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United Nations Development Program
and
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SOMALIA

*Report of a
Joint Technical Cooperation Assessment Mission*

October, 1985

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GLOSSARY

ADB	-	African Development Bank
AFESD	-	Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development
CIDA	-	Canadian International Development Agency
DAC	-	Development Assistance Committee
EDF	-	European Development Fund
EEC	-	European Economic Community
FAO	-	Food and Agriculture Organization
IBRD	-	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
IDA	-	International Development Association
IFAD	-	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC	-	International Finance Corporation
ILO	-	International Labour Organization
ISNAR	-	International Service for National Agricultural Research
MNP	-	Ministry of National Planning
MFA	-	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MF	-	Ministry of Finance
TD	-	Technical Department (Ministry of National Planning)
PD	-	Planning Department (Ministry of National Planning)
NMEF	-	National Monitoring and Evaluation Facility (Ministry of National Planning)
IMCPI	-	Interministerial Committee for Public Investment
ODA	-	Overseas Development Association
OECD	-	Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
OPAS	-	Operational Assistance
OPE	-	Office of Project Execution
FRG	-	Federal Republic of Germany
GTZ	-	Gesellschaft für Technischen Zusammenarbeit
SIDA	-	Swedish International Development Authority
SIDAM	-	Somali Institute for Development Administration and Management
TOKTEN	-	Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
UNDTCD	-	United Nations Department of Technical Cooperation for Development
UNESCO	-	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	-	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNICEF	-	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	-	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	-	World Food Programme
WHO	-	World Health Organization

INTRODUCTION

1. This report contains the findings and recommendations of a joint UNDP/World Bank Technical Cooperation Assessment Mission (TCAM) which visited Somalia between November 26 and December 4, 1984, to undertake a comprehensive review of technical cooperation from all sources. It responds to a need felt both by the Government and by the donor community for an examination of the effectiveness of technical assistance in Somalia and for suggestions on how to improve it.

2. The mission consisted of:

Mr. Nessim Shallon (Senior Advisor to the Administrator of UNDP as Team Leader),

Mr. Bengt Sandberg (Technical Assistance Adviser, Eastern and Southern Africa Region, World Bank),

Mr. Willem Nijhof (Senior Loan Officer for Somalia, World Bank),

Mrs. Sakiko Fukuda-Parr (Technical Adviser on Agriculture, UNDP) and,

Mr. Rajeev Pillay (Evaluator and Consultant, UNDP).

3. The mission's terms of reference are at Annex 1. In brief, the objectives were to consider:

- (i) the effectiveness and achievements of technical cooperation;
- (ii) Government and donor constraints to effective technical cooperation;
- (iii) the impact of the civil service on the effectiveness of technical cooperation;
- (iv) donor modalities for technical cooperation;
- (v) the relationship of technical assistance to the Government's Public Investment Programme;
- (vi) national counterparts and their development;
- (vii) institution-building under technical assistance; and,
- (viii) differences in effectiveness of technical assistance for macro-economic issues, sectoral problems, etc.

4. The mission included in its review technical assistance programmes undertaken by both multilateral and bilateral institutions in

the country using the following as a working definition of "technical cooperation": 1/

Technical cooperation is an externally funded process aimed at capacity building and the transfer of skills to Somalia, which involves foreigners and nationals in the planning and carrying out of officially supported development activities. Technical cooperation includes direct support activities in the form of feasibility and other studies.

The mission excluded from this definition humanitarian relief and defense activities, concessions for the exploitation of natural resources, construction work, and support services performed by the staff of external aid agencies.

5. The mission recognized that the objectives of technical assistance vary and sometimes conflict. Often its primary function is seen by donors as the effective preparation and implementation of a donor financed investment. Nevertheless, because both the Government and the donors agree to regard the ultimate aim of technical cooperation as the development of national capacity by the permanent transfer of skills and know-how to Somali nationals and institutions, the mission has, to a large extent, gauged the effectiveness of technical assistance on this basis. 2/ Particular attention was paid to assessing the effectiveness of Government and donor modalities in promoting institutional development.

Methodology

6. On the mission's arrival in Mogadishu there was no comprehensive data or information available on the size, nature or effectiveness of current technical assistance activities. An attempt to compile an inventory of such assistance had been on-going for several months under the auspices of the Resident Representatives of the UNDP and the World Bank but the results, which relied largely on questionnaires filled out and submitted by donors, was so incomplete and inconsistent that the mission decided to undertake a second "inventory". This exercise, which was carried out by consultants in December 1984 - March 1985, used data obtained from multilateral and bilateral donors on the basis of

1/ The terms "technical cooperation" and "technical assistance" have been used interchangeably throughout the body of this report. In the eyes of the mission both terms refer to the same process.

2/ There are, of course, many instances where development of permanent local capacity would not be required, e.g. the carrying out of a detailed design study of a major technically complicated project. Even in these cases it would be important, however, to strengthen the local capacity to supervise and manage such studies.

questionnaires ^{3/} and personal interviews and was cross-checked with the appropriate sectoral ministries. An analysis of this information appears in Chapter II of this report.

7. As indicated in paragraph 24 of Chapter II, even this effort produced data which is both incomplete and difficult to compile and interpret. The mission is conscious of this fact and, while using the material to the maximum extent possible, has therefore been circumspect in the conclusions drawn from it. A much better continuous flow of information about on-going technical assistance activities is clearly required as a part of the improvements in planning and coordination of technical assistance recommended by the mission and the creation of a system to generate information about technical assistance on a continuous basis should be high on the agenda for the UNDP and the World Bank. The mission does not feel, however, that another major effort should be undertaken to fill the gaps or update the "inventory"; while such an undertaking might yield additional insights on particular aspects of technical assistance, the magnitude of the task is such that the results are unlikely to be worth the cost.

8. Given the paucity of reliable statistical data and the tentative nature of the conclusion that could be drawn from it, the mission concentrated on collecting information through consultation with a large number of Government officials, donor agency staff both in Somalia and at their headquarters, as well as technical assistance personnel. This was supplemented by a review of relevant literature and project documentation. In addition, members of the mission made several field trips focussing on the agriculture sector.

9. Even in these circumstances, however, the mission is unanimous and comfortable with the conclusions which it has reached. Only when it was sure of its ground, and after thorough judgemental evaluation of the evidence heard, based on its own members' long experience in the field of technical assistance, did the mission formulate conclusions and make recommendations. It is noteworthy that during the review process within the World Bank and UNDP, there has been virtually complete agreement with the report's conclusions and recommendations among those familiar with Somalia and with institutional development and technical assistance issues; some regret has been expressed about the unavailability of "hard evidence" or "scientific proof" for these conclusions.

10. The mission regards this report as a step in a process of change and improvement in the way technical cooperation between Somalia and the donor community is carried out. Based on its view of the situation as it existed in late 1984 early 1985, the mission has outlined suggestions for further action, including the setting up of task forces and the carrying out of sector studies. Given that the process of technical assistance is a cooperative and interactive one, that would have been the mission's

^{3/} The Guidelines for Completion of the Technical Cooperation Questionnaires are at Annex 3.

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approach in any case, but the lack of a database also made it the only practical one. The mission expects that further steps, if taken along the lines indicated by the mission, would lead to modifications in the patterns of technical assistance, to improved programming of technical cooperation and to increased effectiveness in aid coordination, suggestions for all of which are included in the report.

11. The mission presents its findings within the following framework and has tried to highlight the interplay between, and impact on, the effectiveness of technical cooperation of (i) factors operating at the "macro" level, i.e., development planning and civil service policy, and those at the "micro" level, i.e., design of specific projects and assignments, choice of experts and counterparts, as well as their interaction, and (ii) the national and international dimensions of technical assistance.

12. Chapter I contains a brief description of the general setting in Somalia and the overall development policy of the Government, within which technical cooperation has been taking place. Chapter II reviews on-going technical assistance using the data collected in the "inventory" to the maximum extent possible to quantify its dimensions and characteristics; a brief review of technical cooperation in the agriculture sector follows, with a qualitative assessment of how it works and what its effects are.^{4/} In Chapter III the mission analyses the process of technical cooperation which has produced the results described in Chapter II. In doing so, it follows the sequence of the project cycle from planning and programming of technical assistance through design and implementation, to monitoring and evaluation of the individual technical assistance projects, and looks at the way that the participants in the process interact in the various stages. This Chapter includes suggestions regarding the way in which the Government and the donors can, individually, improve the process of technical cooperation with particular emphasis on strengthening the process of planning and programming, design and delivery systems. Chapter IV deals with the international dimensions of technical cooperation, i.e., aid coordination, and more specifically, how donors and Government, working together, can make technical assistance more effective. In Chapter V, the mission takes a look at the future and addresses one of the topics it was expressly asked to address - critical needs for technical assistance. Chapter VI is a summary and conclusion, and brings together all of the mission recommendations.

13. The basic message that this report conveys is that there are many and complex reasons for the clearly unsatisfactory performance of technical assistance and that these are shared by Government and donors, expatriate experts and local counterparts. The mission has sought to explain the reasons for failure, and to propose alternative ways of achieving the results sought. It hopes that its report, and especially the discussion of it by the various parties concerned, will contribute to getting the process of change and improvement started in a spirit of cooperation and mutual support. Its suggestions can only succeed if they are acted upon by all parties concerned, in a coordinated effort to set out on a different track.

^{4/} Agriculture was chosen because of its importance in the Somali economy, the Government's investment program, and in terms of the overall technical assistance effort in Somalia.

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND AND GOVERNMENT STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT

14. Somalia is a large, sparsely populated country. The topography is varied and includes a hot and arid central plain, rugged mountains, plateaus and lowlands. The varying rainfall is by and large inadequate or marginal for sedentary agriculture. Some 13% of the land is potentially suitable for agriculture but only 8.5% of this area is actually cultivated. The bulk, 50%, of the population depend on livestock for their livelihood, most using nomadic practices. Both herding and agricultural practices are primarily geared to minimizing risk in case of drought, which is a fairly frequent occurrence. Government development policy likewise concentrates on minimizing the effects of drought, i.e., by developing the country's scarce water resources for crop production and other activities independent of rainfall such as fisheries and manufacturing. Efforts in these directions are hampered by the limited resource base; in the longer term, development is also threatened by the rapid increase in population which is growing at an annual rate close to 3% (not counting refugee inflows).

15. The harsh natural environment and the great risks inherent in the semi-arid, unpredictable climate have shaped the structure and development not only of the Somali economy but of its social setting as well. Social organization is based on the large family groupings and clans, predominantly nomadic in the North and more sedentary in the South. While the groups are distinct there is a remarkable degree of cultural unity among them based on language, history and religion, as well as family ties between clans.

16. The impact of the two former colonial powers, Britain and Italy, on the nomadic society appears to have been limited. The British saw its colony primarily as a source of supply to Aden and did little to develop its infrastructure, other than in transport to the port of Berbera, or the country in general. The Italians concentrated on the development of irrigated plantation agriculture to supply their home market. Neither power did much to promote education or the development of indigenous institutions.

17. At independence in 1960, the new country, the Somali Democratic Republic, formed by joining the former British and Italian colonies, was starting out with severe handicaps. The dual colonial heritage left Somalia with a divided and weak educational system, different administrative traditions and without a common language of government since there was no official script for Somali. With few trained and educated people, no administrative experience and a political system based on clan families and clans, the national leadership was ineffective. This period ended in 1969 when the October Revolution put the present government in power.

18. The new Government soon declared itself a scientific socialist revolutionary government and, with assistance from Soviet advisers, embarked on a policy of centralized control of the economy. The public sector expanded rapidly and direct controls replaced the market mechanism.



A major positive reform was the adoption, in 1972, of a Somali script which laid the basis for educational reform and administrative unification. During this time Somalia also began to experience a rapid emigration of Somali citizens, now estimated at over 100,000, to neighboring oil exporting countries and an influx of an estimated 700,000 refugees from Ethiopia.

19. The movement towards centralization of the economy came to a halt in 1977, when the Soviet advisers were expelled, following Russian support of Ethiopia in the Ogaden War. The economic consequences of the 1974-75 drought, the Ogaden War and the effects of the two oil crises in the 1970s together plunged the country into a series of economic crises. By 1981 the Government realized the need for corrective action and gradually moved towards a more open economic system and greater reliance on price incentives and private initiative and enterprise. It has since undertaken several stabilization measures culminating in the preparation in 1983 of a medium-term recovery program and public investment program (revised in 1984 and 1985) as well as stand-by arrangements with the IMF in 1983 and 1985.

20. While the Government has been preoccupied with the immediate problems of stabilizing the economy, it has retained its commitment to Somalia's economic development. The basic objective of its development strategy is to raise the standard of living of the Somali population and to create a society based on social justice with individual freedom.

21. The Government's development efforts center on a set of policy reforms designed to liberalize the economy in the areas of prices, exchange rates and trade policies, encourage private enterprise, reform of public enterprises and formulation and implementation of a resource constrained public investment program focussed on increasing domestic commodity production, as well as exports and import substitution. The public investment programs, therefore, lays emphasis on quick yielding investments, completion of ongoing projects, and rehabilitation and fuller utilization of existing capacities. These policy reforms would be supplemented by efforts to improve economic management and development planning.

22. The Government's policy reform program was endorsed and supported by the participants in a Special Meeting of members of the Consultative Group for Somalia in January 1985 which focussed on the financing of the 1985 balance of payments gap. The next meeting of the Consultative Group, scheduled for November 1985 is expected to address the issues relating to support for the medium term (1986-1988) recovery program including the Public Expenditure Program.

CHAPTER II

CURRENT TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN SOMALIA

A. Overall Level and Structure of Technical Cooperation Activities

23. Accurate data on past and ongoing technical assistance in Somalia are extraordinarily difficult to obtain and to interpret. There is no central point on the Government side that collects such information on a systematic basis. While the OECD publishes data obtained from donors on the amounts disbursed under various categories of aid, these data are on an aggregate basis and do not provide breakdowns between sectors or categories of technical assistance. The Development Assistance Report compiled every year by the office of the UNDP Resident Representative has been incomplete due to the paucity of data available from donors.

24. To remedy the data problem the mission arranged for an inventory of all ongoing technical assistance as of December 1, 1984. Even though the inventory relied on several sources of data, with some cross-checking between them, including questionnaires, interviews with Government and donor staff and reviews of documents, there are still serious gaps in the information. While the UNDP, World Bank, US/AID, Italy, EEC, West Germany, France and the UK are well covered, information about Canadian, Chinese, Japanese and Romanian aid is absent. Based on the available data the mission estimated that about three-quarters of all technical assistance, as defined by the mission, are covered. However, differing interpretations by respondents of some of the questions included in the questionnaires and raised in interviews make it difficult to classify certain data and to interpret the information. The statistical information should therefore be used with caution and the conclusions drawn from it are necessarily tentative.

Total Flows of Technical Cooperation

25. According to OECD figures, total annual flows of official technical cooperation grants to Somalia from multilateral, industrialized and oil producing countries rose rapidly after 1976; they doubled between 1976 and 1979 and quadrupled again by 1983 when they reached \$120.2 million. Although total official development assistance from the same sources also increased sharply, in peak years largely in the form of emergency assistance in the wake of large refugee inflows, drought and serious balance of payments difficulties, technical cooperation grew faster and in 1983 accounted for over half of all grant disbursements and over one-third of total ODA. By 1983 the total flow of technical cooperation grants had reached the very high level of about \$27 per capita; cumulatively total technical cooperation grants over the five year period 1980-84 are very likely to have been over a half billion dollars or well over \$100 for every Somali man, woman and child. 1/

1/ Disbursements for technical assistance under development loans and projects would have to be added to arrive at a figure for total technical assistance flows.

Technical Cooperation in 1984

26. While the OECD figures provide a general picture of the level and growth of technical assistance, the inventory arranged by the mission is a snapshot of the situation in 1984 (as of December 1). A complete list of the projects covered by the inventory is given in Annex 2.

27. The OECD data and the inventory cover different sets of activities and are not readily comparable. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the technical cooperation effort indicated by the OECD data is generally confirmed by the inventory and it is the mission's view that the inventory gives a broadly correct picture of technical cooperation as it was carried out in 1984.

28. As shown in Table 1, the largest financiers of technical assistance in 1984 were US/AID, Italy, Egypt, the World Bank/IDA, the ADB and UNDP. Together they accounted for some 75% of total contributions.

Table 1: Total Annual Contributions in 1984 from the Largest Donors

Donor	1984 Contribution (US\$ '000)	Number of Projects	Average Contribution per Project (US\$ '000)
USAID	17,632	14	1,259
Italy	15,100	14	1,986
Egypt	12,050	4	3,012
World Bank	10,642	9	1,182
ADB	6,984	2	3,492
UNDP	5,492	16	343

29. The bulk of technical assistance is used in the productive sectors, agriculture, forestry, fisheries and industry; about 42% was spent in these sectors (see Table 2 below). The social sectors, health and education are also important, accounting for some \$37 million or 39%; it should be noted, however, that about 80% of total technical cooperation in education consisted of Egyptian teachers of various levels and Italian support for the university. Given the difficulty and complexity of the economic management issues facing the Government and the general weakness of the civil service, it is surprising that only \$3.5 million or 3.7% of the total contributions was spent on general development issues, policy and planning. Apart from this, it would appear that the sectoral breakdown of technical assistance by and large has been in line with Government

Table 2: Distribution of 1984 Contributions by Sector

sector	Total 1984 Contribution (US\$ '000)	% of Total Contribution
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries	38,864	40.8
Education	25,991	27.3
Health	10,713	11.3
Human Settlements	1,463	1.5
Natural Resources	5,705	6.0
Transport & Communications	5,612	5.9
Industry	784	0.8
General Development Issues, Policy and Planning	3,518	3.7
Population	474	0.5
Other	2,117	2.2
Total	95,241	100.0

30. Most technical assistance is provided in the south of the country with projects based in Mogadishu accounting for about 28% of the total. Again this appears to be generally in line with the Government's investment program which has a similar geographical distribution. The heavy concentration in Mogadishu, which is probably even greater when account is taken of assistance classified as "multi-regional and country-wide", reflects to a large extent the concentration of administrative services and Somali staff there.

31. The inventory reveals the great range and diversity of technical cooperation to Somalia. Technical assistance projects and components range in size from the University Cooperation Project to which Italy contributed about \$11 million in 1984, to a charcoal project to which FAO contributed \$22,000. Three projects (Egypt's teacher project, Italy's University project, and the Bay Region project) account for close to one-third of all technical assistance funding covered by the inventory; the remaining two-thirds is spread over 130 projects ranging in size between \$6.7 million and \$12,000 measured in 1984 donor contributions.

32. Another striking aspect of technical cooperation in Somalia is the degree to which it is tied to or in support of investment projects. The mission estimated that close to half of all technical cooperation funding and about one-third of all technical assistance projects formed an integral part of or were in support of an investment project. Furthermore,

they were in most cases the biggest projects. At the same time, virtually every project was reported to have as one of its goals the strengthening of Somali institutions.

