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MISTI STABILIZATION TRENDS AND IMPACT EVALUATION SURVEY

ANALYTICAL REPORT, WAVE 4: APR 28 – JUN 30, 2014

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MISTI STABILIZATION TRENDS AND IMPACT EVALUATION SURVEY

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Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI)

CONTENTS

ACRONYMS

AAPOR	American Association of Public Opinion Researchers
ACSOR	Afghan Center for Socioeconomic and Opinion Research
ADS	Automated Directives System
AECOM	Architecture, Engineering, Construction, Operations and Management
Afs	Afghanis, local currency
AGEs	Anti - Government Elements
AIC	Akaike information criterion
ALP	Afghan Local Police
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
AOG	Armed Opposition Groups
AYC	Afghan Youth Consulting
CC	Community Cohesion
CCI-Creative	Community Cohesion Initiative implemented in the North and West by Creative
CCI –IOM	Community Cohesion Initiative implemented in the South and East by IOM
CCI	Community Cohesion Initiatives
CDC	Community Development Council
CDP	Community Development Program
CEM	Coarsened Exact Matching
DDA	District Development Assembly
DFID	British Department for International Development
DGP	District Government Performance
DGS	District Government Satisfaction
DID	“Difference in differences”
DSC	District Stability Committee
FOGs	Fixed Obligation Grants
GC	Government Capacity
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
IEC	Independent Election Commission
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IQ	Intelligence Quotient
ISAF	International Security Assistance Forces
KFZ	Kandahar Food Zone
LG	Local Governance

LLP	Local Leaders' Performance
LLS	Local Leader Satisfaction
MISTI	Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives
MOE	Margin of Error
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
MSI	Management Systems International
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NSP	National Solidarity Program
PG	Provincial Governor
PGP	Provincial Government Performance
QoL	Quality of Life
RI	Resilience Index
SATT	Sample Average Effect on the Treated
SC	Social Capital
SI	Stability Index
SIKA - E	Stability in Key Areas East
SIKA - N	Stability in Key Areas North
SIKA - S	Stability in Key Areas South
SIKA- W	Stability in Key Areas West
SIKA	Stability in Key Areas
SOI	Sources of Instability
SRS	Simple Random Sampling
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

The USAID/Afghanistan Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives project (MISTI) Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey (Wave 4) seeks to identify trends in stability and measure stabilization programming impacts across USAID's stabilization program districts. Data collection for the Wave 4 survey was conducted in 100 districts of Afghanistan between April 28, 2014 and June 12, 2014 and builds upon the Baseline Survey (Wave 1), which was conducted between September 13 and December 23, 2012, the Wave 2 Survey, which was conducted between May 18 and August 7, 2013, and the Wave 3 survey, conducted between November 16, 2013 and January 30, 2014. The intent of the MISTI project (the Project) is to provide USAID and implementing partner managers with information for evidence-based decision making about how, where and when to invest increasingly scarce resources to promote stability and set the stage for transition to Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) led security and longer-term development.

Limitations

The report identifies several limitations associated with the impact evaluation. The most significant limitation affecting the impact evaluation is that the number of treated observations (villages) covered by the Wave 4 impact evaluation is still smaller than originally anticipated. Due to reasons beyond the control of the Project, a delay in beginning the implementation of the main nationwide USAID stabilization program, "Stability in Key Areas" (SIKA), resulted in fewer completed activities at the time of the Wave 4 survey than USAID had anticipated. The other significant stabilization project, the "Community Cohesion Initiative" (CCI), while more advanced in its programming, also had not progressed as far as originally planned. Consequently, the Impact Evaluation results cannot at this stage be broken down beyond the program level due to the low number of treatment villages and project activities included.[1]

As the number of ongoing and completed project activities increases, so too does the MISTI survey's precision and the reliability of the findings concerning the stabilization program's impacts. MISTI will revisit the impact evaluation findings available from the Wave 4 survey as the number of treated villages increases in the final survey wave.[2]

It was also expected that over the life of the MISTI project and USAID stabilization programming there would be a steady stream of events in Afghanistan (e.g., 2014 Presidential election, ISAF drawdown,

[1] The number of villages surveyed in both Waves 3 and 4 is 125 and the number of project activities is 166. The number of villages surveyed in both Waves 2 and 4 is 164 and the number of project activities is 264.

[2] It is important to note, that the other Wave 4 survey findings regarding stability trends are not affected by the low number of activities in the sample.

etc.) that could be reflected in survey findings. The Wave 4 results seem to indicate that this has indeed occurred.

Stability and Resilience Trends

The method used to calculate the Stability Index (SI) was revised for the Wave 4 analytical report.[3] This revision was undertaken in response to a mid-term peer review of the MISTI Survey and impact evaluation methodology that was completed by the RAND Corporation in July-October 2014.

As a result, several adjustments were made to the SI following a factor analysis of the survey data to re-define the set of survey questions that can be combined into a valid indicator of overall stability. Changes included the removal of certain questions from the SI (e.g., those concerning corruption) that, despite a theoretical relationship to stability, showed no empirical relationship based on survey responses according to the factor analysis. Other questions, such as several concerning the security situation in a respondent's local area, were given too much weight in the index in Waves 1-3. The revised SI includes the following components:



Figure 1.1: Stability Index Components

The factor analysis also showed that the relationship between stability and resilience is more complicated than initially theorized. In Waves 1-3 the SI treated resilience as a sub-index component of the overall SI score. The factor analysis however showed that resilience and stability are empirically and

[3] A paper outlining the factor analysis run to review the SI and RI components is included in Appendix 1.

conceptually distinct. Both stability and resilience are strongly influenced by local governance and quality of life, but government capacity is not a significant factor for resilience, and community cohesion is not a significant factor for stability. A new Resilience Index (RI) was therefore developed that measures local capacity to withstand external shocks and solve local problems, but it does not include measures of government performance and satisfaction that pertain to formal state institutions that are largely foreign to the village context in Afghanistan.[4] The new RI includes the following components:



Figure 1.2: Resilience Index Components

Between the Fall of 2012 (Wave 1) and late-Spring of 2013 (Wave 4), the overall stability trend across the 55 districts surveyed in all four survey waves shows the average Stability Index (SI) score remaining at 3.33. If we remove seasonality from our analysis and look at the trend in stability scores between Spring 2013 (Wave 2) and Spring 2014 (Wave 4) the score increases from 3.25 (Wave 2) to 3.33 (Wave 4). Stability Index trends for each district and province over all survey waves are illustrated in a series of graphs and maps in Chapter XI of the report. Chapter XI also provides the same in-depth look at resilience trends and finds that resilience has deteriorated markedly in several areas of the country, most notably across the southern districts surveyed in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces. Lastly, Chapter XI applies the same rigor to explore trends in each of the component parts that make up the Stabilization and Resilience Indices.

Impact Evaluation

The evaluation findings show conclusively that stabilization programming is having a positive impact on stability and has caused an average gain in stability of 3.1 – 6.9 percentage points across all villages where stabilization activities took place over baseline measurements. These gains in Stability Index

[4] A full description of the SI and RI components including their weights and values are included as Appendices 2 and 3 to this report.

scores were also observed on several of its component sub-indices, including Quality of Life, Government Capacity, Provincial Government Performance, District Government Performance, Local Governance, and the performance of Community Development Councils (CDCs) and District Development Assemblies (DDAs).

Impacts were measured over six-month (Waves 3 to 4) and one-year (Waves 2 to 4) time periods by collecting survey data in villages before and after a project activity was implemented. The six-month impacts on Stability, Government Capacity, and Provincial Government Performance were sustained in the one-year measurement. Different results were however observed on the local governance indicators that form the second sub-component of the Stability Index. The six-month impacts on Local Governance and DDA-CDC Performance dissipated after one year. The six-month impact on DDA-CDC Performance was driven by a positive change in perceptions of CDCs, most likely because these village organizations were credited with securing new projects. After one year however the effect went into reverse – project activities caused a negative impact on perceived CDC performance after one year.

Also, a small, statistically insignificant, but still negative change on the Social Capital sub-index (ability to work together to solve internal and external problems) after six months became a significant negative impact after one year. This negative impact on Social Capital is of similar magnitude to the positive impact on Stability. These negative findings may indicate that project interventions create new challenges that communities struggle to overcome using their existing capacities for local governance and problem solving.

A negative change in District Government Satisfaction (perceived fairness, honesty, and understanding of local problems) was observed over the six-month impact measurement, but this finding was reversed in the one-year measurement. While neither effect was large enough to be considered statistically significant, the reversal from a negative to a positive effect is nevertheless worth noting because it suggests that stabilization interventions are helping build the legitimacy of local government officials. Gains in formal government capacity stand in contrast to negative findings on Local Governance and Social Capital over the one-year timeframe. This suggests that the effort to build synergy between local informal governance institutions and formal government institutions should remain a key priority for sub-national governance and stability programming.

Analysis also reveals how a small and statistically insignificant gain in Quality of Life after six months became a positive impact after one year. This finding suggests that stabilization activities have effects that mature over time into durable improvements in rural life. These results on Government Capacity and Quality of Life sustained positive impacts on Stability, despite the worsening of Local Governance indicators after six months.

Wave 4 findings suggest that stabilization programming improves the public's perceptions of government service delivery. Afghans who report being aware of a development project in their community, regardless of benefactor, report a 6.3 percent higher perception of government service delivery. Among Afghans who report being aware of multiple development projects in their community, governance measures increase as much as 18 percent. Analysis also reveals that stabilization impacts increase with the number of projects implemented in a community.

Last but not least, regression analysis was used to determine which local characteristics and individual perceptions make a survey respondent more likely to report improved stability. The evaluation identified that perception of government service delivery and whether district government officials are originally from the district are the strongest predictors of stability, followed by the presence of Afghan army, police, and local police. Interestingly, measures of civil society are also pertinent: perceptions that it is acceptable to voice criticisms of government and membership in voluntary groups predict stability.

In stating these findings, it is important to acknowledge the continuing smaller-than-anticipated size of the sample used in this impact evaluation. Due to the level of programming at the time of the Wave 4 survey, MISTI was able to identify a relatively small number of project activities (264) in 164 treated villages to include in the impact analysis. This means that MISTI is unable as a result of the Wave 4 survey to break the results down beyond the program[5] level and by other factors. Also, it is important to note that the effects of stabilization program activities will develop slowly over time, such that the final MISTI survey wave (Wave 5) will pick up a larger impact than was the case for Wave 4. In this round of impact evaluation, MISTI was only able to examine the near to mid-term effects (6 to 12 months) of these (limited) program/project activities. Wave 5 of the MISTI Survey will deliver a larger sample of treated villages and twice the time period for examination (24 months as opposed to 12 months).

[5] It is important to distinguish between stabilization "program" and "project." MISTI concerns USAID/Afghanistan's entire stabilization portfolio, within which there are multiple programs and projects. SIKA and CCI are both defined as "programs," as they have multiple projects (4 and 2, respectively). KFZ is defined for the purpose of MISTI and this report as a project.

II. WAVE 4 OVERVIEW BY PROJECT

Introduction

Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI) conducts a biannual survey to measure and map stabilization trends and impacts in key districts across Afghanistan. MISTI has three primary M&E goals:

1. Provide independent monitoring, evaluation and impact assessment of USAID stabilization projects;
2. Collect, synthesize and analyze data at the district, provincial and regional levels to track higher-order stabilization trends and inform USG and Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) policy and practice related to transition;
3. Contribute to the larger body of knowledge on best practices and lessons learned related to the design, implementation and assessment of stabilization activities within a counterinsurgency context.[6]

The MISTI Survey Wave 4 report contributes to these goals by measuring trends in key in indicators of stability and resilience, and implementing scientifically rigorous evaluations of project impacts across key districts. This part of the report is intended to provide the leadership of USAID stabilization projects with summary information on changes in stability in their areas of operation and other local factors that affect project implementation.

Data collection for Survey Wave 4 occurred between April 28 and June 12, 2014. The Wave 4 sample consists of 37,399 male and female respondents, ages 18 and above, living in districts served by at least one of seven USAID stabilization projects. These projects include: four Stabilization in Key Areas (SIKA) projects covering the North (SIKA-N), South (SIKA-S), East (SIKA-E), and West (SIKA-W); Community Cohesion Initiative implemented in the North and West by Creative (CCI - Creative) and Community Cohesion Initiative implemented in the South and East by IOM (CCI - IOM); and lastly, Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ).

While the four SIKA projects are comprised of districts that are mutually exclusive to each other, the districts that comprise the CCI and KFZ project areas sometimes overlap with each other and with the SIKA districts. Detailed lists of project compositions by district can be found in the methodology report under Section II: Sample Design.

This overview chapter describes Wave 4 findings for each stabilization project on topics such as security and crime, governance, service provision and development, rule of law, corruption, quality of life, economic activity, community cohesion and resilience, grievances, and media. For in-depth district-level analysis and longitudinal trends, see the individual project chapters.

[6] http://usaidmisti.com/about

Project Descriptions

The Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) program is comprised of four regional projects designed to promote good governance and service delivery in targeted districts. The program's intended effects are reducing the impact of the insurgency, increasing confidence in the Afghan government, and paving the way for a peaceful security transition. SIKA delivers assistance in two ways: 1) building the capacity of sub-national government structures and 2) delivering community grants to for small scale, community and government-endorsed projects.[7]

The Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) is a project of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives. Its goal is to increase the resilience of residents and communities in areas of Afghanistan that are susceptible to insurgency and other sources of instability. CCI has two primary objectives: 1) strengthening ties between local actors, customary governance structures, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and 2) increasing cohesion among and between communities by bringing communities together through projects to address common needs.[8]

The Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) project intends to strengthen and diversify legal rural livelihoods in targeted districts by identifying and addressing the root causes and sources of instability that lead to opium poppy cultivation. KFZ project activities seek to: 1) assist farmers, laborers, and rural communities through a package of comprehensive, practical, and sustainable interventions in an equitable manner and 2) prevent the spread of opium poppy cultivation and reduce it where it has already taken root.[9]

Details about project activities can be found in the individual project chapters. The table below shows the sample size for each program area surveyed in Wave 4. Margins

Project	Sample Size	Project	Sample Size
SIKA-N	n=3,828	CCI-Creative	n=8,225
S KA-S	n=5,955	CCI-IOM	n=5,600
SIKA-E	n=9,663	KFZ	n=3,015
SIKA-W	n=4,302		

Table 2.1: Sample Size of USAID Stabilization Projects, MISTI Wave 4[10]

[7] USAID Stability in Key Areas Fact Sheet. http://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/fact-sheets/stability-key-areas-sika. Accessed October 2014.

[8] USAID Community Cohesion Initiative Fact Sheet. http://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/fact-sheets/community-cohesion-initiative-cci. Accessed October 2014.

[9] USAID Kandahar Food Zone Grant Opportunity. http://www.grants.gov/web/grants/view-opportunity.html?oppId=233213. Accessed October 2014.

[10] The total sample size of the MISTI Wave 4 survey is N=37,399.

Stability in Key Areas- North (SIKA-N)

Security and Crime

Security is relatively good in SIKA-N districts compared to other parts of Afghanistan. Majorities rate local security and security on roads as good and say they feel secure at home and while traveling. Despite high levels of security, the majority of respondents report instances (either "a little" or "a lot") of petty offenses and serious crimes in their area.

Respondents are more likely to report a strong presence of Afghan National Police (ANP) than Afghan National Army (ANA) in their area; however respondents report higher levels of confidence in the ANA's ability to keep their area safe than the ANP's. One in five respondents say there are "a lot" of armed opposition groups in their area. Meanwhile, the vast majority say there are no ISAF forces.

Governance

SIKA-N activities aim to expand and improve legitimacy of the Afghan government to districts and unstable communities. Overall, respondents have positive opinions of the central government and local governments.

More than three-fourths say the Afghan Government is well regarded in their area. Majorities also report confidence in their district governor, district government, local village/neighborhood leaders, and provincial governor, and believe they are responsive to needs of local people in their area. However, they hold more positive opinions of their district government and local leaders than provincial governor.

SIKA-N capacity building activities assisted district entities to work more effectively with constituents to understand sources of instability in their area. Therefore, it is a positive finding that most respondents are aware of the District Development Assemblies (DDAs) and Community Development Councils (CDCs) in SIKA-N districts. Majorities report confidence in their DDA and CDC and also believe they are responsive to the needs of local people in their area.

Service Provision & Development

SIKA-N project activities mainly focused on improving roads, water systems, retaining and flood walls, and education. Respondents in Wave 4 reported satisfaction with the district government's provisions of roads and bridges, water for irrigation, clean drinking water, and schooling for boys. Together with the Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, the findings of the MISTI Wave 4 Survey suggest that projects related to roads and water systems are greatly appreciated by communities, and that implementing more of these projects will improve respondents' views of their local governments by meeting their most pressing needs.

On the other hand, majorities reported *dissatisfaction* with the electricity, agricultural assistance, retaining and flood walls, and schooling for girls. When thinking about development projects that are needed in their area in next year, Afghans surveyed in SIKA-N districts most frequently mention electricity and road construction.

Rule of Law

In general, respondents are most likely to turn to local/tribal elders to seek justice when they are involved in a dispute. As disputes get more serious, though, respondents are slightly more inclined to turn to government courts. In light of the preference for traditional mechanisms of justice, it is not surprising that respondents report the most confidence in local/tribal elders to resolve disputes. Respondents believe decisions made by local/tribal elders are always or mostly respected.



Figure 2.1: Respect of Justice System Decisions (SIKA-N)

Corruption

Eight out of ten respondents admit corruption is a problem in their area. They are most likely to complain about corruption of the Ministry of Education, the Directorate of Electricity, and the courts.

Quality of Life

Afghans surveyed in SIKA-N districts remain generally satisfied with their quality of life. More than seven in ten respondents are satisfied with life as a whole and six in ten are satisfied with their household's current financial situation. However, the majority of respondents are worried about meeting their basic needs over the next year. More than half say their area is too uncertain to make plans about their future.

Economic Activity

The majority of respondents believe prices for basic goods in local markets have increased over the past year. They are divided in their perception of paid jobs in their area. One-third believes there are more paid jobs than last year, another-third says there are the same amount, and another third says there are less.

Community Cohesion and Resilience

Armed people and ethnic disputes are issues from outside respondents' villages/neighborhoods that disrupt normal life in their area. Meanwhile ethnic disputes from inside their area and disputes over water are internal issues that cause problems in SIKA-N districts. The majority of respondents believe that villages/neighborhoods in their area are able to work together to solve problems.

Two-thirds of respondents say local leaders consider the interests of ordinary people when making decisions, while just over half say the same about the interests of women.

Grievances

Unemployment, the lack of electricity, and insecurity are the most common grievances causing stress and tension in SIKA-N districts.

Media

Respondents tend to rely on friends and family, the radio, and the Mosque/Mullah to communicate with others and/or get news and information. Many also use cell phones and television. Far fewer respondents mention using print media (posters, billboards, and newspapers), while almost no respondents use the Internet or e-mail.

Stability in Key Areas- South (SIKA-S)

Security and Crime

Local security varies across SIKA-S districts, with less than half reporting "good security" and the majority saying it is either "fair" or "poor." Most respondents believe that their district is more secure than last year, and that road security has improved. Improving security on the roads is also reflected in the majority of respondents who report feeling secure when traveling to a neighboring village.

Q2a. Would you say security in your local area is good, fair or poor?



Q2b. Is your local area more secure, about the same, or less secure than it was a year ago?



Figure 2.2: Perceptions of Local Security (SIKA-S, n= 5,955)

Over half of respondents say there are "a lot" of Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) in SIKA-S districts. Although majorities report confidence in both the ANA and ANP to provide security in their area, respondents have more positive views of the ANA. Two-thirds of respondents report there are armed opposition groups in their area ("some" or "a lot"), while less than half report a presence of ISAF forces.

Governance

SIKA-S activities seek to expand and improve the legitimacy of the GIRoA at the sub-national level. Opinions of the Afghan government remain high, with three in four respondents saying the government is well regarded in their area. Respondents also have positive opinions of their district governor, district government, local leaders, and provincial governor. However, they report the most confidence in their local leaders compared to other local entities.

When possible, SIKA-S projectming is implemented through existing Community Development Councils (CDCs) and District Development Assemblies (DDAs) to make use of a bottom-up approach to improving local governance and strengthen these local government institutions. Nearly three-fourths of respondents are aware of both the DDA and CDC in their area, and majorities have confidence in these organizations.

Service Provision & Development

USAID stabilization project activities in SIKA-S districts focused mainly on infrastructure, with a particular emphasis on improving roads, water systems, retaining and flood walls. A key objective of the SIKA program is to assist district governments in providing better basic services to constituents. Most Afghans surveyed in SIKA-S have seen or heard about development projects in their local area.

A majority of respondents are dissatisfied with the district government's provisions of retaining and flood walls, schooling for girls, and electricity. About half are also dissatisfied with medical care and agricultural activities. More optimistically, respondents are satisfied with clean drinking water, water for irrigation, and schooling for boys.

Rule of Law

In general, respondents are most likely to turn to local/tribal elders to seek justice when they are involved in a dispute over property, but prefer to seek resolution from government courts for cases involving violent crime. As disputes get more serious (i.e. those which involve assault, murder, or kidnapping), respondents are more inclined to turn to government courts. Around one in ten respondents seek justice from armed opposition groups when involved in disputes over land/water, kidnapping, or theft.

In light of the preference for traditional mechanisms of justice, it is not surprising that Afghans surveyed in SIKA-S have most confidence in local/tribal elders to resolve disputes. Although a majority also report confidence in government courts, they are most likely to believe decisions made by local/tribal elders are "always" or "mostly" respected.

Corruption

The vast majority of respondents admit corruption is a problem in their area. They are most likely to complain about corruption of the courts, district/office of attorney, and the municipality.

Quality of Life

Afghans surveyed in SIKA-S districts remain generally satisfied with their quality of life. About six in ten respondents are satisfied with life as a whole and with their household's current financial situation. However, the majority of respondents are worried about meeting their basic needs over the next year. Just over half say their area is certain enough to make plans about their future**,** while nearly half are uncertain about their future.

Economic Activity

Although a plurality of respondents believes markets are more accessible, the majority of respondents believe prices for basic goods in local markets have increased. Respondents are most likely to say there are less paid jobs in their area compared to last year.

Community Cohesion and Resilience

Disputes over water and land disputes are issues from outside respondents' villages or neighborhoods that disrupt normal life in their area. Meanwhile family problems and land disputes from inside their area are internal issues that cause problems in SIKA-S districts.

Three-fourths of respondents say local leaders consider the interests of ordinary people when making decisions, but fewer say the same about the interests of women.

Grievances

Unemployment and insecurity are the most common grievances causing stress and tension in SIKA-S districts.

Media

Respondents tend to rely on the radio, friends and family, and the Mosque/Mullah to communicate with others and/or get news and information. Some also use cell phones and television. Very few mention using print media (posters, billboards, and newspapers) or the Internet to communicate with others and/or get news and information.

Stability in Key Areas- East (SIKA-E)

Security and Crime

Local security varies across SIKA-E districts, with similar pluralties saying it is "good," "fair," and "poor." Despite divided perceptions of security, respondents believe their local area is more secure than last year and the majority believe security on their local roads is good. Respondents say there are "a lot" of petty crimes and offenses in SIKA-E districts, while there are "a little" serious crimes (violent and non-violent).

There is a high presence of Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police in SIKA-E districts. Majorities report confidence in the ANA and ANP to keep their area safe and believe both groups have improved in their ability to provide security over the past year. However, respondents are more likely to have confidence in the ANA to keep their area safe than the ANP. The majority say there is no ISAF presence in their area, and pluralites believe there are at least some armed opposition groups, Arbaki (local thugs), and Afghan Local Police.

Governance

SIKA-E activities strive to build the capacities of local entities in order to establish trust and legitimacy of governance. Overall, opinions of the central government and local governments are positive in SIKA-E districts. Nearly three-fourths say the Afghan government is well regarded in their area, and majorities report confidence in their district governor, district government, local/village neighborhood leaders, and provincial governor.

It is a positive development that most respondents are aware of the District Development Assemblies (DDAs) and Community Development Councils (CDCs) in SIKA-E districts. Majorities report confidence in their DDA and CDC and also believe they are responsive to the needs of local people in their area.

Service Provision & Development

SIKA-E project activities targeted irrigation, education, agriculture, transportation, and water supply and sanitation. However, the majority of respondents in Wave 4 are dissatisfied with the district government provisions of electricity, agricultural assistance, retaining and flood walls, medical care, roads and bridges, and schooling for girls. Respondents are much more satisfied with the government's provision of clean drinking water and schooling for boys, and nearly half are satisfied with water for irrigation.

Rule of Law

Respondents seek justice from local/tribal elders when they are involved in a dispute concerning land, water, or theft. As disputes become more serious, respondents are more inclined to turn to government courts over local elders. They are least likely to seek justice from armed opposition groups.



Figure 2.3: Preferred Justice System by Type of Dispute (SIKA-E, n=4,302)

Corruption

Eight out of ten respondents admit corruption is a problem in their area. They are most likely to complain about corruption of the courts, police, the District Office, and the Ministry of Education.

Quality of Life

Afghans surveyed in SIKA-E districts remain generally satisfied with their quality of life. Majorities say they are satisfied with life as a whole and with their household's current financial situation. However, the majority of respondents are worried about meeting their basic needs over the next year.

Economic Activity

The majority of respondents believe prices for basic goods in local markets have increased over the past year. They are also likely to say there are less paid jobs in their area compared to last year.

Community Cohesion and Resilience

Land disputes and road-side bombs are issues from outside respondents' villages/neighborhoods that disrupt normal life in their area. Meanwhile land disputes from inside their area and disputes over water are internal issues that cause problems in SIKA-E districts. The majority of respondents believe that villages/neighborhoods in their area are able to work together to solve problems.

Nearly seven out of ten respondents believe local leaders consider the interests of ordinary people when making decisions, while five out of ten believe they also consider the interests of women.

Grievances

Insecurity and unemployment are the most common grievances causing stress and tension in SIKA-E districts.

Media

Respondents tend to rely on the radio, friends and family, and elders to communicate with others and/or get news and information. More than half say they communicate and/or receive news through the Mosque/Mullah and cell phones. They are much less likely to use television, posters/billboards, and newspapers. Nearly all of those surveyed never use the Internet or e-mail.

Stability in Key Areas- West (SIKA-W)

Security and Crime

Security is relatively good in SIKA-W districts compared to other areas of Afghanistan. Half of the population reports that security is good, and about one-third say it is fair. Afghans surveyed in SIKA-W districts also believe security on their local roads is good, and a plurality believes it is improving. Although the majority report instances of petty crime and offenses, serious non-violent crimes, and serious violent crimes (combination of "a lot" or "a little"), they believe there is less crime compared to last year.

When asked about the presence of security forces and opposition groups, respondents are most likely to say there is "a lot" of Afghan National Police (ANP) in their area, and least likely to say there is "a lot" of ISAF.



Figure 2.4: Presence of Security Forces & Opposition Groups (SIKA-W, n=4,302)

Governance

Local governance is a priority of the SIKA-W stabilization project. SIKA-W activities have been presented as Afghan government-led activities with the theory that infrastructure development projects will improve perceptions of the government. Overall, respondents have positive opinions of the central government and local governments.

Two-thirds say the Afghan Government is well regarded in their area, while one-third say it is not well regarded. Majorities report confidence in their district governor, district government, local village/neighborhood leaders, and provincial governor, and believe they are responsive to needs of local people in their area.

The Midterm Performance Evaluation noted that SIKA-W project activities were successful at attracting the community to the district center. District Stability Committee (DSC) meetings were held to encourage bottom-up communication of the District Development Assembly (DDA). Survey responses indicate that the SIKA-W activities intended to increase the authority and exposure of district entities seem to have been effective. Nearly seven out of ten respondents say they have heard of the District Development Assembly (DDA) in their district. Those who have heard of it are likely to have confidence in their DDA and believe it is improving. Similarly, the majority has heard of the Community Development Council (CDC) in their district, reports confidence in their CDC, and believe it is improving.

Service Provision & Development

Although half of respondents believe government services in their area have improved in the past year, majorities report *dissatisfaction* with the district government provisions of medical care, electricity, retaining and flood walls, roads and bridges, agricultural assistance, water for irrigation, and schooling

for girls. More than half of respondents are satisfied with the government's provision of clean drinking water, and nearly half are satisfied with schooling for boys.

When thinking about development projects that are needed in their area in next year, Afghans surveyed in SIKA-W districts most frequently mention road construction, electricity, and education.

Rule of Law

Afghans in SIKA-W have more confidence in informal justice systems than formal justice systems. They are most likely to seek justice from local/tribal elders when they are involved in a dispute concerning land, water, or theft. However, as disputes get more serious (such as assault, murder, or kidnapping), they turn towards government courts. Very few respondents turn to armed opposition groups for justice.



Figure 2.5: Preferred Justice System by Type of Dispute (SIKA-W, n=4,302)

Corruption

Eight out of ten respondents admit corruption is a problem in their area. They are most likely to complain about corruption of the courts, district/office of attorney, customs, and the municipality.

Quality of Life

Afghans surveyed in SIKA-W districts remain generally satisfied with their quality of life. Two of every three respondents say they are satisfied with their life as a whole. However, respondents are less likely to be satisfied with their household's current financial situation. Most are worried about meeting their basic needs over the next year and believe their area is too uncertain to make plans about their future.

Economic Activity

Although respondents believe markets are more accessible in SIKA-W, they believe prices for basic goods in local markets have increased over the past year. Respondents are divided when asked about the availability of paid jobs in their area—one third say there are more than last year, another third say they are less, and another third say there are the same amount of jobs.

Community Cohesion & Resilience

Small crimes/theft and the existence of the Taliban are issues from outside respondents' villages/neighborhoods that disrupt normal life in their area. Meanwhile ethnic disputes are issues that originate within villages/neighborhoods and cause problems in SIKA-W districts. The majority of respondents believe that villages/neighborhoods in their area are able to work together to solve problems.

Majorities of respondents believe local leaders consider the interests of ordinary people and women when making decisions. Respondents also perceive their local leaders to be effective at securing funds from the district or provincial government for local needs.

Grievances

Unemployment and insecurity are the most common grievances causing stress and tension in SIKA-W districts.

Media

Respondents depend on the radio or word of mouth (friends/family, elders, and the Mosque/Mullah) to get news and information about government services. Cell phones and television are not as popular, and very few respondents mention that they rely on print media (posters/billboards and newspapers). Virtually no respondents use the Internet or e-mail to communicate or receive information.

Community Cohesion Initiative – Creative (CCI-C)

Security and Crime

Evaluations of security are important to the CCI Creative project because insecurity and conflict contribute to the shocks and stresses that lead to crisis and a lack of resilience in Afghan communities. Nearly half of respondents in CCI-C districts believe their area has become more secure in the past year and the majority rates their local security as good or fair. Most respondents also believe that petty offenses and serious crime has decreased in the past year.

Respondents perceive a strong presence of ANA and ANP in their area, and majorities report confidence in them to keep their area safe and believe both the ANA and ANP have improved in the past year. There is a varied presence of armed opposition groups in CCI-C districts, with about half of respondents saying there are "some" and pluralities saying there are "a lot" or "none."

Governance

Given CCI's programmatic objective of strengthening ties between local actors, customary governance structures, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), respondents' opinions of government officials is a key indicator of the impact of CCI-C's project activities.

Seven out of ten respondents living in CCI-C districts believe the Afghan government is well regarded in their area and majorities report confidence in sub-national governments. Compared to their district governor, district government, and provincial government, respondents are most confident in their local

village or neighborhood leaders. They also believe local leaders are the most responsive to the needs of people in their area.



Figure 2.6: Confidence and Responsiveness of Local Entities (CCI-C, n=8,225)

Service Provision & Development

A large proportion of CCI-C's project activities seek to deliver goods and services. As of February 2014, one- third of activities focused on infrastructure improvements.

Nearly half of respondents in Wave 4 say services from the government have improved in the past year and most respondents have heard of development projects in their area. Respondents are most aware of projects for drinking water, and are also most satisfied with the district government's provision of clean drinking water and water for irrigation. Majorities are dissatisfied with the district government's provision of agricultural assistance, retaining and flood walls, roads and bridges, medical care, and electricity. Although respondents are satisfied with their district's schooling for boys, they are dissatisfied with schooling for girls.

Rule of Law

Respect for the rule of law and establishing effective means of dispute resolution are two key components of building a community's adaptive capacity for dealing with internal conflict. Three major authorities that community members could turn to for dispute resolution are local or tribal elders, government courts, or armed opposition groups. In CCI-C districts, the preferred source of dispute resolution is the local or tribal elder. Almost all respondents say they have confidence in local leaders to fairly resolve disputes, and respondents are most likely to believe decisions made by local leaders are always respected.

Corruption

Almost 9 of every 10 respondents admit corruption is a problem in their area. They are most likely to complain about corruption of district office and courts.

Quality of Life

Afghans surveyed in CCI-C districts remain generally satisfied with their quality of life. Majorities say they are satisfied with life as a whole and with their household's current financial situation. However, the majority of respondents are worried about meeting their basic needs over the next year and worry that their area is too uncertain to make plans for the future.

Economic Activity

Although respondents believe their ability to access markets has gotten better, the majority of respondents believe prices for basic goods in local markets have increased over the past year. They are also likely to say there are less paid jobs in their area compared to last year.

Community Cohesion and Resilience

One of CCI's primary objectives is to increase cohesion among and between communities in order to increase their ability to collectively respond to shocks and stresses that can lead to crisis.

Disputes over water and road-side bombs are issues from outside respondents' villages/neighborhoods that disrupt normal life in their area. Meanwhile disputes over water from inside their area and family problems are some of the top internal issues that cause problems in CCI-C districts. The majority of respondents believe that villages/neighborhoods in their area are able to work together to solve such problems.

Overall, CCI-C respondents believe local leaders take concerns of ordinary people into account when making decisions. Fewer say the same about the interests of women.

Grievances

Unemployment and insecurity are the most common grievances causing stress and tension in CCI-C districts.

Media

Respondents depend on the radio or word of mouth (friends/family, elders, and the Mosque/Mullah) to get news and information about government services. Cell phones and television are not as popular, and very few respondents mention that they rely on print media (posters/billboards and newspapers). Hardly any respondents use the Internet or e-mail to communicate or receive information.

Elections

Nearly half of respondents in Wave 4 believe "hardly any" or only "some" of the people in their area voted in the presidential and parliamentary election in April 2014. However, respondents believe more people voted in the 2014 election than in 2009. More than half of CCI-C respondents believe people in their community voted for different candidates in the 2014 election.

Respondents in CCI-C districts say they had discussion in their community about who to vote for prior to the 2014 election. The majority feel voting is a personal, individual responsibility.

Community Cohesion Initiative –IOM (CCI-IOM)

Security and Crime

Understanding the security status of IOM districts and the potential drivers of conflict in certain areas will enable IOM implementers to target mitigation efforts and reduce the risks associated with these shocks in areas where there are security problems. Unlike in other areas of the country, particularly in the south, respondents in IOM districts (located in the north and west) enjoy very high levels of security. Just over half of respondents report their area is more secure than it was a year ago, with strong majorities reporting security at home and while traveling on local roads. Crime is not prevalent in IOM districts and only one in every ten respondents report high incidences of petty offenses or serious crimes.

Respondents perceive a stronger presence of ANP than ANA in their area, and are more likely to believe the ANP's ability to provide security has improved over the past year. Although respondents are confident in the ANA, most say there is no ANA presence in their district. There is a low presence of Arbaki, local police, armed opposition groups, and ISAF forces in CCI-IOM districts.

Governance

Given CCI's programmatic objective of strengthening ties between local actors and customary governance structures, respondents' opinions of government officials is a key indicator. Seven in ten respondents believe the Afghan government is well regarded in their area. District governors and local leaders enjoy the highest level of confidence among IOM respondents overall, with 8 in 10 respondents expressing confidence in each.

Majorities believe the district government, district governors, local leaders, and provincial leaders are responsive to the needs of people in their area, and also believe they have improved in the past year.

Service Provision & Development

A large proportion of IOM's project activities seek to deliver goods and services. Of the activities implemented as of February 2014, the vast majority dealt with infrastructure improvements.

Respondents in IOM districts believe services have improved in the past year; however they remain dissatisfied with the district government's provisions of water for irrigation, agricultural assistance, retaining and flood walls, roads and bridges, medical care, schooling for girls, and electricity. They are most satisfied with clean drinking water and schooling for boys.

Only one-third of respondents say they have heard of development projects in their area over the past year. Of those who have heard of it, respondents are most likely to be aware of projects for drinking water.

Rule of Law

There are three justice systems that community members could turn to for dispute resolution: local or tribal elders, government courts, or armed opposition groups. When respondents or their family members are involved in less serious disputes (concerning land, water, or theft), IOM respondents show

a preference for turning to local and tribal elders. Government courts are preferred when it comes to more serious crimes such as assault, murder and kidnapping. Armed opposition groups are rarely the preferred source of justice for any type of crime.



Figure 2.7: Preferred Justice System by Type of Dispute (CCI-IOM, n=5,600)

Respondents have the most confidence in local leaders and believe the members of their community are more likely to respect their decisions.

Corruption

Six of every 10 respondents admit corruption is a problem in their area. They are most likely to complain about corruption of courts and the district office.

Quality of Life

Afghans surveyed in CCI-IOM districts remain generally satisfied with their quality of life. Nearly three of every four respondents say they are satisfied with life as a whole. Slightly fewer are satisfied with their household's current financial situation. Overall, respondents are worried about meeting their basic needs over the next year and worry that their area is too uncertain to make plans for the future.

Economic Activity

Measures of economic activity are important to the IOM project because increasing economic opportunities is one of the mechanisms by which adaptive capacity, and therefore resilience, can be fostered in a community.

Although respondents believe their ability to access markets has gotten better, the majority of respondents believe prices for basic goods in local markets have increased over the past year. Respondents are not optimistic about job growth over the past year, with the majority saying there are either less paid jobs in their area or there has been no change.

Community Cohesion and Resilience

Another primary objective of the CCI project is to increase cohesion among and between communities; IOM communities already display a relatively high level of cohesion. Almost three quarters of respondents living in IOM districts report that factors from outside their village/neighborhood "never" create problems in their area, and 7 in 10 agree that things from within the village "never" create problems.

IOM respondents believe that communities are more often able to solve problems that come from within the village than those that come from outside the village.

Most respondents believe local leaders take concerns of ordinary people into account when making decisions; however fewer say the same about the interests of women.

Grievances

Unemployment and lack of electricity are the most common grievances causing stress and tension in CCI-IOM districts.

Media

Respondents report depending on the radio or word of mouth (friends/family, elders, the Mosque/Mullah) to get news and information. Nearly half of respondents also use the television as a source of news and information

Elections

A majority of IOM respondents in Wave 4 believes "a lot" or "almost all" of the people in their area voted in the last election in April 2014. The overall reported rate of physical violence within communities regarding which candidate to vote for in 2014 is very low.

Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ)

Security and Crime

Afghans surveyed in KFZ districts tend to believe their local area is more secure than it was last year and there is less crime in their area. Local security varies across districts, however, with less than half of respondents saying their local security is good and the majority saying it is either fair or poor. Respondents believe security on local roads is good and most feel secure while traveling.

There is a strong presence of ANA and ANP in KFZ districts. Although majorities report confidence in both the ANA and ANP, there is a higher level of confidence in the ANA to keep local areas safe. Respondents are also more likely to believe the ANA has improved in the past year.

While one-third of respondents believe there are no armed opposition groups or ISAF forces in their area, the majority believe there are at least "some" or "a lot" of both.

Governance

Respondents in KFZ districts think highly of the GIRoA and sub-national governments. Three of every four respondents believe the Afghan government is well regarded in their area. Majorities say they have confidence in their district governor, district government, local leaders, and provincial governor, and also believe these entities are responsive to local needs. Respondents are most confident in their local leaders, however they are most likely to believe their district governor is responsive to their local needs.

Most respondents are aware of the District Development Assembly (DDA) and Community Development Council (CDC) in their district. Although both groups are perceived to be responsive to local needs, they are much more confident in the abilities of the DDA than the CDC.

Service Provision & Development

USAID programming conducted under the KFZ project focus mainly on improving irrigation and water systems, providing agricultural assistance, and providing capacity-building and vocational training. All of these services aim to address the root causes of opium poppy cultivation and steer farmers towards licit crops. However, despite these efforts, respondents in KFZ districts report mixed satisfaction with the district government's provision of water for irrigation and agricultural assistance.

Aside from clean drinking water, respondents in KFZ districts are dissatisfied with district government services (retaining and flood walls, roads and bridges, medical care, girls schooling, boys schooling, and electricity). The majority of respondents have not even heard about development projects in their area. Of those who have, most say they have heard about projects related to irrigation and water maintenance.

Rule of Law

Afghans in KFZ districts have more confidence in informal justice systems than formal justice systems. They are most likely to seek justice from local/tribal elders when they are involved in a dispute concerning land, water, or theft. However, as disputes get more serious (such as assault, murder, or kidnapping), they turn towards government courts. Very few respondents turn to armed opposition groups for justice.

There is a clear preference for traditional mechanisms of justice. Nine in ten respondents report confidence in local/tribal elders to fairly resolve disputes and respondents believe decisions made by elders are most respected by their local community.



Figure 2.8: Respect of Justice System Decisions (KFZ)

Corruption

Almost 9 of every 10 respondents admit corruption is a problem in their area. They are most likely to complain about corruption of the district office, the Ministry of Education, and the police.

Quality of Life

Afghans surveyed in KFZ districts remain generally satisfied with their quality of life. Majorities say they are satisfied with life as a whole and with their household's current financial situation. However, most respondents are worried about meeting their basic needs over the next year and worry that their area is too uncertain to make plans for the future.

Economic Activity

Although respondents believe their ability to access markets has gotten better, half of respondents believe prices for basic goods in local markets have increased over the past year. Respondents in KFZ districts believe they are seeing less improvement in the number of paid jobs that are becoming available.

Community Cohesion and Resilience

Disputes over land and water are known as the top issues disrupting normal life in KFZ districts. These property disputes originate from both within respondents' village/neighborhood and outside of their village/neighborhood. Six of every ten respondents believe that villages/neighborhoods in their area are able to work together to solve such problems.

Just over half of KFZ respondents believe local leaders take concerns of ordinary people into account when making decisions. Fewer say the same about the interests of women.

Grievances

Insecurity and unemployment are the most common grievances causing stress and tension in KFZ districts.

Media

Respondents depend on the radio or word of mouth (friends/family, elders, and the Mosque/Mullah) to get news and information about government services. Cell phones and television are not as popular, and very few respondents mention that they rely on print media (posters/billboards and newspapers). Hardly any respondents use the Internet or e-mail to communicate or receive information.

KFZ Module

The KFZ module was only asked of respondents who own farm land living in KFZ districts. Questions in this module dealt with topics such as land tenure, irrigation, land and crops farmed, credit/loans, and household economics. About half of farming respondents say they own 100% of the land that they farm. Three-fourths of those who own their land say they inherited the land and one-fourth say they purchased it.

Land leasing is not as common, and sharecropping is even less common. Of those who do lease or sharecrop land, respondents reported a wide range of payments made: from 500 Afs to 500,000 Afs per year for use of the land they farm. Consistent with the high levels of reported land ownership, the majority of farmers in KFZ districts say they have either a title document or sales agreement securing their land use.

III. MISTI SURVEY: WAVE 4 ANALYSIS BY PROJECT

Introduction

In the following chapters, the Survey Wave 4 data from the each project's area of operation were analyzed for using a variety of statistical techniques including correlations, regression analysis (logistic), district comparisons, tests for difference in proportions and trend analysis. Correlations are useful for looking at whether variables are related to each other and they provide information about the strength and direction of the relationship. District level analysis uses chi-square testing to highlight responses in districts that are significantly different from each other. Trend analysis is used to look at shifts in opinion since the baseline survey.

Regression analysis is used to identify key factors that predict an outcome variable (for example, perception of local security), while controlling for other related variables (such as presence of security forces). In all regression models, the response variable is binary, Likert scale variables are collapsed to positive and negative nets where positive responses were coded as 0 and neutral/negative response as 1. The independent variables in all models include a set of control variables, they are ethnicity, gender and education. Wald tests for significance are used to test independent variables, which test if the variable's coefficient is significantly different than zero. Hierarchal modeling is used in all cases were district-level project data were analyzed in tandem with survey data. Significance is determined through a likelihood ratio test of a model with the district variable and one without, coupled with an analysis of Akaike information criterion (AIC). Tests on the regression models were conduct with alpha = 0.05 for significance testing. These models are presented in appendices following each chapter. In all models non response including "Don't Know" and "Refused" were omitted from the sample prior to testing.

Methodology

The Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI) Wave 4 survey is a public opinion study that identifies trends in stabilization indicators throughout Afghanistan. The Wave 4 survey builds upon the Wave 1 baseline survey (September-December 2012), the Wave 2 survey (May-August 2013), and the Wave 3 survey (November 2013-January 2014). Wave 4 was conducted between April 28, 2014 and June 12, 2014. The analysis of this survey data is intended to inform the leadership of the six stabilization projects about changes in stability across their areas of responsibility.

The projects assessed in Wave 4 are the same as those in Wave 3: four Stabilization in Key Areas (SIKA) projects covering the North (SIKA-N), South (SIKA-S), East (SIKA-E), and West (SIKA-W), the Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI), and the Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ). Waves 1 and 2 included all of these projects with the exception of KFZ. The Community Development Program (CDP) was included in Waves 1 and 2 but ceased operations before Wave 3. The sampling design, field implementation, quality control, questionnaire design, and overall field experience are summarized in the Methods Report (see in Appendix 7 to this report). Some highlights are presented below.

1. The target population includes Afghan citizens, 18 years of age or older, living in 100 pre-selected districts throughout 21 provinces in Afghanistan. All 100 districts were selected

because at least one of the six USAID stabilization projects is in the process of planning or implementation in the district.

2. The target N size for the project was 37,536 interviews. The achieved N size was 37,399 interviews after all quality control measures were employed and unacceptable interviews were rejected. The target n size for each district ranged between 212 and 491 interviews with the average size per district being 374 interviews.

3. Sampling was conducted across 100 districts specified by MISTI. These districts were located in the following 21 provinces: Parwan, Wardak, Logar, Ghazni, Paktiya, Khost, Kunar, Baghlan, Kunduz, Balkh, Samangan, Jawzjan, Badghis, Herat, Farah, Nimroz, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan and Ghor. Nineteen of these provinces were included in the Wave 1 and Wave 2 surveys; in Waves 3 and 4, districts in Balkh and Jawzjan were added.

4. The primary sampling units were villages within each district. The sampling plan included 16 interviews in each selected village. Each of the villages (also referred to as settlements) and districts were selected by MISTI. In some instances, villages were determined to be inaccessible to interviewing teams due to security concerns, travel restrictions (imposed by either insurgent groups or NATO forces), or weather. In these instances, a replacement village was selected by MISTI. All replacements are summarized in the full Methodology Report.

5. The sampling methodology has evolved throughout the life of the MISTI project. Survey villages were randomly selected for the baseline survey (Wave 1) within three different population zones defined by their proximity to the administrative center of each district. Seventy percent of the survey sample was drawn from the villages nearest to each district center that make up 50% of the district's population. Twenty percent of the sample was drawn from a second zone of villages that are more distant from the district center, composing 30% of the district population. The final population zone included villages making up 10% of the district population at the furthest reaches of the district. This sampling design was chosen to meet the twin objectives of the MISTI survey: 1) reliably measure the perceptions of the populations of key district in order to measure changes in stability over time, and 2) measure the impacts of stability projects. To enable longitudinal analysis, the villages selected in Wave 1 were resurveyed in the later waves to the extent that this was feasible and expedient. The MISTI Survey thus incorporates a panel of villages that have been resurveyed in each Wave, thereby increasing the ability of the survey to capture meaningful trends and measuring impacts using survey data collected before and after the implementation of project activities. Adjustments to the list of villages included in the sampling frame after Wave 1 followed shifts in stabilization programming away from some districts and into new districts. The ability to resurvey all villages from previous waves was further limited by the changing accessibility of some areas, and by budget constraints. Nearly all villages surveyed in previous waves that received stabilization activities were resampled in Wave 4 to enable analysis of project effects.

6. The presentation and analysis of survey findings at the district and project levels assumes that the data collected within each district or project area is representative of the local population. The reader should keep in mind that:

- Accessibility of villages differs at the time of each survey. Therefore, target treatment villages sampled in previous waves which were intended to be resampled in W4 may not have had a probability of inclusion.
- There are no accurate data on population size associated with villages. The assumption that is made is that all villages are of approximately equal size, as any random selection was done by way of simple random sampling.
- The AYC household level selection is not random, but is instead done through a snowball sampling technique.

7. If simple random sampling (SRS) were used to select the 37,399 respondents that completed interviews for Survey Wave 4, then the margin of error (MOE) associated with the sample would be +/- 0.05%. That is, any statistic drawn from the whole sample would be considered significant if it changed more than 0.05% compared to a previous survey wave. SRS (e.g. one respondent per village) is however prohibitively expensive in rural Afghanistan. Additionally, the need to represent project effects at the village level necessitated the use of two-stage cluster sampling in which districts were selected in Stage 1, then villages were selected in Stage 2, and 16 respondents were interviewed in each village (see Paragraph 4 above). Compared to simple random sampling, cluster sampling adds additional error to the margin associated with SRS because people living in the same village more often express similar opinions compared to people living in different villages. The additional error created by the village "intra-cluster correlation," also called the sampling "design effect," was estimated for each stabilization project. This additional error was added to the margin associated with SRS, yielding a "complex MOE" for each project. More details on the complex MOE are included in each project chapter and the Methods Report (see Appendix 7 to this report).

8. The cautions presented above regarding the sampling limitations and resulting limitations on statistical calculations for these data also apply to the sample aggregation and analysis at the district and program level. Each project chapter includes a table showing each district's margin of error, and the complex margin of error associated with the representativeness of the survey statistics for the project area as a whole. The complex MOE values for each project were calculated using an average design effect for all districts covered by a program. It should be noted that there is also overlap between each project's area of operations. The project-level results can also be found in each program chart at the start of each chapter and additional information on the calculation and recommended use of these statistics can be found in the Methods Report.

9. The MISTI Wave 4 survey was conducted face to face by 1,181 ACSOR interviewers and 52 AYC interviewers. Some districts are inaccessible to ACSOR interviewers because it is difficult to enter and exit certain areas without attracting the attention of insurgent elements and endangering the safety of the ACSOR interviewers. Certain districts are also accessible only to male interviewers due to cultural and security concerns. ACSOR maintains an accessibility tracker to monitor each district in Afghanistan. This tracker is updated monthly as the security situation in Afghanistan changes frequently. As a result of ACSOR's inaccessibility assessment,

the interviews in nine districts were conducted completely by AYC and another 10 districts were interviewed using both ACSOR and AYC interviewers during the Wave 4 fieldwork.

10. ACSOR interviewing teams consisted of male and female interviewers who were local residents of the areas where the interviews were conducted. The ACSOR interviewers utilized a random walk methodology to select households, and a Kish grid to randomize respondent selection within households. These interviewers were all from the province where they conducted interviews, and in most instances they were from the districts where the interviews were conducted. The ACSOR interviewing teams were overseen by a supervisory team from their province. The supervisory team consisted of 21 lead supervisors (one for each province) and one or two assistant supervisors in each province that helped with back checks, field monitoring and general field logistics throughout the field period. ACSOR's field work began on April 28, 2014 and concluded on June 12, 2014.

11. The AYC interviewing teams consisted of small groups of male interviewers who are from the districts where the interviews were conducted. In Wave 4, AYC was able to recruit and use one female interviewer as well. Due to the poor security situation in the districts where they conducted field work, the AYC interviewing teams selected households through convenience sampling using their local knowledge of the villages and contacts they have within those villages so as to lessen the possibility of encountering insurgent elements that would result from employing a random walk. Since the AYC interviewers were primarily male and they selected households through convenience sampling, respondents were selected by either asking for the male head of household or interviewing another male member of the household who was available at the time. The female interviewer also selected a respondent through convenience sampling, asking for any female who was available and willing to participate in the household. The AYC interviewers were overseen by a team of 19 supervisors who were responsible for back checking, direct observations and all field logistics. AYC began field work on May 17, 2014 and concluded on June 6, 2014.

12. Contact sheets were completed by both ACSOR and AYC interviewers throughout the field period. ACSOR used standard American Association of Public Opinion Researchers (AAPOR) calculation standards to derive field performance and disposition rates (including: Response Rate 3, Cooperation Rate 3, Refusal Rate 2, and Contact Rate 2). These figures are included in the full methodology report.

13. AAPOR offers a variety of formulas to calculate disposition rates depending on the circumstances for which they are being used. ACSOR typically uses the rates reported above, as they most logically fit the face to face field methodology used in Afghanistan.

14. The questionnaire consisted of 39 management and quality control variables, 85 substantive questions and 19 demographic questions. The CCI module added to the questionnaire only in districts where the CCI project is operating contained 8 questions. The KFZ module added to the questionnaire for the districts in Kandahar where that project is operating contained 54 questions. For the purposes of this count, each item in a battery of questions was counted as 1/3 of a variable.

15. The average length of time it took for an interview to be conducted was 36 minutes with the shortest interview taking 20 minutes and the longest interview taking one hour and 10 minutes.

16. Districts were selected for inclusion in the sample based on the evaluation needs of the various projects being implemented and evaluated. The sample was never intended to be a representative sample of all of Afghanistan. Due to this sampling process for the MISTI Wave 4 survey and the lack of reliable demographic targets available in Afghanistan at the district level, there are no weights used on these data.

