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
*Latin  
America*

ADMINISTRATION OF BILATERAL  
TECHNICAL COOPERATION

*A Statement by the  
NPA Special Policy Committee on  
Technical Cooperation*

NATIONAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION

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TECHNICAL COOPERATION

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technical cooperation  
in  
*Latín América*

# technical cooperation in *Latin America*

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## BACKGROUND AND APPROACH

**B**Y 1953, a number of public agencies and private groups in the United States were sharing their knowledge and skills with the people and governments of other countries. Most of them, however, were working independently. While it seemed likely that technical cooperation programs could become an increasingly constructive element in international cooperation, all too little was known about them. No thorough organized effort had been made to determine the extent to which this sharing of useful knowledge was helping the underdeveloped countries to help themselves or to see what its benefits—tangible and intangible—were to the United States.

Discussions with informed leaders in this field and with policy-makers, administrators, and technicians who were actively at work in public and private technical cooperation programs clearly indicated that a review and evaluation of the purposes, methods, and results of such programs would have wide usefulness, both in administering present programs and planning new ones. It was felt, further, that all concerned would have greater confidence in the findings if a critical analysis were made by an independent organization not involved with any of the public and private programs.

The National Planning Association's decision to undertake a far-reaching study of technical cooperation programs in order to gauge their potentialities and limitations in Latin America grew out of these discussions. The study was purposely concentrated on activities in Latin America—not because they were necessarily the most important or the best programs in the world, but because technical cooperation programs have been underway longer there than elsewhere and, until recent years, on a larger scale. Also, a great diversity of programs has been developed in Latin America. This diversity came about because the programs were created under a wide variety of auspices and conditions—sponsored by private foundations, the government of the United States, international organizations, religious groups, universities, and business firms—each with somewhat different objectives. The programs also differ because the level and pace of development vary greatly from one Latin American country to another, as do the political and social settings in which the programs operate. It was hoped that an intensive study of the rich experiences of the public agencies and private groups which have sponsored these programs under such diverse

and complex circumstances, would furnish important practical guides for technical cooperation.

The main objectives established for the NPA Project on Technical Cooperation in Latin America were:

- To find out whether technical cooperation programs are making and can make a significant contribution to the long-range interests of the United States and of Latin American countries in international understanding and growing international prosperity.
- To identify the present objectives of public and private programs and judge their merits; to weigh results achieved in terms of such objectives; and to indicate standards for deciding which programs have greatest value for the future both for the people of Latin America and of the United States.
- To clarify the role of public technical cooperation programs in relation to private programs.
- To point out ways and means of increasing the effectiveness of technical cooperation programs, of improving their administration, and of attracting and training competent and dedicated personnel for the programs.

Early in 1953, the Ford Foundation made a grant of \$440,000 to finance the NPA Project on Technical Cooperation in Latin America. The Ford Foundation is not, however, to be understood as approving by virtue of its grant any of the views expressed in the research studies or the policy statements growing out of the Project.

In accordance with NPA's established procedures, a Special Policy Committee on Technical Cooperation was formed to help plan the Project, to consider the products of staff research, and to make recommendations on policy issues that confront the United States and Latin America in the fields of technical cooperation. This Committee is composed of U. S. and Latin American leaders from agriculture, business, labor, education, health, and other fields, to ensure that its recommendations take into account the experience and views of such broadly based representative groups. Laird Bell, a senior partner of Bell, Boyd, Marshall & Lloyd in Chicago and a trustee of NPA, is chairman of the Special Policy Committee.

Theodore W. Schultz, of the University of Chicago and also a trustee of NPA, has organized the plan of study as director of research and

has selected the research staff and consultants of the Project. He and the research associates have done field work in all 20 Latin American republics, where they have made surveys and examined the records. They have consulted with business firms, religious bodies, foundations, universities, and other private organizations, as well as with government officials both of Latin American countries and of the United States, and with representatives of the Organization of American States, and the United Nations and its specialized agencies. A number of staff reports incorporating the findings of the research effort are being prepared. These reports are to be published at irregular intervals by the University of Chicago Press. Subjects of monographs and the authors are: the administration of technical cooperation, by Philip M. Glick; technical cooperation in education, by Armando Samper; technical cooperation and foreign policy, by George I. Blanksten; technical assistance activities of religious agencies, by James G. Maddox; the transfer of technology by private business firms, by Simon Rottenberg; technical cooperation and agricultural development, by Arthur T. Mosher; university contracts for technical cooperation, by R. E. Buchanan; training programs within technical cooperation, by James G. Maddox; and ways of improving the distribution of technology among countries, by Theodore W. Schultz.

These studies are the sole responsibility of the authors. They are building stones for the NPA Special Policy Committee in its efforts to resolve policy issues in the area of technical cooperation.

A major activity of the Special Policy Committee is to correlate the findings of the research staff and to prepare an over-all policy report on technical cooperation. Meanwhile, the Committee is issuing recommendations or policy statements on matters which in its opinion warrant special attention. (A list of the Committee's reports published to date in a special series of NPA pamphlets faces the contents page of this report.) In addition, the Committee has published one and may issue other case studies of particular programs as illustrations of a few of the problems which are common to many of the activities studied in the NPA Project.

The National Planning Association is grateful for the Ford Foundation's financial support, and is deeply indebted to all who are contributing to this Project: to the Special Policy Committee members; to the Project's research staff; and to other individuals—too numerous to list—in Latin America and the United States, in the United Nations

and its specialized agencies, and in the Organization of American States, for their invaluable cooperation and generosity with time and knowledge.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "H. Christian Sonne". The signature is fluid and elegant, with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

H. CHRISTIAN SONNE, *Chairman*  
NPA Board of Trustees

January 1956

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

THIS STATEMENT on *Administration of Bilateral Technical Cooperation* is a companion piece to the one we issued in May 1955 on *Organization of the United States Government for Technical Cooperation*. Here, as in our earlier statement, we have relied heavily on an analysis of past performances and future needs which has been made by Philip M. Glick, a research associate of our Project. While the recommendations here made are our own, much of the supporting information has been drawn from his monograph, *The Future Can Be Built: The Administration of Technical Cooperation in the Americas*.

In his book, to be published next year, Mr. Glick discusses more fully the aspects of bilateral administration that we are here highlighting, as well as the administration of the programs of the United Nations and the Organization of American States. Our recommendations are here presented in advance of publication of our own final report on technical cooperation and of Mr. Glick's monograph because we believe it is urgent that attention be called to administrative deficiencies which the United States can and should correct promptly.

We are grateful to Mr. Glick for his valuable contribution to this statement, and to Howard R. Tolley and Virginia D. Parker for their work in summarizing the material in the forthcoming monograph which relates most directly to this Committee's recommendations.

# ADMINISTRATION OF BILATERAL TECHNICAL COOPERATION

*A Statement by the NPA Special Policy Committee  
on Technical Cooperation*

## I.

### Lessons From the Past

ONLY 15 YEARS AGO, today's concept of technical cooperation between governments was in an embryonic stage. This cooperation began in a small way in the thirties when the United States was seeking closer and more effective relationships among the American republics. Experience with larger scale programs during World War II, when there was an urgent need to use Latin American resources more effectively, reinforced the recognition that all participants in technical assistance programs could benefit.

