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DRAFT OF REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

PHASEOUT OF U.S. ASSISTANCE TO SOUTH VIETNAM
IN SUPPORT OF POLICE ORGANIZATIONS,
LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND PUBLIC SAFETY RELATED PROGRAMS

(Code 47112)

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BY
THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES

D R A F T



UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

INTERNATIONAL DIVISION

FEB 1 1975

The Honorable Daniel Parker
Administrator, Agency for
International Development

Attention: Mr. Aubrey Mills
GAO Liaison Officer

Dear Mr. Parker:

Enclosed are 35 copies of our draft report on the phaseout of U.S. assistance to South Vietnam in support of police organizations, law enforcement and public safety related programs.


The draft is being made available for review and comment by officials charged with responsibility for managing U.S. assistance programs authorized by the Congress. Copies are also being provided to the Secretaries of State and Defense.

The draft is subject to revision and should not be released or used for unauthorized purposes. It should be appropriately safeguarded to prevent premature or unauthorized use.

We would appreciate receiving your comments within 30 days from the date of this letter so that we may have the benefit of your views before the report is released.

If you have any questions pertaining to the proposed report please contact Mr. Frank Borkovic, Assistant Director, International Division, Code 129, Extension 5207.

Sincerely yours,


J. K. Fasick
Director

Enclosures - 35



UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

INTERNATIONAL DIVISION

FEB 11 1975

The Honorable
The Secretary of State

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
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Enclosures - 10



UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

INTERNATIONAL DIVISION

FEB 11 1975

The Honorable
The Secretary of Defense

Attn: Deputy Comptroller for Audit
Reports

Dear Mr. Secretary:

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Enclosures - 30

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ABBREVIATIONS

AID	Agency for International Development/Washington
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
CC	Correction Centers
CORDS	Civil Operations and Rural Development Support
CTD	Combined Telecommunications Directorate
DAO	Defense Attache Office
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DMJ	Directorate of Military Justice
DOD	Department of Defense
GAO	General Accounting Office
GVN	Government of Vietnam
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MASF	Military Assistance Service Funded
NP	National Police
OMA	Operations and Maintenance, Army.
PEMA	Procurement, Equipment, Missiles, Army
PF	Popular Forces
RF	Regional Forces
USAID	United States Agency for International Development/Vietnam

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

PHASEOUT OF U.S. ASSISTANCE TO
SOUTH VIETNAM IN SUPPORT OF POLICE
ORGANIZATIONS, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
PUBLIC SAFETY RELATED PROGRAMS
Department of State
Agency for International Development
Department of Defense
B-

D I G E S T

WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE

The Vietnam ceasefire agreement of January 1973 required all United States advisors to the police forces of South Vietnam to depart South Vietnam by March 1973. In December 1973 and January 1974, the President signed legislation that prohibited use of any Foreign Assistance Act funds for public safety projects, prisons, police organizations, and related activities in South Vietnam. The prohibitions did not apply to funds appropriated to the Department of Defense (DOD).

Questions concerning the phaseout of United States assistance and the related issue of incarceration and treatment of political prisoners have been raised by members of the Congress and others since the ceasefire and passage of the Foreign Assistance Act legislation. Because of the intense Congressional interest, GAO reviewed the steps taken to phase out the prohibited assistance.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Since 1955 the Agency for International Development (AID) and DOD provided more than \$235 million in public safety assistance to

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South Vietnam broken down as follows:

- \$158 million for commodities, e.g., vehicles, weapons, ammunition, communication equipment, etc.
- \$46 million for direct hire personnel, i.e., advisory assistance.
- \$27 million for contract services and local currency purchases.
- \$4 million for training Vietnamese in the United States and Taiwan.

With help from the United States, the Vietnamese National Police force grew from about 16,900 in December 1962 to about 120,700 in December 1972. However, despite massive U.S. assistance, the National Police are not self-sufficient, and U.S. and Government of Vietnam (GVN) officials believe that termination of U.S. assistance will reduce the effectiveness of police operations. (See pp. 9 to 14.)

GAO found no evidence to indicate that advisory assistance to the National Police did not terminate in accordance with the January 1973 ceasefire agreement. The United States continued to provide commodities and training in the United States to the National Police throughout 1973 and into 1974. Such assistance was not prohibited by the ceasefire agreement. (See pp. 19 to 22.)

GAO found that AID and DOD have taken steps to phase out further direct U.S. assistance to the National Police as directed by the Congress. However, some commodity assistance to the National

Police, based on U.S. commitments made before December 1973, is continuing. There was about \$2.8 million in the public safety commodity pipeline at the end of fiscal year 1974. (See pp. 22 to 27.)

DOD funds have been used to provide assistance to the National Police and Combined Telecommunications Directorate. Although not legally required to do so, DOD decided in April 1974 to terminate this assistance. GAO believes, however, that as long as the United States continues to provide supplies to the military forces of South Vietnam, there is a possibility that items needed by the National Police -- such as ammunition, fuel, weapons, and vehicle repair parts -- could filter down to the National Police. (See pp. 25 to 29.)

U.S. assistance is continuing to flow to organizations that could be construed as having authority and responsibility for civil law enforcement and internal security.

--Military field courts have authority to try and convict civilians who commit crimes against the national security of South Vietnam, including offenses such as smuggling, bribery, corruption, disturbance of state security, neutralism, and hooliganism. (See pp. 30 to 31.)

--Regional Forces and Popular Forces, elements that make up more than one-half of the forces supported by U.S. military assistance, are controlled by Province Chiefs who are respon-

sible for public order and security, including coordination of police and all security forces. (See pp. 29 to 30.)

Narcotics control assistance to GVN Narcotics Police by the Drug Enforcement Administration will continue. In fiscal year 1974, the assistance cost about \$149,000. AID narcotics control assistance totaled about \$182,000 in fiscal year 1974 and has been terminated. (See pp. 31 to 32.)

Because of restrictions imposed by the State Department and American Embassy, Saigon, GAO's examination into the political prisoner issue was made without the benefit of discussions with South Vietnamese officials, visits to prisons, or interviews with prisoners. On the basis of information made available through American Embassy channels in Saigon, GAO believes that allegations of the existence of upwards of 200,000 political prisoners in South Vietnam are exaggerated. The Embassy, on the other hand, has steadfastly maintained that, based on its definition of political prisoners as "persons who have been imprisoned solely for their opposition to the Government", it has not been able to identify a single political prisoner. Although U.S. officials do not rule out the possibility that there are some political prisoners in Vietnam, the problem remains: How does one recognize or identify a political prisoner when those incarcerated are charged with violations of specific laws? (See pp. 33 to 40.)