33. The main vehicle for providing technical assistance to Somalia is the long-term resident expert. Table 3 indicates that about 42% of all expenditures, or about \$40 million, are estimated to have been spent for this purpose in 1984. In addition 13% was spent on short-term consultants and 26% on equipment much of it to support the resident experts. Only about 10%, or less than \$10 million, was spent on training of Somalis with the bulk of these funds allocated to formal degree programs abroad. Much of the transfer of skills expected under the various technical assistance programs would, therefore, have been through on-the-job or counterpart training without specific allocation of resources.

Table 3: Distribution of Total Contributions Between Components

Components	% of Total <u>*/</u>
Long-Term Experts	42
Short-Term Consultants	13
Training	10
Equipment	26
Miscellaneous	9
Total	100

*/ Figures are expressed as a percentage of total allocation for technical assistance.

34. The vast majority of those involved in the technical assistance program are expatriate experts; in December 1984 there were about 1,270 experts in the field of whom only 99 were Somalis (see Table 4). In addition there appear to have been about 200 persons engaged in technical support activities either based at donor missions or donor agency headquarters. These numbers are somewhat misleading, however, because they include Egyptian assistance to the Ministry of Education which essentially consists of 380 teachers. If this project is excluded, the remaining 132 projects, to which donors contributed about \$84 million, consisted of 550 expatriate experts, 99 national experts, 48 associate experts and volunteers and 183 short-term consultants. This is still an impressive number particularly since it probably understates the actual situation by perhaps 25%; i.e. the number of expatriate long-term advisers, excluding Egyptian teachers, is likely to be about 750. 2/

2/ This number also excludes a large contingent of Chinese staff working on the Faanole Irrigation Project.

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Table 4: Personnel Involved in Technical Cooperation in Somalia

	Total Number	% of Grand Total
Expatriate Long-Term Experts	930	73
National Long-Term Experts	99	8
Associate Experts	13	0.1
Resident Volunteers	45	4.5
Short-Term Consultants	183	14.4
Total Excluding National Experts	1,171	89.0
Grand Total	1,270	

35. The data on staffing patterns used by donors is heavily influenced by a few projects and/or donors. Thus, about one-fifth of the projects financed by 12 donors employed a total of 99 national experts but half of them worked on IDA financed projects, 37 on the Bay Region Project alone. Similarly, about one-quarter of all projects used 183 short-term consultants but 108 of them were accounted for by two projects; the National University financed by Italy and Assistance to Somali TV financed by Egypt. Only the UNDP uses associate experts and it also has the largest number of volunteers. This latter category is rarely used and only five donors (France, UK, US/AID, EEC and UNDP) report that volunteers were part of their staffing.

36. Although these figures should be used with caution, they reinforce the conclusion that technical cooperation in Somalia is built around resident expatriate experts. Other types of expertise are used in special circumstances in a few instances by some donors. Donor policies with respect to procurement of services and use of volunteers and short-term consultants must have some impact although their relative importance is hard to gauge on the basis of available data. Nevertheless, the limited use of national experts, volunteers and short-term expertise raises questions about how technical assistance to Somalia has been designed, because these are precisely the forms of assistance advocated by many to address problems of effectiveness and cost.

37. The survey data reveals other interesting patterns in the design of technical assistance projects in Somalia. The overwhelming majority of projects include a substantial equipment component. In one or two cases the whole project consists of equipment but more commonly 25-50% of the donor contribution is used for this purpose. While it is not clear what was included in this component by the respondents, it is likely that in many instances the equipment was in support of the experts. ^{3/}

3/ Some 25 projects, of which 5 carried out by UNICEF, reported equipment components of 50-100%. In these cases it is likely that the experts' task was to ensure the effective use of the equipment making these projects very similar to investment projects.

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38. Training of Somali nationals ranks high among the stated priorities for technical assistance. However, the survey data indicates that some 40% of all projects did not allocate funds for this purpose; all but three of these projects also reported that institutional development was one of its objectives. The data does not reveal the form which the training took although there is some information on the number of Somalis in degree programs abroad (see Table 5). Of the total number of fellowships, 341 were concentrated in four major development projects financed by Italy (National University), Egypt (National University), U.K., France and WHO; of the remaining 152 fellowships, 52 were under the Bay Region Project and 14 under Egyptian assistance to Somali TV. In all, about half the projects with a training component also included fellowships for study abroad. There is no information on local training, short-term training or on-the-job training of counterparts.

Table 5: Total Number of Somalis in Degree Programs Abroad

Sector	Somalis	% of Total
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries: Livestock	105	21
Education	308	63
Health	60	12
Human Settlements	2	0
National Resources	3	0
Transport and Communication	14	3
Industry	0	40
General Development Issues		
Policy and Planning	4	0
Population	0	0
Other	0	0
Total	496	100

39. Although fragmentary and incomplete the data on training indicates that this aspect of technical assistance is not given the weight and importance that it deserves. In 1984 it appeared that donors spent more than six times as much on experts as on training and two projects out of five had no allocation at all for training. Moreover, a substantial amount was used for overseas fellowships under a few human resource development programs not directly linked to technical assistance projects. ^{4/} With few exceptions then it appears that the main effort to develop local capacity in the context of technical assistance projects is through the traditional expert/counterpart relationship.

^{4/} Egyptian Program of Postgraduate Studies, 200 fellowships; UK Training Program, 25 fellowships; and French Scholarship Program, 13 fellowships.

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40. Almost all (80%) of technical assistance projects in Somalia include an allocation for operating costs ranging as high as 100% in one case. Most commonly this component seems to be below 25% of the total donor contribution. Some part of the operating cost component is used to pay salary supplements and/or daily subsistence allowances to Somalia staff. The frequency and size of these payments are set out in Tables 6 and 7.

Table 6: Range of Salary Supplements Paid by Donors

Donors	Supplement Range Somali Shillings/month
UNDP	1300 - 5000
US/AID	300 - 5000
Italy	500 - 5000
UN-FAO	200 - 4000
FRG (GTZ)	0 - 4000
ADF	200 - 4000
World Bank	200 - 4000
Egypt	3750
IFAD	500 - 3500
Netherlands	200 - 3000
Arab Gulf Fund	200 - 2600
EEC	360 - 2500
Finland	200 - 2000
UNFPA	150 - 200
UNICEF	100 - 2000
Canada	200 - 1700
Denmark	0 - 1280
Overall Range	0 - 8000

Total Number of Donors in Somalia - 36.

Total Number of Donors Paying Supplements - 18 (including 17 of the 19 largest donors).

Total Number of Somali Nationals Receiving Supplements - 3127.

Table 7: Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSA) Payments by Donors

Donors	DSA +/- (Somali shillings)
FAO +/-	70 - 300
FRG (GTZ)	100 - 250
World Bank	100
UNICEF	100
USAID	100
UNCTCD	60
Overall Range	60 - 300

+/- DSA payments are generally made to personnel for each day spent away from their home stations.

*/- FAO provides a monthly field allowance of approximately 1700 Somali shillings when DSA is not paid.

B. Technical Cooperation in Agriculture

41. Since the Mission could not undertake a detailed review of every project in every sector it decided to look more closely at agriculture, and in particular the Ministry of Agriculture, to get a better appreciation of the problems and effects of technical assistance. The inventory indicates that 20-25% of all technical assistance to Somalia is in the agriculture sector with projects ranging from major investment projects like the Bay Region Agriculture Development Project to small ones such as the UNDP/FAO Bird Control Project.

Background

42. In Somalia the agriculture sector, including both livestock and crop production, has a dominant role in the economy with about 60% of the labor force engaged in pastoralism (livestock) and 20% in settled farming (crop production). The livestock subsector generates about 35% of gross domestic product (GDP) and, normally, about 80% of total exports while crop production contributes about 8% to both GDP and exports. The sector is expected to continue to play a key role in future growth and some 25% of investment resources under the 1984-86 PIP are allocated to it. ^{5/}

Technical Assistance in the Crop Production Sector - Volume and Range

43. The 1984-86 Public Investment Program lists 28 projects in the crop production sector including the Bardhere Dam which is being implemented by the Ministry of Jubba Valley Development (for a list of projects see Annex 4). Of these projects, 11 are classified as large scale public investment projects in various stages of implementation, 11 are supplementary projects for which funding is being sought, and seven are technical assistance projects. However, with one or two exceptions, all 28 projects include a technical assistance component. The inventory included data on 23 projects in agriculture and although there was some double counting and some gaps, the lists are broadly consistent (not all small grant funded technical assistance projects are included in the PIP and furthermore the inventory did not include some PIP projects such as the Faanole Irrigation Project financed by China and the Balad Irrigation Project financed by North Korea). The total allocation in the PIP for 1984-86 for both investment and technical assistance projects was \$184 million. The inventory indicates that some \$23 million was spent in 1984 on technical cooperation in agricultural sector projects covered by the inventory; of this amount, over 40% went to the Bay Region project which according to the Ministry of Agriculture data employed 10 expatriate experts and 49 senior Somalis. ^{6/}

^{5/} This figure does not include the major investment projects in the Jubba Valley including the Bardhere Dam or other infrastructure investments in support of the agriculture sector.

^{6/} The inventory lists a total of 14 long-term expatriate experts and four short-term consultants plus 38 national experts.

44. Data available from 18 projects in the crop production sector show the importance of technical assistance. In 1983 these projects employed 392 expatriates out of a total staff of 5,700 (Table 8). However, 335 of the foreigners were Chinese working on the Faanole Irrigation Project, and a more representative figure would be 57 expatriates in the 17 other projects, probably all in professional/technical positions, compared to the 779 Somalis in these categories.

Table 8: Summary of Personnel Data/18 Agricultural Projects

Occupation/ Source	<u>Somali</u>	<u>Expatriate</u>	<u>Vacant</u>
Professional/ Technical	779	350	50
Administrative/ Management	211	15	2
Clerical	251	5	4
Sales	3	---	1
Transport/ Communication	668	21	18
Skilled/ semi-skilled and others	<u>3370</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>54</u>
Total	5282	392	129

Source: Ministry of Agriculture progress report on 1984 annual plan implementation.

Technical Assistance in the Crop Production Sector - Basic Features

45. The table in Annex 6 clearly shows that most of the resources allocated to this sector have been used for large investment projects in irrigation. In addition, several large projects in smallholder rainfed farming are also under implementation and now cover most of the important production areas; they include the Northwest Region, the Bay Region, the Agricultural Resettlement, and the Agricultural Extension and Farm Management projects. All these major projects have donor support and most are financed by several donors. Technical assistance is included in all these projects.

18

46. Virtually all projects aim primarily at increasing production through infrastructure development, irrigation, plantations, and rural roads, as well as through extension support to small farmers and research. While all projects profess to aim at institutional development, only four small projects appear to have this as a major objective. The objectives of institutional development and strengthening of national capacity have thus received only secondary consideration at best.

47. All the large investment projects are implemented through special project management units (PMUs). This includes the rainfed agricultural production projects, most of the irrigation projects, and the Agriculture Extension and Farm Management Project. The irrigation works and development program for the Bardhere Dam and Jubba Valley are entrusted to a special Ministry for Jubba Valley Development. All rainfed production projects integrate investments in infrastructure with support services to farmers and include both extension and research elements.

48. As a result of these factors, technical assistance to the crop production sector has been largely aimed at the implementation of big investment projects by supporting the operations of the PMUs. Not only have external resources been channelled in this way, but local financial and staff resources as well. The best national staff have been assigned or drawn to these projects by the salary supplements and perquisites available through external assistance. In addition, sizeable external and local resources have been provided for buildings and equipment, training of national staff, as well as for operational expenditures such as transport. The effect of this pattern of technical cooperation has been not only that the line departments have received relatively little assistance, but that these departments have been weakened in terms of both personnel and responsibilities.

49. The PMUs have by definition a limited life, the implementation period for the investment project. The fate of these units once their task is completed is not clear and most often not defined at the outset. Most seem to be based on the expectation that they, and the services they perform in areas such as extension and research, will be taken over by the permanent line departments. However, few projects seem to include in their design budgetary and organizational arrangements for the line departments to absorb activities financed through external grants, which are to a large extent used for imported inputs as well as for substantial salary supplements and perquisites to the staff of the PMU's.

50. Not only is technical assistance in the agriculture sector provided mainly through PMUs with limited life, the assistance is also generally expected to last for a relatively short period. This reflects in part optimistic expectations with respect to the implementation period of major investments, but also attempts by donors to encourage the takeover of activities by the Somali Government.

Experience with Technical Assistance in the Crop Production Sector -
The Case of Extension and Research

51. The results of the pattern of technical assistance described above are well illustrated in two important areas of Government activity in agriculture, extension and research.

52. The Department of Production in the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for all extension activities in Somalia through the national extension service. However, the National Extension and Farm Management Project which is financed by four external donors (IDA, ADF, EEC and US/AID) is being implemented through a Project Management Unit theoretically attached to the Department, but operating as a separate autonomous agency under a national project director who effectively exercises considerable influence, perhaps even greater influence than the head of the national extension service. Although the project currently operates in only nine regions virtually all the Ministry's extension staff have been transferred to the project. This has left the Department of Production without capacity to carry out its extension functions in the rest of the country. At the end of the project it is assumed that its functions will be reabsorbed by the Department but as far as the mission could understand there were no plans for accomplishing this objective.

53. External assistance in agricultural research was provided by Italy prior to independence. After 1964 US/AID, using the University of Wyoming, helped establish a central research station for irrigated agriculture and a sub-station for rainfed production. This assistance was terminated in 1969 after which activities at the stations declined. In 1976 UNDP was asked to assist and has done so since, using the Mid-Western University Consortium in Agriculture (MUSIA) until 1979 and FAO thereafter. Between 1979 and 1983 this assistance was provided on an annual basis by ad hoc extensions due to uncertainties about availability of financing and delays in reaching agreement among UNDP, FAO and the Government. A number of other research and experimentation activities are receiving technical assistance in the context of various investment projects, e.g., the Bay Region and Agricultural Settlement projects. These research programs, carried out under the guidance of PMU's, use the facilities of the Department of Experimental Research, which itself is assisted by UNDP/FAO, but they are not under the authority of its Director. Again it is unclear what will happen to, or who will be responsible for, the research activities under these projects once their investment phases are completed or foreign assistance ends.

54. External assistance has undoubtedly provided considerable resources, both financial and human, to the areas of extension and research. At the same time, however, there have been some major shortcomings. First, there have been severe problems of coordination not only among projects and between projects and the permanent line departments but also between donors. There have been, for example, differences of view between the World Bank and US/AID over the implementation of the "training and visit" extension system which has affected the implementation of the National Extension and Farm Management Project and caused confusion in the efforts to design a national extension system. Coordination between projects and with the Department of

Experimental Research has also been difficult as well as between research and extension in large part because of the divergent views and interests of different donors. The fact that UNDP/FAO provide support for research while extension services are assisted by US/AID and the World Bank has contributed to difficulties in linking research and extension. There have been divergent views, for example, with regard to appropriate programs for farming system research and on-farm trials. Secondly, the discontinuity and fragmentation of assistance to agricultural research has meant that there has been little possibility of pursuing a consistent program of investigation over an extended period of time. In fact there is evidence that information collected and research results obtained in one phase of the assistance has been lost or, at least, not been available to those working on other or later phases. As a result, the efforts to develop improved technical packages for farmers has evidently been disrupted and the results delayed. Thirdly, handling technical assistance through the PMU's responsible for individual investment projects has had a negative impact on the development of an integrated research and extension system.

Technical Assistance in the Agricultural Sector - Conclusion

55. The results of technical assistance in the agricultural sector, as it is currently provided, in terms of strengthening the institutional framework of the sector has been poor. The Ministry of Agriculture does not appear to have been strengthened over the long-term and it is unlikely to be able to absorb and benefit from the assistance now being provided to the PMUs established to implement specific investment projects. By deliberate choice both the Government and the donors have decided to give priority to increasing production and implementing investment projects with a consequent relative neglect of institutional development and resulting instead in a weakening of the permanent institutional structure. The consequences of this are seen not only in the continued weakness of national institutions and reliance on technical assistance as well as perpetuation of projects over long periods of time but, more seriously, contributing to the poor performance in the agricultural sector as a whole. The review of major projects in Annex 4 shows that investments have generally faced major implementation difficulties such as long delays, large cost increases, or disappointing impact on production.

56. Moreover, almost all technical assistance has been channelled to government institutions at relatively high levels. Thus, not only has the central organizational structure been neglected but the local administrative and decentralized authorities as well. A strong argument could be made for a strategy which depends less on a weak central administration and bureaucratic structure and more on local authorities and the farmers themselves including cooperatives and other farmers' organizations.

57. It is clear to the mission that the current system of providing technical assistance and the strategy for institutional development in the agricultural sector needs to be urgently reviewed. Among other things the future relationships of the PMUs with the line departments of the Ministry of Agriculture needs to be settled and the institutional requirements of the agricultural sector considered as a whole. Such an effort to review and revise the long-term strategy for institutional development will be

carried out, with UNDP assistance, as a follow-up to this report and within the framework of the ongoing agriculture sector survey being undertaken by the Government of Somalia with World Bank assistance. This will include an assessment of the major institutions in the agricultural sector, their function and roles, as well as staffing, training, and technical assistance requirements. The terms of reference for this assessment are at Annex 5.

CHAPTER III

MODALITIES 1/ AND PROGRAMMING PROCEDURES

58. In a process of technical cooperation which aims at building national capacity by transferring skill and know-how from external sources the ways in which the technical assistance is programmed, prepared and delivered are clearly important. The individual technical assistance project is the vehicle through which this process takes place; how it is identified, designed and implemented will determine whether it is successful. The delivery of technical assistance is a complex process and there are innumerable pitfalls and occasions for things to go wrong. The following sections are an attempt to analyze how the system works both on the Somali and the donor side and to make some recommendations for improvements. The discussion is not exhaustive but since it covers the major donors who contribute more than two thirds of all technical assistance it may be considered to be broadly representative. 2/

A. Planning, Programming and Identification of Technical Assistance

59. Almost all studies carried out by donors of technical assistance (or for that matter any other assistance including consulting services in both developing and industrialized countries) identify "client commitment" as a crucial element in the success or failure of the effort. This is just another way of saying that there has to be agreement between the recipient (client) and the donor both on the need for technical assistance and on its objectives. In an ideal world this would be achieved if the recipient first defined his needs and then approached the most qualified donor, who responded to the request. The request, in turn, would flow naturally from the recipient's planning process through which national goals are defined and matched with national capabilities and gaps in the latter identified. This idealized process is, in fact, the one many donors profess to adhere to. Is it a myth and if so how far does reality differ from theory? And, finally, is it possible to move reality closer to theory?

The Planning Process

60. Primary responsibility for planning in Somalia rests with the Ministry of National Planning (MNP). The basic planning document is the Five-Year Development Plan on the basis of which the Government also produces medium-term Public Investment and Expenditure Programs (PIP) and Annual Plans. The most recent of these documents, the 1986-88 PIP entitled "National Development Strategy and Programme", is dated September 1985 and will be included in the documentation for the next meeting of the Consultative Group scheduled for November, 1985. The current Five Year Development Plan covers the years 1982-86 and an Annual Plan for 1985 was published in December 1984.

1/ Assistance modalities may be defined as the procedures and delivery systems utilized by donors and Government institutions in the process of technical cooperation.

