel—how you can allow such a request to be handled in this fashion.

You have a person who bucks it to the Ambassador, who bucks it back to the State Department, which bucks it over to the Red Cross. If that request had been for military aid—for guns or air support—how many hours do you think it would take for us to respond? How quickly are those requests treated when they are bucked back to the Pentagon? Our Government seems conditioned to respond efficiently when guns or ammunition are needed, but when civilians need medicine we buck the request all over Washington.

Speaking for myself, I think this is enormously distressing.

Mr. O'CONNOR. Senator, I share your concern. And I am not the least bit happy to sit here and relate these delays. One answer is that we did followup with the Red Cross, and we spent a good deal of time there. But I am not happy with the results.

Senator FONG. Did you say you had counterpart funds in Cambodia?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Yes, sir. Our commodity import program, dollars spent in the United States for essential items, not Italian motor scooters—

Senator FONG. How much in counterpart funds do you have?

Mr. O'CONNOR. We get counterpart funds in the amount of imports that actually come into that country. And I think that total is now over \$30 million.

Senator FONG. Did you say that the Cambodian Government knows that if it needs anything it can use those funds?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Yes. The Cambodian Government has two sources of funds, particularly counterpart funds on the one hand, from our commodity imports, and foreign exchange from an economic stabilization fund. That fund in total is \$34.5 million. It came from various donors, including the Khmers themselves. So, they had these two sources of additional revenues out of the AID program of ourselves and other nations that is available to them for any one of these supplies. One of the reasons why that fund was necessary was to allow them with that kind of foreign exchange to buy, for example, pharmaceuticals.

Senator FONG. So, they could have bought the pharmaceuticals that this man was asking from the Red Cross with these counterpart funds?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Yes, sir; or they could have gotten it from the Red Cross or through other channels.

I will say that I am unhappy that we didn't follow it up.

Senator FONG. If they had gotten it from the Red Cross it would save part of that \$34 million?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Yes, sir; it would.

Senator FONG. And, if they had really wanted certain pharmaceuticals they could have gotten them with the \$34 million from the International Red Cross, or from other agencies or countries?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Yes, sir.

Senator FONG. How much are we talking about?

Mr. O'CONNOR. You mean the total need?

Senator FONG. No; I mean what was requested from the Red Cross?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Actually it wasn't quantified in terms of money, Senator.

Senator FONG. You said they needed a certain amount of bandages and things like that?

Mr. O'CONNOR. It wasn't quantified.

Senator FONG. It wasn't quantified?

Mr. O'CONNOR. No. Unfortunately we have this problem very often with Khmer officials. They make a very general statement of need, and they don't give very much to put your teeth into.

Senator FONG. If the man really knew what was going on, he could have gotten the money that was needed from the counterpart funds to buy these things?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Yes. And that is one of the reasons why we asked the UNDP team, and, now, the WHO team that was in there to take a look at that situation, so that we and the international community can begin to get a handle on just exactly what they did.

Senator FONG. So, if this were really needed, it was not denied them by the U. S. Government because the United States had already told the Cambodian Government that it could use the counterpart funds for this purpose?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. Please tell me how you can buy American pharmaceuticals with local counterpart funds.

Mr. O'CONNOR. Senator, although legally we can buy American pharmaceuticals, as a matter of policy over the years we have had so much difficulty with them because, as you know, they are very high priced and very hard to handle, that we have tried to stay away from using that in our commodity import funds.

Now, with the counterpart funds, or with this free foreign exchange available to them, they can indeed, and I am sure they do, buy substantial quantities of pharmaceuticals. We may have that figure.

There is, Senator, a company there that does produce, and is increasing that production right now, of pharmaceuticals that can be bought with local currency out of the counterpart funds.

Senator KENNEDY. What about American or Japanese pharmaceuticals? It is my understanding that you can't buy American pharmaceuticals with counterpart funds, and you can't buy Japanese pharmaceuticals.

Mr. O'CONNOR. No, sir, you can't. You can buy them with the free exchange which comes through the stabilization fund.

Senator KENNEDY. What percentage of that fund is used for medical supplies as opposed to military supplies?

Let's read your budget presentation for last year. It refers to the economic assistance to finance petroleum products, transportation and

spare parts—local currency generated by U.S. financed imports will be used by the Cambodian Government for the purpose of its budget, the military element all of which is for military equipment.

Can you tell us what percentage is used now for medical supplies and what for humanitarian purposes?

Mr. O'CONNOR. I am sure we can supply that for the record. I am not sure we have it here with us.

(Subsequent to the hearing, the following information was submitted:)

CAMBODIAN IMPORTS OF PHARMACEUTICALS

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

1969	\$7.8
1970	4.1
1971	4.3

Senator KENNEDY. This is a hearing on refugees. You ought to be able to tell us what part of the Cambodian Government budget is being used for refugee plus humanitarian programs.

Mr. O'CONNOR. It is a question of looking back at their imports over the past years.

Senator KENNEDY. We are talking about Cambodian refugees. That is the purpose of this hearing. I think a reasonable question would be, what part of the Cambodian budget is being spent on refugees.

Mr. O'CONNOR. I gave you those figures. I thought you were asking me specifically about pharmaceuticals. The amount spent by the Cambodian Government I gave you, out of four different agencies.

Senator KENNEDY. But you can't tell us what part of their budget, or of the counterpart funds, is being used for refugee work, or for pharmaceuticals or medical supplies? Because we know none of the other money is being spent for it, don't we?

Mr. O'CONNOR. I am not quite sure what you mean by the other money. It could be foreign exchange from the exchange support funds, of which they did have over \$34 million when it was set up. They could be spent for pharmaceutical supplies, and medicines, coming in from foreign countries. I will try to get a breakout, sir, of their budget, how much is spent on pharmaceuticals or medical supplies.

Could I add, the WHO group there reports to us that the treatment of civilian war casualties—first of all, they talked about the number of beds, as I mentioned in my statement, it is under international standards. And they say the trouble is in management; they are often not coordinated well. And WHO then goes on to find that the treatment of civilian war casualties, as I say, suffers from the same defect as Cambodian medical services in general. Although there are sufficient numbers of doctors, supplies, and equipment, the administration of the facilities is inadequate, so that casualty care takes longer, and is lower in quality than it should be.

There is a WHO team in Phnom Penh, and this problem is one of their top priorities. I am hopeful that this will give some improvement in the coordination of the use of these facilities.

Senator KENNEDY. What sort of items—as raised by this Washington Post article—what sort of things are being imported through AID as "essential items?"

In order to clear up the record, is there anything that you can tell us? Have you a list of items?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Yes, sir, we can submit a complete list, but I can give you from my own memory the thrust of what it is.

A good deal of it is small machinery, equipment and parts, for the production and vehicles and other things moving in the economy. That is a very important aspect. There is a certain amount of iron bars and things of that sort. We are getting a certain amount of foodstuffs and cement, things that are really impractical to bring from the United States. But essentially what we are trying to do is get that kind of either raw materials or parts of machinery that allow their own production to be kept up. And I wish we were doing better than we are. There has been a lot of damage to production. And we would like to increase the speed with which we are bringing in these spare parts and machinery to bring that production up again.

Senator KENNEDY. If the Cambodian Government were to request medical supplies from you, what would your answer be?

Mr. O'CONNOR. I think that we would find some way of making it available, Senator. I am not certain that we would bring them in under the commodity import program, as I say, that has been a very difficult problem. But I am sure we will make it available.

In my statement I note that we are watching the situation and do have a number of ways of making available the kind of supplies and funding that might be needed if the situation is such that there is a clear need that cannot be handled by the international community or the international agencies.

Senator FONG. In the GAO report, it is stated that the Minister of Public Health had requested through the Minister of Finance, that \$3 million worth of pharmaceuticals be included in the fiscal year 1972 U.S. commodities import program.

Mr. O'CONNOR. That is the GAO report?

Senator FONG. Yes.

Mr. O'CONNOR. What page is that?

Senator FONG. That is on page 49. It looks like they are asking you to give them \$3 million of pharmaceuticals through the U.S. commodities import program. Evidently, they do know that they can get pharmaceuticals through the U.S. import program. The report reads:

At the time of our review, a final decision had not been made with regard to this request; however, Embassy officials advised us that the Agency for International Development was reluctant to include pharmaceuticals in the program. We were advised that there were significant inadequacies in the Cambodian Government's control system for pharmaceuticals, and U.S. officials fear diversion of commodities to North Vietnamese or Vietcong forces.

So, it shows that you were using U.S. commodity import program funds for the purchase of pharmaceuticals.

Mr. O'CONNOR. I am not certain of all the background, sir. At one point I know the Minister of Finance did not want to approve that item. I am not certain how it worked out. The fact of the matter is that medicines are made available through voluntary and international agencies which we help support. We have been reluctant, however, to make medicines available under the CIP because prescriptions are not required there, although in this country they would be

prescription, and there has been in the past an enormous diversion of them, and, indeed, dangerous uses of them, going into enemy hands or going into the community.

And this is one of the problems we had with trying to bring them in through the commodity import program.

Senator FONG. What is the problem with control of drugs?

Mr. O'CONNOR. The problem of control with all pharmaceuticals requires a pretty complicated system of keeping track of them in the distribution system, and where in this country we have most of these drugs under prescription, in most of the lesser developed countries very few of them are under prescription, so that they can be given out to people that don't know how to use them or don't even need them. And, obviously, that will create a serious medical problem of its own.

So, we are rather reluctant to do that, Senator. In this particular case, we also have contributed, as you know, \$12.5 million to their exchange support funds. I am happy to say that that is about one-third of what came from the rest of the international community. And this source of funds, we think, is the proper source of funds for them to spend on their own pharmaceuticals, or to appeal through the international agencies, the WHO, and the International Red Cross, which I will check and see what happens to that request, and other agencies.

Senator FONG. That fund is approximately \$36 million?

Mr. O'CONNOR. It was \$34.5 million, sir.

Senator FONG. Do you think that is a proper fund from which disbursement for items such as pharmaceuticals should be made?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Yes, sir. One of the reasons why that fund was set up was to allow the Khmer Government and the whole international community, or large numbers of it that contributed to it, to import just these kinds of items that are difficult to bring in under our program.

Senator FONG. Do you know whether that fund is still intact?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Well, in fact, I believe the documents have not legally been signed. But the full amount of \$34.5 million has been pledged by donor nations. But, we have already supplemented their own cash reserves, and they are free to use that now.

With your permission, may I finish the statement?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes. Would you, please?

Mr. O'CONNOR. We talked about the UNDP report and its recommendations, and the question of our making available if needed supplies through the American aid program, or contributing better housing for the refugees.

In addition to official refugee camps, there are in Phnom Penh 26 locations—pagodas, apartment houses, and other buildings—that have been designated refugee centers. The UNDP report found certain of these centers to be overcrowded and recommended that additional centers be created. You will recall that the GAO report found three of the official refugee camps in Phnom Penh to be adequate, and the fourth, supported primarily by a private charitable group, to be crowded and unsanitary.

The UNDP report is currently under active consideration by the Government of the Khmer Republic's (GKR) Refugee Committee,

chaired by the Minister of Labor and Social Welfare. However, as of May 4 the committee had not yet formulated its own recommendations.

Mr. Chairman, we believe that on the whole the GKR level of effort combined with the efforts of the families and friends of the displaced persons is meeting the current requirements and is consistent with the standards of living of the Cambodian people. Therefore, we have not undertaken a U.S. program for refugees in Cambodia as we have done in Laos and Vietnam. Aside from the fact that the GKR along with other nations and international bodies are already involved, U.S. programs have the disadvantage of requiring an increased American presence in Cambodia and a gradual shifting of responsibility. I might add parenthetically that your subcommittee has in the past been instrumental in alerting us to the dangers of overinvolvement.

Though we do not have a U.S. refugee program in Cambodia, our economic aid program does have an impact on the well-being of those in the urban centers. It attempts to assure an adequate supply of essential commodities in the marketplace. Thus, the Phnom Penh residents, displaced persons as well as permanent residents, can have available a substantially larger amount of resources than they would if there were no U.S. economic aid program.

Furthermore, according to our own periodic observations, the GKR has maintained adequate stocks of rice and wheat flour in the urban areas; regular convoys by road and sea have averted any sustained food shortages.

Of course, we have the problem of displaced persons under continuing review. A senior official in the Embassy follows the status of displaced persons and war victims. We remain receptive to suggestions of what we might do and action that appears to be appropriate to avert undue hardships. We would be willing to divert local currency, generated by our aid program, for overall budget support, to meet such displaced persons' relief requirements for locally available resources. We could increase our contribution to the Public Law 480 title II program handled by UNICEF in Bangkok if that were called for. We are always ready to work with American and international voluntary agencies to help identify suitable projects and to help finance shipping costs for their donations.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we do not find that the refugee problem in Cambodia is on the same scale as in Laos and Vietnam where the fighting has gone on much longer and has been more destructive. From all the evidence we have, the Cambodian society, with some help from the authorities and private donors, has been able, by and large, to cope with the influx. Should the problem intensify to the extent that it is clear that help from the United States is necessary and sought, we are ready to provide it.

Thank you, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. Has the American Red Cross ever made any requests of the Department for any kind of help and assistance?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Other than the one we have already discussed, you mean?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes. And in that one they didn't formally request, they just indicated they had some spare vitamin tablets that

they were going to make available. But have they put out a general appeal for Cambodia, either American or international?

Mr. O'CONNOR. I doubt that the American Red Cross would.

Senator, I am going to check the record to see where it stands.

(Subsequent to the hearing, the following information was submitted:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,  
BUREAU FOR SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE,  
Washington, D.C., May 19, 1972.

Hon. EDWARD M. KENNEDY,  
Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees, Committee on the Judiciary  
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: Further to my letter of May 13 regarding American Red Cross undertakings in Cambodia. I enclose a memorandum prepared by a member of my staff indicating that the ARC is now planning a substantial shipment of pharmaceuticals to Cambodia.

You will recall that in my earlier letter I noted that we had sent a copy of the UNDP survey of the refugee situation in Cambodia to the ARC, and we understand they are studying it in order to determine areas for possible further action. We will continue to keep contact with the ARC on this matter.

Sincerely yours,

RODERIC L. O'CONNOR.

MEMORANDUM

To: For files.

From: S. Silver, SA/C.

Subject: American Red Cross (ARC) Assistance to Cambodia.

Following the Senator Kennedy Refugee Subcommittee hearings of May 9, the Department of State called the American Red Cross to get an up-to-date report on ARC activities in and plans for Cambodia. A Mr. Robert Martin reported that the ARC had 300,000 multiple vitamin capsules for Cambodia but delivery was delayed because of the high cost of war-risk insurance in the War Zone.

Mr. Martin was referred to me to see whether AID could help with the financing of the extraordinary shipping costs. After consultation within AID, I called Mr. Martin to advise him we would be willing to cover the extraordinary costs. He thanked me but advised that the ARC was going ahead with its own funds.

I surmise that Mr. Martin's report to higher authority that he was seeking some \$700 to \$800 from AID to cover the war-risk insurance elicited a decision to go ahead with their own funds. I was assured by Mr. Martin that the ARC was going ahead with the project. He volunteered the statement that it was about time the ARC did something for Cambodia.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you have people in the Embassy in Cambodia whose responsibility it is to review the refugee program of the Cambodian Government?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. We have brought Mr. Antippas in from Phnom Penh. He is here today.

Senator KENNEDY. Maybe he would like to tell us about it.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. ANTIPPAS. Senator, I am a political officer in the Embassy in Phnom Penh. As part of my function as a political officer, trying to discover what is going on—

Senator KENNEDY. Did we break up your home leave for these hearings?

Mr. ANTIPPAS. No, sir, you didn't.

I followed the refugee problem in my function as a political officer until the first week in February, when I was injured in a car accident

at Siem Reap, Cambodia, near the Angkor Wat complex, where I went to interview some 300 Cambodian refugees from the conservation work in the Angkor Wat area. These were the refugees who had escaped the roundup of all conservation employees by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces in the area. I was injured in this car accident, so I have done very little since then. The Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy has followed this work with the UNDP.

I am not conversant with the UNDP report. However, I did spend 2 years in Cambodia in the very beginning of our involvement, and I spent 2 years in Vietnam watching Cambodia from the point of view of Vietnam. And I accompanied Mr. de Haan, your counsel, when he came out in August.

Senator KENNEDY. He said you were very helpful.

Mr. ANTIPAS. And I also accompanied the GAO investigator in the field.

I don't have any other specific statement to make, other than to answer questions about conditions in Cambodia.

Senator KENNEDY. What impressions do you have about the refugee problem outside of Phnom Penh?

Mr. ANTIPAS. I have visited just about every provincial capital in Cambodia that one could reach, using basically helicopters from Vietnam. I specifically centered my travels to the northern front, the Route 6 area, particularly after the rollup of the Cambodian offensive activity on Route 6 last December. I probably am the one officer who has visited Kampong Thom, which is in the center of Cambodia, and has been surrounded by North Vietnamese forces since June of 1970. On each one of my visits to Kampong Thom in these helicopters I took along at least a ton of salt in the helicopter, because that seems to be the greatest need of most provincial authorities, particularly in the northern areas. And it is very difficult to get salt when you are that far away from Phnom Penh, plus the fact that they are, in southern Cambodia, pretty well cut-off by Vietcong forces.

My impression, generally, coincides with the testimony already given; it is extremely hard to get any kind of a handle on refugees. And I told Mr. de Haan just the other day—we took him to a refugee center in August of 1970 which was by any standard pretty horrible. And yet 3 weeks after his departure—that was at a school in downtown Phnom Penh, and there were refugees there—and yet 3 weeks later, by September, the school had been completely cleaned out and the refugees had been moved to other locations.

I might add, in talking about hospital facilities and drug supplies, I was cared for in the hospital at Siem Reap, which by other standards is also an area that is fairly well cut off—there is only one road that leads to Siem Reap. And the airport at Siem Reap is directly under North Vietnamese fire. And yet I was well cared for in the Siem Reap hospital, and I was given up-to-date drugs for the injuries that I sustained in that accident.

In August or September, when I accompanied a GAO team down to the Route 1 area in the Parrot's Beak, we looked at a fairly large influx of Cambodian peasants that streamed up to Route 1 from the ARVN contact along the Cambodian border. By all counts there were thousands of refugees that showed up at the district town. And I went down there and talked to the district officials. And they told me

they were busily counting these refugees, and they were asking Phnom Penh to send down rice supplies. These peasants come from a rice surplus area, and yet the Phnom Penh Government had to organize truck convoys to bring rice to these people. When I went back a week later by helicopter all those people had gone back to their areas.

So, for that reason, Senator, outside of going around and doing the district officer's job for him, it is difficult for our Embassy to document this.

Excuse me, I have rambled.

Senator KENNEDY. No.

How much of your time do you spend on refugee work?

Mr. ANTIPPAS. Of course, it varies. It is one of the things I look at when I go to the field, when I go on a provincial tour, when I go to the district. We try to talk to refugees. I don't speak Cambodian, but I take an interpreter, because this is one of our basic sources of information as to what is going on in the occupied areas, what is happening in actual fights or contacts. So, it is one of the things I definitely do. I suppose it rises and falls. I would say 15 or 20 percent of my time over the past year was spent on that. And the GAO team was in Phnom Penh. And I spent up to 50 percent of my time accompanying them on their travels, and arranging appointments, and that sort of thing.

Senator KENNEDY. Did you get into the problem of civilian war casualties at all?

Mr. ANTIPPAS. No, sir, only in that I visited hospitals. But it wasn't in my purview.

Senator KENNEDY. Was anybody following that—the numbers of civilian casualties, the reasons for them?

Mr. ANTIPPAS. Well, sir, obviously in the report that we have sent back to the State Department, periodic progress reports—when this data was available we transmit it to the State Department. But, again, we have to emphasize that the data is very fragmentary. And frequently data from the provinces does not get even to Phnom Penh, even to their headquarters.

On many occasions I have asked the Minister for war victims to accompany us, to take advantage of the helicopter lift to go look at these areas. On the two trips that I took to the Route 1 area to talk to refugees, to see what was happening after the rollup of the Cambodian operation, we took along with us the head doctor of the Cambodian Army, because he just doesn't have the wherewithal or the transport to get out to these areas himself.

Senator KENNEDY. Who has priority in terms of supplies? Who has access to the helicopter? The political officers, obviously, and yourself.

Mr. ANTIPPAS. The Military Attache, sir, going out to look at the combat operations basically.

Senator KENNEDY. Where does that fellow who wants to get some salt up country go for transportation—do the Cambodians have helicopters for this purpose?

Mr. ANTIPPAS. They have a few helicopters that we have given them under our military aid program, but not enough to do all the kinds of operations that are necessary. I took salt to Kampong Thom because I know that the place has been cut off from all sources except

by air for a period of 15 months, and that there was a large influx of civilians from the Route 6 area that could not make it down toward Phnom Penh. These people, I suppose, some 4,000 or 5,000 civilians, streamed into Kampong Thom, which has a rather large perimeter, and it was under a great deal of pressure by an NVA regiment at the time. That is the only time that I have airlifted salt.

Senator FONG. I have been to Siem Reap in that section, quite a few years back. Is the section still primitive, simple, and sparsely settled?

Mr. ANTIPPAS. Well, again, like many provincial towns, Senator, many civilians have moved in. The perimeter around Siem Reap is actually quite large, except to the north. To the south that extends to the Great Lake, so that the people do get sources of fish.

May I mention here again, as was mentioned earlier, that one of the problems is low income.

Senator FONG. What is the per capita income there?

Mr. ANTIPPAS. I think before the war it was probably less than \$100. One would have to check that figure.

Senator FONG. About \$100 a year?

Mr. ANTIPPAS. But one of the basic problems that I think is little known concerning Cambodia is the fact that traditionally for Asia, they have had a tremendously high caloric daily intake. They eat a lot of meat and they eat a lot of fish. It is readily available. And in probably no other part of Indochina could you find this caloric intake. So, even a light drop in their income, and the fact that it has been difficult to get cattle into Phnom Penh, for example—meat is more expensive—fish—it is a seasonal thing, depending upon when the river is high, so that fish sometimes becomes expensive.

So, that even a small drop in their net income could bring something of a hardship on an individual family. When the first Cambodian troops went to Vietnam for training in Vietnamese training centers they complained bitterly that they were being starved to death. When officers checked the situation they found that the ARVN were feeding the Cambodians the ARVN ration which is about 50 percent of what a Cambodian eats daily.

Senator KENNEDY. We have read some pretty tough stories of the activities of the South Vietnamese troops in Cambodia.

Is there anything you want to tell us about that?

Mr. ANTIPPAS. I think a lot of the stories are true, sir. But I think it is a small unit commander's problem, lack of discipline. I don't think that senior ARVN officers condone this sort of thing. But these things happen, this is true.

I think that a lot of the worst came in August, 1971. But following this period discipline did improve, as small unit commanders did do a better job of controlling their troops. The Cambodians and Vietnamese set up a joint mission to inquire into these things. I would say generally that the situation improved from August to February.

Senator KENNEDY. How bad was it before then?

Mr. ANTIPPAS. I think we have to recall that perhaps the Vietnamese—the average Vietnamese soldier—doesn't have a great deal of respect for Cambodians, particularly those living on the border areas, because for a period of 7 or 8 years the border areas, and particularly at the Parrot's Beak, were used extensively as VC and NVA sanctu-

aries. And I can imagine that the ARVN soldier felt he was just getting his own back when for the years the NVA and VC were shooting at them from these border sanctuaries.

I have detailed knowledge of this, sir, because it is the work that I did in Vietnam dealing with border incidents.

I think it was more that sort of thing, plus just the fact that soldiers will do this sort of thing.

Senator KENNEDY. In terms of the pillaging and destruction and robbing and raping, is the ARVN behavior any worse than the NVA or the Vietcong? Is it better, or what?

Mr. ANTIPPAS. I think the NVA is probably somewhat better disciplined. Their cadres are very strict about this. They have also had a tradition of trying to keep their relations in the sanctuary good, because they didn't want any embarrassment with the Sihanouk Government.

I would say, however, that the Vietcong are probably less disciplined. And certainly Khmer Communist forces are even much less disciplined. But there are a number of horror stories that they come up with.

Senator KENNEDY. Did you form any impressions when talking to the refugees about how refugees were created—whether it was by terrorism of the NVA, by aerial bombardment, indiscriminate artillery, or air strikes?

Mr. ANTIPPAS. No, sir, I have never questioned them about that, because the sample you take is so small it is rather difficult. Obviously it is a mix of all these things. Basically they come in because of the insecurity. And they leave—they also leave the area because the only support that they can get is on their own land.

I might cite one example. The Cambodian Government received a grant from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees of \$48,000 with which to build refugee housing. They have built a cantonment area just west of the city between the airport and the city in Phnom Penh for refugee housing. And until the time I left in March that housing had not been occupied. They couldn't get anybody to move into what would then become a camp, even though the thing had been built. At the time of the Route 6 rollup in December I went to the camp because I had been told that the district officer from the area that had been overrun on Route 6 was gathering his villagers and was planning to settle in that refugee camp so that they could all be together. In fact, I saw him at that camp. And he said, come back in 2 days and the rest of the refugees would be there, and we could do some detailed debriefings about just what happened.

And they never showed up.

I went back and found out that they all drifted back up toward their home districts, although the area was in NVA hands at the time.

Senator FONG. Would you give us your overall estimate of the refugee problem in Cambodia? Are they in tragic circumstances, or are they faring all right? Are they being taken care of, or are they not being taken care of?

Mr. ANTIPPAS. That is a difficult question, Senator. I was present in Saigon during the Tet offensive, during the May offensive. I watched over 100,000 refugees stream into Saigon in 1968. I have never seen anything like that in Cambodia.

I guess I have traveled in Cambodia more than anybody else in the mission. Obviously they have a lot of problems. The Cambodians are inexperienced in handling things. They don't have the transport to get around. Frequently they can't marshal the resources to get to a given spot at a given time. I can't say that there has been tragic hardship, I cannot say that, not in comparison to Vietnam. Obviously the thing is very spotty.

Senator FONG. Do you feel that there is enough food provided to a refugee?

Mr. ANTIPPAS. Obviously Phnom Penh is a fairly special area, sir. It is difficult—you can't double the size of a population in 2 years and not get some dislocation. You have two and three families living in the same house. The one person that is working is supporting everybody, because the man who comes in from the provinces doesn't get a job immediately.

So, obviously there is some difficulty there.

Senator FONG. What about food? Is there sufficient food?

Mr. ANTIPPAS. There is sufficient food, vegetables, and rice. I am aware of what the ICRC doctor told investigators. He said that he felt that there were a lot of people that were suffering from malnutrition. That perhaps is a long-range problem.

Senator FONG. What about medical supplies and medical services?

Mr. ANTIPPAS. There are a number of hospitals operated in Phnom Penh. The hospital that would seem to be very adequate.

I might add that I have my family and my children in Phnom Penh. I am going back for an additional year, and I am taking them with me.

I have been in hospitals in Phnom Penh and in Siem Reap, as I said. The hospital that is referred to in the GAO report is in Kampong Chhnang, which is northwest of the capital about 45 miles. And let's face it, it was a pretty awful situation. But I might also add, there has been virtually no fighting in Kampong Chhnang, and the people that were in that hospital were coming from the areas north of the Vietcong from the Route 6 operation at the time we visited this thing.

Senator FONG. You say you are taking your family back?

Mr. ANTIPPAS. Yes, sir. They have been with me for the last 2 years.

Senator FONG. In Phnom Penh?

Mr. ANTIPPAS. In Phnom Penh.

Senator FONG. Did they go with you to Siem Reap?

Mr. ANTIPPAS. No, sir. We went by helicopter.

Senator FONG. Would you be willing to take your family to Siem Reap.

Mr. ANTIPPAS. Well, except—

Senator KENNEDY. By road?

Senator FONG. By helicopter.

Mr. ANTIPPAS. We had instructions not to travel by road. My wife would like to go back to Siem Reap. We visited there twice before 1960. And really the only area you can travel that has commercial services is Batdambang.

Senator FONG. What about dispensaries in Phnom Penh and Siem Reap?

Mr. ANTIPAS. Dispensaries are scattered throughout the city, from hospital to hospital. I was treated in a rather well-equipped dispensary in Siem Reap. It was termed a military hospital.

Senator FONG. How about clothing? You don't need too much clothing there, do you?

Mr. ANTIPAS. This is a problem, though. It is a basic problem for refugees that have to leave in a hurry. And the weather does get rather cool in the dry season. But again this is more a distribution problem by the Cambodians. I would be glad to give a couple of my own suits away, but they wouldn't wear them.

Senator FONG. Thank you.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much.

I guess we will move on to Laos.

Before we do, I want to recognize that the GAO report shows improvement in the general conditions of the refugees in Laos, especially in the medical area. So, we want to congratulate those that were responsible for such improvement.

Mr. O'CONNOR. I appreciate that, Senator. I might say that Dr. McCreedy is here—she was here before your committee last year. She was a very important factor in that improvement. And it runs in her family. Her husband is the chief of all the medical services in Laos. And I am happy to say that Dr. McCreedy was awarded one of the Federal Woman's Awards for her outstanding services in Laos. And she will be ready to testify and answer any questions she can.

I have a short summary which I can read in 6 or 7 minutes on Laos.

Senator KENNEDY. Why don't you proceed.

Mr. O'CONNOR. From June 1970 to April 1972, AID has supported an annual average of 281,000 refugees in Laos. The high point was reached in June 1971 when the total was 317,000. This total steadily decreased to 238,000—a 25 percent decrease—by February of this year, due largely to the fact that some refugees managed to become at least temporarily self-sufficient. This decrease occurred during the unexpectedly early and strong dry season offensive of the North Vietnamese, equipped with Russian tanks and Russian 130 millimeter guns, across the Plain des Jarres. This offensive, which has not yet ended, has to date displaced about 45,000 refugees and created about 7,500 new ones. AID is presently supporting about 263,000 refugees, which means that some who had become temporarily self-sufficient again need our assistance.

We have for some years been devoting about one-third of our AID funds for Laos to refugee assistance. That assistance has doubled from \$8.4 million in fiscal year 1969 to \$16.3 million in fiscal year 1972. During these same years, other agencies of the Government—the Department of Agriculture with Public Law 480 commodities, the Department of Defense, and in fiscal year 1972, the CIA—have also contributed substantial amounts for this purpose. Thus, the sum total of funding for refugee assistance from all U.S. agencies has also doubled, from \$12.2 million in fiscal year 1969 to an estimated \$23.9 million in fiscal year 1972.

And incidentally, some figures in the GAO report we found to be inaccurate. They presented higher figures for other agencies, as they

included some other costs. So I am giving you what I think is more accurate.

Senator KENNEDY. Can you give us a breakdown on those figures later, along the lines of the GAO report?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Yes, we can give that to you for the record.

(Subsequent to the hearing, the following information was submitted:)

REFUGEE RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO LAOS

[In millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year—			
	1969	1970	1971	1972 (estimate)
AID.....	8.423	15.776	15.850	16,264
USDA (Public Law 480, title II).....	.800	.600	1.300	1.400
OOD (all years) plus CIA (fiscal year 1972).....	2.983	4,594	4.151	6.227
Total.....	12.206	20.970	21.301	23.891

Mr. O'CONNOR. AID has also doubled the number of full-time American staff assigned to refugee work since 1970. There are now 23 full-time Americans in the Office of Refugee Affairs, created in the late 1970 reorganization to upgrade the refugee function. I may say to a considerable extent at the urging of this committee and the GAO.