RECOMMENDATIONS OR SUGGESTIONS

This report contains no recommendations.

MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS

The Congress may wish to consider the contents of this report in its deliberations concerning the use and level of assistance provided to the GVN.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Questions concerning the phase out of U.S. assistance to prisons and police forces of South Vietnam, and the related issue of incarceration and treatment of political prisoners, have been raised by numerous members of the Congress and others since the Vietnam ceasefire agreement of January 1973 and passage of Foreign Assistance Act legislation in December 1973 and January 1974. The ceasefire required all U.S. advisors to the police forces of South Vietnam to depart South Vietnam by March 1973. The Foreign Assistance Act legislation was intended to terminate all other assistance to the police forces of the Government of South Vietnam.

Our primary objective in performing this review was to determine whether assistance to police and prison systems in South Vietnam has been phased out in consonance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 and the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Act of 1974. Our secondary objective was to obtain information on incarceration and treatment of political prisoners in South Vietnam.

RECENT FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT LEGISLATION

Section 112 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as added by section 2 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, December 17, 1973, prohibits the use of any funds made available under the act for police training or related programs in a foreign country. Section 112 further states the prohibitions shall not apply:

"(1) with respect to assistance rendered under section 515(c) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, or with respect to any authority of the Drug Enforcement Administration or the Federal Bureau of Investigation which related to crimes of the nature which are unlawful under the laws of the United States; or

"(2) to any contract entered into prior to the date or enactment of this section with any person, organization, or agency of the United States Government to provide personnel to conduct, or assist in conducting any such program."

Section 112 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs

Appropriation Act of 1974, January 2, 1974, specifically addressed the issue of police related assistance to the Government of South Vietnam (GVN).

"None of the funds appropriated or made available pursuant to this Act, and no local currencies generated as a result of assistance furnished under this Act, may be used for the support of police, or prison construction and administration within South Vietnam, for training, including computer training, of South Vietnamese with respect to police, criminal, or prison matters, or for computers or computer parts for use for South Vietnam with respect to police, criminal, or prison matters."

Other sections of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 pertinent to our review follow.

Section 617. Winding up period

"* * * Funds made available under this act shall remain available for a period not to exceed eight months from the date of termination of assistance under this Act for necessary expenses of winding up programs related thereto."

Section 801. General authority

"No assistance shall be furnished under this section to South Vietnam unless the President receives assurances satisfactory to him that no assistance furnished under this part, and no local currencies generated as a result of assistance furnished under this part, will be used for support of police, or prison construction and administration, within South Vietnam."

Section 32. Political prisoners

"It is the sense of Congress that the President should deny any economic or military assistance to the Government of any foreign country which practices the internment or imprisonment of that country's citizens for political purposes."

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Military assistance to Vietnam is provided from the appropriations of the military services rather than Foreign Assistance Act appropriations, and thus was not affected by the above legislation. However, Department of Defense (DOD) funds were being used to support the police when the legislation was enacted. DOD funds have been used by AID for public safety projects on the basis of an interagency agreement effective July 1, 1966, whereby DOD agreed to provide funds to support certain AID programs which were judged to be closely allied with the military effort in Vietnam. DOD assistance was primarily in the form of commodity support.

In a letter to the Agency for International Development (AID) in April 1974, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs advised AID that he had reviewed DOD's continued participation in providing financial and commodity support to the National Police and Combined Telecommunications Directorate and that such support would be phased out. The Secretary stated that although Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) appropriations do not appear to be restricted by the legislative prohibition contained in section 112 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Act of 1974, to be responsive to the desires of the Congress, DOD will not provide any new funding to the National Police or Combined Telecommunications Directorate.

CHAPTER 2

COST AND NATURE OF PUBLIC SAFETY ASSISTANCE

Available records indicated that AID and DOD provided about U.S. \$235 million and VN \$3 billion for public safety programs in South Vietnam during fiscal years 1955 through 1974 as shown below. Additional details of the funding provided are contained in appendices I and II of this report.

U.S. SUPPORT PROVIDED FOR PUBLIC SAFETY
PROJECTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(in millions)

<u>Source</u>	<u>Amount</u>	
<u>AID dollar support</u>		
National Police	\$114	
Telecommunications	37	
Correction Centers	<u>2</u>	
Subtotal		\$153
 <u>DOD dollar support</u>		
National Police	64	
Telecommunications	<u>18</u>	
Subtotal		\$ 82
TOTAL DOLLAR SUPPORT		<u>\$235</u>
 <u>AID piaster support</u>		
National Police	VN\$2,323	
Telecommunications	353	
Correction Centers	<u>373</u>	
TOTAL PIASTER SUPPORT		<u>VN\$3,049</u> a/

a/ At the exchange rate in effect on June 30, 1974, when VN\$640=U.S.\$1, this is equivalent to \$4.8 million. However, piasters were provided at varying rates from 1964 (VN\$35=U.S.\$1) to 1974 (VN\$640=U.S.\$1). Because of this, exact dollar equivalents are not known.

The information contained in appendix I and summarized above is based on budget data. AID and DOD personnel advised us that the data was the best available but cautioned that it might not be completely accurate because:

- ammunition figures were estimated and no one was completely sure of the amount the National Police actually drew since this was a free issue item;
- many prior year records were retired or destroyed, especially when the ceasefire caused the hurried departure of most U.S. military in Vietnam;
- in the years 1968-1972, AID provided certain items under a Mission-wide Commodity Support project. Although the police, telecommunications, and correction centers received some assistance under this project, records were no longer available; and
- AID did not know the value of items requisitioned through military channels because the actual cost was not known at the time of order.

The majority of the \$235 million U.S. dollar assistance to police and public safety activities (\$158 million or 67 percent) was in the form of commodities--vehicles, communications equipment, and ammunition. Direct hire personnel accounted for about 20 percent (\$46 million). Another 11 percent (\$27 million) was for contract services and DOD local currency purchases. Almost 2 percent (\$4 million) provided training to Vietnamese in the United States and Taiwan, and included police training programs and courses in criminal investigations, immigration and customs control, instructor methods, patrol operations, public and community relations, traffic management, dignitary protection, narcotics, and automatic data processing.

EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

The United States Government started providing support to the police of South Vietnam through a contract with Michigan State University in 1955. The contract covered the period 1955-1961. The stated goal of the United States was to provide assistance to GVN law enforcement agencies in recruiting, training, organizing, equipping, administering, and supporting a force capable of maintaining public law and order and internal security throughout Vietnam. In 1960, AID began utilizing direct hire personnel. In 1967 administrative and functional responsibility for public safety activities was transferred to the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) element of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). CORDS/MACV was disbanded after the January 1973 ceasefire agreement and functional and administrative responsibility was returned to AID.

