

# **USAID/WASHINGTON AND FIELD COLLABORATION IN THE USE OF CENTRAL RESOURCES**

**A Discussion Paper**

**Prepared by  
John M. Miller  
in collaboration with  
the USAID Greater Horn of Africa Initiative Transitions Team**

**February 1998**

*This document represents the views presented to and interpreted by the author. It does not necessarily reflect a collective view of the Transitions Team. The Transitions Team added introductory comments and made format changes and edits primarily to assure clarity and the presentation of multiple points of view.*

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AA	Assistant Administrator
ACDI	Agricultural Cooperative Development International
AF	Bureau of Africa (State)
AFR	Bureau for Africa (USAID)
BHR	Bureau for Humanitarian Response
CA	Cooperating Agencies
CP	Congressional Presentation
DAP	Development Assistance Program
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DFA	Development Fund for Africa
DOS	Department of State
EA	Office of East African Affairs (USAID)
ERMA	Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance
EU	European Union
FFP	Office of Food for Peace
FY	Fiscal Year
G	Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support and Research
GC	General Counsel
GHA	Greater Horn of Africa
GHAJ	Greater Horn of Africa Initiative
GOE	Government of Eritrea
GOR	Government of Rwanda
IDA	International Disaster Assistance
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IR	Intermediate Result
ISP	Integrated Strategic Plan
ITSH	Internal Transportation, Shipping, and Handling
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSU	Michigan State University
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
OYB	Operating Year Budget
PAA	Previously Approved Activities
PHN	Center for Population Health and Nutrition
PMPP	Division of Prevention, Mitigation, Preparedness and Planning
PRM	Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (Department of State)
PSC	Personal Services Contractor
PVC	Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
R4	Results Review and Resource Request

REDSO/ESA Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa  
RLA Regional Legal Advisor  
SO Strategic Objective  
SOAG Strategic Objective Agreement  
TAP Transitional Activity Proposal  
UN United Nations  
USAID United States Agency for International Development  
USAID/W United States Agency for International Development/Washington, D.C.  
USDH United States Direct Hire  
USG United States Government  
WFP World Food Program  
WIT Women in Transition Project

## **I. COMMENTS FROM THE TRANSITIONS TEAM**

### **A. Background**

During the 1995-1996 period, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) Transitions Team conducted a study to determine how USAID could better link its relief and development activities and improve its responses in transition periods.<sup>1</sup> In the course of the study, many USAID staff urged the Transitions Team to consider in much greater detail the USAID/Washington-field relationship with regard to centrally managed resources. They noted that innovative new approaches in strategic planning and project approval and management needed to be documented, as well as some problems that hinder smooth programming, especially in the context of transition situations.<sup>2</sup> As a result of this input, the Transitions Team funded the attached study on USAID/W-field collaboration. It covers some contentious material. Where differences of opinion remain, the Transitions Team hopes the paper will stimulate further dialogue and generate recommendations on how to address them. The paper itself documents ongoing issues, offers some observations and suggestions, but stops short of prescribing solutions.

The Team contributions to this paper include these introductory comments as well as some formatting changes and edits primarily to assure clarity and the presentation of multiple points of view.

### **B. Transitions Team Summary of Key Themes**

The Team wishes to highlight the following key issues raised in the paper:

- The Integrated Strategic Planning (ISP) process, promoted under the auspices of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, has proven a useful tool in achieving agreement among USAID Bureaus and the field missions on overall USAID objectives in a country and, in some cases, on notional funding levels coming from all parts of the Agency. It has been less successful in integrating Department of State resources, an originally stated goal of the process. The discussion paper both endorses "enhanced efforts" within USAID in the development of future ISPs, and raises serious questions about the most appropriate way to involve the State Department in the process. The Transitions Team believes these should be topics for further discussion prior to the next ISP in the region, (i.e., for Ethiopia).

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<sup>1</sup> The study was printed in May 1996 and entitled "Linking Relief and Development in the Greater Horn of Africa: USAID Constraints and Recommendations."

<sup>2</sup> The term transition refers to periods when countries are either emerging from crisis or moving from relative stability into crisis.

- In keeping with both reengineering concepts and the GHAI, some "new ways of doing business" are underway in the Greater Horn region, which include new ways of field-USAID/W interaction. The paper highlights some particularly innovative approaches, especially the following:

- ISPs undertaken for Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda and Eritrea.
- In Ethiopia, conduct of Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR) Food for Peace (FFP) Title II development reviews in-country vice in USAID/W FFP headquarters.
- In Rwanda, an innovative Title II emergency monetization program that supports the government's efforts to rehabilitate rural roads. While emergency food aid is channeled traditionally through American PVOs, this work in Rwanda (and a recent approval of food aid to the Government of Ethiopia) demonstrates tighter programming between BHR/FFP and field missions and a willingness to undertake non-traditional approaches when they best suit the circumstances.
- In Eritrea, BHR's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the USAID mission are working together on contingency planning for drought and refugee-related emergencies.

Other report findings include:

- Missions in the Greater Horn region have faced and continue to face reductions in staff. As a result, some Missions' ability to manage their OYB-funded programs as well as central resources is stretched, making increased decentralization problematic. This is one key element of BHR's reluctance to further decentralize control of resources to the field missions.
- However, where Missions *do* have the management capacity, be it US Direct Hire or Personal Services Contractor staff, to handle BHR resources, Missions are frustrated by what they perceive as micro-management by Washington, (cited most often in the case of BHR/FFP emergency programs.)
- Despite these tensions, problems between central Bureaus and the field missions may have less to do with "control" of the resources, including who reviews and approves use of resources, and much more to do with timeliness and responsiveness of the central Bureaus to Mission requests. This becomes clear when considering the paper's description of BHR/OFDA and BHR/FFP relations with field missions. While BHR/FFP and BHR/OFDA operating procedures are in many ways similar, with major programming decisions made in USAID/W, Missions *perceive* OFDA more favorably than FFP (although some problems do exist), because for the most part it can respond in a timely fashion.

- While not specifically cited in the paper, the Transitions Team perceives that FFP's weaknesses on this score are in part due to serious staffing constraints in BHR/FFP's USAID/W office. A related issue raised in the paper is the lack of time and travel money available to direct hire FFP officers in USAID/W to spend time in the field visiting country programs and developing solid relations with field staff that could improve the "micro-management" problems. These are issues for discussion by USAID management.
- BHR/OFDA, FFP and the Office of Transition Initiatives often work in countries where there are no USAID missions, and this may account for their independent management styles. Where Missions are present, the potential for miscommunication is high, especially when there are full Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) operating with direct command channels back to Washington and directly to the Ambassador. The paper suggests some variations on the DART structure and reiterates the Transition Team's earlier recommendation for developmental expertise on DART teams.
- The paper provides an excellent overview of the Global (G) Bureau Field Support Funding rationale and approach. Good communication and timeliness appear to be the key ingredients to strong field-G Bureau collaboration. Mission and host government perceptions regarding the high cost of G services are also discussed.
- As has been reported in other Agency fora, this paper also confirms that Agency procurement practices have not kept pace with reengineering reforms. While not directly related to USAID/W-field collaboration (and thus discussed in an annex), it goes to the heart of USAID's efforts to provide timely assistance and was an issue raised consistently by the Missions. The paper suggests that it is time to consider a return to host country contracting in the name of promoting African ownership under GHAI. In doing so, the Agency needs to consider how host country contracting procedures can be streamlined while protecting U.S. interests to effectively use foreign assistance resources.

### **C. Next Steps**

The Transition Team hopes that this paper contributes to and generates further constructive dialogue on the subject of improving USAID/W-field collaboration. It welcomes comments from all readers both on the subject matter of the report and on ways in which the Transitions Team can usefully follow up on issues raised in it. The Team believes that the development of USAID Bureau GHAI Action Plans and the Results Review and Resource Request (R4) process may offer appropriate venues for addressing some of the issues raised in the paper. In addition, separate sessions to address various key topics, (such as host country contracting issues), might also be desirable.

Comments can be sent via e-mail to Lynne Cripe, AFR/GHAI, and GHAI Transitions Team Leader, Dina Esposito, BHR/PPE.

## **II. INTRODUCTION**

**This discussion paper was prepared under the auspices of the Transitions Team of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI). The paper's purpose is to provide a reference piece for ongoing discussions within the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) about Washington headquarters and field collaboration in the use of central resources. Current approaches, opportunities and constraints to expanding collaboration will be discussed (see Annex A for the complete Scope of Work).**

**The paper deals principally with food aid and International Disaster Assistance (IDA) provided by Bureau for Humanitarian Response's (BHR) Office of Food for Peace (FFP), Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), respectively. Some development assistance efforts of the Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support and Research (G) are also discussed.**

### **III. STRATEGIC PLANNING AND THE INTEGRATION OF RESOURCES - WASHINGTON AND FIELD RELATIONS**

#### **A. Background**

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has served as one of the lead agencies in Vice President Gore's reinvention of government efforts. From 1993 through the end of FY 1997, USAID has closed 29 overseas missions (about 25% of all overseas posts) and reduced overall staff from about 11,000 to under 8,000. At the beginning of FY 1996, USAID began implementation of "reengineering," a set of reforms of the Agency's processes and management systems. This effort was guided by four core values -- customer focus, managing for results, empowerment and accountability, and teamwork and participation. As a result, the Agency has significantly changed how its operating units develop their strategic plans, achieve the results called for in these plans, and monitor and evaluate performance. (For a discussion of USAID resource and beneficiary levels, see Annex C.)

In recognition that it derives its strength from field missions, decentralization is a stated Agency goal. Increased authorities for development assistance have been delegated to field units and, within field units, to Strategic Objective (SO) teams. The most profound changes in the Agency have been evidenced in its field operations and missions. USAID/Washington (USAID/W) and the way in which central resources are managed have not seen the changes to the extent evident in the field. (For a further discussion of development assistance and staff, procurement and other issues, see Annex D.)

#### **B. Integrated Strategic Plans: Experience to Date**

An integrated planning mechanism, known as the Integrated Strategic Planning (ISP) process, was a recommendation of the GHAI Transitions Team's May 1996 report, which was subsequently approved by the Administrator for implementation in the Greater Horn of Africa (GHA). The process was established to help achieve strategic coordination within the U.S. Government (USG), clarifying roles and responsibilities, and priorities for GHAI countries. Integrated Strategic Planning is a process in which all relevant USG partners in a developing country work together to develop a coherent and integrated USG package, reflecting mutually agreed upon objectives and program outcomes, contingency planning in the event of crisis or an improved situation, and a plan for capturing results. In response to the Agency's decision to move to Integrated Strategic Planning, bilateral missions scheduled to prepare country strategies were instructed to prepare ISPs.

There were several reasons for the Transitions Team's recommendation and the Administrator's subsequent endorsement of ISPs. The ISP process was thought to be especially important for those countries in the throes of complex emergencies and transition, e.g., Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda. Given the predominant role of humanitarian assistance to these countries, it was judged essential to more consciously consider the relationship

between relief and development. To be meaningful, representatives from BHR's OFDA or FFP, for example, should be involved in an ISP's preparation and be able to commit resources, subject to agreement with the ISP's objective and recognized constraints regarding future availability of funds. The Department of State's (DOS) role in articulating U.S. foreign policy objectives and providing a "political vision" for USAID recipient countries in the Greater Horn of Africa (GHA) would also be a critical contribution to the ISP process.

The full integration of USG resources within an ISP has been, at times, extremely difficult, given individual agency planning and programming systems, and constraints. Some USAID/W representatives believe that, more important than the integration of resources is the forum the process provides to achieve inter- and intra-agency agreement on basic objectives and strategic coordination. The country-specific findings outlined below suggest that the formula for integration of USG resources behind a unified strategic thrust remains elusive. The ISP process, however, still remains a vehicle for pursuing that goal, although a primary focus should probably be on USAID's, rather than other agencies', resources.

The USAID programs in Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda were the first to undertake the preparation of ISPs. Both the Somalia and Sudan ISP processes used co-chairs, including the Africa Bureau's (AFR) and BHR's Deputy Assistant Administrators and the DOS's Office Director for East Africa, for both the parameter setting and strategy reviews to help ensure the integration of all USG issues and resources.

#### 1. Somalia

The ISP for Somalia was the first attempted. The strategy was developed primarily by mission staff in Nairobi, with input from AFR, BHR and the DOS. It treated relief to development transition issues. The ISP sought to capture at least notional levels of resources expected to be provided from all relevant U.S. Government agencies. The process required that the various agencies, as well as the different bureaus and offices within USAID, give up some of their flexibility and independence as they made commitments to support the ISP. This required extraordinary efforts to coordinate across agencies and between Washington- and field-based personnel.

Unfortunately, there was a change in USAID representatives as well as other staff of the AID Representative/Somalia after the ISP was prepared. This resulted in some tensions between the ISP team and the new AID Representative, and a recommendation that an ISP not be scheduled when the head of a field operating unit is scheduled to change. From the field perspective, however, the team working on the ISP was thought to have performed well. The new AID Representative would have preferred to reduce the ISP's Strategic Objectives (SO) to one and voiced this opinion to Washington. Under this proposal, the three SOs would have become Intermediate Results (IR), under one SO. This SO -- a less vulnerable, more self-sufficient population -- was, however, judged to be beyond the mission's manageable interest. Washington gave the AID Representative the option of developing a

new, revised SO that would be within the mission's manageable interest but USAID/Somalia chose not to exercise this option.

Somalia was to be a pilot for figuring out how to do monitoring, evaluation and reporting in a complex emergency. As a pilot, the mission was given complete freedom to establish a system that made sense from a field perspective. In the R-4 review, USAID/W recommended a reduction in the number of indicators to be tracked to make the system more manageable given the capabilities of this thinly staffed mission. As a result, the mission was provided with assistance in modifying the Intermediate Results, and monitoring and reporting requirements.

At this point, the mission believes that USAID/W, partners and the mission itself all accept and endorse the ISP. Some also believe that, as a result of the Somalia ISP process, the various offices and bureaus of USAID are more willing, at least in notional terms, to provide anticipated levels of assistance for integration into strategies. With respect to strategic coordination with non-U.S. Government partners, USAID has played a key role in the Somalia Aid Coordination Body which is made up of over a dozen donors and implementing agencies, and serves as the principal assistance coordination body for the country.

The integration of non-USAID resources in ISPs has been subsequently handled on a case-by-case basis due, among other reasons, to the significantly different planning and programming systems used by the various agencies, such as the DOS. However, wherever possible, such integration remains a USAID goal.

