ETHIOPIA

DISASTER ASSISTANCE RESPONSE TEAM

RESPONSE PLAN

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U. S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
OFFICE OF U.S. FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE

ETHIOPIA DART RESPONSE PLAN

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INTRODUCTION

The first wave Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) spent four intensive weeks in Ethiopia. This included very close coordination with USAID/Ethiopia, Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and Tufts University representatives. This Response Plan summarizes the DART's findings and recommendations.

The DART

The seven person DART was heavily weighted toward those with technical and significant Ethiopia experience. The team was composed of: Jeff Borns (Team Leader); Mia Beers (Deputy Team Leader/Planning Coordinator); Peter Morris (Health/Nutrition); Sky Wiseman (Water/Sanitation); Laura Powers (Livelihoods); Rob Luneburg (Program Officer); and Sonya Green (Information Officer). (Kasey Channell also provided information officer assistance during the initial 10 days.) The DART was conveniently housed with USAID's Office of Food and Humanitarian Assistance (FHA), which enhanced the exchange of information and ideas.

Members of the DART traveled to the six most affected regions in Ethiopia: Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR), Oromiya, Somali, Tigray, Afar and Amhara. They participated in meetings and discussions with numerous local and national representatives from the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (GFDRE), local and international NGOs, donors, the key United Nations agencies, and USAID/Ethiopia. A large number and variety of documents were also reviewed.

The purpose of the DART is to enhance the nonfood response to the humanitarian crisis caused by the drought. The interest in the nonfood response generated by the activities of the DART may be its most immediate and major accomplishment. While the DART must share the credit with the many other actors on the ground, this heightened interest is evidenced by the substantial increase in proposals submitted by partners that had supposedly reached their implementation capacity, GFDRE attention paid to immediate seed requirements, and enhanced UN engagement in critical health issues, such as the measles campaign.

This is not a closeout report. While most members of this DART depart Ethiopia on June 6, they will be replaced by a second-wave DART composed of Mia Beers (Team Leader), Rob Luneburg (Program Officer), Ron Libby (Field Officer) and Tom Handzel (CDC). Most of this team will be in country until early August and will continue to monitor OFDA projects, review proposals and report on and keep close watch on the developing situation on the ground. OFDA is exploring options to retain an adequate field presence after that time.

The Plan

The purpose of the DART is to enhance the OFDA nonfood response to the drought. This plan serves as a guide to that response. It briefly describes the situation on the ground in the most affected areas and discusses the key emergency response interventions best designed to prevent mortality and suffering. Generally focused on the World Food Program (WFP) Priority 1 and 2 areas, the interventions vary among regions. No single intervention is the key, but rather a mix of complementary interventions will have the greatest effect.

The plan separates the discussion into various segments, starting with the key technical sectors, and followed by crosscutting and specific areas and interventions. It also includes a draft contingency plan in case the situation worsens significantly due to failure of the meher rains, and a summary of the flood assistance provided by OFDA. The plan is supplemented by a significant annex, which contains the numerous cables written by the DART, minutes of key meetings, useful maps and other relevant background information.

The focus of the DART and this plan is on more immediate life-saving measures. The DART realizes that OFDA's role may not end with these activities and depends in part on the level of rains that fall (thus the contingency plan). More importantly, there are clearly longer-term, structural issues that must be addressed in Ethiopia to avoid the repetition of such crises. Therefore, this plan contains some activities that may be linked to development efforts, and may comment on longer term measures required to address the chronic problems in Ethiopia. This is a work in progress and will be updated as the situation develops and further information is acquired, including through the efforts of OFDA and others, such as the valuable work conducted by Tufts and CDC.

TECHNICAL SECTORS

The following table identifies OFDA sectoral priorities for the short-term, broken down by geographic location. Technical information is detailed in the technical sector response plans.

GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS	SECTORAL PRIORITIES
Afar	Measles vaccination Animal health activities Pilot animal feed program Animal restocking Water tankering Water rehabilitation activities
Amhara	Seeds Water rehabilitation activities
Oromiya	Nutrition Seeds Water tankering Water rehabilitation activities
Southern Nations, Nationalities, People (SNNP)	Nutrition Seeds Measles vaccination Malaria treatment/prevention Water tankering Water rehabilitation activities Local purchase of pulses
Somali	Measles vaccination Malaria treatment Nutrition Animal health activities Pilot cash grant activities Water tankering Water rehabilitation activities
Tigray	Seeds
Nationwide	Secondments Coordination

HEALTH AND NUTRITION RESPONSE PLAN

The DART (in consultation with the CDC representatives) recommends that priority be given to not only areas of high malnutrition, but also of high excess mortality, with immediate focus on WFP Priority 1 areas. Currently, the areas of focus include affected woredas within SNNPR, Somali and Afar. Amhara, Oromiya, and Tigray should continue to be monitored. Support should be provided to the MOH Measles Vaccination Campaign. The DART should consider supporting local coordination mechanisms for health and nutrition activities at the regional and zonal level through secondment modalities; and surveillance and reporting systems to track malnutrition, mortality, measles, and other public health indicators.

Mortality is related to malnutrition and disease. Nutrition interventions, including therapeutic feeding centers (TFCs), are an important intervention to address malnutrition. TFCs, however, are not effective unless supported by an adequate supplementary feeding program and general ration. Furthermore, notwithstanding substantial nutritional interventions, excess mortality will continue in this emergency unless its underlying causes are addressed. These major causes of mortality – malaria, measles, diarrhea, and acute respiratory infections – should be given at least equal importance as nutritional interventions. While it is dangerous to prioritize among these diseases, malaria is reported to be the number one cause for morbidity and mortality in the country. As Ethiopia is a high HIV/AIDS prevalence country (>5%), the DART recommends that NGOs include a minimum HIV/AIDS awareness package in their interventions.

SNNPR

Decreasing excess mortality and malnutrition is the priority in SNNPR. The recent decentralization of the health services has increased parochialism of the zones and regions such that coordination suffers and there is little ability to implement cohesive health service policies. An example of this is seen in the differing policies on nutritional screening and cost reimbursement for medical supplies and pharmaceuticals in drought priority areas in the region. In addition, the health reporting system from the district (woreda) to the zone level is very weak, so health surveillance data is not available on a weekly or biweekly basis as would be needed for an emergency situation. Mortality and morbidity information from nutritional surveys are essential for response planning, but have limitations in the number of indicators and coverage in a drought area. Survey data is crucial and needed but should not be used as a substitute for an effective health surveillance system. The most effective health interventions will be measles vaccination, malarial prevention and treatment, and nutritional support.

