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## Organizing Work: Results Packages

*By Tony Pryor, Africa Bureau*

One of the major innovations in the new operations system is the concept of organizing development work within results packages (ADS section E202.5.4a and .4b). This concept is key to providing the flexibility needed to adapt to changes during implementation. As with much of the new system, while there are certain parameters defining what a results package (RP) is, you won't find a cookbook definition. The RP is an opportunity to be innovative in managing for results and focusing resources toward sustainable development.

A results package consists of people, funding, authorities, activities and associated documentation required to achieve a specified result or results within an established time frame. Unlike projects, RPs do not have a formal structure, they are basically a management decision permitting the allocation of staff and other resources in the most optimal way to achieve the results defined by the results framework (RF). The RP is managed by a strategic objective (SO) or RP team which coordinates the development, negotiation, management, monitoring and evaluation of activities toward the achievement of the associated result or results.

It's as important, as always, to manage inputs properly and to monitor outputs. The RP concept, however, emphasizes two things: the underlying focus on the results framework, and the need to allow flexibility to change approaches and tactics as situations change or lessons are learned.

There are a wide variety of ways to combine results into manageable units. Small, highly focused management units can provide more flexibility to change and target approaches. Large, complex collections of results may be more management-intensive (as many of us found with many disparate elements combined into one project). Most importantly though, combining or separating results under RPs should be purely a management decision.

It is essential to have a rich and deep understanding of the developmental hypotheses driving the SO as defined in the RF. A good RF is the *first step* and provides the basis for the grouping of results and their associated activities into RPs. Simply achieving results without any view as to *why* those results are important defeats the purpose of the new system.

In identifying a results package, the SO team may consider similarities in tactics and tools that could be used, availability and technical capacity of staff, locational or sequential relationships between results and potential activities, overlapping interests of partners, customers and USAID staff or the contiguous nature of some

*Continued on page 7*

### *A Note from the Editor ....*

*On Track* is a monthly publication from the M Bureau addressing issues related to USAID's reengineering effort. Regular features cover the Country Experimental Labs, the latest literature on reengineering, and letters and questions to the editor. Special features highlight particular aspects of the reengineering process.

# Larry Byrne, AA/M, Speaks to Trainers

As a kickoff to the "Training of Trainers" workshops held recently in Washington, Larry Byrne, AA for Management Bureau, spoke about the importance of reengineering for this agency. The following comments are adapted from his speech.

Our emphasis, not only within the agency but with Congress, has been on achieving results and being able to demonstrate those results. The new operating and management systems are geared around allowing you to do *development work*.

The common argument is that everything we do takes a long time. These same arguments have been used at other federal bureaus and agencies, but the same answer applies. If you cannot show results, it will impact your budget. Now that's the reality.

We are trying to eliminate needless paper work, simplify the processes, and allow you to get the best bang for the buck. And we are putting this agency's success, and likelihood of success in the future, in your hands.

But, in adopting the new systems, you need a new definition for the word *failure*. *Failure*, in this agency, is *not trying* to do your best and *not learning* when you are not successful and *not admitting* that it has not been successful.

Whenever I visit one of our missions, I read all the project papers and the evaluations. On a particular visit, I read a project paper and then I read the two-year evaluation: "Had a few problems getting it started. Still basically a good idea. Need to carry it out. We're going to get this going." Then I read the five-year evaluation: "Had a few problems getting it going. Still a good idea. We are going to carry this out." And then I read the seven year evaluation: "We really haven't gotten this going. It has not been successful. But, there are still a lot of farmers out here really dependent on what we are doing and we really need to carry this out."

We needed to make a decision before we were nine years out, that the

government and the people we were trying to sell an idea to were not ready for or no longer interested in our program. In this case, we either would have gotten something more done, or else we ought to have been putting that money to use more effectively elsewhere.

But reengineering is not going to change the fact that the budget numbers are going to slide up and down. What we have tended to do historically is hold onto programs too long. If money got tight on a five-year project, we made it six, or seven, or even eight years. We often slid

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***"We are trying to eliminate needless paper work, simplify the processes, and allow you to get the best bang for***

***the buck. And we are putting this agency's success, and likelihood of success in the future, in your hands."***

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When we talk about becoming a learning institution, we're talking about learning from what we've done. Try it. If it works, proceed, and make sure everybody else knows why it worked. If it doesn't work, go to a different idea. But learn from and document your efforts.

