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EVALUATION

Kenya Tuna Uwezo: Final Performance Evaluation

USAID/Kenya and East Africa Office of Democracy,
Governance and Conflict

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Kenya Tuna Uwezo: Final Performance Evaluation

USAID/Kenya and East Africa Office of Democracy, Governance and Conflict

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Cover Photo

International Day of Peace celebrations held in Nairobi in September, 2015
Translation: Dumisha amani kataa uchochezi (Swahili for “maintain peace, resist manipulation”)

Photo: USAID

DISCLAIMER

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ACRONYMS

ADS	Automated Directives System
AOR	Agreement Officer's Representative
APP	Africa Peace Point
CBO	Community Based Organization
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CMM	Conflict Management and Mitigation
COP	Chief of Party
COR	Contracting Officer's Representative
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DCC	District County Commissioner
DGC	Office of Democracy, Governance and Conflict
DO	Development Objective
DPC	District Peace Committees
EW/ER	Early Warning/Early Response
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GI	Group Interview
GOK	Government of Kenya
HFF	Housing Finance Foundation
ICC	International Criminal Court
ID	Identification Card
IEBC	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
IEC	Information, Education and Communication
IR	Intermediate Result
IRI	International Republican Institute
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organizations
JCCP	Japan Center for Conflict Prevention
KII	Key Informant Interview
KMYA	Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance
KTU	Kenya Tuna Uwezo
MCA	Member of County Assembly

MSI	Management Systems International
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NSC	National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management
NYS	National Youth Service
PD	Program Description
PMP	Performance Management Plan
RF	Results Framework
RTA	Research Triangle Africa
SOW	Statement of Work
SDS	Sustainable Development Solutions
SUPKEM	Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims
TPM	Team Planning Meeting
TYB	The Youth Banner
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VE	Violent Extremism
YADEN	Youth Arts Development & Entrepreneurship Network
YYC	Yes Youth Can

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

A **performance evaluation** focuses on the following descriptive and normative questions:

- What a particular project or program has achieved (either at an intermediate point in execution or at the conclusion of an implementation period);
- How it is being implemented;
- How it is perceived and valued;
- Whether expected results are occurring; and
- Other questions that are pertinent to program design, management and operational decision-making.

Performance evaluations often incorporate before-and-after comparisons, but generally lack a rigorously defined counterfactual.

A **theory of change** describes the hypotheses through which activities will be transformed into results.¹ It is analogous to a USAID development hypothesis or project hypothesis.²

The **development hypothesis** identifies causal linkages between USAID actions and the intended strategic objective (highest-level result).

The **results framework** is a graphical representation of the development hypothesis and includes the country development cooperation strategy's (CDCS) goal, development objectives (DO), intermediate results (IR), sub-IRs and performance indicators. It includes any critical assumptions that must hold for the development hypothesis to lead to the relevant outcome. Typically, it is presented in graphic form and supplemented by narrative.³

Findings are empirical facts collected during the evaluation.

Conclusions are interpretations and judgments based on the findings.

Recommendations are proposed actions for management and are based on the conclusions.

Lessons learned are the conclusions extracted from reviewing a development program or activity by participants, managers, customers or evaluators with implications for effectively addressing similar issues/problems in another setting.

Youth in this report generally refers to people under age 35, as defined in the 2010 Constitution of Kenya.

¹ USAID Project Starter, <http://usaidprojectstarter.org/content/learning-pathway-1-integrating-evaluation-lessons-design>.

² USAID Technical Note: Developing Results Frameworks, July 2013.

³ USAID Automated Directives System (ADS) Glossary of Terms, Mar 30, 2014.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Evaluation Purpose and Evaluation Questions

This is a final performance evaluation of the Kenya Tuna Uwezo (KTU) Activity, which operated from February 2012 to April 2016 (Award Number: AID-623-A-12-00007). The evaluation is intended to assist USAID/Washington's Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) office and the Kenya East Africa (KEA) Mission to understand how and why KTU was effective.⁴ In addition, the evaluation seeks to inform Mission management about how to strategically address conflict in informal settlements through a combination of approaches, including countering violent extremism (CVE), in a more integrated way.

Project Background

Kenya has a long history of ethnic conflict centered on access to resources such as land and political power.⁵ Politicians use ethnicity in particular to produce, direct and support conflict to sustain their rule, promote their economic advancement and draw attention away from issues that threaten their position.⁶ Through KTU, USAID/KEA supported activities aimed at strengthening community cohesion and increasing civic awareness, particularly among youth, of the new constitution to empower informal settlement inhabitants to make informed, non-ethnically charged decisions and create opportunities for increased incomes.

USAID/KEA's goal behind KTU was to strengthen Nairobi's informal communities to withstand the political manipulation that leads to violent conflict. In eight Nairobi informal settlements and Eastleigh, KTU aimed to develop strong inter-community relationships around shared interests, ensuring an informed and engaged population. KTU therefore leveraged the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, which gives meaning to national values based on human dignity, expands the range of human rights available to citizens, particularly the most vulnerable groups, decentralizes decision-making authority, and sets in motion mechanisms for addressing citizen grievances. To achieve this, KTU focused on strengthening national, county and grassroots peace-building networks.⁷

Evaluation Methods and Limitations

This evaluation used qualitative data collection and analysis methods and triangulation across data collection methods and stakeholder perspectives to assess emerging trends and themes and to ensure the reliability and validity of findings. Primary data collection took place in Nairobi from July 20 to August 4, following a week of desk review of activity documents. The sample included eight of the nine KTU target communities. For phases 1 and 2, these were: Kiambiu, Kibera, Mathare and Korogocho. For Phase 2 only, they were: Kangemi, Mukuru, Eastleigh and Majengo. Dandora was not included in the sample, as it was not expected to yield substantively different data. Limitations included selection bias in the recommended interviewees for the evaluation and the mobilizers who arranged the interviews, and unavailability of some respondents for interviews. The Methodology and Limitations section further details this.

⁴ Statement of Work, Evaluation of the Kenya Tuna Uwezo Program in Kenya, p. 7

⁵ Mueller, S.D. The Political Economy of Kenya's Crisis: Journal of Eastern African Studies, May 2008

⁶ Ibid

⁷ Statement of Work, Evaluation of the Kenya Tuna Uwezo Program in Kenya, p. 6

Findings and Conclusions

As outlined in the evaluation Statement of Work, KTU was generally deemed a success. The evaluation, therefore, focused on understanding how and why KTU was effective.

Question 1: What factors facilitated or hindered the Kenya Tuna Uwezo activity's successes and failures, and how?

This evaluation question contained three sub-questions covering the effectiveness of the main approaches; the effectiveness of partnerships developed; and the activity's adaptability and flexibility. In all 47 evaluation interviews, respondents spoke about the *effectiveness of KTU approaches or activities* for achieving results, at least in the short term. KTU partners who were knowledgeable about the activity's pre-defined approaches could articulate how KTU applied the "do-no-harm" principle of conflict sensitivity, while others spoke to the same principle through examples, such as KTU conducting careful analysis of the context for a particular conflict.

Main beneficiaries, consultants, government and peace collaborators perceived shortcomings with the *livelihoods component* of the project. While positive examples of beneficiaries applying new skills and obtaining loans emerged, so did frustrations that the project did not provide more support. Beneficiaries' understanding, expectations and hopes for what KTU could provide were different from what was planned. Two sub-partners involved in *countering violent extremism (CVE)* programming indicated weaknesses with this component consistent with the short-term nature of the intervention.

All eight respondent groups, including all 18 interviews with community members (main beneficiaries, elders and religious leaders), identified *community ownership* as an important factor for KTU success.

Most respondent groups, including more than half of the main beneficiary groups interviewed, indicated that KTU was *inclusive and nonpartisan* in its approach, and felt that this facilitated the success of the activity. Government officials noted the importance of neutrality for securing stakeholder buy-in, while key beneficiaries indicated that having an inclusive approach was important for project credibility and effectiveness.

In 13 of 47 interviews respondents noted the *good use of local talent and resources* by KTU. However, respondents in nine of the interviews said KTU could have made better use of local resources, particularly local vendors.

Respondents in 38 interviews highlighted *KTU leadership* as an important factor for success. This included the selection of sub-partners and their comparative expertise; KTU staff's background in peace activities; KTU's knowledge of the communities; the personal dedication of KTU staff; KTU mentorship; KTU staff being good listeners; Global Community (GC)'s open-door policy (whereby community members were able to visit GC offices); good project planning and good identification of the issues; being solution-oriented; good communication; transparency and accountability; and showing appreciation for participants.

Respondents in 29 interviews also pointed to *KTU's flexibility and adaptability*. This included addressing challenges well; revising approaches/activities when needed; being responsive to community needs, including external events that could trigger conflict; expanding the activity scope and partnerships as needed; and emphasizing and incorporating learning.

Most respondent groups pointed to *positive relations in partnerships that had been developed during KTU*. This included relationships at all levels, vertical and horizontal. Challenges of securing *stakeholder buy-in*, *high stakeholder expectations* about what the activity could and could not offer, perceived bias with *participant mobilization*, and national-level *political and security developments* were generally managed well, according to respondents.

In conclusion, key factors that facilitated KTU's success were: an emphasis on community ownership/empowerment; being inclusive and nonpartisan; outstanding leadership; strong partnerships; and a high

degree of flexibility/ adaptability. Through persistence and expert knowledge of the operating environment, KTU effectively managed most of its internal and external challenges. KTU made progress in meeting all four of its objectives. However, evidence for the achievement of Phase 1 objectives (*Strengthened social networks of community members and civil society groups to collaborate productively on community issues and address grievances* and *Enhanced ability of local institutions to lead and implement people-to-people peace building independently*) is clearer than for Phase 2 objectives (*Address the pull and push factors that drive youth to engage in violent extremism* and *Reduce susceptibility to manipulation through supporting youth to engage in viable livelihoods*). Time was comparatively limited (approximately two years) to pursue Phase 2 objectives. The livelihoods component of the project did not fully meet beneficiary expectations. Beneficiaries did not appear to understand the limits of what KTU could offer under this component.

Question 2: To what extent and in what ways did the program involve and affect men and women?

This question examined how the activity involved women in particular, and whether and why it used different approaches to engage them. While the evaluation question references men and women, USAID confirmed during the evaluation in-brief meeting that the question should focus on women. The data collection instruments were designed accordingly. The evaluation also explored the overall effects of women's inclusion and the extent to which KTU took advantage of opportunities to include women and young men.

KTU involved both men and women; its planning documents refer to engaging women and youth, and include standard indicators for tracking female participation in the activity.⁸ KTU did not have a particular gender focus. Phase 2 included a deliberate effort to involve women in CVE activities, particularly Somali women in Eastleigh. Respondent groups identified efforts by KTU to include women in KTU activities. Examples included KTU being gender-conscious and developing a gender strategy; conducting women-specific activities; striving for gender balance in activities; and engaging female opinion leaders. Respondents also reported women's inclusion in empowerment activities for leadership and livelihood skills.⁹

On what informed the different approaches, several respondents identified *gender roles and culture* as an important consideration for how to engage women in programming. This included the observation that female attendance and participation was lower in mixed-gender activities compared to women-only activities; religious norms that restricted the mixing of men and women; a perception that peace is a male-dominated field; women's family/ parental obligations; and the related issue of timing of activities.

Nearly all respondent groups identified the *unique role that women play in conflict mitigation and community leadership as a factor for how to include women in KTU*. This is reflected in KTU design documents, which name women as key stakeholders and recognize their role in influencing youth with respect to violent extremism and viable livelihoods.¹⁰

On the effect of women's inclusion, respondents in more than half of the main beneficiary interviews and government official interviews reported that *women are playing a more active role in CMM and CVE*. Other respondent groups also commented favorably on this. Women were identified as an important source of information; being able to bridge the gap between youth and the police; and engaging other members of the community in activities and educating them on peace.

⁸ See, e.g., KTU 2012 Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP).

⁹ Under Objective 1 (*Strengthened social networks of community members and civil society groups to collaborate productively on community issues and address grievances*), KTU tracked the number of local women participating in a substantive role or position in a peacebuilding process supported with U.S. Government assistance. This is a standard (F) indicator.

¹⁰ See, e.g., KTU May 2014 work plan narrative.

Respondent groups said *KTU empowered women politically and/ or socially*. Examples included women being more interested in elected and non-elected leadership positions; being more confident and having a stronger voice in the community; and standing up for their rights and participating in community forums.

Main beneficiaries, government officials, sub-partners and GC reported that *KTU contributed to women's economic empowerment*. They cited examples of women engaged in alternative livelihoods, starting their own businesses and being less financially dependent on men. Government officials provided examples of women starting businesses as an alternative to other forms of income, such as commercial sex.

On emerging opportunities to include women, KTU organized events around international days like Women's Day, International Youth Day and International Peace Day. KTU made efforts to link women and youth to (new) government opportunities, in particular Uwezo funds¹¹ and government tenders and it linked women to emerging capacity-building opportunities. In addition to pre-planned initiatives, this included short-term engagement with other international implementing partners to supplement the support that KTU was able to provide.

In conclusion, KTU effectively involved women by identifying their unique needs — particularly including at-risk groups — and addressed these needs through targeted, female-only activities when appropriate. The involvement of women had individual and activity-level effects. At an individual level, women were politically, socially and economically empowered. At the community and activity levels, stakeholders became more knowledgeable about the roles of women (both positive and negative) in CMM and CVE; and women provided important information that can reduce conflict, narrowed the gap between youth and the police and engaged other members of the community in peace efforts. The involvement of women contributed to community learning and activity success.

Question 3: To what extent and in what ways will the activity's interventions be sustainable?

This question focused on the effectiveness of KTU's original sustainability planning and explored the target communities' perceptions about the extent and ways the activity's effects will affect the 2017 general elections.

KTU's design sought to ensure sustainability by building the capacity of community leaders and groups to work effectively with each other across ethnic lines. It also sought to build the technical and organizational capacities of the local implementing partners in program management, financial management, monitoring and evaluation, grant writing and technical areas such as conflict monitoring and rapid response.¹²

Some respondents — largely USAID, GC and sub-partners — reported that *KTU planned well for sustainability*. They spoke about KTU effectively building the capacities of sub-partners and communities; clearly communicating when the activity would end; linking beneficiaries to other resources that can be leveraged after KTU; and conducting livelihoods training. Nearly half of the main beneficiary groups interviewed, and some sub-partners, government representatives, religious leaders and peace collaborators *did not think KTU planned well for sustainability*. They observed that KTU did not effectively communicate its exit. Some respondents expressed fears that reformed youth are not prepared to sustain themselves after the exit of the activity, and that some had fallen back to their past lives.

¹¹ The Uwezo Fund, enacted in 2014, aims to enable access by women, youth and persons with disabilities to finances to promote businesses and enterprises at the constituency level. This enhances economic growth toward the realization of the same and the Millennium Development Goals No.1 (eradicate extreme poverty and hunger) and 3 (promote gender equality and empower women). <http://www.uwezo.go.ke/>

¹² KTU 2012 Program Description p. 11.

The majority of respondents indicated that *KTU prepared communities to resist political manipulation* ahead of the 2017 elections. They pointed to increased citizen awareness of their rights and the roles of elected leaders; the establishment or strengthening of structures and networks to mitigate and manage conflict (e.g., active cohesion champions, improved relations between community and police and use of social media for early warning/ early response); youth engaged in alternative livelihoods; and the application of other skills acquired, such as ongoing dialogue forums.

Despite measures to encourage sustainability, findings from the evaluation point to several risks to this effort. Respondents in most interviews pointed to *political instability* in the informal settlements as a risk to sustainability. They spoke about persisting negative ethnicity, tribal groupings re-emerging, criminal gangs forming around ethnic identities and continued political mobilization around ethnic lines. Most interview groups also identified underlying *economic vulnerability* as a risk to sustaining the progress that KTU made. Respondents spoke of low-paying irregular or casual employment, unemployment, lack of access to credit and limited ownership of productive assets. Some respondents said the *short activity duration* was a risk to sustainability. They indicated that the activity was generally too brief for a peace activity and was too short to institute (lasting) change.

Respondents pointed to *changing demographics in the informal settlements* as a risk to sustainability. They spoke of increased rural-urban migration; unemployed youth flowing into the informal settlements; a younger generation of youth joining gangs; and the memory of the 2007–08 post-election violence fading from people’s memory. Related to this, they indicated that some people who have been sensitized to peace programming are moving out of the settlements. Sub-partners, main beneficiaries and elders spoke of *increased insecurity* in the informal settlements. They pointed to more sophisticated crime; youth criminals who are more aggressive and use guns instead of knives; and criminals’ increased fearlessness. Related to increased insecurity, sub-partners, government respondents and main beneficiaries pointed to growing radicalization as a risk to sustainability. They observed that the methods, locations and age for recruiting youth into violent extremism are evolving.

In conclusion, KTU planned for sustainability by implementing its work through local organizations and individuals; improving the technical and organizational capacity of sub-grantees; creating links between communities and government agencies; and linking beneficiaries to resources and opportunities that they can leverage the KTU’s closure. However, its exit was not well communicated to the communities; hence, key beneficiaries did not feel prepared for KTU to end.

KTU effectively prepared communities to resist political manipulation. Target communities are more aware of their rights and more confident in their ability to resist manipulation; they are more engaged in alternative livelihoods; and structures are in place to mitigate conflict. The livelihoods component was a positive move toward bolstering the peace gains made during the activity. However, the short duration of this component is a risk to its sustainability. Underlying drivers of conflict (e.g., political instability and economic vulnerability) persist in the informal settlements. Together with changing demographics, this increased insecurity and growing radicalization, threatening to undermine KTU achievements in the targeted communities.

Recommendations

The evaluation generated important learning around CMM in the informal settlements that can guide future programming, both stand-alone and integrated into other types of activities. The evaluation team offers the following recommendations. These are detailed in the main report.

1. Future conflict-sensitive activities should integrate an alternative livelihoods component to the extent possible, or collaborate with other projects that have livelihoods as a main focus.
2. Drawing on the lessons of KTU, USAID should consider how to expand the involvement of other key stakeholder groups in future CMM programming, particularly women, elected leaders and government officials.

3. KTU took a CMM approach to CVE. This emphasized diagnosing the challenges and needs of the community before intervening, and remaining flexible throughout the project. Future CVE activities should apply a similar approach.
4. Future activities should offer psychosocial support for implementing partner staff.
5. Future activities should engage local talents and resources as much as possible. This promotes local ownership, sustainability and essential economic empowerment for the communities.
6. Future activities should have a clear sustainability plan. Project stakeholders should understand the plan and be involved in monitoring and evaluating its implementation. The plan should be updated as needed.
7. KTU provides key learning points for project stakeholders and future conflict-sensitive programming, including CVE. As part of the Mission's collaborating, learning and adapting (CLA) strategy and in line with the 2016 USAID Evaluation Utilization Study,¹³ USAID/KEA should consider how to share the KTU evaluation report and other KTU learning with key stakeholders.

NOTE: Annex I contains additional findings that are beyond the scope of the evaluation but offer important context for the evaluation and learning points for future activities.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Evaluation Purpose

Overall, the evaluation is meant to assist USAID/Washington's Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) Office and the Kenya East Africa (KEA) Mission to understand how and why KTU was effective. It generates important learning around conflict mitigation and management programming in informal settlements that can inform future programming, both stand-alone and integrated into other types of programming (e.g., elections). In addition, the evaluation seeks to inform Mission management about how to strategically address conflict in informal settlements through a combination of approaches, including countering violent extremism in a more integrated way.

The key audiences for this evaluation include USAID/Washington's Conflict Management and Mitigation Office, USAID/Kenya and East Africa (KEA), the Strategic Planning and Analysis Office, the Democracy, Governance and Conflict (DGC) Office and other technical teams. The evaluation also seeks to more broadly inform other donors, such as the UK Department for International Development (DfID), European Union, Danida, etc., on conflict-sensitive programming. The evaluation can be useful to the implementing partner Global Communities (GC) and its consortium of partners. USAID/KEA will share the final report with implementing partners, relevant government agencies (e.g., Ministry of Devolution & Planning, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, other government peace actors) and other peace actors (e.g., faith-based groups such as the National Council of Churches Kenya, Council of Imams, Interfaith Council, etc.) and KTU target communities. USAID/KEA anticipates this audience using the evaluation results to inform future conflict mitigation programs. Dissemination methods may include press releases, tailored reports or workshops; these should be planned in detail through an evaluation dissemination strategy created by USAID.

¹³ http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00KXVT.pdf

Evaluation Questions

Evaluation Question 1

What factors facilitated or hindered the Kenya Tuna Uwezo activity's successes and failures, and how?

In answering this question, the evaluation examined three things:

1. The **effectiveness of the main approaches** used to achieve the activity's stated goals and objectives. This included both pre-defined approaches (e.g., people-to-people) and approaches that were developed or evolved over the life of the activity.
2. The **effectiveness of partnerships developed** to support the realization of the activity's stated results. This included partnerships at every level – between the activity's implementing partners (IPs) and their subs and the Government of Kenya, community organizations, USAID, other donors, etc.
3. The **activity's adaptability and flexibility** throughout its duration and the factors that facilitated or hindered that.

Evaluation Question 2

To what extent and in what ways did the program involve and affect men and women?

In answering this question, the evaluation examined how men and women were involved in the activity, whether different approaches were used to engage them and why. The evaluation also explored the overall effects of their inclusion, including how it influenced the activity's successes. It examined the extent to which KTU took advantage of emerging opportunities for the inclusion of women.

Evaluation Question 3

To what extent and in what ways will the activity's interventions be sustainable?

In answering this question, the evaluation focused specifically on the effectiveness of KTU's original sustainability plans. The question also explore the target communities' perception about the extent to which and in what ways the activity's effects will affect the 2017 general elections.

The evaluation recommendations focus on lessons learned, bearing in mind the evaluation purpose. They therefore focus on constraints and opportunities for conflict-sensitive programming both as stand-alone activities and integrated into other activities.

ACTIVITY BACKGROUND

A brief background of the activity follows. The full activity background is in the evaluation statement of work (SOW), Annex 2 of this report.

Development Problem

Nairobi's informal settlements are a microcosm of the larger Kenyan society, where conflicts are largely caused and fueled by political manipulation of ethnic identities. Using this space, politicians incite informal settlement inhabitants to violence using pre-existing vulnerabilities such as poverty, inequity, poor service delivery, employment access limitations or underemployment, lack of education, perceptions around historical injustices, exclusion from decision-making organs, insecurity, etc.¹⁴

Unemployment and underemployment have been identified as key factors in violence in Nairobi's informal settlements. A study by Amnesty International¹⁵ observed that perpetrators of violence were mostly unemployed youth (mainly males) and men who are criminals individually or as part of groups or gangs. Because of this unmet need, violent extremism is a growing reality in Kenya, particularly in these settlements, as youth are recruited and manipulated into radicalism with a promise of employment and income to their families.¹⁶

These conditions are also rooted in widespread feelings of marginalization and alienation from the larger society. This sense of alienation and disenfranchisement leads informal settlement inhabitants to view themselves as existing outside formal structures. In response, they mobilize to provide for their own security and services, for which they charge high fees and often subvert attempts by others, including government, to provide the same services. These arrangements reduce community trust in the police and other government organs, creating dissent, which can lead to violence at the slightest provocation.¹⁷

Over the years, politicians have used such sentiments to establish political strongholds in the capital city by promising residents that their plight will be heard in Parliament and other executive offices if the politician wins election or re-election. Because of this hope and the feelings of vulnerability, residents will go to great lengths to support their candidates by any means, including violence against opponents.

Kenya's 2010 Constitution presents a crucial opportunity to address some issues at the core of violence and ethnic tensions, particularly in Nairobi's informal settlements, as it delinks political power from access to resources. However, limited knowledge of the new constitution and deep-seated divisions also make its implementation an opportunity for ethnic manipulation and conflict. Many informal settlement residents have never read or understood the articles of the constitution and therefore do not know their rights. This makes them susceptible to manipulation by politicians who tell them what is *supposedly* in the constitution, but is not actually there.

Issues of concern include political manipulation, ethnicization of politics, devolution, lack of access to essential basic services, countering violent extremism and other underlying causes of conflict in Nairobi's informal settlements. To address them and provide non-violent alternatives through KTU, USAID/KEA supported activities aimed at strengthening community cohesion and increasing civic awareness,

¹⁴ Omenya Alfred, Understanding the tipping point of urban conflict: the case of Nairobi, Kenya, May 2012.

¹⁵ Insecurity and Indignity: Women's Experiences in the Slums of Nairobi, Kenya, 2010.

¹⁶ Baseline Assessment Countering Violent Extremism in Eastleigh and Selected Informal Settlements (Kenya), Action Research Consultancy Services, January 2015.

¹⁷ Ibid.

particularly among youth, of the new constitution. This can empower informal settlement inhabitants to make informed, non-ethnically charged decisions and create opportunities for increased incomes.

USAID Activity Strategy and Tasks

USAID/KEA launched KTU (Award Number: CA. No AID-623-A-12-00007) to strengthen communities to counter violent extremism and withstand political manipulation that leads to violent conflict by increasing resilience and cohesion in communities experiencing conflict in Nairobi's informal settlements and Eastleigh. Global Communities (GC) was the lead implementing partner. GC had 12 sub-partners (see Annex 5 for an overview of sub-partner roles).

Target Areas and Groups

KTU was a two-phased activity. Phase I covered the four informal settlements of Kiambiu, Kibera, Mathare and Korogocho/ Babadogo. In 2014, building on the success in these four, the activity expanded its geographic reach to another five communities: Dandora, Kangemi, Majengo, Mukuru and Eastleigh. The activity targeted a wide range of stakeholders from a pool of new and pre-existing peace-building networks including international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community leaders, religious institutions and national and civic leaders, particularly women and youth group leaders, county government and other peace-building agencies and commissions.