- **Secondment of Health Advisor to SNNPR.** Consideration should be given to support the secondment of a consultant to SNNPR to assist health authorities with coordination meetings, health information systems, monitoring and evaluation of health clinics and programs, and selective feeding programs. Local staff, as well as expatriate staff could be hired.

- **Immediate Action on Measles Vaccinations.** Characteristics of an emergency measles vaccination campaign are a rapid vaccination of the most vulnerable children aged 6 months to 15 years; vaccination of newcomers and revaccination at nine months for those

children vaccinated at age six to eight months. The DART should consider additional support to the measles campaign to ensure these characteristics are met. In addition:

- There should be vaccination of all children upon entry to a selective feeding program (TFC or SFC) along with vitamin A distribution.
- All children in woredas with less than a 90 percent measles vaccination coverage rate should be revaccinated regardless of prior vaccinations. If this is not feasible, mobile 'mop-up' vaccination teams should return to remote areas or villages with low coverage to revaccinate children.
- The CDC and DART has engaged UNICEF and WHO on this issue to have a joint position to present to the deciding body within the government. Of concern, is the identification of woredas that do not have adequate measles coverage and accelerating a revaccination campaign. This would take extra resources but is necessary.

- **Free Distribution of Pharmaceuticals.** The DART strongly advocates the widespread dissemination to peripheral areas of the GFDRE policy of free distribution of pharmaceuticals in drought priority areas. Apparently, free distribution of drugs in an emergency is the policy dating back to 1969 in Ethiopia, but is not known or practiced in all areas.

- **Malaria Prevention and Treatment** -- Malaria is reported in the field to be the number one cause for morbidity and mortality in the country.
  - For the short-term response (in the next three months), a program should be facilitated to map the areas and seasonality of malaria prevalence. Logistical and financial support should be given to facilitate mobile teams of health care workers to perform outreach into the kebeles providing free malaria treatment (Fansidar) to households with members who present with febrile symptoms[1].
  - Medium and longer-term components of an emergency malaria intervention include vector (mosquito) protection; provision of insecticide treated bed nets for young children and pregnant women; indoor residual spraying; chemoprophylaxis for pregnant women; and curative treatment. All of these are efforts that should be promoted concurrently with Mission support.

- **Nutrition** -- There is an immediate need for selective feeding programs (therapeutic and supplemental feeding programs) in areas where malnutrition rates are at emergency levels (>15% GAM).
  - Therapeutic feeding centers should be operated in conjunction with health clinics and have access to supplementary feeding programs. Where feasible, TFC phase II operated as day-care in lieu of 24-hour care and community based therapeutic (CTC) feeding programs should be encouraged. In addition, nutritional surveillance will be encouraged through surveys and coordination of activities by sector.

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[1] see section 1.6.1 of National Five Year Strategic Plan for Malaria Control in Ethiopia (2001-2005).

- Procurement of local pulses for rations - There is an immediate need to increase the protein quality of the ration, consideration should be given to augmenting the ration with local pulses.
- In areas designated by WFP as priority one areas, consideration should be given to distribution of a **complementary** ration of blended food with oil. In addition, protein rich ration (e.g. pulses) should be sourced for the priority one areas.

Somali Region

The Somali region is a pastoral area with relatively low population density, but with high excess mortality and malnutrition rates. Currently, Somali region is difficult to access for security reasons. The DART recommends the following health and nutrition interventions, as detailed above:

- **Immediate Action on Measles Vaccinations**
- **Malaria Prevention and Treatment**
- **Nutrition** -- There is an immediate need for selective feeding programs (therapeutic and supplemental feeding programs) in areas where malnutrition rates are at emergency levels (>15% GAM)
  - Therapeutic feeding centers.
  - Complementary ration of blended food with oil

Afar Region

The Afar region is a pastoralist region in which the greatest need is access to water. Currently, there is only one TFC (soon to be operating) in the Dubti hospital.

- Unless there is clear indication of a declining nutrition profile, it would be not appropriate at this time to scale up TFCs.
- Support should be given to support health interventions which that assure the measles vaccination rate is indeed greater than 90% in affected areas and to assure access to malaria treatment.
- Support should be given to local NGOs involved in primary health care and who support the regional health office. This could include logistic support as well as for pharmaceuticals through a third party.

Oromiya, Tigray and Amhar Regions

These regions all have potential for elevated mortality and malnutrition in 'hotspots.' The current approach should be to support the health and nutrition surveillance systems in the Ministry of Health and DPPC/ENCU to effectively report mortality and malnutrition data on a timely basis (and then support appropriate responses).

WATER AND SANITATION RESPONSE PLAN

Background/Chronic Problems

Despite the current emergency conditions in water and sanitation resulting from the drought, it is important to recognize that most of Ethiopia suffers from a chronic water shortage. 85% of the total population is rural, and less than 25% of the rural population has access to water that is

microbiologically and chemically safe. In many zones, this percentage is less than 10%, and sanitation coverage is generally much less than safe water coverage. In other words, the use of unsafe water sources – vulnerable to contamination from a variety of factors, including livestock – is the norm in rural areas of Ethiopia.

That the baseline for water and sanitation in Ethiopia is extremely low cannot be ignored. Chronic water issues must be addressed by concerted and focused efforts in water resources development. Emergency interventions will not be able to address the chronic problems of insufficient water to any great extent, nor will they be able to address the poor quality water that most people consume on a regular basis.

Emergency Needs

In rural Ethiopia, women and children typically walk 2 or more hours a day to collect water. During extreme drought conditions, local springs, shallow wells, watercourses and catchment ponds often become dry. As a result, trips of up to 8 hours a day – as well as overnight journeys – in search of other water sources have been reported. For vulnerable populations, this increased energy consumption can be a critical factor in the ability to cope with the health and nutritional challenges of the drought. Insufficient quantities of water for basic hygiene are also a cause for concern. In extreme cases, vulnerable individuals may suffer from dehydration.

