

# MOZAMBIQUE

## Emergency Programme

### Mid-term Evaluation

(Abridged)

*Not USAID-funded but  
closely related to USAID  
emergency program*

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**Mozambique  
UNICEF Emergency Programme**

**Mid-term Evaluation**

**(Abridged)**

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The Emergency Programme is closely linked to the Programme for Economic Rehabilitation. The problems we are facing are at the same time, problems of the emergency, problems of the necessity for economic rehabilitation and the necessity to promote the development of the country. Thus as these problems cannot be separated from each other in their causes and consequences, also the solutions cannot be entirely compartmentalized.

Joaquim A. Chissano  
President, P. R. M.  
April 26, 1988

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## Executive Summary

Mozambique is gripped by an emergency of appalling dimensions. Per capita income has dropped from over \$200 in 1975 to less than \$100. Nearly two million of the nation's rural residents have been displaced from their farms by war or drought.

More than three million people are dependent on relief assistance for survival. Mozambique has lost the productive contribution these households would normally make to the national economy, and it is now encumbered by the staggering burden of supplying them with food. The projected food production deficit for 1988 is more than 700,000 tonnes. The impact of the crisis affects the supply of nearly all goods and services, it pervades the entire economy. Exports, for example, have fallen by 30 per cent.

The emergency is structural in nature, and its causes are multiple. Mozambique, after four hundred years of exploitative colonialization, was ill-prepared for its independence in 1975. It lacked basic institutional infrastructure and skilled personnel, and its economy was dependent on unsustainable trade relationships.

From 1982 through 1984 much of the country was affected by severe drought. Tete, Manica, Gaza, Inhambane and Maputo were provinces most severely affected, agricultural production fell precipitously. The South African supported destabilization campaign, including the banditry of RENAMO, continues to displace large numbers of people from their homes. Most of these "deslocados" become dependent on relief. South Africa's campaign to reduce its use of Mozambican labour and transport services compounds the burden on the economy.

Mozambique is in the midst of an economic recovery programme which includes fundamental changes in fiscal and economic policies. The programme seeks to address the economic impact of drought and destabilization, as well as the effects of a number of inappropriate economic and productive policies pursued by the government in the early post-independence period. The long-term outlook is favourable, but during the adjustment period, the purchasing power of some groups, particularly among the urban poor, may be adversely affected.

Finally, as a result of the factors noted above, migration to urban areas has increased dramatically. Mozambicans who were formally self-sufficient in the rural areas are now entering the monetized urban sector of the economy, and employment opportunities are not growing rapidly enough to absorb them.

Since 1984 UNICEF has initiated 35 projects to address the emergency situation. Creative use of UNICEF's inherent flexibility has enabled staff members to design and implement projects in direct response to critical needs identified jointly with the government. These projects fall into three basic categories: immediate, short-term relief to war- and drought-affected populations, medium-term measures designed to stabilize household productivity and income, and to improve access and delivery of basic social services, and, long-term development efforts, particularly capacity building.

About half of UNICEF's inputs have been devoted to immediate relief measures. Specific activities have included provision of cooking utensils, clothing, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, and other basic supplies. Transport facilities have also been provided including airlifts to isolated regions requiring urgent assistance. In a few critical situations, UNICEF has provided food relief, primarily with in-kind donations received from external donors for this purpose.

UNICEF's relief activities have been particularly effective and, as a result, thousands of lives have been saved. However, UNICEF's restrictive global supply regulations have often hindered timely delivery of emergency goods.

UNICEF Maputo has a strong record for its initiatives in the areas of household stabilization. UNICEF began distribution of seeds, agricultural tools and other productive inputs at an early stage in many of its initial relief oriented projects. Although the long-term impact of these inputs is difficult to assess at this early stage, individual project evaluations suggest that these inputs have served as important elements in the re-establishment of household food security in several areas of the country. Delays in supply of commodities meant, however, that some planned "stabilization" projects became more relief-oriented than originally planned.

UNICEF has shown considerable initiative and innovation in responding quickly to the rapidly changing emergency situation in the country. Its activities are particularly impressive in the areas of information systems development, assistance for Children in Difficult Circumstances, Commodity Grain Exchange projects, and the recently developed Quick Action Relief Capacity (QUARC). UNICEF has been involved in both shallow water and tubewell projects which have directly benefited over 100,000 Mozambicans.

More limited progress has been made in the transition from stabilization to development. Conditions in Mozambique are changing rapidly making long-term planning and project phase-out difficult. Inter-sectoral projects initiated in resettlement areas have had varying degrees of success. In the case of Espungabera there is some cause for concern, since the resident population now depends to a considerable degree on external inputs. The recent transfer of Mozambican personnel associated with the project means that little institutional memory now exists on the project site. The Changara and Massingao projects (the latter funded through UNICEF's Regular Programme) seem more encouraging as they are integrated rural development projects that have had a certain amount of external inputs, continuity in staffing, and UNICEF support for local capacity building.

UNICEF has made important contributions to building institutional capacity at the national level. The plan to strengthen the National Institute of Health and the support already provided to the National Section of the Ministry of Health and to produce vaccines to be produced locally have been particularly valuable.

UNICEF maintains good relations with other UN agencies. The ability of UNICEF's Deputy Representative to allow the UNICEF Deputy Representative to act as a catalyst and effectively to perceived needs, particularly during the initial emergency period when other agencies were not yet well established in the country. UNICEF has established a working relationship with bilateral donors and the national government in order to coordinate responses.

UNICEF has established a good working relationship with a number of local NGOs which provides an excellent means of extending the impact of UNICEF activities through organizations which are closely linked to local needs and priorities.

Looking to the future, UNICEF's Emergency Programme and its Regular Programme in Mozambique should improve capacity building and the provision of inputs and materials which support the more effective delivery of basic social services. UNICEF should focus its activities in areas where it has proven expertise, pursuing projects in those areas where it has comparative advantage relative to other donors, and limiting interventions in areas where other donors could assure better implementation of specific activities.

UNICEF Deputy Representative should begin immediately a process of strategic planning. In the interim, the situation in Mozambique is changing rapidly, particularly with regard to other donors and their interests and commitments. Given these factors and the long-term nature of the Mozambican emergency, UNICEF must review its

own commitments in light of the strengths and priorities of the Maputo office

The impressive results obtained in the Emergency Programme and in UNICEF Maputo's overall country programme result primarily from the high level of professionalism and the dedication of the UNICEF staff involved. However, with impending growth of the programme resulting from the 1988 Emergency Appeal, there is an urgent need for re-allocation of responsibilities to ensure that this high quality of work continues. The UNICEF Maputo office in general, and the Emergency Unit in particular, require restructuring in order to respond to these conditions.

The strategic review of objectives and priorities should form the basis for such restructuring. Once accomplished, the overall UNICEF Programme can be expected to evolve in an increasingly coherent manner, with less emphasis on reactive response and more attention to proactive planning. In addition, the inclusion of increased planning capacity within UNICEF's office will help to ensure continued complementarity with other donor initiatives, and the high level of responsiveness to national development priorities.

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Section I

UNRELENTING STRUCTURAL CRISIS

### Four Centuries of Exploitative Colonialization

The crisis in Mozambique is occurring in a context shaped by more than four hundred years of colonial exploitation. Historically, Mozambique played a role as a provider of service for white-ruled neighbouring countries and its colonial master. Mozambique supplied cheap labour for mines and farms and low-cost access to the sea. Development of internal markets and basic services for the domestic population was virtually neglected until Independence in 1975.

The colonial period was characterized by extremely low levels of investment in economic, social and cultural infrastructure, a high dependence on external markets (especially Portugal and South Africa), and the dislocation of labour that resulted in the disruption of families and farming. Part of this dislocation was due to large scale labour flows to South African mining and farming enterprises that at peak times employed up to 200,000 workers. It was also a reflection of the forced labour for plantations and for construction projects within the country.

The country's underdevelopment was made worse by the effects of a prolonged and brutal war of independence, and the massive flight of skilled settlers and capital. Deficiencies in implementing policies in the early years of Independence, combined with increasing direct and indirect external aggression and with recurrent climatic disasters, have contributed to a sharp decline in economic production since 1982. Instability in world markets has also weakened Mozambique's economy and its capacity for reconstruction and development.

## Factors Contributing to the Present Emergency

### Lack of Development

At Independence Mozambique had only eighty qualified doctors for more than nine million people. There were only six economists. Such stark statistics reflect the extent of underdevelopment and the enormity of the task the new Government faced in 1975. High priority was given to improvement of basic social services, particularly health and education. Efforts were also made to develop new productive sectors with extensive mineral and fuel explorations. Joint ventures were undertaken with international companies to invest in the agricultural and tourism sectors. However the obstacles to development remained. These included a shortage of trained personnel to administer Government programmes, inadequate transport and communication networks, scarcity of expertise in crucial income-earning sectors such as industry, agricultural marketing and export, insufficient access to development loans, and a set of counter-productive agricultural policies. It is indicative of the weakness in institutional capacity that by 1988, in spite of considerable government effort and donor assistance, Mozambique still had only sixty agronomists to serve a population that had grown to 14.5 million.

### Drought

The drought, most intense between 1982 and 1984, had a devastating impact on the nation's underdeveloped agricultural system. It is generally estimated that between 1982 and 1984 approximately 100,000 people died as a direct result of drought, coupled with the effects of insurgency. Traditional coping strategies such as the movement of cattle to Zimbabwe for sale, and migration in search of casual labour, were constrained by growing insecurity. Insecurity also disrupted local and regional trading networks that would normally facilitate commodity transfers between surplus and deficit areas. Opportunities for the practice of shifting cultivation were curtailed, and by 1984 large numbers of people had migrated from villages to towns. This displacement created new administrative burdens for the government, particularly at district and provincial levels. In many cases, it also resulted in missed opportunities to plant in areas where the rains were relatively good during late 1984.

As a result of disruption in the agricultural sector, production has fallen and the country has become increasingly dependent on external sources of food. Between the two periods 1978/82 and 1984/85 food aid imports rose by 95 per cent. By 1985 approximately 60 per cent of all marketed cereals were imported.

### Destabilization

Although severe drought continued beyond 1984, destabilization superseded it as the principal cause of death, displacement, and social and economic disruption. The armed aggression of RENAMO, together with other

effects of South African supported destabilization, now dominates most aspects of Mozambican life

Shortly after Mozambican Independence, South Africa began to reduce its use of Mozambican port facilities and migrant labour. These changes deprived the country of much of its foreign exchange earning opportunity. Since 1975, the annual volume of freight shipped through Maputo port has fallen from nine million to one million tonnes. The number of migrant workers has shrunk from a high of some 200,000 to 60,000. This drop in employment has been particularly devastating for those households in the southern part of Mozambique which have limited farming opportunities and have grown dependent on foreign remittances.

In addition to other forms of disruption, Mozambique has been victim of repeated armed attacks on productive units. Banditry has increased dramatically since the dissident movement formed by Rhodesian intelligence was taken over by South Africa (1980) for use in its destabilization campaign against the countries of the region. In the early 1980s banditry was primarily concentrated in the central Provinces of Tete, Manica, Sofala, and Inhambane. However, since 1986, the major focus of attacks and of RENAMO domination have spread into northern Tete and Sofala, Zambezia, southern Nampula and Niassa, and the extreme south of Maputo Province. The capacity of the Government to provide even basic services in these areas is greatly reduced by the difficulty of access. In some RENAMO dominated areas, there has been no contact with the Government for more than two years. For these areas, the main concern is no longer attempting to maintain production levels, but planning emergency services for the ravaged communities once they are liberated by government forces, or when the people manage to escape to more secure areas.

As a result of rural disruption, substantial numbers of people are migrating to urban areas. These large-scale population movements reflect the increased frequency of attacks on villages and a breakdown in local food supply systems. Movements to the larger towns and cities result in the growth of squatter communities that are unable to be self-sufficient in food production.

#### Programme for Economic Rehabilitation

The Government of Mozambique has begun to implement a Programme of Economic Recovery (PER) to gain control over the nation's economic problems. This effort is strongly supported by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and is designed to stimulate economic growth through a restructuring of the nation's economic base. The intent is to improve utilization of existing industrial capacity, and to place a far greater development emphasis on agricultural production and marketing, especially in the family sector. Some beneficial effects of the PER are already apparent. In 1987-88 industrial output rose by 18% and construction by 5%. In 1987 a five per cent growth in "gross social product" was achieved, as compared with four per cent in 1986. However, the central objective of the programme, which is to significantly increase agricultural production has not yet been achieved.

The PRE, undoubtedly a necessary and ultimately positive step, also has potentially adverse effects on certain sectors of the population. It is, thus, a contributor to current food security and employment problems. The devaluation of the escudo and liberalization of imports, basic elements of the PRE, have narrowed the gap between the official and the parallel market for foreign exchange and have increased the availability of certain important consumer goods. Salaries have been increased as part of the PRE, but price rises and the reduction in food subsidies have generally outstripped the impact of these wage increases. The purchasing power of many households, especially in urban areas, has been effectively reduced.

Many Mozambicans can no longer buy adequate quantities of basic foods. The problem is particularly acute for unemployed urban dwellers, especially the recent migrants from rural areas. The rural farmer who is now included in a broader tax structure will also face higher consumer prices, although this is expected to be offset by production increases and higher producer prices.

The effects of the programme on social services such as health and education, both of which will depend increasingly on user fees, will be more difficult to assess. The information systems to monitor those likely to be most vulnerable to the PRE are not yet adequate. However, data from other countries introducing similarly fundamental economic readjustment programmes suggest that any reduction in family purchasing power will have an adverse impact on the nutritional status of children. In this context, any economic stringency in Mozambique at present will generate further emergency needs.