If you're going to encourage people to take risks, you have to realize that some number of those risks are not going to be successful. But if you hide the fact that it wasn't successful, 40 other people may be trying the same idea. And we need to make sure that does not happen.

This is as much about attitudes as approaches. This means saying to our partners that we really want you to be partners. And when you talk to the people in the experimental labs, what you learn is that they're getting great insight because they are working together and figuring out better ways.

programs out rather than cutting or modifying them. Given the reality of budget constraints, we are going to be asking much more what can you keep and where do you have to reduce or change your commitments. The new operating and management systems are designed to help us make those choices.

*Both the full version of this speech and Administrator Brian Atwood's introductory comments are available on video. For copies, contact Rolanda Savoy, LPA/MC, at (202)647-3910 or by e-mail: Rolanda.Savoy@LPA@AIDW.*

# Transition Guidance Cables Released

On October 1, 1995 the new operating procedures based upon the principles of reengineering became effective. A series of transition guidance cables (TGCs) has been released which provide additional guidance on transitioning to the new systems. The cables do not establish policies or change procedures, but simply aid in the transition from the old systems to the new. After cables were released, they were also sent as agency notices to ensure the widest distribution. Each has also been made available to the field on the EXONET, and in Washington on the electronic bulletin board system (BBS).

*The following is a list of each of the transition guidance cables released and a brief summary of their contents.*

**TGC #1: Rollout of the Reengineered USAID Systems**  
*State 214052, General Notice dated Sep. 11, 1995*

This first cable sets the tone and provides a general introduction to the reengineered systems. It announces the series of transition guidance cables and describes what the next steps will be.

**TGC # 2: Transition to Reengineered Operations Processes**

*State 221490, General Notice dated Sep. 20, 1995*  
Provides guidance regarding planning and implementing (achieving) USAID development assistance beginning October 1, 1995. The following topics are covered: strategic plans and management contracts; alignment of activities with strategic or special objectives; special objectives; reaching an understanding with customers and partners; new FY 1996 obligations; documentation required before obligation of funds; options for obligation and related documents; resource allocations; and teams.

**TGC # 3: NMS Infrastructure**

*State 221491, General Notice dated Sep. 27, 1995*  
The purpose of this notice is to provide information about the technical infrastructure required for the automated New Management Systems (NMS) and the current schedule for putting all the pieces in place.

**TGC # 4: New Management Systems (NMS) Applications Software**

*State 221492, General Notice dated Oct. 3, 1995*  
Provides applications information about the automated NMS to be implemented in FY 96 in support of the agency's key business practices.

**TGC # 5: Customer Service Planning**

*State 234428, General Notice dated Oct. 5, 1995*  
Provides guidelines, information, and contacts to assist USAID missions and offices in developing customer service planning.

**TGC # 6: Transition to Reengineered Operations Processes - Achieving**

*State 234430, General Notice dated Oct. 6, 1995*  
This cable acts as a supplement to the automated directives system (ADS) series 200 which replaced handbooks 2 and 3 and parts of handbooks 1, 4, 5 and 7. The impact of the core values on the operations systems is discussed as well as other changes in the operations system.

**TGC # 7: Results Framework Development**

*State 255335, General Notice dated October 25, 1995*  
Designed to assist operating units in transitioning to the new operating system described in ADS chapters 201 through 203. Guidance on developing strategic plans, results frameworks (RFs) and/or converting existing plans is provided. Bureau reengineering coordinators and agency subject matter experts are identified.

**TGC # 8: Automated Directives System (ADS)**

*General Notice dated October 25, 1995*  
This notice provides a descriptive explanation of what the ADS is and how it is structured. System improvements and future modifications are discussed.

**TGC # 9: Teamwork and USAID's Reengineered Operations System**

*State 255298, General Notice dated October 25, 1995*  
Its purpose is to assist operating units in planning and implementing human resource changes in the context of the reengineered operations system. Topics covered include: size and scope of teams; participation with partners and customers; team assignments and membership; organizational structure; team responsibilities; personnel evaluations; and, awards and incentives.

**TGC # 10: Performance Monitoring and Evaluation**

*State 255113, General Notice dated Nov. 1, 1995*  
Provides guidance and summarizes key aspects of the new performance monitoring and evaluation (PM&E) policies and procedures which became effective on October 1, 1995, as contained in section 203 of the ADS.