While large segments of the drought affected population have emergency water and sanitation needs, the sector has not received as much attention as others. The Ethiopian Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) has developed a strong partnership with UNICEF in water and sanitation, and through their joint efforts increased emphasis is now being placed on emergency needs. The joint Government/UN appeal is based on an estimate that 2.6 million people require emergency water and sanitation assistance. This estimate has recently been increased to 4.2 million people, and will be reflected in a new appeal. The true magnitude of the needs is still not well defined, however, and accurate indicators and a systematic approach to estimating water and sanitation emergency needs must be further developed. An emergency water unit has been approved for establishment with the MOWR. At present, emergency response responsibilities reside in an office essentially staffed by one person, thus limiting emergency response capacity at the federal level. UNICEF provides considerable technical support to the MOWR.

The current appeal for emergency water and sanitation is $18,717,045. The MoWR estimates that approximately 32% of the need has been met, based on 1,341,919 people having been served through a combination of water tankering, maintenance/rehabilitation of existing water systems, and construction of new water systems. This estimate, however, does not include all NGO responses, thus reflecting gaps in coordination and sharing of information. At recent Water Task Force meetings chaired by the MoWR, it was agreed that NGOs would make a concerted effort to report their contributions to the MoWR.

Response

The DART's water and sanitation response plan is focused on implementing rapid emergency interventions that provide safe water to vulnerable populations in situations where water scarcity has become extreme. These interventions will include rehabilitation of existing water sources where practicable, and in some cases development of new water sources. Water tankering will

also be provided to populations that require a drastic intervention to prevent excess morbidity and mortality, or extreme suffering. As outlined in the contingency plan, a failure of the meher rains in June through August would undoubtedly prompt the need for increased water tankering programs. Funding of point-of-use water treatment applications will be considered in certain situations, particularly where there are strong indications of potential or ongoing water related disease outbreaks. Funds for tankering and point-of-use interventions must be positioned to allow for rapid response to extreme situations. OFDA will also provide assistance to ensure a microbiologically and chemically safe water supply of adequate quantity to therapeutic feeding centers where gaps exist.

Mitigation interventions such as borehole drilling, the development of gravity fed spring systems, and well-planned rainwater harvesting applications will be considered for funding by OFDA, particularly when linked with rapid emergency response measures as noted above. There is no doubt that the promotion of drought mitigation projects has a tremendous impact on the health and well being of populations who have minimal water and sanitation coverage. Nevertheless, any mitigation projects funded by OFDA that will represent an extremely limited response to a very large chronic deficiency in the water and sanitation sector. This deficiency must be addressed by a long-term water development strategy for rural areas.

Response Plan (June-August 2003):

- Support emergency water tankering operations where gaps exist, particularly in the Afar, Somali, and SNNP Regions. There may also be continued needs in the lowland regions of West Hararghe Zone, Oromiya Region. Funds for potential water tankering operations will need to be made available in the event of meher rain failure. Livestock water needs are significant.

- Continue to support international NGO proposals for water tankering, as well as a possible umbrella water tankering proposal from UNICEF to include funds for emergency point-of-use treatment. UNICEF has taken the lead role in water tankering, and mechanisms are currently in place for them to partner with the government, international NGOs and local NGOs.

- Continue to support rapid response proposals for emergency maintenance and rehabilitation of water sources and systems.

- Continue to support the construction of shallow wells where feasible, as well as limited provision of more complex drought mitigation interventions such as borehole and rainwater harvesting where appropriate.

- Continue to encourage and support sanitation and hygiene training, as well as the provision of appropriate sanitation facilities in conjunction with emergency water interventions.

- Where therapeutic feeding centers do not have water of acceptable quantity and/or quality, or do not have adequate sanitation facilities, fill gaps as necessary by working with NGO partners.

- Consider supporting secondments to the Regional and Zonal Water Bureaus, and to the proposed emergency water unit within the MoWR. The MoWR has indicated that a request for technical expertise is forthcoming from the Regions.

- Close coordination with local NGOs is particularly important in the difficult environments of the pastoral areas of Afar and Somali regions. Several such NGOs have developed dynamic programs in close partnership with pastoral communities and their efforts should be encouraged.

AGRICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK RESPONSE PLAN

Introduction

While the recovery of agricultural production in Ethiopia will be closely linked to the success of the 2003 meher rains, it will take more than one year for most of the hardest-hit areas to return to normal rates of production even if the rains are well-distributed, timely, and of sufficient duration. Several consecutive years of drought have not only depleted household assets, but have also exhausted farmer seed stocks, leading to reduced quality of seed, and a likely decrease in genetic variability among common cereal crops. None of these problems can be solved in one year, yet all of them will continue to reduce productivity for many years.

Seed is the most immediate need in the agricultural sector for the 2003 season. While farmers will have saved some seed to plant, stocks of many are likely to be seriously depleted, since they replanted several times during the 2002 season as the rains started and stopped. Unfortunately, the seed needs of Ethiopia have been significantly underestimated in the national appeal, so the actual amount of seed needed by farmers in agricultural regions is staggering. NGOs are struggling to meet the needs before the upcoming meher season begins, but it is likely that seed demands in many areas will exceed supply.

The productivity of the livestock sector will also be closely dependent on success of rains over the next several months. For now, the livestock situation appears to be stable, but will deteriorate rapidly over the next eight months if rains fail. Most deaths of livestock already occurred from late 2002 into early 2003, causing many households to lose 50 percent or more of their animals in pastoral and agro pastoral areas. From an ecological point of view, this lowered population size is probably allowing the remaining animals to survive on a much-reduced amount of rangeland, but this has left households in extremely fragile situations.

Immediate Response Needs

Within the agricultural sector, provision of seeds to farmers in time to put a meher crop into the ground should be OFDA's top priority over the next 1-2 months. Fields have been prepared in Tigray, SNNPR, Amhara, and Oromiya, and farmers are awaiting the arrival of seeds to begin planting.

- In addition to funding provision of cereal crops now, OFDA should be prepared to assist in funding seeds for vegetables, pulses, and some tuber crops for September planting, depending on the needs in the regions. While seed needs in the country are great, OFDA should urge caution in determining which seeds to purchase. For subsistence farmers, OFDA should continue to strongly recommend against funding hybrid seeds, particularly in this early recovery stage. These vulnerable farmers must be able to save seeds for their next crop from what they harvest, rather than being forced to sell their harvest (at a low price) in order to purchase seed when it is most expensive.