#### Extent of the Emergency

The situation in Mozambique has been complicated by a woefully inadequate national infrastructure for systematically monitoring needs and planning responses. Government capacity for response, in the form of transport and access, is limited. Nevertheless, since 1984 it has been possible to build a general, and in some cases more specific, picture of both the effects of the sustained emergency and appropriate response in terms of meeting immediate needs and providing the resources for recovery. Some lessons have been learned and the beginning of an institutional memory have emerged.

#### Shortage of Food

In retrospect it appears that an acute food crisis, if not famine, was inevitable in Mozambique. The fundamental problem during the last five years has been one of absolute food shortage rather than one of distributing existing food stocks. Mozambique has never been self-sufficient in staple food, but historically the family sector of subsistence farmers has been able to feed itself while producing small marketable surpluses. This economy was crucially assisted by cash income, for example by migrant labor remittance. Today, however, the combination of drought, economic recession and insecurity has so disrupted agricultural production that it is difficult to see how national self-sufficiency can be achieved in the foreseeable

future, even though the country is well endowed with fertile soil and has a relatively low population density

The amount of food marketed from domestic production has declined steadily over the last several years. This is a reflection of both a reduction in agricultural output and the failure of normal marketing channels. The deterioration of marketing systems has resulted from the depression of farm-gate producer prices, a reduction in the value of the metical, and an absence of consumer goods in the rural areas for purchase. As a result, national and local food supply and distribution systems have come perilously close to collapse.

#### Destruction of Physical Infrastructure

Statistics on the destruction of physical infrastructure are regularly quoted as evidence of Mozambique's plight. The enormity of the rebuilding task is staggering. The basic public facilities outside the cities and larger towns no longer exist in many parts of the country. The difficulty in running a district health centre in a building which has no roof and in which the chances of maintaining clean conditions are minimal may well be appreciated. Schools and water and road systems, are no longer functioning in many areas. The capacity, in terms of trained manpower and appropriate materials, to provide basic services no longer exists, nor does the physical structure in which to carry them out.

#### Loss of Household Purchasing Power

Loss of purchasing power has been one of the most severe consequences of the drought and insurgency. In rural areas it has caused acute shortages of food and other essential items such as clothing, soap, and agricultural tools. In urban areas, in spite of the rationing system, loss of purchasing power through unemployment, or an inability to keep pace with rising food prices, is increasing. Rapid deterioration in the terms of trade for individual households is an indicator of acute vulnerability to malnutrition. Thus, further erosion of household purchasing power will inevitably result in more widespread and severe malnutrition in young children.

#### Displacement of People From Their Farms

Government estimates suggest that in the past five years about one third of the rural population has been forced to leave home villages. What began in 1983 as a temporary out-migration because of drought has become continuous displacement due to insurgency. While it is difficult to distinguish the two types of movement today, people fleeing drought are more likely to return and to need less help to resume subsistence production. People fleeing violence have a more complex history. They have often spent months, if not years, under subjugation by RENAMO. Families have been torn apart, their members may have been killed, tortured or otherwise brutalized, and their villages destroyed. Both groups require relief, but rehabilitation may require different inputs. Also, those who fled drought

and insecurity into neighbouring countries will require assistance to resettle in Mozambique and rebuild a way of life they had to abandon

#### Breakdown of Trading Networks

Formal (such as through the State Marketing Board, Agricom) and informal trading networks are fundamental to the efficiency of the agricultural production systems. The breakdown of local trading networks and the increasing peripheralisation of communities in inaccessible areas compound the emergency.

Mozambique was never well served by an integrated national trading and marketing system, but farmers were at least able to sell or trade surpluses locally and obtain seeds, tools and basic consumer goods. The discontinuation of the colonial system of Cantineiros (inland traders) exposed the absence of alternative trading networks. Government efforts to fill the gap were rapidly overtaken by the destructive impact of the emergency. A major problem today is that the infrastructure in many areas is inadequate to deal with the volume of material assistance needed at the local level. To some extent the issue is being addressed with the rehabilitation of transport facilities. Other elements, however, such as technical skills at the most local level to assist in agricultural regeneration, information gathering, training and marketing are needed.

#### Breakdown in Community Support Systems

Terrorism in rural areas, as well as drought, have broken up whole villages which previously had functional coherence. The complex relationships that occur in small communities, and which regulate much of day-to-day life, are built on trust, familiarity, and kin connections. During periods of hardship, people traditionally survive through debt and obligation credit and borrowing schemes, and charity. These life-sustaining systems are lost when communities are forced to disperse. Authority structures have been eroded by outside attack and long periods of captivity, by the conscription of young people into fighting forces, and by the abuse of women and children. These events leave scars that make the task of rebuilding social units difficult.

#### Growing Number of Children in Difficult Circumstances (CIPC)

It is estimated that perhaps 200,000 children have been either orphaned or abandoned as a direct result of armed aggression. Many of these children have suffered injuries and need medical attention and physical rehabilitation. Others have been scarred psychologically by seeing their parents murdered and their home destroyed, or by being conscripted into RENAMO's banditry. The Government policy is to encourage the placement of abandoned children with families. Family kits<sup>1</sup> are provided to assist in

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<sup>1</sup> A family kit provides clothing and basic household supplies to ease the burden of absorbing a new child into the family.

the process of adoption or fostering. However, there remain many children who are in institutions for extended periods. In urban areas the number of street children is growing.

The Government and the Donor Community have only recently begun to address the issue of assistance to children who have been traumatized by the experience of extreme and prolonged violence.

Section II

UNICEF EMERGENCY PROGRAMME

## Objectives

In keeping with UNICEF overall mandate, its work in Mozambique focuses on promoting the survival and development of children. The organization's support to the country began in 1975 immediately after Independence, and consisted primarily of humanitarian relief. UNICEF also assisted, however, in setting up training for basic health staff, and in the development of programmes for mass immunization. In addition, funds were made available for the transfer and accommodation needs of FRELIMO members and other Mozambicans returning from Tanzania.

As the programme evolved, UNICEF concentrated on areas of its traditional expertise including the extension of basic health, rural water supply and sanitation, and teacher training programmes. In 1977, UNICEF began supporting the appointment of local Social Communications Agents and programmes for women in rural development.

The programme continued at a modest level for several years. Then the situation in Mozambique began to change. By early 1984 it was estimated that in the most severely drought-affected regions of Tete, 40 per cent of children under one year of age were dying. Given this situation, and the growing insurgency in many parts of the country, it became clear that UNICEF would need to mount a major Emergency Programme. The agency initiated relief activities, primarily in Tete and Inhambane provinces. Emergency supplies such as blankets, vital medicines, vaccines, and health equipment were provided. Fuel was supplied for urgent transport requirements. Seeds and hand tools for the re-establishment of household level food production were also supplied along with material for improved water supply and sanitation.

Early on UNICEF recognized that the causes of the Mozambican emergency were multiple. It became increasingly clear that severe under-development was impeding effective response to the drought and war. This problem required more than a traditional relief effort. Thus, the Emergency Programme evolved from an initial quick relief orientation to the relief-stabilization-development approach that has continued to characterize the overall effort of the regular Country Programme.

The overall objectives for the current Phase II of the Emergency Programme (1985-1988) have been to

- Provide basic survival necessities to populations affected by drought and war;
- Strengthen government capacity to monitor, plan and respond to the changing emergency situation, and
- Support household food and health security, and promote self-reliance

### UNICEF Activities

In order to address the needs of the structural emergency, UNICEF has three foci of activities: national, provincial, and local

#### National level

- Technical assistance, equipment and materials necessary for information collection, policy analysis and planning for the emergency programme effort,
- Support for transport systems (including training of maintenance/support staff) to enable rapid response to emergency needs,

#### Provincial level

- Capacity building in programme planning, implementation, and monitoring through sectoral and multi-sectoral projects,
- Transport, material, infrastructural support, and improvement of basic service delivery, and

#### Local level

- Relief, restoration of productive capacity (households), and access to basic services including health and water

#### Emergency Support Programme Phase II (1985-88)

The second phase of the Emergency Programme was a part of the overall UNICEF Country Programme (For a detailed list of projects see Annex 1 ) The emergency components of this effort originally included 16 projects which were designed to address five basic constraints

- Inadequate government capacity to deliver goods and services,
- Lack of materials, especially consumer goods and tools,
- Shortages of marketed food (from the family sector),
- Weakness in social, economic and physical infrastructure, and
- Food shortages at family level

Relief Although a basic aim of UNICEF projects has been to provide support for national capacity building, the relief requirements in some areas became so pressing that a number of activities to provide immediate

assistance were begun. These projects focused on the most affected areas of the country.

Integrated rural development Two integrated rural development projects were initiated, one each in Tete and Manica Provinces. Their overall intent was to assist formerly displaced and drought-affected populations, as well as to serve as demonstration projects for strengthening household food and health security. An additional project with a similar objective was subsequently begun in Massingao District of Inhambane Province, although as part of UNICEF regular Country Programme.

Information The Government has long acknowledged that its lack of reliable information is one of the most serious impediments to mobilizing support and to efficient management of relief and rehabilitation. Since the emergency began, strenuous efforts have been made by the Government and by multilateral, bilateral and private organizations to address this problem. UNICEF was early to recognize the extent of the information gap and its importance in the planning of emergency response efforts. It has therefore steadily increased support of national information capacity building.

UNICEF has supported the gathering and dissemination of information for the purposes of international awareness building and advocacy. These activities contribute to the current international debate on the ways in which the developing world is perceived by donor representatives, and how it is perceived and interpreted by citizens of the countries concerned.

Within the emergency context UNICEF has assisted in providing information in the form of briefing materials for visiting donor missions and journalists. Visual materials have been prepared to create more awareness of Mozambique and its history, as well as the extent and causes of the current emergency. UNICEF has collaborated with various government departments, and with the international media, to produce graphic materials focussed on Mozambique's needs, assets, and accomplishments.

UNICEF has also supported local journalism for local communities. It has assisted in the development of materials for use in schools, that reflect the theme of self-awareness and analysis for development. To ensure a wider understanding of development efforts, UNICEF has simultaneously supported communications capacity in the form of radios, television sets, and news magazines. While such efforts are not always thought of as the leading edge of UNICEF development objectives, as Mozambique puts increasing emphasis on development, this type of effort will become increasingly important.

UNICEF support in this sector has grown with the Government's perception of needs in the field of emergency planning and information. The objectives are twofold: to plan, design and implement an overall system for data collection and analysis, and to utilize the information available at all levels in order to begin constructing a data base.

Capacity building UNICEF initiated a number of projects designed to increase the Government's capacity to collect and use information for the

planning and management of relief efforts. For example, responding to the need to cope with the nutritional emergency which was rapidly emerging, as well as to the long-term need for developing national capacity in nutrition surveillance, UNICEF and the Ministry of Health embarked on two related projects: Nutrition Capacity Development, and the Food and Nutrition Information System (FNIS)

Support for Nutrition Capacity Development included the provision of a senior technical advisor in nutrition, partial salary support for four staff members (cooperantes), support for training of Mozambican professionals, and a supply of basic equipment including a micro-computer and vehicle. The project sought to strengthen the staff of the Nutrition Section of the Ministry to enable them to make rapid nutritional assessments of populations in high risk areas and to develop guidelines for therapeutic feeding programmes. The project also supported policy analysis for development planning. The Food and Nutrition Information System project sought to improve the flows of information on the nutritional and health conditions of vulnerable groups of the population. The system was designed to reinforce information collection and analysis at the district, provincial, and national levels. These two projects have made substantial progress toward their objectives, and have now been transferred to the regular Country Programme of UNICEF assistance.

Emergency response planning Short and long-term technical assistance has been provided to Departamento de Prevencao e Combate as Calamidades Naturais (DPCCN), Comissao Executiva Nacional de Emergencia (CENE), and to the Food Security Department in the Ministry of Commerce. The focus has been on the development both of policy for emergency response and the capacity for response itself. From 1986-88, UNICEF supported a United Nations Volunteer within the Food Security Department to devise and set up a computerized system for tracking food imports and domestic production, and to give early warning of potential food shortages. UNICEF has recently seconded a staff member to the Planning and Information Unit of DPCCN to address the need for information collection and analysis and to develop training for locally-based agents. UNICEF has also provided an advisor to the Projects Unit of DPCCN. These inputs have helped the government to define its own information needs as well as its overall strategy for emergency response.

Children in Difficult Circumstances Finally, under this initial set of emergency projects, UNICEF assisted national initiatives to help Children in Difficult Circumstances. This was a direct response to the plight of the large and growing number of displaced, war traumatized and orphaned children in the country. The Emergency Programme has supported training of child care specialists and agents, and development of policy guidelines, as well as special refresher courses for teachers. Material support for Children's Centres has begun, and UNICEF is now exploring new strategies with the government.

## 1987 UN Emergency Appeal for Mozambique

It became apparent in early 1987 that the effects of South Africa's policy of economic aggression and destabilization, coupled with renewed drought, had provoked a significant deterioration of conditions in the country. Estimates indicated that the total affected population had doubled between June and December 1986 to approximately 3.5 million or nearly 25 per cent of the Mozambican population. Eight of the country's ten provinces were severely affected by armed aggression and/or drought, and more than 70,000 Mozambicans had fled to Malawi.