In addition, about 39 other U.S. personnel in the AID mission devote either all or part of their time to refugee work. Most importantly, about 1,800 local Lao personnel, in the employ of the Laotian Government or in the employ of our mission, provide the necessary manpower to make the program function.

Let me now address myself to some of the criticisms that have been leveled against AID's refugee and health programs in Laos.

First, regarding the repeated charges that AID funds have been used in Laos to finance combat operations. This is not true now, and it never has been true.

What is true is that AID has in the past financed food for the Lao military and paramilitary forces and paramilitary dependents, medical care and supplies for paramilitary forces and their dependents, and miscellaneous relief supplies for paramilitary dependents.

However, for a number of reasons dealt with in some detail in my prepared statement, the responsibility for financing all of these types of assistance has now been transferred to either DOD or CIA.

This last statement is substantiated by the GAO's latest report of March 29, 1972, which states at page 30:

In our prior report we noted that action had been taken or was under way to transfer funding responsibility for assistance to military and paramilitary forces and their dependents from AID to DOD. . . . Our current work indicates that, beginning with fiscal year 1972, DOD and CIA will be funding these remaining items of assistance.

Second, regarding contentions that our health program in Laos is not adequate. Let me give you just a few main points.

During the past year, AID funded construction has increased hospital bed capacity at AID supported hospitals by 240, to a total of 725. This total was achieved despite the total loss of two hospitals in

1971. A 60-bed hospital at Paksong was deliberately burned to the ground by the North Vietnamese military in May 1971. A 100-bed hospital in Long Tieng had to be evacuated under enemy fire in December 1971. Four other hospitals with a total of 385 beds had to be temporarily closed down during the year as a result of enemy action for periods of a month or more.

In addition to AID supported hospitals, our agency also supports about 225 dispensaries in the rural areas of Laos. These handled approximately 3 million patient visits in 1971, approximately a 20 percent increase over the previous year. With a population of about 750,000 in the rural areas served, this means an average of four visits per person during the year, an unusually high level for rural Asia.

And these are, of course, the increases, Senator, which you have already generously commented on, and I appreciate it.

Third, I would like to deal with criticisms of our mission's management of the refugee and health programs.

I am convinced that over the years our mission has done a good management job in a very difficult situation. I was pleased to read the following statement on page 9 of the GAO report of March 29:

Our followup work showed that USAID Laos had taken steps to eliminate many of the weaknesses noted in our previous report and as a result, had strengthened the management of the refugee program. Specifically, we found that USAID/Laos:

Had increased the number of people assigned to the organization responsible for program management.

Had developed statements describing the functions of the organization responsible for program management.

Was developing written procedures for program execution.

Had given consideration to steps it would need to take to respond to unpredictable program changes.

Had increased the quantity of data being reported to AID/Washington.

And we appreciate those comments from the GAO.

The GAO report also notes that the "upgrading" of the refugee function accomplished by the reorganization "does evidence the high priority assigned refugee affairs by the Mission."

Mr. Chairman, I hope this brief summary has been helpful in putting into perspective our refugee program in Laos. Since fiscal year 1969, we have reorganized the program, doubled its staff, doubled its budget and improved its efficiency.

Further improvements can and will be instituted—there is no institution that is perfect, particularly one that is operated under these particular conditions—and the GAO reports and those of your own staff are helpful in this respect. I and my colleagues now stand ready to answer any of your questions.

Thank you.

(Prepared statements on treatment of war victims and displaced persons in Cambodia and on the refugee situation in Laos follow:)

#### TREATMENT OF WAR VICTIMS AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN CAMBODIA

Mr. Chairman, as Ambassador Sullivan has indicated, the situation in Cambodia is quite different from that prevailing in Laos and Vietnam. In Cambodia most displaced persons tend to congregate in Phnom Penh and have generally been able to find temporary shelter with relatives and friends. Some have had to construct makeshift housing in and around the capital. Relatively few persons—some 15,000 according to our latest information—are housed in refugee camps or official resettlement areas.

Our best estimate is that since March 1970, about 800,000 additional people have come to Phnom Penh on their own. However, reliable statistics are extremely difficult to find. Most people do not ordinarily report their movements to the authorities. As the February 2d GAO report to this Subcommittee points out on page 2, "The total number of refugees in Cambodia is largely conjectural. There is no system for enumerating refugees, and they are moving continually."

Over the two years since the war spread to Cambodia, we estimate that the Cambodian Government and private groups have dispensed a minimum of 400 million riels for aid to refugees and the injured. (This is the equivalent of \$2.7 million at the current rate of 150:1 and over \$7 million at the exchange rate which prevailed until October 1971.) This includes funds expended by the Ministry of Social Action, Labor and Employment; the General Commissariat for Veterans; the Directorate for War Victims; the Khmer Red Cross, and private donations in local currency from religious and charitable groups. We estimate that of this amount well over a million dollars can be attributed to expenditures for civilian casualties and victims of the war. In addition, there has been over \$4 million worth of donations in kind, chiefly medical supplies, from Japan and 13 other countries.

The Directorate for War Victims gives food for ten days and clothing, if needed, to each refugee after which time he is expected to provide for himself or depend on relatives. The vast majority are said to be self-sufficient within ten days. If a refugee is sick and unable to work, however, the Directorate continues the food ration. With regard to civilian casualties, the Directorate pays five thousand riels, lump sum, to a civilian war widow all of whose children are minors. If any of the children have reached majority, they are expected to provide for the family without assistance from the Directorate. The Directorate pays two thousand riels to a civilian or a soldier whose wife is killed by military action and for a child so killed. Fifty riels per week are paid to the hospital in which a wounded refugee is held and the wounded refugee receives a payment of one thousand riels when he leaves the hospital.

In attempting to assess the condition of the refugees and the effectiveness of ongoing programs, our mission had a number of conversations in Phnom Penh with the UNDP, other international agencies, and the Cambodians, in one of which I personally participated in January. As a result, all parties agreed that, because of the paucity of data, a study was needed to determine the conditions and problems encountered by refugees and displaced persons in Phnom Penh, where the largest numbers of people have gathered. The UNDP agreed to undertake such a study within the context of its ongoing programs and available staff.

This study was completed just a few weeks ago. It produced no evidence that the refugees who are able to live with relatives and friends are in urgent or dire need of assistance. It found that the shift in population has not brought on serious unemployment although it may have lowered per capita income. It noted that the influx has, however, put a strain on public facilities in the city. The UNDP therefore recommended intensive efforts by the GKR to insure that the present water supply system in Phnom Penh is maintained at sufficiently high standards to prevent epidemics and to increase garbage collections as a general preventive health measure. Increased public health surveillance was recommended to guard against outbreaks of plague or cholera.

With reference to medical services, the UNDP found that, although the quantity of hospital beds in Phnom Penh to treat civilian casualties was found to approach international standards, these facilities are frequently inefficiently utilized. Present stocks of standard medicines are reported to be satisfactory, but more trained physicians and nurses are needed. The UNDP advised the GKR to seek help from appropriate international bodies (such as the World Health Organization and the International Red Cross) or bilateral donors in a nurses' training program.

To help those who have had to construct makeshift housing in and around Phnom Penh, the UNDP recommended that the GKR provide assistance with materials for low-cost, self-help type housing and pointed to the possibilities for increased importation of these commodities under the American aid program. It recommended that the GKR utilize French aid for the cost of repairs and improvements to the water supply.

In addition to official refugee camps, there are in Phnom Penh 26 locations—pagodas, apartment houses, and other buildings—that have been designated refugee centers. The UNDP report found certain of these centers to be overcrowded and recommended that additional centers be created. You will recall that the GAO report found three of the official refugee camps in Phnom Penh to be adequate, and the fourth, supported primarily by a private charitable group, to be crowded and unsanitary.

The UNDP report is currently under active consideration by the GKR's Refugee Committee, chaired by the Minister of Labor and Social Welfare. However, as of May 4 the Committee had not yet formulated its own recommendations.

Mr. Chairman, we believe that on the whole the GKR level of effort combined with the efforts of the families and friends of the displaced persons is meeting the current requirements and is consistent with the standards of living of the Cambodian people. Therefore, we have not undertaken a U.S. program for refugees in Cambodia as we have done in Laos and Vietnam. Aside from the fact that the GKR along with other nations and international bodies are already involved, U.S. programs have the disadvantages of requiring an increased American presence in Cambodia and a gradual shifting of responsibility. I might add parenthetically that your Subcommittee has in the past been instrumental in alerting us to the dangers of over-involvement.

Though we do not have a U.S. refugee program in Cambodia, our economic aid program does have an impact on the well-being of those in the urban centers. It attempts to assure an adequate supply of essential commodities in the marketplace. Thus the Phnom Penh residents, displaced persons as well as permanent residents, can have available a substantially larger amount of resources than they would if there were no U.S. economic aid program.

Furthermore, according to our own periodic observations, the GKR has maintained adequate stocks of rice and wheat flour in the urban areas; regular convoys by road and sea have averted any sustained food shortages.

Of course, we have the problem of displaced persons under continuing review. A senior official in the Embassy follows the status of displaced persons and war victims. We remain receptive to suggestions of what we might do and action that appears to be appropriate to avert undue hardships. We would be willing to divert local currency, generated by our aid program, for overall budget support, to meet such displaced persons' relief requirements for locally available resources. We could increase our contribution to the PL 480 Title II program handled by UNICEF in Bangkok if that were called for. We are always ready to work with American and international voluntary agencies to help identify suitable projects and to help finance shipping costs for their donations.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we do not find that the refugee problem in Cambodia is on the same scale as in Laos and Vietnam where the fighting has gone on much longer and has been more destructive. From all the evidence we have, the Cambodian society, with some help from the authorities and private donors, has been able, by and large, to cope with the influx. Should the problem intensify to the extent that it is clear that help from the U.S. is necessary and sought after, we are ready to provide it.

#### REFUGEE SITUATION IN LAOS

Mr. Chairman, I am glad to have the opportunity to appear before this Subcommittee again and to discuss, from the standpoint of A.I.D., the current refugee problems in Laos and Cambodia.

Let me deal first with Laos. The Subcommittee already has considerable knowledge of the refugee problem in Laos and of the nature and scope of A.I.D.'s refugee assistance there. I shall therefore confine my comments to a summary of some of the major developments of the past two years since I last appeared before this Subcommittee.

From June 1970-April 1972, we have supported an annual average of 281,000 refugees. The high point was reached in June 1971 when the total was 317,000. The total steadily decreased to 238,000 (a 25% decrease) by February of this year, due largely to the success of some refugees in planting and harvesting sufficient rice to become at least temporarily self-sufficient. I might point out that this decrease occurred during the unexpectedly early and strong dry season offensive of the North Vietnamese, who were equipped with Russian tanks and, for the first time, Russian 180 millimeter guns. This offensive, which has not yet

ended, has to date displaced about 45,000 refugees and created about 7,500 new ones. We presently are supporting about 203,000 refugees, which means that some who had become temporarily self-sufficient, again need our assistance.

As the Subcommittee knows, we have for some years been devoting about one-third of our A.I.D. funds for Laos to refugee assistance, and that assistance has gone from about \$8.4 million in fiscal year 1969 to about \$16.3 million in fiscal year 1972, virtually doubling that part of the A.I.D. program. During these same years, other agencies of the government—the Department of Agriculture with PL 480 commodities, the Department of Defense and in fiscal year 1972, CIA—have also contributed substantial amounts for this program, with the result that the sum total of funding for refugee assistance in Laos has gone from about \$12.2 million in fiscal year 1969 to an estimated \$23.0 million in fiscal year 1972, again virtually a doubling of the resources made available for this purpose.

These are large increases in resources, but perhaps the human side of the equation can be better understood in terms of per capita expenditures. We estimate that in fiscal year 1969 the per capita assistance given to refugees was approximately \$70, whereas in fiscal year 1972 it has risen to about \$88. This may sound like very little money in Western terms until one realizes that the annual average per capita income in Laos is something less than \$75.

We have doubled the number of full-time American staff assigned to refugee work since 1970. There are now 23 full-time Americans in the Office of Refugee Affairs, created in the late 1970 reorganization to upgrade the refugee function. In addition, about 39 other U.S. personnel in the A.I.D. Mission devote either all or part of their time to refugee work.

Despite the war, permanent resettlement of refugees with A.I.D. assistance is a constant process. The Royal Lao Government estimates that over the past decade about 500,000 refugees have become permanently resettled and self-sufficient. At present, our Mission is giving resettlement assistance to nearly 71,000 refugees. Such assistance includes clearing new villages, building houses, roads, streets, schools, and dispensaries, drilling wells, preparing land for planting, giving the settlers seed, tools, insecticides, fertilizers, and special agricultural training. I have seen some of these resettlement projects in my visits to Laos and have been impressed to see the effective way resettlement is done and the enthusiasm of the settlers for their new lives.

Let me now address myself to some of the criticisms that have been leveled against A.I.D.'s refugee and health programs in Laos. These criticisms, both from members of Congress and the press, fall into essentially two areas. First, there have been charges that A.I.D. funds have been devoted—or “diverted”—to financing combat operations in Laos; sometimes it's put that A.I.D. is financing “CIA's secret war.” Second, there has been criticism of certain alleged shortcomings in A.I.D.'s refugee programs, particularly in the health services and management areas. I should like now, for the record, to respond to these two sets of criticisms.

First, regarding the repeated charges that A.I.D. funds have been used in Laos to finance combat operations. This is not true now, and it never has been true.

What is true is that A.I.D. has in the past financed food for the Lao military and paramilitary forces and paramilitary dependents, medical care and supplies for paramilitary forces and their dependents, and miscellaneous relief supplies for paramilitary dependents. In order to show why this was done, I would like to explain the background briefly.

In the spring of 1968, a decision was made at the highest level of the Kennedy Administration that the United States should resume assistance to Lao paramilitary units, and the CIA was given the responsibility for the training and advising of these irregular forces. These forces needed food, medical care and supplies. The dependents of these irregulars had long since been forced from their homes by the North Vietnamese Army and were thus refugees, qualifying for assistance under the A.I.D. refugee program.

Until 1970, the financing noted above had been determined by our General Counsel to be authorized under our statutory authority because the primary purpose of this assistance was to maintain political stability. Moreover, A.I.D. regularly described these activities to Congress in its annual presentation.

However, in January 1970, A.I.D.'s General Counsel ruled that Supporting Assistance was no longer an appropriate funding source with respect to two items; namely, the direct provision of rice and other foodstuffs to Lao military personnel, and the costs associated with the Requirements Office. That office,

manned by civilians, was established in 1962 in the A.I.D. Mission to perform logistics functions in connection with the military supply assistance our Government had decided to give the Royal Lao Government at its request. This finding by A.I.D.'s General Counsel was precipitated by a September 1969 GAO decision in the Premier Auto Case in India, which held that funds authorized under Part I of the Foreign Assistance Act are not an appropriate funding source to finance consumables for direct delivery to the military or to fill existing military orders.

Let me emphasize that our General Counsel's ruling was applicable only to delivery of food and logistics services directly to the Lao military. The General Counsel's decision neither explicitly nor by implication challenged A.I.D. authority to finance medical supplies and services and refugee supplies such as cooking utensils and blankets to paramilitary personnel or their dependents.

As a result of our General Counsel's ruling, A.I.D. and DOD agreed on the transfer to DOD, beginning in July 1970, of funding responsibility for the two items mentioned above. However, to this date, the legality of financing by A.I.D. of medical services and supplies and relief supplies for paramilitary dependent refugees has not been challenged. We continue to believe that these are clearly justifiable uses of Supporting Assistance funds. It was agreed, however, on policy rather than legal grounds, that all costs for these services should be shifted to CIA and DOD, and this has now been done.

In summary, I want to reiterate the following points. *First*, at no time have A.I.D. funds been used in Laos to finance any combat operations. *Second*, A.I.D. financing of food for the Lao military was considered legal until 1970 when a GAO ruling, entirely unrelated to Laos, cast doubt upon A.I.D.'s prior legal interpretations. *Third*, A.I.D. financing of food, medical services and relief supplies for paramilitary dependent refugees has never been legally challenged and continues to be, in the view of our General Counsel, a clearly justifiable use of Supporting Assistance funds. *Fourth*, the shifts of financing to CIA and DOD subsequent to 1970 were made as a result of policy determinations and not because the activities were considered illegal. *Finally*, the responsibility for financing all of the above types of assistance has now been transferred to either DOD or CIA.

This last statement is substantiated by the GAO's own report of March 29, 1972. On page 30 of that report, the GAO states:

"In our prior report we noted that action had been taken or was under way to transfer funding responsibility for assistance to military and paramilitary forces and their dependents from AID to DOD. We pointed out that, at the time of our prior review, despite DOD agreement to pay all such assistance costs beginning July 1, 1970, AID was funding certain assistance—medical aid, protein supplements, and nonconsumables, such as knives and blankets—being provided to these forces and dependents. Our current work indicates that, beginning with fiscal year 1972, DOD and CIA will be funding these remaining items of assistance.

"We also found that, through an oversight, the AID-DOD cost-sharing agreement did not cover about \$1.1 million worth of protein supplement being provided to paramilitary dependents; however, the matter was being negotiated at the AID/Washington level at the conclusion of our review."

I can report that an agreement has been reached between A.I.D. and DOD on this last item, and that no FY 1972 A.I.D. funds have been spent for this purpose. I hope that the GAO statement I have just referred to will once and for all put a stop to statements that A.I.D. is still allocating funds for assistance to military and paramilitary forces and their dependents.

Let me now turn to contentions that our health program in Laos is not adequate.

We are proud of that program. In the midst of war, it is enabling the Lao Government not only to meet the immediate medical needs of its people but also to develop its own public health capacity for the longer pull. Let me give you just a few main points.

During the past year, A.I.D.-funded construction has increased hospital bed capacity at A.I.D.-supported hospitals by 240, to a total of 725. This total was achieved despite the total loss of two hospitals in 1971. A 60-bed hospital at Paksong was overrun by the North Vietnamese military in May of 1971 and was deliberately burned to the ground. 68 patients and 8 Lao staff are missing. A 100-bed hospital in Long Tieng had to be evacuated under heavy artillery and

small arms fire in December 1971; and because of the heavy fighting that has continued in the area to the present time, this installation has been closed indefinitely. Four other hospitals with a total of 385 beds had to be temporarily closed down during the year as a result of enemy action for periods of a month or more.

However, in spite of these hazards, overall patient load increased in these hospitals by 12% in 1971 over 1970 and by 20% in the first quarter of 1972 over the previous quarter.

In addition to A.I.D.-supported hospitals, our Agency also supports about 225 dispensaries in the rural areas of Laos. These handled approximately 3 million patient visits in 1971, approximately a 20% increase over the previous year. With a population of about 750,000 in the rural areas served, this means an average of four visits per person during the year, an unusually high level for rural Asia.

In the meantime, in-country training of Lao medical personnel is proceeding on schedule despite the war. The retraining cycle of 350 medics will be completed this fiscal year. 20 medics completed the basic six months' course and 31 maternal-child practical nurses completed 9 months' training this fiscal year. All of the above personnel have been assigned to refugee locations.

Now I would like to deal with criticisms of our Mission's management of the refugee and health programs.

I am convinced that over the years our Mission has done a good management job in a very difficult situation. Many improvements have been made—in good part reacting to suggestions coming from the GAO and this Subcommittee. I was pleased to read the following statements on page 9 of the GAO report of March 29:

"Our follow-up work showed that USAID/Laos had taken steps to eliminate many of the weaknesses noted in our previous report and, as a result, had strengthened the management of the refugee program. Specifically, we found that USAID/Laos:

- had increased the number of people assigned to the organization responsible for program management.
- had developed statements describing the functions of the organization responsible for program management.
- was developing written procedures for program execution.
- had given consideration to steps it would need to take to respond to unpredictable program changes.
- had increased the quantity of data being reported to AID/Washington."

It is true that the GAO says (p. 10) the reorganization of refugee assistance has "not resulted in any readily discernible differences in USAID/Laos' policies and practices." However, no where in the GAO report is there any criticism of USAID's policies and practices. I have here with me, and would like to insert for the record, a copy of the Mission's "Action Memo No. 71-05 dated September 1, 1970." That memorandum sets out in some detail the policy of our Mission, noting among other things that "relief assistance to refugees will normally receive the highest priority within all USAID projects and supporting services in claims on material and human resources." The GAO report also notes, however, that the "upgrading" of the refugee function accomplished by the reorganization "does evidence the high priority assigned refugee affairs by the Mission."

Management of a complex program can almost always be improved, however, and we are examining the GAO report carefully to determine whether it contains any suggestions not already being acted upon by the Mission which it would be desirable to adopt.

Also in the management area, the GAO makes some suggestions for improving the control over refugee commodities and the administration of our Title II P.L. 480 program. As to the control over commodities, the GAO expressed concern that in some cases USAID/Laos is paying freight bills without "appropriate documentation evidencing the actual receipt of transported items." Unfortunately, shipments of in-transit goods from Bangkok to Laos have to be handled by three separate carriers. Claim action must be directed against the carrier in custody of the cargo at the time of damage or loss. Deferral of payment to the Express Transport Organization (ETO) until all handling is cleared would be inequitable. As we indicated in 1970, payment to ETO is "in accord with standard commercial practices."

Although the GAO report continues to question this as a prudent practice, it is the experience of A.I.D. that commercial carriers generally require payment in advance of final delivery both in the U.S. and overseas. If there is a discrepancy between what is shipped (and paid for) and what is subsequently received, a claim is initiated. Deliveries are certified by USAID personnel. USAID personnel also verify at least monthly receipt of air deliveries and airdrops. In the first three quarters of fiscal year 1972 commodities with a value of \$4,800,000 were shipped with claims against carriers totaling \$2,647 or .06 percent.

The GAO report on refugee relief listed several deficiencies in commodity storage and record-keeping. The Mission has corrected or is in the process of correcting these problems and will continue with on-the-job training to upgrade the performance in this area.

Mr. Chairman, I have, of course, not covered all the points made in the recent GAO reports. But what I have said about some of the GAO suggestions goes for all of them. We welcome the constructive recommendations of the GAO and shall carefully examine both of its recent Laos reports—the second of which was received only about two weeks ago—to determine how we can be helped by them.

I hope my remarks have been helpful in summarizing and putting into proper perspective our refugee program in Laos. Since fiscal year 1969, we have reorganized the program, doubled its staffing, doubled its budget and improved its efficiency. We have an excellent and devoted field staff. Two of these people are with us today, Mr. Chairman, and we now stand ready to give you as much additional information as we can.

Senator KENNEDY. Very good. I appreciate your testimony.

You can understand the concern that this committee has over the use of funds which we thought were being devoted to either refugee or humanitarian needs, but were being used to support paramilitary activities and personnel. As one who has followed it very closely, I never suggested that AID funds were used for military operations, because I myself didn't feel that to be the case. But in reviewing the way this program developed, the support for paramilitary personnel, did concern me. This goes back for some period of time, to the early or mid-sixties, when the term "refugee" was used in Laos as a pragmatic euphemism to cover the development and support of paramilitary forces—to any person who took up arms against the Communists. I believe that was generally understood as the purpose of the refugee program, and I think that aspect was ill advised.

So, I want to express appreciation for the budgetary separation of these programs. I think that it makes a good deal of sense.

Will paramilitary personnel still be eligible for title II Public Law 480 food? That program is funded for help and assistance in the case of national disaster, cyclones and this type of thing—or at least that is the reason or the justification that is given to Congress.

There are many instances, of course, where this type of program is needed—in Bangladesh, the earthquake in Peru, and in many other areas.

Can title II commodities still be used to support the paramilitary personnel?

Mr. O'CONNOR. Senator, title II commodities will be used for paramilitary dependent refugees. They will not be used for paramilitary personnel themselves. I think our lawyers have drawn that distinction.

Senator KENNEDY. I would like to congratulate Dr. McCreedy for the work that has been done in the medical program. It is very commendable, and I want to add my congratulations for the efforts

that have been made and the support that has been given to this program.

Dr. McCreeDY, would you like to comment on the present situation and what particular problems or opportunities you foresee in the next year?

Dr. McCreeDY. Over the past year, despite some difficulties within the country, we have made some progress in institution building. The Royal Lao Government (RLG) has made some progress. The number of medical doctors in Laos has tripled. And the number of medical assistants who have gone off for postgraduate training, which has been subsidized by UNICEF, has been up to 30 percent for a total of 120.

The Royal Lao Government, with the assistance of WHO, has established a 7-year medical school as against the medical assistance school of 4 years.

USAID has assisted in the development of the first nursing school in Laos, and it will graduate its first class this year.

We are in the process of constructing a 200-bed national child health training center with WHO advisory assistance, which will be staffed by the RLG and operative at the end of this year.

The RLG-USAID assisted training programs have produced approximately 160 nurses and midwives, who are presently out in the village areas. And these people, I think about 20 percent of them, are in the refugee areas.

And we will continue to extend this type of services to refugees in the rural areas there.

Senator FONG. Are you constantly training medical technicians?

Dr. McCreeDY. Yes, sir, at several levels. We just finished our training cycle for 350 medical technicians. And this has been mainly in the field of village sanitation, water development, reporting systems, and maternal child health which we particularly wish to introduce into these areas.

Senator FONG. I understand the North Vietnamese deliberately burned a hospital to the ground after they had captured it. Why would they do that?

Dr. McCreeDY. I don't know. This was a 60-bed hospital in Pak-song. Things had been a little difficult there for a few weeks. And the Operation Brotherhood team was being evacuated nightly, as were all the nonambulatory service patients. A week before it was invaded we evacuated approximately 110 patients out of this site. They overran it one night with 68 patients remaining and 28 staff. Of this staff 21 managed to make their way out in the next few weeks. Three days after the North Vietnamese took over the town—and there had been no damage to the hospital installation—the hospital caught on fire, and the town was roused to stop the fire, which the NVA said was started by American bombing. There had been no air activity at the time.

The Pathet Lao people came in the next day, according to our staff, and this was the story that the North Vietnamese told the Pathet Lao, that there had been some action which resulted in the destruction of a hospital.

Senator FONG. Was the fire deliberately set?

Dr. McCreeDY. The staff said it was deliberately set by troops.

Senator FONG. Thank you.

I congratulate you on a very fine report.

Mr. O'CONNOR. I would just like to express again on the record not only my thanks for your kind comments, but particularly on behalf of our staff and the mission director, Dr. Weldon and Dr. McCreedy. I have been out there three or four times, and I know they work awfully hard. That doesn't mean that we can't improve, and we will.

Senator KENNEDY. Dr. McCreedy, what about the Meo tribesmen? What kinds of programs are you working on for them, and what shape are those programs in?

Dr. McCREEDY. Well, medical service is extended to all groups where we are working. The main effort is in the rural areas and in the congested areas where we have access, where we have aircraft, security, and where the RLG does not have a permanent facility.

We have attempted to develop facilities in these areas. As far as Meo alone, particularly in region 2, region 2 was a main hospital 200-bed training center at Sam Thong which was destroyed in 1970 and now we have a unit in Bon Song. And in this region there are 70 dispensaries, one 200-bed hospital and one 50-bed hospital and then the backup at site 272 of a 150 bed hospital.

I feel that the medical treatment is adequate.

As far as the general condition of refugees are concerned, it is not too bad. With the protein supplement, Public Law 480 and certain other supplements we brought in, rice, fish ponds, and these programs, I think it approaches that of the general population.

Senator KENNEDY. I suppose they will have a rather difficult time being resettled in their ancestral homes. Is that true?

Dr. McCREEDY. Yes, sir.

Perhaps Mr. Williamson can go into that.

Mr. O'CONNOR. He is our expert on that particular subject, if you would like to hear it.

Senator KENNEDY. Fine, we would like to hear it.

Mr. WILLIAMSON. Senator, I'm Jack Williamson, Assistant to the Chief of Refugee Affairs in Laos.

Senator KENNEDY. I am interested in what the prospects for resettlement of the Meo tribes are and some of the particular difficulties which they are confronting. Obviously, they have been very much involved in the struggle there. I am interested in what their conditions are. The doctor mentioned about medical supplies, but what about their prospects for resettlement and a return to their lands?

Mr. WILLIAMSON. In part, or perhaps entirely, it depends on the North Vietnamese. Over the last 10 years the North Vietnamese have been steadily pushing the tribal people in the northern part of Laos out of their homelands. At the present time there is a problem of land remaining for these people to resettle on. At the present time our surveys in the country indicate that there is still sufficient land in order to resettle these people. But, of course, they will have to be developed, they are frontier area lands literally—jungle, hard to get to areas. And this is, in fact, our problem.

We are at the present time processing some 70,000 people in the resettlement program. We have millions of dollars of equipment, engineers, land clearing, and so on, to resettle these people.

If the North Vietnamese will not allow these people to go back to their homelands, we will have to resettle them.

Senator KENNEDY. How much mountain land is there in the government controlled areas?

Mr. WILLIAMSON. The total land in government control at the present time is about 4 million hectares of land. At present people are living on land of about a million hectares.

So, there is about 3 million. As you recall, Laos is lightly inhabited territory. So, we estimate about 3 million hectares of lands is left. Of that, probably 300,000 or 400,000 hectares is arable, in other words, people can plant on it. We have about 50,000 families to resettle. And if you figure roughly 5 hectares per family we think it will be adequate.

But, as I say, the problem is applying our resources to develop these lands on the frontiers.

Senator KENNEDY. Maybe you could just give us a short note on that, could you, Mr. Williamson?

Mr. WILLIAMSON. Yes, sir, we can supply that.

Senator KENNEDY. Just supply it.

This whole experience has been a tragic experience, especially for the Meo. And we are just interested in sort of following along and seeing what happens to them.

Mr. O'CONNOR. Do you want that for the record?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes, please.

(Subsequent to the hearing, the following information was submitted:)

Final resettlement of the thousands of Lao civilians who have fled the war and their homes depends on further identification and development of suitable land and on the outcome of the war.

Extensive surveys have been and are continuing to be conducted to determine the availability and suitability of land resources in the areas presently under RLG control. Estimates to date indicate that in these areas there are about 8 million uninhabited acres. About 1 million of these acres have been identified as potentially available and suitable for refugee resettlement in terms of accessibility and the possibility of rice cultivation.

These 1 million acres, of which to date about 330,000 have been or are being reserved for resettlement, are mainly lowlands. They do not include enough hill acreage to permit all the Meo and other hill-tribe refugees to resettle and practice their traditional farming methods. Moreover, the Meo and other hill tribes much prefer their native mountain areas, and have been historically reluctant to settle in lowlands, although a relatively small number of them have done so.

In the remaining 2 million uninhabited acres under RLG control—much of this marginal land with difficult access—there is enough hill acreage to resettle all the Meo and other hill-tribesmen who are currently refugees. How much developmental effort this would require will depend on the results of the surveys being pursued in these areas. Whether such resettlement will have to be undertaken will depend on whether the course of the war permits the hill-tribe refugees to return to their homelands.

Senator KENNEDY. I have just one final area.

Major Cook, one of the areas that I have been interested in has been the rules of warfare, the manual on the rules of warfare. And I understand there is a manual on the rules of land warfare for the Army, and rules of naval warfare for the Navy. I am interested in what the rules of air warfare are, particularly in Laos and Cambodia.

Is there anything you can tell us about that?

Major Cook. There are some things, yes, sir.

I notice in your entry in the Congressional Record that you explained that there were rules of land and naval warfare, but no rules of aerial warfare.