Project Phases	Start Date	End Date	Comments
Questionnaire Design / Translation	March 25, 2014	April 15, 014	KFZ module edits caused delay
Sampling	April 7, 2014	May 10, 2014	
ACSOR Briefings	April 23, 2014	May 16, 2014	ACSOR offices closed for: General Election (April 3-5) Run-off Election (June 12-14) Limited operating hours during Ramadan: June 28 – July 28
AYC Briefings	May 16, 2014	May 17, 2014	
ACSOR Fieldwork	April 28, 2014	June 12, 2014	
AYC Fieldwork	May 17, 2014	June 4, 2014	
Quality Control	April 28, 2014	August 13, 2014	
Data Processing	May 12, 2014	August 13, 2014	

Table 3.1: Project Schedule

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IV. STABILITY IN KEY AREAS NORTH (SIKA-N)

Introduction

As explained in the Mid-Term Performance Evaluation[11], Stability in Key Areas-North (SIKA-N) aims to improve governance and provision of basic services, thereby promoting stability. SIKA-N activities focus on capacity-building and infrastructure development in order to build confidence in local governance and improve the provision of basic services. SIKA-N seeks to establish the legitimacy of local governance and encourage community-led development through small-scale stabilization projects. The Mid-Term Performance Evaluation used multi-level qualitative methods, including observation, interviews, and desk review of project documents, to evaluate SIKA-N performance through January 2014. Conclusions from the Mid-Term Performance Evaluation are used throughout this chapter to provide context for the quantitative analysis.

The following sections provide summary and detailed information about the attitudes and opinions of respondents living in districts targeted by the SIKA-N project. The report compares findings across four waves of research to examine trends in stabilization and shifts in development indicators on the following topics: security and crime, governance, service provision and development, rule of law, corruption, quality of life, economic activity, community cohesion and resilience, grievances, and media.

SIKA-N targets nine districts in the provinces of Baghlan and Kunduz in northern Afghanistan:

Provinces	District	Sample size	SRS MOE
Baghlan	Pul-e Khumri	489	4.42%
Baghlan	Baghlani Jadid	476	4.48%
Kunduz	Imam Sahib	477	4.48%
Kunduz	Kunduz	456	4.59%
Kunduz	Khanabad	467	4.53%
Kunduz	Archi	310	5.56%
Kunduz	Chahar Darah	454	4.59%
Kunduz	Qal'ah-ye Zal	220	6.61%
Kunduz	Aliabad	479	4.47%
SIKA-N Overall		3,828	1.58% (3.50% Complex MOE)

Table 4.1: SIKA-N Provinces and Districts

[11] The Mid-Term Performance Evaluation was prepared by MSI in August 2014. It should be noted that conclusions drawn in the performance evaluation were based on project activities implemented as of early 2014. This report refers to the most up-to-date data on project activities until February 2014.

It should be noted that interviews in Baghlani Jadid, Imam Sahib, Kunduz, Khanabad, and Chahar Darah were conducted in part by a field team from Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC), and in part by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic Research (ACSOR). Field work in Archi was conducted entirely by AYC, while field work in Qal'ah-ye Zal, Pul-e Khumri, and Aliabad was conducted entirely by ACSOR. Differences exist in the field implementation and quality control measures used for the AYC interviews, which may impact some survey results. For detailed descriptions of these differences, refer to the full Methodology Report for MISTI Wave 4.

ACSOR regularly updates its accessibility tracker. This tracker indicates accessibility of districts for the field staff and the reasons for inaccessibility, whether it be insecurity or transportation. Additionally, the accessibility tracker indicates which districts are inaccessible to ACSOR's female staff. Archi and Baghlani Jadid were inaccessible to women due to Taliban presence in most parts of those districts, and only included men in the sample.

Unless otherwise noted, district-level analysis and wave–to-wave comparisons are provided with significance testing at the 99% confidence level.

SIKA-N Projects

The SIKA-N project started in early 2012, with the aim of building local governance capacity. Capacity-building projects seek to prepare the district entities for hard and soft project activities with Fixed Obligation Grants (FOGs). Between January 2013 and July 2014, USAID planned to execute 186 hard and soft project activities throughout the SIKA-N project area. Four-fifths (80%) of these activities focused on rehabilitation efforts to improve public infrastructure, such as bridges, canals, community centers, culverts, flood protection walls, schools, roads, and water irrigation systems (hard projects). Sixteen percent of SIKA-N project activities focused on capacity building, which in SIKA-N districts mainly dealt with improving the educational system through teacher training, high school and university entrance exam preparation, and improvements to local schools. Outreach activities included diverse events such as poetry recitations, bicycle races, and English courses, which aimed to build community cohesion and strengthen the bonds between district governments, traditional figures of authority, and youth. The remaining 4% of SIKA-N projects focused on equipment provision, which included both hard and soft projects. As of February 2014, 8% of project activities were complete, 37% were on-going, and 56% remained in the pipeline stage.[12] Stabilization activities were presented as government-led activities in an effort to improve perceptions of local governance, and were implemented by local contractors or Community Development Councils.

The 186 stabilization project activities are in the process of planning or implementation across the 8 districts, and the percentage breakdown of project activities by district is displayed in the chart below (It should be noted that at the time of writing, there was no data on project activities in Qal'ah-ye Zal):

[12]Data about project activities were provided by the implementing partner, Architecture, Engineering, Consulting, Operations and Maintenance (AECOM). It is important to note that the most up-to-date project data used in this report was collected until February 2014, prior to field work.



Figure 4.1: SIKA-N Project Activities by District

Hierarchal regression modeling was used to test whether the frequency of project activities in a district was not a significant predictor of respondent's outlook for the future of their district ($p < .05$ likelihood ratio test). This test was done using only projects on which work had started or been completed so that results would not be skewed by projects which were still in the planning or approval stages. As of February 2014, 82 out of 186 SIKA-N project activities had started or been completed. As a whole, a majority of respondents living in the SIKA-N region say things in their district are headed in the right direction (62%, "right direction a lot" and "right direction a little"), while 34% say the wrong direction. Respondents in Archi, where the only 9% of project activities were implemented, were the most pessimistic; notably, Archi was the only district where a majority of respondents, 62%, believed that things in their district were moving in the wrong direction.

Wave 4: SIKA-N | MISTI Fact Sheet

OVERVIEW

Stability in Key Areas-North (SIKA-N) aims to improve governance and the provision of basic services, thereby promoting stability. SIKA-N activities focus on capacity building and infrastructure deve opment with the aim of building confidence in local governance and improving service delivery.

The SIKA-N program is implemented in key districts of the provinces of Kunduz and Baghlan in northern Afghanistan.

SECURITY AND CRIME

Overall perceptions of security have seen little change since the beginning of the survey in late 2012. More than half of respondents in Wave 4 say their ocal security is "good" or "very good."

Wave 4: Perceptions of Security (SIKA-N Districts)



Respondents living in A iabad and Pul-e Khumri have the most positive perceptions of local security, while those in Archi are most negative. It should be noted that many metrics of crime and security display a cyclical pattern that reflects increases in perceived insecurity during the annual fighting season, which usually takes place in the spring and summer.

One-third of respondents say that there are a lot of Afghan National Army (ANA) sold ers in their area, while just under half say there are a lot of Afghan National Police (ANP) present. Levels of confidence in the ability of both the ANA and ANP to keep the area safe have fluctuated over the four waves of the survey.

> "1/3 of respondents say there are a lot of Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers...just under 1/2 say there are a lot of Afghan National Police (ANP) present."



GOVERNANCE

Local governance is a priority of SIKA-N stabilization projects. Opinions of the Afghan government have improved over time, with an increasing majority say ng that the Afghan Government is regarded positively in their area. However, confidence in local governance during the warmer months is slightly lower, which may again be related to the summer fighting season.

Majorities in all SIKA-N districts hold positive views of their district governments. Respondents in Imam Sahib express the most confidence in their district government, while respondents in Baghlani Jadid express the least.

Respondents are increasingly aware of the District Development Assembly (DDA) in their area. In the past year, more respondents have also heard of an established Community Development Council (CDC) in their area. As with the DDA, those living in Archi are most likely to have heard of a CDC in their area, while those in Imam Sahib are least likely to have heard of one.

SERVICE PROVISION AND DEVELOPMENT

A key objective of the SIKA program is to assist district governments in providing better basic services to their constituents. The Mid-Term Performance Evaluation reported that hard projects, such as road improvement, flood protection walls, water dividers, and culverts, were among the most valued project activities, as were efforts to improve the education system. However, the majority of respondents in Wave 4 report dissatisfaction with the district government's provision of electricity, agricultural assistance, retaining and flood walls, and schooling for girls.

More optimistically, respondents' satisfaction with the district government's provision of roads and bridges rose, while satisfaction with water for irrigation saw a more modest increase These find ngs suggest that projects related to retaining and flood walls are greatly appreciated by

Wave 4: SIKA-N | MISTI Fact Sheet

communities, and that implementing more of these projects will improve respondents' views of their local governments by meeting their most urgent needs.

RULE OF LAW

In general, respondents are most likely to turn to local/tribal elders to seek justice when they are involved in a dispute. As disputes get more serious, though, respondents are slightly more inclined to turn to government courts. Respondents living in Kunduz are most likely to say they would seek justice from their government court for land or water disputes, while those in Archi are by far the most likely to refer to a government court for cases of assault, murder, or kidnapping, or theft. Respondents are less likely to seek justice from armed opposition groups.

In light of the preference for traditional mechanisms of justice, it is not surprising that respondents report the most confidence in local/tribal elders to resolve disputes.



CORRUPTION

Eight out of ten respondents (80%) admit corruption is a problem in their area. Respondents in Archi are most likely to say corruption is a problem, while those in Aliabad are least likely to say so. Over half of all respondents (60%) say that the level of corruption has increased in their area over the last year.

Respondents most frequently mention the Ministry of Education as the local government sector in which people complain about corruption, followed by the courts.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Respondents remain generally satisfied with their quality of life, with 72% saying they are "very" or "somewhat" satisfied with life as a whole. Those living in Imam Sahib, Khanabad, and Chahar Darah are most positive about their quality of life these days. Most respondents in SIKA-N districts are satisfied with their household's current financial situation.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

A plurality of respondents says that their ability to get to local markets has gotten better in the past year. However, a majority of respondents believe prices for basic goods have increased. About one third say there are more paid jobs this year than last year, while at the same time, a slightly higher percentage say there are fewer, and another third say there are about the same number of paid jobs available. Respondents in Aliabad are most likely to say there are more paid jobs available, while respondents in Baghlani Jadid are least likely to say so.

COMMUNITY COHESION AND RESILIENCE

When respondents were asked what types of outside interference cause problems in their village/neighborhood, the most common responses are armed people, small crimes and theft, ethnic disputes, presence of Taliban, and disputes over water. Perceptions of which internal interferences cause problems in their area are slightly different: respondents most frequently mentioned ethnic disputes, disputes over water, land disputes, small crimes and theft, and family problems.

MEDIA

Respondents most often use friends and family, radio, elders, and the Mosque/Mullah to communicate with others and/or get news and information. Many also use cell phones and television. Far fewer use posters/billboards, newspapers, or the Internet.

Security and Crime

Overall perceptions of security have seen little change since the beginning of the survey in late 2012. More than half of respondents in Wave 4 say their local security is "good" or "very good" (52%). This represents a decline from Wave 3 (59%) to a level consistent with the first two waves of the survey (53% in Wave 1 and 54% in Wave 2). Respondents living in Aliabad (67%) and Pul-e Khumri (65%) have the most positive perceptions of local security, while those in Archi are most negative (38%, "poor" or "very poor"). It should be noted that many metrics of crime and security display a cyclical pattern that reflects increases in perceived insecurity during the annual fighting season, which usually takes place in the spring and summer.



Figure 4.2: SIKA-N: Perception of Security

A plurality of respondents (44%) believe that their local area is more secure than it was one year ago, although the percentage of respondents saying that security has improved in the past year has seen a steady decline since Wave 1. Aliabad (62%) and Pul-e Khumri (56%) are the only two districts where majorities hold this view.

A large majority of respondents (94%) report that they feel secure in their homes during the day, and most also say that they feel secure in their homes during the night (80%).

Regarding perceived security while traveling, two-thirds of respondents say security on local roads is "good" or "very good" (66%), and half (50%) say road security has improved ("a lot" or "a little") in the past year.

The majority of respondents say that they feel secure traveling to a neighboring village (76%) or to the district or provincial capital (70%), and these percentages have seen an increase across all four waves of the survey, even as overall feelings of security on roads have fluctuated.



Figure 4.3: Perceptions of Crime in SIKA-N Districts, Waves 1-4 [Q5.1a-c]

Perceptions of crime in SIKA-N districts have evolved since the baseline study. Although there has been a perceived increase in petty crime specifically, the percentage of respondents saying that there is "a lot" of serious crime, such as murder, assault, or kidnapping, decreased noticeably from Wave 1 to Wave 2, and has since remained at a similar level. Currently, a majority of respondents report instances of: petty crimes and offenses (30% say there are "a lot," and 52% say there are "a little"); serious/non-violent crimes (21% say there are "a lot," and 55% say there are "a little"); and serious/violent crimes (16% say "a lot," and 50% say there are "a little") in their area. Respondents living in Imam Sahib are most likely to say there are "none at all" when describing the level of petty crimes (23%), serious/non-violent crimes (34%), and serious/violent crimes (39%) in their area. Respondents in Chahar Darah are most likely to say that there is "a lot" of violent crime (24%), while those in Qal'ah-ye Zal (5%) are least likely to say so.



Figure 4.4: Perceptions of Crime in SIKA-N Districts, Waves 1-4 [Q5.1a-c]

One-third of respondents in SIKA-N districts (33%) say there are "a lot" of Afghan National Army (ANA) in their area (consistent with the 32% found in Wave 1 and up from the levels found in Waves 2 and 3). Just under half (46%) of respondents say there are "a lot" of Afghan National Police (ANP) in their area (down slightly from 49% in Wave 3). Levels of confidence in both the ANA and ANP's ability (90% and 77% respectively) to keep the area safe have fluctuated over the four waves of the survey but have overall seen a slight decrease since Wave 1.



Figure 4.5: Confidence in ANA and ANP Waves 1-4 [Q6.2a-b]

The reported presence of armed opposition groups has fluctuated but seen an overall rise since Wave 1, with 20% in Wave 4 saying there are "a lot" in their area. Respondents in Archi report the highest presence of armed Anti-Government Elements (AGEs), also referred to as armed opposition groups (43% "a lot"), while those in Pul-e Khumri report the lowest (2% "a lot"). The AGE presence in SIKA-N districts has seen an increase since Wave 3, when it was 14%.



Figure 4.6: SIKA-N: AGE Presence

Since Wave 1, there has been a steady decrease in the perceived level of ISAF forces in SIKA-N districts. The majority of respondents surveyed in Wave 4 (79%) say there are "none" in their area.



Figure 4.7: Presence of ISAF [Q6.1f by Wave]

The presence of security forces and perceived level of security varies across districts. For example, in Aliabad, 67% (net) report good security, higher than the 52% found for the total sample, but only 23% report high ANP presence, compared with 46% in the total sample. By contrast, in Pul-e Khumri, where 65% of respondents (net) report good security, 81% say there are "a lot" of Afghan National Police. In Archi, respondents report both the lowest level of security (18% good vs38% poor) and the highest level of AGE presence (43% "a lot", compared with 20% in the total sample). In a logistic regression, presence of the ANA and ISAF were significant predictors of an increase in perceptions of security ($p<0.05$). Conversely, presence of the ANP, Arbaki, and Armed Opposition Groups were significant predictors of a decrease in perceptions of security ($p<0.05$).

Governance

Local governance is a priority of SIKA-N stabilization projects. As stated in MSI's Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, "SIKA North aims to expand and improve the legitimacy of the Afghan Government to districts and unstable communities. Their strategy is to first assist district entities in better understanding their operating environment and identifying challenges to stability they face, and then

enable district governments to implement activities aimed at addressing those identified sources of instability (SOI)."[13] SIKA-N activities have been presented as Afghan government-led activities, with the theory that infrastructure development projects will improve perceptions of the government. Capacity building will both improve the quality of governance at the local level and strengthen community cohesion by strengthening bonds between local people and their district governments in Kunduz and Baghlan Provinces.

Opinions of the Afghan government have improved over time, with increasing majorities saying that the Afghan Government is well-regarded in their area (77%, up from 76% in Wave 3, 70% in Wave 2, and 68% in Wave 1). However, confidence in local governance declined in Wave 4 after increasing in Wave 3 (See Figure 4.8 below). It is interesting to note how seasonal differences may influence respondents' perceptions of local governance. Confidence in local governance during the warmer months is slightly lower, which may again be related to the summer fighting season.



Figure 4.8: Percentage of "a lot" or "some confidence" in local governing bodies (Q9 by Wave)

Majorities in all SIKA-N districts hold positive views of their district governments. Respondents in Imam Sahib expressed the most confidence in their district government (81% "a lot" or "some confidence") while respondents in Baghlani Jadid expressed the least (61% "a lot" or "some confidence").

[13] SIKA North Mid-Term Performance Evaluation prepared by MSI in August 2014

Views on Local Government: SIKA-N Districts (Wave 4, n=3828)			
	Have Confidence In (net)	Are Responsive (net)	Ability to Get Things Done Has Improved (net)
District Governor	80%	77%	59%
District Government	71%	70%	53%
Local village/neighborhood leaders	76%	71%	56%
Provincial Governor	59%	57%	41%

Table 4.2: SIKA-N: Views on Local Government

Although they have seen noticeable seasonal fluctuations, overall attitudes towards local government institutions have seen an overall decline since Wave 1 was fielded in late 2012. Local leaders and provincial governors have seen the largest decline in confidence and perceived responsiveness. Perceptions of the provincial governor's responsiveness have seen the greatest decline, from 62% in Wave 1 to 57% in Wave 4, though opinions did drop in Wave 2 before spiking in Wave 3, suggesting that the seasonal cycle is at play here as well.

The majority of those surveyed in Wave 4 believe district government officials are from their district (76%, same as Wave 3 and up from 70% in Wave 2); however respondents are divided when asked about their district government's behavior. While over half of respondents believe their district government understands the problems of people in their area (58%), respondents are almost evenly divided as to whether local officials care about people in their area (49% say that it does, while 48% believe it does not), and a majority (56%) believe that government officials in their district abuse their authority to make money for themselves. Half of the respondents say that district government officials visit their area. In findings of particular concern, majorities believe that district government officials are not doing their jobs honestly (56%) and that the district government does not deliver basic services in a fair manner (57%).

Respondents are increasingly aware of the District Development Assembly (DDA) in their districts. Seventy-five percent say they have heard of the DDA in their district (up from 64% in Wave 3 and 58% in Wave 2). Most of those who have heard of it have "a lot" or "some" confidence in their DDA (81%, n=2,883), and 72% believe it is responsive to local needs (similar to the 73% found in Wave 3). Over half believe the DDA has improved in its ability to get things done over the past year (58%). Respondents living in Archi are most likely to have heard of the DDA in their area (96%), and those in Imam Sahib are least likely (59%). The SIKA-N Mid-Term performance evaluation notes that DDAs were created to bridge the gap between village-level and provincial-level governance institutions in order to pave the way for a bottom-up framework for development. However, the report also noted that multiple layers in bureaucracy and lack of coordination between local, provincial, and national-level governments had

hindered the effectiveness of the overall SIKA-N project.[14] It is probable that DDAs will be perceived as being more effective if coordination between the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) in Kabul and provincial Rural and Rehabilitation Directorates in Kunduz and Baghlan can be improved. While DDAs can provide an effective bottom-up communication process for local communities, this can only be truly effective if partners and stakeholders at all levels of government work together effectively.

In the past year, more respondents have also heard of a Community Development Council (CDC) in their area (75%, up from the 58% found in Wave 3 and the 56% found in Wave 2). Seventy-five percent of those who have heard of a CDC in their area (n=2,869) have confidence in it (down slightly from 77% in Wave 3), and 76% believe it is responsive to local needs. The majority of respondents (63%) believe the CDC has improved in its ability to get things done over the past year. Similar to the DDA, those living in Archi are most likely to have heard of the CDC in their area (98%). Those in Imam Sahib are least likely (57%).

Respondents are divided when asked if it is acceptable for people to publicly criticize the Afghan government; 53% say it is acceptable, which represents a slight decrease from the 55% found in Wave 3 to a level similar found in Wave 2(52%). Perceptions of security are related to whether or not respondents believe it is acceptable to criticize the Afghan government: a logistic regression found a significant relationship between positive perceptions of security and feeling that it is acceptable to criticize the government ($p<.05$). In Archi, where respondents reported the worst security situation and the highest presence of anti-government elements, respondents were least likely to say that it was acceptable to publicly criticize the government (35%), so this should be borne in mind when analyzing findings about governance from that district. At the same time, in districts where respondents report feeling more secure, they are more likely to say that it is acceptable to criticize the government.

Service Provision & Development

USAID stabilization activities in SIKA-N districts focused mainly on improving roads, water systems, retaining and floodwalls, and education. A key objective of the SIKA program is to assist district governments in providing better basic services to constituents. The Mid-Term Performance Evaluation reported that hard projects, such as road improvement, flood protection walls, water dividers, and culverts, were among the most valued project activities, as were efforts to improve the education system.[15] However, the majority of respondents in Wave 4 report *dissatisfaction* with the following district government provisions:

- Electricity (63% dissatisfied)
- Agricultural assistance (63% dissatisfied)
- Retaining and flood walls (62% dissatisfied)

[14] SIKA North Mid-Term Performance Evaluation prepared by MSI in August 2014

[15] SIKA North Mid-term Performance Evaluation prepared by MSI in August 2014

- Schooling for girls (50%, dissatisfied)

More optimistically, respondents' satisfaction with the district government's provision of roads and bridges rose from 35% "very" or "somewhat" satisfied in Wave 3 to 51% in Wave 4. Satisfaction with water for irrigation saw a more modest increase, from 44% in Wave 3 to 48% in Wave 4. Together with the Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, the findings of the MISTI Wave 4 Survey suggest that projects related to retaining and flood walls are greatly appreciated by communities, and that implementing more of these projects will improve respondents' views of their local governments by meeting their most pressing needs.

The majority of respondents (54%) say they have seen or heard about development projects in their local area in the past year. Respondents living in Archi and Chahar Darah are most likely to have seen or heard about development projects in their area (93% and 73% respectively). The result for Chahar Darah is in line with expectations, considering that the most SIKA-N projects were allocated there; but, the result for Archi is slightly more surprising because it had the fewest projects allocated, many of which are still in pipeline status. Those living in Baghlani Jadid, which was allocated 15% of stabilization project activities, are least likely to have heard of development projects in their area (23%). Among those who have heard about development projects (n= 2,054), 78% say they are aware of projects for drinking water in their area, with those in Chahar Darah most likely to have heard of such projects (96%). Smaller percentages of respondents say they have seen or heard about projects related to roads and bridges (73%), schools (68%), medical facilities (58%), irrigation/water (46%), electricity (29%), agricultural assistance (27%), retaining and flood walls (16%), and farm produce processing and storage (13%).

Looking forward to the next year, respondents in SIKA-N districts most frequently mention the following development projects as being needed in their area:[16]

Views on development projects for next year: SIKA-N Districts	
Electricity	39%
Road Construction	25%
Water	21%
Education and School	21%
Clinics	19%

Table 4.3: SIKA-N: Views on development projects for next year

[16] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Respondents were also asked about the obstacles preventing them from obtaining health care or medicine. The most frequent responses include:[17]

Views on the obstacles preventing respondents from obtaining health care or medicine.: SIKA-N Districts	
Lack of clinics/hospitals	42%
Distance to facilities/lack of transportation/lack of good roads	27%
Cost of health care or medicine	25%
Lack of medicines	24%
Lack of professional doctors	23%

Table 4.4: SIKA-N: Obstacles preventing respondents from obtaining health care or medicine

Rule of Law

In general, respondents are most likely to turn to local/tribal elders to seek justice when they are involved in a dispute. As disputes get more serious, though, respondents are slightly more inclined to turn to government courts. For example, 37% say they would turn to government courts if they were involved in a dispute concerning theft, 42% would do the same for disputes concerning land or water, and 45% say they would turn to government courts if they were involved with assault, murder, or kidnapping. Respondents living in Kunduz are most likely to say they would seek justice from their government court for land or water disputes (54%), while those in Archi are most likely to refer to a government court for cases of assault, murder, or kidnapping (71%) or theft (76%). The percentage of respondents preferring to resolve serious disputes concerning violent crime in government courts showed seasonal fluctuation. More respondents preferred to use the courts in the colder months when security is generally better; but for other types of disputes, the preferred mechanism for dispute resolution did not noticeably demonstrate these types of fluctuations.

Respondents are less likely to seek justice from armed opposition groups overall; however, 10% say they would turn to armed opposition groups for cases of theft. Respondents in Qal'ah-ye Zal are most likely to seek resolution to theft cases from armed opposition groups (23%), and this was the only district where respondents prefer armed opposition groups to government courts for resolution of such cases. In no district did respondents prefer to have cases of violent crime or disputes concerning land or water resolved by armed opposition groups. Respondents in Aliabad are most likely to say that they have confidence in armed opposition groups to fairly resolve disputes (39% "a lot" or "some" confidence).

In light of the preference for traditional mechanisms of justice, it is not surprising that respondents report the most confidence in local/tribal elders to resolve disputes (93% "a lot" or "some" confidence).

[17] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

A majority of respondents also express confidence in government courts (84% "a lot" or "some" confidence). Similarly, respondents are most likely to believe decisions made by local/tribal elders are "always" respected, as compared to decisions made by government courts (52%, compared to 29%). Only 23% of SIKA-N respondents express confidence in armed opposition groups to resolve disputes fairly, and a majority of respondents (61%) believe decisions made by armed opposition groups are "never" respected.



Figure 4.9: Respect of Decisions Made by Elders, Courts, Opposition Groups (Q22a-Q22c)

Corruption

Eight out of ten respondents (80%, down from the 82% found in Wave 3 and in line with the 80% found in Wave 2), admit corruption is a problem in their area. Respondents in Archi are most likely to say corruption is a problem (97%), while those in Aliabad are least likely to say so (61%). Over half of all respondents (60%) say corruption has increased ("increased a lot" and "increased a little") in their area, and 29% say it has stayed the same. Respondents in Chahar Darah are most likely to say that corruption has increased (75%).

Respondents were asked to name the department or sector of the local government that people complain about being the most corrupt; in an open-ended format, the top mentions include: the ministry of education (16%), the directorate of electricity (9%), courts (9%), all government offices (5%), and the municipality (5%). In particular, 23% of respondents in Kunduz report that people complain about corruption in the Education Ministry. Because many SIKA-N project activities seek to improve education or local governance, these findings suggest that an enhanced anti-corruption component in capacity-building activities may serve to make the SIKA-N project more effective and improve positive perceptions of local governance and service delivery in SIKA-N districts. While SIKA-N is not specifically

an anti-corruption project, corruption remains a serious problem at all levels in Afghanistan, and it continues to be an important issue that should be addressed by USAID projects so that it does not undermine their effectiveness.

Quality of Life

Respondents remain generally satisfied with their quality of life, with 72% saying they are "somewhat satisfied" or "very satisfied" with life as a whole. Overall satisfaction with quality of life has seen relatively little change across the four waves of the survey. Those living in Imam Sahib, Khanabad, and Chahar Darah are most positive about their quality of life, where 81%, 80%, and 80% respectively say that they are satisfied with their life as a whole.

Sixty-two percent of respondents say they are satisfied with their household's current financial situation, and 36% say their ability to meet their basic needs has increased ("increased a lot" and "increased a little") in the past year; although, a plurality (41%) say it has stayed the same. Looking forward, more than half (54%) say they are "a little worried" about meeting their basic needs over the next year, just under a fifth say they are "not worried" (19%), and another fourth say they are "very worried" (27%).

The majority of respondents (56%) say their area is too uncertain to make plans about their future, while 41% say their area is certain enough for them to make plans about their future. Respondents in Aliabad (54%) and Qal'ah-ye Zal (50%) are most likely to consider the situation certain enough to make plans about their future.

Economic Activity

When asked to think about their access to local markets, 46% say their ability to get to local markets has gotten better ("a little better" and "much better") over the past year, 33% say it has stayed about the same, and 21% say it has gotten worse ("a little worse" and "much worse"). Although a plurality of respondents believe markets are more accessible, the majority of respondents (57%) believe prices for basic goods in local markets have increased ("increased a lot" and "increased a little") over the past year. However, the percentage of respondents who perceive an increase in prices has fallen in each wave of the survey so far (66% in Wave 1, 59% in Wave 2, 58% in Wave 3).

Perceptions of paid jobs in SIKA-N districts have seen little change. About one third say there are more (31% "a lot more" or "a little more") paid jobs this year than last year, a slightly higher percentage say there are less (37% "a lot less" or "a little less"), and another third say there are about the same (31%). Respondents in Aliabad are most likely (53%) and respondents in Baghlani Jadid are least likely (12%) to agree that there are more paid jobs in their area than last year.

Community Cohesion and Resilience

Nearly six in ten respondents say things from outside their village/neighborhood "never" or "rarely" create problems in their area that disrupt normal life (59%, a noticeable decline from the 68% found in

Wave 3), while 38% say things outside their area "often" or "sometimes" cause problems. When respondents were asked what types of outside interferences cause problems in their village/neighborhood, the most common responses were: [18]

Most common types of outside interferences: SIKA-N Districts	
Armed People	27% (up from 17%)
Ethnic Disputes	24% (up from 16%)
Small crimes/theft	19%
Existence/Presence of Taliban	17%
Disputes over water	11%

Table 4.5: SIKA-N: Most common types of outside interferences

Respondents in Imam Sahib are most likely to say that armed people come from the outside their area to cause problems (39%). Those in Kunduz (26%), Khanabad (25%), and Chahar Darah (24%) are more likely to say the existence/presence of Taliban causes problems in their area compared to those in other districts.[19]

Perceptions of which *internal* interferences cause problems in their area were slightly different. A majority of respondents (59%) say things from inside their village/area "never" or "rarely" create problems to disrupt normal life, and 40% say they "sometimes" or "often" do. When asked about the types of internal interferences that cause problems in their village/neighborhood, respondents most frequently mention:[20]

Most common types of internal interferences: SIKA-N Districts	
Ethnic disputes	24% (up from 17%)
Disputes over water	19% (up from 10%)
Land disputes	18%
Small crimes/theft	15% (down from 21%)
Family problems	14%

Table 4.6: SIKA-N: Most common types of internal interferences

Respondents in Imam Sahib (45%) are most likely to say that ethnic disputes create problems in their village, suggesting that ethnic reconciliation may need to be a focus for future outreach projects in that district in particular. Respondents in Archi are most likely to mention disputes over water (31%) as the

[18] This question was only asked of respondents who answered "often," "sometimes," or "rarely" when asked how often outside factors create problems in their area (n=1,920). Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

[19] Total of two mentions

[20] This question was only asked of respondents who answered "often," "sometimes," or "rarely" when asked how often inside factors create problems in their area (n=2,076). Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

most common internal interference, while those in Kunduz (29%) are most likely to mention land disputes.[21]

About two-thirds of respondents (67%) believe local elders "sometimes" or "often" consider the interests of ordinary people in their village/neighborhood when making decisions, while 32% believe they "rarely" or "never" do. Respondents in Aliabad believe that they receive the least consideration from local leaders, with 48% saying that they "rarely" or "never" consider their interests when making decisions that will affect them. Overall, 72% of respondents perceive their local elders to be effective ("somewhat effective" and "very effective") at securing funds from the district or provincial government for their local needs.

The percentage of respondents who say that local leaders "often" or "sometimes" consider the interests of women when making decisions dropped from 64% in Wave 3 to 56% in Wave 4. However, the perceived inclusion of women in local decision-making varies by district, as seen in Figure 4.10 below. Respondents in Archi (69%) were most likely to believe that women were included in decision making at least "sometimes", while those in Khanabad were least likely to think so (47%). This reflects the concern raised in the SIKA-N Mid-Term Evaluation Report that programming on women's issues and efforts to increase their involvement in decision-making had not been effective.[22] Cultural factors make female empowerment and the inclusion of women in decision-making difficult.

"In your opinion, when decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by



Figure 4.10: Women's Interests in Decision Making (Q37b by District)

Most respondents in SIKA-N districts (72%) do not belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss common interests or do certain activities together. Of those who do belong to such groups (n=1,020), respondents are most likely to belong to: development councils (35%, up from 23% in

[21] Total of two mentions

[22] SIKA North Mid-term Performance Evaluation prepared by MSI in August 2014

Wave 3), farmers' unions (30%, down from 41% in Wave 3), welfare foundations (10%, down from 19% in Wave 3), people's councils (10%), and business companies (10%).[23]

Grievances

Grievances vary when respondents are asked to identify the biggest problems that create stress or tension in their areas. The most common responses include:[24]

Most common types of Grievances: SIKA-N Districts	
Unemployment	31%
Lack of electricity	29%
Insecurity	27%
Lack of paved roads	15%
Lack of Drinking Water	12%

Table 4.7: SIKA-N: Most common types of Grievances

Unemployment was most frequently mentioned in Baghlani Jadid (49%). A majority of respondents in Archi mentioned insecurity (56%), while a majority in Qal'ah-ye Zal mentioned lack of electricity as the main grievance (61%).

Media

Respondents most often use friends and family (91%), radio (89%), elders (86%), and the Mosque/Mullah (69%) to communicate with others and/or get news and information. Many also use cell phones (52%) and television (45%). Far fewer respondents mention using posters/billboards (8%) and newspapers (5%). Only 4% use the Internet or e-mail for communication.

Respondents get most of their information about government services from the radio (66%), friends/family (37%), elders (35%), television (29%), and the Mosque/Mullah (16%).[25]

[23] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

[24] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

[25] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

SIKA-N Appendix

Model 1

q1NET ~ dummy(d1) + d3 + dummy(eth) + (projects | dis)

				95% CI for odds ratio		
	B	SE	Sig	Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	0.38	0.02	*	1.46	1.41	1.52
D1 : Female	-0.02	0.02		0.98	0.95	1.02
Education	0	0		1	1	1
Ethnicity: Tajik	-0.04	0.02	*	0.96	0.92	1
Ethnicity: Uzbek	0	0.03		1	0.95	1.05
Ethnicity: Hazara	-0.06	0.04		0.94	0.87	1.01
Ethnicity: Other	-0.01	0.02		0.99	0.95	1.04

Random Effects

	Intercept	B	SE (B)
Aliabad	0.10746	-0.0136	0.05
Archi	0.23447	-0.0296	0.03
Baghlani Jadid	-0.0146	0.00184	0.11
Chahar Darah	-0.0207	0.00261	0.01
Imam Sahib	0.18526	-0.0234	0.03
Khanabad	-0.0398	0.00503	0.04
Kunduz	-0.0825	0.01042	0.1
Pul-e Khumri	-0.0108	0.00137	0.07
Qal'ah-ye Zal	-0.1172	0.0148	0.03

Model 2

Response: "Q2a. Would you say security in your local area is good, fair or poor? Is that 'very good/poor'?"

q2aNET ~ as.factor(d1) + d3 + as.factor(eth) + q6_1aNET + q6_1bNET + q6_1cNET + q6_1dNET + q6_1eNET + q6_1fNET

				95% CI for odds ratio		
	B	SE	Sig	Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	1.06	0.15	*	2.87	2.14	3.88
D1 : Female	0.22	0.08	*	1.25	1.06	1.46
Education	-0.03	0.01	*	0.97	0.96	0.99
Ethnicity: Tajik	0.46	0.09	*	1.59	1.34	1.88
Ethnicity: Uzbek	0.07	0.12		1.08	0.85	1.36
Ethnicity: Hazara	0.43	0.17	*	1.54	1.1	2.15
Ethnicity: Other	0.4	0.1	*	1.5	1.22	1.84
ANA	0.27	0.09	*	1.31	1.1	1.55
Arbaki	-0.52	0.1	*	0.6	0.49	0.73
ANP	-0.56	0.13	*	0.57	0.44	0.74
Armed Opp. Groups	-0.75	0.07	*	0.47	0.41	0.55
Afghan Local Police	-0.05	0.11		0.95	0.76	1.18
ISAF	0.28	0.09	*	1.33	1.1	1.6

Model 3

Response: Q14h. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion: It is/is not acceptable for people to publicly criticize the Afghan Government

q14hNET ~ as.factor(d1) + d3 + as.factor(eth) + q2aNET + q2bNET

				95% CI for odds ratio		
	B	SE	Sig	Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	0.22	0.08	*	1.24	1.07	1.44
D1 : Female	0.12	0.08		1.13	0.97	1.31
Education	-0.03	0.01	*	0.98	0.96	0.99
Ethnicity: Tajik	-0.02	0.08		0.98	0.83	1.16
Ethnicity: Uzbek	-0.09	0.12		0.92	0.73	1.15
Ethnicity: Hazara	0.04	0.16		1.04	0.76	1.44
Ethnicity: Other	-0.15	0.1		0.86	0.71	1.05
Security	0.15	0.07	*	1.16	1.01	1.35
Security one year ago	0.05	0.07		1.05	0.91	1.21

V. STABILITY IN KEY AREAS SOUTH (SIKA-S)

Introduction

Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) is a USAID project designed to promote good governance and service delivery at the local level in targeted districts, with the intended effect of reducing the impact of the insurgency, increasing confidence in the Afghan government, and paving the way for a peaceful security transition.[26] SIKA thereby seeks to expand and improve the legitimacy of the Afghan government at the sub-national level. [27] This chapter focuses on SIKA-South, which is currently active in 14 districts in the provinces of Zabul, Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Nimroz in the south of Afghanistan. It is implemented by Architecture, Engineering, Construction, Operations and Management (AECOM). SIKA-S works closely with the Government of Afghanistan's Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD).

SIKA South's strategic objective is to give Afghans increased confidence in their district government, thereby leading to the expansion of authority and legitimacy of Afghan provincial governments to the districts, and especially to unstable communities. Since the Afghan government has been unable to meet the challenges of addressing its population's various needs, SIKA-South's strategy is to assist district entities in understanding their operating environment and the challenges to stability with which they are faced. SIKA-S enables district and provincial governments to develop a localized methodology aimed at addressing sources of instability by implement activities that address them.[28] The Mid-Term Performance Evaluation used multi-level qualitative methods, including observation, interviews, and desk review of project documents, to evaluate SIKA-S performance up through March 2014. Conclusions from the Mid -Term Performance Evaluation are used throughout this chapter to provide context for the quantitative analysis.

SIKA-S targets a core group of districts in five provinces of southern Afghanistan:

Provinces	District	Sample size	SRS MOE
Nimroz	Zaranj	319	5.49%
Nimroz	Kang	316	5.51%
Helmand	Nad 'Ali	316	5.51%
Helmand	Nahr-e Saraj	478	4.48%
Helmand	Garmser	465	4.54%
Helmand	Lashkar Gah (Bost)	468	4.53%
Kandahar	Arghandab	479	4.48%

[26] http://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/fact-sheets/stability-key-areas-sika

[27] The Mid-Term Performance Evaluation was prepared by MSI in August 2014. It should be noted that conclusions drawn in the performance evaluation were based on project activities implemented until March 2014. This report refers to the most up-to-date data on project activities as of February 2014.

[28] Stability in Key Areas – South Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, August 2014.

Provinces	District	Sample size	SRS MOE
Kandahar	Daman	398	4.91%
Zabul	Shah Joy	429	4.73%
Zabul	Qalat	465	4.54%
Zabul	Tarnak wa Jaldak	478	4.48%
Uruzgan	Tarin Kot	475	4.50%
Uruzgan	Chorah	479	4.48%
Uruzgan	Deh Rawud	390	4.96%
SIKA-S Overall		**5,955**	**1.58%** **(3.76% Complex MOE)**

Table 5.1: SIKA-S Provinces and Districts

It should be noted that interviews in Tarnak wa Jaldak were conducted by a field team from Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC). Fieldwork in the other districts was conducted entirely by ACSOR. Differences exist in the field implementation and quality control measures used for the AYC interviews, which may impact some survey results. For detailed descriptions of these differences, refer to the full Methodology Report for MISTI Wave 4.

ACSOR regularly updates its accessibility tracker. This tracker indicates accessibility of districts for the field staff and the reasons for inaccessibility, whether it be insecurity or transportation. Additionally, the accessibility tracker indicates which districts are inaccessible to ACSOR's female staff. The districts of Shah Joy in Zabul and Chorah and Deh Rawud in Uruzgan were inaccessible to women because the distance of those districts was judged too far for women to travel. Thus, only men are included in the sample for those districts. The AYC sample from Tarnak wa Jaldak is also all-male.

Unless otherwise noted, district-level analysis and wave-to-wave comparisons are provided with significance testing at the 99% confidence level.

SIKA-S Projects

SIKA-S pilot projects started in July 2012, with the objective of building the capacity and confidence in local governance and addressing community-identified sources of instability in target districts. As of mid-2014, USAID has executed or plans to execute 323 hard and soft project activities throughout the SIKA-S project area. The vast majority of SIKA-S project activities (89%) are hard infrastructure projects, while the remainder (11%) relate to vocational training. All SIKA-S soft project activities consist of vocational training, while all hard project activities conducted under the aegis of this project relate to infrastructure. As of February 2014, most SIKA-S project activities had not started work, and in fact the Mid-Term Report cites multiple delays and the lengthy USAID approval process as major barriers to the project's effectiveness: 83% of projects are listed as "grant application in progress", 8% had been approved by COR, 2% had been closed, 1% had had either their first or second disbursement made, and the remainder were at various other stages in the approval process. The Mid-Term Performance

Evaluation states that SIKA-S requires more time to responsibly complete and implement existing project activities and approve proposed ones. The report also acknowledges that, "MISTI is particularly concerned that the grants approval process, as it currently stands, may hinder performance levels and result in negative implications for sub-national government entities where SIKA-South directly intervenes."[29] The 323 project activities are in the process of planning or implementation across the following 11 districts (It should be noted that at the time of writing, there was no data on project activities in Zaranj, Kang, or Nahr-e Saraj):



Figure 5.1: SIKA-S Project Activities by District

Because very few SIKA-S project activities have been implemented so far, it is too early to ascertain any relationship between the frequency of activities in districts and respondents' general perceptions of the situation in their district. In the SIKA-S region as a whole, the majority of the population says things in their district are headed in the right direction (66%, "right direction a lot" and "right direction a little"), while 32% say wrong direction. Respondents in Qalat were the most pessimistic (28% "right direction"), while those in Lashkar Gah were most optimistic (85% "right direction").

[29] Stability in Key Areas – South Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, August 2014.

Wave 4: SIKA-S | MISTI Fact Sheet

OVERVIEW

Stability in Key Areas-South (SIKA-S) is a USAID program designed to promote good governance and service delivery at the local level in targeted districts. It aims to reduce the impact of the insurgency, increase confidence in the Afghan government, and pave the way for a peaceful security transition. It is currently active in 14 districts in the provinces of Zabul, Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Nimroz in the south of Afghanistan.

SIKA-South's strategic objective is to give Afghans increased confidence in their district government, thereby leading to the expansion of the authority of Afghan government institutions out to the districts, and especially to unstable communities.

SECURITY AND CRIME

Overall perceptions of security have seen a noticeable decline since the beginning of the survey in late 2012. Just under half of respondents in Wave 4 say their local security is "good" or "very good."

Wave 4: Perceptions of Security in SIKA-S Districts



Majorities in all districts except Qalat say that they feel secure in their homes during the day, two-thirds of respondents say security on their local roads is "good" or "very good," and about half (52%) say road security has improved in the past year.

Over half of respondents in SIKA-S districts say there are "a lot" of Afghan National Army (ANA) in their area. However, this varies widely across SIKA-S districts, from a low of 16% in Kang to a high of 100% in Tarnak wa Jaldak. Just over half of respondents say there are "a lot" of Afghan National Police (ANP) in their area. Levels of confidence in both the ANA and ANP's ability to keep the area safe have fluctuated over the four waves of the survey.

The reported presence of armed opposition groups, also referred to as anti-government elements (AGEs), has risen from Wave 3 to Wave 4. However, their reported presence varies enormously by district. Respondents in Tarnak wa Jaldak report very high AGE presence, while those in Zaranj and Kang report the lowest.

GOVERNANCE

Local governance is a priority of SIKA-S stabilization programs. The program's strategy is to assist district governments in implementing development projects, facilitating governance and democracy initiatives, as well as delivering training and mentoring to district and provincial line entities. When possible, SIKA-S programming is implemented through existing Community Development Councils (CDCs) and District Development Assemblies (DDAs).

Opinions of the Afghan government have improved over time, as has confidence in local leaders. Majorities in all SIKA-S districts except Qalat and Shah Joy express confidence in their district governments.

Local leaders are viewed most positively, while provincial governors are viewed most negatively. Perceptions of local leaders' responsiveness have seen improvement since Wave 1.

Slightly less than three quarters of respondents are aware of the District Development Assembly (DDA) in their district. Most of those who have heard of the DDA have "a lot" or "some" confidence in it.

Most respondents have heard about a Community Development Council (CDC) in their area. Of those who have a CDC in their area, over three-quarters have confidence in it, and a majority believes it is responsive to local needs. Although the perceived responsiveness of CDCs has fallen sharply, a majority of respondents still believe their CDC has improved in its ability to get things done over the past year.

Wave 4: SIKA-S | MISTI Fact Sheet

SERVICE PROVISION AND DEVELOPMENT

USAID stabilization programs in SIKA-S districts focus mainly on infrastructure, with a particular emphasis on improving roads, water systems, retaining and flood walls. The plurality of respondents in Wave 4 report dissatisfaction with the district government's provision of retaining and flood walls, schooling for girls, electricity, medical care, and agricultural assistance. More optimistically, respondents' satisfaction with the district government's provision of schooling for boys has risen steadily in all waves since the baseline.



RULE OF LAW

In general, respondents are most likely to turn to local/tribal elders to seek justice when they are involved in a dispute over property (be it land or a case of theft), but prefer to seek resolution from government courts for cases involving violent crime. As disputes get more serious (i.e. those which involve assault, murder, or kidnapping), a majority of respondents become inclined to turn to government courts. In light of the preference for traditional mechanisms of justice, it is not surprising that respondents overall report the most confidence in local/tribal elders to resolve disputes.

CORRUPTION

The vast majority of respondents (84%) admit corruption is a problem in their area. Virtually all respondents in Nad' Ali, Nahr-e Saraj, and Lashkar Gah say that corruption is a problem in their area, with near unanimity in Garmser as well. Respondents most frequently complain about corruption in the courts, the district/office of attorney, and the municipality.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Respondents remain generally satisfied with their quality of life. Most also say that they are "very" or "somewhat" satisfied with their household's current financial situation, though a plurality say that they are worried about their household's ability to meet its basic needs over the next year. Additionally, a majority of respondents says that the situation is too uncertain to make plans for their future.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Although a plurality of respondents believes markets are more accessible now, the majority of respondents also believe that the prices for basic goods have increased. At the same time, perceptions of the availability of paid jobs in SIKA-S districts have seen a continual decline across the four waves of the survey.



COMMUNITY COHESION AND RESILIENCE

A slim majority of respondents say that things from outside their village/neighborhood "never" or "rarely" create problems in their area that disrupt normal life. Those who do think that things from outside their community cause problems most frequently mention disputes over water, disputes over land, roadside bombs and suicide attacks, closing roads, and ethnic disputes.

A majority of respondents say things from inside their village/area "never" or "rarely" create problems to disrupt normal life. Those who do think that things from within their community cause problems most frequently mention family problems, disputes over land, disputes over water, ethnic disputes, and disputes over livestock.

MEDIA

Respondents most often use radio, friends, family, elders, and the Mosque/Mullah to communicate with others and/or get news and information. Fewer use cell phones and television. Less than five percent of respondents use posters/billboards or newspapers, and virtually none use the Internet.

Security and Crime

Overall perceptions of security have seen a noticeable decline since the beginning of the survey in late 2012. Just under half of respondents in Wave 4 say their local security is "good" or "very good" (47%). This represents a decline from Waves 2 and 3 (56% each), which in turn was a decline from the 65% found in the Wave 1 baseline. Respondents living in Zaranj (67%) have the most positive perceptions of local security, while those in Qalat are most negative (27%). In contrast, a majority of respondents (56%) actually say that their local area has become "somewhat" or "much" more secure over the past year, a result which is consistent with previous waves of the survey.



Figure 5.2: SIKA-S: Perception of Security

The vast majority of respondents (84%) report that they feel secure in their homes during the day; this includes majorities in all districts except Qalat (33%). Also, most respondents (76%) say that they feel secure in their homes during the night. This ranged from 97% in Lashkar Gah to 27% in Qalat.

With regards to perceived security while traveling, two-thirds of respondents say security on their local roads is "good" or "very good" (66%), and about half (52%) say road security has improved ("a lot" or "a little") in the past year.

Fewer respondents say that they feel secure traveling to a neighboring village (65%) or to the district or provincial capital (52%), these percentages have seen an increase across all four waves of the survey, and feelings of security have seen fluctuation over the course of the survey, as shown in Figure 5.3.



Figure 5.3: Perceptions of Security in SIKA-S Districts, Waves 1-4 [Q3]

Perceptions of crime in SIKA-S districts have fluctuated since the baseline study. Petty crime and theft have seen an overall decline since Wave 1. Currently, a majority of respondents report instances of: petty crimes and offenses (29% say there are "a lot," and 49% say there are "a little"); serious/non-violent crimes (19% say there are "a lot," and 53% say there are "a little"); and serious/violent crimes (17% say there are "a lot," and 48% say there are "a little") in their area. Respondents living in Shah Joy are most likely to say there are "none at all" when describing the level of petty crimes (48%) and serious/non-violent crimes (50%). Those in Zaranj report the least serious/violent crime (82% "none at all") in their area. Respondents in Deh Rawud are most likely to say that there is "a lot" of violent crime (35%), while those in Zaranj and Kang (3% in each) are least likely to say so.



Figure 5.4: Perceptions of Crime in SIKA-S Districts, Waves 1-4 [Q5.1a-c]

Over half of respondents in SIKA-S districts (56%) say there are "a lot" of Afghan National Army (ANA) in their area (up from the 51% found in Wave 3 and similar to the 58% found in Wave 2). However, this varies widely across SIKA-S districts, ranging from 6% in Kang and 7% in Zaranj to 82% in Tarnak wa Jaldak. Just over half of respondents (53%) say there are "a lot" of Afghan National Police (ANP) in their area, consistent with the 55% found in Wave 3 (up from 50% in Wave 2, and 48% in Wave 1). Levels of confidence in both the ANA and ANP's ability to keep the area safe have fluctuated over the four waves of the survey, as can be seen in Figure 5.5 below.



Figure 5.5: Confidence in ANA and ANP Waves 1-4 [Q6.2a-b]

The reported presence of armed opposition groups, also referred to as anti-government elements (AGEs) has fluctuated, and has risen from Wave 3 to Wave 4, with 23% in Wave 4 saying that there are "a lot" of

armed opposition groups in their area (up from 18% in Wave 3). However, this figure varies enormously by district. Respondents in Tarnak wa Jaldak report very high AGE presence (85% "a lot"), while those in Zaranj and Kang report the lowest (1% "a lot" in each). The presence of Arbakai (31% "a lot") has remained relatively stable after seeing a decline from 47% in Wave 1 to 32% in Waves 2 and 3.



Figure 5.6: SIKA-S: AGE Presence

Since the 2012 baseline study, there has been a steady decrease in the perceived level of ISAF forces in SIKA-S districts. The majority of respondents surveyed in Wave 4 (52%) say there are "none" in their area, continuing a steep and steady decline since Wave 1, when only 14% said that there were none. This decline is likely due to the overall drawdown of foreign forces around the country.



Figure 5.7: Presence of ISAF [Q6.1f by Wave]

The presence of security forces and perceived level of security varies across districts. Although it was expected that districts with better-than-average security would have a lower overall presence of Arbakai because residents would not feel the need to seek security from informal militias, when using respondent perceived security as a predictor in modeling the presence of Arbakai, the variable was not found to be significant at the .05 level. Districts in Helmand tend to have higher ANP presence: respondents in Lashkar Gah were most likely to say there were "a lot" of ANP in their area (84%), and those in Nad Ali were next most likely (75%). AGE presence is strongest in Zabul (85% "a lot" in Tarnak wa Jaldak and 43% in Qalat), and to a lesser extent in Kandahar (33% in Arghandab).

Governance

Local governance is a priority of SIKA-S stabilization projects. As stated in MSI's Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, "SIKA South seeks to expand and improve the legitimacy of the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) at the sub-national level."[30] Their strategy is to assist district governments in implementing development projects, facilitating governance and democracy initiatives, and delivering training and mentoring to district and provincial line entities. SIKA-S activities have been presented as Afghan government-led activities, with the theory that infrastructure development projects will improve perceptions of the government. Capacity building will both improve the quality of governance at the local level and strengthen community cohesion by strengthening bonds between local people and their district governments in the provinces where SIKA-S projects are active. When possible, SIKA-S activities are implemented through existing Community Development Councils (CDCs) and District Development

[30] Stability In Key Areas – South Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, August 2014.

Assemblies (DDAs) to make use of a bottom-up approach to improving local governance and strengthen these local government institutions.

Opinions of the Afghan government have improved over time, with increasing majorities saying the Afghan Government is well regarded in their area (74%, up from 70% in Wave 3 and 67% in Wave 2 to a level equal to that found in Wave 1). This reflects the trend spoken of in the Mid-Term evaluation, in which stability indicators declined in Waves 2 and 3, concurrent with the drawdown in foreign forces, before rebounding in Wave 4 to a level more or less consistent with the baseline.

Confidence in local leaders has improved since the baseline. Views of the district governor have improved since Wave 3, but have still seen an overall decline since Wave 1.



Figure 5.8: Percentage of "a lot" or "some confidence" in local governing bodies (Q9 by Wave)

Majorities in all SIKA-S districts except Qalat and Shah Joy (27% and 38% "a lot" or "some" confidence) hold positive views of their district governments. Respondents in Tarnak wa Jaldak expressed the highest confidence in their district government (92% "a lot" or "some confidence"), a surprising result considering the district's poor accessibility and security situation.

Views on Local Government: SIKA-S Districts (Wave 4, n=5955)			
	Have Confidence In (net)	Are Responsive (net)	Ability to Get Things Done Has Improved (net)
District Governor	71%	71%	61%
District Government	67%	68%	57%
Local village/neighborhood leaders	88%	87%	74%
Provincial Governor	61%	63%	53%

Table 5.2: Views on Local Government

Local leaders are viewed most positively, while provincial governors are viewed most negatively. Perceptions of local leaders' responsiveness have seen improvement since the Wave 1 baseline: from 81% "very" or "somewhat" responsive in Wave 1 to 87% in Wave 4. Perceptions of the responsiveness of district governors have also improved, from 65% in Wave 1 to 71% in Wave 4.