After the war, there came a growing recognition in the United States and in Latin America that these activities should become a continuing process. At the same time, there was a growing belief that the programs should not be simply a matter of giving advice. They should be undertaken cooperatively and geared to the long-range social and economic programs of host countries. Despite the shortcomings and newness of many of the programs, there was clear evidence that relatively inexpensive bilateral programs of technical cooperation could have far-reaching effects. It had been demonstrated that technical cooperation, by expediting economic growth accompanied by social improvement and political independence, could help underdeveloped countries strengthen the will and power to be free.

Point 4 of President Truman's inaugural address of 1949 proposed that technical assistance be extended to less developed areas in all parts of the world. It was followed in 1950 by the U. S. Act for International Development; the United Nations (UN) Expanded Technical Assistance Program; and the Organization of American States' (OAS) own program of technical cooperation.

The concept of technical assistance—relatively new to governments—was familiar to private groups. Religious groups in the United States for at least a century have been cooperating on health and educational programs in other countries. For many years, U. S. foundations and other philanthropic organizations have worked with institutions and people in other countries. For an equally long period, U. S. business firms operating abroad have carried technical knowledge to other countries and trained workers in many fields. During the forties, all of these groups stepped up their activities; since 1950, their work has been further expanded and better organized to achieve broader goals of technical cooperation.

The bilateral programs of technical assistance during the 1940's concentrated primarily on special activities in the health, educational, and agricultural fields. In all of these, there are major needs in every Latin American country. During the early fifties, the programs spread to other important fields. Efforts were made to introduce new techniques in public administration; industry, mining, and labor; transportation, communications, and power; and community development. But health, education, and agriculture continued to receive the greatest amount of attention, as indicated by the fact that in 1953 and 1954 around 80 percent of U. S. funds for bilateral programs was spent in these fields. And, growing out of the concern of many Latin Americans over inadequacies in their governmental procedures, there was a considerable spurt in bilateral programs designed to improve public administration in the host governments.

Although all of these private and public technical cooperation programs approach their tasks in different ways, they are moving in the same direction. The common aim is what we have called a "seeding" operation. By introducing new ways of doing things in a few programs, the public agencies and private groups hope to stimulate initiative and enterprise in the wider domestic application of technologies and skills. The growth of technical cooperation has gained impetus since 1950. We believe the time has come to look at past experience so that future programs can more fully realize the potentials of this relatively new type of neighborliness.

In a companion piece to this statement—*Organization of the United States Government for Technical Cooperation*—we stressed the acute problems caused by the extraordinary instability of the organizational structure for bilateral programs. From 1939 to 1950, the United States conducted two independent programs of bilateral technical cooperation in Latin America. One of these was through the Interdepartmental

Committee on Scientific and Cultural Organization—a loosely organized coordinating committee for programs carried on directly by 25 government departments and agencies. The other was through the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA), a government corporation, which administered its own programs. Since 1950, when the President was given power to set up an administrative framework for planning and carrying out technical cooperation programs in all regions of the world, there have been four major reorganizations.

The periodic disruption and reconstitution of the administrative pattern have had a demoralizing effect on every major phase of program operations. This has kept the program off balance. It has caused delays in major policy and administrative decisions, and has interfered with the retention of experienced and competent personnel and the recruitment of new staff. And, importantly, it has baffled and confused the foreign governments with which the United States wishes to cooperate.

Our recommendations were aimed at an administrative structure in which sufficient authority and flexibility were lodged to carry on the complex functions involved in bilateral technical cooperation. We urged the establishment of a semiautonomous agency for technical cooperation within the Department of State—the permanent governmental agency responsible for leadership in the field of foreign policy. With the creation, on July 1, 1955, of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) within the State Department, a first and logical step was taken, which we heartily endorse. We also recommended—and again call attention to another needed step—that the basic legislation be amended to authorize such annual appropriations for technical cooperation as Congress may deem necessary. Termination of the necessity for annual reauthorizations would remove from the program the misleading appearance of short-term status.

It is still too early to determine what ICA's position will be in the State Department, and whether the new agency will guard against some of the dangers which reduced the effectiveness of bilateral programs in the past. It is important that the head of the agency be given considerable latitude in making administrative decisions and that he report directly to the Secretary of State. It is important that the agency have its own staff to carry on the specialized functions required in this new type of cooperative effort. It would be unfortunate if too much of the work were turned over to other government agencies, as it often has been in past programs. The full authority for operation of bilateral technical cooperation should be left with the ICA, although

the resources of other agencies should be drawn upon when appropriate.

The ICA was given responsibility for administering economic aid as well as technical cooperation programs. This could cause continued administrative confusion if the separate purposes of each type of program were not clearly recognized and defined. Technical cooperation programs can increase the effectiveness of economic aid, but they should be clearly distinguished from programs providing direct capital grants, loans, or materials for economic development. Technical cooperation is a joint undertaking of sovereign governments and the U. S. officials should guard against any hint of a "colonial" attitude.

In setting its administrative house in order, the Washington headquarters office should delegate to its staff in host countries broad authority in program making and execution. This is essential if true mutuality with the host governments is to be promoted. Without such delegation of authority, it will be impossible readily and efficiently to adjust operations to the differing conditions and requirements of the many host countries. We believe it urgent that the U. S. administrative structure and procedures for bilateral technical cooperation begin in the field and work back to the U. S. headquarters in Washington. Taking this approach, we present our views in this order:

- The instruments which have proved most useful for administering different types of technical cooperation tasks and other elements which should be considered at the planning stage.
- The type of administrative structure for bilateral technical cooperation in the host country which seems most likely to achieve efficiency and adaptability to the variety of programs and regions.
- The type of administrative structure in the U. S. headquarters office in Washington which can best provide the policy directives and technical guidance required by U. S. staffs in host countries.
- Finally, and importantly, ways to overcome a problem which has been a basic weakness—the lack of an adequate reservoir of personnel willing to and capable of performing the demanding but rewarding job of technical cooperation.

We wish to point out that U. S. administrative improvements alone cannot solve all of the current problems in bilateral programs. It is the host government which initiates requests for technical cooperation; it shares the expense and responsibility for operating programs. And it is the host government which eventually must take over programs and see that the new seeds of skills and technologies grow and flourish throughout its country. Consequently, we have some suggestions to make to the host governments, which we believe will improve joint

operations in these cooperative programs. We hope that if the U. S. technical cooperation policies are more clearly stated, if improved procedures are adopted, and if administrative arrangements are stabilized, the host governments will be stimulated to make matching efforts.

## II.

# Planning Programs and Choosing Administrative Devices in the Host Country

A MAJOR WEAKNESS in the administrative structure of bilateral technical cooperation agencies has been the failure to provide adequately for planning new programs. Starts have been made in strengthening this basic function, but progress has been uneven and in no country has it been rapid enough.

The officials planning bilateral programs of technical cooperation need to take into consideration private business activities and investments in factories, assembly plants, mines, merchandising facilities, and other commercial operations. Their plans also should be tied into the host government's regular activities and the operations undertaken with loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Export-Import Bank, and economic aid from other sources. Plans for the bilateral programs need to take account of the current and proposed technical assistance programs of the OAS, the UN and its specialized agencies, and of foundations, religious groups, and other private organizations. And, finally, decisions on each bilateral program and project will be affected not only by the physical, economic, and social facts of existing situations, but also by the personalities, specialized interests, and abilities of the host officials.