*This regular feature highlights the reengineering efforts of one or more of the labs. Each lab has worked on different areas of reengineering and is at a different stage of development. Comments featured below are adapted from the Bangladesh Reengineering Report # 4: Evaluation Findings, October 1995. The full report can be obtained by contacting Gary Robbins@PRO@DHAKA or Yvonne John@IRT@AIDW.*

## Bangladesh Team Members Reflect on the Design Process

### **Design Summary**

It took 28 months for the last major project design effort to go from USAID/W's approval of the project idea to the signing of the bilateral project agreement (May 15, 1992 to September 28, 1994).

From the day the experimental design team's charter was signed to the day the cooperative agreement was modified to begin implementation took only five and one-half months (April 13 to September 28, 1995). During this time, the team conducted an appraisal of its customers' democracy needs, issued a request for applications (RFA), competitively selected its partners, and, working with its partners, developed a results framework validated by the partnership's customers. It also prepared activities packages, a monitoring and assessment plan, a customer service plan, and operating principles for the partnership.

The pace of work was extreme and could only be sustained through effective teamwork including the use of sub-teams formed to address particular problems. Comments below reflect the views of the various USAID team members, as well as external partners regarding the new design process.

### **Member 1**

The experiment was a resounding success in that the partnership formed by USAID/Bangladesh, The Asia Foundation (TAF) and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee

(BRAC) developed, in less than six months, a plan in which it has a high degree of confidence. During this period, individual participants committed 50 to 100 per cent of their time to the partnership's work, depending on their role and nature of work. Even this was not enough, however. It was necessary to involve non-team members at two critical stages of the process—during the original customer focus work and later, when the results framework was validated with the partnerships' customers.

The mission didn't anticipate the very favorable impact its experiment would have on staff morale. The increased level of customer interaction forced the mission to exploit fully its human resource base. This meant including "support" staff in its field teams. Using rapid appraisal techniques (*See July issue of On Track*), normally quiet people came into the foreground and expressed themselves clearly and articulately. Our staff are now more knowledgeable about our democracy program and speak with more confidence about it, and their role within the mission.

Two related methodological issues need to be resolved: "Do customers really know what they want or need?" and "What is the role of outside experts?" Partners argued that responding only to stated customer needs could limit the development options, while others argued that it was the role of development specialists to work with customers to help them

understand their options. As to the role of outside experts, two outside facilitators were used and the partnership discussed its results framework with six Bangladeshi experts. While the partnership has a high level of confidence in its products, there is a nagging doubt about whether it engaged in sufficient consultation with "experts."

### **Member 2**

The experiment was an unqualified success, and the quality of the end product was improved immeasurably by the full participation of USAID's partners in the design process. Indeed, it calls into question why USAID would ever want to design a program without such participation. The team approach, by putting everyone on an equal level, is critical in getting this full participation. Simply getting outsider "inputs" is a far cry from this.

Secondly, the team approach need not be a time guzzler (a common concern of team "doubters") and, indeed, can ultimately save a lot of time if it operates properly. The various techniques to get issues quickly on the board, setting agendas with time frames and sticking to them, and the extensive use of small subteams are just three of the techniques that were used effectively.

Third, the "spin-off" effects, including, most notably, the impact on FSN morale, through the use of rapid appraisal techniques have been both amazing and surprising, as well as a clear demonstration to USAID that it has resources that it has not been using optimally. Also, it empowers the mission to find out for itself what is happening at the customer level without having to rely, as we usually

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do, on outsiders. As such, it is a real source of power and confidence builder for the mission.

Fourth, the design was accomplished in record time. But there were certain "costs" in this, including occasional and temporary "burn-out" by team members and possible insufficient time for the team to consult more outside "experts." These "problems," if they can even be labelled such, were certainly minor, and proceeding in the future at a slightly less frenetic pace should eliminate them altogether.

#### **Member 3**

From an individual perspective what makes the team excel are: a definite commitment from all to inherit the team's mandate; showing respect, tolerance and giving equal treatment/value to the views and contributions of others in the team; and, building an environment that fosters meaningful participation culminating in productive consensus on achieving results.

This equation, with the inclusion of other organizations, becomes evermore complex, posing tremendous challenges. Again, discipline and respect for each other as equal contributing members to the team/partnership process are of paramount importance.

At regular intervals the team must evaluate its performance and progress toward achieving the common goal. Another critical factor is having a group of people who possess the right blend of skills at the right time. When this is left to apt team leaders and facilitators in their capacity as team players, it can bring the team dynamics to its zenith, attaining the most desirable of results. The team with its

partners did just that, proving it, and in the process never lost sight of the four core values as the all important doctrine that made the difference.

