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CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:
1945-1963

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FOREWARD

The writer is indebted to many persons for their assistance in this undertaking. In particular, Professor John D. Montgomery, Professor of Public Administration and Chairman of the summer seminar of the Comparative Administration Group held at Boston University in 1963 should be mentioned. The project was initially proposed by Professor Montgomery and his suggestions and encouragement were of great value to it. The criticism of members of the CAG was also helpful.

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The generalizations made and conclusions reached, however, are the writer's own. He takes complete responsibility for them.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the first eighteen years following the end of World War II, \$1.6 billion and several thousand technicians were sent abroad as part of U.S. government technical assistance to the under-developed countries.¹ Of this, an estimated \$130 million, or slightly more than eight per cent, was spent in an effort to help improve the governmental machinery of the host governments. Currently, 57 countries are receiving such assistance.²

Public administration technical assistance has been provided in a variety of ways. American advisors have been attached to units of the host governments. American contractors have performed a variety of services within these governments. Americans, both with members of the host country and alone, have conducted surveys and made recommendations for reform. American universities have helped establish schools of public administration abroad. With American encouragement, institutes and centers of public administration have been created. Foreign visitors have been brought not only to the United States but to third countries as well for observation, study and training.³

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1. The United States has also supported United Nations' technical assistance. In addition, there have been substantial contributions by private institutions, such as the foundations.
 2. From information supplied by the Statistics and Reports Division, Agency for International Development, to the author. This covers the period, 1945-1963.
 3. The full story of the American public administration technical assistance effort has yet to be told. Data are to be found in a variety of places. Chief among these are, of course, the official reports-- reports of the Public Administration Division at headquarters; reports of country projects prepared at the mission levels; end-of-tour reports

The purpose of this paper is not to attempt to assess the impact of these programs. It is appropriate, however, to review some of the major directions they have taken and to assess in a general way the value of the theories sustaining them. It is appropriate also to explore by way of reference the manner in which public administration assistance is seen within the U. S. Agency for International Development (AID), currently the major U. S. vehicle for the foreign aid programs; to note some of the problems it faces both within that agency and in the host countries; and to examine the strategies by which its programs are undertaken. Such an effort may shed some light on those courses which may most profitably be followed during the period ahead.

The information on which this study is based came largely from AID sources. The writer was given access to the public administration files of the agency, with the individual reports of public administration technicians providing the bulk of the data. These have been supplemented by published materials, by interviews with AID and other personnel, and by personal observation in several countries, including a tour with an AID university contractor in Asia. Of particular interest were the confidential reports of interviews with public administration technicians and selected mission directors, deputy directors and specialists from technical fields on their return to this country. Where use is made of this

of specific advisors; and special reports, some of which are still classified, of survey teams. Public administration is treated with other technical assistance projects in such studies as Walter Sharp's International Technical Assistance (Public Administration Service, Chicago, 1952); Walter Adams and John Garraty, Is the World Our Campus? (Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 1960); Philip M. Glick, The Administration of Technician Assistance Growth in the Americas (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1957); and Edward W. Weidner et al. The International Programs of American Universities: An Inventory and Analysis (East Lansing, Mich., Michigan State University, 1958).

material, the confidence of the person providing it will, of course, be observed.

The limitations of a study of this kind are to be found not only in the size of the public administration program and its far-flung bases of operation but also in the time span it covers. There have been, of course, hundreds of changes in personnel over the years as well as a modification in the thinking of many of those still responsible for what is being done.

It is not easy to generalize from such data. The rule has been followed, accordingly, of giving major emphasis to recent events and trends. The reader should bear in mind, however, that such generalizations may not reflect the current views or practices of those with responsibilities for such programs.

II. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PROGRAMS

A technical assistance program is shaped by many factors, especially if it includes public administration. Indeed, public administration occupies a unique position among the functional divisions of AID. Few others are called upon to deal with so widely varying a group of problems. Few work in areas where there is less by way of guidelines or measures of achievement. None are in more sensitive areas, for the administrative processes involve both national need and national pride.

Considerations such as these have substantial bearing not only upon the kind of public administration assistance that is given but also the manner in which it is supported. It is appropriate, therefore, that they and other factors which help to determine the size and nature of these programs be examined carefully as the basis for further study. In particular, seven factors will be considered:

1. The definition and "content" of public administration
2. The public administration role in technical assistance
3. Public administration improvement as viewed by the host government
4. The difficulty of measuring achievement
5. The manner in which the aid agency is organized
6. The problem of limited resources
7. Administrative influences

1. The Definition of Public Administration

The manner in which a public administration program is administered depends in part upon how it is defined. Specifically, what is public administration? What should an organization claiming expertness in public

administration assist others in doing? What should be the main areas of its focus?

There is still substantial disagreement among those with professional standing in the field on the definition of the term. This disagreement applies also to the subject matter it includes and to the kind of training or background a specialist in it should have. The range of definition is cited by Stein:

There are many ways in which the phrase "public administration" can be defined: the words can be used to describe certain types of activities, or the activities of certain types of organizations, or some combination of the two. There is no sanctity about any of the numerous conventional definitions.⁴

Vieg notes that "at its fullest range, public administration embraces every area and activity governed by public policy"; but he goes on to say that, by established usage, it "has come to signify primarily the organization, personnel, practices, and procedures essential to effective performance of the civilian functions entrusted to the executive branch of government."⁵ Weidner adds that, in the United States, "public administration both in its practice and in its scholarship has been distinguished by the fact that it has had almost no relationship to substantive policy."⁶ Emphasis added.⁷ Such a definition has been accepted during

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4. Harold Stein, ed., Public Administration and Policy Development: A Case Book (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1952). P. x.
5. John A. Vieg, "The Growth of Public Administration," in Marx, ed., Elements of Public Administration (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1959). P. 6.
6. Edward W. Weidner, "Development Administration: A New Focus for Research," in Heady, ed., Papers in Comparative Administration (Ann Arbor, Mich., Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1962). Weidner expresses the views of a considerable number of those in the profession in his distinctions between the "policy" and the "administrative" processes. He goes on to say:

most of the lifetime of public administration technical assistance. In consequence, one finds the majority of those serving in public administration technical assistance positions in the overseas missions, as well as the contract groups, coming from such professional fields as personnel, training, budgeting, organization and methods, planning, accounting and the like.

Recently, however, there has been a growing awareness of the shortcomings of a definition that focusses primarily on the staff functions. These shortcomings are pointed up by the chief of the public administration division in one of the AID missions in the following words:

Will personnel changes remove the corruption of a thousand years past? Will a possible audit of personal wealth check bribery? Will officials become honest if they are paid more adequate salaries?

The answer, of course, to questions such as these is that there is more to administration than techniques, and more to management than methods. The improvement of a people's capability to meet their own needs involves an ability, first, to define these needs. It involves also, as a careful

Practitioners and scholars have been primarily concerned with personnel, budgeting, and organization and management. The problem that has interested them is how to make these tools more effective, in a narrow sense. The test of effectiveness has been largely an internal one: how much control is exercised and how much efficiency and economy is enforced by the personnel, budget, and O and M agencies. Public administration has not been a part of the policy sciences in the broadest sense of the latter term. Public administration and good human relations have become ends in themselves, quite apart from the achievement of other values that they may or may not facilitate. (Pp. 102-3)

For a definitive discussion, see Dwight Waldo, The Study of Public Administration (Garden City, New York, Doubleday and Co., 1955).

7. From AID files.

study of American administration will show, a host of culturally acquired characteristics and qualities which those in underdeveloped areas do not yet possess. Among these are clear and attainable national objectives; a competent body of public servants to help achieve them; the emergence of a suitable ethic to guide them in their performance; and finally, the existence of suitable extra-bureaucratic forces which will help to hold those in the administrative services to the fulfillment of their tasks.

The public administration technician serving overseas finds himself caught between those on the one hand who would focus upon the development of methods and techniques, and those on the other who see a far broader and more difficult assignment in the development of people's capacity to provide for themselves. The manner in which the individual technician sees the problem will determine to a considerable degree how he goes about fulfilling it.

2. The Public Administration Role in Technical Assistance

The difficulty of obtaining a satisfactory definition of public administration as a field of study is reflected also in the manner in which the task has been approached on a country-by-country basis within the various aid agencies. While some within the public administration divisions have maintained from the beginning that the concern of the entire technical assistance program is the improvement of governmental administration as a whole, the country missions have generally favored a much more limited approach. This latter view has been strongly supported by specialists in other fields who have seen public administration at best as a "fringe" activity, and at worst as a slice of the pie they would otherwise be getting.

As a result, the public administration has been generally confined to improving revenue and finance systems, developing and systematizing the personnel functions, creating management improvement units, improving specific administrative practices, and establishing schools and institutes of public administration. To these have been added, from time to time, various functions as training police, improving statistics, taking a census, improving customs administration, urban government, narcotics control, and, in one instance, encouraging the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Less frequently has there been an effort to relate the public administration resources of a mission to such other programs as agriculture, education, health, or public works in which American technical assistance is also heavily engaged.

From time to time there have been agency policy statements which have seemed to presage a less limited approach to the problem. In 1960, for example, a manual order, under the heading, "Philosophy of Public Administration," stated:

The ICA Mission's first task in the field of public administration, therefore, is to convince leaders of the cooperating country that administrative weaknesses and inadequacies of government have a pervading and retarding influence upon economic and social development, that these weaknesses can be corrected, that, indeed, similar difficulties have been resolved in other countries, and that the experiences of those countries in this regard can be valuable to attaining the aspirations of their own country.⁸

However, the impact of such a statement has often been lessened by issuances from other technical areas, with the result that projects of a more limited nature are undertaken.⁹

8. ICA Manual Order 2651.1, June 13, 1960.

9. Sometimes also the setting of priorities can have the same effect. An example is the unclassified cable to all Latin American missions of

This situation may be changing. An increasing, although still small, number of persons has recently stressed the relationship between the administrative capability of a government and the manner in which the developmental programs are likely to be carried out. Some of those with this point of view are public administration professionals but some are from the program areas. Support has come also from outside the agency, not only from the academicians but also from United Nations and World Bank observers, and occasionally from those in the developing countries themselves.¹⁰ Such comments do not make a policy, but the fact that they are being made at all is significant.

The importance of such a trend is in the emphasis it gives to establishing a relationship between a specific developmental program and the administrative machinery on which its success will ultimately depend. The health and sanitation specialist who states that "the conduct of a DDT spraying program...is 90% administrative and 10% knowing how to spray" is recognizing, perhaps for the first time, that he and his associates in the country to which he is accredited must concern themselves with the machinery as well as the purposes of government.¹¹

Jan. 30, 1962, which establishes a priority order in direct assistance as follows: (1) central management activities; (2) revenue yielding activities; (3) major substantive development programs; and (4) personnel administration efforts, in that order.

10. See A Handbook of Public Administration, issued by Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, N. Y., 1961, in particular Part I, pp. 1-40, and Part III, pp. 109-123. Also, K. William Kapp, "Economic Development, National Planning and Public Administration," in Kyklos: International Review for Social Sciences, Verlag Basel, Switzerland, Vol. XIII, fasc. 2, 1960; and David S. Brown, "The Key to Self-Help: Improving the Administrative Capabilities of the Aid-Receiving Countries," (processed), issued by Communications Resources Division, Agency for International Development, May, 1963.
11. Ross Jenney, Chief, Division of Health and Sanitation, USOM, Brazil, in covering letter to terminal report of Charles O. Carlston, undated, but circa Feb. 10, 1956.

3. Public Administration Improvement as Seen by the Host Government

Helping a less developed country improve its performance is never easy. As a highly placed Filipino observer has eloquently put it:

To start with, the administration of the foreign assistance program must inevitably be conducted within a delicate, often embarrassing, and inevitably awkward psychological setting. The program is seldom spared from mistrust, misgivings, and sometimes downright hostility....As a consequence, the recipient government often displays the curious and ambivalent attitude of wanting U. S. assistance and at the same time resenting it, of accepting it and at the same time suspecting the motives with which it is given.¹²

The mistrust a recipient country displays towards outside assistance, however necessary, is nowhere more evident than in the field of public administration. American personnel serving abroad comment repeatedly on the difficulties they face in gaining acceptance for themselves or their programs. Not only are the motives of the aid-giver questioned, but there is resistance to his concepts and methods as well. A technician writes:

A nation in the process of development will not hesitate to borrow chromium, plastic or even nuclear embellishments from a more advanced neighbor and yet will stiffen with wounded dignity at the mere mention of deficiencies in its government-operated civil service or higher educational systems.¹³

12. From a speech by Sixto K. Roxas, Chairman of National Economic Council, The Philippines, to a meeting of AID Mission Chiefs, Manila, Nov. 6, 1963.