In the early years public safety assistance was provided under numerous projects. Eventually, assistance was consolidated into three major projects that coincided with GVN agencies or organizations--the National Police, the Combined Telecommunications Directorate, and Correction Centers.

National Police Project

When U.S. advisory assistance to the Vietnamese police began in 1955 there was a virtual absence of civil police organization, leadership, and effectiveness. The U.S. assistance to the police sought to attain the following goals: (1) establish and train a national police force, (2) provide effective command control, (3) expand police coverage to the village level, and (4) provide technical and logistical support to the police until the GVN was capable of supporting it without U.S. aid.

The goal of establishing a national police force was achieved. A Presidential Decree of June 27, 1962, combined the organized GVN civil police elements into the "National Police." Operational control was decentralized and vested in elected or appointed officials, usually military officers, at each level of government.

On December 26, 1972, a national law was enacted which gave national status to the National Police by law rather than by decree.

Under the guidance of U.S. training advisors, the GVN recognized the need for a comprehensive and effective police training program. Facilities were expanded to absorb the training requirements of the growing police force. The National Police Academy, National Police Training Center, Regional In-service Training Centers, and other more specialized training facilities were constructed or converted. During 1971-1972, about 86,000 policemen of various levels received basic, command, and in-service training as well as courses on highly specialized and technical subjects.

One area of specialized training that received major emphasis was the centralized identification and records system. Approximately 3,000 police officers were trained during 1971-1973 in new central records procedures. The resultant National Police-Central Records and Identification System has been termed a major success.

With help from the United States, the size of the National Police force grew rapidly from 1962 to 1972. The following table shows the increase in officer ranks and the increase in the overall force strength. It also shows that there was extensive borrowing from the military to help meet the need for experienced officers to provide command coverage. Because of the

rate of force expansion, operational pressures, and the limitation on the enlistment of quality recruits, command coverage has been relatively thin and most of the key positions are filled by professional soldiers with command experience.

	<u>NP officers</u>	<u>Military officers</u>	<u>Total officers</u>	<u>NP strength</u>
Dec. 1962	1,317	10 (approx.)	1,327	16,890
Dec. 1963	1,631	10 (approx.)	1,641	19,711
Dec. 1964	1,687	20 (approx.)	1,707	33,570
Dec. 1965	2,371	50 (approx.)	2,421	52,242
Dec. 1966	3,081	108	3,189	59,999
Dec. 1967	3,839	143	3,982	70,291
Dec. 1968	4,461	132	4,593	78,431
Dec. 1969	4,448	56	4,504	85,218
Dec. 1970	4,781	51	4,832	87,884
Dec. 1971	5,829	520	6,349	113,686
Dec. 1972	6,840	1,002	7,842	120,668

A breakdown of the National Police force structure as of May 1972 showed that there were four major sections--Conventional Police (78,500), Special Branch (19,600), Field Police (16,500), and Marine Police (2,400).

The expansion of the police force led to achievement of one of the long term objectives of the public safety advisory effort, i.e., to extend permanent police coverage to the village level. In 1969, 1,659 village police stations had been established. In 1970, 39 stations were added. By 1973, there was a total of 2,301 police stations. Initially, these stations were manned with one to three policemen. In 1971, however, additional personnel were deployed to the village level. Manpower became available with the transfer of 13,000 Army of Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) personnel into the National Police and from a renewed recruiting campaign. About 1,000 military officers were assigned to villages as police chiefs.

Unfortunately, the increase in manpower quantity was not matched by an equivalent increase in manpower educational quality. In general, the

bulk of new police recruits acquired during this expansion period had only 5 to 7 years of formal education. Another serious deficiency was the inability of the National Police to gain access to young and qualified candidates for police commissioned officer training. This shortage of qualified personnel at all levels has continued.

The National Police also face serious supply and maintenance problems. With U.S. assistance, its supply system in 1973 had to support 122,000 men, 180,000 weapons, and 6,000 vehicles. Without U.S. assistance, it will be difficult to maintain adequate support. The police are not self-sufficient in the logistics area. Replacement equipment, parts, and other commodities will be required. In July 1974, the Director General of the National Police advised us that the police could not operate without U.S. assistance in acquiring spare parts, ammunition, and fuel. He also stated that village police stations were becoming the focus of enemy attacks. He said that over 300 police stations were attacked in the first 6 months of 1974. It was his belief that, unless U.S. support continued, the police would be forced to pull back from the village and hamlet level and local security would deteriorate.

Embassy officials also believed the National Police supply system was not self-sufficient and without continued U.S. assistance, the effectiveness of the police would diminish. In discussions with Embassy and Defense Attache Office (DAO) officials, we were advised that small police stations cannot defend against sustained enemy attacks and, consequently, depend on communications and mobility. These officials also told us that they expected security conditions to weaken because U.S. support was terminated.

Telecommunications Project

The public safety telecommunication project began in the midfifties as an effort to improve police communications. In 1960, AID expanded the project to include supporting the GVN Combined Telecommunications Directorate (CTD). In 1967, DOD began providing assistance to the CTD through AID. By the end of fiscal year 1974, more than \$55 million had been contributed by AID and DOD to the telecommunication project.

The CTD was established in 1960 as an administrative, operational, technical, and logistical organization to operate and maintain a common user radio teletype and telegraph system for the National Police and about 20 other GVN civil security agencies. Operating under the Ministry of Interior, the CTD system extends from Saigon to each region, province, and district.

Initial support of the CTD included radios and associated equipment for the police telecommunications systems, a part of the CTD. Subsequently, support was expanded to include the Village Hamlet Radio System which provided communication to virtually all GVN-controlled villages and hamlets in Vietnam. This system consists of over 40,000 VHF-AM transceivers country-wide and provides interface communications for GVN military and para-military units operating in support of pacification.

In January 1973, AID began to concentrate its efforts on training CTD personnel. However, the Foreign Assistance Act legislation enacted in December 1973 and January 1974 prohibited such U.S. assistance. In July 1974 Embassy and DAO officials expressed belief that the termination of U.S. assistance to the CTD would seriously hamper the effectiveness of

GVN civil communications systems, because the equipment spare parts and the technical know-how for repair had been provided by the United States. The CTD was considered a victim of circumstances because as its major customer, the National Police could not be segregated from other CTD benefiting civil agencies. To comply with the law, AID cut off communication support to the CTD and, in effect, all GVN civil agencies.