Senator KENNEDY. I think I was talking about manuals. Is there a manual of air warfare?

Major COOK. You are correct, there is no manual of aerial warfare, in part because there is no international agreement which would provide the basis for such a manual, as there is in the case of ground and naval warfare. One should not infer from that, however, that we observe no rules in aerial warfare. In fact, there is a substantial body of self-imposed rules that we observe in the conduct of aerial warfare.

Senator KENNEDY. As I understand, this is a subject matter that is being considered now at the meeting of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva.

Do you know what our position is on that?

Major COOK. No, sir, I don't know what the details of our position have been. We would certainly favor the development of rules of aerial warfare.

Senator KENNEDY. Ambassador Sullivan?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I can tell you a bit about that. But we also have with us one of our lawyers, Mr. Kerley.

What is currently going on in Geneva—and this is where we have our prime experts on it right now—there is a meeting of government experts who are developing this set of laws in an international context. What they will be doing once they have developed this body of documents is to send them back to the governments for a perusal of ratification. We have here only the preliminary ones, we don't have the result of this current conference, which won't end until June 3.

But until we get that result we won't have the actual context in which we are dealing. These are the documents that have been developed in a preliminary meeting, and these are the ones that the experts are now working on.

Senator KENNEDY. Do we have our position, is that stated, Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. SULLIVAN. We have no position as yet. These people who are there are experts, and they are uninstructed experts in that sense of the word, they can develop their own context. And then when they bring this back, then there will be a consideration in the government, and presumably there will be another conference with instructed delegates.

Senator KENNEDY. So we haven't got a position here defending the results of the technical studies?

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is correct, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. I don't know whether you are familiar with the article that was put in the Congressional Record which lists the various kinds of antipersonnel weapons that have been developed by the United States—the "pineapple," the antipersonnel bomb, which has 250 steel ball-bearing pellets that shoot out horizontally on impact. One sortie load carries a thousand such bombs, 250,000 steel pellets shooting out horizontally over an area the size of four football fields. And the "guava," which is another antipersonnel bomb—an improvement over the pineapple, with 4,000 to 5,000 steel ball-bearing

pellets. There is the fragmentation antipersonnel bombs—63 fragmentation projectiles designed to be an improvement over the pineapple and the guava. And the “flechette” rockets are even more destructive. Fired from rockets in the air war as well as in an M-79 grenade, tiny steel nails with a large head on one end and a large head on the other, they peel off the flesh and enlarge the wound at the end of the body, shredding the internal organs and large blood vessels. And extremely delicate surgery is necessary to remove them. And the bombs in plastic cases which break up into hundreds of tiny slivers one-eighth of an inch to one-sixth of an inch. They are not X-rayable, so that if a person is hit with enough of them they must be removed by exploratory surgery.

Are all these antipersonnel weapons going to be discussed in Geneva, do you know?

Major COOK. I don't know what the agenda is at Geneva, no, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you know whether they are, Mr. Sullivan? I see there is a gentleman back there shaking his head.

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is Mr. Kerley, who is our lawyer. We can bring him up here, and he can tell us what the Geneva discussions will be about.

Mr. KERLEY. Senator, under consideration at the Geneva Conference is entirely the application of the rules of humanitarian law to civilians in armed conflict. It would not deal with material such as you have discussed here.

Senator KENNEDY. Aren't civilians affected by these types of weapons as well?

Mr. KERLEY. Yes, sir. What I meant to suggest is that the focus would not be on material, but rather on special rules applicable to people having civilian status.

Senator KENNEDY. Could you develop that a little bit for me. I am not sure I quite understand it.

Mr. KERLEY. The present legal norms we have are the 1949 Geneva Conventions. They drew their legal inspiration from the experience of World War II, which involved a very heavy amount of hostilities expended on the civilian population. You recall the mass bombings of World War II, and so forth. The current focus of the Geneva Conference, which springs from a resolution of the 21st General Conference of the Red Cross in 1969, is to see whether certain specific rules can be developed dealing with the role of civilians in the attacks that are made upon them. But the focus is not on the kind of weapon used, but on employment separation, and this kind of thing.

Senator KENNEDY. Why wouldn't they be included? Is it just that it is not an item on the agenda?

I can see the legal distinction, but in a practical way it is difficult for me to see. You can say, well, if they see someone running in with three guns and they draw gunfire, maybe you can bomb him.

Do you then drop the flechette rocket or the fragmentation bomb that can spread over a whole community?

Mr. KERLEY. So far as I know, Senator, at the first government experts meeting last year, and the one this year, this particular question has not been addressed. I wouldn't suggest that it would be impossible for it to be so.

Senator KENNEDY. But it is not at this time?

**Mr. KERLEY.** It is not.

**Senator KENNEDY.** Is napalm, incendiaries, or white phosphorus on the agenda?

**Mr. KERLEY.** I believe there is some discussion of this, but again it is not a topic being dealt with by this group. But since the experts are uninstructed there would be nothing to preclude their doing so if they chose to do so.

**Senator KENNEDY.** Do we have a position? What is our position?

**Mr. KERLEY.** Sir, as a government we do not. A number of the experts there are American experts. They have met as experts together, and reached certain conclusions of things that would be useful for the conference to recommend. But this would not be a government position.

**Senator KENNEDY.** Do other governments have positions?

**Mr. KERLEY.** Other experts have positions, sir. There are no government positions being taken at this stage. That will be at the next stage prior to the 1973 conference.

**Senator KENNEDY.** When does it meet again?

**Mr. KERLEY.** It is presently scheduled for 1973.

**Senator KENNEDY.** In Geneva?

**Mr. KERLEY.** Probably Geneva, probably convened by the Swiss Government. But it is not certain.

**Senator KENNEDY.** Major, on the rules of war, the aerial rules of war that we were talking about just before, is there anything further that you can tell us on how they have developed, for example, in Laos and Cambodia, or even for North Vietnam? Have we been able to develop any? Is there a desire to do so within the Defense Department? We certainly didn't see one during the previous administration. I am wondering what the thinking in the Defense Department about this type of thing is now.

**Major COOK.** We have the rules of engagement which have been discussed in this committee before. We feel as though the details of the rules would have to be discussed in executive session.

**Senator KENNEDY.** As I understand, we have those, but they are classified confidential. As I remember, they are really full of a lot of loopholes.

I see the story here in the Evening Star of April 19. It says:

"The top American military commanders in Saigon have been given a free hand in selecting and striking military targets anywhere in North Vietnam."

What kind of rules of engagement cover that? Do you know whether that is accurate?

**Major COOK.** It is not accurate to the extent that they do not have a free hand. The rules of engagement apply to the commanders, as they do to pilots flying missions.

**Senator KENNEDY.** Has there been a change in the rules of engagement in recent times?

**Major COOK.** There have not been basic changes to the rules of engagement. Detailed matters of confrontation may undergo periodic review.

**Senator KENNEDY.** We were there in 1968. And they had a process, or a means of clearing various strikes, aerial strikes, with the civilian

commanders. This was in South Vietnam. Is that still the procedure now?

Major Cook. Yes, sir. There are procedures which involve the person most likely to be familiar with the characteristics of the targets.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. O'Connor and Ambassador Sullivan and Major Cook—thank you all very much for coming up this morning.

We get frustrated, as I am sure many of you do, and I hope in my exchanges with Mr. Blackburn and Mr. Corcoran, that they will accept the spirit in which those questions were asked. I know there are so many dedicated people all the way along the line in Cambodia and Laos, and that they are trying to do a good job. But sometimes the road blocks come from further up rather than down at the local level. What we are trying to do here is to find ways in which we can help open up some of those roadblocks and insure that the genuine humanitarian concern which I think is such an indelible part of the American character is reaching out to the extent that it can to alleviate the pain and suffering of millions of people in the Indochina Peninsula.

I am firm in my belief that the best way of doing that is to end the war. But, in the meantime, we have got to try and find ways to alleviate these conditions the best way that we can.

So, I hope all of you will realize that that is the spirit of these hearings. And we have appreciated working with you in the past.

Thank you again for your appearance here.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you.

Mr. O'CONNOR. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the chair.)

# Appendix I:

## UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM REPORT

### PROBLEMS POSED BY DISPLACED PERSONS AROUND PHNOM PENH

(A Preliminary Look by UNDP Staff in Phnom Penh, within the Context of Ongoing UNDP Programs)

(Unofficial Translation)

This report, whose purpose it is to set forth a program to help the government overcome the difficulties created by the population influx around Phnom Penh is in four sections:

1. An Evaluation of the Population and Employment Situation
2. Public Health—Hygiene
3. Housing
4. The Official "Refugee" Camps

#### 1. *An Evaluation of the Population*

1.1 According to data obtained from the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Interior, and from certain spot checks, the present population for greater Phnom Penh may be considered to be about 1,100,000. However, it should be remembered that after March 1970, about 250,000 South Vietnamese citizens left the city. This means, therefore, that about 800,000 Cambodians have come to settle in the capital.

1.2 It doesn't appear, however, that this shift in population has brought on unemployment in the real sense of the word. However, the small number of jobs obtainable has certainly contributed to lowering per capita income of the population. School attendance is proportionately not as high. However, such effects will only be felt in the medium and long term. On the other hand, the effect on financial income will have rapid and considerable repercussions in the area of public health.

#### 2. *Public Health—Hygiene*

2.1 Malnutrition, and in certain cases, undernourishment are harmful to the health and increase the risk of epidemics.

2.2 Those epidemics to be feared most are cholera and the plague. Adequate epidemiological facilities do exist. Increased surveillance by these services is to be recommended. In order to reduce the risk of epidemics, the following measures should be advocated:

- Better infrastructure for sanitation facilities
- Improved general hygiene
- Pharmaceuticals
- Hospitalization and sanitation facilities

2.3 Present health services consist of regular hospitals, temporary hospitals and 14 dispensaries.

In fact, available hospital facilities would seem to approach international norms (one bed for every 200 inhabitants), however—

- (a) Hospital doctors (about 250 in all) are too busy with consultations with in-patients and out-patients,
- (b) Too many beds, of which there are about 3,000, are occupied by persons not requiring hospitalization,
- (c) Present dispensaries are not plentiful enough, nor are they located where they would do most good.

2.4 The most important issue then is the better utilization of existing resources. The following steps advanced by the WHO representative ought rapidly to be put into operation.

(a) One health center, having its own doctor, for every 50,000 inhabitants that is, 22 centers whose task it would be to diagnose a case and/or prescribe any necessary treatment and/or direct the patient to a hospital unit.

(b) A combination dispensary/sick ward for every 16 to 18,000 inhabitants (thns, 3 dispensaries for each health center) whose task it would be to treat the sick as prescribed by the health centers, at the same time maintaining epidemiological surveillance. This means that instead of the present 9 dispensaries, 60 would be required, and there also should be instituted 28 health centers. The personnel factor should not present insurmountable difficulties.

The number of nurses, male and female, presently attached to dispensaries might be doubled, and more nurses might be trained with the help of international organizations (WHO, IRC), national organizations (including the armed forces), and bilateral groups (such as the Japanese, Australians). Such a program could be realized in three years.

Regarding doctors, in the mobilization framework, appeal should be made to their sense of civic pride and duty.

Regarding working quarters, temporary edifices ought to be quickly put up (Japanese huts) or existing premises such as former stores, warehouses, unoccupied housing, etc. properly equipped and furnished.

2.5 *Improved General Hygiene*—The two main epidemics to be feared are Cholera and the Plague.

A. Cholera is transmitted through water. Only 35 percent of the urban population enjoys the advantages of running water. Proper maintenance of the existing water supply is imperative. The cost of necessary repairs and improvements has been estimated to be \$400,000. In this area, it should be possible to count on French aid. That portion of the population which does not have running water should be induced to boil its drinking water. At the same time, any suspected Cholera cases should be immediately brought to the attention of the proper authorities. The installation of dispensaries and health centers should facilitate surveillance. Except in the case of an epidemic, general inoculation against Cholera is of limited value.

B. The Plague is transmitted through rat lice. Rats proliferate anywhere they find food, and garbage represents food for these animals. It is in the area of garbage collection that a concentrated effort should be made. Collection facilities should be increased (the provision of trucks with platforms and side paneling should be possible) and mobile garbage receptacles (trucks) added and regularly emptied. As for solid refuse—old tires, oil cans, scrap iron—special deposit areas should be set up and collections effected once a week.

As for the number of dumping sites, these should be increased and low areas selected to be filled in. Arrangements should then be made to cover these areas over with dirt and flatten them out (with a bulldozer).

C. In order to assure the active support of the population, every two or three months a national health and cleanliness week should be organized. After launching a sensitizing campaign through the radio, press, signs and billboards, talks at school and family gatherings, the population would be invited to conduct a thorough cleaning of their yards, houses, nearby garden areas, streets, ditches, gutters, and to gather together in a specified area any solid refuse. During that week, street cleaning facilities might be augmented so that complete garbage collection would be assured and empty lots cleared out. Help from the armed forces would be very helpful here and should be solicited. These national cleanliness weeks should be scheduled for May, July (the little dry season), October, December and February.

D. Present pharmaceutical stocks as well as facilities for their replenishment would appear to be satisfactory. An effort should be made to identify themselves with this operation and should be urged to organize and work as a group. The government might look toward distributing free of charge to the poor those medicines prescribed by the health centers. It happens sometimes that supplies of certain patent medicines become exhausted. There usually exists a substitute, however, the doctors may not happen to be aware of this. Steps should be taken to ensure that the medical corps is better informed.

Recent decisions to arrange conferences or seminars for the benefit of the medical corps should be pursued further, and subjects for research or study selected in corroboration with the Ministry of Health, WHO, IRC and the military health facilities.

### 3. Housing

Under the present circumstances, it is suggested that the main thrust of any housing policy should reside in assistance to self-help type construction, the furnishing of technical advice, the providing of necessary materials to the disadvantaged, and the installation by the government of the necessary infrastructure, viz., streets, water lines and sewage facilities. It would also be well to encourage local production of necessary materials (cement, bricks, tile, wood) and to arrange for the importation of those materials which cannot be produced here for the time being, viz., metal products, etc. Possibilities exist for the increased importation of these products through American aid.

Help should be extended by certain UN and other technicians to the "Committee for the Promotion of Low Cost Housing" in order to assist it in the construction of pilot villages and the renovation of certain sections of the city. Three important activities have already begun:

**3.1 Pilot Villages**—The attached request, made to the World Food Program (WFP) gives all necessary data concerning the cost of constructing a village of 200 houses and measures are indicated for financing such a program. It is to be feared, however, that although WFP help might be granted, that organization might still not be able to obtain rice in sufficient quantity, this in spite of the fact that world stocks of this grain happen to be in excessive supply. It would be useful to contact international and national organizations on the subject. Concerning the construction of these villages, it would be necessary also to try to obtain the help of certain countries in order to procure the following materials: tiles, wood, nails, etc.

**3.2 Renovating Certain Sections of the City**—At the present time, there is a study in process to renovate Beng Trabeck. Because of the usefulness of this project and of the data which will be accumulated to support future programs, it would be well to seek out sources of financing:

- Cambodian Development Bank
- Central Fund for Economic Cooperation
- Asian Development Bank

and also obtain free and voluntary types of foreign aid so that it will not be necessary to go into debt. It should be noted also that on an economic basis, the financing of productive works and collective investments would justify the fact that normal budgetary procedures might be relaxed.

**3.3 Planning Entirely New City Areas**—The decision to construct the northern dike will permit the clearing out of a fairly large zone, and after a study of a detailed master plan, to locate buildings there and the type of farming appropriate for marshland areas. As regards construction, the prototypes furnished by the pilot village will prove useful and, there again, it will probably be necessary to bring together public capital, domestic and foreign, as well as private capital and initiative. What is most important is that at the beginning, land speculation be avoided and a master plan followed.

It is probable that certain low areas will have to be filled in here, collected waste and refuse might be used as fill.

Mentioned here as a reminder is the fact that assistance has been provided to this operation by the U.S. which, during the work of this committee, increased the pool of heavy construction equipment belonging to the Ministry of Public Works, thus helping the operation to proceed rapidly and under satisfactory conditions. Regarding marshland cultivation, the granting of fertilizer and grain should help to get it off to a good start, and it might be well for the land to be distributed on a priority basis to refugees—without their having final claim to the land, however. Families will then have something to do and be able to earn extra income.

### 4. Centers and Official Camps for Refugees and Displaced Persons

The most pressing problem in this area is to ameliorate the health and sanitary conditions found in these camps and centers. Given the fact that the number of centers is limited to about 30 and that about 8,000 persons are lodged there, the task of providing health training and education to these people should not pose any major problems. We consider that this type of training could well be given by Khmer sanitation agents.

Certain centers are overpopulated, and relieving the congestion would improve the situation. It would thus be necessary to consider opening up new centers,

which, from the very start, should provide at least minimum health standards in order to avoid the problems encountered earlier.

The matter of employment and of work doesn't appear to us to be alarming, given the fact that the great majority of the inhabitants of these centers are families of military men who, in principle, are receiving a regular allowance. Civilians are for the most part regularly employed.

One point which should not be overlooked is that of medical assistance, such assistance should absolutely be planned for and provided as these people do not have the means to go elsewhere for medical attention. Mobile and stationary teams presently provided by municipal health services need to be augmented. The furnishing of pharmaceuticals for use in the work of these teams should be effected on a regular and continuous basis.

## Appendix II

### A SURVEY OF CIVILIAN FATALITIES AMONG REFUGEES FROM XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCE, LAOS,

(By Walter M. Haney, IVS Volunteer, Laos, 1970-71)

#### INTRODUCTION

In December of 1970 and January of 1971 a survey of civilian casualties among refugees from the Plain of Jars was conducted. This was published in the Subcommittee's hearing of July 22, 1971.<sup>1</sup> This first survey contained a sampling of 189 civilian casualties among a refugee population of approximately 8500. In an attempt to gain additional information on the plight of the refugees, a group of individuals in Vientiane decided to make further inquiry into the situation. The result of their effort is this report.

The individuals who contributed to this effort included both Lao and non-Lao. Unfortunately, due to the nature of the information and the positions held by some of these individuals it would be imprudent to reveal the names of all of those who participated.<sup>2</sup> In consequence, throughout the remainder of this paper I shall use the editorial first person plural form even though I, myself, did not personally participate in all aspects of the study. Nevertheless, I personally can attest to the individual integrity and seriousness of purpose of all who helped in the study.

#### II. PROCEDURES

Names of Laotian civilians who had been killed in the war in Laos were obtained from lists of civilian fatalities given to us by officials from the Ministry of Social Welfare in Vientiane. All of the fatality lists had been drawn up from forms filled out by Laotian refugees. The forms entitled "Request for Aid for Death in the Defense of the Country," contained information on the name, home, age, occupation, date of death, and cause of death of each victim. Those forms which we were shown came from many parts of Laos and covered a time span of roughly six years, 1964-1971. Each request form was counter-signed by the village chief, subdistrict chief, district chief, and Governor of the appropriate jurisdiction. Unfortunately, in most cases, the information contained in these forms regarding the cause of death was so vague as to be meaningless. For example, many forms indicated simply that victims had been "killed in the war" or "died in the fighting." Also, we subsequently found that information regarding the dates of death was often inaccurate.

In an attempt to gain more information on the exact causes of civilian fatalities we decided to carry out a survey. Given our limited access only to those refugees in the vicinity of Vientiane, and our limited resources we were only able to gather information among refugees from four subdistricts in two districts: Tasseng Kat and Tasseng Phiang in Muong Pek and Tasseng Pha and Tasseng Kang Sene in Muong Khoun. Officials at the Ministry of Social Welfare informed us that the fatality lists for these four subdistricts were probably incomplete. One official suggested, however, that the list for Tasseng Kang Sene was probably very nearly complete. With lists of civilian fatalities from these four subdistricts, Laotian members of our group visited the respective refugee camps and interviewed refugees as to the cause of death of each victim. In many cases it was impossible to locate immediate relatives of the victims and in such cases people from the same village or subdistrict as the victim were queried as to the cause of death. The accounts of how each of the victims died were written out in Laotian and later translated into English.

<sup>1</sup> (See "A Survey of Civilian War Casualties Among Refugees from the Plain of Jars" printed in *World Refugee and Humanitarian Problems*, U.S. Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, Hearing, July 22, 1971, pp. 95-108.)

<sup>2</sup> The need for keeping in confidence the names of those who participated in this study is, unfortunately, not just idle speculation. After one individual looked into the refugee situation in early 1970, an American official in Vientiane threatened in our presence to do everything he could to "get rid of the troublemaker".

## III. FINDINGS

## A. Tabulated Results

The tabulated results of our survey are shown in the following tables:

Table I, Total Fatalities; Table II, Tasseng Kang Sene; Table III, Tasseng Kat; Table IV, Tasseng Pha; Table V, Tasseng Phiang.

In each of the tables the numbers in parentheses represent the number of women who were killed in each category. The causes of death can be separated into two broad categories which are discussed below.

## B. Fatalities Caused by Disease

The greatest number of civilian deaths were reportedly caused by disease or illness. While the exact location and time of death was not noted in most accounts, many fatalities caused by disease were said to have occurred in refugee camps in the area of the Plain of Jars. Specifically, refugees mentioned three camps: Thong Khoun, Lat Sene, and Khaug Si. Refugees said they had been gathered into these camps after Royal Laotian Government troops recaptured the Plain of Jars in the summer of 1969. Most often the death causing disease was called a fever (*Khai*) or common fever (*Khai thammada*) and occasionally refugees referred to an epidemic or contagious disease (*nhat tit pek*). Evidently this is the same epidemic-like disease as that reported by refugees from Tasseng Xieng.<sup>3</sup> Those refugees reported that during July and August of 1969, the disease caused 200-300 deaths among the approximately 2600 from Tasseng Xieng and Tasseng Nheun while they were located in a refugee camp at Nalouang. They reported that the disease struck hardest at the children and the elderly. This is also the pattern indicated in Tables II and V. Evidently, the disease did not strike so heavily among the refugees from Tasseng Kat and Tasseng Pha. See Tables III and IV.<sup>4</sup>

TABLE I.—TOTAL FATALITIES

Ages of the victims (in years)

	0 to 10	11 to 20	21 to 35	36 to 50	51 plus	Subtotal
<b>Causes of death:</b>						
Disease.....	84 (45F)	28 (15F)	6 (1F)	6 (2F)	25 (9F)	149 (72F)
Bombing.....	38 (17F)	36 (12F)	29 (13F)	18 (8F)	16 (8F)	137 (56F)
Mines.....	2 (1F)	10 (4F)	6 (1F)	8 (1F)	3 (2F)	29 (9F)
Artillery.....	12 (7F)	11 (4F)	7 (0F)	7 (3F)	5 (0F)	42 (14F)
Small Arms.....	9 (5F)	19 (6F)	8 (0F)	11 (3F)	10 (2F)	57 (16F)
Miscellaneous.....	8 (2F)	5 (3F)	2 (1F)	5 (2F)	3 (1F)	23 (9F)
<b>Subtotal.....</b>	<b>153 (77F)</b>	<b>109 (44F)</b>	<b>58 (16F)</b>	<b>55 (17F)</b>	<b>62 (22F)</b>	<b>437 (176F)</b>

TABLE II.—TASSENG KANG SENE

Ages of the victims (in years)

	0 to 10	11 to 20	21 to 35	36 to 50	51 plus	Subtotal
<b>Causes of death:</b>						
Disease.....	55 (31F)	24 (13F)	6 (1F)	4 (0F)	17 (5F)	106 (50F)
Bombing <sup>1</sup> .....	17 (11F)	19 (6F)	19 (7F)	4 (1F)	5 (2F)	64 (27F)
Mines <sup>2</sup> .....	1 (0F)	4 (0F)	3 (0F)	4 (1F)	0	12 (1F)
Artillery <sup>3</sup> .....	4 (3F)	6 (1F)	7 (0F)	4 (1F)	4 (0F)	25 (5F)
Small Arms <sup>4</sup> .....	1 (0F)	12 (2F)	5 (0F)	7 (1F)	8 (2F)	33 (5F)
Miscellaneous.....	3 (0F)	4 (2F)	0	3 (2F)	1 (0F)	11 (4F)
<b>Subtotal.....</b>	<b>81 (45F)</b>	<b>69 (24F)</b>	<b>40 (8F)</b>	<b>26 (6F)</b>	<b>35 (9F)</b>	<b>251 (92F)</b>

<sup>1</sup> Of the individuals whose death was attributed to bombing, 5 reportedly died while portering and 2 died as soldiers.

<sup>2</sup> Of those who died from mines, 3 were killed while portering and 2 died as home-guard soldiers.

<sup>3</sup> Four of the victims in this category died while portering, 2 as home-guard soldiers and 1 as a regular soldier.

<sup>4</sup> Of the victims in this category, 2 were home-guard soldiers and 5 were regular soldiers.

<sup>5</sup> See "Survey of Civilian Casualties . . ." *op. cit.*, pp. 91-93.

<sup>6</sup> When settled on the Vientiane Plain, the refugees were clearly receiving far better medical care than they had prior to their evacuation from Xieng Khouang Province. We were told that they were visited regularly by medical personnel from Vientiane.

TABLE III.—TASSENG KAT

	Ages of the victims (In years)					Subtotal
	0 to 10	11 to 20	21 to 35	36 to 50	51 plus	
<b>Causes of death:</b>						
Disease.....	0	1 (1F)	0	1 (1F)	0	2 (2F)
Bombing <sup>1</sup> .....	1 (1F)	2 (0F)	3 (2F)	4 (0F)	1 (1F)	11 (4F)
Mines <sup>2</sup> .....	0	0	1 (0F)	1 (0F)	0	2 (0F)
Artillery <sup>3</sup> .....	0	1 (1F)	0	0	1 (0F)	2 (1F)
Small Arms.....	0	0	1 (0F)	1 (0F)	0	2 (0F)
Miscellaneous.....	0	0	1 (0F)	1 (0F)	0	2 (0F)
Subtotal.....	1 (1F)	4 (2F)	6 (2F)	8 (1F)	2 (1F)	21 (7F)

<sup>1</sup> Of the individuals whose deaths were attributed to bombing, 2 reportedly died while portering, 1 was a home-guard soldier, and 1 a regular soldier.

<sup>2</sup> One of the victims in this category died while portering.

<sup>3</sup> One of the victims in this category also died while portering.

TABLE IV.—TASSENG PHA

	Ages of the victims (in years)					Subtotal
	0 to 10	11 to 20	21 to 35	36 to 50	51 plus	
<b>Causes of death:</b>						
Disease.....	5 (2F)	1 (0F)	0	0	7 (4F)	13 (6F)
Bombing <sup>1</sup> .....	6 (2F)	6 (1F)	2 (2F)	3 (2F)	8 (4F)	25 (11F)
Mines <sup>2</sup> .....	0	4 (3F)	2 (1F)	1 (0F)	2 (1F)	9 (5F)
Artillery.....	4 (2F)	1 (0F)	0	1 (1F)	0	6 (3F)
Small Arms <sup>3</sup> .....	3 (1F)	2 (1F)	2 (0F)	2 (1F)	2 (0F)	11 (3F)
Miscellaneous.....	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotal.....	18 (7F)	14 (5F)	6 (3F)	7 (4F)	19 (9F)	64 (28F)

<sup>1</sup> Of the bombing victims 1 was killed while portering and 4 died as home-guard soldiers.

<sup>2</sup> Of those who died from mines 1 was a home-guard soldier, 1 a regular soldier, and 1 was killed while portering.

<sup>3</sup> Of those killed by small arms 1 was a regular soldier and 1 died while portering.

TABLE V.—TASSENG PHIANG

	Ages of the victims (in years)					Subtotal
	0 to 10	11 to 20	21 to 35	36 to 50	51 plus	
<b>Causes of death:</b>						
Disease.....	24 (12F)	2 (1F)	0	1 (1F)	1 (0F)	28 (14F)
Bombing <sup>1</sup> .....	14 (3F)	9 (5F)	5 (2F)	7 (3F)	2 (1F)	37 (14F)
Mines <sup>2</sup> .....	1 (1F)	2 (1F)	0	2 (0F)	1 (1F)	6 (3F)
Artillery.....	4 (2F)	3 (2F)	0	2 (1F)	0	9 (5F)
Small Arms <sup>3</sup> .....	5 (4F)	5 (3F)	0	1 (1F)	0	11 (8F)
Miscellaneous.....	5 (2F)	1 (1F)	1 (1F)	1 (0F)	2 (1F)	10 (5F)
Subtotal.....	53 (24F)	22 (13F)	6 (3F)	14 (6F)	6 (3F)	101 (49F)

<sup>1</sup> In 11 of these accounts it was specified that individuals died of disease while in refugee camps on the Plains of Jars.

<sup>2</sup> Two of the fatalities in this category occurred while the individuals were imprisoned in a Pathet Lao jail which was bombed. Also of the fatalities in this category 3 were regular Pathet Lao soldiers and 2 were home-guard soldiers.

<sup>3</sup> In 2 of the incidents in this category the mines were reportedly placed by the "Meo soldiers". In 1 case an individual was killed while portering.

<sup>4</sup> One of the individuals killed by artillery was reportedly a home-guard soldier.

<sup>5</sup> Four of the small arms killings were attributed to the "Meo soldier" and 2 to the Pathet Lao.

### C. Civilian War Fatalities

The second broad category of fatalities was that of civilian war casualties or deaths caused directly by military action. The data for fatalities in this category may be compared with that from the previously conducted "Survey of Civilian War Casualties Among Refugees from the Plain of Jars."<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 100.

Cause of fatality or injury:	Fatality survey		Casualty survey	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Bombing.....	137	52	108	65
Mines.....	29	11	22	13
Artillery.....	42	16	20	12
Small Arms.....	57	21	15	9
Totals.....	265		165	

The findings of the fatality survey generally substantiate those of the casualty survey. In both surveys the majority of civilian war casualties were caused by bombing and lesser numbers were caused by mines, artillery and small arms.

#### D. Soldier "Civilians"

Perhaps the finding of the current survey which is most divergent from those of the previous study is that some of the purported "civilians" were killed while they were actually either home guard or regular Pathet Lao soldiers. Such deaths are tabulated below:

#### DEATHS OF "CIVILIAN" SOLDIERS

Cause of death:	Home guard	Regular	Total
Bombing.....	7	6	13
Mines.....	3	2	5
Artillery.....	3	1	4
Small arms.....	4	6	10
			32

This finding that 32 (or roughly 12%) of the 265 fatalities caused by military action were either home guard or regular soldiers is notably different from the findings in the previous survey on civilian casualties. In that study no reports of either homeguard or regular soldiers' deaths were received. There are two possible explanations as to why there were no such reports in the casualty survey.

(1) Refugees may have been afraid to tell a foreign interviewer about relatives who were Pathet Lao soldiers. In consequence, they may have reported some casualties as civilian when in fact they were not.

(2) In the casualty survey the interviewer asked about civilian casualties only and specifically stated that he was not interested in casualties among soldiers. The refugees may therefore have complied with his wishes and simply not related to him accounts of casualties among home guard or regular Pathet Lao soldiers.

Regardless of which explanation may be correct, the inclusion of a small number of military and quasi-military personnel in the civilian statistics would seem to influence the findings only slightly. Note, for example, that if all thirty-two accounts of soldier "civilian" fatalities are subtracted from the remaining accounts, the portion of deaths attributed to bombing rises only from 52% to 58%.