13. William F. Larson, International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 314, "Public Administration Technical Assistance: Planning Notes." Another writes with obvious discouragement: _____ wants to progress in her own way. Wanted are modern institutions but not modern ideologies, modern power but not modern purposes, modern wealth but not modern wisdom, modern laws but not modern justice, modern governmental institutions but not modern administrative practices and principles, modern dignity and respect for government institutions without changing the customs, practices and laws which produce such institutions. [From AID files.]

The members of the host bureaucracy are, of course, concerned because their workways, emoluments, value systems, influence, tenure, and, in fact, their very face, are involved.¹⁴ The politicians are concerned for some of the same reasons.¹⁵ A technician in Brazil underlines these factors:

Experience seems to show that the techniques which pertain to a scientific specialty are much more easily introduced in a cooperative program than are the administrative techniques which, in many cases, govern the efficiency of application. This lag is quite natural since administrative innovations impinge on local tradition much more forcefully and are therefore more likely to encounter serious obstacles.
/Emphasis added./¹⁶

14. Public Administration Service, "Concluding Report: Technical Assistance in Brazil," June 10, 1959: "Certain groups of public employees develop, for one reason or another, a sort of vested interest in the existing administrative pattern. Old-line bureaucrats may have devoted their entire public careers to learning the intricate routines through which a great part of the business of the Brazilian government must proceed; they fell (often with good reason) that their main value as public employees depends on this knowledge. They naturally look with disfavor on recommendations which would abolish many of the venerable and complex procedures. Lawyers and legalists, too, are suspicious of proposals which often call for either the amendment or the reinterpretation of long-standing, sometimes traditional, laws--a problem especially important in Brazil where European administrative theories have produced voluminous legal provisions dealing with administrative details.

"A keener personal interest is felt by many minor supervisors. The organization of Brazilian public services usually includes too many positions of this kind, and clothes them with prestige out of proportion to their real importance; their occupants will not willingly accept proposals which would take away these advantages...The opposition of these people is especially serious because they are often influential, either in their own right or as recognized spokesmen for the politically potent group of public employees. These minor supervisors, for this reason, often have rather easy access to high authorities, to whom they may give unfounded accounts of widespread dissatisfaction with the survey proposals for reform." pp. 6-7.

15. On the politics of administrative change, Caldwell has this to say: "Because maladministration is often the outgrowth of unfavorable political conditions, public administration reform is usually a delicate business. It frequently must deal with arrangements and practices that are direct consequences of political ambitions, fears, and consequences.

This point is emphasized by the sociologists in their culture studies. Hagen, for example, notes that an official of an under-developed society may well have achieved his position not because of demonstrated capability but because of family background and personal eminence. For him to accept the advice of others might imply that he is unable to make the proper decision himself. The difficulties of accommodating change are likely to be increased where the elite of a society turn to the civil service for role gratification.¹⁷ This is a characteristic of many countries, with India and Pakistan providing prime examples. Outside efforts to bring about improvement in an unwieldy bureaucracy face solid opposition from those who see their influence threatened.

Needed programs of reform are thus often put aside because of the controversy they are likely to create.

4. The Difficulty of Measuring Achievement

Measuring achievement is always difficult in programs where a variety of factors is involved and there are few standards of performance. This is

Administrative reform almost inevitable will favor some persons and policies over others." Lynton K. Caldwell, "Technical Assistance and Administrative Reform in Colombia," The American Political Science Review, Vol. XLVII, No. 2, June, 1963, p. 495.

16. Comments of Ross Jenny, op. cit. The transfer of skills in military assistance from one country to another offers an area for fruitful study. An interesting comparison might well be made with public administration, particularly as this kind of aid also involves the development of administrative capability.
17. This point is developed by Everett E. Hagen in a paper, "A General Framework for Analyzing Economic and Political Change," mimeographed, bearing the date July, 1961, which was distributed within ICA. For a more comprehensive discussion see Hagen, On Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins (Homewood, Ill., Dorsey Press, 1958).

true of all technical assistance areas. Special problems, however, exist in the area of public administration.

In public health, the health officer can point to the decreased incidence of disease. The public works officer can report miles of roadway built or dams constructed. The educator can speak of the number of students trained. In public administration, however, the use of quantitative forms of measurement is greatly limited. Of value also is the citation of particular accomplishments. The passage of a civil service reform law, for example, is interesting but, by itself, hardly meaningful. Likewise, the "reform" of a budget or the development of a national plan says little of the manner in which either may actually work out.

The difficulty of measuring achievement often results in a defensiveness on the part of public administration technicians which serves no really useful purpose. Reports of mission and individual performance, for example, are likely to be detailed and descriptive rather than analytical in nature, with heavy emphasis on testimonial by host country officials. The agency's annual reports or the testimony before Congress are scarcely more enlightening.¹⁸

However difficult an accurate evaluation of a specific program in public administration may be, some form of impact analysis is necessary. Agency officials recognize this and are looking at ways of remedying it.

5. The Organization of the Foreign Aid Agency

The organizational structure of the foreign aid agency, and its headquarters leadership, have had a major impact on the conduct of the

18. See, for example, House of Representatives, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1963, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. Part 2, p. 347, et seq.

public administration programs. There have, of course, been several aid agencies, each much the same as its predecessors, but each containing significant differences.¹⁹ At least ten changes of leadership have taken place in the last 15 years. Two of these, under Harold Stassen and Fowler Hamilton, have been marked by major personnel upheavals which have had vast unsettling effects.

Irrespective of the leadership, however, the task of providing effective direction from Washington for 80 country programs is massive enough. The usual problems have been increased by the additional relationships of those in the country missions with the ambassador and other State officials, an issue by no means resolved when the aid agency was made a part of that department.²⁰

While the notion of cerebral leadership and direction has been maintained over the years, the fact of the matter has long been that country-by-country "control" by either the Administrator in Washington or the heads of his area divisions was often more fancied than real. The proliferation of missions, the nature of the problems they face, the distances involved, and the difficulties of communication, when taken together, have resulted in a large degree of de facto autonomy at the country levels. As one observer has commented, "Washington keeps close track over many of the details,

19. These have included Institute for Inter-American Affairs, Technical Cooperation Administration, Economic Cooperation Administration, Mutual Security Agency, Foreign Operations Administration, International Cooperation Administration, and U. S. Agency for International Development.

20. For a discussion of some of the problems of AID organization, see John D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid (New York, Praeger, 1962), pp. 151-172, and Lloyd Mosolf, "Overview Overseas: Dilemma for Aid Missions," Public Administration Review, December, 1963, pp. 219-226.

but it can't really do much with program problems unless, of course, they are large ones. Most program matters have to be handled at the mission level."²¹

For most of the last fifteen years, there have been both geographical and technical organizational units at headquarters. The latter, by virtue of their influence over their technicians at mission level, had various ways of making their voices heard. In late 1961, however, this arrangement was revised and the responsibilities of the technical divisions (such as public administration) distributed among the geographic divisions. These have now become centers of headquarters authority, or "little AIDs" as they are sometimes called. For public administration, the change was seen by many as a step backward because it seemed to give increased strength to those in the Agency who were more concerned with program planning than with its implementation.

While the geographical units were being expanded at headquarters, more authority was actually being assumed in the missions. There, the traditional organizational pattern includes separate divisions for the various technical assistance functions--education, public health, agriculture, industry, public administration and the like. In most countries, the public administration divisions are tiny, the norm being two or three technicians to a mission. Sometimes there are none. Occasionally, in a large program such as in Iran in 1959, public administration projects may involve as many as 50, but this is exceptional. In the 57 countries receiving public administration assistance, including the training of officials in the United States, only 300 or so professionals were involved in 1963, including contract employees.²²

21. Statement made to author by member of USOM staff, Pakistan, 1962.

22. From information provided by the Public Administration Division, US AID.

In an organization long dominated by economists, public administration influence has never really been high. The Marshall Plan, as its agency title, Economic Cooperation Administration, suggested, was conceived by economists and run by them. Without becoming deeply involved in economic theory, one can still recognize in the agency's current behavior the type of thinking which marked its progenitors. Economists still hold many (most?) of the top jobs; and they are likely to think in terms of the economic capacity of a country, rather than its administrative capability, in determining the size or nature of an aid grant.

Nor has the parent agency, the Department of State, been greatly sympathetic to such matters as administrative improvement. The average Foreign Service officers are likely to see their task as that of getting along with, rather than attempting to improve, the local bureaucrats; neither by training nor by inclination do they take much of an interest in the administrative processes. They may not use the epithet of one old line departmental officer that the Marshall Planners were a "gang of international gypsies," but they have sometimes left the feeling that administrative technicians and their own "housekeeping personnel" were really from the same root stock and of little real importance to American foreign policy.

Such factors have clearly had their impact on the shape and nature of the public administration programs. It would be strange if it had been otherwise.

6. The Problem of Limited Resources

The nature and shape of the public administration effort has been strongly influenced by the availability of resources, both financial and human.

When compared with our national investment in economic aid (under the Marshall Plan) or with military assistance, the \$130 million we have put into public administration technical assistance is minuscule. It is modest even by comparison with what we have done in agriculture, public health, or education. Not only has the \$130 million been spread over 18 years but it has also been divided among some 50 countries. In the majority of these, three or four projects, along with limited participant training in the United States, are all that were possible. In a number of African nations, our contributions are not even this large. Encouragingly, there has been an upward trend in agency allocations as evidenced by the \$11.3 million spent in FY 1959 and the \$22.7 million in FY 1963, to cite two recent examples.

Even had more funds been available, it is by no means clear that qualified personnel could have been found to meet increased program demands. It is, of course, not enough that those sent abroad know their specialty. They should have some knowledge as well of the language and customs of the country to which they are accredited. They should also be able to help others--many of whom have little motivation or feelings of need--in acquiring initiative and skill. This requires personal attributes of zeal, patience and understanding. Finding such talent has not been easy. Indeed, the comment is frequently made that there is even a shortage of such personnel within the United States itself where one is not required to know Spanish or Turkish as well as budgeting.

A number of different approaches have been tried within AID to assure a continuing flow of qualified, experienced personnel abroad. This has included the use of contractors, including universities. An inordinate amount of time has been spent by the public administration

divisions in Washington in recruiting an overseas staff. There is no real solution in prospect for the shortage of qualified personnel.

7. Other Influences on Public Administration

Other factors that have influenced the shape of the public administration programs include the clarity and applicability of agency policy; the availability of knowledge of agency practices that have proven "safe," and those resulting in complaints from the host country or from headquarters; the desires of superiors in the mission, along with their willingness to see to it that their views are carried out; the views of the profession; the ability to get on with host country counterparts; and the skills the particular technician possesses.²³

Such factors contribute to the ambiguity of the technical advisor's role in public administration. Far from headquarters and beset by many problems, the individual technician has wide latitude with respect to the course of action to be taken. Perhaps his freedom of action is enriched by the knowledge that how well he succeeds will be known to only a few.

23. "Too often our public administration projects," one advisor reported in a confidential interview, "seem to stem from the proficiencies or vigor of the preceding technician in his own specialty." He went on to say that the technician who served ahead of him was a city manager with the result that city manager training and city planning had been given a higher priority because these were the fields he knew best. Another, in speaking of the assignment of a large group of Americans to a Middle Eastern country, noted that they could hardly be expected to "sit around twiddling their thumbs," so they turned to the development of a number of projects in which they felt qualified. These became "mission policy." Such projects might not have been what the host country needed, but they were what the Americans could do. A similar pattern is reflected in the American tendency, noted frequently, to "do it yourself." As one advisor reported, "This may produce the best immediate product, but it is the poorest way to educate others."

III. ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Few theories regarding the conduct of technical assistance in public administration have been consciously stated as a part of agency policy. A somewhat larger number has appeared in the form of working precepts, sometimes gaining fairly wide acceptance. Both the official policies and the informal hypotheses show internal inconsistencies and obscurities. The most commonly encountered of these are described below.

Commonly Held Assumptions

Four major basic assumptions underlie much American public administration technical assistance. The listing of them here does not mean, however, that there is official sanction of them, or even full agreement on them. There is, in fact, neither.

A viewing of what has been done over the years in the effort to help others improve their administrative capability leaves no doubt that those who have engaged in this work have proceeded from certain general assumptions with respect to both the tasks they have faced and the state of the art they have practiced. This is supported by the reading of individual country reports, by numerous discussions with American technicians abroad, and by observation of their work.