Intended Results

USAID/KEA's goal behind KTU was to strengthen Nairobi's informal communities to withstand the political manipulation that leads to violent conflict. Using a people-to-people approach in eight Nairobi informal settlements and Eastleigh, KTU aimed to develop strong inter-community relationships around shared interests, ensuring an informed and engaged population. KTU therefore leveraged the 2010 Constitution, which gives meaning to national values based on human dignity, expands the range of human rights available to citizens (particularly the most vulnerable groups, e.g., women, persons with disabilities and marginalized ethnic groups), decentralizes decision-making authority and sets in motion mechanisms for addressing citizen grievances. To achieve this, KTU focused on strengthening national, county and grassroots peace-building networks.

Objectives

The KTU project description details the activity's objectives and expected results as the following.

Phase I (February 2012 – February 2014)

1. Strengthened social networks of community members and civil society groups to collaborate productively on community issues and address grievances and
2. Enhanced ability of local institutions to lead and implement people-to-people peace building independently.

These two objectives were met through delivery of the five following results:

- a. Increased grassroots demand for accountable and equitable service delivery in Nairobi's informal settlements;
- b. Enhanced knowledge and skills of community members and civil society in conflict mitigation;
- c. Improved ability of groups to communicate on issues that drive conflict;
- d. Increased capacity of local NGOs to provide services in support of conflict mitigation; and

- e. Increased services and solutions provided by duty bearers that address citizens' needs and grievances.

Building on this, Phase II (March 2014–April 2016) added the following two strategic objectives:

1. Address the pull and push factors that drive youth to engage in violent extremism and
2. Reduce susceptibility to manipulation through supporting youth to engage in viable livelihoods.

EVALUATION METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

KTU's final performance evaluation sought to understand how and why KTU was effective to inform Mission management about how to strategically address conflict in informal settlements. Using the methodology framework described in the KTU evaluation SOW (Annex 2) as a reference, the evaluation team refined the methodology during its team planning meeting (TPM) July 11–16, 2016. Based on feedback from USAID provided during a July 18 meeting and in writing, the team revised the work plan and instruments, which USAID approved on July 19. The approved documents are in annexes 3 (Final Work Plan) and 4 (Data Collection Instruments).

Data collection lasted from July 20 to August 4. The sample included eight of nine KTU target communities. For phases 1 and 2, these were: Kiambiu, Kibera, Mathare and Korogocho. For Phase 2 only, these were: Kangemi, Mukuru, Eastleigh and Majengo. Dandora was not included in the sample, as it was not expected to yield substantively different data from Kangemi.

Data analysis took place August 5–13, followed by a validation meeting with USAID/KEA and GC on August 22 and a formal presentation to USAID/KEA on August 25. Report drafting took place August 25–31 under the direction of the team leader.

The evaluation team consisted of team leader Katherine Vittum and local experts Otieno Ombok, Kenneth Odary and Gloria Mmoji. Abridged biographies of the evaluation team members are in Annex 10. USAID and GC assisted the team with identifying and contacting individuals for interviews, as well as compiling a complete list of KTU documents for review.

Given the nature of the evaluation questions and the stakeholders involved, this evaluation used qualitative data collection and analysis methods. Qualitative methodologies are the most appropriate because they facilitate acquisition of rich detail regarding how and why things happened or did not and triangulation across perspectives to assess emerging trends and themes. They allow exploration of the processes behind the results, which is what interests USAID in this evaluation.

Data Collection Methods and Sources

The evaluation SOW includes detailed description of data collection, analysis and sampling methods by evaluation question. While the evaluation team refined this methodology, it did not make major changes. A summary of methods used and data sources follows. The specific collection methodologies used include secondary data review, key informant interviews (KIIs) and group interviews (GIs).

For the desk review, the evaluation team reviewed all activity documentation provided by USAID and GC, as well as additional resources obtained online from stakeholders and from evaluation team members' own libraries that were relevant to the activity efforts, including CVE.

Secondary documents reviewed include the following: activity award and modifications; activity descriptions, work plans, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plans, performance reviews, baselines and assessments, mid-term review and evaluation and periodic progress reports. Annex 7 contains a list of the key documents reviewed.

Findings from the initial document review identified information needed to completely answer each evaluation question and guide discussions about sources for that information. Those discussions helped shape both the list of individuals to be interviewed and the semi-structured interview guides.

To determine interviewees, the team began with the list of organizations and titles included in the SOW and consulted with both the USAID officers commissioning the evaluation and GC to identify, locate and schedule KIs and GIs. During the two weeks of data collection, the team conducted 47 interviews (21 KIs and 26 GIs) with 191 total respondents (103 women and 88 men). A full list of interviewees is in Annex 6.

The 47 interviews included: 16 with main beneficiaries, 13 with government officials, 9 with sub-partners (six with sub-grantees and three with consultants), 5 with peace collaborators and 1 each with USAID, GC, elders and religious leaders.

Data Analysis Methods

Data analysis methods included content analysis, comparison and mixed-methods data integration.

The evaluation team integrated information from the desk review, KIs and GIs by evaluation question to identify common trends and themes related to KTU's performance, as well as feedback on how to strategically address conflict in informal settlements. Preliminary data analysis began during the fieldwork to ensure that the team was capturing the information necessary to fully address the evaluation questions.

During data collection, the team held weekly debriefings to identify common themes among interviews by evaluation question. The team refined these themes as it progressed through data collection. After completing data collection, the team reviewed all interview notes to finalize the list of key themes, which it used to code each set of interview notes. With coding completed, the team analyzed the interview data using content analysis and pattern analysis in gathering and comparing the perspectives of various stakeholder groups to answer the evaluation questions. A tally sheet was used to conduct content and pattern analysis of key themes. The tally sheet captures the frequency of key themes and underlying evidence from the interview notes.

Respondents fell into eight categories:

1. USAID/KEA staff;
2. Global Communities staff;
3. KTU sub-partners (six sub-grantees: Peacenet; Kituo Cha Sheria; The Youth Banner/TYB; Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims/SUPKEM; Youth Arts Development and Entrepreneurship Network/YADEN; and Housing Finance Foundation/HFF; six consultants: Kenya Youth Muslim Alliance/KYMA; Usalama Reforms Forum; Research Triangle Africa/RTA; Africa Peace Point/APP; and Action Research);
4. Government officials: chiefs, police, National Steering Committee (NSC), District County Commissioner (DCC), members of county assemblies (MCAs);
5. Peace Collaborators:¹⁸ National Democratic Institute (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI), Yes Youth Can (YYC) and District Peace Committee (DPC);

¹⁸ These respondents are listed in the evaluation statement of work as "key peace actors" (YYC), "other key peace collaborators" (NDI, IRI) and "key staff or members" for group interviews (DPCs).

6. Main beneficiaries:¹⁹ youth groups, youth leaders, youth reformists, women's groups, women leaders, cohesion champions and volunteers;
7. Community elders; and
8. Religious leaders: pastors and sheikhs.

The Findings and Conclusions section of this report uses the term “communities” to include main beneficiaries, community elders and religious leaders. The term “stakeholders” includes communities as well as sub-partners, government officials and peace collaborators. While USAID is also a stakeholder, it is not categorized as such in the evaluation methodology.

The team looked for areas of convergence and investigated divergent and unique perspectives to assess whether they merited consideration in the analysis. For the content analysis of secondary sources reviewed, the team used a process developed by Management Systems International (MSI) called “Answering Questions with Background Documents” and organized findings by theme and sub-themes for each evaluation question. The evaluation team then compared and triangulated key pieces of evidence from the various interviews and documents to identify the main evaluation findings that responded to each question. In some cases, the team used secondary sources to identify KTU activities, results and definitions and drew upon findings from the interviews to flesh out the complete answers to the evaluation questions.

The evaluation acknowledges that responses across the respondent groups cannot be weighted equally, considering the level and role of engagement with KTU and CMM/CVE. Also, the respondents answered different questions, depending on their capacity to respond to the evaluation sub-questions. Consequently, the evaluation analyzed the information collected in light of the extent of each source's experience with KTU. As such, where percentages or precise numbers could be misleading, the report focuses on substantive significance rather than on quantitative figures.

Limitations

As with any assessment or evaluation, the team experienced a few limitations that it addressed through various methodological approaches. First, selection bias existed in the form of contacts provided by USAID/KEA and GC, which meant the team likely heard from respondents with positive experiences. Use of various (primary and secondary) data sources triangulated the findings in an attempt to minimize the effects of this bias.

Second, three respondents were unavailable for their respective interviews: representatives from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), IEBC and a youth group affiliated with Tawakal Medical Center.²⁰ Similarly, group interviews for police and chiefs had two participants each, missing the initial target of five, which resulted from unavailability of the targeted respondents. This limited the views available from government officials. The respondent from the National Youth Service (NYS) was expected to provide a government perspective on KTU. However, she was only temporarily affiliated with NYS and is not a government official. She did provide valuable information as a cohesion champion and project beneficiary.

Third, since no control group existed for impact assessment, the evaluation was not designed to determine with certainty whether any changes in the use of non-violent conflict-solving mechanisms within Nairobi's informal settlements can be specifically and directly attributed to KTU. The effect of the activity on maintaining peace can be measured only in nominal terms, considering that other players supported peace

¹⁹ The main beneficiaries interviewed were representative of the eight informal settlements that were part of the evaluation.

²⁰ Further explanations of the limitations are in Annex 8.

processes during the pre- and post-2013 election period in the same conflict zones where KTU implemented interventions. However, through triangulation across various data sources, the team attempted to correlate the extent to which changes in these communities related to KTU's interventions.

Fourth, during data analysis, the evaluation team identified discrepancies between the objectives section of the SOW and the approved performance management plans (PMPs) for KTU. The SOW identifies four objectives and five intermediate results (IRs).²¹ However, the approved 2012 PMP for KTU includes four IRs (three that match the SOW and one that does not). Further, the 2014 PMP includes sub-IRs but not IRs. Annex 8 contains a table with this information and further details on this limitation.

The most effective approach for combating any and all of these biases was using multiple layers of triangulation. By combining information found in documents and interviews from multiple sources, any one piece of biased data did not unduly skew the analysis. The use of different data collection methodologies (group and individual interviews) and researcher triangulation to ensure the reliability and validity of results supported this.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The findings and conclusions are organized by the three evaluation questions.

Question 1

What factors facilitated or hindered the Kenya Tuna Uwezo activity's successes and failures, and how?

In answering this question, the evaluation team examined three things in particular:

1. The *effectiveness of the main approaches* used to achieve the activity's stated goals and objectives.²² This includes both pre-defined approaches (e.g., people-to-people) as well as approaches that developed or evolved over the life of the activity.
2. The *effectiveness of partnerships* developed to support the realization of the activity's stated results. This includes partnerships at every level — between the activity's implementing partners (IPs) and their subs and the Government of Kenya, community organizations, USAID, other donors, etc.
3. The *activity's adaptability and flexibility* throughout its duration and the factors that facilitated or hindered that.

Findings

This question contains three sub-questions. The findings are organized by sub-question. Sub-section 1.4 includes additional factors that facilitated or hindered activity success.

1.1. Effectiveness of the Main Approaches

For this evaluation, “approaches” refers to formal and informal approaches, methods and tactics used by KTU. Some of these were pre-defined and others evolved over the life of the activity. USAID was keen to

²¹ Also known as “expected results.”

²² Statement of Work, Evaluation of the Kenya Tuna Uwezo Program in Kenya, p. 7.

have the evaluation explore the “soft approaches” that KTU used to achieve results, especially those outside of the activity design and those that may not have been explicit in the proposal.

All respondent groups addressed this line of questioning. The findings cover respondents’ opinions about KTU’s approaches, their perceptions of what did and did not work well and how the project affected individual stakeholders and the community. The findings also reflect information in secondary literature reviewed for the evaluation.

KTU operated under the people-to-people principle that “for Kenya to move toward a lasting and positive peace, distrust and division among ethnic groups must be replaced by civil dialogue and trust.” KTU used a combination of approaches, including single and cross-identity dialogues; messaging on the importance of cohesion and tolerance; capacity building and conflict management and mitigation; and civic education. Each of these was based on conflict-sensitive and do-no-harm principles. The mainstreaming of livelihoods training, business skills development and activities to counter violent extremism in Phase 2 were treated as an expansion of KTU’s conflict-mitigation focus.

Perceptions of Kenya Tuna Uwezo’s Achievement

In all 47 evaluation interviews, respondents spoke about the effectiveness of KTU’s approaches or activities for achieving results, at least in the short term. This was expressed in different ways; for example, KTU partners who were knowledgeable about KTU’s pre-defined approaches could articulate how KTU applied the “do-no-harm” principle of conflict sensitivity, while other respondents spoke to the same principle through examples, such as KTU conducting careful analysis of the context for particular conflict. The respondent examples below are in line with the intended results and objectives of KTU.²³

With respect to the *improved ability of groups to communicate on issues that drive conflict*, diverse respondents highlighted the effectiveness of dialogue for resolving issues. For example, a government official expressed that cross-identity dialogues allowed participants to unburden themselves and that they were not willing to leave the table without a solution to the issue. Similarly, a sub-partner said countering violent extremism (CVE) has become a regular part of talks in one community, and business groups are now discussing the importance of remaining independent and not falling victim to radicalization. Little discussion of CVE transpired prior to KTU. Interviewees also frequently mentioned examples of improved cohesion — in particular between the community and police — as a result of KTU interventions. KTU activity reports capture this well.

Respondents provided examples of *enhanced knowledge and skills of community members and civil society in conflict mitigation*. For instance, a government respondent said communities have been left with skills such as early warning and early response and they know how to identify and report on conflict.

In terms of *grassroots demand for improved service delivery and improved services and solutions by duty bearers*, respondents reported that citizens are more aware of their rights and more likely to demand for these rights; a sub-grantee observed that members of the local administration involved in KTU have changed their approach to use softer language that is less patronizing.

KTU identified the lack of *viable livelihoods* as a push factor for violent extremism. At the end of Phase I, the activity introduced an alternative livelihoods component designed to reduce susceptibility to

23 The Limitations section of this report (Annex 8) identifies the differences in the activity results frameworks as presented in the SOW of the evaluation and the approved performance management plans (PMPs) for KTU. The findings and conclusions related to evaluation questions 1.1 (regarding the effectiveness of the main approaches to achieve the activity’s stated goals and objectives) and 1.2 (regarding the effectiveness of partnerships developed to support the realization of stated results) should be read with this limitation in mind.

manipulation. KTU sub-partner TYB delivered this component, providing support for business development and entrepreneurship to youth who had skills and passion for the arts and other alternative livelihoods. To complement this effort, another sub-partner, Housing Finance Foundation (HFF), provided skills enhancement support for vocations such as plumbing and electrical work in the final year of KTU. In total, approximately USD \$627,000 of the USD \$4.91 million budget (less than 1 percent) was allocated for livelihood activities under KTU.

KTU documents and respondent interviews indicate that some groups have been economically empowered through the livelihood activities, and are hopeful that this is a sign they will continue legitimate economic pursuits rather than return to criminal behavior. For instance, volunteers noted that some youth are applying for loans, have made significant advancements in their lives, and are now able to run businesses.

Approach/Activity Challenges

Livelihoods component. Main beneficiaries, consultants, government and peace collaborators perceived shortcomings with the livelihoods component of the project. While there were positive examples of beneficiaries applying new skills and obtaining loans, there were also frustrations that the project did not provide more support.

For instance, beneficiaries felt that the two-week vocational training by HFF was too short; that TYB did not deliver on the “promise” of loans; and that KTU did not always reply to proposals ideas. It is important to note that, in fact, KTU did not have any plan or promise of loans, and that HFF aimed to provide skill *enhancement* rather than skill *development*. Nonetheless, beneficiary understanding, expectations and hopes for what KTU could provide were different.²⁴ One respondent articulated the frustration, saying that she used to make a lot of money through illegal activities and hoped that KTU could offer an alternative, but “instead they left me idle and vulnerable to past criminal ways.” Similarly, a government official, describing the desire of people in the informal settlements to escape poverty, lamented that KTU provided empowerment, but not the funds to launch enterprises. GC fully acknowledged these frustrations and reported that it would have been preferable to have a more robust livelihoods component.

CVE programming. CVE programming was introduced in Phase 2 as a pilot effort to address factors that drive people toward radicalization. Two sub-partners involved in CVE indicated weaknesses with this component consistent with the short-term nature of the intervention. One partner noted that CVE was outside the original activity mandate and that it took time to identify expertise and begin implementing activities. The same respondent reported that planning for CVE was ad hoc and suggested little progress relative to the efforts made. Similarly, the second sub-partner said implementing CVE in Eastleigh and Majengo was “just a scratch on the surface,” adding, “They just applied a bandage on a cancerous wound.”

Community Ownership

All eight respondent groups, including all 18 interviews with community members (main beneficiaries, elders and religious leaders) identified community ownership as an important factor for KTU success. Examples of ownership included communities understanding the activity goals: identifying their own needs; driving the agenda; taking the lead in delivering project activities; and the cultural appropriateness of KTU approaches and activities (e.g. KTU used sports to build community cohesion and music to deliver messaging on countering violent extremism.)

²⁴ TYB did have a loan activity separate from KTU. Respondents may have conflated the two initiatives.

Several respondents expressed that KTU provided the necessary *platform* for communities to address their needs. For instance, volunteers reported that KTU provided support when needed, but the community led and facilitated the process. Similarly, youth leaders reported that the community felt like the process “was their thing,” with the community telling KTU what they wanted and leading the process without KTU imposing its own ideas. A sub-partner described how KTU involved the community from inception to reporting, saying the community did 80 percent of the work through volunteerism and other efforts, while KTU did 20 percent.

Inclusive, Non-Partisan

The direct beneficiaries of KTU were at-risk groups with a special focus on youth and (in Phase 2) women. While KTU had specific target groups, most categories of respondents, including more than half of the main beneficiary groups interviewed, indicated that KTU was inclusive and nonpartisan in its approach and said this facilitated the success of the activity. USAID, communities, government officials and peace collaborators provided various examples of KTU being inclusive, fair and neutral.

Government officials noted the importance of neutrality for securing stakeholder buy-in. One official said, “[The] community accepts KTU as a key partner because the issues they address are not political.” Another noted that KTU and USAID’s perceived neutrality aided in people registering for a national identity card²⁵ in Korogocho. Key beneficiaries indicated that having an inclusive approach was important for project credibility and effectiveness. Youth groups in Kangemi commended KTU’s ability to bring together diverse state and non-state actors for dialogue, noting that everyone was brought on the same level, and that there were “no issues of big fish and small fish.” Religious leaders also reported that KTU managed to set a tone of political neutrality, whereby “even” politicians who participated in KTU forums identified as individuals rather than as members of a political party.

Use of Local Talent/Resources

KTU was designed to be community-led in order to build trust among potential adversaries to mitigate conflict, and to sustain the gains made during the activity. In 13 of the 47 interviews, respondents noted good use of local talent and resources by KTU. This included the use of cohesion champions, change agents (many of whom were former criminals and gang members) and other local leaders and experts; use of community radio for programming and messaging; and use of community halls, local vendors and local police to support project activities.

Respondents particularly appreciated KTU’s use of community members to implement activities, “*sio watu wa ku-come*” (Sheng²⁶ for “not people from the outside”). They described change agents, trainers, facilitators and resource persons who knew their communities and the issues at hand best. One respondent commented that the most effective approach was using local youth, elders and religious leaders, noting, “Even if there is money or no money I will follow him, unlike if a stranger said this.” A government respondent underscored this point, saying that the use of change agents brought an element of credibility and legitimacy to the project, given their local knowledge and expertise. Beneficiaries also valued KTU’s recognition of local up-and-coming artists and musicians as part of mobilization efforts, instead of engaging known celebrities.

While respondents generally spoke favorably about KTU’s use of local talent and resources, they mentioned shortcomings in nine interviews. These largely revolved around perceived inflexibility with USAID/ KTU procurement policies and the use of outside facilitators, vendors and police to support KTU activities in some cases. Respondents noted the important economic benefit to the local community when

²⁵ A national ID is required for employment, receiving government services, banking, voting and other civic activities in Kenya.

²⁶ A Swahili-based street slang, perhaps a mixed language or creole, originating among the urban underclass of Nairobi, Kenya.

local resources were used and expressed frustration that this was not always possible. KTU staff were well aware of these concerns. They identified the need for policies that reflect the realities of working in poor communities and noted some success in obtaining USAID procurement waivers.

KTU Branding/Visibility

Most respondent groups, including most main beneficiary groups, provided positive feedback on the KTU brand or activity visibility. This included favorable references to KTU-branded information, education and communication (IEC) materials; pride in the KTU brand; and the motivating impact of community visits and recognition by prominent people.

USAID and Global Communities staff noted stakeholder sensitivities to the USAID brand given the nature of the activity. The Mission issued USAID branding waivers to KTU and described the name Kenya Tuna Uwezo — Kiswahili for “We have the power” — as a “game changer,” allowing the activity to penetrate the communities.

Main beneficiaries said the KTU brand was powerful for promoting peace, brought them confidence and made them “feel like Kenyans,” while communities embraced the message. Elders noted that nearly all households have a KTU T-shirt, and youth groups in Mukuru remarked that the branded *kikois* (lessos)²⁷ were a special attraction for women and encouraged them to attend KTU events. Women’s groups from Mukuru also noted that having t-shirts that said, “From the American People” was very powerful in that community. Diverse groups of respondents also noted the feel-good effect that high-level visits had on the communities. One beneficiary recalled meeting U.S. President Barack Obama; sub-partners noted the importance of having the face of the donor in the community, and felt that visits by the U.S. ambassador to Kenya helped institutionalize memory and add weight to the activity.

1.2. Effectiveness of Partnerships Developed

This sub-question examines the effectiveness of the partnerships developed to support the realization of the activity’s stated results.²⁸ It includes partnerships at all levels, both horizontal and vertical. All respondent groups spoke about partnerships. The findings are presented with consideration to which partnerships — and related topics — the various respondent groups were familiar with.

Global Communities’ Relations with Its Sub-Partners

KTU had 12 sub-partners, comprising six sub-grantees and six consultant partners.²⁹ Annex 5 contains an overview of the roles of sub-partners. Nine interviews incorporated all 12 sub-partners; the six sub-grantees responded as KIIs and the six consultants were largely included in group interviews. In eight of the nine sub-partner interviews, sub-partners described GC as providing strong support; being open to their views and proposals; meeting and working “as a family”; having confidence in what sub-partners were doing; and addressing challenges head on. One partner said, “The partnership was a partnership for life. ... It was mutually beneficial and we hope to continue working for good for a long time.” Other respondent groups also commented on GC’s strong relations with its sub-partners. USAID described coherency and transparency in the team, and noted that when a particular sub-partner struggled due to high staff turnover, GC stepped in and took up the burden itself, allowing the partner to focus on its work. A group

27 Sarong popular with women in informal settlements and rural communities and at the coast, often with messages printed on it.

28 USAID clarified this to mean IRs contained in the activity work plans. Please refer to the Methodology and Limitations section of this report.

29 The sub-grantees were Peacenet; Kituo Cha Sheria; The Youth Banner (TYB); Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM); Youth Arts Development and Entrepreneurship Network (YADEN); and Housing Finance Foundation (HFF). The consultants were Sustainable Development Solutions (SDS); Kenya Youth Muslim Alliance (KYMA); Usalama Reforms Forum; Research Triangle Africa (RTA); Africa Peace Point (APP); and Action Research.

in Kangemi said, “GC and sub-partners were all KTU, [you] couldn’t tell the difference. Other projects should emulate that.” GC echoed this point, noting that this unity helped ensure that communities could not manipulate KTU partners.

However, one sub-partner reported challenges with the partnership. The partner had been implementing activities in the community prior to KTU and described differences in organizational goals and policies that have affected how that organization continues to work in the community. The main example had to do with financial allowances. The respondent reported that GC introduced a culture of paying “stipends” to participants that the partner cannot afford to maintain after KTU. They called this “counterproductive,” adding that other INGOs have continued the same practice.

Kenya Tuna Uwezo-Government Relations

Nearly all government respondent interviews (12 of 13) and most main beneficiary interviews (11 of 16) indicated positive relations between KTU and the Government of Kenya (GOK), including local administration. Respondents said the government was well informed and involved in KTU activities; that government support gave KTU legitimacy and facilitated access to the communities; that KTU showed respect for government interlocutors; and described the success of KTU in creating opportunities for GOK and community engagement.

Respondents underscored the role that GOK played in easing KTU’s access to the communities, noting that it would have been “impossible” for KTU to operate without GOK endorsement. Several respondent groups also described the platform that KTU created for community and the local administration to engage more effectively, and said relations — in particular between the community and police — had improved as a result. For example, youth groups in Kangemi noted that police are now able to see that other, non-state actors are complementing their work; not competing with them. A group of youth reformists noted, “We got a platform to exchange numbers with them. . . . Police would just call us if they have identified youths that are involved in criminal activities and tell us to talk to them. This was different from before when they would just shoot these youngsters.” Cohesion champions reported that working with government created linkages that are important even after KTU has ended.

Government respondents indicated that KTU had made its work easier, e.g., by arranging dialogue forums and other activities that government did not have resources for. The National Youth Service (NYS) reported, “KTU contributed to NYS and not the other way around as it [KTU] found youths who have already reformed, which created easier entry for NYS.”

The common challenges identified in working with the GOK included: general bureaucracy in government institutions and related protocol considerations; expectations by some officials of financial incentives for participation; and frequent police transfers, which required communities to re-establish relations with newly deployed police officers. Some government officials also expressed a desire to be more involved in KTU. For example, one respondent indicated that KTU could have involved law enforcement officers earlier to inform the activity’s approach on CVE. Youth reformists presented a discouraging picture, reporting that some police saw KTU beneficiaries as “sellouts” and retaliated against them, and that police “pretended during KTU but reverted back to their true colors after the program ended,” suggesting that police were not genuinely committed to KTU.

Kenya Tuna Uwezo-Community Relations

Most interviews revealed positive relations between KTU and communities/community organizations and indicated that this facilitated project success. Challenges were noted in just five of 47 interviews.