#### E. Other Significant Findings

(1) Again, as in the casualty survey we received reports of the bombing of a Pathet Lao prison in which over 60 people were killed.

(2) In one account we were told of the bombing of a primary school in Tasseng Phiang. Also, we were told of the bombing of a teacher training school for girls east of Xieng Khouangville in which four or five girls were reportedly killed.

(3) Unlike the previous study we received no accounts of civilian fatalities caused by the North Vietnamese.

(4) Twenty-one (roughly 8%) of the civilian fatalities were reportedly engaged in some form of portage at the time they were killed. Portage was also reported in the casualty survey.

## IV. Conclusions

(1) The greatest single cause of civilian fatalities among the 437 cases surveyed was not any type of direct military action. Rather, it was disease and fever. While the exact nature of the disease(s) is not known, many fatalities reportedly occurred during the summer of 1969 when the refugees were gathered into camps which were ravaged by what some described as an epidemic.

(2) Of the 265 fatalities caused as a direct result of military action, a majority (or roughly 52%) were caused by aerial bombardment. In descending order of prevalence, other causes of civilian war fatalities were small arms (roughly 20%), artillery (10%), and mines (11%).

ANNEX A: CASE STUDIES OF FATALITIES AMONG LAO REFUGEES  
TRANSLATED FROM LAOTIAN

CASES FROM TASSENG PHIANG

1. Sao Bounma, 39, Ban Nathao. Died when they attacked Phou Kout. Her village was just a little way from Phou Kout. One time at 8AM in the morning before anyone had awakened, there came the loud sound of a shell from the mountains. As everyone was running from their homes some bullets which they had shot in the mountains fell in passing and struck her. She was badly hurt and was sent to the hospital at Khang Khai. But she didn't arrive in time because there was no vehicle. All they could do was carry her by hand. Along the way her heart gave out.

2. Thao La Hou, 53, Ban Nathao. He died from fever on account of sleeping in the holes all the time. Pustules had appeared on him more than three months before he died.

3. Thao Phommi, 9, Ban Nathao. Died from drowning after heavy rains. There was a sound of airplanes and he hurriedly ran across a bridge toward some holes far from the village. But the bridge had already been hit and damaged and when he came to the middle of the bridge it broke and he fell into the stream. He couldn't swim and was swept away forever.

4. Thao Dai, 6, Ban Nathao. He died when his parents weren't around. They had gone to work in the ricefield far from the holes. The child didn't know enough to be careful. He wandered away in play. But at that time there were bombs in the forest and around the edge (of the village) maybe 150m from the child. He wandered about and came upon a bomb. He picked up a stone and threw it at the bomb causing it to explode. It killed the boy and wounded some of his friends.

5. Thao Meung, 12, Ban Nathao. He died when he went to look for a cow which had broken its tether. He was walking along a path when he heard the sound of a 155mm shell from Muong Soui but he thought that it was not coming his way. But it fell about 15m from him. He was hit in the arm. There was no one with him and he fainted there in his own blood, all alone. After a long time he hadn't yet died. His parents came looking and found him. They carried him back intending to send him to the hospital but the planes came all day so he was unable to go, until after a few days, his heart gave out and he died before (he could reach the hospital).

6. Sao Chandt, 35, Nathao. She died during childbirth when the child didn't come out. She was far from a hospital and died in about 20 hours.

7. Sao Ten, 30, Ban Nathao. She died when the airplanes bombed the hole she was in. She had gone to the village to make food. But there was a hole very near to her home. Then the planes flew over and she had nowhere to go so she went into the hole. Then the planes bombed the village causing her house to burn so she ran out to save some of her belongings, but after she returned to the hole a 250 kg bomb fell on the mouth of the hole causing it to cave in covering and killing her. She was dug out but was dead already.

8. Nang Kham, 19, Ban Nathao. She was a nurse in the hospital but she was sent to cure some people who were hurt at the front. She brought them back from the front. News was received that there were some other injured people at that place so she hurried to return. But when she went along the road there came an F-4H plane sewing bombs, along the road. One bomb fell near her and injured her severely, almost killing her. Her friend who was also a nurse tried to help her but could not because she was too badly injured. She died within a few days.

9. Thao Boun Heuang, 14, Ban Nathao. He was a student in grade 5 in Ban Nyuan. He was selected to go study in Ban Nyuan in Tasseng Kat. But they had to study among the hills and streams in order to protect against the airplanes seeing them. But one time after school let out at 10 o'clock, and the students were walking along the stream toward home an Eller-19 plane saw them and shot four rockets at them. He was hit and died right there.

10. Sao Thong, 50, Ban Nathao. She died on account of illness which she had had for eight months. She died from this sickness of hers. Because she was very depressed and couldn't eat.

11. Thao Seu, 6, Ban Nathao. He died from fever and pustules. The pustules broke into pus and after about 10 days he died.

12. Thao Sim, 10, Ban Nathao. He died on account of playing with a 60 mortar shell which they left in the forest. The children found it and picked it up. They played with it and carried it about until it exploded, killing three people together with Thao Sim.

13. Thao Dai Nyai, 12, Ban Nathao. Killed by bombi when the planes came bombing in the night. He had gone to bring back rice to store in the forest. But just when he came to the road the airplanes dropped flares so he was unable to continue traveling. So he just stopped to sleep right there. But then an A-T-6 plane dropped bombi and shot rockets around the area, killing him and wounding his sister. When the planes left, someone coming along saw them, but he had already died because he had been hit by two bombs.

14. Sao La, 45, Ban Nathao. She was riding in a car going to Nam Thanh on the way to Phonesavanh. They reached the road and then stopped because they saw an airplane coming. But the airplane had seen them first and dropped down many many flares on parachutes making the people in the car very careful. There was no place for them to go so they fled into the forest and the grass as the planes shot Douchet rockets and fire bombs. She was hit by a rocket and severely wounded and before long she died.

15. Nang La, 12, Ban Nathao. She died when the Meo soldiers came to plunder her house. Her father fought back causing the Meos to throw two grenades into the house. She was killed and her father severely wounded.

16. Thao Keu, 6, Ban Nathao. This boy was deaf and couldn't speak so that if anyone warned him to go into the holes when the airplanes came, he wouldn't understand. On that day he had gone out to herd buffalo and a T-28 plane saw (them) and shot and killed him together with the buffalo.

17. Nang Pi, 8, Ban Nathao. She died after fleeing to Lat Sene. Died on account of the fever which she caught and before long died.

18. Thao Outta, 30, Ban Nathao. He was a regular soldier and was sent to attack mount San Loh. But after it fell they didn't flee in time. Eight F105 planes came shooting, causing them to flee but not in time. He was hit and killed at that time. He died there at the front in the fighting at San Loh.

19. Nang Out, 8, Ban Nathao. She died from a bad fever in the time after fleeing to Lat Sene. She couldn't be cured and died.

20. Sao La, 20, Ban Nathao. She was in the women's home guard and went on a month long portorage. But after three days they were ambushed along the way by Meo soldiers. She died on account of the bullets of the Meo soldiers.

21. Nang La, 4, Ban Nathao. She died when a car fell into a fast stream because the car was travelling at night without any lights because they were afraid of the airplanes. When the airplanes came they were afraid the planes would drop flares so they drove fast and didn't see the way and fell into the stream and Nang La was killed.

22. Sao Sing, 14, Ban Nathao. She was a student and had gone to study in the secondary school at Khang Khai. She had gone to buy food in the market in the afternoon but as she returned along the road four F105 planes flew up. She heard the sounds of the planes and the dropping of bombs, altogether 48 bombs at one time but she had nowhere to go because they surprised (her) and shot. She was hit by a large stone and fell down right there at that place. Then after about 3 hours she died.

23. Nang Meung, 16, Ban Nathao. She went to porter artillery shells to the Neo Lao (Hak Sat) on Phou Kut. At that time she had almost arrived at the mountain and the Meo soldiers blocked the way with mines, so three soldiers came back first and she was coming after. There was a sound of a mine and she fell because she had been hit by a mine fragment. But she took heart and was able to run down away from the mountain, after (them). But the three soldiers

fought back but then the Meo soldiers shot a (?) gun causing her to be hit again and she died right there.

24. Sao Phom, 80, Ban Nathao. She died after going into the forest to hide in the forest in a spot where it was heavily overgrown in a small shelter built in a small open space. That day it was raining and she thought that the planes probably wouldn't come. She lit a fire to boil rice. She came out of the hole to boil rice alone. The smoke went up through the trees and at that time three T-6 planes flew up returning from a mission. They saw that (the smoke) and circled around and ordered two F-4H planes to bomb the place where she was. Her hole caved in burying her and her belongings in the hole. Everyone in her family was in his own hole for safety so she alone was killed.

26. Sao Kha, 48, Ban Nathao. She was a hard working person and worked all the time in the garden or at some other work. Usually she just sent her children into the holes and she went to work in the village. But on that day the buffalo went into the garden and she went to chase them out. She didn't know that an L-19 plane flew overhead. The airplane shot a rocket at her. She then knew about the airplane. But then she was already wounded. She was able to sit up and call for villagers to come help her. But when they came to help her, her heart had already given out.

27. Luang Tha, 53, Ban Nathao. He died from illness because he worked a great deal. This caused the severe illness and was not cured well and he died.

25. Nang Koh, 9, Ban Nathao. She died on account of a stomach sickness in the time after fleeing to Lat Sene. And then she died.

28. Nang Sot, 7, Ban Nathao. She was sick from a common disease and couldn't be cured because the airplanes were around and she was very hungry and died.

29. Thao Tum, 7, Ban Nathao. He died when he fell into a hole where there was a firebomb. He fell along the way where he was herding cows. The child didn't know enough to be careful. He fell into the hole and the fire bomb went off burning him. He could not be cured and died.

30. Nang Sivohn, 7, Ban Nathao. She died when she fled to Khang Si next to the Plain of Jars. She had been there for about a month when she became feverish. A doctor went to give her an injection and came back to give another injection and she died.

31. Thao La, 6, Ban Nathao. He died because he didn't get medicine in time. Because the child didn't know enough to be careful. He went to play and came upon some poison of the kind like salt and he picked some up to play with it and after about an hour became drunk like a drunk person and he came back to the village and reached his house and his heart gave out and he died. His parents didn't know but observed that he played with the poison which had fallen in that area.

32. Xieng Bounta, 47, Ban Nathao. He was captured by the Neo Lao (Hak Sat) when he tried to flee. He was put into jail and when he was in jail, he was shot by the airplanes, at the edge of the jail in Khang Khai. He went to dig and the bomb covered him partially with earth and he died within the next few days.

33. Thao Ot, 11, Ban Nathao. He went to look for mushrooms in the forest on the edge of the stream next to the road from Muong Soui and he went to look for mushrooms along the edge of the road. He didn't know that there were mines along the road. But those mines were very old and no one really knew about them and so they walked along looking for mushrooms. He stepped on an 81 mine causing him to lose his leg. His friends heard and ran to carry him back, but his heart had already given out because he had lost very much blood.

34. Thao Van Som, 9, Ban Nathao. He went fishing along the river and was bitten by a snake and died right at that spot because the poison was strong and there was no one able to help him.

35. Thao La, 9, Ban Nathao. The child was playing with a spade and went to look for a place to dig but along the way saw a bomb of the kind with six legs, but hadn't yet exploded. He threw a rock at it but it didn't explode, so then he took his spade and hit it hard. It exploded injuring the child. He was sent to the hospital but his bones were broken and he couldn't be cured. He became weaker and weaker and then died.

36. Nang Chan, 11, Ban Nathao. She died from goring by a cow when the cow had been shot and injured by the airplanes. She saw it and went to get her father to cure it and returned to watch a little but the cow was angry because it

was badly injured, so it charged Nang Chan and she fell down and it trampled her until she lost consciousness. Then the cow badly injured fell down at that place. Nang Chan was unconscious for a long time and then when she regained consciousness she was taken back to the house, but she was all swollen up inside and died the next week.

37. Nang Southa, 8, Ban Nathao. She died during flight to Khang Si when an artillery shell fell very close to where she was. It caused a very loud noise and she shook inside and threw up blood, because of the loudness and the strength of the wind which injured (?) her. But after arriving at Khang Si, she became sicker and sicker and then died.

38. Thit Nuan, 47, Ban Nathao. He was the chief of the home guard unit. He had the duty of defending the Tasseng. At that time some home guard soldiers came to report to him that some Meo soldiers had come to plunder and shoot-up some houses on the edge of the jungle. So he led 15 of his men out to fight with the Meos but he was too brave for he was very angry and wanted to drive the Meos away. But before the Meos fled they put in mines. So as he went after them he stepped on a mine which the Meos had put in. His body was all torn up. He ordered his men to chase and kill the Meo for him and then his heart gave out and he died.

39. Kang Oui, 50, Ban Nathao. He led many of his friends to go shoot deer but at that time there were some Meo soldiers who had come to set mines and set an ambush but when he ran he stepped on a mine which had already been set and the Meo shot at him and his friends. He was hit and killed and his friends returned the fire causing them to flee, then they took him (his body) back to the village.

40. Nang Pha, 10, Ban Nathao. She was hit by the Meo soldiers when they came down around the village at night. They suspected there were Neo Lao (Hak Sat) soldiers in her house so they shot into it causing her to die in the house from the bullets and wounding many other people.

41. Thao Phomma, 6, Ban Nathao. Died from fever when he came down (to Vientiane) because the change in climate caused the child to have the fever for many days and then he died.

42. Thao Khamxing, 10, Ban Nathao. He received an injection became "drunk" and died. When he had the fever a nurse from Region 2 came to cure him in Lat Sene, but after the injection he died.

43. Nang Si, 9, Ban Nathao. She was hit by a bullet during fighting around the edge of the village at night. She didn't know what to do because she heard the loud shooting and just as she was going to the holes a bullet struck little Nang Si in the head and she died immediately because her brains came out.

44. Thao Remi, 17, Ban Nathao. He was encouraged to join a supply group for the army which had come almost a year earlier. He went to transport goods with a load in a vehicle, all the way. But they had to travel at night. And one night as they were returning from Phou Kut along the road, he thought that no planes would probably come because it was very dark and they couldn't see the road. So the vehicle used its lights, to come along the way. But two AT-6 planes saw them and dropped 10 fares all at once. They didn't know which way to flee so they stopped on the edge of the road. The airplanes dropped bomb and fire bombs. There was one bomb which hit behind them and exploded. He was hit and died right there. At that time an anti-aircraft team shot the planes to help them so those who weren't killed hurriedly ran into the forest.

45. Thao Khudom, 6, Ban Nathao. He died after fleeing to Khang Si. He caught the fever and there was no medicine and he died.

46. Thao Sai, 9, Ban Nathao. He went to play with the soldiers in the camp on the edge of the village, in the evening, but at that time they heard the sound of a 155mm shell. Everyone jumped into the holes. He jumped in too but he didn't get down in fast enough. The 155 shell fell behind him, wounding him. The soldiers tried to cure him but his condition was bad and he died because his wound was too big.

47. Luang Koh, 60, Ban Nathao. Her house burned when the airplanes shot it. She longed for her belongings so ran out of the holes to try to save them. But before she reached the house the airplanes came again and saw her run into the jungle. The airplanes shot after her. She was old and couldn't go (fast) and was hit in the stomach by bomb fragments. It was most pitiful because her body was completely broken. Her body was all up in the branches of the trees.

48. Nang Neut, 9, Ban Nathao. She went to look for fish in the ricefield which was full of water. She took a short cut through the water but that water had been hit by bomb which the airplanes had dropped and many hadn't yet exploded. The child didn't know about that and she took the short cut and approached the bomb and picked up one with wings. It exploded and she was hit in the stomach by fragments. She died.

49. Thao Bounta, 5, Ban Nathao. Died on account of fever because they waited for medicine and it didn't come in time. It was when they were in the forest in the holes. There was no medicine to help him and he died.

50. Chanwansi, 40, Ban Nathao. A firebomb dropped by an AT-6 plane fell at the mouth of their hole. The gasoline (?) flowed into the hole burning them causing two people in this family to die, because they were burned. The others were able to go out another hole and weren't killed.

51. Thao San, 9, Ban Nathao. Died at the same time (as Chanwansi) because he was in the same family.

52. Nang Deuan, 10, Ban Nathao. Rode in a vehicle going to Phonesavan. But when it reached the road, the vehicle turned over killing her.

53. Nang Sutdi, 8, Ban Nathao. Died on account of common fever. After fleeing into a cave.

54. Sao Da, 60, Ban Nathao. Died from old age and common fever. She was old and her years were simply all used up.

55. Thao Wansom, 9, Ban Nathao. He had gone to school at 5 in the evening and was returning. A single Ellier 19 plane flew up. The children thought that it wouldn't see them and that it had already shot all of its rockets so they just walked along. But it dove and shot two rockets killing two children together and wounding one. He died when he was coming along the road.

56. Thao Rem, 18, Ban Nathao. Thao Rem went to be a soldier with an armored vehicle division, in order to protect the air. That day he had gone out to fight on the front with a 37mm gun. But they fought against F-4H jet planes, eight of them. And many bombs fell, and they fought against the airplanes for many hours. And the earth flew up and covered the vehicle, until it was impossible to clearly see the planes and shoot because the smoke of the bombs made everything dark until he was hit and died in the armored vehicle and a friend was wounded.

57. Xieng Bounta, 40, Ban Nathao. He died from falling out of a tree. He had gone up into a mango tree which had many fruits to search for fruit among the branches. He caused a branch to break and fell down to the ground killing himself.

58. Nang Nail, 10, Ban Nathao. Hit by 60mm mortar; she had gone to visit relatives in the evening. As she went along the way, the home guard soldiers met the enemy and they fought along the way. As Nang Nail ran back the enemy shot many mortar shells onto the road to protect themselves. One shell hit her. Her body broke and she died.

59. Nang Sam, 12, Ban Nathao. Died from fever and illness. Had been weary for many days and then died.

60. Sao La, 8, Ban Nathao. When they fought around the village an artillery shell fell into her village at night. She was hurt badly but there was no one able to help cure her because there was still fighting. The airplanes came so it was impossible to go anywhere. She couldn't suffer through her injury and died.

61. Nang Chum, 6, Ban Nahoi. Died after red bumps came out (on her). She wasn't cured well and didn't get medicine in time and died.

62. Nang Bounta, 10, Ban Nahoi. She had gone to work in the ricefield at the edge of the forest. The Meo ambushed and killed her there in the ricefield. Her mother was badly wounded but was able to return home.

63. Thao Eh, 6, Ban Nahoi. Little Thao Eh didn't know enough to be careful. He got up early one morning. A flare had fallen at the edge of the village and he went and brought it back. But the flare hadn't yet burned. He brought it to the house. When his father came and saw it he went to take the flare, but he couldn't take it so they pulled it back and forth and it ignited and burned all of his (the boy's) body. He was sent to the hospital and they tried to cure him for many days but couldn't and he died.

64. Nang Boutda, 6, Ban Nahoi. Died on account of fleeing to a cave. Became feverish and wasn't cured well and died.

65. Nang Pheng, 7, Ban Nahoi. She died in Lat Sene from fever. Given an injection and then died.

66. Thao Boun Louan, 5, Ban Nahoi. He died from drunkenness from the silver and gold poison paper. The child saw it and thought it was pretty and played with it when his parents didn't see. He became drunk and wasn't cured in time and just died.

67. Sao Sohn, 53, Ban Nahoi. He went to search for wood to bring back and repair his house. He went into the forest and stepped on an M-13 mine which they put in the road. He died right there so that he didn't even see his children.

68. Thao Oui, 8, Ban Nahoi. Died after fleeing to the Plain of Jars. He was sleeping in a soldiers' camp and that night a Neo Lao (Hak Sat) commando squad attacked the camp and threw grenades into (the camp) and Thao Oui was not in a good spot and two children died together (the second Nang Boua Wai) and many people were injured.

69. Nang Boua Wai, 11, Ban Nahoi. Died together (with Thao Oui) because they were at the same place. There was no airplane to send them. So they didn't reach Lat Sene. They died first.

70. Xieng Si Pho, 16, Ban Nahoi. He had gone to be a district cadre. He went to work with (?) the people near the forest near the jungle where there were people who were newly liberated. When returning he was hit by a spy group. They knew and they ambushed and killed him along the way. But some friends who were with him fought back killing some of them (the spys) also.

71. Sao Som, 48, Ban Nahoi. The Meo (soldiers) went down into her village and shot guns in before they came. Sao Som didn't flee in time. She was hit by a bullet and badly wounded. She couldn't be cured and so died. When they came into the village they saw she was wounded and they still cursed her saying she helped the Neo-Lao (Hak Sat). So they took the ducks and chickens from her house and ate them all and they took and shot the cow.

72. Thao Ta, 7, Ban Nahoi. Died on account of fever. He was still in the village and wasn't cured well and he died.

73. Thao Noi, 8, Ban Nahoi. He died on account of planes bombing the village with 250 Kg bombs. A bomb dropped on the mouth of the hole causing Thao Noi to be buried. The airplanes were F-4H's six planes. In the same hole three other people were also wounded.

74. Thao Vong, 6, Ban Nahoi. Died after fleeing to Lat Sene together with many other people. He became sick and died because the weather was not the same.

75. Sao Chuang, 40, Ban Nahoi. She died when she went to the market one morning at 5 A.M. At 7:00 o'clock she returned from the market and when she reached the road an Ellor 19 plane flew over. Then they relaxed by a stream. Then three T-28 planes flew up. They saw that it wouldn't be safe because there was no hole so they ran for the forest. But when they had run only 200 meters the bombs fell both in front and behind them. The bombs exploded and Sao Chuang was killed immediately.

76. Thao Tui, 8, Ban Nahoi. He was killed by an 105 artillery shell shot from far away. A shell fell north of Thao Tui's village. Then it began to rain and he went to bring the cows into the garden. After he brought the cows in he returned to the hole as usual. An 105 shell seemed to come from the mountains and Thao Tui didn't flee in time. He was hit by a fragment which cut off his leg and he died.

77. Nang Bouawai, 11, Ban Nahoi. Nang Bouawai died when she went to school. Two A-D-6 planes flew back and forth over the school. The teacher sent all of the children to the holes. Bouawai was in such a hurry that she forgot her books. She stuck out her head just as a plane strafed. A fragment hit her in the head. She was sent to the hospital but died before she received any medicine. The school was hit and burned on this occasion also.

78. Nang Bohm, 7, Ban Nahoi. She died after her mother left her to carry fertilizer to the rice seedbed. Then she went to bathe. She left her things on the edge of the pond. At that time four A-D-6 airplanes flew past. When they saw (her) they strafed and shot three (rockets) but she wasn't hit. She hurried to run out of that place but just as she went out she was hit by a rocket which the planes shot. Her stomach burst and she died right at that spot.

79. Thao Phomm, 5, Ban Nahoi. He died when they fled to Lat Sene. Then he caught the epidemic, became feverish and died very suddenly.

80. Thao La, 4, Ban Nahoi. Died from fever when he didn't get medicine in time. He had a bad fever and then died right away.

81. Thit Thon, 54, Ban Nahoi. He died when he went to look after the buffalo in the field. In that herd there were many animals. But there were both black

and white buffalo which made an easy target for the airplanes. An F-102 jet dived very suddenly and Thit Thon couldn't flee in time. He died with the buffalo. Many buffalo were killed at the same time.

82. Thit Kham Di, 36, Ban Nahoi. Thit Kham Di was one of the home guard soldiers. He was very courageous in shooting down airplanes. That day he went up into the hills with eight of his friends. He thought that they would fight against the airplanes that day. He warned everyone to be ready. Then he saw four F-4-H planes coming very near. He came out and shot. But he didn't flee fast enough and became a target for the planes' bombs. He died because he was too courageous.

83. Xieng Thon, 40, Ban Houei. He was killed when he went to build a dam in the ricefield. Many people were working together to help build the dam. Then an Ellier 19 flew over and as (everyone) ran four F-105 planes came over and bombed the dam. It caused Xieng Thon to run but not in time for he was hit and wounded by a bomb. He was sent to a hospital but he died along the way before he reached it. At that time many other people were wounded also.

84. Thit Douang, 41, Ban Houei. He died when he went to cut wood for his house. An 155 artillery shell shot from Muong Soui landed right on him and he died immediately.

85. Sao Bouavan, 25, Ban Phiang Luang. She died when T-28 planes came to shoot her village. While her village was burning, but after she saw the planes leave, she went to free the buffalos so they could flee from the village. But then three more T-28's came to shoot the village. But she ran to a hole near the village but a bomb fell right on the hole and she was killed.

86. Thao Boun Oum, 9, Ban Phiang Luang. He just died from a normal sickness. He didn't die on account of the bombs.

87. Thao Kham Kong, 7, Ban Phiang Luang. He died when they had fled to Lat Sene on account of the epidemic, together with many others. Truly the cause of his death was disease.

88. Thao Eh, 4, Ban Teng. He died when the B-52 airplanes bombed at night. It made the air foul like drunkenness. It caused the child to die within two hours.

89. Thao Phohn, 8, Ban Teng. When they left the village to flee from the airplanes there was a spooky which dropped a parachute and then shot douchet bullets (rockets?). A bullet hit Thao Phon in the leg and he died before the doctor came.

90. Thao Inta, 8, Ban Teng. Thao Inta died in the evening when he went out of the hole to herd the buffalo. He saw a bomb which hadn't exploded and was standing looking at it when it exploded killing him on the spot. Earlier, in the afternoon the planes had dropped the bomb.

91. Sao Thohng Si, 10, Ban Teng. She died when she went to the forest to gather firewood with her mother. She went to get some string with which to tie up the wood and stepped on a mine which had been put in the path in the forest. It's purpose was to kill anyone who came along.

92. Nang Sida, 7, Ban Teng. Died from fever. It wasn't on account of anything else.

93. Than Tem, 9, Ban Teng. Died when they had fled to Lat Sene on account of the epidemic.

94. Nang Si, 11, Ban Teng. She died when the hole in which she was sleeping caved in. There were airplanes and artillery shells from Muong Soui. They fell near causing wood to close off the mouth of the hole and then it caved in killing her.

95. Thao Bouavan, 6, Ban Teng. Died while fleeing on account of drunkenness. Don't know what kind. It caused him to die right there on the road.

96. Sao Meung, 8, Ban Teng. Died while they were still at the village. They had been sleeping in the holes for many days on end. Then (without warning) he just died very suddenly.

97. Xieng Som Phan, 30, Ban Teng. Died when they (PL) took him into the jail at Khang Khai. Then the airplanes went to shoot up Khang Khai. Bombs dropped in the jail killing almost all of the prisoners. Also, some of the soldier guards died. Altogether 69 people died at the same time.

98. Nang Kham Meung, 15, Ban Teng. She went to carry eight 12mm shells up the mountain preparing to shoot the airplanes which came to shoot their village. During the fight with the airplanes many planes came together. She ran but was hit by a bomb and died in the road before she could reach the holes.

99. Thao Thong Di, 12, Ban Teng. He died from fever and disease. He didn't die from bullets.

100. Xieng Pheng, 18, Ban Teng. He died when he went to work in the upland ricefield in the forest. Some soldiers from this side were there in the forest and called them to come. But they didn't go to them (the soldiers) so they shot at him. But he just ran and didn't want anything to do with them. He was hit by a bullet and died right there in the ricefield.

101. Nang Ouan, 14, Ban Nahoi. This girl was selected to be a dancer. She would go to perform in different places throughout the Tasseng. But on that day she went to perform on Phu Kut (mountain). While they were performing a 155mm shell from Muong Soui fell killing her and three of her friends at the same time.

CASES FROM TASSENG KAT

1. Sao Kham Phou, 55y. Ban Lat Houang. She was hit in her large village one night in 1967 when the village was heavily destroyed. That day in 1967 many airplanes had started to shoot the village in the afternoon. In the evening she came out of the holes into the village in order to boil some rice and then early the next morning she thought she would flee from the village. But after she went into her house, an airplane dropped flares all around. She thought that it would be impossible to flee. She was afraid that they would see her. And she thought that they probably wouldn't shoot the village because they had already shot it in the afternoon.

So she took care to stay there but in just a little while a fire bomb fell and started burning the house she was in. She saw that her position was no good so she ran to leave. But just then an airplane dropped some bomb and she was killed. She was the only one killed on this occasion. When the sounds of the airplanes were quiet, her relatives came out to look for her. They found her with her body badly mutilated.

2. Xieng Douangta, 57, Ban Thakhek. He was hit by an 82 artillery shell which they shot from the mountains in the evening (at night). He heard the sound and ran toward his hole in the ground. But because he was in weak condition and because he was old already, he couldn't make it to his hole in time. While still outside, a bullet struck him in the leg. He was wounded and fell down right there. Because he was an old man and weak, he lost a lot of blood and died.

3. Thao One, 19, Ban Nam Tom. In 1968, he was a teacher. He was sent to teach about 5 km outside of his village. After he dismissed school he usually tried to return along the road. One time there were some other people walking along the road with their buffalo and cows in rows. Then airplanes came and saw them and thought that they were a group of soldiers moving. So they dropped many fragment bombs. He saw that he couldn't stop there so he ran away fast. But one plane saw him and shot after him and dropped bomb. So he was hit by bomb. He was still able to run for about 10 minutes, until he collapsed on the road to the village. Then he was seen and brought back and he told us of his condition. Then they were sending him to the hospital and saw that he wouldn't make it so they took him into a house and in about 15 min. he died.

4. Sao La, 28, Ban Nam. She went to bathe at about noon. She bathed near the bridge for vehicles on the big road. In a little bit, a spotter plane came up in the sky. She didn't know which way to go because she was in the middle of a field. She hid in a bush. Soon four F-105's came with the spotter plane to tell the jets where the bridge was. She thought about what to do. She tried to crawl quietly away across the field but they shot up the bridge completely and then let bombs go all over the area near there. Some of the fragments hit her. She was in pain and couldn't move from her place. No one saw her. She suffered great pain. She lost a lot of blood until she couldn't get more than halfway home. Her people came looking for her and saw her but when they got her home she died.

5. Thao Boun, 18, Ban Nam Tom. He was called to be a soldier in 1965. He was sent to the region near Phou Kout. He went out and fought many times and many places. When he went to Phou Kout, he had the function of going out on guard. One day he went to bathe, some planes came up. He ran for his hole but couldn't get there because four F-105 planes saw him and came down shooting. He was hit by dirt and buried right there because the planes were shooting in many passes. His friends came to help dig him out but they couldn't get him and he died.

6. Xieng Vanna, 35, Ban Thakhek. He went to get a cartridge of an 85mm shell which is of beautiful copper (brass). He was going to make tools. He went to get it in a place where they had already shot and left. At the time he went to get it, a mine blew up and killed him. Several people who went with him were hurt.

7. Thit Vounta, 28, Ban Nan. He went to his Hai fields, and met some Meo soldiers who caught him and took him away. But he didn't cooperate and go with them and began to fight with them. The Meo soldiers shot him dead. Because he didn't cooperate and go with them or tell them anything.

8. Chan Nan Tha, 50, Ban Lak Houei. He was riding in a vehicle going to Xieng Khouang. They arrived at the (main) road at night because they were afraid of the airplanes, so they went at night. They arrived at the road and hit a mine and were ambushed and had to fight. He was a civilian and didn't have (a weapon?) and was hit by a bullet and died right there in the vehicle.

9. Thao Da, 25, Ban Nam Mou. He came as a refugee to Lat Sen. He was taken off to fight against the Neo Lao but only 15 days after being sent off to fight, he was in a battle and there was no way out at all. He was hit by an (artillery shell?), and killed, so that he had no chance to get away.