As a result, the Secretary-General of the United Nations launched an International Appeal for Mozambique on 27 February 1987. The appeal emphasized short-term emergency assistance for a one year period, and sought \$169 million for immediate food aid, \$42 million for supplementary foods, and \$33 million for logistical support, basic health needs, water supply development, relief items and essential agricultural inputs to rehabilitate the affected population. Congruent with the overall framework of the UN appeal, UNICEF portion of the request was primarily relief- and rehabilitation-oriented, and included projects totalling \$17.3 million. These projects focused on the following:

- Reconstructing and re-equipping basic health facilities including provision of essential drugs and technical assistance to enhance local level health sector capacity,
- Supporting development of basic water facilities in Tete, Inhambane and Sofala provinces, and developing central management and information capacity with training and workshops for planning water systems,
- Supplying relief and survival items (including support for their distribution) and increasing government capacity to manage relief operations,
- Supporting resettlement efforts in Manica and Tete Provinces, and
- Supporting special projects concentrating on children in difficult circumstances and child survival projects, to be implemented through locally active NGOs.

Limited additional funds (two percent of the total UNICEF appeal) were allocated to the administrative support for the above activities. The unwillingness of donors to fund the concomitant technical assistance has seriously affected the quality of project implementation.

During 1987, total donations of \$8.4 million were received for the expansion of project activities outlined above. New projects were also set up. These included the pilot Commodity Grain Exchange Operation in Niassa and the Quick Action Response Capacity programme (QUARC). The purpose of the QUARC is to provide a bridge between survival and recuperation of

displaced and war-affected people. Activities are multi-sectoral. A Quick Action Fund was established within the QUARC framework, and put at the disposal of the Emergency Operations Committee of CENE. It is used for immediate relief purposes.

#### 1988 UN Emergency Appeal for Mozambique

Throughout 1987, despite substantial support from the international community, the situation in Mozambique continued to deteriorate. It became increasingly clear that the emergency was structural in nature and therefore likely to continue for several years. It also became apparent that classic emergency relief measures would be an inadequate response to the multiple factors inhibiting Mozambique's development. Thus, the Secretary General of the United Nations launched a second Appeal, this time for a two-year programme totalling \$380 million of special assistance for the country. The international conference in support of the Appeal was held in Mozambique in April 1988. This Appeal emphasized much more strongly than before the need to link relief, rehabilitation and development, and proposed long term commitments from the donor community. It specifically identified the need to rehabilitate basic health and, for the first time, educational infrastructure, and to increase investment in small scale agriculture. In addition, large amounts of food aid were requested along with logistic support more typical of emergency programmes.

Within the appeal, UNICEF has sought a total of \$39.4 million for a two-year assistance programme.

- Rehabilitating basic health facilities and services as well as supplying vital drugs and surgical materials,
- Developing capacity (including training) in planning and management of health, agriculture, water and emergency response efforts,
- Rehabilitating the primary education system and providing assistance to war-affected children,
- Developing water supply systems in Inhambane, Tete and Sofala provinces,
- Providing emergency relief and survival supplies, including transport and logistics,
- Supporting expansion of integrated rural rehabilitation projects in Tete, Manica and Zambezia, and
- Covering administrative costs

### Linkages Between Emergency and Regular Country Programmes

Structurally, the Mozambique Emergency Programme is integrated with the regular on-going Country Programme of UNICEF assistance. This reflects the fact that Phase II of the Emergency Programme (1987-1988) was developed as part of the overall Country Programme submission for 1985-90. The Situation Analysis undertaken in 1983 provided a basis for the conceptual framework of both programmes. Furthermore, as part of the Country Programme submission, the Emergency Programme (Phase II) was subjected to the normal analytic rigour of UNICEF programming process. Such internal consistency is rare given the fact that most Emergency Programmes must, by the nature of the conditions they seek to ameliorate, be developed rapidly without the benefit of this detailed process.

The fact that both UNICEF Regular and Emergency Programmes have a common strategic focus on capacity building and long-term support to family level subsistence minimizes the conceptual distinctions that might exist between the two programmes. As a result, activities begun under the Emergency Programme can be transferred to the regular Country Programme as illustrated by the FHS project.

### Relationship to Other Emergency Programmes in Mozambique

#### Linkage Between UNICEF Programme and Government Policy

The UNICEF Emergency Programme is closely linked to national policy. This reflects, in part, their co-evolution and UNICEF commitment to support national efforts in appropriate ways. The elements of the Emergency Programme have been designed to address specific problems in Mozambique as jointly defined by the government and UNICEF.

Relief The provision of relief receives the highest government priority because it can directly and immediately save lives. Despite its modest resources in comparison with the major food donors, UNICEF has played an important role in targeting its relief efforts on emergency needs that fall between the focal points of other programmes.

Rehabilitation of family life Government policy couples the provision of relief with rehabilitation of family life in order that people might re-establish household food security as quickly as possible. In support of this policy, UNICEF has undertaken several projects that include the provision of seeds and agricultural hand tools to help families re-establish their economic independence and food security as well as low-cost water supplies for drinking and irrigation.

Reconstruction. Destabilization has caused significant damage to the basic physical, social and economic infrastructure of Mozambique. The government estimates that 36 per cent of the rural primary schools have been destroyed, severely damaged, or otherwise forced to close, and more than 31

per cent of the rural health facilities are likewise affected. UNICEF has undertaken several community-based projects designed to rebuild social infrastructure at the local level, and now plans new programme activity to support the reconstruction of schools and health posts.

Economic rehabilitation Mozambique's economy is currently functioning far below earlier levels of performance. The government, with World Bank technical assistance and financial support, as well as with help from the International Monetary Fund, has undertaken a major programme of economic rehabilitation. The programme involves several activities (such as the refurbishment of factories) that are beyond UNICEF mandate. There are, however, significant opportunities for the agency to support the adjustment policy within its mandated areas of focus. These include increased domestic procurement of goods and services for UNICEF projects. They also include support to programmes designed to protect households from food price increases that may result from the economic recovery programme.

Development National development activities are proceeding simultaneously with the government's emergency and economic rehabilitation programmes. The new communications systems, new port and railway infrastructure and new dams all complement the emergency and economic rehabilitation programmes. For its part, UNICEF has supported area-based local development activities, as well as national-scale efforts such as information system development.

Integrated response As part of its emergency assistance to displaced and affected rural Mozambicans, the government has begun the rehabilitation of family life in several areas, and is moving ahead rapidly to rebuild infrastructure. However, as long as the current destabilization continues, the number of displaced people will rise. Hence, relief work will be required even as earlier affected people receive rehabilitation assistance and as reconstruction progresses. Given its mandate, UNICEF is currently involved in all three of these areas through its portfolio of emergency rehabilitation and development projects.

#### UNICEF Coordination With Other UN Agencies

Coordination of programmes between UN agencies is a complex process and it is particularly difficult under the time pressure of an emergency situation. The need for immediate response limits the time that can be given to coordination and planning efforts. At the inception of UNICEF Emergency Programme in Mozambique, there was no formal arrangement for UN agencies to coordinate emergency response efforts. UNICEF began its work in direct partnership with the Government at both national and provincial levels. It worked at filling gaps in relief programme coverage as well as setting up longer-term development projects.

Meanwhile, other UN agencies launched their own respective emergency programmes. The World Food Programme, for example, made significant contributions to transport and delivery capacity for food supply. Some UN agencies were constrained in their initial emergency response by focus of mandate, limited operational capacity, limited financial flexibility, and an

orientation toward long term rather than emergency efforts. In 1985, the office for Emergency Operations in Africa (OE/OA) established an office in Maputo to act as a coordinating mechanism for UN operations, providing a forum for sharing information, although its meetings were irregularly attended.

UNICEF, with a relatively broad mandate and a substantial degree of programmatic flexibility, found itself addressing a wide range of issues. The organization was frequently requested by the Government to respond to emerging problems, regardless of whether or not the assistance required was strictly within UNICEF's traditional area of focus. In some cases, this response led to friction between agencies as to the allocation of tasks.

In 1987 the UNDP Resident Representative was appointed as UN Special Coordinator for Emergency Operations, leading to more effective integration of efforts between the various UN agencies. This coordination has become increasingly important as the various UN agencies establish their own emergency projects. UNHCR and UNICEF both initiated programmes in 1987, the former concentrating on disaster relief while the latter focussed on programmes for refugees returning from neighboring countries. As part of the coordination efforts the UN Agencies now meet jointly with CENE on a weekly basis.

This structured system of reporting and planning is complemented by the day-to-day informal communication between agencies, and the willingness of individuals to link efforts and minimize misunderstandings. UNICEF and WFP, for example, coordinate an institutional feeding programme for selected Government training and rehabilitation centres. UNICEF has in the past, and no doubt will continue in the future, to complement UNHCR-supported projects with critical material inputs not available from other sources.

There are, however, wider issues to consider. Although the government now makes little distinction between relief and rehabilitation in its policy, this integration of focus is not necessarily consistent with the policy and programming of most UN agencies. UNDP, for example, is committed to short term (typically up to nine months) life-saving support, and this shapes its programmatic focus. As a result of its willingness to be flexible, UNICEF has created government expectations that it can respond to virtually any emergency need. Relief, however, is traditionally an UNDP function and, when undertaken by UNDP, releases UNICEF resources for other more specialized work. UNICEF has supported and implemented programmes for returnees. Collaboration with UNHCR will be required to minimize duplication of effort.

Collaboration with WHO is less problematic because links are focussed primarily on national-level policy inputs. While UNICEF has a major interest in health and nutrition, the focus of its projects is broader than WHO's focus, which does not undertake field projects at provincial or local levels. Furthermore, the constructive relationships forged between the two agencies and with the Government help ensure complementarity of effort and consistency with Government policy.

### Complementarity with Bilateral and Other Donors

Relationships with bilateral donors have continued to grow and in some cases deepen. Some bilateral donors disburse programme funds through UNICEF (providing direct financial support for specific UNICEF activities). On the whole, they express appreciation of UNICEF use of their funds. However, as the emergency programme moves to a new phase, the demands put upon UNICEF by the injection of new and substantial funds from bilateral agencies may prove difficult to handle. A number of donors questioned UNICEF capacity to implement additional projects at the field level, despite the fact that several of these same donors are clearly looking for implementational support from UNICEF.

Commitment to the programme of a major donor may make it difficult for the organization to move towards small scale locally-based development input programmes.

Furthermore, formal cooperation between UNICEF and bilateral donors as equal funding partners requires that the partners co-ordinate their activities. In some cases, project implementation has been substantially delayed, despite UNICEF commitment, due to the different priorities of the funding partner. In other cases, UNICEF has had to significantly alter its initially agreed role due to changes in bilateral commitments with the government. If the bilateral contribution then falls short of initial commitments, the adequacy of UNICEF assistance is necessarily compromised.

Another type of problem is illustrated by a current World Bank proposal which includes a major component for the design and implementation of a supplemental feeding programme. The Bank and the Government seek partners for the administration and implementation of the project, one of which could well be UNICEF. This would represent yet another demand on UNICEF, together with yet another set of stringent reporting procedures for which there is limited capacity in the Meputo office to respond.

Taken together, these and other examples of bilateral relations underline the difficult middle ground which UNICEF seeks to tread. Although support of the major donors is important for the broadening of UNICEF approach on a national basis, this same support imposes administrative and philosophical constraints on the organization which could undermine UNICEF effectiveness. Care will need to be taken to define clearly the role of UNICEF in any joint endeavor. The decision of the Representative to avoid the role of "implementing agency" provides a clear policy for guiding UNICEF relationships with bilateral and other donors.

### Programmatic Relationship with NGOs

UNICEF is mandated to work with and through NGOs, the rationale being that UNICEF seeks to further its work for the welfare of children through whatever channels are available and appropriate. UNICEF recognizes that NGOs may, in certain cases, have a more specialized expertise and certainly a greater outreach in the communities in which they operate. This can

provide UNICEF with excellent opportunities to extend its assistance without necessarily incurring extra administrative responsibility.

Joint ventures with NGOs can take several forms including joint financing of a given programme or project, single donations to an NGO which may not have the resources to meet sudden needs, or more sustained funding of a NGO so that it becomes, in effect, the operational arm of UNICEF for a longer period.

NGO presence in Mozambique was limited in the early days of the emergency and it is only since 1985 that many well established NGOs have become operational. UNICEF has in some cases forged useful relationships with some of the agencies — notably in its early collaboration with CARE US in setting up the Logistics Support Unit within DPCCN.

The establishment in 1986 of a special fund for NGO collaboration reflected overall UNICEF policy and has resulted in thirteen joint projects, some of which are to be extended. UNICEF inputs have included the provision of carpentry tools and family kits for distribution by NGOs. It has also provided technical assistance and materials at Provincial levels to improve delivery. UNICEF has also distributed the trucks it received from USA for Africa amongst five NGOs. More substantial is the donation to Community Aid Abroad of \$50,000 over a one-year period to support a health and agriculture programme in Inhambane Province. The collaboration has recently been extended, but it is as yet unclear precisely what goals have been achieved in this programme and thus what the basis of UNICEF continued support rests upon.

There may, however, be room for greater collaboration in the future, although this will be modified to some extent by the role of the proposed UNICEF field officers.

Section III

PROGRAMME EFFECTIVENESS

Programme effectiveness is more than the sum of the contributions of individual projects. It is an indication of how well projects complement one another to minimize impact. The effectiveness of the UNICEF Emergency Programme can be assessed in terms of its contribution in three areas of focus: relief, stabilization and development. Effectiveness can also be seen in the impact that extends beyond the programme's initial objectives.

### Relief

Although UNICEF does not consider itself primarily a relief organization, and indeed the greater part of its interest and professional effort is spent in longer-term assistance, it is clear that relief activities in Mozambique have helped save thousands of lives. UNICEF has been particularly effective in facilitating distribution management, supporting critically needed airlifts, and in providing non-food relief supplies.