2/ US/AID, Italy, West Germany, United Kingdom, Sweden, Egypt, the EEC, France, IDA and the UNDP provide about 70% of all technical assistance to Somalia.

61. The MNP is responsible for the preparation, monitoring and evaluation of economic development plans and screening of projects. Planning units in the main sectoral ministries are responsible for preparing sector programs and policies as well as projects in their respective sectors. The Ministry of Finance prepares the recurrent and the MNP the development budget.

62. The overall planning process follows fairly conventional lines. At the outset of the planning cycle sectoral sub-committees chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the respective sector ministry and including staff from the MNP are set up to be responsible for reviewing sectoral policy and the identification of projects for inclusion in the plan. Draft chapters of the plan, including policy statements and project lists, are reviewed and assembled by MNP in consultation with the ministerial planning units. After completion the planning document is submitted to the Economic Committee of the Cabinet, the Council of Ministers, the Congress of the Party and the Parliament before it becomes law. The MNP in consultation with the ministerial planning units is then responsible for screening, preparing and financing the specific projects included in the plan.

The Ministry of National Planning

63. To carry out its tasks, MNP is organized along common lines. Under the Permanent Secretary there are five departments, Planning, Technical, Human Resources, Central Statistics and Administration. Both the Planning and Technical Department are sub-divided along sectoral lines. The Ministry has a total of about 40 graduate Somali staff in the four operational departments, but there are several vacancies; in most sectors there is only one professional, in some none. The planning units in the sectoral ministries are also often staffed by only one professional.

64. The MNP receives large amounts of external assistance including:

- a team of six resident planners, two associate experts and one UN volunteer provided by the UN Department of Technical Cooperation for Development (DTCD) with UNDP financing;
- an IDA financed team of two long-term experts and two short-term consultants in the National Monitoring and Evaluation Facility located in the Planning Department;
- an IDA financed team of three experts and a number of short-term consultants from the Swedish Central Bureau of Statistics in the Central Statistics Department;
- one expatriate and one national expert provided by ILO and funded by the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) in the Human Resources Department;

three experts from the Federal Republic of Germany in the Technical Department, and

an adviser in energy policy financed by US/AID.

65. While the total number of experts working in the MNP varies from time to time, it appears to average about 20. The teams seem to work independently of each other and in addition, the German experts are primarily concerned with the implementation of the German programs. Some external assistance is also provided to the planning units in sector ministries e.g. by West Germany to the Ministries of Agriculture, Livestock, Jubba Valley Development and Transport, by SIDA/FAO to the Ministry of Fisheries and by UNDP/UNIDO to the Ministry of Industry.

Weaknesses in the Planning Process

66. A full analysis of the planning process is beyond the scope of the present report. However, other studies, particularly by the World Bank and the UNDP/DICD, have shown that the process has had a number of serious shortcomings, some of which are being corrected. Among those that have been identified are:

- (i) the degree of attention paid to human resources planning including planning for expatriate assistance and training;
- (ii) the effectiveness of the monitoring, evaluation and feedback mechanisms; and
- (iii) the screening, preparation and appraisal of development projects.
- (iv) the availability of an adequate macro-economic framework, realistic financial projections and of clear priorities;
- (v) the linkage of the planning and the budgetary processes particularly between the development and to the recurrent budgets;

67. The need to address these has been recognized by the Government and the mission understands that significant improvements have taken place. In particular, much more attention has been given in the 1986-88 PIP and the Annual Plan for 1985 to the preparation of the macro-economic framework and realistic financial projections. Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance is now participating more actively in the policy process which has led to improved linkages between the planning and budgeting processes.

68. These developments are welcome and should over time address the most serious shortcomings of the system. Thus the PIP and the other planning documents are becoming more than lists of projects and include a clear set of priorities to be used to guide the allocation of the very limited resources available (national budgetary, external aid and manpower resources). Only in this way can the planning process provide an adequate

framework within which external aid, including technical assistance inputs, can be rationally planned. It is, for example, important to consider the financing and staffing implications of externally funded projects; failure to do so will, in many cases, lead to a collapse of project activities when the external assistance is terminated. Similarly, there need to be clearly defined priorities and plans for the development and allocation of trained manpower to ensure that adequate numbers of counterpart staff are assigned and retained in externally assisted projects.

The Planning Process and the Donors

69. The way donors program their assistance to Somalia and the need for donors to reflect their own national concerns has contributed to the degree to which donor priorities influence the choice of projects to be assisted, and the extent to which their priorities have influenced the choice of projects to be assisted. Most donors conduct annual or bi-annual programming exercises at which agreement is reached on the projects to be included in the donor's program for the next two-three years. The discussion has usually been held on the basis of project lists proposed by the Government without a clear indication of their relative priority. After assessing requirements for on-going projects the donor, in consultation with Government, have selected projects for funding on the basis of its own priorities. In the end the Government's investment program has consisted largely of those projects, on-going and new ones, on which agreement has been reached with donors leaving others without financing.

Planning of Technical Assistance

70. The Government has stated its strategy with respect to technical assistance in its various planning documents, most recently in the Annual Plan for 1985. The objectives include institution building, research, academic and on-the-job training to build up skills in disciplines where there is a shortage. The plan documents also foresee that technical assistance will be required for some time to come. Apart from this there is little effort made to plan technical cooperation in a systematic way based on an assessment of requirements of (i) manpower, (ii) institutional development, and (iii) new technology.

71. The basic planning process is primarily concerned with financial planning. Manpower planning is carried out as a separate exercise in the Ministry of Labor and the Human Resources Department of MNP. The work of the former, such as the National Manpower Survey, follows a conventional approach and takes a broad view of the training requirements of the economy but does not include on-the-job training, informal training or individual fellowships for study abroad. The MNP has as an objective the planning of national and expatriate personnel and seeks to gather information about the number and location of foreign experts and set timetables for their withdrawal.

72. Identification of technical assistance requirements takes place primarily on a project by project basis, in particular in the context of preparation and appraisal of investment projects, with the objective of ensuring the successful implementation of the investment project. Such assistance is therefore primarily based on the donor's perception of the weaknesses of the Somali organization responsible for implementation and operation of the investment. Should there be a difference of view between the donor and the Somali Government, the views of the donor tend to prevail because the technical assistance is regarded as a condition for the financing of the investment.

73. There are, of course, also many technical assistance projects that are not directly related to the preparation, implementation or operation of investment projects. In some cases these projects have their origin in a clearly felt need on the part of the Government, one of its ministries or parastatal organization. Just as often, however, these projects are based on a needs identification carried out by a donor or an implementing agency.

Conclusions

74. The mission is of the view that strong measures are required on the part of both the Government and the donors to ensure that external assistance is truly in line with Government priorities and Somalia's needs. On the Government side there has to be a strong planning system which results in clear project priorities within an investment program, which is realistic in terms of current and future resource availabilities, to ensure that its priorities prevail in the programming of external aid. The donors should assist by agreeing to limit their assistance to projects in the Government's investment program. The same general principle applies to the programming of technical assistance which is not tied to investment projects, i.e. the setting of priorities is a Somali responsibility and must be based on a strong planning system.

75. The need to strengthen the planning system has been recognized for a long time and external assistance on a large scale has been provided for many years. Nevertheless, there has been little improvement in the capacity of MNP to carry out most planning tasks or in the processes themselves, although procedural improvements seem to have been made in the preparation of the 1985 Annual Plan. Most planning tasks are still performed by the expatriate advisers and although considerable formal training has been provided over the last two years the technical assistance has primarily been oriented to performing the work of the Ministry rather than to strengthening the Ministry, through e.g. on-the-job training, or the planning process itself through e.g. procedural changes. For example, the UNDP/DTCD project (SOM/82/002) has been more concerned with operational work than with developing standard procedures and guidelines for the basic work of the Ministry, including project selection criteria and procedures and project and plan preparation.

76. New and much more determined efforts to strengthen the planning system will be required involving organizational changes, recruitment and training of staff as well as procedural changes. External assistance will also be needed for some time to come. However, experience shows clearly

that, while expatriates can make suggestions and recommendations for improvements and can assist in implementing changes as well as provide training, to be effective the basic design and decisions must be made by the Somali Government. The planning process is at the heart of government and therefore needs a solid political foundation to be successful. The mission therefore recommends that the Government appoint a high level inter-ministerial Task Force or committee to review the present planning system and make recommendations for improvements.^{3/} The mission also recommends that donors, especially the multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and UNDP, assist the work of the Task Force by financing consultants and experts to carry out special studies required by it. Donors should also be prepared to provide assistance to the Government in implementing the recommendations of the Task Force. Since the assistance required will cover several organizations and ministries and consist of varied inputs that may be provided by several donors, the mission believes that it is essential that Government provides strong leadership to ensure that it is provided in a coordinated and integrated fashion. The mission understands that UNDP/the World Bank would be prepared to assist in this endeavor if the Government would so wish.

77. When considering changes to strengthen the planning system the Government, and the Task Force, should also focus on manpower planning. The mission believes strongly that effective technical cooperation must be based on long-term plans for the development of Somali institutions and development of Somali human resources so that technical assistance needs (expatriate expertise and training) can be programmed in a consistent framework of Somali needs and resources. The mission recommends that the Government, in addition to reviewing manpower and human resource planning in the context of the Task Force, undertake, with donor cooperation, systematic sector-by-sector reviews of its institutions, including manpower and training needs as well as the expected role of external assistance, along the lines of the ongoing review of institutional structures in the agricultural sector which has been arranged by the UNDP in conjunction with the World Bank sponsored agricultural sector study.

B. Design of Technical Cooperation Projects

The Formal System

78. Formally, project preparation in Somalia starts with the MNP and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs jointly exploring the prospects for financing feasibility studies or other project preparation activities for projects specifically mentioned in the plan, those directly or indirectly proposed by donors and those proposed separately by sector ministries and other agencies. Most donors have made available substantial amounts to finance feasibility studies and other project preparation activities. Except for IDA and EEC such funds are usually tied to projects likely to be ultimately financed by the respective donor. Once one or more likely donors have been identified the Technical Department of MNP prepares a project description which is presented to the donor(s). In the case of particularly large projects the project description must be approved by the Economic Committee, the Council of Ministers, the Congress of the Party and

3/ One of the assignments of the task force would be to critically review the recommendations made by various outside organizations most recently the UNDP/DTCD review of the UNDP funded Planning Project (SOM/82/002) and the World Bank economic mission (Report No. 5584-SO). This mission also has some suggestions for improving the planning system which are at Annex 6.

Parliament. Once approved the donor appoints ^{4/} one or more consultants or fields a team to carry out the study in close cooperation with the respective sector ministry or agency and the Technical Department of MNP. The report of the consultants is submitted to MNP and the sector ministry or agency for substantive comments which are coordinated and transmitted to the donor by the Technical Department of MNP. If the project is feasible MNP and MFA jointly explore financing with donor(s). Before financing or technical assistance agreements can be signed, approval must be obtained from an interministerial committee chaired by the Minister of National Planning and including the Ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs.

The Role of Donors

79. This system gives large scope for donor influence on the design of projects. This is reinforced by the weakness of the Somali organizations involved and the lack of clearly defined criteria for project selection and preparation. In practice therefore, just as most technical assistance requirements, whether related to investment projects or not, are identified by donors, almost all technical assistance projects, and technical assistance components of investment projects are prepared by donors. Where there is an investment the consultants carrying out feasibility and other preparation studies will also assess the ability of the implementing agency to carry out and operate the project and identify any organizational changes needed as well as technical assistance and training requirements. Although the details of such proposals often are left to be worked out by consultants after the investment is underway the principle is the same. Non-investment related technical assistance is by and large handled in the same way; consultants and experts are sent out by the donor agency to study and make recommendations on how to resolve problems that have been identified, e.g. in the planning system, including details of technical assistance and training requirements. Often these first design efforts only result in the preparation of terms of reference for further more detailed studies.

The Role of Government

80. The Government's role in the preparation process is largely passive and reactive. Consultants are supervised and supported by the Technical Department of MNP and the ministry or agency responsible; sometimes there are interministerial steering committees set up to perform these functions. The same parties are responsible for commenting on the reports and recommendations of the consultants and experts and in the end the Government must approve the technical assistance component before it can be implemented. The substantive impact of the Government is, however, limited and its role is often confined to providing support and information largely because of a lack of expertise and capacity.

The Results of the Present System

81. In this system the design of a successful technical assistance project will depend on the competence of the consultant or expert and the willingness of the Somali agency and its staff to cooperate. There are undoubtedly many cases where the consultant has the ability to analyze the perceived needs of the organization and where the staff of the organization are prepared to discuss and acknowledge their needs. More often, however,

^{4/} In the case of IDA the Government appoints the consultant following approval by IDA.

the consultant will base his analysis and recommendations on interviews with a limited number of people who may or may not cooperate. The results will be superficial and there will not be full agreement at all levels (especially those where the technical assistance will actually operate) about the need for and the design of the technical assistance component or project.

82. The combination of donor influence on the identification of technical assistance needs and on the design of such technical assistance, is not the best basis for successful technical cooperation. When donor preoccupations with the success of investment projects is added it is not surprising that the overall results of technical assistance efforts over the past several years have been disappointing at best and negative at worst in terms of development of Somali institutions and capacity.

83. The consequences of the present system of project preparation and design are manifold but the mission regards the following as especially important from the point of view of institutional development and capacity building:

- i) similar projects are designed differently, use different methodologies and provide Government with sometimes conflicting views and advice;
- ii) the national counterpart and recurrent budgetary implications of the project is often forgotten or disregarded;
- iii) there is an insufficient concern for long-term institutional development, including training and staff development, as well as establishment of procedures and systems within the supported institutions, with the emphasis on PMU's having a detrimental effect on the permanent Government organizational structure.

a) Lack of Criteria

84. The absence of Government criteria for project design and appraisal and the use of varying methodologies and criteria by different donors is well illustrated by the Agriculture Extension and Farm Management Project (see para. 54 above) in which the donors seem to have had divergent views on extension methodology. More generally, it seems that, while some donors use financial viability as a criterion for revenue - generating projects, others do not, while some donors systematically apply social cost/benefit analyses to all production oriented projects, others do not, while some donors look closely at cost structures in social service projects, others do not, while some donors regard direct benefits to the poor as a sine qua non, others do not, while some donors stress market forces as a determinant of prices for inputs and outputs others do not, etc. The effect of such differences in donor practices must be difficult to cope with for those responsible for project implementation or for sectoral activities as a whole.

b) Recurrent Costs

85. Many, if not most, technical assistance projects, include provisions for operating costs as well as for imported equipment and spare parts. This shows a realistic appreciation of Somalia's difficult budgetary and balance of payments situation. The majority of projects do not, however, consider in the design of projects the ability of the Government to assume these obligations when external assistance ends. As a result the inability to meet recurrent costs, especially in foreign exchange for spare parts and raw materials, appears to be the single most important factor contributing to the collapse of project activities once external assistance is withdrawn; there are many examples of shortages of spare parts to keep plant and equipment in operation, lack of books, supplies and other facilities, problems of maintenance and shortages of staff. More often than not, rather than risk losing all benefits, donors continue their support for the project, it would seem, indefinitely ^{5/}.

c) Institutional Analysis

86. The effects of the donor focus on investment project implementation on the line departments in the Ministry of Agriculture were discussed in Chapter II above. More generally, technical assistance projects have often lacked a serious analysis of the institutions involved to determine their function, capacities, and needs as a basis for the choice of organizational set-up and project design. As a result many technical assistance projects have been designed or gravitated towards providing direct support, i.e. to help perform the basic functions of the beneficiary organization, rather than to long-term development of its capacity.

Timeframe

87. Virtually all technical assistance projects are designed for two to five years rather than the much longer periods generally considered necessary for successful institutional development. The toll in terms of both donor and Somali frustration and sometimes acrimony has been heavy. At the same time, too short a timeframe is a major cause of the most noticeable characteristic of technical assistance projects in Somalia, their unforeseen longevity. Almost all projects go through a number of

5/ A classic example is the central veterinary laboratory (UNDP/FAO project SOM/82/004). The UNDP has attempted to terminate its assistance several times on the grounds that the equipment has been provided and sufficient counterparts trained. Nevertheless, the project has continued partly because trained staff have been transferred but also because budgetary and foreign exchange resources were lacking to finance imported inputs. While little can be done about the foreign exchange shortage, the budget problem arises in part because vaccines are provided free of charge to the users. The financial implications for the Government and the project of this policy were not adequately projected and analyzed during project formulation and therefore no plans were developed for financing the operation in the long run.

unforeseen phases, and those that are not already doing so are generally expected to be extended as soon as they reach their original completion dates. The reason for this is that, generally, provision is not made for the continuation of critical functions when donor support is terminated. Many functions are simply not provided for such as: (i) financing of future costs (both in local currency and foreign exchange); (ii) planning of future activities; (iii) personnel recruitment and management; (iv) procurement of spare parts and raw materials; (v) maintenance; (vi) research; (vii) data gathering and analyses; (viii) monitoring and evaluation; and (ix) external linkages and liaison.

Project Perpetuation

88. Because of insufficient provision for an effective future transfer to Somali responsibility the many technical assistance projects take on an organizational life of their own; since donor support is almost always tied to the provision of expatriate services the whole activity can, and often does, become self-perpetuating. Nobody is really prepared to terminate the assistance as the long-term burden on national resources and the need to build the institution over the long-term were ignored when the project was designed and approved. The Government is not prepared, or cannot afford, to finance continuation of the activities from its own resources; the Ministry or agency can not absorb the activities earlier carried out under separate management with external assistance; the Somali staff do not want to lose their incentive payments, salary supplements and other perquisites nor the expatriate experts their lucrative salaries. By virtue of principle, the donor is, of course, interested in terminating the project yet is unable to do so because project activities would cease once its support is withdrawn.

Conclusions

89. Efforts are needed to strengthen the Government's control over the identification and design of technical assistance projects, including components of investment projects. As part of the process of strengthening the planning system the Government should develop a set of simple standard criteria or requirements for project preparation, appraisal and approval. These could be set out in a mandatory format for project documentation used in the approval process. In addition the MNP and the sector ministries and agencies must have the capacity to provide more effective inputs into the project preparation process to ensure that Government priorities and needs are adequately taken into account, that consultants designing technical assistance projects have access to the best information available and that the review of his reports and recommendations is thorough and honest.