10. Thit Boun My, 49, Ban Lat Houei. He came as a refugee to Lat Sen. He was taken to go be an old soldier on the Plain of Jars. After more than a month, they came to fight. They fought with big guns. He could not fight because he was already old. He couldn't keep up with his friends and was hit by shells of big guns (artillery). They fired away and there was no one to take him away. He crawled back to get a drink and died at the edge of the water (stream).

11. Xieng Vanna, 35, Ban Thakhek. He was asked to help with portorage far away. But they had only gone half way when air planes came and dropped bombs and shot bombis and fire bombs. The porters had to break up and flee. Different people went different ways. He was hit by a bombi. He called for his friends but they didn't see him. When his firends came looking for him he was already dead.

12. Xieng Boua Pha, 40, Ban Thakhek. He was in the Tasseng home guard. He went out to protect the village. At that time they came in shooting along with airplanes attacking but he didn't want to surrender but with his little strength and all his bullets finished he fled. An airplane was shooting in front, preventing him from going ahead. Along with that, bombs were coming. He had gone one part of the way when an airplane shot at him and he was hit by a 500 kg bomb and killed.

13. Sao Pheung, 43, Ban Lat Houei. She died when she came as a refugee to Lat Sen. She was just there when she fainted. There was no one to cure her, and she was unconscious and just died.

14. Thit Kham Phouang, 50, Ban ThaKhek. He was going to make fence around his garden in that area. He was going to cut wood when four F-4-H's came flying up. He thought they wouldn't shoot at him but just then three or four soldiers walked out. The spotter planes saw them and flew down to look at the soldiers and fired away at them. At that time the planes were shooting all around the area where he was. He had nowhere to go he ran behind a tree but the bombs fell nearby and the tree fell over killing him.

15. Thit Som, 45, Ban Pha Mou. He was going to dig a ditch for fish near his paddy fields. Three T-28's came up and began shooting his village. He thought he'd run away and take his things into a hole but he didn't make it. The plane shot him. He was hit by little bullets from the planes. His leg was broken, his arm gone. But he wasn't dead yet. They sent him to the hospital. He wanted water. Those who were taking him gave him some and he died right away.

16. Xieng La, 45, Ban Nam Tom. He was carrying bullets to soldiers near Phou Khe. He got there in the evening. At daybreak, he headed back very quickly because he was afraid the planes might come shoot. So he came to the main road and to a bridge. T-6 planes came to shoot the bridge. He had nowhere to go and was half killed there before the planes left. Then he went into the woods because he was afraid. But the planes had dropped bombi which hadn't exploded yet and were still in the woods. There were also tree leaves which hid them. They exploded and his heart gave out and he died.

17. Thao Thieng, 44, Ban Lat Houei. He was riding in a vehicle toward Tha Vieng on the road. There were three men who came to note everyone doing portorage. When they got to the place the men carried things to a stronghold. They had just come to a bridge when they stepped on a mine which exploded right there. The three men and he were all killed.

18. Sao Si, 25, Ban Houa Va. She went to harvest rice in the morning till 9 am when she came back. But when she got halfway, the planes came and saw a lot of people who had gone to harvest rice running into the forest. Four T-28's shot into the forest at the place they had run to, until all was destroyed. She couldn't run fast and fell into a ditch but the bomb pellets hit her and killed her in the ditch.

19. Sao Kham My, 15, Ban Yawn. She went portering, carrying bullets but she had bad luck. They shot 106's which fell near her. A fragment of a bullet hit her arm and head and she died right there. It was truly most pitiful.

20. Sao Khammy, 9, Ban Nouane. She went to the market with her elder sister in the morning, when two T-6's flew up and shot 20mm guns onto the road, hitting pretty Sao Khammy. She was sent to the hospital but the hospital was very far away. Before they got there they had to stop. In the daytime the planes came and they couldn't move. In the evening they took her on again but she died when they got to the hospital even though they gave her some injections.

21. Sao Pha, 13, Ban Nouane. She died from a fever. She didn't get medicine in time. She just got the fever and died.

## Appendix III

### STATEMENT ON ANTIPERSONNEL WEAPONRY

(By Fred Branfman, Director, Project Air War, Washington, D.C.)

The widespread use of antipersonnel weaponry in Indochina is one of the most striking and prominent features of today's air war. From 1969-71, for example, I interviewed several hundred victims of American bombing in Laos. The vast majority of these civilian casualties were caused by antipersonnel bombs. From our research on the air war both out in Indochina and with Project Air War here at home, from 1970-72, we would concur with Professor Pfeiffer and Westing's estimate that at least  $\frac{1}{2}$  the total tonnage dropped on Indochina is antipersonnel in nature. For example, I was told in November 1970 by an airforce captain in charge of the ordnance dump at Udorn Air Force base that about 75-80% of the ordnance on hand was antipersonnel.

But although the use of antipersonnel bombs has been reported since 1966, the American public to this date remains largely unaware of the full nature and extent of antipersonnel technology in use in Indochina. Few Americans are aware of the many kinds of antipersonnel bombs in use, the frequency with which they are deployed, and their effects on the human body.

We are not aware, for example, that any major newspaper or magazine in this country has ever published a major piece containing the information revealed in the supplement to this statement.

The reason is clear. Almost all information about antipersonnel weaponry has been classified out of public reach.

This material does not appear to be classified because publishing it would aid the people against whom these bombs are directed. As the film "U.S. Technique and Genocide in Vietnam" makes clear, the DRV, PRG, Pathet Lao, and FUNK are fully aware of the technology deployed against them. It would appear, rather that secrecy has been followed for fear of the domestic repercussions that might result from full disclosure, and because much of the weaponry is outlawed by international law.

The U.S. Army Manual on the Laws of Land Warfare, for example, states that the use of "irregular-shaped bullets" and "glass-filled projectiles" is illegal. The United States is using both in the form of flechettes and plastic casings which break into hundreds of un-x-rayable jagged slivers, 1-8th by 1-16th of an inch at this very moment.

It is a sad commentary on the state of public knowledge of the war today that one must turn to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for knowledge of what our leaders are doing in the name of America.

It is even more distressing to note that the use of antipersonnel weaponry continues to increase under the Nixon Administration without public and congressional awareness or restraint.

Whether or not one agrees that the Administration has the right to employ this antipersonnel weaponry in Indochina, this much seems clear:

1. It is clearly antithetical to the laws of the land that any small group of men would unilaterally develop, produce and deploy such weaponry without the knowledge of consent of the public or Congress.

2. The unceasing refinement of weapons designed only to kill or maim human beings is one of the most important developments of our time. At the very least, it ought to be reported in full to the general public by the media, so that some kind of national debate can be undertaken.

#### ANTIPERSONNEL WEAPONRY

Antipersonnel weaponry is designed to kill or maim human beings. Although sometimes used in other ways, such weaponry cannot destroy a factory, a bridge, an anti-aircraft site. Its objective is human flesh.

American involvement in Indochina has been characterized by unceasing refinement of new ways to kill from the air. The varieties and variations of antipersonnel weaponry are innumerable. What follows are only some examples, divided into three main categories: antipersonnel projectiles, incendiary bombs, and antipersonnel mines.

**Antipersonnel Projectiles:** These are dropped by jets and B52s when there is some target in mind; intelligence justifying their use is generally some sign of human life: cut grass, tire tracks, smoke or heat from fires, ploughed fields, or metal sound, or movement picked up by electronic sensors or infra-red detectors. In a guerrilla war, such bombs are almost never dropped on a clearly identifiable military force out in the open:

1. The Pineapple antipersonnel bomb is a yellow-colored, cylindrical-shaped bomblet which contains 250 steel ball-bearing pellets which shoot horizontally on impact. One sortie with a full load carried 1000 such bombs, which means that one sortie sends 250,000 steel pellets shooting out horizontally over an area the size of 4 football fields. Anything above ground is hit.

2. The Guava antipersonnel bomb (BLU 24/28) is an improvement over pineapple. Gray in color and round in shape, without the pineapple's fins, the guava is thus smaller, allowing one planeload to carry 4-500,000 steel ball-bearing pellets. It also rotates on its axis and will either explode in the air or on impact with the ground depending upon the type of fuse. In either case, it avoids the pineapple's problem of sending its pellets out horizontally, which thus explodes harmlessly over the heads of people hiding underground. The guava's pellets shoot out diagonally so they'll go into holes where people are hiding.

3. Fragmentation antipersonnel bombs, including the smooth orange, striated orange and BUL 63 fragmentation projectiles, are also designed as improvements over the pineapples and guavas. Unlike the latter two projectiles, they do not employ steel pellets. Rather they break into hundreds of jagged fragments which do far more damage to the human body.

4. The Flechette Rockets are even more destructive to the human body. The flechettes, fired from rockets in the air war (as well as M79 grenade launchers and artillery in the ground war), are tiny steel nails with larger fins on one end and a sharpened point on the other. They peel off the outer flesh, enlarge the wound as they enter the body, shred the internal organs, and lodge in the blood vessels. Extremely delicate surgery is necessary to remove them.

5. The plastic bombs consist of a pressed plastic casing which breaks up into hundreds of tiny jagged slivers, 1/8th of an inch by 1/16th of an inch. These slivers are un-X-rayable so that if a person is hit with enough of them and they must be removed, he must be laid on the operating table (if surgical care is available), his body opened up, and the doctor then tries to pick through his body removing what slivers he can find.

**Incendiary bombs:** Interviews with pilots and other U.S. airmen and targeting officers have made it clear that incendiary bombs while designed for a wide variety of purpose, are in practice primarily used as an antipersonnel weapon. Since they cover such a wide area and destroy all human life above and often below ground through burning or suffocation, they are regarded as a particularly effective weapon.

1. Most Americans are aware of Napalm. Few, however, are aware of the fact that they are also using Napalm B, Supernapalm, Napalm Paragel, all improvements on the original napalm. These later variants burn at a higher temperature, explode over a wider area, and have greater adhesiveness.

2. Even few Americans are aware of white phosphorous and magnesium. These substances burn on an oxidation principle, which means that they cannot be rubbed out or even put out by water (they take the oxygen out of water and continue burning under the skin). In fact, the more one rubs, the more they burn. If a person is hit with incendiary bombs containing these substances, he must wait until they burn themselves out, which usually means they have to burn their way down to the bone.

3. And I have met no one who is aware of thermite, a substance which greatly increases temperature at which incendiary bombs burn.

4. These substances are all combined in the most destructive incendiary bomb yet developed, the napalm-phosphorous-thermite bomb. It explodes over an extremely wide area, cannot be extinguished until it burns itself out, and burns at 3,500 degrees centigrade as compared with 900 degrees centigrade for conventional napalm.

**Antipersonnel Mines:** Unlike antipersonnel projectiles or incendiary bombs, antipersonnel mines are not used with any particular target—whether suspect or confirmed—in mind. Rather they are simply strewn over 100's of square miles as part of an officially-designated "Area-Denial" program designed to make whole areas of Indochina uninhabitable for human life. The scope of the use of these mines staggers the imagination. For example, a Honeywell contract that we have signed calls for the production of over 200,000 of one of these types of mines (the WAAPM) in a single month. In the November 1970 Electronic Battlefield Hearings, the Air Force Revealed that this area denial program has been installed throughout one-half of southern Laos. This is an area inhabited by over 200,000 people, according to the estimate of the U.S. Embassy in Laos. The area denial program has also been implemented in northeastern Cambodia, northern Laos, North Vietnam, and portions of South Vietnam. These mines include:

1. The Gravel and Dragontooth mines, which come in small cloth bags and metal containers disguised to look like leaves or animal droppings. One F4 sorties will drop 7,500 of such mines.

2. The WAAPM (Wide-Area-Antipersonnel-Mine) mines, which are round in shape and emit 8 cords each 8 yards in length. A person tripping on one of these cords will cause an explosion of a charge sufficient to kill or maim him. The other side has charged that some of these mines also emit a noxious gas.

3. The Button Bomblets are even smaller charges, strewn in the 10's of 1000's, and extremely difficult to detect with the human eye.

Nothing explains the nature of the air war today more than the expansion of the area denial program under the Nixon Administration. It is clear that these antipersonnel mines cannot distinguish between human beings and animals, let alone military and civilians. The deployment of the area denial program violates the very basis of international law calling for at least some minimal attempt to distinguish between military and civilians in time of war.

[From The Guardian (London), Apr. 27, 1972.]

#### US USING 'PELLET' BOMBS AGAINST HANOI

(By Harold Jackson)

A new type of antipersonnel bomb dropped on Hanoi by American aircraft is causing severe medical problems for the North Vietnamese, according to a British consultant physician who has just returned from the northern capital.

Dr. Philip Harvey, who works at St Stephen's Hospital, Fulham, arrived in Hanoi on April 8 to carry out an extensive medical education programme at the invitation of the medical faculty at Hanoi University. A week after his arrival—on Sunday, April 16—60 US aircraft bombed the city, causing extensive damage to eight residential districts.

Dr. Harvey said in London yesterday that he visited one of the areas, about a kilometre from his city centre hotel, and examined some of the dead and wounded.

"I saw the body of one woman—she was pregnant—and she had been riddled with plastic pellets from an antipersonnel bomb. This is a new development. The pellets used to be metal, but now that they are using plastic it is impossible to locate the pellets by normal X-rays. They can be found with the use of ultrasonic vibrations, but the North Vietnamese do not have such equipment."

Dr. Harvey said that the pellets penetrate the victims' bodies at 1,800 feet a second, creating such intense heat that they vapourise the flesh. "They can fracture a bone without even making contact with it," he said. A full ultrasonic vibration unit costs about £20,000. The wounded people seen by Dr. Harvey all had multiple penetrating wounds caused by cubic pellets.

The raid took place at about 9:30 in the morning, and involved three waves of 20 aircraft flying at about 25,000 feet. "It was impossible to see the planes," Dr Harvey said, "though the sky was completely clear. I did see the vapour trails of the ground-to-air missiles being fired against them."

He said that six or seven brick-built thatched houses had been destroyed in the area he visited. Two people were killed outright and 11 others injured, five seriously. Later two of the injured died, and another two bodies were located in the ruins.

The bombs dropped seemed to be an equal mixture of high explosive and antipersonnel. The latter, Dr. Harvey said, had no effect on property or structures. "I dug some pellets out of the brickwork and they had only gone in about a quarter of an inch."

The other areas attacked that morning were all within one or two kilometres of the city centre. "It was a public holiday, and the streets were teeming with people. At the moment Hanoi has about five times the population for which it was originally designed. Later the authorities started evacuating women and children."

Dr. Harvey said that this was the only raid on the city while he was there—he left on Saturday—though there had been one false alarm five days after the attack.

"So far as I could tell the morale seemed to be remarkably high and they carried on with my programme as though nothing had happened. It seemed to me that the bombing had much the same effect in Hanoi as it did in London during the blitz: it just strengthened people's determination to struggle on."

[From The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 14, 1972.]

#### MORAL REVULSION RISES AS BOMBINGS INTENSIFY

(By William K. Wyant Jr., A Washington Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch)

Washington, May 13—One of the things that bothers many Americans about the Vietnam War, now that American ground troops are pretty well out of it, is that the killing by the United States goes on, but in an even more long-range, antiseptic fashion than before.

Throughout the war, the emphasis of the American effort has been to substitute death-dealing machines—air strikes and artillery—for manpower. This has resulted in a saving of American lives, but sometimes at the cost of Asian lives, including those of women and children.

And the moral revulsion against slaughter by remote control has been intensified as the American air war against North Vietnam has been resumed with greater fury. At the same time, North Vietnam's leaders have been ruthless and stubborn, showing no regard for human life themselves, Administration leaders point out.

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird was asked at his press conference Wednesday about North Vietnam's charges that civilian areas were being bombed. "What precautions are we taking?" a reporter wanted to know.

Laird replied, "Every effort is made, of course, on behalf of the U.S. to minimize civilian casualties and that is, of course, the instructions that our pilots will operate under as they interdict the rail lines and they take out the POL (petroleum, oil and lubricants) facilities in North Vietnam as part of this interdiction campaign."

Laird gave assurances that in the American campaign to stop movement of supplies, called Operation Linebacker, the choice of targets would be such that civilian casualties would be kept to a minimum. "I do not want to say there will be absolutely none," he said. "We will certainly carry them out in that fashion."

Laird pointed what he described as the enemy's "complete destruction and lack of respect for human life and civilian casualties." At An Loc and Quan Tri, he said, "they sprayed artillery into those civilian centers just as if they were using a water hose."

To say that aerial bombing is an indirect, impersonal kind of warfare is to take nothing away from the bravery, skill and dedication of American pilots and crews operating from carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin and from air bases in South Vietnam, Thailand and Guam. The U.S. lost 15 aircraft over North Vietnam from April 6 through last Wednesday. And, as President Richard M. Nixon said in Texas two weeks ago, brave Americans are flying dangerous missions.

But the point about the nature of air warfare is that the men who drop the napalm and the bombs speed quickly from the scene and do not witness the consequences.

With primitive man, there were natural and technological limitations to the killing that could be accomplished in one day. The sword arm got tired; after

lopping off a dozen heads, a warrior might decide that he had done enough. But in modern warfare, the machine takes over, and there are no comparable restraints.

A soldier who bayonets an enemy knows what he has done. But a bomber pilot who misses a bridge and hits a civilian area may be back on the carrier within an hour, having a cup of coffee and not knowing where his bombs went.

As the American Air Force and Navy go after military targets in North Vietnam, there is no way, as Laird suggested, of avoiding some civilian casualties. Thus far, the bombing may accurately be called restrained in comparison with the all-out bombing of major cities that went on in World War II.

North Vietnam endured intensive bombings before President Lyndon B. Johnson halted air attacks on the north in 1968. Mr. Johnson's sustained bombing, called Rolling Thunder, begun early in 1965, did not cripple Hanoi's war efforts. In 1965 and 1966 alone it is said to have caused 36,000 casualties, of which 80 per cent were civilians.

A draft of a Pentagon memorandum for President Johnson in May 1967 on the bombing of North Vietnam said: "The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1000 noncombatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one."

During the Johnson Administration many targets in North Vietnam were off limits. Restrictive circles were drawn around Hanoi and Haiphong. There was a buffer zone near the Chinese border. The North Vietnamese, of course, took advantage of these sanctuaries from air attack.

Now that President Nixon has ordered a new rain of bombs in the North, critics of the war have had difficulty learning whether the old restrictions still apply. Apparently they do not, at least in the same way. The Pentagon has been vague about it.

Laird said the U.S. would try to avoid injuring noncombatants. At the same time, he was emphatic in warning that this country would take "those steps that are necessary" to prevent delivery of supplies.

At hearings Monday and Tuesday Senator Edward M. (Ted) Kennedy (Dem.), Massachusetts, raised questions about civilian casualties in North Vietnam and the kind of weapons being dropped by American pilots in that country.

Kennedy, chairman of the judiciary subcommittee on refugees, wrote a letter to Secretary Laird early this month asking about the war's impact on North Vietnam's civilian population. The Pentagon makes estimates but does not publish them, his aids said.

There has been no reply to Kennedy's letter, his staff said. He and his panel are expected to begin a public inquiry soon on the enemy noncombatant casualty issue. They will also go into targeting restrictions, if any, and the weapons used.

There are rules of land warfare and rules of naval warfare. What are the rules of air warfare? Judging by what a military witness told the Kennedy panel this week, there is no manual of aerial warfare at present, although there are self-imposed restrictions.

The horrendous arsenal of ingenious antipersonnel devices developed for air drop in the Vietnam War—not only the burning agents but guava bomblets, dragontooth mines, pineapples, and the like—has been called to the public's attention by the Air War Study Group at Cornell University and the Indochina Resource Center in Washington.

Raphael Littauer and Norman Uphoff of the Cornell group are editors of a 280-page book called "The Air War in Indochina." Using a term from economics, it calls the American strategy "capital-intensive" in that it depends heavily on expensive machines rather than manpower.

"Remote-controlled warfare," the Cornell work says, "reduced the need for the public to confront the consequences of military action abroad. The cost of a fully automated war can be reckoned in dollars and machinery—a small price compared to the harvest of casualties."

Another advantage, the authors point out, is that there is no longer as much need for conditioning the armed forces emotionally so that they can stand up to face-to-face killing. Just press the button, and there you are.

[From The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 21, 1972.]

### TRYING TO HUMANIZE WAR

(By William K. Wyant, Jr., A Washington Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch)

Washington, May 22—While the war in Vietnam rages on, the lovely Swiss city of Geneva is the scene of a little-publicized effort to make armed conflicts a bit less rough on civilians.

It bothers a great many persons that the United States, North and South Vietnam and others are busy making widows, orphans and cripples in Indochina. The quiet conference near Lake Geneva, however, is not getting much attention. Making rules about warfare is a slow, difficult business.

The U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense have representatives at the Geneva meeting, which opened May 3 and will continue through June 3, held under auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross. About 70 nations are represented.

George H. Aldrich, deputy legal adviser at the State Department, heads the American delegation. Officially, the meeting is called the "Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts."

The experts are considering a set of proposals prepared by the Red Cross and designed to improve the 1949 Geneva Conventions for protection of war victims.

The work of the conference will form the basis for a later international meeting of diplomats who will be in a position to reach official agreement on changing the rules of war.

Senator Edward M. (Ted) Kennedy, (Dem.), Massachusetts, a critic of the Vietnam War, has been trying to find out more about the United States posture in the Geneva talks. He would like to see a receptive attitude, on this country's part, toward changes calculated to reduce the impact of warfare on civilians.

For example, there is the problem of napalm and various antipersonnel bombs that the U.S. either uses or is accused of using in Indochina. Kennedy has been eloquent in voicing his revulsion at the indiscriminate use of such weapons.

The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, of which Kennedy is chairman, explored the napalm and related issues at its May 9 hearing. It is expected to go into the subject more thoroughly later—that is, the effect of modern weaponry on civilian populations.

Officially the U.S. says it is taking no position at the Geneva talks, insisting that Americans there are uninstructed at this point.

As a member of the American Society of International Laws' panel on humanitarian law, however, Senator Kennedy had received a strong impression that the U.S. attitude on changing the rules was negative. He thinks it ought to be positive.

"I share the distress of many here tonight," Kennedy said at the society's annual meeting here late in April, "over the multitude of excuses which the Administration is putting out to oppose . . . legal controls over the use of napalm bombs and other incendiary weapons which may affect civilian populations. The position of our government defies all reason . . ."

Kennedy said there had been a vast gap between the U.S. policy of concern for welfare of civilians and the performance of its military field forces.

President Richard M. Nixon, he said, should consider the establishment of a permanent "military practices review board." The function of the board would be to advise the joint chiefs of staff on standards and procedures, and to monitor what goes on in actual combat.

Kennedy said he hoped the Red Cross conference at Geneva would include provisions for more effective protection of civilians "despite the opposition of our government."

When the Geneva meeting opened early this month, Hans Blix of Sweden praised the Red Cross draft proposals but charged the Red Cross with a "negative attitude."

Blix criticized also what he called "passive resistance" on part of "some important states." It is not enough, he said, merely to outlaw in general terms "weapons, projectiles or substances calculated to cause unnecessary suffering, or particularly cruel methods and means."

"We need to define the dum-dum bullets of today," Blix said.

What the U.S. said, if anything, was not made available here. The sessions are not public. Because this country is waging war at present, using some of the horror weapons, the U.S. is not in a heroic role at Geneva.

On May 10 Sweden proposed a ban on napalm, phosphorus and splinter bombs. Joining in the move were Algeria, Austria, Egypt, Finland, Yugoslavia, Mexico, Norway and Switzerland. Blix again accused the Red Cross with being too passive.

Last Monday Blix urged an amendment banning "indiscriminate weapons and methods of warfare," such as area bombing and other tactics that do not distinguish between military and civilians.

Blix noted that there had been warnings—he did not say from whom—against becoming too zealous and emotional in trying to write new war rules.

"In this regard," he replied, "let me only say that the prospects of developing the humanitarian law relating to armed conflicts will be poor, indeed, if responsible officials do not allow themselves to be influenced by some restraints which are emotional, and which, I trust, exist in all human beings."

## Appendix IV

### SELECTED PRESS REPORTS AND COMMENTS

[From The Sunday Star, Washington, D.C., Feb. 27, 1972.]

#### MOUNTAIN WAR IN LAOS GRIM

(By Tammy Arbuckle)

Vientiane—Lao government guerrillas are fighting North Vietnamese regulars on the steep mountain slopes at the south edge of the Plain of Jars in an attempt to relieve pressure on Long Cheng, the lynchpin in the defenses of north Lao.

The effort is the biggest the Lao have launched, employing 15,000 guerrillas who sneaked up to the Plain of Jars 10 days ago.

The operation has been an outstanding success as far as relieving North Vietnamese pressure on Long Cheng, the operation's commander, Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, and American officials say.

Hanoi has moved parts of six regiments to defend its long-range artillery and road supply routes on the plain, leaving only parts of two regiments around Long Cheng to face numerically superior Thai and Meo forces.

The second part of the Lao guerrilla operation—to go onto the plain itself and destroy enemy artillery and supplies to buy another month's time for Long Cheng—has stalled on a series of mountain peaks here on the plain's south edge.

Vang Pao, dressed in a long, grey, woman's overcoat and pacing round the campfire in his 8,000-foot-high mountaintop aerie, said he is "not certain" his troops can advance onto the plain.

During this past week spent with the troops, and in night conversations with Vang Pao, the reasons things are not moving became apparent.

One very important reason is the tenacity of the North Vietnamese defending the plain and the heavy firepower they have.

Vang Pao's troops occupy a salient of mountains jutting onto the plain with Route 4 and the town of Xieng Khouang east of the salient. Hanoi's main supply route to Long Cheng is to the west.

In front of the salient is Theung Mountain. Here the North Vietnamese have installed antiaircraft guns ranging from the lowly but effective 50 caliber machinegun to 23 and 37mm. anti-aircraft cannon. They have installed themselves in deep forest-hidden bunkers.

At the beginning of last week, Meo guerrillas and Lao Theung tribesmen slipped from helicopters on mountain top pads used for resupply down through old banana plantations.

The route was overgrown by secondary jungle growth, and vines twined around weapons and radios.

The guerrilla goal was Phou Teung, but the unit was beaten back by North Vietnamese troops before it got very far. North Vietnamese anti-aircraft stopped Air American helicopters from picking up the wounded, forcing the retreating troops to carry them.

Vang Pao has six B52s he can call on most of the time, he said. This is 20 percent of the B52s available in Indochina.

Sometimes he gets additional B52 strikes which are ordered by U.S. Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley on targets of the ambassador's choosing.

But the big bombing attacks don't seem to shift the North Vietnamese from their positions. Last Wednesday, for example I watched two B52 attacks against Phou Teung at 8:30 a.m. and at 10:10 p.m. Phou Teung changed from a green hill to a mass of brown dust, but the Vietnamese were firing again from there later in the day.

They are still there.

Then the Vietnamese moved to cut behind the mountain salient of Vang Pao. With 15-mile range 130mm. guns and 120mm. mortars, direct fire rockets and

smaller mortars, they pounded Cobra Ridge overlooking their supply route to Long Cheng west of the salient.

A few hours before, I had talked to 16-year-old Bee Kar, a forward air guide.

Bee Kar spoke good English, which he learned in Bangkok. He and other forward air guides are products of one of the best U.S. training programs.

The boys are taught how to spot targets and direct U.S. Air Force "ravens"—forward air controllers in light aircraft—onto the target.

Bee Kar and his fellow forward guides spend most of their time close to enemy positions calling in strikes.

Helping them to spot targets is a "magic box" about eight inches square. It has a round white plastic tube in front which Bee Kar points toward the enemy, then presses buttons and the distance is registered in hundreds of meters—up to 2,000 yards. It also registers whether the target is tanks, trucks or troops on a screen which lights up with a drawing of a tank, truck or soldier.

All this is transmitted to a U.S. Air Force "Spectre" gunship which automatically registers on the target.

Bee Kar, a Meo, claimed to be 18 years old, though the records showed it's 16.

He was tough and forthright. "Yes, you must come up here to see the terrain properly to understand," were his first words when I reached his mountaintop.

He described how he watched the lights of North Vietnamese trucks moving across the plain toward Long Cheng last night.

From time to time Communist artillery opened up on his position.

Bee Kar said 10 troops with him were killed and 15 were wounded the day before by shells exploding in their bunkers.

That night the Vietnamese poured more than 500 shells into Bee Kar's position after I left.

One piece of mortar shrapnel entered Bee Kar's stomach but he walked out.

The next morning I was on an Air American helicopter to evacuate him. It was a special mission for there were North Vietnamese all around. But Bee Kar is an American favorite and everyone from Vang Pao on down wants to get him out.

He was in a patch of bamboo amidst North Vietnamese troops, but the helicopter went in with U.S. Air Force Sky Raiders flying cover in a box pattern.

When we touched down, Bee Kar lurched out supported by two other soldiers, one of them also wounded. Everybody dove into the helicopter and we were off.

Bee Kar was in shock and his clothes were covered in blood. The doctors at the hospital said he will die.

Bee Kar insisted "I won't die." Two days later U.S. officials said he was alive in Undorn Hospital in northeast Thailand.

Bee Kar's position was lost, however, and the North Vietnamese were behind the guerrillas and advancing into the Plain.

Every day last week Communist shelling increased. On a helicopter pad overlooking the plain known only as "uniform Uniform". There was a distant boom, then a whistle and a rush about 20 feet over our heads as the first of three 130mm artillery shells came in.

They overshot slightly and no one was hurt by these or by two other shells fired by a patrol 80 minutes later.

As the shelling continued sporadically, it became apparent that the Meo guerrillas were not all they were cracked up to be.

They were in open positions atop hills. In between the shells they stood in bunches on the ridge lines, usually to watch the U.S. Skyraiders and jet fighters and Lao air force T28s attack North Vietnamese troops who advanced behind our position from fallen Cobra.

As the Skyraiders zoomed up after a strike, Vietnamese submachine guns and a heavy 50 caliber machine gun hammered at the aircraft without success.

The troops lacked discipline and their commanders seemed to have no intention of moving forward to attack. "The only thing that will move these people is if Vang Pao comes up" a U.S. official said.

As Vang Pao climbed into the hills, the troops began moving forward again up the steep slopes of elephant grass bowed down by their gear.

Many of them would throw away equipment afterwards when Vang Pao was not around. I've seen them toss away shells and other ammunitions.

When Vang Pao saw anything like that discarded, he picked it up and slipped it back into the troops' packs.

"The army here is something like the American revolutionary army," said an American. "It fights for a while then the troops take off for two or three months. When you go to towns or villages there are a lot of deserters, but then you go to the front and you wonder why all these guys stay here and fight under these conditions for years and years."

Vang Pao said the irregulars are no longer a Meo army, but are made up of many nationalities. In this operation, he said, he has his Meos, people from Nam Yu and Lao from Savannakhet in south Laos. To the rear are Thai troops.

"The Meo move fast," Vang Pao said. "But the Savannakhet Lao are too slow. They go only three or four kilometers a day and they cannot carry food for 10 days on their backs. They eat it all, then ask for resupply by air and they stop and the planes give their positions away."

Vang Pao continued, "The Thais shoot off all their ammunition when the enemy sends small rocket teams against them, then the enemy puts an antiaircraft round in a Thai position when they think all the ammunition is finished and hit the Thais from two sides with a main force and wipe them out."