The four statements listed below represent an effort to summarize those assumptions which appear to have had the most influence on the character of the public administration programs. While most would agree with No. 1 and 3, the two others are highly controversial and need to be examined critically in the light of experience. There can be no question, however, that many have accepted them, particularly in the early days of

technical assistance, and that they have had major influence on the manner in which country programs have been undertaken.

Assumption No. 1: The study and practice of public administration involves an area of knowledge which can be acquired or, if already possessed, can be improved upon.

This is the theoretical base of all our efforts to share administrative "know-how" with others. Regardless of their sophistication, all administrative systems and methodologies can be improved. Such an idea inspired the first studies by Taylor in the field of "scientific management." It provides the rationale behind the efforts of those in both business and government to find a better and more economical way of achieving objectives. The systematization of this effort has resulted in the development of such fields of study as business management, organization and methods, work simplification, personnel administration, employee testing and evaluation, planning, cost accounting, human relations, operations research, cybernetics, data processing, and human engineering--to provide only a partial listing--in addition to those specifically related to public administration.

Assumption No. 2: Public administration has an increasingly important role to fulfill in the development of the under-developed areas, and one which should be thought of as supporting and supplementing the substantive programs.

The improvement of the governmental processes has been, along with agriculture, health, and education a vital part of the American technical assistance effort from the very beginning. The problem, however, has been one of determining what should be done, how large a share of the available resources should be allotted to it, and the relationship of the public administration efforts to the other programs. The latter has been particularly nettlesome. Over much of its history, the technical assistance

effort has been geared to a project approach which has emphasized the independence rather than the interdependence of the various programs. The development of country programs in recent years has attempted to reverse this trend, but there is still much to be done to make full use of the public administration potential. There is, fortunately, a growing understanding within the agency, albeit still modest in size, of the relatedness of public administration improvement to the success of other activities.²⁴

This point of view is stated by a mission director:

Over the years we have not concentrated enough on this public administration improvement although it should be the central stress in all our activities. Instead, we have concentrated on how to grow better potatoes and on other concrete technical improvements and as a result we haven't succeeded in making much progress. Much of our work in passing on technical skills has been lost because of our failure to provide the framework and capacity to utilize those skills. This country is a prime example, for in our 18 years of activity the training of hundreds of technicians has been wasted because there was no management or organizational know-how or philosophy of development...to make these technicians effective.²⁵

Kapp in his analysis of the Indian economic development program, sums up as follows:

24. The Manual of Orders, AID, has this to say: "Many of the major needs of countries desiring to strengthen their economies and to raise their standards of living lie in the area of public administration. The serious lack of managerial skills and appropriate government experience is a critical barrier to economic development and a potential threat to political stability. Until deficiencies in management are reduced or eliminated, much will continue to be wasted in terms of manpower and resources." Order No. 2651.1, June 13, 1960

25. From AID files.

A quantitatively inadequate or qualitatively defective system of public administration will not merely retard the development process but may defeat the entire development effort in an even more decisive manner than any temporary shortage of capital or inadequate technical skills or an unfavorable monsoon.²⁶

Despite the force of these arguments, such a theory is likely to be honored more in the breach than in the observance. In a recent year, the improvement of country administrative systems was listed as a No. 1 objective in 21 country programs. It is doubtful, however, if it got this kind of priority treatment in five.

Assumption No. 3: Much of American experience with, and achievement in, public administration can be made applicable to the administrative system of other countries.

This assumption has moved us to attempt to export, sometimes bodily, American techniques and even, occasionally, American institutional arrangements. Throughout the history of aid, there has been support for the idea that American experience in public administration can be made applicable to administrative systems elsewhere. One finds such sentiments expressed not only by the heads of mission but also by those with responsibility for undertaking the projects in question. The record, on the face of it, is an impressive one: the development of a variety of American-model staff systems in other countries; the establishment of personnel examination, recruitment and rating systems elsewhere; job classification surveys and even the establishment of American-model grade structures; American model training programs (particularly executive training); the creation of organization and methods units; the establishment of cost accounting systems; the encouragement of professional public administration societies; the

26. K. William Kapp, International Review for Social Sciences, op. cit., p. 188.

growth of records management activities; tax reform, both substantive and procedural; police organization on the American pattern; planning and budgeting along American lines; model personnel, budgeting and tax legislation, passed by local legislatures; and the establishment of American-style schools of public administration.

Other similar types of projects could be added to the list. As if to prove the point, many (most?) of those remain in form at least in the host country well after the Americans who had a hand in their creation depart.

The rationale behind the effort to share with others the specifics of our success in administration is typified by the accountant who observed: "After all, there aren't very many ways of setting up a system of books." A similar argument has been made for assembling an automobile, drawing up a national plan, making a budget, taking a census and writing a job description. Americans, through longer and greater experience with such activities than those in most countries--certainly than those in the developing ones--are able to pass much of their experience along to others. Indeed, some of it can be applied en toto to other areas.²⁷

27. This point is underlined by Bush in his experience as an American public administration advisor in Indonesia. On the basis of an effort to measure the transferral of administrative knowledge and skill among staff officers in a variety of central and local areas, he estimates that successes were had with 63% of the trainees, 1956-8; some transfer in the case of 22%; and failures in 14%. He noted attitude shifts following their exposure to the Americans but found this not really measurable. Also, (Indonesian) specialists do better than generalists, senior officials do better than junior officials, and those from urban areas do better than officials from rural jurisdiction. In some areas, he suggests, "nothing transfers," such as police administration, public relations, and municipal, county and state planning. He concludes on a note of optimism:

"The point is that American public administration is transferrable. It is not culture-bound. Sixty-three per cent successes and 36 per cent partial or total failures may be expensive but it is not hopeless." (P. 13)

(Henry C. Bush, "Transplanting Administrative Techniques: Lessons from Indonesian Experience," International Development Review, Oct. 1960, pp. 10-16.

There is no question that this line of argument has been persuasive. There is, however, a substantial and growing feeling that it has been applied much too broadly--that many American public administration methods and approaches are not really suited to the needs of other countries; that some of those we have exported have not even been satisfactory at home; and that, despite their seeming acceptance by others, the graft has not really achieved what was intended of it.²⁸ Certainly more will be heard of these points of view as deeper study is made.

Assumption No. 4: The administrative system of a country develops as part of an historical process. In so doing, patterns of behavior are established based upon approved values which are legitimized both by repetition and by the passage of time. These must be taken into account in any effort to change existing administrative practices.

During recent years, increasing attention has been given both within the aid agency and outside to the importance of the cultural milieu in which a governmental system exists and its influence upon it.²⁹ The failure in the past to understand the importance of ecological factors, many feel, has been responsible for the failure of parts of the technical assistance program to "take."

Most Americans serving in overseas posts recognize that there are differences between their own cultural values and those of the people they

28. As one observer remarked wryly: "We tried a technical assistance graft, but they seemed to prefer their own--the baksheesh variety."

29. Lynton K. Caldwell, op cit.: "A public administrative system is the product of its environment--particularly of its political environment, affecting and affected by the tendencies of the society of which it is a part." (P. 494) The AID Manual of Orders stresses this point: "Public administration is concerned with not only methods, techniques and principles of management, but also attitudes, social relationships, value judgments, and behavior patterns. Successful technical assistance in public administration considers, builds upon, and adapts itself to the political, social, and cultural conditions of the government concerned." (Order No. 2651.1, June 13, 1960).

are trying to change. They recognize also that in the former colonial areas, there is likely to be a transplanted from the metropole countries which has had substantial impact on local administrative patterns. More and more also, they are coming to understand that before an administrative methodology can become fully operable, it must be seen as appropriate to the needs of those it is designed to serve.³⁰

There has been, as might be expected, a larger degree of lip service paid this concept than real understanding or acceptance. In many ways, it seems in conflict with Assumption No. 2. Americans abroad have found it much easier to get on with the tasks they were recruited to perform than to understand the reasons why an Iranian, a Brazilian, or a Liberian could not or would not accept the innovations they proposed. Also, aculturation cannot be accomplished overnight. There are problems of language, of health, of living accommodations, and of taste which must be dealt with before the insights that are necessary to the bridging of cultural barriers are possible.

30. The following statement is from "Some Assumptions in the Application of Technical Assistance in Public Administration," discussed at a Manila conference of public administration advisors, Dec. 2-6, 1957:

"Public administration techniques and methods should not be transferred blindly in their existing form, but fitted into the local culture and constitutional system with whatever modifications are necessary. In some cases, even modification may not be sufficient; entirely new forms or techniques may have to be developed...

"Public administration means more than techniques and gadgets. It must be preoccupied with people and their development--attitudes, social relationships, behavior patterns--and can be successful in the long run only if it rests on a broad social science base. Successful public administration technical cooperation must embrace human characteristics as well as techniques; it must take into account, build upon, and adapt itself to the political, social and cultural conditions of the country concerned."

("Establishing Sound Public Administration--and Development of Administrative Leadership," report of a conference of Far East Public Administration Advisors, International Cooperation Administration, Dec. 2-6, 1957, p. 68.)

What is not always so easy to understand either at home or abroad are the infinite and intricate ways people have of relating to each other in modern bureaucracies, and the values such relationships support. Bureaucracy, in fact, may be seen as a microcosmic social system with its own observable characteristics--status, role, mores, goals, power/authority, rewards/punishments, duties/responsibilities, and space. While administrative systems the world over have many of the same mechanical aspects to them, the difficulties of transplanting ideas or methods from one to another are explained in part by the disruptions, or fear of disruptions, which proposed changes may contain. It is at this point that those who are the focus of the change efforts pay their most impressive obeisance to indigenous cultural values and make their loudest criticisms of the visiting change agents.

Much remains to be done in this whole area, but there can be no doubt that there is growing sensitivity on the part of Americans going overseas to individual values held in the bureaucracy to which they are accredited, as well as to the ecological factors which have had so much influence on its development.

IV. STRATEGIES OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The art of war divides itself into tactics and strategy. The former occupies itself with the form of the separate combat, the latter with its use.

--Clausewitz, On War³¹

Strategy is the "art of the employment of battles as a means to gain the object of war." It forms the plan of the war, develops the proposed course of the campaigns which figure in it, and relates the battles to those objectives.³² Tactics are the details by which the strategy is put into effect.

As a concept, strategy has been applied chiefly to military affairs. It need not be limited to these, however.³³ Its applications elsewhere provide a useful approach to other social situations. There can be, for example, a foreign policy strategy, a strategy of politics--the broad approach to the undertaking of a political campaign; a strategy of business; and even a strategy of games.

It is the purpose of this paper to explore the major strategies developed by those whose function it is to help in the improvement of the administrative practices of the less developed nations. What have been the larger aims behind their efforts? What have been the plans by which their objectives were to be achieved? What, in short, has been the design behind their operations?

31. London, Kegan Paul, 1940. Book II, p. 94.

32. Clausewitz as interpreted by B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, (New York, Praeger, 1954). p. 333.

33. Ibid. See Chapter XIX, "The Theory of Strategy," pp. 333-346.

A Number of Strategies

The history of public administration technical assistance has been marked by the presence of a variety of strategies, and also at times by the absence of any well-defined strategy at all. Indeed, a thoughtfully developed, carefully planned strategy of approach has been devised for few of the countries in which we have programs.

The determination of a specific country strategy is, of course, primarily the function of the local mission, but others share the responsibility. The headquarters role is one of leadership and assistance-- seeing to it that a strategy has been developed and is being consciously followed. This requires not only the advice and guidance of the public administration specialists but the encouragement and support of the area directors as well. Experts in the ecological disciplines will have to be provided; support of all kinds will be required. In particular, the learnings to be had in one country will need to be shared with others.

No one, of course, should expect to find a single, universal strategy of public administration. The situation in Ecuador is much too different from that in Vietnam to suppose that one approach will fit both of them. Each, however, has elements in common and the successes or failures in one country will have some relevance for what we do in another. It is reasonable also to expect that there will be no major aid commitment without the development of a conceptual rationale for it. The strategy this implies should certainly make use of the best and most recent of experience. It should, furthermore, be well known to those involved in its execution.

This study has identified six major strategies, as follows:

1. The Beachhead strategy
2. The Power Elite strategy
3. The Multiplier Effect strategy
4. The Grass Roots strategy
5. The strategy of Program Integration
6. The Behavioral strategy

These strategies are by no means of equal importance, nor is there any particular significance to the order in which they are examined. The Beachhead strategy has undoubtedly enjoyed the widest acceptance, but this is probably because much of our early aid efforts were directed at obtaining acceptability. Often a combination of strategies can be discerned; there is no reason why this might not represent a reasonable approach to given country problems. But sometimes also no strategy at all seems to be followed.