Once the need for a program in a particular field is established and its general purposes agreed to by the U. S. and host officials, there are a number of important decisions to be made at the planning stage. A very important one is the administrative device most suitable for implementing the program. Other important results of the planning process involve the timing of particular types of programs; the centralization or decentralization of administration; the relative merits of concentration of programs in one area or dispersal throughout the country; the provision of training opportunities in each program; acquiring basic data and keeping adequate records; and assuring the periodic review of programs.

## ADMINISTRATIVE DEVICES FOR BILATERAL PROGRAMS

IT IS NOT EASY to devise machinery that will stimulate the use of new technology, train technicians and administrators, and make institutional improvements—all in a number of functional fields. Technical cooperation requires an extraordinary amount of patience, judgment, willingness to compromise, and ability to improvise on the part of the U. S. field staff and officials of the host governments. A variety of mechanisms has been developed for administering the bilateral programs.

Some weaknesses and strengths of these different devices are evaluated here to indicate the reasons for some of our conclusions and recommendations on the kind of U. S. administrative structure required for bilateral programs.

### *The Servicio*

The most widely used administrative device for achieving the goals of bilateral technical cooperation in Latin America has been the *servicio*. This is a special agency, created by the government of the host country to administer a cooperative program. The usefulness of the *servicio* depends largely upon the scope of the program, the field of operation, and the pattern of governmental structure and administration in the host country. In 1955, there were 44 *servicios* in Latin America which were operating either bilateral agricultural, health, or educational programs; six were operating in other fields. So far, no *servicio* has been used for public administration programs; and there are many small or short-term programs which have not warranted the use of the *servicio*.

Different arrangements are found in each *servicio*, because of variations in local laws, the purposes to be served, and the personalities of U. S. and host officials. However, it is possible to describe the way they usually have been set up for bilateral operations.

The start is always a formal agreement between the United States and the host government on a technical cooperation program in a particular field. The host government agrees to establish a *servicio* as part of its appropriate ministry. The *servicio* acts as a special bureau of the ministry, but is semiautonomous, and has the power to establish its own administrative procedures, including the employment and dismissal of its own staff. The chief of the U. S. technical mission for the particular program usually is director of the *servicio* (but sometimes he is codirector). In that capacity, he is answerable to the host

minister, but as chief of the technical mission, he is also responsible to his superiors in the U. S. government.

The servicio is jointly financed by the host country and the U. S. government, either of which can withdraw from the arrangement under specified conditions. This joint financing assures a mutual voice on how the money shall be spent, but, as the servicio's work progresses, the contributions of the host country usually have increased in relation to those of the U. S. government. The staff of a servicio usually includes several members of the appropriate U. S. technical mission, but most employees are nationals recruited within the host country.

Ideally, the bilateral agreement should cover only the broad objectives of the work to be done by the servicio—whether it is a program in health, agriculture, or some other field. The servicio itself should have the responsibility for setting up specific projects to be undertaken in carrying out the over-all program. This procedure permits the ready initiation of new projects, the transfer of old ones when they reach a point where the host government can carry them forward, or the discontinuation of some by mutual consent. The servicio in this way can be preserved as an operating device which can respond quickly to emerging needs for new technical cooperation projects in its particular field.

One of the strongest points of a well administered servicio is the fact that U. S. personnel assist their hosts by working with them daily, over a long period of time, in the same organization on completely shared tasks. The servicio is a training ground for Latin American administrators and technicians. At the same time, the work of the U. S. employees becomes more effective as they gain a deeper insight into the problems and customs of the host country through daily and intimate contact with the nationals. On the other hand, there are weak points in this device. There have been cases where this semiautonomous mechanism has encouraged foreign technicians and administrators to dominate the programs, to by-pass and compete with the ministry of which it is a part, and to withhold too long the transfer of successful joint projects to the appropriate domestic agency.

Our conclusion is that the servicio is an effective method of operation for many, but not all, bilateral programs in Latin America. We believe that the strengths of the servicios are greater than their weaknesses, and that the pitfalls can be avoided, if they are clearly recognized by officials of the U. S. and host countries. The semiautonomous nature of the servicio allows creative administrative innovation, and the servicio should retain this right to demonstrate new and improved procedures.

The tendency toward U. S. domination of servicios can be avoided by special efforts to draw the host minister and his staff into full and active participation at all stages in the operation. Not only is such participation necessary to assure a cooperative operation, but also it should result in the introduction of better procedures throughout the parent ministry. The semiautonomous status is a further asset in that the servicio can continue work on a stable basis even when there are frequent changes of government.

Hundreds of bilateral projects initiated by the servicios have been transferred from servicios to parent ministries, but it seems clear that many transfers have been too long postponed. It is not always easy, however, to determine just when the proper stage for transfer is reached. The continuing goal should be to transfer projects when they are in full operation and when a sufficient number of nationals has received enough basic training to operate them—even if in some cases it is necessary for the servicio to continue contact and provide advice for a while. In all cases, it is important to differentiate between transfer of the servicio itself, which usually is needed through the entire life of a cooperative program, and a project which is only part of the program.

### *The Operating Mission*

For some purposes, the operating mission is more appropriate than the more formal servicio, and it is effectively used for a variety of programs in Latin America. An operating mission—in any of several fields—helps officials of the host government in expanding or initiating a program which is to be continued by that government. An operating mission, for example, may help extend public health services or help set up a program of agricultural research. The minister of the host government retains complete administrative authority and direction over the program, but the U. S. mission works continuously with him and his staff in getting the program started. Thus, like the servicio, the operating mission is a joint activity.

A difference between the operating mission and the servicio lies in the fact that the former is a more flexible device, which is especially well adapted to many short-term operations involved in bilateral programs. It is particularly suited to specialized tasks where the host government is attempting to improve a substantial program of its own and has a going organization which can readily take on new functions. There is thus little tendency for such a mission to become a U. S.-dominated operation. On the other hand, the operating mission

is less able than the *servicio* to induce the host government to make adequate financial contributions to the program, to demonstrate new procedures, or to insure continuity of programs.

### *The Advisory Mission*

Unlike operating missions, the advisory mission only counsels and instructs officials of a host government or other entity on a stipulated set of problems in a particular field. It has no part in helping to put recommendations into effect. Advisory missions can make a real contribution when they are called in to consult on a specific problem in an over-all program which the host government otherwise is carrying forward competently. Even under such circumstances, there is some danger that the advisory mission will make its recommendations without sufficiently close relations to the officials of the host government. Too often advisory missions have worked for a short period on a report, which they have left to be interpreted and put into effect by officials who have had little contact with the mission. The U. S. programs, constantly seeking more mutuality of operations, have used fewer advisory missions than operating missions, and the trend is away from them. However, the value of an advisory mission can be increased considerably if it remains to help in carrying out its recommendations—either with the host ministry or in a *servicio*, or if it is succeeded by an operating mission.

### *University Contracts*

One of the newest instruments used in bilateral programs of technical cooperation is the university contract. We presented our views on such contracts in *The Role of Universities in Technical Cooperation* issued in July 1955. At that time, we called attention to two forms of university contracts now used in bilateral programs. The differences between these two types of university contracts should be recognized and their relative merits more thoroughly studied.

Under one contractual arrangement a university renders professional services in a segment of a program jointly administered by the U. S. and host governments. The university personnel, like that of any other private contractor, is directed and supervised by the U. S. or host government. In our opinion, this form of university contract should only be used when the project is uniquely related to the university's activities in the United States. In the majority of cases, such contracts should be made with other qualified specialists to avoid draining scarce talent from the U. S. universities.