## 2. Sudan

The next ISP for Sudan contained no indicative amounts from other agencies or USAID central sources, although both the DOS's Sudan "watcher" and regional Refugee Coordinator participated in the ISP's development, thus bringing foreign policy and refugee perspectives to the exercise. While no resources were pledged by the DOS' Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), the Refugee Coordinator endorsed the ISP's SO dealing with returnees.

Significant field input and thought by USAID and non-government organizations (NGOs) were also given to the transition from relief to development. In addition, the ISP development process included linking relief and development training -- which was promoted and supported by the GHAI Transitions Team -- for staff of USAID, NGOs and other interested parties. This training is thought to have contributed significantly to the participation of a wide range of NGOs and other groups in the process.

Although no development assistance funds were flowing to Sudan, AFR/East Africa (AFR/EA) staff were part of the ISP team and, among other things, considered the possibility of programming development assistance funds at a future point in time. This laid the groundwork for the recent decision to provide \$3 million for democracy and governance

activities under the GHAI. A field-driven, short addendum to the current ISP or concept paper for such assistance is under preparation.

The Sudan Field Office reports that the ISP has been valuable, especially for use in discussions with other donors. Implementing partners are also pleased with the ISP.

The Somalia and Sudan ISPs were fundamentally different from the Rwanda ISP which followed. The former ISPs were prepared where there were, in effect, no national governments with which to deal in the strategy formulation process. Both these strategies had substantial Washington leadership and input from staff based there. In addition, these programs were different, with Somalia's being relatively small and comprised of both development and humanitarian assistance, while Sudan's was more sizeable and almost entirely underwritten by BHR.

### 3. Rwanda

Rwanda was the first ISP done in the field by a full-fledged mission, with and for a unified country with a central government and local public sector infrastructure. It was also the first to be done for a country further along in the transition process. As a result, USAID's Rwandan program is much more dispersed across the relief to development spectrum, with a large mainstream development component in health and a multitude of spigots and USG entities to integrate into the strategy. The Rwanda ISP did contain nominal amounts of resources required from the DOS, both Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) and Economic Support Funds (ESF), as well as central resources from FFP, OFDA and OTI.

From a Washington perspective, some officials believe the Rwanda ISP confronted several issues, including the timing and team mix. The timing concern was related to the length of time required to prepare an ISP. If too time consuming, the situation on the ground was expected to change, thus negatively affecting the value of the exercise. With respect to team mix, the DOS' PRM was not included, in part due to the lack of agreement between DOS and USAID on the Rwanda reconstruction plan and a mutually agreed upon USG approach. More importantly, PRM was not asked to participate. As a consequence, PRM was not involved in the ISP process. In addition, although a DART had been sent to Rwanda in late 1996 and provided about \$22 million in funding, OFDA did not participate on the ISP team. According to OFDA, this was because the office saw no significant continuing role in the country and thought the ISP should focus on longer-term development. In short, the Rwanda ISP was not of critical interest to OFDA. Also, the addition of another member from BHR to the small ISP team was thought to be overwhelming.

One of the hardest tasks in preparing the Rwanda ISP occurred at the outset and involved reaching consensus in Washington and between Washington and the field on exactly what was being undertaken. Some in the mission believed the strategy should take the form of a Transition Assistance Program rather than an ISP, which they believed to be a USAID/W-

imposed process. In addition, both AFR and the Agency were pressing the mission to get the strategy completed as quickly as possible. Leadership from both AFR and BHR was judged to be instrumental in this process. It is judged essential to the process that the ISP team and mission have a clear mandate from Washington, the mission buys into the process, and there be an understanding that the ISP is being prepared for the mission (not USAID/W).

There was strong and considerable cross-bureau participation in the exercise, with G, BHR and AFR representatives on the small outside team brought in to help prepare the strategy. Unfortunately, the principal BHR representative (two served on the ISP team) could not commit resources for OTI, which led to frustrations during the ISP review in Washington. While there was some debate over team size, the mission desired and succeeded in keeping it relatively small. This was important from the field perspective in assuring mission leadership and ownership. The Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa (REDSO/ESA) played a key role in facilitating preliminary thinking and the work that preceded the team's arrival in Rwanda. In addition, a very useful mid-course visit was made by the Field Coordinator of the GHAI in REDSO/ESA. Nonetheless, there were reportedly criticisms of the USAID Mission for not fully adhering to the ISP process and for not being more responsive to Washington suggestions. From the mission perspective, this criticism was misplaced given that it was the first full mission to be attempting an ISP, and thought it imperative that the exercise be field-driven and involve USAID's partners.

USAID/Rwanda believes the ISP was the springboard for reengineering program development both within the mission and with the Government of Rwanda (GOR), and in arriving at Strategic Objective Agreements (SOAG) with the GOR which set the course for the USAID program over the next few years. It was considered invaluable in this regard. The ISP contains crisis modifiers that helped the mission and GOR think through the implications and corrective measures to be taken in an unstable context, should serious deterioration occur.

To improve the ISP process, the USAID/Rwanda's principal suggestion is to provide adequate time for ISP preparation so as to provide full participation by in-country partners and customers, and more assurance of ownership. Missions, where present, should lead the ISP process and be given adequate flexibility to deal with the transition country context. Further, "Washington issues" should be off the agenda -- in the case of Rwanda, differences such as OTI's "global policy" for providing assistance, transcended country issues during the ISP review to the detriment of a focus on Rwanda. Lastly, there should not be overblown expectations with respect to integration of resources. In the case of the Rwanda ISP, huge amounts of energy were expended in trying to integrate all the major players and activities, but, in the end, some of these simply did not or could not "pledge" resources. For example, PRM committed none and OTI only \$1 million.

#### 4. Eritrea

In the case of Eritrea, USAID is pioneering a new kind of assistance relationship and way of doing business. This relationship is based on an equal partnership between two nations and a set of mutual investments to meet needs related to primary health care services, rural enterprise and democratic governance. Thus and given that the USAID program is developmental in nature, the strategic plan is called an Investment Partnership.

Being limited to economic assistance in the form of development assistance and Titles II (regular) and III of food aid, the Eritrean strategy paid less attention than Somalia's to the integration of resources. Nonetheless, it involved extensive consultation and dialogue across USAID bureaus, including BHR even though no emergency assistance was being provided to the country. The strategy, thus, has many of the characteristics of an ISP. For example, it contains an innovative "crisis modifier" which assumes, in accordance with the GHAI principles, that crises will occur over the strategy's time frame, and addresses crisis preparedness and outlines how the Agency, including the bilateral program, would be expected to respond. A more detailed "crisis" plan is being developed in close collaboration with OFDA. The mission looks also to engage FFP in this exercise and was disappointed in FFP's recent inability to participate with mission, host country and two OFDA representatives. This mission initiative in response to the GHAI has the potential to improve collaboration between Washington and the field.

## 5. Integrated Strategic Planning in other GHA Countries

The current plans for Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, and REDSO/ESA are Country Strategic Plans, not ISPs, although they generally recognize the GHAI umbrella under which their programs are to operate.<sup>3</sup> Food For Peace has commended both the Ethiopia and Eritrea programs for integrating food aid into their strategies. Concerns were raised early on that Uganda's plan provided an inadequate analysis of the conflict situation in the north of the country and its impact on the strategy. However, the mission is now finalizing a strategy for assistance to this region. In the case of Kenya, a limited presence country, the mission has been commended for an excellent democracy/governance component of its program as well as an extensive series of studies which explored the root causes of conflict. GHAI funding will support a related workshop and the publication of these studies. The mission's current strategy is focused on development and, historically, little attention has been given to linking relief and development and how crises might impact the program. The mission now recognizes that drought will be a recurrent event that it needs to factor into its strategy. In this context, the mission recently brought a contractor on-board to look at issues related to linking relief and development, including the impact of recurring droughts on the society and economy. ISPs will not be required for these programs until new strategies become due over the next couple of years.

## 6. Department of State Views on the ISP Process

With respect to the ISP objective of integrating resources, some representatives from the DOS' PRM and Bureau for Africa (AF) believe USAID has demonstrated arrogance in trying to take the lead in the process. For example, Chiefs of Mission are charged to put together consolidated plans (Mission Program Plans) annually that aim to maximize the impact of USG resources on U.S. foreign policy objectives in a given country. Under this planning system, DOS is to take the lead in rationalizing resources to be requested for the foreign affairs (150) budget account. Some DOS interlocutors believe it is problematic for USAID to try to take the lead in obtaining a similar objective under the ISP process. They assert that USAID's arrogance is evidenced by its inability to effectively integrate its own resources, let alone those of other USG agencies.

In addition to this basic concern, significant frustration is evidenced over the numerous ISP-related meetings which DOS representatives have been requested to attend which: 1) overly focus on internal USAID matters; 2) reflect lack of agreement among USAID organizational entities; 3) concern process over substance; and 4) reflect a lack of understanding among some USAID officials that other agencies have different mandates, methods of operation and budgeting processes, which can not be controlled by USAID.

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<sup>3</sup>Although Burundi and Djibouti are included in the GHAI, they do not have USAID Missions. BHR/OFDA does have a Personal Services Contractor in Burundi to address emergency needs.

There is also a concern that too much emphasis and attention has been given to the issue of linking relief and development. While opinions differ, some DOS staff believe that relief and development assistance have significantly different aims and that the implementers of each type of assistance focus on their respective areas. PRM believes it maintains good coordination and works effectively with BHR's OFDA and FFP in providing humanitarian and relief assistance. Less success has been in evidence with those responsible for development assistance in AFR. For example, bilateral missions often view assistance through the lens of the host country and its needs, rather than in a regional or cross-border context.

PRM considers its involvement in the ISP process to have been minimal. Although regional Refugee Coordinators were involved with the ISPs for Somalia and Sudan, this participation was limited by the press of other priorities and these representatives were not authorized to commit PRM resources. In this context, unlike most of USAID's development assistance programs, PRM is highly centralized given that refugee assistance is provided on a multilateral and cost sharing basis (principally through United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross), with all substantive program and funding decisions made in Washington. In the case of Rwanda, PRM was interested, but not invited, to participate in the ISP process. The ISP team subsequently recommended activities to be funded by PRM that were unacceptable. From the PRM perspective, USAID may be trying through the ISP process, to integrate foreign assistance elements that simply do not have similar approaches.

Concurrently, PRM and AF representatives understand that DOS can play an important role in the ISP process, specifically in ensuring that political, refugee and internally displaced, and foreign policy matters as well as variables bearing on crisis and conflict are taken into account. USG dealings and relationships with regional organizations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are also important to DOS. In principle, interagency collaboration and strategic coordination are considered important to pursue.

In this context, it was suggested that rather than looking at the ISP process as the basis for reaching interagency agreement, perhaps an approach, such as was used for the GHAI and entailed the preparation of a short "overarching" statement of goals and objectives which was approved at an inter-agency meeting of the National Security Council, should be considered. Once such a statement was approved, individual agency plans could be attached to more clearly delineate actions and resource levels. Individual agency budget allocations would then be determined in line with each agency's processes and systems. At the same time, USAID could continue to use the ISP process to achieve improved integration of its own resources.

## **7. Experienced ISP Team Members Needed**

USAID has a limited cadre of professionals to serve on ISP teams. Ideally, such a team would include representatives with experience in looking at linking relief and development, strategy development and with other donors' [e.g., the European Union (EU)] methods and operations. The availability of the right people from appropriate offices can be an issue. For example, in the case of the Somalia and Sudan ISPs, AFR sought OTI participation on the ISP team, but this did not happen.

### **C. Improving Conflict Analyses in Strategic Plans**

An issue was raised in USAID/W regarding the adequacy and/or sequencing of conflict analyses for missions' strategic plans. In Somalia's case, such an analysis was completed after the ISP's approval. The same situation existed for the USAID/Kenya strategy, although a series of analyses has been subsequently carried out. In Uganda, the conflict analysis in the country strategy was judged to be minimal, although recent work has been undertaken with respect to the conflict in the north. The issue is one of timing and sequencing in the preparation of strategies, in that such analyses are judged critical to inform USAID democracy and governance activities in the GHA.

### **D. Strategy Reviews**

In accordance with the Agency's reengineered procedures, once a USAID operating unit receives Washington's approval of its strategy, it is responsible for deciding -- within the limits of an approved assistance budget, resource availabilities and earmarks -- the allocation of development assistance, Title II regular and Title III resources among its SOs to achieve agreed upon IRs. The review and approval process for operating units' strategies is Washington-based, with the cognizant bureau taking the lead in making arrangements and identifying issues for the review. Participation from other concerned bureaus and offices is invited. Subject to the resolution of any substantive issues identified by the review, the bureau's AA is authorized to approve the strategy.

Several Washington and field representatives have voiced the opinion that Washington reviews for ISPs and country strategies take too much time and tend to deal too often with Washington as opposed to host country and bilateral program issues. The most important element in the ISP exercise is considered by some field staff to be the parameters meeting at which Washington expectations with respect to analyses and directions for the ISP are spelled out, and indicative resource levels provided. The ISP parameters meeting and subsequent Washington cable provide the "marching orders" to be followed by a mission as it prepares its strategy. In most cases to date, there has been significant USAID/W involvement in the preparation of ISPs, including contributions from OFDA and FFP staff. As a result, their views are captured as the strategy develops. In such cases, the suggestion has been made that the actual strategy review should be held on a selective basis in the field -- similar to the

reviews now being carried out by FFP for Title II regular programs. Such an approach is in line with the GHAI and its principles, as well as the Agency's core values.

#### **E. Results Reviews and Resource Requests: Supporting Resource Integration?**

The operating unit's performance in achieving results is based upon the Washington review of the Results Review and Resource Request (R-4) document. Individual bureaus take the lead in the review of R-4s for their operating units. Once reviewed and any substantive issues resolved, a telegram or memorandum summarizing the review is sent to the head of the operating unit. This communication represents the Management Contract between a bureau's senior management and the operating units. It sets forth expectations with respect to results given a level of resources -- both financial and human -- to be provided by the Agency.