- While improved seeds might seem to be a good alternative to hybrids and local varieties, it is important that farmers know their crops and are completely comfortable with what they are growing during this recovery stage. For this reason, the drought should not be used as an opportunity to dump experimental seeds on farmers.

Within the livestock sector, the most pressing and immediate need is in animal health provision, including both training and supplies. Across the country, animal health concerns were constantly cited as one of the top priorities of livestock owners. Other interventions will be crucial if the rains in Afar and Somali regions fail, so monitoring of the situation in these regions will be critical. In the highlands, where animals are used to prepare fields, close attention should be paid to livestock conditions if the rains are not well distributed. Specific recommendations:

- Support of animal health programs in Afar and Somali, including provision of drugs and support for training of additional community animal health workers. This is essential, regardless of whether the rains are adequate.

- In the livestock sector, much of what OFDA should do over the next 6-12 months is being based primarily on the success of the next rainy season. In some regions of the country, livestock restocking may be necessary, though if rains are good, only patchy restocking will be needed. If rains fail, animal mortality will increase dramatically. In this case, the only way to prevent alarming levels of destitution in pastoral areas will be to keep a core herd of reproductive animals alive. While providing animal feed may seem to be a prohibitively expensive endeavor, it will, in the long run, be far less expensive than restocking pastoral families up to viable herd sizes. Water availability for these animals will also be critical.

- OFDA should also consider the funding of a pilot program in pastoral areas to look at the possibility of using high-protein animal feed (e.g. urea/molasses blocks) as a dietary supplement for herd animals. There is some concern that an already-stressed animal will not be able to tolerate these supplements, and may not even accept them, so it is important to know this on a small scale before a large-scale feeding program for animals becomes necessary. Perhaps having an NGO (such as APDA) funded for an either/or scenario would be appropriate, so the organization would be set to assist with either restocking or feeding, depending on which is indicated by success or failure of the rainy season.

Longer-term Issues

The DART's scope of response does not include longer-term issues. Nevertheless, it is critical to address these structural issues now to avoid a repetition of the same problems. Therefore this paper briefly addresses longer-term issues made apparent during the DART's presence.

The most important issue to be addressed in both the agricultural and livestock sectors is coordination among the organizations working in these areas. What has become increasingly obvious over the past several weeks is that very few organizations know what other organizations are doing in a region, even if their planned interventions are similar. Not only is there a serious lack of coordination at the national level, but there is also a serious lack of coordination at the local and regional levels. This has led to complete chaos in the seed sector during this emergency, with actual needs of the country alarmingly underestimated. Without strong leadership and coordination in the future, the same problem will recur each time there is a drought situation in Ethiopia.

Within the seed sector, several longer-term issues must be addressed. The first is that the seed credit system must be carefully examined, since the government currently requires that farmers must take out loans to purchase seeds right before planting, at a time when prices of seed are quite high. In order to pay back that loan at the end of the season, they must sell their harvest at very low market prices. Instead of providing cash loans, it would make more sense for farmers to borrow a specific amount of seed and to pay that back at the end of the season. Seed banks, then, are more important than government credit schemes for keeping farmer systems viable.

The issue of hybrid seed is a contentious one, since the government is pushing its purchase, along with the use of a technology package of irrigation and fertilizer. While this is an important component of agricultural development in Ethiopia, particularly as farmers commercialize and mechanize, it is not yet a viable alternative for subsistence farmers. These farmers rely on saving their seed from year to year, and cannot produce enough grain each year to both feed their families and sell the excess to purchase more seeds, more fertilizer, and develop irrigation. This is a quick way to get farmers in serious debt, and to prevent them from being self-sufficient. For now, it is probably more important to slowly introduce improved varieties of open-pollinated seed to subsistence farmers.

Still, improved seeds must be introduced carefully, since many of the traits that scientists look for when breeding new varieties are not traits that farmers appreciate. In addition, some improved varieties will require different management schemes that are not familiar to local farmers. In order for these new varieties to be adopted and accepted by farmers and their families, farmers must be given a choice and allowed to slowly work these varieties into their farming systems. In addition, since genetic diversity and crop diversification is key to reducing farmer risk, it is never a good idea to only plant one variety, so it is important to allow as much farmer choice into the system as possible.

Over the long term, livestock marketing issues are very important to address. With the Assab market closed to the Afar, and the Somalia border closed to the Somalis, pastoralists have no alternative market area to take their animals to. International regulations regarding livestock

imports should also be relaxed, since diseases that the ban is attempting to prevent are already endemic to the Gulf States.

CROSS-CUTTING INTERVENTIONS

CASH GRANT PROGRAMS

The DART has explored the possible use of cash grants to address critical needs – particularly to serve as a supplement to an inadequate food ration – as a result of the drought in Ethiopia. It has reviewed a variety of documents written about such programs conducted in Ethiopia and elsewhere. It has also met with a number of groups who have conducted related programs in Ethiopia. This note summarizes our findings and provides guidance for the selection and implementation of a cash grant program as part of OFDA's response to the humanitarian crisis.

There are very few examples of pure cash grant programs in Ethiopia. Most well known was UNICEF's Cash for Food program in 1984-85. More recently, OFDA is supporting a cash for seeds program in Tigray. Most cash programs have been Cash for Work (CFW), Cash for Food (CFF) or part of a plan of Employment Generating Schemes (EGS). Some have been done in the context of emergency relief, while others are more developmental in nature. CFW and similar programs tend to have two goals – increase access to food, etc. through increased purchasing power and to further development activities (e.g., build a road) – while cash grants seek to increase purchasing power. Nevertheless, CFW-type programs can be instructive for cash grant programs (and some such programs have a cash grant – or gratuitous relief – component for those too old or frail to work).

Both Ethiopian government officials and NGO representatives have indicated that under the right circumstances, a cash grant program could be an effective tool in Ethiopia. The program has to be implemented in the right place, under the right circumstances and by the right group(s). There was some difference in opinion as to who should implement the program. One key government official stated that it should be managed by NGOs for greater effectiveness, while most NGOs made it clear that the local government should be heavily involved.