The majority of those surveyed in Wave 4 believe district government officials are from their district (65%, up slightly from 63%Wave 3, consistent with the 65% found in Wave 2, but down overall from the 69% found in Wave 1). A majority also believes that the district government understands the problems of people in their area (59%), which has changed little since the baseline (62% in Wave 3, 61% in Wave 2, 59% in Wave 1). Although a majority of respondents believe that the district government cares about people in their area (59%), this figure has seen a steady decline since Wave 1 (69%). A majority also believe that district government officials are doing their job honestly (55%), and that they visit their area (64%). Those in Lashkar Gah are most likely to say that their district government officials are doing their jobs honestly (80%), while those in Tarnak wa Jaldak (25%) are least likely to say so. Forty-one percent of respondents believe that their district government officials abuse their authority to make money for themselves. While this represents an increase from Wave 3 (37%), it is still a decline from the level found in the Wave 1 baseline (50%). Respondents in Qalat (69%) are most likely to say that district government officials abuse their position to make money for themselves, while those in Garmser are least likely to say so (26%).

Just under three quarters of respondents (72%) are aware of the District Development Assembly (DDA) in their districts. Most of those who have heard of the DDA (n=4,305) have "a lot" or "some" confidence in their DDA (77%), 71% believe it is responsive to local needs (down from the 80% found in Wave 3, but in line with the 72% found in Wave 2 and the 71% found in Wave 1). Respondents living in Lashkar Gah and Tarnak wa Jaldak are most likely to have heard of the DDA in their area (93% in each), and those in Qalat are least likely (19%). Over half of the respondents believe the DDA has improved ("improved a lot" or "improved a little") in its ability to get things done over the past year (56%). Of these respondents who are aware of DDAs, more than three-quarters (77%) have confidence in them. The SIKA-S Mid-Term performance evaluation notes that DDAs have proven themselves effective at mediating disputes, and have provided forums for bottom-up communication which are greatly valued in communities. This is reflected in respondents' generally positive views towards their DDAs. However, positive views of DDAs are at similar levels to what was found in the baseline, the Mid-Term report stated that their effectiveness can be improved through tailored capacity-building. If this can be successfully implemented, positive views of DDAs, especially with regard to their perceived effectiveness, should improve. [31]

Most respondents have also heard about a Community Development Council (CDC) in their area (74%, up from the 68% found in Wave 3 and the 65% found in Wave 2, but in line with the 72% found in Wave 1). Of those who have a CDC in their area (n=4,428), 78% have confidence in it, and 63% believe it is responsive to local needs. The perceived responsiveness of the CDC has fallen sharply from the 81% found in Wave 3. However, a majority of respondents (60%) believe the CDC has improved in its ability to get things done over

[31] Stability In Key Areas – South Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, August 2014.

the past year. Those living in Tarnak wa Jaldak (92%) are most likely to be aware of a CDC in their area, while those in Kang are least likely (43%).

Respondents are divided when asked if it is acceptable for people to publicly criticize the Afghan government; 52% say it is acceptable, which represents an increase from the 45% found in Wave 3 to a level similar found in Wave 2 (53%). Respondents in Lashkar Gah and Qalat are most likely to say it is acceptable to publically criticize the government (70% in each district), while those in Nahr-e Saraj and Garmser are least likely (33% and 32% respectively).

Service Provision & Development

USAID stabilization projects in SIKA-S districts focused mainly on infrastructure, with a particular emphasis on improving roads, water systems, retaining and flood walls. A key objective of the SIKA program is to assist district governments in providing better basic services to constituents. The Mid-Term Performance Evaluation reported that hard projects, such as road improvement, flood protection walls, water dividers, and culverts, were the most valued project activities because they provide tangible results and can be implemented with high levels of community participation. The cash-for-work aspect of these projects is particularly appreciated because they provide income to people in the community, reduce unemployment, and help the local economy.[32] However, the plurality of respondents in Wave 4 report *dissatisfaction* with the following district government provisions:

- Retaining and flood walls (61%, up from 48%)
- Schooling for girls (56%)
- Electricity (56%)
- Medical care (49%)
- Agricultural assistance (49%)

More optimistically, respondents' satisfaction with the district government's provision of schooling for boys has risen steadily in all waves since the baseline (71% in Wave 4, up from 68% in Wave 3, 59% in Wave 2, and 52% in Wave 1). Satisfaction with water for irrigation has seen a more modest increase, from 51% in Wave 1 to 55% in Wave 2, to 54% in Wave 3, and finally 61% in Wave 4. Together with the Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, the findings of the MISTI Wave 4 Survey suggest that work-intensive projects related to retaining and flood walls are greatly appreciated by communities, and that implementing more of these projects will improve respondents' views of their local governments by meeting their most pressing needs.

[32] Stability In Key Areas – South Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, August 2014.



Figure 5.9: Perceptions of Security in SIKA-S Districts, Waves 1-4 [Q3]

The majority of respondents (64%) say they have seen or heard about development projects in their local area in the past year. Respondents living in Chorah are most likely to have seen or heard about development projects in their area (87%). Those living in Zaranj are least likely to have heard of development projects in their area (24%). Among those who have heard about development projects (n= 3,826), 83% say they are aware of projects for drinking water in their area, with those in Tarnak wa Jaldak most likely to have heard of such projects (100%). Smaller percentages of respondents say they have seen or heard about projects related to: schools (68%), irrigation/water (63%), agricultural assistance (58%), roads and bridges (54%), medical facilities (54%), retaining and flood walls (34%), electricity (29%), and farm produce processing and storage (15%), and electricity (10%).

Looking forward to the next year, respondents in SIKA-S districts most frequently mention the following development projects as being needed in their area:[33]

[33] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Views on development projects for next year: SIKA-S Districts	
Road Construction	30%
Education and School	30%
Electricity	22%
Clinics	20%
Water	12%

Table 5.3: SIKA-S: Views on development projects for next year

Respondents were also asked about the obstacles preventing them from obtaining health care or medicine. The most frequent responses include: [34]

Views on the obstacles preventing respondents from obtaining health care or medicine.: SIKA-S Districts	
Lack of Lack of Medicines	33%
Lack of professional doctors	32%
Lack of clinics/hospitals	32%
Lack of medical equipment	20%
Cost of health care or medicine	18%
Poor security	18%

Table 5.4: SIKA-S: Obstacles preventing respondents from obtaining health care or medicine

Rule of Law

In general, respondents are most likely to turn to local/tribal elders to seek justice when they are involved in a dispute over property, but prefer to seek resolution from government courts for cases involving violent crime. As disputes get more serious (i.e. those which involve assault, murder, or kidnapping), respondents are more inclined to turn to government courts. For example, 55% would turn to local or tribal elders for disputes concerning land or water, 44% would refer to them for a dispute related to theft, and 37% would seek justice from local or tribal elders if they were involved in a case of assault, murder, or kidnapping. Thirty-six percent would refer to a government court to resolve a dispute over land or water, 41% would seek justice from a government court for a dispute related to theft, and a slim majority (51%) would refer to a government court for a case of murder, assault, or kidnapping. The percentage of respondents who would seek justice from a government court in a case of murder has seen some fluctuation, but has witnessed an overall rise from the 39% found in Wave 1.

[34] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Respondents are less likely to seek justice from armed opposition groups/anti-government elements (AGEs) overall: 8% would seek justice from AGEs for a dispute over land or water, 10% would use them for a kidnapping case, and 11% would use them for a case of theft.), However, a majority of respondents in Qalat would refer a dispute over land or water (57%) or theft (51%) to a court run by an armed opposition group, while a plurality in that district would refer a case of murder, assault, or kidnapping to such a court (48%). Substantial numbers of respondents in Shah Joy, Daman, and to a lesser extent Arghandab would seek justice from armed opposition groups, but very few respondents in other SIKA-S districts would. Unsurprisingly, respondents in Qalat have the most confidence in armed opposition groups to resolve disputes fairly (73%).

In light of the preference for traditional mechanisms of justice, it is not surprising that respondents overall report the most confidence in local/tribal elders to resolve disputes (94% "a lot" or "some" confidence). A majority of respondents also express confidence in government courts (73% "a lot" or "some" confidence). Similarly, respondents are most likely to believe decisions made by local/tribal elders are "always" or "mostly" respected, as compared to decisions made by government courts (90%, compared to 68%). Only 27% of SIKA-S respondents express confidence in armed opposition groups to resolve disputes fairly (same as Wave 3, but down from 34% in Wave 2 and 47% in Wave 1), and a majority of respondents (60%) believe decisions made by armed opposition groups are "never" respected.



Figure 5.10: Respect of Decisions Made by Elders, Courts, Opposition Groups (Q22a-Q22c)

Corruption

The vast majority of respondents (84%, down slightly from the 87% found in Wave 3, but still similar to the 83% found in Wave 2 and slightly above the 81% found in Wave 1), admit corruption is a problem in their area. Virtually all (100%) respondents in Nad' Ali, Nahr-e Saraj, and Lashkar Gah say that corruption is a problem in their area, with near unanimity in Garmser as well (99%). Those in Zaranj (55%) are least likely to

say corruption is a problem in their area. Half of respondents (50%) say that corruption has increased in the past year, with respondents in Tarnak wa Jaldak (77%) and Qalat (73%) being most likely to say so.

Respondents were asked to name the department or sector of the local government that people complain about being the most corrupt; in an open-ended list, the top mentions include: the courts (11%), the district/office of attorney (7%), and the municipality (6%). The district/office of attorney is most frequently mentioned in Garmser (18%), Lashkar Gah (17%), and Nahr-e Saraj (17%). These findings suggest that these districts in particular could benefit from anti-corruption programming under the auspices of the SIKA-S project.

Quality of Life

Respondents remain generally satisfied with their quality of life, with 61% saying they are "very satisfied" or "somewhat satisfied" with life as a whole. Overall satisfaction with quality of life has fluctuated over the four waves of the survey: it fell from 75% in Wave 1 to 66% in Wave 2, before rising to 70% in Wave 3, only to fall again to 61% in Wave 4 .It should be noted that most fieldwork for this survey was conducted during the period between the first and second rounds of the presidential election, when the challenging security environment and uncertainty about the country's future may have contributed to lack of contentment about the general state of things. Those living in Garmser (79%) are most likely to be satisfied with the quality of life as a whole, while those in Qalat (29%) are least likely.

Fifty-nine percent of respondents say they are "very" or "somewhat" satisfied with their household's current financial situation, and 39% say their ability to meet their basic needs has increased ("increased a lot" and "increased a little") in the past year. Looking forward, just under half (48%) say they are "a little worried" about meeting their basic needs over the next year, just under a third (30%) say they are "not worried," and 22% say they are "very worried."

A slim majority of respondents (52%) say their area is certain enough to make plans about their future, while 47% say the situation in their area is too uncertain. Respondents in Kang (72%) are most likely to consider the situation certain enough to make plans about their future, while those in Qalat (27%) are least likely to say so.

Economic Activity

When asked to think about their access to local markets, 45% say their ability to get to local markets has gotten better ("a little better" and "much better") over the past year, 30% say it has stayed about the same, and 25% say it has gotten worse ("a little worse" and "much worse"). Although a plurality of respondents believes markets are more accessible, the majority of respondents (57%) believe prices for basic goods in local markets have increased ("increased a lot" and "increased a little") over the past year. Respondents in Qalat (77%) are most likely to say that prices have increased, while those in Tarin Kot and Deh Rawud (37% in each) are least likely to say so.

Perceptions of the availability of paid jobs in SIKA-S districts have seen a continual decline since Wave 1. Twenty-eight percent say there are more ("a lot more" or "a little more") paid jobs this year than last year, a

higher percentage say there are fewer (42% "a lot less" or "a little less"), and about a third say there are about the same (30%). Respondents in Tarnak wa Jaldak are most likely (53%) to agree that there are more paid jobs in their area than last year, while respondents in Qalat are least likely (0%).



Figure 5.11: Availability of Paid Jobs (Q33)

Community Cohesion and Resilience

A slim majority of respondents (53%) say that things from outside their village/neighborhood "never" or "rarely" create problems in their area that disrupt normal life. This figure has seen a slight overall decline from the 56% found in Wave 1. When respondents were asked what types of outside interferences cause problems in their village/neighborhood, the most common responses were: [35]

Most common types of outside interferences: SIKA-S Districts	
Disputes over water	26% (up from 16%
Land disputes	17%
Roadside bombs/suicide attacks	15%
Closing roads	15%
Ethnic disputes	10%

Table 5.5: SIKA-S: Most common types of outside interferences

[35] This question was only asked of respondents who answered "often," "sometimes," or "rarely" when asked how often outside factors create problems in their area (n=3,301). Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Respondents in Lashkar Gah are most likely to say that the closing of roads causes problems (49%). Disputes over water, most frequently mentioned overall, are most likely to be mentioned as a cause of problems in Nahr-e Saraj (53%).

Perceptions of which *internal* interferences cause problems in their area were slightly different. A majority of respondents (54%) say things from inside their village/area "never" or "rarely" create problems to disrupt normal life, while 46% say they "sometimes" or "often" do. When asked about the types of internal interferences that cause problems in their village/neighborhood, respondents most frequently mention: [36]

Most common types of internal interferences: SIKA-S Districts	
Family problems	30% (up from 13%)
Land disputes	26% (up from 18%)
Disputes over water	24%
Ethnic disputes	13% (down from 20%)
Disputes over livestock	7%

Table 5.6: SIKA-S: Most common types of internal interferences

The sharp increase in the reported incidence of family problems suggests that local governance institutions would be strengthened if they could develop a mechanism for providing families with recourse for such issues. Family problems are most frequently mentioned in Tarnak wa Jaldak (80%) and Lashkar Gah (54%). Respondents in Tarnak wa Jaldak are also most likely to mention disputes over land (71%). Disputes over water are mentioned by a majority of respondents in Garmser (53%) and Nahr-e Saraj (51%).

Almost three-fourths of respondents (73%) believe local leaders "often" or "sometimes" consider the interests of ordinary people in their village/neighborhood when making decisions, while 27% believe they "rarely" or "never" do. Respondents in Kang believe that they receive the least consideration from local leaders, with 47% saying that they "rarely" or "never" consider their interests when making decisions that will affect them. Overall, 65% of respondents perceive their local elders to be effective ("very effective" or "somewhat effective") at securing funds from the district or provincial government for their local needs.

The percentage of respondents who say that local leaders "often" or "sometimes" consider the interests of women when making decisions dropped from 72% in Wave 3 to 62% in Wave 4. However, the perceived inclusion of women in local decision-making varies by district, as seen in Figure 5.12 below. Respondents in Chorah (75%) were most likely to believe that women were included in decision making at least "sometimes", while those in Kang were least likely to think so (37%). The SIKA-S Mid-Term Evaluation Report raises the concern that programming on women's issues has been only marginally addressed by SIKA-S, and

[36] This question was only asked of respondents who answered "often," "sometimes," or "rarely" when asked how often inside factors create problems in their area (n=3,450). Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

that more outreach efforts are needed to help mitigate cultural factors that complicate the effort to empower women and foster greater female inclusion in decision-making processes.[37]



Figure 5.12: Women's Interests in Decision Making (Q37b by District)

Most respondents in SIKA-S districts (71%) do not belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss common interests or do certain activities together. Of those who do belong to such groups (n=1,667), respondents mostly belong to: farmers unions (31%, down from 42% in Wave 3), business companies (20%), people's councils (11%), Hizb-e Islami (8%), and Afghan Milat (8%). Membership in development councils has declined from 22% in Wave 3 to 6% in Wave 4.[38]

Grievances

Grievances vary when respondents are asked to identify the biggest problems that create stress or tension in their areas. The most common responses include: [39]

[37] SIKA North Mid-term Performance Evaluation prepared by MSI in August 2014

[38] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

[39] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Most common types of Grievances: SIKA-S Districts	
Unemployment	36%
Insecurity	21%
Illiteracy	14%
High prices	10%
Ethnic disputes	8%

Table 5.7: SIKA-S: Most common types of Grievances

Unemployment was most frequently mentioned in Tarnak wa Jaldak (80%). Respondents in Zaranj and Kang frequently mention lack of drinking water as a major problem that creates stress (42% and 32% respectively), though this is rarely mentioned in other districts. Those in Nahr-e Saraj and Garmser most frequently mention ethnic disputes (27% and 22% respectively).

Media

Respondents most often use radio (92%), friends and family (89%), elders (68%), and the Mosque/Mullah (54%) to communicate with others and/or get news and information. Some also use cell phones (30%) and television (18%). Very few use posters/billboards (4%), newspapers (2%), or the Internet or e-mail (1%) to communicate with others and/or get news and information.

Respondents get most of their information about government services from the radio (74%), friends/family (47%), elders (26%), television (12%), the Mosque/Mullah (11%), and mobile phones (11%).[40]

[40] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

SIKA-S Appendix

Model 1

Response: Presence of Arbaki

sikas$ArbakiNET ~ as.factor(d1) + d3 + as.factor(eth) + Q2aNET

				95% CI for odds ratio		
	B	SE	Sig	Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	1.6	0.06	*	4.94	4.39	5.57
D1 : Female	0.01	0.08		1.01	0.87	1.18
Education	-0.05	0.01	*	0.95	0.93	0.97
Ethnicity: Tajik	-3.19	0.21	*	0.04	0.03	0.06
Ethnicity: Uzbek	-2.37	1.16	*	0.09	0	0.74
Ethnicity: Hazara	-2.19	0.7	*	0.11	0.02	0.41
Ethnicity: Other	-4.09	0.2	*	0.02	0.01	0.02
Q2aNET	0.09	0.07		1.09	0.95	1.25

VI. STABILITY IN KEY AREAS EAST (SIKA-E)

Introduction

Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) is a USAID project designed to promote good governance and service delivery in targeted districts, with intended effects of reducing the impact of the insurgency, increasing confidence in the Afghan government, and paving the way for a peaceful security transition. This chapter specifically focuses on SIKA-East, which includes 29 key districts in Wardak, Logar, Ghazni, Paktiya, Paktika, and Khost.

At the time of the Wave 4 report, SIKA-East evaluators were still in field monitoring the progress of SIKA-E project activities for the Mid-Term Performance Evaluation. The Mid-Term Performance Evaluation uses multi-level qualitative methods, including observation, interviews, and desk review of project documents, to evaluate SIKA-E performance. SIKA-E activities focus on capacity building and infrastructure development, in order to build confidence in local governance and increase the provision of basic services. The project seeks to establish legitimacy in local governance and encourage community-led development, resulting in small scale stabilization projects.

The following sections provide summary and detailed information about the attitudes and opinions of respondents living in districts targeted by the SIKA-E project. The report compares findings across four waves of research to examine trends in stabilization and shifts in development indicators on the following topics: security and crime, governance, service provision and development, rule of law, corruption, quality of life, economic activity, community cohesion and resilience, grievances, and media.

Unless otherwise noted, district-level analysis and wave-to-wave comparisons are provided with significance testing at the 99% confidence level.

SIKA-E targets a core group of districts in six provinces of eastern Afghanistan:

Provinces	District	Sample size	SRS MOE
Wardak	Sayyidabad	480	4.47%
Wardak	Chak-e Wardak	480	4.47%
Wardak	Nerkh	480	4.47%
Wardak	Jalrayz	319	5.49%
Wardak	Maidan Shahr	480	4.47%
Logar	Baraki Barak	474	4.50%
Logar	Muhammad Aghah	480	4.47%
Logar	Khoshi	212	6.73%
Ghazni	Qarah Bagh	478	4.48%
Ghazni	Andar	480	4.47%
Ghazni	Muqer	352	5.22%
Ghazni	Deh Yak	231	6.45%
Ghazni	Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu)	316	5.51%
Ghazni	Khwajah Omari	253	6.16%

Provinces	District	Sample size	SRS MOE
Pakitka	Sharan	318	5.49%
Pakitka	Yosuf Khel	272	5.94%
Pakitya	Zurmat	479	4.48%
Pakitya	Sayyid Karam	236	6.38%
Pakitya	Jaji	238	6.35%
Pakitya	Lajah-Ahmad Khel	254	6.15%
Pakitya	Dzadran	236	6.38%
Pakitya	Ahmadabad	238	6.35%
Khost	Tanai	320	5.48%
Khost	Manduzai (Isma il Khel)	236	6.38%
Khost	Nadir Shah Kot	239	6.34%
Khost	Gurbuz	303	5.63%
Khost	Jaji Maidan	226	6.52%
Pakitya	Lajah-Mangal	320	5.48%
Pakitya	Mirzaka	233	6.42%
SIKA-E Overall		**9,663**	**0.99%** **(2.18% Complex MOE)**

Table 6.1: SIKA-E Provinces and Districts

It should be noted that interviews in Baraki Barak, Khoshi, and Andar were conducted by a field team from Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC). Interviews in Nerkh, Zurmat, and Dzadran were conducted in part by AYC and in part by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic Research (ACSOR). The remaining districts were conducted entirely by ACSOR. Differences exist in the field implementation and quality control measures used for the AYC interviews, which may impact some survey results. For detailed descriptions of these differences, refer to the full Methodology Report for MISTI Wave 4.

ACSOR regularly updates an accessibility tracker that indicates where districts are completely accessible, only accessible by men, or completely inaccessible. The following districts were inaccessible by women and only include men in the sample due to the following reasons:

- Chak-e Wardak (Wardak): Taliban presence in most of the district
- Muqer (Ghazni): Taliban presence in most of the district
- Yosuf Khel (Pakitka): District is too far away for women interviewers to travel to
- Jaji (Pakitya): Taliban presence in most of the district
- Lajah-Ahmad Khel (Pakitya): Taliban presence in most of the district
- Lajah-Mangal (Pakitya): Taliban presence in most of the district

SIKA-E Projects

Between May 2013 and June 2014, USAID planned to execute 234 hard and soft project activities throughout the SIKA-E region of Afghanistan. The majority of these activities (79%) focused on rehabilitation efforts to improve upon public infrastructure, such as bridges, canals, community centers, culverts, flood protection walls, schools, roads, and water irrigation systems (hard projects). The remaining SIKA-E project activities (21%) focused on capacity building of district officials, public awareness campaigns, and vocational courses covering a wide range of topics, such as literacy, carpet weaving, computers, tailoring, embroidery, veterinary science, university entrance preparation, poultry, and carpentry (soft projects). As of February 2014, 23% of project activities were complete, 36% were on-going, and 41% remained in the pipeline stage.[41] All SIKA-E stabilization activities were presented as Afghan government-led activities in an effort to improve perceptions of local governance.

The 234 stabilization project activities were to be implemented across the following 17 districts:



Figure 6.1: SIKA-E Project Activities by District

[41] Data about project activities were provided by the implementing partner, Architecture, Engineering, Consulting, Operations and Maintenance (AECOM). It is important to note that the most up-to-date project data used in this report was collected until February 2014, prior to fieldwork.

Wave 4: SIKA-E | MISTI Fact Sheet

OVERVIEW

Stability in Key Areas-East (SIKA-E) targets 29 key districts in six provinces of eastern Afghanistan: Wardak, Logar, Ghazni, Paktiya, Paktika, and Khost. Findings here summarize attitudes and perceptions of respondents living in districts targeted by SIKA-E project activities, which focused on capacity building and infrastructure development in order to build local governance and increase the provision of basic services.

SECURITY AND CRIME

Perceptions of local security are relatively stable in SIKA-E districts. More than three-fourths of respondents perceive the security in their local area as either "fair" or "good." However, the percentage who say "good" is less than subsequent waves. Opinions of security are most critical in Baraki Barak and Dzadran, where respondents are most likely to report poor security and say their area is less secure than it was last year. Respondents in Baraki and Barak and Dzadran are also most likely to say security on their local roads is bad and has worsened in the past year. Meanwhile, overall perceptions of local roads have improved since the baseline. This may be the reason increasing percentages of respondents say they feel secure while traveling to neighboring villages or the district capital.

Wave 4: Perceptions of Security in SIKA-S Districts



According to respondents, crime rates have remained steady since the baseline. One-third say there is "a lot" of petty crime and offenses in their area, and one-fifth say there is "a lot" of serious crimes in their area. Twice as many respondents in Baraki Barak say there are a lot of petty crimes and offenses, and twice as many in Andar report "a lot" of serious crimes. Crime is perceived to be least prevalent in Ahmadabad, Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu), and Yosuf Khel.

Half of respondents in SIKA-E districts say there are "a lot" of Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) in their area. Majorities report confidence in both the ANA and ANP to keep their area safe, and each wave increasing numbers of respondents believe they have improved.

Almost all respondents in Baraki Barak and Andar report confidence in the ANA and believe the ANA has improved. Responses in Baraki Barak and Andar tend to be homogeneous. However, it is worth noting that these districts were completely inaccessible to the ACSOR field team because of the Taliban presence and both samples only include men.

GOVERNANCE

Local governance is a priority of SIKA-E activities due to the program theory that improved perceptions of the government will help pave the way to stabilization. Since the baseline, opinions of the Afghan government have improved, with increasing majorities saying that the Afghan government is well regarded in their area.



Increased positivity towards the Afghan government reflects respondents' positive opinions about local governing entities. Majorities in SIKA-E districts say they have confidence in their district governor, district government, local/village neighborhood leaders, and provincial governor. Despite high levels of confidence in local governance, respondents are less likely to believe their district governor, district government, local village/neighborhood leaders, and provincial governor are responsive to the needs of local people.

District Development Assemblies (DDAs) and Community Development Councils (CDCs) are increasingly well known in SIKA-E districts. This is a major finding, as SIKA E stabilization programs intend to build capacities of DDAs and CDCs to understand community needs and sources of instability. Although SIKA-E respondents are increasingly confident in their local DDA and CDC, respondents are less likely to believe the groups are responsive to the needs of local people in their area.

Wave 4: SIKA-E | MISTI Fact Sheet

SERVICE PROVISION AND DEVELOPMENT

SIKA-E program activities targeted irrigation, education, agriculture, transportation, and water supply and sanitation. However, the majority of respondents in Wave 4 are dissatisfied with the following district government provisions: electricity, agricultural assistance, retaining and flood walls, medical care, roads and bridges, and schooling for girls. We recommend implementing partners to use qualitative techniques to further explore respondents' perceptions of infrastructure activities and understand reasons for dissatisfaction.

Preferred Justice Systems



More than half of respondents are satisfied with the government's provision of clean drinking water and schooling for boys, and nearly half are satisfied with water for irrigation.

RULE OF LAW AND CORRUPTION

Respondents seek justice from local/tribal elders when they are involved in a dispute concerning land, water, or theft. As disputes become more serious, respondents are more inclined to turn to government courts over local elders. They are least likely to seek justice from armed opposition groups. More than eight of ten respondents admit corruption is a problem in their area. Nearly all respondents in Baraki Barak say corruption is a problem. This is expected in Baraki Barak, where majorities accuse their district government of being dishonest and unfair.

QUALITY OF LIFE AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

More than half of respondents say they are satisfied with life as a whole. Those living in Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu), Khqajah Omari, and Qarah Bagh are most satisfied with their quality of life, while those in Jalrayz, Baraki Barak, and Nerkh are the most dissatisfied.

Although SIKA-E program activities focus on vocational efforts, perceptions of paid jobs have not changed in SIKA-E districts. Respondents are divided when thinking about their ability to make plans about the future. Just over half say their area is too uncertain to make plans about their future, while nearly half say their area is certain enough to make plans.

COMMUNITY COHESION AND RESILIENCE

Overall, respondents in SIKA-E districts believe their local people are able to solve problems that originate within their village more often than problems that come from outside their village. Respondents mention "land disputes" from both inside and outside of their village are known to disrupt normal life in their area.

Most respondents living in SIKA-E districts believe that villages/neighborhoods in their area are able to work together to solve problems. However, respondents from Jalrayz say that they are "rarely" or "never" able to work together to solve problems. Seven of ten respondents believe local leaders consider the interests of ordinary people when making decisions, and about five of ten respondents say the same about the interests of women in particular.

Insecurity and unemployment are main causes of stress and tension in SIKA-E districts.

MEDIA

Respondents mostly depend on the radio or word of mouth (friends/family, elders, and the Mosque/Mullah) to get news and information about government services. Just over half of respondents say they use cell phones to communicate and receive news. Television and print media (posters/billboards and newspapers) are much less popular avenues of communication. Virtually no respondents use the Internet or e-mail.

Security and Crime

Perceptions of local security are relatively stable in SIKA-E districts, with more than three-fourths (76%) rating the security in their local area as either "fair" (38%) or "good" (38%). However, the percentage of respondents who report good security is declining. Thirty-eight percent say their local security is "good" or "very good," compared to 43% in Wave 3 and 45% in Wave 2. Opinions of local security are most critical in Baraki Barak (15%)and Dzadran (19%), where respondents are most likely to report poor security and say their area is less secure than it was last year. Meanwhile, majorities living in Qarah Bagh (52%), Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu) (54%), Deh Yak, (54%), Sharan (54%), and Yosuf Khel (56%) say security in their local area is good. Perceptions have drastically shifted in Chak-e Wardak. In Wave 3, 78% of respondents living in Chak-e Wardak reported good security in their area, compared to just 23% in Wave 4.



Figure 6.2: SIKA-S: Perception of Security

Perceptions of security on local roads have improved since the baseline. More than half (54%, up from 50% in Wave 3, 52% in Wave 2, and 40% in Wave 1) say security is "good" or "very good." Opinions about road security are most positive in Manduzai (69%) and Yosuf Khel (67%). Those in Yosuf Khel are also most likely to say security on their local roads has improved ("a lot" or "a little") in the past year (63%, compared to 38% overall). Security on local roads is most critical in Baraki Barak and Dzadran, where respondents are most likely to say security on roads is "bad" or "very bad" and has worsened ("a little" and "a lot") in the past year.

The vast majority of respondents (88%) feel secure in their home during the day. Increasing percentages also feel secure in their home during the night, and while traveling to neighboring villages or the district capital. When used in a logistic regression, opinions on security while traveling to a neighboring village or the provincial capital are significant predictors of opinions of security on the roads ($p<0.05$).



Figure 6.3: Percentage of "very" or "somewhat secure" (Q4a-Q4d by Wave)

Perceived crime rates have remained steady since the baseline survey. One-third of those living in SIKA-E districts say there are "a lot" of petty crimes and offenses in their area, while about half say there is "a little" serious, non-violent crime (52%) and serious violent crime (50%). Twice as many respondents in Baraki Barak (66%) say there are "a lot" of petty crimes and offenses in their area, compared to SIKA-E respondents overall (33%). Respondents in Andar are most likely to report "a lot" of serious non-violent crime (40%, compared to 21% total) and serious violent crimes (37%, compared to 20% total). Crime is perceived to be least prevalent in Ahmadabad, Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu), and Yosuf Khel, where majorities say there are "none at all" for at least one of the categories.

Half of respondents in SIKA-E districts (50%) say there are "a lot" of Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) in their area, with perceptions varying across districts. In Baraki Barak and Andar, areas with the highest perceptions of crime, respondents are more likely to believe there are a lot of ANA and ANP. Eighty-three percent in Andar say there are "a lot" of ANA, and 85% in Baraki Barak say there are "a lot" of ANP. Respondents in Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu) are most likely to believe there are no ANA in their area (62%, compared to 11% overall).

Majorities report confidence in the ANA (77%, down from 82% in Wave 3) and ANP (59%, up from 55% in Wave 3) to keep their area safe. High levels of confidence in the ANA and ANP may be linked to perceptions of improvement. Each wave, more respondents living in SIKA-E districts report the ANA and ANP have improved ("improved a lot" or "a little") in their ability to provide security.



Figure 6.4: Percentage of "improved a lot" or "a little" (Q7a-Q7b by Wave)

In Baraki Barak and Andar, almost all respondents report having confidence in the ANA (99% each) and believe the ANA has improved its abilities to provide security in their district (97% in Baraki Barak, 100% in Andar). Responses in Baraki Barak and Andar tend to be homogenous, and perceptions of security forces and governing entities appear to be overwhelmingly positive. However, it is worth noting that these districts were completely inaccessible to the ACSOR field team because of the Taliban presence. Social desirability bias or the difference in field vendor may have influenced responses in these areas.

Respondents perceive more Arbaki and armed opposition groups in SIKA-E districts in Wave 4, although perceptions decreased in Waves 1-3. The percentage of those who report there are no Arbaki in their area dropped from 51% in Wave 3 to 35% in Wave 4, with 28% saying there are "a lot" (up from 20% in Wave 3). An additional 28% say there are "a lot" of armed opposition groups (up from 25% in Wave 3 and 22% in Wave 2, but down from 42% in the baseline). The majority of respondents in Baraki Barak (53%), Zurmat (55%) and Andar (88%) say there are "a lot" of armed opposition groups in their district.

Since the 2012 baseline study, perceptions of ISAF presence in SIKA-E districts continue to decline.



Figure 6.5: Presence of ISAF (Q6.1f by Wave)

Governance

Local governance is a priority of SIKA-E activities due to the stabilization programming theory that improved perceptions of the government will help pave the way to stabilization. Opinions of the Afghan government have improved over time, with increasing majorities saying the Afghan government is well regarded in their area (73%, up from 70% in Wave 3, 63% in Wave 2, and 54% in Wave 1). Increased positivity towards the Afghan government reflects respondents' positive opinions about local governing entities. Majorities in SIKA-E districts say they have confidence in their district governor (69%), district government (65%), local/village neighborhood leaders (75%), and provincial governor (52%). Despite high levels of confidence in local governance, respondents are less likely to believe their district governor, district government, local village/neighborhood leaders, and provincial governor are responsive to the needs of local people. Perceived responsiveness of local entities dropped in Wave 4 after steadily increasing in Waves 1-3.



Figure 6.6: Percentage "very" or "somewhat responsive" (Q10a-d by Wave)

Respondents living in Andar report the highest levels of confidence in their district governor (94%), district government (91%), and local village/neighborhood leaders (93%). However, more than three of four respondents (76%) in Andar say they have "not much confidence" or "no confidence at all" in their provincial governor.

Each wave, more respondents say they are aware of the District Development Assembly (DDA) and Community Development Council (CDC) in their district. This is a major finding, as SIKA-E stabilization project activities intended to build the capacity of district DDAs and CDCs to understand community needs and sources of instability. Respondents' confidence in their district's DDA and CDC continues to increase each wave. Of those who have heard of the DDA in their district (n=5589), 79% say they have "a lot" or "some confidence" in it (up from 72% in Wave 3, 68% in Wave 2, and 67% in Wave 1). Of those who have heard of the CDC in their district (n=6148), 77% say they have "a lot" or "some confidence" in it (up from 73% in Wave 3, 68% in Wave 2, and 62% in Wave 1).



Figure 6.7: Awareness and Confidence in DDA and CDC (Q12a-b and Q13a-b by Wave)

Respondents are most likely to have heard about their DDA and CDC in Baraki Barak (100% each), Zurmat (100% each), Dzadran (96% DDA, 91% CDC), and Andar (92% DDA, 96% CDC).

Although SIKA-E respondents are increasingly confident in their local DDA and CDC, respondents are less likely to believe their DDA and CDC are responsive to the needs of local people in their area. The percentage who believe the DDA is responsive ("very responsive" or "somewhat responsive") to local needs dropped slightly from 76% in Wave 3 to 72% in Wave 4, while those who believe the CDC is responsive to local needs dropped more drastically from 79% in Wave 3 to 58% in Wave 4.

The majority of those surveyed in Wave 4 believe district government officials are from their district (68%, up from 56% in Wave 3); however, respondents are divided when asked about their district government's behavior. On one hand, about half of the respondents believe their district government understands the problems of people in their area (48%, down from 55% in Wave 3) and cares about the people in their area (51%). On the other hand, 52% believe their district government officials abuse their

authority to make money for themselves, 55% say they are not doing their jobs honestly, and 50% say the district government does not deliver basic services in a fair manner.

Respondents living in Yosuf Khel have the most positive opinions of their district government. More than seven out of ten respondents in Yosuf Khel believe their district government understands the problems of people in their area (73%), cares about local people (74%), does not abuse their authority to make money (72%), are doing their jobs honestly (71%), and are delivering basic services in a fair manner (72%). Meanwhile, those living in Baraki Barak have the most negative opinions about their district government, where vast majorities believe their district government does not understand the problems of the people (81%), does not care about local people (79%), abuses their authority to make money (94%), does not do their job honestly (89%), and does not deliver basic services fairly (85%). It is interesting to note that in Yosuf Khel, where respondents are most positive about their district government, 65% say "it is not acceptable for people to publicly criticize the Afghan government." In Baraki Barak, where respondents are most negative about their district government, 60% believe "it is acceptable for people to publicly criticize the Afghan government." Whether or not respondents believe it is acceptable to criticize the government may influence their responses to questions about local governance.

Service Provision & Development

USAID stabilization activities targeted the following government services in SIKA-E districts:

USAID Activities	No. Activities	% Activities
Irrigation	105	45%
Education/Livelihood	66	28%
Agriculture	49	21%
Transportation	11	5%
Water Supply & Sanitation	3	1%
Total	**234**	**100%**

Table 6.2: SIKA-E USAID Stabilization activities targeting government services

Overall, respondents in Wave 4 are more likely to believe government services in their district have improved in the past year (42%, compared to 36% in Wave 3). Thirty-six percent believe there has been no change, and 22% believe services have gotten worse. Respondents living in Sharan (62%), Yosuf Khel (61%) and Deh Yak (60%) are most likely to believe government services in their district have improved. At the time of the evaluation, no USAID stabilization actvities were implemented in Sharan or Yosuf Khel; however, 10 projects were implemented in Deh Yak, and another 4 were in the pipeline.

The majority of respondents in SIKA-E districts report *dissatisfaction* for the following district government provisions:

- Electricity (56%)[42]
- Agricultural assistance (57%)
- Retaining and flood walls (62%)
- Medical care (63%)
- Roads and bridges (64%)
- Schooling for girls (66%)

Nearly three of four respondents are satisfied with the district government's provision of clean drinking water (73%), and about half are satisfied with water for irrigation (49%). Sixty-three percent are satisfied with their district's schooling for boys.

Although 21% of USAID stabilization activities in SIKA-E districts were focused on improving agriculture and 45% focused on irrigation, there is no relationship between the districts where activities were implemented and satisfaction with agriculture assistance or water for irrigation. Including total agriculture expenditures for SIKA-East activities in a hierarchal model on the district level did not prove to be a significant factor in predicting respondents' satisfaction with agriculture assistance. We recommend that qualitative assessments be conducted to understand attitudes and opinions of specific project activities.

The majority of respondents (52%) say they have not seen or heard about any development projects in their local area in the past year. All respondents in Andar (100%) say they have seen or heard about development projects in their area in the past year; however, only 5% of USAID SIKA-E activities (n=11) were implemented in Andar. Respondents in Khoshi are least likely to be aware of local development projects.

[42] An additional 13% of respondents mentioned that electricity is not even provided in their district.



Figure 6.8: Awareness of Development Projects (Wave 4)

In the previous wave of data collection (Wave 3), no respondents in Dzadran said they knew of any development projects in their area. In Wave 4, however, 52% of respondents living in Dzadran say they have seen or heard about development projects in their local area over the past year. Interestingly, no USAID stabilization projects have been implemented in Dzadran.

Among those who have heard about development projects (n=4608), 86% say they are aware of projects for drinking water, and 60% say they are aware of projects for schools. Much smaller percentages of respondents say they have seen or heard about projects for irrigation/water maintenance systems (47%), agricultural assistance (37%), retaining and flood walls (37%), roads and bridges (34%), medical facilities (34%), farm produce processing (22%), and electricity (15%).

Looking forward to the next year, respondents in SIKA-E districts most frequently mention the following development projects as being needed in their area:[43]

Views on development projects for next year: SIKA-E Districts	
Road construction	37%
Electricity	29%
Education and School	28%
Building bridges	20%
Clinics	18%

Table 6.3: SIKA-E: Views on development projects for next year

[43] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Respondents were also asked about the obstacles preventing them from obtaining health care or medicine. The most frequent responses include: [44]

Views on the obstacles preventing respondents from obtaining health care or medicine.: SIKA-E Districts	
Lack of clinics/hospitals	33%
Lack of professional doctors	32%
Lack of medicines	25%
Cost of health care or medicine	21%
Distance to facilities/lack of transportation/lack of good roads	21%

Table 6.4: SIKA-E: Obstacles preventing respondents from obtaining health care or medicine

Rule of Law

When respondents in SIKA-E districts are involved in disputes concerning land and water, they are nearly twice as likely to seek justice from local/tribal elders (61%) than government courts (34%). They are also more likely to seek justice from local/tribal elders (49%) than government courts (39%) when involved in cases of theft. For more serious disputes concerning assault, murder, or kidnapping, respondents are inclined to turn to government courts (52%) than local/tribal elders (37%). The vast majority of respondents in Andar turn to government courts for cases of theft, assault, murder, or kidnapping (93%).

Since the baseline survey, respondents in SIKA-E districts are much less likely to seek justice from armed opposition groups when involved in disputes concerning land/water (4%, down from 14% in Wave 1), theft (8%, down from 21%), and assault, murder or kidnapping (8%, down from 16% in Wave 1). Respondents living in the province of Wardak (districts: Sayyidabad, Chak-e Wardak, Nerkh, Jalrayz, and Maidan Shahr) are much more likely to seek justice from armed opposition groups compared to those in other provinces.

When respondents discuss how to resolve disputes fairly, 89% of respondents report having confidence in local/tribal elders, and 71% report having confidence in government courts. Respondents are more likely to believe decisions made by local/tribal elders are "always" respected than decisions made by government courts (38%, compared to 18%). Forty-three percent believe decisions made by armed opposition groups are "never" respected.

[44] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.



Figure 5.8: Respect of Decisions Made by Elders, Courts, Opposition Groups (Q22a-Q22c)

Corruption

More than eight of ten respondents (81%) admit corruption is a problem in their area. Nearly all respondents in Baraki Barak (99%) say corruption is a problem. This is expected in Baraki Barak, where majorities accuse their district government of being dishonest and unfair. More than half of respondents overall (56%) say corruption has increased ("increased a lot" and "increased a little") in their area, and one-third (33%) say it has stayed the same. Respondents in Zurmat are most likely to say that corruption has increased in their area (81%).

Respondents were asked to name the department or sector of the local government that people most complain about corruption; in an open-ended format, the top mentions include: courts (13%), police (10%), the District Office (9%), the Ministry of Education (7%), District/Office of Attorney (6%), and all government offices (6%).

Quality of Life

Respondents in Wave 4 are more likely to say things in their district are going in the right direction (57%, compared to 48% in Waves 3 and 2, and 41% in Wave 1). More than half of respondents remain generally satisfied with their quality of life. Fifty-five percent say they are "somewhat satisfied" or "very satisfied" with life as a whole. Those living in Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu) (87%), Khqajah Omari (80%), and Qarah Bagh (76%) are most satisfied with their quality of life, while those in Jalrayz (73%), Baraki Barak (67%), and Nerkh (67%) are the most dissatisfied.

Fifty-nine percent of respondents overall say they are satisfied with their household's current financial situation, and 37% say their ability to meet their basic needs has increased ("increased a lot" and "increased a little") in the past year. Looking forward, nearly half (48%) say they are "a little worried" about meeting their basic needs over the next year, while nearly one-fourth say they are "not worried" (23%), and another fourth say they are "very worried" (28%).

A slim majority of respondents (52%) say their area is too uncertain to make plans about their future, while 46% say their area is certain enough for them to make plans about their future. Almost 9 in 10 respondents (89%) living in Khoshi believe the situation in their area is too uncertain for them to plan for their future.

Economic Activity

When asked to think about their access to local markets, 34% say their ability to get to local markets has gotten better ("a little better" and "much better") over the past year, 45% say it has stayed about the same, and 21% (down from 27%) say it has gotten worse ("a little worse" and "much worse"). Although 34% of respondents believe markets are more accessible, the majority of respondents (63%) believe prices for basic goods in local markets have increased ("increased a lot" and "increased a little") over the past year.

Although 21% of SIKA-E projecting focuses on vocational efforts, perceptions of paid jobs have not changed in SIKA-E districts. Forty-three percent of respondents say there are less ("a lot less" or "a little less") paid jobs in their area compared to last year, 26% say there are the same amount, and 30% say there are more ("a lot more" or "a little more") paid jobs this year. Respondents in Maidan Shahr are more than twice as likely as the overall respondents (67%, compared to 30% overall) to say there are more paid jobs in their area than there were last year. Nearly all respondents in Baraki Barak (96%) say there are less paid jobs in their area.

Community Cohesion and Resilience

Six of ten respondents say things from outside their village/neighborhood "never" or "rarely" create problems in their area that disrupt normal life (60%, up from 54% in Wave 3), while 39% says things outside their area "often" or "sometimes" cause problems. When respondents were asked what types of outside interferences cause problems in their village/neighborhood. The most common responses include: [45]

[45] This question was filtered to only ask respondents who answered "often," "sometimes," or "rarely" when asked how often outside factors create problems in their area (n=4947). Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Most common types of outside interferences: SIKA-E Districts	
Land disputes	19% (up from 12%)
Road-side bombs/suicides	16%
Closing roads	14% (up from 5%)
Disputes over water	13% (up from 8%)
Existence/presence of Taliban	10% (down from 20%)

Table 6.5: SIKA-E: Most common types of outside interferences

"Kidnappings" (14%) and "Existence/presence of foreign forces" (12%) were mentioned frequently in Wave 3, but are less frequently mentioned in Wave 4 (7% and 6%, respectively). Some external interferences are more common in specific districts. For example, 69% in Maidan Shahr say "ISAF attacks," and 52% in Muhammad Aghah say "Pakistan's interference" cause problems in their area.

Overall perceptions were similar when respondents were asked how often *internal* interferences cause problems in their area. Nearly six of ten respondents (59%) say things from inside their village/area "never" or "rarely" create problems to disrupt normal life, and 40% say they "sometimes" or "often" do. When asked about the types of internal interferences that cause problems in their village/neighborhood, respondents most frequently mention: [46]

Most common types of internal interferences: SIKA-E Districts	
Land disputes	46% (up from 34%)
Disputes over water	28%
Family problems	23%
Closing roads	11% (up from 5%)
Disputes over forests	10% (up from 5%)

Table 6.6: SIKA-E: Most common types of internal interferences

"Ethnic disputes" (22%) and "Disunity" (12%) were the top internal interferences mentioned in Wave 3, but are less frequently mentioned in Wave 4 (9% and 2%, respectively).

Overall, respondents in SIKA-E districts believe their local people are able to solve problems that come from inside their village more often than problems that come from outside their village. When asked if villages and neighborhoods come together to solve problems, 69% respond that they are "often" or "sometimes" able to work together. The majority of respondents in Jalrayz, though, say

[46] This question was only asked of respondents who answered "often," "sometimes," or "rarely" when asked how often inside factors create problems in their area (n=5116). Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

villages/neighborhoods in their district "rarely" or "never" work together to solve problems (51%, compared to 31% of total respondents).

Sixty-nine percent of respondents believe local leaders "sometimes" or "often" consider the interests of ordinary people in their village/neighborhood when making decisions, and 30% believe they "rarely" or "never" consider them. Another 69% of respondents perceive their local leaders to be effective ("somewhat effective" and "very effective") at securing funds from the district or provincial government for their local needs.

Respondents are divided when asked how often women's interests are considered when decisions are made by local leaders. Just over half (51%) say women's interests are "sometimes" or "often" considered, while nearly half (48%) say they are "rarely" or "never" considered. Women's voices are more likely to be heard in Muhammad Aghah (70%) and Khoshi (71%), where respondents say leaders "sometimes" or "often" consider the interests of women in decision making.[47]

The vast majority of respondents in SIKA-E districts (87%) do not belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss common interests or do certain activities together. Of those who do belong to such groups (n=1255), respondents mostly belong to: people's councils (18%), development councils (17%), farmers unions (17%), sports unions (17%), and business companies (10%).[48]

Grievances

Grievances vary when respondents are asked to identify the biggest problems that create stress or tension in their areas. The most common responses include: [49]

Most common types of Grievances: SIKA-E Districts	
Insecurity	42%
Unemployment	40% (up from 32%)
Illiteracy	14%
Corruption	13%
Poverty	11%
Lack of electricity	10%
High prices	10%

Table 6.7: SIKA-E: Most common types of Grievances

[47] This question was filtered to only ask respondents who answered "often," "sometimes," or "rarely" when asked how often the interests of ordinary people are considered when local leaders make decisions (n=8599).

[48] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

[49] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Respondents in Zurmat (76%), Maidan Shahr (75%), and Chak-e Wardak (55%) are the most likely to report that insecurity is the biggest problem in their area, while respondents in Sharan are the least likely to report insecurity as the biggest problem (12%). Respondents in Andar stand out as having the largest majority (77%) assessing unemployment as the biggest problem in their area, followed by those in Chak-e Wardak with 58%.

Media

Respondents tend to rely on the radio (93%), friends and family (84%), and elders (72%) to communicate with others and/or get news and information. More than half say they communicate and/or receive news through the Mosque/Mullah (64%) and cell phones (54%, up from 48% in Wave 3). Respondents are less likely to use television (33%), posters/billboards (21%), and newspapers (7%). Nearly all of those surveyed (98%) say they do not use the Internet or e-mail.

Respondents get most of their information about government services from the radio (67%) and through word of mouth from friends/family (39%), elders (28%), the Mosque/Mullah (18%).[50]

[50] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

SIKA-E Appendix

Model 1

Response: Q3a. I would like to know about security on the roads you use in this area. Overall, would you say that security on the roads you use in this area is very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad?

q3aNET ~ dummy(d1) + d3 + dummy(eth) + q4c + q4d

				95% CI for odds ratio		
	B	SE	Sig	Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-2.37	0.08	*	0.09	0.08	0.11
D1 : Female	-0.08	0.05		0.92	0.83	1.03
Education	-0.01	0		0.99	0.98	1
Ethnicity: Tajik	0.63	0.08	*	1.89	1.6	2.22
Ethnicity: Uzbek	-0.19	1.25		0.83	0.08	18.2
Ethnicity: Hazara	-0.38	0.09	*	0.68	0.57	0.82
Ethnicity: Other	-0.1	0.39		0.9	0.41	1.93
q4c	0.43	0.03	*	1.53	1.44	1.63
q4d	0.51	0.03	*	1.66	1.57	1.75

Model 2

Response: Q16c. Generally speaking, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the District Government's provision of ... Agricultural assistance (seed fertilizer, equipment)?

q16c ~ dummy(d1) + d3 + dummy(eth) + (rescale(totalagexped) | dis)

				95% CI for odds ratio		
	B	SE	Sig	Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	0.59	0.02	*	1.81	1.73	1.88
D1 : Female	-0.02	0.01		0.98	0.95	1
Education	0	0	*	1	0.99	1
Ethnicity: Tajik	0.04	0.03		1.04	0.99	1.1
Ethnicity: Uzbek	0.32	0.26		1.38	0.82	2.3
Ethnicity: Hazara	0.1	0.04	*	1.11	1.03	1.19
Ethnicity: Other	0.12	0.09		1.12	0.94	1.34

Random Effects

	Intercept	B	SE (B)
Ahmadabad	0.14707	-0.5939	0.03
Atghar	0.13672	-0.5521	0.03
Daychopan	-0.2098	0.84742	0.02
Deh Rawud	0.07659	-0.3093	0.03
Dzadran	0.11043	-0.4459	0.03
Gurbuz	0.05388	-0.2176	0.01
Jaji	0.21265	-0.8588	0.03
Jaji Maidan	-0.0396	0.16	0.06
Kahmard	-0.1591	0.64267	0.03
Kandahar	-0.0372	0.15038	0.02
Khakrez	-0.1816	0.73351	0.02
Lajah-Ahmad Khel	-0.2001	0.80826	0.02
Lajah-Mangal	-0.0704	0.28448	0.01
Ma'ruf	0.38185	-1.5421	0.02
Maiwand	-0.1283	0.51832	0.02
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)	-0.143	0.57744	0.03
Mirzaka	0.17849	-0.7208	0.03
Nadir Shah Kot	0.04896	-0.1977	0.03
Now Bahar	0.01567	-0.0633	0.03
Panjwa'i	-0.0722	0.29145	0.02
Sayyid Karam	0.16735	-0.6758	0.03
Shah Joy	0.05377	-0.2171	0.02
Shinkai	-0.0032	0.01279	0.02

Shorabak	0.11538	-0.4659	0.03
Spin Boldak	-0.0636	0.257	0.02
Tanai	0.01798	-0.0726	0.14
Taywarah	-0.1173	0.47363	0.03
Zharay	-0.1377	0.55592	0.03
Zurmat	-0.1573	0.63536	0.01

VII. STABILITY IN KEY AREAS WEST (SIKA-W)

Introduction

Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) is a USAID project designed to promote good governance and service delivery in targeted districts, with intended effects of reducing the impact of the insurgency, increasing confidence in the Afghan government, and paving the way for a peaceful security transition.[51] This chapter specifically focuses on SIKA-West, which includes 10 key districts in Badghis, Herat, Farah, and Ghor.

As the Mid Term Performance Evaluation concludes, Stability in Key Areas-West (SIKA-W) is less a stabilization project than a local governance project with a stabilization component.[52] SIKA-W activities focus on capacity building and infrastructure development, in order to build confidence in local governance and increase the provision of basic service. SIKA-W seeks to establish legitimacy in local governance and encourage community-led development resulting in small scale stabilization projects. The Mid Term Performance Evaluation used multi-level qualitative methods, including observation, interviews, and desk review of project documents, to evaluate SIKA-W performance up to November 31, 2013. Conclusions from the Mid Term Performance Evaluation are used throughout this chapter to provide context for the quantitative analysis.

The following sections provide summary and detailed information about the attitudes and opinions of respondents living in districts targeted by the SIKA-W project. The report compares findings across four waves of research to examine trends in stabilization and shifts in development indicators on the following topics: security and crime, governance, service provision and development, rule of law, corruption, quality of life, economic activity, community cohesion and resilience, grievances, and media.