Most respondent groups described KTU as working well through and with community organizations that had skills, networks and inroads in the informal settlements. Respondents noted that KTU built trust with the community, identified existing local expertise and helped communities recognize their own resources and capacity to address community issues. Government officials reported that KTU had a feel of the ground and was able to reach people in a way that government could not, and that communities were

happy with KTU and asked for an extension of the activity. Reported effects of the strong partnership with communities included improved community exposure to other like-minded individuals and programs and improved relationships among the government, local administration and the community. Youth from Eastleigh/Majengo in particular noted that KTU helped government officials better understand CVE and allowed youth to speak more freely about this and other issues without fear of arrest.

The extent of the collaboration varied by community. For example, Kiambiu and Mukuru had examples of working through community-based organizations (CBOs) to deliver activities; while Majengo indicated a perception that it was more difficult to work through CBOs at an institutional level, so KTU worked with like-minded individuals from CBOs and other groups.

Challenges with KTU-community relations identified by main beneficiaries, peace collaborators and a KTU consultant included a perception that KTU did not sufficiently involve local organizations in activity design and implementation; “poached” the best people from local CBOs; and relied on CBOs for mobilization but not substantive input. In one interview with sub-partners, respondents said the greatest weakness of KTU was the belief that earlier peace initiatives that had been implemented in the informal settlements had failed, instead of recognizing that some efforts had worked at a micro level and needed to be built upon.

Global Communities-USAID Relations

GC and USAID reported a strong working relationship during the implementation of KTU. GC staff appreciated that USAID and the U.S. Embassy showed interest in the activity, made field visits to meet with communities and participated in the activities, and that USAID communicated its confidence in the KTU team. USAID staff said, “They [USAID and GC] enjoyed mutual respect. They [GC] were flexible to USAID requests; a lot had to do with the management of the activity and the staff.” USAID also noted the appreciation that the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) in Washington had for the activity, saying, “They call KTU their poster program.”

KTU Relations with Other Activities/Projects

Most respondent groups pointed to positive relations between KTU and other projects. They referenced KTU creating linkages and synergies, and having complementarity with other projects, both funded by the U.S. Government and independent, working in the informal settlements. They also noted the emphasis that USAID placed on coordination with other USAID-funded activities.

KTU partnered informally with other USAID implementers, including the National Democratic Institute (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI) and United States Institute of Peace (USIP), on civic education and women-specific training initiatives. USAID and other respondents noted that the collaboration was good and wished it had started earlier. IRI stated, “USAID kept stressing the importance of synergy within the grantees and we are a product of that stressing.” Respondents also pointed to positive relations with non-USAID funded activities. According to a sub-partner, linkages with other programs like SNV (Netherlands Development Organization) and USIP “enriched” the activity.

In addition to the many positive examples of relations between KTU and other projects, main beneficiaries and peace collaborators identified some shortcomings. A youth respondent reported a lot of competition between the USAID-funded Yes Youth Can (YYC) and KTU, which were being implemented concurrently in the same communities, as some youth respondents participated in both activities. GC recognized this challenge and noted during the evaluation that it may have been a coordination or communication issue because the activities were funded through different offices within USAID and had different approaches. Two main beneficiary groups noted that the Japan Center for Conflict Prevention (JCCP),³⁰ which was

³⁰ Supports conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives.

being implemented at the same time as KTU, offered better financial allowances than KTU, which affected turnout at KTU events that fell on the same day as JCCP events.³¹

1.3 Activity Adaptability and Flexibility

This sub-question looked at the adaptability and flexibility of KTU through its duration and the factors that facilitated and/or hindered that.

Most respondent groups provided examples of KTU's flexibility and adaptability. This included addressing challenges well; revising approaches/activities when needed; being responsive to community needs, including external events that could trigger conflict; expanding the activity scope and partnerships as needed; and emphasizing and incorporating learning.

Flexibility in Design

Secondary documents and interviews with GC and USAID point to KTU's flexibility from the design stage. The CMM design focused on using expertise, wisdom and a people-to-people (P2P) approach without restricting how it should be done. Hence, in Phase 2, KTU expanded the geographic scope of the activity, expanded the livelihoods piece and incorporated a CVE component (along with corresponding new objectives and a second theory of change) without shifting the overall activity design or goal.

GC and sub-partners also highlighted the existence of a rapid response fund, which was available in case of urgent and unforeseen needs, as providing flexibility. One sub-partner noted that this money allowed KTU to "embrace what may come," thereby easing its work. GC noted that the fund made it possible to reprogram budget for unanticipated election expenses in 2013 and recommended that USAID include a rapid response fund for similar future activities.

Responsiveness to Emerging Community Needs

USAID, GC and sub-partners pointed to KTU's ability to address community needs and challenges and incorporate learning throughout the activity.

KTU underwent four modifications.³² Three were substantive, in response to emerging needs. Modification 1 added "economic incentives for sustaining peace" (youth livelihood development and a small grant to "seed peace initiatives") to cement activity gains made to that point.³³ In Modification 2, TYB was added as a sub-partner to implement the livelihoods component. Modification 3 extended KTU by two years, expanded its geographic focus and added the CVE component to address factors that drive people toward radicalization. Modification 4 expanded the CVE component and added sub-partners SUPKEM and YADEN. Sub-partners noted the value of enlarging the KTU partnership. For example, one respondent said, "SUPKEM [was] brought in at a later stage because of a gap that was identified. SUPKEM came in to mobilize religious leaders to help address issues of radicalization." Another group noted, "There was flexibility (that's how SDS was brought on board). SDS introduced the Somali language. SDS was there doing programs before USAID," indicating that KTU identified partners with relevant expertise who could add value.

Respondents also pointed to KTU learning throughout the activity. A sub-partner commented, "When these things were happening we would meet as a team ... do some conflict analysis and do some mitigation measures. ... Although we had a work plan, when things came from the community we were able to address them." Main beneficiaries reflected this sentiment. For example, a youth respondent said,

31 This was identified as a specific challenge in Mathare.

32 Mod 1, June 2013; Mod 2, February 2014; Mod 3, April 2014; Mod 4, September 2014.

33 Mod 1, June 2013

“The process was flexible. If something didn’t work, like who was spearheading the process, they went back to the drawing board. ... There was always a post-mortem for every activity. ... That was outstanding.”

Just two respondent interviews (both with sub-partners) reported unresolved challenges. One reported that the KTU policy of limiting stipends (transportation reimbursement) to participants from outside the community (instead of local participants) was a challenge. The other indicated that monthly disbursement of funds to sub-partners implementing activities restricted the planning and continuity of activities, and felt that disbursements should have been on a quarterly basis instead. It was not clear to the evaluation team whether these challenges ultimately affected the achievement of the activity goal.

Responsiveness to External Factors

External political and security developments were an important consideration for KTU. KTU responded to incidents such as the terrorist attacks at the Westgate Shopping Mall (September 21, 2013) and at Garissa University College (April 2, 2015) by organizing community activities to address community fears and the potential escalation of violence. Youth groups from Kibera also gave an example of the KTU team working quickly to cool tensions when a segment of community members refused to be relocated away from the railway line, in a slum-upgrading program by the GOK and World Bank.

Several respondents, including USAID and sub-partners, reported that KTU provided important support for the 2013 general elections, although KTU was not an election activity. For instance, KTU partnered with the election management body, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) to conduct civic education in the informal settlements and mock voting and training of cohesion champions to monitor elections. According to a sub-partner, “KTU reprogrammed to ensure a peaceful election in the four targeted communities [in Phase I] by conducting activities that were outside of the original work plan.” When the presidential election results were contested, KTU provided additional support to ease tensions arising from the Supreme Court ruling and, according to youth groups in Kibera, “prevent violence from occurring.”

1.4. Other Factors that Facilitated or Hindered Activity Success

Kenya Tuna Uwezo Leadership

A majority of respondent interviews (38 of 47) highlighted KTU leadership as an important factor for success. These were unprompted responses from all respondent groups; the evaluation team did not seek respondent views of KTU leadership per se. The examples of good leadership encompassed the selection of sub-partners and their comparative expertise; KTU staff background in peace; KTU knowledge of the communities; personal dedication of KTU staff; KTU mentorship; KTU staff being good listeners; GC’s open-door policy, whereby community members were able to visit GC offices; good project planning and good identification of the issues; being solution-oriented; good communication; transparency and accountability; and showing appreciation for participants.

Youth groups noted, for example: “They implemented in areas that nobody before had dared go. They came with a high pace that none of the previous NGOs had come with” and “[It was] amazing how they came up with sub-partners. There was a partner who could teach skills, give law assistance, deal with cohesion.” Sub-partners commented, “Selline [KTU Chief of Party] made government offices change their perception about KTU; her background in peace, cohesion made it possible to open different doors. John Okanga [GC Monitoring & Evaluation Officer and Senior Program Officer] was similar. Communities knew they will easily relate.” Several respondents also cited examples of empathy on the part of KTU, including going out of their way to personally help members of the community who were in trouble and linking them to other resources if KTU was not in a position to help.

Challenging Political and Security Environment

The operating environment for KTU was extremely dynamic. All stakeholder groups cited this as a challenge throughout the activity period. In addition to the underlying conflicts in the informal settlements, respondents noted that political statements by politicians raised tensions in the communities, and that spoilers who were benefitting from crime (including politicians and members of the business community) sought to undermine the project. According to a sub-grantee, politicians coming into the community led some at-risk groups to “slide back to their previous lives.” Respondents also referenced national events — especially breaking news stories — that affected the project, including the high-profile Kenyans who were charged by the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Supreme Court ruling on the disputed 2013 elections, and government targeting of NGOs through the Public Benefits Organization (PBO) Act. One sub-grantee indicated that KTU had to meet frequently to address these challenges. A peace collaborator explained that due to the high susceptibility to political manipulation in the informal settlements, KTU had to repeat activities several times for them to be effective, especially during the 2013 general elections.

Security was a serious challenge. Respondents noted the risks that KTU took by working with known gangsters and stated that some KTU staff were threatened. GC reported that KTU did not have a clear security strategy, especially for staff, and largely relied on community security (not formal systems) for their safety.

Stakeholder Buy-In

Thirteen of 47 interviews, including nearly half of the main beneficiary groups interviewed, identified challenges with stakeholder buy-in to the activity. This included general suspicion/ distrust; a belief that KTU (staff) were spies; fear by local administration and other community leaders that KTU was trying to replace them; fear by criminal elements in the community that they would be arrested; concern by elected leaders that KTU had come to tell the community that they were bad leaders; and community resistance to KTU working with or through criminals. This led to examples of stakeholders initially trying to disrupt the process. One main beneficiary group in Eastleigh/ Majengo reported, “We almost killed them,” thinking that KTU was collaborating with the government “to try to deal with us.”

Despite this hurdle, respondents emphasized KTU’s resolve in obtaining stakeholder buy-in. Half of the 16 main beneficiary groups interviewed shared examples of KTU convincing stakeholders, through multiple engagements and targeted outreach, to give the activity a chance. For example, cohesion champions reported “chasing KTU away again and again until eventually they spotted us and included us in the program.” A district peace committee (DPC) said, “In the beginning we saw KTU as giving criminals a platform [and] this caused problems with other people [but] when they brought in other stakeholders and started working together this changed.” Likewise, a youth participant described KTU’s persistence and eventual success in persuading older men in the community who were benefitting from crime to stop that behavior. This respondent noted that KTU was persistent, “but we are the ones who have benefitted.” A government official provided a similar example, commenting that not all police worked in good faith, but once they understood the project objectives and were asked for their help, they changed and “now play a very important role.”

Stakeholder Expectations

The evaluation found that people in the informal settlements have dire needs and high hopes for what activities like KTU can deliver. In addition to elevated expectations for the livelihoods component mentioned previously, main beneficiaries, sub-partners and government respondents reported that project stakeholders saw KTU as having money and expected to benefit financially from the activity. This included some chiefs who expected money for their time and change agents who expected remuneration for engaging in peace work instead of crime. Youth leaders noted that the monthly stipend offered to cohesion champions in Phase I ended abruptly in the second half of the project. GC and a sub-partner remarked on the significant challenge of managing stakeholder expectations, saying they kept asking for money even though KTU explained this was not possible. One respondent cited a related challenge when the U.S.

Embassy announced the activity budget to the target communities. It reportedly “took time to refocus the communities” after the announcement.

Mobilization Challenges

Fifteen of 47 interviews, including several with main beneficiaries and government officials, referenced mobilization challenges. These included (un)availability of participants; perceived bias of mobilizers who were responsible for inviting participants and arranging logistics; and short notice for activities.

Main beneficiaries, GC and a sub-partner reported that target participants were sometimes unavailable for KTU activities/trainings because they took temporary work or chose to attend an activity funded by another donor on the same day.

Main beneficiaries, a government official and a sub-partner perceived mobilizer bias, saying that the same people were invited to multiple events. KTU was able to resolve some of the issues, including an allegation in one community that mobilizers were not transparent about reimbursement allowances and may have mishandled activity money.

Local administration officials in particular said the notice for events was often insufficient. For example, a police official reported being invited to speak at an event the same day, and having to scramble to prepare. GC staff acknowledged this type of challenge, noting that it was sometimes the downside of trying to be responsive to community needs and issues that arose or escalated quickly.

Competition Among Beneficiaries

Five of 16 main beneficiary groups interviewed identified competition among beneficiaries as a challenge. This mainly related to rivalry among cohesion champions and change agents³⁴ such as: tension and bickering over activity concept notes to KTU; disorganization and public disagreements among cohesion champions in some communities; and difficulties incorporating Phase 1 and Phase 2 change agents. Youth leaders expressed strong and united views on this, saying they received no explanation of why KTU expanded its geographic focus (and sub-partners) in Phase 2 to include five new informal settlements or the role of them in the activity; noting a sense that many cohesion champions were effectively “lost” in the transition period; and contending that KTU did not make good on promises to engage and expand the role of cohesion champions in Phase 2. They indicated that “there was a lot of storm” during the transition period, which took time to resolve. Women leaders noted that despite internal conflicts, KTU had a way of ensuring that differences were resolved.

Conclusions

The evaluation team concludes that key factors that facilitated KTU’s success were: an emphasis on community ownership/ empowerment; being inclusive and nonpartisan; outstanding leadership; strong partnerships; and a high degree of flexibility/ adaptability. Through persistence and expert knowledge of the operating environment, KTU effectively managed most internal and external challenges to the project, including stakeholder buy-in, high stakeholder expectations, mobilization issues, evolving community needs and national-level political and security developments.

KTU approaches included a combination of formal and informal approaches, methods and tactics. KTU’s people-to-people approach — through single and cross-identity dialogues, messaging on the importance of

³⁴ Change agents refers to at-risk youth who were empowered by KTU and changed through awareness. They are youth who wanted to actively improve their communities. In Phase 1, these agents were referred to as cohesion champions and they were trained by the Directorate of National Cohesion and National Values. (See <http://www.cohesionandvalues.go.ke>.) Those who came on board in Phase 2 were simply referred to as change agents and were not trained by the directorate.

cohesion and tolerance, capacity building, conflict management and mitigation and civic education — helped reduce distrust and division among community groups. Civil dialogue has been effectively introduced as an alternative to violence for resolving conflicts and is taking root.

Partnerships were generally strong. KTU's contribution to improving community-police relations is particularly noteworthy, given the longstanding lack of community trust in police and other government organs that can quickly lead to dissent and violence.³⁵

KTU made progress in meeting all four of its objectives. The evidence for the achievement of Phase 1 objectives (*Strengthened social networks of community members and civil society groups to collaborate productively on community issues and address grievances* and *Enhanced ability of local institutions to lead and implement people-to-people peace building independently*) is clearer than for Phase 2 objectives (*Address the pull and push factors that drive youth to engage in violent extremism* and *Reduce susceptibility to manipulation through supporting youth to engage in viable livelihoods*). Time was comparatively limited (approximately two years) to pursue the Phase 2 objectives. The livelihoods component of the project did not fully meet beneficiary expectations. Beneficiaries did not appear to understand the limits of what KTU could offer under this component.

Question 2

To what extent and in what ways did the program involve and affect men and women?

This question examined how women, in particular, were involved in the activity; whether different approaches were used to engage them, and why.³⁶ The evaluation also explored the overall effects of women's inclusion and the extent to which KTU took advantage of opportunities to include women and young men.

Findings

Inclusion of Women

KTU involved both men and women. KTU planning documents make special reference to engaging women and youth and include standard indicators for tracking female participation in the activity.³⁷ KTU did not have a particular gender focus, however. The literature review and interviews with GC and USAID indicate that KTU initially emphasized engaging at-risk men and youth,³⁸ who were deemed the “hard” cases and important for entry into the community and impact.

During implementation, KTU targeted females aged 16–35 who were involved in crime; worked with women in organized groups aged 18–48 who were influential in their communities; and female elders and religious leaders above age 45. Phase 2 included a deliberate effort to involve women in CVE activities, in particular Somali women in Eastleigh.

Seven of eight respondent groups identified efforts by KTU to include women in its activities. Examples included KTU being gender-conscious and developing a gender strategy; conducting women-specific activities; striving for gender balance in activities; and engaging female opinion leaders. Respondents also

35 See, e.g., Baseline Assessment Countering Violent Extremism in Eastleigh and Selected Informal Settlements (Kenya), Action Research Consultancy Services, January 2015.

36 While the valuation question references men and women, USAID confirmed during the evaluation in-brief meeting that the question should focus on women. The data collection instruments were designed accordingly.

37 See, e.g., KTU 2012 Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP).

38 Youth typically refers to individuals under age 35, as defined in the 2010 Constitution of Kenya.

reported inclusion of women in empowerment activities geared toward leadership and livelihoods skills. For instance, youth groups in Eastleigh/Majengo reported, “Activities were evenly spread between men and women. [The] entrepreneurship program was for male and female youth. [And] there was a dedicated women’s forum on CVE.”

All seven respondent groups that identified KTU efforts to include women noted the conduct of women-only activities, and most noted efforts to target at-risk females, including teenage girls; commercial sex workers; women who served as gun keepers and gun couriers for men; drug abusers; gang members; refugees; relatives of radicalized males; and victims of gender-based violence (GBV). GC staff reported dedicated forums for women included clear identification of the role of women and girls in peace building and CVE, such as single and cross-identity dialogues; capacity building on human rights and governance; entrepreneurship and livelihood skills training; and talent concerts and sports. For instance, a government official reported that the women-only meetings on violent extremism made women more open and willing to share information.

Respondents in three of the 47 interviews — a sub-partner, women’s groups and religious leaders — commented that KTU should have made more efforts to include women. The sub-partner described insufficient participation of women in the activity design and planning. Women’s groups from Eastleigh/Majengo stated that women should have been included more because of the influence they have on youth. Religious leaders³⁹ indicated that women were not “felt” in the activity as much as they would have liked and said, “There was nothing special for women; we did not see any efforts to try to include women.”

Approaches for Engaging Men and Women

KTU documents and interview respondents identified key factors for why different approaches were used for engaging men and women in KTU.

Activity documents identify differences in how men and women perceive and define peace. For example, the 2012 KTU PMP notes, “Women tend to believe that there is cohesion when they are able to join in activities together and find a tangible outcome out of the interaction. Men, on the other hand, do not need a tangible outcome, but rather see cohesion as having an enabling environment that allows them to do what they want to do.”

Gender roles and culture. Several main beneficiaries, sub-partners and government officials, as well as USAID and GC, identified gender roles and culture as an important consideration for how to engage women in programming. This included the observation that female attendance and participation were lower in mixed-gender activities compared to women-only activities; religious norms restricting the mixing of men and women (this was a particular consideration for the Muslim community); a perception that peace is a male-dominated field; women’s family and parental obligations; and the related issue of timing of activities. Sub-partners explained that activities had to be timed around women’s daily responsibilities and with respect to community dynamics. Referring to targeted efforts to mobilize women, one sub-partner noted, “If we had gone mobilizing ‘major actors,’ we would have ended up with [just] men. ... Women also were a rich source of knowledge and information. ... Their ability to negotiate and convince was really important.”

Women’s role in conflict (mitigation) and community leadership. Linked to gender roles and culture, nearly all respondent groups (seven of eight) identified the role that women play in conflict mitigation and community leadership as a factor in how to include women in KTU. This is reflected in KTU design documents, which name women as key stakeholders and recognize their role in influencing youth with

³⁹ While KTU worked with female religious leaders, they were not interviewed as part of the evaluation. Further, the religious leaders who were interviewed came from Kibera, Kiambiu and Mathare. They may not have been aware of efforts to include women from other informal settlements, in particular on CVE.

respect to violent extremism and viable livelihoods.⁴⁰ A youth respondent group identified women as the biggest inciters of violence. This recognition grew throughout the activity; as USAID noted, “Early in the project, women weren’t identified as people who would take money and run or go out and fight, but they were the instigators. KTU realized they needed to target women and use them for peace activities.” Similarly, government interview groups reported, “After identification that women were at the core of the violence that was going on, they decided to have specific activities to engage women in KTU” and “Women are the frontrunners when it comes to incitement. So targeting women was good, as they would become change agents.”

Effects of Women’s Inclusion

Women are playing a more active in CMM and CVE. The evaluation sought interviewee opinions of the effects of women’s inclusion at the individual and activity levels. Respondents in more than half of the main beneficiary interviews and government official interviews reported that women are playing a more active role in CMM and CVE. Other respondent groups also commented favorably on this. Respondents identified women as an important source of information and noted the role they play in bridging the gap between youth and the police and their role in engaging other members of the community in activities and educating them on peace.

For instance, respondents from the national and administrative police reported that KTU gave women the opportunity to share experiences that they might fear sharing with police, and that communities are now more willing to volunteer information to the police. GC also spoke to this point, explaining that women tend to deny that their male relatives are involved in illegal activities and will share information only when trust and a safe space for discussion are present. Youth groups in Eastleigh/ Majengo observed that “Women play a critical role because they have important information about their families, e.g., if children want to be radicalized.” Women in multiple interviews reinforced this finding, saying that youth are more likely to listen to their mothers than to their peers or to men, and that participants in some mixed-gender dialogues (especially on CVE) listened to women more than men because of the influence mothers have on youth. Sub-partners commented that women provided new insights about their role in pressuring men into crime, and at the same time identified crime spots; and that women whose relatives were affiliated with VE and killed are now speaking out on their own experience. Sub-partner SUPKEM identified this as a big part of its institutional learning during the activity. Finally, a peace collaborator who reflected on this theme said that women’s inclusion “demystified the whole issue of governance and CVE and the role that women play. Especially since VE is seen from a male perspective and women are seen as just victims. There was more information coming out from the women, especially in Eastleigh and Kibera, on VE. It’s the kind of information that would not have easily come from the men.”

Increased stakeholder knowledge about the role of women in C(MM) and (C)VE. As the previous example illustrates, besides strengthening women’s role in CMM and CVE, respondents felt that KTU increased stakeholder *knowledge* of the roles women can play in CMM and CVE, both positive and negative. All stakeholder groups spoke about this. For example, sub-partners commented that women’s inclusion “debunked the myth that women cannot be criminals, especially where it involves violent extremism” and “We realized on VE that women were actually encouraging their boys to participate in violence — even encouraging them to go to Somalia and bring back money.” A government official reflected that women are better peace builders than men, noting as an example that during KTU they shared stories of rape and forgiving their rapists. The respondent described this as a positive example to the community about cohesion.

⁴⁰ See, e.g., KTU May 2014 work plan narrative.

Women politically and socially empowered. Seven of eight respondent groups, including nearly half of the main beneficiary groups interviewed, reported that KTU empowered women politically and socially. Examples included women being more interested in elected and non-elected leadership positions, being more confident and having a stronger voice in the community.

Women and youth interview respondents (main beneficiaries) reported that women now stand up for their rights and participate in forums on community issues, whereas previously they did not even know their rights. Likewise, a group of youth volunteers reported, “Girls have improved and are now challenging boys. ... They are coming out to do activities and stand and speak before people. [There’s] community respect, more respect for women in Mukuru.”

Respondents emphasized that women are increasingly interested in taking up leadership roles in the community, including elected office. They attributed this partly to the skills and exposure women gained through leadership trainings, such as those provided by the NDI.⁴¹ Respondents in Kibera and in Eastleigh/Majengo noted that women who participated in KTU have shown interest in vying for elected office in the 2017 general elections. (In one reported case, the aspirant has developed a platform on women and youth.) A local elected official interviewed for the evaluation noted, “The number of women interested in vying [for MCA] in the next general elections, especially cohesion champions having honed their skills during KTU, is impress[ive].”

Women economically empowered. Main beneficiaries, government officials, sub-partners and GC reported that KTU contributed to women’s economic empowerment. They cited examples of women engaged in alternative livelihoods, starting their own businesses and being less financially dependent on men. Government officials provided examples of women starting businesses (such as a chain of mini-shops in Mukuru and salons in Majengo and Kangemi) as an alternative to other forms of income, such as commercial sex. An official from the National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management (NSC) said these enterprises have transformed the individual lives of these women and the direct beneficiaries are now talking to other women and girls to get them off the streets. Women leaders echoed this point, saying that, “The change in individuals is pronounced. Through TYB loans, there is a woman who started with a small kiosk, now she has a mini-supermarket just because of these loans.” (As noted under Evaluation Question 1, TYB did not provide loans under KTU, but did have a separate loan program that benefitted some KTU participants). Similarly, an official from a county constituency office who credited KTU with improving people’s understanding of their rights, reported that females — “especially young girls” — increasingly visit the office to ask, “What have you done for the girl child?”

Reduced/ addressed gender-based violence. Participants in three respondent groups felt that KTU contributed to a reduction in GBV. While the overall frequency of responses is low (four of 47 interviews), this is an interesting finding, given the diverse categories of respondents who shared this opinion (two government respondents, a sub-partner and youth groups), and given that the evaluation team did not explicitly ask about GBV. In addition, the finding should be viewed in light of the prevalence of domestic violence in the informal settlements, which is rarely reported or discussed. According to the sub-partner, “Women now know their rights. This reduced GBV at a household level. Men are now less aggressive.” Similarly, a government official said, “KTU helped identify victims of crime and domestic violence. They are now freer to pass information about violence and sexual harassment to police.”