Factors to Consider in a Cash Grant Program

1. Food Availability. If the primary purpose of the cash grant is to permit purchase of food, then food must be available in sufficient quantities and in relative proximity to the population. Reasonable access to food markets may be a problem in some areas of a drought-stricken country and must be thoroughly understood before implementing a program.

2. Misuse of Cash. There is always a concern that the money will not be spent on food or other necessities, but rather will be used to purchase frivolous items. There is some evidence that the farther away the food market is, the more likely the money will be spent on something that may be less of a necessity. There is also some evidence that putting the money in the hands of women ensures that a greater percentage of funds are used for important household purchases.

In most cases, the fear of misuse has been unfounded, and people tend to prioritize correctly, knowing and buying what they need. There may, however, be some legitimate concern in certain parts of Ethiopia that funds are used to purchase chat (a locally grown stimulant) or other low priority items.

3. Market Disruption/Failure. If too much money enters a location with a limited market, it could cause prices to spiral. This fear of inflation has not usually occurred as a result of cash programs, but must be considered. Given the lack of sophisticated markets in Ethiopia, less than perfect information, etc., there is also a risk of market failure.

4. Targeting/Amount. Criteria, usually arrived at in conjunction with local (e.g., peasant association) officials, must be established for participation in the program. These must be deemed fair, agreed upon and followed. (CFW programs can be self-targeting, by keeping the wage rate low enough so that only the poorest will participate.) The amount of the cash grant in part depends on the purpose of the program (e.g., to supplement or replace a food ration) and should not serve to disrupt markets or the social structure of a community.

5. Security. Security is always a concern when a program involves the transportation of relatively large amounts of cash in possibly remote areas. There are various ways to ensure security, such as working through local banks where available or relying on local officials for protection. Still, there may be some places where security is such a serious concern that it will scuttle a program. (For instance, security concerns derailed recent discussions for a possible NGO cash grant program in Fik.)

6. Knowledge of the Community. It is clear that the implementing organization, usually working closely with local officials, must truly know the communities in which the cash grant program is located. Since time is of the essence in a relief situation, this usually means that the implementing organization is already working in the area. Any such organization should be able to properly consider all of the above factors.

7. Monitoring/Contingency Plans. Constant monitoring is essential to a cash grant program. This includes monitoring that: the cash is delivered to designated beneficiaries; the markets are functioning and prices do not increase quickly as a result of the program; and there are no "leaks" or corruption in the cash delivery system. Contingency plans should be adopted in case any of these problems arise.

The DART foresees the cash being used to supplement an inadequate food ration, but cash grants can also entirely replace food assistance. Cash programs can have many other uses, including purchase of a variety of household or livelihood goods, or to pay off debts. Any OFDA-funded cash grant program will likely be flexible in terms of what recipients purchase, since it is difficult to force people to purchase a particular set of items, and since people usually know and purchase what they need. (One CFW program in Ethiopia found that people used cash to pay for the following in order of priority: food, debts, school fees, social obligations, clothes and small animals.)

Cash programs have many advantages over food programs. Because it is easier to carry cash than food, there are fewer logistical problems for both the implementing organization and the recipients. Transportation costs are reduced, allowing for a greater emphasis on targeting and monitoring. Recipients are free to buy what they want. They are not forced to eat a certain type of food, or sell it (at a low price) in order to buy what they really want or need.

The DART feels that appropriate cash grant programs are not the only solution to the crisis. Nevertheless, if implemented in selected geographic areas that satisfy the key factors, they can be an important part of the OFDA and USG response to the humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia. OFDA will continue exploring the possibility of initiating a cash grant program in the near future.

COORDINATION AND INFORMATION

The Constraint

Coordination and information sharing remain major constraints to a more effective nonfood humanitarian relief operation. This is in part explained by the relief structure in Ethiopia, which is composed of four major groups: the GFDRE, donors, NGOs and UN agencies. Each of these major groups is composed of diverse actors. The Government has the DPPC and the three functional line ministries of water, health and agriculture. There are multiple NGOs with significant functional and geographic diversity. There are at least five major UN agencies supporting relief activities: OCHA/EUE, UNICEF, FAO, WHO, and the WFP. While the numerous donors do not negatively impact coordination and information sharing, stronger efforts to promote donor coordination needs to be done. This complexity is exacerbated by a relief operation in Ethiopia that must address the needs of over 12 million affected people spread over a large and diverse area.

Given the complexity of the structure and the enormity of the task, it is not surprising that there are serious constraints to coordination and information flow. Gaps in coordination and information flow are evident at many levels and among various actors.

<u>UN and GFDRE</u>. The GFDRE properly attempts to assert its authority in leading the relief effort. Despite its great efforts and many successes, it suffers from inefficiencies, lack of clarity of roles and lack of capacity. (For example, only one of the three line ministries – MoWR – has an emergency unit, but is essentially staffed by only one person.) The UN apparently feels caught between its typical lead in coordinating the relief effort and letting the GFDRE take the lead.

<u>UN and NGOs</u>. The UN complains that the NGOs do not share information and do not attend meetings. The NGOs complain that the UN does not consult with them or seek their advice (e.g., on the nonfood appeal). There is a clear disconnect between NGO and the UN, but both seem to recognize this and are making steps to improve communication.

<u>Within the GFDRE</u>. This constraint is further exacerbated by a decentralized government structure, which contains four levels: federal, regional, zonal and district (woreda). The strength

of these various levels of government varies considerably among the regions, and results in uneven information flow. This is further exacerbated by the serious disconnect between the federal level line ministries and their local offices. Furthermore, while the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC) has the overall responsibility for coordination, its relationship with the line ministries is not always clear in practice.

Between Addis Ababa and the Field. Generally, there is a gap between the field and Addis Ababa-based organizations. This is due to many factors, including poor communication, limited presence of implementing institutions, and lack of field presence by the GFDRE and UN (although the latter seems to be improving).

There are numerous efforts to coordinate and share information. At the federal level, there are over a dozen established meetings, committees and task forces. These include participation by the DPPC, line ministries, NGOs and the UN. To varying extents, these meetings are repeated at the local level. Common deficiencies at all levels include poorly conducted and attended meetings and lack of follow up. (At the local level, coordination effectiveness varies considerably, with the worst seen in SNNPR.) This results in the failure to communicate the appearance of "hotspots" and a timely response, and complaints about too many meetings and the resultant lack of attendance and apathy. Ironically, under the 2003 joint GFDRE/UN appeal, only 25% of capacity building and 32% of the coordination line item requests have been met.