90. There are two requirements that should be mandatory for all technical assistance as well as investments projects. First, there should be a thorough review of the long-term budgetary and foreign exchange implications of the project and adequate plans should be devised to ensure that these can be met after the external assistance is terminated. This may lead to design of projects with a much longer original life than at present, or, at least, to projects with a "tail end" of donor support to meet foreign exchange requirements after the technical assistance per se has ceased, or to changes in Government policies, e.g. with respect to cost

recovery, to enable it to cover the cost of the services previously financed from abroad. ^{6/} Second, the design of technical assistance, projects and components, should be based on a broader view of technical assistance needs than the present narrow project focus; before designing any technical assistance activity there should be a thorough sector and institution analysis of capabilities and needs for both technical assistance and training with the objective of achieving lasting institutional improvements. ^{7/} While PMUs are often justified to ensure effective implementation of major investments their long-term implications and relationship to the permanent organizational structure as well as the needs of the permanent organizations in the sector should be taken into account before designing the technical assistance component of such projects. It is also likely that adequate analysis and consideration of the institutional objectives of technical assistance will lead to the design of technical assistance projects and components with a much longer time frame than at present and the use of mechanisms such as tranching or phasing which would require a long-term commitment by the donor to avoid discontinuity and loss of effectiveness. ^{8/}

91. It is clearly in the interest of the donors to support the Government in implementing these recommendations. The mission recognizes that donors face constraints and requirements laid down by their policy making bodies and therefore recommends that the process be a joint one between the Government and the donor community within the framework of an intensified local donor coordination effort. At the same time donors need to examine their own procedures to determine in what form they could make the long-term commitments required if the institutional development objectives of technical assistance are to be achieved and continuity of project activities ensured. They should also make every effort to select consultants and experts familiar with the methods of analysing institutional capacity and needs and who are able to involve their Somali counterparts in the design process. Coordination and exchange of information between donors and, through them, between consultants to ensure that the best information and experience is made available and brought to bear on the project design is also important to supplement efforts in this regard by the Government. The use of joint efforts (orchestrated by the Government), task forces or working parties should be considered seriously particularly in analyses of sector or institution wide needs. Finally, once an overall project design or framework has been established by the

^{6/} This must include both foreign and local currency requirements. Some projects, e.g. the Swedish financed Boat Factory, are financially viable but cannot acquire the substantial amounts of foreign exchange needed for imported raw materials and spare parts.

^{7/} An example of this process is the ISNAR study of agricultural research sponsored by the US/AID which includes a long-term plan for development of a national research capacity including detailed programs of staffing, training and technical assistance.

^{8/} Finnish assistance for a Tuberculosis Eradication project is designed with a ten year timeframe and incorporates a specific phasing out period.

Government it is imperative that all donors providing assistance in the sector or to the institution adhere to it.

C. Implementation of Technical Cooperation Projects

The Ideal Process

92. Implementation of most technical assistance projects needs to be a joint effort between a Government ministry or agency and one or more donors; the donor supplies most of the inputs and the counterpart agency uses them. In the case of projects financed through loans from the multilateral agencies (IDA, ADB, IFAD and EIB) project implementation is the sole responsibility of the Government while the lending agency confines itself to "supervision". Even in these cases, however, implementation must take place within the rules and regulations of the lending agency, the financing agreement and whatever adjustments are agreed in the course of implementation.

93. Ideally project implementation would involve technically competent and dedicated expatriate and other experts providing high quality advice and services to equally dedicated local staff, able and willing to absorb the knowledge and know how of the experts. Other components would consist of a smoothly flowing stream of required equipment and short-term consultants to the project and a flow of dedicated trainees to institutions around the world, including Somalia, who on return would effectively utilize the knowledge they had acquired. Making all this possible would be a budgetary system that would provide the institutions, on a timely basis, with the financial resources necessary to carry on the operation.

Reality

94. The reality is, of course, quite different. On the input side virtually all bilateral grant assistance consists of goods and services supplied from the donor country where they are in fact procured and experts hired by the donor agency; the counterpart agency has little or no say in the matter. Each donor agency has its own rules, regulations and practices for selecting and hiring experts and for procuring goods and services (selecting consulting firms). The UNDP generally uses the Specialized Agencies of the UN System as Executing Agencies each one of whom uses, within certain limits, its own system. The lending agencies have different procurement and selection rules and also get involved in the process to varying degrees; some of the experts financed by IDA are actually under contract to it while others have been identified by its staff.

95. The result of this is a set of different practices, which must be very difficult for the Somali counterpart agencies to deal with. It would appear, for example, that, while most donor agencies have elaborate selection procedures themselves, they only consult casually with the counterpart agency, e.g. by providing curriculum vitae of a few, often only one, candidates but without arranging for interviews in Somalia before a selection is made. Practices with regard to briefing and training of experts also vary and seem rarely to include a visit to Somalia. Instruction in Somali language also seems rare and little training or

briefing is provided to the experts or their families after their arrival in Somalia.

96. The logistics of living and working in Somalia are not easy and the amount of administrative support provided to the experts varies from donor to donor. Although most evidence is anecdotal it seems clear that a large amount of the expert's time, much of it during working hours, is spent on activities relating to his car (spare parts, repairs, gasoline), or his house (water, electricity) or his household goods (importing and clearing foodstuffs and other necessities through customs). Some donor agencies and consulting firms provide assistance for their staff, others do not.

97. The supply of other inputs suffers from similar problems. Procurement by the donor agency tied to goods supplied from the donor country sometimes leads to inappropriate equipment, lack of maintenance facilities, expensive spare parts and, where there is more than one donor, lack of standardization. Overseas training is usually confined to institutions in the donor country and relatively little training is arranged in Somalia.

98. These problems could be handled without much loss of effectiveness if the Somali counterpart institutions were reasonably strong and adequately managed. This is not the case, however, since most are inadequately staffed (see below) and suffer from lack of financial, physical and administrative resources leaving some administrative and clerical tasks to the experts themselves.

99. Although there are undoubtedly exceptions and examples of extremely effective assistance, the general impression that the mission has gathered is of services provided by experts recruited by the donor agency with little input from the counterpart agency and under contract to the donor, with little previous experience in Somalia and given little or no training or briefing before or after their arrival. In Somalia the experts spend much time on logistical and administrative matters related both to their work and their private lives. They are supported by short-term consultants contracted in the same way and coming from their own countries and by equipment with which they are familiar but which may or may not be compatible with other equipment available in the local organization. Funds for routine expenditures are often lacking and many items are in short supply in particular, at the moment, gasoline. Some staff working in the counterpart organization are sent to courses in the donor country which to a greater or lesser degree provide knowledge which is relevant to the work they are expected to do on their return to Somalia. If the project is financed by several donors there are additional problems of coordination, compatibility and cross-cultural communications; the latter problems also arise in the case of multilaterally financed projects.

100. The above is, of course, in part a caricature and it is, hopefully, rare that all these difficulties occur in the same project. Also, the technical assistance provided might still be effective in transferring know how if the counterpart organizations were able to effectively utilize and absorb it. This is clearly not the case, however,

which brings us to the Somali side of the implementation problem and the transfer mechanism itself.

101. The most common mode used in deploying experts in technical assistance projects and components in Somalia, and indeed the mechanism for transferring know how, is the classic adviser/counterpart relationship. In this system, the counterpart is expected to conduct most of the substantive work under the guidance and with the advice of the more experienced expatriate adviser. In practice it has not worked this way for many reasons and instead the system has often functioned as a form of direct support with the adviser doing the substantive work while the counterpart is entrusted with data collection or routine administrative work. The result is that the adviser/counterpart relationship contributes little to institutional development or capacity building; self-reliance, which is the ultimate goal of technical assistance, is poorly served.

102. There are many reasons for this situation. Apart from poorly selected or unsuitable expatriate experts, the most important are the severe problems of the whole Somali Civil Service and the drain of capable people to the Gulf Countries; most of the difficulties on the Somali side, which are cited by donors, experts and Somali staff alike, are largely symptoms or consequences of these two problems. Among the most frequent such problems is lack, and/or frequent transfer, of counterparts. These, together with tight deadlines, often force the advisers to take the work into their own hands. Because they do not carry the responsibility, some counterparts have little opportunity to learn by doing and they therefore remain inadequately trained.

103. The other main vehicle for the transfer of knowledge and know how, formal training abroad, is also not working well for essentially the same reasons. Most projects visited by the mission had great difficulties retaining Somali staff who had been trained abroad with most, in some cases all, trainees having left the project for the Somali private sector or, more often, for jobs in the Gulf States; some trainees also extend their studies for long periods rather than return to Somalia. Indeed, the various fellowship programs are probably the components most appreciated by Somali staff because of their educational value which has made it easier to find employment abroad. Many civil servants also use fellowships for short-term study or study tours to supplement their income which helps to keep them in the Civil Service; while useful, this is not necessarily the best use of funds intended for training.

Civil Service - Main Problems

104. It is clearly recognized by both the Somali Government and the donors that the weaknesses of the Civil Service and public administration constitute major constraints to the effective use of technical assistance. While technical assistance has sought to strengthen Somali institutions and train nationals this task has been made extremely difficult by two factors. First, existing institutions were not only weak but they were based on two different inherited traditions and languages, Italian and English. This and a lack of clear directions for the development of public administration provided little or no framework for the technical assistance

efforts. Secondly, the morale problems resulting from excessively low salary scales and an absence of performance linked incentives have undermined technical assistance efforts.

Civil Service - Language

105. The complications arising from Somalia's multi-lingual heritage are likely to persist for a long time to come. The educational system uses Italian, English, Somali and Arabic at various levels, in different parts of the country and in different training institutions. The absence of a unified educational tradition and common shared training obviously causes difficulties in the development of a national civil service quite apart from the difficulties faced by students and trainees who have to switch from language to language at different stages of education and training.

106. One consequence of the language problem is that many of the most important government documents, including all the planning documents, are written in English which is not easily accessible to all those concerned. When added to the unfamiliarity with written communication and recording in a basically verbal society it is not surprising that many civil servants are not familiar with even the most basic policy documents. To help address this problem which is likely to remain for many years, the mission recommends that the government, supported by donors, adopt a policy designed to ensure that all vital documents, including donor financed technical reports, are translated into Somali.

Civil Service - Salaries

107. The totally inadequate salary levels of the Somali civil service are clearly recognized. Not only is morale undermined but civil servants have to find other means to support their families which directly increases absenteeism. Poor motivation is further exacerbated by the absence of organized career prospects, and performance related incentives.

Civil Service - Salary Supplements

108. In an attempt to at least achieve some results from their efforts and ensure that major investment projects are effectively implemented, many donors have resorted to incentive payments of various kinds including the payment of direct salary supplements to Somali staff. This has been done with encouragement from the Somali Government and, in fact, government funds are sometimes channelled through the project entities to Somali staff. The effect of this is to make project posts more attractive to Somali nationals (quite apart from the much better working conditions in the projects as a result of donor financed equipment, buildings and operating costs) and there are examples of staff moving between projects in search of higher pay. They have also tended to leave their posts once external assistance terminates. As Table 6 on page 17 indicates the

incentive payments vary enormously from 0 to SSh 5000 and in one case reaching SSh 8,000 a month. They are also allocated on an ad hoc project by project basis and there are in most Somali agencies no fixed criteria for who should receive them and how much.

Civil Service - Conclusions

109. The result of all this is confusion, inequity and misallocation of human resources. There is basically competition between donors and between projects and a complete lack of coordination both on the donor side and within Government. It is the firm view of the mission that the very system of incentive payments needs to be reconsidered. While they may contribute to more effective operation of individual projects and implementation of investment projects such substantial incentive payments work in the longer term against orderly development of government institutions and the civil service itself; they also weaken existing non-supported institutions and act as a constraint on technical assistance efforts. The civil service reforms currently underway as a result of the 1984 US/AID supported Civil Service Study (see Annex 7) should eventually make incentive payments less necessary, i.a. by raising basic salaries. However, given the fiscal problems facing the Government and the need for extreme restraint in expanding government expenditures, the mission does not believe that this will happen very fast and that the Government and donors, therefore, must search for other quicker ways to address the problems of the civil service.

110. The issue of civil service reform is so crucial to any effort to develop Somali institutions that it must be a major area of donor concern and assistance. While the mission has assumed that both the Government and donors would find direct donor funding for basic across the board salary increases undesirable, it does believe that there are other more palatable approaches. One clearly is for all concerned to take the need for salary reform into account in any stabilization program devised by Government and donors. A second is for Government and donors to review carefully the functions of the civil service to see if they can be reduced by transferring some to the private or parapublic sectors. Third might be donor support for the incentives in the form of land to farm and loans to go into fishing now being provided for staff to leave the civil service. Finally, and most importantly, Government and donors should define together other general perquisites that could in part be financed by donors, which would compensate staff for the intolerably low level of salaries prevailing in the civil service.

111. The mission believes that the idea of a jointly developed and financed scheme or schemes to assist in the reform of the civil service should be seriously considered by Government and interested donors. The mission recommends that donors establish a working group within the framework for closer coordination recommended below to explore these ideas with Government. This working group should also review current practices with regard to salary supplements with a view to minimizing their negative impact.

Delivery Systems for Technical Assistance - Conclusions

112. Beyond civil service reform, the mission also feels that the relationship between expatriate and Somali staff needs to be reexamined and redefined if technical assistance is to be more successful in building Somali institutions and capacity. The present expert/counterpart relationship clearly has not been effective except in special situations. The mission therefore believes that each case must be examined in light of its particular objectives. When doing so, Government and donors might consider the following possible improvements in the manner of delivering technical assistance.

(a) When training and institutional development are the primary objectives there are three possible delivery systems which can be used singly or in combination:

- (i) the standard expert/counterpart arrangement but with more explicit terms of reference for both. The terms of reference for the advisor should specify that he is an adviser only and there should be an explicit time table for transfer of specific skills to the counterpart. The adviser's duties should include preparation of guidelines with a timetable for implementation. The Government should be under a legal obligation to provide counterparts for specified periods of time;
- (ii) the donor might assign, when possible, the task of providing technical guidance to projects to technical staff in their resident missions or to frequently visiting short-term missions, leaving to Somali staff the responsibility of running the project. This system is used with some success by EEC, US/AID, UNICEF and Italy;
- (iii) the Government and the donor could jointly identify a National Project Director (NPD) responsible both to the Government and to the donor for the implementation of the project. If necessary the NPD would be backed up and supported by short and medium term expatriate experts. While it is not necessary for the NPD to possess all the required knowledge and skills, he should be selected for basic qualifications and potential to perform the functions in a short time. The arrangement also requires clear delineation of responsibilities, full agreement on the choice of candidate, and security of tenure for the NPD at least for the life of the project and preferably beyond.

(b) Where production of goods by a self contained government or parastatal unit is the main objective the donor could supply a management team, to operate with the authority of Somalia, to set up the production facilities and initiate production

using Somali staff who would learn on the job. A timetable for completion of the team's task should be agreed and a sufficient number of qualified Somalis assigned to provide choices for promotion and replacement of the expatriates. Salaries should be sufficient to retain qualified staff. The mission was informed by Government and donors that this was a viable approach which was already being used e.g. in the Swedish assisted Boat Factory.

(c) When direct support is needed to establish new government services and trained Somalis are not available or not expected to be available soon the Government and the donors should consider:

(i) giving suitably qualified expatriates operational responsibilities and assign them to regular government positions ^{9/} with the donor topping up their salaries (OPAS arrangement in UNDP terminology). The expatriate would report to a Somali chief and would have operational authority over Somali staff and full responsibility for the operations of his unit. Local staff would in fact be trained on the job by an expatriate chief;

(ii) the use of United Nations or donor national volunteers to fill specific skill gaps at middle technical and professional levels.

Repatriation of Somalis Working Abroad

113. The thrust of the mission's suggestions is to make the expatriate/Somali staff relationship more explicit by assigning operational responsibility more clearly. There are, however, obviously limits to the application of arrangements that give operational responsibility to expatriates, e.g. in the case of policy making positions, and ways will therefore also have to be found to find and retain qualified Somali staff in such positions. One source of such staff is the many Somalis presently working abroad. ^{10/}It is the mission's view that the time is ripe for energetic steps to be taken to reverse the flow of trained Somalis abroad. This would be especially timely since the attraction of the Gulf countries appears to be leveling off and because some earlier emigrants may well be ready to return to Somalia. In fact a program of the Intergovernmental Committee on Migration funded by the EEC has been operating in Somalia for

9/ This would i.a. ensure that appropriate budgeted positions exist for the long term.

10/ While there are no accurate comprehensive data available on the type of qualifications or experience of Somalis presently working abroad, or their number, it is generally agreed that there is a large group of highly qualified expatriate Somalis who might be induced to return to Somalia.

some time with the purpose of aiding the return of expatriate Somalis. The UNDP supported scheme, Transfer of Know-How Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) should also be activated in Somalia. TOKTEN consultancies are normally for short-term assignments for expatriates in their own country and could be arranged in Somalia as a first step in a process of their return, possibly with ICM support. Beyond this the TOKTEN scheme might be extended still further to permit the deployment in Somalia of qualified Somalis under OPAS-type assignments with the costs financed by donors. Finally, Government and donors should consider if some services, financed by the donors, might be performed outside the public sector, e.g. by local consulting firms and individual consultants, thereby providing a source of reasonable income for Somali professionals who might wish to return to Somalia.

114. With respect to the problem of returning Somali staff who have been formally trained abroad, the mission is of the firm view that donors should gradually reduce their reliance on degree programs abroad and place more emphasis on short-term courses and study tours abroad and degree training in Somalia. This would not only reduce the opportunities for defection abroad but is also likely to make the training much more relevant to the needs of the trainees, or at least their organizations. Such a shift would probably also be much cheaper per trainee although initially involving more work for those responsible for training since they could not rely on "prepackaged" training programs. Should this prove to be an obstacle, donors might consider pooling their resources for example by one donor sponsoring trainees at courses run in Somalia by another donor or by providing inputs into such courses. Improvement of Somali training institutions should also be high on the agenda for donor action and a review of existing capabilities should be undertaken as soon as possible.

D. Monitoring and Evaluation of Technical Cooperation Projects

Monitoring

115. The best designed and executed projects will inevitably run into unexpected circumstances that will require adjustments and changes. This is especially true for projects with a very long timeframe as advocated in this report for projects with institutional development objectives. However, changes can be made in a rational way only if the need is recognized and there is a system for adjusting the project design. Every project should, therefore, include provision for periodic monitoring of progress and a mechanism for review and change. In addition, the Government needs an overall system for monitoring the implementation of its development program as a whole as well as of specific projects.

116. In Somalia monitoring of the implementation of the Public Investment Program is the responsibility of the Interministerial Committee for Public Investment (IMCPI) chaired by the Ministry of Finance and including representatives of the Central Bank, MNP and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. The main concern of the IMCPI is the implementation of the PIP in financial terms to enable the Government to make adjustments in the PIP and to more accurately reflect the needs of ongoing projects in

its financial projections. Secretariat functions, including maintenance of a set of profiles of all major investment projects, are provided by the Ministry of Finance assisted by a World Bank financed adviser.

117. Monitoring of the physical progress of projects and the implementation of the development plan is the concern of MNP in general and its National Monitoring and Evaluation Facility (NMEF) in particular. The NMEF is part of the Planning Department of MNP and staffed by two expatriate advisers financed by IDA and about six Somali professionals most of whom are studying abroad. Its mandate is to develop a system of monitoring all projects in the development plan on a quarterly basis. So far it has concentrated its efforts on major projects in the agriculture sector but is slowly expanding its portfolio of projects being monitored. In addition, some monitoring of projects is done by the Planning Department with assistance from the UNDP financed team as part of its evaluations of the Annual Plans. At the sector level some ministries also monitor progress of plan implementation, in the case of agriculture quite well.