Community acceptance of KTU. Two respondents (of 47 interviews) — a sub-partner and youth leaders — commented that the inclusion of women was important for community acceptance and the “legitimacy” of KTU. The sub-partner noted, “It enriched the program and strengthened the outcomes. Their inclusion

41 NDI collaborated with KTU to conduct two rounds of leadership training for 32 women in May and December 2015.

also legitimized the program in the community and in the eyes of the people.” Youth leaders reported that women’s inclusion helped people understand the activity and not associate it only with youth and crime.

Emerging Opportunities to Include Women and Young Men

GC, sub-partners and USAID were best placed to speak about emerging opportunities, since they had knowledge of which activities were planned in advance and which responded to specific opportunities. These three respondent groups spoke about seizing opportunities to plan activities around so-called “international days”; linking women and youth to government opportunities; and linking women to emerging capacity-building opportunities.

KTU organized events around International Women’s Day, International Youth Day and International Peace Day. These were opportunities to celebrate women and youth as key target groups for KTU and to educate community members about rights enshrined in international human rights instruments. The events were also an effort to create linkages between local and global issues. The Westgate Shopping Mall terrorist attack in 2013 occurred while KTU and its communities were commemorating International Peace Day.

GC, a government respondent and a sub-partner spoke about KTU’s efforts to link women and youth to (new) government opportunities, in particular Uwezo Fund⁴² money and government tenders. As reported in the section that follows on Evaluation Question 3, linkages to these and other funds were part of the sustainability efforts for the activity. The funds are designed to increase employability through business enterprises. An Uwezo official reported that five of 20 proposals put forward by KTU beneficiaries who were trained on the fund were successful on the initial review, with the remaining returned to address compliance issues.⁴³ In addition to linkages to the mentioned funds, a sub-partner noted that KTU supported the re-integration of youth — foreign fighters from Somalia — into the community. This involved working with the government and security agencies to grant them amnesty⁴⁴ in some cases.

GC, sub-partners, elders and a peace collaborator provided examples of KTU linking women to emerging capacity-building opportunities. In addition to pre-planned initiatives, this included short-term engagement with other international implementing partners to supplement the support that KTU provided. Two examples were the aforementioned leadership training provided by NDI, and community visits by female parliamentarians as part of mentorship efforts by the International Republican Institute (IRI). GC reported that it made a big difference to take women out of the informal settlements for training, though this is expensive. GC held regular activity coordination meetings hosted by USAID for fostering KTU collaboration with NDI and IRI, noting that the collaboration would not have happened otherwise.

Conclusions

The evaluation team concludes that KTU effectively involved women. KTU identified the unique needs of women — particularly at-risk groups — and addressed these needs through targeted, female-only activities when appropriate. KTU prioritized women from the activity design stage through implementation, adapting methods for inclusion when necessary.

42 The Uwezo Fund was enacted in 2014. It aims to enable women, youth and persons with disability to access finances to promote businesses and enterprises at the constituency level, thereby enhancing economic growth toward the realization of the same and the Millennium Development Goals 1 (eradicate extreme poverty and hunger) and 3 (promote gender equality and empower women). <http://www.uwezo.go.ke>

43 The evaluation team was not able to verify the general success rate for Uwezo applications.

44 Amnesty for involvement in violent extremism was introduced by presidential decree after the Westgate terrorist attacks in 2013. Many people feared government reprisal for pursuing amnesty.

The involvement of women had individual and activity-level effects. At an individual level, women were politically, socially and economically empowered. At a household level, KTU may have also contributed to a reduction in GBV. At the community and activity levels, stakeholders became more knowledgeable about the role of women (both positive and negative) in CMM and CVE, and women provided important information that can reduce conflict, narrowed the gap between youth and the police and engaged other members of the community in peace efforts. Thus, women's involvement contributed to community learning and activity success.

KTU seized emerging opportunities to include women and young men through the activity period, and created important linkages between this population and government that are being leveraged after KTU has ended. Some success stories resulted from the establishment of micro-enterprises. These examples are important in an environment where poverty and lack of economic opportunity are underlying drivers of conflict and VE.

Question 3

To what extent and in what ways will the activity's interventions be sustainable?

This question focused on the effectiveness of KTU's original sustainability planning. It also explored the target communities' perception about the extent to which and in what ways the activity's effects will affect the 2017 general elections.

To answer this question, the evaluation team considered factors such as activity design; examples of capacity-building efforts; stakeholder awareness and articulation of the planning; and KTU efforts to link stakeholders to broader resources, opportunities and activities.

Findings

Planning for Sustainability

Activity Design

According to the KTU 2012 Program Description, the activity was designed to ensure sustainability by building the capacity of community leaders and groups to work effectively with one another across ethnic lines. It was also designed to build the technical and organizational capacities of the local implementing partners in program management, financial management, monitoring and evaluation, grant writing and technical areas such as conflict monitoring and rapid response.⁴⁵

As described under Evaluation Question 1, KTU introduced a livelihoods component toward the end of the Phase I as a move toward sustainability. This resulted in the addition of Objective 4, "*to reduce susceptibility to manipulation through supporting youth to engage in viable livelihoods.*" The new component aimed to promote economic resilience, particularly among at-risk groups in the informal settlements, as a way to reduce the risk of political manipulation.

Respondents in 10 of 47 interviews reported that KTU planned well for sustainability. These were largely USAID, GC and sub-partner respondents. As part of sustainability planning, they spoke about KTU building the capacities of sub-partners; clearly communicating when the activity would end; linking beneficiaries to other resources, including government agencies; and conducting livelihoods training.

⁴⁵ KTU 2012 Program Description p. 11.

Capacity Building of Sub-Partners

An assessment was conducted in 2012 to determine the capacity needs of the initial KTU sub-partners, Peacenet and Kituo cha Sheria. For Peacenet, this occurred jointly with International Rescue Committee (IRC), which was implementing another USAID-funded activity.⁴⁶ For Kituo cha Sheria, KTU used findings from an organizational assessment that had been done by PACT.⁴⁷ GC conducted coaching, mentoring, on-site support and training of sub-partners in line with the needs identified in the capacity assessments. It also sponsored thematic trainings on the conflict-sensitivity principle of “do-no-harm” and facilitated trainings on gender mainstreaming for sub-partners. They provided orientation to sub-partners on U.S. Government rules and regulations and trained them on financial management and procurement in compliance with USAID standards. GC also assisted some sub-partners to develop systems for program and budget management, and developed their capacity in monitoring and evaluation. KTU activity reports contain participant feedback on these capacity-building efforts.

In interviews, all six KTU sub-grantees shared the opinion that either their organizational or technical capacities had been enhanced through KTU. For example, sub-partners reported, “GC trained HFF on financial and reporting to the USAID standards. This has been the greatest learning point for HFF”; “Organization-wise we are stronger than before especially in finance and reporting”; and “They built capacity for Peacenet and the organization picked strategies that it uses till now like the single/cross-identity dialogues.” On technical capacity, a sub-partner reported, “The Mombasa office picked KTU approaches and customized them to Mombasa and it is working. ... e have gained technical capacity in issues of peace, which wasn’t the organization’s area of specialty previously.”

Strengthened Linkages

GC described efforts to link communities to other implementing partners and donors in the communities where it was working. For example, it linked one target community, Kiambui, with JCCP, a peace program focusing on conflict monitoring, when KTU was ending. KTU also linked youth to affirmative action funds available within the government, e.g., the Uwezo, Youth and Women’s funds, all of which provide loans for business development to community groups. According to USAID, “They tried to link with other programs like the Uwezo Fund. ... The director really engaged with KTU. ... They are likely to continue supporting the [beneficiary] groups.” Such were the sentiments from the Uwezo Fund coordinator for Kamukunji Constituency, who commented, “More and more youths are applying for the Uwezo funds and even visiting the [District County Commissioner’s, or DCC’s] place to apply for the loans, something that wasn’t there previously.”

KTU created links between the communities and government agencies at the county and sub-county levels. In all informal settlements, KTU collaborated with the provincial administration, mainly the offices of the local chiefs, DCC and the national and administrative police services. KTU conducted consultative meetings with these institutions and they participated in community forums on CMM and CVE.

According to main beneficiaries and government respondents, these linkages resulted in improved cohesion between community and the police, in particular. As one respondent from Kamukunji commented, “Sports day police versus public — they laughed, opened up. ... That interaction increased trust between public and police. ... Now we are like friends and information passes more easily.” A group of elders commented, “KTU humanized the police. ... The communities have learned to appreciate what the police do. ... Even the police discovered that there may be bad elements within them.” KTU also worked with the Department of Immigration’s division for registration of persons based in Kasarani Constituency to support community

⁴⁶ KTU Quarterly Report October-December 2012.

⁴⁷ KTU Quarterly Report October-December 2012.

members to obtain national identification cards (IDs). As noted previously, an ID is required for access to services and viable (legal) livelihood opportunities, and for voter registration.

Working Through Local Organizations and Individuals

KTU worked through existing sub-partner structures in the target communities. These organizations had their own staff and established community networks. KTU built on the experience and work of the local organizations by leveraging existing skills, approaches and tools. A sub-partner commented, “They planned for sustainability through partners. ... What most activities partners were doing can outlive the project.”

In addition to working through local organizations, KTU identified individuals in the target communities with whom it worked. Many of these individuals already enjoyed informal power in their respective communities⁴⁸ and were trained as change agents and cohesion champions. A peace collaborator commented, “They invested in change champions who are still doing activities after the activity closed. This was really important, as the change champions who trained the community still stay in the community.”

Communication

As part of planning for sustainability, USAID and GC indicated that KTU explicitly communicated when the activity was expected to end. As part of this, KTU held exit celebrations in each of the target communities. In these exit celebrations, they communicated their impending exit from the communities. This was corroborated with USAID’s account that “They were clear the project was going to end at some point. ... They asked for exit meetings with the community.” To USAID, this was creative, as it ensured targeted communities weren’t “left just like that.”

Youth have been talked to a lot of time in the board room. ... there should have been a “what’s next” program now — you’ve talked to me about crime, now what options are you giving me. ... Need program with sustainability, not just board room meetings and trainings; participants should be able to say, “We own this board room/ youth empowerment center, etc., courtesy of KTU.

— Local Government Official

Lack of Sustainability Planning

Respondents in 17 of 47 interviews reported that KTU did not plan well for sustainability. This included nearly half of the main beneficiary groups interviewed and some sub-partners, government, religious leaders and peace collaborators.

Main beneficiaries, sub-grantees and a peace collaborator observed that KTU did not effectively communicate its exit. A peace collaborator from Kangemi commented, “[There was] no exit strategy. ... We knew [the] project was ending, but activities were still continuing, not tapering off. ... In a classroom, there is always a summary of the lessons — this is what we learned, this is what we reached.” These sentiments were echoed by a youth group from Eastleigh/Majengo, whose members said, “When KTU exited, [they] didn’t share this information ... just came with *barazas*. ... [We] didn’t have [an] opportunity to share ideas for [the] way forward.”

Some respondents expressed fears that reformed youth were not prepared to sustain themselves after the exit of the activity, and that some had fallen back to their past lives. In an interview with reformed youth, a respondent noted, “The change champions may have fallen back, as they were left as orphans.” In the same

⁴⁸ By virtue of them being in gangs or individual criminals feared by the communities they operated in.

vein, a religious leaders group commented, “The youths who were involved in the KTU activities were left just like that and they are not involved in anything and most have started going back to past activities.”

Perceptions of KTU Effects on the 2017 General Elections

Preparedness to Resist Political Manipulation

The evaluation team sought respondent views of how KTU prepared communities to resist political manipulation ahead of 2017 elections. In 42 of 47 interviews, respondents indicated that KTU had prepared the communities. The responses are described in more detail below.

Increased awareness. Twenty-six of 42 interviews pointed to increased awareness (of citizens’ rights and roles of leaders); people being more enlightened; youth being able to effectively question authority; and people communicating more peacefully. A government respondent reported that youth are no longer willing to be manipulated by the politicians, saying, “People are more informed today and if we are to have a scenario like what we had in 2007, people on the ground are not willing to disrupt their peace for the sake of the politician.” Similar sentiments were echoed by a group of sub-partners, who said, “They are more willing to talk about the issues. ... Some may still take money [from politicians] but then make their own choices.”

Structures and networks. In 22 of 42 interviews, respondents described structures and networks that have been established or strengthened that can be used to mitigate and manage conflict. This includes the cohesion champions and change agents; and CBOs such as Lang’ata Youth Network, Kiambiu Youth for Peace and Development, Mukuru Ladies Football Club and Kibera Women for Peace and Fairness that arose out of the work done by KTU. As one peace collaborator commented, “There is a group of influencers (cohesion champions, change agents and others) in the communities that can positively influence the informal communities come election time.” A youth leader from Kiambiu who reformed from criminal gang activities through KTU commented, “We have CBOs that resolve conflicts. ... We continue talking to young men/ people who may be going the wrong way and bring them back. ... We have learned to resolve our own problems.”

Informal networks have also been established to mitigate conflict. For example, target communities have established WhatsApp groups to discuss local and national issues likely to affect their areas and to plan for new initiatives. These serve as early warning, early response (EW/ER) mechanisms in the communities ahead of elections. For example, women’s groups in Kiambiu reported that EW/ER systems, e.g., WhatsApp groups, were used to maintain peace in the community during demonstrations against the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) in July 2016.

Application of (other) skills. Seventeen of 42 interview groups reported that KTU prepared communities to resist political manipulation pointed to communities applying the skills acquired, such as those organizing their own single and cross-identity dialogue forums. One respondent commented, “I saw a retired chief do such sessions and dialogues even after retirement and it is generally because of the learning under KTU.” Another noted, “The dialogues are still being held and people have learned to resolve their issues amicably. This will (likely) continue into the future.” Main beneficiaries reported that they are striving to replicate KTU initiatives to engage more members of their communities in peaceful activities. A youth leaders’ group stated, “Youth trained as cohesion champions have started their own initiatives engaging youth and other organizations working in the same area, trying to engage them on what demonstrations are about and how the constitution defines them.” Women’s groups from Korogocho similarly noted, “We have formed groups where we continue teaching each other in the groups and to everyone.”

Youth engaging in alternative livelihoods. Twelve of 42 interview groups who said KTU prepared communities to resist political manipulation shared examples of youth who were idle or previously involved in crime now engaging in viable livelihood activities. This includes electrical installation, catering, car washing, retail shops and other “small activities that will deter them from engaging in violence.”

Risks to Sustainability

Despite measures to encourage sustainability, findings from the evaluation point to several risks to this effort. Interview respondents pointed to general political instability and economic vulnerability, changing demographics, growing insecurity and increased radicalization in the informal settlements.

Political instability. In 31 of 47 interviews, individuals from all eight respondent groups pointed to political instability in the informal settlements as a risk to sustainability. They spoke about persisting negative ethnicity, tribal groupings re-emerging, criminal gangs forming around ethnic identities and continued political mobilization around ethnic lines. A peace collaborator commented, “Political influence is the greatest risk. It has the potential of making or breaking the fragile peace in the informal settlements.” A religious leader stated, “The sheer number of political leaders who have made their intentions [to run for a political seat] in the next [2017] general elections is a risk. They have recruited a number of youths in the community and these youths go round causing tensions in the community.”

Economic vulnerability: In 29 of 47 interviews, respondents identified underlying economic vulnerability as a risk to sustaining KTU’s progress. Respondents spoke of low-paying irregular or casual employment, unemployment, lack of access to credit and limited ownership of productive assets. A cohesion champion commented, “There are still unemployed youths who can still be manipulated easily.” A youth reformists’ group agreed, saying, “They [youth] have nothing much to do and now since the project has ended they are likely to slide back *akili imepanuka lakini mfuko bado*” (Swahili for “the brain has expanded but not the pocket”). This is related to the assertion mentioned in several interviews that one “can’t eat peace.”

Short project duration. Respondents in nine of the 47 interviews noted the short activity duration as a risk to sustainability. They indicated that the activity was generally too brief for a peace activity and too short to institute (lasting) change. According to a peace collaborator, “The problem with short-term programming is that there may not be the capacity or resources to plan and walk with the community to institute real change.”

Changing demographics in the informal settlements. Respondents in eight of 47 interviews pointed to changing demographics in the informal settlements as a risk to sustainability. They spoke of increased rural-urban migration; unemployed youth flowing into the informal settlements; a younger generation of youth joining gangs; and the 2007–08 post-election violence fading from people’s memories. Related to this, they indicated that some people who have been sensitized to peace programming are moving out of the settlements. Women’s groups in Kibera commented, “There are new people migrating into the settlements. ... This has created a new group of people who haven’t been reached by KTU interventions.”

Increased insecurity. In five of the 47 interviews, sub-partners, main beneficiaries and elders spoke of increased insecurity in the informal settlements. They pointed to more sophisticated crime; more aggressive youth criminals who use guns instead of knives; and criminals’ increased fearlessness. Elders commented that “people have the mentality that ‘if you don’t have your way, make your way,’” suggesting that people in dire circumstances will earn a living any way they can.

Increased radicalization. Related to increased insecurity, five interviews with sub-partners, government respondents and beneficiaries pointed to growing radicalization as a risk to sustainability. They observed that the methods, locations and age for recruiting youth into VE were evolving. For instance, radicalization is increasingly taking place inside the informal settlements (not only internationally).

General Perceptions of the 2017 General Elections

Annex I: Additional Findings contains findings on general perceptions of the 2017 elections. The findings extend beyond the formal scope of the evaluation. However, they provide context for understanding community preparedness to resist political manipulation that could lead to violent conflict during the 2017 election cycle.

Conclusions

The evaluation team concludes that KTU planned for sustainability by implementing its work through local organizations and individuals; improving the technical and organizational capacity of sub-grantees; creating links between communities and government agencies; and linking beneficiaries to resources and opportunities that can be leveraged after KTU's closure. However, its exit was not well communicated to the communities and key beneficiaries did not feel prepared for KTU to end.

KTU effectively prepared communities to resist political manipulation. Target communities are more aware of their rights and more confident in their ability to resist manipulation; they are more engaged in alternative livelihoods; and structures are in place to mitigate conflict.

The livelihoods component was a positive move toward bolstering the peace gains made during the activity. However, the short duration of this component is a risk to its sustainability. While positive examples show beneficiaries applying their new skills and obtaining necessary loans after the project, frustrations remain about the project not providing more comprehensive or longer-term support to sustain this investment.

Underlying drivers of conflict (e.g., political instability and economic vulnerability) persist in the informal settlements where KTU was implemented. Along with changing demographics, increased insecurity and growing radicalization, this threatens to undermine KTU achievements in the targeted communities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The evaluation generated important learning around CMM in the informal settlements that can inform future programming, both stand-alone and integrated into other types of activities. The evaluation team offers the following recommendations.

1. Future conflict-sensitive activities need to address underlying causes of conflict, in particular poverty. **As such, future projects should integrate an alternative livelihoods component to the extent possible, or collaborate with other projects that have livelihoods as a main focus.** This should include monitoring and evaluation efforts to determine the effectiveness and sustainability of the intervention, and learning and adaptation where necessary. *Caveat:* While it is clear that respondents for this evaluation perceive a link between conflict (mitigation) and livelihoods, the specific link between livelihoods and violent extremism is not supported in many studies. The recommendation is therefore limited to contexts where unemployment/poverty is a local driver for conflict.⁴⁹ This underscores the importance of understanding the local context where conflict-sensitive activities are being implemented.
2. Drawing on the lessons of KTU, **USAID should consider how to expand the involvement of other key stakeholder groups in future CMM programming, in particular women, elected leaders and government officials.** This may involve closer collaboration with projects funded by other USAID units and offices (not only CMM).

⁴⁹ For additional resources, see Keith Proctor, "Youth and Consequences: Unemployment, Injustice and Violence," Mercy Corps, 2014, available at https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/MercyCorps_YouthConsequencesReport_2015.pdf; and Mercy Corps' "Examining the Links between Youth Economic Opportunity, Civic Engagement and Conflict: Evidence from Mercy Corps' Somali Youth Leaders Initiative," January 2013.

- a. Women are an integral part of communities and community dynamics. Drawing on the KTU experience and the role that women play as peacemakers and perpetrators and instigators of conflict, **women of all ages should be a key target group for future CMM programming.**
 - b. **Future projects should consider expanded collaboration with — and support to — government offices for CMM and CVE.** This may include building the capacity of government offices to budget for the types of conflict-sensitive programming and services needed in the informal settlements.
 - c. **Future projects should consider how best to engage elected leaders, who are often viewed as inciting conflict or as spoilers of CMM efforts in the informal settlements.** This could include engaging members of county assemblies (e.g., following 2017 elections) to understand their roles as duty bearers, and including them in community dialogue efforts as a means to enhance community cohesion. It could also involve working through constituency offices, which serve everyone.
 - d. The evaluators recommend that **future projects should also consider how best to engage the private sector.** Private clinics and hospitals treat victims of violence. Businesses create demand for stolen goods and knowingly or unknowingly supply materials and weapons used in conflict. The private sector in the past has supported community policing and contributed to improved street lighting, and donated police booths and closed circuit televisions (CCTVs).
3. KTU took a **CMM approach to CVE. This emphasized *diagnosing* the challenges and needs of the community before intervening, and remaining flexible throughout the project.** According to evaluation respondents, this approach was effective and project stakeholders appreciated it. **Future CVE activities should apply a similar approach. This will require regular mapping to determine VE trends and evolutions** (such as new recruitment tactics and propaganda efforts).
 4. The evaluators recommend that **future activities offer psychosocial support services for implementing partner staff.** Psychosocial support for activity staff is essential in CMM and CVE programming. Staff suffer burnout and trauma. For instance, they need technical *and* psychosocial support to process confessions from reformists, the information they learn about VE activities and reports of gender-based violence.
 5. KTU demonstrates that it is important to identify, use and build local resources and capacities for peace, a key “do-no-harm” tool. **Future activities should engage local talents and resources as much as possible.** This promotes local ownership, sustainability and essential economic empowerment for the communities. USAID and implementing partners should strive for procurement practices that are in line with this aim.
 6. KTU’s community-driven approach was a key part of its sustainability efforts. **Future activities should have a clear sustainability plan.** Project stakeholders should understand the plan and be involved in monitoring and evaluating its implementation. The plan should be updated as needed. Project duration and external factors are important considerations for developing and updating the plan.
 7. KTU provides key learning points for project stakeholders and future conflict-sensitive programming, including CVE. **As part of the Mission’s collaborating, learning and adapting (CLA) strategy and in line with the 2016 USAID Evaluation Utilization Study, USAID/ KEA should consider how to share the KTU evaluation report and other KTU learning with key stakeholders.** This could include in-house (or externally facilitated) post-evaluation action planning meetings to prioritize the report recommendations and identify the steps and timeline for addressing

the recommendations. It could also include briefings and workshops with key Kenyan stakeholder groups, other U.S. Government and non-government activities in Kenya that deal with conflict sensitivity, and CMM colleagues in Washington, D.C., to actively share the KTU evaluation report and other learning from KTU. More immediately, activities designed to support the 2017 general elections, such as the new Kenya Electoral Assistance Program (KEAP), with its conflict-mitigation component, should be briefed on the evaluation report and other KTU learning.

ANNEX I. ADDITIONAL FINDINGS

Respondent Recommendations for Future Conflict-Sensitive Programming

As part of data collection, the evaluation team sought respondent views on key lessons about conflict-sensitive programming in the informal settlements and their recommendations for how future activities can more effectively address CMM (in general) and CVE (in particular) in the informal settlements. All respondent groups shared their views.

While no specific evaluation question solicited respondent recommendations, these findings were important for informing the evaluation team's own recommendations regarding constraints and opportunities for future conflict-sensitive programming. The information may also be useful to readers and users of this report.

How Future Activities Can More Effectively Address Conflict in the Informal Settlements

Respondents identified several opportunities for strengthening future CMM programming. These ranged from activity design considerations to project duration to the inclusion of broader stakeholder groups.

1. Make livelihoods more central to CMM programming. Thirty-two of 47 interviews, including seven respondent groups, recommended that livelihoods be more central to future CMM programming. KTU introduced livelihoods activities at the end of Phase 1 and expanded the effort in Phase 2 to include vocational skills enhancement. This was driven by the recognition that youth who formerly engaged in a life of crime no longer had a source of income, and a lack of viable livelihoods is a push factor for conflict. GC staff recommended an integrated approach that looks at grievances right from the start of the activity: "We would look at how to invest in the things making communities so vulnerable — livelihoods," and "Make sure skills enhancement starts from word go. ... The design would focus on identifying real opportunities." A peace collaborator echoed these sentiments, stating, "We need to look at peace from a livelihoods perspective. Poverty has been used as a mobilization tool." Main beneficiaries held a similar opinion and recommended that "empowerment projects must set aside capital for grants ... have to have grants to start business."
2. Use "soft" approaches. Twenty-eight of 47 interviews, including seven respondent groups, also recommended soft approaches in conflict programming. This included references to culturally appropriate methods; use of soft entry points; use of soft skills; and following local protocol and customs during implementation. According to respondents, these approaches facilitated project planning, led to better partnerships and greater acceptance of KTU, and consequently contributed to more effective programming. USAID staff suggested that efforts like KTU "employ alternate approach[es]; use soft skills to implement a program like this. It's harder to document and put in a proposal but it's something that has turned out to be very effective. ... It's something the Mission may want to look into." Respondents also noted the importance of persistence, flexibility and the personal dedication of implementing partner staff. This included a commitment to follow through with the community, including taking calls after work hours and on weekends. It also involved building a rapport with institutions such as the police and local and national governments, and keeping them informed of relevant activities and engagements.
3. KTU should have continued at least through the 2017 elections. Twenty-seven of 47 interviews, including all eight respondent groups, felt that the activity should have continued at least through the 2017 general elections. Respondents noted that conflict mitigation and management is difficult and interventions often take a long time to bear fruit, and that elections have historically been a trigger

for violence. They said KTU was timely and addressed community needs well (e.g., heightened need for community cohesion efforts following the 2007–08 post-election violence, civic education on the 2010 Constitution ahead of the 2013 general elections, pilot CVE efforts), but pointed to gaps that still exist. (See Evaluation Question 3 on risks to sustainability.) Respondents judged the intervention as too short, ending just as some of its effects were starting to be felt. A peace collaborator with knowledge in CMM opined, “For CMM programs to be effective, they need to be long-term.” Another respondent group saw the “need to continue building consciousness of people to live together peacefully.”