1. The Beachhead Strategy

Primary efforts in public administration technical assistance should be directed at "establishing a beachhead." This may be done through undertaking any of a variety of projects. Once the beachhead is achieved, American advisors are in a position to expand it to other areas.

Such a strategy implies that the emphasis, from the American side, will be on obtaining voluntary acceptance of our ideas and methods as quickly as possible; that getting a project started will be more important than its basic quality or long-run potential; and that special weight will be placed on what those in the host country want, as long as it is not illegal or clearly ill-advised. Such a strategy is not usually difficult to implement. What is done is circumscribed only by the range of law and

propriety. In effect, the patient is given a large voice in prescribing his own medicine. Out of such efforts, we will have hoped to gain time and opportunity for more helpful undertakings.³⁴

This strategy also has the advantage of fitting the style of the normally gregarious American. It provides him with a ready (and familiar) slogan: "It's up to us to sell others our ideas." As one advisor has put it:

Providing technical assistance always involves selling the other fellow on your point of view. Our point of view needs to be sold more widely.³⁵

To encourage acceptance, the technician has at his disposal a variety of "persuaders," some hidden, some obvious, which those in the host country may find of value. They may, for example, be invited to come to the United States for observation or study; they may be able to recommend others for such a trip. The assignment of American advisors to a particular unit may be personally prestigious (particularly if the advisors are seen as "working for" the host). The coming of the Americans may mean that they will do the work the locals couldn't or wouldn't do. It may mean new equipment and money.

This kind of a strategy can encourage projects of the widest possible variety. For example:

- Projects which are particularly wanted by officials of the host government. These may be projects which are really needed, but they may also involve those which have "show" effect.

34. "You get in by doing 'modest' things, such as office management and mechanical techniques." (From AID files.)

35. Ernest Barbour, public administration advisor, Brazil, end-of-tour report, March 20, 1962. p. 6.

- Projects which provide useful demonstrations of what can be done by the application of improved administrative capability.
- Projects to which there will be little or no local objection.
- Projects which can be easily undertaken and quickly completed.
- Projects to eliminate "bottle-necks" or impediments in the way of national development. An illustration of such a project might be one involving tax revenues. The selection of a tax reform project would, therefore, be given high priority.
- Projects which are seen as basic to the building of a stronger administrative system. Such projects might involve recruitment and training of more capable personnel; establishment of equitable pay systems; the organization of a particular office; the improvement of budgeting; or the use of planning.
- Projects urged by headquarters in Washington.
- Projects particularly suited to the capabilities of the technical advisor.

It is always difficult to say categorically that any given project was undertaken as a "beachhead." But an assessment of the wide variety of projects undertaken over the years leaves little doubt that the chief merit of many is the opportunity they provided to demonstrate to a host government what can be done. Such phrases as "the Banco Anglo...sought the assistance," "at the request of the Minister of the Treasury," "at the request of the Ministry of Government," "as requested by the Government of Iran" and "the Korean government...has been particularly receptive to....," hold far deeper meaning than the words suggest.

This does not mean that beachhead projects cannot be successful in their own right. They can be, and they have been. Nor does this detract from the strategy which produced them.

Several criticisms may be made of the beachhead strategy. It tends to dissipate our efforts over too wide a range of activities; it lays heavy emphasis on the willingness of the host to have use, particularly in circumstances where our arrival coincides with the need for dollars; it accepts somewhat too fully the host government's ideas of what ought to be done.³⁶ As one observer has remarked only half facetiously, "A country which has to have technical assistance is probably not really capable of determining the kind it needs."

Finally, there is always the danger in a strategy of this kind that, if we are popular, we will see ourselves as achieving results; and if we are not, we will see ourselves as a failure. Acceptance is, of course, essential but popularity with the host is not necessarily a measure of long-range value.

2. The Power Elite Strategy

American efforts to improve the public administration of a country have their greatest likelihood of success when they are approved and supported by the power elite of that country. Once convinced of its advantages, the latter becomes a major force for its acceptance elsewhere. The power elite should, therefore, be a focus of our effort.

36. Some good advice on this score is provided by a Filipino observer: "There are governments that exert a strong preference for certain projects purely for their dramatic effect on the people, regardless of their economic soundness and their technical relevance to the conditions of the country. It is for such projects that foreign assistance is frequently requested. Local AID offices sometimes suffer from the same propensity of searching for dramatic projects to add to their record of accomplishments. Resources have been dissipated by these preoccupations. It is here that the AID can exert the leadership of example by openly giving support to and placing a premium on the soundness and efficiency of plans and programs. It is by such example that the AID program can serve as a help towards improving the quality and depth of domestic planning, programming, and project work, and of over-all public administration." Speech of Sixto Rosas to AID Mission Chiefs, op. cit., Nov. 6, 1963.

This strategy is summed up in the words of an observer: "One first trains the executives who occupy positions of authority." The ICA Manual of Orders states:

The ICA Mission's first task in the field of public administration...is to convince leaders of the cooperating country that administrative weaknesses and inadequacies of government have a pervading and retarding influence upon economic and social development, that these weaknesses can be corrected...³⁷

This is expanded by a public administration advisor to the Philippines:

The success of management improvement efforts and indeed, the quality of public administration, depends to a very great and undeniable extent, upon the concepts, philosophies, interests, and characteristics of key officials at the top echelons of the government hierarchy. Without the proper attitudes and impetus at these levels, the cause of improved management and operations in government faces constant frustration. This is not said in disparity of Filipino administrators for it is a situation recognized even in countries considered to be the most sophisticated in terms of the practice of administration. It is therefore, essential, in the interests of progress, that these individuals be endowed with the desire to see that the public service is administered in the most efficient, effective, and economic manner possible and possess the knowledge and breadth of understanding necessary to fulfill that desire.³⁸ /Emphasis added./

The argument follows that a working alliance with those in the power elites can be used to help achieve the U. S. goal of modernizing and strengthening the administrative structure of the host government.

Anyone conversant with the order of things in even the most advanced of the under-developed areas is aware of the great influence exerted by relatively few people. In some areas, these with the greatest influence in the governmental sphere will be the landed or the economic elite;

37. ICA Manual Order 2651.1, June 13, 1960.

38. Charles E. Nicholas, public administration advisor, The Philippines, end-of-tour report, June 23, 1962. Pp. 11-12.

in others they are the bureaucratic elite.³⁹ One writer speaks of them as the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie"--"a class whose power and rewards depend almost exclusively on holding government jobs."⁴⁰ More often than not, the noble-born, the landed, the economically and politically powerful will be from the same strata of society, often tied to each other by bloodlines.⁴¹ Anyone who is at all sensitive to the presence of power can speak to the many ways by which deference is shown such men.

Whether the AID Manual suggests it or not, mission personnel are frequently thrown in among such elite. They are among the first in the host countries they meet, they entertain them and are most likely to be entertained in turn. In the poorer countries, they are those most likely to be educated, to share interests with the visitors and, perhaps, to know English.

There are a number of ways of interesting the elite in the public administrative improvement programs. One of the most obvious is the possibility of a trip to the United States for observation or study. Nearly 5000 persons have been brought here for such purposes.⁴² Many of these have come from favored areas of the bureaucracy. The list of high personages includes President Macapagal of the Philippines when he

39. For an explanation of a particular bureaucratic elite, see Ralph Braibanti, "The Civil Service of Pakistan: A Theoretical Analysis," first published in South Atlantic Quarterly, Spring 1959, and later republished as a separate, Lahore, Pakistan.

40. David Hapgood, "Africa's New Elites," Harper's Magazine, Dec. 1963, p. 44.

41. "The administration of the public service does not seem a great burden. It consists only in not offending the most powerful families." --Micius

42. From "Program Guide to Participant Training in Public Administration," International Training Division, AID, January, 1963.

was a lesser official, a number of permanent secretaries and under-secretaries, parliamentarians, heads of important offices, and the like. Evaluation studies (by country) currently in process in AID point to the impact many of these visits have had.

Elites are influenced through a personalized educational process. American advisors have been used as advisors, consultants, teachers, confessors and confidantes, with good results to those well placed in other governments. A highly placed Pakistani official known to this writer was fond of borrowing books on administration from his American counterparts and discussing their implications. Others sought counsel on matters facing them which they could not easily discuss with their associates. In Iran, members of the sub-cabinet met regularly with one of the public administration advisors in weekly training sessions.

A great deal of information such as the above is provided not only in the country reports but also in individual reports. Advisers speak proudly of their association with (and influence upon) high ranking officers of the governments to which they are accredited. In private conversations they are likely to be even more frank. There is no question that such relationships as the above can often have highly salutary results in terms of lasting influence.

On the other hand, a strategy aimed deliberately at the centers of influence can also present a number of problems. Power elites of the under-developed areas often hold political or personal views to which the American advisors and U. S. policy are strongly opposed. It is possible, also, that the improvement of the administrative processes will provide for a tightening of an oligarchy's grip on the country,

If the American aligns himself too closely with them, he helps to cut himself off from others in the administrative community, many of whom are closer to his own points of view and more likely to support reform activity. A turnover, as we have found in a number of countries to our chagrin, may leave us with no friends in the new government.

All of this, of course, assumes that the American advisor is able to influence his host. This is by no means always the case. Sometimes, as a matter of fact, the reverse is true. As long as he has money in quantity, as long as money is in demand, the American advisor will probably be accorded an audience. But matters can, and sometimes, do, end there. Frank Coffin, Deputy Director of AID, makes this point:

...AID is not without its influence. It is a lover---but it is only one force among many. The average policy proposal...is based on the tacit assumption that the offering or withdrawing of our aid will determine the course of events within another country. Policy, however, to be effective must be related to the power which is available to be exercised. To speak loudly and carry a tiny truncheon is the reverse of wisdom...⁴³

There may be other reasons why the public administration advisor may have trouble negotiating a satisfactory program with those in the host government's bureaucratic elite. Their standing in their own government is sure to be well above his own with the American government, and sometimes even within his own mission. Being enormously sensitive to status, they are sure to be aware of this; it is likely to affect the manner in which they relate to each other. The Power Elite strategy has very real possibilities, as experience has shown, but it also has its own deficiencies.

43. From remarks made at the Briefing Conference on Foreign Aid, Trade and Investment, Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D. C., May 4, 1962.

3. The Multiplier Effect Strategy

American effort in public administration technical assistance should concentrate on areas where there is the greatest likelihood of a "multiplier effect"-- that is, in areas where members of the local bureaucracy can be trained and expected to carry on the training of others in improved administrative practices.

Because the climate for developing and sustaining multiplier-effect activities is best provided outside the conventional bureaucracy, encouragement has been given to the development of discrete institutions of a wide variety and nature. Indeed, "institution building," which is an aspect of the Multiplier Effect strategy, has become something of a catchword in aid circles.

The first of the institutions we helped to create were the servicios of South America. Fearing what would happen if the fledgling technical assistance effort were attached to existing departments, and desiring some kind of an alignment with their professional Latin counterparts, the American program directors ultimately settled upon a new kind of organization which could help to produce the "multiplier effect" so badly needed. The servicios, unfortunately, had little applicability to public administration.

Since then, a number of other types of institutional arrangements have been supported with mixed results. One of the best examples of an institution which has succeeded is the Institute for Public Administration in the Philippines. Now entirely free of U. S. governmental support, this organization is establishing a growing reputation in research, writing, training, and teaching. Other countries with U. S.-aided institutes of public administration include Iran, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, Guatemala, and Ecuador. Pakistan has three--one primarily for East Pakistan, one for West Pakistan and the third for the central government.

There are several graduate schools of public administration which were started with U. S. aid effort. One of the eldest is at Thammasat University in Thailand which is conducted in connection with the Institute there. Similar efforts have been undertaken, and still exist, in Pakistan, Iran, Brazil, Paraguay, El Salvador, Indonesia, and Korea. The influence of each of these varies, depending upon the attitudes of both those in the government and those in competing areas in the host bureaucracies but they are going concerns. Of the Institute for Administrative Affairs in Iran (now the Institute of Public and Business Administration), an observer reports:

At one point three of our students were in the Majlis (parliament) at one time. I believe two, possibly three, are in the new Majlis just elected. Most have left the Plan Organization. The big concentration is now in the High Council for Government Organization headed by one of our students and he carries the rank of Deputy Prime Minister. All major positions in this unit are headed by our people. One still heads the Ag Development Bank; several are teaching in a new National University (private); and one has a position in the World Bank, now stationed in Libya; and so on.⁴⁴

Institution building has also extended to police academies, finance centers, statistical programs, and the like.