The Maputo office has created operational links with locally based NGOs for the delivery of relief goods to isolated areas. One important feature of this has been the support to the Save the Children Fund (SCF) for airlift operations to remote parts of Zambezia. This provided a rapid response to an extreme need. Such linkages enable UNICEF to increase the outreach and efficiency of its activities.

UNICEF operations have also encouraged other organizations with greater resources to respond to situations of urgent need. The World Food Programme (WFP), for example, now supplies food to government training institutions identified by UNICEF and others. In this way UNICEF has played an important role in facilitating links between relief agencies and the Government.

UNICEF has also assumed a major role in helping with public information on the crisis in Mozambique. Although this work does not fall specifically under the category relief, UNICEF advocacy with the international community has been important in mobilizing interest and resources for relief operations. Of special note in this area are the series of videos co-produced or supported by UNICEF: the publication *Children on the Frontline*, interviews and assistance given to foreign journalists, and organizational support for the 1982 donors' conference.

### Stabilization

UNICEF activities which have had a stabilizing impact include those which go beyond immediate relief needs to assist households in reestablishing self-sufficiency and strengthening their purchasing power. The categorization of projects into relief, stabilization or development is somewhat arbitrary, but it helps explain the combination of inputs at different levels. There are some interventions which are clearly stabilizing rather than merely life saving. These include, for example, the

provision of seeds and agricultural tools for subsistence and cash cropping, as well as raw materials for small scale industries such as carpentry or shoe repair. These inputs support a stabilizing function only, however, when the supply is regular and timely. In many cases, what was designed as a stabilizing intervention has degenerated into a relief input because of the long delay in delivery of essential materials such as seeds and tools. Some small-scale industrial activities have lost momentum due to late arrival of initial tools and equipment and the lack of regular supply of raw materials.

### Water

The water development projects have been an important element in UNICEF contribution to stabilization. In Inhambane 197 wells have been installed, a further 190 repaired, and a smaller number of boreholes constructed or repaired. These alone directly influence the lives of an estimated 150,000 Mozambicans. This programme has not, however, reached its full potential. Delays in material supply slow construction progress, and shortage of field staff (reflecting in part the continuing insecurity in the provinces) limit the amount of training that can be done on the use of water and its relationship to public health. To an important extent, what was intended as a major set of stabilizing activities paving the way for more sustained development, has been limited to the more modest provision of wells.

### Commodity-for-Grain Exchange

This operation aims to provide incentives to rural producers. It provides farmers with commodities in exchange for their surplus production. By making basic but difficult to obtain items available, it is designed to provide a positive stabilizing influence on the local area. An evaluation of the Tete operation, itself hindered by insurgent activity, was equivocal in its conclusion as to the success of the effort in terms of increased market output. The operation in Niassa was more successful yielding 700 tons of surplus food which in turn was given to needy schools and other institutions in the area.

The concept of commodity for grain exchange is attractive in the short run in that it has the dual function of providing incentives for both increased agricultural production and generating supplies for relief. In the long run it would compete with normal market mechanisms. The overall conclusion for this effort is that it works most effectively when applied to the more established communities and if the consumer goods are highly valued. Neither of these criteria are appropriate, however, to newly resettled target communities.

### Information Collection and Analysis

The proposed system of monitoring the effects of the Economic Recovery Programme (PRE) is particularly important. This system is to include the undertaking of relatively low-cost household nutrition, income and expenditure surveys in some urban areas, with possible UNICEF technical support to the government. This activity is significant for these reasons

- It will help identify vulnerable groups and their needs so that appropriate responses can be made,
- It will contribute to a national framework for ongoing monitoring which should, in time, provide the mechanisms as well as the information for a national data base, and
- The resulting information of such monitoring will provide a strong basis for further accuracy, especially on the educational, nutritional and health needs of children

#### Quick Action Response Capacity (QUARC)

The QUARC was intended to provide a bridge between relief and development projects for displaced populations. QUARC projects are limited to 18 months, and it is assumed that within that period a significant degree of household self-sufficiency will have been attained in the project area. The success of the scheme depends on timely and coordinated inputs, and there is therefore the danger that the funds will be dispersed over several sectors which themselves lack co-ordination. It is thus possible that few of the original QUARC goals will have been reached within the 18-month period, if a sufficient degree of integration is not achieved.

#### Children in Difficult Circumstances

The proposed projects for Children in Difficult Circumstances are still at the preliminary discussion stage. However, it would appear that inputs into this type of programme could help with stabilization. The programme aims to provide the children with the normality they require to become productive members of society. Given the severity of the problem, UNICEF mandate, government policy, the spread of the problem, and the funds available (approximately \$200,000), this promises to be an area of considerable importance for the expansion of UNICEF activities.

#### Development

In the context of the continuing emergency, it is difficult to measure the long-term impact of development efforts. While bilateral support for the commercial and industrial sectors continues to grow with evident results, UNICEF impact on the more social dimensions of development is less easy to assess. Furthermore, it is often not possible for agencies such as UNICEF to ignore urgent relief needs in the interests of development. Compromises therefore have had to be accepted.

#### Integrated Rural Development

The Changara and the Espungabera integrated rural development programmes were designed as pilot efforts. They have been implemented, however, amongst rather different population groups. In Changara the targeted community whilst drought-affected, is relatively well established,

whereas the Espungabera project was specifically designed to assist Mozambican refugees returning from Zimbabwe. In both communities the overall goal was to ensure household food security and nutritional rehabilitation through farming and small-scale industry for income generation.

Reviews of each of these programmes indicate that, despite evidence suggesting the food security of some households has clearly been improved, the overall development goals are proving to be exceedingly difficult to attain under present conditions. One project was overwhelmed by the constant influx of new people and needs for material inputs, coupled with limited land availability as a result of the insurgency, and the other project suffered from intermittent small-scale attacks combined with the efforts of repeated drought seasons.

It is, therefore, a major accomplishment that so much has been achieved in Changara, including training of agricultural agents and health personnel and development of small-scale irrigation. The Espungabera experience has been less encouraging. The project has suffered a number of setbacks, including the turnover of the main government counterparts. The small-scale industries are not functioning. UNICEF inputs appear to have created a marked divergence in household food security between the local community and returning refugees served by the project. It remains to be seen how the lessons learned from Changara and Espungabera can be incorporated into the integrated rural development programme planned for the Beira corridor (Manica) and the Zairezia QUARC project.

#### National Capacity Building for Nutrition Programmes

Another set of UNICEF developmental activities focus on national capacity building. The effectiveness of this effort is best seen in the Nutrition Section of the Ministry of Health which, since 1981, has received substantial and varied support from UNICEF. The Nutrition Section has developed its management skills enabling it to plan and implement annual programmes, and improve its capability in the analysis of nutritional surveillance data. Standard guidelines for nutritional assessment to be used by locally based personnel and NGOs have been produced. The Nutrition Section has conducted its own surveys, including the gathering of information on household food security.

Progress on development of the FMIS has not moved as far. This reflects not only the lack of access to rural areas because of insecurity, but also the inherent difficulty of convincing key decision-makers of the importance of nutrition monitoring. One way of overcoming this has been the adoption of a more action-oriented approach whereby monitoring is promoted as the basis for action. To this end, the Nutrition Section has produced five Nutrition Surveillance Reports which document the extent of growth-faltering in children up to 36 months of age. The reports have been widely disseminated within the government sectors which have the capacity to respond.

## Programme Impact Extending Beyond Initial Objectives

As one of the first international agencies to assist Mozambique after Independence, UNICEF has established a broad-based working relationship with the government. At a time when the nation's needs were mounting, resources dwindling, and its emergency response strategy options unclear, UNICEF assisted the government in initiating several pilot activities related to relief, stabilization and development. Some of these have served as prototype projects for subsequent large-scale programme activity by other donors.

### Policy and Strategy

UNICEF's continued commitment to innovation has been a major factor in the Government's willingness to work with the agency on problems related to policy and strategy. UNICEF has been able to provide senior-level technical assistance in key policy areas, and to allow advisors to work with a great degree of independence. This willingness to complement advocacy with technical assistance has been particularly appreciated.

UNICEF has been effective at recruiting competent external consultants to address specific issues, although in some cases internal restrictions on conditions and length of contract have hampered their efforts. Medium-term arrangements with research and consultancy groups have tended to increase the quality of assistance. Continued involvement enables consultants to develop the depth of knowledge about Mozambique and its particular needs that makes them increasingly valuable over time.

### Enhanced Role for NGOs

UNICEF has played an important part in helping integrate the technical resource potential of various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with emergency response programmes. The government is critically short of personnel trained to implement social service development activities. It is also short of development management staff and financial resources. UNICEF, with its access to donor resources and collaborative relationships with NGOs, has been able to play a useful role in designing projects, enhancing their funding, and ensuring their implementation through agreements with appropriate NGOs.

### Linking Emergency Efforts with Development

UNICEF's contribution to capacity building, although difficult to achieve within an emergency context, is facilitated by the integration of the Emergency and the regular Country Programmes. Lessons learned from support of the Nutrition Section suggest that an emphasis on institution building, especially in terms of office management and technical skills designed to be sustained in the absence of international advisory staff, can be achieved even under emergency conditions.

It is not clear, however, that UNICEF has accomplished integration of its nutrition related activities in the UNICEF regular programme. The programmatic links between the support given to the Nutrition Section and the nutrition component of support given to the Agricultural Training Centre (CEA) could be strengthened. The input into the CEA is important to achieving integration of nutrition with the agricultural training of local cadre, a goal under the policy of the Nutrition Section to integrate nutrition into other sectors.

This lack of project integration does not appear to be an issue of the link between Emergency and regular Country Programmes, but rather a more subtle and pervasive problem of links between project activities within the UNICEF programme as a whole, especially between related projects which are implemented by different staff members. This appears to be a structural characteristic of UNICEF present planning and administrative system which does not seem to provide sufficient communication and coordination between projects, within and across sectors.

Section IV

ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS

## Issues for UNICEF Attention

### The Continuing Emergency

UNICEF activities in Mozambique must be seen in the context of the continuing wide-scale brutalization of the Mozambican population by RENAMO. Should new areas of the country be liberated or the destabilization programme substantially reduced, the emergency would require an increased level of emergency response by the Government and donors. The Government, UNICEF, and the international community are well aware of this situation and have several years of response planning and implementation experience.

### Programme Coherence: The Need for Strategic Planning

UNICEF emergency response thus far has been characterized by flexibility and innovation. These attributes have served the effort well, UNICEF pioneered several activities which became design foundations for subsequent larger-scale efforts of other donors. UNICEF has also provided key inputs, such as supplies and transport, which were critical to the success of Government emergency efforts.

The situation however is changing. Many of the innovative opportunities have now been explored, and as more donors launch emergency and development programmes of their own, the scope for pioneering initiatives will decrease. Further, as the current situation becomes better understood and more donors respond to the emergency appeal, the scope for UNICEF role in gap-filling is likely to diminish.

In the future, although flexibility and responsiveness will continue to be important, strategic planning will become increasingly critical. UNICEF Maputo must review its current emergency projects in light of the agency's priorities and strengths. The present portfolio of emergency projects, including the 1988 appeal, is more a set of discrete activities than a programme with an integrating strategy. As a result, despite the short-term efficacy of individual projects, the long-term developmental impact of UNICEF overall effort, as currently structured, is not reaching its potential.

UNICEF is thus in danger of becoming over-extended with too many different types of project activity. It has neither the professional nor the support resources to continue expanding without prejudicing the quality of its work. Although the resources available to UNICEF are growing, they are unlikely to match the total need. Difficult allocation choices will have to be made.

A re-focussing of the various emergency projects within a development strategy framework would facilitate the establishment of planning and management priorities. In addition, this process would assist UNICEF to limit its scope of intervention and thus provide a means of reducing the number of ad hoc requests from the government and other donors.

In order to ensure the continuing integration of regular and emergency activities, UNICEF Maputo will need to bring this planning process immediately. Phasing out of activities which can be more effectively funded and implemented by other donors or UN agencies, and the consolidation of efforts in areas of UNICEF expertise will also be needed. UNICEF should continue to work closely with the government to play an advocacy role, encouraging other donors to target their resources on those critical complementary areas outside of UNICEF expertise and experience.

Project replicability UNICEF should design projects for maximum replicability. In the Mozambican context, conditions change rapidly with population movements and the volatile security conditions. Nevertheless, the effort should draw on the experience of the past four years, and use it to plan and implement proven projects in areas of need. The focus should be on enabling others (Government and NGOs) to administer such projects so that UNICEF can responsibly and relatively quickly phase out support and move to new areas.

Capacity building UNICEF should continue to target its inputs at multiple levels of the Government to help ensure that essential capacity is developed throughout the administration. National-level capacity building is important, but has little impact unless it is linked to complementary efforts at provincial, district, and local levels. Effective implementation of programmes oriented toward people in rural areas depends on capable administration at the district level. District-based projects can help ensure that the government is able to provide the sustaining momentum required for long-term development. Careful planning with an emphasis on community participation and decision making will help to avoid projects that create dependence on external inputs. This will also contribute to ensuring that field projects are maintained beyond the period of UNICEF support.

### Management

UNICEF Maputo finds itself with the management burden of rapid growth and programme success. The management structure and systems that served an earlier level of operations cannot be scaled-up effectively to meet the needs of major programme expansion. Old structures and systems can absorb an increased level of activity for short periods of time on an overload basis, but this cannot be sustained without some loss of efficiency. The critical phase in such situations occurs when staff members can no longer take on more work, when reasonable office hours are exceeded on a regular basis, and demands continue to escalate.