118. Project by project monitoring is largely a donor affair and the thoroughness of the process and degree of Government participation varies from donor to donor. The World Bank requires periodic reports from the projects it finances and also regularly reviews (supervises) projects through visits by staff from headquarters or its Regional Mission in Nairobi in the course of which changes are proposed and agreed; overall implementation problems are discussed at less frequent Country Implementation Reviews. All UNDP projects include regular reporting by the projects to and monitoring by both the Executing Agency and UNDP in the form of detailed monthly reports and at least yearly tripartite reviews of progress by the Government, UNDP and the Executing Agency. Other donors carry out similar monitoring exercises as part of their own programming and budgeting cycle and most hold annual meetings with the Government to review progress.

119. While the Government's system for monitoring the implementation of the PIP and of major investment projects has improved considerably, which is reflected in the 1985 Annual Plan, much more needs to be done if it is to achieve better control over the implementation of technical assistance projects, many of which are grant financed and therefore fall outside the IMCPI framework. ^{11/} This should, in the first instance, be the task of the sector ministries, and in particular their planning units, who should report regularly to MNP on progress of all projects under implementation in their respective sectors. Without such a system the Government (MNP and sector ministries) are not in a position to prepare, or react to, suggested changes in project design or execution that are called for by changing circumstances. However, this will require strengthening of the ministerial planning units, as well as the central monitoring units. Design and implementation of a workable system of reporting and monitoring should be high on the agenda for the proposed Interministerial Task Force on the planning system.

11/ The tremendous difficulties encountered by the mission in trying to compile reasonably accurate statistical information about ongoing technical assistance attest to the lack of a functioning monitoring system.

120. The detailed monitoring of project progress is, as noted, now primarily a concern of the respective donors. This will continue to be the case until such time as the Government has the capacity to carry out this task and report to the donors. In the meantime the mission recommends that donors involve the responsible ministries and agencies to the maximum extent possible e.g. by requesting information from the responsible ministry rather than directly from their own staff, and that they report regularly on the progress of their projects to the MNP. In addition, donors should coordinate their monitoring efforts in order to minimize the burden on the Somali administration; joint missions should, for example, be the rule whenever a project is financed by more than one donor or when two or more donors are supporting closely related projects in the same sector.

Evaluation

121. Beyond the regular monitoring of project implementation a properly functioning system for planning and programming technical assistance requires feedback based on evaluations of both ongoing and completed projects or project phases so that weaknesses in e.g. project design, can be either corrected or avoided in the future and lessons of success learned. The function of such evaluations is to assess if the soundness of project design, the effectiveness and efficiency with which projects are achieving their objectives (effectiveness and efficiency of implementation) and the continuing relevance and utility of the projects. When appropriately designed, evaluation exercises may be utilized to generate findings applicable to the identification, formulation, appraisal and implementation of future projects.

122. Although acknowledged in theory to be crucially important evaluation is almost universally neglected and Somalia is no exception. While one important step has been taken with the establishment of the NMEF progress is slow and the main attention focussed on monitoring of project implementation. Many donors, including the World Bank, conduct evaluations of completed projects and sometimes commission special studies of sets of projects. All large (over \$1 million) UNDP financed projects are subject to in-depth evaluation at the mid-point of their scheduled life and all projects are evaluated ex post on the basis of detailed terminal reports. Both UNDP and the World Bank also have internal procedures for making the results of such evaluations available within their organizations to those responsible for project planning and design. The World Bank and the UNDP also make their completion reports and project audits available to the Government and the implementing agency. There does not appear to be, however, any automatic mechanism for disseminating evaluation results within the Government so that they can be taken into account in the formulation of new technical assistance projects or in the planning process generally. There also does not appear to be any functioning mechanism for sharing experience among donors. Although many evaluation reports are available widely outside the agencies directly involved in executing and financing the project and may even be routinely sent to one or more other agencies the impression is that by and large there is no system within the

donor community for ensuring that the evaluation findings are used by those who need them.

123. To address these weaknesses and to help make the evaluation process more effective the mission suggests that efforts be made to gradually strengthen the NMEF to enable it to expand its monitoring capacity; this is an important aspect of planning to be reviewed by the proposed Interministerial Task Force. In the meantime donors should, to the extent possible, make their evaluation process a joint one with the Government to ensure that the results are available in MNP and the sector ministries and agencies. Whenever projects are financed by more than one donor there should obviously be close coordination, including agreement on the evaluation criteria, in order to avoid confusion and overloading the Somali administration. Finally, the donor community should, within the framework of close local coordination proposed below, set up a system of automatic dissemination of evaluation reports among the donors and from time to time arrange meetings or workshops specifically to discuss the findings of such studies.

CHAPTER IV

AID COORDINATION

124. Some 37 donors and donor agencies are active in technical cooperation in Somalia working with 21 different ministries and a large number of other organizations. As detailed in Chapter II, there are at least 150 separate technical assistance projects involving some 750 individual long-term expatriate experts and costing around \$100 million a year. To coordinate this massive program is obviously a very large and complex task.

125. The Government clearly has the primary responsibility for aid coordination. The key to effective coordination is an effective planning system which, in light of human and financial resource constraints, enables the Government to set and enforce its priorities and decisions with regard to which projects are to be implemented and by whom. As described in Chapter III, the planning system as it presently operates in Somalia is insufficiently equipped to meet this challenge and donors, therefore, exercise great influence on the selection and design of technical cooperation projects. This situation places a particular responsibility on donors to coordinate their technical assistance efforts in order to maximize the benefits to Somalia.

126. The discussion of current technical assistance in Chapters II and III shows that the present system of aid coordination at the sector and project level has not served either the donors or the Government well. The problems caused by a lack of coordination include (i) duplication as exemplified by assistance in the field of agricultural research; and (ii) divergent approaches, as for example in the area of agricultural extension. The results of the disparate policies of donors, with respect to salary supplements for local staff, is a prime example of the effects of poor aid coordination and lack of an overall strategy for institutional development (see paragraph 108 above).

127. These problems are most apparent in cases of joint or parallel financing of a specific project, but are likely to appear in other contexts as well if the mission's recommendations with respect to broader sectoral and organizational analysis are adopted, since they would require that assistance is provided within a common framework. While other mission recommendations would gradually help strengthen Government's capacity to coordinate technical assistance, that will take some time; in the meantime donors need to take immediate steps to improve its aid coordinating mechanism.

128. At present, coordination among donors at the international level takes place from time to time in the framework of the Consultative Group (CG) for Somalia chaired by the World Bank. The CG meetings have had before them the Medium Term Recovery Program and the Public Investment and Expenditure Program of the Government (PIP), as well as the economic reports prepared by the World Bank.

129. The meetings of the CG are held outside Somalia and while they provide a general framework for coordination at the micro level, they have little bearing on the day-to-day coordination of technical assistance activities which can only be achieved at country level. In Mogadishu there is a semi-formal monthly gathering of donors with resident missions called the Donor Coordination Group which is in principle concerned with local aid coordination. The mission's impression is, however, that the Group has, in the past, provided little active coordination in the substantive sense. Meetings have been devoted primarily to an exchange of information on activities recently undertaken and those scheduled in the coming weeks. Written notes have only occasionally been provided prior to meetings and follow-up appears to be rare. Although the Government of Somalia has a standing invitation to attend the meetings of the Group, it has rarely, if ever, availed itself of this opportunity; nor has it suggested an alternative mechanism.

130. It is clear to the mission that, in order to be truly effective, aid coordination at the country level needs to focus on substantive issues; it should be an active process seeking to bring together and integrate the various technical assistance programs with each other and with the national development framework so as to achieve a synergy from the give and take of such meetings. On the international level this involves a discussion to reach mutual understanding and commonality of objectives among donors and Government on key issues of development strategy. The objective of local coordination is to ensure that the inputs of the various donors effectively support this strategy.

131. To achieve this objective the coordination work should be organized on the basis of sectors, subsectors, institutions and themes. Extensive consultations as well as preparatory and follow-up actions will be required. There is some experience in Somalia in the past of having successfully followed this path on some subjects, most often when one donor through its mandate, by request of the Government or through fortuitous circumstances has found itself in a lead role acknowledged by all. Examples of this include:

- (a) the World Bank and IMF in dealing with the financial crises and in putting together a financing package to help bridge the balance of payments deficit; and
- (b) US/AID with respect to civil service reform.

132. To strengthen the present system of country level aid coordination, the mission recommends that it be thoroughly restructured and integrated with the national planning system. A principal objective would be to make possible effective monitoring of the progress achieved with respect to the understandings reached at the Consultative Group meetings between the Government and the donor community. Only in this way will it be possible to make the necessary adjustments in the broad contents of aid programs to take account of changing circumstances.

133. The restructured aid coordination system should ensure that:

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- (a) technical assistance operates squarely in the framework of Government development and macro-economic policies and priorities;
- (b) aid programs are determined within Government by appropriate interaction of sectoral departments and central authorities responsible for finance, planning and coordination;
- (c) there is effective division of labor among donors in order to avoid duplication, and conflict, as well as competition for, and unnecessary burdens on, the scarce local human resources;
- (d) all priority needs are met and there is mutual support among projects and programs to maximize benefits;
- (e) the administrative burden of aid programs is minimized and procedural requirements are harmonized to the extent possible; and
- (f) multilateral agencies and bilateral donors in specialized areas of activity accept and equip themselves to perform an active servicing and support role in the aid coordination process.

134. To achieve these objectives, it is proposed that the restructured system include the following elements:

- (a) regular meetings of all donors represented in Mogadishu with well-defined agendas and written material prepared and circulated in advance;
- (b) designation of sectoral or thematic working groups consisting of interested donors and government officials. A specifically designated lead-donor would orchestrate the preparatory work and provide servicing for the group. ^{1/} The working groups would report regularly to the main coordinating group;
- (c) preparation and review by the main coordinating group of case studies and work prepared by the working groups; and

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The subject of handling of the proceeds of food aid which is sold on local markets came to the attention of the mission. One possibility would be to muster part of this substantial resource in support of the civil service reform effort. There are other possibilities for an orderly use of these proceeds, to be jointly agreed upon between Government and donors. Experience in other countries has shown the advantages for the recipient country and for its community of donors, that lie in concerted handling of these local cash flows. Although this does not squarely fall within technical coordinating arrangements, the manner of its disposition can follow the course outlined in this section: one of the subgroups of donors entrusted with sectoral subjects, in concert with the concerned government officials, would appear to be an appropriate mechanism.

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(d) strengthening of the resident missions of major donors with the necessary resources to ensure that proper functioning of the main coordinating group and the working groups. In particular:

- (i) the UNDP and World Bank offices should be strengthened to enable them to provide the necessary leadership and services to the overall coordinating mechanism; the burden might well be shared by the two organizations with the World Bank assuming responsibility for coordination of financial and capital assistance and the UNDP for technical assistance;
- (ii) the lead-donors should ensure that they have the necessary technical support staff to carry out their functions effectively; and
- (iii) other donors should staff their missions and give them sufficient authority to enable them to play a meaningful role in the coordination system.

135. One particular coordination problem is that of joint or parallel assistance by several donors to a single project or organization. Such multi-donor support appears fraught with difficulties and technical assistance projects identified, prepared, implemented and monitored by a single donor within a commonly accepted sectoral framework, therefore, seem to offer better chances of lasting success. The proposed coordination mechanism would help establish the sectoral framework for such single-donor assisted projects. When co-financing or joint assistance is required because of the size of the financial requirements, this could best be organized along the lines of UNDP's third-party cost-sharing formula which combines single-donor implementation with multi-donor financing.

136. One theme of this report has been the need for an improved mechanism for integrating donor assistance into government programs. Since such an improved mechanism would need full support of both donors and Government, the mission recommends that a working group be established with both Government and donor representation and asked to identify ways and means to:

- (a) tighten the Government's management of technical assistance resources made available by donors;
- (b) assure a better integrated and more clearly defined body of technical assistance projects and programs to secure, by synergistic action, the greatest possible benefits to Somalia;
- (c) improve the linkages and integration of technical assistance activities with the development plans and priorities of the Government; and
- (d) avoid duplication, competition and conflicting advice (except when deliberately sought by the Government).

The work of this donor/Government working group would need to proceed in close consultation and coordination with the work of the Interministerial Task Force concerned with the planning system recommended in paragraph 75 above.

137. The complexity of the task and the firmness of purpose required to balance and regulate the multiplicity of donors' contributions, require the cooperation and commitment of all donors to achieve the maximum benefit for Somalia. It will be difficult enough to ensure that the Government assumes a stronger managerial role at project level as has been suggested in paragraph 112 of this report. In the coordination of aid, the burden of moving towards clearer commitments and monitorable policies demands that specific help be made available to the Government. This help will have to come from international organizations having resident missions in Somalia, and more particularly the UNDP and the World Bank, until such time as the Government is equipped to fulfill its leadership role. The support and services to be provided by the offices of these organizations are staff-intensive and it is hoped that their resident missions will be sufficiently strengthened to accomplish this purpose. The natural division of labor between them will give the Bank a primary role in coordination of activities relating to the country's financial health and its investment programs, while UNDP's primary responsibility will be technical cooperation in all its aspects. The management of aid is clearly an area where both field establishments will need to work closely together in supporting and strengthening Government capacity in a concerted fashion, dividing the tasks according to the exigencies of the situation, while keeping each other thoroughly informed.

CHAPTER V

CRITICAL NEEDS FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION

138. As part of its mandate, the mission was asked to identify the critical needs for technical assistance in Somalia over the next several years. Following from the mission's review of the range of activities needed and of the weaknesses of the present planning system, it has concluded that no detailed programming of total technical cooperation need on a national basis is feasible, or indeed desirable, by a single mission. What it can do is to suggest an approach to programming which addresses the concerns expressed in earlier chapters of this report, and set down a list of themes for future action which arises from the mission's consultations with the Government and various donors.

139. Apart from being based on a sound system of national planning, specific technical assistance requirements need to emerge from an in-depth review of the sector, organization and subject for which assistance is proposed or requested, undertaken jointly by donors and the Government. This review should lead to a determination, in a comprehensive manner, of actions needed by Government to strengthen the institutions involved and of the support required from the outside, without regard to the source of assistance. The result should be an agreed action plan specifying the objectives and time frame, as well as domestic and external resources required to achieve them. Such a prior determination of true needs should help solve the principal conundrum of technical cooperation practice; how to match the best of donors' capabilities with the most urgent and important needs of the recipient Government in a way that ensures full recipient commitment to the effort. Thus donors should be able to make realistic and timely technical cooperation contributions within an appropriate framework of Government actions and capabilities.

Critical Needs

140. Having found, as earlier stated, that no detailed programming of total technical assistance requirements is feasible by a single mission, the mission sought and obtained indications from Government of its current sectoral and thematic preoccupations. These Government perceptions of areas requiring priority attention, and those expressed by the donors consulted, helped identify areas needing urgent attention. In addition, the mission itself offers some suggestions which flow from its own analysis of needs. The following listing of critical technical assistance requirements includes both categories, without regard to any particular order among them, since they are all felt to be critical.

141. Government has indicated that there is in Somalia an under-utilization of existing capacity in terms of both human and physical infra-structures. Owing to changed circumstances and the interruption of major aid programmes, a proportion of existing facilities have either fallen into disuse or are currently underutilized. Hence a major preoccupation is the need for rehabilitation and fuller utilization of existing capacity.

142. Somalia being essentially a rural economy, the insufficient availability of support services for rural production is perceived to be a significant gap in the country's development. Strengthening national capacity to provide the services essential for the sound development of rural areas, is clearly an area for the concentration of technical assistance. The mission has already partly responded to this felt need, by arranging for an institutional development exercise to be carried out alongside the sectoral review of agriculture, livestock, etc. which is being mounted with World Bank assistance.

143. In the mission's own view, foremost among technical assistance requirements and transcending any other need, is the assistance to be given to improve the Somali government's ability to guide the development process and to assume full leadership of the technical cooperation effort.^{1/} This will have to be based on work by the Interministerial Task Force on the planning system recommended above, as well as on coordinated and comprehensive assistance in implementing its recommendations. Apart from increased aid to the Ministry of National Planning, to the Ministry of Finance and to the sector ministries, a Task Force of the suggested type is likely to call for fairly radical restructuring of some ongoing assistance activities to make them mutually supportive and in line with the Government objective of increased self reliance.

144. Another area of major concern and high priority for all, Government and donors alike, is civil service reform, without which much technical assistance remains a temporary exercise, likely to be ineffective in the longer term. A start has been made through the US/AID sponsored Civil Service Study which is being reviewed by a series of interministerial working groups. Proposals for assistance in specific areas such as civil service training are being prepared by some donors. It is clear to the mission, however, that the Government will not be able to carry out a major reform of the civil service without substantial assistance from the donor community and the mission has made some suggestions in this regard. The point to be made here is that donors should give high priority within their assistance programs, by recasting them if necessary, to support for a viable action program that the Government will hopefully prepare in consultation with them in the area of civil service reform.

145. Somalia has faced severe economic problems over the past several years and still needs to carry through difficult stabilization and restructuring measures agreed with the IMF and the World Bank. Apart from improvements in the planning system mentioned above, this will require greater capacity to formulate and implement economic policy measures. The agencies charged with this task (MNP, Ministry of Finance, Central Bank and the several economic ministries) do not have sufficient capability to meet the demands placed on Somalia by the international community and to adequately address the problems facing the country. It is, therefore, a matter of urgency to provide direct assistance to these agencies to carry

^{1/} The mission noted during its second visit that a beginning had been made through the creation of a committee of Ministers, headed by the Vice President, Minister of National Planning, and responsible for approving all proposed externally assisted projects. Further work is needed, however, on the detailed terms of reference and program of work for this committee.

out the economic policy work while, at the same time, building Somali capacity. In the same way as the needs of sector policy-making will be addressed in the context of sector reviews suggested elsewhere, the needs of central agencies (MNP, Ministry of Finance and Central Bank) require separate exercises with initial support by the IMF, the World Bank, and the UNDP. In particular it is important that the institutional and technical assistance requirements implied in the stabilization and restructuring programs agreed between the Government and the international community are identified, analysed and adequately addressed.

146. Another priority area for technical assistance flows from the Government's development program and its Public Investment Program: it can be expressed as "programming for institutional development". Once decided upon and agreed, it is crucial that not only their financial requirements are met, but the human and institutional ones as well. In various places in this report the mission has made suggestions regarding the process by which the identification, design, and implementation of technical assistance for these programs can be improved. An effort to look at the agricultural sector in a comprehensive and coordinated way is currently under way, as already mentioned; other efforts have already been made in population (1982) and energy (1985); additional reviews should be carried out in the next several years regarding the industry, education and health and nutrition sectors, etc.

147. The focus of this report has been the impact of technical cooperation on institutional strengthening and on the building of national capacity. These are the primary objectives of technical assistance as expressed by both donors and the Government. There are also areas where direct assistance to provide services to the Somali people is both useful and beneficial; Egyptian school teachers and Italian University professors and lecturers are obviously important parts of the education system and donor-supplied doctors, nurses and medicines help save many Somali lives. The mission's recommendations and priorities for technical cooperation in no way imply that these efforts should be neglected or reduced. These programs are clearly useful and should continue in areas where Government and donor priorities coincide. It is, however, important that this type of assistance is provided in a form that does not undermine the Government's efforts to build its own institutions, always remaining essentially a supplement to Government resources and efforts.