The aim of integrating USAID resources under the GHAI is undermined by the R-4 guidance. The FY 1999 guidance, for example, indicated that missions, including those under the GHAI, were to identify program resources by type, including development assistance, Development Fund for Africa (DFA), ESF, non-emergency Title II, and Title III as well as field support. Field operating units were not required to identify emergency Title II and IDA requirements. BHR was tasked with addressing these needs in its R-4. Further, BHR was tasked with reporting on Title II emergency, and disaster and transition (IDA) resources within USAID's managing for results system. Field operating units with non-emergency Title II and Title III resources which do not contribute directly to the objectives of the unit are not responsible for reporting on results, but, rather, are expected to provide comments to BHR on the use of these resources. For grants from the Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation (PVC) to PVOs, BHR continues to assume responsibility for results reporting.

While such guidance has the advantage of reducing reporting requirements on field operating units in the GHA, it obviously provides a disincentive to more effectively integrate these resources into programs or to allocate scarce staff resources for purposes of management, monitoring and oversight. The R-4 reporting system, thus, "rewards" missions for paying more attention to their development assistance programs and less to relief and humanitarian assistance. There are few obvious incentives or rewards for missions to be concerned with or accountable for the results achieved through emergency food, OFDA and OTI interventions. This situation, in turn, often drives mission staffing decisions. Since resource requests and staffing are driven, principally, by the development assistance program, a field operating unit is disinclined to use scarce staffing slots for monitoring, tracking and assessing humanitarian and emergency assistance. Having said this, it is also apparent that some GHAI mission managers, such as in Ethiopia, have taken the initiative to more fully integrate all USAID resources into their strategies and programs.

At the same time, it is reported that, while AFR would like to see more results reporting from programs such as Sudan, BHR is satisfied with the results reporting requested of and

prepared by PVOs and international organizations. Nonetheless, at least two missions in the GHA -- Ethiopia and Uganda -- intend to report results from the use of all USAID resources in the countries.

One suggestion from the field was, if a USAID office or mission is present, the entity in the field would have responsibility for the use of and reporting results on all USAID resources flowing to a recipient country.

A related issue affecting collaboration is how to reconcile the various SOs established for central and regional bureaus, and regional and bilateral missions. For example, BHR has a principal objective of saving lives, G has objectives of a world-wide nature, while regional and bilateral missions tend to focus on regional or country-specific problems, respectively. The Agency's ability to date to maximize collaboration and integration in the face of these various SOs has been largely unsuccessful. The GHAI provides a new opportunity to work on this, although it should be recognized that the Agency will be unable to reconcile all these differences.

Another R4-related field concern was that where mission programs emphasize African ownership, the likelihood of sustainability is increased, but will entail a longer time line than is typical in the design, implementation and achievement of results. However, the R-4 process does not recognize this.

#### **IV. THE BUREAU FOR HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE AND FIELD COLLABORATION**

A major issue for several missions in the GHA is to have a greater say in the use of BHR resources. A fundamental problem is that BHR processes appear to have difficulty in dealing with the change from short-term emergencies, often as a result of natural disasters, to complex emergencies which are man-made and longer-term in nature. The impression is not enough thought is being given by all BHR's offices to new ways of doing business.

In addition, there continues to be room for improvement in collaboration between those responsible for IDA assistance, and AFR and its field missions. The most serious constraints involve BHR's FFP/Emergency Relief (ER) division and, although of lesser immediate importance for the GHAI, OTI. In part, this may be due to the fact that these programs are at times carried out in USAID non-presence countries, thus these offices are experienced in operating where no USAID mission exists. Additionally, there is little history of BHR working closely with missions on complex emergencies, although this situation has been changing quite rapidly over the past few years.

There are also constraints related to field missions which have a single-minded focus on issues related to longer-term development in a host country context and pay inadequate attention to cross-border and regional issues and how to strengthen the linkage between relief and development.

##### **A. Office of Food for Peace**

###### **1. Agency Culture**

USAID's culture with respect to food (and other emergency) assistance remains an impediment to improved collaboration. Increasing numbers of foreign service officers need to be assigned to FFP (as well as OFDA and OTI). A number of "development purists," including some in AFR, are reluctant to devote attention and resources to relief assistance.

To expand training opportunities, FFP is considering, should budgetary resources permit, taking its training courses on the road. One current constraint is that FFP can employ personal services contractors (PSC), including those to serve in overseas missions, only under the Title II emergency program. Such staffing flexibility does not currently exist for the Title II regular program.

In general, management of food aid, both in Washington and the field, has not been considered "career enhancing." There are only 15 Food for Peace Officers worldwide (with eight of these currently posted in Africa), which is not considered adequate by FFP to meet the demands of food aid management.

## 2. General

At the current time, FFP officials in Washington arrange, through the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), for the procurement and transportation of food under Title II and Title III programs. For monetization programs under Titles II and III, proceeds from the sale of U.S. food commodities are to be maintained by host governments or implementing PVOs in separate accounts, with proceeds to be used in accordance with the terms of the agreements governing these programs.

It is usually the case that none of the resources available to FFP are approved for implementation by field missions without substantive Washington involvement. In Washington, Title II proposals are reviewed with participation from both the development and emergency sides of FFP as well as from OFDA and AFR. Such reviews are reportedly having a beneficial effect in linking relief and development, although field missions question the need for duplicative proposal reviews in both the field and Washington. FFP also plays a significant role during field implementation of these activities. In several cases, field missions complained that, especially as related to Title II emergency assistance, FFP was micro-managing activities. While USAID field officers have enhanced authorities with respect to development assistance, this is not the case for food aid.

## 3. Title II (Regular)

The Farm Bill legislation that guides Title II is valid for five years, thus, there are limited opportunities for amendments. Under Section 207(a) of P.L. 480, Development Assistance Program (DAP) approvals may not be re delegated by BHR/FFP to Mission Directors, other principal officers of USAID field posts, or otherwise outside of USAID/Washington.

Under current legislative provisions pushed for by members of the PVO community, USAID can not turn down the consideration of PVO Title II proposals in USAID non-presence countries, or on the basis that they are not integrated into a country strategy. Under Title II regular programs, a minimum of 10 percent of the total food resources available are to be monetized for use through and for support to programs of U.S. PVOs.<sup>4</sup> This is indicative of the Congressional influence of these partners.

In the case of Title II regular, development-related programs, FFP hopes to increasingly move responsibilities for program reviews and approvals to the field. For example, under a pilot effort, three developing country programs, including Ethiopia, were identified as meeting basic FFP criteria to permit the review process to be moved to the field. These criteria include: 1) being a full-service mission; 2) having adequate FFP staff on-board; 3) and having food aid integrated into the mission strategy. In the case of Ethiopia, the

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<sup>4</sup>Approximately 40% of Regular Title II commodities are currently monetized in this way.

mission, working with seven NGO partners, developed a Special Objective for the Title II program within its overall strategic framework. Subsequently, senior leaders from BHR and/or FFP have twice traveled to the country for the review of multi-year Development Assistance Programs (DAP) prepared by NGOs. These reviews were praised for a number of reasons, including: 1) their more substantive nature; 2) the more active involvement and participation of NGO, host country and USAID staff; and 3) their conduct on-site where the assistance is to be provided. As a result of the first of these reviews, cables were prepared that reported on the review sessions and provided joint Mission and BHR approvals of two of the three programs reviewed. This process took about one week. Although final decisions on budget amounts and the preparation of approval documents under this revised procedure continue to rest with FFP in Washington and take additional time, this has not been considered an issue for the mission. A most important factor was FFP's willingness to decentralize the review process which permitted more substantive mission and NGO input.

Beyond this, FFP is considering the redelegation of authority for the approval of Previously Approved Activities (PAA) to missions with proven Title II track records. This would permit missions to make year-to-year funding decisions among PVO programs, once the amount of Title II regular resources was decided by FFP. This approach is seen as another step towards further decentralization to the field and enhancing missions' ability to direct resources where performance warrants. FFP is also trying to develop a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) mechanism for use between FFP and missions which would spell out, in accordance with the legislation, the roles and responsibilities of each for Title II regular programs. One constraint is that PVOs cannot be forced to become parties to such a understanding. From FFP's perspective, such arrangements would allow an increasing focus on country programs needing the most attention, and on policy and institutional support issues.

USAID has heard a number of criticisms of the field review of DAPs from some PVO headquarters, specifically Catholic Relief Services and CARE. While they agree in principal with the new process, a principal point of contention is their unwillingness to accept the vagaries among individual mission directors. They believe that guidelines for such reviews need to be specific and clear. They also want the right of appeal beyond a USAID mission. Their preference is to deal, for all country programs in which they are involved, with the staff of FFP in Washington. While FFP has listened to these concerns, it intends to gradually expand field reviews.

With the current criteria established by FFP, there are currently no other countries in the GHA which have been considered candidates for expanding this pilot effort. (Some believe USAID's programs in Mozambique and Ghana meet the criteria at this time.) AFR might wish to ask FFP to revisit the established criteria to determine if, for example, there is some flexibility vis-a-vis the requirement for qualified FFP staff within a mission. Several missions are currently being served by PSCs with extensive food aid experience and FFP-provided training and, thus, appear to have the qualifications one would think would satisfy FFP.

Another candidate country for field reviews is Uganda, where an impressive Title II regular program is underway. Under this program, Agricultural Cooperative Development International (ACDI) is monetizing vegetable oil with the proceeds used to support rural feeder road construction, the capitalization of the country's largest rural lending bank, and a food security initiative which focuses on maize and beans, edible oil and cassava. An experienced and trained PSC manages the food aid program in Uganda for the mission.

ACDI and the mission report that their biggest problem is FFP's tendency to micro-manage the program. Problems encountered have included inability to have vegetable oil tins date stamped; to convince Washington to extend the use period for vegetable oil from 12 months to 18 months (both the Canadians and EU product carries a 24-month use period); a decision by Washington to sell a quantity of vegetable oil deemed to be too old to be used for human consumption, even though Ugandan government testing judged it fit for human consumption; and questions regarding the quantities required under a call-forward and stocks on-hand, which led to a delayed shipment of food and, in turn, the postponement of a sale to small traders. In addition, some delays in getting DAP approval cables out to the field have resulted in the mission being unable to issue call forwards for approved Title II programs. Some of these problems relate to FFP's implementation of regulations established by USDA over which USAID has no control.

In Uganda, ACDI is handling monetization of food aid commodities for the World Food Program (WFP), Africare and World Vision. In this context, the mission credits FFP for its support in convincing World Vision to use ACDI rather than establish its own mechanism to monetize food.

From the mission's standpoint, collaboration could be enhanced if FFP would delegate more responsibility to the field, establishing, in effect, a "contract" between FFP and the field on the responsibilities of each. This appears strikingly similar to the MOU mechanism which FFP is trying to activate.

In addition, it is believed that adequate time and travel budgets must be provided to FFP direct hire staff to travel to the field. Two benefits are seen -- first, to gain greater familiarity with the food aid program and partners and, second, to help build trust between FFP and the field. (This same principle applies to direct hire staff in G. OFDA reportedly does not face as serious a constraint on travel funds.)

#### 4. Title II (Emergency)

The flexibility and decentralization seen for the Title II regular program has not been nearly as evident for emergency food programs and collaboration between FFP/ER in Washington and the field has been spotty.

For example, in accordance with the policy of the FFP/ER division, proposals are to be reviewed within a one-month period. The legislation governing Title II provides more

leeway, indicating that the Agency must act on the approval or disapproval of a proposal within 45 days of mission submission or PVO submittal with a mission's concurrence. In early March 1996, the Ethiopia mission, which had qualified FFP staff on-board, requested rapid Washington action to approve the use of about 20,000 metric tons of carry-over food stocks and the extension of Internal Transportation, Shipping, and Handling (ITSH) agreements to address severe food needs in several population pockets. The stocks were to be distributed by four U.S. PVOs with ongoing food aid programs. In response, FFP raised, in late March, numerous issues concerning the mission's request and NGO proposals. The mission response ran close to 40 pages and resulted in the NGO proposals being belatedly approved about the beginning of May. A part of the problem in this case concerned the NGOs and the mission, which is indicative that collaboration is a two-way street. In the case of the NGOs, there was a lack of transparency in keeping the mission apprised of food on hand. For the mission, there was a lack of adequate planning. Overall, FFP was considered to have been responsive, although it took several lengthy exchanges and about ninety days for the proposals to be approved.

In another case, the USAID program for Somalia noted inordinate delays in obtaining FFP/ER approvals of Title II emergency food aid provided to WFP. From the USAID/W perspective, such delays were the result of WFP's inability to submit food aid proposals to Washington in a timely fashion. In another case involving a mission request to lower the sales price for vegetable oil to be monetized under the Title II program, about two years have passed and an answer is still pending.<sup>5</sup> Some in Washington attribute the delay more to WFP's management weaknesses than to FFP's non-responsiveness. Both FFP and AFR report that they have spent inordinate time in trying to address WFP's management weaknesses. Even in this case where the mission had a cadre of experienced FFP officers on-board, the program encountered -- for a number of reasons -- delays in the review and approval of WFP programs. More recently, there has been a change in the composition of AID Representative/Somalia's staff and a PSC with little food aid experience is now charged with monitoring the food aid program. This has not helped the situation. The AID Representative/Somalia recently sent to Washington for FFP consideration a food for work proposal from CARE, which would provide an alternative to WFP, albeit on a modest pilot basis for food for work only.<sup>6</sup>

Delays in FFP reviews and approvals have reportedly been encountered for the USAID program in Sudan. With experienced FFP officers in REDSO/ESA and the Sudan Field Office available to review emergency food aid proposals and assure their adequacy, the field

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<sup>5</sup> FFP informed the Transitions Team that this issue was resolved in mid-November, after completion of the author's research on this subject.

<sup>6</sup> FFP informed the Transitions Team that this activity was approved after completion of the author's research on this subject.

does not understand the delays encountered. In effect, proposals are being subjected to two reviews -- one in the field, the other by the FFP/ER division in Washington.

There appears to be a reluctance within FFP/ER to decentralize responsibilities for Title II emergency food aid to the field. Part of this is explained by the vulnerabilities faced by the Agency in dealing with valuable food commodities that can be tempting targets for diversion. In addition, some missions lack qualified FFP officers and/or senior managers who fully understand food aid. As a result, food aid is too often not fully integrated into mission strategies or given an adequate priority for time and attention. From the Washington perspective, reasons identified as hindering collaboration with the field include determinations by the BHR/General Counsel (BHR/GC) regarding limitations on delegating authorities to the field, turf and personalities. For example, FFP has little say and no control over who is assigned to FFP positions overseas. This has contributed to disagreements with field staff and a lack of willingness to delegate for emergency programs. Some of these disagreements reflect a lack of trust and/or a desire for control. This is set against a stage where some believe AFR is trying to use Title II emergency resources to replace declining development assistance levels.