UNICEF appears to be close to this critical point. The quality and commitment of staff within the Maputo office are exceptionally high. This has allowed the Emergency Programme to be sustained during the past two years despite significant increases of individual staff member responsibility. These increases in responsibility, however, have created an almost unbearable load. In the Emergency Unit in particular overtime has become the norm, not on an occasional, but on a continuous basis. The new Emergency Appeal now adds a two-year period of further expanding demands on

the staff. Such a situation cannot be sustained without impacting on staff morale and performance.

The Emergency Appeal of 1988 is already a reality. The programme it contains will entail increased implementation activities on several new types of projects and in a number of new areas of the country. The pressures on staff will increase. This will further reduce the possibility of strategic thinking and planning of the future direction of UNICEF efforts. This kind of thinking and planning represents the underlying strength of UNICEF programming and the opportunity for it should not be compromised.

Strategic planning is an absolute necessity at this time. The addition of staff (even though they may be outposted, seconded or brought on as cooperantes) to administer the expanding needs of the Emergency Programme will not by itself solve the problem. These staff will require support and coordination. What is required is a fundamental rethinking of programme strategy and management structure.

#### Information Systems

UNICEF has provided the government with substantial assistance in setting up information systems. The information in question can be divided into two categories, information for advocacy, and information for designing and managing emergency response efforts. UNICEF has supported efforts of both types, and in the Phase II of Emergency Programme has increased its technical assistance to DPCON to help set up local data collection systems.

It is perhaps too early to judge the success of these inputs, some of which have only been in place for a few months. However, it would appear that the level of investment in information by donors and Government alike is not yet reflected in the quality and usefulness of output. Thus, in spite of Herculean efforts, Mozambique may still not have an accurate picture of problems such as the extent and spread of malnutrition in children. The situation, however, appears to be improving.

The expansion of information systems and the attention given to them by donors is constructive, but carries the potential for ineffectiveness. There is a danger of a proliferation of vertical systems without due attention to horizontal linkage. It is important, for example, to integrate data on nutrition with data that are being collected and processed by the DPCON, the Food Security Department in the Ministry of Commerce and the Early Warning System in the Ministry of Agriculture. There is a critical need to clarify the use for which the information is being collected. It is particularly important to identify the users and their information needs, whether long-term policy formulation or short-term assessment of impending food crises.

Also important is the use of information to monitor not just the national situation, but also the conditions of the family sector and household food, health and economic security. The collection and use of this type of information at the district and provincial levels is an

exciting prospect. This was a central theme in the original proposal for the Food and Nutrition Information System project, but it has not yet materialized.

There is a danger of an imbalance between the level of funding for sophisticated information systems at central levels, and the level of funding for local data collection. The result could be a top-down system that does not meet important need. At present, several major proposals to improve food security rest on the most fragile information source basis. Planning in the Ministry of Agriculture, Agricom and the Food Security Department are apparently all based on information collected by local agricultural agents who have little training, and frequently lack transport.

#### Non-Governmental Organizations

There is a basic complementarity between UNICEF and the NGO community. NGOs can help UNICEF with local level activities, and UNICEF can provide NGOs with vital support. This relationship, however, contains elements of potential tension. From the point of view of an NGO, the UN has massive resources, and UNICEF is often thought of as a supply network rather than as an on-the-ground development agency. Similarly, UNICEF remains skeptical about the depth of development professionalism of some NGOs. These feelings were illustrated by one NGO field worker who said that UNICEF co-opted and took over successful projects. The NGO was concerned that it would lose its identity and, most importantly, its fund raising profile. Another NGO felt that the material resource capacity of UNICEF can in itself, act as an impediment to development. The NGO provided an example of a case in which it was planning to augment a water-based project with training in vehicle maintenance and repair. When the province was suddenly supplied with new UNICEF financed vehicles, local motivation for the NGO training activity declined.

These are individual examples, but they reflect a wariness on the part of NGOs which UNICEF may wish to address through more regular and informal contact and cooperation, particularly at local level. Several NGOs noted that visiting UN missions often did not make an effort to talk with them, despite the fact that with their local bases the NGOs had relevant and up-to-date information. UNICEF was frequently complemented as the exception to this criticism. Its willingness to work with NGOs is appreciated despite the potential tensions involved.

Collaboration with NGOs is a two way process. The proposed management of the Espungabera project by the Socsof Belgium (SSB) presents a opportunity for this type of interaction. However, the agreement, especially concerning finance and supply arrangements between UNICEF and SSB, will have to accommodate the rather different philosophies of the two agencies. While the former is in a position to maintain regular supply of material inputs, the stated aim of the latter is to introduce self-sufficiency at the earliest opportunity. Misunderstanding could arise unless frank discussions are held and reasonable contact maintained.

### UNICEF Field Offices

The Maputo office is in the process of appointing several field officers. It is envisioned that there will eventually be five field officers, each serving a different part of the country. The objective is to provide better assistance to the provincial government, particularly in the planning and implementation of projects. Having officers in the field should also help UNICEF extend its knowledge of changing needs and opportunities. The placement of the officers and the detailing of their assignments is crucial to the success of field operations. To what extent will they be accountable to UNICEF as compared to the Government? How will their responsibilities be divided between professional and administrative duties? Should they be generalists or sectoral specialists? What type of administrative support should UNICEF Maputo provide? How much decision making authority should the field officers have?

### Commodity Procurement and Supply System

The Emergency Programme has a large component of commodity procurement and supply. This includes provision of typical emergency relief and survival goods. Given the long-term nature of the emergency, there is also a significant amount of development-oriented material that must be purchased and delivered. The UNICEF Maputo office has streamlined its supply procedures including adoption of the new CFSS computer-based system. Whereas long delays often occurred in the initial stages of the emergency, the internal problems of paper processing have now been minimized.

There are, however, still a number of supply-related problems that remain as major obstacles to programme effectiveness. Since the 1988 Emergency Appeal will significantly increase programme activity, urgent attention to the supply issues is required to maximize the effective utilization of resources. Nearly all collaborating parties (Government, donors, and NGOs) praise UNICEF for all its operations except supply. As an organization specialized in this area, such criticism should be taken seriously.

Longer term planning The structural nature of the Mozambican emergency entails long-term interventions. To the extent possible UNICEF Maputo must plan for its supply requirements in advance. With the programme of the current emergency appeal running through 1989, such planning should be facilitated. Given the office's experience with the emergency and the staff's knowledge of the current situation, it should be possible to foresee many of the supply needs over the next two years.

Use of air transport Facing the security constraints on road transport UNICEF will need to continue to use frequent air lifts for relief goods. This will be especially important for operations in newly liberated areas which are typically not accessible by road. UNICEF will need to investigate the cost-effectiveness of long-term plane rental.

## Financial Factors In Financing the Emergency Programme

The Mozambique Emergency Programme has expanded at an astounding rate. Annex 2 shows the levels of total programme funding since 1984 and clearly illustrates the rapid expansion of the emergency component from \$270,000 in 1984 to an estimated expenditure of \$9,000,000 in 1987. Such mushrooming of resources presents a number of specific problems.

Planning in the context of financial uncertainty One of the principal factors impeding UNICEF implementation of the various emergency projects has been the uncertainty of funding. Emergency Programmes generally require significant resources on short notice to satisfy immediate needs. UNICEF's general approach to resource mobilization includes public information campaigns and appeals such as those launched by the UN on two separate occasions for Mozambique. Funding, however, is uncertain and sporadic. Response to emergency appeals depends on many factors including donor understanding of the situation, the relative availability of funding, urgent requirements elsewhere in the world, and other specific, often political, imperatives.

UNICEF's situation in Mozambique is illustrative. In 1985, the first year of significant funding for the Emergency Programme, UNICEF received contributions of \$6,796,700 between 1 January and 30 September. However, over the same period of the following year, contributions dropped to \$57,313. Although the crisis in Mozambique is long-term in nature, such radical shifts in funding levels favour short-term responses and complicate the task of addressing the complex issues which prevail. They also generate a large volume of reporting obligations on an overstretched country office.

Proliferation of donors An Emergency Programme is necessarily made up of emergency projects, which in turn are funded, totally or partly, by specific donors. The proliferation of donors supporting UNICEF in Mozambique has reached complex proportions. At present, UNICEF's 35 emergency projects must respond to the priority guidelines and accounting requirements of over 40 donors. Such a situation clearly creates a number of problems.

- Emergency funding requires activity-specific justification and reporting to donors.
- Many donors want implementation to begin immediately. This is clearly difficult given the fact that most project planning is not possible until financing is assured. Also donors often fund only portions of individual projects generating lag time for mobilization of the complementary funds required.
- Donors each have their own agenda. Many only support projects which are quick, action-oriented and life-saving in nature. Other donors specify particular provinces or sectors for targeting. Given the long term nature of the problems in Mozambique, and UNICEF's own objectives beyond relief, it is sometimes difficult to pursue policies deemed appropriate.

- Many donors with high visibility. Thus it is often easier to raise funds for capital investment projects (construction of hospitals, provision of equipment, etc.) than for capacity building. This problem is especially important in Mozambique where the recurrent expenditure requirements of new capital investment cannot be met from government resources.
- Donors are often unwilling to fund technical assistance or the organizational costs related to emergency programmes. In the case of UNICEF Emergency Programme the resulting increase in per capita work-load and accompanying stress levels in the office have the potential to seriously impair programme effectiveness.
- Donors sometimes change their policies. The recognition of the structural nature of Mozambique's emergency has promoted far greater bilateral assistance and concomitant stringency in reporting procedures, as well as more competition between donors. The net effect on UNICEF has been a major increase in the work load.

#### Other Issues

It is important for UNICEF to document, as fully as possible, the difficulties encountered in meeting its own objectives, and especially in the implementation of field projects. While it is understood that on occasion, UNICEF is called upon to continue with projects which it may feel to be outside either its mandate or current areas of focus and expertise, frank reference to these constraints can assist donors and others to recognize the kind of difficulties encountered in operating a complex Emergency Programme in a country such as Mozambique. UNICEF has followed a commendable policy of project evaluation. However, the result of this institutional memory could have a wider effect than it has today.

### Programme Strategy

#### Objectives

Provide immediate, short-term relief Relief assistance should continue to focus on the provision of non-food items to identified target areas to bridge critical gaps in assistance from other donors. UNICEF should continue to operate its relief efforts in coordination with locally based NGOs, since these agencies usually have close contact with the situation at the local level, thus facilitating quick response to evolving needs.

Improve household food security As the immediate relief requirements of an area begin to be satisfied, UNICEF should work to re-establish the agricultural production capacity of the household. This would involve the provision of basic inputs such as seeds and agricultural implements. Attention should also be paid to strengthening and diversifying non-farm income-generating activities, particularly amongst the urban poor.

Strengthen key service sectors Emphasis should be placed on preventive health services, water supply and sanitation, and primary education. Particular attention needs to be given to the potential for community financing and support of required services. To facilitate long-term development, it is essential that UNICEF (and other organizations) support capacity building for national emergency relief and rehabilitation management, particularly with respect to increasing household food and health security, as well as assuring delivery of basic social services. Given the serious shortage of mid- and upper-level personnel, UNICEF should emphasize training and technical assistance. Short-term senior technical assistance will be needed at central levels and medium-term cooperative assistance at provincial and district levels.

UNICEF efforts should focus on content and systems development rather than on physical infrastructure. Attention should be paid to improving the means of service delivery through existing channels and to the quality of these services rather than on building facilities for service delivery. The comparative advantage for construction activities lies with other donors.

#### Target Populations

Although UNICEF mandate focusses on the basic needs of children, it is clear that in Mozambique where needs are so great, helping children requires improving the situation of the entire family. It is important to identify the most vulnerable groups in order to target UNICEF inputs effectively.<sup>2</sup> There are several groups which have been identified as having extraordinary need.

Children in Difficult Circumstances There are approximately 200,000 children dependent on relief, and at least that many more will require relief when the RENAMO-held areas of the country become accessible. Many of these children have suffered physical injuries and are in need of medical attention and physical rehabilitation. Others have been scarred psychologically by seeing their parents murdered and their homes destroyed, or by being conscripted into service for RENAMO.

A new group of children in difficult circumstances is emerging in the urban areas. These include orphans and children who can no longer be supported by their families. Street children, although highly visible, are among the most difficult to assist since many have developed inappropriate coping behaviors which are reinforced by the transient nature of their day-to-day lives.

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<sup>2</sup> A special report and sample typology for identifying these groups is included in Annex 3. It considers variables such as degree of vulnerability and need, agro-economic potential of the area, previous investment by UNICEF, and the extent to which other organizations and agencies are working in the area.

Refugees returning from neighboring countries To date, some 700 000 Mozambicans have fled to neighboring countries, primarily Malawi and Zimbabwe. It is estimated that most will return to Mozambique when internal conditions improve. Given the fact that they have virtually no personal or productive resources, they will need food, clothing, seeds, tools, and access to water as well as health and education services. Special efforts will have to be made to re-establish the vital family and community linkages that have been destroyed through war and displacement. The children of these households will require particular attention since many of the normal societal support mechanisms for their development are lacking.

Internally displaced persons More than one million Mozambicans have fled their homes and taken refuge in other areas of the country. They are not generally recognized by the international community as being refugees because they have not left their home country. As a result, these men, women and children are not eligible for the assistance normally provided by most international networks for helping refugees. Many of these internally displaced persons are living under desperate conditions. This places an enormous burden on the government which will find it difficult to meet the needs of this group as it expands.