The multiplier effect may, of course, be found in other types of activities. The creation of an organization and methods division is such an example. The providing of leadership in management improvement clearly points the way to what is possible. So it is with the creation of training divisions and the administration of various type and level training programs. The new draft of AID's Public Administration Sector Guidelines contains this

⁴⁴. Richard W. Gable, Jan. 7, 1964, in a personal letter to the writer.

significant statement: "Training will be undertaken as part of every advisory service project."⁴⁵ An illustration of what can be accomplished by it were the executive institutes for high and medium level officials in Korea.⁴⁶

Under the instructor training programs, a number of university professors, government officials responsible for training programs, and graduate students have been brought to this country for two semesters or more of academic work at universities with strong public administration programs. These include Syracuse, Harvard, Southern California, New York University, George Washington, Michigan, Wayne, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and the New York State School of Public Affairs, among others. Some of these have received doctorate degrees. Many of them are now making use of this education in teaching positions in their home countries. Of 30 Iranian scholars educated in the United States (through 1960) all hold high level positions in either the Government of Iran or the Institute for Administrative Affairs. Ten were teaching full time at the Institute. Several of these men had been unemployed prior to their participation in the U. S. university programs, or had held insignificant positions.⁴⁷

The major criticisms of the "multiplier effect" strategy lie not so much in the concept itself as in the difficulties in mounting it. The problems of establishing a self-generating and self-correcting unit

45. Draft Revision No. 3, dated Dec. 12, 1963, p. 10.

46. Cf., E. R. Draheim, "Improving Management Through Effective In-Service Training," a report, Nov. 1959, p. 24.

47. Bruce Storm and Richard W. Gable, "Technical Assistance in Higher Education: An Iranian Illustration," The Educational Record, April 1960, pp. 175-182.

in an archaic and retrogressive bureaucracy are obvious. The creation of a new institution, however, is not necessarily the answer.

Institution-building in this sense is often an expensive process, particularly in terms of housing. Also, its creation provides no guarantee that it will do the things the Americans (and sometimes even the locals) foresaw of it. The creation of an institution by itself is not enough: assurance is needed that the "right" kind of institutions are being built, that they are capable of serving the purposes for which they were established, and that they will not be taken over by those who have other purposes in mind for them. The latter, unfortunately, includes in a few instances those who have been made responsible for their stewardship. Esman has made the point well:

...an institution must have the capacity not only to perform its function--to provide a major modernizing service--but also to sustain itself in a competitive, often hostile, and not wholly predictable environment. Institutions must, therefore, satisfy the tests both of functional efficiency and of survival power and the balancing of these two values is one of the major preoccupations and dilemmas of institution builders.⁴⁸

This is, of course, why not all institutions succeed.

Observation and study in the United States also have their problems.⁴⁹ Some of those who come here do not return.⁵⁰ Others do so only to discover that there is no real place for them in the bureaucracy they left.

48. Milton J. Esman, "Institution Building in National Development: A Research Note," International Development Review, Dec. 1962, p. 28.

49. Such an experience, of course, may serve many other values such as friendship for the United States, cross-cultural insight, etc. Only administrative improvement, however, is of concern to us here.

50. For an analysis of some of the problems to be encountered when those in one country attempt to train those in another, see Howard L. Waltman, "Cross Cultural Training in Public Administration" (Public Administration Review, Summer 1961, pp. 141-7).

Often they themselves contribute to such an impasse by acquiring a new attitude of superiority, or by making demands the old system is unable or unwilling to meet. But often also it is because those in the home government have made no plans for their return, or see no good coming of it. In either event, this does little for the multiplier effect. Of the first three doctoral candidates in political science/public administration to return with Ph.D. degrees to one country, two subsequently re-emigrated, one to Canada and one to the United States.⁵¹ The third went through a painful three years of readjustment, much of which was spent in trying to work out a satisfactory position and salary arrangement with his own government before he could begin to fulfill a really useful role. Such instances may or may not be typical. The point is that the obtaining of the appropriate degrees is still no guarantee that the multiplier effect will take place.

4. The Grass Roots Strategy

Because of the importance of the community to the life of the underdeveloped country, primary attention should be given in any nation-building program to the development of effective government at the grass roots level.

Although this approach is not a new one in the life of the aid agencies, it has only recently been seen as a major area of public administration focus. In a circular letter to members of the Third Regional Conference of Public Administration Advisors in Honolulu, in April 1963, David E. Bell, AID director, said:

51. One of these could be use only sparingly in executive training programs in his own country because his presentations were based so substantially on American illustrations and American experience that they did not apply to the local situation.

During this conference you will be concentrating on the improvement of local government in relation to national development. The gap between central governments and rural areas has led directly to serious social and economic unrest....What new political and administrative practices can be introduced to achieve this goal? How and in what way can they be best assisted in this effort? I will be particularly interested in the findings of the conferees on this subject of local government.⁵²

The theory behind such a strategy, as recent events in Southeast Asia have demonstrated, is that the strengthening of local and regional government are of increasing importance in direct proportion to the inability of the central bureaucracy to provide for the welfare of the people or even to protect them. Instead of concentrating on the center, this strategy suggests a building of the ability to govern at grass roots levels. It is underlined by recent efforts within AID to relate the areas of community development and public administration more closely together. The two are now joined in a single office (under the Human Resources Staff) although this has been reflected in only a very few missions.

The strengthening of local governmental processes has, of course, always been among the objectives of the public administration programs but the emphasis given it has never been great. Moreover, its focus has usually been in the cities, not the villages. Programs for the improvement

52. Circular letter from Secretary of State Rusk, April 25, 1963, to all missions. (AIDTO Circular 336), p. 1. See also ICA Manual Order 2651.1: "At the present stage of the ICA program of overseas technical assistance in public administration, most of the projects deal with problems of central national governments. This concentration on administrative problems at the national level is the choice of the cooperating governments. ICA is itself very concerned by the problems of local and municipal governments in those countries as well. It is anticipated that appreciation and concern for problems of local government will increase year by year in other countries, and that ICA's public administration activities may correspondingly increase in the field of local government. As such an emphasis takes place, ICA activities will continue to demonstrate more clearly the concern of the American people for the welfare of individual citizens of other countries."

of urban administration, the increase in citizen services, city planning, public works and similar projects, have been undertaken in a number of countries, of which Brazil and Iran are illustrations.

American aid for the villages, as apart from the cities, has largely been provided by the community development divisions. Making use primarily of agricultural technicians, with assistance from community specialists, some of whom are sociologists, community development has helped to strengthen not only the economic base of the villages but their governing processes as well. In a few countries, academies for the training of village workers have been established with the backing of the central government, and increasing funds and effort are being channelled in this direction. One of the most successful examples of this effort is in the Philippines where a great deal of useful work has been done at the Barrio (village) level.

The limitations of such an approach lie mainly in its scope. No one would deny the importance of strengthening the grass roots structure of a country, but this can hardly be seen as having other than a peripheral application to the total governmental problem. Primary emphasis, for the present at least, must be given to what goes on in such capital cities as Rio de Janeiro, Saigon, Lagos and Manila.⁵³

53. The relationships between public administration and community development are explored in some detail in the UN publication Public Administration Aspects of Community Development (St/TAO/,/14, 1959, 107 pp.). The conclusion reached there is that while the two have very much in common, they are not the same. The concern with governmental improvement at the local (village) level, for example, is directed primarily to such matters as planning, taxation, and finance, economic support, and the provision of trained workers for community work. Public administration ordinarily has a much larger span of interest.

On the other hand, there may be merit in the suggestion that corruption in the villages infects the center, or vice versa. Public administration should participate in community development as well as in the central ministries.

5. The Strategy of Program Integration

Public administration has its most important contribution to make in conjunction with other types of technical assistance. This calls for agreement not only within the host country but also within the aid agency that the transferrence of technical skills is incomplete without accompanying administrative ones.

Instead of seeing a technical assistance project in agriculture and one in public administration as being separate and unrelated, this strategy suggests their combination, at least in part. The host country would be given to understand that there would be no agricultural aid unless aid was also accepted in administration improvement. Administrative technicians would, as a consequence, be assigned to work with agricultural technicians. Thus, a coordinated effort could be achieved.

This strategy is suggested in the following statement from the deputy director of a large mission:

One of the most critical elements in the entire technical assistance program is effective advice in the field of public administration. This does not necessarily mean independent public administration programs, but rather public administration advice in the establishment of programs and projects in other areas of technical assistance such as agriculture or public health. This is something which is frequently overlooked.⁵⁴

Despite its wisdom, this strategy has had only limited application. In only a handful of instances have mission chiefs been able to get host governments to accept special administrative surveys, and then usually

54. From the AID files.

as the price of agreeing to other types of technical assistance. Sometimes administrative advisors have been attached to local departments as one of these conditions. These, however, are usually the exception rather than the rule.

Over the years an effort has been made by the headquarters Public Administration Division to urge joint projects. The latest revision of Guidelines, for example, presses for "close collaboration with other assistance activities in such governmental programs as agriculture, education, health, housing, community and industrial development, and labor."⁵⁵ Sometimes the administrative assistance that is needed can be provided by the technical service; sometimes additional assistance will be needed.

The effect of such an effort, even one of modest proportions, is in evidence. Contracts in dam building and other public works undertakings usually contain provisions requiring the contractor to help train locals in aspects of project operation once the Americans leave, and often this is one of their most significant contributions. Useful cooperation has also been had on industrial, agricultural and educational projects. The following report of such a venture in Paraguay is worth noting:

55. Draft Public Administration Section Guidelines, p. 1. The same point of view is also put by Roxas (op. cit.):

The development of a local planning and management capability invariably demands foreign assistance on a wide range of fronts simultaneously, and it is well for the AID to think in terms of integrated assistance in many areas together. The provision of separate, isolated, individual types of assistance here and there are usually futile, particularly where one type of change is meaningless unless accompanied by other changes together...Unless these problem areas are attacked together, the foreign assistance program may continuously indulge in innumerable separate activities without yielding any substantial returns. /Emphasis added/.

The salient feature of this joint division's effort is the leading role taken by the Educational Division of the Mission⁵⁸ in encouraging the Ministry to examine more critically its management capabilities. The advisory services of specialists in the field of management and administration frequently do not carry sufficient weight in the functional fields of Education, Health and Agriculture if the counterpart USAID advisory staff for these important activities do not also insist on the importance of improving the management of the resource--often before improving the specific components of the resource itself.⁵⁸

Why is such a strategy not followed more often? The reasons are both historic and organizational. There is, first of all, the fact that those in the top policy positions in the agency have never really accepted the approach. Many of them are economists by profession: some of them are carry-overs from Marshall Plan programs where the major effort was to provide dollar purchasing power for the countries of Western Europe. Their primary interest over many years has been with such matters as balance of payments, economic viability, encouragement of capital development, and similar economic approaches. Others are specialists in agriculture, health, public works, and industrial development. Their concern for administrative improvement has been notable neither at home nor overseas. And at home a certain level of administrative capability can be taken for granted.

The nature of mission organization has helped also to reinforce the separatist point of view. Traditionally, each division has had a wide degree of independence in determining its course of action. While agreement on country programs has helped to assure the achievement of a national purpose, the project system has remained much as it had been before. There are few truly integrated undertakings.

58. Airgram, U.S. AID Washington from U.S. Embassy, Asuncion, Paraguay, December 27, 1963.

This is said not in disparagement but in recognition of the problems of design, negotiation, and implementation. Such activities must be carried on often under the most primitive of conditions, in the face of shortages of manpower and awkwardness of communications. Two bureaucracies, the American and the host, must be dealt with. It is small wonder that there has been little real enthusiasm for a strategy requiring forms of integration and coordination of effort that might appear to threaten the autonomy of the technical approaches.

6. The Behavioral Strategy

The nature and extent of the public administration effort should be determined by an assessment not only of need but also of what the recipient country is likely to accept, implement, and use. No program should be undertaken without exploration in depth of the country's administration system, agreement upon the goals to be achieved, and an understanding of the steps to be undertaken by the host and assisting country.