CHAPTER VI

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE ACTIONS

148. There has been a rapid increase in the amount of technical assistance to Somalia in the last decade. Figures published by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD show that the disbursements of technical assistance grants increased from \$16.0 million in 1976 to \$120.0 million in 1983. The mission's survey, discussed in Chapter II, indicates that at least \$100 million was disbursed for technical assistance in 1984, and that some 1200 expatriates were engaged in technical assistance activities at the end of 1984. By any measure both the absolute size and the rate of growth of the technical assistance effort have been substantial.

149. In terms of its impact on Somali institutions, on the Government's capacity to manage the country's development and on the transfer of knowledge and skills to Somalis, the criteria used by the mission to gauge the effectiveness of technical assistance, the results of this massive effort can only be characterized as not satisfactory. Externally funded technical assistance projects tend to continue for long periods and to leave few visible results when discontinued. Many institutions that have been receiving assistance for a long time show few signs of being able to function without continued help.

150. The reasons for this situation are complex, and as detailed in Chapters II and III, are the responsibility of both Government and donors. They relate fundamentally to the way technical assistance is programmed, designed and implemented. The present system gives considerable weight to donor priorities and preferences. When combined with the understandable preoccupation of donors with the proper design and implementation of donor-funded investment projects, it is not surprising that both the selection and design of technical assistance projects and components have focussed primarily on short-term project implementation objectives rather than long-term institutional development goals. The result, however, has been a plethora of special project units and other organizations, outside the normal government structure, supported by external donors providing salary supplements and other perquisites for the Somali staff and with easy access both to foreign exchange and local currency resources. It should come as no surprise that these units have tended to be self-perpetuating and that the permanent government structure has, if anything, been weakened.

151. Even in cases where the objective of technical assistance has been the development of permanent government structures, this objective has often been defeated by defects in the delivery system for technical assistance and weakness at the receiving end. The lack of a well-functioning civil service, exacerbated by the erosion of salaries, and prevalence of donor financed salary supplements, has led to misallocation of staff resources including rapid turnover of local staff, failure of trainees to return to Somalia, low staff morale, absenteeism and low productivity. Poor project design, staff selection, and administrative procedures and

other problems have occasionally resulted in poorly qualified expatriate experts. The traditional adviser/counterpart modality has poorly served the objective of transferring skills to Somalis, and innovative approaches are clearly needed. Finally, lack of coordination among donors seems to have resulted in occasional competition for scarce local resources, conflicting advice and, in many cases, failure to provide mutually supporting assistance.

152. The mission believes that strong measures are required by both Government and donors if future technical assistance is to contribute effectively to the development of Somali institutions; the following recommendations for future action could well contribute to increasing the effectiveness and impact of technical cooperation activities in Somalia.

RECOMMENDATION 1: Civil Service Reform (paragraphs 109-111)

153. Successful civil service reform is crucial to technical cooperation effectiveness. A working group of interested donors organized at an early date could explore with the Government the type and extent of support to be given by donors to ensure success of the civil service reform currently under way. Among the topics to be taken up could be:

- (a) a plan for concerted action by all interested donors to contribute to those aspects of the civil service reform decided upon by the Government;
- (b) more particularly, a thorough examination of possible help by donors in ensuring more realistic compensation for civil servants. In this context the possibility should be explored of a donor-supported scheme or schemes for the civil service which would leave inflation-proof assets in Somalia, as an attraction to civil servants, in lieu of part of salary increases of 300-500% now under discussion;
- (c) a joint review of current practices regarding the payment of incentives and salary supplements in order to minimize their negative impact upon the civil service.

RECOMMENDATION 2: Retention of Trained Somalis (paragraph 114)

154. Agreements between donors and Government could incorporate clauses explicitly requiring the assignment of Somali counterparts for minimum periods of time, to secure application of knowledge they acquire in the area of Somalia's need for which they were trained. By the same token, training should as much as possible be conducted in Somalia, the duration of fellowships abroad should be minimized and formal studies abroad should be as much as possible completed in Somalia itself and degrees granted there. This will require an improvement of training capabilities in Somalia, which should be a subject for early review, aiming at better preparation of the trainees for service in their own country.

RECOMMENDATION 3: Return of Trained Somalis to Serve Within the Country
(paragraph 113)

155. Efforts to attract expatriate Somalis with skills and qualifications presently in short supply, back to Somalia should be stepped up. This will require active cooperation with, and the support of, specific programmes aiming at the return on short or long term basis of expatriate Somalis. Two such programmes are: (a) the Intergovernmental Committee on Migration (ICM) repatriation scheme which recently began in Somalia, and (b) the UNDP's Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) scheme, for which a project in Somalia should be started, for the benefits to be derived from the short-term consultancies of qualified Somalis residing abroad, and also as a possible first step for the permanent return of some of these. Additional efforts to use Somali consulting and contracting firms in the execution of donor-supported projects, might also help to attract expatriate Somalis back.

RECOMMENDATION 4: Planning of Technical Cooperation (paragraphs 76-77)

156. A strong and effective planning system including procedures for identifying, screening and selecting projects is an essential ingredient in any effort to give the Government greater influence over the content and shape of technical assistance. To help correct present weaknesses the following steps could be taken:

- (a) the Government could establish an Interministerial Task Force to review the present planning system and make recommendations for improvement as well as to identify future technical assistance requirements;
- (b) the donors could agree to support the effort inter alia by providing assistance to the organizations involved in the planning process within a coherent framework to be established by the Task Force;
- (c) the donors could agree to provide technical assistance only for programmes and projects included in the Government's Public Investment Program and its Annual Plan and Budget;
- (d) the donors could agree to provide assistance within the common framework for as long as adequate progress is being made and as long as necessary to meet its objectives;
- (e) the Government could, with donor cooperation, undertake systematic sector-by-sector reviews of its initiatives, including manpower and training needs as well as the expected role of external assistance.

RECOMMENDATION 5: Programming for Technical Cooperation: Priority Needs
(paragraphs 138 -147)

157. The mission has concluded that it was neither feasible or desirable for it to undertake a detailed programming of technical assistance needs. Instead it suggests an approach to programming of such

assistance and sets down a list of themes for future action. It is the mission's view that specific technical assistance proposals should be based on a review of the sector, organization and subject for which assistance is requested resulting in an agreed action plan specifying objectives, timeframe, domestic and external resources, as well as other action required to achieve them. With respect to areas or themes of high priority for further action the mission identified the following without any particular order or priority:

- (a) rehabilitation and fuller utilization of existing capacity;
- (b) strengthening of services essential for the sound development of rural areas;
- (c) improvements in the Government's ability to guide the development process and to assume full leadership of the technical cooperation effort;
- (d) civil service reform;
- (e) improved capacity to formulate and implement economic policy measures; and
- (f) improved programming for institutional development in the context of implementation of the Government's development program and Public Investment Program.

RECOMMENDATION 6: The design of Technical Cooperation Projects
(paragraphs 89-91)

158. While the mission recognizes the need for the Government and the donors to ensure that major investment projects are efficiently implemented, which may require special organizational arrangements, it strongly feels that the effect of such arrangements on the permanent government structures should be taken into account. It also feels that much more can and should be done to improve permanent government institutions. The following are actions that might be taken to accomplish these objectives:

- (a) before making special institutional arrangements such as setting up of special project units, the Government and the donor should consider whether the activity can be effectively handled within the existing structure, with appropriate attention to the permanent character of the activity including its long-term budgetary consequence;
- (b) assistance to an existing organization should be based on a thorough institutional analysis of the sector or subsector as a whole as well as of the organization itself, taking account of its total responsibilities and of its ability to absorb and manage effectively technical assistance provided by donors;
- (c) projects should be designed to ensure that basic functions can continue after withdrawal of donor involvement; a

ending, without providing expensive inputs such as resident advisers, but with donor-financed spare parts, refresher training and short-term consultancies, would help ensure a realistic phase-out with full assumption of financial and technical responsibility by the Government.

RECOMMENDATION 7: Delivery Patterns of Technical Assistance (paragraph 112)

159. (a) In general, the appointment of resident long-term experts should be considered only after all other means of providing the advisory or support services needed have been explored. Short-term advisory services, with a planned schedule of repeat visits, should be the first choice, with a concomitant strengthening of resident missions by the addition of technical staff to provide guidance and support to projects, while day-to-day management is in Somali hands. Whenever appropriate, institution to institution (twinning) arrangements, which combine technical assistance, training and technical backing, should be used.

(b) Depending on the primary objective of the technical assistance activity, whether for institution building, for direct support in the production of goods, or for the establishment of new government services, a variety of arrangements should be examined as alternatives to the traditional one-to-one expert/counterpart relationship. These may include the following:

- (i) appointment of a National Project Director (NPD) to act both on behalf of the national administration and of the donor, to be assisted in starting the project by short or medium-term specialist(s) with repeated periodic visits as needed. Technical guidance and support in intervening periods will need to be provided by qualified staff in the resident missions of donors
- (ii) supply of a foreign management team, to function alongside Somali staff but with managerial authority during a predetermined launching period;
- (iii) in the absence of qualified or potentially qualified Somali staff, recourse to OPAS (Operational Personnel and appointments to regular posts with line authority within the Somali administration. Here again, time limitations would be set in advance for Somali nationals to replace the OPAS person;
- (iv) resort to Somali nationals resident abroad, brought back through negotiated tripartite contracts, with a donor providing the necessary financing for an introductory period; and
- (v) where gaps exist at middle technical and professional levels, UN or other qualified volunteers can be called upon and integrated in the project structure, with guidance and support from a donor's resident mission;

(c) in-country interviews of candidates should be arranged. This should especially apply prior to recruitment of OPAS-type expertise.

RECOMMENDATION 8: Aid Coordination (paragraph 132-137)

160. There is need, on the donors' side, to move forward from the present system of passive exchanges of information to more active coordination, in order to resolve common problems, to increase the mutually supportive effect of donors' assistance and to devise concerted policies and procedures for better serving Somali interests. To this end, it is recommended that a more structured arrangement of meetings be set up at which Government participation would be invited, with well documented agendas, as follows:

- (a) regular meetings among senior donor representatives presented with:
 - (i) tabulated information on technical cooperation activities and plans (possibly by regularly updating the UN Development Cooperation Report), and;
 - (ii) occasional case studies of particular subjects. Secretariat functions to be performed by the UNDP and World Bank offices.
- (b) sectoral or thematic subgroups with participation of interested donors and of Government operational units, which would report regularly to the main donor group; a mutually agreed lead donor would provide technical support and service each group;
- (c) strengthening of resident donor missions with technical and administrative staff to permit more effective participation in the coordination process. This would also enable the missions to provide the local backstopping to projects referred to in Recommendation 7a and b(i) above;
- (d) participation of donors in sectoral or subsectoral reviews of institutional needs in areas chosen and agreed with the Government to ensure more coherent programming of technical cooperation and a better integration of these subjects with government priorities;
- (e) following the next Consultative Group meeting between Somalia and interested donors, the local donor coordinating group should keep under regular review, on behalf of both the Government and the donor community, progress being made in technical cooperation regarding the understandings which emerge at the meeting.

RECOMMENDATION 9: Language (paragraph 106)

160. In the view of the mission, all donors who do not already do so should strive to translate into Somali, or provide detailed summaries in the national language, of technical and other general reports that are distributed among significant numbers of officials. It would considerably enhance the effectiveness of the technical assistance, if these texts were thus made more accessible to those needing to know the reasoning and justification for any changes in development practices that may be advocated. This is a function to be performed normally within the Government; however, until such time as the Government is able to afford the necessary cost and staff, the burden will fall on donors and those donor resident missions which do not have them, should establish translation facilities geared to promptly turn out the necessary texts.

TECHNICAL COOPERATION ASSESSMENT MISSION FOR SOMALIA

TERMS OF REFERENCE

The objectives of the TCAM are to:

1. Prepare in consultation with Government an in-depth diagnosis of technical assistance in Somalia, focussing on achievements, problems and opportunities, as well as the roles of government and donors, with a view to making recommendations on improving the utilization and administration of technical assistance. Specifically, the following points will be considered:
 - a) Effectiveness and achievements of technical cooperation in relation to country needs and progress towards self-reliance, and government's expressed priorities and plans.
 - b) Government and donor constraints to the effective utilization, absorption, and sustainability of the results of technical assistance.
 - c) Impact of civil service policy and practices on technical assistance effectiveness.
 - d) Donor modalities of technical assistance.
 - e) Relationship to the Government's Public Investment Programme and projects.
 - f) National counterparts and their development.
 - g) Skills and roles of expatriate advisers.
 - h) Institutional building under technical assistance.
2. Provide the Government with proposals for strengthening the national capacity to manage technical assistance and thereby to ensure that the technical assistance provided by donors constitute a coherent international programme of support to Somalia's development.
3. Identify to the extent possible, critical needs for technical assistance over the next three to five years and possible adjustment to ongoing or planned technical assistance activities, including donor modalities and procedures.

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The mission will base its work on the following:

- i) The inventory of technical cooperation now in preparation;
- ii) Development Strategy and Public Investment Programme, 1984-86;
- iii) Other documentation on technical assistance to Somalia which may be provided by the Government, UNDP, IBRD, and if they so wish, other donors, including issues relating to civil service;
- iv) Discussions by the Mission with key Government officials at the central ministry level, and in recipient agencies, along with any plans they may provide for future technical assistance request;
- v) Discussions with donor agencies in Mogadishu, and if appropriate, at their headquarters, including any plans and proposals they may provide for possible future technical assistance.

The mission will produce an assessment and recommendations addressing the above objectives. They will be prepared by the Mission team in close consultation with Government and donor staff. Following normal practice, they will be reviewed in draft by the Government before distribution to any wider and more general donor audience.

Following review and discussion with the Government, the assessment and recommendations will be updated as necessary and distributed to the participants in the consultative group for Somalia. They are expected to be considered at the next meeting of the consultative group. They may also be considered at local meetings in Mogadishu of Government and donor representatives, and serve as a basis for strengthening local coordination of technical assistance.

INVENTORY OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROJECTS

PROJECT	DONOR EXEC. AGENCY	OTHER DONOR CONTR.	GOVT./ AGENCY	TOTAL CONTR.	CURRENCY	GRANT/ LOAN/ MIXED	1984 CONTR. US\$
AGRICULTURE							
1) Advisory to Planning Department Ministry of Agriculture	FRG/GTZ	0	Min. of Agr.	650,000	DM	G	95,000
2) Strengthening Agricultural Research	UNDP/FAO	0	"	1,506,000	US\$	G	545,780
3) Preparatory Assistance in Land Use Plann. and Management	FAO/TCP	0	"	105,000	US\$	G	105,000
4) Bay Region Agricultural Development Project	USAID	3	"	11,171,000	US\$	G	1,041,000
5) Bay Region Agricultural Development Project - Access Roads	ADF	3	"	8,900,000	US\$	L	2,030,200
8) Bay Region - Overall Management	WB/IDA	3	"	10,841,531	US\$	L	4,250,000
9) Bay Region - Overall Management	IFAD	3	"	7,277,689	US\$	L	2,833,000
10) NW Region Agric. Dev. Project	WB/IDA	3	"				
11) Afgoi-Mordinle Irrigation Project	ADF	1	"	7,999,700	FUA	L	382,047
12) Afgoi-Mordinle Irrigation	Libsoma	1	"				
13) Janaale Bulo Mareerta	ADF	0	"	8,000,000	FUA	L	4,571,780
14) Smallholder irrigated with Rainfed Agriculture	FRG/GTZ	0	"	4,874,000	DM	G	Start 1985
15) Irrigation Potential in the North	FRG/GTZ	0	"	5,600,000	DM	G	-
16) Mogambo Irrigation							
17) Seed Production Improvement	Denmark/FAO	0	"	1,065,780	US\$	G	368,912
18) Integrated Date Palm Development Project	EEC	1	Min. of Agr.	2,300,000	ECU	G	338,100
19) Integrated Date Palm Development Project	France	1	Nat. Range Ag.	1,300,000	US\$	G	310,700
20) Improvement to the Agricultural Area of Golven and Janaale	EEC-EDF	0	Min. of Agr.	4,500,000	ECU	G	-
21) Development of Bird Control Unit	UNDP/FAO	0	"	50,000	US\$	G	40,000
22) Promotion of Food Security through Pest Control	Netherlands/FAO	0	"	1,027,885	US\$	G	379,533

PROJECT	DONOR EXEC. AGENCY	OTHER DONOR CONTR.	GOVT./ AGENCY	TOTAL CONTR.	CURRENCY	GRANT/ LOAN/ MIXED	1984 CONTR. US\$
AGRICULTURE (Cont'd)							
23) Food Security Marketing	Norway/FAO	0	"	340,305	US\$	G	10,983
24) Agricultural Delivery Systems ARMET	USAID	3	"	8,635,000	US\$	G	1,233,555
25) Agricultural Farm Management and Extension Training (AFMET)	IDA	3	"	10,500,000	US\$	L	2,730,420
26) Jowhar Small Farmer Project (AFMET)	FRG/AGRO-ACT		"	1,294,990	DM	G	128,726
27) Technical Support to Ministry of Fisheries	SIDA/FAO	0	Min. of Fish.	620,799	US\$	G	292,150
28) Adviser to Coastal Development	ODA	0	"	200,000	£	G	70,000
29) Strengthening and Intensification of Sand Dune Fixation Activities	Italy/UNSO	0	Nat. Range Agency	1,144,180	US\$	G	361,938
30) Development of Inshore Fisheries	UNDP/FAO	1	Min. of Fisheries	1,241,440	US\$	G	209,880
31) North Coast Fisheries	IDA/FAO	1	"	509,610	US\$	L	21,320
32) Use of Sail Power	FAO/TCP	0	"	63,000	US\$	G	63,000
33) National Monitoring - Evaluation Facility (Bay Region Proj. Comp.)	WB/IDA	1	Min. of Nat. Plan	-	US\$	L	328,602
34)	IFAD	1	"	795,440	US\$	L	219,068
35) Agricultural Farm Mgmt. & Ext. Training (AFMET) Statis. Comp.	WB/IDA	0	"	1,267,000	US\$	L	482,650
36) Technical Assistance in Support of	UNDP	1	Central Bank of	359,007	US\$	G	96,657
37) Animal Health Master Plan (TCP/SOM/2306)	FAO	0	Min. of Livestock For. and Range	77,000	US\$	G	72,000
38) Coastal Sand Dune Fixation Brava	DANIDA/UNSO	0	"	1,116,000	US\$		591,334
39) Coordinating & Monitoring Asst. to Forestry	UNDP/FAO	0	"	117,000	US\$	G	80,678
40) Training Forestry Technicians	US-ODA	0	"	350,000	UK£	G	210,000
41) Community Forestry/Household Energy Conserv. (Part of CDA Forestry)	UNICEF	6	"	532,000	US\$	G	91,000
42) " (141,142,183,175 GTZ contrib. not identified)	Netherlands/ CARE	5	Nat. Range Agency Min. of Interior	315,543	US\$	G	57,668
43) Charcoal Project	UNIDO	0	"	64,000	US\$	G	26,000
44) Assistance in Apiculture	FAO	0	"	42,000	US\$	G	22,000