Urban poor The Mozambican population is predominately rural. However, the emergency is significantly altering the spatial distribution of the population, and the rapid migration to urban areas is severely straining the carrying capacity of urban systems. Urban employment opportunities are limited and are unlikely to grow fast enough to absorb the flow of immigrants. Arable land for new settlement in peri-urban areas is becoming scarce. Those individuals who are able to find employment are finding that the purchasing power of their incomes is being eroded as the prices of basic staple foods and essential household goods rise with the implementation of the economic recovery programme. The urban poor are finding themselves increasingly marginalized, with decreasing access to food and deteriorating economic security.

Geographic focus UNICEF should concentrate its efforts in those provinces of the country where project activities have already begun to be implemented, and where important contacts have been made with government authorities and communities. These focal provinces include Tete, Manica, Zambezia, Sofala, Inhambane and Gaza, and are some of the areas most affected by insurgency and drought.

#### Programme Focus

UNICEF has particular strength in the areas of advocacy, information systems, and planning, especially in linking emergency responses to long-term development objectives and in re-establishing basic community services. Given these strengths, UNICEF should concentrate on health, household food

security and nutrition, education, water and sanitation, information<sup>3</sup>, literacy, emergency relief, and planning. The latter is, and is more limited support for health, education, and other social services logistics.

### Health

Emphasis in the health sector should be on strengthening existing projects and on expanding them into newly accessible areas of the country. UNICEF has experience in facilitating the delivery of basic health programmes such as the Expanded Programme of Immunization, Maternal and Child Health, Essential Drugs, and the Control of Diarrhoeal Diseases. UNICEF supported activities should continue to strengthen national capacity, especially through training to improve the content and delivery of these services. The agency should minimize its involvement in building physical structures.

Projects already undertaken by UNICEF should continue in areas where security permits. These include extending primary health care to rural communities, supporting social mobilization, and assisting immunization campaigns. Recent discussions between UNICEF and the Ministry of Health on the possibility of promoting village self-reliance in primary health care through community management and financing of health services along the lines of the Bamako Initiative are to be encouraged.

### Household Food Security and Nutrition

One of UNICEF's strongest programme areas, both in terms of an emergency response that contributes to development, and in terms of having a positive effect on national capacity building, is its support to nutrition. The current strategy focuses on the provision of senior technical assistance and on manpower development. This should be continued. Support should also continue for the promotion of child growth monitoring, nutrition and health education, and improved child-feeding practices.

With population movements and continued insecurity, pressure on land resources will increase as families congregate in the more secure areas where transport and other infrastructure remain functional. Efforts must therefore concentrate on increasing agricultural productivity within the context of smaller per capita land holdings.

Priority attention should be given to increasing the availability of clean<sup>4</sup> planting materials. In addition, to the extent that UNICEF continues its involvement in rural development and resettlement projects, attention

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<sup>3</sup> Information as a general focus includes information for needs assessment and for development planning and management, public information (domestic and international), as well as information for social mobilization.

<sup>4</sup> Clean in the sense that it is free of disease and pests.

will need to be given to reclaim land and for the improvement of crop management

To complement this approach and link nutrition with agriculture, UNICEF should continue to support the integration of nutrition into the training of provincial and district level administrative staff. This should be done through collaboration with the Centro de Formación Agraria. UNICEF should also strengthen inter-office linkages between its activities in nutrition and household food security. Analysis of the short-term effects of the PRE on income, consumption, and nutritional status at the household level should be pursued on an advocacy basis. Such advocacy should strive to ensure that the national economic recovery programme includes compensatory measures that protect vulnerable households from negative effects.

### Education

UNICEF assistance should focus on developing the capacity of the nation's primary education system in resettlement areas, on making books, materials and basic classroom equipment accessible<sup>5</sup>, and on support to teacher training. School kits<sup>6</sup> could be one option for providing the standard educational materials. Although some limited assistance for low-cost community-based reconstruction of war-damaged facilities may be required, UNICEF should avoid over-extending itself with commitments to construct schools that could be built through local initiatives supported by other donors. When possible, teacher training should be done through the provincial government system with UNICEF assistance for materials, subsistence, and transport. Technical assistance to producers and distributors of books and supplies could be provided to help reduce the cost to school children.

Children in Difficult Circumstances UNICEF should continue to develop its Programme for Children in Difficult Circumstances. The need is for a broad-based approach which will assist the government to work through the institutions rooted at local levels of society. It should focus on the educational and counselling needs of children traumatized by war and displacement. A number of innovative activities have been initiated already, but they could be more fully developed and integrated with the country programme.

The number of street children in urban areas is growing, and ways by which this problem can be addressed must be developed. Because this is clearly an area of widely recognized UNICEF expertise, it is unlikely to be a central focus for other large donors. UNICEF should take the lead. There

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<sup>5</sup> School books and supplies are currently available commercially, but at prices that make them inaccessible to many children.

<sup>6</sup> School kits would contain the basic teaching supplies necessary to establish a village primary school.

is potential for NGO involvement. UNICEF should use its strong advocacy position to stimulate action, both local and international.

Primary Education Project Given the magnitude of the proposed primary education project, the provision of full-time technical advisors to the Ministry of Education as well as to the Department of Social Action in the Ministry of Health is a sound move. If the education programme grows as projected, UNICEF should consider providing more technical assistance to the government to help manage this expansion.

#### Water and Sanitation

Water supply and sanitation projects include material inputs and training (for community participation in management and maintenance). UNICEF has considerable expertise in both areas. It has mounted several district level projects for water supply development. It has also trained a number of rural maintenance teams to service and repair the facilities. UNICEF should, however, reinforce the vital component of community participation, and every effort should be made to identify additional village networks through which training activities could take place. These networks could serve as vital linkages for other UNICEF efforts, especially for monitoring and future planning. Women's groups and the party organization at the village-level have been under-utilized. The scarcity of skilled people at provincial and district levels increases the importance of initiating work through local structures.

#### Information

UNICEF has a keen interest and extensive experience in the collection of data for planning, especially as it relates to the situation of women and children. As a result, UNICEF has provided Government with technical assistance to many of the information units in the different sectors: the Nutritional Surveillance System in the Ministry of Health, the Planning and Information Unit of the DPCCN, and the Food Security Department in the Ministry of Commerce. In the future, UNICEF should continue to take an active role in fostering this work. However, more integration and cohesion is needed between existing information systems in order to guide their growth, and improve the utility of the data, particularly for monitoring household food and economic security, to date the focus has been almost entirely on the national level systems.

UNICEF could help the government in this integration process. It will need careful thought and attention to determine the essential information needs for decision-making at national, provincial and district levels. This approach should be aimed at identifying which components of the existing systems should be utilized and what the data gaps are. If data gaps are identified then solutions for obtaining this information need to be explored with the appropriate government offices at all levels.

UNICEF should also assist in strengthening the information systems at the district and provincial levels. To date, activity in this important area has been limited by security problems and the shortage of trained

staff UNICEF should provide technical assistance to address this problem. It should assist government in the development of village based information systems for use by the communities themselves. Area-based projects are particularly good entry points for local level monitoring initiatives.

### Advocacy

One of UNICEF's most important contributions in Mozambique has been identifying critical problems and bringing them to the attention of the government and other organizations for action. The publication of *Children on the Frontline* is notable in that it has done much to focus both the attention and resources of the donor community. By taking a broad view of its mandate, UNICEF has been successful in advocating creative approaches to addressing major development issues of children and women.

UNICEF should continue to play a key advocacy role with government and other donors, especially as this is closely related to the promotion of information systems for social communication and social mobilization. Focus should also be given to promoting local capacity and strength. UNICEF should encourage local journalists, writers and broadcasters to address issues related to child survival and development.

### Emergency Response Planning and Management

The 1988-89 emergency appeal gives considerable emphasis to emergency response planning and management. Technical assistance will be provided to strengthen the sectoral ministries as well as the central emergency planning institutions. This input is vital, and additional concentration on such capacity development within the framework of the new UNICEF Country Programme should be encouraged. Support to capacity development should be provided through technical expertise at the provincial level. It is clear that there are significant bottlenecks to information utilization and transmission at this level which could be reduced through the strengthening of staff capability.

### Short-term Relief

UNICEF has particular strength in the rapid procurement of emergency supplies. This capacity is extremely valuable and should be used to maximum effect. UNICEF should concentrate on the non-food elements of relief. However, it should assist as it has in the past, to enhance the government's capacity to monitor food stocks and flow. Linkages with NGOs based in the rural areas should be sought because of their close contacts with the changing situation. This will facilitate quick response as emergency needs unfold. UNICEF's advocacy role in mobilizing other donors to assist the government in emergency relief should continue.

### Logistics

UNICEF became involved in transport and logistics in response to the urgent need for food distribution capacity. Subsequently, CARE and other donors significantly increased their technical and financial assistance in

this area. Given the fact that these other agencies can adequately address the logistic requirements of the country, UNICEF should focus its support in logistic capabilities and information systems such as the link between emergency information systems and the response capacity of the DECCO.

### Supply Procedures

UNICEF maintains global expertise in the rapid procurement and delivery of emergency goods, but it is clear that in Mozambique, with its protracted structural emergency, this system is not serving the programme as well as it might. The Maputo office has significantly improved its supply operations and, as a result, procedures are generally efficient and streamlined. Nevertheless, except for urgent emergency supplies, lengthy delays in the delivery of emergency goods have become the norm rather than the exception.

### Procurement Procedures

The UNICEF procurement system should be adjusted so that procedures can accommodate the needs of this programme. Administrative regulations designed for non-emergency accountability impede efficient action.

The ceiling on local procurement should be raised immediately. For an emergency programme a ceiling of no less than \$50,000 is suggested.

Planning for supply requirements for the next two years also should begin immediately. In the extent that funding constraints permit, supply lists and purchase orders should be processed well ahead of target deadlines to allow for the often lengthy delivery times encountered.

### Stockpiles

UNICEF Maputo should create small stockpiles of essential relief items. New relief needs will arise as security improves and new areas of the country become accessible. The physical condition of the populations of these areas will probably be grave and require immediate assistance. Stockpiles of blankets, cooking utensils and other basic necessities could significantly reduce delivery time and cost. It should be noted, however, that stockpiles should not serve as an excuse for inadequate planning. Stockpiles should be kept to the minimum required for immediate response to urgent need.

### Local Procurement

UNICEF should encourage local enterprises through local procurement. As the effects of the PRE become more widespread, there will be increased availability of goods and services produced in Mozambique. Items such as the components of family kits are becoming available in the market. UNICEF Maputo should conduct a detailed market survey to determine local availability of goods for its projects. Given the rapidly changing nature of the Mozambican economy such surveys should be done on an annual basis. When there are problems of availability of raw materials, UNICEF could work

with local banking authorities, merchants and manufacturers to seek out creative solutions to freight charges and taxes. If appropriate packaging is a problem for local procurement, the use of locally or other locally manufactured containers could be utilized.

UNICEF should avoid purchasing goods produced in the Republic of South Africa. While purchases from South Africa may occasionally be necessary because of conditions of extreme urgency and life-saving, these situations should be minimized through improved information about alternative sources of supply and improved supply procedures.

#### Supply from Zimbabwe

To ease bottlenecks for the projects which border Zimbabwe, the UNICEF Maputo office should discuss with UNICEF New York the possibility of recruiting a junior-level project officer to work full time in Harare in procurement and delivery follow-up for the Mozambique emergency programme. UNICEF Maputo should also purchase a four to six tonne truck to be used for emergency programme transport from Harare to the border area projects in Tete and Manica.

#### Management Structure

In anticipation of the projected work load increase over the next two years, UNICEF should adjust the internal office assignment of project and programme responsibilities to make the most effective use of its staff. It is suggested that professional resources be administratively organized along sectoral lines, (e.g. water, health, education). Staff time could then be allocated to programmes as appropriate. Each programme would be managed by a working group with membership representing the relevant sections. Any given professional on the staff may be a member of several working groups. This cross cutting allocation of resources will facilitate the coordination of activities among programmes. By organizing the management structure along sectoral lines, the office can preserve the flexibility of allocating professional resources where necessary, and dissolving working groups when an activity is phased out.

Integration can be achieved between the Emergency and Country Programmes by strengthening the sectoral units of the office and including emergency operations within the most relevant unit. In this way, the Emergency Unit would be relieved of some of its routine functions, freeing up the Senior Emergency Programme Officer for increased attention to strategic planning of both the Emergency and the Country Programmes.

By detailing the major tasks required in the next 12-18 months, UNICEF Maputo will be better able to set priorities within the context of both the Emergency and Regular Programmes. The need to begin the Situation Analysis and the next five-year country programme submission loom large on the list of priorities. This has major implications for the functions of the office. The proposed re-structuring therefore includes a specific section devoted to planning. The inclusion of increased planning capacity within UNICEF office

will help to ensure continued complementarity with other donor initiatives, and the high level of responsiveness to national development priorities.

### Conclusion

The UNICEF Emergency Programme in Mozambique is large and dynamic. It is operating under extremely difficult conditions. A brief evaluation such as this one cannot do justice to documenting the extraordinary effort and dedication of the UNICEF staff. The breadth and depth of programme activity are truly impressive.

The suggestions offered as a result of the evaluation are intended to assist UNICEF in dealing effectively with upcoming challenges and opportunities. Particular effort has been put into identifying critical issues and constraints that need to be addressed. A summary of recommendations is presented in the next section. It is hoped, however, that the entire report will provide a frame of reference for the design and management of future programme activity.