Where integration with a mission strategy and program is seen, it is often in declining order from Title III, to Title II regular, then to Title II emergency programs. Title III tends to be given more attention because it is usually tied to a mission's policy dialogue and reform agenda with the host country and its senior officials. Title II regular programs are somewhat difficult for they often involve a number of PVOs whose programs may be integrated into a mission strategy only with much effort from all involved, as was the case in Ethiopia. PVO food programs can demand inordinate amounts of management attention and time, which few missions are willing or capable of providing. Lastly, there are Title II emergency resources. These are provided either through PVOs (as is the case with Title II regular programs) and the World Food Program. Too many missions give little serious thought as to how such emergency assistance can be integrated into a strategic plan and used more effectively to promote relief and development linkages. As a result, Title II emergency resources tend to receive inadequate attention from mission managers and in strategies. Exceptions certainly exist, as, for example, in Rwanda, where the Title II emergency, government-to-government monetization program is judged critically important to the USAID strategy and program.

In an attempt to more effectively deal with countries in transition, FFP has drafted guidelines for transitional Title II activities, which are envisioned to include both relief and development food aid interventions. DAP guidelines are to provide the framework for a Transitional Activity Proposal (TAP), with some important exceptions. For example, due to the expectation that conditions will change during a transition period, activities will be initially funded for 12 months and renewable for another 12-month period. FFP/ER will lead TAP reviews and make funding decisions during the activity's first year, while the Development Program division will coordinate, review and fund an activity's second 12 months. Transitional activities are eligible for 202 (e) funding. ITSH funding, while available during the first year of a TAP, would not be available in the second year under Development

Program funding. Reporting requirements for a transitional program will follow ER program requirements, i.e., FFP, not missions, will be responsible. TAPs are to include an exit strategy from relief as well as a contingency plan should the country or regional situation deteriorate. Although it can be argued that 12 months is an arbitrary period during which to expect a complete transition from relief to development, FFP's attempt to more adequately deal with countries in transition is commendable.

Obviously, because timeliness is critical in the case of Title II emergency food requests, Washington approvals need to be expedited. Because of delays in food arrivals for the Sudan program, consideration is being given to allow each of the CSs to request some amount of reserve commodities. FFP reflected a concern with the Sudan Field Office's capacity to monitor food programs in Sudan. In the case of a diversion of vegetable oil under a NGO program, FFP suspended further oil distribution pending resolution of issues related to losses.

Missions are increasingly asking PVOs to link their Title II programs to mission strategies. However, in the case of emergency programs, PVO efforts are often quite small, and difficult to develop and implement, thus making integration problematic. Staffing pressures, micro-management from FFP, and the management time required for Title II emergency programs are leading some missions to conclude that the results from such programs do not warrant inclusion in the portfolio.

In the case of program efforts in southern Sudan and northern Uganda, REDSO/ESA FFP, Sudan Field Office and USAID/Uganda staff have supported proposals from World Vision for emergency food aid monetization, with proceeds to be used to buy from food surplus areas in the region, thus negating the five to six month wait for commodities to arrive from the U.S. This approach would also alleviate the need to borrow emergency food supplies from WFP, which is time consuming and an administrative "nightmare." World Vision's proposal was submitted initially as a TAP, but FFP subsequently asked WVRD to redesign it as an emergency food proposal. As a result, the proposal had to be re-written and 18 months passed between the original submission and the final approval of the revised proposal as an emergency program.

FFP believes the lengthy approval process was related to fundamental differences of opinion as to what kinds of activities should be funded and under what rubric. Was it a GHAI regional activity, an emergency program, a Transition Assistance Program or a Development Assistance Program? As such, the delay was less an issue of FFP timeliness and more an issue of the serious bureaucratic constraints to rapid turnaround when exploring new ways of response and efforts to link relief and development.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> This FFP perspective was provided to and inserted by the Transitions Team after the author completed the draft manuscript.

An example of FFP successfully responding to Mission and host country wishes is Rwanda. There, a Title II emergency, government-to-government monetization program has been approved. This mechanism is being used to provide local currency for use by the government in the rehabilitation of rural roads. This Title II program is considered to be transitional in nature in anticipation of the development of a longer-term, development-oriented Title III program. In the case of Sudan, FFP (and OFDA) has agreed to the preparation of multi-year planning documents by NGOs, with funding to be provided initially for one year. Based upon a review of progress and updated, more detailed activity plans for year two, additional funding is approved. This procedure is much simplified over the annual submittal of full proposals.

Missions are increasingly requesting authority from FFP to monetize Title II emergency foods, using the proceeds to procure food through local markets. Some in FFP are philosophically opposed to this, believing the U.S.-provided food should be used for the purpose intended, i.e., feeding people. On the other hand, monetization and local procurement have the advantages of stimulating local production and supporting local markets. An additional advantage is that such monetization is often easier to link to missions' food security strategies.

Another problem faced by missions is related to Washington-based technical and backstopping staff who do not have the same level of knowledge about the foreign, host country environment and context. Several missions in the GHA perceived that this contributed to some ill-founded judgements and decisions, and a tendency to micro-manage field operations, monitoring and oversight responsibilities. FFP/ER was identified as an offender in this regard.

## 5. Title III

For Title III programs, approval authority has been delegated to regional Assistant Administrators. Once approved, missions are authorized to proceed with the negotiation and implementation of a Title III agreement subject to the annual review of host country compliance with any conditions (e.g., policy reform measures) set forth in the agreement. Should a host country, as was the case with Eritrea, require significant changes in the "standard" language of a Title III agreement, these are also approved in Washington. If annually judged satisfactory by the mission -- including the Regional Legal Advisor (RLA) who opines on whether the agreement's conditions have been satisfactorily met -- and Washington, missions are authorized to annually amend Title III agreements over the life of the approved program.

Under the legislation governing Title III, the AA/BHR must approve each Title III program every year. This authority can be redelegated to the Director of FFP. The form of this approval has not been clearly defined and, thus, for example, last year involved for Ethiopia and Eritrea an exchange of e-mails.

The annual program review process in Washington has been criticized as being too slow and too often of little substance, especially given the authorities delegated to the AA and the field review process which includes the involvement of the RLA to assure that conditions are met. The results under Title III programs must be included in the annual R-4s prepared by field missions.

Title III resources are only a shadow of what they were formerly. In FY 1991, Title III resources totaled about \$360 million. By FY 1997, they had declined to less than 10 percent of this earlier level or about \$30 million. As a result, the food aid program that tends to be most closely integrated with mission strategies represents a declining source of assistance.

The Eritrea mission has obtained USAID/W's approval for a Title III program which is highly unusual for the Agency. The Government of Eritrea (GOE) is known for its independence, lack of corruption, and desire to reach within 10 years the point where donor assistance will no longer be required. In the interim, the GOE refuses to have conditions for assistance imposed by the donor community. In response, USAID has agreed, in the case of the Title III program, to look at the actions taken by the GOE to achieve food security objectives it has established for the country. The judgement of the mission staff, with input from the RLA, is the basis for recommending to Washington the continuation of this multi-year program. The local currency generated under this program is made available to the GOE for the construction of rural roads.

An exception with respect to a separate account for proceeds was made for the Title III program in Eritrea. Generations are not maintained in a separate account, but rather in a ledger or sub-account of the government's Grain Board. From there, local currencies are transferred into a line item of the Ministry of Interior's budget for secondary road rehabilitation. An additional feature of this agreement is that the Grain Board provides the local currency equivalent based upon local market prices. Import parity pricing is not required. There is no ongoing USAID involvement in the programming of local currencies. The mission believes FFP's Development Program division has been very supportive of this new and unique approach to Title III.

In Ethiopia, the mission views the multi-year Title III program as Non-project Assistance. It is closely integrated into the mission strategy. Food resources are used to replenish an Emergency Food Security Reserve maintained by the government. The government is to develop a food security strategy that has been under development for some time as part of the Transatlantic Initiative with the EU. The reserve is used as a food safety net, for emergency responses and to support an employment generation program. Title III shipments are timed to arrive in the spring, thus avoiding the harvest period in Ethiopia.

## **B. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance**

### **1. General**

OFDA is responsible for providing non-food, humanitarian assistance in response to international crises and disasters. The Administrator is designated as the President's Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance and OFDA assists in the coordination of this assistance. The largest percentage of OFDA's assistance goes to relief and rehabilitation project grants managed by PVO/NGOs and international organizations. In addition, OFDA's Prevention, Mitigation, Preparedness, and Planning (PMPP) division oversees a portfolio of projects which aim to reduce the impact of disasters, including efforts to support drought early warning systems and training local relief workers to manage disaster responses more effectively. PMPP operates on a budget of about \$10 million annually. Thus, the OFDA division with the greatest need to interact with field missions to help reduce the humanitarian costs of emergencies has little in the way of resources to accomplish this objective.

Under current BHR practices, allocations of OFDA's IDA funds to the field are quite limited. OFDA generally maintains the principle responsibility for the review and approval of grants to private voluntary and United Nations organizations implementing disaster assistance activities. The substantive involvement of other bureaus in proposal reviews varies, depending upon its nature and geographic (e.g., regional and country-specific) focus. Only in the case where such a PVO or UN implementing organization desires and has the authority to sign or amend a grant in the field, are IDA funds provided to a USAID field mission for obligation. These cases are the exception.

OFDA is widely respected for its responsiveness in the wake of disasters. Its principal mandate is to save lives threatened by such events. As a result, its structure and approach aim at a rapid response, with few incentives to encourage and promote interventions with longer-term impacts on development or in the context of USAID bilateral programs. OFDA is permitted to provide responses aimed at relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. However, an emphasis is placed on relief -- given its principle mandate as well as its interest in avoiding the provision of longer-term assistance which could be characterized as developmental. Thus, while OFDA aims to provide relief "developmentally", as is the case in Sudan, this does not mean that it uses relief resources to conduct development activities. Rather, assistance retains the life saving focus as its primary objective, while supporting and building on existing capacities of target populations. It also aims to reduce dependency by meeting only those needs that a community cannot meet itself, and sustaining livelihoods while saving lives. OFDA is concerned about potential Congressional criticism, if it permits missions and/or embassies to use its emergency assistance for longer-term, developmentally-related interventions.

On the other hand, OFDA has not always coordinated its assistance. In the case of humanitarian assistance for Burundi, over AFR's objections and without its clearance, an "internal" OFDA document of March 1997 which provided guidelines on the provision of

assistance to civilians in regroupment camps established by the military was distributed throughout the Agency. OFDA believes the USG was faced with the decision to provide or not provide humanitarian assistance to civilians in need. OFDA also believes the assistance was made available only on a temporary basis, was developed in close association with the Embassy, and included clear statements by the USG (joined by the EU) denouncing the government's regroupment policy.

In order to maintain funding flexibility and its ability to respond to unexpected crises worldwide, OFDA has an internal policy to not obligate funds for longer than 12 months at a time. This is the case even though a management assessment reportedly recommended that OFDA move to multi-year funding. (For similar reasons, FFP has a like policy for emergency food aid.) Nonetheless, BHR has been willing to provide at least notional planning figures for OFDA (and Title II) emergency resources anticipated for countries in the GHA. In addition, in the case of Sudan, OFDA (and FFP) have agreed to approve two-year PVO proposals with the caveat that the second year's funding is to be provided subject to availability.

OFDA has given increased attention to strategy development and programming processes, including efforts to identify appropriate indicators to enhance the measurement of results. For complex emergencies, OFDA faces obstacles such as the lack of data bases, difficulties in information gathering, and the lack of common indicators among different implementing grantees. Some even question the relevance of performance-based budgeting in the context of complex emergencies. Nonetheless, OFDA has developed proposal guidelines for grantees to help standardize proposal design and results reporting. A number of missions in the GHA indicate, however, that they are unaware of OFDA's criteria for providing assistance and, thus, are disadvantaged in trying to more closely integrate OFDA resources into their programs. At the same time, OFDA requires, where there is a USAID mission, field concurrence for all proposals prior to their approval.

OFDA has had long-term involvement in both Sudan and Somalia. In Sudan, OFDA is helping families to survive and continue productive activities during a conflict. Assistance targeted at health workers and on increasing agricultural production contribute to these objectives. The USAID Representative/Somalia characterizes collaboration with OFDA as very good, although some questions were raised on the allocation of OFDA funding among activities. This having been said, the mission reports that it reviews and comments on all proposals for OFDA funding prior to their review and approval in Washington. The Sudan Field Office, which includes an OFDA-funded PSC, also indicates that its relationship with OFDA is a positive one.

During early November 1997, two representatives from PMPP visited Eritrea for follow-up work on the ISP's crisis modifier and an earlier OFDA assessment of the government's disaster response capabilities. The government, not NGOs or UN organizations, is expected to play the predominant role in responding to disasters and OFDA has been willing to

conduct contingency planning on this basis. The current efforts are to examine the flow of resources in the case of a disaster, and procedures for monitoring and reporting.

## 2. Disaster Assistance Response Teams

To respond to major crises, OFDA often looks to Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs). DARTs are placed in the field with authorities to act on behalf of and with funding provided by OFDA. They are organized along military lines, with the DART leader recognized as the senior OFDA representative. Generally, OFDA insists that those serving on a DART must have recently completed a several-day DART training course as well as its week-long disaster assessment course. DART teams often include not only relief technicians and operational staff, but also administrative and contract staff which permit the DART to function as a mini-mission.

Historically, DART leaders in the field have reported to the Ambassador, not the USAID mission director. This, in part, is related to the "high profile" of most disasters and Ambassadors' interest in being intimately involved with any USG response. However, according to OFDA, if an Ambassador agrees, there is no reason that a DART leader could not report to a USAID director where there is a mission. The link to Ambassadors may stem from the fact that OFDA operates in non-presence USAID countries. DART leaders are also to report directly to OFDA, with the expectation that neither mission directors nor Ambassadors will need to approve messages. As a mission director has no direct authority over OFDA employees (as is also the case with OTI employees in the field) and given the increased reliance upon e-mail for communications, it is critical that mission (as well as DOS) staff are kept fully informed of OFDA and OTI activities. Where this is not done, miscommunications result.