SIKA-W targets a core group of districts in four provinces of western Afghanistan:

Provinces	District	Sample size	SRS MOE
Badghis	Qadis	451	4.61%
Badghis	Muqur	477	4.49%
Herat	Shindand	480	4.48%
Herat	Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	476	4.49%
Herat	Pashtun Zarghun	461	4.56%
Farah	Bala Boluk	416	4.80%
Farah	Pusht-e Rod	320	5.48%
Farah	Khak-e-Safayd	240	6.33%
Ghor	Chaghcharan	491	4.42%

[51] http://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/fact-sheets/stability-key-areas-sika

[52] The Midterm Performance Evaluation was prepared by MSI in March 2014. It should be noted that conclusions drawn in the performance evaluation were based on project activities implemented until November 2013. This report refers to the most up-to-date data on project activities until February 2014.

Provinces	District	Sample size	SRS MOE
Ghor	Shahrak	490	4.43%
SIKA-W Overall		**4,302**	**1.49%** **(3.60% Complex MOE)**

Table 7.1: SIKA-W Provinces and Districts

It should be noted that interviews in Shindand were conducted in part by a field team from Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC) and in part by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic Research (ACSOR). The other districts were conducted entirely by ACSOR. Differences exist in the field implementation and quality control measures used for the AYC interviews, which may impact some survey results. For detailed descriptions of these differences, refer to the full Methodology Report for MISTI Wave 4.

ACSOR regularly updates its accessibility tracker. This tracker indicates accessibility of districts for the field staff and the reasons for inaccessibility, whether it be insecurity or transportation. Additionally, the accessibility tracker indicates which districts are inaccessible to ACSOR's female staff. The following districts were inaccessible to women and only included men in the sample:

1. Bala Boluk: (Farah) Taliban presence in most parts of the district
2. Khak-e-Safayd: (Farah) Taliban presence in most parts of the district
3. Pusht-e Rod: (Farah) Taliban presence in most parts of the district
4. Shahrak: (Ghor) the distance of this district is too far for women to travel

Unless otherwise noted, district level analysis and wave to wave comparisons are provided with significance testing at the 99% confidence level.

SIKA-W Projects

The SIKA-W project started in January 2012 to build the capacity of local governance. Capacity building projects intended to prepare the district entities for hard and soft project activities with Fixed Obligation Grants (FOGs). Between April 2013 and February 2014, USAID planned to execute 278 hard and soft project activities throughout the SIKA-W region of Afghanistan. Nearly three-fourths (74%) of these activities focused on rehabilitation efforts to improve upon public infrastructure, such as bridges, canals, community centers, culverts, flood protection walls, schools, roads, and water irrigation systems (hard projects). The remaining 25% of SIKA-W project activities focused on vocational courses and education (soft projects). Vocational training activities covered auto mechanics, embroidery, mobile phone repair, tailoring, carpentry, and carpet weaving. Three courses taught community based health education, and another three were geared towards providing educational supplies. As of February 2014, 17% of project activities were complete, 57% were on-going, and 16% were on hold for security, inclement weather, or

other reasons. Eleven percent remained in the pipeline stage.[53] All SIKA-W stabilization activities were presented as government-led activities in an effort to improve perceptions of local governance.

The 278 stabilization project activities were to be implemented across the following 10 districts:



Figure 7.1: SIKA-W Project Activities by District

As a whole, just over half of respondents living in the SIKA-W region say things in their district are headed in the right direction (53%, "right direction a lot" and "right direction a little"), while 44% say wrong direction. Respondents in Qadis, where nearly one-fourth of project activities are implemented (24%), are more optimistic, with 85% saying their district is headed in the right direction. Meanwhile, the majority of those in Khak-e-Safayd, where only 5% of SIKA-W projects were implemented, say their district is headed in the wrong direction (68%).[54]

[53] Data about project activities were provided by the implementing partner, Architecture, Engineering, Consulting, Operations and Maintenance (AECOM). It is important to note that the most up-to-date project data used in this report was collected until February 2014, prior to fieldwork.

[54] Including project level data by district in a hierarchal model with the "right/wrong direction" variable indicates that project activities do not prove to be a significant predictor of outlook.

Wave 4: SIKA-W

MISTI Fact Sheet

OVERVIEW

Stability in Key Areas-West (SIKA-W) targets ten key districts in four provinces of western Afghanistan: Bagdhis, Herat, Farah, Ghor. Findings here summarize attitudes and perceptions of respondents living in districts targeted by SIKA-W project activities, focused on capacity building and infrastructure development in order to build local governance and increase the provision of basic services.

SECURITY AND CRIME

Although perceptions of local security improved from 2012 to 2013 (from Wave 1 to Wave 2), there was no significant shift in opinions in 2014 (from Wave 3 to Wave 4). Respondents living in Qadis, Pashtun Zarghun, and Bala Boluk have the most positive perceptions of local security.

Wave 4: Perceptions of Security in SIKA-W Districts



There is a noticeable decrease in perceptions of security at home in Waves 2 and Wave 4. Since fieldwork was conducted bi-annually, perceptions of the security situation may be attributed to the timing of fieldwork, as Waves 2 and 4 were conducted during the warmer "fighting season" and Waves 1 and 3 were conducted during the colder months, when inclement weather historically slows the insurgency.

The security situation in Khak-e-Safayd is most critical, as respondents in Khak-e-Safayd are most likely to perceive "a lot" of armed opposition groups in their area and report the highest levels of crime. They are also most likely to report insecurity at home during the day and night, and while traveling.

There is a relationship between the presence of Afghan National Police and level of crime. In Qadis, respondents report the lowest crime rates and also perceive "a lot" of ANP in their area.

GOVERNANCE

Local governance is a priority of SIKA-W stabilization activities. The SIKA-W Mid Term Performance Evaluation indicates "the program is designed to improve local governance through district and provincial entity capacity building and mentoring, which then results in small scale stabilization projects." Since the baseline, opinions of the Afghan government have improved, with increasing majorities saying that the Afghan government is well-regarded in their area. However, confidence in local governance declined in Wave 4. Respondents are less likely to report confidence in their district governor, district government, local village leaders, and provincial governor. Declining confidence may be related to declining opinions of responsiveness. Respondents in Wave 4 are less likely to believe each entity is responsive to the needs of local people.



Respondents living in Qadis and Muqur report the highest levels of confidence in local governance, while those living in Khak-e-Safayd and Shahrak report the lowest levels of confidence.

District Development Assemblies (DDAs) and Community Development Councils (CDCs) are increasingly well known in SIKA-W districts. Majorities report confidence in their DDA and CDC and believe that both organizations are responsive to local needs. This is a major finding, as SIKA-W

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stabilization programs intended to build capacities of DDAs and CDCs to understand community needs and sources of instability.

SERVICE PROVISION AND DEVELOPMENT

The midterm performance evaluation reported that protection walls, water dividers, and culverts were among the most valued mitigation activities funded by SIKA-W. However, the majority of respondents in Wave 4 are dissatisfied with the following district government provisions: medical care, electricity, retaining and flood walls, roads and bridges, water for irrigation, and schooling for girls. More than half are satisfied with the government's provision of clean drinking water and nearly half are satisfied with schooling for boys.



We recommend implementing partners to use qualitative techniques to further explore respondents' perceptions of infrastructure activities and understand reasons for decreased satisfaction.

RULE OF LAW AND CORRUPTION

Respondents are most likely to seek justice from local/tribal elders when they are involved in a dispute. As disputes become more serious, respondents are more inclined to turn to government courts. However, they are least likely to seek justice from armed opposition groups.

More than eight of ten respondents admit corruption is a problem in their area. Respondents in Bala Boluk and Pusht-e Rod are most likely to say corruption is a problem.



QUALITY OF LIFE AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Two-thirds say they are satisfied with life as a whole. Those living in Qadis and Pusht-e Rod are most positive about their quality of life, while those living in Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi) report the least satisfaction.

Although one-fourth of SIKA-W programming focuses on vocational efforts, perceptions of paid jobs have not changed in SIKA-W districts.

COMMUNITY COHESION AND RESILIENCE

Respondents most frequently mention "small crimes/theft" and the "existence/presence of the Taliban" as problems from outside their area that disrupt normal life. "Ethnic disputes" and "small crimes/theft" are most often mentioned as problems that start inside their area. "Existence/presence of the Taliban" is mentioned most in Pusht-e-Rod and Khak-e-Safayd.

Most respondents living in SIKA-W districts believe that villages/neighborhoods in their area are able to work together to solve problems. However, respondents from Bala Boluk say that they are "rarely" or "never" able to work together to solve problems. Unemployment and insecurity are main causes of stress and tension in SIKA-W districts.

MEDIA

Respondents depend on the radio or word of mouth (friends/family, elders, and the Mosque/Mullah) to get news and information about government services. Cell phones and television are not as popular, and very few respondents mention that they rely on print media (posters/billboards and newspapers). Virtually no respondents use the Internet or e-mail to communicate or receive information.

Security and Crime

Although perceptions of local security improved from 2012 to 2013 (from Wave 1 to Wave 2), there was no significant shift in opinions in 2014 (from Wave 3 to Wave 4). About half of respondents say their local security is "good" or "very good" (51%, consistent with Wave 3, up from 41% in Wave 2, and 39% in Wave 1). Respondents living in Qadis (69%), Bala Boluk (60%), and Pashtun Zarghun (57%) have the most positive perceptions of local security.



Figure 7.2: SIKA-W: Perception of Security

More than half of respondents say security on their local roads is "good" or "very good" (59%), and 40% say road security has improved ("improved a lot" or "a little") in the past year. Although 65 road rehabilitation activities were implemented across SIKA-W districts between 2013 and 2014, there is no correlation between perceptions of road security and the location of road rehabilitation activities.

Perceptions of security at home have declined over time. In Wave 4, 85% of respondents say they feel secure in their homes during the day (compared to 88% in Wave 3, 87% in Wave 2, and 95% in Wave 1), while 63% say they feel secure in their homes at night (compared to 73% in Wave 3). There is a noticeable trend throughout the security data that indicates a decrease in perceptions of security in Waves 2 and Wave 4 (see Figure 7.3 below). Since fieldwork was conducted bi-annually, perceptions of the security situation may be attributed to the timing of fieldwork. Waves 1 and 3 were conducted

during the summer, which is known as the annual "fighting season" due to warm weather. Waves 2 and 4 were conducted during the winter, which is historically known as a calmer period where inclement weather slows the insurgency.



Figure 7.3: Percentage of "very" or "somewhat secure" in homes (Q4a and Q4b by Wave)

Respondents feel less secure while traveling than when they are in their homes, however perceptions of security while traveling have not changed over time. Just over half (55%) of respondents say they feel "very secure" or "somewhat secure" when traveling to a neighboring village, and nearly half (48%) say they feel secure when traveling to the district or provincial capital. Compared to those living in other SIKA-W districts, respondents in Khak-e-Safayd report feeling the least secure when they are in their homes and while traveling.

Perceptions of crime in SIKA-W districts have not changed since the baseline study. The majority of respondents report instances of petty crimes and offenses (23% say there are "a lot" and 59% say there are "a little"), serious/non-violent crimes (21% say there are "a lot" and 52% say there are "a little"), and serious/violent crimes (19% say "a lot" and 41% say there are "a little") in their area. Respondents living in Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi) are most likely to say there are "none at all" when describing the level of petty crimes (28%), serious/non-violent crimes (44%), and serious/violent crimes in their area (65%).

One-third of respondents in SIKA-W districts (33%) say there are "a lot" of Afghan National Army (ANA) in their area (consistent with Waves 2 and 3, but down from 55% in Wave 1). Forty-one percent of respondents say there are "a lot" of Afghan National Police (ANP) in their area (up from 35% in Waves 2 and 3, and consistent with Wave 1). Levels of confidence in both the ANA and ANP's ability to keep the area safe have increased in Wave 4, after steadily declining in Waves 1-3.



Figure 7.4: Percentage of "a lot" or "some confidence" in ANA/ANP (Q6.2 by Wave)

The reported presence of Arbaki, armed opposition groups, and Afghan Local Police continues to drop, with increasing pluralities saying there are "none" in their area. Since the 2012 baseline study, there has been a decrease in perceptions of ISAF presence in SIKA-W districts. The vast majority of respondents surveyed in Wave 4 (88%) say there are "none" in their area.



Figure 7.5: Presence of ISAF (Q6.1f by Wave)

It is interesting to note how the presence of security forces and opposition groups varies across districts. In Qadis, where respondents tend to have higher perceptions of security, 62% say there are "a lot" of Afghan National Police (compared to 41% of total respondents). In Khak-e-Safayd, where respondents

report the highest levels of crime and insecurity at home, 42% say there are "a lot" of armed opposition groups (compared to 14% of total respondents). The presence of armed opposition groups is a significant predictor of perceived security situation when included as an independent variable in a logistic regression.

Governance

Local governance is a priority of the SIKA-W stabilization project. "The project is designed to improve local governance through district and provincial entity capacity building and mentoring, which then results in small scale stabilization projects."[55] SIKA-W activities have been presented as Afghan government-led activities, with the theory that infrastructure development projects will improve perceptions of the government. Opinions of the Afghan government have improved over time, with increasing majorities saying the Afghan Government is well regarded in their area (67%, up from 62% in Wave 3, 54% in Wave 2, and 63% in Wave 1). However, confidence in local governance declined in Wave 4 after increasing in Wave 3 (See Figure 7.6 below). It is interesting to note how seasonable differences may influence respondents' perceptions of local governance. Perceptions of local governance during the warmer months are slightly lower, during times of increased fighting. As a whole, over half of respondents across all four waves report confidence in local governance.



Figure 7.6: Percentage of "a lot" or "some confidence" in local governing bodies (Q9 by Wave)

Respondents living in Qadis and Muqur report the highest levels of confidence in their district governor, district government, local village/neighborhood leaders, and provincial governor, while those living in Khak-e-Safayd and Shahrak report the lowest levels of confidence.

[55] SIKA West midterm performance evaluation prepared by MSI in March 2014

Both wave and responsiveness of the district governor are significant predictors in a regression of confidence in the district governor. This finding suggests a relationship between declining levels of responsiveness and declining levels of confidence in each local entity. Respondents in Wave 4 are less likely to say their district governor, district government, local village/neighborhood leaders, and provincial governor are responsive ("very responsive" or "somewhat responsive") to the needs of local people in their area.



Figure 7.7: Declining Responsiveness and Confidence in Local Governance (Q9 and Q10 by Wave)

The majority of those surveyed in Wave 4 believe district government officials are from their district (70%, up from 65% in Wave 3); however respondents are divided when asked about their district government's behavior. Just over half of respondents believe their district government understands the problems of people in their area (55%), cares about their area (54%), visits their area (51%), and does not abuse their authority to make money (51%). Fifty-two percent say the district government officials are not doing their jobs honestly and 50% say the district government does not deliver basic services in a fair manner.

Respondents are increasingly aware of the District Development Assembly (DDA) in their districts. Sixty-eight percent say they have heard of the DDA in their district (up from 61% in Wave 3 and 51% in Wave 2). Nearly three-fourths of those who have heard of it (74%, n=2,932) have "a lot" or "some" confidence in their DDA, and 60% believe it is responsive to local needs (down from 65% in Wave 3). Just over half believe the DDA has improved in its ability to get things done over the past year (53%).

As noted in the SIKA-West Midterm Performance Evaluation, monthly District Stability Committee (DSC) meetings were effective at attracting the community to the district center, increasing the authority and

exposure of district entities to their constituents. The DSC meetings allowed for an effective bottom-up communication process for DDAs. [56] Respondents living in Kushk and Pusht-e Rod are most likely to have heard of the DDA in their area (86% and 83%, respectively), and those in Muqur and Shindand are least likely (56% and 58%, respectively).

In the past year, more respondents have also heard of an established Community Development Council (CDC) in their area (65%, consistent with Wave 3 and up from 54% in Wave 2). Sixty percent of those who have heard of a CDC in their area (n=2,803) have confidence in it (down from 65% in Wave 3) and 67% believe it is responsive to local needs. The majority of respondents (60%) believe the CDC has improved in its ability to get things done over the past year. Similar to the DDA, those living in Kushk and Pashtun Zarghun are most likely to have heard of the CDC in their area (76% and 79%, respectively). Those in Bala Boluk and Khak-e Safayd are least likely (50% and 44%, respectively).

Most respondents are divided when asked if it is acceptable for people to publicly criticize the Afghan government (51% say it is acceptable, 47% say it is not). However, there is a correlation between perceptions of local governance and whether or not respondents believe it is acceptable to criticize the Afghan government. This is shown by including easements of confidence in the government in a logistic regression against acceptability of criticizing the government. Confidence in district governors, local village leaders and provincial governors all prove to be significant predictors. In Qadis, respondents have the most positive perceptions of local governance (confidence in governing bodies/DDA/CDC and opinions of responsiveness), and respondents are also most likely to say it is acceptable to criticize the government (63%). In Khak-e-Safayd, respondents have the most negative perceptions of local governance, and respondents are also most likely to say it is unacceptable to criticize the government (69%).

Service Provision & Development

USAID stabilization programming targeted the following government services in SIKA-W districts:

USAID Activities	No. Activities	% Activities
Water and Irrigation	92	33%
Retaining and flood walls	25	9%
Roads and Bridges	73	26%
Education	88	32%
Total	**278**	**100%**

Table 7.2: SIKA-W USAID Stabilization activities targeting government services

[56] SIKA West Midterm Performance Evaluation prepared by MSI in March 2014

The midterm performance evaluation reported that protection walls, water dividers, and culverts were among the most valued mitigation activities funded by SIKA-West.[57] However, the majority of respondents in Wave 4 report *dissatisfaction* with the following district government provisions:

- Medical care (70% dissatisfied, up from 55%)
- Electricity (68% dissatisfied, up from 51%)
- Retaining and flood walls (66% dissatisfied, up from 55%)
- Roads and bridges (66% dissatisfied, up from 55%)
- Agricultural assistance (65% dissatisfied, up from 60%)
- Water for irrigation (64% dissatisfied, up from 52%)
- Schooling for girls (57%, dissatisfied, up from 52%)

The majority of respondents (56%, down from 60%) are satisfied with the government's provision of clean drinking water, and nearly half are satisfied with the government's provision of schooling for boys (49%, up from 40%).

There seems to be no correlation between the districts where stabilization project activities were implemented and respondents' levels of satisfaction. Although 40% of water and irrigation activities were implemented in Qadis, the majority of respondents remain *dissatisfied* with the district government's provision of clean drinking water (53%) and water for irrigation uses (61%).

The majority of respondents (58%) say they have not seen or heard about any development projects in their local area in the past year. Respondents living in Shahrak (61%) and Chaghcharan (60%) are most likely to have seen or heard about development projects in their area, although only 3% of stabilization project activities were implemented in Shahrak and 7% in Chaghcharan. Those living in Bala Boluk (18%), where 12% of stabilization project activities were implemented, are least likely to have heard of development projects in their area. Among those who have heard about development projects (n=1,686), 67% say they are aware of projects for drinking water in their area. Much smaller percentages of respondents say they have seen or heard about projects for schools (47%), roads and bridges (47%), agricultural assistance (36%), irrigation/water (33%), retaining and flood walls (30%), medical facilities (28%), farm produce (23%), and electricity (13%).

Looking forward to the next year, respondents in SIKA-W districts most frequently mention the following development projects as being needed in their area:[58]

[57] SIKA West Midterm Performance Evaluation prepared by MSI in March 2014

[58] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Views on development projects for next year: SIKA-W Districts	
Road construction	34%
Electricity	34%
Education and School	25%
Clinics	19%
Water	19%

Table 7.3: SIKA-W: Views on development projects for next year

Respondents were also asked about the obstacles preventing them from obtaining health care or medicine. The most frequent responses include: [59]

Views on the obstacles preventing respondents from obtaining health care or medicine.: SIKA-W Districts	
Lack of clinics/hospitals	44%
Lack of medicines	31%
Lack of professional doctors	26%
Distance to facilities/lack of transportation/lack of good roads	20%
Poor security	19%

Table 7.4: SIKA-W: Obstacles preventing respondents from obtaining health care or medicine

Rule of Law

Consistent with previous waves, respondents are most likely to turn to local/tribal elders to seek justice when they are involved in a dispute. As disputes get more serious, respondents are slightly more inclined to turn to government courts. For example, 29% say they would turn to government courts if they were involved in a dispute concerning land or water, 31% say the same about disputes concerning theft, and 42% say they would turn to government courts if they were involved with assault, murder, or kidnapping. The majority of those living in Qadis say they would seek justice from their government court if they were involved in cases of theft (53%), land or water disputes (61%), and assault, murder, or kidnapping (67%).

Respondents are least likely to seek justice from armed opposition groups; however, 17% say they would turn to armed opposition groups for cases of theft. More respondents from Shahrak rely on armed opposition groups compared to respondents from other districts served by SIKA-W. Nearly half of respondents in Shahrak say they have confidence ("some confidence" and "a lot of confidence") in armed opposition groups to resolve disputes fairly (48%, compared to 28% overall).

[59] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

When respondents discuss how to resolve disputes fairly, 86% of respondents report having confidence in local/tribal elders and 67% report having confidence in government courts. Respondents are more likely to believe decisions made by local/tribal elders are "always" respected than decisions made by government courts (36%, compared to 23%). Nearly half of respondents (48%) believe decisions made by armed opposition groups are "never" respected.



Figure 7.8: Respect of Decisions Made by Elders, Courts, Opposition Groups (Q22a-Q22c)

Corruption

More than eight of ten respondents (82%, up from 74% in Wave 3) admit corruption is a problem in their area. Respondents in Bala Boluk and Pusht-e Rod are most likely to say corruption is a problem (96% each). Half of respondents overall (50%) say corruption has increased ("increased a lot" and "increased a little") in their area, and 37% say it has stayed the same.

Respondents were asked to name the department or sector of the local government that people most complain about corruption; in an open-ended format, the top mentions include: courts (16%), District/Office of Attorney (11%), customs (7%), the municipality (6%), and police (6%), and the Ministry of Education (5%).

Quality of Life

Respondents remain generally satisfied with their quality of life, with 66% saying they are "somewhat satisfied" or "very satisfied" with life as a whole. Those living in Qadis and Pusht-e Rod (82% each) are most positive about their quality of life, reporting that they are satisfied with their life as a whole. Respondents in Kushk are least satisfied with their life as a whole (46%).



Figure 7.9: SIKA-W: Satisfaction with Life

Forty-five percent say they are satisfied with their household's current financial situation, and 42% say their ability to meet their basic needs has increased ("increased a lot" and "increased a little") in the past year. Looking forward, nearly half (48%) say they are "a little worried" about meeting their basic needs over the next year, while one-fourth say they are "not worried" (26%) and another fourth say they are "very worried" (25%).

The majority of respondents (54%) say their area is too uncertain to make plans about their future, while 45% say their area is certain enough for them to make plans about their future. As expected, districts where more respondents report satisfaction with their life (Qadis and Pusht-e Rod) also have more respondents who say the situation in their area is certain enough for them to make future plans (71% and 62% respectively).

Economic Activity

When asked to think about their access to local markets, 39% say their ability to get to local markets has gotten better ("a little better" and "much better") over the past year, 37% say it has stayed about the same, and 24% say it has gotten worse ("a little worse" and "much worse"). Although respondents believe markets are more accessible, the majority of respondents (54%) believe prices for basic goods in local markets have increased ("increased a lot" and "increased a little") over the past year.

Although 25% of SIKA-W activities focus on vocational efforts, perceptions of paid jobs have not changed in SIKA-W districts. About one third say there are more (34%, "a lot more" or "a little more") paid jobs this year than last year, another third say there are less (32%, "a lot less" or "a little less"), and another third say there are about the same amount of jobs (34%). Respondents in Chaghcharan are most likely (48%) and respondents in Kushk are least likely (12%) to agree that there are more paid jobs in their area than last year. It is interesting to note that there were no vocational activities implemented in Chaghcharan, while 10% of vocational activities (n=67) were executed in Kushk.[60]

Community Cohesion and Resilience

Seven of ten respondents say things from outside their village/neighborhood "never" or "rarely" create problems in their area that disrupt normal life (71%, up from 63% in Wave 3), while one in four say things outside their area "often" or "sometimes" cause problems (26%). When respondents were asked what types of outside interferences cause problems in their village/neighborhood. The most common responses include: [61]

Most common types of outside interferences: SIKA-W Districts	
Small crimes/theft	31%
Existence/Presence of Taliban	19%
Ethnic disputes	15%
Insecurity	10%
Armed people	10% (down from 19%)
Road-side bombs/suicide attacks	9%

Table 7.5: SIKA-W: Most common types of outside interferences

Respondents in Pusht-e Rod (34%) and Khak-e-Safayd (26%) are more likely to say the existence/presence of Taliban causes problems in their area compared to those in other districts. About one-third of respondents in Bala Boluk (32%) and Khak-e-Sayfd (33%) say road-side bombs/suicide attacks cause problems in their area.

Perceptions were similar when respondents were asked how often *internal* interferences cause problems in their area. Nearly three of four respondents (74%) say things from inside their village/area "never" or "rarely" create problems to disrupt normal life, and 24% say they "sometimes" or "often" do.

[60] Using a hierarchical model of the total budget for completed or ongoing projects in a district indicates that project activity is not a significant factor in modeling how respondents view the number of jobs in their districts.

[61] This question was only asked of respondents who answered "often," "sometimes," or "rarely" when asked how often outside factors create problems in their area (n=1526). Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

When asked about the types of internal interferences that cause problems in their village/neighborhood, respondents most frequently mention: [62]

Most common types of internal interferences: SIKA-W Districts	
Ethnic disputes	32% (down from 41%)
Small crimes/theft	18%
Disputes over water	14%
Land disputes	12%
Armed people	11% (up from 5%)
Insecurity	11% (up from 6%)

Table 7.6: SIKA-W: Most common types of internal interferences

A plurality of respondents in Pusht-e Rod (23%) responded that "drug-addicts" disrupt normal life in their area, although this was not frequently mentioned in other districts.

The majority of respondents living in SIKA-W districts (63%) believe that villages/neighborhoods in their area are "often" or "sometimes" able to work together to solve problems. Respondents in Bala Boluk mostly say they are "rarely" or "never" able to work together to solve problems (56%, compared to 36% of total respondents).

More than half of respondents (59%) believe local elders "sometimes" or "often" consider the interests of ordinary people in their village/neighborhood when making decisions. Forty percent believe they "rarely" or "never" do. Respondents in Bala Boluk (56%) and Khak-e-Safayd (55%) report the least efficacy, with majorities saying local elders "rarely" or "never" consider their interests when making decisions that will affect them. Overall, 59% of respondents perceive their local elders to be effective ("somewhat effective" and "very effective") at securing funds from the district or provincial government for their local needs.

Respondents are divided when asked how often women's interests are considered when decisions are made by local leaders.

[62] This question was only asked of respondents who answered "often," "sometimes," or "rarely" when asked how often inside factors create problems in their area (n=1486). Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

"In your opinion, when decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of women considered?" (Wave 4)[63]



Figure 7.10: Women's Interests in Decision Making (Q37b by District)

Eighty-one percent of respondents in SIKA-W districts do not belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss common interests or do certain activities together. Of those who do belong to such groups (n=760), respondents mostly belong to: development councils (39%), farmers unions (32%, up from 26% in Wave 3), welfare foundations (18%, up from 13% in Wave 3), people's councils (13%), business companies (10%), and women solidarity unions (9%).[64]

Grievances

Grievances vary when respondents are asked to identify the biggest problems that create stress or tension in their areas. The most common responses include: [65]

[63] This question was filtered. The n=sizes here represent respondents who answered "often," "sometimes," or "rarely" when asked if local leaders consider the interests of ordinary people in Q37a.

[64] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

[65] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Most common types of Grievances: SIKA-W Districts	
Unemployment	35% (up from 24%)
Insecurity	33%
Lack of electricity	16%
Lack of paved roads	11%
Illiteracy	10%

Table 7.7: SIKA-W: Most common types of Grievances

"Unemployment" was more frequently mentioned in Bala Boluk (56%), Pusht-e Rod (47%), and Kushk (46%).

Media

Respondents usually use radio (80%), the Mosque/Mullah (72%), friends and family (90%), and elders (84%) to communicate with others and/or get news and information. They are less likely to use television (45%) and cell phones (26%). Very few respondents mention using posters/billboards (3%) and newspapers (2%). Almost all of those surveyed (99%) say they do not use the Internet or e-mail to communicate with others and/or get news and information.

Respondents get most of their information about government services from the radio (60%) and through word of mouth (friends/family (38%), elders (30%), the Mosque/Mullah (23%).[66]

[66] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

SIKA-W Appendix

Model 1

Hierarchal Model

Response: Q1. Generally speaking, are things in [name the district] going in the right direction or in the wrong direction? Is that a lot or a little?

q1NET ~ dummy(d1) + d3 + dummy(eth) + (rescale(totalexped_complete) | dis)

				95% CI for odds ratio		
	B	SE	Sig	Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	0.57	0.04		1.77	1.65	1.91
D1 : Female	0.02	0.02		1.02	0.99	1.06
Education	0	0		1	0.99	1
Ethnicity: Tajik	-0.16	0.02		0.85	0.81	0.89
Ethnicity: Uzbek	-0.14	0.1		0.87	0.72	1.06
Ethnicity: Hazara	0.1	0.08		1.1	0.95	1.29
Ethnicity: Other	-0.2	0.04		0.82	0.75	0.89

Random Effects

	Intercept	B	SE (B)
Bala Boluk	0.08592	-0.0441	0.05
Chaghcharan	0.10351	-0.0531	0.02
Khak-e-Safayd	0.11029	-0.0566	0.03
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	0.0528	-0.0271	0.02
Muqur	-0.0409	0.021	0.02
Pashtun Zarghun	-0.1071	0.05496	0.02
Pusht-e Rod	-0.1033	0.053	0.03
Qadis	-0.2686	0.13785	0.02
Shahrak	0.12439	-0.0638	0.02
Shindand	0.01358	-0.007	0.02

Model 2

Response: Q2a. Would you say security in your local area is good, fair or poor? Is that 'very good/poor'?

q2aNET ~ dummy(d1) + d3 + dummy(eth) + q6_1d

				95% CI for odds ratio		
	B	SE	Sig	Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	0.04	0.05		1.04	0.94	1.16
D1 : Female	0.28	0.07	*	1.32	1.15	1.51
Education	0.01	0.01		1.01	0.99	1.02
Ethnicity: Tajik	-0.4	0.07	*	0.67	0.59	0.76
Ethnicity: Uzbek	-0.07	0.39		0.93	0.43	2.02
Ethnicity: Hazara	1.46	0.45	*	4.28	1.92	11.42
Ethnicity: Other	-0.6	0.16	*	0.55	0.4	0.76
q6_1d	0.01	0	*	1.01	1	1.01

Model 3

Hierarchal Model

Response: Q33. Compared to a year ago, how would you describe the availability of paid jobs in your local area? Are there a lot more, a little more, about the same, a few less, or a lot less paid jobs available in your local area?

q33NET ~ dummy(d1) + d3 + dummy(eth) + (rescale(totalexped_complete) | dis)

				95% CI for odds ratio		
	B	SE	Sig	Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	0.39	0.03		1.47	1.38	1.57
D1 : Female	-0.01	0.02		0.99	0.95	1.02
Education	0	0		1	1	1.01
Ethnicity: Tajik	0.02	0.02		1.02	0.97	1.07
Ethnicity: Uzbek	0.24	0.1		1.28	1.06	1.54
Ethnicity: Hazara	-0.01	0.09		0.99	0.83	1.17
Ethnicity: Other	0.04	0.05		1.05	0.96	1.14

Random Effects

	Intercept	B	SE (B)
Bala Boluk	-0.0798	0.15108	0.08
Chaghcharan	0.1025	-0.1523	0.03
Khak-e-Safayd	0.07786	-0.1183	0.03
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	-0.2373	0.36055	0.02
Muqur	-0.1143	0.16525	0.04
Pashtun Zarghun	-0.0216	0.03182	0.03
Pusht-e Rod	0.10827	-0.1486	0.06
Qadis	-0.0874	0.12801	0.04
Shahrak	0.02324	-0.0353	0.02
Shindand	-0.0459	0.06981	0.02

VIII. COMMUNITY COHESION INITIATIVE – CREATIVE (CCI-C)

Introduction

The Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) is a project of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives. Its goal is to increase the resilience of residents and communities in areas of Afghanistan that are susceptible to insurgency and other sources of instability. CCI utilizes USAID's definition of resilience to develop and inform its project activities: "the ability of people, households, communities, countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth."[67]



Figure 8.1: USAID Conceptual Framework for Resilience

[67] United States Agency for International Development, *Policy and Program Guidance: Building Resilience to Recurrent Crisis*, Washington, DC, 2012, http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/USAIDResiliencePolicyGuidanceDocument.pdf (accessed September 25, 2014).

USAID's conceptual framework for resilience states that in order to increase resilience, a community must increase its adaptive capacity and its ability to reduce risk. The primary components of adaptive capacity and risk reduction are displayed in the graphic to the left.

With the goal of increasing resilience in mind, the CCI project has two primary objectives: 1) strengthening ties between local actors, customary governance structures, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), and 2) increasing cohesion among and between communities by bringing communities together through projects to address common needs.[68]

The CCI project is implemented throughout Afghanistan by two separate organizations that target different districts. Creative Associates International is the implementing partner for CCI in southern and eastern provinces in Afghanistan: Ghazni, Khost, Kunar, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, and Uruzgan. For disambiguation purposes, this project is referred to as CCI-C throughout the report. CCI-C targets the following districts in Afghanistan:

District	Sample size	SRS MOE
Qarah Bagh	478	4.48%
Gelan	348	5.25%
Muqer	352	5.22%
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)	400	4.90%
Bak	307	5.59%
Shamul (Dzadran)	311	5.56%
Khas Kunar	480	4.47%
Sar Kani	319	5.49%
Marawarah	320	5.48%
Nahr-e Saraj	478	4.48%
Kajaki	472	4.51%
Sangin	478	4.48%
Musa Qal'ah	456	4.59%
Spin Boldak	479	4.48%
Panjwa'i	476	4.49%
Zharay	465	4.54%
Qalat	465	4.54%
Khas Uruzgan	352	5.22%
Shahid-e Hasas	314	5.53%
Dand	475	4.50%
CCI-C Overall	**8,225**	**1.08% (2.97% Complex MOE)**

Table 8.1: CCI-C Wave 4 Districts

[68] United States Agency for International Development, *Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) Mid-Term Performance Evaluation Report: March 2012-December 2013*, Washington, DC, 2014, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/ PA00JW3H.pdf (accessed September 25, 2014).

This chapter provides summary and detailed information about the attitudes and opinions of respondents living in districts targeted by CCI-C activities. The report compares findings across four waves of research to examine trends in stabilization and shifts in development indicators on the following topics: security and crime, governance, service provision and development, rule of law, corruption, quality of life, economic activity, community cohesion and resilience, grievances, and media. Respondents in CCI districts were also asked a specialized set of questions designed for the CCI project, all of which relate to voting and elections.

Throughout this chapter, special emphasis will be given to survey results that address components of the conceptual framework for resilience and the two stated objectives of the CCI project. Additional context will also be provided by the CCI Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, which evaluates CCI-C project activities from March 2012-December 2013. Multi-level qualitative methods, including observation, interviews, and desk review of project documents, are used in the performance evaluation.[69]

It should be noted that districts included in CCI-C varied by wave, and settlements sampled in Wave 3 were purposefully excluded from selection in Wave 4. This is particularly important to keep in mind when considering wave-to-wave analysis, as changes in the composition of project districts can have a significant impact on trend analysis. The addition or removal of particular districts can shift the overall results within any particular wave of research, so changes from wave to wave may not, in fact, be changes in the trend, but may be a factor of which districts were included or excluded from the analysis. For this reason, we present the following list of districts by wave and their sample sizes:

CCI-C Districts	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4
Qarah Bagh (1)	644	469	467	478
Ghazni	0	484	0	0
Gelan	655	489	474	348
Muqer	622	492	495	352
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu)	0	492	0	0
Orgun	650	0	0	0
Bermal	147	0	0	0
Sar Rowzah	336	0	0	0
Sabari (Ya qubi)	0	298	0	0
Tanai	0	489	0	0
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)	616	488	495	400
Gurbuz	0	493	0	0
Bak	328	492	496	307
Shamul (Dzadran)	0	494	416	311

[69] The Mid-Term Performance Evaluation was prepared by MSI in May 2014. It should be noted that conclusions drawn in the performance evaluation were based on project activities implemented until December 2013. This report refers to the most up-to-date data on project activities until February 2014.

CCI-C Districts	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4
Tsowkey	654	495	0	0
Khas Kunar	654	494	494	480
Narang	0	481	0	0
Shigal wa Sheltan	0	495	0	0
Sar Kani	334	496	352	319
Marawarah	280	496	336	320
Nahr-e Saraj	654	450	472	478
Kajaki	0	0	319	472
Lashkar Gah	0	491	0	0
Sangin	656	309	397	478
Musa Qal'ah	655	286	410	456
Spin Boldak	655	493	463	479
Panjwa'i	640	496	479	476
Zharay	651	493	478	465
Shah Wali Kot	0	496	0	0
Shah Joy	0	494	0	0
Qalat	623	0	496	465
Tarnak wa Jaldak	0	399	0	0
Tarin Kot	0	467	0	0
Khas Uruzgan	647	0	495	352
Shahid-e Hasas	653	0	462	314
Dand	643	493	496	475
TOTALS	**12,397**	**13,504**	**8,992**	**8,225**

Table 8.2: CCI-C Districts by Wave

Interviews in Musa Qal'ah and Sangin were conducted in part by a field team from Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC) and in part by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic Research (ACSOR). The other districts were conducted entirely by ACSOR. Differences exist in the field implementation and quality control measures used for the AYC interviews, which may impact some survey results. For detailed descriptions of these differences, refer to the full Methodology Report for MISTI Wave 4.

ACSOR regularly updates its accessibility tracker. This tracker indicates accessibility of districts for the field staff and the reasons for inaccessibility, whether it be insecurity or transportation. Additionally, the accessibility tracker indicates which districts are inaccessible to ACSOR's female staff. The following districts were inaccessible to women and only included men in the sample:

- Gelan
- Muqer
- Sar Kani
- Marawarah
- Kajaki

- Sangin
- Musa Qal'ah
- Khas Uruzgan
- Shahid-e Hasas

Unless otherwise noted, district-level analysis and wave-to-wave comparisons are provided with significance testing at the 99% confidence level.

CCI-C Project Activities

The CCI-C project started in March 2012, but the implementation of activities did not begin until September 2012. As of February 2014, 153 (23%) project activities were in the pipeline, 226 (35%) were ongoing, and 273 (42%) were completed[70]. Under CCI-C's task order, project activities are scheduled to continue through the end of February 2015. Of the 499 project activities that started or completed implementation by February 2014, 39% were 'hard' project activities dealing with infrastructure improvements, and 61% were 'soft' project activities, which includes media, socio-cultural, training, and technical assistance activities.

Project activities have the overall goal of increasing community resilience, and they seek to address the main programmatic objectives of strengthening ties between local actors and formal government structures and increasing cohesion among and between communities. Of the project activities that have been implemented, 61% seek to strengthen ties between local actors and the government, and 23% seek to build community cohesion. Sixteen percent of project activities seek to advance both of these objectives.

CCI-C project activities have a variety of mechanisms by which they advance the goals of stabilization programming. For example, the repair of a retaining wall in the Jandrai village of northern Khost strengthens ties between government actors and the community by enabling the district government to provide a needed service and increases community resilience by reducing the risk of future flooding. A karez rehabilitation project to improve agricultural irrigation in southern Ghazni increases community cohesion by bringing together different communities to solve a problem that is impeding the economic advancement of them all. As stated in the CCI Mid-Term Performance Evaluation Report, "program objectives are not met solely by refurbishing a school or a clinic…but are to be met through an inclusive locally-led process…that brings the community (including GIRoA) together to realize its goals and foster linkages and cohesion."[71]

Of the 499 project activities implemented, 396 were executed in 19 CCI-C districts surveyed in Wave 4:[72]

[70] Data about project activities were provided by the implementing partner Architecture, Engineering, Consulting, Operations and Maintenance (AECOM). It is important to note that the most up-to-date project data used in this report was collected until February 2014, prior to fieldwork.

[71] United States Agency for International Development, *Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) Mid-Term Performance Evaluation Report: March 2012-December 2013*, Washington, DC, 2014, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00JW3H .pdf (accessed September 25, 2014).

[72] A 20th CCI-c District, Dand, was included in the Wave 4 survey; however no project activities have yet been implemented in Dand.



Figure 8.2: CCI-C Project Activities by District

Using hierarchal regression modeling, the frequency of activities in a district is not a significant predictor of respondent's perceptions of life in their district. As a whole, 58% of respondents living in CCI-C districts say things in their district are headed in the right direction ("a lot" or "a little"), while 39% say wrong direction. There is a lot of variation across districts, from 28% of Qalat residents saying 'right direction', versus 87% in Sar Kani. While Qalat has the lowest incidence of respondents saying 'right direction' in conjunction with one of the lowest percentages of project activities (2.3%), 78% of Khas Uruzgan residents report 'right direction,' despite having an even smaller percentage of project activities (1.3%). In addition, the district with the largest share of project activities—Sangin with 9.6%—has a comparatively low percentage of respondents reporting 'right direction' (43%).

Wave 4: CCI-Creative | MISTI Fact Sheet

OVERVIEW

The goal of the Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) is to increase the resilience of Afghan communities by strengthening ties between local actors and customary government structures and by increasing cohesion between communities. The CCI program is implemented in southeastern Afghanistan by Creative Associates International and serves key districts in Ghazni, Khost, Kunar, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, and Uruzgan. Findings here summarize attitudes and perceptions of respondents living in these districts.

SECURITY AND CRIME

Evaluations of security are important to the CCI program because insecurity contributes to the shocks and stresses that lead to crisis in Afghan communities. Although nearly half of respondents believe their area has become more secure in the past year, the proportion reporting that security in their area is good has steadily decreased across all four waves of research.

Most respondents report feeling secure at home during the day, although there was a significant increase in those feeling insecure between Wave 3 and Wave 4. Majorities report feeling secure at home during the night and while traveling to a neighboring village; half of respondents feel secure when traveling to the district or provincial capital.

The perception that there are "a lot" of Afghan National Army (ANA) troops in local areas has increased over time, but this has not translated to an increase in confidence in the ANA. Fewer respondents report seeing "a lot" of Afghan National Police and Arbaki in Wave 4, though there is a growing proportion of respondents who see "a lot" of Afghan Local Police.

Wave 4: Perceptions of Security (CCI-Creative)



The perceived presence of armed opposition groups has increased, with 7 in 10 respondents reporting their activity. Respondents in Qalat are most likely to report "a lot" of armed opposition groups.

GOVERNANCE

Given CCI-C's program objective of strengthening ties between local actors and customary governance structures, respondents' opinions of government officials is a key indicator. Seven in ten respondents believe the Afghan government is well regarded in their area. Confidence in provincial governors decreased in Wave 4 after increasing in Waves 1-3.

Overall confidence in district governors is eroding, though a majority still report having "a lot" or "some" confidence. Respondents in Helmand have the least confidence in their district governors; half of Musa Qal'ah respondents report having no confidence and large minorities from each of the other surveyed Helmand districts agree.

Confidence in local village or neighborhood leaders is highest, with eight in ten respondents saying they have "some" or "a lot" of confidence. More than nine in ten respondents in each Helmand district and in Qalat in Zabul report confidence in local leaders.

Opinions of district and provincial leaders have declined or remained stagnant, while positive opinions of local leaders have increased over time. In order to better achieve its' program objective, CCI-C programming should redouble efforts to explicitly connect district and provincial officials with local leaders in the eyes of the public.

SERVICE PROVISION AND DEVELOPMENT

A large proportion of CCI-C's project activities seek to deliver goods and services—of the activities implemented as of February 2014, one-third dealt with infrastructure improvements.

Nearly half of respondents in Waves 3 and 4 say services from the government have improved in the past year; this is a slight increase from Waves 1 and 2. When asking about the provision of specific goods, improvements are small and changes are uneven. Satisfaction with clean drinking water is an exception, which saw an increase to three-quarters

Wave 4: CCI-Creative | MISTI Fact Sheet

of respondents in Wave 4. Spin Boldak residents are the least satisfied with the provision of most of the goods asked about.

Improvements in satisfaction with services are small and inconsistent. Though the percentage of respondents reporting satisfaction with schooling for girls has not changed since Wave 3, an increasing percentage report that this service is not provided. In Kajaki, over 8 in 10 respondents say schooling for girls is not provided.

RULE OF LAW AND CORRUPTION

Respondents are most likely to seek justice from local/tribal elders when they are involved in a dispute. As disputes become more serious, respondents are more inclined to turn to government courts, though nearly half still prefer local leaders in the case of serious crimes. More than nine in ten respondents believe local leaders' decisions are "always" or "mostly" respected.



Nearly nine in ten respondents admit that corruption is a problem in their area, a proportion that has been slowly rising since Wave 1. Majorities in each district agree; every respondent surveyed in Helmand province believes corruption is a problem.

QUALITY OF LIFE AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Two-thirds of respondents say they are satisfied with life as a whole, though this proportion has decreased since Wave 3. Those living in Qalat are the least satisfied with life in general and with the current economic situation.

Although one-fourth of CCI-C programming focuses on vocational efforts, perceived availability of paid jobs has decreased since Wave 3; however, the trajectory of this measure has not remained steady over time.

COMMUNITY COHESION AND RESILIENCE

Another primary objective of the CCI program is to increase cohesion among and between communities. When asked about how often things from outside their village create problems, half of Wave 3 and 4 respondents say these things "never" create problems; this is an increase from Waves 1 and 2. Water disputes are the most often mentioned source of conflict both within and between villages.

A growing majority of respondents believe people in the area are "often" or "sometimes" able to solve problems coming from outside the village. When asked how often villages in the area work together to solve problems, nearly three-quarters say this happens "often" or "sometimes," demonstrating a high level of cohesion and village-to-village problem solving.

MEDIA

Respondents report that they depend primarily on the radio or word of mouth to get news and information about government services. Cell phones and television are not as popular, and very few respondents rely on print media. Virtually no respondents use the Internet or e-mail to communicate or receive information.

ELECTIONS

A plurality of respondents in Wave 4 believe "hardly any" or only "some" of the people in their area voted in the April 2014 election; however results from Wave 3, which asked about the 2009 election, indicate that respondents believe more people voted in 2014 than in 2009. Respondents in Khas Uruzgan, Zharay and Panjwa'i are most likely to report "hardly any" people voting in 2014. Qalat, which has been a negative outlier for many indicators, is on the positive extreme in this instance; more than 9 in 10 respondents report "a lot" or "almost all" people voted in their area.



Respondents believe that more people voted in the 2014 election than in 2009.

Security and Crime

Evaluations of security are important to the CCI project because insecurity and conflict contribute to the shocks and stresses that lead to crisis and a lack of resilience in Afghan communities. Though environmental disasters can lead to risk as well, undoubtedly a major problem in CCI-C districts is the insurgency and a lack of security. Understanding the drivers of this conflict and how it manifests will enable CCI-C implementers to help communities mitigate the risks associated with these shocks.

Nearly half (48%) of respondents in CCI-C districts believe their area has become "somewhat" or "much" more secure in the past year, and this assessment has remained relatively unchanged in all four waves of research. Despite these consistent perceptions of improvement, respondents' overall assessment of the current security in their area has declined slightly over each wave. Forty-six percent of respondents in Wave 4 say security in their area is "very good" or "good," compared to the 58% in Wave 1 who share this opinion. An independent proportions test confirms that Wave 1's proportion of positive responses is greater than that of Wave 4 ($p<0.05$). By district, CCI-C respondent opinions can vary substantially. In Qalat, for example, 71% say security in their area is "poor" or "very poor," compared to the 76% of those in Sar Kani who say their security is "good" or "very good."



Figure 8.3: CCI-C: Perception of Security

The assessment of road security in CCI-C districts overall has remained largely positive over time; currently, 59% say it is "somewhat" or "very" good, and there are no significant differences from wave to wave. However, majorities in Qalat (72%), Musa Qal'ah (61%), Kajaki (56%), and Sangin (54%) express significant concern, evaluating security on their roads as either "somewhat" or "very" bad. Respondents in CCI-C districts overall are also twice as likely to say road security has improved (45%) rather than worsened (23%), with 32% saying it stayed the same over the past year. Not surprisingly, respondents in Qalat (71%) and Musa Qal'ah (49%) are the most likely to say road conditions worsened either "a little" or "a lot" in the past year.

Respondents are asked to evaluate their personal security in four different situations. Most respondents in CCI-C districts report feeling secure at home during the day, although there was a significant increase in those feeling insecure between Wave 3 and Wave 4 (from 13% to 21%). Respondents in Qalat are far more negative than respondents in other districts, with 67% saying they feel insecure in their home during the day. For the remaining scenarios, the trend has remained relatively stable over time. Sixty-six percent of respondents report feeling secure at home during the night, 62% report feeling secure traveling to a neighboring village, and 50% report feeling secure traveling to the district or provincial capital.



Figure 8.4: Percentage of "very" or "somewhat secure" in homes (Q4a and Q4b by Wave)

Overall evaluations of the frequency of petty offenses and serious crime have remained stable over all four waves when averaging respondents from CCI-C districts. When looking at individual districts in Wave 4, 55% of respondents in Zharay say there is "a lot" of petty crime (theft of food or goods worth less than 1000 Afs) in their area, while 58% of those in Marawarah say there is "none at all". For serious, non-violent crime (theft of goods worth more than 5,000 Afs), 41% of respondents in Musa Qal'ah say this happens "a lot," while 64% of those in Marawarah say there is "none at all". When considering serious, violent crime (murder, assault and kidnapping), 28% of Khas Uruzgan respondents, 27% in Shahid-e Hasas and 26% in Qalat say this happens "a lot."

A majority (56%) of Wave 4 respondents report that petty crime has decreased in the past year, with 29% saying rates are the same, and 15% saying petty crime has increased. Seventy-eight percent of Khas Uruzgan residents, and 70% in Nahr-e Saraj report less petty crime in the past year. With regards to serious, non-violent crimes, 70% of Nahr-e Saraj residents report less in the past year, in comparison to 52% overall. Nahr-e Saraj also has the largest percentage of residents (63%) reporting a decrease in serious violent crimes in the past year, in comparison to 47% overall.

Overall, the perception that there are "a lot" of Afghan National Army (ANA) troops in their area has increased each wave, from 48% (Wave 1), to 53% (Wave 2), to 58% (Wave 3), to now 61% of respondents agreeing in Wave 4. This has not translated to an increase in confidence in the ANA; the proportion saying they have "a lot" of confidence in the ANA in Wave 1 (38%), Wave 2 (50%), Wave 3 (42%), and Wave 4 (40%) does not show the same consistent, upward trend. Evaluations of ANA improvements in their ability to provide security in the area have followed the same trend as perceived confidence. The proportions of respondents in CCI-C districts who believe the ANA has "improved a lot" over the past year are 32% (Wave 1), 37% (Wave 2), 33% (Wave 3), and 35% (Wave 4).

The number of respondents stating there are "a lot" of Afghan National Police (ANP) in their area has decreased slightly since Wave 3 (50% in Wave 4 versus 54% in Wave 3). This breaks the previous trend, which saw progressive growth from Wave 1 to Wave 3. This is accompanied by a small increase in the number of people reporting "a little" or "no" confidence in the ANP (38% in Wave 4, up from 35% in Wave 3). There has also been a small shift in perceptions of the ANP's ability to provide security. Fifty-seven percent report their ability has improved in the past year, which has remained steady since Wave 3; but there has been a 3% shift from "stayed the same" to "worsened" in Wave 4 (25% "stayed the same" and 17% "worsened").

After a large increase between Waves 2 and 3 in the percentage of CCI-C respondents who report "a lot" of Arbaki in their area (Wave 1: 28%, Wave 2: 17%, Wave 3: 34%), the proportion of respondents answering thusly in Wave 4 has decreased slightly to 31%. However, the proportion of respondents who say there are "a lot" of Afghan Local Police (ALP) in their area continues to grow, with 37% saying so in Wave 4 (Wave 1: 34%, Wave 2: 30%, Wave 3: 32%). Not surprisingly, the proportion who say there are "a lot" of International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in their area remains low. After dropping from 20% to 10% between Waves 1 and 3, the percentage remains at 9% in Wave 4. Similarly, the percent who say there are "none" in their area increased from 26% (Wave 1), to 36% (Wave 2), to 50% (Wave 3), and now is holding steady at 51% in Wave 4. As ISAF continues to draw down, this trend of Afghans seeing fewer ISAF troops will continue.

The proportion of CCI-C respondents who report that there are no Armed Opposition Groups in their areas in Wave 4 is 30%, a decrease from 39% in Wave 3. Prior to Wave 4, the percentage of respondents reporting no Armed Opposition Groups was on an upward trajectory, with 24% in Wave 1, and 33% in Wave 2. In Wave 4, a greater proportion of respondents (49%, up from 39% in Wave 3) now report "some" presence of Armed Opposition Groups in their area. However, when included as a predictor in a logistic regression model of local security, the presence of Armed Opposition Groups in the area is not a significant predictor ($p > 0.05$). The lowest reported presence of Armed Opposition Groups is in Khas Kunar, where 66% say there are "none" in their area. Other districts where a majority reports there are

no Armed Opposition Groups in their area include: Sar Kani (65%), Terayzai ('Ali Sher) (59%), Bak (55%), Marawarah (54%), and Shamul (52%).

Governance

Given CCI's program objective of strengthening ties between local actors, customary governance structures, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), respondents' opinions of government officials is a key indicator of the impact of CCI-C's project activities. CCI-C has two main methods of achieving this objective: 1) "bringing GIRoA officials into processes that connected them with communities in grant development and implementation" and 2) providing "grants that focused on increasing government capacity, communications, and credibility."[73] By these means, CCI-C activities should have the effect of increasing GIRoA presence and visibility within communities and increasing its capacity to address and resolve problems for communities. Of the project activities that have been implemented as of February 2014, 61% specifically seek to strengthen ties between local actors and the government, while 23% are targeted at building community cohesion. Sixteen percent of project activities seek to advance both of the main program objectives.