Similarly, some were generally pessimistic about the prospect of peaceful elections in 2017 (see Evaluation Question 3) and felt that more time and effort are needed to educate the public about their rights under the Constitution and to prepare communities to resist political manipulation, including through investments in alternative livelihoods. Some respondents reference the limited reach that KTU had, given its concentration in select informal settlements. For example, a main beneficiary respondent said, “Some people still need a program like KTU to educate them before 2017. Some people don’t want to vote, don’t know their rights, may not know about county governments. This program should continue.”

4. Engage government in CMM activities. In 20 of the 47 interviews, respondents recommended enhanced government involvement in CMM activities. Respondents noted that government is a key stakeholder for conflict-sensitive programming and felt that government involvement facilitated KTU entry into the communities and contributed to activity success. They also stated that it eased the work of government. Several interviewees commented that KTU civic education on devolution helped communities understand the role of duty bearers and more effectively demand their rights. They also described better relations between communities and government institutions (especially the police) as a result of KTU efforts such as dialogue forums and recreational activities. (See discussion under Evaluation Question 1). A government official commenting on how future CMM initiatives can support government recommended, “There is need for donor and government and the community to work together and not in conflict or competition.”
5. CMM should be ongoing and integrated. In 14 of the 47 interviews, participants from seven respondent groups recommended an ongoing and integrated approach to CMM. They noted that conflict is complex and requires ongoing attention. Many felt that conflict sensitivity should be part of other initiatives, including education programming, election support and gender activities. They emphasized the need for implementing partners to understand the dynamics of informal settlements and the unique factors that contribute to conflict in the various communities. In addition, respondents recommended coordinating with other activities working in the community to promote complementarity and sustainability.
6. Utilize existing local capacities (both individual and community) for peace. In 13 of the 47 interviews, including several with main beneficiaries, respondents emphasized the importance of utilizing and coordinating with existing local capacities for peace. As reported under Evaluation Question 1, respondents identified the use of local talent and resources as essential for community ownership and sustainability of the activity. The evaluation heard examples of (local) change agents supporting and responding to community needs, championing the values of cohesion and contributing to the reduction of conflict among the communities in informal settlements. KTU activity reports are also full of examples of local people and communities engaging in the activity of managing community peace and cohesion events. According to elders interviewed, “Programs should be down-up and not up-down. Let the communities be the impetus on whatever they want to do. KTU consulted the community in what they wanted.”

7. Provide psychosocial services. In four of the 47 interviews, main beneficiaries, a sub partner and a government official explicitly discussed the need for psychosocial services for target communities and activity partners dealing with CMM and CVE issues. For instance, women leaders noted that mothers of Al Shabab members are traumatized and tend to isolate themselves-unable even to attend weddings or funerals- and that they need counseling. KTU partners also discussed the unique stresses that their staff experience working on these issues.

How USAID Can More Effectively Address CVE

1. Have flexible approaches. In 22 of 47 interviews, participants from seven respondent groups recommended having flexible approaches to CVE programming. This largely focused on designing the activity in a way that can respond to emerging needs and developments. As a District Peace Committee respondent in Eastleigh said, “Stick to your mandate but be flexible to address new issues that come up.” Similarly, respondents felt that it is important to identify opportunities to integrate CVE into mainstream education, development and social services domains and offer recreational opportunities for youth (such as neighborhood football leagues) that can combat idleness. They also recommended having flexible procurement policies that reflect the operating environment. (See discussion on use of local resources and talents in Evaluation Question 1.)
2. Conduct regular mapping to identify VE trends/ evolutions. Closely related to flexibility, respondents in 16 of 47 interviews, including nearly half of the main beneficiary groups, recommended regular mapping to identify VE trends and evolutions. They emphasized that VE is dynamic and evolving. According to women’s groups in Kibera, “There are new dynamics in the community that will require a new mapping exercise to ensure all sections are included.” Others specified an increased use of cell phone technology and social media for radicalization purposes and said the younger generations being radicalized tend to be more lethal. They also stated that the reasons for radicalization differ among informal settlements, so tailored approaches are needed to address the unique challenges.
3. Use a CMM approach to CVE. Respondents in 14 of 47 interviews recommended using a CMM approach to CVE programming. According to GC, “[A] CMM approach gives an opportunity to diagnose the issues. ... Once you diagnose, you know the right way to go.” While other respondent groups generally did not use the term “CMM,” they noted that CVE is *a type of conflict*, not something separate, and recommended following the approach, partnerships and types of activities that KTU had.
4. Include women and school-aged children as key target groups. Twelve of 47 interview groups recommended expanding the inclusion of women and 10 of 47 recommended school-aged children as key targets groups in future CVE activities. This was largely because of the increased knowledge of the role of women in CVE, in particular the role that mothers can play. For school-aged children, respondents were of the opinion this group was now being targeted for radicalization. According to an elders respondent group, “Al-Shabaab is an equal opportunity employer that doesn’t require an ID and any experience,” hence the need to target even children younger than 18 years.

Conclusions

Evaluation participants provided valuable insights on lessons that can inform future conflict-sensitive programming.

- *For CMM programming generally*, evaluation participants feel that a robust livelihoods component is vital for tackling issues of economic vulnerability that can lead to conflict. They also strongly believe that “soft” approaches work well for securing buy-in for the activity. Some of these approaches (such as adhering to local protocol) can be learned and replicated, while others are

less tangible and depend on the personal dedication and attitude of implementing partner staff. Respondents felt that KTU's exit ahead of the 2017 elections was untimely, given that some of the effects of the activity were just starting to be felt and considering that elections have historically been a trigger for conflict. They identified government as a key stakeholder and recommended that future activities enhance engagement with government. Evaluation participants also emphasized the importance of utilizing and coordinating with existing local capacity for peace building as part of community buy-in and sustainability efforts. They believe that conflict-sensitivity efforts should be ongoing and integrated into other types of activities; and that psycho-social services are important for target communities and Activity partners dealing with CMM and CVE.

- *For CVE programming in particular*, evaluation participants strongly emphasized the need for a flexible activity design and approaches to respond to emerging needs and developments. Closely linked to this, they recommended regular mapping to identify VE trends and evolutions, such as a growing use of technology for radicalization purposes and younger generations being radicalized. Respondents identified CVE as a type of conflict and recommended using a “CMM approach” for addressing it. Participants also felt that future CVE activities should expand the inclusion of women (given the influential roles that mothers in particular have on youth at risk for radicalization) and school-aged children (given trends toward recruitment of younger youth into VE).

General Perceptions of the 2017 General Elections

The findings that follow extend beyond the formal scope of the evaluation. However, they provide context for understanding community preparedness to resist political manipulation that could lead to violent conflict during the 2017 election period. The findings reflect issues that were outside KTU's mandate. As such, the information is not necessarily a reflection on KTU. The information can be of use to USAID and other donor efforts to support electoral reform. It may also inform other types of activities that have a conflict-sensitivity aim.

Optimism

In 15 of 47 interviews, respondents expressed optimism that the 2017 general elections will be peaceful. They spoke of community preparedness with early warning and early response systems that can mitigate conflicts. The interview with elders indicated “There are coordinated forces in the community, the DPC,⁵⁰ the police are all working in a coordinated manner. ... People are very prepared with an effective rapid response.” A group of former KTU volunteers commented, “People are more informed and learned. ... They speak of what development has been done by the political leaders and it's based on their responsibilities. Even now, people talk of voting for an individual not a party, which is a good way to show there may be some sort of preparedness against political manipulation.” Similar sentiments were echoed by a sub-grantee: “They are prepared. ... We had installed an early warning system, which still works.”

Respondents noted increased community cohesiveness and a sense that people are not willing to disrupt their peace for the sake of politicians. A responding youth group from Eastleigh/Majengo commented “If we fight, we'll lose. In 2017, we are prepared to eat money but not fight.” GC shared the view that,

50 District Peace Committee (DPC)

“There is a fair level of resilience/ resistance to political manipulation ... increased cohesiveness, resistance to violence ... a lot of self-restraint compared to four years ago, when people went to the streets.”

Pessimism

Respondents in 29 of 47 interviews expressed pessimism about the prospect of peaceful elections in 2017.⁵¹ Respondents spoke of growing disillusionment with the system; lack of trust in public institutions; informal settlements being realigned along ethnic lines; communities adopting hardline stands similar to 2007; and people registering to vote up-country where it is considered relatively safe. A youth leader from Kiambiu noted, “The current politics aren’t that different from those in 2007, where everyone believes they have the right to be in power.” An official from Kamukunji commented, “People had a lot of hopes in 2013; now they fear elections. Tribal lines have already been drawn.”

Respondents, including USAID, pointed to a lack of trust in institutions such as the IEBC community lack confidence in IEBC, just as it happened in 2007.” A female community leader expressed similar sentiments, noting plenty of peace building, but when politicians come to the communities, people and the Judiciary. A youth leader from Kiambiu commented, “People in the start burning houses and moving. She added that IEBC has to play a role and punitive measures must be in place for those who incite violence. Respondents also pointed to voter apathy. These examples included people not interested in registering to vote, not planning to vote even if they are registered and others who are waiting for aspirants to pay them to register.

51 The political situation at the end of KTU and during the evaluation was charged. This likely influenced respondent views. Many of the respondents who expressed pessimism spoke of the IEBC as the reason and referenced recent demonstrations against the IEBC.

ANNEX 2. EVALUATION STATEMENT OF WORK

C. I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

I.1 Identifying Information

1. Program: Democracy, Governance and Conflict Office
2. Project: Kenya Tuna Uwezo (KTU)
3. Award Number: AID-623-A-12-00007
4. Award Dates: 2012 to 2016
5. Period to be Evaluated: 2012 to 2016
6. Funding: \$4,911,534
7. Implementing Organization: Global Communities
8. Contracting Officer's Representative (COR): Makena Kirima

I.2 Development Context

I.2.1 Problem or Opportunity Addressed

A study by the United Nations Human Settlements Programme established that informal settlement growth in sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya, and particularly Nairobi, is of increasing concern.⁵² This study further indicated that 72 percent of urban Africa's citizens, representing a total of some 187 million people, live in informal settlements.⁵³ In Kenya, over 60 percent of Nairobi's population lives in informal settlements⁵⁴ where the overall policies and practices to address their needs have not been fully developed and implemented. As a result, Nairobi's informal settlements are fertile ground for political violence and the development of violent extremism, fomented by both internal and external sources.⁵⁵

Nairobi's informal settlements, which are characterized by overcrowding, occupy 5 percent of all Nairobi's land area that is used for residential purposes. However, they house 60 percent of the city's population.⁵⁶ The average density of informal settlements is 250 dwelling units (or 750 persons) per hectare compared to 10-30 dwelling units (or 50-180 persons) per hectare in middle and upper-income areas⁵⁷. The majority of settlement residents' are poor in terms of income, assets, access to resources and environmental conditions. This situation creates fertile grounds for violence to flourish.

Kenya has a long history of ethnic conflict centered on access to resources such as land and political power.⁵⁸ Politicians use ethnicity, in particular, to produce, direct, and support conflict to sustain their rule, economic advancement and draw attention away from issues that threaten their position.⁵⁹ As a result, elections are triggers for conflict that threaten peaceful co-existence among diverse ethnic groups.

52 United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), 2006

53 Syagga et al, Nairobi Situation Analysis Consultative Report, 2001

54 *ibid*

55 Statement of Principles on Long-term Issues and Solutions, Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Mediated by H.E. Kofi Annan, Chair of the Panel of Eminent African Personalities signed on 23 May 2008

56 Alder, G. Tackling poverty in Nairobi's informal settlements: developing an institutional strategy, 1995

57 *ibid*

58 Mueller, S.D. The political Economy of Kenya's Crisis: *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, May 2008

59 *ibid*

Nairobi's informal settlements are a microcosm of the larger Kenyan society, where conflicts are largely caused and fueled by political manipulation of ethnic identities. As with the rest of society, residents of informal settlements are highly factionalized along ethnic lines. Using this space, politicians incite informal settlement inhabitants to violence using pre-existing vulnerabilities such as poverty, inequity, poor service delivery, limited access to employment and/or underemployment, lack of education, perceptions around historical injustices, exclusion from decision-making organs, insecurity, etc.⁶⁰

Un- and/or underemployment have been identified as a key factor in violence within Nairobi's informal settlements. A study by Amnesty International⁶¹ observed that perpetrators of violence were mostly unemployed (mainly male) youth and men who are criminals individually or as part of groups or gangs. Muggings, physical attacks, theft and other violence by these individuals and groups are rampant. Because of this unmet need, violent extremism is a growing reality in Kenya, particularly in Nairobi's informal settlements, as youth are recruited and manipulated into radicalism with a promise of employment and income to their families.⁶² According to the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, there were 22 such motivated attacks in Kenya, including Nairobi, between January 2012 and January 2014, targeted at law enforcement, places of worship, shopping malls, restaurants, public vehicles and other crowded places. This clearly demonstrates a growing trend.

These conditions are also rooted in widespread feelings of marginalization and alienation from the larger society. This sense of alienation and disenfranchisement lead informal settlement inhabitants to view themselves as existing outside formal structures. In response they mobilize themselves to provide for their own security and services, for which they charge high fees and often subvert attempts by others, including government, to provide the same services. These arrangements reduce community trust in the police and other government organs, creating dissent, which can lead to violence at the slightest provocation.⁶³ Conflicts and violence bred by these sentiments have consequently become part of the informal settlements' social fabric.

Exclusion from decision-making organs, perceptions around historical injustices and insecurity are also among the issues that politicians can use to incite informal settlement residents to violence and violent extremism. Over the years, politicians have used such sentiments to establish political strongholds in the capitol city by promising residents that their plight will be heard in parliament and other executive offices if elected/re-elected. Because of this hope and feelings of vulnerability, residents will go to great lengths to support their candidates by any means, including being violent to opponents.

Kenya's 2010 Constitution presents a vital opportunity to address some of the issues at the core of violence and ethnic tensions, particularly, in Nairobi's informal settlements, as it delinks political power from access to resources. However, limited knowledge of the new constitution and deep-seated divisions also make the Constitution's implementation an opportunity for ethnic manipulation and conflict. Many residents of these informal settlements have never read or understood the articles of the constitution and, therefore, do not know their rights. This makes them susceptible to manipulation by politicians who tell them what is supposedly contained in the constitution, but not actually there. To remain in power, politicians only re-produce what is palatable to themselves and take advantage of informal settlement residents' ignorance to manipulate them to violence. Kituo Cha Sheria revealed

60 Omenya Alfred, Understanding the tipping point of urban conflict: the case of Nairobi, Kenya, May 2012

61 Insecurity and Indignity: Women's Experiences in the Slums of Nairobi, Kenya, 2010

62 Baseline Assessment Countering Violent Extremism in Eastleigh and Selected Informal Settlements (Kenya), Action Research Consultancy Services, January 2015

63 *ibid*

this⁶⁴ during a pre-assessment exercise about open debate on devolved governance systems in Nairobi's informal settlements. The debate established that 22 percent of sampled respondents in Mathare informal settlement had knowledge of devolution against 77 percent were illiterate.

To address these issues of political manipulation, ethnicization of politics, devolution, lack of access to essential basic services, countering violent extremism and other underlying causes of conflict in Nairobi's informal settlements and provide non-violent alternatives, through Kenya Tuna Uwezo (KTU), USAID Kenya and East Africa (USAID/KEA) supports activities that are aimed at strengthening community cohesion and increasing civic awareness, particularly among youth, of the new constitution to help empower informal settlement inhabitants to make informed, non-ethnically charged decisions and create opportunities for increased incomes. KTU, in particular, worked to reduce ethnic and politically motivated conflict in Nairobi's informal settlements by strengthening communities to withstand the political manipulation that leads to violent conflict and extremism.

1.2.2 Target Areas and Groups

KTU was a two-phased activity. Phase I covered the four informal settlements of Kiambiu, Kibera, Mathare and Korogocho/Babadogo. In 2014, building on the success of these four, the activity expanded its geographic reach to another five communities: Dandora, Kangemi, Majengo, Mukuru and Eastleigh. The activity targeted a wide range of stakeholders from a pool of new and pre-existing peace building networks including international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community leaders, religious institutions and national and civic leaders, particularly women and youth group leaders, county government, and other peace building agencies and commissions, etc.

⁶⁴ Kituo Cha Sheria, Open Debate on Devolved Government Structure, May 2013



FIGURE I: KTU EVALUATION SITES

I.3 Intended Results

Goal

USAID/KEA’s goal behind KTU was to strengthen Nairobi’s informal communities to withstand the political manipulation that leads to violent conflict. Using a people-to-people approach in eight Nairobi informal settlements and Eastleigh, KTU aimed to develop strong inter-community relationships around shared interests, ensuring an informed and engaged population. KTU therefore, leveraged the 2010 constitution, which gives meaning to national values based on human dignity, expands the range of human rights available to citizens, particularly the most vulnerable groups (e.g. women, persons with disabilities, and marginalized ethnic groups, etc.), decentralizes decision-making authority, and sets in motion mechanisms for addressing citizen grievances. To achieve this, KTU focused on strengthening national, county and grassroots peace building networks.

Objectives

According the KTU project description the activity’s objectives and expected results were as follows.

Phase I (Feb 2012 – Feb 2014)

1. Strengthened social networks of community members and civil society groups to collaborate productively on community issues and address grievances
2. Enhanced ability of local institutions to lead and implement people-to-people peace building independently

These two objectives were met through delivery of the five following results:

1. Increased grassroots demand for accountable and equitable service delivery in Nairobi's informal settlements
2. Enhanced knowledge and skills of community members and civil society in conflict mitigation
3. Improved ability of groups to communicate on issues that drive conflict
4. Increased capacity of local NGOs to provide services in support of conflict mitigation
5. Increased services and solutions provided by duty bearers which address citizens' needs and grievances

Building on this, Phase II (March 2014-April 2016) added the following two strategic objectives:

1. Address the pull and push factors that drive youth to engage in violent extremism
2. Reduce susceptibility to manipulation through supporting youth to engage in viable livelihoods

1.4 Approach and Implementation

For Kenya to move toward a lasting and positive peace, distrust and division among ethnic groups must be replaced with civil dialogue and trust. This was the principle behind KTU's people-to-people strategy. The people-to-people methodology strives to achieve results by developing strong inter-community relationships around shared interests and ensuring an informed and engaged population. This community-led strategy recognizes that building mutual understanding and trust among potential adversaries is vital to reducing and preventing violent conflicts. In Phase I KTU also focused on building knowledge of the new constitution and its implementation as a means of empowering informal settlement inhabitants to make informed non-ethnically charged decisions, in concert with one another. Phase II worked toward strengthening social networks among community members and civil society groups to collaborate productively to address grievances and other factors supporting development of violent extremism.

C2. EVALUATION RATIONALE

2.1 Evaluation Purpose

Overall, the evaluation will assist USAID Washington Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) office and the Kenya East Africa (KEA) Mission to understand how and why KTU was effective. It will generate important learning around conflict mitigation and management programming in informal settlements that will inform future programming, both stand-alone and integrated into other types of programming (e.g. elections). In addition, the evaluation will inform mission management about how to strategically address conflict in informal settlements through a combination of approaches, including countering violent extremism in a more integrated way.

2.2 Audience and Intended Use

The key audiences for this evaluation include the USAID Washington, Conflict Mitigation Management office, USAID Kenya/East Africa (KEA), the Strategic Planning and Analysis Office, the Democracy, Governance, and Conflict (DGC) Office, and other technical teams. The evaluation will also seek to inform, more broadly, other donors such as UK Department for International Development (DfID), European Union, Danida, etc. on conflict sensitive programming. The evaluation will be useful to the implementing partner, Global Communities, (GC), and their consortium of partners. USAID/KEA will share the final report with implementing partners, relevant government agencies (e.g. Ministry of Devolution & Planning, Ministry of Interior & Coordination of National Government and other government peace actors), and other peace actors (e.g. faith based groups such as the National Council of Churches Kenya (NCCCK), Council of Imams, Interfaith Council, etc.) and KTU target communities. USAID/KEA anticipates this audience using the evaluation results to inform their future conflict

mitigation programs. Dissemination methods may include press releases, tailored reports, or workshops and should be planned in detail through an evaluation dissemination strategy created by USAID.

2.3 Evaluation Questions

Evaluation Question 1: What factors facilitated or hindered Kenya Tuna Uwezo activity's successes and failures and how? In answering this question, the evaluation team will examine three things in particular:

- a. The effectiveness of the main approaches used to achieve the activity's stated goals and objectives. This includes both pre-defined approaches (e.g. People-to-People) as well as approaches that were developed and/or evolved over the life of the activity.
- b. The effectiveness of partnerships developed to support the realization of the activity's stated results. This includes partnerships at every level – between the activity's implementing partners (IPs) and their subs and the Government of Kenya, community organizations, USAID, other donors, etc.
- c. The activity's adaptability and flexibility throughout its duration and the factors that facilitated and/or hindered that.

Evaluation Question 2: To what extent and in what ways did the program involve and affect men and women? This question will examine how men and women were involved in the activity, whether different approaches were used to engage them and why. The evaluation will also explore the overall effects of their inclusion, including how it influenced the activity's successes. It will examine the extent to which KTU took advantage of emerging opportunities not only for the inclusion of men and women, but also of marginalized groups.

Evaluation Question 3: To what extent and in what ways will the activity's interventions be sustainable? The answer to this question will focus specifically on the effectiveness of KTU's original sustainability plans. The question will also explore the target communities' perception about the extent to which and in what ways the activity's effects will affect the 2017 general elections.

The evaluation recommendations will focus on lessons learned, bearing in mind the evaluation purpose. They will, therefore, focus on constraints and opportunities for conflict-sensitive programming as both stand-alone activities and integrated into other activities.

C3. EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Evaluation Design

This will be a final performance evaluation aimed at understanding the effectiveness of KTU's non-violent conflict mitigation strategies.

3.1.1 Selection of Informal Settlements

KTU was a two-phased activity. Phase I covered three informal settlements, while Phase II expanded to include another six settlements. In total six sub-partners were given sub-grants to implement KTU interventions. In Phase II two sub-partners from Phase I continued their involvement in the activity and four new partners were added. Given the diversity of settlements the evaluation will cover six informal settlements, based on:

- the range of issues addressed
- receptiveness to the activity by targeted beneficiaries

- targeted minority groups, such as the Nubians of Kibera and Nairobi’s Disabled Empowerment Program

Table I, below, depicts the six communities sampled for the evaluation. Kiambu and Mathare were selected because they presented similar issues (ethnic groupings and land) as Kibera. Mathare was also receptive to the KTU interventions. Korogocho and Mukuru were included in Phase I hence will give a rich context into what KTU has been able to achieve in the last five years. Kangemi was a Phase II entrant, and was also very receptive to KTU. Eastleigh, which is a suburban setting, was also added in Phase II because of its unique setting, which will provide information on the development of violent extremism.

Table I: Informal Settlement Selection

Sub-County	Informal Settlements
Kamukunji	Kambiu
Kasarani	Korogocho
Starehe	Mathare
Westlands	Kangemi
Embakasi	Mukuru
Kamukunji	Eastleigh/Majengo
Kibera	Kibera

3.1.2 Sample Selection of Stakeholders

Stakeholder sampling for key informant (KI) and group interviews (GI) will purposefully target relevant respondents and beneficiaries who have valuable information on the activity or who played a key role in implementation. Table 2 below provides an illustrative list of stakeholders for key informant and group interviews.

Table 2: Illustrative List for Key Informant and Group Interviews

Group Interviews (GIs)	
<p>Group Interviews will be held with key staff or members of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Youth Groups Women Groups District Peace Committees Youth Reformists/Entrepreneurship & Vocational Training Trainees Volunteers USAID staff <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Activity AOR and alternate Elders Cohesion Champions Religious Leaders Police Global communities Staff <ul style="list-style-type: none"> M&E specialist COP Local Administration (Chiefs) Political leaders 	
<p>Each interview will have between 5-7 participants.</p>	
Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)	
<p>Key members of KTU Sub-partners and other NGOs</p> <p>Primary Respondents:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Youth Banner Kituo Cha Sheria - PEACENET- Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM)- Youth Arts Development & Entrepreneurship Network (YADEN)- Housing Finance Foundation (HFF) 	<p>Key Members of County Governments and Community</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> County Commissioner

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainable Development Solutions (SDS)- • Action Research Consultants • Research Triangle Africa • Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance (KMYA) • Usalama Reforms Platform 	
<p>Key Peace Actors</p> <p>Primary Respondents</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) • Yes Youth Can-YYC Nairobi Region • Africa Peace Point <p>Secondary Respondents</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pamoja Trust • International Rescue Committee (IRC) 	<p>Community level</p>
<p>Other key stakeholder who promote peace State Departments</p> <p>Primary Respondents⁶⁵:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Directorate of Cohesion and National Values, State Department of Interior • Independent Elections and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) • National Police Service (NPS) • Immigration Department-office of Registrar of persons-Kasarani Sub-county • National Steering Committee 	
<p>Other Key Peace Collaborators</p> <p>Primary Respondents:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tawakal Medical Center • National Youth Service (NYS)- • UWEZO Fund • Constituency Development Funds (CDF)- Kamukunji and Kibra Constituencies • National Democratic Institute (NDI) • International Republican Institute (IRI) • United States Institute for Peace (USIP) <p>Secondary Respondents⁶⁶</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Danish Demining Group (DDG) • Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) Nairobi Region 	

3.2 Data Collection and Analysis Methods

3.2.1 Data Collection Methods

Evaluation data will be gathered from both primary and secondary sources. The evaluation team is expected to review and finalize the methodology as part of the work plan development. The evaluation design will use a mix of data collection and analysis methods to generate answers. Following is a

⁶⁵ Primary respondents: The evaluation team will interview them.