In addition to the "non-presence" factor, the DART team's relationship to an Ambassador may be the result of the latter's role in issuing a disaster declaration, which is the basis for an OFDA response. In the absence of an Ambassador, OFDA looks to senior officials of the DOS to issue the equivalent of a disaster declaration. The disaster declaration is an OFDA administrative requirement and is not required by statute. The legislation requires that OFDA assistance be provided in consultation with the DOS and, where Embassies exist, the disaster declaration mechanism satisfies this requirement. For several reasons, including OFDA's emphasis on quick, live-saving responses, the performance of DARTs in linking relief assistance to field mission programs has been mixed, with inadequate planning prior to use of funding for Rwanda cited by officials in AFR. In response to such criticism, OFDA indicates that its mandate was to respond quickly to saving lives and assistance proposals were fully vetted with mission staff prior to approval.

It is not unusual that, once a DART has been withdrawn from a country, an OFDA-funded PSC will be employed to monitor continuing activities, follow-up on DART actions and continue to report to OFDA. It expects that such a staffer will not report to USAID field managers, but will maintain an independent line of communication to OFDA. This, at times,

has caused confusion in communications with the senior USAID representative in-country. In some cases, this has weakened collaboration between OFDA and mission staffs. In recognition of this problem, OFDA is clarifying field staff reporting responsibilities to assure better communications with mission representatives.

Over the past couple of years, REDSO/ESA's R-4s have requested that, on a pilot basis, OFDA provide a relatively small amount of IDA funds which could be drawn upon when needed. This request stems from the regularity with which emergency humanitarian assistance is required in the GHA, the familiarity of the REDSO staff to the situation on the ground, and desire to respond quickly to an emergency. (As noted earlier, a similar request was made to FFP for a small stockpile of food to be used for emergency purposes.) There appears to have been no formal response to these requests. Some officials in Washington believe formal proposals from the REDSO/ESA were to be the next step in the process and that REDSO/ESA was cognizant of this.

Regardless of the status of a formal proposal from the field, there is no interest in OFDA to consider this matter further. OFDA's disinterest is based upon its concern with "parking" funds in the field when other disasters might demand resources. OFDA also argues that it has a solid reputation for responding to disasters in a rapid manner and, therefore, there is no reason to believe REDSO/ESA could respond any faster. On the other hand, REDSO/ESA staff believe they have the training, experience and capabilities to serve as a "mini-DART" and should be provided a DART's authorities and flexibilities, thus enabling a rapid response requiring little or no involvement by USAID/W. Several AFR officials commented on the magnitude of OFDA's FY 1996 to FY 1997 carry-over of about \$37 million to argue for flexibility on OFDA's part to allocate a small amount to REDSO/ESA on a pilot basis.

This issue might be addressed by the assignment in the GHA of an OFDA Regional Advisor or team with some funding authorities. Formerly, a Regional Advisor was located in Addis Ababa. The position is currently vacant. OFDA is studying the geographic options for a replacement. It is also considering the provision of a small amount of IDA funding to its Regional Advisors for prompt and initial responses to disasters. With the placement of a new Regional Advisor or team in the GHA with some funding, the objective sought by REDSO/ESA could be achieved. The principal requirement would be a sound working relationship between OFDA's Regional Advisor or team and REDSO/ESA.

There is little evidence that, as recommended by the GHAI Transitions Team, USAID officers with "development" experience are being actively recruited to serve on DARTs sent to the GHA. In the case of the DART to Rwanda, the most recent to the GHA which took place in late 1996, no such individual served on the team. This is the case even though BHR has indicated that more development experts and DOS staff have participated in OFDA courses. However, the DART to Rwanda ensured that mission staff were included in the review of proposals for OFDA support. Although final approval authority for proposals rested with OFDA, the proposals had mission approval or concurrence before OFDA's final

approval. At the same time, some members of the mission staff, while acknowledging participation in reviews, believed their input was basically ignored and DART planning superficial. From OFDA's perspective, relief assistance was provided in accordance with the GHAI principles as, for example, evidenced by the government's involvement (ownership) in the process and the attention paid to longer-term development concerns. Some of the tension between the DART and mission might stem from the bilateral mission having an annual assistance budget of about \$6 million as contrasted to the DART's over \$20 million humanitarian aid budget. That is, from a resource standpoint, the mission's development assistance budget was dwarfed by OFDA's assistance.

One suggestion to help integrate OFDA's field activities with those of bilateral missions (where these exist) is to formally assign a mission director or deputy as DART co-leader or, at least, member. OFDA is unenthusiastic because of concerns that confusion may result with respect to who is responsible to OFDA for the DART and its performance, and that director and deputies lack DART training and may be unable to serve on a DART full-time. Nonetheless, it is judged to be an idea that deserves further discussion.

### C. Office of Transition Initiatives

#### 1. General

Office of Transition Initiative's (OTI) funds are controlled and generally obligated in Washington. Missions, where they are present, are asked to comment on proposals for OTI funding, but the final approval rests with OTI. Reportedly, no OTI proposals go forward without a mission concurrence.

OTI operates under the same "notwithstanding" provisions governing the activities of OFDA. Although they may be developed at a later time, OTI does not currently have proposal guidelines to share with grantees. In part, this is explained by OTI as being related to the relatively small program it manages. There is a general perception in AFR that OTI performance relative to collaboration has been disappointing, to include the sharing of knowledge gained while working in transition countries. However, in the case of the Congo Task Force, OTI's contributions in sharing information with AFR and seeking lessons learned by AFR in transition countries were viewed as very positive.

From the standpoint of the GHAI and GHA, OTI's involvement to date has been limited to Rwanda. Therefore, from the field perspective, missions did not view OTI's assistance as significant or relevant to countries of the GHAI.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> OTI will be working with GHAI staff and field missions on the development of an OTI GHAI Action Plan.

## 2. OTI in GHAI Countries

In Rwanda, OTI has provided assistance dealing with the recruitment and training of human rights field officers for the United Nations, the services of a Justice Advisor to help the government with legal advice on criminal trials, support to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, technical assistance to the Ministry of Interior to support decentralized decisionmaking processes, and support to Rwandan women to provide them with the resources and capacity to play a significant role in rebuilding their society. These activities have been carried out in the context of OTI policies which favor involvement in countries in transition where it is anticipated that efforts will: 1) succeed; 2) be responsive to U.S. foreign policy objectives; 3) end in results that are demonstrable; and 4) be able to be handed off to another entity by the end of a two-year period. As with OFDA, OTI wants independence of action. As well, both OTI and OFDA are principally responsible for responding to events, not for long-term development.

In the case of Rwanda, OTI has carried out a Women in Transition (WIT) project to strengthen local women's associations through the provision of grants aimed at community-based housing and income generation. This project was designed in close association with a mission-based PSC, who had formerly served in Somalia and had extensive relief and development experience. As a result, the WIT project is closely aligned with the efforts of the USAID mission, which has also contributed to such associations for shelter activities. OTI assistance in Rwanda is special in that it entails close collaboration with the government, which is not the case for many IDA-funded programs. OTI has provided about \$5 million in assistance over the FY 1995-97 period, with about \$2.5 million made available for support to the WIT project. The USAID/Rwanda is providing over \$700,000 in its own funding for this effort. This activity appears to have reflected close collaboration between OTI and the mission, although significant effort was required by both parties. Mission staff judge the relationship with OTI to be good.

## **V. GLOBAL BUREAU AND FIELD COLLABORATION**

### **A. Field Support Funding Budget System**

As part of USAID's reengineering efforts, G has established a Field Support Funding Budget system which aims to give field missions more control over centrally-funded activities, strives to capture central resources flowing to an assisted country, and attempts to address long delays missions experienced in obtaining services from G. Although problems remain, this approach in giving more authority to the field is to be commended.

Prior to the FY 1995, there were generally two "pots" of development assistance funds -- central and mission/regional. Central funds were obligated into contracts and cooperative agreements managed by USAID/W. Mission or regional funds were obligated through bilateral projects or grant agreements or regional programs, used for buy-ins to central contracts or add-ons to central cooperative agreements, or transferred back to Washington for obligation as Operational Year Budget (OYB) transfers.

As part of USAID's reengineering efforts, a Field Support Funding Budget system was put in place for G. This system was meant to address three problems found under the old system. First, field missions often believed they were not in full control of all USAID-funded activities conducted in their host countries. Some centrally-funded cooperating agencies (CA) were perceived as working in the host country outside the overall mission strategy and program. Second, centrally-funded activities were not contained in the country level in the Congressional Presentation -- thus not accurately reflecting USAID central resources flowing to an assisted country. Third, many missions which wanted to obtain services from G's cooperating agencies were experiencing long delays while mission-provided funds were being processed for obligation in Washington. This is still reported to be often the case for mission-funded Delivery Orders.

The concept behind Field Support Funding was to better plan and allocate central and bilateral resources in the pursuit of Strategic Objectives. As a result of this planning, the need for buy-ins, add-ons, and OYB transfers were expected to diminish as funds were added to contracts and cooperative agreements at the beginning of the fiscal year. As well, under the new system, all G activities within a country were to be included as part of the country program in the Congressional Presentation (CP). (Note: This was only a partial "fix" to the problem, since BHR IDA and development assistance funds were not intended to be included.)

Under the old system, many of the costs of providing services to the field were absorbed by G. In most cases, the costs of project administration and management activities were covered by central funding and were not borne by missions. Under the new system, the concept of "fully loaded costs" was put in place. Under this procedure, the cost of services are distributed in a way that more accurately reflects the actual cost. However, missions were surprised at the total cost to them and, in several missions in the GHA such as Eritrea

and Ethiopia, host governments have begun to complain over the high cost of U.S. technical assistance and the drain this represents on their development budgets.

Resources needed for G services and support are included in a field unit's budget planning level. These funds include those that are a part of the unit's planning level, but which are designated for obligation by G and incorporated into G's OYB. They also include those that are a part of the unit's planning level and OYB, and obligated or sub-obligated by the unit through G mechanisms (now called unit obligations which were referred to as buy-ins in the past). Reportedly, in FY 1997, when missions were taken off the New Management System (NMS), Field Support Funding remained with regional bureaus and, based upon regional bureau communications and coordination with field missions, was subsequently allocated to G for obligation. Unfortunately, G was unable to attribute such funding to individual country programs.

As a result of the new system and as mentioned, missions and host governments have experienced "sticker shock" in that costs that were formerly borne by G are now allocated to missions and partially funded through the Field Support Funding mechanism. While these costs might appear high, the indirect costs and allocable cost factors involved are largely said to result from the various accounting systems and practices used by contractors and grantees. It has been suggested by a number of contracting officers that only the bottom-line costs for equivalent activities are a good basis for comparison among contractors/grantees. Many also believe that, in the absence of such comparisons, a professional judgement that appropriate value is being received for the costs incurred is a sound approach.

Nonetheless, from the perspective of governments in countries with among the lowest per capita incomes in the world, the cost of G-provided technical assistance appears extremely high. That is, there is no way to allocate technical assistance costs among countries or regions based upon the relative cost of living or per capita income levels. As a result, technical assistance costs that might not appear too high from the point of view of one working in Latin America, might be totally out of line in the GHA. In addition, GHA governments are increasingly looking at donor assistance as an integral component of their budgets and are legitimately concerned that it be efficiently and effectively used on the basis of local, not world market, prices.

Under this budget system, there have been nagging problems in providing missions with accurate and timely expenditure and accrual information, thus negatively impacting on missions' financial management capabilities.

There has reportedly also been a G preference for OYB transfers vice Delivery Orders from missions. This has a couple of ramifications. First, missions have less control over the contractor's services when funds are obligated into the core contract rather than through Delivery Order. Second, where field funding results in a core contract approaching its financial ceiling, there is no contracting flexibility to increase the core's total estimated cost without re-competing the contract.

Discussions are currently underway in USAID/W with respect to, for FY 1998, either allocating Field Support Funding to mission OYBs or retaining it, as was the case last year, within the regional bureaus.

Funding from regional bureaus and field missions has become increasingly important for G and its portfolio. For example, in FY 1984, G's "core" OYB represented about 90 percent of its total program budget. By FY 1996, this core budget represented less than 50 percent of G's total program, with the balance of funding coming from field support, OYB transfers, and buy-ins. For FY 1997, G obligated about \$30 million in Field Support funding made available by GHAI missions.

## **B. Field Comments**

With the staff reductions absorbed by many missions, G is being turned to increasingly for technical support and backstopping of bilateral programs. However, some of G's development assistance-funded activities are creating problems for the USAID program in Kenya. G is apparently entering into worldwide agreements with cooperating agencies for a number of activities, some of which include the long-term placement of advisors in the field. However, there is no system for full notification to missions with respect to such advisors and their authorized privileges such as duty-free status. This status is difficult to obtain when such assignments are not covered under a mission project or SO agreement with the host government or when they entail positions of a regional nature. When queried about this issue, G informed that the problems encountered have been with those serving under cooperative agreements, not contracts. Under cooperative agreements and other grants, there are no entitlements due grantees' employees. Missions are, therefore, not compelled to provide any type of support, unless they so desire. In addition, G is considering informing missions on a more regular basis of active contracts and grants, and what entitlements (if any) run with these instruments.

On the other hand, REDSO/ESA reports that its relationship with G's Population, Health and Nutrition (PHN) Center (as well as the AFR/SD/Human Resources and Democracy division) is exemplary. The staff of USAID/Uganda report positive benefits as a result of contact maintained with the environmental efforts of G. Several missions commented on the need to enhance the flow of information between G and the missions so the latter can be kept current with assistance available from G.

There were several concerns with respect to the BASICS project -- G's flagship child survival effort. First, the contract services are considered to be very expensive. Second, lack of responsiveness was an initial problem in Eritrea as was the contractor's inability to field a long-term advisor in health financing and the shortened stay of an advisor who left the Ministry of Health with an incomplete Health Management Information System.

In another case, it was reported that it took about six months to process a mission's final payment to Michigan State University (MSU) under a G cooperative agreement. Under this

same agreement, financial records maintained in Washington are said to be two years behind. To address these issues and with the possibility that G's cooperative agreement would not be extended, and to obtain more rapid procurement actions, increased control closer to the site of implementation as well as to assume responsibility for reporting on results, the Ethiopia mission has now entered into a stand-alone agreement with MSU.