What Key Actors Can Do

There are a number of possible approaches that could improve coordination and information flow. Some require a modification of structure or function and may demand additional resources. The key players in improving coordination and information flow are the GFDRE, UN and NGOs.

United Nations

The UN Humanitarian Coordinator and the specialized agencies have a major role to play in information sharing and coordination. The UN should be commended for many of its efforts. Perhaps the most promising development in this area is the recent effort by OCHA/EUE to develop an information center within the DPPC. If the DPPC buys into the information center, this effort could serve as an important tool to promote coordination through easy access to relevant, timely and systematic information. (Establishment of a functioning system, however, will take years, and may not have an impact during this crisis.) Efforts, however, should be directed to the following areas:

1. The UN must remain cognizant of – but cannot hide behind – the GFDRE's determination to take the lead in humanitarian relief operations. The UN must be more proactive in pointing out gaps and ensuring coordination.
2. While UN field presence seems to be improving, it seems to be reactive, if not ad hoc. The UN should have a plan (certain to evolve) as to how it plans to expand field presence to adequately cover affected areas and promote coordination. It should also have a readily available and updated list of its field presence.
3. Continue efforts to consult with NGOs on significant matters such as joint appeals and encourage information flow.

4. Continue efforts to strengthen the capacity of the DPPC and line ministries to promote coordination.
5. The joint appeal is a critical information tool. The process, results and tracking of contributions must become more transparent and accurate.

GFDRE

The GFDRE has asserted its leadership, but it must back this up with stronger actions. This requires the following concerted efforts:

1. Working jointly with the UN as appropriate, the GFDRE must promote more effective and action-oriented meetings. This may include reviewing the list of meetings and consolidating where possible. The results of meetings should be distributed in a timely manner and actions assigned and monitored.
2. The DPPC should demonstrate its buy-in to the development of the information operations center by providing adequate human and other resources.
3. The DPPC and line ministries must focus their efforts at promoting coordination with and within their local counterparts to ensure the smooth flow of information. Line ministries should have adequately staffed emergency units.

NGOs

NGOs are a key source of much of the on-the-ground information. While their efforts are rightfully focused on implementation, they are obligated to share information and coordinate with other key actors.

1. NGOs must actively participate in meetings that involve their technical sector or geographic region. If the meetings are deemed ineffective, the proper response is to seek to correct the inefficiencies, rather than not attend.
2. OFDA partners must inform regional and federal government and the relevant UN agencies in writing as to the nature, scope and location of their interventions. Reporting is critical to the relief effort and the efforts to standardize reporting should be supported.

DART Recommended Actions

Given the critical importance of coordination and information flow to the overall relief effort, OFDA should support key efforts at improving the situation. This includes:

1. Additional support to the establishment of the information operations center by OCHA/EUE within DPPC.
2. Secondments, particularly at the regional level, of experts who can promote more effective coordination.
3. Strong encouragement directed toward the UN, GFDRE and NGOs to better coordinate and share information. In this regard, DART and OFDA field presence – and participation in key meetings – will be important in the next few months.

SECONDMENTS

One of the greatest constraints that the GFDRE has in addressing the current emergency is the lack of human and financial resources. This is evident at all levels of government. Since government line ministries – MOH, MoWR and MOA – have decentralized their staff and budget decisions, there is a lack of technical expertise at the zonal and regional levels. This is manifested in a low level of coordination, reporting, surveillance and monitoring of emergency programs. Similarly, the DPPC, the agency given the task of coordination, lacks qualified staff.

An example of the lack of capacity can be seen with the MOH, which has purview over therapeutic feeding programs. At the federal level, there is no specialized emergency unit and there is only one staff person in the nutritional unit within the MOH. It must rely on others to carry out its mandate. Other ministries share the same lack of an emergency unit, although the government has approved the creation of an emergency unit within the MoWR, and suffer from insufficient technical supervision and administrative support, particularly at the regional and zonal levels.

The DART suggests the secondment of staff or consultants to work with government ministries to assist in coordination, reporting, and technical supervision of the current emergency programs, as well as to build capacity for the future. The most optimal use of seconded staff may be at the regional and zonal levels – or at the federal level for the purpose of coordinating with the regions – with consultants working alongside line ministry and DPPC staff. Seconded staff could be comprised of small teams of expatriate with technical expertise as well as local technical experts. A SOW should be designed for each secondment that would include provision of technical assistance, facilitation of coordination meetings, recording of minutes and following up on issues of concern. It is anticipated that each secondment would be for a period of 6 months, which should provide sufficient time to build trust and sustainability.

The DART is in the process of discussing priority secondments with the GFDRE. Priorities will be determined and will be factored in with the availability of required experts and funding. (The GFDRE request may be shared with other donors who express interest in supporting secondments.) A major factor in supporting this concept will be the GFDRE's willingness to accept and support the particular secondment.

RAPID RESPONSE/EXPANSION OF PARTNERS

The humanitarian crisis is highlighted by its expanse, striking hard at parts of six regions, and with the occurrence of "hotspots" in different parts of the country. Combined with limited capacity of traditional OFDA partners, the situation mandates consideration of all possible implementation mechanisms. The DART has been exploring ways to address these matters, including the use of a rapid response mechanism and working more with local actors.

USAID/Ethiopia recently initiated rapid response mechanisms with two NGOs (Save the Children/US and GOAL). These mechanisms have been useful in addressing specific critical needs and jump-starting certain activities. Both, however, have limited funding and have almost

reached their limits. The DART is negotiating a more extensive and flexible rapid response mechanism that would permit either the implementing organization or another group through a sub-agreement to rapidly respond to an urgent need, whether it be in nutrition (e.g., therapeutic feeding center), water (e.g., tankering) or in another sector. This will be a particularly useful mechanism to address hotspots.