Just over seven out of ten respondents (70%) living in CCI-C districts believe the Afghan government is well regarded in their area; this is a slight decrease from 72% in Wave 3, which follows a gradual increase from 68% in Wave 1, and 70% in Wave 2. In evaluating respondents' openness in answering this question, it should be noted that 46% of Wave 4 respondents also say "it is not acceptable to publicly criticize the Afghan government," though this is a decrease from the 51% who agreed with that statement in Wave 3. While it is not clear if respondents viewed the interview process as a "public" format, this indicates there could be a social desirability bias impacting measures of governance and that actual evaluations of government performance could perhaps be lower than reported.

Overall confidence in district governors has been slowly eroding over time, with 66% of Wave 4 CCI-C respondents reporting "a lot" or "some" confidence (Wave 1: 72%, Wave 2: 70%, Wave 3: 69%). Respondents in Helmand province stand out as having the least confidence in their district governors. Half (51%) of respondents in Musa Qal'ah report having "no" confidence in their district governors; large proportions of respondents in Kajaki (31%), Sangin (30%) and Nahr-e Saraj (19%) report "no" confidence as well. The only other district with such high levels of no confidence is Qalat in Zabul province (26%). Opinions of responsiveness closely follow those of confidence; 51% in Musa Qal'ah say their district governor is "very unresponsive" to the needs of local people, and 32% in Sangin and Qalat agree. Not surprisingly, respondents in these districts are also most likely to say their district governor's ability to get things done has "worsened a lot" in the past year; 54% in Qalat and 46% in Musa Qal'ah share this assessment.

Respondents in Musa Qal'ah and Qalat also give the lowest rating of their district government overall, with 40% and 30% respectively sharing a "no confidence" evaluation. This trend continues for measures

[73] United States Agency for International Development, *Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) Mid-Term Performance Evaluation Report: March 2012-December 2013*, Washington, DC, 2014, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00JW3H .pdf (accessed September 25, 2014).

of responsiveness and improvement, with respondents in Qalat and Musa Qal'ah rating their district government lowest of all CCI-C districts on both of those measures.

Confidence levels in local village or neighborhood leaders are highest of all government officials or offices, with 84% of CCI-C respondents overall saying they have "some" or "a lot" of confidence, and only 2% who say they have "no confidence." Respondents in every Helmand district that was surveyed had greater than 90% confidence in local leaders ("a lot" or "some"), as did 94% of respondents in Qalat. Though respondents in Musa Qal'ah and Qalat gave low ratings to district leaders and high ratings to local leaders, when using opinion of the district governor and opinion of the district government as predictors in two separate logistic models of confidence in local/village neighborhood leaders, coefficients were both positive and statistically significant.

Respondents in CCI-C districts continue to share positive views of their local leaders when it comes to responsiveness, with 83% who say they are "somewhat" or "very" responsive to their needs. This measure has increased over time, with 74% sharing that assessment in Wave 1, and 80% in Waves 2 and 3. Qalat respondents continue to rate local leaders favorably when it comes to responsiveness, with 77% who say they are "very" responsive, and 22% who say they are "somewhat" responsive to their needs. Nahr-e Saraj respondents are most likely to perceive improvements in their local leaders' abilities in the past year, with 54% who say they have "improved a lot," and another 40% who say they have improved "a little" in the past year. This is in comparison to 67% of CCI-C respondents overall who believe they have improved "a lot" or "a little," a figure that has increased over time (Wave 1: 59%, Wave 2: 60%, Wave 3: 65%).



Figure 8.5: CCI-C: Confidence in Local Leaders

Respondents are also asked to evaluate their provincial governors. Overall confidence among respondents in CCI-C districts decreased in Wave 4, with 19% who say they have “a lot” of confidence and 39% who say they have “some” confidence. These 58% who have confidence in Wave 4 represent a slight drop in a previously upward trend of those who express at least “some” confidence (Wave 1: 52%, Wave 2: 53%, Wave 3: 63%). Nearly identical trends are seen in overall evaluations of responsiveness and improvements among provincial governors, with increases between Waves 1 and 3, followed by a dip in Wave 4. Though a majority of CCI-C respondents have positive views of their provincial governors, Qalat residents continue to be more negative, with 72% stating they have “not much” or “no” confidence in the provincial governor. Additionally, 71% of Qalat residents say the provincial governor is somewhat or very unresponsive, and 72% believe his ability to get things done has worsened “a little” or “a lot.”



Figure 8.6: Confidence ("a lot" or "some") in Government Leaders (Q9 by Wave)

Respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement with several competing statements, all concerning their district government. Overall, majorities chose the positive assessment over the negative assessment for each set of statements. These statistics have changed very little over time, demonstrating only small and non-linear shifts between survey waves.



Figure 8.7: Evaluations of District Government (Wave 4, Q14)

Responses varied by district, however, and not all districts shared positive assessments by the majority of respondents. Notable outliers include:

- 98% in Qalat believe district government officials are not from their district
- 71% in Qalat, 60% in Zharay and 58% in Panjwa'i do not believe their district government understands the problems of the people in their area
- 69% in Qalat and 56% in Musa Qal'ah do not believe the district government cares about people in their area
- 69% in Qalat, 63% in Khas Uruzgan and 60% in Musa Qal'ah believe officials abuse their authority to make money for themselves
- 62% in Qalat and 56% in Musa Qal'ah say officials do not visit their area
- 72% in Qalat, 58% in Musa Qal'ah and 56% in Panjwa'i do not believe officials are doing their jobs honestly
- 70% in Qalat and 58% in Musa Qal'ah do not agree that the district government delivers services in a fair manner

Taken in its totality, the clear takeaway from the questions probing opinions of government officials is that positive opinions of district and provincial leaders have declined or remained stagnant, while positive opinions of local leaders have increased over time. Of the CCI-C project activities that have been implemented as of February 2014, 61% specifically seek to strengthen ties between local actors and the government (objective 1). However, hierarchal modeling indicates no relationship between the number CCI-C activities targeting Objective 1 and feelings about local or national leaders. The number of Objective 1 activities in CCI districts is not a significant predictor of confidence in the local or national government. This type of impact is found at the village, rather than the district level, as detailed in the chapter on the findings of the impact evaluation.

The lack of results at the district level indicates that in order to better meet its first objective, CCI-C programming should redouble efforts to explicitly connect district and provincial officials with local leaders in the eyes of the public in order to take advantage of the local leaders' high confidence ratings. One way of doing this may be by increasing the involvement of district government officials in project shuras in order to demonstrate trust and cooperation between local and district leaders. USAID's CCI Mid-Term Performance Evaluation indicated that in some locations there were GIRoA representatives on project shuras, but this was not true in all cases.

Respondents' awareness of a District Development Assembly (DDA) in their area increased to 67% in Wave 4, following mixed results in previous waves (Wave 1: 63%, Wave 2: 58%, Wave 3: 60%). This measure varies significantly by district, however, as 94% in Khas Uruzgan say they have heard of a DDA, compared to just under 19% in Qalat. Of those who have heard of a DDA (n=5534), 50% or more of respondents in every CCI-C district report having "some" or "a lot" of confidence in the DDA in their area. It should be noted that confidence skews heavily toward "some" rather than "a lot" in these districts, as pluralities or outright majorities report "some" confidence in each district aside from Marawarah (51% "a lot" of confidence) and Qalat (64% "a lot" of confidence). The strongly positive confidence levels in Qalat are particularly striking, given that district's strongly polarized opinions about other officials and entities. When respondents who have heard of a DDA rate their responsiveness,

majorities in most districts say the DDA are "somewhat" or "very" responsive; exceptions are in Spin Boldak (58%), Sangin (54%), and Musa Qal'ah (50%), where DDAs are rated as "somewhat" or "very" unresponsive. In terms of observed improvements in their DDA over the past year, responses by district were mixed, though most respondents believe they have improved or stayed the same. Belief that DDAs have improved is strongest in Bak (73%) and Qalat (70%).

Awareness of a Community Development Council (CDC) in CCI-C districts also increased in Wave 4 to 70%, which is an increase compared to previous waves (Wave 1: 64%, Wave 2: 60%, Wave 3: 62%). Of those who have heard of a CDC in their area (n=5720), confidence is high overall, with 70% having "some" or "a lot" of confidence; although, this does represent an 8% drop from Wave 3. Responsiveness ratings have also dropped, with 62% rating them as "very" or "somewhat" responsive to the needs of the local people. This is down from 68% in Wave 3 (Wave 1: 63%, Wave 2: 75%). However, majorities in all districts other than Muqer (55% unresponsive) and Spin Boldak (70% unresponsive) still consider the CDCs to be responsive.

Perceived improvements in the CDC's ability to get things done have not changed since Wave 3, with a majority overall (54%) who say CDCs have improved "a little" or "a lot" in the last year, and 26% who say CDCs have stayed the same. Nineteen percent say CDCs have worsened in the last year.

Service Provisions and Development

Many of CCI-C's project activities deal with training and relationship building, but a large proportion also seek to deliver goods and services to local populations. Of the project activities that were implemented as of February 2014, 39% were 'hard' project activities dealing with infrastructure improvements, such as building flood retaining walls, refurbishing schools, developing irrigation systems, and repairing roads and bridges. Of the infrastructure project activities that were implemented in districts surveyed in Wave 4, project activities in Sar Kani represent the largest share (10.8%), followed by Panjwa'i (9.7%) and Khas Kunar (9.2%). Conversely, there are fewer than 2% of all infrastructure project activities in each of the following Wave 4 districts: Kajaki, Khas Uruzgan, Qalat, Shahid-e Hasas, and Spin Boldak.

Forty-six percent of respondents in CCI-C districts say services from the government have improved ("a little" or "a lot") in the past year, which represents no change from Wave 3; although, this is a slight increase from Waves 1 and 2 (44% in each wave). This trend bears out when respondents are asked about specific goods or services, where there are only small and uneven changes over time. The one exception is clean drinking water, which saw an increase to 73% satisfied in Wave 4, up from 65% in Wave 3.



Figure 8.8: Satisfaction with Provision of Goods (Q16 by Wave)

By a wide margin, respondents in Spin Boldak are least satisfied with clean drinking water; 52% are somewhat dissatisfied and 29% are very dissatisfied, for a total of 81% dissatisfied. Eighty-seven percent of Spin Boldak residents are also dissatisfied with water for irrigation and other non-drinking purposes, followed by 65% in Qalat. Dissatisfaction with agricultural assistance is highest in Spin Boldak (70% "very" or "somewhat" dissatisfied, 6% "not provided"), Musa Qal'ah (72% "very" or "somewhat" dissatisfied, 2% "not provided"), and Sangin (71% "very" or "somewhat" dissatisfied, 1% "not provided"). Respondents in Qalat (94% "very" or "somewhat" dissatisfied) are the most likely to express dissatisfaction at perceived provision of retaining and flood walls. When rating the provision of roads and bridges, Spin Boldak respondents (81% "very" or "somewhat" dissatisfied, 9% "not provided") and Terayzai ('Ali Sher) respondents (81% "very" or "somewhat" dissatisfied, 3% "not provided") stand out at the least satisfied.



Figure 8.9: Satisfaction with Provision of Services (Q16 by Wave)

Spin Boldak respondents express the highest level of dissatisfaction with medical care, as 75% say they are dissatisfied ("very" or "somewhat"), and 20% say the service is "not provided." Respondents in Kajaki find schooling for girls lacking, with 16% who say they are dissatisfied ("very" or "somewhat"), and a huge 84% who say the service is "not provided." There are also high reports of "service not provided" in Sangin (68%), Musa Qal'ah (50%) and Spin Boldak (36%). It should be noted that these numbers demonstrate an increase in reports of "service not provided" over time. Waves 1-3 showed 7-8% "service not provided" for girls' schools in CCI-C districts overall, a number that has increased to 18% overall in Wave 4. Schooling for boys is rated lowest in Spin Boldak, where 78% are "very" or "somewhat" dissatisfied, and 19% say it is "not provided." Electricity is a major source of dissatisfaction in most CCI-C districts; in Terayzai ('Ali Sher), Bak, and Shamul (Dzadran), almost none of respondents were satisfied. However, those in Kajaki and Sangin are uniquely satisfied with this service, with 80% and 68% respectively who say they are "very" or "somewhat" satisfied.

Respondents in CCI-C districts are much more likely to say they have heard of development projects in their area in Wave 4 (59% compared to 47% in Wave 3). District-level responses are fairly positive as well; the lowest response rates are from Terayzai ('Ali Sher), Bak, and Shamul (Dzadran), and each of those are still above 30%.

Though respondents are more likely to say they have heard of development project in Wave 4, it is not clear that respondents are recalling CCI-C project activities specifically. Of the CCI-C project activities that were implemented as of February 2014, 39% were 'hard' project activities dealing with infrastructure improvements. However, the number of CCI-C infrastructure project activities within a district is not a significant predictor of whether or not a respondent reports seeing or hearing about development projects. Number of projects is modeled as a district level variable in a hierarchal model.

Respondents who say they have heard of development projects in general were asked a series of questions about specific development projects in their area. Among those who have heard about development projects (n=4,841), 78% say they are aware of projects for drinking water in their area. Much smaller percentages of respondents say they have seen or heard about projects for schools (57%), irrigation/water (54%), roads and bridges (52%), agricultural assistance (44%), medical facilities (43%), retaining and flood walls (35%), electricity (26%), and farm produce (21%).

Looking forward to the next year, respondents in CCI-C districts most frequently mention the following development projects as being needed in their area:[74]

[74] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Views on development projects for next year: CCI-C Districts	
Road construction	34%
Electricity	27%
Education and School	26%
Clinics	22%
Water	13%

Table 8.3: CCI-C: Views on development projects for next year

Respondents were also asked about the obstacles preventing them from obtaining health care or medicine. The most frequent responses include: [75]

Views on the obstacles preventing respondents from obtaining health care or medicine.: CCI-C Districts	
Lack of medicines	34%
Lack of clinics/hospitals	32%
Lack of professional doctors	32%
Lack of medical equipment	22%
Poor security	18%

Table 8.4: CCI-C: Obstacles preventing respondents from obtaining health care or medicine

Rule of Law

Respect for the rule of law and establishing effective means of dispute resolution are two key components of building a community's adaptive capacity for dealing with internal conflict. Three major authorities that community members could turn to for dispute resolution are local or tribal elders, government courts, or armed opposition groups. In CCI-C districts, the preferred source of dispute resolution is the local or tribal elder. In cases of land or water disputes, 55% say they would go to the local elders; in cases of assault, murder or kidnapping, 48% agree; in cases of theft, 53% agree.

In the case of land or water disputes, only in Khas Uruzgan (57%) and Shahid-e Hasas (58%) is there majority reliance on government courts. There is greater reliance on government courts in the case of assault, murder or kidnapping, with majorities of residents in Qarah Bagh, Terayzai ('Ali Sher), Shamul (Dzadran), Khas Kunar, and Sar Kani supporting that avenue for seeking justice. In no district does a majority endorse seeking justice in a government court for theft. However, Qalat is an outlier; pluralities

[75] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

or outright majorities of Qalat respondents would turn to armed opposition groups to resolve all three types of dispute.

Ninety-five percent of Wave 4 CCI-C respondents say they have "a lot" or "some" confidence in local leaders to fairly resolve disputes. This percentage has slowly increased over time from 90% in Wave 1, reflecting the opinion trend found when asking respondents about their confidence in local leaders in general. Sixty-six percent of respondents have "a lot" or "some" confidence in government courts to fairly resolve disputes, and 25% have "a lot" or "some" confidence in armed opposition groups.

Respondents are more likely to believe decisions made by local/tribal elders are "always" respected than decisions made by government courts (45% compared to 20%). More than half of respondents (56%) believe decisions made by armed opposition groups are "never" respected.



Figure 8.10: Respect for Decisions Made by Elders, Courts, and Opposition Groups (Q22a-Q22c)

Corruption

The majority of respondents in CCI-C districts (89%) admit that corruption is a problem in their area; this figure has been slowly rising from wave to wave (Wave 1: 81%, Wave 2: 85%, Wave 3: 86%). Majorities in each district agree; the lowest proportion is found in Qalat, where 72% agree. Furthermore, a full 100% of respondents in each of the four surveyed Helmand districts agree that corruption is a problem in their area.

Respondents in CCI-C districts have become more likely over time to report that corruption has increased in the past year. In Wave 1, 39% said it increased "a little" or "a lot," compared to 48% in Wave 2 and 52% in Wave 3. In Wave 4, responses are now holding steady at 51%.

When asked which department or sector of the local government is most corrupt, respondents most frequently mention the district office (14%), courts (10%), the Ministry of Education (8%), the municipality (7%) and the district attorney's office (7%).

Quality of Life

Satisfaction with life as a whole has decreased from Wave 3 to Wave 4. Sixty-four percent of respondents say they are satisfied ("somewhat" or "very") with their life in general, compared to 73% in Wave 1, 64% in Wave 2 and 71% in Wave 3. Respondents are similarly likely to say they are "somewhat" or "very" satisfied with their household's current financial situation (61% in Wave 4, down from 65% in Wave 3).

Respondents in Qalat report the lowest level of satisfaction in general, with a majority (54%) who report being "very dissatisfied," and another 17% who say they are "somewhat dissatisfied." Though not nearly as extreme, Musa Qal'ah residents also report being more dissatisfied than satisfied with their lives (54% report being "somewhat" or "very" dissatisfied). Qalat respondents also report low levels of satisfaction with their current economic situation, with 80% who report being "somewhat" (43%) or "very" (37%) dissatisfied. Musa Qal'ah residents are almost evenly split between satisfaction (49%) and dissatisfaction (51%) with their current economic situation.

Overall, respondents in CCI-C districts are 10% less likely than in Wave 3 to say their ability to meet basic needs has increased in the past year: 40% now say it has increased "a little" or "a lot," compared to 50% in Wave 3, 41% in Wave 2, and 47% in Wave 1. Similarly, the proportion who say they are "very worried" about meeting basic needs in the next year has increased to 27% in Wave 4, which is up from 22% in Wave 3. A slight majority (51%) also believe the future is too uncertain to make plans, a figure that has stayed the same since Wave 3. Majorities in 12 of 19 CCI-C districts agree with that assessment.

Economic Activity

Measures of economic activity are important to the CCI project because increasing economic opportunities is one of the mechanisms by which adaptive capacity, and therefore resilience, can be fostered in a community. Of the project activities that were implemented by CCI-C as of February 2014, 28.5% were training activities, many of which were job training activities targeted at increasing community members' economic viability and employability. Of the training project activities that were implemented in districts surveyed in Wave 4, Sangin residents received the largest share (16.5%), followed by Musa Qala (9.6%) and Nahr-e Saraj (8.7%). Conversely, Shahid-e Hasas, Gelan, and Panjwa'i all received less than 2% of training project activities implemented in Wave 4 districts.

When asked about their ability to access markets now compared to last year, 45% of CCI-C respondents (down from 53% in Wave 3) say it has gotten better ("a little better" or "much better"), 32% say it is about the same, and 22% say it has gotten worse ("a little worse" or "much worse"). Notably, Qalat respondents are much more likely to say their ability to access markets has declined: 35% say this has become "a little worse," and a plurality (40%) say it has become "much worse." Musa Qal'ah residents

are strongly divided, with 39% of respondents saying access has gotten better, and 47% saying access has gotten worse.

Respondents are also more likely to report increases in the cost of food at the markets over the past year. In Wave 4, 55% say prices either increased "a little" or "a lot," compared to 51% who said the same in Wave 3. Thirty-two percent in Qalat report that prices have "increased a lot" in the past year; 31% in both Khas Kunar and Sar Kani report the same.

Overall, respondents in Wave 4 are less likely to believe there are "a lot" or "a little" more paid jobs in their areas than there were a year ago, as positive responses to this measure dropped to 32% from 40% in Wave 3. Qalat respondents are most likely to report fewer jobs in their area, with 87% who say there is "a little" or "a lot" less opportunity in their area. Respondents in Terayzai ('Ali Sher) are also not optimistic about job growth, with 54% who say there is "a little" or "a lot" less; 53% in Shamul (Dzadran) report the same.

Community Cohesion and Resilience

The CCI program's second primary objective is to increase cohesion among and between communities in order to increase their ability to collectively respond to shocks and stresses that can lead to crisis. Participants in the CCI Mid-Term Performance Evaluation reported that this objective was conceptually and practically more difficult to implement than the first objective, which is targeted at increasing ties between local actors and the district and provincial government. Means of achieving the second objective varied by implementer but centered on "having different tribes come together, having people with different political views work together, and linking communities within the district together." [76]

This conceptual and practical difficulty may be evidenced in the number of cohesion-focused project activities that have been implemented; only 23% have been targeted at building community cohesion, versus 61% that focus on strengthening ties between local actors and the government. Sixteen percent of project activities seek to advance both of the main program objectives. The Wave 4 survey data on cohesion and resilience are critical for understanding the current status of connectivity between villages in CCI-C districts and highlight areas that would benefit from further programming in the future.

Half of respondents living in CCI-C districts (51%) say things from outside their village/neighborhood "never" create problems in their area, which is consistent with Wave 3 results; although it represents an increase from Waves 1 and 2, when 46% and 47% agreed, respectively. Respondents who say such problems happen "often," "sometimes," or "rarely" (n=3,935) are asked what types of outside interference causes problems in their village/neighborhood. The most common responses include: [77]

[76] United States Agency for International Development, *Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) Mid-Term Performance Evaluation Report: March 2012-December 2013*, Washington, DC, 2014, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00JW3H .pdf (accessed September 25, 2014).

[77] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Most common types of outside interferences: CCI-C Districts	
Disputes over water	23% (up from 17%)
Road-side bombs/Suicide attacks	16% (down from 20%)
Closing roads	15% (up from 9%)
Land disputes	14%
Existence/Presence of the Taliban	11%

Table 8.5: CCI-C: Most common types of outside interferences

The large percentage of respondents citing water issues corresponds with an anecdote from the CCI Mid-Term Performance Evaluation. Project shura members noted that a project to repair the Jabahi Karez in Marawarah helped build cohesion by addressing the source of a conflict over water between two communities.[78] This is an example of how an infrastructure project was used to meet a need, eliminate a driver of conflict, and increase cohesion and resilience.

A growing majority (67%) of CCI-C respondents believe people in the area are "often" or "sometimes" able to solve problems coming from outside the village. This percentage has increased from 56% in Wave 1, to 60% in Wave 2, to 62% in Wave 3. This belief is also strong at the district level, where a majority in each district believes people are "often" or "sometimes" able to solve these problems.

Respondents overall have similar opinions on the frequency of disputes originating from inside their village/neighborhood, with another 52% who say these things "never" create problems in their area (a percentage that has held steady for the past three waves). Those who say such disputes happen at least "rarely" (n=3,873) are asked about the types of internal interferences that cause problems in their village/neighborhood. Respondents most frequently mention: [79]

Most common types of internal interferences: CCI-C Districts	
Disputes over water	34% (up from 28%)
Family problems	27%
Land disputes	26% (down from 30%)
Ethnic disputes	11% (down from 15%)
Closing roads	9%

Table 8.6: CCI-C: Most common types of internal interferences

Respondents in Khas Uruzgan are most likely to say these types of disputes happen "often," with 24% who say this happens from internal origins, and 31% who say it happens from external origins. Respondents in Sangin are the most likely to say the people in their area are able to solve internal

[78] United States Agency for International Development, *Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) Mid-Term Performance Evaluation Report: March 2012-December 2013*, Washington, DC, 2014, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00JW3H .pdf (accessed September 25, 2014).

[79] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

disputes on their own, with 89% who believe people in their area can "often" or "sometimes" resolve such disputes. Panjwa'i residents are the least likely to say people are able to solve internal disputes on their own, with 46% saying it is "rarely" or "never" possible. This compares to 73% of CCI-C respondents overall who share this assessment.

When asked how often villages or neighborhoods in the area work together to solve problems, 71% say this happens "often" or "sometimes," demonstrating a fairly high level of cohesion and village-to-village problem solving. These figures have held steady for the past three waves. Furthermore, majorities believe this in all CCI-C districts other than Spin Boldak, where half report that villages "often" or "sometimes" work together. The effectiveness of Objective 2 programming can be measured by including the number of projects per district in a hierarchal model, which proves not to be a significant predictor of social cohesion at the district level.

Overall, a majority of CCI-C respondents believe their local leaders take the concerns of ordinary people into account at least "sometimes" (45%) or "often" (21%). This measure has remained steady for the past three waves. Majorities in each district agree with this sentiment, though respondents in Zharay are the most moderate, with only 56% who say local leaders "sometimes" or "often" take ordinary peoples' concerns into account in decision making.

Q37a. When decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of ordinary people in the village/neighborhood considered?



Figure 8.11: Local Decision Making – "Ordinary People" (Q37a by Wave)

While the overall trend is less clear, it appears that respondents in CCI-C districts generally feel that the concerns of women are taken into account less frequently than the interests of "ordinary people" in general. A small majority (57%) of Wave 4 respondents believe the interests of women are "often" or

"sometimes" taken into account when decisions are made. While the proportion who believes local leaders "never" take women's concerns into account has remained basically static over time, the proportion who believes they "often" take such concerns into consideration has declined in Waves 3 and 4.

Q37b. In your opinion, when decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of women considered? (Wave 4 n=7271)



Figure 8.12: Local Decision Making – "Women" (Wave 4, Q37b by District)

Overall, a majority of Wave 4 respondents (66%) believe their local leaders are "somewhat" (46%) or "very" (20%) effective in securing funds for their local area. This measure has remained relatively consistent over all four waves.

Most respondents (76%) do not belong to any "groups where people get together to discuss issues of common interest or to do certain activities together." Of those who do (n=1,900), out of a possible two

mentions, the most common types of groups mentioned are farmers unions (40%), business companies (27%) and development councils (8%).[80]

Grievances

Grievances vary when respondents are asked to identify the biggest problems that create stress or tension in their area. The most common responses include: [81]

Most common types of Grievances: SIKA-N Districts	
Unemployment	31%
Insecurity	25%
Corruption	15%
Illiteracy	14%

Table 8.7: SIKA-N: Most common types of Grievances

Respondents in Qarah Bagh are most likely to mention unemployment as the biggest problem (48%); Khas Uruzgan residents are the most likely to mention insecurity (51%); Sangin residents are the most likely to mention corruption (40%); and Gelan and Muqer residents are the most likely to mention illiteracy (both 24%).

Media

Respondents in CCI-C districts increasingly use radio (97%), which is the same as in Wave 3 (up slightly from 95% in Wave 2, and 94% in Wave 1), and it remains the most popular method of getting news and information. Other popular methods of getting news and information include friends and family (93%), elders (79%), and their Mosque/Mullah (62%). They are less likely to use cell phones (31%), television (22%), posters/billboards (7%), and newspapers (3%). Hardly any respondents use the internet or email (1%).

Respondents get most of their information about government services from the radio (76%, down from 80% in Wave 3), friends/family (46%), and elders (33%).[82]

[80] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

[81] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

[82] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

CCI Module

A plurality of respondents in Wave 4 (47%) believe "hardly any" or only "some" of the people in their area voted in the last election in April 2014. Another 17% say "about half" voted, and 36% say "a lot" or "almost all" of the people in their area voted. In Wave 3, which was fielded prior to the April 2014 election, respondents were asked about how many people voted during the previous presidential election held five years ago. According to Wave 3 respondents, 63% believed "hardly any" or only "some" of the people voted in that election; 18% said "about half," and another 18% thought "a lot" or "almost all" of the people in their area voted. This indicates that respondents believe more people voted in the 2014 election than in 2009, though these results are colored by the limits of human memory. Wave 4 respondents were asked about an event that was fresh in their minds, while Wave 3 respondents were asked about an event that occurred several years ago.

Respondents in Khas Uruzgan (41%), Zharay (34%) and Panjwa'i (33%) are most likely to report "hardly any" people voted in their area in 2014. Qalat, which has been a negative outlier for many questions, is on the positive extreme in this instance; 99% of respondents report that "a lot" or "almost all" people voted in their area. Respondents were asked to evaluate how many people in neighboring settlements in their area voted, and these results mirrored assessments of voting in their own neighborhood; although, in some districts, there was a shift from "hardly any" or "some" to "about half, with respondents selecting the more moderate option when describing the voting behavior of their neighbors.

About half of CCI-C respondents (52%) believe most people in their community voted for different candidates in the 2014 election; these results mirror those collected in Wave 3 regarding the 2009 election. However, large majorities in Terayzai ('Ali Sher) (72%) and Muqer (70%) believe residents voted for the same candidate. Smaller majorities believe this in Gelan (60%), Bak (66%), Shamul (Dzadran) (63%), Panjwa'i (64%), and Zharay (66%). Overall, 66% believe people in neighboring settlements voted for different candidates than those in their community; these results are consistent with Wave 3 results referring to the 2009 election. These results also bear out on the district level, as there are no extreme outliers.

Seventy-nine percent of CCI-C respondents overall say they had discussions in their community about who to vote for prior to the 2014 election, a sentiment shared by a majority in each district. This is in comparison to 66% of respondents saying community discussions were held prior to the 2009 election. This may indicate an increasing openness to discussing election issues within communities, though these results may be tainted by the fallibility of human memory. Almost half (47%) of respondents say there were arguments in the community about whom to vote for in 2014. Fewer say there were clashes or physical violence about which candidate to vote for; 70% say this did not happen. A similar proportion (75%) say there were no clashes or physical violence with those in neighboring villages about who to vote for prior to the 2014 election; although, 45% in Khas Uruzgan say this did happen. Another 72% say there was no violence on Election Day 2014 between supporters of different candidates, a sentiment shared by a majority in each district other than Panjwa'i and Zharay, where only half of respondents reported this (50% and 51%, respectively). Nearly three quarters (72%) believe there were no disputes in

their area about how polling stations were handled, and a similar proportion (75%) say there were no disputes in their area after the election about the final results.

Most respondents (83%) feel voting is a personal, individual responsibility, rather than believing one cannot vote for whomever they want; these results are consistent with Wave 3 findings; although, 75% in Qalat say they cannot vote for whomever they want. Qalat residents were also outliers on this question during Wave 3, when 49% said they could not vote for whomever they want.

Respondents more frequently agree (77%) that "obeying the laws of the Afghan government is necessary to achieve peace and prosperity," rather than "there may be times when it is necessary to take matters into your own hands, even if this means breaking the law." Qalat respondents are again the outliers, with 75% who agree with the second statement.

Displaying a well-established preference for local leaders, most respondents choose local tribal elders (55%) if they needed to resolve an election dispute, rather than government courts (29%) or the Afghan National Police (15%). If a family member were involved in violence during the election process, 51% would go to the local or tribal elders for justice, versus 25% choosing government courts, and 23% choosing the Afghan National Police. When asked to choose between "government leaders and officials" and "tribal and community leaders" to trust to make decisions about managing election voting, 50% choose local or tribal elders, 32% choose government courts, 10% say neither and 6% opt for both equally (the last two options were volunteered by respondents).

When asked to rate their level of concern with election violence, respondents are more likely to express concern than to not. Sixty-one percent say they were "somewhat" (40%) or "very" (21%) concerned, compared to 39% who say they are "not very" (28%) or "not at all" (12%) concerned about election violence. These results are similar to responses collected in Wave 3, when 65% said they were concerned, and 34% expressed unconcern about violence in the 2009 election.

CCI-C Appendix

Model 1

Hierarchal Model

Response: "Q1. Generally speaking, are things in [name the district] going in the right direction or in the wrong direction?"

q1 ~ dummy(d1) + d3 + dummy(eth) + (# of projects in a district | dis)

				95% CI for odds ratio		
	B	SE	Sig	Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	0.42	0.03	*	1.52	1.44	1.6
D1 : Female	0	0.01		1	0.98	1.03
Education	-0.01	0	*	0.99	0.99	0.99
Ethnicity: Tajik	-0.06	0.09		0.94	0.78	1.13
Ethnicity: Uzbek	-0.26	0.15		0.77	0.57	1.03
Ethnicity: Hazara	-0.06	0.06		0.94	0.84	1.05
Ethnicity: Other	-0.13	0.08		0.87	0.75	1.02

Random Effects

	Intercept	B	SE (B)
Bak	-0.0077	-0.0004	0.01
Dand	0.03638	0.00201	0.02
Kajaki	0.06692	0.0037	0.01
Khas Kunar	-0.0796	-0.0044	0.01
Khas Uruzgan	-0.0986	-0.0055	0.02
Marawarah	-0.0892	-0.0049	0.01
Musa Qal'ah	0.07166	0.00396	0.01
Nahr-e Saraj	-0.0621	-0.0034	0.01
Panjwa'i	0.06097	0.00337	0.01
Qalat	0.10868	0.00601	0.01
Sangin	0.05054	0.00279	0.01
Sar Kani	-0.0931	-0.0051	0.01
Shah Joy	-0.0634	-0.0035	0.02
Shahid-e Hasas	-0.008	-0.0004	0.02
Shamul (Dzadran)	-0.0554	-0.0031	0.03
Shinkai	0.01025	0.00057	0.02
Spin Boldak	0.11325	0.00626	0.02
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)	-0.0058	-0.0003	0.01
Zharay	0.01994	0.0011	0.01

Model 2

Response: "Q2a. Would you say security in your local area is good, fair or poor?

Q2aNET ~ as.factor(d1) + d3 + as.factor(eth) + AOGNET

				95% CI for odds ratio		
	B	SE	Sig	Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-0.25	0.05	*	0.78	0.71	0.86
D1 : Female	-0.1	0.05		0.91	0.82	1.01
Education	0.06	0.01	*	1.06	1.05	1.08
Ethnicity: Tajik	1.14	0.47	*	3.12	1.31	8.63
Ethnicity: Uzbek	0.05	0.64		1.05	0.29	3.84
Ethnicity: Hazara	-0.28	0.23		0.76	0.48	1.19
Ethnicity: Other	0.77	0.37	*	2.16	1.08	4.62
Presence of Arbaki NET	-0.07	0.05		0.93	0.84	1.02

Model 3

Response: Q9c. How much confidence do you have in your Local village/neighborhood leaders?

q9cNET ~ as.factor(d1) + d3 + as.factor(eth) + q9aNET

				95% CI for odds ratio		
	B	SE	Sig	Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	1.54	0.06	*	4.64	4.17	5.18
D1 : Female	-0.39	0.07	*	0.67	0.59	0.77
Education	-0.01	0.01		0.99	0.97	1
Ethnicity: Tajik	0.68	0.74		1.98	0.58	12.36
Ethnicity: Uzbek	-0.42	0.79		0.66	0.16	4.36
Ethnicity: Hazara	0.06	0.32		1.06	0.59	2.07
Ethnicity: Other	-0.21	0.45		0.81	0.36	2.17
Confidence in District Governor	0.48	0.06	*	1.62	1.43	1.83

Model 4

Response: Q9c. How much confidence do you have in your Local village/neighborhood leaders?

q9cNET ~ as.factor(d1) + d3 + as.factor(eth) + q9bNET

				95% CI for odds ratio		
	B	SE	Sig	Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	1.7	0.06	*	5.49	4.92	6.14
D1 : Female	-0.35	0.07	*	0.7	0.62	0.8
Education	-0.01	0.01		0.99	0.98	1.01
Ethnicity: Tajik	0.71	0.74		2.03	0.6	12.69
Ethnicity: Uzbek	-0.37	0.79		0.69	0.17	4.6
Ethnicity: Hazara	0.09	0.32		1.1	0.61	2.15
Ethnicity: Other	-0.1	0.45		0.9	0.4	2.41
Confidence in District Gov't	0.17	0.06	*	1.18	1.05	1.34

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IX. COMMUNITY COHESION INITIATIVE – IOM (IOM)

Introduction

The Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) is a project of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives. Its goal is to increase the resilience of residents and communities in areas of Afghanistan that are susceptible to chronic instability. CCI utilizes USAID's definition of resilience to develop and inform its project activities: "the ability of people, households, communities, countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth."[83]

USAID's conceptual framework for resilience states that in order to increase resilience, a community must increase its adaptive capacity and its ability to reduce risk. The primary components of adaptive capacity and risk reduction are displayed in Figure 9.1.



Figure 9.1: USAID Conceptual Framework for Resilience

[83] United States Agency for International Development, *Policy and Program Guidance: Building Resilience to Recurrent Crisis*, Washington, DC, 2012, http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/Policy%20% 26%20Program%20Guidance%20-%20Building%20Resilience%20to%20Recurrent%20Crisis_Dec%202012.pdf (accessed September 25, 2014).

With the goal of increasing resilience in mind, the CCI program has two primary objectives: 1) strengthening ties between local actors, customary governance structures, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and 2) increasing cohesion among and between communities by bringing communities together through projects to address common needs.[84]

The CCI program is implemented throughout Afghanistan by two separate organizations that target different districts. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is the implementing partner for CCI districts in the northern and western provinces of Afghanistan. For disambiguation purposes, this project is referred to as IOM throughout the report. IOM targets the following districts in Afghanistan:

District	Sample size	SRS MOE
Aybak	240	6.33%
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in	419	4.79%
Ruy Do Ab	318	5.49%
Hazrat-e Sultan	238	6.35%
Fayroz Nakhchir	268	5.99%
Mazar-e Sharif	272	5.94%
Balkh	320	5.48%
Sholgarah	313	5.54%
Chimtal	318	5.49%
Chahar Bolak	314	5.53%
Shibirghan	318	5.49%
Faizabad (2)	240	6.33%
Aqcha	240	6.33%
Khwajah Do Koh	272	5.94%
Qush Tepah	250	6.20%
Injil	431	4.72%
Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)	431	4.72%
Adraskan	398	4.91%
IOM Overall	**5,600**	**1.80% (2.93% Complex MOE)**

Table 9.1: IOM Districts

This chapter provides summary and detailed information about the attitudes and opinions of respondents living in districts targeted by IOM project activities. The report compares findings across two waves of research to examine trends in stabilization and shifts in development indicators on the following topics: security and crime, governance, service provision and development, rule of law,

[84] USAID Community Cohesion Initiative Fact Sheet. http://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/fact-sheets/community-cohesion-initiative-cci. Accessed October 2, 2014.

corruption, quality of life, economic activity, community cohesion and resilience, grievances, and media. Respondents in IOM districts were also asked a specialized set of questions designed for the CCI program, all of which relate to voting and elections. Throughout this chapter, special emphasis will be given to survey results that address components of the conceptual framework for resilience and the two stated objectives of the CCI program.

It should be noted that districts included in IOM varied by wave and settlements sampled in Wave 3 were purposefully excluded from selection in Wave 4. This is particularly important to keep in mind when considering wave-to-wave analysis as changes in the composition of program districts can have a significant impact on trend analysis. The addition or removal of particular districts can shift the overall results within any particular wave of research, so changes from wave-to-wave may not, in fact, be changes in the trend but may be a factor of which districts were included or excluded from the analysis. For this reason, we present the following list of districts by wave and their sample sizes:

CCI-IOM Districts	Wave 3	Wave 4
Aybak	0	240
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in	496	419
Ruy Do Ab	490	318
Hazrat-e Sultan	481	238
Fayroz Nakhchir	360	268
Mazar-e Sharif	488	272
Balkh	478	320
Sholgarah	452	313
Chimtal	490	318
Chahar Bolak	491	314
Shibirghan	493	318
Faizabad (2)	477	240
Aqcha	0	240
Khwajah Do Koh	428	272
Qush Tepah	327	250
Injil	0	431
Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)	0	431
Adraskan	0	398
TOTALS	**5,951**	**5,600**

Table 9.2: CCI-IOM Districts by Wave

A field team from Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC) conducted interviews in Qush Tepah. The remaining districts were conducted entirely by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic Research (ACSOR). Differences exist in the field implementation and quality control measures used for the AYC interviews, which may impact some survey results. For detailed descriptions of these differences, refer to the full Methodology Report for MISTI Wave 4.

ACSOR regularly updates its accessibility tracker. This tracker indicates accessibility of districts for the field staff and the reasons for inaccessibility, whether it be insecurity or transportation. Additionally, the accessibility tracker indicates which districts are inaccessible to ACSOR's female staff. Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in in Samangan was inaccessible to women due to the great distance to travel to get there, as well as the lack of proper overnight accommodations for women; therefore the sample in that district only includes men.

Unless otherwise noted, district level analysis and wave to wave comparisons are provided with significance testing at the 99% confidence level.

CCI-IOM Project Activities

The CCI program in Afghanistan started in March 2012, but IOM project activities in the northern and western provinces did not start until much later. Implementation of project activities began January 2014 and the latest available data on project activity implementation is from February 2014. Unsurprisingly, only a few project activities—26 in total—launched in that short time span. As of February 2014, 23 (88%) project activities were ongoing, and 3 (12%) were completed[85].

Of the 26 ongoing or completed project activities, 23 were 'hard' project activities dealing with infrastructure improvements, and 3 were 'soft' project activities, which included socio-cultural and training activities. Ten of the project activities (38%) dealt with road rehabilitation; four addressed flood mitigation; four involved school construction; four were sports-related; two were water related, one dealt with sanitation, and finally there was a single conflict mitigation training.

Project activities have been started or completed in nine of the 18 IOM districts surveyed in Wave 4. Of the project activities that have been implemented, the largest proportion has been implemented in the districts of Adraskan, Shibirghan, and Hazrat-e Sultan.

[85] Data about project activities were provided by the implementing partner Architecture, Engineering, Consulting, Operations and Maintenance (AECOM). It is important to note that the most up-to-date project data used in this report was collected until February 2014, prior to fieldwork.



Figure 9.2: CCI-IOM Project Activities by District

Due to the small number of project activities that have been launched as of February 2014, it is not yet possible to discern any programming influence on public opinion in IOM districts. According to the survey data, 71% of respondents living in IOM districts say things in their district are headed in the right direction ("a lot" or "a little"), while 22% say things are headed in the wrong direction. Optimism is strong at the district level as well, with a majority of respondents from all districts, excluding Adraskan (41% "right direction") and Qush Tepah (48% "right direction"), saying things are headed in the right direction. In addition to the lowest reported rates of "right direction," Adraskan and Qush Tepah have the largest proportion of respondents stating "neither right nor wrong direction" with 12% of respondents in each district.

Wave 4: CCI-IOM | MISTI Fact Sheet

OVERVIEW

The goal of the Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) is to increase the resilience of Afghan communities by strengthening ties between local actors and customary government structures and by increasing cohesion between communities. The CCI program is implemented in northwestern Afghanistan by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which serves key districts in Balkh, Samangan, Jawzjan and Herat. Findings listed below summarize attitudes and perceptions of respondents living in districts targeted by IOM.

SECURITY AND CRIME

Evaluations of security are important to the CCI program because conflict contributes to the shocks and stresses that lead to crisis in Afghan communities. Respondents in IOM districts enjoy high levels of security. Two thirds of respondents say security in their area is "good" or "very good." Although half of respondents believe their area has become more secure in the past year, a growing percentage report that security is "about the same."

Wave 4: Perceptions of Security (CCI-IOM)



Large majorities report feeling secure at home during the day and at night. Ratings are slightly lower when asked about security while traveling to a neighboring village and while traveling to the district or provincial capital; however, more than three quarters still say they feel secure. Respondents in Adraskan and Qush Tepah tend to be the least likely to say they feel secure in these situations.

Half of respondents report at least some Afghan National Army presence in their area; the Afghan National Police are more commonly seen in IOM districts. Perceived presence of Armed Opposition Groups is very low; majorities in every district other than Qush Tepah say there are "none." ISAF presence is also believed to be low in all IOM districts other than Mazar-e Sharif, where nearly half report "some" ISAF presence.

GOVERNANCE

Given CCI's program objective of strengthening ties between local actors and customary governance structures, respondents' opinions of government officials is a key indicator. Seven in ten respondents believe the Afghan government is well regarded in their area, and there is little variance by district.

District governors and local leaders enjoy the highest level of confidence among IOM respondents, with 8 in 10 respondents expressing confidence in each. Confidence in the district government is slightly lower. Confidence in provincial governors is the lowest of all government figures or groups, though a majority still express confidence.

When asked about the ability of government leaders and offices to get things done, majorities in every district agree that local leaders, district governors, district government, and provincial governors have either "stayed the same" or improved ("a little" or "a lot") over the past year. Respondents are slightly more likely to report improvements in local leaders' abilities.

SERVICE PROVISION AND DEVELOPMENT

A large proportion of IOM's project activities seek to deliver goods and services. The proportion of respondents who say services have improved in the past year is nearly equal to those who say services have not changed. Aqcha is the only district where a plurality says that services have worsened. Though a majority of respondents say they are dissatisfied with most services, satisfaction with nearly all services has increase since Wave 3.

The two services that have experienced the greatest increase in satisfaction are electricity and medical care. A majority of respondents still express dissatisfaction with each of these services, but the minority expressing satisfaction has become much larger. Nearly a third of respondents now express satisfaction with each of these services.



Wave 4: CCI-IOM

MISTI Fact Sheet

RULE OF LAW AND CORRUPTION

When respondents or their family members are involved in minor disputes IOM respondents show a preference for local and tribal elders to resolve the dispute. Government courts are preferred when it comes to more serious crimes such as assault, murder and kidnapping. Armed opposition groups are rarely the preferred source of justice for any type of crime. Only in Mazar-e Sharif, Qush Tepah, and Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in do a majority prefer government courts to resolve all types of disputes.

Respondents in IOM districts have a lot of respect for decisions made by local leaders and government courts, but almost no respect for the decisions made by armed opposition groups.



A majority of respondents admit that corruption is a problem in their area, though this question prompted high nonresponse in some districts. In Qush Tepah, nearly three quarters of respondents say they don't know, while smaller but substantial percentages say the same in Hazrat-e Sultan, Ruy Do Ab, Aybak, and Dar-ye Suf-e Pa'in.

QUALITY OF LIFE AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Three quarters of respondents say they are satisfied with life as a whole, though this proportion has decreased slightly since Wave 3. Those living in Adraskan are the least satisfied with life in general and with the current economic situation.

Overall, respondents are not optimistic about job growth over the past year. Nearly half of respondents say there is "a little" or "a lot" less availability of jobs. Aqcha respondents are least optimistic, with three quarters saying there are fewer jobs in their area.

COMMUNITY COHESION AND RESILIENCE

Another primary objective of the CCI program is to increase cohesion between communities; IOM communities already display a high level of cohesion. Almost three quarters of respondents report that factors from outside their village/ neighborhood "never" create problems in their area, and 7 in 10 agree that things from within the village "never" create problems.

Though ethnic disputes are a problem both internally and externally, they are a bigger source of disputes within villages; however, the percentage of disputes attributed to ethnicity has dropped substantially since Wave 3.

MEDIA

Respondents report that they depend on the radio and word of mouth to get news and information. Nearly half of respondents also use the television as a source of news and information, a proportion that has increased since Wave 3. The relatively high level of television usage is largely driven by Mazar-e Sharif, where nearly all respondents say they use television. There are also high rates of television usage in Shibirghan, Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah), Khwajah Do Koh, Injil, and Balkh.

ELECTIONS

A majority of IOM respondents in Wave 4 believes "a lot" or "almost all" of the people in their area voted in the April 2014 election. Results from Wave 3, which asked about the 2009 election, indicate that respondents believe more people voted in 2014 than in 2009. Respondents in Qush Tepah are most likely to report "hardly any" or only "some" people voting in their area.

Though the overall reported rate of physical violence within communities regarding 2014 voting choices is very low, rates of violence are much higher within certain districts. Almost half of the respondents in Qush Tepah report physical violence, as do a third in Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah) and Adraskan. Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah) and also report the highest rates of physical violence between their community and people from other villages.

Security and Crime

Evaluations of security are important to the IOM project because insecurity and conflict contribute to the shocks and stresses that lead to crisis and a lack of resilience in Afghan communities. Understanding the security status of IOM districts and the potential drivers of conflict in certain areas will enable IOM implementers to target mitigation efforts and reduce the risks associated with these shocks in areas where there are security problems.

Unlike in other areas of the country, particularly in the south, respondents in IOM districts (located in the north and west) enjoy very high levels of security. Two thirds (67%) of respondents in IOM districts say security in their area is "good" (41%) or "very good" (25%); just 6% say security is "poor" or "very poor." A majority of respondents in every IOM district, excluding Qush Tepah and Adraskan, say security in their area is "good" or "very good." In Qush Tepah and Adraskan (35% and 39% "good" or "very good") we still see a significant percentage with a positive opinion of security in their area, as well as over three quarters of respondents reporting that security is at least "fair."



Figure 9.3: SIKA-S: Perception of Security

Overall, 53% of respondents report their area is “somewhat” (32%) or “much” (21%) more secure than it was a year ago. However, this percentage has decreased since Wave 3 while those reporting security is “about the same” has increased to 37% from 32% in Wave 3. District-level results are also positive, though 15% or more of respondents in Chimtal, Qush Tepah, Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah), and Adraskan all report that security is “somewhat” or “much” less secure.

A majority of respondents (75%) in nearly every district say road security is “somewhat” or “very” good. Again, Qush Tepah and Adraskan are the only districts with negative assessments of road security: 62% in Qush Tepah and 59% in Adraskan believe road security is “somewhat” or “very” bad. Respondents in Qush Tepah are most likely to say road security has “stayed the same” in the past year, with 58% of respondents believing the situation has not gotten any better or worse.

Respondents are asked to evaluate their personal security in four different situations. Nearly all respondents say they feel secure in their homes and relatively few say they feel insecure while traveling outside of their village. These ratings have not changed substantially since Wave 3.



Figure 9.4: Evaluations of Security (Wave 4, Q4)

A majority of respondents within most districts believe they are at least “somewhat” secure when traveling to the district or provincial capital. Adraskan is the only district where a majority of residents report feeling insecure (66% “somewhat” or “very”) while nearly half of the respondents (48%) in Qush Tepah feel the same.

Petty crime (theft of goods or food worth less than a few thousand Afs) is not prevalent in any IOM district and only 10% overall say this type of crime happens “a lot” in their area. More serious thefts (goods worth more than 5,000 Afs) are also uncommon with only 9% of the respondents reporting this happens “a lot.” Serious, violent crime (murder, kidnapping, assault) is even less common with only 6% who say this happens “a lot” in their area. Though reported rates of these types of crime are still low,

there have been small but significant increases in rates for each type of crime since Wave 3. Forty-six percent of respondents in Wave 4 say there is no petty crime at all, versus 54% in Wave 3. The percentage reporting no serious non-violent crime decreased to 56% in Wave 4 from 63% in Wave 3, and the percentage reporting no serious violent crime decreased to 66% from 71%. However, when asked directly, there is no perception that these types of crimes are increasing in any IOM district: only 2-4% overall on each measure say there is "a little" or "much" more of each type of crime as compared to last year.

An increasing number of respondents in IOM districts report seeing Afghan National Army (ANA) troops in their areas, with half of the respondents now reporting "a lot" or "some" in contrast to 44% in Wave 3. Reported rates vary greatly by district: 83% in Mazar-e Sharif report "a lot" or "some" ANA, while 85% in Aqcha report none at all. Confidence in the ANA is also high with 81% of respondents overall having "some" or "a lot" of confidence in the ability of the ANA. The results are similar across the board, with majorities in all districts other than Qush Tepah – where only 22% in that district have "a lot" or "some" confidence – expressing a positive opinion. This also corresponds with a perception among respondents in IOM districts of improved capability with 55% overall saying the ANA's abilities have improved ("a lot" or "a little") in the past year and another 30% who say they have stayed the same. Only 4% believe their abilities have gotten worse (by "a lot" or "a little").

The Afghan National Police (ANP) is more commonly seen in IOM districts. Seventy-five percent overall say there are "a lot" (34%) or "some" (41%) ANP in their area; 83% in Mazar-e Sharif say there are "a lot" of ANP in their area, though almost half of Chimtal residents (47%) report there are "none." Confidence in the ANP is also high with 80% overall expressing at least "some" confidence in them. Respondents in Qush Tepah are again the least likely to say they have confidence in the ANP, with only 10% saying they have "a lot" or "some" confidence. Majorities in each district say the ANP has at least "stayed the same" in terms of their capabilities compared to last year, with 61% overall saying they have improved and 28% saying they stayed the same.

Arbaki presence decreased since Wave 3. Sixty-five percent of IOM respondents now report no Arbaki presence in their area, versus 58% in Wave 3, though these results vary across districts. For example, in Qush Tepah, 94% say there are "a lot" or "some," but in seven other IOM districts (Aybak, Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in, Ruy Do Ab, Hazrat-e Sultan, Fayroz Nakhchir, Mazar-e Sharif, and Aqcha) over 90% say there are "none." Afghan Local Police (ALP) presence has also decreased: 62% now report "no" ALP in their area, versus 53% in Wave 3.

Perceived presence of Armed Opposition Groups is generally very low (17%). Aside from the 93% in Qush Tepah who say there are "a lot" or "some" in their area, majorities in every other district say there are "none."

ISAF presence is also believed to be low in all IOM districts, with 86% overall who say there are "none" in their area—a view shared by a majority of respondents in all districts other than Mazar-e Sharif, where 45% report "some" ISAF presence.

Governance

Given CCI's program objective of strengthening ties between local actors, customary governance structures, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), respondents' opinions of government officials is a key indicator of the impact of IOM activities. By connecting district and provincial officials to local communities via development grant making and participation in local projects, IOM programming should have the effect of increasing GIRoA presence and visibility within communities and increasing its capacity to address and resolve problems for communities.

Nearly three-fourths (71%) of respondents in IOM districts say the government in general is well regarded in their area and there is little variance by district; these results have not changed greatly since Wave 3 (73%). There have also only been minor changes in evaluations of particular government leaders since Wave 3.

District governors and local leaders enjoy the highest level of confidence among IOM respondents. Eighty-two percent of respondents express "a lot" or "some" confidence in district governors, while 81% have this level of confidence in local leaders. The degree of positivity is somewhat stronger for local leaders: 38% express "a lot" of confidence in local leaders, versus 27% for district governors. Confidence is also high within each district, with majorities in all districts expressing confidence in both district governors and local leaders.

Respondents report that district governors and local leaders are the most responsive: 78% believe local leaders are "somewhat" or "very" responsive, and 75% believe the same of district governors. In all districts, a majority of respondents believe local leaders are responsive, and majorities in all but one district believe district governors are responsive; 51% of respondents in Qush Tepah believe their district governor is "somewhat" or "very" unresponsive, and only 41% believe he is responsive.