Correction Centers Project

Within the GVN, two agencies are responsible for the incarceration of civilians -- the National Police for unsentenced persons, and the Directorate of Corrections for sentenced persons. The Directorate of Corrections was organized by decree on January 13, 1960, with its prime function being that of holding and rehabilitating prisoners sentenced by the courts. In July 1974, there were 5 National and 35 Province correction centers holding a reported 33,732 prisoners.

AID began supporting the GVN Correction Centers in 1961 as part of its National Police project. Initial support consisted of a U.S. advisor, some commodities and training. AID established a separate project in fiscal year 1967 under the title "Correction Centers" when the GVN requested expanded assistance. From that time, according to AID, assistance was directed toward strengthening and improving the GVN Correctional Centers' administrative, operational, physical, hygienic and professional standards.

In order to improve the conditions of prisoners and the prison system in Vietnam, AID has promoted the removal of prisoners to secure areas, modernization of the correction system and humane care of prisoners. Thus, in 1973 over 9,000 prisoners were transferred from provincial to national centers. U.S. advisory effort led to the institution of a rudimentary parole system in 1970. Also, AID and DOD provided commodity assistance in rebuilding and remodeling many GVN prisons.

There are many areas, however, which still need improvement. Prisons continue to be over-populated, understaffed, and prisoners need more food.

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There are many areas, however, which still need improvement. Prisons continue to be over-populated, understaffed, and prisoners need more food.

A more concentrated national effort is needed to improve health and sanitation in the prisons. Embassy officials advised us that termination of assistance will affect prisoners because AID no longer permits prison dispensaries to draw U.S. funded medicine from the Ministry of Public Health.

REF I

Assistance Provided After the January 1973
Ceasefire Agreement

By the end of March 1973, all of the advisors to the National Police had either left Vietnam, found other jobs in Vietnam, or were reassigned to other AID projects and activities. We found no evidence of advisory support to the National Police by the United States at the time of our field work in Vietnam -- June to September 1974.

In May 1973, AID retired the National Police, CTD, and Correction Centers project titles and codes. However, assistance to the National Police and CTD continued under other general project codes. For fiscal year 1974

--\$821,000 of AID funds were budgeted for training under the

"USAID Technical Support" project,

--\$196,000 of AID funds and \$7,519,000 of DOD funds were

budgeted for logistic support under the "Logistics
Technical Support" project, and

--\$870,000 of AID funds and \$1,343,000 of DOD funds were

budgeted as support for the CTD under the "Engineering
Technical Support Project."

In addition, about VN\$165 million was provided under the "Rural Development Project" for reconstruction of National Police command facilities destroyed or damaged during and after the 1972 invasion by the North Vietnamese. Some indirect support to the National Police and Correction Centers was also provided through the "Public Health" and "Central Logistics Agency" projects. AID and DOD provided medicine to the GVN Ministry

of Health through the health project. Among the customers of the Ministry were the National Police hospital and the prison dispensaries. Under the Central Logistics Agency project AID advised and supported the GVN's vehicle spare parts depot and province vehicle maintenance shops. Among their customers were the National Police and prison systems. We were told that the National Police and prisons are no longer authorized customers of the Ministry of Health and Central Logistics Agency.

CHAPTER 3PHASE OUT OF PUBLIC SAFETY ASSISTANCE

AID and DOD took several steps to phase out direct U.S. assistance to the National Police and others in compliance with the ceasefire agreement, foreign assistance legislation, and the intent of the Congress.

Among other actions, we found that

- AID public safety advisory assistance was terminated,
- funds which had been obligated for commodities were deobligated,
- plans to send Vietnamese to the United States for police related training were cancelled, and
- local currency (piaster) support was terminated.

Advisory Assistance

AID advised us that all advisory assistance to the police and prisons had terminated in March 1973 as a result of the ceasefire agreement. We found that advisory assistance was being provided by 143 public safety advisors assigned to South Vietnam as of January 1973. By the end of March 1973, according to AID, all of the advisors to the National Police had either left Vietnam, found other jobs in Vietnam, or were reassigned to other AID projects and activities as shown in the table below.

Relocation of Public Safety Advisors
Assigned to South Vietnam Following
Ceasefire Agreement of January 1973

Advisors assigned to South Vietnam January 27, 1973		<u>143</u>
Departed South Vietnam by March 28, 1973	100	
Reassigned to other United States Agency for International Devel- opment (USAID) Mission Positions in South Vietnam	28	
Terminated USAID employment in South Vietnam (note a)	<u>15</u>	
Total		<u>143</u>

aIncludes 12 individuals who transferred to the Defense Attache Office in Saigon and three who went to work for contractors in South Vietnam.

We determined that, as of August 1974, three of the 43 who had remained in Vietnam were working for private contractors and 18 were working for either USAID or DAO. Our analysis of the job descriptions of those working for USAID and DAO disclosed no apparent support of the police, prison, or telecommunication systems.

We also examined into the functions of the office of the Special Assistant to the Ambassador for Field Operations (SAAFO). This is the successor organization to CORDS/MACV which had cognizance over the public safety program at the time of the ceasefire agreement. We reviewed job descriptions for 111 personnel working for SAAFO and found no apparent advisory support to the police, prison, or telecommunications systems.

Deobligation of Funds

On January 8, 1974, the State Department directed the Mission in

Saigon to terminate any activity which could be construed as AID involvement in direct or indirect assistance to the National Police or prison systems. By January 11, 1974, USAID had begun action to terminate commodity support and was able to cancel about \$3.1 million of \$3.8 million in fiscal year 1974 procurement which had been obligated prior to the legislation. The remaining \$700,000 was found to be uncancellable, the money was expended, and the items were received in Vietnam prior to June 30, 1974.

With respect to obligations made prior to fiscal year 1974, there was an open pipeline of about \$9.8 million as of December 31, 1973. Of this amount, USAID canceled requisitions valued at \$548,500 and deobligated about \$2.2 million. As of June 30, 1974, the pipeline had been reduced to \$2,781,000, and will be liquidated as final billings and services are received.

Participant Training

AID provided general and specialized training in the United States for 129 Vietnamese National Police during fiscal years 1973 and 1974. The training included courses in criminal investigations, immigration and customs control, instructor methods, patrol operations, public and community relations, traffic management, dignitary protection, narcotics, and automatic data processing.