A greater contribution to the goals of technical cooperation can be made through the second form of contract—university-to-university cooperation. Under this more promising type of arrangement, bilateral funds finance a program in which a U. S. university cooperates with the host university in developing training and research centers adequate to serve the needs of the host country.

Several of our earlier recommendations for improvement of university-to-university contracts were made to the universities themselves. Some, however, would require action by government administrators of the bilateral programs. There should be more careful selection of the U. S. university in order to assure that it is well qualified in the fields of activity or professions concerned. The U. S. and host governments should insist that the cooperating universities work out advance agreements which contain clear statements on the scope of the joint activity, on its relationship to the long-range needs of the country, and on the respective roles of each university. Sufficient funds should be provided to cover a period long enough to assure that the agreed-upon task can be completed. The U. S. government should grant to contracting institutions more autonomy for planning and conducting university-to-university programs than exists in most current arrangements. The U. S. personnel should be employees of their own university; U. S. field officers should have no administrative authority over them. However, the U. S. field officers should be kept informed of the interuniversity activities at all stages so that they can evaluate progress and promote integration with other technical cooperation programs. And, of course, the U. S. embassy should be informed of their presence and general activity.

### *Other Private Contracts*

More use should be made in the joint operating programs of contracts with private organizations to perform specific services in a wide variety of fields. Experience shows that private concerns, for a fee, have performed well in a number of bilateral programs—ranging from planning a railway system to administering rural credit and community development programs. They have undertaken such assignments as training mechanics, organizing training centers, making surveys, mapping, and various other specialized work. These private contracts draw into the program skilled personnel who may not be available for regular government employment. Sometimes, the representatives of private U. S. concerns and groups are more readily accepted in the host country than U. S. government employees, because there is less

implication that another government may be attempting to impose its views on a sovereign people. Also, the reputation and prestige of particular organizations have a bearing on the cooperation forthcoming from host personnel.

### *Training Nationals*

From the beginning of the bilateral programs of technical cooperation, wide use has been made of grants from bilateral funds for study, training, and observation abroad. Since 1941, approximately 8,000 nationals of Latin American countries have received grants for study and observation in the United States. A large portion of these have entered colleges or universities for study, usually at the graduate level. Pending establishment of more types of specialized university instruction and training centers in Latin America, the technical cooperation programs should continue to rely heavily on trainee programs for technicians, teachers, administrators, and government officers. There is general agreement that trainee programs have been effective and should be continued, but these programs have offered a number of difficult, unresolved administrative problems.

Since we presented our views on some of these problems in our earlier report, *The Role of Universities in Technical Cooperation*, we only list here a few steps which administrators of bilateral programs should take.

- The types of training most needed in the host country and the length and content of the training programs should be defined more clearly than at present.
- Criteria for more careful selection of trainees need to be developed and more orderly methods for making the selections devised.
- For those who undertake academic study, the amount and kind of training—including the English language—required to enable the trainee to take full advantage of study abroad should be determined, and only those with the requisite training should be chosen.
- The stage of development in the trainee's own country should be taken into consideration when choosing the institution to which he is to be sent and the course of study he will pursue. The knowledge and skills he acquires should be those which can be put to practical use in developmental programs. Not all should be sent to the United States, and not all who come to the United States should enter college. Special Latin American training centers often should be used to teach the industrial, agricultural, or governmental processes which are most applicable to the host countries' needs. The choice of the institution should be made on the basis of its

experience with trainees and other students from particular sections of Latin America.

- Universities should be encouraged to assign instructors who have travelled and worked in the host country to teach trainees from abroad. And U. S. technicians who have served abroad in technical cooperation programs should be used as much as possible as training supervisors.
- More attention should be given to arrangements for the trainees' reception on arrival; living quarters; relations with other students and faculty advisers; the organization and conduct of study tours; and the amounts to be paid to the university, methods of payment, and ways of speeding up administrative procedures generally.

Another device for training nationals is the teaching mission. Such technical assistance—little used in the bilateral programs—takes several forms and was the forerunner of the university-to-university programs. One form is to have a visiting professor teach in a Latin American university or in an educational foundation or research center. Another is to have the visiting professor participate in seminars or workshops or some other type of training center. Such arrangements—like advisory missions—require clear definition of the purpose and scope of the mission, adequate preparation for working facilities, and cooperation with appropriate sponsors of the program.

## **ELEMENTS OF PROGRAM PLANNING**

A PREREQUISITE of any plan is agreement on a goal. In planning for bilateral technical cooperation the long-range objective is the promotion of economic growth and improvement of levels of living within an ever-broadening democratic framework. The contribution of technical cooperation to this objective is the introduction of new knowledge and skills through improved institutions, so that they can be absorbed as quickly as possible throughout the country. A number of elements enter into final decisions on the size and form of this complex operation.

### *The Timing of Programs*

The administration of bilateral cooperation should provide for the preparation and continuous review of both annual and long-range plans. Those planning bilateral programs should draw up a working outline, with time targets for a number of years ahead, of the kind of technical cooperation projects and programs which would facilitate progress in the economic and social development of the host country.

The precise number of years covered by such plans is considerably less important than that they be flexible enough to change with the country's developmental plans and programs. Also, the bilateral programs should be so timed that they are undertaken as far in advance of related developmental programs as possible. In that way, the new skills and processes introduced by bilateral programs can be brought to bear on the more important private and public developmental projects, and their benefits be spread more widely.

The fact that it will be years—sometimes a generation or more—before the full effects of most technical cooperation programs are felt often stresses the importance of projects which will make an immediate and continuing impact on the host people. There are so many needs in all of the Latin American countries that it will not be difficult to find productive projects having immediate impact. Annual plans not only should spell out in some detail the current steps to be taken in long-term programs, but also might include a number of worthwhile short-term projects. If such projects appeal to the host government and people of the area, they can create invaluable confidence in, and enthusiasm for, the long-range bilateral programs.

### *Decentralization of Administration in the Host Country*

In recent years, a few bilateral programs of technical cooperation have involved the participation of state, provincial, or municipal governments in Latin America. There are several arguments in favor of a greater decentralization of authority in the bilateral programs. One is that almost every Latin American country has distinct and markedly different regions. Often the regions which are most remote from the capital have the greatest need for technical cooperation programs. Another is the fact that the delegation of greater authority to state, provincial, and municipal governments will strengthen those bodies and will stimulate a wider dissemination of skills and technology in such fields as agriculture, health, education, and administration.

Even within the national governments, the bilateral programs are weakened by the fact that many of the competent government officials in central ministries are not given enough discretionary responsibility to do the kind of creative jobs for which they are fitted. We recommend to the Latin American governments that they increase their efforts to delegate more authority within the ministries and more responsibility for technical cooperation programs to the states, provinces, and municipalities.

### *Area Concentration Plans*

The advantages of dispersing bilateral programs and projects throughout a country must be weighed against those of concentration within a more limited area. The U. S. and host officials will need to decide whether a bilateral program can make a greater impact if a substantial part of the available funds and personnel are focused on a single area. An interesting experiment in area concentration, called Plan Chillan, is being undertaken in Chile. This program warrants careful consideration by administrators of bilateral programs elsewhere.