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PROJECT	DONOR EXEC. AGENCY	OTHER DONOR CONTR.	GOVT./ AGENCY	TOTAL CONTR.	CURRENCY	GRANT/ LOAN/ MIXED	1984 CONTR. US\$
AGRICULTURE (Cont'd)							
45) Northern Rangelands Dev. Proj.	Kuwait/FAO	0	"	2,153,000	US\$	G	1,251,950
46) Central Rangelands Dev. Proj. - Forestry	GTZ	3	"	3,000,000	DM	G	185,000
47) Central Rangelands-Vet. Services Mechanical Workshop, Education	GTZ	3	"	11,700,000	DM	G	468,000
48) Central Rangelands Dev. Proj.	USAID	3	"	14,944,000	US\$	G	1,499,000
49) Central Rangelands	IDA	3	"	8,000,000	US\$	L	2,119,700
50) "	IFAD	3	"	7,000,000	US\$	L	2,407,900
51) Afgoi Forestry and Wildlife Training School (CDA Forestry) (141,142,183,175)	UK	5	"	590,657	£	G	273,315
52) Support to World Food Program Forestry	GTZ Contrib. not Identified	0	"				
53) CDA Forestry (see also 141,142, 183 above)	FAO	0	"	20,000	US\$	G	20,000
54) Erosion Control Program	USAID	5	"	6,000,000	US\$	G	1,433,000
55) Agricultural Settlements (Drought Rehabilitation)	OXFAM	0	"	120,000	£	G	33,330
56) "	WB/IDA	1	Settlement Dev. Agency	1,574,532	US\$	G	470,000
57) Strengthening the Planning Dept. of Min. of Livestock, Forestry and Range	Arab Fund	1	"	4,570,842	Kuw.dn.	L	151,943
58) Strengthening the Veterinary Lab. Resources (SOM/84/007)	FRG/EMZ/GTZ	0	Min. of Livestock, For. and Range	650,000	DM	G	120,371
59) Livestock Marketing and Health	UNDP/FAO	0	"	1,558,808	US\$	G	669,808
60) National Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Control Project	USAID	0	"	11,000,000	US\$	G	2,000,000
61) "	ODA	1	"	2,000,000	UK£	G	840,000
62) Development of Poultry Industry (NECP/SOM/504/MVL)	Arab Fund	1	"	5,683,000	US\$	L	
	Near East	0	"	1,868,042	US\$	G	775,139
	Coop Program/						

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PROJECT	DONOR EXEC. AGENCY	OTHER DONOR CONTR.	GOVT./ AGENCY	TOTAL CONTR.	CURRENCY	GRANT/ LOAN/ MIXED	1984 CONTR. US\$
AGRICULTURE (Cont'd)							
63) Emergency Rinderpest (TCP/SOM/MVL)	FAO/TCP	0	"	250,000	US\$	G	244,000
64) KOMSOMA	Romania		"				
65) Development of Livestock	Egypt	0	"	200,000	US\$	G	200,000
66) Technical Assistance in Support of Rural Credit for Coops, Small Farmers (SOM/81/008)	UNDP	1	Central Bank Som.	359,007	US\$	G	95,657

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PROJECT	DONOR EXEC. AGENCY	OTHER DONOR CONTR.	GOVT./ AGENCY	TOTAL CONTR.	CURRENCY	GRANT/ LOAN/ MIXED	1984 CONTR. US\$
EDUCATION							
67) Assistance to Min. of Education	Egypt	0	Min. of Educ.	-	US\$	G	11,000,000
68) Diversification of Primary Educ.	UNICEF	0	"	124,200	US\$	G	34,000
69) Formal Education	UNICEF	2	"	493,600	US\$	G	253,000
70) Formal Education (Key Eng. Lang. Teaching Project)	UK-ODA	2	"	350,000	UK£	G	182,000
71) " " "	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
72) Technical Teacher Training (SOM/81/002)	DANIDA UNDP/UNESCO	2	"	2,325,448	US\$	G	553,996
73) Professional Schools Agriculture, Fisheries, Pharmaceuticals	Italy	0	"	778,000	US\$	G	262,000
74) Nonformal Education	UNICEF	1	"	104,200	US\$	G	40,00
75) Nonformal Education	FRG/ED. ASST.	1	"	12,500,000	DM	G	629,630
76) Insp/Family Life Program	Italy/UNICEF	1	"	603,000	US\$	G	-
77) Education, Nutrition, Family Life NW	UNICEF	0	"	183,615	US\$	G	146,300
78) Support for Population Activities (SOM/79/P07/8)	UNFPA/UNESCO	0	"	872,280	US\$	G	225,180
79) Development in Women's Educ. (522/SOM/10)	Arab Gulf Fund/UNESCO	0	"	600,000	US\$	G	218,500
80) Infrastructure Development (SOM/81/X71)	IDA	0	"	288,000	US\$	C	88,514
81) Education IV	IDA	0	"	8,000,000	US\$	C	-
82) University Cooperation	Italy	0	Min. of Higher Education	40,000,000	US\$	G	10,902,000
83) Training Program	UK-ODA	0	"	350,000	USE	G	462,000
84) Various Scholarships in France	France	0	"	482,400	FF	G	60,300
85) Industrial Vocational Training Center	FRG/GTZ	0	Min. of Labour & Social Affairs	"	"	"	"
86) Vocational Rehabilitation of the Disabled (SOM/80/003)	UNDP	0	"	207,461	US\$	G	42,500

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PROJECT	DONOR EXEC. AGENCY	OTHER DONOR CONTR.	GOVT./ AGENCY	TOTAL CONTR.	CURRENCY	GRANT/ LOAN/ MIXED	1984 CONTR. US\$
EDUCATION (Cont'd0							
87) SIDAM (SOM/80/004)	UNDP/ILO	0	Som.Inst. of Dev. Adm. and Managmt.	1,946,364	US\$	G	407,248
88) Assistance to SIDAM	Italy	0	"	440,000	US\$	G	145,000
89) Training Civil Servants at SIDAM	France	0	"	1,864,000	FF	G	233,000
90) Assistance to SIDAM (Consultant)	WB/IDA/Fresno University	0	"	2,218,000	US\$	L	
91) Training of Somali Graduates & Post Grad. Study	Egypt	0	National Univ.			G	250,000
92) French Language Department - National University	France	0	"	484,000	FF	G	60,500
93) Italian Language Instruction	Italy	0	"	277,000	US\$	G	109,000

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PROJECT	DONOR EXEC. AGENCY	OTHER DONOR CONTR.	GOVT./ AGENCY	TOTAL CONTR.	CURRENCY	GRANT/ LOAN/ MIXED	1984 CONTR. US\$
HEALTH AND POPULATION							
94) Asst. to Demographic Analysis Studies ATCSD SOM/80/P04	UNFPA/DTCO	0	Min. of National Planning	427,000	US\$	G	142,606
95) Family Health Services	USAID	0	"	10,100,000	US\$	G	12,000
96) Medicine and Public Health in CASS (Polyclinic)	France	0	CASS (Public Health Clinic)	1,776,000	FF	G	222,000
97) CASS	Italy	0	CASS	500,000	US\$	G	228,472
98) Establishment of Workers Pop./ Family Welfare Unit	UNFPA/ILO		Somali Trade Unions	307,873	US\$	G	106,600
99) Urban Services for Children Mogadishu	UNICEF	0	Municipality of Mogadishu	125,000	US\$	G	1,000
100) Mogadishu Storm Water Drainage	FRG/GTZ	0	"	5,900,000	DM	G	74,630
101) Primary Health Care	WHO	7	Min. of Health	399,200	US\$	G	199,600
102) Primary Health Care	Finland/UNICEF	7	"	1,491,000	US\$	G	647,300
103) Primary Health Care	Nether/UNICEF	7	"	832,396	US\$	G	783,000
104) Primary health Care	Save the Children (UK)	7	"				
105) Primary Health Care	Italy	7	"	7,368,421	US\$	G	2,105,263
106) Primary Health Care North	Com. Aid Abroad (Aust.)	7	"				
107) Rural Health Delivery	USAID	7	"	13,028,000	US\$	G	1,892,000
108) Health Manpower Development	WHO	1	"	997,200	US\$	G	498,600
109) Health Manpower Training	UNICEF	1	"	181,000	US\$	G	60,200
110) Public Health Lab. Services	WHO	0	"	296,200	US\$	G	148,100
111) Expanded Program - Immunization	WHO	1	"	224,300	US\$	G	224,300
112) Expanded Program - Immunization	Italy, Arab Gulf, UNICEF	1	"	755,600	US\$	G	457,700
113) Malaria Control Program	WHO	0	"	587,400	US\$	G	293,700
114) Strengthening Epidemiological Services	WHO	0	"	285,600	US\$	G	133,000
115) Center for Maintenance and Repair of Medical Equipment	WHO	0	"	151,000	US\$	G	85,000
116) Health Education	UNICEF	1	"	168,000	US\$	G	24,500

PROJECT	DONOR EXEC. AGENCY	OTHER DONOR CONTR.	GOVT./ AGENCY	TOTAL CONTR.	CURRENCY	GRANT/ LOAN/ MIXED	1984 CONTR. US\$
HEALTH AND POPULATION (cont'd)							
117) Health Education - Study	WHO	1	Min. of Health	20,000	US\$	G	20,000
118) Ontenne Medicale Belge en Somalie	EEC	2	"				
119) " " " " "	Belgium	2	"				
120) " " " " "	Delipro	2	"				
121) Maternal & Child Health Services	UNFPA/WHO	0	"	229,000	US\$	G	229,000
122) Maternal & Child health Services	Italy/UNICEF	0	"	249,000	US\$	G	187,600
123) Family Health Initiatives	USAID	0	"	415,000	US\$	G	103,750
124) Joint Nutrition Support Project	Italy/UNICEF	0	"	5,400,000	US\$	G	-
125) Joint Nutrition Support Project	Italy/WHO	0	"	5,448,000	US\$	G	-
126) Essential Drugs Program	Italy/UNICEF	0	"	1,500,000	US\$	G	21,000
127) Essential Drugs Program	Italy/WHO	0	"	1,500,000	US\$	G	-
128) Technical Unit-Health Ministry	Italy	0	"	800,000	US\$	G	160,000
129) Family Health Services	USAID	0	"	10,100,000	US\$	G	12,000
130) Health Situation and Trend Assessment	WHO	0	"	533,200	US\$	G	266,600
131) Primary Health Care Middle Juba	Swedish Church Relief	7	"				
132) Control of Sexually Transmitted Diseases	WHO	0	"	62,000	US\$	G	31,000
133) Medical Care help	Egypt	0	"	600,000	US\$	G	600,000
134) Water/Environment Sanitation NW	CIDA/UNICEF	0	Water Dev. Agency	1,500,000	US\$	G	1,031,600
135) Pump Maintenance Mechanic Trg.	OXFAM	0	"	40,000	£	G	20,000

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PROJECT	DONOR EXEC. AGENCY	OTHER DONOR CONTR.	GOVT./ AGENCY	TOTAL CONTR.	CURRENCY	GRANT/ LOAN/ MIXED	1984 CONTR. US\$
NATURAL RESOURCES							
136) Strengthening of the Geological Survey (SOM/82/003)	UNDP	0	Min. of Min. & Water Resources	780,646	US\$	G	373,314
137) Preparatory Assistance for Est. of Nat. Water Center (TCP/SOM/2204)	FAO	0	"	137,000	US\$	G	81,000
138) Water Legislation TCP/SOM/231 Y	FAO	0	"	54,500	US\$	G	54,500
139) Water Hydrometry Project	UK-ODA	0	"	180,000	UK£	G	84,000
140) Rural Water Supply in Somalia	Saudi Arabia	0	"	10,000,000	US\$	G	1,500,000
141) Energy Initiatives for Africa/ Somalia - Adviser to MNP	USAID	0	Min. of Nat. Pl.	264,000	US\$	G	37,000
142) Rehabilitation of Rural Water Supplies	WHO	0	Min. of Interior	1,050,000	US\$	G	55,000
143) Northeast Somalia Springs Project	EZE (Germany)	0	"	247,500	US\$	G	-
144) Advisory Assistance to the Min. of Jubba Valley Development	FRG/GRZ	0	Min. of Jubba Valley Dev.			G	
145) Jubba Valley Development Analytical Studies	USAID	0	"	5,250,000	US\$	G	750,000
146) Rehabilitation of Rural Water Reservoirs Preparatory	UNDP	0	National Range Agency	178,334	US\$	G	37,930
147) Rehabilitation of Rural Water Reservoirs	UNDP/FAO	1	"	365,087	US\$	G	-
148) " " "	UNSO/FAO	1	"	276,243	US\$	G	260,243
149) Comprehensive Groundwater Dev. Proj. (Assists Bay Region Corral Rangelands Projects)	USAID	0	Water Dev. Agn.	12,244,000	US\$	G	2,796,000
150) Tech. Asst. to Water Dev. Agn.	FRG/GTZ	0	"	4,000,000	DM	G	740,741

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PROJECT	DONOR EXEC. AGENCY	OTHER DONOR CONTR.	GOVT./ AGENCY	TOTAL CONTR.	CURRENCY	GRANT/ LOAN/ MIXED	1984 CONTR. US\$
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS							
151) Development Civil Aviation	UNDP/ICAO	0	Min. of Air & Land Transport	1,082,654	US\$	G	305,549
152) Development of Civil Aviation Training School	UNDP/ICAO	0	"	1,119,688	US\$	G	1,119,688
153) Advisory Assistance to the Transport Ministry	FRG/GTZ	0	"	-		G	-
154) Nat'l Telecommunications Training Institute (SOM/78/010)	UNDP/ITU	0	Min. of Posts & Telecom.	764,095	US\$	G	159,575
155) Telecommunications Development	AFESD/ITU	0	"	430,000	US\$	L	60,000
156) Kismayo Port Rehabilitation	USAID		Min. of Public Works	42,000,000	US\$	G	3,913,000
157) SONNA	Italy	0	Min. of Inform. & Nat. Guidance	170,000	US\$	G	5,700
158) Assistance to Somali TV	Egypt	0	"	800,000	US\$	G	800,000
159) Port Pilot Formation	Italy	0	Som. Ports Auth.	120,000	ECU	G	103,380
160) Advisory Assistance	FRG/GTZ	0	Som. Shipping Agency and Line			G	

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PROJECT	DONOR EXEC. AGENCY	OTHER DONOR CONTR.	GOVT./ AGENCY	TOTAL CONTR.	CURRENCY	GRANT/ LOAN/ MIXED	1984 CONTR. US\$
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS							
161) Assistance to Min. of Industry (SOM/81/013)	UNDP/UNIDO	0	Min. of Industry	1,047,827	US\$	G	523,000
162) Assistance to Somali Textile Ind. (RP/SOM/84/001/11-01/34)	UNIDO	0	Min. of Industry Somaltex	46,800	US\$	G	46,800
163) Mogadishu Dairy	EEC-EIB		Min. of Industry	1,250,000	ECU	G	214,000
164) Advisory Services to the States Printing Agency	FRG/GTZ	0	State Printing Agency	4,000,000	US\$	G	814,815

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PROJECT	DONOR EXEC. AGENCY	OTHER DONOR CONTR.	GOVT./ AGENCY	TOTAL CONTR.	CURRENCY	GRANT/ LOAN/ MIXED	1984 CONTR. US\$
GENERAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES AND HUMAN SETTLEMENTS							
165) Assistance in Development Planning (SOM/82/002)	UNDP/ UNDTCD	0	Min. Nat. Plan.	4,059,076	US\$	G	1,198,660
166) Advisory Service to the Min. National of Planning	FRG/GTZ	0	"	2,800,000	DM	G	253,500
167) Technical Assistance Unit MNP	Italy	0	"	600,000	US\$	G	600,000
168) Strengthening of Human Resource Development (SOM/79/P04)	UNFPA/ILO	0	"	308,515	US\$	G	131,800
169) Policy Initiatives and Privalization	USAID	0	"	2,500,000	US\$	G	209,198
170) Project Implementation Unit	IDA	0	"	150,400	US\$	G	150,400
171) Establishment of Documentation Center - MNP (SOM/76/009)	UNDP	0	"	521,084	US\$	G	25,000
172) Statistics Dept. - MNP	UNICEF	0	"	5,800	US\$	G	5,800
173) Integrated Refugee Camp Dev. Project	Nether/ILO	1	Nat. Refugee Commission	872,000	US\$	G	141,464
174) " " "	Canada	1	"				
175) Refugee Self Reliance	Save the Children (US)	1					
176) Refugee Self Reliance	USAID	1	"	6,000,000	US\$	G	700,000
177) Support for Somali Women's Democratic Organization	UNICEF	0	Som. Women's Democrat. Org.	105,000	US\$	G	25,800
178) Training Women in Crafts and Cottage Industry	DANIDA	1	"	404,000	US\$	G	
179) " " "	UN Women Fund	1	"	47,000	US\$	G	29,287
180) Cooperatives Training Inst.	FRG	0	"	3,435,000	DM	G	460,000

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GUIDELINES FOR COMPLETION OF THE TECHNICAL COOPERATION QUESTIONNAIRE

Please refer to these guidelines as you answer the questions on the attached questionnaire.

1. Please title. The official name of the project from the project agreement. Please indicate check if this is a component of a large, multilateral project, such as Primary Health Care, Central Rangelands, etc.
2. Donor. The name of the agency or government financing the project and the name(s) of any subcontracting or executing agencies.
3. Other donor. The name(s) of any other agency or agencies also contributing money to the government of Somalia for this project.
4. Government agency. The Somali ministry, agency, parastatal, or organization with which the project is being implemented.
5. Total contribution by this donor. Total contribution for this project agreement only. Please indicate which currency your total figure is in and whether the contribution is a loan, grant, or a mixture of the two.
6. Contribution by this donor for 1984 in US dollars. Kindly fill in the planned or budgeted contribution for 1984 only.
7. Duration of project. Indicate the number of years this project agreement has been in effect.
8. Duration of contribution by this donor. Indicate the years during which this project agreement is or was in effect.
9. Is this project a follow-up? Please indicate "yes" if the project can be seen as a logical outgrowth of (a) previous project agreement(s). Please write in the year of the first check project agreement and indicate when the agreement previous to the current agreement ended.
10. Estimate percentage breakdown by this donor to the following inputs. Please complete this section using your budgeted expenditures for the calendar year 1984. If you wish to provide the actual budget numbers, the percentages will be calculated by the UNDP.
 - a. resident experts, national experts and volunteers - This category includes all personnel involved in the project during 1984 who had agreed or could be expected to live and work in Somalia for at least one year. It also includes all supplementary expenses for these employees, such as international travel, per diems for field travel, housing cost, educational allowances, insurance, etc.

- b. short-term consultants - Any personnel in Somalia paid by this donor who were hired for less than one year. As with the previous category, supplemental costs of the short-term consultants should be added to the actual salary amounts.
- c. training - expenditure on fellowship, in-service training, local and out-of-country courses (excluding personnel expenses of training listed in "a" or "b" above, also excluding training equipment listed in category "d").
- d. equipment and supplies - all equipment, supplies and materials directly involved in project activities (including medicines for medical projects, books and teaching materials for educational project seeds for agricultural projects as well as heavy equipment and vehicles provided exclusively for this project).
- e. operation costs - Everything else not included in aid above. Paper fuel, rent, overhead, etc.