This strategy has two essential elements to it. The first is an assessment of the behavioral patterns and national requirements of the host country. It requires careful study not only of the governmental but also of the entire social structure of the country to be aided. Such a study will involve the use of anthropologists, sociologists, social psychologists and political scientists, along with those with administrative training and experience.⁵⁹

59. See ICA Manual of Orders 2631.1, June 13, 1960: "There is no single method of meeting the administrative problems of different governments. Each situation must be clearly analyzed and evaluated and a program of assistance specifically designed to meet the local situation. In some instances, existing (indigenous or previously introduced) techniques and methods of public administration technical assistance are adopted and modified. In other instances, entirely new methods must be developed. Normally, this requires a multiple and balanced approach, first to assure that solving one problem does not create others of equal or greater importance, and second, to assure that assistance in public administration is responsive to and is in turn supported by other U.S. technical assistance and resources."

The behavioral strategy requires an agreement, also carefully worked out, between host and visitors which attempts to define the role of each and the resources each will contribute; the setting of a time schedule for compliance; and the development of a pattern under which future relationships will be conducted to insure the good faith of each. Such a program, which in many respects is a "national plan for administrative improvement," should take into account the total contributions of the technical assistance program.

The key to the behavioral strategy is that it attempts to relate what the host country is likely to do to what is most needed, and plans the allocation of resources accordingly.⁶⁰ It may be as large or as small as circumstances indicate, so long as a real effort is made to relate the two factors above.

The behavioral approach suggests a number of sub-strategies. These may involve emphasis on areas: where there is a strong desire for improvement, or where there is likely to be less strongly entrenched bureaucratic or public opposition (as in those involving government corporations, industrial development or new forms of transportation); where, if there is not already a clientele receptive to the ideas which are likely to be advanced, one can be created (as in younger groups in the host bureaucracy),

60. What happens when no such understanding exists is suggested by the following: "A lack of cultural understanding and insight into [name of country] characteristics and personality is partially responsible for program failure, lack of progress, frustrations and bitterness on the part of advisors. [Name of country] concepts of administrative morality, personal sincerity, objectivity, trust and confidence is very different from that experienced in our western culture. A great deal of time has been lost and advisors frustrated because in programs and documents prepared [local] officials have, on the surface, given strong support, when their intent has been negative. They said yes when they really meant no." From an end-of-tour report.

or the strengthening of which will enhance the position of those in positions of responsibility. These may include ministries or departments which have been under strong internal attack for lack of efficiency or corruption; where there is some kind of cultural kinship with the United States, or where the presence of Americans is likely to be well received; where a substantial number of American-trained technicians are on hand, or where external danger threatens.

The advantage of the behavioral strategy lies in its ability to adapt itself both to different kinds of climate and to the available resources of the host government. Once these are ascertained, and the need and advantage of the proposed program determined, a solid basis for change is established. What is being suggested here, and what is being increasingly urged by the social anthropologists, is an over-view of the governmental-societal structure of the country in question.

Thus, the effort would be made to settle upon those types of programs which, fitting the cultural characteristics of the country, seem to have the greatest likelihood for long-range success. Representatives of the host government should be involved in such studies, the details of each such arrangement being carefully worked out in advance. Certainly, those who want to embark upon programs of change need to understand what they involve. Oberg points out:

Although the people in technologically less developed countries readily admit that increased food supplies, better education, better health, greater industrial development and more efficient public administration, are highly desirable, they do not generally realize that these desirable objectives imply changes, in some respects radical changes, in their traditional way of life.⁶¹

61. Kalervo Oberg, "Papers in Applied Anthropology," distributed in USOM/Brazil, March, 1957, (Processed) p. 34.

Such undertakings should not, of course, be entered upon lightly. Many host country leaders need to give more thought than they now do to the cost of modernization.

There are few instances one can point to where the behavioral strategy, as described above, has been used in the aid programs. Indeed, most such efforts in this direction fall well short of the scope suggested here. There is, however, an encouraging trend in this direction.

A rationale for the "behavioral" strategy appears in the draft Public Administration Sector Guidelines which is expected (1964) to replace the current guidelines. This document urges that a number of factors be explored prior to the development of a program. These include: "environmental factors, attitudes, social relationships and behavior patterns"; "host country interest in such assistance"; and "constitutional provisions, policies, legislation or other traditional or customary practices which will require attention before an effective plan of administrative reform can be developed." Significantly, the Guidelines propose also a survey team⁶² prior to the reaching of an agreement on the nature of the program. They go on to say:

American motivations for administrative improvement may not be pertinent to the local environment--for example, economy in staffing. Urging a particular reform on the basis that it will permit a reduction in staff may result in a silent but effective blocking of that reform, and appropriately so, in a country where the government must make work and emphasize labor-intensive projects.⁶³

62. Its suggested membership--"a broad gauged administrator with knowledge of overseas administrative situations, a person familiar with development planning, and a representative of the academic community familiar with training requirements and techniques for developing countries." (Pp. 6-7.)

63. Ibid., p. 5.

A systematic effort to find a satisfactory behavioral base for its operations may be illustrated in the work of the African Bureau of AID. It emphasizes the fact that organizations and administrative systems in the African countries are and undoubtedly will continue to be European-oriented and that there is no desire for their wholesale replacement by American processes.⁶⁴ With this as a starting point, it has sought to learn how U. S. assistance can be most effective in the activities that it undertakes.⁶⁵ To this end it raises a variety of pertinent questions concerning possible courses of action. The "deliberate speed" with which it is undertaking its mission bespeaks a real concern for local behavioral patterns.

There are, of course, a number of examples of administrative studies preceding the undertaking of aid programs. Some of these have been country-wide, others limited to particular problem areas. What is needed is an attempt to relate administrative behavior to the cultural patterns which have produced it.⁶⁶

64. This thesis is also stated in one of the AID reports from the Caribbean area:

"Many approaches to public administration suffer from an inclination to introduce a new system of administration. This approach may work where the existing system is chaotic or non-existent. However, in those ex-colonial areas where an effective system of administration existed and is still being used...the technical assistance donor should encourage the country to retain the familiar system and to emphasize improvements in it."

65. Draft policy paper: "A Strategy for A.I.D. Technical Assistance in Education and Training for the Public Service in African Nations," Jan. 14, 1964.

66. See Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration, William J. Siffin, ed., (University of Indiana, Bloomington, Indiana, 1957) Pp. 278-324. Although these studies are all useful, Mosel's "Thai Administrative Behavior" is particularly to be commended.

A number of examples of individual projects fitting readily into the local culture scheme could be cited. Indeed, one must exercise some care in a reading of individual and mission reports lest the enthusiasm of the reporter be accepted for fulfillment of the objective. Even, however, with due allowance, there is a record of undertakings that have succeeded because they were wanted and because they fitted. The case of Pakistan International Airways provides a useful example. PIA needed help and its personnel were willing to accept it. American aid was directed not only to the technical areas but to the administrative as well. Today, PIA is serving its own domestic needs and competing with modest success in the international runs. Other examples might include revisions of the personnel classification system in the Philippines, as well as certain tax administration changes there; the acceptance of the idea of national planning in a number of countries; support for and use of centers or institutes of public administration; and a variety of local public works projects.

The behavioral strategy, of course, has its problems. It is basically slow to function because so large an emphasis is put upon thoroughness of approach. ("Where," asks one AID official, "do we go to get the team members for studies of this kind?") It involves high level mission officials, and probably the ambassador as well, in matters they have preferred in the past to leave to the technicians. It involves hard thinking and careful planning--the use, perhaps of a "national Gantt chart" designed to measure the contributions of each of the parties, phased out in an acceptable time sequence.⁶⁷

67. "Local situations should be thoroughly analyzed before projects are planned in detail. Bench marks should be built into projects as a means of stimulating and later measuring progress." From Report of Third Regional Conference on Public Administration for Latin Americas, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, April 26-29, 1960, p. 65. [Emphasis added]

Finally, there is the matter of developing ways and means of assuring that promises or commitments once made will be kept. This, of course, is never easy; it is less so when our own policy objectives vis a vis the underdeveloped nations are likely to be so broad and varied in character. The behavioral strategy is a long-range one, but so is the task of helping backward countries find a better way of life.

V. THE TACTICS OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Tactics are actions taken in support of the plan or design. In the military sense, they involve the selection of weapons, the arrangements of troops in order of battle, and the use of maneuver. In the sense used here, they are the methods by which technical assistance advisors attempt to gain acceptance for specific projects or undertakings.

On the whole, a great deal of time and attention has been given to the development of suitable tactical approaches, particularly at the country level. The relative merits of various ways of advice-giving have been weighed; there has been much discussion of such matters as the use of demonstration projects; local institutes and centers, ways of getting and holding the attention of host officials, use of improved methodologies, and the like. Meetings have been held to consider whether to use U.S. government "direct hire" or contract personnel. The role of the universities in particular has been probed. The possibilities of these and other tactical approaches have been widely discussed.

Agenda topics selected from several regional public administration conferences provide useful illustration: Adapting American Educational Practices to the Teaching of Public Administration Abroad; Organization and Personnel Problems in Fiscal Reform; Acquiring Effective Government Through Education and Training; Supporting Management Improvement Among Ministries; Techniques for Securing Improvements in Personnel Management; Techniques for Securing Improvement in Revenue Systems; Training as a Means of Facilitating Economic Development; and Techniques of Technical Assistance.

There is no desire here to suggest that one tactical approach is more appropriate than another. Military tactics are devised to fit the situation: the nature of the terrain, the characteristics of the enemy, the abilities of one's own troops, their equipment, the time available, and, above all, the strategy being followed. So should the tactics of public administration technical assistance be shaped to fit the situations it is called upon to face.

The tactics of public administration assistance may be classified broadly into seven major categories. These are as follows:

1. Persuading and selling
2. The advisory role
3. Demonstration projects
4. Training and assisting others
5. Engaging in operations
6. The use of third parties
7. The use of "leverage"

1. Persuading and Selling

Such a tactic fits readily into American notions of salesmanship. It also fits readily the image others have of us.

"Providing technical assistance" one advisor has suggested, "always involves selling the other fellow on your point of view. PTAD's Productivity and Technical Assistance Division point of view needs to be sold more sidely."⁶⁸ The chief of a university party elaborates on this view:

68. End-of-tour report of Ernest Barbour, Brazil, March 20, 1962, p. 6.

"A basic condition of success in a program such as this is the winning of confidence, acceptance and friendship in the institutions wherein the program is conducted...."⁶⁹

Persuading others that what we are offering is good for them involves not only acceptance of the product but of the salesman as well. The latter has received a great deal of attention not only from popular writers (e.g., The Ugly American)⁷⁰ but also from those inside the aid agency who have been given the chore of helping prepare the American technician, his wife and his family for their overseas assignment. The result, in part at least, is the encouragement of a "smile, smile" approach. The one-time chief of an important public administration division emphasizes the personality factor:

I think that the technical side, while very important, is not as important as the personality traits, which enable an individual to get along well with other human beings. I have seen technicians who were absolutely superlative technically, but who were not getting anywhere because of unfortunate traits. They were living, so to speak, by the slip stick...⁷¹

No one will quarrel with the notion that Americans who serve their government abroad must be able to get along with others. The real argument is likely to be over the extent to which the "cult of salesmanship" becomes an effective tool of the trade. Selling and for that matter persuasion in all its forms have very definite limitations, as our own Madison

69. End-of-tour report of Earl C. Campbell, head, University of Southern California Party to Brazil, May 18, 1961.

70. By William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick (New York, Crest Publications, 1958.)

71. Interview with John C. Russell, chief, Public Administration Division, Tripoli, Libya, as reported in Louis J. Kroeger, ed., Reflections on Successful Technical Assistance Abroad, (processed), (International Cooperation Administration, Washington, D. C.: 1957). P. 66.

Avenue has discovered. Among other things, they create sales resistance. Because of this, we now distinguish between types of selling: the "hard sell," for example, vs. the "soft sell"; advertising vs. promotion; and product vs. institutional advertising.

No one will quarrel either with the view that voluntary acceptance of an idea or a tool is essential to its continued use. The problem is how to achieve it. Our ability to persuade, and our willingness to make our case in this fashion, are among our greatest strengths. But others have shrewdly exploited this characteristic, availing themselves of our "loss leaders"--even asking trading stamps in the bargain--while preparing to conveniently forget their obligations once we have written up the order. They say "yes"--politely--when they really mean "maybe" or even "no."

The wining and dining of American advisors, for example, has sometimes seemed to be offered as a substitute for undertaking reform measures. The Americans enjoy it hugely, it fits their cultural view of being "well received." It also appears to be an indication that "something is happening." Another illustration is the testimonial. The instance of a distinguished foreign professor, a one-time rector of his own university, remains vividly in mind. He had been given a Cook's Tour of American schools of public administration on a two-month visit here, during which the selling process had been fully invoked. At its end, he blandly announced, not once but as needed, that upon his return to his own country, he would establish a similar school himself. He had no intention of taking such a step and did not.