## **VI. CONCLUSION**

In preparing this paper, a variety of issues and concerns with respect to Washington and field collaboration and related subjects were raised. Many of these involved operational issues between various offices in Washington, and between Washington offices and field missions, and reflect the "creative tension" one would normally expect to find between organizational units. Other issues were judged to be beyond the Scope of Work. As a result, only those issues that were thought to relate principally to USAID/Washington (W) and field collaboration in the use of central resources are included in this paper.

The findings are more descriptive than analytic and more illustrative than comprehensive. As a result, they are presented as observations. And, given that the paper's purpose is to stimulate further dialogue on collaboration within USAID, there are no recommendations, but, rather, suggestions which hopefully will contribute to constructive and productive discussions.

### **A. Observations**

1. There is widespread support among USAID/W and field staff for the GHAI and its principles.
2. The principles of the GHAI are being applied by missions in their programming and there is a significant base of activities from which the GHAI can move ahead.
3. Governments in the GHA increasingly want to be treated as partners by the donor community and are rejecting the imposition of external conditions on assistance.
4. USAID has demonstrated flexibility and risk taking behavior towards the Eritrean program that is in many ways unique. Such behavior is evidenced, for example, in the Title III program.
5. The ISP process has been helpful in achieving agreement between USAID/W, the field, partners, and host governments on common objectives and, at least notional, the USAID resources to be committed to ISP implementation.
6. Too much time is taken for Washington reviews of country strategies and ISPs, with too little value-added.
7. The Strategic Objectives of the various operating units in Washington and the field reflect different priorities which will be difficult to reconcile.
8. The GHAI principle of African ownership will improve the likelihood of sustainability, but will also entail a longer time line than is typical in the design and implementation of assistance activities, and the achievement of results.

9. FFP has taken steps to increase the role of field missions regarding food aid, particular for Title II, regular, and Title III programs. Nevertheless, there is still a tendency among some FFP/W staff to over-control and micro-manage Title II regular and emergency programs which missions appear fully capable of managing.

10. OFDA operates, to a great extent, as an independent arm of the Agency, while being recognized as decisive and timely in responding to foreign disasters.

11. OTI has been involved in the GHA only in Rwanda and, thus, its program to date is of relatively limited significance or relevance to countries participating in the GHAI.

12. G's involvement in achieving the GHAI's objectives is recognized as important, both through the provision of technical as well as field support. Improvements are needed in several areas, however, including responsiveness to the field, cost effectiveness of technical services, and regularity in informing the field of activities of import to its programs.

## **B. Suggestions**

1. The Administrator should continue to speak out on the importance of the GHAI as well as collaboration between Washington and the field to achieve its objectives.

2. The ISP process should be continued with provisions to permit adequate time for preparation and mission leadership where USAID missions are present, and enhanced efforts to integrate all USAID resources, at least in notional terms.

3. On a selective basis, country strategy and ISP reviews should be held in the field.

4. The Agency should address how to deal with results reporting for central resources between Washington and the field. If a USAID office or mission is present, that entity in the field should be primarily responsible for the use of all USAID resources flowing to a recipient country.

5. FFP should continue, on a selective basis, efforts to increase the field management of Title II programs.

6. OFDA should use every opportunity to include "development" types on its staff and DART teams, including the designation of mission/deputy directors as DART members, if not co-leaders.

7. Adequate time and travel funds need to be made available for direct hire USAID staff from FFP and G to more frequently and for longer periods travel to the field. This will enhance their familiarity with field programs and build trust.

**USAID/WASHINGTON AND FIELD COLLABORATION  
IN THE USE OF CENTRAL RESOURCES**

**Annexes**

<b>Annex A</b>	<b>Methodology, Acknowledgement and Scope of Work</b>
<b>Annex B</b>	<b>Background</b>
<b>Annex C</b>	<b>Resource and Beneficiary Levels</b>
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<b>Annex E</b>	<b>Persons Contacted</b>
<b>Annex F</b>	<b>Resource Documents</b>

## **ANNEX A - Methodology, Acknowledgement and Scope of Work**

The information in this paper was obtained through key informant interviews with USAID/W officials, including those from the Bureau for Africa (AFR); BHR; Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support and Research (G); Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination (PPC); Bureau for Management (M); Office of the General Counsel (GC); and Office of the Chief of Staff (COS). Interviews were also held with officials from the Department of State's (DOS) Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) and Bureau for Africa (AF) concerning the Integrated Strategic Planning process. In addition, interviews, and e-mail and telephone exchanges were carried out with representatives from USAID field missions in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda. During the period October 18 to November 2, 1997, field visits were made to USAID bilateral missions in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, and Uganda as well as to the Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa (REDSO/ESA), including the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) Field Coordination Unit, AID Affairs Office for Sudan, and AID Representative/Somalia located in Nairobi, Kenya. Secondary materials were reviewed related to the GHAI, reengineering and issues concerning headquarters and field collaboration.

The author would like to thank the many USAID and DOS staff who shared their views and opinions with me. Any value found in this document is the result of their openness and ideas, although I alone am responsible for paper's contents.

## Scope of Work

### Discussion Paper: USAID/W-field collaboration in the use of centrally managed resources

#### Introduction

This is a scope of work for a discussion paper that documents some of the current approaches to AID/W-field collaboration in the use of centrally managed resources. It will discuss how these approaches have evolved and consider both the opportunities and constraints to expanding the most successful collaborative models.

This discussion paper is designed to serve the Agency as a reference piece in ongoing discussions about AID/W-field collaboration to assure the best management of programs supported with centrally funded resources.

#### Background

During the 1995-1996 period, the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) Transitions Team conducted a study to determine how USAID could better link its relief and development activities and improve its responses in transition periods. A series of recommendations were outlined in a May 1996 report entitled, "Linking Relief and Development in the Greater Horn of Africa: USAID Constraints and Recommendations." In July 1996, the USAID Administrator formally endorsed the recommendations in this report and asked that Agency senior managers work with their staff to implement them.

A central theme explored in the paper is how USAID staff can collaborate more effectively to assure that there are the proper synergies among the various USAID resources flowing into a country. This has particular relevance in "transition" contexts, where the operating environment is difficult and circumstances call for fast and flexible responses. In this context, many USAID staff urged the team to consider in more detail the AID/W-field relationship with regard to centrally managed resources. They noted that some innovative new approaches are being undertaken both in the strategic planning, project approval and management contexts that need to be documented. For example: within AFR, experiments are already underway to provide greater delegation authority for its Title III program to the field. And within BHR, Title II development activity proposals are being reviewed in some field missions on an experimental basis. A decentralized approach is also underway to some extent in G centers and in AFR for regional activities led by AFR/SD, in that missions use their OYB to "buy in" to the activities of these offices.

Some interlocuters argued for the expansion of such innovative approaches while others cautioned that there are real limitations to their application on a broader basis.

While this discussion is relevant for the Greater Horn region, it is also an appropriate topic to explore across the Agency and in different regions. The GHAI Transitions Team proposed during the course of preparing its linking relief and development document to prepare a separate discussion paper on this subject. This recommendation was included among the linking relief and development report recommendations which, as noted above, were subsequently approved by the Administrator.

This scope of work outlines the parameters for such a discussion paper.

### Scope of work

The contractor will review and document recent trends in the collaboration between AID/W offices and field staff with regard to centrally managed resources. Centrally managed resources include those of the Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR), the Global (G) Bureau and the Africa (AFR) Bureau, Office of Sustainable Development (SD).

Since the idea for this study emanated from USAID staff working in the Greater Horn region, the contractor shall focus on specific case studies in this part of the world. However, s/he should feel free to discuss the topic more broadly within the Agency, and consult the LAC, ENI and ANE Bureaus on the subject. The consultant shall make contact with the Greater Horn missions (who have had an opportunity to review and comment on this SOW). The contractor shall contact Missions outside this region only after the appropriate regional Bureau is approached and approves this contact.

The contractor shall interview both AID/W and field staff in order to:

- Place the discussion of centrally managed resources into the context of reengineering. Has reengineering had an impact on how centrally funded resources are managed?
- Describe innovative AID/W-field relationships with regard to centrally managed funds. (Examples include Title II DAP reviews in Ethiopia, the Title III program in Eritrea.)
- Consider both the opportunities and constraints to expanding such initiatives.
- Consider the extent to which such initiatives have improved programming: that is, whether USAID has been able to obtain synergies among programs and achieve stronger results because of them; and, where appropriate, whether the change has improved USAID's ability to link relief and development.
- Most of the innovation in this area has involved decentralization of decisionmaking about use of these resources. Lay out the factors that argue for a more expansive use of these new approaches. Lay out factors that mitigate against such approaches.

Include consideration of:

- any relevant legislative requirements related to food and dollar resources that are centrally managed;
- allocation of central resources worldwide and in "non presence" countries;
- separate reporting or accountability requirements of BHR, G, or AFR, as required by law or for USAID policy reasons.

The report should rely on case studies or specific examples of AID/W-field approaches to management of central funds to illustrate points and provide the basis for general findings.

While decisionmaking requirements vary depending on where one is in the resource allocation process, the contractor shall specifically consider AID/W-field collaboration with regard to the strategic planning process and the activity review and approval of funding for individual country/regional activities. (Monitoring and reporting responsibility issues may naturally flow from the strategic planning discussion.)

### Information Sources

Within Washington, the contractor shall meet with:

Senior management from AFR, BHR, G and PPC  
 Office staff from AFR/DP, AFR/SD, AFR/EA, the G centers of excellence, BHR/OFDA, BHR/OTI, BHR/FFP and BHR/PVC;  
 GHAI Transitions Team  
 USAID Chief of Staff  
 M staff, particularly those involved in reengineering

ANE, ENI, LAC staff as needed.

The contractor shall also make contact with staff in the Greater Horn missions:

USAID/Ethiopia  
 USAID/Eritrea  
 USAID/Somalia  
 USAID/Rwanda  
 USAID/Kenya  
 USAID/Uganda  
 USAID/Tanzania  
 USAID/Rwanda  
 REDSO/EA  
 The Sudan Field Office (REDSO/ESA)  
 GHAI Field Coordination Unit (REDSO/ESA)

Missions in other parts of Africa or in other regions of the world may also be consulted, if approved by the appropriate Bureau.

In addition to interviews, secondary data from these missions and offices, especially cables, emails and memos documenting issues relating to field-headquarters collaboration may also need to be consulted.

### Methodology

Most information will be obtained through key informant interviews and secondary materials related to the GHAI, reengineering and specific issues related to field-headquarters cooperation.

Interviews with AID/W staff should be conducted in person. Overseas contacts shall be made by phone, fax and/or email. No overseas travel is necessary. Assistance with names of individuals within AID missions and in Washington can be provided by the GHAI Transitions Team.

### Final Product

It is expected that work under this contract will begin o/a September 1, with a draft discussion paper to be submitted to the GHAI transitions team 30 work days from issuance of the work order. The consultant should be prepared to present preliminary findings orally to GHAI transitions team upon submission of the draft written report. The transition team's comments will be provided to the consultant within approximately five working days after receipt of the draft and oral presentation of report. Based on transition team comments, the consultant will then have 15 working days to prepare and submit the final report. Based on this timetable, the work should be complete o/a November 7. Total number of work days is 45.

The paper shall not exceed 50 pages. It shall be provided in hard copy as well as electronically in WP 5.1/5.2

### Contractor Selection

The contractor should be extremely familiar with internal workings of USAID and of USAID program in the Greater Horn Region. Familiarity with USAID food aid (Titles II and III) as well as non food programs funded with central resources is critical. Familiarity with reengineering efforts within the Agency is also important.

The contractor must have proven ability to work independently and write quickly and clearly. S/he must be able to relate any recommendations provided to the Agency realities of a diminished development budget and reductions in direct hire staff.

The contractor must be highly regarded by both relief and development practitioners within the Agency.

## **ANNEX B - Background**

### **I. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)**

USAID's mission is to support U.S. national interests by helping people of developing and transitional countries in their efforts to achieve enduring economic and social progress and develop democratic processes which allow full participation in resolving the problems of their countries and the world.

Promoting sustainable development is considered a critical component of America's role as a world leader. It reduces the threat of crisis, and creates conditions for economic growth, the expansion of democracy and social justice, and a protected environment. Humanitarian assistance -- a vital part of sustainable development -- is essential to saving lives during natural and man-made crises, and for returning societies to social and economic progress in post-crisis countries.

Increasingly, USAID supports countries emerging from post-conflict situations. In such cases, USAID's emphasis is on restoring fundamental social, institutional, and physical infrastructure in ways that reduce the risk of renewed conflict and return the country to a path of sustainable development.

In 1997, U.S. development assistance reached the lowest level in real dollar terms since World War II. In FY 1997, USAID development assistance totaled \$1.632 billion. Economic support funds, allocated by the Department of State for activities implemented by USAID, totaled \$2.363 billion. Support for Eastern Europe and the New Independent States totaled \$475 million and \$625 million, respectively. Food aid amounted to \$837 million in Title II (regular and emergency) commodities and \$30 million in Title III food. International disaster assistance totaled \$190 million, up from previous years.

The total international affairs share of the federal budget was halved between 1985 and 1995, from 2.5 percent to 1.2 percent, with the share going to USAID programs abroad representing less than 0.5 percent.

With respect to the future, USAID's resource assumptions as contained in its draft Strategic Plan of August 1997 projects most program accounts to remain at fixed levels in constant dollar terms. It also assumes that current levels of development assistance from other donors will remain at roughly current levels. In contrast, support costs associated with maintaining the Agency's work force are projected to remain fixed in current dollar terms, thus effectively shrinking each year at the rate of inflation. Such a continued contraction in USAID staff is anticipated to further limit the Agency's ability to provide adequate oversight for its program portfolio. It is also an incentive to do business differently as proposed under the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI).

Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of assistance needs has changed dramatically. Ethnic and national tensions, leading to increased civil strife, have led to an explosion in the number of complex emergencies. From 1989 through 1994, the number of complex emergencies to which the U.S. Government responded increased from 17 percent to 41 percent of all officially declared emergencies worldwide. The number of people requiring emergency humanitarian assistance is triple that of the early 1980s. Worldwide spending on humanitarian assistance rose to \$7.2 billion in 1994, compared with \$2.7 billion in 1985.

Prior to 1989, about 80 percent of the budget of USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) was allocated to natural disasters. More recently, with the increase in highly visible, large-scale, protracted complex emergencies, such as those in the Greater Horn of Africa, there has been a dramatic shift in this funding. Currently, more than 80 percent goes towards responding to multi-faceted crises which are mostly political in origin, and which tend to last longer and have more enduring negative impacts than natural disasters. In FY 1996, about \$33 million (over 26 percent) of OFDA's total obligations for complex emergencies went to countries included in the GHAI. This compares with about \$324,000 provided in response to natural and man-made disasters.