AID records indicated that 80 Vietnamese arrived in the United States for training during fiscal year 1974. Fifty-four were funded with 1973 funds and 26 were funded with 1974 funds. After enactment of the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Act for 1974, AID canceled its plans to send additional Vietnamese for training. Those Vietnamese

already in the United States were permitted to complete their training programs. As of April 1974, only two participants remained in the United States. They completed their traffic management course at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, and departed on June 18, 1974.

Local Currency (Piaster) Support

In a letter dated March 7, 1974, USAID informed the GVN that it could no longer provide piasters to support the National Police, CTD, and Correction Centers. Accordingly, USAID advised the GVN that it was cancelling the 1.2 billion in piaster support (equivalent to about \$1.9 million based on a conversion factor of VN\$640=U.S. \$1) for the police and other prohibited organizations previously agreed upon for the GVN's calendar year 1974 budget. Applicable 1974 project agreements were revised to include statements prohibiting police support. However, USAID determined that piaster support committed through the American Aid Chapter of the GVN budget for calendar year 1973 and prior years would not necessarily be cancelled. As of June 30, 1974, about VN\$582 million (about \$909,000) stemming from prior year agreements remained in the pipeline and USAID was taking action to close out the accounts.

Other Support

In addition to the steps discussed above, the following action was taken in order to comply with the legislative prohibitions.

--National Police, CTD, and Correction Centers personnel were banned from attending English language and office skills courses at the USAID Saigon Staff Development Center.

--The National Police, CTD, and Correction Centers were prohibited from receiving U.S. funded military articles, excess property and medical supplies.

--The National Police, CTD, and Correction Centers personnel were barred from flying on U.S. funded Air America flights.

--National Police and Correction Centers computer programs were purged from the GVN Prime Minister's Computer Center.

--AID terminated its support of common-use GVN facilities used by the National Police, such as Province Maintenance Shops and Spare Parts Depot.

DAO ACTIONS TO TERMINATE
POLICE SUPPORT

In December 1973, the Defense Attache directed all DAO service divisions to review their fiscal year 1975-1979 requirements and delete any items included for support of the GVN National Police and Military Police units with civilian law enforcement responsibilities. All divisions reported that no police support was included in their individual budget segments.

In a letter to AID in April 1974, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs advised AID that he had reviewed DOD's continued participation in providing financial and commodity support to the National Police and CTD and that such support would be phased out. The letter makes the following points.

--Although Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) appropriations do not appear to be restricted by the prohibition contained in section 112 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Act of 1974, to be responsive to the desires of the Congress, DOD will not provide any new funding to the National Police or CTD for the remainder of fiscal year 1974 or beyond.

--Unexpended 1974 and prior year DOD funds should be deobligated to the maximum extent possible, and returned to DOD.

--In view of the requirement that AID disassociate itself rapidly from police support programs and to preclude an abrupt end of program management, DOD would assume responsibility for delivery of those commodities already on irrevocable order.

In order to ascertain whether the National Police and CTD were still receiving support through DOD channels, we reviewed fiscal year 1974 DAO and MASF budgets, the master customer list for Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) depots, and performed a limited test of depot issues. The \$985 million fiscal year 1974 MASF budget justification provided to us was rather broad and the supporting documentation was limited, but contained no evidence of programmed support to the police. Likewise, our review of the \$40 million fiscal year 1974 DAO budget, appropriate change orders, and discussions with DAO officials disclosed no police support.

ARVN procedures required that, in order to draw supplies from any of its 27 depots, a customer must be included in the ARVN National Materiel Management Agency master customer list. In May 1974, DAO advised

responsible ARVN commands that no MASF support or transportation was to be provided to the National Police or CTD. During the same month, these commands informed subordinate commands that the police were no longer authorized to draw any MASF supported line items through ARVN. In July we reviewed the ARVN master customer list and found that the police were no longer authorized customers.

As a further test, in July 1974 we visited one of the ARVN's 27 depots and an ARVN ammunition facility which were located in the Saigon area. These two facilities formerly had served the police force guarding the Saigon area, estimated at about 10,000 men, and other police units. We selected several items which the police had drawn in the past--barbed wire, batteries, and ammunition--and determined that after restrictions had been imposed, the ARVN made no issues of these items to the National Police or CTD.

CHAPTER 4
CONTINUING SUPPORT

The mission of the National Police is to provide internal security, to enforce the nation's laws, and to combat subversives. Our review suggests that as long as the U.S. continues to provide support to the military forces of South Vietnam, there is a possibility that common-use items could filter down to the National Police. Also, MASF assistance is continuing to flow to organizations that could be construed as having responsibility for law enforcement and internal security. U.S. support in the area of narcotics suppression was not included in the legislative prohibition and has continued.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

U.S. military assistance to South Vietnam in fiscal years 1974 and 1975 was budgeted at \$985 million and \$1.4 billion respectively. The commodities provided go to military supply depots located throughout South Vietnam. Without U.S. advisors at the various operations within the ARVN supply system, it is extremely difficult to assure that commodities are used only by authorized recipients.

The Embassy and DOD officials advised us that there was insufficient U.S. personnel in Vietnam to insure that commodities provided to the ARVN depots will actually be used only by the Vietnamese military. It is generally agreed that GVN police units could obtain MASF items through ARVN depots. This appears possible in view of the fact that the ARVN and National Police ultimately report to the same commander -- the President. Furthermore, at the time of our review, the presidential palace in Saigon was being guarded by the National Police who are responsible for the internal

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security of the entire city. However, as stated in the preceding chapter, our tests disclosed no evidence that ARVN depots were making unauthorized issues to police units.

Embassy and DAO officials in Saigon assured us that they were well aware of the sensitivity of this matter and, although they did not have advisors in the field, they would monitor the distribution of U.S.-funded commodities to the extent their limited resources permitted.

REGIONAL FORCES AND POPULAR FORCES

In Vietnam, approximately one-half of all forces receiving MASF assistance were the Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF). They are infantry elements of the ARVN with the primary duty of providing security to local provinces and districts; they are also used as a counter-guerrilla force in rural areas. The RF operate as the main force at the province and district level and the PF at the village/hamlet level.

The RF are responsible for conducting military operations and assisting in certain training and planning functions. RF units are also assigned static security missions such as manning outposts, and protecting military and key economic installations.

The PF units are under the operational control of the hamlet/village chief and employ guerrilla tactics to provide security protection for the population of completely secure areas and to prevent guerrilla infiltration.