In Chile, a model area has been chosen in which about 70 percent of the U. S. funds and personnel available for technical cooperation programs in Chile now is being spent. At administrative headquarters in Chillan (well away from the nation's capital), a Chilean coordinates the projects and programs carried forward by the different U. S. missions and host officials. The central ministries of agriculture, health, public works, lands and colonies, and the Chilean Development Corporation, are all cooperating in the area program. Several UN agencies are establishing projects in the area and efforts to stimulate other activities in the area are meeting with success.

There are interesting elements in this experiment. It promotes administrative coordination of the many technicians working on different projects. Program planning for a limited area is more manageable than for the whole country. One danger, however, is that the enthusiasm for the concentrated program may lead to the withdrawal of support for useful programs outside the area which should not be dropped.

### *Strengthening Training Institutions*

Every proposed technical cooperation project and program should be measured against a training yardstick. Projects important for other reasons should be designed so that they will be good instruments for developing high-grade technicians and administrators. This is in addition to study abroad and other direct educational programs.

### *Data for Program Planning*

Data showing the present economic and social status of Latin American countries, which are needed in planning technical cooperation programs, often are incomplete. Furthermore, most of the countries have not yet formulated long-range programs for economic and social development, which should provide the framework for technical cooperation programs.

Broad country surveys have not been undertaken by bilateral programs. However, the World Bank has made a number of them as a preliminary to deciding on applications for loans, and the UN has made some. Where these are available, they provide background which is useful in defining the problems and priorities of bilateral technical cooperation programs.

In many situations, it may be important for bilateral technical cooperation programs to help improve the techniques used by the host government in continuously collecting and analyzing current data and in formulating and adapting developmental programs. The absence of adequate data, however, should not provide an excuse for delaying the planning needed for bilateral technical cooperation programs. The planning process should be continuous, with revisions and modifications made in the light of new information or added experience.

### *Reporting and Evaluation*

Program planning has been seriously hampered by insufficient records, and by the lack of a system for evaluating procedures and the results of programs. Each project should be evaluated periodically in such a way that its lessons can be widely applied. The form in which records are to be kept should be fitted into a pattern for all bilateral programs so that they can be of greatest use to administrators in the U. S. headquarters office and in the host governments, as well as to all of the field staff working in related programs. Other reporting and informational aspects of technical cooperation programs also have been largely overlooked. Methods to gain widespread awareness and support of the programs and the active participation of as many nationals as possible should be included as an organizational part of all programs.

### III.

## Administrative Structure in the Host Country and the United States

EVERY MAJOR PHASE of operations in the bilateral technical co-operation program has been adversely affected by the periodic administrative reorganizations at headquarters in the United States. To some extent, this trial-and-error period in technical cooperation was to be expected. It is natural that with a new type of organized relationship between sovereign governments there should be some stumbling, some advances, some retreats. It is hard to set up a neat administrative organization for a program which touches almost every aspect of national life in the host country. The difficulties, however, are by no means insurmountable.

The field staff requires operating flexibility, able personnel, and the necessary equipment and supplies. We believe the new ICA should promptly take steps more adequately to meet these needs. In taking our bearings on the administrative structure for bilateral cooperation, we thus start with the structure in the host country and move to the headquarters office in the United States.

#### AN INTEGRATED COUNTRY STAFF

THE NEED FOR INTEGRATION of technical cooperation activities in the host countries became clearer as the size and number of programs increased. In every host country, all U. S. technical cooperation activities in each broad field—agriculture, education, health, industry, etc.—are headed by a chief of technical mission. Each chief of technical mission is fully responsible for supervising all U. S. technical cooperation personnel and for administering all programs and projects which make up the broad program in his field. Until 1951, he dealt directly with Washington on all phases of his operations, and there was no formal coordinating mechanism for the various U. S. technical missions in a host country. The extent of consultation and cooperation among the technical missions varied widely, depending upon the inclinations of individual chiefs of the

missions. There often was confusion on policies, purposes, and priorities of the different programs in which the United States was participating in a host country.

During 1951, the U. S. government began to organize a unified country team. A country director was appointed to coordinate all U. S. technical cooperation activities in the host country and a country program planning committee was established. The results, so far, have been uneven, but we believe that the system envisioned in 1951 is good and that it should be retained. However, the functions and lines of authority of country directors and chiefs of technical missions should be more clearly defined as a forerunner to insisting that the improved structure be put into effect promptly in all host countries.

In re-examining the structure of country staffs, the ICA should consider two problems which have caused confusion and conflict in many host countries.

- The introduction of a country director of technical cooperation in some cases has interfered with the intimate, continuing relations between the chiefs of technical missions and the host government ministers and other officers with whom they must cooperate.
- Some country directors have been appointed on a political basis despite their lack of special qualifications for leadership in technical cooperation.

Experience in some countries has demonstrated that a clear recognition of these difficulties and proper precautions to avoid them can make the integrated country system work effectively.

### *The Country Director*

The purpose of the country director of technical cooperation is to furnish leadership for all U. S. programs in a host country; not to direct and administer all of the intricate details of the different missions' programs and projects. He is primarily responsible for assuring that all bilateral programs fit into the country's broad program of economic development—both in his position as country director and as chairman of the program planning committee. At the same time, he is responsible for seeing that the bilateral programs in the host country are being planned and operated in line with the intent of Congress and the broad policy outlined by the ICA.

An important function of the country director is to free chiefs of the technical missions of onerous and time-consuming administrative tasks. The country director can carry the major burden for contact with the headquarters office. He can follow up and expedite attention

to requests for additional technicians or necessary materials and equipment. He can work out budgetary allocations, report on progress in various projects, and take care of administrative housekeeping generally. A country director who is familiar with the host government and its officials and who can provide an operating base with adequate working facilities can smooth the way for all projects and programs, including those of a short-term nature.

The country director has a difficult and delicate human relations job with personnel of the technical missions, the host government, the U. S. embassy, and with officials in the Washington headquarters. He should be thoroughly familiar with the country, be experienced in technical cooperation activities, and have the professional competence necessary to understand the varied activities underway or contemplated in the host country. Some country directors have demonstrated an extraordinary ability in both human relations and professional skills, but this is not uniformly true. A number of political appointments of poorly qualified directors was made after 1952. We recommend that all country directors be appointed solely on the basis of their qualifications for this ticklish and important position. The unsuccessful directors have not been solely to blame when their work has caused confusion. The position has never been as clearly defined as it should be. We believe it should be clarified without further delay.

We have considered the possibility of combining the posts of country director for technical cooperation and of economic counselor to the U. S. embassy. In Europe, where the economic aid program has been reduced materially, a move similar to this has been made. The requirements for an expanding program of technical cooperation, however, are different from those involved in the curtailed European economic aid program. We believe that the post of country director for technical cooperation should be continued apart from that of the economic counselor. The country director has an operating and administrative function, whereas the economic counselor is primarily concerned with gathering and reporting information.

### *Chiefs of Technical Missions*

Before the country directors were appointed, there was no question that the chief of each technical mission should deal directly with the appropriate minister and his principal assistants in all stages of his program. He had the prestige of being the top U. S. administrator in the country for programs and projects in his particular field. In some instances, the advent of country directors confused this subtle relation-

ship, and hindered rather than helped the smooth operation of the programs. We urge that the position of chief of technical mission—like that of the country director—be redefined to state unequivocally the necessity that he should maintain a direct working relationship with the operating minister in the host government.