NOTE: It is recognized that donors use differing categories in their budgets. If your projects do not easily fit into these categories, please provide the budgetary information you have with an explanation of what each item includes (long-term personnel, but not air travel or housing, as an example). Use the comments section on page 2 or the back of one of the sheets, if extra space is needed).

- 11. Salary supplements. Kindly mark "yes" if your project paid any Somali employees a regular monthly cash supplement above and beyond their regular salaries (not including incentive payments for occasional specific tasks, or field per diems). If the answer is "yes" please complete a and b.
 - a. range of incentives - The range in the number of shilling paid per month to Somali workers above their salaries. (Example: 600-2000).
 - b. number of Somali people who received such supplement within the range specified.
- 12. Technical support staff paid for by this donor. Please fill in the number of people who backstopped this project. "Backstopping people" do not work full-time on this project and may backstop other project as well. They do not necessarily live in Somalia. Regional advisors, who visit occasionally to check progress, evaluation or monitoring teams from outside, and administrative personnel, such as a donor agency secretary or project manager are examples of backstopping technical support personnel.
- 13. Number of the following staff categories employed by this project on the specific date of 1 December 1984.
 - a. resident expatriate experts who agreed to stay in Somalia at least one year, in the country on 1 December.

- b. resident national experts of professional levels on the staff on 1 December who are expected to work on the project for at least one year.
 - c. resident volunteers of the United Nations or other agency in the country for at least a year and present on 1 December.
 - d. short-term consultants - local or expatriate workers in Somalia on December 1 whose work agreement is for less than one year.
 - e. associate experts (in the UN system only) residing in-country for at least a year, and working on 1 December.
14. Is project part of or in support of an investment project? If the project is designed to increase productivity and also to generate revenue for the state or any other Somali entity, answer "yes".
15. Is project intended to establish or strengthen Somali institutions? If the project involves a transfer of skills to a counterpart or other Somali or an improvement of facilities to enhance the development process answer "yes". (Please answer "no" if the project is purely "direct support" - merely filling in gaps in existing Somali resources without attempting to modify existing Somali skills, structures, or institutions).
16. Number of Somalis abroad on degree-training on December 1984, paid for by this project. Please indicate the number of students sent to other countries for full-time study leading to degrees (BA, BSc, MA, MS, Ph.D., MD, etc.).
17. Project location. Kindly list the actual site(s), or regions(s) involved.
18. Comments, future plans. Please use this space to explain any special item either not adequately covered on this form or not covered at all. Any comments you wish to add about anything you feel would contribute to improvement in technical cooperation in Somalia would be appreciated.

PUBLIC INVESTMENT PROGRAM 1984-86, CROP PRODUCTION SECTOR

AGRICULTURE (Crop and Production)	Financing Total 1984-86	Staffing	Objectives	Progress and Main Constraints
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Public Investment Projects

175.3

JV01 Bardhere Dam

61.0

Production/
Construction

EEC

3.3

Germany

8.3

France

4.6

Italy

8.9

Saudi Fund

11.0

Arab Fund

9.0

Kuwait Fund

11.0

GOS

4.9

TBF

JV02 Fanole Irrigation Project

10.3

335 experts

Production/

Minor delays due to lack of

China

0.1

1,515 nationals

Construction

staff, fuel, equipment

GOS

10.2

(of whom 46 senior)

JV05 Mogambo Irrigation Project

22.5

4 experts

Production/

Major delays (17% expenditure)

Kuwait Fund

9.5

33 nationals

Construction

Germany

12.6

GOS

-

TBF

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AGRICULTURE (Crop and Production)	Financing Total 1984-86	Staffing	Objectives	Progress and Main Constraints
<u>JV06 Sakow Experimental Farm</u> (EEC)	<u>4.3</u>		Production/ Construction	Major delays, cost overruns
<u>IR01 Balad Irrigation Project</u>	<u>14.7</u>	367 nationals	Production/ Construction	Inadequate Budget for opera- ting costs. 53% expenditure rate.
North Korea	-			
GOS	-			
Other Domestic Sources	-			
TBF (Estimated)	14.7			
<u>IR02 Genale-Bulo Marerta-Doryole</u>	<u>12.5</u>		Production/ Construction	38% expenditure rate, major delays.
African Development Bank	5.0			
GOS	3.2			
TBF	4.3			
<u>IR04 Afgol-Mardinle Project</u>	<u>6.8</u>			
ADF	5.3		Production/ rehab.	
GOS	1.5			
<u>AD02 Bay Region Agricultural Dev.</u>	<u>24.5</u>	487 nationals (49 senior) 10 experts	Production	History of major problems, reformulated at mid-term. Progress in some components. Problems in research, seed production.
IDS	6.5			
ADF	1.5			
United States	9.5			
IFAD	4.9			

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AGRICULTURE (Crop and Production)	Financing Total 1984-86	Staffing	Objectives	Progress and Main Constraints
<u>CP03 Grapefruit Plantation (Irrigated)</u>	<u>2.0</u>	10 experts	Production	Completed.
EEC	1.1	241 nationals		
GOS	0.9	7 (senior)		
TBF ^{1/}				
<u>ID02 Extension and Farm Management</u>	<u>16.7</u>		Production/ training, re- search, inst. building	Major delays and production objectives unlikely to be achieved due to absent research results.
IDA	6.0			
ADF	2.8			
EEC	1.0			
United States	3.1			
GOS	3.0			
TBF (Estimated cost overrun)	-			
<u>AD01 Northwest Agricultural Development</u>			Production	Good overall performance 65% increase in farm yields.
<u>Technical Assistance Projects</u>	<u>8.7</u>			
<u>CP02 Oilseeds and beans</u>	<u>1.5</u>	109 nationals	Research, demonstration	Delays in farm development and construction.
Iraq/FAO	-			
GOS	-			
To be funded	1.5			

^{1/} See supplementary Public Investment Projects.

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Technical Assistance Project	Financing Total 1984-86	Staffing	Objectives	Progress and Main Constraints
<u>CP08 Small Farmer Rice Production</u> (Germany).	<u>0.2</u>		Extension/ Production	Satisfactory progress. Needs improvement in areas such as linkage with extension and seed production.
<u>ID05 Agricultural Research (UNDP)</u>	<u>3.4</u>		Strengthen institution and research	Unsatisfactory, production very low.
<u>ID06 Seed Production and Improvement</u> UNDP	<u>0.7</u>	1 expert 2 nationals	Direct support	Inadequate operation due to lack of training
<u>ID07-10 Plant Protection (UNDP)</u>	<u>0.5</u>			
<u>ID12 Agrometeorology (Germany)</u>	<u>0.4</u>			
<u>ID01 Agriculture Planning Department</u> Qatar/FAO GOS	<u>2.0</u> - -	1/2 expert	Strengthen planning institute procedures.	Overall performance unsatis- factory. Failed to leave noticeable impact on department
To be funded (terminated March 83 follow-up by GTZ)	2.0			

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Technical Assistance Projects	Financing Total 1984-86	Staffing	Objectives	Progress and Main Constraints
<u>Supplementary Projects</u>				
IR05 River Dredging and Canal Desilting			Maintenance	
<u>CP01 Date Plantation Northern Region</u>			Production	
<u>CP06 Jowhar River Production</u>			Production	
<u>CP09 Agricultural Crash Program</u> GOS			Production	Project not economically viable after 12 years - production results poor.
<u>CP12 Strengthening Agricultural Production</u> (Irrigation rehab)			Production/ Construction	Performance satisfactory.
<u>CP04 Banana Plantation Study (Italy)</u>				Delayed.
<u>ID14 Hydrology</u>			Survey	Too early to remark
<u>SP01 Agricultural Settlements</u> IDA Arab Fund USA Netherlands Euro Action			Production Construction	

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Study of Agricultural Institutions and Technical Co-operation Requirements

Terms of Reference

Scope and Purposes of the Study

The purposes of the study are firstly to analyse the national capability for rural development (crops, livestock, and fisheries); secondly, to assess further development of capability required to meet both current and future needs of producers and rural people, and thirdly, to identify requirements of a medium-term program of technical co-operation. The scope of the study would include the production-oriented subsectors of agriculture, livestock and fisheries. Emphasis will be placed particularly on the Ministries of Agriculture, of Livestock, Forestry and Range, and of Fisheries, as well as the National Range Agency. While the review should be comprehensive, the study should pay particular attention to the following key issues:

- The scope and level of services required for the various groups of producers;
- The role of the special project management units - their relationship to the central ministries and their line departments;
- The need for horizontal linkages across sector-based institutions at the local levels (village, district, region), particularly to promote integration of livestock, crop production and land and water management;
- Appropriate balance between centralized and decentralized decision-making and planning, including the role of farmers and pastoralists;
- Capability to make full use of irrigation investments, particularly the organization and management of operation and maintenance.

The study should be concerned particularly with the need for Somalia to develop enduring national capability and thus self-reliance in managing and implementing rural development. Thus the recommendations should take account of the need to avoid pitfalls of imposing foreign institutions and attempt to build on the characteristics of Somali society, making full use of its traditions and qualities. At the same time, constraints inherent in the country's current situation must be recognized, such as the paucity of trained and experienced personnel and of financial resources for the recurrent budget. Furthermore, a medium- to long-term perspective should be adopted (10-20 years), that is longer than is normally used in planning development assistance projects.

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Study contents

The questions to be addressed in the study are listed below.

1. Current national capability of agricultural institutions

(a) General overview of institutions

- Historical review of institutional development in the agricultural sector of Somalia;
- Inventory of existing institutions and their major functions;
- Overall approach to institutional development adopted in the recent past; and
- Technical co-operation provided to Government in terms of training, expatriate staff and strengthening of organizational, management and technical procedures.

(b) Detailed study of key institutions (Ministries of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and NRA)

- Organizational structure;
- Staffing - posts budgeted and occupied;
- Physical facilities;
- Management systems and procedures including policy making, planning, and implementation of field operations;
- Financing systems and procedures;
- Personnel systems including training and staff development.

(c) Assessment of effectiveness

- A "top-down" view of how Government services function and provide essential services, viz: planning; policy making; monitoring; research; extension; training; veterinary services; plant protection, seeds; inputs supply; marketing assistance; storage and transport; credit; legal regulations (water and land rights); and rural organizations;
- A "bottom-up" view of field services at local level - meeting the needs of the small farmer and pastoralist;

- Vertical linkages;
- Horizontal linkages.

2. Proposals for future institutional development

- Elements for successful development of Somali institutions including consideration of social structure of Somalia and the sociology of Somali administration; the social structure of rural communities and their interaction with development assistance;
- Overall structure, relationships among institutions, role of the special project units, coordination at the regional level, decentralized decision-making potential, and role of people's organizations;
- Specific proposals for key institutions, covering points made under section 1(b) above.

3. Technical cooperation required for institutional development

- Capital investment in physical facilities;
- Advisory inputs for improving systems and procedures;
- Training of Somalia Staff;
- Expatriate personnel to fill gaps;
- Government recurrent budget implications.

Relationship to the World Bank Agricultural Sector Survey

The study would be carried out within the framework of the agricultural sector survey being organized by the World Bank together with the Government of Somalia. The study team should work closely with, or be integrated into, one or more of the task forces to be organized. The recommendations should take account of the conclusions of the overall sector study regarding agricultural development strategies and investment programs.

Study Team

The study would be undertaken with the Government officials and specialists designated to the relevant task force of the World Bank sector study, aided by consultants. The composition of the Government specialists should include representatives of Ministries of Planning, Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries. Additional specialists could be drawn from institutions such as SIDAM.

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External consultants should include the following:

1. Anthropologist/sociologist, preferably with knowledge of Somalia and/or predominantly pastoralist societies;
2. Public administration and management specialist; and
3. Agricultural sector economist, with broad experience in agricultural administration.

Duration

The study is expected to take about 6-8 weeks' field work in Somalia, another 4-6 weeks of report writing and consultations particularly with other task forces and with the World Bank in Nairobi and Washington. One or two of the consultants will be required for a further 2-3 weeks to advise and assist UNDP in follow-up activities.

Report

A comprehensive report covering the points listed above will be prepared for submission to the Government, UNDP and the World Bank.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF PLAN PREPARATION

The planning cycle could begin by a joint review of the current macroeconomic conditions in the country by the proposed Macroeconomic Planning Section (MEPS) of the MNP and the Inter Ministerial Committee for Public Investment (IMCPI). The findings of the latter, whose function it is to monitor the implementation of the plan, would constitute one of the core inputs for this exercise. Other issues to be assembled and scrutinized in detail would include monetary data, the balance of payments, and other economic information all to be reviewed within a medium-term financial framework.

The two committees would then arrange for the preparation of an "issues paper" for the Economic Committee and the Council of Ministers by way of a sectoral entities concerned. The issues paper would include the delineation of a policy action programme for the year, a brief description of the macroeconomic setting within which the new plan is to be implemented, and assessment of the various policy trade-offs and suggested guidelines for the allocation of resources within the plan under preparation. Submission of this "issues paper" to the Economic Committee and Council of Ministers for approval would serve to achieve a consensus on development and public investment strategy.

Based upon the consensus achieved, the Planning Department (PD) of the Ministry of National Planning would prepare a macroeconomic chapter for the Plan with the MEPS taking responsibility for much of the substantive work involved.

At about this time, the Ministry of National Planning would initiate the creation of sectoral subcommittees by circulation memoranda (as under current procedures) requesting the nomination of senior officials of the sectoral ministries to serve on the committees. The macroeconomic chapter of the Plan would constitute the foundation upon which would be based a) the budgetting exercise and b) preparation of sectoral chapters for the Plan.

a) The budgetary process would be initiated upon completion of the macroeconomic chapter with the clear understanding - as recently stated by the Somali Government at the January 1985 mini consultative group exercise in Paris - that no projects other than those included in the Public Investment Programme would be budgetted for or prepared. Finalization of the Recurrent Budget (also known as the Operational Budget in Somalia) would be closely intergrated with the planning cycle. The budgetary process would begin with the setting up of guidelines on premissible increases in the recurrent budget taking into account current and projected inflation rates. Estimates for both the recurrent and development components of the national budget would be scrutinized by the Ministry of Finance and finalized in close consultation with those involved in the planning process. The resulting recurrent budget and development budget would be submitted for approval to the Council of Ministers and the Parliament.

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b) In preparing the sectoral chapters of the Plan, and in particular in identifying new projects, the sectoral subcommittees would seek advice on the performance of on-going projects from the National Monitoring and Evaluation Facility (NMEF) and would also take into account the updated shadow prices outlined by the Technical Department. In short, the selection of new projects for inclusion in the plan would be based upon economic as well as technical criteria and feedback - both positive and negative - from on-going and recently completed projects.

While the sectoral chapters are being drafted, the Interministerial Committee for Public Investment would undertake a review of current and planned expenditure. This would be carried out in consultation with those directly involved in the budgetary process. Steps would be taken to ensure that expenditure estimates are realistic and feasible within the expected budgetary framework.

Utilizing the draft sectoral chapters and the expenditure reviews, the Ministries of Planning and Finance together with the ministerial planning units would coordinate all elements of the Development and Recurrent budgets for the fiscal years to be included in the Plan. The recurrent and fixed costs of development projects need to be reflected in the Recurrent Budget to ensure that the true total cost of projects is known and projected. Only development projects included in the PIP and the national plan would qualify for implementation.

The draft plan is then finalized by the Ministry of National Planning and submitted in sequence to the Economic Committee, the Council of Ministers, the congress of the Party and Parliament where it becomes law.

*/ The national economic picture outlined in the "issues paper" would provide the basis for an updating of the shadow prices for Somalia by the Ministry of National Planning which would be utilized at a later stage during the identification of projects to be included in the Plan.

CIVIL SERVICE REFORM

Among the reforms advocated by a USAID mission as a result of a recent study of the civil service included the following:

- i) Establishment of a Civil Service Commission with legal, advisory and appeal functions at the interministerial level to provide overall policy guidance the review for the civil services system.
- ii) Reorganization of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs into two major divisions, each under the supervision of a director-general, strengthening of the Personnel Department and the addition of a Training Department.
- iii) Creation of a unit for the studying of organizational and administrative problems throughout the Government.
- iv) Improvement of promotion and assignment procedures to increase the probability of having the best qualified person in each position.
- v) The identification by the Government of redundant workers and the provision of assistance to them, as necessary, in finding alternative employment outside the civil service . A goal of reducing by approximately 20 per cent the current Government employees on the rolls should be set and an attempt made to reach this reduced staffing level by the end of 1986.
- vi) Subsequent to the reduction in workforce, the Government should grant selected groups of employees a substantial increase in salaries (3-500%). This increase should become effective no later than January 1987.
- vii) Strengthening of the coordination and training in the ministries and agencies by creation of a National Training Council. A training office should be created for each ministry and major agency.
- viii) Increasing of the emphasis on action-oriented training which emphasizes participating exercises rather than lectures and conferences. Where possible all training should be done in the Somali language.
- ix) Introduction of a programme of general management training for senior ministry officials. An initial aim of the programme would be to identify decision and actions suitable for delegation and the development of methods by which delegation can be properly implemented and supervised.

2. At the time of the TCAM's visit to Somalia, it appeared from discussions with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs that substantial strides were being made towards implementation of part - if not all- of these recommendations. Five subcommittees consisting of permanent secretaries of various ministries, general managers, and Chairmen of parastatals, party representatives, and members of the trade unions, had

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each been assigned a chapter of the study for analysis. The findings of the subcommittees had been presented at a national symposium and recommendations jointly formulated on that basis. Following an institutional review of the recommendations by the various ministries, final suggestions were to be submitted to the Council of Ministers by the end of December 1984.

3. A list of "redundant" staff and individuals to be retired in each of the ministries had been submitted to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs which is responsible for coordination of the civil service reform programme. By end 1984 approximately 4-5% of the total central Government staff had already been identified as "redundant" ^{1/}. It was being proposed that individuals be given the choice of either accepting one meter fishing boat to be shared with 6 other families, or 5 hectares of irrigated land per family as part of a retirement package. The Government was to be required to construct mud houses on the land or in coastal areas for the personnel being retired. The Government was also to continue to pay salaries to these individuals until the time when their new investments could be expected to yield returns.

4. Another committee had just been formed to discuss salary increases for those remaining in service ^{2/}. It was, however, quite evident to both the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the MNP that the redundancies alone would not be adequate to finance the 300-500% salary increment recommended by the Civil Service study. Budgetary support from donors over a finite period of time was a formula repeatedly suggested by both ministries. Other means of raising adequate financing under consideration include reduction of Government expenditures in other sectors, closure of some relatively less essential Somali embassies overseas and charging for some of the services presently subsidized by the Government, such as the provision of veterinary medicine.

1/ Based on a total estimate 100,000 civil service personnel in the central government (including parastatals), this would amount to just under 5,000 individuals.

2/ This committee was composed of representatives of each of the ministries and trade unions and was chaired by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

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