Section V

Summary of Recommendations

## A General

### 1 Programme Coherence

- a UNICEF programme in Mozambique, both Emergency and Regular, should focus on the strategic development of national capacity and on the catalytic provision of inputs and materials to facilitate effective delivery of social services
- b UNICEF should concentrate its efforts in areas where it has comparative strength relative to other donors, and limit attention given to areas where other organizations could assure better implementation of specific activities. In particular, the construction components of the recent emergency appeal will stretch the human and administrative resources of the UNICEF office beyond its current capacities. A prioritization of planned UNICEF activities will help to ensure the effective use of resources, both financial and human
- c The UNICEF programme should concentrate on areas of proven expertise, including health, household food security and nutrition, education, water information and advocacy, and emergency planning and management. More limited support should be provided in the areas of short-term relief and logistics
- d UNICEF work should focus on content and systems development rather than on physical infrastructure. For the immediate future, UNICEF should concentrate on small-scale and locally-based interventions with maximum community participation, rather than attempting to replicate integrated rural development programmes on a wider scale
- e Collaborative alliances should be strengthened with other UN and bilateral agencies, particularly with NGOs. This will help improve coordination, avoid duplication and extend UNICEF field operational capacity. UNICEF should design field projects with a built-in phase-out schedule and a clear specification of the take over party

### 2 Management

- a The management structure of the UNICEF office should reflect functional responsibilities. An outline should be drawn up detailing the major tasks required in the next 12-18 months. This will allow for a prioritization, within the context of both the Emergency and Regular Programmes. The next to begin the situation analysis and the next five-year country programme submission forms large on the list of priorities, and this need has major implications for the functions required by the office. The proposed re-structuring therefore includes a specific section devoted to such planning

b. Better integration could be achieved between the Emergency and Regular Programmes by strengthening the control units of the office and including the various emergency operations within the most relevant units.

## B Programme

### 1 Health

- a The major emphasis should be on strengthening existing projects and attempting to replicate them strategically in newly accessible areas. Senior technical advice should be provided to the ministry to facilitate the reconstruction and development of the national primary health care systems. Coordination with other donors is essential.

### 2 Household Food Security and Nutrition

- a UNICEF should continue to provide seeds and basic agricultural tools as part of its effort to help stabilize rural communities. In addition, in area-based programmes, focus should be limited to four to six districts. In these areas, attempts should be made to concentrate inputs, particularly technical assistance, to promote better crop management, food production, marketing and utilization.
- b Close linkages should be established with CFA and the Nutrition Section of the Ministry of Health. UNICEF support should focus specifically on capacity building. UNICEF should also discuss with the Government potential technical assistance support for food and nutrition policy analysis.

### 3 Education

- a UNICEF support should focus on the provision of education materials and on training activities rather than on physical infrastructure inputs. UNICEF should also devote considerable discussion and planning expertise to developing a major programme for Children in Difficult Circumstances with the possible provision of senior level technical assistance within the two relevant ministries and five to ten cooperantes at the provincial level to ensure rapid implementation.

### 4 Water

- a UNICEF should continue with its successful projects in this field. However, added attention should be paid to training and other sectoral activities as an integral part of water inputs. It is especially recommended that every effort be made to implement water projects through the mechanisms of community participation.

### 5 Information

- a UNICEF should promote, assist and use local information sources. UNICEF can play a particularly valuable part in strengthening local

capacity to process information into a form more readily understandable by donors

- b UNICEF support of the Planning and Information Unit of DPCCN should be increasingly directed toward coordination of information which already exists at national and provincial levels
- c Advocacy should be extended to include promotion of the achievement as well as the continuing needs in Mozambique in order to encourage more confidence in development potential amongst donors

### C Supply

- a Planning for supply requirements for the next two years should begin immediately. To the extent that funding constraints permit, supply lists and purchase orders should be processed well ahead of need deadlines to allow for the often lengthy lead times encountered
- b UNICEF Maputo should create small stockpiles of essential relief items to facilitate rapid response to emerging needs. Stockpiles of blankets, cooking utensils and other basic necessities could significantly reduce delivery time and cost. Stockpiles should not serve as an excuse for inadequate planning, however, and should be kept to the minimum required for immediate response to urgent need
- c UNICEF should encourage local enterprises through local procurement. This will support the PRE and help stimulate the domestic economy. Items such as the components of family kits are becoming available in the market. Where there are problems of availability of raw materials, UNICEF could work with local banking authorities, merchants and manufactures to seek out creative solutions to foreign exchange shortages
- d UNICEF Maputo should conduct a detailed market survey to determine local availability of goods for its projects. Given the rapidly changing nature of the Mozambican economy the survey should be repeated on an annual basis
- e UNICEF should avoid purchasing goods from the Republic of South Africa
- f UNICEF Maputo should discuss with UNICEF New York the possibility of recruiting a junior-level project officer (L-2) to work full time in Harare in procurement and delivery follow-up for the Mozambique emergency programme
- g UNICEF Maputo should purchase a four to six tonne truck to be used for emergency programme transport from Harare to the border area projects in Tete and Manica

ANNEXES

EMERGENCY PROGRAMMES

1987 - 1989

No.	Projects	Period	Budget (\$)*	Strategic Objectives	Category**	Project Activities
<u>REGIONAL PROGRAMMES</u>						
M073	Effects of Destabilization on Children and Regional Networking	1986/87 ongoing	130 6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Southern African programming strategy</li> <li>Interagency monitoring/cooperation on impact of regional crisis on households</li> <li>- Information strategy development with CENE/Min of Information</li> </ul>	D = 100	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Preparation of <u>Children on the Frontline</u></li> <li>Attendance at UN/SADCC regional meetings</li> <li>Video Co production on Moz emergency</li> <li>- Material support to CENE information unit</li> <li>- Development of emergency info strategy with govt</li> <li>Publication of Moz books on child war victims</li> </ul>
<u>NATIONAL LEVEL CAPACITY BUILDING</u>						
M051	Nutrition Capacity Development	1985/86	230 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthen nutrition unit within ministry for regular analysis of data, establishment of guidelines and policy</li> <li>training &amp; orientation of staff (central and provinces)</li> <li>establishment of growth monitoring and reporting systems</li> <li>- input to nutrition education MOH</li> <li>special surveys of nutrit onal assessment of affected groups</li> </ul>	S = 40 D = 60	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- IA 1 advisor and 5 (partial) nutritionists</li> <li>nutrition agents retrained</li> <li>Supply of equipment</li> <li>- Inputs to UNICEF project design</li> <li>Monitoring system established with regular nutrition bulletin</li> <li>Guidelines established for nutritional rehabilitation and supplemental feeding programmes</li> <li>- Surveys accomplished (Changara, Espungabera, Tete, Gaza, Sofala, Maputo)</li> <li>Food and Nutrit on Policy drafted</li> <li>Now transferred to Regular Programme</li> </ul>

\* US \$  
Excludes unfunded needs

\*\* R = Relief  
S = Stability  
D = Development  
(% given)

No.	Projects	Period	Budget (\$)	Strategic Objectives	Category	Project Activities
M052	Support for DPCCN	1985/86	84.8	Assist establishment and capacity of DPCCN provincial offices	R = 20 S = 0 D = 80	Provision of office equipment, supplies
M053	Support to MCI Food Security Unit	1986/88	176.3	- Enhancing emergency preparedness Improving collection & analysis of food security (macro) data	D = 100	TA (UNV) Data analysis, computer equipment and office supplies Regular Food Security reports 20 radios, and workshops TA (occasional, for policy analysis)
M054	Food and Nutrition Information System (FNIS)	1985/86	73.7	- Develop locally-based integrated FNIS - Promote use of data for multisectoral planning and emergency response at various levels	R = S = D =	Indicators tested and 2 selected (growth faltering and household food stocks) Health personnel trained in growth monitoring and data reporting system established Central micro-computer facilities established Household food stock monitoring carried out in 3 provinces Now transferred to Regular Programme
M063	Logistics support to DPCCN	1986/88	2,268.0	Assistance in air transport for essential commodities thru LAM Enhance road fleet management & maintenance at central/prov levels Increase agency access to air passenger services	R = 60 D = 40	Study of communications and logistics system Radios to DPCCN network (10) - TA Logistics 4 mechanics trainers in Provincial workshops Air transport 1985-87 Port Provinces & 1988 - Province district for over 1000 tonnes relief items Passenger transport provided 86-88 via Airserve (MAF) to UNICEF and NGOs

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No.	Projects	Period	Budget (\$)	Strategic Objectives	Category	Project Activities
M077	Emergency Information systems Development (DPCCN Planning unit)	1987/89	306 0	- Food and Nutrition policy analysis Enhance emergency management & response capacity at national and provincial levels	D = 100	- 1986 inventory & assessment of emergency information systems (D'Souza) TA (FSG) planning and training (emergency assessment, planning and management) Computer and office supplies & vehicle Projects advisor DPCCN planning unit/ Field Training Officer Training courses at Provincial level (1988 )
Other	Short term consultancies Food security & PRE Policy framework dev for emergency General policy review related to eco adjustment	1987/88	Funded from other projects	Assess evolution of household food availability under rationing systems - Provide policy planning assistance to CENE Assess PRE related issues for Min of Finance	D = 100	- TA (FSG/Hay) 3 weeks TA (FSG/Lewis) 4 weeks TA (FSG/Green) 2 weeks
<u>RELIEF PROGRAMMES</u>						
M055	Donations in Kind	1985	910 0	Provision goods in kind to emergency areas	R = 100	- Tuna fish, blankets, 4 Landcruisers
M057	Coastal Food Delivery	1985	226 4	- Logistics support food delivery	R = 100	Support (6 mos) to WFP boat to deliver food relief
M058	Fuel Support for Tete	1985/86	173 1	Relieve critical shortage fuel for relief and other operations	R = 50 S = 50	- Fuel supplied to DPCCN Tete and other Depts for over 2 years
M065	Emergency Airlift Operation	1985	40 2	- Logistics support to emergency operations	R = 100	- Emergency relief airlift to Tete
M067	USA Trucks	1986	86 6	- Logistics support	R = 100	10 pickups for NGOs through UNICEF

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No.	Projects	Period	Budget (\$)	Strategic Ob_ectives	Category	Project Activities
M068	Maputo Displaced People	1985/86	15 3	Medical support	R = 100	- Supply of medicines
M069	Gorongosa Emergency	1986	37 1	- Well digging & handpump equipment to provide water to displaced people	R = 50 D = 50	Material support to water workshop (Sofala)
M070	Emergency Seed Supply Northern Provinces	1986	42 6	Relieve shortage vegetable seeds for agric rehabilitation in 2 provinces	S = 100	2 4 tonnes vegetable seeds supplied to families in Northern provinces
M071	Emergency Supply Niassa	1986/87	127 4	Commodity grain exchange to mobilise local surplus production for food for Lichinga town Small scale rehab Lichinga hospital	R = 20 S = 80	Soap and cloth bought from Maputo factories, air-lifted with existing handtools/clothes to Niassa AGRICOM commercialised 700 T for local sale and provision to vulnerable groups - Materials supplies to Lichinga hospital
M072	Emergency support for Tete	1986/87	70 5	Support to displaced people around Tete City	R = 70 S = 30	Soap, disinfectant, milk powder, blankets delivered to displaced centres and health units for nutritional rehab School construction & school materials displaced people plus clothes for pupils
M074L	Airlift Operation Zambezia	1986/87	43 4	Assist SCF/UK programme to deliver relief/rehab materials	R = 80 S = 20	Agreement (over 6 mos) with AirServe & SCF for delivery DPCCN, education, health materials and supervisory trips to District
M078	Emergency seed supply Caza	1986	79 8	Restore family production capacity	S = 100	180 maize seed delivered to drought affected Districts

No.	Projects	Period	Budget (€)	Strategic Objectives	Category	Project Activities
<u>SECTORAL PROGRAMMES</u>						
#061	Inhambane Shallow Wells	1986/89	771 2	Provision of water to drought affected rural population of Inhambane Train communities in operation and install permanent water maintenance capacity	R = 20 S = 40 D = 40	TA 158 new wells dug, 43 recuperated, 72 handpumps installed, 147 handpumps repaired 100,500 beneficiaries 2 water workshops built several construction/maintenance brigades formed
#052	Inhambane Tubewells	1986/1989	1,012 3	- Provision of water to drought affected rural population of Inhambane Train communities in operation and install permanent water maintenance capacity	R = 20 S = 40 D = 40	TA 39 successful new tubewells, 6 tubewells recuperated, 22,500 beneficiaries Community participation component training of animators
#064	NGO support fund	1986/88	586 5	Resources to specific emergency/ rehab requirements thru NGOs	P = 30 S = 50 D = 20	1 SCF Morrumbala, hopeia tool kits (\$8,600) 2 CAA Morrumbane integrated rural development project (\$50,000) 3 MSF Zambezia drug supply (\$28,500) 4 Medicins du monde, MSF supply of medicines & equipment (\$40,800) 5 DAPP Laputo Vocational Centre (\$65,000) 6 CUSO/SUCO Inhambane Water Project (\$53,000) 7 BIOFORCE seeds and consumer goods for W Inhambane (\$80,000)
#066	Children in Difficult Circumstances	1986/89	928 6	- Rehabilitation of social services affected by war and support to war affected children	R = 25 S = 35 D = 40	- Provision of family kits for foster parents Training of social monitors MOH/MOE TA for national policy development and legal rights of child Support to specific institutions