## **II. Greater Horn of Africa**

Conflicts and complex emergencies in sub-Saharan Africa continue to take a terrible human toll and place unsustainable demands on scarce local and international resources. While the United States and donor community have responded with increased allocations for disaster relief and transitional support, U.S. funding for longer-term development aid has declined significantly. This, in part, is due to the increasingly popular and accepted approach within the donor community to focus on strengthening the global economy and look for trade to replace aid. Often, however, it is those African countries, such as in the GHA, furthest from the global economy and with the most serious development challenges that are affected by conflict. Declines in development assistance for such countries forecloses the opportunity to address the underlying causes of economic and political instability and, thereby, mitigate the need for more expensive responses to complex emergencies.

As expressed in the over-arching framework paper for the GHAI, over the past decade, the GHA region has been viewed as an "arc of crisis" characterized by war and famine. At the root of continued crises are widespread poverty and growing instability. Governance in the region has been characterized by over-centralization, the exclusion of large segments of the civil society in decision-making, and ill-conceived economic policies. Population growth has continued to outpace national economic growth. Regional trade and cooperation as well as national development have been constrained by the limited development of infrastructure.

At present, all of the countries of the region are in transition either from or towards some sort of significant or potential crisis, although many would classify Kenya, Tanzania

and Uganda as further along the path to sustainable development. According to the United Nations, all but Uganda are classified as low income and food deficit countries.

Nonetheless, the post-Cold war period has seen some positive movements in the region. National or local elections, which have received mixed reviews from the international community and some internal constituents, have been held in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda for the first time. Several governments are trying to build democratic institutions. With varying degrees of success and some risk, the three governments above plus Rwanda are attempting decentralization to include the devolution of power from the capitals to the rural areas. Governments in the GHA increasingly want to be treated as partners by the donor community and are rejecting the imposition of external conditions on donor assistance. Capital flows to the region remain low, although some new sources of private capital are being attracted to a number of countries.

In summary, the region is characterized by competing trends. On the one hand, there is a sharp increase in the incidence and scope of crisis. There is more conflict today than at any time in the recent past, and dependency is growing, not decreasing. On the other hand, there are growing signs that the region is recognizing and acting on the need for both regional economic cooperation and regional solutions to regional problems. There are also increasing signs that the pursuit of democracy is gaining currency with both governmental and non-governmental bodies.

### **III. Greater Horn of Africa Initiative**

The GHAI was launched in 1994, after a visit to the region by USAID Administrator J. Brian Atwood and a determination by President Clinton that the U.S. government should develop a new framework for and approach to addressing post-Cold War realities in that troubled part of the world. Drought and conflict, recurring problems, were affecting the area at that time.

The GHA is a region consisting of ten East African countries -- Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Country responsibilities of the concerned USAID and Department of State geographic offices do not perfectly overlap with these ten countries of the GHAI.

In carrying out the GHAI, the U.S. is guided by five principles:

1. African ownership. This is the key principle. While striving for strengthened partnerships, it recognizes that the ultimate ownership of African development rests with Africans themselves.

2. Strategic coordination. Increased coordination among individuals and organizations in Africa and the donor community is to be enhanced through both formal and informal channels.

3. Linking relief and development. Increased emphasis is being placed on relief and development programs that complement each other.

4. Regional approaches. Since many of the problems in the GHA know no national boundaries, regional approaches are being explored wherever possible.

5. Promoting stability. All programming is to reflect an awareness of the fact that each of the GHA countries is vulnerable to significant economic and political change. Thus, advance planning and preparedness, and flexible programming will be promoted.

USAID missions are expected to incorporate these principles into their strategies and programs, while USAID/W providers of central resources are to be aware of and sensitive to these principles in proposing and providing assistance to the GHA.

Given the importance attached to the GHAI and to provide the priority judged necessary for its support in Washington, in 1994, a senior level, Washington-based Steering Committee was established. Initially, this committee was chaired by the Assistant Administrator (AA) for Africa with membership including the AAs from AFR, BHR, G, PPC, LPA, M, and the General Counsel (GC) and Agency's COS. As determined by the agenda for Steering Committee meetings, State Department, National Security Council and other agency officials were also invited. After approximately one year, the COS assumed the chair of the Steering Committee. Over time, bureau and office attendance was delegated to other than the most senior staff. As a result, some have questioned the ongoing priority of the GHAI among other priorities for the Agency's and AFR's leadership.

Over this same period, small units were established within AFR and, in the field, REDSO/ESA to support the GHAI. Each bilateral mission also identified a staff member to serve as a GHAI Coordinator. Within six months of the initiative, several teams were formed in Washington dealing with food security (headed up by AFR/SD), transitions from relief to development (chaired by BHR), conflict early warning and response (headed up by State/AF), and donor coordination (chaired by PPC). Later, a team dealing with private voluntary organizations/non-governmental organizations (PVO/NGO) was established and chaired by AFR/Development Planning (DP). These teams performed a number of GHAI-related functions, including the preparation of analyses and the maintenance of communications across bureaus and offices as well as backstopping GHAI coordinators in USAID field missions and offices. During 1995, when the head of the food security team transferred to REDSO/ESA, the responsibilities of this team went with him. Also in year two, the State team became inactive. The most active has been the transitions team which prepared in May 1996 a report on linking relief and development. The report contained numerous recommendations which were principally targeted at Washington offices and bureaus. The report and its recommendations were subsequently endorsed by the Administrator, although not all action offices have implemented the recommendations for which they were responsible.

As a result of this dual structure, the GHAI was considered by many to be overly concerned with Washington, as contrasted to field, issues, with too few activities undertaken of interest and importance to the Agency's bilateral programs in the region. Contributing to this field skepticism was the Washington-only staffing of the teams formed early on, the delegation of authority for GHAI funding to the Director of AFR/EA, and the lack of transparency on how this funding was to be used.

After some delay, a GHAI Strategic Plan for the FY 1998-2000 period was approved by Washington in October 1997. On November 18, 1997, GHAI missions had received official word of this approval from the Administrator. The lack of an earlier approved GHAI strategy contributed to confusion with respect to its role. An additional concern related to the lack of clarity in the processes and procedures for accessing GHAI resources, with a general field perception that these were made available on a first-come, first-served basis.

The recently approved strategy sets forth two Strategic Objectives -- Strengthened African Capacity to Enhance Regional Food Security, and Strengthened African Capacity to Prevent, Mitigate, and Respond to Crisis. It also has a Special Objective -- Improved Access to Regional Analytical Information. There is little integration of resources within the strategy, principally because time did not permit this information to be gathered. A Management Plan is also included. This plan sets forth the roles and responsibilities of all the GHAI-involved units in both Washington and the field, including the newly established position of GHAI Senior Coordinator. The Senior Coordinator is responsible to the AA/AFR for the GHAI as the latter is responsible for the initiative's overall success. However, the Senior Coordinator reports to the Administrator and is responsible for the day-to-day management of the initiative in Washington. In addition, there is to be a Washington Policy Committee (WPC) to be chaired by the Administrator. The WPC will keep senior managers informed of major issues and important information concerning the GHAI, serve as a forum on foreign policy issues, and make decisions and ensure coordination among USAID bureaus and missions. Consideration is being given to the establishment of a separate interagency policy forum for the GHAI which would focus on policy only and not be used for the resolution of internal USAID issues.

In the GHA, a Field Steering Committee, comprised of mission directors, the GHAI Field Coordinator, and the Senior Political Advisor to the COS and chaired by the director of REDSO/ESA, is expected to be responsible for GHAI policy and budget decisions. This Steering Committee has a critical role in encouraging bilateral programs to be put in a regional context and, perhaps, evolving towards objectives which are increasingly regional in nature.

There is the hope that these planning and management actions will help address a criticism of the GHAI to date that its role vis-a-vis bilateral and REDSO/ESA programs is unclear.

Funding proposed for the five-year period of the GHAI strategy ranges from a base level of about \$17 million to a high scenario of about \$20 million, with \$15 million in development assistance designated for specific GHAI purposes. The achievement of the strategy's objectives relies on improved linkages between existing and future regional and bilateral programs, including those which are centrally-funded. GHAI resources alone are not judged sufficient, in most cases, to achieve significant progress. GHAI funding is intended to be used to leverage other resources, both from within USAID and from other partners. In this context, effective collaboration between USAID/W and the field is judged critical to achievement of the GHAI's objectives.

#### **IV. General Perceptions of the GHAI**

In the process of collecting information on issues related to USAID/W and field collaboration, some general perceptions on the GHAI were expressed that are worth noting.

While some significant accomplishments have been seen under the GHAI, such as support for the reinvigoration of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), these have fallen short of the expectations of many, especially those in field missions who have seen too little impact at the national level. In this context, several missions expressed the view that bilateral programs remain essential even with increased attention on regional issues because a recognized national capacity is essential for countries to be able to contribute meaningfully at a regional level.

The role of other regional organizations beyond IGAD as well as the support roles of the Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa (REDSO/ESA), AFR/Office of Sustainable Development (SD), and G need to be more clearly defined. With respect to the GHAI's food security objective, AFR/SD and G are said to be working together to develop a common approach in the GHA.

While a number of issues were raised, there is acceptance of and support for the GHAI among most of the host countries, regional organizations, and USAID missions in the GHA. There appears to be less broad support and enthusiasm for the GHAI among Agency bureaus in Washington.

Among those in USAID/W who are lukewarm, concerns, frustrations and doubts were voiced with respect to the ambiguous nature of the GHAI, the actual priority it represents to the Agency and its leadership, its real impact on USAID programs in the GHA, the long period required to obtain an approved strategy, turf, and possible claims on financial and staff resources.

Some USAID officials opined that Washington is paying lip-service to GHAI principles such as African ownership, while maintaining a budgeting system that aims to "move" money.

The private voluntary organization (PVO) community also has concerns regarding the GHAI. These relate to the impact the GHAI principle of African ownership will have on PVOs and the lack of a clear definition of the role of PVOs, especially in those GHA countries where they are coming under increased government criticism and oversight. Among some governments, it is believed that foreign PVOs are not moving fast enough from service provision to capacity building. Such pressures are expanding throughout the region and USAID is increasingly being forced to play the honest broker between host country and PVO partners.

The lack of priority given to this Presidential Initiative by various Washington offices and bureaus has led many to question its importance to USAID's leadership. The lack of significant new resources specifically for the GHAI has confused African leaders as well as other donors with respect to U.S. intentions. Within AFR itself, concerns have been voiced that the GHAI will draw focus and resources away from sustainable development -- the principal mission of the Agency. On the other hand, the argument has been made that in the GHA, AFR must deal with conflict, crises, and development -- a situation much more complex than found elsewhere. To adequately respond will require increased staff as well as funding.

There are several recent actions that have been taken which may help address many of the issues raised, favorably affect the GHAI, and enhance the potential for progress. These include the Administrator's approval of the GHAI strategy, reconfirmation by the Administrator of the importance and priority of the GHAI, assignment of a GHAI Senior Coordinator within AFR who reports to the Administrator, delegation of GHAI funding to the REDSO/ESA, and submittal of action plans in support of the GHAI by concerned Washington bureaus and offices.

At the same time, there are numerous activities taking place at the bilateral level which clearly reflect the GHAI principles and objectives, and provide a platform for further progress. Following is a sampler only:

-In Uganda, the GHAI provided \$1.2 million for food security efforts in the northern part of the country. This included assistance through several local non-governmental organizations (NGO) and seed money to support World Vision while it prepared a food aid monetization proposal for southern Sudan and northern Uganda. GHAI funds also supported an AAAS Fellow who is serving as the mission's GHAI and Emergency Relief Coordinator.

-Also in Uganda, OFDA provided a disaster assistance advisor for approximately three months to explore assistance possibilities in the north. Four additional proposals for OFDA assistance were prepared, and are pending review and approval. The mission believes its relationship with OFDA is strong.

-In addition, the Uganda mission used local currencies to support meetings between the government and local officials with respect to the Turkana/Karamajong conflict on the

border with Kenya. At the same time, the Kenya mission is exploring how to assist with peace initiatives in this area.

-The Uganda mission is exploring with the World Food Program (WFP) the potential for linking relief efforts to the mission's development activities. To enhance collaboration, the mission is providing FFP with regular information on WFP and European Union (EU) food aid for refugees in Uganda.

-The Uganda mission has drafted a three-phased strategy for assistance to the north of the country.

-In Ethiopia, mission development assistance funds are being used to improve the capacity of the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission to carry out vulnerability assessments, design response packages, and better identify food needs.

-Building on a USAID grant to the United Nations International Children's Fund to support the production of iodized salt in Eritrea, the mission is exploring the possibility of expanding this product's export to Ethiopia, Kenya and other markets. USAID's prior contribution helped Eritrea to become a primary supplier of iodized salt to Ethiopia -- it is now supplying about 80 percent of the market.

-The Eritrea mission is working closely with OFDA and trying to work with FFP to develop contingency plans as a follow-up to the ISP "crisis modifier" for its program.

-In Kenya, the USAID recently hired a contractor to explore issues related to linking relief and development, including the impact of recurring droughts on the country.

At the Washington level, to help strengthen the linkage between relief and development and in response to a recommendation of the GHAI Transitions Team, the Acting Assistant Administrator (A/AA) for AFR has sent a cable to missions advising them to incorporate in performance evaluations of field staff, including directors and deputies, objectives related to policy or program responsibilities for humanitarian or transition assistance. In addition, all AFR/Office of East Africa's (EA) -- and other offices' where appropriate -- country development officers will have at least one such work objective.

## ANNEX C - Resource and Beneficiary Levels

### I. Economic Assistance

Total FY 1997 economic assistance (Development Assistance, Title II - regular, and Title III) appropriated for GHAI countries and the GHAI included:

Total Economic Assistance to GHAI Countries - FY 1997  
(Millions of Dollars)

Country	Development Assistance	Title II (Regular)	Title III	Total
Burundi	1.5			1.5
Djibouti				0
Eritrea	9.5	.5	15.0	25.0
Ethiopia	37.3	25.5	9.4	72.2
Kenya	19.5			19.5
Rwanda	4.5	66.7		71.2
Somalia	4.0			4.0
Sudan		9.7		9.7
Tanzania	18.7			18.7
Uganda	40.4	12.6		53.0
GHAI	15.0			15.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>150.4</b>	<b>115.0</b>	<b>24.4</b>	<b>289.8</b>

The development assistance level for countries covered by the GHAI represents about one-third of the total of about \$450 million available to AFR. Other development assistance funds impacting on the GHAI countries are allocated to Washington operating units, including AFR/SD, BHR's FFP and PVC, and G.