Though confidence in the district government is somewhat lower than confidence in the district governor, 75% still report confidence, with 24% expressing "a lot" of confidence and 51% expressing "some." Those in Qush Tepah rate the district government lower than respondents in other districts, though a majority still express confidence. In Qush Tepah, 36% express "not much" or "no" confidence while 9% refuse to answer or say they do not know. Responsiveness measures show that 18% of respondents overall say their district government is "very responsive" and 51% saying they are "somewhat responsive." Again, Qush Tepah is the outlier with only 45% saying the district government is "somewhat" or "very" responsive.

Confidence in provincial governors is the lowest of all government figures or groups rated. Only 22% of respondents have "a lot," and 44% have "some," confidence in them. Respondents in Ruy Do Ab are most critical with 47% of respondents having "not much confidence" and 9% having "no confidence" in their provincial governor. A majority overall find their provincial governor to be responsive (17% "very" and 45% "somewhat"). Respondents in Qush Tepah are most likely to say their provincial governor is unresponsive, with 48% saying he is "somewhat," and 10% saying he is "very," unresponsive. Half of the respondents in Roy Do Ab (52%) and Adraskan (49%) also believe their provincial governor is unresponsive.

When asked about the ability of government leaders and offices to get things done over the past year, there are only minor differences reported by respondents for each entity. Majorities in every district agree that local leaders, district governors, district government, and provincial governors have either "stayed the same" or improved ("a little" or "a lot") over the past year. Respondents are slightly more likely to report improvements in local leaders' ability to get things done.

Respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement with several competing statements, all concerning their district government. Overall, majorities chose the positive assessment over the negative assessment for each set of statements. In almost every case, agreement with the positive assessment has slightly decreased since Wave 3; however, more waves of data need to be collected before the strength of this trend can be determined.



Figure 9.5: Characteristics of District Government (Wave 4)

A majority of respondents are aware of a District Development Assembly (DDA) in their area. Those who are aware (61% of IOM respondents overall, n=3391) have positive opinions of the DDA: 85% have "a lot" or "some" confidence in the group, 73% believe it is "very" or "somewhat" responsive, and 60% believe the group's ability to get things done has improved in the past year (while another 30% think there has been no change). These figures have not changed substantially since Wave 3, and are representative of the district-level data. All districts other than Qush Tepah express confidence in the DDA and believe the group is responsive. Only half of Qush Tepah respondents have "a lot" or "some" confidence in the DDA while at the same time 56% believe it is responsive.

Of the 63% of IOM respondents (n=3555) who have heard of a Community Development Council (CDC) in their area, 77% have "a lot" or "some" confidence in the CDC, though this represents a drop from Wave 3 when 83% said the same. Belief in the CDC's responsiveness is roughly the same at 78%. Sixty-six percent also believe the CDC's ability to get things done has increased in the past year; however, this percentage decreased since Wave 3 when 71% said the CDC's ability improved. Qush Tepah is again the

only district that doesn't express majority confidence and a belief in the responsiveness of CDCs (46%). Qush Tepah has by far the lowest assessment of CDC improvements also, with only 22% agreeing that it has improved. Additionally, only half of the respondents in Chimtal, Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah), and Adraskan believe the CDCs have improved in their area.

Service Provisions and Development

A large proportion of IOM's project activities seek to deliver goods and services to local populations. Of the 26 ongoing or completed IOM project activities, 23 (88%) were 'hard' project activities dealing with infrastructure improvements. Of the hard project activities, ten have dealt with road rehabilitation, four addressed flood mitigation, four involved school construction, two were sports-related, two were water related, and one dealt with sanitation.

Respondents in IOM districts are more likely to say services have improved in the past year (43%) than to say they have worsened (14%), while at the same time 41% say that services have not changed. The percentage of respondents saying services have improved has stayed the same since Wave 3 (45%); however, the percentage of respondents reporting services have worsened has decreased by 6% from the 20% who said so in Wave 3. Aqcha is the only district where a plurality says that services have worsened: 38% say this, while 35% see no change, and 27% say services have improved. However, when asked about specific services, some services enjoy much higher levels of satisfaction than others. Overall, a majority of respondents say they are dissatisfied with all services aside from schooling for boys and girls and clean drinking water.

Q16. Generally speaking, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the District Government's provision of... (n=5600)



Figure 9.6: Satisfaction with Provision of Goods and Services (Q16, W4)

Satisfaction with nearly all services has increased since Wave 3. Water for irrigation (29% "very" or "somewhat" satisfied, down from 33%) and agricultural assistance (17% satisfied, down from 21% satisfied) are the only services with which respondents express less satisfaction in Wave 4. The two services that have the greatest increase in satisfaction are electricity and medical care. Interestingly, a majority of respondents still express dissatisfaction with each of these services, but the minority expressing satisfaction has become much larger. Thirty-four percent of respondents now express satisfaction with medical care, in comparison to 24% in Wave 3, and 31% now express satisfaction with electricity, in comparison to 17% in Wave 3.

Not surprisingly, respondents in Mazar-e Sharif, the most urban district included in this assessment, are significantly more likely to say they are satisfied with nearly every service. Rural focused services such as "agricultural assistance" and "retaining and flood walls" received lower levels of reported satisfaction, while a plurality of respondents in Mazar-e Sharif report that the service is "not provided."

Only about one-third (32%) of respondents say they have heard of development projects in their area over the past year, a figure that is consistent with the Wave 3 results. About half of the respondents in Ruy Do Ab (48%) and Hazrat-e Sultan (51%) say they have heard of development projects; conversely, in Faizabad, 91% say they have not heard of any development projects in their area. These district-level results are consistent with Wave 3 findings.

Those respondents who say they have heard of development projects were asked to elaborate on the nature of the development projects. Furthermore, each respondent who had heard of a particular project was asked if that project helped the people in their area. Of those who have heard of a project, majorities say it has helped the local people. In a logistic regression, having heard of medical projects in their area was a significant predictor of satisfaction with the medical projects ($p<.05$). Similarly, having heard of electricity projects was a significant predictor of satisfaction with the electricity projects ($p<.05$).

Type of Project	Heard of	Has helped
Drinking water	63%	82%
Schools	56%	82%
Roads and bridges	53%	76%
Medical facilities	34%	72%
Irrigation/water maintenance	26%	71%
Electricity	25%	86%
Agricultural assistance	23%	69%
Retaining and flood walls	16%	72%
Farm processing / storage facilities	12%	75%

Table 9.3: Awareness and Benefit of Development Projects

When asked about the types of projects that are most needed in their area, road construction is the most commonly mentioned response (in an open ended question format with 33% who mention it out

of a possible two mentions per respondent). Additionally, 32% say electricity, while 30% say water projects (again, out of a possible two mentions). The percentage of respondents saying electricity projects are most needed has gone down substantially: 43% of respondents in Wave 3 said electricity projects were mode needed in their area. In the logistic regression, being satisfied with electricity projects in the area decreased the likelihood of reporting electricity as a major need.

Respondents are also asked about the obstacles preventing them from obtaining health care or medicine. The top five most frequent responses include: [86]

Views on the obstacles preventing respondents from obtaining health care or medicine.: IOM Districts	
Lack of clinics/hospitals	44%
Lack of medicines	32% (up from 28%)
Cost of health care or medicine	26%
Lack of professional doctors	25%
Distance to facilities, lack of transportation and/or good roads	24%

Table 9.4: IOM: Obstacles preventing respondents from obtaining health care or medicine

The survey data collected on service provision and development can inform decision-making about future IOM infrastructure project activities. Regression analysis demonstrates that hearing about aid projects in a certain sector is a predictor of satisfaction with services in that sector, indicating that future infrastructure aid dollars will not be wasted if allocated wisely. However, IOM implementers must keep in mind that increased satisfaction with services does not in itself demonstrate that the overall CCI program objectives are being met. That will only happen if a greater number of infrastructure projects results in greater GIROA presence in communities (thus strengthening ties between communities and their government), or if the project removes a driver of conflict (such as a lack of water resources) and thus establishes greater cohesion between communities.

Rule of Law

Respect for the rule of law and establishing effective means of dispute resolution are two key components in building a community's adaptive capacity for dealing with internal conflict, and therefore important for achieving CCI's program goals. Three major authorities that community members could turn to for dispute resolution are local or tribal elders, government courts, or armed opposition groups. When respondents or their family members are involved in less serious disputes (concerning land, water, or theft), IOM respondents show a preference for turning to local and tribal elders. Government courts are preferred when it comes to more serious crimes such as assault, murder and kidnapping.

[86] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the total number of mentions are reported.

Armed opposition groups are rarely the preferred source of justice for any type of crime. These percentages have not changed substantially since Wave 3.

Q20. If you or a family member was involved in a dispute concerning [Insert Item], please tell me who or where you would go to get justice?... (n=5600)



Figure 9.7: Sources of Justice (Q20, W4)

Only in Mazar-e Sharif, Qush Tepah, and Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in do a majority prefer government courts to resolve all three types of disputes.

Not surprisingly, local and tribal elders enjoy high marks for confidence among respondents in IOM districts: 44% say they have "a lot" of confidence in them, while 48% say they have "some" confidence.

Confidence in government courts is more tempered with 27% saying they have "a lot of confidence," 50% who say they have "some," and 21% who say they do not have much confidence in them. Only a third of respondents have some level of confidence in armed opposition groups: 70% report "no confidence" in armed opposition groups' abilities to fairly resolve disputes.

Respondents in IOM districts have high levels of respect for the decisions made by local leaders and government courts, but almost no respondents have respect for the decisions made by armed opposition groups.



Figure 9.8: Respect for Decisions made by Various Leaders (Q22 W4)

Corruption

The majority of respondents in IOM districts (58%) admit that corruption is a problem in their area, a figure that has not changed substantially since Wave 3. It should be noted that this question prompted high nonresponse in some districts. In Qush Tepah, 70% of respondents say they don't know, while a smaller but substantial percentage say the same in Hazrat-e Sultan (25%), Ruy Do Ab (19%), Aybak (17%), and Dar-ye Suf-e Pa'in (16%).

When respondents were asked which department or sector of the local government receives the most complaints about corruption, respondents mention courts (11%), the district office (8%), the Ministry of Education (7%), and "all government offices" (7%) most often.

A plurality of respondents believes corruption has increased in the past year: 44% believe it has increased "a lot" or "a little." Respondents in Aqcha are the most likely to believe corruption has increased: 60% believe it has increased "a lot" or "a little" in the past year.

Quality of Life

Seventy-four percent of respondents in IOM districts say they are satisfied ("somewhat satisfied" and "very satisfied") with their life in general; this result compares to the 79% who said the same in Wave 3. Slightly fewer (64%) report being satisfied with their household's economic status, with 36% saying they are dissatisfied. The only district that reports a majority dissatisfied with life in general is Adraskan, where 58% report being "somewhat" or "very" dissatisfied. A majority (68%) in Adraskan also report dissatisfaction with their household's economic status.

Overall, respondents in IOM districts are most likely to say their ability to meet basic needs has stayed the same in the past year: 32% say it has increased "a little" or "a lot" compared to the 44% who say it has "stayed the same," and 22% say it has decreased "a little" or "a lot." These results are a slight drop from Wave 3, when 36% said their ability to meet basic needs had increased. The Wave 4 results are quite consistent among the various districts included in the IOM assessment.

A majority (54%) report they are "a little worried" about being able to meet their basic needs over the next year, while 20% say they are "not worried" and 24% admit they are "very worried." There has been no change in these figures since Wave 3.

Overall, 52% of IOM district respondents say the situation in their area is certain enough for them to plan for the future, though this represents a 5% drop from Wave 3. At the district level, 58% in both Chimtal and Nizam-e Shahid, as well as 57% in Adraskan, believe the situation is too uncertain for them to make plans for the future. Half of the respondents in Balkh believe the same.

Economic Activity

Measures of economic activity are important to the IOM project because increasing economic opportunities is one of the mechanisms by which adaptive capacity, and therefore resilience, can be fostered in a community. Though job training activities are traditionally a part of CCI programming, none of these types of project activities have yet been launched in IOM districts.

When asked to compare their ability to access markets in the last year, respondents are unlikely to say their access has gotten worse. Forty-three percent say it has gotten "a little" (32%) or "a lot" (10%) better, while 32% say it is about the same and 25% say it has become "a little" (19%) or "a lot" (6%) worse. There is substantial variation in district-level assessments, with 71% of respondents in Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in stating access has gotten better ("a little" or "much" better), and large proportions saying it has gotten "a little" or "much" worse in Adraskan (37%), Chimtal (36%) and Chahar Bolak (35%).

Respondents have observed price increases at their markets in the past year. Thirty percent say prices have increased "a lot" and 33% say they have increased "a little," while 27% believe that prices have "stayed the same." These results are fairly consistent between districts.

Overall, respondents are not optimistic about job growth over the past year. While 28% report that the availability of paid jobs is about the same, another 24% say there is "a little less" availability and another 24% say there is "a lot less." Aqcha respondents are least optimistic with 78% saying there are fewer jobs in their area.

Community Cohesion and Resilience

The CCI program's second primary objective is to increase cohesion among, and between, communities in order to increase their ability to collectively respond to shocks and stresses that can lead to crisis. The Wave 4 survey data on cohesion and resilience are critical for understanding the current status of connectivity between villages in IOM districts as well as to highlight areas that would benefit from future programming.

The vast majority of respondents living in IOM districts (72%) report that factors from outside their village/neighborhood "never" create problems in their area. Respondents who say such problems happen "often," "sometimes," or "rarely" (n=1104) are asked what types of outside interferences cause problems in their village/neighborhood. The most common responses include: [87]

Most common types of outside interferences: IOM Districts	
Small crimes/theft	24% (up from 11%)
Ethnic disputes	19% (down from 27%)
Land disputes	13%
Disputes over water	10%
Armed people	10%

Table 9.5: IOM: Most common types of outside interferences

Respondents overall have similar opinions on the frequency of disputes originating from inside their village/neighborhood with another 70% who say these things "never" create problems in their area. Those who say such disputes happen at least "rarely" (n=1381) are asked about the types of internal interferences that cause problems in their village/neighborhood. Respondents most frequently mention: [88]

Most common types of internal interferences: IOM Districts	
Ethnic disputes	25% (down from 34%)
Disputes over water	17%
Land disputes	15%
Small crimes/theft	12%
Family problems	8%

Table 9.6: IOM: Most common types of internal interferences

Though ethnic disputes are a problem both internally and externally, they are a bigger source of disputes within villages; however, the percentage of disputes attributed to ethnicity has dropped since Wave 3 in both categories. This is an encouraging development for IOM implementers who are working to increase cooperation between disparate people groups.

IOM respondents believe that communities are more often able to solve problems that come from within the village than those that come from outside the village. Sixty-five percent believe internal problems can be solved "often" or "sometimes," while only 56% believe this about problems from outside the village. The district that most strongly epitomizes this belief is Qush Tepah, where 68% of respondents believe internal problems can "often" or "sometimes" be solved, while only 32% believe

[87] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the total number of mentions are reported.

[88] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the total number of mentions are reported.

external problems can be solved. There is also a greater than 20% difference in Chahar Bolak (68% internal versus 43% external) and Shibirghan (60% internal versus 37% external).



Figure 9.9: IOM: Ability to Solve Internal Problems

A large percentage of respondents still believe that villages and neighborhoods "often" or "sometimes" work together to solve problems, though this percentage has dropped to 69% from 77% in Wave 3. A majority of respondents within each district also believes that villages work together to solve problems.

Respondents tend to believe their local leaders take the interests of ordinary people into account when making decisions. Fifty-nine percent believe ordinary people are taken into account "often" or "sometimes," though this percentage has dropped from 71% in Wave 3. Those who say leaders at least "rarely" take ordinary people's interests into consideration are additionally asked if they believe local leaders take the interests of women into consideration when making decisions. Of the 78% who believe ordinary peoples' interests are taken into consideration (n=4389), 55% say women's interests are taken into consideration "often" or "sometimes," while 44% say women's interests are "rarely" or "never" taken into consideration.

Overall, 70% of IOM respondents believe their local leaders are "somewhat" (51%) or "very" (19%) effective in securing funds for their local area. This measure is also relatively consistent among all districts included in IOM analysis excluding Adraskan, where only 43% of respondents believe their leaders are effective in securing funds.

Most respondents (81%) do not belong to any "groups where people get together to discuss issues of common interest or to do certain activities together." Of those who do (n=871), out of a possible two mentions, the most common types of groups mentioned are farmers unions (39%), development councils (33%), and people's councils (16%).[89] At the district level, Khwajah Do Koh residents are the most likely to participate in both farmers unions (78%) and development councils (67%).

Grievances

Grievances vary when respondents are asked to identify the biggest problems that create stress or tension in their areas. The most common responses include: [90]

Most common types of Grievances: IOM Districts	
Unemployment	41% (up from 34%)
Lack of electricity	22% (down from 30%)
Lack of drinking water	19%
Lack of paved roads	17%
Lack of clinics	11%

Table 9.7: IOM: Most common types of Grievances

Respondents in Qush Tepah are most likely to cite unemployment (68%) and respondents in Fayroz Nakhchir are most likely to identify a lack of electricity as the largest problem (53%).

Media

Respondents in IOM districts use friends and family (92%), elders (79%), radio (73%), their mosque/mullah (58%), television (49%), and their cell phones (41%) to get news and information. Television usage has increased since Wave 3, when only 38% of respondents cited television as a way to get news and information. The relatively high level of television usage in the sample is largely driven by those in Mazar-e Sharif where 97% of respondents say they use television. There are also high rates of television usage in Shibirghan (85%), Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah) (85%), Khwajah Do Koh (83%), Injil (83%), and Balkh (81%).

Respondents get most of their information about government services from the radio (51%), friends/family (44%), television (36% overall, 85% in Mazar-e Sharif), and elders (34%).[91]

[89] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the total number of mentions are reported.

[90] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the total number of mentions are reported.

CCI Module

A majority of respondents in Wave 4 (62%) believes "a lot" or "almost all" of the people in their area voted in the last election in April 2014. Another 17% say "about half" voted, while 20% say "hardly any" or "some" of the people in their area voted.

In Wave 3, which was fielded prior to the April 2014 election, respondents were asked about how many people voted during the previous presidential election held five years ago. According to Wave 3 respondents, 55% thought "a lot" or "almost all" of the people voted in that election, 20% said "about half," and 23% believed "hardly any" or only "some" of the people in their area voted. This indicates that respondents believe more people voted in the 2014 election than in 2009, though these results are colored by the limits of human memory. Wave 4 respondents were asked about an event that was fresh in their minds, while Wave 3 respondents were asked about an event that occurred several years ago.

Respondents in Qush Tepah are most likely to report "hardly any" or only "some" people voted in their area: 65% of respondents from that district said this was the case. Respondents in Faizabad are the most likely to say that "a lot" or "almost all" people voted: 87% said this was the case.

When asked about whom people in their area voted for, a majority (65%) believes most people in their community voted for different candidates. Overall, 72% believe the people in their community voted for different candidates than those whom were voted for in neighboring settlements. There was no major variation in these results by district.

Respondents are asked a series of questions about things that may have happened in their area on, or around, Election Day 2014. In general, respondents in IOM districts believe there were discussions that happened in their communities, however they were generally not confrontational. Violence related to the elections is not widely perceived to have happened prior to, or during, the 2014 election. These responses do not differ substantially from those given in Wave 3 when respondents were asked about the 2009 election.

[91] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the total number of mentions are reported.

C3. Still thinking of the last Presidential election in April of this year, did you have any of the following in your community during the time before the election day... (n=5600)



Figure 9.10: Situation in Communities around Elections

Though the overall rate of physical violence within communities regarding which candidate to vote for is low (only 16% agree there was such violence), rates of violence are much higher within certain districts. Almost half (45%) of the respondents in Qush Tepah report physical violence within the community, as do 35% in Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah) and 34% in Adraskan. Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah) and Adraskan also report the highest rates of physical violence between their community and people from other villages (31% and 30% respectively).

Most respondents (83%) feel voting is a personal and an individual responsibility, rather than believing one cannot vote for whomever they want. Similar proportions agree with this ideology across all IOM districts, except in Qush Tepah where only 52% agree and 19% refused to answer or say they don't know.

Seventy-nine percent of respondents agree that "obeying the laws of the Afghan government is necessary to achieve peace and prosperity" rather than "there may be times when it is necessary to take matters into your own hands, even if this means breaking the law." Qush Tepah is again the only outlier district, where only 44% agree that obeying Afghanistan's laws is necessary, and again 19% chose not to give a substantive response.

If the respondent or a family member was involved in an election related dispute, most respondents would choose local tribal elders (50%) rather than government courts (28%) or the Afghan National Police (ANP) (20%) to resolve the dispute. If a family member were involved in election violence, 40% would turn to local or tribal elders while 31% would go to the ANP and 27% would go to a government

court. This indicates that if violence is involved in the dispute, respondents are more inclined to involve the police.

When asked to choose between “government leaders and officials” and “tribal and community leaders” to trust to make decisions about managing election voting, 36% choose local or tribal elders, 36% choose government courts, 7% say neither and 19% opt for both equally (the last two options were volunteered by respondents).

When asked to rate their level of concern with election violence, respondents are more likely to express concern than to not. Fifty-seven percent say they are “somewhat” (43%) or “very” (14%) concerned compared to 41% who say they are “not very” (26%) or “not at all” (15%) concerned about election violence. Respondents in Hazrat-e Sultan are most concerned about election violence, with 61% saying they are “somewhat” concerned and 15% saying they are “very” concerned.

CCI-IOM Appendix

Model 1

Response: "Q16f. Generally speaking, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the District Government's provision of ... Medical care?"

q16fNET ~ as.factor(d1) + d3 + as.factor(eth) + as.factor(q17bgNET)

				95% CI for odds ratio		
	B	SE	Sig	Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-0.82	0.14	*	0.44	0.33	0.58
D1 : Female	0.13	0.11		1.14	0.92	1.42
Education	0.06	0.01	*	1.06	1.04	1.09
Ethnicity: Tajik	0.41	0.14	*	1.5	1.14	1.99
Ethnicity: Uzbek	0.08	0.17		1.08	0.77	1.51
Ethnicity: Hazara	-0.17	0.25		0.84	0.52	1.37
Ethnicity: Other	-0.37	0.21		0.69	0.46	1.03
Medical Facilities	1.21	0.11	*	3.37	2.71	4.21

Model 2

"Q16i. Generally speaking, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the District Government's provision of ... Electricity?"

q16iNET ~ as.factor(d1) + d3 + as.factor(eth) + q17biNET

				95% CI for odds ratio		
	B	SE	Sig	Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-1.26	0.17	*	0.28	0.2	0.39
D1 : Female	0.34	0.13	*	1.4	1.08	1.82
Education	0.09	0.02	*	1.1	1.07	1.13
Ethnicity: Tajik	0.26	0.17		1.3	0.93	1.81
Ethnicity: Uzbek	-0.68	0.21	*	0.51	0.33	0.77
Ethnicity: Hazara	-0.96	0.34	*	0.38	0.19	0.72
Ethnicity: Other	-0.43	0.24		0.65	0.4	1.04
Electricity	2.9	0.16	*	18.24	13.35	25.35

Model 3

Response: " Q18a. Looking forward to the next year, what types of development projects are most needed in this area?... Most needed: Water and electricity "

"Q18b. Looking forward to the next year, what type of development projects are most needed in this area?... Next most needed: Water and electricity "

Electricity ~ as.factor(d1) + d3 + as.factor(eth) + q16iNET

				95% CI for odds ratio		
	B	SE	Sig	Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-3.7	0.28	*	0.02	0.01	0.04
D1 : Female	-0.3	0.19		0.74	0.5	1.08
Education	-0.05	0.03		0.95	0.89	1
Ethnicity: Tajik	0.45	0.31		1.56	0.86	2.98
Ethnicity: Uzbek	1.32	0.3	*	3.73	2.14	6.9
Ethnicity: Hazara	0.01	0.64		1.01	0.23	3.12
Ethnicity: Other	0.39	0.36		1.48	0.73	3.02
Provision of Electricity	-0.54	0.23	*	0.58	0.36	0.9

X. KANDAHAR FOOD ZONE (KFZ)

Introduction

The Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) project seeks to strengthen and diversify lawful rural livelihoods in targeted districts by identifying and addressing the root causes and sources of instability that lead to opium poppy cultivation.[92] Kandahar Province is a major center of illicit opium poppy cultivation, second only to neighboring Helmand.[93] The project targets seven districts in Kandahar province in southern Afghanistan:

District	Sample size	SRS MOE
Panjwa'i	476	4.49%
Zharay	465	4.54%
Maiwand	336	5.35%
Shah Wali Kot	473	4.51%
Arghistan	478	4.48%
Dand	475	4.50%
Takhtapol	312	5.55%
KFZ Overall	**3,015**	**1.78% (4.10% Complex MOE)**

Table 10.1: KFZ Wave 4 Districts

This chapter provides summary and detailed information about the attitudes and opinions of respondents living in districts targeted by the KFZ project, which was added to the MISTI Survey in Wave 3. Because MISTI Wave 3 was the first to include results for the KFZ districts, the Wave 4 report is the first in which trend analysis is possible. This section will assess stabilization and development indicators on the following topics: security and crime, governance, service provision and development, rule of law, corruption, quality of life, economic activity, community cohesion and resilience, grievances, and media. In addition to the topics which were asked in all MISTI districts, the KFZ districts were administered a tailored module of questions specific to farmers and agriculture. The results of this module are presented at the end of this chapter.

It should be noted that fieldwork in Arghistan was conducted in part by a field team from Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC) and in part by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic Research (ACSOR). Fieldwork in Shah Wali Kot was conducted entirely by AYC, while fieldwork in the other districts was conducted entirely by ACSOR. Differences exist in the field implementation and quality control measures used for

[92] USAID Award Letter. Online: http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1871/AID-306-A-13-00008-KFZ.pdf.

[93] *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012: Summary Findings.* United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics. Online: http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Summary_Findings_FINAL.pdf.

the AYC interviews, which may impact some survey results. For detailed descriptions of these differences, please refer to the full Methodology Report for MISTI Wave 4.

ACSOR regularly updates its accessibility tracker. This tracker indicates accessibility of districts for field staff and the reasons for inaccessibility, such as insecurity or transportation. Additionally, the accessibility tracker indicates which districts are inaccessible to ACSOR's female staff. Maiwand and Shah Wali Kot were inaccessible to female interviewers due to Taliban presence in most parts of those districts, and thus included only men in the sample.

Unless otherwise noted, district-level analysis and wave-to-wave comparisons are provided with significance testing at the 99% confidence level.

KFZ Projects

The KFZ project seeks to identify and address the root causes of opium poppy cultivation in the target districts of Kandahar Province in Southern Afghanistan. It seeks to assist farmers, laborers, and rural communities that have been impacted by counter-narcotics campaigns, or who have consciously decided not to engage in the production of narcotics, with a package of comprehensive, practical, and sustainable interventions in an equitable manner. Through this, the KFZ project seeks to prevent the spread of opium poppy cultivation and reduce it where it has already taken root.[94] As of the writing of this report, USAID plans to execute, or has executed, 115 projects in the KFZ target districts in Kandahar province. There is a nearly even split between hard (53%) and soft (47%) project activities. All projects planned or implemented so far can be classified into four broad categories:

1. Training/capacity-building
2. Vocational training
3. Agricultural (building of new farms or agricultural processing centers)
4. Irrigation & Water

Due to the nature of this project, nearly a third of the planned and implemented projects, particularly those that relate to capacity-building, are located in the Kandahar provincial center (30%), while another 8% are in Kabul. As of September 2014, 39 projects had been completed, one was ongoing, 33 had not started, 39 had been approved, and three were planned.

[94] Kandahar Food Zone Grant Opportunity. USAID. Online: http://www.grants.gov/web/grants/view-opportunity.html?oppId=233213.

The geographic distribution of KFZ all projects was as follows:



Figure 10.1: KFZ Project Activities by District

Sixty-two percent of the project activities were actually implemented in KFZ target districts, and the rest were implemented in either the provincial center or Kabul. Of the target districts, Zharay and Panjwa'i had by far the most activities (24 each), while Arghistan had the fewest (3). Most of the activities in the KFZ districts themselves are hard projects to improve irrigation and agricultural infrastructure, or to provide vocational training (82%). Because few projects had actually been implemented in KFZ target districts, in this wave we were unable to test whether KFZ programming has a significant impact on respondent perceptions of the situation in their district. There did not appear to be a relationship between the frequency of KFZ activities in a district and respondents' general perceptions of their district. As a whole, respondents living in the KFZ project area are divided about the general direction of things in their district: 49% say that things are headed in the right direction "a little" or "a lot," while 50% say that things are headed in the wrong direction. Respondents in Shah Wali Kot and Panjwa'i were more negative than the overall average for the districts, while those in Dand and Zharay were slightly more positive than average. Respondents in Takhtapol were most positive about the overall direction of things in their district (63%), although only 4% of all project activities took place there.

There did not appear to be a relationship between the geographical distribution of KFZ programming and the prevalence of poppy cultivation. Only five KFZ project activities were conducted in Shah Wali Kot, where the highest percentage of farmers (44%) report growing at least some poppy. This may be due, in part, to the poor security situation in that district. Additionally, 24 project activities were

conducted in Panjwa'i, while only three were conducted in Arghistan, and yet both districts report similar percentages of farmers who grow poppy (27% and 28%, respectively). Factors influencing poppy cultivation will be explored in greater detail in the section of this chapter that analyzes the results of the KFZ module.

Wave 4: KFZ | MISTI Fact Sheet

OVERVIEW

The Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) program seeks to strengthen and diversify legal rural livelihoods by identifying and addressing the root causes and sources of instability that lead to opium poppy cultivation. It assists farmers, laborers, and rural communities that have been impacted by counter-narcotics campaigns or have chosen not to engage in the production of narcotics. The program seeks to prevent the spread of opium poppy cultivation and reduce it where it has already taken root.

The KFZ program is implemented in key districts of Kandahar province. Findings here summarize attitudes and perceptions of respondents living in target districts.

SECURITY AND CRIME

Perceptions of local security declined noticeably from Wave 3 to Wave 4. At least some of this decline can be attributed to the fact that Wave 4 was conducted during the spring and summer fighting season, which coincided this year with two rounds of the 2014 presidential elections. Just under two-thirds of respondents say security on their local roads is "good" or "very good.".

A majority of respondents in KFZ districts say there are "a lot" of Afghan National Army (ANA) in their area, while just over half of respondents say there are "a lot" of Afghan National Police (ANP) in their area. Levels of confidence in both the ANA and ANP's ability to keep the area safe have seen improvement.

GOVERNANCE

Opinions of the Afghan government have changed little, and most respondents continue to regard it positively. It should be kept in mind that seasonal differences may influence respondents' perceptions of local governance, as previously discussed.



Respondents have mixed views of their district government's behavior, although some perceptions have improved since Wave 3. The majority of those surveyed in Wave 4 believe district government officials are from their district. While over half of respondents believe their district government does not understand the problems of people in their area, this figure still represents a sizeable improvement from the level found in Wave 3. A majority of KFZ respondents do not believe that district government officials are doing their jobs honestly.

SERVICE PROVISION AND DEVELOPMENT

USAID programs conducted under the auspices of the KFZ program focus mainly on improving irrigation and water systems, providing agricultural assistance, and providing capacity-building and vocational training. Aside from drinking water, most respondents in KFZ districts are dissatisfied with other district government services.

RULE OF LAW

Respondents are most likely to turn to local/tribal elders to seek justice when they are involved in a dispute, while they are slightly more inclined to turn to government courts for more serious cases. In light of the preference for traditional mechanisms of justice, it is not surprising that respondents are most confident in local/tribal elders to fairly resolve disputes.

CORRUPTION

Corruption leads to weak institutions and erodes trust in government, which may in turn lead to social acceptance of illegal behaviors, such as growing poppy. Almost nine out of ten respondents (89%) believe corruption is a problem in their area.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Respondents remain generally satisfied with the quality of their life. Those living in Dand and Maiwand are most positive about their overall quality of life. At the same time, the majority of respondents (55%) say their area is too uncertain to make plans about their future

Wave 4: KFZ | MISTI Fact Sheet

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Although a plurality of respondents believes that markets are more accessible, half of respondents believe prices for basic goods in the local markets have increased over the past year. Respondents in KFZ districts believe they are seeing less improvement in the number of paid jobs that are becoming available. Although a plurality believes that more paid jobs are available now than one year ago, this figure represents a decline from Wave 3.

COMMUNITY COHESION AND RESILIENCE

Over three-quarters of respondents say things from outside their village/neighborhood "never" or "rarely" create problems in their area that disrupt normal life. When respondents were asked what types of outside interferences cause problems in their village/neighborhood, the most common responses include disputes over water, land disputes, ethnic disputes, closing roads, and insecurity.

Similarly, over three-quarters of respondents say things from inside their village/area "never" or "rarely" create problems to disrupt normal life. The most frequently mentioned internal interferences are disputes over water, land disputes, family problems, ethnic disputes, and closing roads.

MEDIA

Respondents most often use radio, friends and family, elders, and the Mosque/Mullah to communicate with others and/or get news and information. Fewer use cell phones or television. Fewer still mention using posters/billboards or newspapers, and almost none use the Internet.

KFZ MODULE

Respondents who answered "yes" to the question "Does this household farm any land?" were asked a series of questions about their farming activities. About half of the farming respondents say they own all the land they farm, about three-quarters of whom say they inherited their land. The rest either purchased it or had it given to them by the village. The majority of farmers in KFZ districts have either a title document or sales agreement securing their land tenure.

Farmers were asked how many jeribs their household farms. One Afghan jerib is equal to 0.4942 acres or 0.2 hectares. More than half of the respondents farm 10 jeribs of land or less.

K7. What is the size in jeribs of all of the land that this household farms? (n=2086)



Wheat is the most commonly reported crop being grown by respondents in all districts. In terms of illicit crops grown by farmers, 28% report growing poppy while 12% say that they grow marijuana. Poppy cultivation is most prevalent in Shah Wali Kot.

Wave 4: Poppy Cultivation by District



The most common places to sell agricultural goods are local markets in the village and local markets in the district center. Many respondents also sell farm produce at markets in the provincial center or in the Howsa.

Less than a third of the farmers in the survey say they received assistance from outside their households in the past year for their farming activities. Of those who say they receive assistance, most say they receive assistance from the government, though many also receive assistance from an international organization or NGO.

Farmers were asked, in an open-ended question, what type of assistance would be most useful to them in the coming year. Seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides were the most commonly mentioned.

Security and Crime

Perceptions of local security declined noticeably from Wave 3 to Wave 4; the percentage of respondents saying that security in their district was "good" or "very good" dropped from 60% in Wave 3 to 48% in Wave 4, while the percentage saying that it was "poor" or "very poor" rose from 12% to 16%. At least some of this decline can be attributed to the fact that Wave 4 was conducted during the spring and summer fighting season, which this year coincided with the two rounds of the 2014 presidential elections. Future waves will continue to examine trends in perceptions of security. Respondents living in Maiwand have the most positive (56%) perceptions of local security, while those in Shah Wali Kot have the most negative (27%).

Despite the apparent deterioration in the security situation, a plurality of respondents (43%) believes that their local area is more secure than it was one year ago. Respondents in Maiwand and Takhtapol are the most likely to hold this view (47% in each). Unsurprisingly, those in Shah Wali Kot are the least likely (28%) to believe their local area is more secure than a year ago.

Just under two-thirds of respondents (64%) say security on their local roads is "good" or "very good," and 40% say road security has improved ("improved a lot" or "a little") in the past year. Most respondents say that they feel secure in their homes during the day (72%), though this figure has seen a marked decline since Wave 3 (90%). The percentage of respondents saying that they feel secure in their homes at night actually saw an increase, from 65% in Wave 3 to 71% in Wave 4.

Meanwhile, 71% of respondents say they feel secure traveling to a neighboring village and 57% report that they feel secure traveling to the district or provincial capital.



Figure 10.2: KFZ: Perception of Security

The perceived level of crime in KFZ districts has declined slightly since Wave 3. The percentage of respondents saying that there is "a lot" of petty crime in their area has declined from 49% in Wave 3 to 42% in Wave 4; the percentage reporting "a lot" of serious non-violent crime fell from 28% in Wave 3 to 25% in Wave 4; while the percentage stating that there

was “a lot” of serious violent crime fell from 24% in Wave 3 to 20% in Wave 4. Respondents in Panjwa’i and Zharay are most likely to say that there is “a lot” of violent crime (24% in each district), while those in Takhtapol are least likely to say so (13%).



Figure 10.3: Perceptions of “a lot” of the following crimes in KFZ Districts, Waves 3-4 [Q5.1a-c]

A majority of respondents in KFZ districts (60%) say there are “a lot” of Afghan National Army (ANA) in their area (up from the 53% found in Wave 3). Just over half (53%) of respondents say there are “a lot” of Afghan National Police (ANP) in their area (down slightly from 55% in Wave 3). While levels of confidence in both the ANA and ANP’s ability to keep the area safe have improved since Wave 3, confidence in the ANA has seen a larger increase: from 59% in Wave 3 (“a lot” or “some”) to 73% in Wave 4. The increase in confidence in the ANP was more modest: from 56% in Wave 3 to 59% in Wave 4.



Figure 10.4: Confidence in ANA and ANP Waves 3-4 [Q6.2a-b]

The percentage of KFZ respondents reporting "a lot" of armed opposition groups in their area dropped from 27% in Wave 3 to 21% in Wave 4, as did the percentage reporting no armed opposition presence, from 36% to 32%. A plurality now say there is "some" armed opposition present in their area (46%). Respondents in Takhtapol are the most likely to report no presence of armed opposition forces (43% "none"), while those in Maiwand are least likely (24%). The presence of Arbaki varies greatly in the districts targeted by the KFZ project: the most (66%) are found in Maiwand and the least (26%) in Dand.



Figure 10.5: Presence of Armed Opposition Groups Waves 3-4 [Q6_1d]

Since Wave 3, there has been a steady decrease in the perceived level of ISAF forces in KFZ districts, reflecting a trend observed across the country due to the drawdown of foreign forces. Thirty-three percent of KFZ respondents say there are "none" in their area, up from the 27% reporting such in Wave 3.

The presence of security forces and perceived level of security varies across districts, and these seem to be correlated. For example, respondents in Shah Wali Kot are least likely to say that the security situation in their area is good, and also the least likely to say that there are "a lot" of ANA and ANP in their area. Residents in Maiwand report the best overall security (56% "good" or "very good"), relatively high presence of ANA and ANP (67% and 58% "a lot," respectively), and the highest presence of Arbaki (66% "a lot").

Farmers also appear to be more likely to grow poppy in districts with poor security and weak ANA and ANP presence. Shah Wali Kot has the highest proportion of farmers who report growing poppy (44%), and respondents in this district are also least likely to report good security or say that there are "a lot" of ANA or ANP. By contrast, farmers in Maiwand, where respondents report relatively good security and higher ANA and ANP presence, are least likely (19%) to grow poppy (or at least to acknowledge doing so).

Governance

Opinions of the Afghan government have changed little: 76% say that the Afghan government is well-regarded in their area; the same figure as was found in Wave 3. However, confidence in district governors fell from Wave 3 to Wave 4, even as perceptions of their responsiveness rose (See Figure 10.6 below). It should be kept in mind that seasonal differences may influence respondents' perceptions of local governance.



Figure 10.6: Perceptions of Responsiveness and Confidence in Local Governance (Q9 and Q10 by Wave)

Majorities in all KFZ districts except Shah Wali Kot have "a lot" or "some" confidence their district governments. Respondents in Zharay expressed the highest confidence in their district government (71%).

Respondents have mixed views of their district government's behavior, though some perceptions have improved since Wave 3. The majority of those surveyed in Wave 4 believe district government officials are from their district (81%, up from 73% in Wave 3). While over half of respondents believe their district government does not understand the problems of people in their area (59%), this figure still represents an improvement from the level found in Wave 3 (69%). A majority of KFZ respondents believe that the district government cares about people in their area (63%, up from 60% in Wave 3), and 65% (up from 54% in Wave 3) believe that their district government officials do not abuse their authority to make money for themselves. A majority also report that district government officials visit their area (63%, up from 58% in Wave 3). A majority of KFZ respondents (59%) do not believe that district government officials are doing their jobs honestly, and respondents are evenly split on whether or not the district government delivers basic services in a fair manner (50% say that it does, while 50% say it does not).

Respondents are increasingly aware of the District Development Assembly (DDA) in their districts. Seventy-two percent say they have heard of the DDA in their district (up from 67% in Wave 3). However, this increased awareness has also come with increased skepticism: although most of those who have heard of the DDA (65%, n=2,175) have "a lot" or "some" confidence in it, this figure is down from Wave 3, when over three-quarters (77%) of those who knew about a DDA in their area expressed confidence in it. Despite this decline in confidence, the perceived responsiveness of DDAs has improved from 47% in Wave 3 to 61% in Wave 4. KFZ respondents are evenly split on whether or not the DDA's responsiveness has improved: 33% say it has improved, 34% say it has worsened, and 33% say there has been no change. Respondents in Takhtapol have the most confidence in their DDAs (72% "a lot" or "some" confidence), while those in Zharay have the least (59%).

Views of Community Development Councils (CDCs) have become more negative in the first half of 2014. Respondents are more aware of CDCs in Wave 4 (75%) than they were in Wave 3 (69%). However, confidence in CDCs has seen a sharp decline in KFZ districts, from 86% in Wave 3 to 46% in Wave 4. Respondents in Dand have the most confidence in their CDC (60% "a lot" or "some" confidence), while those in Zharay have the least (37%). At the same time, the percentage of respondents who see the CDC in their area as responsive has risen from 34% in Wave 3 to 50% in Wave 4. These seemingly contradictory trends suggest that respondents may perceive their CDCs as responsive but not effective.

A slight majority of KFZ respondents believes it is not acceptable to publicly criticize the Afghan government (56%), which represents a slight increase from the 51% found in Wave 3. An independent proportions test confirms that W4's proportion is indeed greater than that of W3 ($p<0.05$). In Shah Wali Kot, where respondents reported the worst security situation, respondents were least likely to say that it was acceptable to publicly criticize the government. At the same time, in some districts where respondents report feeling more secure, they are more likely to say that it is acceptable to criticize the government. However, in a logistic regression, perceptions of security were not a significant predictor of acceptability of criticizing the government ($p< 0.05$).

Service Provision & Development

USAID programming conducted under the auspices of the KFZ project is focused mainly on improving irrigation and water systems, providing agricultural assistance, and providing capacity-building and vocational training. All of these services aim to address the root causes of opium poppy cultivation and steer farmers towards licit crops. However, despite these efforts, respondents in KFZ districts report mixed satisfaction with the district government's provision of water for irrigation (44% "very" or "somewhat" satisfied, with another 1% who say that the service is not provided) and agricultural assistance (50% "very" or "somewhat" satisfied). Respondents in Maiwand, Panjwa'i, and Zharay, where more KFZ project activities are allocated, are more likely to be satisfied with the district government's provision of water for irrigation (55%, 52%, and 51%, "very" or "somewhat" satisfied respectively), while those in Arghistan and Shah Wali Kot, where fewer activities are allocated, are less satisfied (35% and 24%, respectively).

Aside from drinking water (71% "very" or "somewhat" satisfied), most respondents in KFZ districts are dissatisfied with other district government services. Sixty-five percent of respondents in KFZ districts are

dissatisfied with the district government's provision of retaining and flood walls, up from 47% in Wave 3, while 64% express dissatisfaction with the roads and bridges in their district. Most KFZ respondents are dissatisfied with education for both boys (68%) and girls (69%). Only 13% are satisfied with the district government's provision of electricity, while 74% are dissatisfied, and 12% report that the service is not provided at all.

The majority of respondents (56%) say they have not seen or heard about any development projects in their local area in the past year. Of those who have heard about development projects in their area (n=1,311), 64% have heard about projects related to irrigation and water maintenance systems, and two-thirds (66%) have heard about projects related to agricultural assistance. Nearly all respondents in Shah Wali Kot who have heard about irrigation and water maintenance projects (98%, n=88) feel that they have made life better for people in their local area, which is by far the highest of any district. Also, despite the relatively small number of KFZ projects in Shah Wali Kot, 74% of respondents in that district – a relatively high percentage - have heard about agricultural assistance projects, and 96% feel that they improve life for people in their area. This general trend in Shah Wali Kot data suggests that despite (or perhaps because of) security and accessibility issues, development initiatives are greatly valued and appreciated there. Fewer respondents in KFZ districts (46%) have heard about projects related to farm produce processing or storage facilities. Respondents are also less likely to believe that these projects improved the lives of people in their area when compared to other types of development activities, though a majority still holds this view (54%).

Many respondents who have heard about development projects have heard about projects related to drinking water (78%, n=1,311), and an overwhelming majority of these respondents feel that these projects have improved life for people in their area (84%). Only 24% have heard about projects related to retaining and flood walls, and 36% have heard about projects related to roads and bridges. Only 8% have heard about electricity projects in their area, and of those, only 42% think they have improved life for people in their area.

Looking forward to the next year, respondents in KFZ districts most frequently mention the following development projects as being needed in their area:[95]

Views on development projects for next year: KFZ Districts	
Electricity	34%
Road Construction	31%
Education and School	27%
Clinics	22%
Water	15%

Table 10.2: KFZ: Views on development projects for next year

[95] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Respondents were also asked about the obstacles preventing them from obtaining health care or medicine. The most frequent responses include: [96]

Views on the obstacles preventing respondents from obtaining health care or medicine.: KFZ Districts	
Lack of clinics/hospitals	40%
Lack of professional doctors	33%
Lack of medicines	29%
Poor security	22%
Distance to facilities/lack of transportation/lack of good roads	17%
Corruption or need to pay bribes	17%
Lack of medical equipment	17%

Table 10.3: KFZ: Obstacles preventing respondents from obtaining health care or medicine

Rule of Law

Respondents are most likely to turn to local/tribal elders to seek justice when they are involved in a dispute. Respondents are slightly more inclined to turn to government courts for more serious cases. For example, 37% say they would turn to government courts if they were involved in a dispute concerning land or water, 31% say the same about disputes concerning theft, and 42% say they would turn to government courts if they were involved with assault, murder, or kidnapping. Respondents living in Takhtapol are most likely to say they would seek justice from a government court for land or water disputes (48%) and cases of theft (40%), while those in Shah Wali Kot are most likely to refer to a government court for cases of assault, murder, or kidnapping (50%). The percentage of respondents preferring to resolve serious disputes concerning violent crime in government courts has changed little from Wave 3 to Wave 4, but the percentage saying that they would turn to a government court to resolve a dispute over land or water fell from 44% in Wave 3 to 37% in Wave 4. Similarly, the percentage saying that they would turn to a government court for resolution of a case of theft fell from 40% in Wave 3 to 31% in Wave 4.

Respondents are less likely in general to seek justice from armed opposition groups, however, 10% say they would turn to armed opposition groups for cases of theft, up from 7% in Wave 3. Respondents in Arghistan are consistently the most likely to seek dispute resolution from armed opposition groups: 12% would turn to them to resolve cases of theft, 14% for cases of serious violent crime, and 14% for cases of disputes over land and water. However, in no district do respondents prefer armed opposition groups to government courts for any type of dispute resolution.

[96] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

In light of the preference for traditional mechanisms of justice, it is not surprising that respondents report the most confidence in local/tribal elders to fairly resolve disputes (90% "a lot" or "some" confidence). Most respondents also express confidence in government courts (74% "a lot" or "some" confidence, the same figure as was found in Wave 3). Despite the paucity of respondents who report referring disputes to armed opposition groups, 43% of KFZ respondents express confidence in armed opposition groups to resolve disputes fairly (down from 48% in Wave 3). Respondents are most likely to believe decisions made by local/tribal elders are "always" respected than decisions made by government courts (33%, compared to 21%).

Q22. Do people in your village always, mostly, sometimes, or never respect decisions made by the following? (n=3,015)



Figure 10.7: Respect of Decisions Made by Elders, Courts, Opposition Groups (Q22a-Q22c)

Corruption

Almost nine out of ten respondents (89%, up from the 79% found in Wave 3) believe corruption is a problem in their area. Respondents in Shah Wali Kot are most likely to say corruption is a problem (98%), while those in Maiwand are least likely to say so (82%). A plurality of respondents overall (46%) say corruption has increased ("increased a lot" and "increased a little") in their area, and 40% say it has stayed the same. Respondents in Arghistan are most likely to say that corruption has increased (56%). Corruption leads to weak institutions and erodes trust in government, which may in turn lead to social acceptance of illegal behaviors, such as growing poppy. There seems to be a relationship between perceived levels of corruption and propensity to grow poppy: in Shah Wali Kot, where poppy cultivation is most prevalent, perceptions of corruption are highest; in Maiwand, where respondents are least likely to see corruption as a problem, the reported rate of poppy cultivation is the lowest.

Respondents were asked to name the department or sector of the local government where people most complain about corruption; in an open-ended format, the top mentions include: the district office (16%, up from 9% in Wave 3), the Ministry of Education (8%), the police (8%), and the municipality (6%). In

particular, 33% of respondents in Shah Wali Kot report that people complain about corruption in the district office.

Quality of Life

Respondents remain generally satisfied with their quality of life, with 63% saying they are "somewhat satisfied" or "very satisfied" with life as a whole, though this represents a decline from 70% found in Wave 3. Those living in Dand and Maiwand are most positive about their quality of life, where 71% and 69% respectively say that they are satisfied with their life as a whole as of Wave 4. Fifty-six percent say they are satisfied with their household's current financial situation (up from 49% in Wave 3). Forty-four percent say their ability to meet their basic needs has increased ("increased a lot" and "increased a little") in the past year, a decline from the 54% found in Wave 3. Looking forward, a plurality (47%) say they are "a little worried" about meeting their basic needs over the next year, just under a quarter say they are "very worried" (24%) and another 28% say they are "not worried".

The majority of respondents (55%) say their area is too uncertain to make plans about their future, while 45% say their area is certain enough for them to make plans about their future. Respondents in Maiwand (62%) are most likely to consider the situation certain enough to make plans about their future, while those in Shah Wali Kot are least likely (27%).

Economic Activity

When asked to think about their access to local markets, 47% say their ability to get to local markets has gotten better ("a little better" and "much better") over the past year, 35% say it has stayed about the same, and 17% say it has gotten worse ("a little worse" and "much worse"). Although a plurality of respondents believes that markets are more accessible, half of respondents (50%) believe prices for basic goods in local markets have increased ("increased a lot" and "increased a little") over the past year.

Respondents in KFZ districts believe they are seeing less improvement in the number of paid jobs that are becoming available. Although a plurality (44%) believes that more paid jobs are available now than one year ago, this figure represents a decline from Wave 3 (56%). Twenty-four percent believe there are fewer paid jobs available (up from 17% in Wave 3), while 31% believe there are about the same (up from 27% in Wave 3). Respondents in Arghistan are most likely (49%), and respondents in Panjwa'i are least likely (40%), to agree that there are more paid jobs in their area than last year.

Community Cohesion and Resilience

Three-quarters of respondents (75%, similar to the level found in Wave 3) say things from outside their village/neighborhood "never" or "rarely" create problems in their area that disrupt normal life, while 24% say things outside their area "often" or "sometimes" cause problems. When respondents were

asked what types of outside interferences cause problems in their village/neighborhood, the most common responses include: [97]

Most common types of outside interferences: SIKA-N Districts	
Disputes over water	25% (up from 16%)
Land disputes	20% (up from 8%)
Ethnic disputes	19% (up from 11%)
Closing roads	12%
Insecurity	10%

Table 10.4: SIKA-N: Most common types of outside interferences

Respondents in Zharay are most likely to say that disputes over water within the community cause problems for people in their area (45%), while those in Arghistan are most likely to say that land disputes within the community cause problems in their village or neighborhood (30%). This suggests that those districts may see the most benefit from KFZ programming aimed at improving water resources and land management, and that strengthening dispute resolution mechanisms with respect to land and water may help inhabitants of those districts build poppy-free livelihoods. Forty-one percent of respondents in Shah Wali Kot say that Arbaki are one of the most common types of interference from outside the village/neighborhood that create problems in their area, indicating that this may be the reason for feelings of insecurity in that district.

Perceptions of which *internal* interferences cause problems in their area are slightly different. A majority of respondents (75%) say things from inside their village/area "never" or "rarely" create problems to disrupt normal life, and 25% say they "sometimes" or "often" do. When asked about the types of internal interferences that cause problems in their village/neighborhood, respondents most frequently mention: [98]

Most common types of internal interferences: SIKA-N Districts	
Disputes over water	38% (up from 24%)
Land disputes	32% (up from 17%)
Family problems	24%
Ethnic disputes	12%
Closing roads	8%

Table 10.5: SIKA-N: Most common types of internal interferences

[97] This question was only asked of respondents who answered "often," "sometimes," or "rarely" when asked how often outside factors create problems in their area (n=938). Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

[98] This question was only asked of respondents who answered "often," "sometimes," or "rarely" when asked how often inside factors create problems in their area (n=1,047). Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Respondents in Shah Wali Kot are most likely to say that both disputes over water (67%) and disputes over land (58%) within their village create problems, suggesting that farmers and households in this district may benefit from improved dispute resolution mechanisms, whether under the auspices of the KFZ project or through other Afghan government or USAID efforts. Respondents in Takhtapol are most likely to mention closing roads as one of the most common internal interferences (16%), while those in Arghistan are most likely to mention ethnic disputes (21%). A majority of respondents (61%) believe that villages and neighborhoods in their area "often" or "sometimes" work together to solve problems.

Over half of respondents (58%) believe local elders "sometimes" or "often" consider the interests of ordinary people in their village/neighborhood when making decisions. Forty-two percent believe they "rarely" or "never" do. Respondents in Shah Wali Kot and Arghistan believe that they receive the least consideration from local leaders, with 49% in each district saying that local leaders "rarely" or "never" consider their interests when making decisions that will affect them. Fifty-one percent of respondents in KFZ districts say that local leaders "often" or "sometimes" consider the interests of women when making decisions. Those in Shah Wali Kot were least likely to think this (43%), while those in Dand and Takhtapol were most likely (54% in each). Cultural factors make female empowerment and the inclusion of women in decision-making difficult. Overall, 61% of respondents perceive their local elders to be effective ("somewhat effective" and "very effective") at securing funds from the district or provincial government for their local needs. Local leaders in Zharay are seen as most effective in obtaining funds from the district or provincial government (77% "very" or "somewhat" effective), while those in Shah Wali Kot are seen as least effective (39% "very" or "somewhat" effective).