The enemy was getting smart Vang Pao said, and described how the Communists put radio aeriels on a rock once to attract U.S. bombers then used the resulting caves for their headquarters.

American officials said the big problem is coordinating all the different nationalities and regions into a cohesive force.

All these problems—from stiffening North Vietnamese resistance to intertribal rivalries and poor discipline—combine to prevent Vang Pao's further advance.

American officials said it was necessary for the guerrillas to remain on the offensive in the dry season to buy sufficient time to keep Long Cheng from falling. "It's the first time Vang Pao has fought back in the dry season," a U.S. source said.

"If any advance is to be made it is totally dependent on Vang Pao. If Vang Pao goes up to the front tomorrow and starts dropping shells into a mortar, the troops will move forward. If he doesn't they will stay where they are."

Long talks with U.S. officials and Vang Pao himself how that the only plans implemented will be ones Vang Pao supports or thinks he can carry out a close-up view of Vang Pao's operations, the first ever provided to newsmen, indicates Vang Pao is the man who counts in the battle for northeast Laos on which the survival of the Lao government in its current form depend.

Yesterday the decision again rested with Vang Pao—go forward onto the plain to buy time for Long Cheng at a cost of possible heavy losses or hold off, satisfied with having drawn North Vietnamese infantry back to the plain from Long Cheng.

[From The Washington Post, Mar. 1, 1972.]

## CIA-BACKED LAOTIANS FACE HANOI'S BEST AT LONG CHENG

(By Laurence Stern,)

(Washington Post Foreign Service)

Long Cheng, Laos—The little twin engine Piper groped through the smoke haze that blotted out the craggy terrain just south of the Plain of Jars.

"It's pretty bad today," said the Greek, "but we're flying by timed distance so we don't have to see the ground to know where we are . . . Wait a minute." He leaned forward and shouted to the pilot, "There's Peter Nob over on the right."

The silhouette of a nob-shaped mountain outcropping poked up through the haze and the plane took a steep dip toward a towering ridgeline which marks the vague boundary between the North Vietnamese infantry and the American-supported Laotian irregular army which have wrestled to a temporary standstill just northward.

"That's Skyline Ridge," said The Greek. "The North Vietnamese have their antiair on the other side."

Another sharp dip and suddenly a valley popped into view, dotted with shacks, roads and a tiny air strip. The shacks were mostly deserted by the villagers who fled last month's North Vietnamese offensive and are still hiding out some 15 kilometers southward.

"Long Cheng!" announced The Greek.

In the seat behind us, Kayak looked up from his book. He is a tow-headed American with an earnest face who might pass for a scout leader in his olive twill uniform were it not for the ammunition and rifle and the .45 revolver that he wore along with it.

The two Air American pilots skimmed the Piper Baron nimbly downward along the hilltops to the landing strip of Long Cheng, the once supersecret headquarters base of the tribal guerrilla army organized and financed by the Central Intelligence Agency and fleshed with Meo, Yao, as well as highland Lao volunteers, conscripts and confused-looking children.

Kayak and The Greek and the flight crew are part of the low profile American presence that provides the guns, ammunition, helicopters, transports, air strikes, medical evacuation—in short the wherewithal—that give the “friendlylies” their plausibility as a military force.

Though much of the secrecy surrounding the CIA role in Laos has been lifted here under investigative prodding from Congress and instructions from the administration, there are still reminders that American participation is somewhat of a political liability.

“You can take all the pictures you want of the Lao,” I was counselled, “but please, we don’t want any photographs of Americans.” I agreed and complied.

On the ground, Gen. Vang Pao, the gritty Meo commander of the irregulars, greeted his visitor with a surprisingly shy smile and handshake. His two visiting sons, Van Su, 3, and Cha Leune, 4, clowned and romped with their father’s staff officers to his unalloyed delight.

Vang Pao is famous for his tough, soldierly talk, but today he reflected the seriousness of the state of affairs in the Plain of Jars.

“The North Vietnamese have artillery and they have tanks. Their artillery is bigger than what we have here—they have a 27 kilometer range and ours is 15 kilometers. Out there on the Plain of Jars we have no artillery at all. We have very few people and not enough materiel. It is getting very difficult to hold the situation.”

#### HAZE HURTS

“Yes, we have American air strikes. But look at that haze.” He raised one hand to simulate an airplane and held out the other hand to represent the ground. “The airplanes can’t see and if they come down too far for support operations, they either crash in the mountains or can get shot down.” The upper hand smacked flatly against the lower hand which trailed toward the floor.

“The American B-52s did a very good job for us. We had our last B-52 strike just last week out along there.” He gestured beyond Skyline Ridge. “Maybe we will have to call for more B-52 strikes.

“But the best thing would be to get talks started again among the nations that participated in the Geneva Conference. We must have the neutralization of Indochina. They must get together and talk just once more.”

In the past 10 years, the fighting has decimated the ranks of Vang Pao’s Meos. His guerrillas once were almost 100 per cent Meo. But now they comprise less than 50 per cent of the force. The Meo mountain people have borne the brunt of the fighting and civilian casualties—as well as the dislocation.

“We have some irregulars up here now, from Saravane in the south. But they cannot walk in the mountains. They slow down our operations. A march that should take three days takes them nine days.” He shook his head sadly.

#### WORLD’S BEST

By the admission of some of the highest-ranking Americans in Vietnam, Vang Pao’s guerrillas are facing in the North Vietnamese units across Skyline Ridge perhaps the best light infantry in the world.

Although road and ground-bound, they are using newly supplied Soviet 130 millimeter cannons, the longest range artillery piece on either side in the war, with devastating effect. They are employing Soviet-supplied tanks as mobile gun platforms.

To bedevil American air reconnaissance, the Communists not only have succeeded in camouflaging their guns, but have fashioned dummy replicas of the guns visible from the air and can simulate secondary explosions with gunpowder firecrackers.

The enemy, declares U.S. Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley, is a very formidable individual. Godley, who monitors the military conflict with a fervor that

has earned him the nickname "Field Marshal Godley," concedes that the enemy's use of artillery and mortars is uncanny.

At Long Cheng one day last week there was a continuous shuttling of American helicopters, C-123 transports, observation craft and Laotian-flown T-28 jets over the 2,200-foot airstrip. Outgoing artillery pounded persistently at fixed targets on the other side of the ridge.

The C-123, a faithful workhorse that must land and take off on abysmally short runways, is the key to the mobility of men and supplies for the irregular army. Conspicuously posted inside the planes are signs in Thai, Laotian, Vietnamese and English warning that "the transportation of opium and other narcotic products is absolutely forbidden on this aircraft." The signs also admonish that all passengers are subject to search and removal by the Air America crews if they are found to be carrying opium.

#### BRACING FOR ATTACK

About the strip there was evidence of the most recent North Vietnamese offensive, at the end of January, that penetrated into the Long Cheng Valley. There were spent cartridges, rocket casings and shell fragments.

"They got up to that point," a Laotian air controller said, pointing to the outer boundaries of the airport. "We managed to chase them out."

Now Vang Pao and his irregulars and the Americans are bracing for a new assault. Across the ridge, said Vang Pao, eight regiments of North Vietnamese are organizing for a new push.

A two-week-old spoiling operation directed against the North Vietnamese supply lines shows no sign of having seriously breached the Communist columns.

In the drowsy capital of Vientiane to the south, meanwhile, the ingrown diplomatic community gossips and backbites and entertains and no sound of war is ever heard. One night last week Premier Souvanna Phouma attended a bridge dinner at the Australian embassy and smilingly remarked with a smile perhaps not altogether original that President Nixon's visit to Peking had broken down a great wall.

Souvanna is making new overtures for talks with his half-brother, Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphanouvong. The first secretary of the North Vietnamese embassy, Nguyen Van Than, has been bombarded by visits from Western newsmen applying hopefully for visas to Hanoi. Than managed to teach himself English with language records and assiduous reading and spends engrossing hours of conversation with the correspondents.

#### TEA AND SMILES

He is asked about President Nixon's visit to Peking, and he smiles and pours a visitor more tea. "The Chinese have given us much assistance," he finally replies in measured cadence. "The Russians have also helped us greatly. But the solution to the war in Indochina will have to be reached by the Vietnamese people."

The resident Western press in Vientiane carries on its own weekly skirmish with American military spokesmen over the war to which most of them are denied access.

Several days ago a U.S. colonel, the regular briefer, stood before a dozen reporters and the adversary tensions were high. The colonel delivered a region-by-region briefing of enemy casualties with numbers killed and wounded, as reported to him by Laotian army sources.

Finally one newsman blurted impatiently:

"Colonel, do you take these figures seriously?"

"No," he replied, "I don't. But I am obliged to pass them out. I will not act as a filter."

"But we come to these briefings in the hope that you will be a filter."

"I am a military spokesman," said the attache, his voice tightening. "I am a guest of the host government. And the average Laotian soldier is as guilty of exaggeration in the heat of battle as the average American soldier."

And the newsmen went off to write their weekend military roundups.

## TRAFFIC IN SECRETS

In Vientiane, where Chinese, Soviet, U.S., Pathet Lao, North Vietnamese and other diplomats commingle in an atmosphere of gossipy social congestion, there is a lively traffic in each other's official and personal secrets.

It is known, for example, who in the Soviet embassy is the principal KGB (secret police) operative. It is also an open secret in the diplomatic circuit who the CIA station chief is and which ambassador from what nonaligned country is his next door neighbor.

Secrecy in Vientiane is mainly an export commodity and it is safe to say that the North Vietnamese apparatus knows more about the local U.S. apparatus than most American congressmen.

The major outside powers in the Laotian war still conspire to maintain the tattered fiction of compliance with Laotian neutrality under the 1962 Geneva Agreements.

The North Vietnamese have never acknowledged the presence of some 90,000 troops in the northern provinces and along the infiltration trails into South Vietnam and Cambodia.

President Nixon has, since 1970, been more candid about the extent of American involvement in Laos. Nonetheless, the CIA paramilitary advisers here are still described with such antiseptic euphemisms as "case workers" and "field technical consultants." And the brunt of the American-supported war is still being fought by the CIA's clandestine irregulars and Thai-based U.S. tactical support air craft on battle grounds almost wholly inaccessible to journalists.

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[From The Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 4, 1972.]

## IN LAOS CROSS-FIRE: MEO TRIBESMEN FIGHT ON

(By Daniel Southerland, Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor)

Ban Xon, Laos—One hears so much about the low morale of the Meo tribesmen in Laos that one expects to see nothing but sullen faces here.

But there is incredible strength—and sometimes laughter—in the faces of the Meo whom the war has deposited here.

Incredible, too, is the daily effort that is made from this American-run relief center to keep alive 120,000 refugees, half of them Meo. Scarcely a minute goes by, it seems, without a small aircraft lifting off the runway with a load of rice for refugees living near scores of scattered drop zones and landing sites in north-central Laos.

Two companies, Continental Air Services and Air America, provide the airplanes, under a contract with the U.S. Government. The pilots are tough, well paid, and expert at zooming in on small landing strips slashed at haphazard angles into the jungle and mountains.

Despite its importance as a refugee supply center, Ban Xon is hardly secure. The Americans who work here fly up every day from Vientiane, 70 miles to the south, and return to Vientiane in the evening. It's not safe to stay here overnight.

A year ago, the North Vietnamese attacked Ban Xon, burned warehouses and vehicles, and killed 14 persons. But American relief workers with the U.S. Agency for International Development, who are dedicated to the Meo and speak the Meo language, note with pride that despite the attack, the Ban Xon center didn't miss a single day of operations.

The airplanes distribute salt and canned meat and a daily average of 44,000 pounds of rice to refugees in the area. If the refugees are on the run because of North Vietnamese pressure, they can get blankets, clothing, straw mats, and cooking pots.

Thanks to the relief program, there is no starvation among the Meo. But North Vietnamese attacks have driven the Meo farther and farther to the south, to the point where they now are threatened with being forced out of the mountains into the lower altitudes, which they find unbearable.

The Meo, the largest ethnic minority in Laos, migrated into Laos from southwestern China in the 19th century. They practice a slash-and-burn system of agriculture on the mountain slopes and like to live above the 8,000 foot level. For them, Ban Xon, at 1,000 feet, is a hot and unhealthy place.

With the support and advice of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the Meo have been the most effective fighters against the North Vietnamese in all of Laos. But forced marches have taken a heavy toll among them.

#### CHILDREN CARED FOR

And, having fought for more than a decade, their casualties in battle have been horrendous. For a population estimated at 300,000, the losses have been so serious—and the advance of the North Vietnamese so unrelenting—that some observers have been asking how much longer the Meo will be able to maintain their present way of life in their beloved mountains.

Fortunately for their children, there is virtually no such thing as an orphan among the Meo. Even if both parents are killed, someone will take care of the child.

If the child is a male, he stands a good chance of becoming a soldier when he grows up, and a Meo is considered a grown man at the age of 14 or 15. According to one estimate, about 20 percent of the Meo soldiers now are under 15 years of age.

#### WHY DID HE JOIN?

When a 13-year-old Meo soldier named Je Yang was asked why he joined the Army, he and his comrades laughed. They'd obviously never really thought much about the matter. There's been a war on for as long as they could remember, and it was simply expected that they would join the Army. "We are attacked, and we fight," said Je Yang, who is expert with an M-16 rifle. Much older men fight, too. Vang Yee Vang, 50, said that he had fought for many years—until a bullet wound in the leg stopped him at the age of 44. But retirement from the Army has not given him a peaceful life. He said that the war had forced him and his family to move seven times in three years.

#### TEN MOVES FOR FAMILY

A Meo who works for the U.S. Agency for International Development mission said that his family had been forced to move 10 times in only half as many years.

"Certainly these people, more than any other people I've known, can put up with tremendous suffering," said Jack Williamson, head of refugee affairs for the AID mission.

"They have a fatalistic attitude, and they make the most of moments of pleasure," he said. "They can laugh and joke. But the joking doesn't necessarily reflect their real feelings."

"There's hardly a family in this country that hasn't suffered a loss because of the war," said Mr. Williamson, a veteran of 11 years' work with the refugees in Laos.

"If every family in the United States lost somebody in a war, how would our morale be?"

[From The Washington Post, Apr. 30, 1972.]

#### SOME MEO TRIBESMEN WOULD RATHER RESETTLE THAN FIGHT

VIENTIANE—In the northern reaches of Laos, in the mountain country where the American embassy and the CIA run their no-longer-secret war, the Meo tribesmen are now being offered an alternative to the unremitting warfare they have endured for a decade.

For 10 years, armed by the United States and led by their Gen. Vang Pao, the Meo have borne the brunt of the indecisive but debilitating war in the north. Despite cruel losses which have reduced them to a skeleton of their former force, the Meo have unflinchingly followed Vang Pao.

Now, however, a possible rival to Vang Pao has appeared. He is Ly Thek, a stocky, 34-year-old, Western-educated Meo who has established a sprawling refugee colony for Meo who want to drop out of the war.

"Ly Thek's colony is political," he says, referring to himself in the third person, "a political alternative to the war in the mountains. This is tomorrow's Meo. I am working on the future of the Meo."

Thirty-two miles north of Vientiane, for three miles off 13, Ly Thek's Meo villages are in various stages of settlement, pushing westward along barely passable roads into the virgin wilderness.

Along the highway there is a sense of permanence to the homes, pig sites, chicken coops and garden plots.

"Those have been here for two years now," Ly Thek explains. "Those in the wilderness, for only days. These people at the front help those further back, then those help others even further until the very last ones will help the next to come. It is our system for building the Meo home."

So far, approximately 8,000 Meo and Lao Theung have opted for Ly Thek's alternative. The Lao Theung are highland Lao who, in recent years, have helped fill the ranks of Vang Pao's once-all-Meo army.

The Americans are not pleased at the prospect of a pacifist Pied Piper leading the Meo out of battle.

The Meo were armed in the early 1960s, in the flush of Washington's infatuation with guerrilla warfare. Originally it was intended that they harass the Communist Pathet Lao and whatever North Vietnamese they could find behind Communist lines.

The task of arming them fell to the CIA because the American military presence, like the North Vietnamese presence, was in violation of the Geneva agreements. The Meo, in their turn, were willing recipients of American arms because they resented Communist efforts to regulate their lives.

But the buildup in Vietnam brought the North Vietnamese into northern Laos in force, and a decade of relentless bloodletting has given some Americans in Vientiane second thoughts. After all, they say, northern Laos is far from the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Perhaps the whole Meo effort so close to the North Vietnamese heartland had been a needless provocation from the start?

But the official American view is that Vang Pao's army is still the "only effective fighting force" on the government's side, and that therefore it must be preserved.

Nearly everyone knowledgeable in Laos agrees that the Meo have been bled to the point of near collapse, and that alternatives must be found soon if the Meo are to have a future. But American officials note quietly that alternatives now will speed that collapse.

Therefore Ly Thek's alternative has not found official favor, and, according to Ly Thek, the Americans have refused to give him the rice and refugee relief they give to Vang Pao's Meo.

"They tell me, 'Ly Thek, your people are not refugees, they wanted to move so we can do nothing.' Okay, maybe that is the best," he says.

"It will teach my people to depend on Meo—not on others. It will break habits they learn all these years with the Americans—to expect to be fed, given clothing, given doctors, given everything so that they will fight the Communists. We will create new Meo people here. We will become sophisticated and give up some of our mountain ways."

American refugee officials in Vientiane say that Ly Thek's settlement poses a special problem because only part of its residents are bona fide refugees eligible to receive assistance, the remainder having left northern Laos of their own choice. Figures on how many are in each category are not available, the sources say.

Traditionally, the Meo have always settled on the highest mountaintops to lead their semi-nomadic lives and perhaps to grow opium as a cash crop. It has always been said that they could not live in the sticky heat of the lowlands, and over the years no love has been lost between the aloof highlanders and the lowland Lao.

But the war has changed all that. Vang Pao's Meo have been driven out of the opium-growing regions and Ly Thek's colony is on the Mekong plain.

Ly Thek believes they will stay. "Look here, you see Meo beginning to learn to live here," he says. "Soon it will be like the Lao villages. We will be Lao people because the Meo and the Lao people will forget about their differences."

"Only time will tell whether their presence on the plain is proof of Meo adaptability or a measure of their willingness to go anywhere to escape the war. In the meantime, Ly Thek's colony has begun experimental plots of sugar cane, pineapple and bananas, and he has already sent five of his people into Vientiane to learn furniture-making.

In Ly Thek's view, "America will end its support for Vang Pao soon . . . Ly Thek respects Vang Pao, but he does not think the Meo will accept Vang Pao

after the Americans stop support. Once the Meo army is defeated the Meo will look for a new leader. They already look for a new leader because they know."

Politics is a rough game in Laos, and assassination is something Ly Thek jokes about. But it is a strong possibility, he admits:

"There are some who would like to kill Ly Thek now, but he must do what he must do and not think too much about that."

[From The Washington Post, Feb. 6, 1972.]

## LAOS: THE QUESTION IS HOW TO GET OFF THE TIGER

(By Stacy B. Lloyd)

The significance of recent events in Laos for the United States lies in the decreasing ability of the U.S.-backed Royal Lao Government forces to maintain a military balance of power with the North Vietnamese and Chinese. As a result it is increasingly difficult for the United States to help support the neutral Lao government, to which the United States is under no obligation, legal or moral. And there is now a good chance that Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma may decide to come to a political settlement with his half-brother, Prince Souphanouvong, head of the Pathet Lao forces.

Recent weeks have been unusually grim for the government forces. The war in northern Laos has escalated far beyond its usual range for this time of year. Two weeks ago Long Cheng, long the central headquarters for Gen. Vang Pao and the CIA-backed tribal forces, was almost overrun. Vang Pao's temporary headquarters, Ban Son, some 20 miles to the southwest, has been under mortar attack. The recent capture of the Sala Phou Khoun road junction on Route 18 by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces, and the fall of the military post and airstrip of Moung Phou 28 miles to the southeast plus the season's first mortar attack on the Luang Prabang airport Jan. 28 are other signs of enemy confidence. On Jan. 22, the Lao Defense Ministry reported a recent Pathet Lao ambush of five civilian vehicles along Highway 18, 90 miles from Vientiane, which could signal the start of a terror campaign between the major towns along the Mekong River. On Jan. 28 the government imposed a curfew in Vientiane.

In the south, the enemy has virtually wiped out the government's military presence on the strategic Bolovens Plateau, coming to within 20 miles of Pakse. U.S. dependents have been evacuated and many Lao are leaving Pakse.

To make matters worse, North Vietnamese surface-to-air missiles have been placed in southern Laos and have been fired at U.S. fighter-bombers. This represents a real threat to Lao T-28s and U.S. forward air controllers. And, for the first time, North Vietnamese Mig-21s have been seen over Laos. In the north, in the Plain of Jars, the North Vietnamese have almost completed a road system capable of sustaining traffic through the rainy season. Newer tanks and heavier artillery are involved—155-mm. guns with a range of 80 miles, far exceeding the 105-mm. guns usually employed by the government troops.

Enemy forces have swelled from a March, 1968, estimate of 91,600 (40,045 North Vietnamese, 51,645 Pathet Lao) to an April, 1971, estimate of between 114,765 and 189,000 (100,000 North Vietnamese and 89,000 Pathet Lao), according to a staff report prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In addition, the Chinese have increased their activity in the northwest, where their road-building crews are now protected by radar-directed anti-aircraft weapons, including 85-mm. and 100-mm.-guns, the latter said to be effective up to 68,000 feet. From an estimated 6,000 to 8,000 in 1969, the Chinese troops had increased to between 14,000 and 20,000 by last April. Their road, extending from Ming La in China's Yunnan Province, reaches down the Moung Houn valley to Pak Beng, 20 miles from Thailand, with an east-west section from Dienbienphu in North Vietnam to Ban Houei Sai, bordering on Thailand and Burma.

### SURGE AND COUNTERSURGE

The annual dry season North Vietnamese offensives matched by Royal Lao Government counteroffensives in the rainy season have occurred since 1962. At that time the Neutralists under Capt. Kong Le and Souvanna Phouma were allied with the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese against the Royal Lao

Government forces of Gen. Phoumi Nosavan. But the Neutralists soon balked at the Pathet Lao's demands for continued military support and were pushed into a holding area at Moung Soui and Vang Vieng.

Since 1963, the enemy's ability to sustain its lines of communication from North Vietnam has grown each year. In 1964, increased North Vietnamese attacks resulted in the Royal Lao Government under Souvanna Phouma asking for U.S. reconnaissance flights. As the war in South Vietnam focused on the need to halt NVN supplies moving to the south, the North Vietnamese reacted to increased U.S. bombing of its trail system by striking at secret radar guidance bases in north and central Laos.

By June, 1967, the Royal Lao forces had come to within 17 miles of the North Vietnamese border. Na Khang, the northernmost CIA-Meo guerrilla staging point and U.S. Air Force search and rescue area, was retaken by the government and Gen. Vang Pao came within reach of Sam Neua city, a Pathet Lao headquarters.

The government's success lasted about a year. In 1968, the North Vietnamese sent in 11 new battalions and began the offensive that today has gained them the ground they need as a buffer against Thailand and as a sanctuary for their supplies moving south.

In 1969, Sam Thong, the government refugee center near Long Cheng, was captured and burned to the ground. This offensive had ominous overtones because it took place in the rainy season and involved the use of Soviet PT-76 tanks in Moung Soui, usually a haven for government troops retreating from the Plain of Jars.

By 1970, the enemy controlled areas from the western edge of the Plain of Jars, south through Sam Thong to Moung Phalane, east of Savannakhet, and seriously threatened the Bolovens Plateau, Pakse and Seno.

By last August, a Senate Foreign Relations staff report rated the U.S.-trained, armed and financed Bataillon Guerriers as the government's only effective force. Royal Lao Army units are controlled by individual region commanders, who often refuse to move them when asked, as in the case of a request by the prime minister for help in protecting Luang Prabang last year. Only the Bataillon Guerrier units operate in all regions except Military Region V around Vientiane. Supplied and transported in and out of battle by Air America helicopters, they do most of the daily patrolling, ambushing and spearheading of commando raids on areas along the Ho Chi Minh trails.

Further evidence that the military balance is shifting in favor of the North Vietnamese and their allies is the increased presence of CIA-trained and U.S.-paid Thai "volunteers." Some 4,000 to 6,000 are now in Laos, and The Washington Post has reported that their numbers are likely to be doubled despite the heavy losses they have suffered since mid-December. There seems to be little alternative. According to last August's Senate report, the government's military base of nearly 115,000 men has been decimated, and 30 per cent of all new recruits desert.

#### TOTAL DEPENDENCE

The complete dependence of the Lao economy upon U.S. funds is well known. The total Lao government budget last year was \$36.6 million. Total U.S. assistance was \$284.2 million—\$52 million in economic aid, \$162.2 million in military aid, and \$70 million spent by the CIA to support irregular forces. This was exclusive of the cost of Thai mercenaries and of the U.S. air war in Laos. Nor does it include the effect of last November's devaluation of the Laotian kip by the International Monetary Fund, which advises the multi-nation Foreign Exchange Operation Fund that supports the kip by buying it with foreign currencies. The Lao devaluation, plus December's U.S. devaluation combined with its effect on the currencies of FEOP's Japanese, French and British members, has depreciated the value of U.S. assistance almost 30 per cent.

This increasingly expensive and ineffective war is not one the United States need feel committed to. It is not, nor has it been, a treaty obligation. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William H. Sullivan, a former ambassador to Laos, told the Senate Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad in 1969:

"As I have repeatedly stated here, we have no obligational commitment to Laos and, therefore, we are not in the position parallel to that of Vietnam."

U.S. involvement in Laos has grown like topsy and not in any premeditated manner such as in Vietnam. The 1954 Geneva accords divided Laos into Communist and non-Communist areas and provided that the United States under

SEATO would stand with its allies against any armed attacks on Laos. In the 1962 Geneva agreements, however, Laos threw off this SEATO guarantee, preferring to remain neutral. In these agreements, a key clause was the removal of all foreign troops with the exception of a small French training mission. North Vietnam refused to comply and has never to this day admitted the presence of its troops in Laos.

This became the horns on which America built its dilemma; for in seeking to provide for the viable neutrality of Laos in accordance with the Geneva agreements, Washington also had to honor request from Laos for its defense. Early attempts by the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese to gain political and military control over Laos led to increased requests for military assistance. The United States, in order to respect its word, had to hide behind its own shadow, supplying arms and advisers to the Laotians through the CIA instead of openly.

Through the years, this arrangement has mushroomed into a huge deficit for both the Americans and the Lao. The question posed by the Nixon Doctrine is especially relevant here: how to get off the tiger.

#### TWO SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

My feeling is that this year's events have shown the prime minister and other members of the Lao government that the situation cannot continue and that some solution must be found without loss of foreign assistance. Such a solution could well be a division of Laos into two spheres of influence—one under Western domination, another under Eastern domination. The benefits are an end in fighting, a regional power balance based on traditional Lao, Thai and Vietnamese buffer zones and a continuance of foreign assistance to all.

The grounds for something like this happening are based on the passage of time as well as on the realities of today. The surplus of refugees, loss of life and the strain to the Lao economy are all symptomatic results of the lack of a natural power balance based on regional security interest rather than the interests of foreign powers. Time has substantially changed the national hierarchy of the Pathet Lao, and many of the supporters of the original nationalism of Prince Souphanouvong are now younger than their leader, and more oriented to North Vietnam than to Laos. The same is true of the Royal Lao Government. Prince Souvanna Phouma is now 70, and there is no one to replace him as a national figure. This alone favors some new approach rather than waiting for the inevitably fragmented politics that would follow his death.

The people under the control of both sides depend increasingly on the values and lifestyle of separate systems instead of borrowing a little from both, as was true in the past.

A Lao recently returned from a visit with his family after five years' absence, told me that there had not been much change except that those he talked with seemed more oriented to the Western lifestyle. The people outside the ruling classes in both sections of the country still do not count in the political power structure.

In Western-oriented parts of Laos, there is no level of rising expectations among the general populace, and many civil servants and other middle-class Lao concentrate on improving their titles or "panya," rather than on solving national problems.

My friend returned with the distinct feeling that the country was really becoming two Laos and that there was no use trying to reunify the country within its French colonial boundaries. In the areas under government control the well-to-do drive Mercedes Benz and other Western vehicles such as Datsuns. By contrast, I was told, in the Hanoi-dominated areas life has become spartan, with emphasis on highly organized activities such as Youth Leagues and Women's Rice Brigades. The culture is more oriented to North Vietnam; songs heard from the area are Vietnamese melodies, not Lao. There are few consumer products and no luxuries. In short, given what really counts for a Lao—your name, your protector, your ethnic group—there is no territory to unify, only a necessity to stay alive.

#### A LAO SOLUTION

It is in this spirit that an opting out of the war by Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong makes sense. Souvanna would have to risk a revolt from the rightists, such as Gen. Phoumi and some of the military, but U.S. and international assurances of continued aid could help avert a rightist coup and provide

a Lao solution to an Asian problem, without foreign influence. The Geneva concept of large nations solving the problems of small nations is as outdated as the Congress of Vienna. The time has come for large nations to realize that they cannot settle the problems of small countries without endangering both themselves and the fates of the small nations involved.

A recent statement by Souvanna may signal his increasing desire for a settlement. Until now, he has stressed in speeches that he will order an end to U.S. bombing in Laos only after the withdrawal of all North Vietnamese troops. On Jan. 14, however, he told a Voice of America correspondent, "We would agree to a cessation of the bombing if we had a guarantee that the North Vietnamese would not reinforce their troops in Laos."

For the United States, the significance of a Lao-settlement, free of foreign influence, is three-fold. First, it gets the financial and moral burden off the United States and lets us get off the tiger gracefully. Second, it fits with the concept of President Nixon's Guam declaration of letting Asians solve Asian problems. Third, it provides a basis for the continuation of foreign assistance in Royal Lao Government areas and allows grounds for a flexible response given possible changes in those areas controlled by the North Vietnamese. Finally, and maybe the most important, it is in the interest of the Lao people.

[From The Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 16, 1972.]

#### ONLY LAO KING'S PRESENCE KEEPS ROYAL CAPITAL SAFE

(by Daniel Southerland, *Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor*)

Luang Prabang, Laos—The Laotian Government is maintaining only a light defensive force around this royal capital in the hope that the Communists will continue to respect the inviolability of the King.

It is generally believed, and has been for years, that the North Vietnamese could take every town in Laos within weeks, if they were willing to accept heavy casualties. But the royal capital, which is also the seat of the kingdom's supreme Buddhist patriarch, seems even more vulnerable than most of the towns in Laos.

This town of 80,000, with its gilded Buddhist temples, is situated closer to the borders of China and North Vietnam than it is to Vientiane, the country's administrative capital.

#### SYMBOL OF UNITY

Precarious though Luang Prabang's mountainous position may be, however, most observers believe it unlikely that the Communists will attack the town, mainly because of the presence here of King Savang Vatthana.

The six-foot-tall, 65-year-old monarch is a symbol of the country's unity, and each of the warring factions of Laos, including the pro-Communist Pathet Lao, has pledged at least formal allegiance to him. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma consults the King on important questions, and most Laos revere him.

Nevertheless, the North Vietnamese and their Pathet Lao allies have come close to Luang Prabang many times, and they have attacked the airfield just outside the town where Laotian T-28 fighter-bombers take off on daily bombing and rocketing runs.