⁶⁶ Secondary respondents: Time permitting, the evaluation team will interview them.

summary of each of the data collection and analysis methods to be used. Table 3, below, summarizes how each of the three evaluation questions will be answered using the various methodologies (also see the Getting to Answers Table in Annex III).

Desk Review

The evaluation team will review activity documentation provided by USAID/KEA and KTU. They will use online resources and other reports relevant to activity efforts. Secondary data sources will be mainly from activity implementation documents such as the activity award, activity descriptions, work plans, monitoring and evaluation (M & E) plans, baselines and assessments, mid-term reviews and evaluation, modifications, periodic progress reports, etc. Other secondary sources will include CVE Evaluation: An Introduction and Tips for Practitioners introduction and tips on how to conduct CVE evaluation among others. The product of the team's document review will be an organized presentation of information found in relation to each of the evaluation questions. The evaluation team will present initial findings to Kenya Support Project (KSP) internally as part of the Team Planning Meeting (TPM) at the beginning of the evaluation. An edited version will then be shared with USAID/KEA as an attachment to the final report.

Key secondary documents include:

- Activity Award and Modifications (1-4)
- Activity description documents (2012 and 2014)
- Annual work plans (2012 and 2014)
- Activity M&E Plans (2012 and 2014)
- Quarterly reports (2012-2016)
- Annual reports (2012, 2013, 2014, 2015)
- Activity Baselines and Assessments (9)
- Activity related and mid-term reviews and evaluations (3)
- Nairobi County Police Crime Reports from the seven evaluation informal settlements (2013 and 2015)

Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)

Key informants, in this case, are people who are knowledgeable about the KTU activity in their specific areas of involvement. The sampled participants will provide information on their experiences with and perceptions of the various activity components addressed in the evaluation. These stakeholders are, therefore, relevant to providing information that will guide the evaluation in terms of KTU's implementation and results.

Key informant interviews (KIIs) with the implementing partners' staff will target the activity senior management teams, including the Chief of Parties and/or managers and the staff responsible for key activity components. At the community level, KIIs will target group leaders, elders, minorities and volunteers. KIIs will be conducted using a semi-structured interview tool that will be developed as part of the TPM.

Group Interviews (GIs)

Group interviews will be purposive, only targeting the institutions and individuals who have valuable information on the activity, including beneficiaries and those who played a key role in activity implementation. Two extra days has been added for KIIs who may not be available for inclusion in GIs. Table 2, above, provides an illustrative list of likely KII and GI respondents.

3.2.2 Data Analysis Methods

Some key data analysis methodologies the evaluation will use include the following.

Content Analysis

The team will document narrative responses at a sufficient level of detail to permit a systematic content analysis of the qualitative data. Narrative reviews of interviews and discussion responses are expected to provide an in-depth understanding of beneficiary and stakeholder experiences and perceptions. Qualitative data analysis begins with note writing. Each interview will be written up so that it can be shared among team members so that everyone has as complete a picture as possible of all the information obtained. In addition to note writing, the team will hold debriefings (in person and/or remotely) at the end of each data collection day and/or week during which they will begin to identify common themes that will be used later for coding the collected data during the formal data analysis process. The team will also use this coding process for the content analysis of all qualitative secondary sources with a focus on the issues most salient to the evaluation questions. This will be done first as part of the document review prior to the fieldwork to help identify missing information that can only come from primary data collection.

Pattern Analysis

From the content analysis, the team will examine interview and discussion notes for patterns to determine whether some responses received appear to be correlated with other factors, such as location (informal settlement), respondent group, age, gender, etc. Preliminary primary data analysis will begin during the fieldwork so the team can be sure of capturing the information necessary to fully address the evaluation questions. Near the end of the data collection process, the team will conduct an open coding process to identify key themes that emerged in the interviews, beginning with the list of preliminary themes identified during the fieldwork. The evaluation team will then work in two sub-teams to analyze the data from a sub-set of all the interview notes, preferably those that they did not collect. Once the list of themes has been generated and the entire set of notes divided among the sub-teams, working independently to enhance researcher triangulation, each team member will then code the interview data collected by the other team. Once the sub-team members have completed their individual coding, they will compare their coding and agree on how to deal with any differences in perspective. Through this process, the entire team will develop a solid common understanding of the various perspectives that emerged among different stakeholders, which will help ensure that the evaluation findings do not rest on the perspectives of one or two people.

Comparative Analysis

Results from the pattern analysis based on the document review, interview and discussion notes that have emerged will be compared across data type or sources. This approach facilitates both within case (each stakeholder group and secondary data source) and between case comparisons. In this way key pieces of evidence from the various interviews and documents are compared and triangulated to identify the main evaluation findings that respond to the evaluation questions.

Table 3: Data Collection and Analysis Methods for the Five Evaluation Questions

Evaluation Question			
I. What factors facilitated or hindered Kenya Tuna Uwezo activity's successes and failures and how?			
Data Collection Methods	Secondary Data	Group Interviews (GI)	Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)
	X	X	X
Secondary data from activity routine data collection, progress reports, baseline assessments and mid-term reviews and evaluations will yield information on what aspects of the activity interventions enhanced and/or hindered program successes and failures. This data was selected as a source			

because it is available, relevant, and reflective of the activity, providing key information on the activity's achievements and/or challenges experienced. These secondary data sources document the interventions and results attained in support of strengthening communities in Nairobi's informal settlements to withstand the political manipulation that leads to violent conflict and how they relate to the activity's goal and objectives. The documented data will also guide development of interview tools aimed at evaluating the elements that facilitated and/or hindered the activity's successes and failures.

To the extent possible within the limits of time the team will also review other reports and on-line data about community-led strategies relevant to KTU's work. This will provide an additional layer of information on KTU from an "outsider" perspective, which will balance KTU's own reporting.

KIIs will be conducted with key stakeholders including KTU consortium staff, state departments, county government, local politicians, key peace-building actors (NGOs), and key peace-building collaborators (INGOs), etc. All these stakeholders will have relevant information and insights on how KTU's interventions contributed to the successes and failures of the activity.

KIIs with the key members of state departments (Directorate of Cohesion and National Values, , Independent Elections and Boundaries Commission, National Police Service, Immigration Department, and National Steering Committee) will provide valuable information on the legal framework for community engagement; they will also provide official curriculum for trainings where such was applicable, (e.g. civic education, national cohesion and integration, etc.) and this will be used to demonstrate how they facilitated KTU's successes and failures.. They will also be asked about to what extent and how KTU supported their work during the pre- and post-elections periods.

KIIs with county government and political leaders will provide useful information on how KTU provided platforms for county government and community dialogues that facilitated participatory decision-making processes which were the bedrock of KTU implementation process Political leaders (Members of County Assembly) will show how they worked with KTU to realize stated results. The will also be asked about the changes they have witnessed in the sampled informal settlements relating to conflict and conflict mitigation and management (CMM) processes, which may be attributable to KTU's work in the informal settlements.

KIIs with INGOs and NGOs (Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance, Action Research Consultants, Research Triangle Africa, Yes Youth Can-YYC Nairobi Region, Usalama Reforms Platform, KTU sub-partners, etc.) will provide valuable information on how skills and resources on conflict mitigation and countering violent extremism were leveraged by KTU and contributed to the activity's successes and failures.

KIIs with key peace-building actors and other collaborators (National Counter-terrorism Center, National Youth Service, UWEZO Fund, Constituency Development Funds, National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute United States Institute for Peace, etc.) will provide valuable information on how KTU's relationships with peace actors and/or collaborators within the informal settlements worked and influenced the achievement of stated successes and failures. They will also be asked about how KTU supported their work during the pre- and post-elections periods for data triangulation purposes.

The KIIs will yield narrative content that will provide in-depth insight to identify key trends and themes about factors facilitating and/or hindering KTU's successes and failures. The information generated through these KIIs will be triangulated with other sources to arrive at the conclusions and recommendations addressing this evaluation question.

GIs with USAID and Global Communities staff will reveal deeper insight into their knowledge as custodians of the activity's initial concept and what it intended to achieve by strengthening Nairobi's informal communities to withstand the political manipulation that leads to violent conflicts. Both, but especially Global Communities, were involved in implementation and regularly monitoring the

activity’s performance. They are, therefore critical interviewees about the factors that facilitated and/or hindered KTU’s successes and failures.

GIs with youth, women, peace committee, youth reformists/entrepreneurship and vocational training trainees, cohesion champions, elders, religious leaders, police, local administration, and volunteers will reveal deeper insight into their knowledge and perceptions of how KTU’s implementation supported them as some of these groups are targeted by politicians for political manipulation. They will also be asked to what extent non-violent conflict solving mechanisms have been instrumental in addressing community disputes; they will also be asked how KTU’s implementation supported mostly the youth to refocus their use of time and energy; they will also be asked how they have utilized the skills and/or capacities gained through KTU, particularly in creating a conflict free environment. Of importance also, they will be asked what factors facilitated and/or hindered KTU’s success or failure.

This “outsider” (these were people not initial targeted by the activity) perspective is critical for off-setting any bias. Both the KIs and the GIs will yield rich textual data through which key trends and themes can be identified. This information will be triangulated with other sources to assess key points of convergence and divergence regarding the factors that facilitated and/or hindered KTU’s success or failure.

Data Analysis Methods	Content Analysis	Pattern Analysis	Comparative Analysis
	X	X	X

Qualitative data analysis begins with note writing. Each interview will be written up so that it can be shared among team members so that everyone has as complete a picture as possible of all the information obtained by the team. This is important, as the evaluation team will work in two separate sub-teams while collecting data. In other words, two team members will be present at each interview so that two interviews can be conducted concurrently. In addition, to note writing, they will hold a debriefs at the end of each data collection day and/or week during which they will begin to identify common themes that will be used later for coding the collected data during the formal data analysis process.

After the data collection is completed, beginning with the list of themes compiled during the fieldwork, the team will conduct an open coding process to identify key themes and issues that emerged in the interviews. Once the list of themes has been generated, working independently to enhance researcher triangulation, each team member will then code the interviews collected by the other sub-team. This process entails identifying what themes and issues emerged in each interview. Once both sub-team members have completed their independent coding, they will compare their individual coding and come to consensus about how to deal with any differences in perspective. Through this process the entire team will develop a solid understanding of the various perspectives that emerged among different stakeholder groups with respect to the extent to which KTU’s implementation created opportunities for, and enhanced the desire and perception of need for, cooperative action among often conflicting groups within Nairobi’s informal settlements. Of particular importance is identifying the key themes and issues that emerged so as to ensure that the evaluation findings do not rest on the perspectives of one or two people. Nonetheless, divergent and unique perspectives will be investigated to assess whether or not they merit consideration in the analysis. If so, the team will specify why.

Once the key themes and issues that emerged in the various sets of interviews and documents are identified, the team will then conduct a pattern analysis, where the perspectives both within and among the various stakeholder groups are compared, and used to map out the patterns that emerge. These data will also be compared with the content analysis from the document review. In this analytical approach, each type of data is analyzed in parallel, and then across data types. Put another way, this approach facilitates both within case (each stakeholder group and secondary data source)

and between case comparisons. In this way key pieces of evidence from the various interviews and documents are compared and triangulated to identify the main evaluation findings that respond to the question.

Evaluation Question

2. To what extent and in what ways did the program involve and affect men and women?

Data Collection Methods	Secondary Data	Group Interviews (GI)	Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)
	X	X	X

Work plans, monitoring and evaluation plans, quarterly and annual reports, baseline assessments and mid-term reviews and evaluations will provide insight into how KTU intended to and actually included men and women into its peace-building strategies. This information is critical to understanding how KTU’s expansion over the two phases effectively involved men and women in peace-building processes. The documents will also be critical to examining whether activity description clearly defined both men and women as active participants. The team will also review these secondary data sources as a guide to development of interview tools aimed at evaluating the extent to which men and women were actively involved in KTU’s peace-building process.

KIIs will be conducted with key stakeholders including state departments, INGOs, peace-building NGOs, county government staff, local politicians, key peace-building actors, and key peace-building collaborators, etc. All these stakeholders will have relevant information and insights on how KTU’s interventions involved both men and women in its peace-building efforts.

KIIs with KTU’s consortium partner staffs who were involved in the activity are especially critical to answering this question because they can speak to how KTU’s design and implementation intended to and actually included men and women differently. In addition, these KIIs will provide information about any studies and analyses that may have shaped the activity implementation strategies, particularly those targeting men and women. Finally, the consortium partners will also provide insight about the extent to which and in what ways men and women championed KTU’s peace-building agenda and the effects of that under the evolving political environments within which the activity was implemented.

KIIs with state departments, county government and political leaders, will provide insights on the legal framework for community engagement and how KTU leveraged that information to include men and women and the effect of that inclusion political leaders (Members of County Assembly) will provide information on the changes they have observed related to men and women’s inclusion in conflict mitigation and management within the selected informal settlements, and overall they will be asked whether men and women’s involvement was in any way significant to the results KTU achieved. They will also be asked about emerging lessons on how best to involve men and women in future peace-building and countering violent extremism programming.

KIIs with INGOs and peace-building NGOs, peace actors and other collaborators will provide information on how KTU leveraged their skills and resources to enhance the inclusion of men and women in the fight against political manipulation and violent extremism. They will also be asked about the specific involvement of men and women in conflict management which relates to KTU interventions.

GIs with USAID and Global Communities staff will reveal deeper insight into their knowledge of how KTU involved men and women in the activity and the effects of that involvement. They can speak to how KTU’s development hypothesis, design and implementation intended to and actually included men and women differently. In addition, they will provide information about any studies and analyses that may have shaped the development hypothesis, design and ultimate activity implementation

strategies, particularly those targeting men and women. Finally, the will also provide insight about the extent to which and in what ways men and women championed KTU’s peace-building agenda and the effects of that under the evolving political environments within which the activity was implemented.

GIs with youth and women’s groups, youth reformist/ entrepreneurship and vocational training trainees, peace committees, elders, religious leaders, police, local administration, and volunteers’ beneficiaries will reveal deeper insight into their knowledge and understanding of how KTU and its consortium partners engaged men and women in the fight against community conflict and violent extremism. They will be asked of incidences where community dialogues involving the participation of men and women solved conflict and/or tension; they will also provide critical insights into the changes, if any, they have experienced in KTU’s selected settlements, particularly regarding men and women’s involvement and its possibly differential effects. Of importance will also be the relationships and networks established by KTU to ensure the equal participation of men and women in the fight against community conflict and violent extremism.

This “outsider” perspective is critical for off-setting any bias. Both the KIIs and the GIs will yield rich textual data through which key trends and themes can be identified. This information will be triangulated with other sources to assess key points of convergence and divergence regarding the involvement and effect of men and women in KTU.

Data Analysis Methods	Content Analysis	Pattern Analysis	Comparative Analysis
	X	X	X

Data analysis for this question will follow the same procedures detailed above.

Analysis will particularly aim to identify the extent to which and how men and women were included and involved in KTU’s implementation strategies of rolling out peace initiatives, countering violent extremism and whether there exists sufficient evidence to demonstrate equal levels of active involvement as well as its effects.

Evaluation Question

3. To what extent and in what ways will the activity’s interventions be sustainable?

Data Collection Methods	Secondary Data	Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)	Group Interviews (GIs)
		X	X

KIIs will be conducted with key stakeholders including state departments, INGOs, peace-building NGOs, county government, key peace-building actors and collaborators, etc.

KIIs with KTU’s sub-partners’ staff will provide important information on KTU’s sustainability plan as well as its strengths, weakness, opportunities and threats that positively and/or negatively affect its continuity. These respondents were directly responsible for the activity’s day-to-day implementation process and monitoring. They are, therefore, critical informants to provide insights about the activity’s implementation, including gains and challenges experienced, and what they could have done better to ensure sustainability.

KIIs with states departments, INGOs and NGOs will provide insights on what will and won’t contribute to sustainability of the activity’s results. As technical people, they will be asked about areas for improvement and what should have been mainstreamed or disregarded to ensure sustainability.

KIIs with key peace actors and collaborators will provide information as to how their involvements in KTU interventions have been incorporated into their day-to-day operations as an indicator of KTU continuity. Of importance will be whether they are using similar interventions in other

communities to address ethnicization and violent extremism.

KIs with county government will provide insight into whether and how they have adapted KTU’s conflict solving mechanisms and the extent to which, if any, they are scaling-up and replicating them in similar environments. Of importance will be how KTU supported interventions have impacted changes within county government operations. They will also be asked about their experiences regarding peace-building before and after KTU implementation.

GIs with USAID and Global Communities staff will provide important information on KTU’s sustainability plan as well as its strengths, weakness, opportunities and threats that positively and/or negatively affect its continuity. These respondents, especially Global Communities were directly responsible for the activity’s day-to-day implementation process and monitoring. They are, therefore, critical interviewees to provide insights about the activity’s implementation, including gains and challenges experienced, and what they could have done better to ensure sustainability.

GIs with youth, women, police, local administration, and peace committee will provide information on how the capacity building strategies implemented by KTU and its sub-partners continues to sustain a conflict free environment in the selected informal settlements. They will also be asked for instances where they have witnessed the people-to-people approach being used to avert conflict within their communities and the extent to which they believe it will continue to be implemented in the absence of KTU. Of particular interest will also be the on-going activeness of the peace networks supported by KTU and its consortium partners.

These interviews will yield narrative content, which will provide in-depth insight to identify key trends and themes. The information generated through these KIs and GIs will be triangulated against each other with other sources to arrive at the conclusions and recommendations addressing this evaluation question.

Data Analysis Methods	Content Analysis	Pattern Analysis	Comparative Analysis
	X	X	X

Data analysis for this question will follow the same procedures detailed above.

Analysis will aim to clearly identify specific aspects of the activity implementation process that have continued, scaled-up or replicated upon exit of implementing partner and its sub-partners.

The data will be triangulated with analysis of other questions specifically addressing the stakeholder’s views of what worked well, and what did not go well as suggestions for future peace building sustainability plans. Only those positives and negatives that recur most frequently and that provide a clear direction for future planning will be reported.

3.3 Gender

As per Automated Directive System (ADS) 205.3.6.2, all USAID Missions must identify all evaluation questions for which sex-disaggregated data are needed. All people-level indicators must be disaggregated by sex and collected before activities with beneficiaries (or clients) begin (i.e., at baseline) and when activities with beneficiaries end or at the end of the project, whichever comes first (i.e., end line). Missions should also consider whether key evaluation questions examine the extent to which closing gender gaps have improved project outcomes and whether the project has transformed gender norms and reduced gender gaps. Finally, evaluations should identify whether any particular sub-groups (e.g., different ages, persons with disabilities, etc.) are losing out.

Good evaluation practice involves:

- Establishing interview teams comprised of both males and females appropriate for the cultural context and data being collected, and
- Ensuring that samples consist of both men and women as appropriate to the evaluation questions.

Table 4: Evaluation Questions, Gender Data and Differentials

Evaluation Questions	Sex Disaggregated Data	Gender Specific/Differential Effects: Access and Participation	Gender Specific/Differential Effects: Results and Benefits
1. What factors facilitated or hindered Kenya Tuna Uwezo activity's successes and failures and how?	✓ Yes training and monitoring data	○ KTU specific support to peace NGOs, , government agencies, other peace actors and collaborators, leaders, and individual beneficiaries.	○ Percentage of men and women who participated in trainings and events
2. To what extent and in what ways did the program involve and affect men and women?	✓ Yes training and monitoring data	○ Extent to which KTU involved men and women to facilitate peace building and conflict reconciliation processes	○ Percentage of men and women who participated in trainings and events ○ Extent to which men and women were equally involved in and benefited from specific interventions
3. To what extent and in what ways will the activity's interventions be sustainable?	✓ Respondents data	○ Respondents' experiences and perceptions on KTU	○ Percentage of men and women who participated in trainings and utilizing that knowledge

3.4 Methodological Strengths and Limitations

3.4.1 Strengths

Qualitative methods provide an important platform through which feedback from the various stakeholders can be collected. Combining both primary and secondary data sources through interviews and desk review provides for inclusion of the various perspectives and perceptions in the analysis. The use of different data sources also enables the evaluation team to triangulate across them before making conclusions and recommendation. The selection of data analysis methods allows facilitates triangulation among researchers, which is critical to ensuring the reliability and validity of the evaluation's findings, conclusions and recommendations.

3.4.2 Potential Limitations and their Mitigation

As with any assessment or evaluation, there are biases and other limitations that must be addressed through various methodological approaches. First selection bias in the form of contacts provided by the implementers can mean that the team only hears from people with positive experiences. A wide and diverse respondent pool including managers of peace NGOs and CBOs, government departments and commissions, other key peace collaborators, etc. will offset this. In addition, the team will obtain information from non-activity sources, particularly other peace actors, about key individuals to include (e.g. United States Institute for Peace, National Counterterrorism Center, and American Friends Service Committee etc.).

Secondly, the availability of desired participants may vary and KSP will have to work with those available at specified times, which may mean that some gaps in data are unavoidable. KSP will try to secure interviews in advance to ensure listed respondents are reached. If certain stakeholders are unavailable, MSI will work to identify appropriate alternatives to avoid any such gaps.

Thirdly, since there is no control group for impact assessment, the evaluation cannot determine with certainty, whether any changes in the use of non-violent conflict solving mechanisms within Nairobi's informal settlements can be specifically and directly attributed to KTU. The effect of the activity on maintaining peace can only be measured in nominal terms, considering that there were other players supporting peace processes during the pre- and post-election period in the same conflict zones where KTU implemented interventions. However, through triangulation across various data sources it will be possible to correlate the extent to which changes within these communities are related to KTU's interventions.

Finally, the most effective approach for combating any and all of these biases is to use data multiple layers of triangulation. By combining information found in documents, interviews from multiple sources, any one piece of biased data will not skew the analysis. This will be supported by the use of different data collection methodologies (group and individual interviews) and researcher triangulation to ensure the reliability and validity of results.

C4. EVALUATION PRODUCTS

Table 5: Evaluation Products

Deliverable	Responsible Party	Date
Initial meeting with USAID to discuss expectations, review evaluation questions, and answer any specific questions.	KSP/DGC/COR	Week 2
A draft work plan and tools shared with USAID. The work plan will provide a projected timeline and describes in detail the final data collection method/tools to be used.	KSP	Week 2
Meeting with USAID on work plan where agreement is reached and provisional approval provided (perhaps with articulated changes).	KSP/DGC /COR	Week 3
USAID approves Work Plan and tools	DGC/COR	Week 3
Group interviews with USAID/DRG staff	KSP/DGC	Week 3
Weekly reports at the end of each week of data collection	KSP	Week 3, 4, 5
A half-day (morning) validation workshop with all partners and USAID	KSP/DGC/partner	Week 7

Deliverable	Responsible Party	Date
Presentation of Findings to USAID/KEA Mission	KSP	Week 8
Draft Report submitted	MSI	Week 11
Comments from USAID and IP on Draft Report	USAID	Week 13
Final Report submitted	MSI	Week 14
USAID approval of final report and notification to MSI if statements of differences are expected	USAID	Week 16
MSI will incorporate any statements of differences if applicable	MSI	Week 17
USAID approval for DEC submission	USAID	Week 19
One page Summary report	USAID	Week 19

A detailed breakdown of the process is listed below:

Week 1	<p><u>Desk Review</u></p> <p>To initiate data collection, the evaluation team will review all the documents remotely. These initial findings will be presented to KSP during the Team Planning Meeting and will be used to inform tool development.</p>
Week 2	<p><u>Team Planning Meeting (TPM)</u></p> <p>The TPM will be held in KSP offices once the evaluation team is in country. It is expected that the team will have the initial meeting with USAID (Day 2 of Week 2) to discuss expectations, and answer any specific questions. The outcomes of the team planning include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presentation of the initial findings of the document review by evaluation question (KSP-only); • Clear understanding of the Theory of Change model for the evaluation; • Clarification of team members' roles and responsibilities; • Establishment a team atmosphere, share individual working styles, and agree on procedures for resolving differences of opinion; • Review of the final evaluation questions; • Review and finalization of the assignment timeline and share with USAID; • Development of data collection and analysis methods, instruments, and guidelines; • Review and clarification of any logistical and administrative procedures for the assignment; • Development of a preliminary draft outline of the team's report; and • Assignment of drafting responsibilities for the final report.
Week 3	<p><u>Work Plan and Methodology</u></p> <p>During the TPM, the team will prepare a detailed work plan, which will include the methodologies (evaluation design, tools) and operational work plan to be used in the evaluation. This will be submitted to USAID on Day 5 of Week 2 (COB). The team will meet with USAID on Day 1 of Week 3 for the Work Plan Review Meeting, to discuss the methodology and get approval prior to implementation.</p>
Weeks 3 into week 5	<p><u>Data Collection and Updates on Progress</u></p> <p>KSP will present weekly reports by email to USAID starting at the end of the first week of data collection and continuing into week 5.</p>

<p>Week 6 through 8</p>	<p><u>Data Analysis, Validation Meeting, Presentation Prep and Presentation</u></p> <p>Data analysis begins at the end of week 5 and continues through week 8. This includes a half-day meeting (morning) with all partners and USAID/DGC to validate and discuss findings, answer/clarify any data gaps and discuss feasibility of potential recommendations, which leads to preparation for the USAID Front Office presentation. The evaluation team will present the major findings of the evaluation to USAID in a PowerPoint presentation on day 2 of week 8. The presentation will follow a similar structure to the final report and present major findings, conclusions, and recommendations. USAID will have an opportunity to comment and provide input/feedback as part of the presentation.</p>
<p>Week 8-11</p>	<p><u>Report writing, Reviews and Editing</u></p> <p>USAID comments from the presentation will be incorporated into the draft report, as appropriate. In addition the draft report submitted by the team to KSP will undergo a thorough technical review after which the team will revise the report. When the report is finalized it will undergo editing and formatting prior to submission to USAID.</p>
<p>Week 13</p>	<p><u>Review of Draft Evaluation Report and USAID comments</u></p> <p>The written report with clearly description of findings, conclusions, and recommendations, fully supported by triangulated evidence will be reviewed by USAID. USAID will provide comments on the draft report within 14 days of submission.</p>
<p>Week 14-20</p>	<p><u>Responding to USAID comments and submission of Final Report</u></p> <p>The team will submit a final report that incorporates responses to USAID comments and suggestions. The format will adhere to the standard reporting guidelines listed in 4.2. USAID has two weeks thereafter for approval. If there are some outstanding questions, KSP will attempt to answer/incorporate them into the report as appropriate. Otherwise, USAID can consider a Statement of Differences. After approval, the one-pager summary report will be submitted.</p>

4.1 Reporting Guidelines

The evaluation report will adhere to USAID Evaluation Policy (including Appendix 1). The format for the evaluation report shall be as follows. The report should be a maximum of 30 pages not including the cover page, table of contents, executive summary, acronyms list, and glossary of terms or annexes. The report format should be in English and restricted to Microsoft products. In accordance with USAID's Evaluation Report Template, it should use USAID fonts: Gill Sans or Gill Sans MT (bold for headlines, subheads and highlighted text; regular or light for body text; italic for captions), or Garamond or Ariel if Gill Sans is not available. An electronic copy in MS Word shall be submitted. If the report contains any potentially procurement sensitive information, a second version of the report excluding this information shall be submitted (also electronically, in English). Below represents a guideline for the report structure:

- a. **Table of Contents** (1 pg);
- b. **Executive Summary**—concisely state the most salient findings and recommendations (3-4 pg.);

- c. **Evaluation Purpose and Evaluation Questions**—purpose, audience, and synopsis of task (1 pg.);
- d. **Project Background**—brief overview of development problem, USAID project strategy and activities implemented to address the problem, and purpose of the evaluation (1-3 pg.);
- e. **Evaluation Design, Methods, Limitations**—describe evaluation methods, including constraints and gaps (1-3 pg.);
- f. **Findings/Conclusions/Recommendations**—for each evaluation question (15-25 pp);
- g. **Annexes** that document the evaluation methods, schedules, interview lists and tables should be succinct, pertinent and readable. These include references to bibliographical documentation, meetings, interviews and group discussions.