There is clearly a capacity issue with respect to the traditional OFDA NGO partners that are here in Ethiopia. Many seem to be stretched at capacity in terms of taking on additional activities, although the DART has received a number of proposals from these partners. In order to address the many needs that will arise, OFDA must expand its normal base of implementing partners. The DART has met with a variety of local organizations to discuss their activities and capacity to further respond. It is important to note that a number of OFDA-supported NGOs are already working in partnership with local NGO and organizations. These local groups include LCWSSHPA, Ethiopian Red Cross Society, Relief Society of Tigray (REST), Afar Pastoralist Development Association (APDA), ADCS, Haraghe Catholic Secretariat (HCS), SHCS, EOC, LWF/EECMY, NACID and various local hospitals. Because, in many cases, local NGOs may not have financial management systems that meet USAID minimum requirements, and to avoid the management burden of a multitude of small grants, the best approach may be to encourage further partnering arrangements between international NGOs and local groups. OFDA will continue to explore all options to expand its local partners to meet the implementation challenges of this crisis.

DRAFT

OFDA CONTINGENCY PLANNING SCENARIOS FOR ETHIOPIA

The humanitarian situation is at a critical juncture as the hunger season (June to August) descends. The upcoming 2003 main season *meher* rains will be one of the key short-term triggers in determining the magnitude and the duration of the current humanitarian crisis. If the meher rains fail, the potential for further deterioration in the already critical humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia looms on the horizon. Excess mortality, increased destitution, and significant migration may be unavoidable. (In addition, the internal resettlement efforts that are underway, along with the potential for increased conflict along the border areas due to demarcation exercises, remain potentially explosive issues affecting the humanitarian situation.)

In normal years, September to December represents a time of relative food security. Short and long cycle crops are harvested and milk and meat are generally available as a result of replenished pastureland. The ongoing drought has reduced the availability of these commodities, resulting in a consumption failure. The scale of the current harvest losses has already sparked large cereal price increases in the domestic market. Although drought is a key factor in the current crisis, many structural factors have contributed to the underlying poverty and food insecurity. Therefore, integrating emergency response with longer-term recovery and development efforts that address the underlying causes is important in the coming months.

The implications of a main season rain failure are staggering. Even partial failure would have tremendous repercussions for the immediate and medium-range humanitarian outlook. This necessitates contingency planning for the next twelve months, from the last half of 2003 to the first half of 2004. The following outlines three possible scenarios, based primarily on the result of the meher rains, and the key non-food interventions that would be the focus of OFDA efforts.

Contingency Planning Scenario One: 2003 Meher Rains Fail (Worst Case)

The key trigger for the current food and humanitarian crisis was the failure of both the main agricultural and pastoral rains in 2002. A complete failure of the 2003 main meher rains could spark an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. Vulnerable population numbers could easily double and be in the twenty or thirty million range. Instead of localized and somewhat manageable "hotspots," widespread acute areas of humanitarian crisis and excess mortality could be expected in pastoral, lowland, midland and highland areas of the country. Massive meher crop failure means the "hunger season" (normally limited to three months per year) could be extended for months, depending on 2004 belg short rains. This climatic shock, as well as other contributing socio-economic factors, would take many years to recover from, even if future rains and humanitarian response were robust. Key implications of a 2003 meher rain failure include:

- Significant deterioration in nutritional status and mass excess mortality across wide swaths of the country
- Increased child mortality among pastoral households
- Significant livestock deaths and even poorer terms of trade for livestock
- Continued rise in grain prices and unaffordable market terms of trade
- Non-availability of seed and short season produce
- Widespread destitution and social disruption
- Possible large scale internal migration and/or pastoral cross-border migration
- Complete household asset depletion in some areas and loss of all coping mechanisms
- Long term implications on household food security
- Intensification of water scarcity and increased need for emergency water tankering

Under this scenario, anything less than a full-scale immediate multi-donor response would bring forth tragic consequences. Imminent excess mortality may be unavoidable but appropriate responses may minimize countrywide levels. Significant USG funding would become a necessity. In this scenario, priority interventions for DCHA/OFDA would include:

- Rapid response mechanisms with NGOs to allow for flexible immediate response
- Purchase of local or regional pulses to supplement general ration (if available)
- Cash grants to supplement inadequate food ration (if food is available)
- Nutrition programs (therapeutic and supplementary feeding)
- Health interventions focused on immunization, EPI, and malaria response, pre-positioning of medical kits
- Provision of safe water through tankering to prevent dehydration deaths, along with other short-term water rehabilitation activities

- Support for coordination and/or secondments to GFDRE to build capacity and improve response capabilities
- Seed distribution for the belg season
- Animal health and feeding programs aimed at keeping a core group of animals alive (vaccination, supplemental fodder programs)
- Possible provision of non-food items (plastic sheeting, jerry cans, etc) in the event of mass migration

Contingency Planning Scenario Two: 2003 Meher Rains Normal (Mid Case)

Under a projected mid-case scenario, the 2003 meher rains would be normal in terms of distribution and duration. While significant reductions in long-cycle (and higher yielding) crops can be expected due to the erratic 2003 belg rainfall, shorter-cycle (but lower yielding) crops would be successful in most areas. Since most of the meher crop will be harvested during November to December 2003, the upcoming "hunger season" will still mean acute crisis over the next four months. The continued chronic poverty of people living in especially vulnerable areas, exacerbated by consecutive drought and food insecurity has resulted in loss of coping mechanisms and erosion of most household assets. Even with a normal meher season, one rainfall season will not result in immediate recovery by any stretch of the imagination. Key implications of a 2003 normal meher rainfall:

- High malnutrition and excess mortality will still continue in localized pockets of the country over the next few months
- Continued rise in grain prices and unaffordable market terms of trade until meher harvest
- Limited availability of seed and of short season produce
- Continued destitution and social disruption
- Household asset depletion
- Long term implications on household food security

Under this mid case scenario, immediate multi-donor response will be key over the coming months, for emergency response in the next several months, as well as longer term recovery and developmental support.

Priority interventions for DCHA/OFDA will include:

- Limited rapid response mechanisms with NGOs to allow for flexible immediate response
- Possible cash grants to supplement inadequate food ration
- Nutrition programs, most likely supplementary feeding
- Health interventions focused on immunization, EPI, and malaria response
- Short-term and medium-term water rehabilitation activities
- Support for coordination and capacity building activities for the GFDRE
- Seed distribution for the belg season
- Livestock interventions (animal health and/or restocking activities)
- Early warning and surveillance systems

Contingency Planning Scenario Three: 2003 Meher Rains Good (Best Case)

Good meher rains will mean short-cycle crops will be successful, bringing much needed relief. However, as most of the meher crop will be harvested during November to December 2003, the upcoming "hunger season" will still reflect a humanitarian crisis over the next few months. As in the mid-case scenario, the continued chronic poverty of people exacerbated by consecutive drought and food insecurity in recent years has resulted in loss of coping mechanisms and erosion of most household assets. Productive assets (oxen for traction power), savings (cash or small livestock) will take a long time to recover to pre-crisis levels and immediate recovery is not realistic even with one good meher season. Modest levels of relief in the short-term would be required but integrated relief and developmental assistance will be crucial in the recovery efforts. Policy dialogue at the highest level, as well as the development and support of a transition framework with the GFDRE must be pursued.