Figure 10.8: Views of Local Leaders by District (Q37a-b)

Most respondents in KFZ districts (93%) do not belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss common interests or do certain activities together. Of the small number who do belong to such groups (n=221), respondents are most likely to belong to: farmers unions (38%, up from 19% in Wave 3), business companies (29%), development councils (15%, down from 25% in Wave 3), welfare foundations (14%), and women's solidarity unions (10%).[99]

Grievances

Results vary when respondents are asked to identify the biggest problems that create stress or tension in their areas. The most common responses include: [100]

Most common types of Grievances: IOM Districts	
Insecurity	32%
Unemployment	29%
Lack of electricity	18%
Illiteracy	12%
Corruption	11%

Table 10.6: IOM: Most common types of Grievances

Respondents in Shah Wali Kot were most likely to mention insecurity (45%), lack of electricity (27%), lack of paved roads (22%), and lack of clinics (19%). However, they were by far the least likely to mention unemployment (14%).

Media

Respondents most often use radio (96%), friends and family (91%), elders (80%), and the Mosque/Mullah (58%) to communicate with others and/or get news and information. Fewer use cell phones (36%) or television (16%). Fewer still mention using posters/billboards (8%). Only 1% use newspapers, and almost none (0% - 8 respondents) use the Internet or e-mail to communicate with others and/or get news and information.

Respondents get most of their information about government services from the radio (79%), through word of mouth (friends/family) (49%), elders (35%), and the Mosque/Mullah (12%).[101]

[99] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

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KFZ Module

Respondents who answered "yes" to the question "Does this household farm any land?" were asked a series of questions about their farming activities. A total of 69% of respondents (n=2,086) answered affirmatively and were taken through the rest of the module. Questions in the KFZ module dealt with topics such as land tenure, irrigation, land and crops farmed, credit/loans, and household economics.

About half (51%) of farming respondents say they own 100% of the land they farm. Of those who own land, 73% say they inherited their land. Another 21% say they purchased it, and 4% say the village gave it to them.

Leasing land is less common: 55% say they do not lease any of the land that the household farms. Sharecropping is even less common, with 72% saying they do not sharecrop any land. Of those who lease or sharecrop land, respondents reported a very wide range of payments made: from 500 Afs to 500,000 Afs per year for use of the land they farm, with 18% saying they do not make any financial payments for the land.[102] However, very high payments appear to be uncommon, as only 2% of respondents pay more than 100,000 Afs per year as part of lease, rent or sharecropping arrangements. Of those who lease, rent or sharecrop land (n=1,029), the majority (73%) give 60% of their crop or less to the owner to use their land for a year, including 9% who give no portion of their crop to the landlord. Another 24% of these respondents say they give more than half (60% or more) of their crop to the landlord each year, including 7% (67 individuals; 3% of all respondents who took the KFZ module) who give all (96% or more) of their crop to the land owner, suggesting that these individuals may be trapped in debt peonage. This situation is most common in Arghistan (14% of those who rent, lease, or sharecrop in that district).

Consistent with the high levels of reported land ownership, the majority of farmers in KFZ districts have either a title document or sales agreement securing their land use. Only 3% do not have a written or recorded agreement.

[102] These reported amounts should be taken in context; financial questions posed to farmers are often misunderstood despite efforts by interviewers to clarify such questions. Low levels of education (76% of KFZ respondents say that they cannot read a letter in their native language), lack of accounting or recording keeping, unfamiliarity with mathematical concepts, and infrequency of thinking about financial matters within year spans can all contribute to respondent misunderstanding of such questions.



Figure 10.9: Types of Land Agreements

Farmers were asked how many jeribs of land their household farms. In order to keep numbers in perspective, 1 Afghan jerib is equal to 0.4942 acres or 0.2 hectares. More than half of the respondents (56%) farm 10 jeribs of land or less.

K7. What is the size in jeribs of all of the land that this household farms? (n=2,086)	
Less than 1 jerib	1%
1 to 2 jeribs	7%
3 to 5 jeribs	19%
6 to 10 jeribs	30%
11 to 20 jeribs	29%
21 to 50 jeribs	10%
51 to 100 jeribs	3%
101 to 150 jeribs	1%
Over 150 jeribs	0%

Table 10.7: Size of Household Farms

In the context of rural southern Afghanistan, it is not difficult to see why poor farmers struggling to support large families on small plots of land are compelled to grow poppy even if they are aware of its corrosive effects on society and know that doing so violates Afghan and Islamic Law. However, a logistic regression of poppy-growing status and farm size did not find a significant relationship between the amount of land held and propensity to grow poppy. These findings suggest that other factors are more important predictors of poppy cultivation.

Wave 4: Poppy Cultivation by District (KFZ)



As hinted earlier in the report, there is a relationship between the security situation in a district and the respondent's likelihood to grow poppy. Security in a respondent's local area is a significant predictor of respondent's likelihood to grow poppy ($p<0.05$). This makes sense on an intuitive level, as farmers who live in districts with weak institutions and little or no army and police presence face fewer barriers can grow poppy without fear of punishment from the authorities.

Nearly all farmers (91%) say their land is irrigated. These farmers report a wide variety of irrigation sources used for their land. Out of a possible two mentions, the most commonly cited sources of irrigation are: rain (48%), river (41%), dam (32%), bore well (29%), karez (29%), and canal (14%).[103]

Wheat is the most commonly reported crop being grown by respondents in all districts (grown by 94% of farmers in KFZ districts). Feed corn and grapes are the next most popular crops, each grown by 46% of farmers. Comparisons of crops grown in Wave 3 and Wave 4 are difficult because fieldwork was conducted at different times of year, and the seasonal crop cycle is likely to impact responses.

[103] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

In terms of illicit crops grown by farmers, 28% report growing poppy, while 12% say that they grow marijuana. There is likely at least a degree of social desirability bias impacting responses to these two items: the past decade has seen widespread anti-poppy campaigns, and Mullahs and Imams have publicly declared that growing and using these crops is a sin. Respondents are being asked to openly admit to activity that their society considers both illegal and immoral if they provide an affirmative response, and many may not be willing to do so with an interviewer they do not know.

Sheep are the most common animals among KFZ farmers interviewed: 35% of farmers say they raise sheep, 21% raise goats, 15% raise cattle, and another 14% raise chickens.

	Total KFZ	Panjwa'i	Zharay	Maiwand	Shah Wali Kot	Arghistan	Dand	Takhtapol
Wheat	**94%**	88%	95%	92%	97%	95%	91%	98%
Rice	**5%**	4%	2%	3%	5%	2%	10%	9%
Maize	**46%**	36%	51%	58%	51%	33%	45%	50%
Corn	**32%**	24%	38%	47%	31%	30%	23%	33%
Safflower	**1%**	2%	1%	0%	2%	1%	2%	0%
Barley	**30%**	31%	37%	29%	15%	31%	39%	31%
Poppy	**28%**	27%	22%	19%	44%	28%	27%	23%
Cotton	**4%**	1%	2%	2%	1%	15%	3%	4%
Soya	**2%**	1%	0%	0%	0%	6%	3%	1%
Potato	**23%**	23%	37%	19%	5%	31%	26%	21%
Onion	**37%**	37%	43%	33%	17%	51%	43%	41%
Cumin	**21%**	25%	25%	22%	4%	33%	20%	22%
Sunflower	**4%**	2%	4%	1%	1%	12%	5%	3%
Okra	**12%**	12%	10%	5%	4%	18%	20%	13%
Green gram (Mung beans)	**3%**	3%	3%	3%	1%	9%	3%	2%
Other pulses (lentils, peas,	**7%**	6%	5%	6%	7%	12%	6%	6%
Marijuana (Chaars)	**12%**	16%	10%	13%	6%	13%	14%	11%
Alfalfa	**19%**	22%	16%	20%	18%	19%	19%	23%
Clover	**13%**	15%	14%	13%	8%	14%	14%	12%
Melon	**37%**	39%	38%	32%	17%	46%	43%	50%
Watermelon	**42%**	40%	51%	39%	21%	48%	50%	52%
Pomegranates	**37%**	44%	54%	43%	8%	40%	44%	35%
Grapes	**46%**	58%	65%	57%	7%	41%	53%	52%
Apricots	**16%**	15%	25%	30%	5%	14%	15%	12%
Palms	**1%**	1%	1%	2%	0%	1%	0%	1%
Apples	**2%**	2%	3%	2%	0%	2%	0%	2%
Pears	**1%**	0%	2%	1%	0%	1%	0%	1%
Peaches	**2%**	3%	2%	1%	0%	3%	4%	3%
Cows (Cattle)	**15%**	16%	12%	13%	21%	14%	15%	11%
Chickens (Poultry)	**14%**	9%	9%	11%	29%	9%	10%	13%
Oxen	**5%**	4%	5%	1%	11%	3%	7%	4%
Donkeys	**3%**	3%	2%	0%	3%	2%	5%	3%

	Total KFZ	Panjwa'i	Zharay	Maiwand	Shah Wali Kot	Arghistan	Dand	Takhtapol
Horses	**2%**	1%	2%	0%	1%	2%	3%	0%
Camels	**2%**	1%	1%	1%	2%	4%	2%	1%
Sheep	**35%**	26%	24%	30%	66%	32%	25%	33%
Goats	**21%**	11%	12%	11%	51%	21%	15%	14%
Fig	**8%**	0%	0%	0%	44%	0%	0%	0%
n-sizes	**2,086**	308	329	208	388	341	288	224

Table 10.8: Crops Grown and Animals Raised (Total Mentions)

Farmers were also asked to name the single most important crop for their household's economic status. Wheat was named by 46% of respondents followed by poppy at 11%. All other crops were named by 5% or fewer respondents.

Farmers were also asked what proportion of their income came from each crop they grow or animal they raise. Among farmers who grow poppy (n=593), 34% derive 50% or more of their income from it. This is most common in Zharay, where 62% of poppy-growing farmers earn 50% or more of their income from poppy. Paradoxically, Shah Wali Kot, which had the highest percentage of farmers growing poppy, also had by far the lowest percentage of farmers making 50% or more of their income from poppy: only 3%. These results show that most farmers who grow poppy in that district are making the majority of their income from other crops.

A majority of respondents (61%) say that they sell their crops within a few days of harvest, while 39% say they store their crops after harvest and before selling them. Of those who say they store at least some of their crops (n=810), 86% say they use a "farm bin, shelter or other type of temporary storage unit on [their] farm" (up from 77% in Wave 3) and 36% say they use a "cold storage facility" (down from 46% in Wave 3).

When asked what percentage of crops they sold or traded at a market in the past year, 9% say they sold all the crops they grew, and 76% say they sold half or less. Most (90%) sold half or less of the farm products they made at the market. About two-thirds (68%) of farmers sold animals they had raised in the market. Farmers report high levels of satisfaction with the price they receive for their crops sold at market, and satisfaction has risen since Wave 3. Farmers believe that they receive a "very" (39%, up from 32%) or "somewhat" (47%, up from 44%) good price for their crops. Most farmers were also satisfied with the prices they received for farm products and supplies they had sold (70% "very" or "somewhat" good), as well as animals they had raised (61% "very" or "somewhat" good).

Farmers who had sold crops, products, or livestock were then asked where they had sold most of their goods. The most common places to sell agricultural goods are local markets in the village (25%) and local markets in the district center (24%). Many respondents also sell farm produce at markets in the provincial center (19%) or in the Howsa (18%). Fewer sell them at the farm (6%), alongside the road (6%), or to a cooperative (2%). Respondents in Maiwand were most likely to sell their goods in the provincial center (36%) and to cooperatives (6%). Respondents in Shah Wali Kot are most likely to sell

their goods at a market in the Howsa (29%), while no respondents in this district sell to cooperatives (0%).

The most common means of conveyance to and from market are: tractor and cart (30%, up from 20% in Wave 3) and rickshaw/zaranj (23%). Less common modes of transport are: passenger car (12%), motorcycle (10%), bicycle (9%), and van (6%). All other means of transport, including walking, truck, and animal-pulled cart, were used by less than 5% of respondents.

The majority of farmers (61%) say they used seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, feed, or paid labor on their farm in the past year. Of those who pay for or receive physical items (n=1,269), most report those items play a "very large" or "medium" role in their economic success. Overall, respondents say that fertilizers play the largest role in their success (87%), while paid labor plays the smallest role (50%). The importance of fertilizers to farmers in KFZ districts has risen notably from 31% in Wave 3 to 46% in Wave 4.

Agricultural Inputs: KFZ Districts (Wave 4, n=1,269)				
	Very large role	Medium role	Small role	No role at all
Fertilizers	46%	41%	11%	1%
Pesticides	37%	25%	28%	11%
Seeds	33%	44%	16%	7%
Feed	16%	37%	37%	10%
Paid labor	11%	40%	37%	12%

Table 10.9: Importance of Agricultural Inputs (K20a-e)

Although many farmers report insufficient access to some of the items they say they need to be economically successful, access to these items has improved since Wave 3. Fertilizers are the most accessible of the items mentioned, with 66% of farmers saying they can access "all" or "some" of what they need, up from 51% in Wave 3. Access to paid labor continues to be the largest obstacle with which farmers contend: 60% say they have either insufficient access or no access to paid farm labor, while 38% say they have "all" or "some" of what they need.



Figure 10.11: Access to Agricultural Inputs, Waves 3 (n=1269) and 4 (n=1284) (K21a-d)

Less than a third of farmers (32%, down from 43% in Wave 3) say they received assistance from outside their households in the past year for their farming activities. Of those who say they received assistance (n=677), 66% say they received assistance from the government, and 47% say they received assistance from an international organization or non-governmental organization (NGO). In terms of the types of assistance, 73% of these farmers say they received fertilizer, 58% say they received pesticides, 67% say they received seeds, 29% say they received feed, and 20% say they were helped with storage of their crops. Comparison of types of assistance with the previous wave is difficult due to the starkly lower percentage of farmers who reported receiving assistance in Wave 4.

Relatively few farmers (32%, up from 28% in Wave 3) report having applied for credit or a loan in the past year, but of those who applied (n=663), most (92%, up from 76% in Wave 3) were successful in obtaining a line of credit or a loan. Of those who were successful in obtaining a line of credit or a loan (n=613), 63% report obtaining loans from friends or family, 53% received a loan from a landlord, 34% went to a wealthy lender, 19% (up from 8% in Wave 3) received a loan through a lending group, 10% went to a bank, 8% received their credit line or loan from the Afghan government, and 8% received it from an international organization or NGO. This suggests improved availability of credit in the KFZ project area, in part due to the presence of lending groups. These farmers say they borrowed anywhere between 1,000 Afs and 800,000 Afs. Most loans (79%) were between 10,000 and 200,000 Afs, and only 5% of farmers received loans greater than 200,000 Afs. Although most loans did not require collateral, the percentage that did increased: 43% of respondents in Wave 4 report having had to provide collateral for their loan, compared with 35% in Wave 3. Of those who had to provide collateral (n=262), almost all used either their land (90%) or their property documents (7%).

Farmers who had applied for a loan but were unable to receive one (n=51) were asked why. The most common reason was “lack of trust” (35%), followed by lack of collateral (20%). However, the very small n-size of this sub-sample should be kept in mind when interpreting results.

Farmers were asked, in an open-ended question, what type of assistance would be most useful to them in the coming year. Given a total of three possible mentions, 83% mention seeds, 83% cite fertilizer, 58% would like pesticide (up from 41% in Wave 3), 30% need herbicide (up from 24%), and 25% say feed (up from 17%).[104] Farmers were also asked to rate the relative usefulness of a variety of potential types of assistance:

[104] Respondents were allowed to provide up to three responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

K33. What types of facilities would be most useful in helping you prepare your crops/animals/products for market in the coming year… (n=2,086)



Figure 10.12: Usefulness of Various Forms of Assistance

The data on what types of facilities would be most helpful showed noticeable variation at the district level, which will help USAID, the Afghan government, and their implementing partners focus on agricultural projects that are most useful to and appreciated by farmers in those communities. Respondents in Takhtapol were most likely to think that a cold storage facility would be helpful (92% "very" or "somewhat" helpful), while those in Panjwa'i were least likely to think a cold storage facility would be helpful (74%). Respondents in Shah Wali Kot were most likely to think that a canning factory would be helpful (81% "very" or "somewhat" helpful), while those in Dand were least likely to think so (64%). Respondents in Shah Wali Kot were also the most likely to say that packaging factories (83%), feed mills (72%), spinning mills (70%), flour mills (69%), and drying facilities (68%) would be helpful, suggesting a great need for new agricultural facilities in that district.

All respondents in KFZ districts were asked a series of questions about other types of work their household does. Forty-two percent say their household operates some type of non-farming business, up from 36% in Wave 3. Of those who say they operate some type of non-farming business (n=1,258), the most common businesses, with a possible two mentions allowed, are: a trading shop (48%), work as a driver (17%), work as a mechanic (11%), and tailoring (10%).[105] Of those who say their household operates a non-farming business, 42% say they get "all" (96% or more) of their income from that business, 14% say it accounts for "most but not all" of their income, 18% say "just over half," 14% say "about half," 7% say "just under half," and 3% say "just a little."

[105] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

All respondents in KFZ districts were also asked the two biggest problems the household faces in earning a livelihood. Out of two possible mentions, the most common responses are insecurity (28%), unemployment (11%), high prices (11%), fear of the Taliban (10%), lack of water (9%), a weak government (9%), and bad roads (8%).[106]

[106] Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

KFZ Appendix

Model 1

Response: Q14h. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion: It is/is not acceptable for people to publicly criticize the Afghan Government

q14hNET ~ as.factor(d1) + d3 + as.factor(eth) + q2aNET + q2bNET

				95% CI for odds ratio		
	B	SE	Sig	Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-0.29	0.07	*	0.75	0.65	0.86
D1 : Female	0.2	0.08	*	1.23	1.04	1.44
Education	0	0.01		1	0.98	1.03
Ethnicity: Tajik	0.27	1.42		1.31	0.05	33.32
Ethnicity: Hazara	0.27	1.42		1.3	0.05	33.15
Ethnicity: Other	-12.23	229.54		0		2.2E+10
Security	-0.02	0.07		0.98	0.84	1.13
Security – Year ago	-0.09	0.08		0.91	0.79	1.06

Model 2

Response: K11a_7. Please tell me if you grow any of the crops or raise any of the animals on your land from the list I will read out ... Poppy

k11a_7 ~ as.factor(d1) + d3 + as.factor(eth) + k7 + q2a

				95% CI for odds ratio		
	B	SE	Sig	Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-1.14	0.2	*	0.32	0.22	0.48
D1 : Female	0.21	0.11		1.23	0.99	1.52
Education	0	0.02		1	0.97	1.04
Ethnicity: Tajik	13.4	324.74		658906	0	
Ethnicity: Hazara	1.15	1.43		3.15	0.12	80.83
Ethnicity: Other	-11.52	324.74		0		5.5E+23
# of Jeribs	-0.06	0.04		0.94	0.87	0.99
Security	0.16	0.05	*	1.18	1.07	1.29

XI. STABILITY TRENDS

Introduction

Stability trends are influenced by a variety of factors that stability projects work to change in a positive direction. This chapter discusses the metrics used by MISTI to measure changes in stability and resilience over time at the district level. The metrics include overall summary measures of stability and resilience, as well as more detailed measures of government capacity, local governance, quality of life, and community cohesion. Together with observational data on violent incidents, accessibility and degree of government control, these metrics provide a comprehensive picture of the key factors that drive changes in stability and resilience across Afghanistan's regions, provinces, and districts.

The first section of the chapter discusses the Stability Index (SI) used to measure overall stability, and the trend in overall stability measured across Survey Waves 1 to 4. The SI scores and each of its subcomponent scores are presented for each district in the form of a summary "league table" that ranks each district from the highest to lowest stability score. The second section describes methodology used to compose the index from various sub-indices, survey questions, and observational data. The subsequent sections address each sub-index that is combined into the SI and the Resilience Index (RI). Each sub-index score is presented for each district using maps, trend line graphs, and bar charts. This combination of graphics displays each district's level of stability and resilience compared to all other districts, tracks changes in stability and resilience over time, and shows the geographic distribution of key indicators of resilience and stability across Afghanistan.

Overall Stability Trends

Trends in overall stability are influenced by a variety of factors and events, some of which are outside the scope of influence of stability programming. The seasonal trend in security incidents in Afghanistan is one such factor that influences stability but is beyond the influence of stability projects. Data collection for the MISTI Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey (MISTI Survey) takes place in the spring/summer and fall/winter months each year. The spring and summer months are the "fighting season" in Afghanistan when the Taliban and other armed opposition groups perpetrate more frequent acts of violence against the government and the population. Armed opposition groups become relatively less active in the fall/winter months of the "off-season." Perceptions of stability across Afghanistan's rural population are understandably affected by the seasonality of violence. This seasonality can be clearly observed in Figure 11.1 below, which shows the zigzag trend in overall stability over the four iterations, or "waves" of survey data collection implemented by MISTI over the past two years. The SI trend line falls when survey data is collected during the spring and summer "fighting season," and rises when the survey takes place during the fall and winter "off-season."

The SI is designed to measure various aspects of the social and political environment that indicate the degree to which a district is stable enough for sustainable development to take place. The SI is a relational metric that situates each district surveyed on a continuous scale where one is the lowest possible stability score and five is the maximum possible score. The SI is weighted with 75% of the index

value composed of public perception indicators from the survey data, and the remaining 25% composed of observational measures. These observational measures include the degree to which government security forces control territory in the vicinity of a survey village, the degree to which the Taliban and other armed opposition groups deny access to the area, and the frequency of violent incidents in the vicinity of the village (see Appendix 2 for details on the index calculation).

The trend line in Figure 11.1 shows the average value of the Stability Index (SI) for the 55 districts that have been surveyed in each of the four waves. These 55 districts are ranked from most stable to least stable in Figure 11.2A on page 211.



Figure 11.1: Overall Stability Trend

Data was collected for the MISTI Survey Wave 1 in the off-season months of fall/winter 2012. Thus the first or baseline SI score on the overall stability trend line (see Figure 11.1) was established during the season when public perceptions are positively influenced by relative security. Next, the data point for Wave 2 was established during the fighting season in spring/summer 2013 when public perceptions are negatively influenced by worsening security. The decrease in overall stability from Wave 1 to Wave 2 is partially explained by the fighting-season trend, along with the closure of ISAF military bases.

Following the seasonal pattern, the trend line rises again with Survey Wave 3, which was implemented in the fall/winter 2013 off-season. The SI score for Wave 3 is slightly higher than Wave 1, showing a positive gain in stability over the baseline. The Wave 4 score, measured during the 2014 spring/summer fighting season, follows the fighting-season pattern down again, but the index does not revisit the low point seen in Wave 2. Rather, the Wave 4 score is equal to Wave 1 score of 3.33. Also, the Wave 4 score from the 2014 fighting season is substantially higher than the Wave 2 score from the 2013 fighting season. Thus, the trend in overall stability should be considered flat or, in light of the seasonality of violence, overall stability may be increasing. The observed equivalence between the baseline Wave 1 and the Wave 4 SI scores may indicate a slight overall improvement in overall stability considering the

qualitative difference between the Wave 1 score, measured during the off-season, and the Wave 4 score, measured during the fighting season.

The bar graph in Figure 11.2A arrays all districts surveyed in Wave 4 from most stable on the left hand side, to least stable on the right hand side. A total of 100 districts were surveyed in Wave 4 (only 55 of the 100 districts were surveyed in all of the other waves). Each district SI score is represented by a bar on the graph. The graph is scaled such that the overall Wave 4 average SI score of 3.33 is set equal to zero on the centerline. District stability scores above the mean are positive and extend above the line; stability scores below the mean are negative and extend below the centerline. The size of the bar above or below the zero centerline shows the extent to which a district diverges from the overall average SI score of 3.33. The green bars represent the most stable districts in the highest SI quartile, the yellow bars represent somewhat stable districts in the second quartile, the orange bars represent somewhat unstable districts in the third quartile, and the most unstable districts are represented by red bars in the lowest quartile.

Figure 11.2B displays a map of all the districts surveyed in Wave 4 with each one shaded according to the quartile where it falls on the SI. The map shows that many of the most stable districts surveyed in Wave 4 are located in the northern provinces of Jawzjan, Balkh, and Samangan. Kunduz and Baghlan provinces contain the least stable districts in the north, such as Archi and Baghlani Jadid. The districts surveyed in the west are distributed across the spectrum of overall stability, with the worst conditions observed in Farah province, as well as Shahrak District in Ghor province. The districts surveyed in south and southwest are clustered around the middle to the low end of the stability spectrum. Northern Helmand remains much less stable than southern Helmand Province, while most districts surveyed in Uruzgan fall into the second, somewhat stable quartile. Most districts in Kandahar fall into the third, somewhat unstable quartile. Maiwand and Shah Wali Kot are Kandahar's least stable districts. Finally the districts surveyed in the eastern region fall across the stability spectrum, with the most stable districts clustered on the Pakistani border in Kunar and Khost Provinces. All of the districts surveyed in Paktiya, Logar and Wardak Provinces are on the somewhat to most unstable end of the stability spectrum. Ghazni Province is relatively more stable, and several districts in Ghazni, such as Muqer and Gelan, show significantly improved SI scores over the four waves.

Over the succession of survey waves there have been significant changes in stability in the districts and provinces surveyed. Figure 11.2C includes a series of line graphs that display the trend in overall stability by district. Most districts display the same seasonality as the overall stability trend depicted in Figure 11.1, especially the districts in the eastern provinces of Logar and Wardak where violent incidents are frequent during the fighting season. Some districts show a secular upward trend in stability, such as those surveyed in Khost and Kunar provinces, and several districts in Ghazni Province. Other districts surveyed show a downward trend, such as Baghlani Jadid in Badghis Province, Qalat in Zabul Province, and, most notably, Shah Wali Kot in Kandahar province. Helmand province shows a bifurcation in SI scores between northern and southern districts after Wave 1. The downtrend in northern Helmand is the result of the resurgence of the Taliban that accompanied the drawdown of international troops. In other areas the district trend lines are largely flat, particularly in the northern provinces and Kandahar.

Figure 11.2D is a map of the 55 districts covered in all four survey waves and displays the percentage change in SI score registered by each district between Waves 1 and 4. The map shows that the largest decreases in SI score occurred in geographic clusters of districts situated in northern Helmand province (Musa Qal'ah, Kajaki and Sangin); the northern districts of Kunduz and Baghlan provinces, most notably Kunduz district; northern Paktiya, Logar and Wardak provinces; Kandahar province, most notably Shah Wali Kot district; and, several western districts in Farah, Herat and Badghis provinces including Pusht-e Rod, Shindand, Kushk and Muqur districts. Increases in SI scores can be seen in the districts surveyed in Kunar, Khost, southern Paktiya and Uruzgan. Moderate increases are also evident in Ghazni, Zabul and western Kandahar provinces.

Figures 11.2A, B, C and D: 11.2A) SI Bar Chart (W4), 11.2B) SI Map (W4), 11.2C) SI District Trend Lines (W1-4), 11.2D) Percentage Change in SI Score Map (W1-4)




STABILITY INDEX (COMPOSITE)
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 4 (Spring 2014)
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
IRAN
PAKISTAN
CHINA
TAJIKISTAN
INDIA
Mazar-e Sharif
Balkh
Sholgarah
Chahar Bolak
Chimtal
Aqcha
Faizabad (2)
Khwajah Do Koh
Shibirghan
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in
Fayroz Nakhchir
Hazrat-e Sultan
Aybak
Qal'ah-ye Zal
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Kunduz
Archi
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
JAWZJAN
BALKH
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
BADAKHSHAN
Qush Tepah
Chaghcharan
Qadis
Shahrak
Muqur
Pashtun Zarghun
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Injil
Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)
FARYAB
SAMANGAN
BAGHLAN
SARI PUL
Ruy Do Ab
BADGHIS
Shindand
Adraskan
Maidan Shahr
Nerkh
Jalrayz
Sayyidabad
Chak-e Wardak
BAMYAN
PARWAN
KAPISA
PANJSHIR
NURISTAN
KUNAR
LAGHMAN
KABUL
WARDAK
NANGARHAR
LOGAR
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
Khoshi
Jaji
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Ahmadabad
Sayyid Karam
Jaji Maidan
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)
Gurbuz
Nadir Shah Kot
Tanai
Shamul (Dzadran)
Dzadran
Zurmat
GHOR
HERAT
Tarin Kot
DAYKUNDI
GHAZNI
PAKTIYA
KHOST
Bak
Chorah
Khas Uruzgan
Shahid-e Hasas
Deh Rawud
Bala Boluk
Khak-e-Safayd
Pusht-e Rod
URUZGAN
Musa Qal'ah
ZABUL
PAKTIKA
FARAH
Deh Yak
Khwajah Omari
Sharan
Yosuf Khel
Andar
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu)
Qarah Bagh (1)
Muqer
Gelan
Kang
Zaranj
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
Shah Joy
Qalat
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Arghistan
Shah Wali Kot
Takhtapol
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Nad 'Ali
Garmser
Nahr-e Saraj
Lashkar Gah
Sangin
Kajaki
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Zharay
Daman
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
LEGEND
Index Score
Rank 1
Rank 2
Rank 3
Rank 4
Provincial Border
International Borders
Regional Highway (IRD)
Source: USAID MISTI Project
Date: Monday November 10, 2014
Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com
Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritive.
No endorsement of the US Government or any other ogranization is implied.
USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
N
W
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Kunduz, Samangan & Baghlan (North)



Helmand (South)



Kandahar (South)



Zabul (South)



Badghis, Farah & Herat (West)



Ghazni (East)



Kunar (East)



Khost (East)



Paktiya (East)



Logar & Wardak (East)




STABILITY INDEX
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts:
Percentage of Stability Index Change from W1 to W4
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
CHINA
TAJIKISTAN
INDIA
PAKISTAN
IRAN
Kunduz
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
Aybak
JAWZJAN
BALKH
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
BADAKHSHAN
SAMANGAN
BAGHLAN
Qadis
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Muqur
FARYAB
SARI PUL
BADGHIS
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
PANJSHIR
NURISTAN
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
BAMYAN
Nerkh
PARWAN
KAPISA
KUNAR
LAGHMAN
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Sayyidabad
Chak-e Wardak
KABUL
Jaji
WARDAK
NANGARHAR
Lajah-Mangal
GHOR
LOGAR
Sayyid Karam
HERAT
DAYKUNDI
GHAZNI
PAKTIYA
KHOST
Shindand
Khas Uruzgan
Bak
Bala Boluk
Shahid-e Hasas
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Nadir Shah Kot
Pusht-e Rod
Musa Qal'ah
URUZGAN
PAKTIKA
ZABUL
Gurbuz
FARAH
Deh Yak
Tanai
Khwajah Omari
Shamul (Dzadran)
Sharan
Dzadran
Yosuf Khel
Zurmat
Andar
Shah Joy
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
Qarah Bagh (1)
Qalat
Muqer
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Gelan
Shah Wali Kot
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Nad 'Ali
Garmser
Nahr-e Saraj
Lashkar Gah
Sangin
Kajaki
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Zharay
Daman
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
LEGEND
Regional Highway (IRD)
International Borders
Provincial Border
Percentage W1 to W4
20.1% - Max
10.1% - 20.0%
0.1% - 10.0%
-9.9% - 0.0%
-19.9% - -10.0%
Min - -20.0%
Source: USAID MISTI Project
Date: Tuesday December 21, 2014
Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com
Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritive.
No endorsement of the US Government or any other ogranization is implied.
USAID
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Methodology for Constructing and Calculating the Stability and Resilience Indices

The purpose of an index is to combine a set of related indicators into a single indicator that captures their commonality. A complex and multifaceted concept, stability encapsulates a variety of different, interrelated factors. These factors must be measured and combined in a systematic and coherent fashion to ensure that the index score provides a better representation of stability than the various component indicators considered separately.

It is important to note that the method used to calculate the SI was revised for the Wave 4 analytical report. This revision was undertaken in response to a mid-term review of the MISTI survey and impact evaluation methodology that was completed by the RAND Corporation in July-October 2014. Analysts from RAND produced a matrix of correlations between the different measures included in the "old" stability index that was reported in the MISTI Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Analytical Reports for Waves 1, 2 and 3. The correlation matrix showed that several indicators included in the "old" index were not significantly correlated, or were not a good statistical fit with the other indicators included in the SI.

RAND's finding was important because it showed that there was room for improvement in the metrics used by MISTI to track trends and evaluate the impacts of stabilization and local governance programing. To revise the index, MISTI ran a series of diagnostic analyses on the full set of survey data collected from Waves 1-4. A statistical technique called factor analysis was the key method used to analyze correlations between the survey items. Factor analysis is a "dimension reducing" technique for determining whether a common indicator (stability) underlies a larger set of interrelated indicators. The Intelligence Quotient (IQ) is a famous example of an "underlying indicator" that is measured by combining different items included in the IQ test.

Factor analysis was used to re-define the set of survey questions that can be combined into a valid underlying indicator of overall stability – the SI (see Annex A for the matrix of survey questions and their "loadings" from the factor analysis). This use of factor analysis should be considered a "confirmatory analysis" because it was used to test the validity of the theory of stability that was used to construct the "old" SI. Indeed, the analysis confirmed that the theory of stability is valid, but the implementation of the theory required certain refinements that increased the precision of the SI and its sub-indices for measuring stability trends and evaluating program impacts.

Key adjustments to the SI included the removal of certain survey questions from the index that, despite a theoretical relationship to stability, showed no empirical relationship in the factor analysis of the survey data. Such questions included ones on corruption and the frequency that normal life in a village is disrupted. Other questions, such as several concerning the security situation in a survey respondent's local area, were given too much weight in the old SI. The factor analysis revealed that the security situation does not stand on its own as a determinant of stability. Rather, the relationship between security and stability is best understood when security is grouped with other indicators of overall quality of life, such as ability to meet basic needs, general life satisfaction, and outlook for the future. These

findings prompted the reorganization of the security questions from their own sub-index in the "old" SI, to a revised quality of life sub-index that forms a large component of the "new" SI.

The factor analysis also showed that the relationship between stability and resilience is more complicated than initially theorized. The "old" SI treated resilience as sub-index component of the overall SI score. The factor analysis however showed that resilience and stability are empirically and conceptually distinct from each other, despite sharing several factors in common. Both stability and resilience are strongly influenced by local governance and quality of life, but government capacity is not a significant factor for resilience, and community cohesion is not a significant factor for stability. The RI measures local capacity to withstand external shocks and solve local problems, it does not include measures of government performance and satisfaction that pertain to formal state institutions that are foreign to the village context. A wide gap between formal government and informal governance remains to be bridged in Afghanistan. These findings drove the decision to remove resilience from the SI and create a separate Resilience Index (RI) (see Table 11.2 for the full list of survey items and sub-indices included in the Resilience Index).

Index	Component	Sub-Index	Survey Item
1. Stability	1.1 Government Capacity	1.1.1 District Government Performance	1.1.1.1 Confidence - district governor (q9a) 1.1.1.2 Confidence - district government (q9b) 1.1.1.3 Responsive - district governor (q10a) 1.1.1.4 Responsive - district government (q10b) 1.1.1.5 Get things done - district governor (q11a) 1.1.1.6 Get things done - district government (q11b)
		1.1.2 District Government Satisfaction	1.1.2.1 District government understands local problems (q14b) 1.1.2.2 District government cares about the people (q14c) 1.1.2.3 District officials visit the area (q14e) 1.1.2.4 District officials do their jobs honestly (q14f) 1.1.2.5 District government delivers services fairly (q14g) 1.1.2.6 GIRoA well regarded (q8)
		1.1.3 Provincial Government Performance	1.1.3.1 Confidence - provincial governor (q9d) 1.1.3.2 Responsive - provincial governor (q10d) 1.1.3.3 Get things done - provincial governor (q11d)
	1.2 Local Governance	1.2.1 DDA-CDC Performance	1.2.1.1 Confidence - DDA (q12b) 1.2.1.2 Responsive - DDA (q12c) 1.2.1.3 Get things done - DDA (q12d) 1.2.1.4 Confidence - CDC (q13b) 1.2.1.5 Responsive - CDC (q13c) 1.2.1.6 Get things done - CDC (q13d)

Index	Component	Sub-Index	Survey Item
	1.2 Local Governance	1.2.2 Local Leaders' Performance	1.2.2.1 Confidence - local leaders (q9c) 1.2.2.2 Responsive - local leaders (q10c) 1.2.2.3 Get things done - local leaders (q11c)
	1.3 Quality of Life		1.3.0.1 Direction of district (q1) 1.3.0.2 Security in local area (q2a) 1.3.0.3 Area more or less secure (q2b) 1.3.0.4 Life satisfaction (q26) 1.3.0.5 Household finances (q27) 1.3.0.6 Ability to meet basic needs (q28)

Table 11.1: Stability Index Indicators

Index	Component	Sub-Index	Survey Item
2. Resilience	2.1 Community Cohesion	2.1.1 Social Capital	2.1.1.1 Ability to solve external problems (q34c) 2.1.1.2 Ability to solve internal problems (q35c) 2.1.1.3 How often villages work together (q36)
		2.1.2 Local Leader Satisfaction	2.1.2.1 Local leaders consider ordinary people's interests in decision making (q37a) 2.1.2.2 Local leaders consider women's interests in decision making (q37b) 2.1.2.3 Local leaders' effectiveness at securing funds from the government(q38)
	1.2 Local Governance	1.2.1 DDA-CDC Performance	1.2.1.1 Confidence - DDA (q12b) 1.2.1.2 Responsive - DDA (q12c) 1.2.1.3 Get things done - DDA (q12d) 1.2.1.4 Confidence - CDC (q13b) 1.2.1.5 Responsive - CDC (q13c) 1.2.1.6 Get things done - CDC (q13d)
		1.2.2 Local Leaders' Performance	1.2.2.1 Confidence - local leaders (q9c) 1.2.2.2 Responsive - local leaders (q10c) 1.2.2.3 Get things done - local leaders (q11c)
	1.3 Quality of Life		1.3.0.1 Direction of district (q1) 1.3.0.2 Security in local area (q2a) 1.3.0.3 Area more or less secure (q2b) 1.3.0.4 Life satisfaction (q26) 1.3.0.5 Household finances (q27) 1.3.0.6 Ability to meet basic needs (q28)

Table 11.2: Resilience Index Indicators

The new SI includes data from 30 different survey items listed in the fourth column in Table 11.1. The survey items in each row are averaged together to form the six sub-index scores listed in the third column. The first three sub-index scores are District Government Performance, District Government Satisfaction, and Provincial Government Performance. These sub-indices are averaged together to yield the Government Capacity component of the SI. The next two sub-indices, DDA-CDC Performance and Local Leaders Performance, are part of the Local Governance component of the SI. Finally, Quality of Life stands on its own as a sub-index and separate component. Like the overall SI score, each of the sub-index scores is scaled from 1-5, where one is the most negative and five is the most positive. The overall SI score is calculated by averaging together the six sub-index scores. MISTI measures stability trends and program impacts using the SI, its eight different sub-index and component scores, and the individual survey items. Similarly, trends in resilience are tracked using the RI and its components listed in Table 11.2.[107]

Comparison of the Old and New Stability Index Scores

It should be noted that the new method of calculating the SI has resulted in a somewhat different overall stability trend line compared to the one measured using the old SI. Comparing the "old" versus "new" SI for the 55 districts surveyed in all four Waves, shows that the baseline overall stability scores measured by the old and new SI are the same at 3.33, but the Wave 2 score measured using the old SI was substantially lower than the one recorded by the new SI. The rise from Wave 2 to Wave 3 is slightly greater on the new SI than the old SI.

The largest divergence between the two trend lines is observed between Waves 3 and 4, where the "old" SI appears to escape the effect of the fighting season and continues to rise from the low point reached in Wave 2, nearly returning to the baseline score recorded in Wave 1. The new SI by contrast never dipped as low as the old SI in Wave 2, and rebounded to a level higher than the baseline by Wave 3.

The best explanation for the Wave 2 drop in the SI score (new and old) is the uncertainty that accompanied the adoption of security responsibility by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in place of ISAF in mid-2013. Wave 2 coincided with widespread closures of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) military bases in most of the 55 districts captured in the stability trend line. Popular expectations of worsening security at the time of Wave 2 contributed to the step decline in the SI score. Compared to the new SI, the more precipitous fall in the old SI is best explained by the relatively larger weight of security perceptions in the old index calculation method. Likewise, the rise in the old SI scores since Wave 2 reflects the relative success of the transition of responsibility for security from ISAF to ANSF, in contrast to the worst-case scenario of the Taliban quickly regaining control of large areas of the country. This rise is also apparent in the new SI trend line, but the new SI's relatively lesser sensitivity to security perceptions allowed for a greater rise in Wave 3 compared to the old SI.

[107] A copy of the SI and RI scores are included as Appendices 4 and 5 to this report.

Relative to the old SI, the new SI is less sensitive to perceived changes in security, and more sensitive to changes in perceived government capacity and local governance – the key areas of intervention for stabilization projects. The fighting season effect, perhaps compounded by the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the 2014 Presidential Election, most likely contributed to the fall in the new SI score from Wave 3 to 4. The fact that the SI returned to its Wave 1 baseline score in Wave 4 (or nearly did so in the case of the old SI), gives some support to claims of a successful transition in the 55 districts surveyed.

Government Capacity

By working closely with Afghanistan's most local levels of government, stability projects aim to increase the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the population by enhancing service delivery to local communities. SIKA projects in particular focus on sub-national governance by working with officials at the district and provincial levels, and with the provincial departments of Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. By enhancing sub-national government capacity to deliver services, projects attempt to promote stability by increasing popular support for the government in the face of threats from the Taliban and other anti-government elements. This section focuses on the trend in Government Capacity (Component 1.1 of the SI, see Table 11.1) across the 55 districts where data was collected in all 4 Waves of the MISTI Survey.

The factor analysis of the SI confirmed that a key driver of stability is the ability of the government to fairly and efficiently provide services to local communities. Government Capacity (GC) is the largest component of the SI. It is calculated by averaging the scores of three different sub-indices: District Government Performance, Provincial Government Performance, and District Government Satisfaction (see Table 11.1). The government performance sub-indices include measures of public confidence, official responsiveness, and perceived ability to get things done at the two levels of government. Satisfaction is measured by the degree to which the district population perceives that district government officials understand local problems, care about the people, visit the area, do their jobs honestly, deliver services fairly, and whether the district government is well regarded generally. The three sub-indices are described in further detail in their own sub-sections below.

The Wave 1-4 trend line for GC is displayed in Figure 11.3 along with the overall SI trend line for comparison. The GC trend line follows the same fighting-seasonal pattern observed in the overall SI. The Wave 1 baseline score of 3.32 is slightly below the overall SI baseline score of 3.33, but the Wave 2 score does not drop as far as the overall SI, and the Wave 3 high point of 3.40 is significantly higher than the Wave 3 SI score of 3.34. The largest divergence from the overall SI trend is the steep drop from the Wave 3 high point to a level below the baseline in Wave 4.

The Wave 4 drop in perceived GC is best explained by the uncertainty surrounding the presidential election run-off that coincided with survey data collection. The data for Wave 4 was collected after the first round of the election but before the run-off election. This period was marked by heightened uncertainty and political competition. These conditions provide one important explanation for the drop in perceived GC.



Figure 11.3: Government Capacity Trend

The bar graph in Figure 11.4A arrays each district surveyed in Wave 4 from highest GC score on the left, to lowest GC score on the right. Each district GC score is represented by a bar on the graph. The graph is scaled such that the overall Wave 4 average GC score of 3.30 is set equal to zero on the centerline. GC scores above the mean are positive and extend above the line; GC scores below the mean are negative and extend below the centerline. The size of the bar above or below the zero centerline shows the extent to which a district diverges from the overall average GC score of 3.30. The green bars represent the districts with the highest GC in the first quartile, the yellow bars represent districts with GC scores in the second quartile, the orange bars represent district scores in the third quartile, and the districts with red bars fall into the lowest quartile of GC scores.

Figure 11.4B displays a map of all the districts surveyed in Wave 4 with each one shaded according to the quartile where it falls on GC. The map shows that the GC scores are highly clustered at the provincial and regional levels, with the highest scoring districts located in the northern province of Samangan, Kunar Province in the east, and southern Helmand, and western Kandahar Provinces in the South. The Most districts surveyed in the west have poor GC scores in the third or fourth quartiles, though Qadis and Muqur in Badghis Province are exceptions. All of the districts surveyed in Zabul Province have GC scores in the bottom quartile. Outside of Kunar Province the only district surveyed in the eastern region that scores in the top quartile is Yusuf Khel in Paktika Province. Most other eastern districts have GC scores in the bottom quartiles, though most districts surveyed in Ghazni and Khost Provinces have improved compared to the baseline.

Figure 11.4C includes a series of line graphs that display the GC trend lines for each district. Most districts display the same seasonal pattern in GC scores as the overall stability trend depicted in Figure 11.1, especially the districts in the northern provinces and Helmand. Some districts show a secular upward trend in government capacity, such as those surveyed in Kunar. The upward trend observed in Tarnak wa Jaldak District in Zabul Province is a marked departure from its neighboring districts. Like

Tarnak wa Jaldak, Andar District in Ghazni Province shows significant improvement in GC from a very low baseline level. Other districts surveyed show a downward trend, most notably Shah Wali Kot in Kandahar Province and Baraki Barak District Logar Province. In other areas the district trend lines are largely flat, particularly in Khost and Kandahar Provinces.

The map in Figure 11.4D shows considerable improvement in GC across the districts surveyed in Khost, Kunar and Uruzgan provinces. As seen in the SI, Paktiya province is split between an improvement of GC in the south and a worsening of it in the north of the province. Northern Helmand province and Shah Wali Kot district in Kandahar Province have had the heaviest decreases in GC scores. Southern Helmand has experienced a modest decrease as have most districts in the West with the exception of Qadis in Badghis Province.

Figures 11.4 A, B, C and D: A) GC Bar Chart (W4), B) GC Map (W4), C) GC District Trend Lines (W1-4), D) Percentage Change In GC Score Map (W1-4)




GOVERNMENT CAPACITY
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 4 (Spring 2014)
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
IRAN
PAKISTAN
CHINA
TAJIKISTAN
INDIA
Mazar-e Sharif
Balkh
Sholgarah
Chahar Bolak
Chimtal
Aqcha
Faizabad (2)
Khwajah Do Koh
Shibirghan
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in
Fayroz Nakhchir
Hazrat-e Sultan
Aybak
Qal'ah-ye Zal
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Kunduz
Archi
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
JAWZJAN
BALKH
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
BADAKHSHAN
Qush Tepah
Chaghcharan
Qadis
Shahrak
Pashtun Zarghun
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Muqur
Injil
Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)
FARYAB
SAMANGAN
BAGHLAN
SARI PUL
Ruy Do Ab
BADGHIS
Shindand
Adraskan
Maidan Shahr
Nerkh
Jalrayz
Sayyidabad
Chak-e Wardak
WARDAK
BAMYAN
PARWAN
PANJSHIR
NURISTAN
KAPISA
KUNAR
LAGHMAN
KABUL
NANGARHAR
LOGAR
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
Khoshi
Jaji
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Ahmadabad
Sayyid Karam
Jaji Maidan
Bak
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)
Gurbuz
Nadir Shah Kot
Tanai
Shamul (Dzadran)
Dzadran
Zurmat
GHOR
HERAT
Tarin Kot
DAYKUNDI
Shahid-e Hasas
Chorah
Khas Uruzgan
Deh Rawud
Musa Qal'ah
URUZGAN
GHAZNI
PAKTIYA
KHOST
PAKTIKA
ZABUL
FARAH
Bala Boluk
Khak-e-Safayd
Pusht-e Rod
Deh Yak
Khwajah Omari
Sharan
Yosuf Khel
Andar
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu)
Qarah Bagh (1)
Muqer
Gelan
Kang
Zaranj
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
Shah Joy
Qalat
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Arghistan
Shah Wali Kot
Takhtapol
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Nad 'Ali
Garmser
Nahr-e Saraj
Lashkar Gah
Sangin
Kajaki
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Zharay
Daman
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
LEGEND
Index Score
Rank 1
Rank 2
Rank 3
Rank 4
Provincial Border
International Borders
Regional Highway (IRD)
Source: USAID MISTI Project
Date: Monday November 10, 2014
Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com
Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritive.
No endorsement of the US Government or any other ogranization is implied.
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Kunduz, Samangan & Baghlan (North)



Helmand (South)



Kandahar (South)



Zabul (South)



Badghis, Farah & Herat (West)



Ghazni (East)



Kunar (East)



Khost (East)



Paktiya (East)



Logar & Wardak (East)




GOVERNMENT CAPACITY
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts:
Percentage of Government Capacity Change from W1 to W4
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
CHINA
TAJIKISTAN
INDIA
PAKISTAN
IRAN
Kunduz
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
Aybak
JAWZJAN
BALKH
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
BADAKHSHAN
SAMANGAN
BAGHLAN
SARI PUL
FARYAB
Qadis
Muqur
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
BADGHIS
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
PANJSHIR
NURISTAN
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
BAMYAN
Nerkh
PARWAN
KAPISA
KUNAR
LAGHMAN
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Sayyidabad
KABUL
Jaji
Chak-e Wardak
WARDAK
NANGARHAR
Lajah-Mangal
Sayyid Karam
LOGAR
GHOR
HERAT
DAYKUNDI
GHAZNI
PAKTIYA
KHOST
Shindand
Khas Uruzgan
Bak
Bala Boluk
Shahid-e Hasas
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Nadir Shah Kot
Pusht-e Rod
Musa Qal'ah
URUZGAN
PAKTIKA
Gurbuz
FARAH
ZABUL
Deh Yak
Tanai
Khwajah Omari
Shamul (Dzadran)
Sharan
Dzadran
Yosuf Khel
Zurmat
Andar
Shah Joy
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
Qarah Bagh (1)
Qalat
Muqer
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Gelan
Shah Wali Kot
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Nad 'Ali
Garmser
Nahr-e Saraj
Lashkar Gah
Sangin
Kajaki
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Zharay
Daman
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
LEGEND
Regional Highway (IRD)
International Borders
Provincial Border
Percentage W1 to W4
20.1% - Max
10.1% - 20.0%
0.1% - 10.0%
-9.9% - 0.0%
-19.9% - -10.0%
Min - -20.0%
Source: USAID MISTI Project
Date: Tuesday December 21, 2014
Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com
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District Government Performance

Lack of effective government is a key source of instability that stability projects seek to address. As the most local level of government in Afghanistan, the district governor and other district officials are the representatives of the government that most rural people are likely to encounter. Enhancing the capacity of district governments to deliver services is therefore an objective of many stabilization activities. When local Afghans perceive that their district government performs its functions effectively, they will be more likely to support GIRoA in the face of threats from the Taliban and other anti-government elements.

District Government Performance (DGP) is Sub-Index 1.1.1 in the overall SI. It is one of three indicators that form Government Capacity (SI Component 1.1) discussed in the previous section. DGP is calculated by averaging together the values form six survey questions related to district government performance (see Table 11.1). Survey respondents are asked two questions about how confident they are in the district governor and the government, and two questions about how responsive the district governor and government are to the needs of local people. Two other questions ask respondents whether the district governor and government's ability to get things done has improved over the past year. The factor analysis used to construct the stability index confirmed that these survey items share a common denominator in government performance, and that this indicator is an important determinant of the level of stability in a district.



Figure 11.5: District Government Performance Trend

Figure 11.5 displays the trend line in DGP for the 55 districts where data was collected in all 4 Waves of the MISTI Survey. The DGP trend line follows the same fighting-season pattern as GC and the overall stability index. The overall trend is downward, and the DGP scores have not regained the baseline level measured in Wave 1. For reference the graph also shows the trend in GC. The DGP scores are consistently above the scores for GC in every survey wave, and above the overall SI scores. DGP is thus

an indicator of the quality of subnational governance that makes a positive contribution to overall stability. Further, because many stability projects focus on engaging district governments in service delivery, the relatively high scores on DGP provide an important indication of the performance of stability projects as well as district governments and governors. The overall downward trend on this indicator is therefore troubling. The fighting season and the uncertainty surrounding the presidential election may partially account for the dip in the DGP score from Waves 3 to 4.

The bar graph in Figure 11.6A arrays each district surveyed in Wave 4 from highest DGP score on the left, to lowest DGP score on the right. Each district DGP score is represented by a bar on the graph. The graph is scaled such that the overall Wave 4 average DGP score of 3.45 is set equal to zero on the centerline. DGP scores above the mean are positive and extend above the centerline; DGP scores below the mean are negative and extend below the centerline. The size of the bar above or below the zero centerline thus shows the extent to which a district diverges from the overall average DGP score of 3.45. The green bars represent the districts with the highest DGP scores in the first quartile, the yellow bars represent districts with DGP scores in the second quartile, the orange bars represent district with DGP scores in the third quartile, and the districts with red bars fall into the lowest quartile of DGP scores.

Figure 11.6B displays a map of all the districts surveyed in Wave 4 with each one shaded according to the quartile where it falls on DGP bar chart in Figure 11.6A. Because DGP is a sub-set of GC, it is not surprising that the map shows a similar pattern to the map of GC scores displayed in Figure 11.4B. The northern provinces contain the largest cluster of districts that score in the top two quartiles of the DGP Sub-Index. Southern Helmand Province scores lower on DGP than on GC, though the districts surveyed in northern Helmand show equally poor performance on both scores. The districts in Uruzgan and western Kandahar score in the top quartile. With Shah Wali Kot District in Kandahar falling into the bottom quartile in a notable exception to the fairly positive picture presented by most of Kandahar Province. Tarnak wa Jaldak is the top-performing district in Zabul Province, in contrast to Qalat and Shah Joy that fall into the bottom quartile of DGP scores. Most eastern and western districts have GC scores that fall in the bottom quartiles, especially in Wardak and Logar Provinces. The border districts of Kunar Province are again top performers in the eastern region.