C5. TEAM COMPOSITION

The evaluation team will be composed of four members, three local sector experts and one expatriate team lead. This team will collect all the data themselves working in two teams of two (1 expat and 1 local; and 2 local experts). This will facilitate conducting two interviews simultaneously so that more data can be collected. In addition, given that KTU is now ended and, therefore, not available to provide assistance in making contacts and setting up meetings, MSI will hire four former KTU volunteers who know the seven informal settlements very well to facilitate the team's entrée in their communities given that they are trusted and have free access to the communities. They will ensure necessary connections to facilitate setting up meetings, venues and translation where necessary. They will only work as liaisons in setting up meetings and will not participate in any way in the evaluation data collection and analysis. CVs for the four team members can be found in Annex VI. The roles and responsibilities as well as each team members' specific qualifications are outlined below.

International Evaluation Team Leader

The team lead is an evaluator who will have ultimate responsibility for the report and will guide the team throughout the evaluation process. Research demonstrates that the quality of evaluation reports is significantly enhanced if an evaluation team lead is primarily an evaluator and secondarily possesses sector expertise. In addition, the team lead also possesses critical expertise in governance, democracy and conflict. Ms. Vittum, who will serve as the team leader and evaluation expert for the KTU evaluation, has previously conducted USAID evaluations, including two for USAID/Kenya Support Project. Moreover, she is already familiar with KTU. She, therefore, fully understands USAID's approach to evaluation and has a deep appreciation of the quality standards required. She will ensure that the final report not only fully addresses the questions with a strong evidentiary base, but also meets all quality standards.

Local Sector Experts

The team will also include three junior local sector experts who have experience in Kenya's democracy and governance sector generally, with particular expertise in CMM, especially in informal settlements. They will provide critical local knowledge on how informal settlement conflicts have been addressed generally, and specifically about ethno-political violence. They have worked over a number of years in this sector on a variety of projects and, therefore, have a deep understanding of the context, particularly, change processes over time in the sector, as well as knowledge of key actors and the legal landscape. These expertise and experience will compliment Ms. Vittum's evaluation skills and broad sector experience. They will support her through their role in the evaluation data collection and analysis. They will also contribute to the report, particularly the background section.

Technical Advisor

The Technical Advisor will provide quality control for this task order from the home office, including provision of basic technical support. This is a proven evaluation team structure that provides quality assurance and control from an experienced Technical Advisor that has worked on or led multiple MSI evaluations. Specifically, the Technical Advisor will participate in the team-planning meeting by phone, review the tools and work plan, check-in with and review the team's progress regularly throughout the data collection and analysis and will review the USAID presentation and draft report ensuring that USAID's comments are addressed in the final product. Please note that the Technical Advisor's LOE was determined based on the fact that KSP will have more than two on-going monitoring and evaluation tasks at the same time. KSP feels that the Technical Advisor's input is of vital importance. Ms. Michelle Adams-Matson will serve in this position.

C6. EVALUATION MANAGEMENT

6.1 Logistics

USAID/KEA will provide input through an initial in-briefing to the evaluation team, identify key documents, and assist in introducing the evaluation team to the implementing partner. It will also be available for consultations with the evaluation team during the evaluation process regarding information sources and technical issues. KSP will assist in arranging meetings with key stakeholders identified prior to the initiation of field work. The evaluation team will be responsible for arranging other meetings as identified during the course of the evaluation. USAID/KEA is requested to advise KSP if they would like to participate in any of meetings. KSP is responsible for arranging vehicle rental and drivers as needed for site visits around Nairobi. KSP will also provide hotel arrangements for lead consultant while in Nairobi, office space, internet access, printing, and photocopying. It will also make all payments to vendors directly after team members arrive in Nairobi.

6.2 Scheduling

The period of performance for this evaluation is July 1, 2016 to November 21, 2016. Following a one week desk review, which the team will conduct remotely, the team will gather in Nairobi. They will spend one week preparing for the fieldwork, which will take two and half weeks. This will be followed by two weeks of data analysis and week of report writing. Once the team has submitted the draft report to KSP, it will undergo technical review and revision, followed by editing and formatting, prior to being submitted to USAID/KEA. These final steps prior to submission will take two weeks. MSI will submit the draft report three weeks after the presentation. MSI will also submit the final report one week after receiving USAID's comments on the draft.

6.3 Budget

The proposed task order budget is attached as a separate document.

MSI requests that the payment terms of the task order follow IDIQ terms, by which payment shall be calculated by dividing the price of the order by the number of months in the period of performance.

ANNEX I: APPENDIX I OF THE EVALUATION POLICY

CRITERIA TO ENSURE THE QUALITY OF THE EVALUATION REPORT

- The evaluation report should represent a thoughtful, well researched and well-organized effort to objectively evaluate what worked in the project, what did not and why.
- Evaluation reports shall address all evaluation questions included in the scope of work.
- The evaluation report should include the scope of work as an annex. All modifications to the scope of work, whether in technical requirements, evaluation questions, evaluation team composition, methodology or timeline need to be agreed upon in writing by the technical officer.
- Evaluation methodology shall be explained in detail and all tools used in conducting the evaluation such as questionnaires, checklists and discussion guides will be included in an Annex in the final report
- Evaluation findings will assess outcomes and impact on males and females.
- Limitations to the evaluation shall be disclosed in the report with particular attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.).
- Evaluation findings should be presented as analyzed facts, evidence and data and not based on anecdotes, hearsay or the compilation of people's opinions. Findings should be specific, concise and supported by strong quantitative or qualitative evidence.
- Sources of information need to be properly identified and listed in an annex
- Recommendations need to be supported by a specific set of findings.
- Recommendations should be action-oriented, practical and specific, with defined responsibility for the action.

ANNEX II: GETTING TO ANSWERS

Evaluation Questions	Type of Answer/ Evidence Needed (Check one or more, as appropriate)		Methods for Data Collection e.g., Records, Structured Observation, Key Informant Interviews, Mini-Survey ⁶⁷		Sampling or Selection Approach (if one is needed)	Data Analysis Methods, e.g., Frequency Distributions, Trend Analysis, Cross-Tabulations, Content Analysis
			Data Source(s)	Method		
I. What factors facilitated or hindered Kenya Tuna Uwezo activity's successes and failures and how?		Yes/No	Activity reports, Stakeholders – USAID/KEA staff, IP staff consortium staff, state departments, county government and local administration, (), community leaders and volunteers, local politicians () peace actor and other collaborating INGOs and NGO, Group Interviews with (youth, women, reformist, peace committees cohesion champions, vocational skill beneficiaries, entrepreneurship and trainer of trainers)()	Desk Review of secondary sources/data KIIs GIs	Purposive sampling of stakeholders and documents	Content Analysis Pattern Analysis
	X	Description				
	X	Explanation ⁶⁸				

⁶⁷ Data from evaluations are a deliverable and methods should indicated how data will be captured, i.e., for focus groups USAID requires a transcript.

⁶⁸ Explanation – for questions that ask “why” or about the attribution of an effect to a specific intervention (causality)

Evaluation Questions	Type of Answer/Evidence Needed (Check one or more, as appropriate)		Methods for Data Collection e.g., Records, Structured Observation, Key Informant Interviews, Mini-Survey ⁶⁷		Sampling or Selection Approach (if one is needed)	Data Analysis Methods, e.g., Frequency Distributions, Trend Analysis, Cross-Tabulations, Content Analysis
			Data Source(s)	Method		
2. To what extent and in what ways did the program involve and affect men and women?		Yes/No	Activity reports Stakeholders – USAID/KEA staff, IP staff consortium staff, state departments, county government and local administration (), community leaders and volunteers (), local politicians () peace actor and other collaborating INGOs and NGO () Group Interviews with (youth, women, reformist, peace committees cohesion champions, vocational skill beneficiaries, entrepreneurship and trainer of trainers) ()	Desk Review of secondary sources/data KII GIs	Purposive sampling of stakeholders and documents	Content Analysis Pattern Analysis Comparative Analysis (for data source triangulation)
	X	Description				
	X	Comparison				
	X	Explanation				
3. To what extent and in what ways will the activity's interventions be sustainable?		Yes/No	Stakeholders – USAID/KEA staff, IP staff, KTU consortium staff, state departments, county government and local administration, INGO and NGOs, volunteers, community leaders, Peace actors and collaborators, groups interviews with (youth, women, peace committees).	KII GIs	Purposive sampling of stakeholders and documents	Content Analysis Patten Analysis Comparative Analysis for data triangulation
	X	Description				
	X	Comparison				
	X	Explanation				

ANNEX III: WORKPLAN

The below table highlights the anticipated field work data collection:

June 2016				
Day	Team 1: Team Leader + Local Expert		Team 2: Sector Expert + Local Expert	
	Interviewee	Venue/Location	Interviewee	Venue/Location
Week 3	GI- USAID staff	USAID Mission	GI- USAID staff	USAID Mission
	GI- Global Communities	Global Comm Offices	GI- Global Communities	Global Comm Offices
Week 3	Usalama Reforms CEO	Usalama Office	United States Institute for Peace	USIP Offices
	Nairobi Region Peace Monitor	NSC	Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance, CEO	KMYA Offices
	National Counter-terrorism Center, CEO	NCTC	Uwezo Coordinator	Uwezo Offices
Week 3	Immigration Officer, Kasarani	Immigration Offices, Kasarani	Tawakal Medical Center, Director	TMC Offices
	Research Triangle Africa, Research	RTA Offices	Yes Youth Can, Nairobi Rep	YYC Offices
	Sustainable Development Solutions, PO	SDS Offices	Action Research Consultants, Researcher	ARC Offices
Week 3	Directorate of Cohesion and National Values, Cohesion Officer	DCSN Offices	Kamukunji Constituency Manager	CDF-Kamukunji
	Commission of Admin Justice, Program Officer	CAJ Offices	National Democratic Institute	NDI Offices
	National Police Service	NPS Offices	International Republican Inst PO	IRI Offices
Week 4	Kituo Cha Sheria, CEO	Kituo Cha Sheria Offices	The Youth Banner, CEO	TYB Offices

June 2016

Day	Team 1: Team Leader + Local Expert		Team 2: Sector Expert + Local Expert	
	Interviewee	Venue/Location	Interviewee	Venue/Location
	PEACENET Manager	PEACENET Offices	Youth Arts and Devt & Ent Network, Manager	YADEN Offices
	SUPKEM Dep Sec Gen	SUPKEM Offices	Housing Finance Foundation, Manager -TBC	HFF Offices
Week 4	IEBC Field Officer	IEBC Offices	Kibra Constituency Asst Mgr	Kibra County Offices
	Cohort leader-	NYS	- MCA	Eastleigh South Ward
	County Commissioner	TBC	- Youth leader	Kiambiu
Week 4	GI with Youth Group, Easleigh/Majengo	Eastleigh/Majengo	GI with Women Groups, Korogocho/Babado	Korogocho/Babadogo
	GI with Peace Committee, Easleigh/Majengo	Eastleigh/Majengo	GI with Youth Reformist/vocational/enterpreneurship/TOT (mixed from 7 settlements),	TBC
Week 4	GI with Women Groups, Kiambiu	Kiambiu	GI with Youth Group, Mukuru	Mukuru
	GI with Youth Group, Mathare	Mathare	GI with Youth Reformist (women), Mukuru	Mukuru
Week 4	GI with Women Groups, Eastleigh/Majengo	Eastleigh/Majengo	GI with Peace Committee, Kangemi	Kangemi
	GI with Women Leaders	TBC	GI with Youth Group, Kangemi	Kangemi

June 2016

Day	Team 1: Team Leader + Local Expert		Team 2: Sector Expert + Local Expert	
	Interviewee	Venue/Location	Interviewee	Venue/Location
Week 4	GI with Youth Group, Kibera	Kibera	GI with Cohesion Champions	TBC
	GI with Women Groups, Kibera	Kibera	GI with Chiefs	TBC
Week 5	GI with Elders	TBC	GI with Police	TBC
	GI with Religious Leaders	TBC	GI with Youth Leaders	TBC
Week 5	GI with Volunteers	TBC		
Week 5	Additional interviews - where KIIs will not be available for GIs	TBC		
Week 5	Call-back interviews	TBC		

ANNEX IV: CALENDAR

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
Week 1	Desk Review	Desk Review	Desk Review	Desk Review	Desk Review	Team Leader Travels to Kenya
Week 2	Team Planning Meeting (Tool Finalization)	Team Planning Meeting and Initial meeting between COR, KSP, and evaluation team	Team Planning Meeting (Tool Finalization)	Team Planning Meeting (Tool Finalization)	Team Planning Meeting. Draft Work Plan and tools shared with USAID	Team Planning Meeting (Tool Finalization)
Week 3	USAID/Partner/ Stakeholder Workshop (1/2 day) to review, refine and accept the work plan and tools - Work plan approved by USAID	TPM (USAID Approves Work plan and tools)	Fieldwork Data collection (USAID & Global Communities)	Fieldwork Data collection	Fieldwork Data collection	Fieldwork Data collection
Week 4	Fieldwork Data collection	Fieldwork Data collection	Fieldwork Data collection	Fieldwork Data collection	Fieldwork Data collection	Fieldwork Data collection
Week 5	Fieldwork Data collection	Fieldwork Data collection	Fieldwork Data collection Additional interviews	Fieldwork Data collection Additional interviews	Data Analysis at KSP	Data Analysis at KSP
Week 6	Data Analysis at KSP	Data Analysis at KSP	Data Analysis at KSP	Data Analysis at KSP	Data Analysis at KSP	Data Analysis at KSP
Week 7	FCR	FCR	FCR	FCR	Validation meeting with partners	Prep for USAID Presentation
Week 8	Prep for USAID Presentation	USAID Presentation	Reporting writing	Reporting writing	Reporting writing	Reporting writing

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
Week 9	Reporting writing	Reporting writing	Report submitted to KSP by Consultants Team Leader departs Kenya	KSP technical Review	KSP technical Review	
Week 10	Team Revises Report	Team Revises Report	Team Revises Report	KSP editing and formatting	KSP editing and formatting	
Week 11	KSP editing and formatting	Submission of draft report to USAID				
Week 12						
Week 13		USAID comments due to KSP	Team Revises Report	Team Revises Report	Team Revises Report	
Week 14	Editing	Final Report Submitted to USAID				
Week 15						
Week 16 & 17		USAID approval of final report and notification on statement of difference if any			KSP to incorporate statement of differences into final report with delivery of raw data on CD	
Week 18						
Week 19		USAID approval of the final report and upload to DEC				
Week 20		One-pager report submitted to USAID				

[END OF SECTION C]

ANNEX 3. FINAL WORK PLAN

Date	Activity	Location
4 – 9 July	Desk Review	KSP Offices, Nairobi
11 – 16 July	Team Planning Meeting	KSP Offices, Nairobi
15 July	Draft work plan and tools shared with USAID	
18 July	USAID workshop to review and refine w/plan and tools	KSP Offices, Nairobi
19 July	USAID approves work plan and tools	Nairobi
20 July	Interviews: USAID; GC	USAID and GC Offices
21 July	Interviews: National Police Service; NSC; Peacenet; NDI; IRI; Kituo Cha Sheria;	Nairobi
22 July	Interviews: TYB; CAJ; Directorate of Cohesion and National Values; YADEN; SUPKEM;	Nairobi
25 July	Interviews; SDS; Usalama Reform; APP; KMYA; Uwezo; NYS; MCA	Nairobi
26 July	Interviews: Youth group – Eastleigh/Majengo; DPC – Eastleigh/Majengo; Kibra Constituency; Youth leader; HFF	Nairobi
27 July	Data collection debrief; Interviews: Immigration Office; Youth leaders; Women group – Korogocho/Babadogo; Reformist group	Nairobi
28 July	Interviews: Women group – Kiambu; Youth group – Mathare; Youth group – Mukuru; Women reformists – Mukuru;	Nairobi
29 July	Interviews: Women group – Eastleigh/Majengo; Youth group – Kibera; Women group – Kibera; Women leaders	Nairobi
30 July	Note taking	Nairobi
1 Aug	Interviews: YYC; Kamukunji Constituency; Action Research	Nairobi
2 Aug	Interviews: Volunteers; Police; Religious leaders; Elders	Nairobi
3 Aug	Interviews: DPC – Kangemi; Cohesion champions; Chiefs; Youth group – Kangemi	Nairobi
4 Aug	Interviews: DCC – Westlands; GC	Nairobi
5 – 13 Aug	Data analysis	KSP Offices
15 – 19 Aug	Preparation of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations (FCR)	KSP Offices
22 Aug	Validation meeting with USAID and GC	KSP Offices
23 – 24 Aug	Preparation for USAID FCR presentation	KSP Offices
25 Aug	Presentation of FCR to USAID	Mission Front Office
26 – 31 Aug	Report writing	KSP Offices
1 Sept	Draft Evaluation Report submitted to KSP by consultants; Team leader departs Kenya	Remotely
2 – 6 Sept	KSP technical review	Remotely
7 – 8 Sept	Team revises report	Remotely
9 – 12 Sept	KSP editing and formatting report	Remotely
13 Sept	Draft Evaluation Report submitted to USAID by KSP	Remotely
27 Sept	USAID comments due to KSP	Remotely
28 – 30 Sept	Team revises report	Remotely
3 October	KSP editing and formatting report	Remotely
4 October	Final Evaluation Report submitted to USAID	Remotely
18 October	USAID approval of Final Evaluation Report	Remotely

ANNEX 4. DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

GROUP INTERVIEW

USAID

1. How would you describe the current state of peace/conflict in the informal communities compared to the period before the last general elections?
2. Overall, how do you think KTU performed?
 - a. What factors facilitated its success?
 - b. What factors hindered its success? (What could KTU have done better?)
 - c. Which, if any, external factors affected the activity? *[Prompt: e.g. major national events, local events, general political situation, policy matters].*
 - d. How did KTU address any challenges?
3. How did the main approaches contribute to the achievement of KTU's goals and objectives? *[Internal reference: P2P, single/ cross identity issues, do-no-harm]*
4. Were there other methods/ tactics (unplanned) that contributed to project achievement? (How so?)
5. In your view, how did the partnerships between Global Communities and its sub-partners contribute to achieving the planned results?
6. How well did KTU work with the following groups to achieve the planned results:
 - a. GoK and local administration
 - b. Community organizations
 - c. Other USAID-funded activities working in the informal settlements?
7. What were the key differences in how men and women were involved in KTU?
8. What informed the different approaches for engaging men and women?
9. How well did KTU respond to new opportunities to include women and young men in the project activities ?
10. Overall, what effect did women's inclusion have on project success?
11. How well did KTU plan for the sustainability of its interventions? (What are the best examples of this planning?)
12. In your opinion, how prepared are the informal communities to resist potential political manipulation ahead of 2017 general elections?
 - a. What structures do communities have in place to resist manipulation?
 - b. How did KTU prepare communities to resist manipulation ahead of the elections?
13. What are the key lessons that can be learned from KTU about CMM programming in the informal settlements in Kenya?
 - a. What constraints/ opportunities are there for stand-alone conflict-sensitive programming?
 - b. What constraints/opportunities are there for integrating conflict-sensitive programming into other types of activities (e.g. elections)?
14. Looking ahead, what approaches can this USAID mission use to more effectively address conflict and violent extremism in the informal settlements?

GROUP INTERVIEW

Global Communities

1. How would you describe the current state of peace/conflict in the informal communities compared to the period before the last general elections?
2. In your view:
 - a. What factors facilitated KTU's success?
 - b. What factors hindered its success? (What could KTU have done better?)
 - c. Which, if any, external factors affected the activity? [Prompt: e.g. major national events, local events, general political situation, policy matters].
 - d. How did KTU address any challenges?
3. How did the main approaches contribute to the achievement of KTU's goals and objectives? [Prompt: P2P, single/ cross identity issues, do-no-harm]
4. What other methods/tactics (unplanned) that emerged over life of project contributed to project achievement? (How so?)
5. In your view, how did the partnerships between Global Communities and its sub-partners contribute to achieving the planned results?
6. How well did KTU and the following groups work together to achieve the planned results:
 - a. GoK and local administration
 - b. Community organizations
 - c. Other USAID-funded activities working in the informal settlements?
7. What were the key differences in how men and women were involved in KTU?
8. What informed the different approaches for engaging men and women?
9. How did KTU respond to new opportunities to include women and young men in the project activities?
10. Overall, how did the inclusion of women affect project success?
11. How well did KTU plan for the sustainability of its interventions? (What are the best examples of this planning?)
12. In your opinion, how prepared are the informal communities to resist potential political manipulation ahead of 2017 general elections?
 - a. What structures do communities have in place to resist manipulation?
 - b. How has KTU prepared communities to resist manipulation ahead of the elections?
13. What key lessons can be learned from KTU about CMM programming in the informal settlements in Kenya?
 - a. What constraints/ opportunities are there for stand-alone conflict-sensitive programming?
 - b. What constraints/opportunities are there for integrating conflict-sensitive programming into other types of activities (e.g. elections)?
14. Looking ahead, what approaches can the USAID Kenya and East Africa mission use to more effectively address conflict in the informal settlements?
 - a. Based on the experience of KTU, how can USAID better integrate CVE into its planning for conflict-sensitive programming?

GROUP INTERVIEWs

KTU Sub-partners (Grantees: PeaceNet, Kituo Cha Sheria, SUPKEM, TYB, YADEN, and SDS)

1. How would you describe the current state of peace/conflict in the informal communities compared to the period before the last general elections?
2. In your view:
 - a. What factors facilitated KTU's success?
 - b. What factors hindered its success? (What could KTU have done better?)
 - c. Which, if any, external factors affected the activity? [*Prompt: e.g. major national events, local events, general political situation, policy matters*].
 - d. How did KTU address any challenges?
3. How did the main project approaches contribute to achievement of KTU's goals and objectives? [*Prompt: P2P, single/ cross identity issues, do-no-harm*]
4. What other methods/tactics (unplanned) that emerged over life of project contributed to project achievement? (How so?)
5. In your view, how did the partnerships between Global Communities and its sub-partners contribute to achieving the planned results?
6. How well did KTU work with:
 - a. GoK and local administration
 - b. Community organizations
 - c. Other USAID-funded activities working in the informal settlements?
7. What were the key differences in how men and women were involved in KTU?
8. What informed the different approaches for engaging men and women?
9. How did KTU respond to new opportunities to include women and young men in the project activities?
10. Overall, how did the inclusion of women affect project success?
11. How are the informal communities currently applying the learning from KTU? In your opinion, how will they apply the learning from KTU in the future?
12. How well did KTU plan for the sustainability of its interventions? (What are the best examples of this planning?)
13. In your opinion, how prepared are the informal communities to resist potential political manipulation ahead of 2017 general elections?
 - a. What structures do communities have in place to resist manipulation?
 - b. How has KTU prepared communities to resist manipulation ahead of the elections?
14. What key lessons can be learned from KTU about conflict-sensitive programming in the informal settlements in Kenya?
 - a. What constraints/ opportunities are there for stand-alone conflict-sensitive programming?
 - b. What constraints/opportunities are there for integrating conflict-sensitive programming into other types of activities (e.g. elections)?
15. Looking ahead, what approaches can USAID use to more effectively address conflict in the informal settlements?
 - a. Based on the experience of KTU, how can USAID better integrate CVE into its planning for conflict-sensitive programming?