#### **Members 4 & 5**

In the experimental approach, the most radical departure from the old way of project design was the direct interaction of USAID staff with the customers at two stages: first, to identify the customers' democracy needs; and, second, to validate the program results developed to ensure that they were an appropriate and adequate response. This was done deliberately, recognizing that for a sustainable development effort, involvement of the customers is essential right from the beginning. A by-product was the broadening of the team members' understanding of the democracy needs in Bangladesh

Another area of significant departure was the spirit of teamwork. Throughout, it was very clear to the team members that they had a common objective. As a result, each member contributed their best, completing their individual and group tasks within the assigned time frame. The team approach provided the first opportunity for three organizations (USAID, TAF, and BRAC) to work together for a common objective, despite differences in organizational objectives and procedures. The success of future design work will depend to a large extent on the inculcation of the value of teamwork.

It is heartening to the team members, hopefully to outsiders as well, to note that this new design process could be completed in only six months, especially when compared to the average time requirement of 28 months for previous project designs. This was possible only because all the team members were guided by a team spirit and high level of commitment.

All team members acknowledge the supportive role played by mission management in fostering an environment which enabled members to operate and complete the task within the stipulated time. In fact, this

operational freedom with appropriate empowerment is essential for effective operation.

#### **Member 6**

I support what my colleagues have said that this approach was an unqualified success. Additionally, during the negotiation phase, two of the NGOs noted how this is the way USAID should always conduct its assistance process. This was far better than letting the NGO design a program description in a vacuum and then having USAID critique the design and require revisions, etc.

Involving specialists in the process as team members, who aren't traditionally part of the design process, i.e., contracting, legal & controller personnel, from the initial concept through final agreement stage, facilitated the accomplishment of the tasks in record time, contributed to the quality of the deliverables and allowed cross-fertilization of knowledge among all team members that will be useful throughout implementation.

#### **Partner Comments**

The design exercise was distinctive in two important ways: it maintained a strong "customer" focus, with group members consulting customers prior to framing proposed results and again before designing activities packages; and secondly, the process successfully merged the perspectives and interests of three separate institutions.

The process was cumbersome due to the participation of three organizations and up to 25 individuals. However, the intensive collaboration set the stage for the partners to mutually administer the program during the next five years. Shared accountability for the documentation required for the agreement streamlined negotiations and helped to avoid a lengthy proposal review process, resulting in the cooperative agreement being finalized at unprecedented speed.

There was early concern about the extent to which the concept of customer focus is applicable to democ-

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# Reengineering: *The Latest in the Literature*

The concept of reengineering is not new to the business world. Many corporations and organizations have grappled with the very issues and concerns that USAID is currently undertaking. This regular feature provides a synopsis of some of the current literature on reengineering. For further details or for additional bibliographies, send E-mail requests to Learning Resources Center@HRDM.TSD@AIDW.



## ***"The Dream Team," by Oren Harari, published in Management Review/October 1995.***

The focus of this article is the same focus as much of the discussion within USAID as to what really constitutes a team. Is a team any different from a committee, workgroup or even offices that are often referred to as teams? The author confronts the fact that merely tacking the label "team" onto a group of people does not make it so. Because the literature is full of evidence of what real teams can accomplish we can set ourselves up for a lot of disappointment if our "teams" are not as successful.

Harari provides eight signs which can help identify if a group is really operating as a team: consensus; trust; candor; respect; caring; collaboration; meaningful recognition and rewards, and; team influence, authority and business connectedness. Within each of these areas the author provides very specific questions which aim to dissect carefully that aspect of team development, providing a basis for analyzing team effectiveness. The following excerpts are only a few of the detailed questions Harari suggests for team evaluation:

- Do you all agree on the team's vision and purpose: why it exists, where it's going, what it's trying to do, what its core priorities are? Or do these issues generate confusion and uncertainty, maybe even conflict among members?
- Do people feel a sense of ownership in the group...and, do they feel that this ownership is an important part of their work life? Or are they noncommittal, grudging participants, perhaps because they feel that membership in the group is irrelevant to their job performance, or perhaps because membership is mandated from above?
- Do people believe each other when communicating? Or are they a bit anxious that they are hearing partial truths and that hidden agendas exist?
- Do team members feel safe with each other, or are they wary of each other's motives?
- Can people be forthright with each other about problems the team faces? Or do they tend to pull their punches with each other, carefully sniffing the wind before communicating at all?
- Are people aware of the full array of each other's skills, experiences and expertise--including those that are not "officially" required by the job description? Or is there a myopic ignorance of people's full array of talents?
- Do people in the team try to make sure that every team member is included, that is, "in the know" and "in the

loop"? Or does a laissez-faire, "I'm-not-my-brother's-keeper" mentality prevail?