2. The Advisory Role

There are a great many ways by which advice can be given. The one used in a given instance will depend to a large degree on the nature of the

task to be performed, the views of those responsible for it, the history of the public administration assistance program in a particular country, the personality of the advisor, and his views of his role.

The most sophisticated advice is that provided by country administrative surveys. The two outstanding examples were those conducted in India and Pakistan under auspices of the Ford Foundation. The Indian study undertaken by Appleby was widely hailed, although many of the changes which he hoped they would bring about were not forthcoming.⁷² The Egger study was immediately classified as secret by the Government of Pakistan and withheld from general release. Seven years later it was made public but copies of it were virtually unobtainable in Pakistan. Sections published in Britain, however, have subsequently won an international citation for its author.⁷³ In other countries, studies have been undertaken of specific functions (such as personnel systems, taxation, organization for planning, and the like).⁷⁴

Ordinarily, advisors are assigned to the under-developed countries for more limited purposes. Some serve as generalists, advising on broad

72. Paul H. Appleby, "Public Administration in India: Report of a Survey," published by the Government of India, Cabinet Secretariat, New Delhi, 1957, 70 pp.

73. Rowland A. Egger, "Ministerial and Departmental Organization and Management in the Government of Pakistan," Public Administration, XXXIX (Summer, 1961) pp. 149-171.

74. On the whole, limited use has been made of this device for the very good reason that many host governments are afraid to risk it. An exception was a Hoover Commission-type study by a Filipino commission in 1955-6 with the strong encouragement from Americans in the aid program. Its findings and recommendations, published in a series of reports, have had considerable influence on administrative reform there although much more remains to be done--part of it, incidentally, of the over-hasty action of the commission.

subject areas. Others are specialists who are prepared to discuss a particular problem in the greatest detail. Some see their role as that of helping when asked, but taking little initiative if they are not. Others become positive agents of change, involving themselves almost from the start in the activities of the agency to which they are assigned.

One advisor attached to an American supported institute of public administration took the blunt position that his job was to give advice and assistance only if asked directly for it. Of the director he said: "If he wants me, he knows where he can find me." He believed strongly that some of the best learning is to be found in one's own mistakes and he was fully prepared to let his opposite number learn that way.

Another had this to say about his relationship with his hosts:

During my tours of duty in the Philippines, I have carefully avoided any participation in individual cases. It is very common to hear, or read, that someone, especially a politician, pays little or no tax. I do not know whether these stories are false or true, for I have never looked at their tax returns. Nor have I ever participated in any personal discussions on problems concerning individuals. I have never recommended the promotion or demotion of any individual; however, I have recommended certain standards and suggested that those who do not meet these standards be replaced.⁷⁵

As to methods, he says:

It is mentioned here that the technical advisors of this project have made very few written reports to the Bureau, but instead carried on the work with oral discussions. In fact, this technical advisor did not even have a desk or chair within the Bureau, but spent several hours each day going from one group or division to another discussing the problems with the individuals concerned.⁷⁶
[Emphasis added.]

75. Ray E. Davis, Terminal Report...to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Department of Finance, Republic of the Philippines, 1958, p. vi.

76. Ibid., p. viii.

These illustrations are probably not typical. More often, the American advisor, whether long or short term, whether based in a host agency, a member of a contract team, or working out of the mission, is likely to feel a personal responsibility for action. This means that he can be expected to go out of his way to give advice and to encourage its acceptance, even perhaps to "politicking" a little. When his advice is not accepted, or, worse, when little or no effort is made to implement it, he is depressed because of it. In the words of one technician:

With respect to my work in the Post Office and Real Property Registry, an honest evaluation leads to the conclusion that aside from polite bouquets and gratitude, the real results were discouragingly few if any.⁷⁷

3. Demonstration projects

Demonstration projects serve several purposes. They provide an opportunity to show, on a limited scale, the advantages of reform. They provide an opportunity for examination, for questioning, for clarification, and for thought by those who view them. They have the further advantage of making economical use of available resources, both American and host government. H. J. Van Mook of the United Nations has spoken feelingly of the demonstration project as "an island of progressive practice in a sea of backward administration."⁷⁸

There are several kinds of demonstration projects. A demonstration may be provided in a single office or by a single employee of a new way of doing something, even something as modest as typing or filing. There may

77. From AID files.

78. As quoted by Roscoe Martin, in "Technical Assistance: The Problems of Implementation," Public Administration Review, Autumn 1952, p. 264.

be a larger demonstration of a new approach within a division, a bureau, or a ministry.⁷⁹ Demonstrations of larger import, covering entire areas, may also be undertaken. Suggestions of the latter nature have been put forward in several countries, including Iran and Pakistan. Under these proposals, American advisors, working with local officials, would provide leadership in the reorganizing of all governmental activities within the selected geographic area.⁸⁰ The writer has not been able to discover any actual instances where such an offer has been accepted, however.

Demonstration projects are often difficult to arrange because of the risk they appear to hold for members of the host government. Should the enterprise fail, they fear their relationship to it. Should it succeed, they are concerned about being seen as violators of local norms. Nevertheless, demonstration projects have been undertaken in a number of countries. The best of these have real merit from the American point of view because they provide tangible evidence, on host country soil, of what can be done by way of administrative reform.

4. Training and assisting others

Training is the function of helping others to acquire and apply knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes which they do not now possess but

79. The National Officials Training Institute in Korea has undertaken a number of demonstration projects with the help and encouragement of American advisors. These have been primarily in the area of personnel administration and training. (See report of E. R. Draheim, op. cit.)

80. A discussion of the demonstration project and the manner in which it can be applied on an area or regional basis is contained in two papers (processed), prepared by Leon O. Wolcott, Public administration advisor, Iran, and later, member of University of Southern California Party in public administration, Pakistan.

which are needed by the organization of which they are a part. It is one of management's most important means of achieving objectives.

Its use in the underdeveloped countries is underlined not only by the need for what it can produce, but also because, as a method, it fits so well into all cultural patterns. All of us, no matter where we come from, are products of parent, school and societal training; we approve of training because it helps us towards greater self-fulfillment. Training as a technical assistance activity becomes one of the most effective means of helping ideas to cross cultural barriers. As one observer notes:

Label it as you please, technical assistance or whatever, its essence is education. It give without taking. It helps without demanding a quid quo pro. It trains the trainers with the expectation that when the job is done the American technician can go home without having newly built structures collapse behind him.⁸¹

Training of those in public administration may take place on the job. If institutionalized, it may take place within the country itself with American trainers assisting in the process. It may take place in the United States or in third-country areas. It may involve short courses (a few days); long courses (from two weeks to a year); or even degree programs.⁸² It may include, as has been noted earlier, observations and study tours.⁸³ In a variety of ways we have stood at the right hand

81. Karl A. Boedecker, "Technical Assistance--Training the Trainers," College of Education Quarterly, Vol. V. No. 3, July 1959, Michigan State University, p. 10.

82. By way of illustrating the range of training courses, the following were offered with American assistance in one Latin American country: Records Management; Organization and Methods; Personnel Administration; Customs Administration; Taxation; Economic Development; Management Studies; Communications; Financial Organization; Budget Preparation; Secretarial Training; Work Simplification and Visual Techniques.

83. There is no question that training in one form or another is among the most popular of all our exportable techniques. In one country, at one and the same time, this writer has observed American on-the-job training

(by invitation, of course) of local administrators and politicians, prompting them when their own ideas become hazy or their words faltered.⁸⁴ We have supported them when they seemed to require it.

Despite its advantages, training has its limitations. One is that, however solid and lasting the approach, its results are not quickly obtained, especially when only a mere handful among thousands receive it. Nor is it always successful: men trained in new methods and approaches are sometimes returned to their old milieu to be re-absorbed in the old ways of doing things.

5. The Use of Third Parties

A great deal of study and thought has been given to the use of third parties in public administration technical assistance. The majority of these are contract employees of the aid agency, but use has sometimes been made of foundation and voluntary agency representatives and United Nations

assistance, advice to trainers and training directors, the assignment of teachers to indigenous institutions, the creation of new institutions, and training-of-trainers locally and in the United States. Indeed, the impact of our efforts can extend, as the report below suggests, to the most unlikely places:

It is gratifying to note from time to time the results of our training programs, especially the speed with which results follow training. In the Leprosy Division, Ministry of Public Health, training of all the personnel (top to bottom) was completed Dec. 14, 1960. (From AID files.)

84. ICA Manual of Orders 2651.1, June 13, 1960: "Government officials and leaders in the business community need to be encouraged to interpret the purposes and benefits of administrative reforms to the public. Furthermore, local officials should be encouraged to seek professional recognition of their field of interest, to seek support for the growth of professional associations, and to contribute to the issuance of professional literature."

personnel as well. Many of the contractors have been universities, but private consulting firms and private individuals have also been engaged.

Many activities can be undertaken better by non-governmental than by official personnel. A limitation of the direct-hire mission advisor is that, no matter how circumspectly he functions, he will always be seen as an arm of U. S. foreign policy. As a mission chief has commented:

ICA...has to be schizophrenic. It must retain the good will of the local authorities while at the same time acting as a representative of a sovereign government, and when it assumes the latter role, it has great difficulty in retaining the necessary good will.⁸⁵

The contractor, on the other hand, has a far greater degree of flexibility. He will be able to do many things the governmental representative cannot.⁸⁶ If a member of a university staff, he may bring to his position the status of the professor. If a consultant, he will be seen as an acknowledged expert in his field. There are additional advantages to the contract device which Reining and others have identified.⁸⁷

85. From AID files.

86. Cf. George W. Lawson, Jr., "Technical Cooperation for Administrative Improvement," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May 1959, p. 113:

"The contractor has certain distinct advantages in providing technical assistance where management improvement is needed in very complex situations...Contractors are best used where the management problem is one of clearly definable size and scope, where a team can go in, make a study, recommend a course of action, and to the extent that their recommendations are accepted, install the system or procedure and train host government personnel to carry on. In some cases the contract is more acceptable to the host country, which may not wish to appear to be taking management advice from officers of a foreign government."

87. Henry Reining, Jr., "The Government Contract as an Administrative Device," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May 1959, pp. 68-79; and Jerome Jacobson Associates, The Use of Private Contractors in Foreign Aid Programs, U. S. Senate, 85th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1951)

U. S. public administration technical assistance staff has worked closely with the Ford Foundation, a number of the voluntary groups, and United Nations agencies and personnel. Americans have also given support to local membership in international associations such as the International Institute for the Administrative Sciences, Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration (EROPA) and similar organizations in more specialized fields.⁸⁸ There is no question that these have encouraged the exchange of information in a variety of areas, the growth of professionalism among civil servants, and thus reinforced American efforts. Underdeveloped countries are often more influenced by what their neighbors think and do than by advice from representatives of more advanced countries.

The contract, particularly the university contract, has its limitations. As Egger has remarked:

Universities, on the whole, are better at writing history than they are at making it. And their contributions to the analysis and evaluation of technical assistance have been in the main of a substantially higher order of excellence than their contributions to direct technical assistance operations.⁸⁹

In general, the contract is least useful where the task is most difficult to define and measure; or where a large measure of direct control is required by the aid agency. Contractors who must recruit new staffs to

88. Cf., Frederic R. Fisher, "Tax Reform in Latin America: Comments, Recommendations, and Brief Country Papers," Jan. 24, 1962: "The idea (for this conference) developed as a result of discussions among the Department of State, the Treasury Department, the Harvard Law School's International Program in Taxation and was an outgrowth of the Act of Bogota. It is also referred to in Resolution A.3 of the Punta del Este Charter." (p. 3)

89. Rowland Egger, "Technical Assistance at Home and Abroad" in Institutional Cooperation for the Public Service, Report of Conference of the "1313" Organizations, 1313 East 60th Street, Feb. 7-9, 1963, p. 49.

fill their contract obligations are considered less likely to succeed than those with qualified people already available. In any case, care should be taken that the assignment the contractor is given is one he is really qualified to perform.

6. Engaging in Operations

The term "technical assistance" is often interpreted to mean "Helping others help themselves," but there is nothing in its definition which limits it to this. Nor have Americans in public administration technical assistance hesitated to do what they considered necessary, limited only by the controversy it was likely to produce.

As one Washington official has pointed out, "Sometimes you have to do things for them because they can't do them themselves."⁹⁰ These activities may be of an administrative nature, such as the provision of clerical support; they may, however, involve the detailed preparation of a budget, the writing of classification specifications, or the development of an accounting system. A large American consulting firm, for example, was hired to put order into the Filipino system of land records because it was the view of the mission (shared, incidentally, by the host government) that this was urgent and could not be done any other way. Filipinos were trained in the process, but the purpose of the contract was to get a needed job done.