Last year, the Communists made what was described as their longest, strongest, and closest threat to Luang Prabang. North Vietnamese troops came to within only one or two miles of the airfield runway. But, in the end, they seemed more interested in making a show of force than in trying to take the town.

#### NO ATTACK CONSIDERED

A Pathet Lao representative in Vientiane, when asked about last year's threat to Luang Prabang, seemed offended that anyone would suggest that the Communists intended to attack the royal capital.

"We were only going after the airfield," he told a friend. "We weren't interested in hitting the city."

This year, after the start of the annual Communist dry-season offensive, the Pathet Lao cut the road between Luang Prabang and Vientiane, 130 miles to the south.

The road has been cut for more than a month now, and chartered American aircraft, loaded with nothing but rice, have had to make daily shuttle flights into Luang Prabang in order to feed refugees and troops.

#### AERIAL FIREWORKS

Communist troops fired a few mortar rounds at the Luang Prabang airfield only a few weeks ago, but caused no significant damage. A Laotian Air Force "Spookie" gunship, an aircraft armed with rapid-firing miniguns, responded by pouring a torrent of fire at the suspected mortar positions.

The plane fired a bit more than was necessary, but gunship crews always do that, because they can make a little extra money after each mission by selling the empty shell casings. The more they fire, the more they make.

But despite such dramatic moments, Luang Prabang remains a tranquil place most of the time. The morning market is packed with food and attracts small groups of mountain tribesmen from the nearby hills. One would hardly know there was a war going on except for the constant roar in the background of airplanes carrying rice and rockets.

One element helping stave off panic is the presence of the King. Like his father before him, the king has a reputation for never leaving Luang Prabang when the going gets rough.

Last March, when the North Vietnamese moved closer to Luang Prabang than ever before, American dependents living in the royal capital were evacuated. Premier Souvanna Phouma flew up from Vientiane to try to persuade the King to leave, too. But his attempt failed.

But the King would have stayed regardless of all this, and he did stay until the crisis was over.

So the King maintains a low profile. He leads a quiet life at his palace on the bank of the Mekong River, spends a great deal of time with his grandchildren, and cultivates flowers at his farm north of the royal capital.

[From The Washington Post, Feb. 6, 1972.]

#### U.S. RAIDS HURT LAOS AID PROGRAM

(By Jack Foiste, Los Angeles Times)

Pakse, Laos, Feb. 5—The refugee village headman spoke in desperate tones to Bob Wulff, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) man.

Wulff, who has cared for innocent sufferers of Asian war for many years and is the author of a book on the resettlement of lepers, "Village of the Outcasts," replied in Lao.

The headman seemed satisfied and saluted. As we drove away, the exchange saddened Wulff.

"He asked me to 'stop the soldiers' from bombing. He said his people did not want to flee again. All I could say was hopefully the bombs would not strike near his village."

It is a tough position to be an American civilian doing relief work in an area where American bombers are constantly overhead. Whether escape from bombing or fear of North Vietnamese impressment causes more concern in Laos is in dispute. Whatever the cause, since the Hanoi-directed offensive began in southern Laos in mid-December, the refugee roll here has grown to 11,000.

Refugees carrying their belongings on their heads, backs and in hand carts, have been streaming toward Pakse and the Mekong River. Asked why he is fleeing, a Lao on the run usually answers with a furtive look back at the battlefield while making noises of gunfire and diving airplanes. One Lao with his wife and a string of children in tow looked incredulous and his reply made the interpreter laugh.

"He thinks the foreigner must be crazy to ask such questions."

Laotians who have lived for a time under North Vietnamese Army-Pathet Lao control and have been interviewed at length in refugee centers generally describe life in occupied areas as rigorous, particularly the required service as porters carrying supplies down the much-bombed Ho Chi Minh trail network.

When the see-saw war gave them a second chance to flee to areas under the Western-backed Lao government they took it.

In the long, unhappy struggle which began in Laos a decade ago, 700,000 lowland Lao and highland tribal minorities have become refugees, according to an American mission tally kept in the capital of Vientiane.

By AID definition, a refugee is a resettled person who must be provided with life's necessities until he has cleared and planted his own rice or money crop.

It usually takes a family a year to get back on its feet but many are uprooted again and so the dependence on American largesse starts over. This fluctuating level of refugees peaked at just over 300,000 last year. It presently stands at 234,000, according to Jack Williamson, director of American refugee relief in Laos.

Of the present refugees, about 70 per cent are Meo or other hardy mountain people. They have been on the run practically since the war began. Coming mostly from the rugged areas close to North Vietnam, some Meos have moved as many as 10 times, Williamson said.

This fiscal year, direct refugee assistance—food, shelter, clothing and medical attention—is costing \$5.7 million.

Snatching refugees out of roadless terrain just ahead of the enemy is often done by helicopters or by shortfield planes.

This costs another \$5 million to \$6 million for chartered Air America and Continental Airways planes. An emergency air evacuation is considered one of a pilot's most dangerous missions.

Distribution of American relief supplies is made by the Lao Ministry of Welfare. Its civilian administrators have been harassed and intimidated by the apparent desire of high-ranking military officers to divert some of the material for their own enrichment.

Wulff describes the average Lao welfare worker as dedicated and honest. Wulff himself appears able to cope with American Bureaucracy and has initiated a new kind of refugee village.

"I don't think the paradeground layout of huts on bulldozed squares of land gives a refugee much incentive to stay," he said. "Our job is to find him fertile land to resettle on, cut an access road into it, give him a few supplies and hand tools if he has none and let him develop his new village as he wishes."

He has started such a project in rich but hard-to-tame jungle just outside Pakse. The land was classified as forest reserve. As soon as an AID tractor cut a road into it, a Lao colonel started putting his mark on prime hardwood trees. He was run off, Wulff said.

"It's his kind of encroachment on government-approved refugee effort which makes me mad," Wulff said.

[From Dispatch News Service International, Jan. 1972.]

## U.S. BOMBING IN LAOS: AN INSIDE REPORT

(by Michael Morrow)

Bangkok—An American once intimately involved in U.S. bombing operations in Laos says an erosion of safe-guards against indiscriminate bombing there has taken place during the Nixon administration.

According to Mr. Jerome J. Brown, a reserve Air Force Captain and former Senior Air Force Photo Reconnaissance expert attached to the Vientiane Embassy, 1966-68, restrictions on American Air Force operations have been quietly relaxed while control over the Air War by the American ambassador in Vientiane has been reduced.

Brown, 29, left the Air Force after finishing his assignment in Vientiane and is now a management consultant in Bangkok, Singapore and Djakarta. Commenting on the Moose-Lowenstein Report, the most up-to-date Senate account of American involvement in Laos, Brown said "in general the report is accurate, but you just cannot say the rules (for bombing) are stricter now than they were some years ago, as the report does.

"The rules of engagement were strictly adhered to from 1966 to 1968 but for all practical purposes after Ambassador William Sullivan left (in March 1969) they appear to have been discarded and are only cited to placate congressmen in Washington," Brown said.

According to Brown, rules of engagement previously in force prohibited napalm bombing by jets and demanded that most American strikes, except those in

response to enemy ground fire, have prior Embassy clearance. No site could be targeted for bombing that was less than five hundred yards from a motorable road or within two kilometers of a civilian building.

The Moose-Lowenstein report, released in August by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, states that napalm can now be used and the restricted areas around an "active village" ("defined as one building, hut or structure not validated by the Embassy for a strike") has been reduced to five hundred meters. No mention is made of a limitation imposed by distance from a motorable road.

According to the report, specially validated areas ('SOLOAS'), partially validated areas ('PARVELAS') and special operating areas ('SOAS') have also been created, which "are, in effect, free fire zones." In these areas targets can be determined without prior Embassy approval and, in the case of SOLOAS and SOAS, without Embassy consultation. SOLOAS and PARVELAS refer to B-52 strikes while SOAS refers to tactical fighter strikes.

Well-informed sources in Vientiane told this reporter that the size of these various areas is growing and now includes most of the Plain of Jars and the Bolovens Plateau in addition to mountainous areas closer to the Vietnamese border.

Brown said that during his tour in Laos he personally participated in targeting sessions at Udorn Air Base in Northeastern Thailand. These meetings were held every Tuesday to determine targets for the fixed number of American air sorties allocated to Laos by the Air Force Command in Saigon.

These meetings were attended by the Director of Intelligence of the 7/13th Air Force (the organizational unit over all American Air Force operations based in Thailand) and representatives of the Airborne Command Center (a special night operations command for bombing over the Ho Chi Minh Trail), the Air Attache's Office in Vientiane (Brown), the Central Intelligence Agency and the 7th Air Force in Saigon.

According to Brown the target sites selected at these meetings were sent immediately to Vientiane. There Brown and his staff checked them against aerial photography to be sure they complied with the Ambassador's ground rules. The list plus the accompanying photography was then delivered to the "Bombing Officer," a junior officer in the Embassy, who was briefed on the targets. In most instances this officer gave final approval.

Prior to July 1967, said Brown, a CIA representative was also allowed to help with the briefing of the bombing officer. Brown feels this might be the case now as well.

But Ambassador Sullivan barred the CIA from this briefing "for trying to sneak by a target that violated the ground rules," Brown said.

Brown claims that he never allowed a target which violated the ground rules to be slipped past the bombing officer, even though this put him in disfavor at targeting meetings. He added, however, that the bombing officer would not have known if he had.

"I'd show him photography, I'd show him the maps, I'd show him the coordinates. He didn't have a clue of what was going on. He'd agree or disagree as the case might be. I'd say look this is a village here and you can't bomb it and he'd say o.k., but it could have been a mountain top. This used to really upset the CIA because they were not allowed in on this . . ."

Although Brown feels that control over the bombing was tighter under Ambassador Sullivan than under current Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley, he admits that it was not all that tight under Sullivan either.

"In the first place, the Lao Air Force which was, in effect, commanded by members of the Air Attache's staff, was not subject to any of the controls the American planes were. They could and did carry napalm and white phosphorous and dropped it where they pleased.

According to the source, who later ventured into the town with Lao troops, "the Wat (temple) was the target and according to the BDA (Bombing Damage Assessment) it had been hit by 30 caliber machine gun fire. We didn't find a single body but the town was destroyed except for the Wat." This incident occurred in the Spring of 1967.

In response to the failure earlier this year of Congressman Paul McCloskey (R. Calif.) to obtain from the Department of Defense aerial photographs of one hundred ninety six villages from which refugees have come in Laos, Brown said:

"It would take about four hours of one enlisted man's work to draw the target folders and/or the appropriate aerial reconnaissance traces to find out if the villages had been covered by air strikes in the last month, year or whatever."

Brown added that there are multiple copies of nearly all aerial photos of Laos and that at least one set is available in Washington with a security clearance of no more than "confidential."

Brown said that if you wanted to see a village that was destroyed by bombing "draw RLAF (Royal Lao Air Force) 907 folder on the Nam Ou River in Northern Laos and look at the village three kilometers down river east of the indicated target. It was destroyed in 1967."

[From Dispatch News Service International, Apr. 2, 1972.]

## THE CAPTIVITY: THREE DAYS AS A CAPTURED U.S. PILOT

### Part I

(By John Everingham\*)

Bangkok—Two squat, broad-faced mountain Lao soldiers in baggy green jungle fatigues of the Pathet Lao blocked my way. They did not lower their rifles, U.S.-made M-2 carbines. I took the initiative, my voice rapid and unsteady. I knew my fate was in the balance.

"I am not American; I am not your enemy," I said in Lao. I lifted my shirt, no gun; dropped my pack to the ground, opened it slowly, no gun. They still looked suspicious.

Hours before on this afternoon of February 7 I was in Pak Sah village, seventeen miles southeast of Laos' royal capital, Luang Prabang. Bombs hammered the mountain walls a few miles away. Reverberations echoed down the valleys. People covered in the village temple.

Pak Sah was the last village in the area controlled by the Royal Lao Government. East of it the Government exercises no control. I walked on hoping that my knowledge of Lao would get me in and out of the villages beyond, and permission to make the photographs I wanted, photographs of villages where no Westerner had visited in many years, if ever.

"You must go with us," said the older of the two Lao soldiers. He was about forty.

It was the beginning of 29 days of captivity during which I was locked in a wooden cage, suffered through attacks from American "Spooky" aircraft, and a bombing attack by American planes. I learned about life with the Pathet Lao at first hand.

After a three-hour walk up and down mountain paths I was led into a village burrowed deep in a thick patch of jade-black forest. The houses were small and rickety, with few of the normal village conveniences, and a scattering of pigs or chickens and many hungry children, their bellies distended. They were like no other I had seen in Laos.

Eight Vietnamese in Pathet Lao uniforms joined the growing crowd of villagers outside the headman's house where I had been taken.

"Who are you? Where are you from?" one of the Vietnamese, a young man about twenty, asked evenly. He had not heard of Australia. "You're not American?" he asked incredulously.

The Vietnamese were friendlier than the villagers, whose hostile stares worried me. I had something in common with the Vietnamese, perhaps that we were foreigners far from home. One asked about my home in "Oh-sta-la". About Saigon. "Are Oh-sta-la girls as beautiful as those from Vietnam?"

So far so good, I thought. But things were changing. I was formally put under arrest. A Pathet Lao *tasseng* (district chief) arrived. The Vietnamese drifted away as did the villagers. An interrogation began.

My possessions were spread across the floor of the District chief's house, just a woven bamboo mat on bamboo ribbing. Each item was inspected and tested, then noted in my growing dossier. Extra lenses and accessories for my two

\* John Everingham is the first Western journalist ever captured by the Pathet Lao forces. He is an Australian photographer/journalist who has spent the last 4 years in Laos. He was captured by the Pathet Lao on Feb. 7 and released 29 days later.

cameras aroused suspicion. One man picked out a lens filter and placed it carefully on my maps. A compass, he said, proof that I had been spying along the border of the Pathet Lao province.

"A pilot I saw captured in Xieng Khouang had a camera," noted a Lao soldier. "It looked like this one," he said as he lifted one of mine.

I again felt ill when I overheard a village headman tell the district chief in a mountain dialect I understood:

"The American must not escape. If he returns to Luang Prabang he may guide the planes to bomb this village."

The next morning, after a restless sleep under guard, I watched the district chief hand a young soldier the only copy of orders pertaining to me. It was somewhat crumpled because the chief had slept with it in his shirt pocket. As I left the village with my new escort I noted that none of the Vietnamese had seen those orders, nor had they participated in my interrogation. The Pathet Lao district chief appeared very much in charge.

I followed one soldier who carried my camera equipment. Another followed me, his gun aimed at my feet. "How many times have you flown a plane over Laos?" asked the rear guard, "How many villages have you bombed?"

Once again I began what was to become a litany, "Australia is a country . . ." But it did little good. He would not believe that I was not an American and could not fly a plane. "In Laos people pole boats. We all can pole them. In America people drive airplanes. Can't all of you drive them?"

We entered a village deep in a forest. The houses were small bamboo huts.

Cold stares and mutterings of "pilot", "American soldier", "spy".

Racks of fresh-cut tobacco leaves were turning brown in the village's only sunlight, flooding through an opening in the forest ceiling. It had been made by lashing down young trees. It could be closed with a couple of jerks on a few ropes, which would loose the saplings and cut the village from view of passing planes.

As I was leaving the village with new guards, three T-28 bombers passed north, flying low. A little girl about six was still in the open playing. Her father screamed, "Airplane." The child ran and jumped into the brush in front of us.

Three more forest villages. A change of guard at each one. The legend about me grew. "*Nak tim labert*" (literally, "professional bomb dropper"). We caught him at Pak Sah." The number of guards increased, guns trained at my back.

In another village about twenty men, competed to guard me. The one selected shoved a bullet into his M-2 carbine much too zealously for my liking. I must have looked scared. "Don't be afraid. Really, I've never ever killed anybody," he grinned. "We won't shoot you now. We've captured you. We must send you to Sam Nena. Many like you are up there in jail."

Nearly ten hours walking ended in the largest village I had seen that day. It, too, was well hidden in the forest. My legs and back ached miserably from the long hike and it was welcome relief when the district chief's wife, a plump, middle aged woman, brought a bamboo tube of water for washing. She also gave me some freshly brewed tea.

She said, "I can't imagine you as a bad man. Why did you come to destroy our villages? Did President Nixon force you?"

We rose at first light. A brief farewell, and my guards and I disappeared into a warm blanket of fog and forest shadows.

I had been told we were on our way to see the *chao meuang* (assistant province chief). We found him in the second of two guerrilla camps, a medium-built man in his early fifties.

"Come," he finally said in what I mistook for a friendly voice, "you must stay here some days; we have a special house for you."

I followed him down the hill. The "special house" was unlike anything I had ever seen. The walls were made of logs bound at the ends with bamboo thongs.

The flat roof was also made of logs, four-layers thick. The ceiling was only five feet above the dirt floor.

I backed away. I refused to enter, tried to talk instead. The *chao meuang's* amusement turned to anger. Suddenly I was inside in darkness.

I tried to reason with the *chao meuang*. He stalked off. "You will stay in jail," he said in parting. "It was colleagues of yours who destroyed my village."

## BENEATH THE PLANES AND BOMBS WITH THE PATHET LAO

## Part II

Bangkok—Two days after my imprisonment by the Pathet Lao in the dark cramped low wooden cell I ceased being classified an American and "professional bomb dropper". Logs were removed from the doorway, and I crawled into the daylight. I had to grab a tree to keep from falling.

The crowds of curious mountain people had been so large on both days that I refused to come out when guards pulled down the logs and announced, "One hour out for exercise." Only once did I venture out, to defecate.

I got two meals a day, in keeping with Pathet Lao Army custom. They were generous by mountain Lao standards.

My new status of "detained Australian photographer" had been granted by a Pathet Lao regular Army battalion commander, Than Bon.

"When I saw your passport and press card I left my work immediately to come here," said Than Bon, a man of about forty with smooth lowland features and a smile etched upon his bronze face.

"Please forgive these Lao Teung (mountain Lao) people. They know only of Americans coming to Laos and are very angry because the Americans come to drop bombs in their villages."

Commander Than Bon said I would eventually be sent to Sam Neua, the Pathet Lao capital near the North Vietnam border. Four soldiers were assigned to guard me on the walk to Phou Khoun, a town fifteen gruelling hours of march to the south.

We arrived at Phou Khoun at midnight. The next night, Feb. 14—seven days after my capture—I was to be taken to the Plain of Jars.

Four trucks pulled up in the dark. Chinese-made, they were just big enough for ten men in the back and two up front.

The road was pockmarked with bomb and rocket craters. We wove, pitched and bounded. A few hours out the driver of the truck I was in suddenly slumped over the wheel. He had fallen asleep, exhausted. We stopped. The trucks parked nose-to-nose in mid-road. We all dismounted and stretched our bedrolls out nearby.

Softly, out of the south came the drone of a plane. A flare over the road two miles behind. It was a Spooky—a C-47 transport with three heavy, rapid-firing machine guns mounted in the cargo bay. "B-r-r-r-r-t," "B-r-r-r-r-t," short burst of the machine guns. Ribbons of red tracers momentarily linked Spooky to the road.

The flare died. The drone grew louder. Suddenly a flare burst over us creating instant daylight. Our trucks were clearly visible. Spooky banked, and lazily circled us. I bolted for the heaviest growth of trees nearby, my two guards right on my heels. The drivers raced for their trucks.

"Spooky" spat out his bullets, bursts up to ten seconds, into each of the forested fullies running between open grassy hills. "Spooky" knew how people tried to survive out here, crouched as we were then behind trees too thin to stop its bullets. "Spooky" knew it was in these groves and gullies that the Pathet Lao camped and dug their tunnels, and where the villagers too stubborn to flee into the lowlands rebuilt their villages.

The drivers swiftly maneuvered from shadow to shadow, timing their moves to take advantage of camouflage offered by scattered trees which obscured Spooky's view.

Spooky's bullets crashed through the trees less than two hundred yards away, right where I had last seen the truck I had been riding in. I later learned that the driver had darted off to another shadow just seconds before.

The flare died out. Spooky flew off. It was like the end of a bad dream.

During the next three weeks of captivity I came to know more of danger from the sky.

I had been held in a Pathet Lao camp along Route 4, about thirty miles north of the CIA's Long Cheng base and about twenty miles west of the much contested Plain of Jars for only eight hours when the camp was bombed.

An American "Birdog" spotter plane had drifted overhead all that day. Its presence gave away the impending attack by the T-28s.

The camp had several air raid tunnels. An official warned me to crawl as deep as possible into the nearest one. I did, soon after two tiny ten year old Lao Teung girls from a nearby village.

Normally only eight or ten persons lived in the camp. That day, however, about forty were there. Most of them were visitors from nearby camps villages who had come to see the tall, towheaded visitor.

Having joined the spotter aircraft, three T-28 single propeller bombers circled overhead. Suddenly their engines accelerated, rising into a hawk-like screech. The ten of us in the tunnel squeezed hard together.

The earth shuddered with the blast. "Bomb!.. said one soldier evenly, using the local word for antipersonnel CBU (cluster bomb units). "Two hundred meters south."

The T-28s struck twice more, farther away, and then they were back. A soldier's hand reached out to protect the back of my head, already buried between someone else's knees. Tension spread through the tunnel. "The Americans have arrived," the soldier partially exposed at the entrance announced loudly. Then he laughed.

A blast. A burst of shrapnel flew down the tunnel. The ceiling, a foot over our heads, split and partially collapsed. We were numb.

Slowly bodies unfolded, took back their shapes and identities, emerged, sucked deeply at the mountain air. Alive! Still alive!

In other tunnels a few were wounded. One soldier had serious shrapnel wounds, having caught the blast of a CBU as he stood at the entrance to a tunnel that took a more direct hit. Blood oozed from the countless tiny punctures from the fragments of the CBU.

CBUs are released from a six-foot long "dispenser bomb," a composite of six aluminum tubes that spews one hundred-twenty of the finned yellow bomblets over a wide area. Each is twice hand-grenade size and lined with tiny ball-bearings. No person caught in the open by them is likely to escape. Still, in a hole you are practically out of danger. If the camp had not been so unusually crowded it is unlikely that anyone would have been hurt.

The camp itself, a battalion command post, was wrecked from dozens of the bombs that scored direct hits. But the damage was small, since all this command post consisted of was a pad of paper, a pen, a rubber stamp-and-pad and a bush telephone. The telephone line, severed by a piece of shrapnel, was repaired, and the Pathet Lao returned to their jobs.

T-28s returned the next day, and almost every day thereafter, to dump randomly more antipersonnel CBU bombs in the forested gullies between the mountains where both military camps and, separately, civilian villages were hidden.

Night brought the newest of the American gunships. Code-named Spectre, they were converted C-130 transports mounted with pom-pom guns and 20mm cannons, equipped with see-in-the-dark infra-red and low-light television scanners, heat sensors, computerized aiming devices, radar and God knows what else.

One night I definitely could hear Spectre's bullets crashing into the nearby forest. My body trembled uncontrollably. I called to the guard, lying next to me under a thick sheet of plastic tarp. "Don't you think we should get in the tunnel?" He sat up, listened a moment, then said, "Oh, that one. Don't worry; it hardly ever kills anybody." He went back to sleep.

Civilians, I often was told, are more often the victims of Spectre, CBU's, Spooky, etc., than are soldiers. Airplanes cannot distinguish between soldiers and civilians, villages and army camps, when all are similarly hidden. My own observations suggest that villagers must suffer more, if for no other reasons than that they are more concentrated, less mobile, lack military experience and have more possessions to lose.

"Only way to kill us," said Company Commander Thanonsak, one of the two officers assigned to guard me, "is to drop a big bomb right on one of our tunnels. Some soldiers will die then. But you can't do that very often."

#### FINAL RELEASE—AND LIFE WITH THE PATHET LAO

#### Part III

Bangkok—After three weeks as a prisoner of the Pathet Lao, I was visited by the local battalion commander at a military camp near Route 4, twenty miles from the Plain of Jars. From handwritten orders, he read:

"Item number one, my government, the Neo Lao Hak Sat (Lao Patriotic Party), has decided to send you back to Luang Prabang.

"You will be sent back immediately.

"We must keep your cameras and notes to send to Sam Neua for inspection. If it is concluded that you were not spying everything will be returned to you.

"We now believe you are Australian so we must let you go. If we keep you prisoner very long your parents will worry and your government will be angry with us."

Three days later I found myself back at Pak Sah where I had been captured twenty-nine days earlier. I drank a final glass of rice whisky with my last Pathet Lao guard, and boarded the sampan for Luang Prabang, the old royal capital of Laos.

The guard smiled, waved. "Please tell the truth about us," he said.

Except for the first few days in the log cell when the Pathet Lao thought I was an American pilot, I had been a prisoner in the loosest sense of the word. Officially, I was a "detained Australian journalist."

I had lived with Pathet Lao soldiers for almost a month in the heavily bombed territory north of the Plain of Jars. I had learned to listen for the drone of the planes above me, to dive for cover without hesitation.

I slept and ate with my captors, was allowed free run of the camps. These camps were virtually indestructible. The only furniture was handmade split timber and bamboo tables. Black plastic sheets served as tents or lean-to's. Cooking was done in metal pots.

I ate the Pathet Lao's sticky rice and *par daak* (a pungent, fermented fish paste). I sucked on three-foot bamboo tubes dipped deep in *lao hai*, a sweet rice wine.

And at first hand, I learned of the Pathet Lao determination not to give up the fight.

"We are patriots. It is only American propaganda that says we are communists," said company commander Thanonsak Darasing, one of the two officers assigned to guard and care for me. Thanonsak is also a well-respected Pathet Lao journalist.

A boyish 31-years-old, Thanonsak has been fighting for 12 years and was eager to discuss his life with me. I developed a deep respect for him during our days of constant talk. When I left he gave me his picture and scoffed at possible future danger which might come from using his name. "I am a Neo Lao Hak Sat, a person who loves his country," he said.

In 1960, he was a 19-year-old student at a high school in Vientiane. His father, a courier for the Pathet Lao, was killed by government soldiers. His mother was also killed, he said, and his family's water buffalo and silver confiscated.

With two brothers and two sisters he was led by an uncle to the Pathet Lao provinces in northern Laos. His oldest brother was killed by machine gun fire in 1969 in a battle with "American Meo" on the Plain of Jars.

"I don't want to die—I'm like anybody else in that respect," said Thanonsak. "But I'm not afraid to die. I can die for my country because my heart tells me I'm doing the right thing for my people. The Vientiane soldiers do not feel this."

Thanonsak admitted that North Vietnamese were helping the Pathet Lao; but "there are not many thousands like the Americans say," he said. I did not see a single North Vietnamese officer or advisor with Pathet Lao troops except for the eight Vietnamese on the first day.

At least during the first nine days of my capture this could not have been rigged for my benefit—messages were often carried by foot and when I arrived in a new place there was confusion and surprise from top ranks down.

Everywhere I went the Pathet Lao exuded confidence. Pathet Lao soldiers consistently told me that even American air power would not stop them.

"Look," a soldier told me, "if the bombing were any good, I'd be dead long ago. We'd all be dead. They've dropped hundreds of tons of bombs for everyone of our people. But we're stronger than ever."

In the midst of war, daily life continues for the Pathet Lao.

Thanonsak is engaged to marry a Pathet Lao medic in June of this year. The newlyweds will honeymoon in a village hidden in the jungle for two weeks before resuming the battle.

"Twelve years is long time to fight," Thanonsak said, his eyes moistening. "It is too long. We have watched the government in Vientiane let our country fall to ruin. They've allowed Americans to bomb the villages of the Lao people. Laos has had war for too many years. We must finish it."

[From The Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 17, 1972.]

## CAMBODIA—WHY A MILLION WAR VICTIMS

(By Daniel Southerland, Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor)

Phnom Penh, Cambodia—One out of every seven Cambodians has been classified as a war victim.

This is the Phnom Penh government estimate, which may be quite conservative.

Putting it another way, the government estimates that about 1 million people out of a population of roughly 7 million have suffered losses since fighting started here nearly two years ago.

Most of the war victims are refugees. But the 1 million figure also includes persons, both military and civilian, who have been killed or wounded or whose homes have been destroyed or damaged.

The 1 million figure, issued by Tiam Kim Chieng, Cambodian Commissioner General for War Victims, shows an increase of 300,000 war victims over an estimate that he made about a year ago.

Shocking though these figures are, they fall far short of those issued recently by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, who estimates that some 2 million refugees have fled their homes at one time or another since the war began.

Cambodian officials say that the Kennedy figure of 2 million refugees is "highly exaggerated" and that they have nothing to hide.

Another point of contention concerns civilian losses resulting from American and South Vietnamese bombing. A report prepared last December for the U.S. Government's General Accounting Office at Senator Kennedy's request concluded that bombing "is a very significant cause of refugees and civilian casualties."

Both U.S. and Cambodian officials argue that the bombing is neither a major factor in the making of refugees nor a major cause of civilian war casualties.

It would probably take scores of interviews with refugees to better understand six refugee families, selected at random, who came from six widely separated locations in the Cambodian countryside, indicate that the bombing—and artillery shelling—are indeed significant causes both of refugees and of civilian casualties.

All six families listed air strikes, artillery fire, or a combination of the two as reasons for fleeing their home villages.

Four of the six families said these were the primary reasons. The other two said the main reason for their leaving their homes was the arrival of attacking North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops.

Parents in four of the six families said that they had seen civilians killed and wounded by air strikes and artillery fire. Three of the families had their homes destroyed by bombing and artillery fire.

In only one case were North Vietnamese troops said to have burned down civilian homes.

## ATTACKS WITNESSED

Phuong Sovann, a mother of seven children, said that her house in Svay Rieng Province burned down after being hit by artillery fire during the U.S. and South Vietnamese invasion in the spring of 1970.

"They thought that Viet Cong were in our village, but they were not," she said.

The family left its home village and took refuge in the provincial capital, later returning to build another, smaller house in the same village. Airplanes—Mrs. Sovann is not sure whether they were American or South Vietnamese—flattened the new house. The family decided then to leave for good when the bombs burned down the house in which they were living with other refugees. They then decided to move to Phnom Penh.

Mr. Ok said that he had also had trouble with South Vietnamese troops, who had demanded small amounts of money from him.

"I welcomed some of those soldiers into my home one day and gave them tea, and they took 20 riels away from me," the old man said.

Mr. Ok has no idea when he will be able to return to his home village. He spends days now grinding rice into a paste for cakes. But this work is not sufficient to give him the money he and his wife need to live. So the Cambodian Government has been providing the couple with rice and dried fish.

But getting food from the government is unusual. In most cases, the government provides food to refugees only during the first difficult days after they flee their homes.

Mr. Ok's case is also unusual in that he and his wife live in a refugee camp. There are still only a few such camps in Cambodia. Most of the refugees who have come to Phnom Penh have moved in with relatives or built bamboo huts with thatched roofs on vacant lots.

[From The Washington Post, Apr. 6, 1972]

### CAMBODIA: TRAPPED IN A WAR IT CANNOT STOP

(By Peter Osnos)

Phnom Penh—This remains a lovely city, quieter and even cleaner than most. There are broad Parisian boulevards, some shaded with the kind of stately trees that pollution long ago killed off in Saigon. Sunsets on the banks of the Mekong River with the now empty Royal Palace as a glittering backdrop, can be spectacular.

The large central market has a selection of meats, fruits and vegetables as good if not better than any in South Asia. Lately, largely for seasonal reasons, the price of foods has fallen so that they are now only slightly more expensive than two years ago.

It is a measure of what Phnom Penh once was like that it could have been run down so far and still have so much. But it has run down very far.