However, RF and PF can also perform certain functions which might be considered police related. For example, during curfew hours the RF

and PF are assigned to security posts where they might detain unauthorized persons. Furthermore, under attack conditions, they could assist in the supervision of the National Police. The RF, PF, and National Police are all controlled by the Province Chief who is responsible for public order and security, including coordination of police and all security forces. Accordingly, he could order the RF and PF to act in a police capacity. To the extent that these situations might occur, the RF and PF could be viewed as military forces being used for police functions. According to U.S. officials in Saigon, however, there is no evidence that RF and PF are performing normal on-going day-to-day police functions.

MILITARY TRIBUNALS

Another recipient of MASF support that performs law enforcement related functions is the GVN Military Tribunal. Military Tribunals try and convict civilians for specific crimes. They are an element of the Directorate of Military Justice (DMJ) and are supported through MASF appropriations the same as other military units in Vietnam.

In September 1974, the DMJ had 755 personnel assigned to four divisions as shown below. Generally speaking, these personnel did not have the authority to arrest. However, the officers were judges who could convict civilians or military personnel.

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Total</u>
Central Directorate	24	84	108
Military Prisons	29	209	238
Permanent Courts	60	125	185
Field Courts	95	129	224
TOTAL	<u>208</u>	<u>547</u>	<u>755</u>

According to the Embassy, the Central Directorate heads the military judicial system. The Embassy considers the term "military prison" a misnomer because it is really a pre-trial confinement facility for military personnel and is not used for imprisonment of convicted personnel. Military personnel, if convicted, are imprisoned in the national or provincial prisons along with civilians. According to Embassy officials, the pre-trial confinement centers are not in any way connected with civil police activities.

There are two separate military court systems, each comprised of four courts -- the Permanent Courts and Field Courts. Both courts are manned by five judges, four of whom are military. The fifth judge, who is the presiding judge, may be civilian or military.

The Permanent Courts have jurisdiction over civilians who commit crimes against the military or are affiliated with the military, such as civilian canteen operators. Thus, the Vietnamese Permanent Courts, although functioning similarly to U.S. military courts, also try and convict civilians.

The military Field Courts have a much broader role and are responsible for cases falling under the various national security laws. These courts try and convict both military and civilians who commit the following specific crimes against national security: illegal transfer of money, smuggling, bribery, corruption, embezzlement, draft dodging, treason, disturbance of state security, pro-communism, neutralism, and hooliganism.

NARCOTICS SUPPRESSION

Narcotics suppression support to foreign police agencies was not included in the legislative prohibitions. U.S. funds for narcotics

suppression were provided by AID and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in fiscal year 1974. A USAID official told us that AID had a small narcotics control project with the GVN Director General of Customs under the Ministry of Finance, and that no commodity or advisory support was provided to the National Police. AID narcotics control assistance totaled about \$182,000 in fiscal year 1974 and has been terminated.

DEA officials informed us that the fiscal year 1974 narcotics program of about \$149,000 included no commodity support. DEA narcotics agents work with the GVN Narcotics Police in conducting joint drug suppression operations. DEA will continue to work with the Narcotics Police and is planning to provide minor in-country narcotics training.

CHAPTER 5

POLITICAL PRISONERS

Since the January 1973 ceasefire agreement, many articles have appeared in various publications alleging large numbers of political prisoners in South Vietnam. In response to congressional requests for information arising from these allegations, we attempted to examine into this issue. Our work included analyses of information provided by U.S. agencies, discussions with knowledgeable U.S. personnel in Vietnam, and discussions with Father Chan Tin, a well-known anti-GVN Catholic priest, who heads the "Committee Campaigning for the Improvement of Prison Conditions in South Vietnam." However, restrictions imposed by the State Department and the American Embassy, Saigon, precluded discussions with South Vietnamese officials, visits to prisons, or interviews with prisoners.

On the basis of information made available to us through American Embassy channels in Saigon, we believe that allegations of the existence of upwards of 200,000 political prisoners in South Vietnam are exaggerated. The Embassy, on the other hand, has steadfastly maintained that it has not been able to identify a single political prisoner, based on its definition of political prisoners as "persons who have been imprisoned solely for their opposition to the Government." Some U.S. officials, however, did not rule out the possibility that there are some political prisoners in South Vietnam.

CHAN TIN'S ALLEGATIONS

In a June 22, 1973, Vietnamese language publication titled "Political Prisoners in South Vietnam After the Signing of the Paris Agreement", Father Chan Tin alleged, among other things, that there were 202,000

political prisoners in South Vietnam and that they were mistreated. We reviewed translated portions of the publication and interviewed Chan Tin to determine his definition of political prisoners and the accuracy of his prisoners statistics.

Chan Tin's definition of a political prisoner was relatively simple but nonetheless very broad. He said that political prisoners are all persons held for political reasons. On the basis of statements he made to us, he would appear to consider much of the prison population of South Vietnam as political prisoners. He would include suspected Viet Cong sympathizers, those who refused the military draft, and those who have destroyed property, if such destruction was done with political motivation.

With respect to the method used by Chan Tin to arrive at his estimate of 202,000 political prisoners, we found that he had (1) used unverified statistics in computing the total number of prisoners, (2) used statistics of varying dates which could have resulted in double counting of thousands who had been released or transferred, (3) apparently double counted eight major prisons, and (4) arbitrarily estimated that there were more than 90,000 prisoners in local jails and interrogation centers.

When we interviewed Chan Tin and requested verification of his data, he acknowledged that many of his figures were estimates and said that the quantity of prisoners is unimportant. The important point, he stressed, is that there are political prisoners in South Vietnam and that peace will not exist until they are released.

ANALYSIS OF TOTAL PRISON POPULATION

The Embassy investigated the Chan Tin allegations in what is termed "an exhaustive survey utilizing all available sources" and forwarded its

findings to the State Department in Embassy Airgram A-296 dated December 26, 1973. The Embassy concluded that Chan Tin's estimates were without foundation and stated that the total prison and detention center population for all of South Vietnam was only 35,000.

Our analysis of the Embassy's supporting documentation for its estimate follows.

National and Provincial Prisons

The Embassy's documentation included prison statistics as of December 31, 1972, for the GVN's national and provincial prisons, and internal GVN prison documents obtained through sources which the Embassy believes to be reliable. We examined public safety reports for the years 1966 through 1972 provided by former advisors which indicated that the average annual prison population ranged from a low of 28,893 to a high of 35,279 with the monthly population never exceeding 40,000. Shown below are prison population figures furnished by the Embassy which are relatively consistent with the public safety reports.