There are, of course, no hard and fast distinctions between demonstrating, assisting, and doing it yourself. In general, however, a demonstration project is undertaken to show someone else either how to do something or what will happen when it is done. Assisting, as the tactic implies,

90. From AID files. Another says, "We must be doers in some areas because the locals can't."

is the lending of a helping hand--sometimes a very big hand at that. On the other hand, an American team might take on a job itself because it needs badly to be done and those in the local government were not capable of doing it, or at least could not do so without an expenditure of resources beyond their current capacity. This has often been the case in efforts to develop a local literature of public administration. Little is written on the administrative system of most underdeveloped countries, but a literature is essential for study and training. The adaptation of American materials is of limited value. And American scholars recruited to help in the preparation of local studies often end up doing the greater part of it themselves.

Aid agency policy opposes engaging in "operations." Not only does such action do violence to the idea of local sovereignty (with possible far-reaching negative effects) but it also discourages self-help. The justification for "operations" appears to be the lack of an alternative.

7. The Use of Leverage

Thus far, the tactics we have been discussing have been largely of a permissive nature. The recipient, once bilateral agreements have been signed, is free to accept or reject our aid. But sometimes the commitment he makes leaves him no longer a truly free agent. The donor, because of the understandings that have been reached and his investment in the program, also has an interest in its success. Influence or power of one kind or another ("leverage") is brought to bear in a variety of patterns. It may embody a gift offered with the implication of not giving further unless certain conditions are met; it may include the use and potential recall

of advisors or other persons of influence; it may even contain the veiled threat of a cutback in funds and the withdrawal of support entirely.⁹¹

A discouraged technician suggested the following ultimatum:

Earlier in this report it was indicated that in this advisor's opinion there are vested interests in administrative confusion in the Government of _____. This situation will persist as long as there is no really compelling reason to change. It would appear that the best way to insure the improved public administration essential to the success of a development program would be to make all forms of economic assistance to _____ by the U. S. contingent upon the Government of _____ adopting and fully implementing a progressive program of reforms in public administration.⁹²

There is no purpose here in citing instances where the threat of pull-out has caused compliance by the host. They do, of course, exist. No person or country likes to be threatened, and certainly it does not like to have its neighbors know of it. It is sufficient to say that leverage has been both successful and unsuccessful on behalf of public administration programs. There are even a few instances in reverse where a host government has prevented the withdrawal of American support by threatening to make a diplomatic incident of it.

An additional factor of tactical importance has been the existence of counterpart funds in many of the countries where technical assistance has been provided.⁹³ Such funds, in local currency, provide an important

91. The concern we must have for the expenditure of aid moneys is argued by Musolf in this fashion. "'Remember,' said one ambassador to newly arriving Americans in his standard speech of welcome, 'you are guests in a sovereign country.' Such advice, valuable as a general prescription and probably deriving from the generous spirit of the 'good neighbor' policy, stands in need of correction in foreign aid administration, whenever it is, in effect, interpreted to mean acquiescence in abuses by the host government in spending American aid dollars." Lloyd Musolf, op. cit., p. 224. /Emphasis added./

92. From AID files.

93. These currencies are generated by the sale of needed U. S. commodities, such as wheat, in the host countries.

lever to attain objectives not available through other methods. Their use ordinarily requires agreement by both host government and the mission, but in practice the Americans make most of the decisions. Sometimes also there are additional local funds, albeit limited, which can be spent on the initiative of the United States alone. How important such funds are to the long range success of the public administration programs is by no means clear. As a facilitative device, they are felt to be of great value, and technicians in those countries where they exist in quantity feel they have a major advantage over those where they do not.

A more subtle variant of leverage is the use of U. S. prestige and influence in support of public administration programs. The United States as a country, and U. S. advisors as individuals, often have much influence in the developing nations.

Occasionally, a host national will be openly critical of the administrative practices of the American mission. More often, he will observe much but say little. In engaging our interest in a particular program, he will note how well we actually support it. American influence, for example, can be marshalled positively and strongly in its favor. It can be dispersed over many programs. Voice support only can be given. One public administration advisor reported candidly:

An almost fatal factor in the conduct of the affairs of the Public Administration Advisor has been the negative interest in Public Administration by /the former Mission director/... The Director ignored Public Administration as an USOM activity, but was personally kind and thoughtful to the advisor.⁹⁴

94. Eugene B. Crowe, public administration advisor, end-of-tour report, August 25, 1961. P. 6.

This has undoubtedly happened on more than one occasion in more than one country. The advisor in a technical field (such as agriculture or education) can do real harm to public administration by demeaning its implications or even by avoiding association with it. Those in the public administration divisions at mission level who must negotiate with officials of the host government do not match them in status and often in experience. This is why they need the help and support not only of those at the highest embassy and mission levels but also of those in the technical branches. The withholding of such support, or the paying of lip service to it, can severely test a public administration program.

The use of leverage in whatever form has received strong endorsement in the past from public and Congressional quarters, but aid agency officials have used it reluctantly.⁹⁵ There is even a reluctance for a number of reasons to say much outside the security of their own offices about its use as a policy. Among the reasons for this, the most important seem to be the nature of and the limitations on leverage. In its severest form, leverage is always disliked, and sometimes openly resisted. Even under the best of circumstances, we cannot do all the kind of things we would like with it.

95. Of interest are the comments of Eugene Black, recently retired head of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Mr. Black, noting "that sometimes no money speaks louder than money," says that if "we allow the underdeveloped countries to postpone making the needed reforms the money [they ask for] may be wasted, or simply add to their inflation. Money unwisely spent in a country that refuses to face up to the needed reforms won't do any good." From an interview in the Washington Post and Times Herald, Dec. 30, 1962, p. A3.

Frank Coffin, Deputy Director of AID, states this position well:

All too often this policy question...is oversimplified and understood to mean that we should not extend aid until a country has taken the social, fiscal, and administrative steps needed to put its house in order. A moment's reflection highlights the difficulty with this concept. It ignores our first principle--the power available to us. As Secretary Rusk recently told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, our aid to the Latin-American nations in the Alliance for Progress is less than 2% of the total of their gross national products.⁹⁶

If all our aid is less than 2% of their GNP, public administration's share is, of course, infinitesimal. There is little real leverage power here.

The action of Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia in rejecting all forms of American aid points up Mr. Coffin's remarks. Prime Minister Nehru attached severe limitations to its use in India. Even where there is ready acceptance of U. S. aid, there can be rejection of a specific type of aid, such as that in public administration, on the presumption that the dollars which go to this have to be switched to other categories. As a mission executive once put the issue to this writer:

These people aren't stupid. They know what they need dollar-wise and they know we know also. If we don't put the money into one project, we will probably have to put it in another. This gives them something of a choice of what to accept. As for public administration, the mission chief has bigger fish to fry than getting into a hassle with them over one of these projects.

Still, no one who would assert that we are without influence in the countries we aid, or that this influence cannot be used in more effective ways than has been done in the past. As this tactic suggests, the leverage potential of our aid can often be increased by combining the administrative with the technical.

⁹⁶. Remarks made at Briefing Conference on Foreign Aid, ibid.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

There is no question that much has been accomplished by American technical assistance in public administration in the underdeveloped areas over the past 18 years. The placing of public administration advisors in over 50 countries, the undertaking of several hundred projects in administrative improvement, and the training of several thousand officials in the United States provide substantial evidence of achievement.

Anyone who has looked closely at the entire technical assistance effort must conclude that the machinery of government in the countries we have been aiding still requires vast improvement. The buildup of the administrative capability of these nations is, and must continue to be, an essential part of the developmental process. It must receive higher priority than it is now getting in our own foreign aid effort.

The purpose of this study has been to examine the major concepts and theories that have influenced the conduct of U. S. governmentally supported technical assistance programs in public administration. It has sought to identify the factors which have had major influence upon it, in particular the strategies and tactics which have been followed in pursuit of it. The six most prominent of these strategies are: (1) the "establishment of a beachhead" in the country we are attempting to aid; (2) identification with local power groups; (3) the use of the "multiplier effect"; (4) the development of "grass roots" support; (5) the combination of public administration improvement with other types of technical assistance; and, finally, (6) the strategy of behavioral adaptation. *Page 47*

Of these, the latter two, perhaps in combination, appear to offer greatest hope for long-lasting impact. There is increasing evidence that

administrative improvement succeeds best where it is part of other technical assistance programs rather than as something separate and discrete. There is evidence also that a strategy geared not only to the needs of a society but to its behavioral characteristics as well, is the one most likely to be successful in the long run. Neither of these two strategies has really been attempted by the aid agency except on a limited scale.

Much more attention, on the other hand, has been given to tactics than to strategies. Seven major tactical approaches were identified: (1) "selling" those in the host country on the wanted approach; (2) the use of advice; (3) demonstration projects; (4) programs of training and assistance; (5) the involvement of third parties; (6) the doing of the job ourselves; and (7) the use of various forms of leverage.

Unfortunately, the accumulation of tactics does not amount to a strategy. Unless they support a broader scheme of things, tactics can achieve only a piecemeal approach to a problem. This is undoubtedly what has happened in many of the countries where public administration assistance has been given.

Some Generalizations

While the focus of this study has been as indicated, a number of facts and facets have been revealed which clearly relate to the conduct of such programs abroad. These deserve further study and thought. With this caveat, the following generalizations are offered:

1. Need for Agency Support.

The public administration programs, despite their achievements, have on the whole not been strongly supported by aid agency leadership. This includes not only directors of the agency and the heads of the geographic divisions in Washington, but also ambassadors and chiefs of country

missions. If these programs are worthwhile, as this study strongly suggests, they need more support than they have been receiving.

2. Support and Assistance to the Missions

The importance of the decentralization of program operating responsibilities to the country missions is, of course, essential. But this should not mean that a mission staff is free to follow any strategy it pleases, or even no strategy at all, in a field of activity as basic and also as sensitive as this one. Technical assistance staffs in public administration and other areas in the field are notoriously small and ordinarily ill equipped by training or insight to deal with matters of this nature. New ways must therefore be found for developing approaches to the problems of public administration technical assistance and for encouraging and supporting the technicians in the field in their applications of them. The need for research support and policy direction in Washington remains.

3. Program Integration

Not nearly enough has been done to relate programs designed to improve the administrative capability of the under-developed countries with those in other technical assistance areas, such as agriculture, education, or public health. Because of the inability of host governments to administer such programs or even to fulfill agreed-upon parts in it, the entire technical assistance program has been weakened. The current efforts within the agency to provide for greater integration of efforts are moves in the right direction. They must be encouraged and supported.

4. The Need for Further Study.

Finally, more needs to be known of what has already been accomplished. It is unfortunate that so little should really be known of an undertaking

as large and as promising as this. It is even more regrettable that there should be so little by which its achievements can be justified. Despite voluminous reports and many interchanges of information, there is little solid evidence of what has had lasting value and what has not. Little has been verified of either achievements or failures. Not only has the experience of able and highly motivated men and women in dozens of countries under a wide variety of circumstances gone unrecorded and unevaluated, but many of their learnings in an important new area of cross-cultural interchange have been permanently lost.

A number of steps which hold real prospects of improving the situation need to be undertaken. There is need, first of all, for a series of studies of what has been accomplished in various countries where public administration technical assistance has been given. In particular, the study of achievements (and failures) in South America where a variety of approaches has been tried over a number of years, offers a fruitful source of data.

A number of questions need to be asked and answers obtained. What programs are least threatening to the host governments? Which have the longest lasting impact? Which the greatest multiplier effect? What is the advantage of sending students and observers to the United States against training on home grounds? What part can area international conferences play in the improvement of administration in individual countries? It is still not too late to undertake a systematic effort to learn from the already vast experiences of AID and its predecessor agencies.

There is need also for acceptance at all policy levels within the aid agency of the importance of a strengthening of a nation's administrative system to its development. AID must be prepared to give full support to public administration improvement; to allocate needed resources to it;

and to insist that efforts in other technical assistance areas give proper attention to administrative needs as well. It is time for integration of such agency programs.

Adequate country strategies remain the key to integrating the tactics of technical assistance in all fields. Washington's role is not to develop such strategies, but to find their common elements and to assure that they are thoughtfully designed and conscientiously carried out.

Only in a fashion such as this can an intelligent and orderly approach be made to one of the most complex and pressing problems of our time.