GROUP INTERVIEWS

KTU Sub-partners (Consultants: RTA, Usalama, KMYA, APP and Action Research)

1. How would you describe the current state of peace/conflict in the informal communities compared to the period before the last general elections?
2. Which KTU project approaches are you familiar with?
 - a. Which of the ways that KTU approached their work were particularly effective?
 - b. Which ways were ineffective?
3. In your opinion:
 - a. What factors facilitated KTU's success?
 - b. What factors hindered its success? (What could KTU have done better?)
 - c. Which, if any, external factors affected the activity? [*Prompt: e.g. major national events, local events, general political situation, policy matters*].
 - d. How did KTU address any challenges?
4. In your view, how did the partnerships between Global Communities and its sub-partners contribute to achieving the planned results?
5. How well did KTU work with:
 - a. GoK and local administration
 - b. Community organizations
 - c. Other USAID-funded activities working in the informal settlements?
6. From your knowledge, what were the key differences in how men and women were involved in KTU?
7. Overall, what were the effects of the inclusion of women in project activities?
8. How are the informal communities currently applying the learning from KTU? In your opinion, how will they apply the learning from KTU in the future?
9. In your opinion, how prepared are the informal communities to resist potential political manipulation ahead of 2017 general elections?
 - a. What structures do communities have in place to resist manipulation?
 - b. How has KTU prepared communities to resist manipulation ahead of the elections?
10. What key lessons can be learned from KTU about CMM programming in the informal settlements in Kenya?
11. Do you have any specific recommendations for how future projects can more effectively address conflict in the informal settlements?
12. Based on the experience of KTU, how can USAID better integrate CVE into its planning for conflict-sensitive programming?

GROUP/KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

Government Officials (Chief, Police, NSC, DCC, MCA)

1. How would you describe the current state of peace/conflict in the informal communities compared to the period before the last general elections?
2. Which KTU activities did your office directly participate in?
 - a. How did these activities affect your office and your community?
3. In your view:
 - a. Which factors facilitated KTU's success?
 - b. What factors hindered its success? (What could KTU have done better?)
 - c. How did KTU address any challenges?
4. What do you think about how KTU carried out the activities you were involved in? [Internal note: emphasis in on *approach*]
 - a. Which of the ways that KTU approached their work were particularly effective?
 - b. Which ways were ineffective?
5. How well did KTU work with the following groups:
 - a. Your office
 - b. Other government officials
 - c. Communities
6. How did your office contribute to the achievement of KTU project results?
7. From your knowledge, what were the key differences in how men and women were involved in KTU?
8. Overall, what were the effects of the inclusion of women in project activities?
9. To what extent did KTU help your community to effectively resolve conflicts?
10. How do you think the communities who participated in KTU will apply what they learned in the future?
11. In your opinion, how prepared are the informal communities to resist potential political manipulation ahead of 2017 general elections?
 - a. What structures do communities have in place to resist manipulation?
 - b. How has KTU prepared communities to resist manipulation ahead of the elections?
12. What key lessons can be learned from KTU about conflict- sensitive programming in the informal settlements in Kenya?
13. Do you have any specific recommendations for how future projects can more effectively address conflict in the informal settlements?
14. How can USAID support the government of Kenya to better address issues such as radicalization and violent extremism in future projects similar to KTU?

GROUP INTERVIEWS

Main beneficiaries (youth groups, youth leaders, youth reformists, women's groups, women leaders, cohesion champions, volunteers)

1. How would you describe the current state of peace/conflict in the informal communities compared to the period before the last general elections?
2. What type of KTU activities were you involved in?
 - a. Why did you participate in these activities?
 - b. How did these activities affect you and your community?
3. What do you think about how KTU carried out the activities you were involved in? [Internal note: emphasis in on *approach*]
 - a. Which of the ways that KTU approached their work were particularly effective?
 - b. Which ways were ineffective?
4. In your view:
 - a. What factors facilitated KTU's success?
 - b. What factors hindered its success? (What could KTU have done better?)
 - c. Which, if any, external factors affected the activity? [*Prompt: e.g. major national events, local events, general political situation, policy matters*].
 - d. How did KTU address any challenges?
5. How well did KTU work with:
 - a. GoK and local administration
 - b. Community organizations
 - c. Other conflict mitigation projects in your community?
6. In your community, what were the key differences in how men and women were involved in KTU?
7. Overall, what difference did the inclusion of women in project activities make?
8. To what extent did KTU help your community to effectively resolve conflicts?
9. How are you applying the learning from KTU now that the project has ended?
10. How prepared is your community to resist potential political manipulation ahead of 2017 general elections?
 - a. What structures does your community have in place to resist manipulation?
 - b. How has KTU prepared communities to resist manipulation ahead of the elections?
11. What are the key lessons that can be learned from KTU about conflict-sensitive programming in communities like yours?
12. Do you have any specific recommendations for how future projects can more effectively address conflict in communities like yours?

GROUP INTERVIEW

Religious Leaders / Elders

1. How would you describe the current state of peace/conflict in the informal communities compared to the period before the last general elections?
2. Which type of KTU activities were you involved in?
 - a. What effect did these activities have on you and your community?
3. What do you think about how KTU carried out the activities you were involved in? [Internal note: emphasis in on approach]
 - a. Which of the ways that KTU approached their work were particularly effective?
 - b. Which ways were ineffective?
4. In your opinion:
 - a. What factors facilitated KTU's success?
 - b. What factors hindered its success? (What could KTU have done better?)
 - c. How did KTU address any challenges?
5. How well did KTU work with:
 - a. GoK and local administration
 - b. Community organizations
 - c. Other conflict mitigation projects in your community?
6. In your community, what were the key differences in how were men and women involved in KTU?
7. Overall, what difference did the inclusion of women in project activities make?
8. To what extent did KTU help your community to effectively resolve conflicts?
9. How is your community applying the learning from KTU?
10. In your opinion, how prepared is your community to resist potential political manipulation ahead of 2017 general elections?
 - a. What structures do communities have in place to resist manipulation?
 - b. How has KTU prepared communities to resist manipulation ahead of the elections?
11. What key lessons can be learned from KTU about projects that address conflict in communities like yours?
12. Do you have any specific recommendations for how future projects can support communities like yours to address conflict?
 - a. How can these projects specifically address radicalization and violent extremism?

GROUP/KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW

Peace Collaborators (NDI, IRI, YYC and DPC)

1. How would you describe the current state of peace/conflict in the informal communities compared to the period before the last general elections?
2. Which KTU activities did you collaborate on?
 - a. What effect did these activities have on you and your community?
3. What do you think about how KTU carried out the activities you were involved in? [Internal note: emphasis in on approach]
 - a. Which of the ways that KTU approached their work were particularly effective?
 - b. Which ways were ineffective?
4. In your opinion:
 - a. What factors facilitated KTU's success?
 - b. What factors hindered its success? (What could KTU have done better?)
 - c. How did KTU address any challenges?
5. How well did KTU work with:
 - a. GoK and local administration
 - b. Community organizations
 - c. Other USAID-funded activities working in the informal settlements?
6. From your knowledge, what were the key differences in how men and women were involved in KTU?
7. How did KTU respond to new opportunities to include women and young men in the project activities?
8. Overall, what were the effects of the inclusion of women in project activities?
9. How are the communities that participated in KTU currently applying what they learned? In your opinion, how will they apply the learning from KTU in the future?
10. In your opinion, how prepared are the informal communities to resist potential political manipulation ahead of 2017 general elections?
 - a. What structures do communities have in place to resist manipulation?
 - b. How has KTU prepared communities to resist manipulation ahead of the elections?
11. What are the key lessons that can be learned from KTU about conflict-sensitive programming in the informal settlements in Kenya?
 - a. (Only NDI & IRI) What constraints/ opportunities are there for stand-alone conflict-sensitive programming?
 - b. (Only NDI & IRI) What constraints/opportunities are there for integrating conflict-sensitive programming into other types of activities (e.g. elections)?
12. Do you have any specific recommendations for how future projects can more effectively address conflict in the informal settlements?
13. How can USAID support the government of Kenya to better address issues such as radicalization and violent extremism in future projects similar to KTU?

ANNEX 5. KTU SUB-PARTNER ROLES

Sub-partner	Informal settlements covered	Major activities conducted	Project phase
Sub-grantees (6)			
The Youth Banner	All with major presence in Kibera, Mathare, Kiambiu	Business skills building for youth, youth groups and women groups	Phase 1&2 (started in June 2013)
Kituo Cha Sheria	All	Civic education with emphasis on devolution, citizen participation and human rights and voter education in the run up to the 2013 General Elections	Phase 1&2
Peacenet	All	Community mobilization and sensitization toward cohesion and peaceful co-existence. Worked with security departments of Government to promote police-community engagement for sustainable peaceful communities, early warning and early response especially around elections and in the prevention of violent extremism	Phase 1&2
Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM)-	Eastleigh/Majengo	Ideological aspects of youth radicalization-engagement with religious leaders. Most of SUPKEM's activities were at Policy level of engagement- worked with security institutions but also had community forums.	Phase 2
Youth Arts Development & Entrepreneurship Network (YADEN)-	Eastleigh/Majengo, Kiambiu and Kangemi	Prevention of violent extremism through talent development and promotion among youth and community conversations ("Saasa" sessions)	Phase 2
Housing Finance Foundation (HFF)	Korogocho, Kibera and Mathare	Vocational skills development for youth-plumbing, painting, masonry, electrical installation, etc.	Phase 2
Consultants (6)			
Sustainable Development Solutions (SDS)	Eastleigh/Majengo	Engaged through a short term MoU to reach out to Muslim youth especially of Somali origin to build their skills in group management skills/ leadership and prevention of violence through peer to peer activities and engagement in viable businesses. This engagement led to capacity development of 7 youth groups who were identified by Uwezo Fund for loans which have seen the groups move to another level.	Phase 2

Sub-partner	Informal settlements covered	Major activities conducted	Project phase
Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance (KMYA)	Eastleigh/Majengo and Kibera	Supported in identifying issues of concern/ that contribute to violent extremism. The engagement was through a collaboration that saw KMYA conduct FGDs to capture these issues to inform KTU programming. But this also provided an opportunity to get the women to discuss with one another in safe groups how they are affected by VE and how they also contribute to its spread and strategies to address this.	Phase 2
Usalama Reforms Platform	Mathare, Kibera, Kiambiu and Korogocho	KTU worked with Usalama Reforms on the early warning early response around the 2013 elections mainly through Peace-Net, one of the implementing partners.	Phase I
Research Triangle Africa (RTA)	Kibera, Mathare, Kiambiu and Korogocho	A consulting firm commissioned to conduct the Mid Term Review of KTU 2014	Phase 1&2 transition period
Africa Peace Point (APP)	Kibera, Mathare, Kiambiu and Korogocho	Consulting firm that did the initial baseline for at the beginning of KTU	Pre-Phase I
Action Research (AR)	Largely in Eastleigh and Majengo	A consulting firm that did the baseline assessment on countering violent extremism (CVE) in Eastleigh and selected informal settlements	Phase 2

ANNEX 6. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Key Informant Interviews

The full list of interviewees and their contact information has been removed to maintain their confidentiality.

Group Interviews

Group/Affiliation		Settlement	Respondent Category	Men	Women
1	Youth Reformist/ToTs	Kangemi, Eastleigh Kibera, Mukuru Kiambiu, Korogocho Babadogo, Majengo	Main beneficiaries	5	3
2	Religious Leaders	Kiambiu, Kibera, Mathare,	Religious leaders	3	
3	Police	Kamukunji, Kangemi	Government officials	1	1
4	Elders	Majengo, Eastleigh, Kibra, Mukuru	Elders	3	1
5	Peace Committee Kangemi	Kangemi	Government officials	3	2
6	Cohesion Champions	Majengo, Kangemi, Kiambiu, Kibra, Korogocho, Mathare	Main beneficiaries	6	1
7	Youth Groups Kibra	Kibra	Main beneficiaries	4	4
8	Chiefs	Majengo/Bondeni, Kangemi, Kangemi	Government officials	2	
9	Youth Leaders	Majengo Kibera Kangemi Mukuru Kiambiu Mathare Korogocho Babadogo Eastleigh	Main Beneficiaries	7	2
10	Youth groups Kangemi	Kangemi	Main Beneficiaries	7	3
11	Volunteers	Majengo Kibera Kangemi Mukuru Kiambiu Mathare Korogocho Babadogo Eastleigh	Main Beneficiaries	8	2
12	Women leaders	Majengo Kibera Kangemi Mukuru Kiambiu Mathare Korogocho Babadogo Eastleigh	Beneficiaries		9
13	County Peace Committee Eastleigh	Eastleigh	Beneficiaries	3	2
14	Women groups Korogocho	Korogocho	Beneficiaries		10
15	Youth groups Eastleigh	Eastleigh	Beneficiaries	5	5
16	Research Triangle, Africa Peace Point		Consultants	1	1
17	USAID	USAID	USAID	1	1
18	Global Communities /Kenya Tuna Uwezo-KTU		Global Communities	2	2
19	Usalama, SDS, KMYA		Peace Collaborators	3	
20	Women groups Kiambiu	Kiambiu	Beneficiaries		9

Group/Affiliation		Settlement	Respondent Category	Men	Women
21	Youth Reformists Mukuru female	Mukuru	Beneficiaries		10
23	Youth groups Mathare	Mathare	Beneficiaries	6	5
25	Youth groups Mukuru	Mukuru	Beneficiaries	7	3
26	Women Groups Eastleigh	Eastleigh	Beneficiaries		11
27	The Youth Banner		Sub-partner	3	1
Total				77	86

ANNEX 7. LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The evaluation team reviewed the following KTU project documents and other global literature provided by Global Communities and Management Systems International, as well as several external reports and other information. The main documents consulted are listed below.

Award Documents and Modifications

- KTU Feb 2012 Award (AID-623-A-12-00007)
- KTU June 2013 Modification 01
- KTU Feb 2014 Modification 02
- KTU April 2014 Modification 03
- KTU Sept 2014 Modification 04
- KTU Activity Description, 2012 document
- KTU Jan 2014 Revised Technical proposal

Work Plans

- KTU 2012 work plan – Narrative
- KTU 2012- 2014 Gantt Chart (final version)
- KTU 2014 Work plan Narrative
- KTU 2014 Gantt Chart (WP)
- KTU 2014
- KTU 2016 Gantt Chart

Performance Management Plans (PMPs) and Other Indicator Data

- KTU *April* 2012 PMP
- KTU *October* 2012 PMP
- KTU *May* 2014 PMP
- KTU *June* 2014 PMP
- KTU *May-June* 2014 PMP
- KTU *May* 2014 PMP
- KTU *June* 2014 PMP
- KTU *December* 2014 MEP - Revised 20th January 2015

Project Reports (Quarterly, Annual, Final)

- KTU Annual Performance Report, 2012
- KTU Annual Performance Report, 2014

- KTU 2013 Q1 progress report
- KTU 2013 Q2, progress Report
- KTU 2013 Q3 progress report
- KTU 2014 Q3 progress report

- KTU 2015 Q1 progress report
- KTU 2015 Q3 progress report
- KTU 2016 Q1 progress report
- KTU 2016 Q2 progress report
- KTU 2016 March quarterly report

Annual Reports

- KTU Annual Report 2014
- KTU Annual Report 2015

Evaluation Reports

- KTU Mid -Term Assessment report, 2014
- KTU Report of Proceedings of the Mid-Term Programme Review Workshop, 2013

Baseline Assessments

- KTU Baseline Report, 2012
- KTU Report of Mapping Organizations in Nairobi County, 2012
- KTU Baseline Assessment Countering Violent Extremism in Eastleigh and Selected Informal Settlements (Kenya), 2015
- KTU Baseline Survey Report, 2015
- KTU Pre - Assessment Report Open Debate on Devolved Government Structure

Internal Reports

- KTU Communities Peace Celebrations Reports, 2016
- KTU Summary of Election Related Activities, 2013
- KTU Music Concert Say Maya to Violent Extremism and Radicalisation Concept Note, 201
- KTU Election Preparedness: Early Warning /Early Response Systems, 2013
- KTU Report on Election Related Activities, 2013

Final Reports

- Final Report of Vocational Skills Training by PCEA, 2015

External Reports

- USAID CVE Evaluation Intro and Tips, 201
- USAID Kenya: Democracy & Governance Assessment and Strategy, 2011
- KMYA Peace and Security for Development Project (PSD) Baseline Survey Report, 2011
- Evaluation Statements of Work, 2016
- KTU Report of The Mapping Exercise With Kibera Women For Peace And Fairness At Kituo, 2012.
- USAID Final Evaluation of USAID/Kenya Conflict Mitigation Activities, 2013
- People-to-People Peace building: A Program Guide”, 2011

ANNEX 8. LIMITATIONS

During data analysis, the evaluation team identified discrepancies between the Objectives section of the Statement of Work (SOW) for the evaluation and the approved Performance Monitoring Plans (PMP) for KTU.

The SOW identifies four (4) objectives and five (5) expected results⁶⁹(IRs). However, the approved 2012 PMP for KTU includes four (4) IRs (three which match the SOW and one that does not). Further, the 2014 PMP contains sub-IRs but not IRs.

The evaluation team consulted GC staff, who noted that the USAID Kenya Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) was finalized around the time of the signing of the KTU agreement for Phase 2 (December 2014), and that the KTU PMP was revised to align with the CDCS. GC indicated that the IRs were likely removed from the Results Framework (RF) in the PMP due to space restrictions.

The evaluation team used the USAID Kenya 2014-2018 CDCS to identify where the four Sub-IRs in the 2014 PMP fit within the overall USAID and KTU strategies. The team identified two IRs in the CDCS that relate to KTU activities:

1. IR 1.3: Informed and empowered citizens participate in county affairs
 - 1.3.1 Capacity for civic engagement improved
 - 1.3.2 Women, youth and marginalized groups participation and representation enhanced
 - 1.3.3 Conflict mitigation mechanisms at the county level strengthened
2. IR 2.3: Youth empowered to promote their own social and economic development
 - 2.3.1 Increased economic prospects for youth through skills development and access to finance create: economically viable microenterprises; self-reliant community level economic projects; and employment opportunities

KTU staff confirmed this understanding.

The lack of an integrated RF for the full activity period created some confusion during the evaluation. While the team was able to reconstruct a results framework for Phase 2 with GC support during the writing of the evaluation report, the strength of the findings and conclusions related to Evaluation Question 1.1 regarding the effectiveness of the main approaches to achieve the activity's stated goals *and objectives* and Evaluation Question 1.2 regarding the effectiveness of partnerships developed to support the realization of *stated results*⁷⁰ should be read with this limitation in mind.

In the future, SOWs for performance evaluations should include the approved RFs for the entire activity period. Any gaps in the RF- or revisions to the RF or CDCS- could be reviewed during the evaluation in-brief meeting between the evaluation team and USAID.

⁶⁹ Also known as Intermediate Results (IRs).

⁷⁰ USAID clarified this to mean IRs contained in the Activity work plans.

Phase 1 (Feb 2012-Feb 2014)		Phase 2 (March 2014 April 2016)	
2012 PD	2012 RF	2014 revised PD	2014 RF
<p><u>Objectives:</u></p> <p>1. Strengthened social networks of community members and civil society groups to collaborate productively on community issues and address grievances</p> <p>2. Enhanced ability of local institutions to lead and implement people-to-people peace building independently</p>	<p><u>Objectives:</u></p> <p>Same objectives 1 and 2.</p>	<p><u>Objectives:</u></p> <p>None included.</p>	<p><u>Objectives:</u></p> <p>Same objectives 1 and 2.</p> <p>Objectives 3 and 4 added.</p> <p>3. Address the pull and push factors that drive youth to engage in violent extremism</p> <p>4. Reduce susceptibility to manipulation through supporting youth to engage in viable livelihoods</p>
<p><u>Expected results (IRs):</u></p> <p>1. Increased grassroots demand for accountable and equitable service delivery in Nairobi's informal settlements.</p> <p>2. Enhanced knowledge and skills of community members and civil society in conflict mitigation</p> <p>3. Improved ability of groups to communicate on issues that drive conflict.</p> <p>4. Increased capacity of local NGOs to provide services in support of conflict mitigation</p> <p>5. Increased services and solutions provided by duty bearers which address citizens' needs and grievances</p>	<p><u>Expected results (IRs):</u></p> <p>1. Not included</p> <p>2. Same</p> <p>3. Improved ability of groups to communicate with conflicting partners.</p> <p>4. Same</p> <p>5. Not included</p> <p>*The RF contains an addition IR not in the PD, namely: IR 1.3: Increased integration of diverse community members into community development initiatives.</p>	<p><u>Expected results (IRs):</u></p> <p>None included.</p>	<p><u>Expected results (IRs):</u></p> <p>IRs not included.</p> <p>4 Sub-IRs included:</p> <p>1.3.1 Capacity for civic engagement improved.</p> <p>1.3.2 Conflict mitigation mechanisms at the county level strengthened.</p> <p>1.3.2 Women, youth and marginalized groups participation and representation enhanced</p> <p>2.3.1 Increased economic prospects for youth through skills development and access to finance create: economically viable microenterprises; self-reliant community level economic projects; and employment opportunities.</p>

Additional Limitations

Sub-grantees had trouble understanding the interview line of questioning about constraints/opportunities for stand-alone and integrated conflict-sensitive programming. Phase 1 sub-grantees grasped this somewhat better than Phase 2 sub-grantees. This may be because Phase 1 sub-grantees come from a peace background and are more familiar with the project evolution. The evaluation team used a new prompt for the final sub-grantee interview to try to elicit their views on this.

The evaluation team appreciates the sensitive nature of KTU's work, including the criminal backgrounds of some key beneficiaries and the trauma that communities have experienced. This can influence respondents' participation in KIIs and GIs. For example, in Mukuru and Korogocho, women and youth groups were not forthcoming with their views. The evaluation team felt that it would have been helpful to have longer than the scheduled two hours with these groups to build rapport and create an environment for interviewees to participate more freely.

For the National Youth Service (NYS) KII on July 25, the respondent was expected to provide a government perspective of KTU. However, she was only temporarily affiliated with NYS and is not a government official. She however provide valuable information as a cohesion champion and project beneficiary.

The GI with women in Korogocho on July 27 was planned for two hours but only lasted one hour. The group had a pre-planned event with NYS that the mobilizer did not inform the evaluation team. The evaluation team had made themselves available for an earlier start time but mobilizer did not confirm this. As a result, the evaluation team had to skip several interview questions on gender and sustainability. This limited the insight that the team was able to gain about KTU in Korogocho.

The former DCC Westlands was only available for a short over the phone interview. The evaluation team prioritized the interview questions in these cases; skipping some as needed.

GC indicated that KTU worked very well with IEBC on civic education ahead of 2013 elections, but indicated that the Commission may be unwilling to meet due to current challenges they are facing. The views of the IEBC on civic education and partner collaboration could have been useful. Not having this interview did not significantly impact the outcome of the evaluation.

The interview with the Tawakal youth group was not initially planned. The evaluation team sought this interview after failing to interview the director of Tawakal Medical Center in the week of 24 July. The purpose of the interview was to get the opinion of Somali youths (specifically from Eastleigh) on their participation in the project, including around issues of trauma and violent extremism. The team was able to obtain views of other respondents on these issues, including those of the youth group in Eastleigh, a youth leader, and cohesion champion from Eastleigh.

ANNEX 9. DISCLOSURE OF ANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	KENNETH ODARY
Title	FIELD ASSOCIATE
Organization	Management Systems International (MSI)
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	720700.40-500-03-15
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Kenya Tuna Uwezo Program, Global Communities, AID 623-A-12-00007
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
<p>If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:</p> <p><i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation. 	<p>I have had Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.</p>

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	
Date	27 July 2016

Name	Gloria Mmoji
Title	Field Associate
Organization	MSI
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Kenya Tuna Uwezo Program, Global Communities, AID 623-A-12-00007
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
<p>If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation. 	

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	
Date	28 th June, 2016.

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Katherine Vittum
Title	Independent Consultant
Organization	Management Systems International, Inc.
Evaluation Position?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	720700-40-500-03-11
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Kenya Tuna Uwezo Program, Global Communities, AID 623-A-12-00007
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
<p>If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation. 	<p>I have some knowledge of the KTU project from a separate evaluation assignment- <i>Performance Evaluation of the Elections and Political Processes Fund</i>, led by Social Impact, Inc. (Evaluation Mechanism Number AID-OAA-M-13-00011.)</p> <p>KTU was part of a case study for that evaluation. I interviewed the KTU staff and USAID Kenya Mission staff by phone for the evaluation.</p> <p>I do not believe that there is any conflict of interest.</p>

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	
Date	June 27, 2016

Name	MAURICE OTIENO OMBOK
Title	Junior expert
Organization	Management Systems International
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	AID-623-TO-16-00004
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Kenya Tuna Uwezo Program, Global Communities, AID 623-A-12-00007
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
<p>If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</p> <p>7. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</p> <p>8. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.</p> <p>9. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.</p> <p>10. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</p> <p>11. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</p> <p>12. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.</p>	

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	
Date	27 th June 2016

ANNEX 10: ABRIDGED TEAM BIOS

Katherine Vittum

Katherine Vittum has 15 years of experience as a manager and adviser for democracy and governance programs in politically sensitive environments. She has expertise in the design, implementation and evaluation of multi-stakeholder programs. Ms. Vittum has participated in numerous evaluations of USAID-funded electoral and political process reform programs, both as a technical expert and as team leader. She has worked in nearly 20 countries throughout Africa, Asia and Europe, and has advised on numerous other programs. She has authored and contributed to several publications on electoral and constitutional issues.

Otieno Ombok

Otieno Ombok is the current coordinator of Usalama Forum, an organization that works for police reforms in Kenya and also manages a CVE project in Garissa, Nairobi and Kisumu. He has done evaluations in East Africa for national and international organizations. He is a trainer in human rights, gender, conflict management and peacebuilding, theatre and participatory methodologies, and organizational development. He is part of social movements for change in fair trade, sustainable development and good governance. He has traveled and worked in more than 20 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and North America.

Kenneth Odary

Kenneth Victor Odary is development worker with experience on issues of governance and democracy. He has expertise in research, policy analysis, strategic planning, monitoring, evaluation, conflict and disaster management. He has researched on issues of security, conflicts and urban vulnerability. Mr. Odary has also supported public policy development processes in Kenya relating to peace, devolution, urbanization and land use.

Gloria Mmoji

Gloria Mmoji has 5 years of experience in research and evaluation. She has expertise in the field on democracy and governance. Ms. Mmoji has worked with a variety of development partners and organizations in Kenya, including UNDP, UNESCO and FORD Foundation. Ms. Mmoji has previously participated in an evaluation of a USAID-funded peace program as a team-member. Ms. Mmoji graduated with Masters of Arts in Political Science and Public Administration from the University of Nairobi.

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