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No.	Projects	Period	Budget (\$)	Strategic Objectives	Category	Project Activities
M076	Sofala Tubewell Programme	1988/89	1570 0	Borehole development in Beira corridor serving displaced communities	R = 20 S = 40 D = 40	- Rig rehabilitation and transport/equipment supplies TA for Central Water Sector Management
M083	Reconstruction Health Facilities	1987/89	1,435 0	- Rehab social services in war-affected provinces Technical design assistance to national health rehab prog	P = 50 S = 40 D = 30	TA for prelim survey (Tele/phone) for project design/coordination at central level Initiation of health unit maintenance and reconstruction
M034	Vital Medicines	1987/89	3,400 0	Provision of essential survival items for referral health units, logistics support for delivery	R = 95 D = 5	Provision of drugs and medical supplies to health units throughout the country
M085	Emergency supply and equipment water and education	1988/89	184 0	Material support (in kind) to Emergency/rehab training programmes	S = 60 D = 40	Provision of education materials for primary schools Inhambane Education materials water training schools Provision of vehicle, National Water Authority Equipment Sofala water workshop

No.	Projects	Period	Budget (\$)	Strategic Objectives	Category	Project Activities
<u>AREA-BASCD REHABILITATION PROGRAMMES</u>						
M056	Commodity Grain Exchange	1985 87	131 8	Provision of consumer goods as production incentives to mobilise local crop surpluses (pilot activity) in Tete	S = 70 D = 30	Over 30 consumer items provided thru AGPICO.1 Over 160 T Maize/sorghum/fish obtained for use in Tete Data on households and terms of trade
M059	Changara Project (Tete)	1985 88	721 6	Improvement nutritional status & reduction HH vulnerability in drought risk areas Increase Prov /Dist institutional capacity for drought management, provide services/ extension support to District	R = 10 S = 70 D = 30	Agric inputs and extension thru rural dev centre Small scale irrigation and handpumps Health Education and infrastructure Support for coops management and marketing Water development schemes Training for District staff Social communications/mobilization programmes
M060	Espungabera resettlement Project (Manica)	1985 88	678 0	Support to resettlement in new villages, returnees from Zimbabwe (1985 7)  Establishment of basic services, production systems & increased food security	R = 20 S = 60 D = 20	Supply of basic household tools, domestic items & ag inputs Establishment of strategic stocks for new arrivals TA Field officer/agriculturalist Building materials, medicines, school materials Establishment of water workshop and construction team Small industries (coop) Food and nutrition monitoring
M075	Manica resettlement zones	1987 89	718 2	Rehab dev activities for displaced people from Beira corridor - Institutional support to District	P = 15 S = 65 D = 20	Supply relief goods, production inputs - Monitoring food security, small scale irrigation (TA), water development Support PHC services
M079	Emergency phase I (Tete)	1986	291 6	Urgent support to drought affected Tete population	R = 100	Fuel and relief goods Tete province
M082	Quick Action Response Capacity Fund (Includes Quick Action Fund for CENE)	1987 89	1,645 6	Critical inputs in process of rehabilitation for 6 18 month period to war affected areas Quick action fund up to \$10 000	R = 30 S = 60 D = 10	Supply of relief materials, seeds, health and school supplies, etc Training and institutional support to Provincial Emergency Commission (Zambezia,

No.	Projects	Period	Budget (\$)	Strategic Objectives	Category	Project Activities
<u>ADMINISTRATION AND STAFF SUPPORT</u>						
HC80	Emergency Staff Support	1985/88	1,249 9	- Staffing equipment of UNICEF Emergency Unit and info unit - assistance to supply, admin and finance units of UNICEF	D = 100	Devt of Emergency Programme strategy Info and fund raising Policy analysis and development, logistics coordination etc Project management and monitoring
HC81	Administrative Support	1987/88	213 6	Admin costs		Office support, Telex, VCR, telephone etc

Food Aid

	Thailand Rice (SportAid)	1987		Relief to drought area	R = 100	269 Tonnes to Gaza Province through DPCC
	Maize (Australian Donation)	1987	-	Relief to drought area	R = 100	2390 Tonnes to Gaza Province through DPCC

ANNEX 2

PROGRAMME THROUGHPUT

YEAR	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990/91	TOTAL
GENERAL RESOURCES	1,215 0	1,492 0	2,210 0	2,092 0	2,070 0	2,070 0		11,149 0
SUPPLY RESOURCES								
NON EMER	1,192 0	3,132 0	7,907 0	7,907 0	5,555 0	6,585 0	-	32 282 0
EMERGENCY	270 0	2,485 0	3,352 0	9,043 0	9,971 0	-	-	25,121 0
SUBTOTAL	2,671 0	7,109 0	9,073 0	19,042 0	17,596 0	8,659 0	-	68,555 0
DONATION IN KIND				146 0	8,633 0	6,160 0	-	14,939 0
EXPECTED FROM EMER APPEAL				19,188 0	15,900 0	23,492 0	-	58,580 0
TOTAL								
WITH DONATION			-	38,376 0	42,129 0	38,311 0	-	118,816 0
W/O DONATIONS				38,230 0	33,496 0	32 151 0		103 877 0

NOTE 1984 86 are actual expenditures  
1987 and 1988 are planned

Figures as of end of April 1988

VULNERABLE GROUPS OF HOUSEHOLDS IN MOZAMBIQUE\*

In any country situation UNICEF situation analysis defines vulnerable groups of households and individuals in accordance with:

- sources and/or levels of their income and/or land tenure and/or occupation,
- level of satisfaction of basic needs such as health, nutrition, education and
- coverage and/or access to services

Within those broader categories, households headed by women are usually considered at higher risk than others.

For UNICEF general and specific programming purposes it is also important to define where those social groups live and those places are usually the settlements which are more vulnerable than others in terms of access to water and physical infrastructure, access to transport facilities etc, or legality of land tenure and corresponding types of dwellings (urban areas).

The above specifications of attributes of households and their members as well as of characteristics of settlements in which they live have to be disaggregated for provincial and district levels, so that programmes and projects intended to be implemented at those levels, address the beneficiaries' needs in as specific ways as possible. In addition to above, the government and NGO institutional capacity as well as existing local resources and survival patterns have to be analysed in order to define the most adequate UNICEF inputs.

It is expected that this type of exercise proceeds the selection of project sites, the definition of project beneficiaries and types of interventions to be carried out. The

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\* Special report prepared by Vesna Bosnjak.

above should not imply rigid blueprints for action, since it is expected that the beneficiaries influence project design in terms of priority interventions and the ways in which should they be carried out. The project design based on the dialogue with potential beneficiaries or part of them, should include definition of baseline data which can then be used as the basis for monitoring, evaluation and reprogramming.

If the above process of programming have had been possible in the context of Mozambique it would have been even more complex due to

- discontinuity of government structures,
- external economic pressures (which is for example responsible for unemployment in Inhambane and Gaza provinces),
- internal economic instability (due to changes in economic structure and policies as well destruction caused by armed conflict e.g. Zambezia and northern Tete Province),
- displacement of population due to famine caused by drought and
- displacement of population caused by war conflict.

It is understood that the evaluation of UNICEF emergency and regular programmes in Mozambique has to do a kind of ex-post assessment of the vulnerability of households and communities which should take into account their characteristics stemming from colonial past, from their inherited social and occupation structure and available natural resources, from the consequences of drought and war conflict and from the assessment of their chances to be included in major development schemes, stemming from macro-economic criteria.

This type of analysis can on one hand provide some ground for the assessment of relevance of the interventions carried out in the past and offer the rationale for the future programmes. It is especially the last consideration which seems to justify

the assessment of existing and past programmes in the above proposed framework.

Given the country present situation, it is also understood that the future programmes will have to contain relief and rehabilitation interventions on a large scale, but that those will not be so unpredictable in scope and characteristics as the ones which were carried out in the past. Hence it is assumed that reduced uncertainty and unpredictability implies that UNICEF programming of both, emergency and development interventions, can be done in the future with the same rigour as the one exercised in "regular" country situations.

In Search for Definition of Vulnerability  
Relevant to Emergency and Development-oriented Programmes

The qualitative assessment of the vulnerability of households in Mozambique, carried out with two staff members from Maputo office culminated in the definition of six target groups with some of their specific characteristics and their location which may imply the need for operationalization of six clusters of interventions. The above exercise in no way replaces the work on situation analysis but may be of help for its completion in programming terms.

The groups of households are the following:

- Households and communities, newly accessible or otherwise severely affected by the war conflict, but otherwise in possession of land resources and/or possibilities for employment through rehabilitation or development of new infrastructure and production capacity of high relevance from the macro-economic point of view. Those households and communities will return or are located mainly in Zambezia, Sofala, Manica, northern part of Tete and in Maputo province.
- Households and communities which will return or are located on arid and semi-arid lands, which complement production for family consumption (including livestock)

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with seasonal or longer term migration in search for employment and whose development of productive capacity would not be considered of high medium-term priority from the macro-economic point of view. (the exception in this category are the communities which are planned to benefit from large irrigation schemes). Those households and communities are mainly located in the provinces of Inhambane, Gaza and southern Tete.

- Households and communities which will return or are located in the province of Niassa and other remote or neglected areas whose productive potential is considerable but whose underdevelopment in terms of inherited social and economic infrastructure present an obstacle for inclusion in the medium-term development priorities from a macro-economic point of view.
- Households and communities which will opt for permanent settlement in Manica and Sofala provinces (especially Beira Corridor districts), when returned or repatriated from neighbouring countries. Those households and communities will most probably be the ones which originate from arid or semi-arid areas.
- Households and communities which are temporary settled:  
a) in the provinces of Manica, Sofala and coastal Zambezia and other relatively secure areas within the country, as well as the ones b) who live in refugee camps or in the communities outside the country (Zimbabwe, Malawi).
- Households and communities which represent the 10-20 per cent of the poorest in the urban areas (to be studied).

Type of Vulnerability and Types of Needed Intervention

Type of Households \ Type of Interventions	Relief and Initial Support to Family Production	HC and Comm. Org	Work Income Generation	Water	Basic Infrastructure	Education	CEDC
1. Zambezia, Sofala Manica, Northern part of Tebe, Mazuto (high development potential)	X	X	-	Rehab.	Rehabilitation		X
2. Gaza, Inhambane, Southern Tebe (and lands)	X	X	X	X	Rehabilitation and new	X	X
3. Niassa (underdevelopment)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
4. Manica, Sofala (resettlement)	-	X	X	X	New	X	X
5. a. Manica, Sofala (temporary settlements)	X	X	Training	Temporary Solutions	-	Temporary Solutions	X
6. b. Zimbabwe (refugees and displaced)	X	X	Training	Temporary Solutions	-	Temporary Solutions	X
7. Mazuto (urban/peri-areas, poorest settlements, including one ones with displaced families)	-	X	Consumption Support to high risk groups	X	Upgrading	-	X

## Community Based Modalities for Child Development

The programmes for children between 2.5-6 years of age, developed so far through Social Action department and popular mass organizations, assisted by UNICEF, Van Leer, Save the Children and others represent the most successful example of the programmes which place the child and his development in the centre of community attention and concern, while based almost entirely on community resources (human and material) and minimum outside support (initial UNICEF advocacy, seminar on experiences from other countries, creation of organization structure, curriculum, training and supervision).

The programme (described elsewhere) succeeded to increase coverage to 30,000 children in urban and rural areas, trained 34 child-care specialists, 76 child-care agents and 405 community residents and developed community level support networks which sensitize parents to send the child to the programme, to include in the programme the children whose parents are unable to pay the minimum and follow-up programme implementation. It also succeeded to activate both, men and women on the issues concerning child development and health.

The observations and suggestions discussed with Government functionaries related to programme improvement are the following:

- If the monitors cannot be paid more than they are paid now, the programme should make provision for permanent training of monitors whose turnover will depend on the employment opportunities elsewhere (the monitors are unemployed young people from the local community and their stipend is based on parents' fees which provide circa 4,000 meticals per monitor).
  - The experience from other Third World countries shows that the turnover would considerably decrease if the monitors would be recruited among women older than 25 years, with stability in a given locality since those
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women generally have lower level of formal education than the unemployed youth and usually do not speak Portuguese fluently, the curriculum should be adjusted to their capacity. The result would be women's involvement, permanence in the community and acceptance of lower stipend in exchange of having a job near the household, what provides for combination of domestic work with remunerated activity.

- Higher stipends (subsidized by the Government) would on the other hand provide higher level of knowledge acquisition and permanence in the community. This would, perhaps, decrease the possibility for replication of the programme on a massive scale, the other recommendations relate to the need of monitors: curriculum upgrading through new modules of in-service training as well as to inclusion in monitors' tasks of one-time a week training sessions for parents. The above should reinforce parents own home-based activities with children.

In the areas with children with war trauma, training should be given on simple techniques of therapeutic work with those children (age 2.5-5 years). The programme expansion should be done in the communities with the greatest need and low-level of organization and not only in already organized communities, since child development can be a good entry point (less politicized than usual in Mozambique) for community and especially women's participation. On the other hand, the existing child development programmes should promote introduction of PHC activities linking them with the health sector while in the communities where PHC networks already exist, these should promote programmes for child development and establish linkages with Social Action Department.

On the part of UNICEF, continuous effort should be done for enrichment of training curriculum and elaboration of didactic material. The above could be the task of Education Project Officers and consultants.

It is highly recommended that UNICEF finances a "cooperante" in the Department of Social Action whose task would be to train the provincial teams and enrich the curriculum of monitor's training.

Reduction of number of children per monitor to provide for different activities in two (2-4 and 4-6) age groups and for more individualized work with children with war traumas and disabilities should be considered an objective related to improvement of the quality of the service.

Joint programming in medium-term perspective should be undertaken with Van Leer, Save the Children etc and Government counterpart. It should refer to division of labour in terms of geographic areas, type of inputs, standardization of programme approaches for similar conditions - rural, urban, war-affected, etc, as well as for introduction of minimum baseline data manageable by monitors and co ordinators of the programmes at district and provincial levels.