NUMBERS OF PRISONERS IN NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL PRISONS

<u>Year</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Annual average</u>	<u>Total prison capacity</u>
1966	33,437	23,000	28,893	22,190
1967	35,442	30,218	33,323	22,190
1968	34,122	29,960	30,371	26,025
1969	36,871	34,023	35,279	34,355
1970	33,952	30,171	32,754	35,075
1971	32,506	28,255	30,495	36,923
1972	39,790	27,570	34,126	36,923
1973	Not available		33,139	36,923
1974	Not available		33,732	36,923

BREAKDOWN OF PRISON POPULATION BY LOCATION

	Prison population		
	<u>12/31/72</u>	<u>7/24/73</u>	<u>7/28/74</u>
NATIONAL PRISONS 5 Facilities ^{1/}	20,501	15,342	16,449
PROVINCIAL PRISONS			
Region I - 5 Facilities	3,066	2,470	2,744
Region II - 9 Facilities	5,526	3,637	4,933
Region III - 7 Facilities	2,637	2,069	2,689
Region IV -14 Facilities	7,927	6,115	6,917
HELD SEPARATELY PENDING RELEASE	<u>0</u>	<u>3,506</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	<u>39,657</u>	<u>33,139</u>	<u>33,732</u>

^{1/} One facility was designated as a Childrens' Protection Center in June 1973.

Although a comparison of public safety prison statistics with Embassy statistics does not conclusively validate the Embassy estimates, it does, in our opinion, tend to indicate that the Embassy data appear reasonable. Also, information obtained by interviews with former public safety personnel and other officials was generally in line with the Embassy's statistics.

Interrogation Centers and Lower Level Jails

In addition to national and provincial prisons there are interrogation centers and lower level jails. In July 1974, the Embassy estimated these facilities held about 2,000 prisoners. This estimate was based on (1) accumulated familiarity with the GVN detention system, (2) data provided through reliable independent sources, and (3) data provided by consulate personnel who were familiar with circumstances below the province level through the normal performance of their duties. Former public safety advisors and other officials that we interviewed believed the estimate was realistic.

Embassy officials said that facilities below the province level were not designed to detain people for more than several days. Interrogation centers, however, are administered by a special branch of the police, and we were told that prisoners may be detained longer there than in other facilities below the province level. It should be noted, however, that U.S. advisory personnel normally have not had access to special branch interrogation centers and thus only limited information was available concerning such facilities.

Military Detention Facilities

According to Embassy officials, there are no military prisons in South Vietnam. Military personnel sentenced by military court serve their sentences in civilian prisons. There are military detention centers for minor offenses and military pre-trial confinement centers for military personnel awaiting trial for more serious offenses. According to the Embassy, the population in four such pre-trial confinement centers as of August 29, 1974, was about 9,000. However, because detention centers are widely scattered, under local control, and involve short sentences and a fluctuating population, we were told that no reliable estimate of personnel held therein is available.

Finally, we were advised that there are four prisoner-of-war camps in Vietnam with a reported population of about 1,000 in August 1974. These individuals, according to the Embassy, were captured after the initial POW lists were drawn up and exchanged under the terms of the Paris Agreement.

Specific Data on Alleged Political Prisoners

In an attempt to test the accuracy of published allegations, we requested the Embassy to obtain for us specific information on a sample of 50 persons

who have been identified in various publications as political prisoners. Some of the names we selected were taken from articles that had been inserted in the Congressional Record. We asked the Embassy to determine whether these individuals were in fact incarcerated, where and how long they had been held, what they were charged with, whether they were convicted, and their physical condition.

The Embassy furnished us data obtained from the GVN and U.S. Government sources on 48 of these persons. All of them had been charged with specific crimes. Twenty-two had been released as of August 1974, while 26 were still imprisoned as shown below.

<u>Charge</u>	<u>Status as of August 1974</u>		
	<u>Total Prisoners Charged</u>	<u>Still Imprisoned</u>	<u>Released</u>
Communist Activities	21	9	12
Treason	13	9	4
Disturbing the Public Order	9	7	2
Communist Commo-Liaison Agent	2	0	2
Liaison with Communists	1	0	1
Treason/Espionage	1	0	1
Communist Guerrilla	1	1	0
Total	<u>48</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>22</u>

The Embassy advised us that no data was available on two of the names we provided. Analysis of the information provided by the Embassy disclosed the following.

--Sentences for the same charge varied greatly. For "Communist Activities", sentences ranged from 1 year to more than 4 years. For "Treason", the range was from 1 year and 6 months to more than 15 years. For "Disturbing the Public Order", the range was from 1 year and 15 days to more than 5 years and 6 months.

--Fifteen of the 26 prisoners still imprisoned had served their initial sentences but their sentences were, according to the data provided by the Embassy, "... prolonged legally for bad behavior." The lengths of the extended sentences were not disclosed.

--Nineteen of the 26 prisoners still imprisoned had been tried and sentenced by Military Courts.

--The physical condition of 25 persons was "unknown" and 23 were "alive." Twenty of the latter were reported to be "healthy."

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS

Because the Embassy said it had no concrete evidence that political prisoners existed, it did not provide information on how such prisoners might be treated. We did obtain information, however, on prison conditions and prisoner treatment in general from a public safety program assessment report and discussions with knowledgeable officials, including a medical doctor. These sources indicated there have been some problems of overcrowding and inadequate food in the prisons. U.S. officials told us that the GVN has attempted to alleviate overcrowding by transferring prisoners to other prisons. These officials, including an American doctor who previously visited the prisons regularly, believed that health care and lack of food, were problems but not serious ones. The problems were attributed to the GVN's limited budget, lack of sufficient and well-trained personnel, low pay scales, and wartime conditions.

Information obtained in interviews with former U.S. advisory personnel who have had access to the national and provincial prisons suggests that widespread, systematic mistreatment of prisoners is not a GVN policy

although some abuses have occurred. U.S. advisory personnel, however, have not normally had access to special branch interrogation facilities and thus, only limited knowledge was available about those facilities. According to a former public safety official, GVN special branch personnel are involved in security operations similar to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations. An Embassy official stated that special branch interrogation procedures include repeated interrogation of suspects in an attempt to identify inconsistencies in suspects' statements, but if mistreatment occurs, it is not common and is a violation of official policy.

We were not able to verify the statements made to us concerning treatment of prisoners.

CHAPTER 6
SCOPE OF REVIEW

We reviewed pertinent State Department, AID, and DOD records and reports, applicable U.S. and GVN correspondence, USAID and DOD accounting and budgetary records, and held discussions with appropriate U.S. and GVN officials. Our field work in Vietnam was completed in September 1974. We performed work at the following U.S. and GVN agencies in Saigon, Vietnam, and Washington, D.C.:

Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

State Department, Washington, D.C.

Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.

U.S. Embassy, Saigon, Vietnam

U.S. Agency for International Development, Saigon, Vietnam

U.S. Defense Attache Office, Saigon, Vietnam

Drug Enforcement Administration, Saigon, Vietnam

GVN Director General of National Police, Saigon, Vietnam

National Materiel Management Agency, Saigon, Vietnam

ARVN 531st Ammunition Depot, Saigon, Vietnam

ARVN 332nd Direct Support Group, Saigon, Vietnam

With respect to the issue of political prisoners in South Vietnam, we interviewed Father Chan Tin, a Redemptorist priest, and attempted to ascertain the reliability of his allegations concerning political prisoners. We also analyzed the Embassy's supporting documentation for its rebuttal of Chan Tin's allegations as contained in its Airgram A-296. Furthermore, we

obtained specific information regarding 48 alleged political prisoners from the U.S. Embassy.

Because of State Department restrictions, we did not visit prisons in South Vietnam, interview prisoners or work with Vietnamese officials in developing information concerning the existence, incarceration, and treatment of political prisoners. The State Department advised us that the Republic of Vietnam would regard that type of investigation as a most serious infringement of its sovereignty.

APPENDIX I

BUDGETED U.S. DOLLAR ASSISTANCE TO
GVN PUBLIC SAFETY RELATED AGENCIES
FISCAL YEARS 1955 TO 1974
(U.S. dollars in thousands)

<u>USAID FUNDING</u>	FY 55 thru						<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>FY 69</u>	<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	
National Police	\$83,917	\$9,395	\$7,320	\$6,571	\$5,679	-0-	\$112,882
Telecommunications	29,632	2,250	1,936	1,550	981	-0-	36,349
Corrections	1,549	223	196	416	167	-0-	2,551
USAID Technical Support	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	821	821
Logistics Technical Support	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	196	196
Engineering Tech. Support	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	126 ^a	870	870
USAID Total	\$115,098	\$11,868	\$9,452	\$8,537	\$6,827	\$1,887	\$153,669
<u>DOD (OMA) FUNDING</u> (note b)							
National Police	\$ 6,341	\$ 4,273	\$3,203	\$6,764	\$8,735	-0-	\$ 29,316
Telecommunications	7,214	1,399	2,200	1,781	3,750	-0-	16,344
Logistics Technical Support	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	7,519	7,519
Engineering Tech. Support	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	152 ^a	1,343	1,343
Ammunition (note c)	3,000	1,000	1,000	623	1,246	857	7,726
OMA Total	\$16,555	\$6,672	\$6,403	\$9,168	\$13,731	\$9,719	\$62,248
<u>DOD REQUISITIONING</u> <u>AUTHORITY (PEMA) (note d)</u>							
National Police	\$ 8,600	\$3,400	\$1,900	\$1,800	\$ 1,764	\$1,764	\$19,228
DOD Total	\$25,155	\$10,072	\$2,303	\$10,968	\$15,495	\$11,483	\$81,476
PROGRAM TOTAL	\$140,253	\$21,940	\$17,755	\$19,505	\$22,322	\$13,370	\$235,145

^a Non-add. Money transferred from National Police or Telecommunications project to this project. Money shown as a part of original project.

^b OMA refers to the Operation and Maintenance--Army appropriation.

^c FY 1955 through FY 1971 ammunition figures are estimated. FY 1972, 1973, and 1974 are actual figures as supplied by GVN.

^d PEMA refers to the Procurement--Equipment, Missiles, Army appropriation.

LOCAL CURRENCY OBLIGATIONS
FOR POLICE RELATED SUPPORT
CALENDAR YEARS 1955 TO 1974
(Piasters in millions)

	CY 55 thru CY 69	CY 70	CY 71	CY 72	CY 73	CY 74	TOTAL
<u>NATIONAL POLICE</u>							
CIP Counterpart Special Account	2,160.9	1.2	120.8	40.3	-0-	-0-	2,323.2
AID-DOD Realignment (Non-add) ^{a/}	-0-	(50.0)	(43.1)	(992.7)	(952.7)	-0-	(2,038.5)
<u>PUBLIC SAFETY TELECOMMUNICATIONS</u>							
CIP Counterpart Special Account	210.6	26.6	62.9	18.8	28.2	-0-	347.1
AID-DOD Realignment (Non-add) ^{a/}	-0-	(88.0)	(124.1)	(128.8)	(256.2)	-0-	(597.1)
<u>CORRECTION CENTERS</u>							
CIP Counterpart Special Account	210.8	25.4	23.9	67.8	45.2	-0-	373.1
<u>ENGINEERING TECHNICAL SUPPORT</u>							
CIP Counterpart Special Account	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	5.6	-0-	5.6
AID-DOD Realignment (Non-add) ^{a/}	-0-	-0-	-0-	(75.8)	-0-	-0-	(75.8)
<u>RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT</u>							
AID-DOD Realignment (Non-add) ^{a/}	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	(165.1)	-0-	(165.1)
Total CIP Counterpart Special Account	<u>2,582.3</u>	<u>59.2</u>	<u>207.6</u>	<u>126.9</u>	<u>79.0</u>	<u>-0-</u>	<u>3,049.0</u>
Total AID-DOD Realignment (Non-add) ^a	-0-	(138.0)	(167.2)	(1,197.3)	(1,374.0)	-0-	(2,876.5)

^{a/} These piasters are shown here only for informational purposes. Beginning in 1974, a portion of the MASF appropriation in support of National Police was used for direct piaster purchase. Since the MASF appropriation is already shown under dollar support, the piasters purchased with this money cannot be counted as additional support.

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE
FOR ADMINISTRATION OF ACTIVITIES
DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

Date appointed

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY OF STATE:			
Henry A. Kissinger		Sept.	1973
William P. Rogers		Jan.	1969
U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM:			
Graham Martin		June	1973
Ellsworth Bunker		April	1967

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:			
James R. Schlesinger		June	1973
William P. Clements (Acting)		April	1973
Elliot Richardson		Jan.	1973
DEFENSE ATTACHE, U.S. EMBASSY, SOUTH VIETNAM:			
Major General John E. Murray		Jan.	1973
Major General Homer D. Smith		Sept.	1974

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

ADMINISTRATOR:			
Daniel Parker		Oct.	1973
John A. Hannah		Mar.	1969
OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY:			
Lauren J. Goin		April	1973
Byron Engle		Nov.	1962
DIRECTOR, AID MISSION SOUTH VIETNAM:			
John R. Robinson		May	1973
John R. Mossler		July	1970