- Does top management trust and respect decisions made by the teams? Or does top management frequently second-guess and interfere in, or simply fail to pay attention to, the recommendations made by the teams?

The author emphasizes that these are ideals that a team should strive for, that a team is not put together in a static fashion, but must evolve and grow. He recommends using the dimensions he provides frequently to analyze your team performance. According to Harari, developing "real" teams is "a never-ending job, but the results are worth it."

## ***"Diverse Teams: Breakdown or Breakthrough?" by Lewis Brown Griggs and Lente-Louise Louw, published in Training and Development/October 1995.***

In many ways, this article addresses the exact kind of high performance teams that the agency envisions having as strategic objective teams, results teams, and other types of support teams. The author focuses on the issue of diversity as it is impacted in the four stages of team development, often referred to as *forming*, *storming*, *norming*, and *performing*. The importance of diversity is in the different talents and thought processes that team members can offer resulting in a synergism that can lead to high performance and breakthrough results.

Diversity is not defined by only race and ethnicity, but by "the full spectrum of differences represented in the general population: age, gender, class, culture, geography, religion, skills, intelligence, education, and looks." While all of these differences can lead to great results, it can also lead to serious problems if not managed carefully. The authors argue that in developing diverse, high-performance teams you are not following a strict guideline but operating more in a state of discovery. Team development takes time and skillful facilitation.

An excellent chart is provided which summarizes the characteristics evident in diverse teams across the four stages: initiating the relationship (*forming*); surfacing conflict (*storming*); forging a team (*norming*); and, leveraging differences (*performing*). On the same chart, corresponding skills required for each stage are provided.

The authors conclude that the challenge for high-performance, diverse teams is to be able to operate on three distinct but interrelated levels: as individuals, as integral team members; and as representatives of the larger organization.

## Additional Readings:

"Learning Organizations Evolve in New Directions," by Dominic Bencivenga, *HR Magazine*, October 1995.

"Design Work Teams to Increase Productivity and Satisfaction," by Michael A. Campion and A. Catherine Higgs, *HR Magazine*, October 1995.

"From Hierarchy to High Performance," by Charles Retts, *Training and Development*, October 1995.

"Realize Your Customer's Full Profit Potential," by Alan W.H. Grant and Leonard A. Schlesinger, *Harvard Business Review*, September-October 1995.

### CEL, Continued from page 5

racy programming, since strengthening democratic institutions and processes involves more than service delivery, and a program based on customer satisfaction risks ignoring, or circumventing, the democratic role of intermediary organizations. Ultimately, the partnership accommodated the customer paradigm through specifying that *customer focus*, as differentiated from *customer service*, was the objective, and deciding to support activities that *affect* customers, rather than only those that deliver services. The end product is a program that appropriately emphasizes local institutions and processes, while allowing flexibility to address structural and policy issues at higher levels.

# Sign Up for RFNET

The RFNET is an informal agency-wide electronic network designed to promote the transfer of field experience about *results frameworks* and *results packages*. As RFNET develops, more structure will be added, but initially all of those involved with results frameworks and packages are encouraged to provide other net subscribers information on the status of their effort, approaches followed, problems encountered, and suggestions to offer.

RFNET is one of many LISTPROC lists set up by IRM that provide structured bulletin boards for the exchange of information. Messages sent to the net are copied to all subscribers. In addition, an archive function is available that allows for access to background documents.

Before subscribing, consider how your office or mission wants to be linked to RFNET. All subscribers to RFNET will receive *all* communications. For those groups who want to limit the demand on their individual banyan E-mail systems, you may choose to have one or only a few subscribers who are then responsible for circulating material which is of particular interest to that group.

If you are interested in joining RFNET and are on the USAID Banyan LAN, send an E-mail message to:

ISMTP@BASA14029@SERVERS[LISTPROC@INFO.USDAID.GOV]. Leave the subject line blank and in the body of the message type the following: Subscribe RFNET-L Your Name. For example: Subscribe RFNET-L John Doe.