A limited amount of AFR/SD's funding is used to support analytic and research studies, most often conducted in collaboration with African institutions and dealing with regional issues. Significant AFR/SD funding also goes to support G's portfolio of activities addressing problems important to development in Africa.

## **II. International Disaster Assistance (IDA)**

IDA funding is provided to USAID to permit humanitarian responses to disasters, including emergency relief and activities related to rehabilitation and reconstruction. BHR's OFDA is responsible for such activities. Formerly, disaster funding requirements frequently exceeded appropriations, forcing OFDA to utilize other USAID funding sources for emergency relief needs. As development assistance funds continue to decline, OFDA's flexibility and contingency planning have become much more limited as these funds formerly provided a source to meet expanded needs.

The "notwithstanding" clause of Section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 indicates that no statutory or regulatory requirements shall restrict OFDA's ability to respond to the needs of disaster victims in a timely fashion.

In FY 1996, total resources available to OFDA amounted to \$189.6 million (\$155.9 in IDA, New Obligor Authority (NOA); \$14.5 million in transfers from other USAID offices; and \$19.2 million in carry-over). For FY 1997, OFDA's budget totalled \$201.7 million (\$165 million in IDA/NOA; \$36.7 million in carry-over). Several AFR representatives commented on the magnitude of this carry-over to argue for some flexibility on OFDA's part to allocate a small amount to REDSO/ESA on a pilot basis to enable an initial and rapid response to disasters in the GHA region.

In FY 1996, OFDA obligations for complex emergencies in GHAI countries amounted to \$33 million (Sudan \$18.1 million; Burundi \$7.1 million; Somalia \$6.5 million; Rwanda \$1.3 million). OFDA has had long-term involvement in both Sudan and Somalia.

BHR's OTI also receives IDA funds for its activities and operates under the same notwithstanding clause as OFDA. In both FY 1996 and 1997, OTI's budget amounted to about \$25 million per annum.

## **III. Food Aid**

U.S. food aid has saved the lives of millions in more than 150 countries and territories and has also represented a flexible form of economic assistance. Today, nine of the top 10 importers of U.S. agricultural products are former recipients of food aid. In much of Asia and Latin America basic food security has been achieved. The challenge now is in the poorest countries of the world, most of which are in Africa.

Title II (relief or emergency, and development or regular food aid) is the domain of USAID. Under Title II, food is provided to WFP, international and local NGOs, and U.S. PVOs as well as on a government-to-government basis. The food is used to support both development and emergency projects. Title II commodities may be sold (or monetized) to provide local currencies to enhance the development impact of food aid.

Title III (government-to-government grants) is also administered by USAID. Title III commodities provided to countries characterized as "least developed" may be used in direct feeding programs and also sold locally by the government with the proceeds used in programs related to food security.

The international donor community faces a serious problem in meeting worldwide food aid requirements. The dramatic increase in emergency food needs, while U.S. food aid budgets are being reduced, has created a funding gap. While the Title II budget has remained static, budgets for Title III have been substantially reduced. At present, FFP manages about \$800 million in P.L. 480 resources (of which over \$300 million is in Title II regular programs).

Funds provided under 202 (e) to strengthen PVOs as well as cover internal transportation, shipping and handling (ITSH) are controlled by FFP and provided through agreements prepared in Washington. These grants are now available under both the regular and emergency Title II programs.

The levels of Title II regular and Title III resources to GHAI countries were noted earlier under economic assistance. Following is a summary of FY 1996 emergency food aid in the GHA.

Country	Cooperating Sponsor	Targeted Population
Ethiopia	World Food Program	64,400
Kenya	World Food Program	230,000
Rwanda (regional)	World Food Program	2,500,000
Rwanda	Catholic Relief Service	96,000
Somalia	World Food Program	158,000
Sudan	Adventist Develop. & Relief	100,800
Sudan	Catholic Relief Service	78,825
Sudan	Norwegian Peoples Aid	140,600
Sudan	World Food Program	720,000
Uganda	World Food Program	320,000
Total		4,408,705

These beneficiaries in the GHA represented about 26 percent of the total targeted beneficiaries worldwide under the Title II emergency program.

## **ANNEX D - Development Assistance and Staff, Procurement and Other Issues**

Missions have been provided delegations of authority for development assistance which provide significant flexibility (other than as related to earmarks and notifications) to effectively apply USAID resources within developing countries. At this point, two major constraints are generally impacting on missions in the GHA -- staff and procurement.

### **A. Staff**

Most missions in the GHA report that, as a result of USAID's reengineering efforts, project design and implementation delegations of authority to mission managers for development assistance are more than adequate. Increasingly, staff, not funding, constrains increasing authorities to the field.

Missions in the GHA have faced and continue to face reductions in staff. As a result, missions' ability to manage their programs as well as central resources is stretched, making increased Agency decentralization problematic in many cases. In addition, staff constraints impact on missions' efforts to better link relief and development, as little time is available to consider alternative approaches to the delivery of either emergency or development assistance. Missions are increasingly turning to other means to obtain staff resources, such as Presidential Management Interns, AAAS Fellows, and Technical Advisors for AIDS and Child Survival (TAACS), although such staff often lack USAID experience. Foreign Service National (FSN) employees as well as PSCs are having their responsibilities broadened to the extent possible, although USAID's project management and contracting systems present obstacles, such as voucher signature authority, to be overcome. Two missions have received GHAI funding for field coordinators. Some missions are also suggesting to USAID/W offices such as Information Resources Management (IRM), OFDA and FFP that their staff be placed within missions to help supplement staff or to fill staffing gaps.

### **B. Procurement**

Under the Development Fund for Africa (DFA), AFR has gained experience with performance-based budgeting, specifically as it relates to Non-project Assistance. Under this fund, AFR and its missions have had more flexibility in allocating resources in exchange for showing results. In addition, although statutory provisions contained in the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), appropriations acts and other laws as well as USAID policies governing development assistance generally also apply to DFA assistance, there is some procurement flexibility in the DFA. Specifically, FAA Section 604(a), which generally requires U.S. procurement, does not apply to the DFA. This is the authority for use of Code 935 in Africa without following USAID's waiver procedures.

While AFR has adopted a policy of pursuing U.S. procurement to the maximum extent practicable, authority to approve non-U.S. procurement generally rests with field

missions. Nevertheless, during the field visit in connection with the preparation of this paper, it was noted that at least one mission (Ethiopia) was using waivers for such purposes, renewing these every six months to justify non-U.S. procurement of vehicles. The purpose of such waivers was to demonstrate the mission's seriousness with respect to the issue of non-U.S. procurement and to avoid potential Congressional criticism. Thus, although the legislation permits flexibility, an administrative decision in this case has negated this feature.

Staffing pressures as noted above and the GHAI principles argue for more progress in USAID doing its business differently. The area of procurement has not kept pace with Agency changes resulting from reinvention and reengineering. It might be insightful to try to determine the value added to the Agency of the various contracting procedures and practices. For example, under USAID direct contracting, African ownership could be enhanced by more actively seeking qualified host country representatives to help develop contractors' scopes of work and contract evaluation criteria, and serve and vote on Technical Review Committees. Although the ultimate contract approval authority would continue to rest with a Contracting Officer, such host country involvement would increase the sense of ownership. In another example, there is currently a five-year limitation on USAID contracts. Given the longer-term nature of much of the Agency's work, some have suggested that this five year limit no longer serves USAID's interests.

In Eritrea (and elsewhere in the Horn of Africa) and in the context of African ownership, there is a interest by the government in obtaining increased influence over contracting with USAID funds. In Eritrea, this has meant the use of host country contracting -- a mechanism out of favor with the Agency at the present time. One reason for its limited use is the onerous assessment of financial and contracting capabilities that must be undertaken before host country contracting is approved. In Eritrea, government contracting capabilities are recognized as being limited, thus there has been an \$50,000 ceiling established by the Regional Contracting Officer for procurement under a host country contract. Host country contracts over \$250,000 require a step-by-step review by USAID of the procurement process. It may be timely for AFR to determine if a return to host country contracting is in order and, if so, how procedures can be streamlined to reflect GHAI principles while protecting U.S. interests to effectively use foreign assistance resources. Where local capability is judged to be in need of strengthening, USAID could consider the feasibility and value of supporting training efforts to develop and enhance local contracting expertise.

Further contracting restrictions include a \$100,000 ceiling on the authority of directors to sign grants or contracts with private entities. Reportedly, this relatively low ceiling was established after it was determined that some directors were abusing their authority. There is no such ceiling on instruments with public or international organizations. And, for a U.S. Personal Services Contract, a director has authority to sign a contract up to \$250,000.

A major challenge to many missions involves trying to get grant funding to indigenous NGOs. Neither Handbook 13 nor ADS 303 accommodate this objective. In these cases, most of the NGOs require advances, yet Agency regulations restrict giving advances where inadequate accounting systems are in place -- which is generally the case with relatively new and inexperienced NGOs with whom missions often deal. In addition, under the provisions of Circular A-133, NGOs receiving a grant of over \$250,000 (recently increased from \$100,000) must be audited. This is a relatively expensive undertaking.

To help address such problems, the Agency has provided in-kind grants. Under these, a major grantee provides local NGOs with goods and services rather than sub-grants. The grantee provides procurement services, conducts end-use checks and provides technical assistance, if required. The Office of Procurement is advertising for a global Indefinite Quantity Contract for such services based upon its experience in Bosnia.

Another innovation is a small grant format with non-U.S. grantees. This instrument facilitates the issuance of non-U.S. grants of under \$100,000. A number of pre-conditions apply to these grants to assure they are relatively simple agreements.

USAID has also used a profit-making contractor as an umbrella organization to provide advances to small NGOs. In such cases, an advance is permitted for the purpose of grant making to local NGOs.

In another attempt to address this issue, OP has agreed to "working capital advances" for non-U.S. grantees which do not otherwise meet the financial accounting standards to make them eligible for advances. This advance is a mobilization-type payment which needs to be liquidated within 30-60 days, after which the grantee is paid on a reimbursement basis. Currently, no Grant Officer is able to authorize more than a 30-60 day working capital advance to a local NGO which does not meet USAID's financial and administrative standards for advances.

Another mechanism being considered is a "fixed amount" grant, which is analogous to a purchase order. The Grants Officer negotiates specific costs to assure reasonableness and then links payment of fixed amounts to accomplishment of benchmarks under the grant.

OP may also explore the possibility of developing a "micro-grant" mechanism, which would entail grants of \$2,500 or less. Such a mechanism may be useful for quick disbursements such as for relief or transition activities where speed of procurement is essential.

Increasingly, OP is encouraging the use of performance-based contracts and results-oriented grants. Drawbacks to these instruments include the difficulty to deal with change as well as to permit creativity following award. This was specifically the case with respect to a performance-based contract under the Office of Women in Development's Girl's and Women's Education Initiative. Ethiopia was to be one of several selected countries to

participate under this initiative. However, when contractor staff traveled to Ethiopia after the contract's award, it was determined that any modifications in approach responsive to Ethiopian needs were not possible. As a result, Ethiopia was dropped as a target country. Collaboration with the USAID/Ethiopia during the design and implementation of this initiative was lacking.

Since August 1997, an Agency Acquisitions and Assistance (A and A) Task Force has been reviewing and investigating procurement mechanisms, organizational culture, resources, and information. Its preliminary findings include:

-There is no major component in the A and A process which, if streamlined or eliminated, would generate substantial improvement.

-There is no visible evidence of positive change in USAID's organizational culture related to A and A.

-The mechanisms currently in Agency use (i.e., grants, contracts, and cooperative agreements) are appropriate for the effective delivery of development assistance.

-The procurement process is perceived as being cumbersome, inefficient, inflexible, time consuming, and unresponsive.

-Procurement authority may be too limited in dollar value and type of individuals on whom such authority rests.

-NMS does not have an effective summary reporting capability.

The A and A Task Force is currently developing an action plan with recommendations for the Administrator. One of the more contentious recommendations is said to be co-locating Contracting Officers with regional bureaus. It is anticipated that the next step, once the recommendations are approved, will be to create a new task force, which will take the findings of the A and A Task Force as well as some of the overlapping findings of the Work Force Task Force, and move the process forward.

Host country contracting was not an area explored by the A and A Task Force. According to OP, host country contracting is not viewed as a preferred option, but continues to be used in construction activities. An exception is in Egypt, where host country contracting also is being used for the provision of services. In this case, a recognized Certified Public Accounting firm assessed counterpart agencies and systems, and certified local capabilities for host country contracting.

### **C. Earmarks, Directives, and Notification Procedures**

A continuing problem faced by the GHAI field missions results from development assistance directives and earmarks. In FY 1999, the Agency expects the Administration to continue to emphasize population, democracy, and the environment, while Congress is expected to direct significant spending for child survival, infectious diseases and basic education. Funding for economic growth, which would largely be drawn upon for the GHAI's Strategic Objective No. 1, Food Security, is expected to remain in extremely short supply. As a result, the GHAI and missions in the GHA have limitations on where and how they can allocate resources.

Congressional earmarks, as well as Administration priorities, and notification procedures continue to negatively impact on the Agency's flexibility. For example, missions are receiving more child survival and population funding than required, but are seriously constrained with respect to economic growth and democracy and governance funding availabilities. There are limits to what a Program Officer can do with respect to "clever coding" as a means of dealing with earmarks. In addition, the Agency should continue to push for notifications by Strategic Objective (SO), rather than activity. The 1996 GHAI transitions team's report recommended and the subsequent Agency "tasker" instructed the Office of Legislative and Public Affairs (LPA) to take on these issues.

While burdensome, such restrictions are not nearly as troublesome as the authority of the DOS over about 20 percent of USAID's budget flowing to the New Independent States, and Central and Eastern Europe. DOS' Coordinators of Assistance to the New Independent States and Central European Countries have statutory authority in determining assistance strategies and resource allocations, thus negatively impacting on USAID's ability to independently allocate resources based on performance.

## ANNEX E - PERSONS CONTACTED

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