The buildings look shabby, public places are neglected. Sidewalks are cluttered with barbed wire and wooden bunkers. Refugees from the countryside have streamed in, poor and often pitiful. The population of Phnom Penh, it is said, has more than doubled.

Off to the side of the main road that leads in from the airport is an area three football fields long where some of the refugees lived until a Communist rocket attack after midnight March 21 leveled most of their shacks. Civilian casualties were in the hundreds. Survivors still mill around a small dispensary waiting for meager handouts of clothes and other items.

Somehow, Phnom Penh has kept its natural charm and food is plentiful by the standards of the world's majority. Life, except for those at the very bottom, is bearable. But otherwise, the picture from the Cambodian capital is almost unrelievedly gloomy.

A war that is no longer new and goes well only at the enemy's sufferance is sapping the public spirit. This is demonstrated in many ways. Fear and contempt for the armed teen-agers who make petty thieving demands on the population (a pair of shoes, a meal without paying) has replaced the admiration once felt for their rush to defend the nation.

Corruption, the people say, is getting increasingly worse. "There is too much of the *bon jour* everywhere," a young Cambodian complains, using the local euphemism for greasing official palms. The pockets of military commanders are stuffed with the salaries of dead or non-existent soldiers. A few months ago the embarrassment became too great and the government abolished 80 battalions that never really existed.

The fear of Vietnamese conquest, rooted in historic precedent, seems also to bind the people less in determining their will to go on. In early 1971, on Highway Four, the road to the Gulf of Siam, there was an 18-year-old girl named Sog Ghenda who replied softly when asked why she was there:

"I volunteered for this battle because I love my country. I am not afraid and I will fight until I get killed." Her fellow soldiers nodded approvingly. Such ardor rarely finds voice anymore.

Partly, it must be the physical cost, the dead and wounded, the families separated, the homes destroyed or abandoned. The naivete of the early days about what had to come assured that it would seem especially harsh.

It is also partly disappointment with the unfulfilled promise of the coup against Prince Sihanouk. The monarchy, self-indulgent and patronizing, was abolished and with it went peace. Thus far the republic has offered them nothing better. Lon Nol, the semi-crippled mystic who presides over the country, is less a president than a surrogate king.

What probably troubles the people most of all, however, is the realization that Cambodia is trapped in a war it cannot win and cannot stop until the interests of bigger and more powerful nations have been served, possibly at Cambodia's expense.

If, for example, the present North Vietnamese offensive below the Demilitarized Zone turned out for any reason to be decisive, finally forcing the two Vietnams and their super-power patrons to a settlement, how much would the Cambodians be forced to give up for the sake of a broader Indochina peace? The decisions, Cambodians realize, are not theirs to make.

From time to time there is even reason to doubt the intentions of the United States, on whose offerings Cambodia so completely depends. There was open dismay here when President Nixon in his eight-point peace plan failed to mention what might happen to Cambodia and how its borders would be guaranteed.

Then, after the China visit, Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green was sent on a tour of America's Asian allies to give them a report of what had gone on in Peking. The itinerary as first announced omitted Cambodia. Later it was added, officially only because Green was able to rearrange his flight plans.

Cambodians are baffled too by the vagaries of American politics that tightly limit the aid they can receive. They know as well that there are some public figures who believe Phnom Penh should get no help at all.

"I can't understand it," a Cambodian colonel said to me as we talked in the rubble of a destroyed town last December, just after government forces had suffered a particularly damaging setback. "When Vietnamese are fighting Vietnamese, you give Saigon all it needs, but when Khmers are fighting outside invaders, you say we must not have too much."

The colonel spoke less than a week after government troops were trounced in the biggest operation they had ever launched, intended to reclaim the road to the surrounded provincial city of Kampong Thom. It was a demoralizing defeat because in its early stages it had sparked so much confidence. The medals were awarded too soon. When the Communists counterattacked from positions the Phnom Penh forces ostensibly had cleaned out, they showed conclusively how great the weaknesses were in leadership, strategy and logistics.

Overall, however, the military situation in Cambodia has been reasonably stable, in a way. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong overran wide areas of the Cambodian countryside in the spring of 1970, just after Sihanouk was overthrown, and they have never been dislodged. Indeed, they have never even been threatened.

On the other hand, although they have battered government forces whenever they have chosen to stand and fight, the Communists have not enlarged the territory (or the population) over which they have control.

Most of the big unit operations take place east of the Mekong River in what used to be called the sanctuaries and continue to be major Communist staging areas. Most of 4 North Vietnamese divisions are there and the South Vietnamese do virtually all the allied fighting.

(When the South Vietnamese pulled out of their base at Krek in January, giving the Cambodian garrison less than a day's notice, the Cambodians fled behind them, actually crossing the border. The colonel in charge said he had no choice. His troops would have been wiped out.)

Elsewhere the fighting is usually small, certainly smaller than it seems from exaggerated news accounts. But the Communists have used terrorism with maximum psychological impact. It can be easily overlooked that an attack as devastating as the one on March 21 probably involved no more than a platoon or two of enemy troops plus a handful of demolition forces.

For three months at the start of this year, there was practically no battlefield activity at all, giving rise to speculation that perhaps both sides were content with the status quo and had reached a tacit understanding that the fighting was costly and accomplished nothing.

The lull ended, more or less, when the Cambodians started a trumpeted but very cautious operation around the Communist-occupied temples at Angkor. But it is indicative of the mood here that talk of accommodation is given so much credibility.

In the gossip mills, it is always the Russians, who keep the second largest mission in Phnom Penh, that are cast in the role of mediators and there is no doubt that they are doing what they can to encourage the belief that some arrangement is possible.

Chou-en-Lai said as much in a speech recently when he accused "certain powers" of attempting to drive a wedge into Prince Sihanouk's "united front." "I don't know of any such contacts," a middle-level Russian said at the embassy here last week, adding with a smile, "But journalists know everything. Of course our diplomats have a right to see officials of Cambodia. They study the situation and make reports to our government."

If a deal did become possible, the most popular formula is for the Cambodians to concede that the North Vietnamese fight it out for the sanctuary areas farther south. In return, the Cambodians would get nothing except a respite.

It is still unlikely that Cambodian morale will fall so low that it would be willing to cede, probably forever, a third of the country. The possibility that it could happen is accepted, however, at the United States embassy. "The Cambodians stagger from one problem to another," said a senior official, "and I can understand why they might want to explore openings to Hanoi. But they don't have much to offer."

The feeling among ranking Americans in Phnom Penh, whose acuity has almost always been matched by their candor, is that Cambodia is not in any imminent danger of collapse or capitulation, although that could quickly change if pressure were significantly stepped up for a sustained period or American support were suddenly withdrawn.

There is little effort to put a gloss on the sorry state of things. The recent political events caused particular concern, especially the ousting of Sisowath Sirik Matak, whom the U.S. mission regarded as the most able man in the leadership. "The prospect now," an American official observed, "is for more inefficient government."

The apparent indispensability of Lon Nol, a demonstrably capricious man removed from Western and even oriental reality, promises further uncertainty.

The Cambodian Communists, although continuing to take a relatively small role militarily, have been busy politically, proselytizing in the countryside and building an infrastructure growing in both numbers and influence. They too could become a formidable factor in the months ahead.

In terms of insecurity, corruption, public malaise and political unrest, Cambodia is not unlike South Vietnam in the period of the middle 1960s when the massive United States buildup got under way. If there is anything at all sure about what will happen in Cambodia, it is that no American expeditionary force will come to the rescue.

[From The Washington Post, May 8, 1972.]

#### CAMBODIAN EXPERIENCE TURNS SOUR

(By Laurence Stern, Washington Post Foreign Service)

*"Cambodia is the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form."*—Richard M. Nixon, November 15, 1971.

*"The quarter-billion dollar aid program for Cambodia is, in my opinion, probably the best investment in foreign assistance that the United States has made in my lifetime."*—Richard M. Nixon, December 10, 1970.

The army that marched in sneakers, rode ebulliently to war in Pepsi-Cola trucks and fired Chinese carbines only two years ago seems like a romantic fiction. There are now proper trucks and uniforms and American M-16s.

Nonetheless President Nixon's description of the Cambodian aid program is a piece of hyperbole that has turned bittersweet, if not completely sour.

The Cambodian army, known as FANK (Force Arme'e Nationale Khmer), has grown from a poorly equipped and ill-trained militia of 80,000 at the time Prince Norodom Sihanouk was overthrown in 1970 into a poorly led and frequently outfought force that is now, at least on paper, supposed to number 200,000.

Although the figure is still technically classified, the administration is seeking to raise its military aid sights to support a Cambodian army of 220,000, although U.S. military planners envision further expansion of the force.

The United States has been pouring in military supplies at a rate of 5,000 tons a month along the Mekong River from Vietnam and into Pochentong Airport in Phnom Penh. Half of the incoming cargo is ammunition.

More than 50,000 Cambodian troops have undergone training in South Vietnam, Thailand, the United States, Indonesia, Malaysia and elsewhere, knowledgeable U.S. officials in Phnom Penh report.

Since President Nixon spoke the above-quoted words 16 months ago the dollar value of assistance to Cambodia has more than doubled.

However, at least half of Cambodia's land mass and a quarter of its 7 million population now lie beyond the writ of the Lon Nol government, by official intelligence estimates.

#### GUERRILLA STRENGTH GROWS

The insurgent Khmer Rouge (Red Cambodian) movement has grown from a scattered force of about 2,000 to a wide-spread guerrilla force that one key White House official this week set at 50,000. State Department intelligence estimates of Khmer Rouge strength are 15,000 to 30,000.

The current North Vietnamese offensive demonstrates that the avowed objective of the American "incursions" two years ago and follow-up operations by the South Vietnamese army—the cleaning out of Cambodia's Communist sanctuaries—was short-lived in its effect.

Despite the rapidly rising scale of American weapons, logistic support and tactical air assistance, the Cambodian army failed its most important test of "Cambodianization" when a major offensive thrust along Route 6 last fall turned into a demoralizing rout.

These are not the judgments of amateur war critics or "knee-jerk" dissenters but of professional diplomats and military men whose job it is to know how the Cambodian conflict goes.

For the progress of the war is the test of the realism and efficacy of the military and economic support programs which in this fiscal year reached an obligatory level of \$341 million from a zero starting point two years ago.

One well-informed U.S. official in Cambodia said the defeat inflicted by counter-attacking North Vietnamese in the Highway 6 operation, known as Chenla II, devastated the Cambodian Army for the 1971-1972 dry season.

#### REOCCUPATION IS CONCEDED

Before the current Communist offensive into South Vietnam officials were conceding that the North Vietnamese had long reoccupied the eastern sanctuaries which served as the staging grounds for the new offensive probes toward Saigon and into the Mekong Delta.

Corruption, no stranger to the Cambodian military or to the civil government before Sihanouk's downfall, has increased in scale along with the enlarged range of opportunities.

The "phantom battalion" system that is a legacy of the Vietnam war experience, under which senior officers collect and pocket the pay of nonexistent troops claimed to be under their command, has achieved a solid reincarnation in Cambodia.

This has been tacitly recognized in the American assistance command. Last fall, at the direction of Gen. Theodore Metaxis, former head of the U.S. equipment delivery program in Cambodia, hundreds of cameras were distributed to Cambodian commanders for troop verification purposes. Several American surveys were also conducted on a spot basis. The results never surfaced nor, it is said by some observers in Phnom Penh, did the cameras.

#### "HAVEN'T LOST ANY GROUND"

"What does anyone expect of a ratty-assed, inexperienced little country of seven million?" asked one senior U.S. official with rhetorical fervor. "At least they haven't lost any ground they didn't have in 1970." That was the year the North Vietnamese backed their forces throughout Cambodia following the American and South Vietnamese incursions from the east.

The scope and objectives of the American aid that has poured into Cambodia in the past two years seem to have expanded at a more rapid pace than was implied in President Nixon's April 30, 1970, telecast announcing the American incursions.

"... We shall do our best to provide small arms and other equipment which the Cambodian army of 40,000 needs and can use for its defense. But the aid we will provide will be limited to the purpose of enabling Cambodia to defend its

neutrality—and not for the purpose of making it an active belligerent on one side or the other.”

On May 14, 1970, Secretary of State William P. Rogers said the defense of the Cambodian government is not “our primary purpose and that will not be our purpose in the future.”

But on March 14, 1972, Rogers told the House Foreign Committee: “As you know one of the reasons we have increased the request for Cambodian assistance is that we are anxious to see that the government in Cambodia survives.”

With the irresistible momentum that has characterized so much of the American experience in Southeast Asia, the commitment took wings.

#### MILITARY AID GRANTS

Within 12 days of his April 1970 speech Mr. Nixon signed a presidential determination for \$7.9 million in military aid grants to the Phnom Penh government. By June 30, there was another trickle of \$1 million. Within a month—\$40 million more. By November the President asked Congress for a \$255 million supplemental military aid program—\$155 million for Cambodia and the rest to replay the program for the emergency Cambodian borrowings.

When Congress enacted the supplemental bill it signaled a new stage in the Cambodian commitment and also touched off an intra-governmental debate over the U.S. military presence there.

Until that point the MEDT (military equipment delivery team) program was funded out of the President's own drawing account and run by ex-Green Beret Jonathan F. Ladd, a military maverick and legendary Vietnam combat advisor. Ladd was sent to Phnom Penh in May of 1970 by presidential National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger. His instructions were to provide objective reporting, set up a “primitive” logistics system and keep a low silhouette.

The mission was to his liking because of Ladd's anti-bureaucratic style of operation.

#### PENTAGON ASSUMES CONTROL

But when the program was funded by Congress it automatically went under the control of the Pentagon and gradually Ladd's influence waned while the military hierarchy in Washington and at Pacific Command headquarters in Honolulu took over.

The tendency from that point onward was toward more Americans, more sophisticated weapons and toward the erection of a typical military assistance bureaucracy in Phnom Penh. (The size of the American government contingent in Cambodia has increased from five in March, 1970, to about 160 today. A limit of 200 Americans has been imposed by Congress.)

An illustrative episode occurred last June when the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for a U.S. logistics delivery team of 100 Americans in Phnom Penh. At the time Ladd had only 23 technicians working under him. Both Ladd and Ambassador Emory C. Swank protested vehemently. Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird halved the Joint Chiefs' proposal to 50—still more than doubling the Phnom Penh contingent.

“No, no,” Ladd pleaded. “I have functional use for no more than seven men.” He got 27.

The size of the MEDT mission now exceeds 115, with less than half the number in Phnom Penh and the rest in Saigon. The new MEDT chief, Gen. John Cleland, who replaced the expansion-minded Metaxis, has put out the word that he will try to reduce the size of the American group and sharply police U.S. “end-use” inspections in the field. The end-use checks are intended to assure that the weapons are being put to the purposes for which they were delivered—and no more.

#### PRESERVE BUILDING SYMBOLIZES

The most palpable symbol of the American presence and of the Nixon Doctrine in Cambodia is a high-rise “tempo” building behind the enlarged American embassy that houses the MEDT program in Phnom Penh. Resident wags call it, as inevitably they would, Pentagon East.

American voices are heard where they would have been a jarring novelty in 1970. At the poolside of the Phnom (the republicanized Royal) Hotel, once a predominantly French sunbathing preserve, hefty U.S. technicians and officers shout, “Gar-sahn” at confused, scurrying waiters. It is an old page out of the Vietnam war next door.

Economic aid to Cambodia has also followed a well-rutted trail that winds through the earlier aid programs to Vietnam and Laos. The newly established Commodity Import Program for Cambodia is stalled dead center and reflects little attention to the priorities of the country's war-disrupted economy.

It has already become a matter of unfriendly attention on Capitol Hill that in the one-year lifetime of the AID program far more money has been pushed on Phnom Penh than the government has been able to digest.

During the first half of 1971 less than a tenth of the \$70 million in economic assistance obligated for Cambodia was used. Nonetheless AID officials in Cambodia asked for another \$110 million to finance commodity imports in this fiscal year.

#### PROGRAM BORN OF HASTE

The economic aid program for Cambodia was hatched in the greatest of haste. AID programmers arbitrarily set the level of the commodity import program, under which the U.S. finances the shipment of essential commodity items to Cambodian importers, at what they believed to be the level of imports before the war broke out in 1970. The guess proved disastrously high. Only a trickle of import applications were filed by the shrewd Chinese traders who form the elite of Indochinese mercantile society.

"It may be that they are unfamiliar with our procedures," conjectured one AID advisor in Cambodia, a theory that brings guffaws of incredulity from more experienced officials.

The Phnom Penh traders and financiers are past masters at dealing with governmental red tape, smuggling, black market operations, currency manipulation and the many other varieties of private enterprise in Southeast Asia.

The more plausible and commonly accepted explanation is that AID underestimated the disruption of the war on consumer demand.

Among the "essential items" approved by AID to underwrite Cambodia's economic survival last year were: 1,700 Italian motor scooters valued at \$660,000; more than \$100,000 worth of color movie film and other professional movie equipment; radio paraphernalia worth \$307,700 to provide broadcasting facilities at the port city of Kompong Som and Battambang. (One U.S. official in Phnom Penh refers acerbically to the project as the "Cambodian Radio Amelioration Program, C-R-A-P.")

[From The New York Times, Thursday, Sept. 9, 1971.]

#### CAMBODIANS TELL OF TERRORISM BY SAIGON'S SOLDIERS

Prasaut, Cambodia, Sept. 8—Scores of Cambodian peasants have gathered in this bombed-out village on Route 1 seeking protection from what they describe as pillaging and wanton attacks by South Vietnamese soldiers operating in Cambodia.

Interviews with some of the most recent arrivals—more than 500 refugees have come during the last six weeks—confirmed a confidential American report of alleged depredations by the Vietnamese that Ambassador Emory C. Swank sent to the State Department in Washington Aug. 24.

Negotiations are now under way in Phnompenh between the South Vietnamese military and the Cambodians, who reportedly want Saigon to withdraw its troops from all but a 16-kilometer zone along the Vietnamese-Cambodian border.

Prasant, which is 18 miles west of the border, normally houses only 400 to 500 people but has recently grown to become a refuge for peasants who find they cannot live with the pillaging of South Vietnamese soldiers. Because of its location on Route 1, the villagers feel less isolated here and less likely to be terrorized by loosely disciplined Vietnamese soldiers who traditionally feel contempt for the Cambodians.

#### COMMISSION SET UP

The civilian in charge of security here, Sok Khim, says he does not know what can be done to stop the atrocities by South Vietnamese soldiers.

American Embassy officials passed through here several weeks ago to investigate the increasing number of assaults. Occasional reports of looting, however, date back more than a year, when the South Vietnamese first entered Cambodia.

A South Vietnamese Government spokesman refused to comment on the alle-

gations today. A joint Cambodian-Vietnamese commission has been formed to investigate the charges, but according to the report by Ambassador Swank red tape has considerably slowed down inquiries.

The Ambassador's report said that embassy officials interviewed Cambodian peasants in Prasaut who told of rape, murder, kidnap and robbery by South Vietnamese troops. Provincial officials, the report said, felt that local feelings were running so high that the peasants would cut the throats of individual soldiers unwary enough to fall into their hands.

More terrifying accounts were told to be a reporter by refugees today.

A 21-year-old mother named Ngeth from the vicinity of Kompong Rau, a small town 10 miles from here, spoke quietly, sobbing as she held her 2-year-old son close to her side. She described how Vietnamese soldiers entered her village on Aug. 27, beat her parents and her eight brothers and sisters to death with their rifles and then robbed and assaulted her.

#### HUSBAND'S STORY

"I begged them to leave us alone," she said. "But they said we were Vietcong. I told them no Vietcong had been in our village for many months." The woman said that nearly a hundred other Cambodians were beaten, tied together and led away by the Vietnamese soldiers.

Other refugees were gathering in close to share their stories of terror. A 27-year-old man fought back tears as he described how five Vietnamese soldiers entered his house on Aug. 28, looted it, then pinned him to a chair while they attacked his wife.

A 50-year-old gray-haired woman stepped forward. "I was attacked, too," she said. "They hit me on the head and then on the legs."

She pointed in the direction of her village. "It was on the road, on the road," she said. "They took my clothes off and forced me to the ground." The woman picked up a cloth to wipe the tears from her eyes. She could not continue.

The peasants who have come to this village, which was mostly destroyed in fighting more than a year ago, all agree that South Vietnamese soldiers are attacking them and not the Vietcong, whom they are supposed to fight. Frequently, the peasants say, the Vietnamese soldiers have taken their livestock, including pigs, chickens and water buffalo, as war booty. They say family treasures and the gold bracelets often worn by the women as ornaments have also been seized.

#### ROCKET ATTACKS REPORTED

"The soldiers came to my house and took my parents' treasures," a 34-year-old pedicab driver said. "Then they took all my brother's pigs and chickens. They said if I did not give them all they asked for, they would kill me and say I was a Vietcong."

Villagers from Kompong Rau said that the South Vietnamese had shelled their homes with rockets on five consecutive nights although no North Vietnamese or Vietcong troops had been in the area for weeks.

"After the rocket attack on the first day six of their helicopters arrived," said a 42-year-old farmer, who had not eaten in four days. They said they had come to investigate. "But all the soldiers did was tell us to get out of our houses. Then they entered and took our treasures and food and loaded it into other helicopters."

The American embassy report confirmed such incidents and said similar looting had occurred in other parts of Cambodia. In a village in Prey Veng Province South Vietnamese soldiers stole sewing machines, outboard motors, clothing, animals, money and jewelry, the American investigators were told.

#### BUDDHIST MONKS BEATEN

Buddhist monks, too, were beaten by the South Vietnamese soldiers. Then the villagers were forced to load the booty into Vietnamese helicopters. The American report listed other examples.

The report brought into doubt the effectiveness of some South Vietnamese soldiers fighting the North Vietnamese in Cambodia.

In a village in an area where South Vietnamese troops had been operating for two weeks, peasants asked for and were given 100 weapons for self-defense.

When asked why it was necessary to issue weapons to the villagers, Cambod-

ia's Premier, Lon Nol, said that the South Vietnamese troops had not neutralized the North Vietnamese and Vietcong and that at least one enemy base area in the vicinity of Trapang Krasang had been pointedly avoided, the Ambassador's report stated.

#### 3 MURDERS REPORTED

Documenting depredations in the Krols Kos district, the report said that South Vietnamese forces had murdered three persons and committed five cases of rape in addition to their usual quota of plundering."

The refugees in Prasaut are not receiving financial assistance. They live under the wooden frames of bombed-out peasant shacks and eat the fish and vegetables given them by the villagers here. Some beg food from merchants.

But merchants, too, who travel Route 1 are stopped by South Vietnamese operating checkpoints set up to provide security by to extract "road taxes." The hapless merchants must pay either in money or in the produce they carry.

The document also quoted the local provincial governor as saying that border markers were reportedly being moved and that he concluded that a deliberate attempt was being made by the South Vietnamese soldiers to drive the Cambodian peasants off their land so it could be taken by "land-hungry Vietnamese."

## APPENDIX V:

### A.I.D. COMMENTS ON GAO REPORT ON CAMBODIA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR,  
Washington, June 12, 1972.

HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY,  
Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In my letter of May 16, I promised to give you our views and comments on the GAO reports of war-related civilian problems in Indochina, as requested in your letter of April 25. Since your letter asked for our views on five separate reports, I am forwarding our comments on each as they are ready, rather than as a package.

Enclosed are our views on the GAO report of February 2, 1972 entitled, "Problems in the Khmer Republic (Cambodia) Concerning War Victims, Civilian Health and War-related Casualties." I believe that these comments address the main issues raised in the GAO report. However, if you would like further information on any of the items, I will be happy to try to provide it.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN A. HANNAH.

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (A.I.D.) COMMENTS ON GAO REPORT OF FEBRUARY 2, 1972, ENTITLED "PROBLEMS IN THE KHMER REPUBLIC (CAMBODIA) CONCERNING WAR VICTIMS, CIVILIAN HEALTH, AND WAR-RELATED CASUALTIES"<sup>1</sup>

In considering the question of refugees in the Indochina area, one must take into account the differences between the situations in Cambodia and the neighboring countries of South Vietnam and Laos.

The GAO study was made in October–November 1971. The only significant military action in Cambodia had taken place in early and mid-1970 and that action was of limited duration and limited geographic terrain—the Cambodia–South Vietnam border sanctuary area. Consequently, the refugee problem in Cambodia has never approached anything like the severity of the problems in Vietnam and Laos.

The number of persons that is quoted as being involved is misleading because it includes people who voluntarily leave their place of residence, such as dependents of soldiers who elect to move close to the military camp; people who have already returned to their homes; and people who have temporarily taken up residence with friends and relatives in the more secure areas. This accounts for the fact there are few refugee camps, and accounts for the fact the Cambodian Government has not accorded a higher priority to the refugee question. In short, the problem is not viewed by them as being acute in Cambodia.

With respect to the specific points raised by the GAO report:

#### 1. NUMBER OF REFUGEES

The report cites a Cambodian Ministry of Health estimate that more than two million persons have been displaced by the war between March, 1970 and September, 1971. This figure was used in subsequent press releases here.

The determination of the number of refugees, as we testified on May 9, is an extremely difficult task. The GAO report itself admits that the number of refugees is largely conjectural. There is no question that the two million figure is high

<sup>1</sup> Full text of this report is published in "War Victims in Indochina," Reports prepared for Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected With Refugees and Escapees by the General Accounting Office, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, May 3, 1972, pp. 83–114.

if we are talking about refugees and is probably high even if we broaden our consideration to all persons who have, left their homes because of the war. The Commissioner for War Victims, for example, had a different calculation in estimating the number of people in a refugee status. He is cited as estimating about 150,000 refugees living in Phnom Penh and about 70,000 living in provincial capitals. Presumably he was referring to displaced persons who were not able to find shelter with family or friends. We conclude therefore there are no reliable statistics on this matter.

## 2. HEALTH CONDITIONS

Concerning public health conditions, the report states (p. 47) that the team was advised that as the result of the war shortages of medical facilities, equipment, supplies, pharmaceuticals, and personnel became severe. The need for medicines was described as "critical" (p. 49).

Data was gathered for the GAO report in the fall of 1971. The UNDP report, for which data was gathered in April of 1972, had an entirely different assessment. That report found that the problem was not a quantitative shortage of resources but poor utilization in many instances of the available resources. For example, the number of hospital beds per capita was found to approach international norms, but hospital doctors were often not available and too many beds were occupied by persons not requiring hospitalization. The UNDP found that "Present pharmaceutical stocks as well as facilities for their replenishment would appear to be satisfactory". However, occasionally supplies of certain patent medicines ran out and second choice medicines had to be employed. More trained physicians and nurses are needed, according to the report, and the UNDP recommended that the GKR seek help in organizing a nurses training program from international organizations such as the World Health Organization and the International Red Cross, or from bilateral donors such as the Japanese and Australians.

On the question of importing pharmaceuticals, we have pointed out in our testimony that the Cambodian Government is now importing and can continue to import pharmaceuticals from their own foreign exchange resources which we have augmented with a \$20 million cash grant and a \$20 million reimbursement program. In 1970 and 1971 more than four million dollars worth of pharmaceuticals were imported annually into Cambodia. We expect at least the same amount to be imported in 1972.

## 3. U.S. POLICY

The GAO report states that the policy of the U.S. has been to not become involved with the problems of civilian war victims in Cambodia. It also states that there is no specific U.S. program for assisting refugees in Cambodia. Both are correct.

Reasons for this policy were stated in our testimony before the Subcommittee on May 9. As stated above, the situation in Cambodia is quite different from that prevailing in Laos and Vietnam where the war has gone on for much longer and has been much more destructive. In Cambodia, the problem is of a different order of magnitude; there have been no sustained onslaughts by the enemy aimed at capturing areas of Cambodia.

In Cambodia, most displaced persons tend to congregate in Phnom Penh and have generally been able to find shelter with relatives and friends. We believe that on the whole the GKR's level of effort, combined with the efforts of the family and friends of the displaced persons, is meeting the current requirements and is consistent with the standards of living of the Cambodian people. Aside from the fact that the GKR, along with other nations and international bodies, is already involved in assisting refugees, U.S. programs have the disadvantage of requiring an increased American presence in Cambodia and a gradual shift in responsibility.

Though we do not have a U.S. refugee program in Cambodia, our economic aid program does have an impact on the well-being of those in the urban areas, where most of the refugees are congregated. Our economic aid program attempts to assure an adequate supply of essential commodities in the marketplace. Thus the urban populace, displaced persons as well as permanent residents, can have available a substantially larger amount of resources than they would if there were no U.S. economic aid program.

## 4. CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

(a) The report finds that "The Cambodian government has not developed an over-all program to deal effectively with the civilian war victim problem. There are, as yet, no specific programs for providing temporary relief to refugees. Relief has been granted on a case-by-case basis."

The GAO report does point out, on the other hand, that there is a program of assistance for civilian war victims. Chapter 4 of the report gives the GAO's findings on the total level of financial assistance to war victims provided by the Cambodian government. Our own figures, as testified before the Subcommittee, show that the equivalent of at least \$2.7 million has been provided by the GKR and private agencies for the relief of war victims.

(b) The GAO report cites a lack of coordination between the various Cambodian government agencies involved in assisting refugees. This was more true at the time the report was made than today. The GKR has improved coordination by establishing a central coordinating committee for refugees with representation from the various ministries involved.

(c) The report states that a total of 23,030 war claims for the equivalent of \$130 million has been reported by the Cambodian government, but none has been paid. In the first instance, the \$130 million figure is derived from converting riels to dollars at an exchange rate of 55 riels to the dollar. The current and more realistic rate of 150 riels to the dollar would lead to total claims of some \$43 million. Furthermore, these claims include destroyed property owned by private individuals and business enterprises. We assume this includes the claims against the GKR of large private enterprises, such as the rubber plantations, for destruction due to the war. We agree, however, that although other assistance is provided to war victims, there has been no procedure established to compensate for war damage claims.

## 5. CONDITION OF REFUGEES

On the key subject of the condition of the refugees, the summary of the report indicates that "Although living conditions varied from place to place, conditions were generally less than adequate. Lack of sufficient food rapidly was becoming serious."

The body of the report, however, gives a somewhat better, or at least more equivocal, assessment than does the summary statement. For example, on page 22 the report indicates that the GAO team was told by numerous persons that the availability of food was considered not to be a serious problem, but that some others did think it a serious problem. Based on our own observations, the GKR has maintained adequate stocks of rice and wheat flour in the urban areas and regular convoys by road and river have averted any sustained food shortages. We believe that the people are not going hungry. However, undoubtedly the diet of the refugees, as well perhaps as the diet of the general population, could be substantially improved in its protein and nourishment content.

As to the camps, the report indicates that three of the official refugee camps in Phnom Penh were adequate, and the fourth, supported primarily by a private charitable group, was found to be crowded and unsanitary. There was similar variation in the conditions of the camps in the rural areas. This would not appear to support the summary statement that "Conditions were generally less than adequate."

## 6. CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

The report correctly states the difficulty of obtaining reliable statistics on civilian war-related casualties. We agree that the blame for creating civilian casualties is not wholly on one side or the other.

The GAO report does state, however, on page 40, that the team was informed that "A large percentage of the refugees in Cambodia were persons who had fled from their homes in Communist-controlled territory and that a lower percentage of refugees were generated as a direct result of aerial bombardment and other competing activities." We suspect that the larger percentage of civilian casualties is attributable to Communist-initiated activity.