For more information about RFNET, contact Tony Pryor@AFRARTS.ROS@AIDW. Contact Craig Fisher@IRM.CLS.PTS@AIDW for general information about LISTPROC.

### Results, Continued from page 1

results. Out of this examination, the SO team will group results, funding and staff resources into RPs based upon logic, cost effectiveness and timing.

It is essential that the RP team identify and document experiences in achieving results, *and* to continue to ask whether the logic tying their results to the SO and the associated tactics and activities, in fact, remain valid. This may require the team to budget sufficient resources for this level of analysis.

The role of the SO team in monitoring the relevancy and efficiencies of results and their associated activities to the results framework across RPs is critical. Changing circumstances, including budgets, failed assumptions or new opportunities, require that the RF be reviewed for possible impact. Changes in the framework may lead to RP modifications.

And how do we go from existing projects to the new operating system? As outlined in the September *On Track* and *Transition Guidance Cables* numbers two, six and seven, the transition will vary. Operating units need to consider: the age of existing contracts or grants; whether obligating instruments are via government agreements or with NGOs; or, the willingness of partners to consider amendments and adaptations. An existing program that is relatively inflexible may require a more traditional management structure, whereas inherently flexible projects may offer opportunities to take full advantage of the benefits offered by the new systems.

*Tony Pryor was a member of the Intensive Reengineering Team (IRT). He has recently worked with a number of Africa Bureau missions on the development of results frameworks.*

# The Mailbag

*"What you always wanted to know about reengineering but were afraid to ask."*

*This section of the newsletter answers your specific questions. Questions or comments can be sent by e-mail, regular postal service, or scribbled on a napkin. Letters and questions can be submitted anonymously.*

*The questions below are some which have been submitted to and answered by Sher Plunkett, one of the Customer Service Representatives on the Results Oriented Reengineering team in M Bureau (M/ROR).*


**What is the difference between customer service standards and customer principles? In developing customer service plans (CSPs) do we need to state principles and standards and practices?**

As I see it, a customer service principle is a statement of service you intend to achieve. A standard is the measurable indicator for that principle. If your principle is, for example, "visit field sites frequently for feedback and adjustment of program," then your standard might be "visit each field site X times per month."

My favorite principle for management is simple: no surprises. Others are identifying clear and complementary roles; effective meetings; and clear, shared understandings of what we are trying to do.

The CSP is meant to be a working tool for your mission, office, or team and would normally include both principles and standards. Practices could be embodied in the standards or described separately, whatever makes sense for your situation and how you perceive your relationship with the customer.

**How is reengineering different from reorganization? Looking at the changes within the new operations system, we are wondering if we should reengineer our office/bureau.**



There is some useful discussion on this subject in Hammer and Stanton's *Reengineering Revolution* (pp. 17-18). You may want to insert the thought into your bureau/office

sessions that you do not reengineer offices or any organizational unit, because no unit is responsible for a whole process.

What you are in fact trying to reengineer is your work processes, to speed up their flow, improve their quality, and deliver services and products to your customers. If you only look at your current office and its functions, your work will be constrained by the demands of the people/offices whose work precedes, and follows, that of your office (so there are gaps in time and communication as the work is "handed over" from one office to another). And the scope for improving work processes will be limited.

If you center your discussions on your, and USAID's, objectives and the results you are trying to achieve with your work, you will then be able to trace the processes to your final customers (internal and external) through distinct linkages. You will also be able to identify clearly who has to play a role on your teams to make sure that all the elements are covered. Processes are not functions: they are the "what you do" vis-a-vis customers, not the "how you do it" of say, program/project/development/procurement/technical management, in the old functional management mode. Processes cross these functional boundaries to deliver work products to customers, drawing on the necessary skills and working together to do so.

Our best cultural model is probably the project design team, which used to pretty much disband once the project paper was drafted and sold. The idea now is to align teams toward results, and keep them involved and focused on those results on a continuous basis, using their complementary skills to make sure the result happens.

If you can't trace a work product to a customer, or it goes nowhere except around and around internally, you'd better drop it! It will be a big mistake to simply take for granted the current functional divisions of labor inside and outside your office, and then try to adjust work arrangements within the status quo. It will be frustrating, time-consuming, and unproductive--and it will distract you from the examination and realignment of critical work processes. *Relabeling an office does not make it a team.*

## ON TRACK

**Editor:** Karen I. Thornton

*All agency employees and associates are encouraged to contribute stories and ideas. Material can be submitted by postal service, e-mail, or through Internet.*

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