The cooperative effort in each broad program is centered in the chief of technical mission. Project agreements should be planned, negotiated, and signed by him and the appropriate minister in the host country. As director or codirector of a servicio, many of the chiefs of technical missions share with their corresponding ministers the executive direction of technical cooperation programs. If they are subjected to excessive supervision by others, their influence in those relationships will be markedly reduced.

In some countries, an effort to combat this problem has been made through appointment of the chief of one of the technical missions to serve simultaneously as a country director. This practice has emphasized the importance of all technical mission chiefs, and has worked well in some cases. As new programs have been added, however, there has been a tendency to appoint generalists as country directors and to leave mission chiefs to concentrate on their particular programs. Experience with both types of appointees indicates that the controlling factor is the competence and experience of the individual appointee rather than the greater value of one or the other of these two methods.

### *Relations with the U. S. Embassy*

The U. S. ambassadors have been made responsible for assuring “the unified development and execution” of technical cooperation programs in the countries to which they are accredited, as part of their responsibility for everything done in the name of the U. S. government in those countries. This requires an administrative structure which will permit good relationships between the U. S. ambassador and the technical cooperation staff. At the same time, the structure should not be one which will involve the ambassador in the kind of internal affairs of the host country with which technical cooperation programs necessarily are concerned.

The working relationships between the technical cooperation personnel and embassy staff quite naturally vary widely from country to country. They are affected not only by the size of the country, and thus the frequency of contacts, but also by the length of service in the host country of the ambassador or of the country director and

chiefs of missions. In our opinion, however, the following pattern would be desirable:

The country director should be subject to the ambassador on all major questions of policy, but should remain free to serve as the principal executive officer of the program. The country director should operate under the general directions of his superiors in ICA, and should report directly to Washington, without detailed supervision by the ambassador. The country director should keep the ambassador and the principal embassy officers fully informed on all that goes on in the programs.

The ambassador should acquaint the top officials and people of the host country with his government's attitude toward the purposes and policies of the bilateral program, and should support the programs wholeheartedly. He should offer suggestions to U. S. personnel that grow out of his special experience and knowledge of the country. He should retain the right to halt any operation which he believes may threaten the interests of the United States until any issues concerning the operation are settled locally or in Washington. On the other hand, the ambassador should not be embarrassed in the performance of his regular duties by having to resolve program or policy differences between representatives of the host government and U. S. technical cooperation personnel.

The economic counselor and the embassy attachés in functional fields often can make important contributions to technical cooperation programs and they should be consulted on projects in their fields. However, nothing should be done to create the impression that the technical cooperation program is designed to serve the short-term political and commercial policies of the U. S. government with which the embassy staff is legitimately concerned. The zeal of the embassy staff for particular trade or economic programs for which it may be currently responsible should not be permitted to steer technical cooperation programs away from their appropriate long-range goals.

### *U. S. Country Planning Committee*

The brief recital in Chapter II of the interlocking elements to be considered in planning bilateral programs can leave no doubt that planning for technical cooperation programs should take place in the host countries. The U. S. field staff should be free to plan bilateral programs jointly with host officials within broad guiding lines established by the ICA.

The system of country planning committees, begun during 1951, is

supposed to operate something like this. The country director is chairman of the committee, which is composed of the chiefs of technical missions. A program officer provides special services to the committee, but has no independent authority for program planning. Each technical mission is responsible for developing preliminary plans in its field for submission to the committee. The committee considers the interrelationships of the separate proposals, and consults with the proper host officials in deciding what adjustments are necessary. As part of its planning activity, the committee recommends appropriate budgets for all U. S. technical cooperation activities in the host country.

In countries where influential U. S. employees recognized the need for broader planning, country planning committees have worked reasonably well. In other countries, where technical missions have been reluctant to change their established habits of independent operation, there is little evidence that program planning geared to the host country's over-all needs for long-range development is being seriously pursued. Too often, the U. S. country committees have planned in a vacuum because of ineffective liaison with other technical cooperation activities and related domestic programs. We recommend that the system of U. S. country planning committees already developed be retained, and that they be strengthened in all countries.

Procedures should be flexible enough to fit the conditions in each country. However, only U. S. government personnel should serve on the committee, since it is there that the considered position of the U. S. government is formulated. One or more officers of the U. S. embassy in the host country probably should attend meetings of the committee.

### *Host Country Planning Committee*

The dominant partner in technical cooperation always is the host government, which must request assistance before any program is initiated and be ready to take it over at an appropriate time. Experience to date supports the conclusion that on the side of the host government some kind of structure for planning technical cooperation programs also is needed.

Each country should shape such a planning structure to fit its particular governmental form and customs. However, a technical cooperation planning committee or agency probably should include top officials from ministries of agriculture, education, finance, health, industry, and in some cases foreign affairs. It also would be desirable, whenever possible, for the host government to develop ways to draw

upon the experience of the country's nongovernmental institutions—profit-making as well as nonprofit—in making technical cooperation plans. A planning committee should be served by a small full-time staff. It should keep informed on the status of all technical cooperation activities—whether bilateral, multilateral, or private—in the country. At the same time, it should continuously consider all available information on the country's long-range development programs which would affect plans for technical cooperation. The planning committee should not have authority for final acceptance or rejection of proposed projects.

In addition to considering and coordinating suggestions of the separate ministries for new technical cooperation projects, the host government's planning committee would have several important roles. It might be an appropriate body to help expedite the transfer of projects so that new bilateral activities could be added, and to review progress in absorbing transferred projects into regular government ministries. It might offer suggestions on ways the host government could modify its own structure so that it could better handle new types of programs. And it could have a wholesome effect in stimulating experimentation and innovation and in re-evaluating the relationship of technical cooperation to developmental processes.

### *Joint Planning and Coordination in the Host Country*

The complexity of elements entering into program planning and the variety of agencies and devices available for technical cooperation inevitably lead to a recommendation for some form of joint consultation. The U. S. technical cooperation staff and the host government officials need to make preliminary plans separately for their own guidance, but such plans should be flexible until there has been an opportunity for joint discussion.

We recommend that some form of joint consultative procedures for public agencies in technical cooperation programs be established in each country. We do not make detailed suggestions on the procedures or on the degree of formality. These are matters which depend upon the number and size and type of technical cooperation programs and agencies in each country. However, it is desirable that consultation be on a sufficiently formal basis so that the U. S. and host country planning committees will meet together regularly, with agenda covering a broad range of subjects of mutual concern to all participants.

We are not directly concerned in this interim report with the administration of the technical assistance programs of the UN and its specialized agencies or of the OAS. However, the reasons for

strengthening planning processes apply to the multilateral programs as well as to those of the U. S. and host governments. We believe that the participation of the international agencies in joint consultative procedures would make both their own activities and the bilateral programs more productive. Lines of communication with private technical cooperation groups in the host country also should be established and their views sought.

Aside from the usual benefits to be gained from a cross-fertilization of ideas among specialists with varied backgrounds and skills, the host government officials would gain some very tangible benefits. Prior discussion can often affect the form in which the host government makes a request for assistance, and may result in the proposal's more ready acceptance. Many ministers in host governments are spending much of their time with the officials of one or the other agencies of technical cooperation. The opportunity to condense such discussions in meetings which are attended by responsible representatives of all the technical cooperation agencies will permit them to spend more time in improving the administrative procedures and programs of their ministries. The evaluation of technical cooperation projects in relation to long-range developmental programs will help to keep before each minister the problems upon which his ministry must concentrate. And, importantly, in these joint meetings all of the participants can develop better understanding of mutual problems.

## ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE IN WASHINGTON

NOW THAT THE ICA has semiautonomous status in a permanent department, the agency can set its administrative house in order. If the administrative structure at headquarters is to serve the purposes of technical cooperation effectively and continuously, several long-standing problems will need to be resolved.

- The first of these is an unsolved conflict over the extent of authority which should be delegated to the field staff as opposed to that retained in the headquarters office.
- Another is the inadequacy of the administrative services and technical guidance provided for the field staff.
- A mechanism is necessary to assure closer, continuing relations with the UN, the OAS, and private technical cooperation groups.
- Improved methods of recruiting, training, and retaining competent technical cooperation personnel are urgently required. (This is such an important and far-reaching problem that it is discussed separately in Chapter IV.)

Enough is known from experience in predecessor agencies to permit the early solution of all these problems.

### *The Delegation of Authority*

Few observers of technical cooperation programs will deny that the delegation of broad authority to field officers is a prerequisite for effective programs. Some of the disagreement on the extent of authority to be delegated grows out of the basic fact that no headquarters office can abdicate its final responsibility for the operation of all its programs. But the greatest amount of conflict has resulted from the tendency of some headquarters staff members to concede the theory that more authority should be delegated to the field, but to deny it in practice. Too often, staff members at headquarters have become so obsessed with problems faced in Washington that they have lost sight of the impact of their instructions on the widely differing activities within the host countries.

In our opinion, the important function of the headquarters office is to provide guidance and establish standards for carrying out the broad policy directions of Congress and the Executive Branch. The Washington office is aware of developments on Capitol Hill, in the White House, and in the Bureau of the Budget, about which field officers must be informed. Annual appropriations may impose new legal demands which headquarters lawyers should interpret. The staff in Washington can keep informed on new technical developments and those that have worked effectively in various areas of the world. The Washington staff, physically and emotionally remote from a particular project, may be able to suggest solutions to problems which the field staff and host government officials might overlook. It is up to the Washington staff, too, to assure that new country directors and chiefs of technical missions are made aware of mistakes in earlier programs which should not be repeated.

In short, once broad policies are determined, the Washington staff should provide guidance rather than mandatory instructions. It should define problems, describe alternatives, and delegate decision-making to the field.

A first and important step which ICA should take is to discard the requirement, introduced by its predecessor, the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), that every project agreement, negotiated by chiefs of technical missions and ministers of a host country, should be sent to Washington for approval before the project can be initiated. The headquarters office should continue to play an important role in the

development and approval of broad bilateral program agreements, which have the status of formal agreements between governments. Special consideration should be given to methods of promptly reviewing and advising on all of the program plans made in the host country. However, ministers and field officers should be left free to negotiate and sign project agreements, drawn up within the confines of the provisions and budgets contained in the program agreements. On these, prior approval by the headquarters office is not necessary. The initiation, modification, and termination of projects can be done more quickly and efficiently in the field than in Washington. If all executed project agreements are sent to Washington for information and subsequent review, there will be adequate opportunity for the headquarters staff to suggest adjustments and improvements.

### *Supervising Field Operations*

The field staff for technical cooperation needs far more administrative service and technical guidance from the Washington office than it has had in the past. And it needs a somewhat different kind of service.

Country directors and chiefs of technical missions necessarily have to send a stream of letters and cables to Washington asking questions and soliciting administrative services. (It might be noted, in this connection, that a clarification of policies and of the powers of field officers might result in a substantial reduction in the volume of such inquiries.) They need prompt answers to questions on program and policy, budgets and expenditures, and to requests for personnel and for equipment and machinery. The replies are likely to require many clearances and consultations, and often are needed in a hurry to avoid inaction in the projects. It is important that each country director be able to deal with a single official at headquarters who knows the history of the major problems in the program and the over-all problems of the host country. At the same time, the field staff needs more technical backstopping on a wide range of activities. In order to provide this, the headquarters personnel must include technicians who are professionally competent to criticize and evaluate work in health, education, agriculture, public administration, engineering, and other fields. And, preferably, the technicians in the headquarters office should have had some experience in the field.

The forerunners of ICA tried to meet these needs in various ways, none of them foolproof. However, the experience of the last 15 years shows that field operations work best when they are supervised and served through both geographical and functional units. We believe that

the long operating history of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs and the good reputation it enjoys are sound reasons for continuing its use as the regional arm for technical cooperation in Latin America. The IIAA should have both country and functional divisions to provide the services required by the field staff. Generally speaking, it would seem desirable for the officer on the country desk to receive all incoming communications and be responsible for consulting technical divisions and expediting replies. The technical staff should do more than answer specific questions brought to it; it should initiate program guidance documents and assist in other ways at every stage of operations. Because the work of the two units is so intertwined, there is some danger that the functional units will be sidetracked and that some tensions may be created. But given firm and clear-cut direction from top ICA officials and some stability in the administrative agency, such tensions should yield to the habits of working together in expediting the progress of the field operations.

### *A Technical Cooperation Clearing House*

Bilateral technical cooperation could gain from an increased exchange of information with administrators of other public agencies and of private groups. We believe that they should work more closely together in determining the roles which each can fill most effectively, in planning and launching their respective programs, and in appraising their effectiveness. Our recommendation is that a technical cooperation clearing house be created in the United States to facilitate the transfer of experience among both private groups and public agencies. We believe the clearing house should be supported by foundation grants and by contributions from participating groups, and feel that it should not be dominated by the public agencies. The number of private groups in technical cooperation is increasing rapidly. Both they and the public agencies will mutually benefit from an orderly and continuing means for achieving a meeting of minds.

## IV.

### Personnel Recruitment — A Major Administrative Problem

OVER AND OVER, discussions of technical cooperation lead finally to this kind of remark: "After all, success or failure in technical cooperation boils down to the quality of personnel." This, we believe, is a true statement and, under present circumstances, a discouraging one. One of the most serious and continuing problems in technical cooperation has been to find, train, and keep qualified technicians and administrators who will serve abroad. The size and persistence of this problem is in large part a product of the organizational instability of the whole program.

Considering the many factors which have discouraged entry into this field, it is surprising to discover the number of dedicated administrative and professional employees both in Washington and in the field who have entered the work, stayed with it, and contributed to the success of technical cooperation programs. Many of these veterans in a relatively new type of activity have made very real personal sacrifices to continue programs under difficult circumstances. They have been largely responsible for keeping alive the faith in this type of cooperation as a practical means for accelerating economic and social development and better living standards in underdeveloped countries. One reason, we believe, is that they know so well that experience and continuity of service are vital to the success of the programs which they have helped to start.

Outside this nucleus of long-service employees, most of the administrative and professional employees engaged in technical cooperation come and go after short tours of duty. Many who would like to enter this field cannot afford to take a chance on its impermanence. The gap between the supply and the demand for technical cooperation employees is steadily widening and little is being done to close this gap by better personnel policies or improved training programs. We believe this is a problem which should be attacked promptly and vigorously by the ICA.