Priority interventions for DCHA/OFDA will include limited short-term support for:

- Targeted health interventions focused on immunization, and malaria response
- Medium-term water rehabilitation activities (boreholes)
- Coordination and capacity building activities for the GFDRE
- Livestock interventions (animal health and/or restocking activities)
- Early warning and surveillance systems
- Targeted seed distribution for belg and meher seasons

FLOOD RESPONSE

On May 9, 2003, the United States Ambassador to Ethiopia issued a Disaster Declaration following a request by the GFDRE for assistance in responding to flooding in areas of Somali, Oromiya, and SNNPR. The flooding displaced approximately 100,000 people and damaged crops and livestock holdings. OFDA has followed the flood situation closely and responded with a grant of $110,000 to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for assistance with immediate delivery of non-food items.

In Somali Region, ICRC estimated that 70,000 individuals were flood affected in Kelafo and Mustaphil. In addition, 9,000 and 10,000 individuals were impacted in East Imi and West Imi respectively. ICRC determined that 10 percent of the population of each village should be targeted for assistance. ICRC could not immediately gain access to isolated populations located in the area between Kelafo and Mustaphil. Recent information provided to the DART suggests that these populations are beginning to plant their fields. Up to 50 deaths were attributed to the flood.

ICRC delivered nonfood items in the area between Kelafo and Mustaphil using two inflatable Zodiac boats. Between 1.2 and 1.3 metric tons of supplies were loaded on each boat. The Zodiac boats were provided through the DPPC. Because the Wabi Shabelle River follows a sinuous course, ICRC boats needed to travel approximately 150 kilometers around river bends and twists to provide relief to the 92-kilometer stretch of river between Kelafo and Mustaphil. Sandbanks, half-submerged trees and bushes, and crocodiles impeded smooth operations. The

ICRC provided 175 metric tons of food aid to East and West Imi by trucks coming from Dire Dawa and Nazereth.

For those targeted for assistance, ICRC provided non-food kits which included one tarp, one blanket, one cooking pot, and one jerry can or bucket. ICRC also provided 20 metric tons of maize seed to farmers who lost their seed as a result of the flooding. The ICRC also deployed three four-wheel drive trucks to Gode, to deliver food aid from ICRC stocks in Nazreth to 20,000 beneficiaries in Kelafo and Mustaphil. In addition, the ICRC provided 175 metric tons of food aid to East and West Imi by trucks coming from Dire Dawa and Nazereth. The ICRC coordinated its activities in Kelafo and Mustaphil with the Regional authorities. The Ethiopian Army provided a helicopter for operations. The DPPC provided 40 metric tons of biscuits and some plastic sheeting.

At the conclusion of the first wave of the Ethiopia DART 2003, it appears that all flood emergency needs have been met and that the U.S. Government's response was appropriate and effective.


OFDA PROGRAMS IN ETHIOPIA
OFDA Funded Programs
Coordination
Emergency Water
Health
Nutrition
Livelihood Protection
Relief Commodities
Seeds/Tools
Therapeutic & Supplemental Feeding
Water/Sanitation
6/10/03
ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS
Afar
Amhara
Beneshangul Gumuz
Gambella
Oromiya
SNNP
Somali
Tigray
TIGRAY REGION
CISP
Mereb Lehe
CISP
Wukro
CISP
Raya Azebo
CISP
AFAR REGION
ACF
WVI
Dubti
WV
Assaiti
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Afambo
WV
AMHARA REGION
FHI
Shinile
SAVE US/UK
Zone3
GOAL
NATIONWIDE
UN FAO
UNICEF
UNOCHA
E. Shewa
CRS
W. Harrarghe
CARE
CRS
IMC
IRC
E. Harrarghe
AMCROSS
CARE
CRS
Kachibira
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Guraghe
GAA
Meskan & Mareko
GAA
Arsi
CRS
Omosheleko
WV
Kedida Gambela
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Kersu
CRS
Boloso Sore
IMC
Oxfam/GB
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Gode
ICRC
Awassa Zuria
IMC
Koyisha
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Sidama
GOAL
Offa
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Soddo Zuriya
WV
Boreda
WV
Damut Gale
WV
Humbo
WV
SNNP REGION
WVI
ZONE NAMES
1 Oromiya (R3)
2 Zone 5
3 Dire Dawa
4 Harari
5 E. Shewa
6 Addis Ababa
7 Yew
Mereb Lehe
Wukro
W. Tigray
C. Tigray
E. Tigray
Zone2
Mekele
S. Tigray
W.Hemra
N. Gonder
Zone4
N. Wello
S. Gonder
Zone1
W.Gojam
Metekel
Agew Awi
S. Wello
E. Gojam
Asosa
N. Shewa (R3)
Zone3
Kamashi
E. Wellega
N. Shewa (R4)
Tongo
W. Wellega
W. Shewa
Jigjiga
Illubabor
Zone 3
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 4
Jimma
Hadiya
KAT
Fik
Degehabur
Keficho Shekicho
Bench Maji
N. Omo
Sidama
Bale
Warder
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Gedio
Gode
Amaro
Dirashe
Burji
Konso
S. Omo
Afder
Borena
Liben


ONGOING PROGRAMS IN ETHIOPIA
Ongoing USAID Programs
OFDA Program
Non-Project Assistance Fund
Emergency Kits and Supplies
Emergency Water
Basic Health Services and Outreach
Innoculations
Livelihood Protection
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Guraghe
GAA
Meskan & Mareko
GAA
Arsi
CRS
Kedida Gambela
WV
Kersu
CRS
Omosheleko
WV
Boloso Sore
IMC
Oxfam/GB
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Koyisha
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