This problem is not only recognized by those who have struggled

with it in the successive U. S. agencies, but many Latin Americans have expressed their concern. They believe that much greater care should be exercised in selecting U. S. technicians. They feel that in too many instances they have received "incompetents who would not be missed," rather than persons who were both skilled technicians and sensitive individuals, up to the difficult task of technical cooperation. They believe that it is unwise to transfer personnel from one country to another too frequently. Once a technician has gained an acquaintance with conditions in one country, they say, he should be allowed to remain there for a considerable time.

### THE SIZE AND CAUSES OF THE PERSONNEL PROBLEM

SOME OF THE QUALITIES which a technical cooperation employee should have in addition to his technical experience and skills were described in our report on *The Role of Universities in Technical Cooperation*. He should be acquainted with and sympathetic to the traditions and culture of the host country and should speak the language of his hosts, understand the characteristics of the people and the organization of their government, know economic and social conditions in the host country, and have a flexible approach to methods through which development can be accelerated.

The recruitment officers of the technical cooperation agencies—searching for urgently needed personnel—have recognized the importance of these qualities, but have not been able to insist on all of them in addition to technical ability. Yet one of the major difficulties has been to induce enough people to enter this work, or to stay in it. There is a high turnover rate in technical cooperation. As country programs expand, the number of vacancies in technical cooperation continues to grow. When positions remain unfilled, doubts arise as to the feasibility of projects and interest drains away.

The size of this problem is indicated by the fact that, in every year since 1950, there have been some 300 or more vacancies for Latin America alone. The turnover in posts of leadership has been a particularly disturbing factor in the Latin American bilateral programs. While stressing the importance of good personnel procedures—appointment for merit and continuity of tenure—to Latin American hosts, the U. S. programs have been characterized by the instability which we condemn.

No drastic legislative or administrative changes are required to correct the main causes of the personnel problem. These causes are:

- Although technical cooperation is now recognized as a continuing part of U. S. foreign policy, it never lost the appearance of a temporary program. This feeling was increased when technical cooperation was consolidated with the administration of economic aid and military assistance, as well as by the continuing necessity for annual legislative reauthorization of appropriations for the program.
- The persons recruited for technical cooperation abroad are not placed under Civil Service or the Foreign Service, and so they are offered no assurance of the continuity of employment and merit promotions which are derived from a career service.
- The idea grew up among staff members in the headquarters office and in the field that employment outside the United States involved a commitment for only a two-year term of service. There was no ruling in this matter, but the common inference grew out of regulations having to do with governmental provision of transportation costs for employees' dependents and household goods, and with eligibility for "home leave" after two years of duty abroad.
- No provisions have been made to help meet the special health and educational needs of employees' families in areas where such facilities are not adequate.
- During delays involved in security clearance, prospective technical cooperation employees have dropped out. During 1954 and 1955, final security clearances usually have taken from six to nine months. Even promotions or transfers from within the programs in recent years have required supplementary security clearances, which necessarily have delayed prompt provision of personnel for new tasks. A number of private organizations and concerns have been discouraged from contracting with the government to participate in technical cooperation projects because of time delays and difficulties created by the requirement that all the private employees concerned with the project—whether located in the host country or in the United States—are required to have security clearances.
- Political clearances were made a standard requirement for all technical cooperation employees under FOA. This practice started on a large scale with the change of administration in 1953.

## **ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS**

THE PURPOSE of the technical cooperation program cannot be achieved in a few years, but will require a persistent effort for several decades. It is therefore essential that the program be able to attract and retain for long periods the services of a number of trained and competent people.

An important step in solving the personnel problem has been taken in placing the program within the State Department. If this were coupled with legislation to authorize annual appropriations, it would go far in removing the feeling of impermanence in a program which has been officially recognized as a continuing part of foreign policy. In addition, however, two important steps should be taken to improve the status and training of technical cooperation employees.

Two reports have been made recently which have included recommendations for increasing the number of competent employees serving abroad. One is the report to the Secretary of State by the Secretary's Public Committee on Personnel, of which Henry M. Wriston was chairman.<sup>1</sup> The other is one of the reports of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (the Hoover Commission).<sup>2</sup> Both reports urged that employment abroad be made a career service. The Hoover Commission suggested that employees in foreign countries be placed under Civil Service and also recommended similar coverage for high-level administrative and supervisory positions. The Wriston Committee recommended a consolidated career service within the State Department.

So far, technical cooperation employees have not been placed in the consolidated career service, which is now being organized in the State Department. We recommend, as a minimum, that administrative and professional employees serving abroad in technical cooperation programs be given the permanent status of Civil Service coverage. Whether or not technical cooperation employees are placed in the consolidated service, we recommend that regulations applicable to technical cooperation personnel permit and encourage long-term service in one post abroad. A long period of service in one country significantly increases the likelihood of successful technical cooperation activities carried on jointly with the host government officials. In any event, liberal provision should be made for "lateral entry," especially at the higher grades. Many mature, well-qualified people will be needed, and this need could not be met entirely through promotions from within. We recommend, further, that political clearances be discontinued as a requirement for employment of technical cooperation personnel, including the country directors and chiefs of technical missions.

With a permanent technical cooperation staff, it would be possible to make better use of the services of noncareer experts for specialized and

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<sup>1</sup> *Toward a Stronger Foreign Service*, Department of State Publication 5458, June 1954.

<sup>2</sup> *Personnel and Civil Service*, a Report to Congress, February 14, 1955.

short-term assignments. Such specialists could be brought into the technical cooperation programs through contracts with individuals, universities, business firms, and other private groups. The career staff could be further supplemented, as necessary, by drawing upon the services of qualified employees in other federal agencies and in state and local governments for temporary periods.

Our report on *The Role of Universities in Technical Cooperation* recommended several steps which should be taken by the government and by universities in building up a reservoir of manpower trained to undertake technical cooperation work. We reiterate the importance of these recommendations:

- Comprehensive training programs for present and prospective technical cooperation employees should be set up without further delay.
- The U. S. government, universities, and private groups should work together to determine the scope and content of training needed to enable U. S. nationals to understand the attitudes and unique cultural patterns of the people with whom they will be associated, and to work effectively in a new environment. Consultation with representatives of universities and others in host countries would be desirable.
- Selected universities should be encouraged to develop curricula and organize courses. Some specialization by regions and fields of activity should be considered. It may be desirable to work out cooperative arrangements with universities or related institutions in host countries for part of the specialists' training.
- Orientation and "briefing" programs for short-term employees should be continued and strengthened, and in-service training as well as pre-service training for longer term employees should be considered.
- The government, universities, foundations, and other nongovernmental agencies should explore together ways of financing training programs.

Administrative arrangements should be made so that an able staff in the ICA office is made responsible for improving training programs. Special attention should be given to working with the universities and to experimentation in new methods. The content and orientation of training for technical cooperation should be different in many ways from that involved in training for the traditional Foreign Service. However, we believe that the ICA should consider the advisability of adapting the Wriston Committee recommendation for establishment of a

Foreign Service Scholarship Training Program to the special needs of the bilateral technical cooperation program.

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TECHNICAL COOPERATION is coming of age. The number of both multi-lateral and bilateral programs and of the countries participating in them has markedly increased in recent years. The United States can no longer afford the luxury of unstable direction, administrative dis-organization, and neglected personnel in technical cooperation programs. As we have indicated in this report, the administration of bi-lateral programs can be improved substantially. We believe, moreover, that some of the guidelines which have emerged as a result of our appraisal of technical cooperation in Latin America also will be useful in increasing the efficiency of bilateral and multilateral programs every-where.

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