Figure 11.6C includes a series of line graphs that display the DGP trend lines for each of the 55 districts included in all four waves of survey data collection. In line with the overall trend in DGP, most districts display an overall decline in their scores over the four waves, particularly in Logar, Wardak, and Helmand Provinces. Downtrends in some districts are mixed with uptrends in other districts surveyed in the western region, and in Zabul, Ghazni, Paktiya, and Kandahar. In Kandahar Province Maiwand and Panjwa'i show increasing DGP scores, while the score for Shah Wali Kot District dropped precipitously in Wave 4, and Spin Boldak also saw a significant decrease. The northern districts as well as Khost, and Kunar Provinces show little change from Waves 1 to 4.

The map in Figure 11.6D shows a marked decrease in DGP scores in all districts surveyed in Helmand Province, Shah Wali Kot, Spin Boldak and Arghandab districts in Kandahar Province, northern Paktiya Province, and several of the districts surveyed in Kunduz and Baghlan provinces in the north. Qalat and Shah Joy districts in Zabul Province also register sharp decreases, standing in stark contrast to Tarnak Wa Jaldak district, which shows a marked improvement in DGP between Waves 1 and 4. Logar and Ghazni

provinces register mixed results with Nerkh and Muhammad Aghah districts showing improvement while DGP in Baraki Barak (Logar Province) and the southern districts of Wardak Province (Sayyidabad and Chak-e Wardak) has deteriorated. Most of the districts surveyed in Ghazni Province show moderate decreases in DGP scores though the districts east of the Route 1 corridor (Andar and Deh Yak) show improvement, especially Andar district. Both districts surveyed in Uruzgan (Shahid-e Hasas and Khas Uruzgan) show strong improvement in DGP. Districts in the west have mixed results with Pusht-e Rod district in Farah Province standing out as the district with the greatest deterioration in DGP scores in the West.

Figures 11.6 A, B, C and D: A) DGP Bar Chart (W4), B) DGP Map (W4), C) DGP District Trend Lines (W1-4), D) Percentage Change in DGP Score Map (W1-4)




DISTRICT GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 4 (Spring 2014)
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
IRAN
PAKISTAN
CHINA
TAJIKISTAN
INDIA
Mazar-e Sharif
Balkh
Sholgarah
Chahar Bolak
Chimtal
Aqcha
Faizabad (2)
Khwajah Do Koh
Shibirghan
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in
Fayroz Nakhchir
Hazrat-e Sultan
Aybak
Qal'ah-ye Zal
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Kunduz
Archi
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
JAWZJAN
BALKH
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
BADAKHSHAN
Qush Tepah
Chaghcharan
Qadis
Shahrak
Pashtun Zarghun
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Muqur
Injil
Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)
FARYAB
SAMANGAN
BAGHLAN
SARI PUL
Ruy Do Ab
BADGHIS
Shindand
Adraskan
Maidan Shahr
Nerkh
PARWAN
KAPISA
PANJSHIR
NURISTAN
KUNAR
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
Khoshi
BAMYAN
Jalrayz
Sayyidabad
Chak-e Wardak
WARDAK
LAGHMAN
KABUL
NANGARHAR
Jaji
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Ahmadabad
Sayyid Karam
Jaji Maidan
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)
Gurbuz
Nadir Shah Kot
Tanai
Shamul (Dzadran)
Dzadran
Zurmat
LOGAR
PAKTIYA
KHOST
Bak
GHOR
HERAT
Tarin Kot
DAYKUNDI
GHAZNI
Chorah
Khas Uruzgan
Shahid-e Hasas
Deh Rawud
Bala Boluk
Khak-e-Safayd
Pusht-e Rod
Musa Qal'ah
URUZGAN
ZABUL
PAKTIKA
Deh Yak
Khwajah Omari
Sharan
Yosuf Khel
Andar
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu)
Qarah Bagh (1)
Muqer
Gelan
FARAH
Kang
Zaranj
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
Shah Joy
Qalat
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Arghistan
Shah Wali Kot
Takhtapol
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Daman
Zharay
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Kajaki
Sangin
Lashkar Gah
Nahr-e Saraj
Garmser
Nad 'Ali
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
LEGEND
Index Score
Rank 1
Rank 2
Rank 3
Rank 4
Provincial Border
International Borders
Regional Highway (IRD)
Source: USAID MISTI Project
Date: Monday November 10, 2014
Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com
Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritive.
No endorsement of the US Government or any other ogranization is implied.
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Kunduz, Samangan & Baghlan (North)



Helmand (South)



Kandahar (South)



Zabul (South)



Badghis, Farah & Herat (West)



Ghazni (East)



Kunar (East)



Khost (East)



Paktiya (East)



Logar & Wardak (East)




DISTRICT GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts:
Percentage of District Government Performance Change from W1 to W4
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
IRAN
PAKISTAN
CHINA
TAJIKISTAN
INDIA
JAWZJAN
BALKH
FARYAB
SAMANGAN
SARI PUL
BADGHIS
BAMYAN
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
BADAKHSHAN
BAGHLAN
PANJSHIR
NURISTAN
PARWAN
KAPISA
KUNAR
LAGHMAN
KABUL
NANGARHAR
LOGAR
WARDAK
GHOR
HERAT
DAYKUNDI
GHAZNI
PAKTIYA
KHOST
PAKTIKA
URUZGAN
ZABUL
FARAH
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
Aybak
Kunduz
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
Qadis
Muqur
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Nerkh
Sayyidabad
Chak-e Wardak
Jaji
Lajah-Mangal
Sayyid Karam
Shindand
Bala Boluk
Pusht-e Rod
Khas Uruzgan
Shahid-e Hasas
Musa Qal'ah
Bak
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Nadir Shah Kot
Gurbuz
Tanai
Shamul (Dzadran)
Dzadran
Zurmat
Deh Yak
Khwajah Omari
Sharan
Yosuf Khel
Andar
Shah Joy
Qarah Bagh (1)
Muqer
Gelan
Qalat
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Shah Wali Kot
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Daman
Zharay
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Kajaki
Sangin
Lashkar Gah
Nahr-e Saraj
Garmser
Nad 'Ali
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
LEGEND
Regional Highway (IRD)
International Borders
Provincial Border
Percentage W1 to W4
20.1% - Max
10.1% - 20.0%
0.1% - 10.0%
-9.9% - 0.0%
-19.9% - -10.0%
Min - -20.0%
Source: USAID MISTI Project
Date: Tuesday December 21, 2014
Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com
Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritive.
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District Government Satisfaction

District Government Satisfaction (DGS) is Sub-Index 1.1.2 in the stability index, and part of the Government Capacity component of the SI. The DGS Sub-Index is calculated by averaging together the data from six survey questions that measure perceptions of how well the district government understands local problems, whether officials care about the people, visit the area, do their jobs honestly, deliver services fairly, and whether GIRoA overall is well regarded by local people (see Table 11.1). Satisfaction is an important indicator of capacity because people will not be satisfied with a government institution if it is not capable of functioning properly. Satisfaction and capacity are also crucial determinants of whether institutions will be respected and obeyed by the people. Indeed, a key driver of the intractable insurgency that plagues Afghanistan is the illegitimacy of state institutions as providers of security, law and order. The electoral uncertainty during Wave 4 of survey data collection and the subsequent political crisis should be considered part of a larger crisis of legitimacy that Afghanistan has yet to resolve. Increased satisfaction with Afghan government institutions is crucial for endowing them with the legitimacy necessary to stabilize the country.

Because rural Afghans are more likely to interact with their district government than any other state institution, satisfaction with district government institutions is an important indicator of the legitimacy of the Afghan state. Levels of popular satisfaction with district governments is therefore an indicator of stability that stabilization projects may affect by enhancing the capacity of district governments to engage effectively with their constituencies and deliver services. Where local Afghans are more satisfied with their district government they will be more likely to support GIRoA in the face of threats from the Taliban and other anti-government elements.



Figure 11.7: District Government Satisfaction Trend

Figure 11.7 displays the trend line in DGS for the 55 districts where data was collected in all 4 Waves of the MISTI Survey. For reference the graph also includes the trend line for the DGP Sub-Index discussed in the previous section. The DGS trend line follows the same fighting-season pattern as GC and the overall stability index. In contrast to the indicators of government capacity and performance described above, DGS shows a slight upward trend; the Wave 4 score of 3.26 is above the Wave 1 baseline score of 3.21. This finding creates some optimism that satisfaction at the district level may be increasing in spite of the national-level political challenges that surrounded the presidential election at the time of data collection for Wave 4. The graph also shows that satisfaction scores are consistently below performance scores for the district government. The best explanation for this divergence between satisfaction and performance is that separate factors influence satisfaction versus perceived performance. Satisfaction with district governors may be significantly influenced by their personalities. District officials may be credited for better performance because they deliver more services with the assistance of stabilization activities, yet service delivery may not always result in higher satisfaction ratings if the district government is ineffective at improving relationships with constituents.

The bar graph in Figure 11.8A arrays each district surveyed in Wave 4 from highest DGS score on the left, to lowest DGs score on the right. Each district DGS score is represented by a bar on the graph. The graph is scaled such that the overall Wave 4 average DGS score of 3.26 is set equal to zero on the centerline. DGS scores above the mean are positive and extend above the centerline; DGS scores below the mean are negative and extend below the centerline. The size of the bar above or below the centerline thus shows the extent to which a district diverges from the overall average DGS score. The green bars represent the districts with the highest DGS scores in the first quartile, the yellow bars represent districts with DGS scores in the second quartile, the orange bars represent district with DGS scores in the third quartile, and the districts with red bars fall into the lowest quartile of DGS scores.

Figure 11.8B displays a map of all the districts surveyed in Wave 4 with each one shaded according to the quartile where it falls on DGS bar chart in Figure 11.8A. While DGS is a component of GC, there are significant divergences between the satisfaction scores, and the performance and capacity scores described above. Starting in the north, the satisfaction scores for the districts surveyed in Kunduz, Baghlan, and Balkh Provinces fall one or more quartiles below the performance scores for the same districts. The same pattern applies to most districts in Jawzjan Province, with the exception of Qush Tepah where the data shows, counter-intuitively, a score in the top quartile for satisfaction, and the bottom quartile for performance. Also in the north, the districts surveyed in Samangan Province show performance and satisfaction scores both in the top quartile. The DGS scores for the districts surveyed in other regions are broadly in line with the DGP scores for these districts. Divergences are typically downward one quartile. Exceptions include southern Helmand Province, where DGS scores are one or more quartiles above DGP scores. Sangin and Kajaki districts in the northern Helmand also score higher on satisfaction than performance, with gives some small grounds for optimism that these troubled areas may benefit from better leadership. In the east there are also notable divergences from the general pattern in Khost, Paktiya, and Paktika Provinces where satisfaction scores are higher than performance scores. Again, the border districts of Kunar Province top the satisfaction scores in the eastern region.

Figure 11.8C includes a series of line graphs that display the DGS trend lines for each of the 55 districts included in all four waves of survey data collection. The best performance over the four survey waves is observed in Kunar, Khost, and Paktiya Provinces. The trend lines for the northern districts vary from slight increases to slight decreases in satisfaction scores over the survey waves. The trend in Kandahar Province is largely flat, but Shah Wali Kot shows a big drop in its score on DGS in keeping with its scores on the other sub-indices reviewed so far. Zabul shows a mix of up and down trends in the three districts surveyed. Baraki Barak District in Logar Province is the bottom performer on DGS, with the trend line falling to a new low in Wave 4. The overall trend in the West is downward, with the exception of Qadis District. In Ghazni Province, significant gains in DGS scores are seen in Andar Province, while largely flat trend lines are observed in Ghazi's remaining districts. While all of Helmand's districts started out with approximately the same baseline score in Wave 1, the northern and southern districts have since diverged widely. This is likely the result of the resurgence of the Taliban in northern Helmand in 2014. Overall the wide variation in DGS scores across districts and over time are best explained by the fact that district governors are appointed by the president and often replaced, leading to unpredictable changes in government and a lack of accountability to local people.

When we map DGS trends in Figure 11.8D, seven areas stand out as having worsened. The first and most obvious are the three districts in northern Helmand Province, Musa Qal'ah, Sangin and Kajaki. In neighboring Kandahar Province, DGS has also taken a hit in Shah Wali Kot and Arghandab districts. In the west, all districts surveyed in Herat and Badghis Provinces experienced drops in DGS. Along the Route 1 corridor between Kabul and Kandahar, many districts surveyed in Wardak, Logar and Zabul Provinces experienced deterioration in DGS as did several districts in northern Paktiya Province. Lastly, the two districts surveyed in Baghlan Province, Imam Sahib and Pul-e Khumri also trended towards less satisfaction with their district government.

On a more positive note, DGS also trended better in several areas. Districts surveyed in Khost, southern Paktiya and western Ghazni Provinces showed marked improvements in DGS, as did all districts surveyed in Kunar. In the South, Spin Boldak District in Kandahar Province as well as the two districts surveyed in Uruzgan Province, Shahid-e Hasas and Khas Uruzgan stand out as having marked improvement in DGS, while the districts in western Kandahar and southern Helmand Provinces all experienced moderate improvement in DGS. In the North, all districts surveyed in Kunduz and Samangan Provinces increased their DGS scores.

Figures 11.8 A, B, C and D: A) DGS Bar Chart, B) DGS Map, C) DGS District Trend Lines, D) Percentage Change in DGS Score Map (W1-4)



DISTRICT GOVERNMENT SATISFACTION

MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 4 (Spring 2014)



Kunduz, Samangan & Baghlan (North)



Helmand (South)



Kandahar (South)



Zabul (South)



Badghis, Farah & Herat (West)



Ghazni (East)



Kunar (East)



Khost (East)



Paktiya (East)



Logar & Wardak (East)




DISTRICT GOVERNMENT SATISFACTION
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts:
Percentage of District Government Satisfaction Change from W1 to W4
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
IRAN
PAKISTAN
CHINA
TAJIKISTAN
INDIA
JAWZJAN
FARYAB
BALKH
SAMANGAN
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
BADAKHSHAN
BAGHLAN
SARI PUL
BADGHIS
BAMYAN
PARWAN
KAPISA
PANJSHIR
NURISTAN
KUNAR
LAGHMAN
KABUL
NANGARHAR
LOGAR
WARDAK
GHOR
HERAT
DAYKUNDI
GHAZNI
PAKTIYA
KHOST
URUZGAN
ZABUL
PAKTIKA
FARAH
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
Kunduz
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
Aybak
Qadis
Muqur
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
Nerkh
Sayyidabad
Chak-e Wardak
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Jaji
Lajah-Mangal
Sayyid Karam
Shindand
Bala Boluk
Pusht-e Rod
Khas Uruzgan
Shahid-e Hasas
Musa Qal'ah
Bak
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Nadir Shah Kot
Gurbuz
Tanai
Shamul (Dzadran)
Dzadran
Zurmat
Deh Yak
Khwajah Omari
Sharan
Yosuf Khel
Andar
Shah Joy
Qalat
Qarah Bagh (1)
Muqer
Gelan
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Shah Wali Kot
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Daman
Zharay
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Kajaki
Sangin
Lashkar Gah
Nahr-e Saraj
Garmser
Nad 'Ali
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
LEGEND
Regional Highway (IRD)
International Borders
Provincial Border
Percentage W1 to W4
20.1% - Max
10.1% - 20.0%
0.1% - 10.0%
-9.9% - 0.0%
-19.9% - -10.0%
Min - -20.0%
Source: USAID MISTI Project
Date: Tuesday December 21, 2014
Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com
Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritive.
No endorsement of the US Government or any other ogranization is implied.
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Provincial Government Performance

Provincial Government Performance (PGP) is Sub-Index 1.1.3 in the SI, and part of the Government Capacity component. PGP is calculated by averaging together the data from three survey questions that measure popular confidence the provincial governor (PG), the extent to which the governor is perceived to be responsive, and the extent to which the PG's ability to get things done has improved or worsened over the past year (see Table 11.1). PGP is an important indicator of overall government capacity because the provincial level is the lowest level of government that is allocated funding from the central budget. Central line ministries, such as the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), are also represented at the provincial level. The provincial governor thus has significant power and responsibility to deliver services to the local population.

PGP is thus an important part of government capacity, and stability projects work with provincial governors and other officials to improve service delivery. Such stabilization activities may improve PGP scores to the extent that provincial officials are engaged in the delivery of services such that they demonstrate better performance to the population.



Figure 11.9: Provincial Government Performance Trend

Figure 11.9 displays the trend line in PGP for the 55 districts where data was collected in all 4 Waves of the MISTI Survey. The graph also includes the trend line for the DGP Sub-Index for reference. The PGP trend line follows the same fighting-season pattern as the overall SI and the other sub-indices reviewed thus far. The PGP scores are significantly lower than the DGP scores in all waves. This finding suggests that the perceptions of most rural Afghans are influenced by the relative remoteness of the provincial government, compared to the district government. Also, stability projects assist with service delivery mainly at the district and sub-district levels. The difference in perceived performance at the two levels of government may be influenced by this focus on district-level service delivery.

PGP shows a downward trend much like the DGP and GC indicators described above. The Wave 4 average PGP score is 3.20 – slightly below the Wave 1 baseline score of 3.23. The PGP score for Wave 3 was however significantly above the baseline score, but then fell dramatically in Wave 4. The Wave 4 score may have been influenced by uncertainty surrounding the election of seats on the provincial councils that took place along with the presidential election.

The bar graph in Figure 11.10A arrays each district surveyed in Wave 4 from highest PGP score on the left, to lowest DGs score on the right. Each district PGP score is represented by a bar on the graph. The graph is scaled such that the overall Wave 4 average PGP score of 3.20 is set equal to zero on the centerline. PGP scores above the mean are positive and extend above the centerline; PGP scores below the mean are negative and extend below the centerline. The size of the bar above or below the centerline thus shows the extent to which a district diverges from the overall average PGP score. The green bars represent the districts with the highest PGP scores in the first quartile, the yellow bars represent districts with PGP scores in the second quartile, the orange bars represent district with PGP scores in the third quartile, and the districts with red bars fall into the lowest quartile of PGP scores.

Figure 11.10B displays a map of all the districts surveyed in Wave 4 with each one shaded according to the quartile where it falls on PGP bar chart in Figure 11.10A. Because PGP is a sub-set of GC and its trend is closely parallel to DGP, it is not surprising that the district scores displayed on the map show a similar pattern to the map of GC scores displayed in Figure 11.4B, and the DGP scores in Figure 11.6B. The northern provinces contain the largest cluster of districts that score in the top two quartiles of the DGP Sub-Index. Southern Helmand Province again scores high on PGP – a quartile higher than on DGP. This positive perception of provincial capacity may be influenced by stabilization projects and other sub-national governance programming focused at the provincial level and implemented by institutions such as the British Department for International Development (DFID).

The districts in Eastern Uruzgan perform better than those in Western Uruzgan, and the PGP scores fall to into the bottom quartile just across the border to the west in northern Helmand. All districts surveyed in Kandahar Province score in the second quartile on the PGP Sub-Index, with the exception of Shah Wali Kot in the bottom quartile. The districts surveyed in Zabul Province are uniformly at the bottom of the scale, and most districts surveyed in the east fall into the third or fourth quartiles. No districts in the east score near the top of the scale except for the three border districts surveyed in Kunar Province.

Figure 11.10C includes a series of line graphs that display the PGP trend lines for each of the 55 districts included in all four waves of survey data collection. The graphs show generally flat or mixed trends for the districts surveyed in each region and province. Exceptions are Kunar Province where the trend is generally upward, as well as Khost Province, which shows slight upward trend. In the west Bala Boluk District is the worst performer and Qadis is the top performer. The districts surveyed in Ghazni Province show mainly flat trends, with the exception of large swings in PGP scores in Andar district from wave to wave as the “Andar uprising” against the Taliban created mixed outcomes for the local population. The trend for Kandahar is generally flat, with the exception of the big fall in Shah Wali Kot from Wave 2 to Wave 4.

When trends in PGP are mapped in Figure 11.10D, we can clearly see several areas that are trending negatively. All districts surveyed in Helmand, Farah and Baghlan Provinces register negative opinions on

PGP, as do all the districts surveyed in northern Paktiya Province. Other areas that stand out include Shah Wali Kot District in Kandahar Province as well as Qalat and Shah Joy Districts in Zabul Province and Khanabad District in Kunduz Province.

Districts that are trending positively include those surveyed in Khost and Kunar Provinces, and southern Paktiya Province (in contrast with the districts in northern Paktiya Province). Trends are somewhat mixed in nearby Wardak and Logar Provinces, though most districts in Kandahar, with the exception of Shah Wali Kot and Arghandab districts have PGP trending moderately towards the positive.

Figures 11.10A, B, C and D: A) PGP Bar Chart (W4), B) PGP Map (W4), C) PGP District Trend Lines (W1-4), D) Percentage Change in PGP Scores Map (W1-4)




PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 4 (Spring 2014)
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
IRAN
PAKISTAN
CHINA
TAJIKISTAN
INDIA
Mazar-e Sharif
Balkh
Sholgarah
Aqcha
Faizabad (2)
Chahar Bolak
Chimtal
Khwajah Do Koh
Shibirghan
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in
Fayroz Nakhchir
Hazrat-e Sultan
Aybak
Qal'ah-ye Zal
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Kunduz
Archi
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
JAWZJAN
BALKH
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
BADAKHSHAN
Qush Tepah
Chaghcharan
Qadis
Shahrak
Pashtun Zarghun
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Muqur
Injil
FARYAB
SAMANGAN
BAGHLAN
SARI PUL
Ruy Do Ab
Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)
Shindand
Adraskan
BADGHIS
Maidan Shahr
PANJSHIR
NURISTAN
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
Khoshi
Jaji
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Ahmadabad
Sayyid Karam
Jaji Maidan
Bak
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)
Gurbuz
Nadir Shah Kot
Tanai
Shamul (Dzadran)
Dzadran
Zurmat
Deh Yak
Khwajah Omari
Sharan
Yosuf Khel
Andar
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu)
Qarah Bagh (1)
Muqer
Gelan
Shah Joy
Qalat
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Arghistan
Shah Wali Kot
Takhtapol
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Zharay
Daman
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Sangin
Kajaki
Garmser
Nad 'Ali
Nahr-e Saraj
Lashkar Gah
BAMYAN
PARWAN
KAPISA
KUNAR
LAGHMAN
Nerkh
Jalrayz
Sayyidabad
Chak-e Wardak
KABUL
WARDAK
NANGARHAR
LOGAR
GHOR
HERAT
Tarin Kot
DAYKUNDI
GHAZNI
PAKTIYA
KHOST
Chorah
Khas Uruzgan
Shahid-e Hasas
Deh Rawud
Bala Boluk
Khak-e-Safayd
Pusht-e Rod
URUZGAN
Musa Qal'ah
ZABUL
PAKTIKA
FARAH
Kang
Zaranj
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
LEGEND
Index Score
Rank 1
Rank 2
Rank 3
Rank 4
Provincial Border
International Borders
Regional Highway (IRD)
Source: USAID MISTI Project
Date: Monday November 10, 2014
Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com
Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritive.
No endorsement of the US Government or any other ogranization is implied.
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Kunduz, Samangan & Baghlan (North)



Helmand (South)



Kandahar (South)



Zabul (South)



Badghis, Farah & Herat (West)



Ghazni (East)



Kunar (East)



Khost (East)



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

Logar & Wardak (East)




PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts:
Percentage of Provincial Government Performance Change from W1 to W4
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
CHINA
TAJIKISTAN
INDIA
PAKISTAN
IRAN
JAWZJAN
BALKH
FARYAB
SAMANGAN
SARI PUL
BADGHIS
HERAT
FARAH
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
ZABUL
URUZGAN
GHOR
BAMYAN
DAYKUNDI
GHAZNI
WARDAK
LOGAR
KABUL
PARWAN
KAPISA
PANJSHIR
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
BAGHLAN
BADAKHSHAN
NURISTAN
LAGHMAN
KUNAR
NANGARHAR
PAKTIYA
KHOST
PAKTIKA
Kunduz
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
Aybak
Qadis
Muqur
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Nerkh
Sayyidabad
Chak-e Wardak
Jaji
Lajah-Mangal
Sayyid Karam
Shindand
Bala Boluk
Pusht-e Rod
Khas Uruzgan
Shahid-e Hasas
Musa Qal'ah
Bak
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Nadir Shah Kot
Gurbuz
Tanai
Shamul (Dzadran)
Dzadran
Zurmat
Deh Yak
Khwajah Omari
Sharan
Yosuf Khel
Andar
Shah Joy
Qalat
Qarah Bagh (1)
Muqer
Gelan
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Shah Wali Kot
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Daman
Zharay
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Kajaki
Sangin
Lashkar Gah
Nahr-e Saraj
Garmser
Nad 'Ali
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
LEGEND
Regional Highway (IRD)
International Borders
Provincial Border
Percentage W1 to W4
20.1% - Max
10.1% - 20.0%
0.1% - 10.0%
-9.9% - 0.0%
-19.9% - -10.0%
Min - -20.0%
Source: USAID MISTI Project
Date: Tuesday December 21, 2014
Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com
Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritive.
No endorsement of the US Government or any other ogranization is implied.
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Local Governance

Local Governance (LG) is Component 1.2 of the SI and RI. It is calculated by averaging together the scores of two different sub-indices: DDA-CDC Performance and Local Leaders' Performance. These two sub-indices are calculated by aggregating survey measures of confidence, responsiveness and perceived ability to get things done (see Tables 11.1 and 11.2). The factor analysis of the stabilization survey data also showed that LG is an important determinant of resilience.

Informal village institutions, elders, and local leaders have traditionally governed rural Afghanistan in the absence of state institutions of formal government. Local governance by village institutions remains important, yet elders, Maliks, Mullahs, tribal leaders and other local decision makers were in many cases forced to flee the country during decades of war. The rule of the Taliban during the 1990s was particularly harsh for local leaders that did not affiliate themselves with the Taliban government. Local governance institutions suffered severe disruptions. Today, ex-mujahidin leaders and "warlords" from the time of the Soviet occupation still exert significant influence over certain rural areas. These local leaders and traditional institutions of local governance generally hold a stronger sway over everyday life in rural Afghanistan than formal government institutions.

Since the fall of the Taliban, various programs have attempted to connect local governance with formal government institutions. The largest and most important of these programs is the National Solidarity Program (NSP), implemented by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). NSP organizes village elections to form Community Development Councils (CDCs). Traditional leaders are in most cases elected to the CDCs and the District Development Assemblies (DDAs) that are formed at the district level from CDC representatives. In this way, local leaders are given a degree of electoral legitimacy, and CDC-DDAs are established as government-sanctioned, albeit still informal institutions. By delivering village grants to the local population through the CDCs and DDAs, NSP works to connect the central government in Kabul with Afghan villages through MRRD. Working with local leaders to implement government programs is an important means of improving the efficacy of these programs for addressing sources of instability and enhancing government legitimacy in the eyes of the population by creating stronger connections between rural populations and their government. Stability projects work with local leaders and governance institutions such as CDC-DDAs to address sources of instability. That is, local leaders and governance institutions are potential sources of resilience that stability projects seek to leverage for addressing SOIs. Stability increases when local informal governance institutions and formal government institutions work together to maintain social order in the face of threats from malign actors.

Figure 11.11 displays the trend line for LG showing the average value for the 55 districts where data was collected in all 4 Waves of the MISTI Survey. For reference the graph also includes the trend line for Government Capacity (Component 1.1 of the SI). The LG trend line follows the same fighting-season pattern as the overall SI and the other sub-indices reviewed thus far. Like overall stability, the Wave 4 LG score is equal to the Wave 1 score of 3.66, despite the fact that the Wave 1 data was collected during the off-season and the Wave 4 data was collected during the fighting season. This finding suggests that the transition has not created widespread negative consequences for local leaders and institutions. The

LG s cores are significantly higher than the GC scores in all waves, showing that local leaders and governance institutions are generally viewed by rural Afghans as more responsive, better able to get things done, and more inspiring of confidence than formal government institutions.



Figure 11.11: Local Governance Trend

The bar graph in Figure 11.12A arrays each district surveyed in Wave 4 from highest LG score on the left, to lowest LG score on the right. Each district LG score is represented by a bar on the graph. The graph is scaled such that the overall Wave 4 average LG score of 3.66 is set equal to zero on the centerline. LG scores above the mean are positive and extend above the centerline; LG scores below the mean are negative and extend below the centerline. The size of the bar above or below the centerline thus shows the extent to which each district diverges from the overall average LG score. The green bars represent the districts with the highest LG scores in the first quartile, the yellow bars represent districts with LG scores in the second quartile, the orange bars represent district with LG scores in the third quartile, and the districts with red bars fall into the lowest quartile of LG scores.

Figure 11.12B displays a map of all the districts surveyed in Wave 4 with each one shaded according to the quartile where it falls on LG bar chart in Figure 11.12A. The LG map shows significant divergences in several regions from the maps shown in the previous four sections on indicators of satisfaction, performance, and capacity of formal government institutions. The districts surveyed in Kandahar province all fall into the fourth or third quartiles on local governance in stark contrast to the scores for these districts on the formal government indicators. These poor LG scores are best explained by the sustained effort of the Taliban to disrupt or destroy the influence of traditional leaders and institutions in the South. Northern Helmand – the area of the south where Taliban influence is the strongest – is similarly low scoring on LG, and also on GC. A similar deeply problematic situation prevails in western Uruzgan and the districts surveyed in Wardak, Logar, and Ghor provinces. All districts in the western region except for Qadis score in the bottom quartiles on LG. Other districts in the south and east – in Zabul, Ghazni, Paktiya, Paktika, and Khost Provinces – all score relatively high on LG in contrast to their GC scores.

The finding that key districts in the east retain traditional sources of resilience is grounds for optimism that sustained effort to create linkages between local governance and formal government will ultimately have a stabilizing impact in these areas. Instability is currently the greatest, and the outlook for the future is the most pessimistic, where districts are red or orange on the both the governance and the government indicators.

Figure 11.12C includes a series of line graphs that display the LG trend lines for each of the 55 districts included in all four waves of survey data collection. The overall trend for Kandahar is downward, in contrast to trends on the formal government indicators. It remains to be seen whether formal government institutions can fill the gap opened by the decline of informal governance in Kandahar. In contrast to Kandahar, the trend lines angle upward for Zabul, Kunar, Khost, and two out of four districts in Paktiya. The trend lines are largely flat in the north, west, and in Ghazni and southern Helmand provinces. The bifurcation between northern and southern Helmand Province is best explained by the resurgence of the Taliban in the northern districts.

In Figure 11.12D we can see a marked deterioration in LG across the southern districts surveyed. Elsewhere, there has been moderate deterioration of LG in northern Paktiya Province, Herat Province, Baghlan Province and several districts in southeastern Kunduz Province. Only in Badghis, Zabul and Uruzgan Provinces do we notice LG improving. Elsewhere the picture is mixed.

Figures 11.12 A, B, C and D: A) LG Bar Chart (W4), B) LG Map (W4), C) LG District Trend Lines (W1-4), D) Percentage Change in LG Scores Map (W1-4)




LOCAL GOVERNANCE
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 4 (Spring 2014)
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
IRAN
PAKISTAN
CHINA
TAJIKISTAN
INDIA
Mazar-e Sharif
Balkh
Sholgarah
Chahar Bolak
Chimtal
Aqcha
Faizabad (2)
Khwajah Do Koh
Shibirghan
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in
Fayroz Nakhchir
Hazrat-e Sultan
Aybak
Qal'ah-ye Zal
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Kunduz
Archi
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
JAWZJAN
BALKH
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
BADAKHSHAN
Qush Tepah
Chaghcharan
Qadis
Shahrak
Pashtun Zarghun
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Muqur
Injil
Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)
FARYAB
SAMANGAN
BAGHLAN
SARI PUL
Ruy Do Ab
BADGHIS
Shindand
Adraskan
Maidan Shahr
Nerkh
Jalrayz
Sayyidabad
Chak-e Wardak
WARDAK
BAMYAN
PARWAN
PANJSHIR
NURISTAN
KAPISA
KUNAR
LAGHMAN
KABUL
NANGARHAR
LOGAR
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
Khoshi
Jaji
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Ahmadabad
Sayyid Karam
Jaji Maidan
Bak
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)
Gurbuz
Nadir Shah Kot
Tanai
Shamul (Dzadran)
Dzadran
Zurmat
HERAT
GHOR
Tarin Kot
DAYKUNDI
Shahid-e Hasas
Chorah
Khas Uruzgan
GHAZNI
PAKTIYA
KHOST
Bala Boluk
Khak-e-Safayd
Pusht-e Rod
Deh Rawud
Musa Qal'ah
URUZGAN
ZABUL
PAKTIKA
FARAH
Deh Yak
Khwajah Omari
Sharan
Yosuf Khel
Andar
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu)
Qarah Bagh (1)
Muqer
Gelan
Kang
Zaranj
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
Shah Joy
Qalat
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Arghistan
Shah Wali Kot
Takhtapol
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Nad 'Ali
Garmser
Nahr-e Saraj
Lashkar Gah
Sangin
Kajaki
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Zharay
Daman
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
LEGEND
Index Score
Rank 1
Rank 2
Rank 3
Rank 4
Provincial Border
International Borders
Regional Highway (IRD)
Source: USAID MISTI Project
Date: Monday November 10, 2014
Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com
Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritive.
No endorsement of the US Government or any other ogranization is implied.
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Kunduz, Samangan & Baghlan (North)



Helmand (South)



Kandahar (South)



Zabul (South)



Badghis, Farah & Herat (West)



Ghazni (East)



Kunar (East)



Khost (East)



Paktiya (East)



Logar & Wardak (East)



LOCAL GOVERNANCE

MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts:
Percentage of Local Governance Change from W1 to W4



LEGEND

- Regional Highway (IRD)
- International Borders
- Provincial Border

Percentage W1 to W4

- 20.1% - Max
- 10.1% - 20.0%
- 0.1% - 10.0%
- -9.9% - 0.0%
- -14.9% - -10.0%
- Min - -15.0%

Source: USAID MISTI Project
Date: Tuesday December 21, 2014
Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com

Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritive.
No endorsement of the US Government or any other ogranization is implied.

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N W E S

DDA-CDC Performance

DDA-CDC Performance is Sub-Index 1.2.1 of the SI and RI, and one of two elements in the LG score discussed in the previous section. DDA-CDC is calculated by averaging together six different survey questions on levels of confidence, responsiveness and the ability to get things done of CDCs and DDAs, as perceived by local villagers. DDA-CDC Performance is thus a highly local indicator of governance because survey respondents in a village are asked to rate the performance of their village leaders, and the village leaders that convene at the district level in the DDA. Stability projects work with CDCs and DDAs as key local partners for addressing SOIs and increasing resilience.

It is a positive finding of the factor analysis that perceptions of DDA and CDC are highly correlated. This correlation supports the view that village-level governance by CDCs is effectively linked to district-level governance by the DDAs. Further, CDC-DDA Performance is an important indicator of the extension of government into rural areas because the formation of CDCs and DDAs are sponsored by MRRD through NSP. Villages in less secure districts and sub-district areas are less likely to have CDCs than villages in more stable areas. The SIKAs in particular work with MRRD to strengthen CDCs and promote their formation in less stable areas. If rural Afghans perceive their CDCs and DDAs as performing their functions effectively, then linkages between informal governance and formal government are strengthened. Stability should be enhanced to the extent that CDCs and DDAs work with government officials at the district and provincial levels to solve priority problems.



Figure 11.13: DDA-CDC Performance Trend

Figure 11.13 displays the trend line for DDA-CDC showing the average value for the 55 districts where data was collected in all 4 Waves of the MISTI Survey. For reference the graph also includes the trend line for LG from the previous section. The DDA-CDC trend line follows the same fighting-season pattern as the overall SI and the other sub-indices reviewed thus far. DDA-CDC shows a slight downtrend with the Wave 4 score of 3.56 below the Wave 1 score of 3.61. The DDA-CDC scores are significantly lower

than the LG scores in all waves, which is due to the strong performance of local leaders discussed in the next section. This finding should be interpreted to mean that CDCs and DDAs are important providers of local governance, but these institutions are still relatively weak compared to the personal prestige of local leaders. While strong individual leaders remain the dominant force in the governance of relatively unstable districts, CDCs and DDAs have gained substantial traction as local governance institutions sponsored by formal government ones.

The bar graph in Figure 11.14A arrays each district surveyed in Wave 4 from highest DDA-CDC Performance score on the left, to lowest DDA-CDC score on the right. Each district DDA-CDC score is represented by a bar on the graph. The graph is scaled such that the overall Wave 4 average DDA-CDC score of 3.66 is set equal to zero on the centerline. DDA-CDC scores above the mean are positive and extend above the centerline; DDA-CDC scores below the mean are negative and extend below the centerline. The size of the bar above or below the centerline thus shows the extent to which each district diverges from the overall average DDA-CDC score. The green bars represent the districts with the highest DDA-CDC scores in the first quartile, the yellow bars represent districts with DDA-CDC scores in the second quartile, the orange bars represent district with DDA-CDC scores in the third quartile, and the districts with red bars fall into the lowest quartile of DDA-CDC scores.

Figure 11.14B displays a map of all the districts surveyed in Wave 4 with each one shaded according to the quartile where it falls on DDA-CDC bar chart in Figure 11.14A. The map of DDA-CDC Performance largely corresponds to the map of LG scores displayed in the previous section. The highest scoring districts are distributed across the north and east, with central Helmand, and eastern Uruzgan also showing high scores. Kandahar, Logar, and Wardak Provinces continue to display a deficit of local governance quality on this measure, along with northern Helmand, Ghor, and most districts in Herat and Farah Provinces. Pusht-e Rod and Qadis, and Muqur Districts are bright spots in the western region.

Figure 11.14C includes a series of graphs that display the DDA-CDC trend lines for each of the 55 districts included in all four waves of survey data collection. These graphs largely parallel the trend lines observed for LG in the previous section. The overall trend for the north is flat, the west shows mixed positive and negative trend lines together with Logar, Wardak, and Paktiya and Ghazni, which shows the largest variation across districts. The trend line for all districts in Kandahar angles downward, while Kunar, Khost, and Zabul provinces show an upward trend. Helmand province again shows a bifurcation in trends between the south, which is largely flat, and the north, which is down with the resurgence of the Taliban.

When trends in DDA-CDC performance are mapped in Figure 11.14D, it is clearly noticeable that there has been a marked deterioration in opinion about DDA-CDC performance across the South, especially in northern Helmand Province. Elsewhere results are mixed though there are several districts with strong improvement are evident in Uruzgan, Zabul, Wardak, Badghis and Kunar Provinces.

Figures 11.14 A, B, C and D: A) DDA-CDC Bar Chart (W4), B) DDA-CDC Map (W4), C) DDA-CDC District Trend Lines (W1-4), D) Percentage Change in DDA-CDC Scores Map (W1-4)




DDA-CDC PERFORMANCE
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 4 (Spring 2014)
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
IRAN
PAKISTAN
CHINA
TAJIKISTAN
INDIA
Mazar-e Sharif
Balkh
Sholgarah
Chahar Bolak
Chimtal
Aqcha
Faizabad (2)
Khwajah Do Koh
Shibirghan
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in
Fayroz Nakhchir
Hazrat-e Sultan
Aybak
Qal'ah-ye Zal
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Kunduz
Archi
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
JAWZJAN
BALKH
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
BADAKHSHAN
Qush Tepah
Chaghcharan
Qadis
Shahrak
Pashtun Zarghun
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Injil
Muqur
FARYAB
SAMANGAN
BAGHLAN
SARI PUL
Ruy Do Ab
Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)
Shindand
Adraskan
BADGHIS
Maidan Shahr
Nerkh
Jalrayz
Sayyidabad
Chak-e Wardak
WARDAK
BAMYAN
FARWAN
PANJSHIR
NURISTAN
KAPISA
KUNAR
LAGHMAN
KABUL
NANGARHAR
LOGAR
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
Khoshi
Jaji
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Ahmadabad
Sayyid Karam
Jaji Maidan
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)
Gurbuz
Nadir Shah Kot
Tanai
Shamul (Dzadran)
Dzadran
Zurmat
GHOR
HERAT
Tarin Kot
DAYKUNDI
GHAZNI
PAKTIYA
KHOST
Bak
Chorah
Khas Uruzgan
Shahid-e Hasas
Deh Rawud
Bala Boluk
Khak-e-Safayd
Pusht-e Rod
Musa Qal'ah
URUZGAN
ZABUL
PAKTIKA
FARAH
Deh Yak
Khwajah Omari
Sharan
Yosuf Khel
Andar
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu)
Qarah Bagh (1)
Muqer
Gelan
Shah Joy
Qalat
Kang
Zaranj
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Arghistan
Shah Wali Kot
Takhtapol
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Nad 'Ali
Garmser
Nahr-e Saraj
Lashkar Gah
Sangin
Kajaki
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Zharay
Daman
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
LEGEND
Index Score
Rank 1
Rank 2
Rank 3
Rank 4
Provincial Border
International Borders
Regional Highway (IRD)
Source: USAID MISTI Project
Date: Monday November 10, 2014
Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com
Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritive.
No endorsement of the US Government or any other ogranization is implied.
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Kunduz, Samangan & Baghlan (North)



Helmand (South)



Kandahar (South)



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

Badghis, Farah & Herat (West)



Ghazni (East)



Kunar (East)



Khost (East)



Paktiya (East)



Logar & Wardak (East)




DDA CDC PERFORMANCE
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts:
Percentage of DDA CDC Performance Change from W1 to W4
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
CHINA
TAJIKISTAN
INDIA
PAKISTAN
IRAN
JAWZJAN
BALKH
FARYAB
SAMANGAN
SARI PUL
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
BADAKHSHAN
BAGHLAN
PANJSHIR
NURISTAN
PARWAN
KAPISA
KUNAR
LAGHMAN
BAMYAN
KABUL
NANGARHAR
WARDAK
LOGAR
GHOR
HERAT
DAYKUNDI
GHAZNI
PAKTIYA
KHOST
PAKTIKA
BADGHIS
URUZGAN
ZABUL
FARAH
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
Kunduz
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
Aybak
Qadis
Muqur
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Nerkh
Sayyidabad
Chak-e Wardak
Jaji
Lajah-Mangal
Sayyid Karam
Shindand
Bala Boluk
Pusht-e Rod
Shahid-e Hasas
Khas Uruzgan
Musa Qal'ah
Bak
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Nadir Shah Kot
Gurbuz
Tanai
Shamul (Dzadran)
Dzadran
Zurmat
Deh Yak
Khwajah Omari
Sharan
Yosuf Khel
Andar
Shah Joy
Qarah Bagh (1)
Muqer
Gelan
Qalat
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Shah Wali Kot
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Daman
Zharay
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Kajaki
Sangin
Lashkar Gah
Nahr-e Saraj
Garmser
Nad 'Ali
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
LEGEND
Regional Highway (IRD)
International Borders
Provincial Border
Percentage W1 to W4
20.1% - Max
10.1% - 20.0%
0.1% - 10.0%
-9.9% - 0.0%
-19.9% - -10.0%
Min - -20.0%
Source: USAID MISTI Project
Date: Tuesday December 21, 2014
Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com
Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritive.
No endorsement of the US Government or any other ogranization is implied.
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Local Leaders' Performance

Local Leaders' Performance (LLP) is Sub-Index 1.2.2 of the SI and RI. District LLP scores are averaged together to form the LG score discussed above. LLP is calculated by averaging together three different survey questions on levels of confidence, responsiveness and the ability to get things done of local leaders. The survey question does not specify specific individuals or types of local leaders, such as Maliks, mullahs, and elders, but rather leaves this definition to the respondent. Like DDA-CDC, LLP is a highly local indicator of governance that measures the leadership qualities of local individuals. Good local leaders are sources of resilience that may exert a stabilizing influence in a district if they are supported with necessary resources and effectively linked to government institutions.

The overall scores for the performance of local leaders are by far the highest of any sub-index measured by MISTI. These local leaders are the foundation of governance in Afghanistan, and exert far more influence over the everyday lives of most Afghans than government officials. Stability will be enhanced to the extent that the government and stability projects work together with the right local leaders to address SOIs. If local leaders are able to effectively use resources from stability projects to solve local problems in cooperation with government partners, then successes should be reflected in LLP scores and spill over to other elements of the SI and RI.

Figure 11.15 displays the trend line for LLP, showing the average value for the 55 districts where data was collected in all 4 Waves of the MISTI Survey. For reference the graph also includes the trend line for LG. The LLP trend line is the only one that does not follow the zigzag fighting-season pattern. Rather the overall LLP score rises significantly from Wave 1 to 3, and then dips very slightly in Wave 4. This rise in LLP through 2013 and 2014 is best explained by the uncertainty surrounding the transition from international to national security control, and the reliance of rural Afghans on their village leaders to defend their interests during this uncertain time. The dip in LLP scores in Wave 4 is most likely associated with the uncertainty surrounding the presidential and provincial council elections.



Figure 11.15: Local Leaders' Performance Trend

The bar graph in Figure 11.16A arrays each district surveyed in Wave 4 from highest LLP score on the left, to lowest LLP score on the right. Each district LLP score is represented by a bar on the graph. The

graph is scaled such that the overall Wave 4 average LLP score of 3.85 is set equal to zero on the centerline. LLP scores above the mean are positive and extend above the centerline; LLP scores below the mean are negative and extend below the centerline. The size of the bar above or below the centerline thus shows the extent to which each district diverges from the overall average LLP score. The green bars represent the districts with the highest LLP scores in the first quartile, the yellow bars represent districts with LLP scores in the second quartile, the orange bars represent district with LLP scores in the third quartile, and the districts with red bars fall into the lowest quartile of LLP scores.

Figure 11.16B displays a map of all the districts surveyed in Wave 4, with each one shaded according to the quartile where it falls on LLP bar chart in Figure 11.16A. The LLP map displays some notable differences from the LG and DDA-CDC maps. Most strikingly all districts surveyed in Helmand Province are in the first quartile. Thus, the resurgence of the Taliban in northern Helmand apparently has not had a significant effect on the perceived performance of local leaders, unlike the other indicator scores reviewed thus far. The LLP scores in eastern Uruzgan across the border from Helmand are similarly positive. These findings suggest that local leaders may be aligning themselves with, or at least not opposing Taliban activity in their districts, and that the population in these areas see this development as positive. In these areas where transition has led to Taliban rather than government control of territory, resilience may be best understood as the ability to adapt to changing local circumstances rather than alignment with one side or the other of the conflict. This dynamic may also account for the high LLP scores observed in Zabul and certain districts in Ghazni Provinces, Baraki Barak District in Logar and Zermatt in Paktiya Province; these districts score in the bottom quartile of the overall SI but the top quartile of LLP. The districts surveyed in most other parts of the country have LLP scores broadly in line with the overall SI. The west region is again marked by consistently low scores, along with the districts surveyed in Ghor, Wardak and Logar Provinces outside of Baraki Barak District. The LLP scores in most of Kandahar are somewhat better than the district scores on DDA-CDC.

Figure 11.16C includes a series of graphs that display the LLP trend lines for each of the 55 districts included in all four waves of survey data collection. These graphs generally show flat or slightly up and down trends in each regional and provincial cluster of districts. Helmand is again of particular interest, as the trend lines diverged between the northern and southern districts in Wave 2, but then the LLP scores for the northern districts rose in Waves 3 and 4 to re-converge with the scores from the southern districts. This suggests that the local population gives their leaders good performance ratings for coping successfully with the resurgence of the Taliban in their area. Zabul province shows an upward trend across the three districts surveyed. Andar in Ghazni Province also shows a significant rise in LLP scores.

When trends in LLP are mapped over the four survey waves (see Figure 11.16D) we find that it has deteriorated in two key areas, Kunduz and Baghlan Provinces in the North, and northern Paktiya Province in the East. Other districts with notable decreases in LLP scores include Shah Wali Kot in Kandahar Province and Pusht-e Rod in Farah Province. Areas with an improving trend in LLP include Zabul and Kandahar Provinces (with the marked exception of Shah Wali Kot District), southern Paktiya Province, Khost Province and the two districts surveyed in Badghis Province. Elsewhere results are mixed.

Figures 11.16A, B, C and D: A) PGP Bar Chart (W4), B) PGP Map (W4), C) PGP District Trend Lines (W1-4), D) Percentage Change in PGP Scores Map (W1-4)




LOCAL LEADERS PERFORMANCE
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 4 (Spring 2014)
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
CHINA
INDIA
PAKISTAN
IRAN
Mazar-e Sharif
Balkh
Sholgarah
Chahar Bolak
Chimtal
Aqcha
Faizabad (2)
Khwajah Do Koh
Shibirghan
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in
Fayroz Nakhchir
Hazrat-e Sultan
Aybak
Qal'ah-ye Zal
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Kunduz
Archi
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
JAWZJAN
BALKH
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
BADAKHSHAN
Qush Tepah
Chaghcharan
Qadis
Shahrak
Pashtun Zarghun
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Muqur
Injil
FARYAB
SAMANGAN
BAGHLAN
SARI PUL
Ruy Do Ab
Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)
Shindand
Adraskan
BADGHIS
Maidan Shahr
PANJSHIR
NURISTAN
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
Khoshi
BAMYAN
Nerkh
PARWAN
KAPISA
KUNAR
Jalrayz
LAGHMAN
Sayyidabad
Chak-e Wardak
KABUL
WARDAK
NANGARHAR
Jaji
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Ahmadabad
Sayyid Karam
Jaji Maidan
Bak
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)
LOGAR
PAKTIYA
KHOST
GHAZNI
GHOR
HERAT
Tarin Kot
DAYKUNDI
Chorah
Khas Uruzgan
Shahid-e Hasas
Deh Rawud
Bala Boluk
Khak-e-Safayd
Pusht-e Rod
URUZGAN
Musa Qal'ah
ZABUL
PAKTIKA
Gurbuz
Nadir Shah Kot
Tanai
Shamul (Dzadran)
Dzadran
Zurmat
Deh Yak
Khwajah Omari
Sharan
Yosuf Khel
Andar
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu)
Qarah Bagh (1)
Muqer
Gelan
FARAH
Kang
Zaranj
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
Shah Joy
Qalat
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Arghistan
Shah Wali Kot
Takhtapol
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Nad 'Ali
Garmser
Nahr-e Saraj
Lashkar Gah
Sangin
Kajaki
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Zharay
Daman
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
LEGEND
Index Score
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Provincial Border
International Borders
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Kunduz, Samangan & Baghlan (North)



Helmand (South)



Kandahar (South)



Zabul (South)



Badghis, Farah & Herat (West)



Ghazni (East)



Kunar (East)



Khost (East)



Paktiya (East)



Logar & Wardak (East)




LOCAL LEADERS PERFORMANCE
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts:
Percentage of Local Leaders Performance Change from W1 to W4
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
CHINA
TAJIKISTAN
INDIA
PAKISTAN
IRAN
JAWZJAN
BALKH
FARYAB
SAMANGAN
SARI PUL
BADGHIS
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
BADAKHSHAN
BAGHLAN
PANJSHIR
NURISTAN
KAPISA
PARWAN
BAMYAN
KUNAR
LAGHMAN
KABUL
NANGARHAR
LOGAR
WARDAK
GHOR
HERAT
DAYKUNDI
GHAZNI
PAKTIYA
KHOST
PAKTIKA
URUZGAN
ZABUL
FARAH
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
Aybak
Kunduz
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
Qadis
Muqur
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Nerkh
Sayyidabad
Chak-e Wardak
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Jaji
Lajah-Mangal
Sayyid Karam
Shindand
Bala Boluk
Pusht-e Rod
Khas Uruzgan
Shahid-e Hasas
Musa Qal'ah
Bak
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Nadir Shah Kot
Gurbuz
Tanai
Shamul (Dzadran)
Dzadran
Zurmat
Deh Yak
Khwajah Omari
Sharan
Yosuf Khel
Andar
Shah Joy
Qalat
Qarah Bagh (1)
Muqer
Gelan
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Shah Wali Kot
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Daman
Zharay
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Kajaki
Sangin
Nad 'Ali
Garmser
Nahr-e Saraj
Lashkar Gah
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
LEGEND
Regional Highway (IRD)
International Borders
Provincial Border
Percentage W1 to W4
20.1% - Max
10.1% - 20.0%
0.1% - 10.0%
-9.9% - 0.0%
-14.9% - -10.0%
Min - -15.0%
Source: USAID MISTI Project
Date: Tuesday December 21, 2014
Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com
Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritive.
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Quality of Life

Quality of Life (QoL) is Sub-Index 1.3 in both the stability and resilience indices. The factor analysis of the survey data was a highly productive data-driven method for resolving nagging issues around the relationship between stability and life quality, and between stability and security. Among the many survey questions that measure various aspects of life quality, the factor analysis revealed the six that are the most relevant to stability and resilience. The analysis also showed that perceptions of security belong in the QoL sub-index – security does not "load" onto stability or resilience as a unique factor that is separate from life quality indicators.

QoL is calculated by averaging together the data from six survey questions. The first asks whether the district is moving in the right direction as a barometer of optimism for the future. Two questions measure perceptions of security – one rates the current security situation and one measures change in security over the past year. Measures of overall life satisfaction, ability to meet basic needs, and the state of household finances make up the other survey items included in QL. Both stability and resilience entail the capacity to meet basic needs for security and livelihood.

The overall scores for QoL largely correspond with the overall SI scores for Waves 1-4. Figure 11.17 shows the trend line for QoL across the 55 districts where data was collected in all 4 Waves of the MISTI Survey. For reference the graph also includes the SI trend line. The overall trend is down, with the Wave 4 value of 3.29 substantially below the Wave 1 value of 3.36. The Wave 3 value – more comparable with Wave 1 because data was collected during the fighting season – is also below Wave 1. Compared to the other sub-indices the familiar fighting-season zigzag pattern is more marked with QoL. This is a result of the high sensitivity of perceptions of security to the change in the number of violent incidents from the fighting season to the off-season.



Figure 11.17: Quality of Life Trend

The bar graph in Figure 11.18A arrays each district surveyed in Wave 4 from highest QL score on the left, to lowest QoL score on the right. Each district QoL score is represented by a bar on the graph. The graph is scaled such that the overall Wave 4 average QoL score of 3.29 is set equal to zero on the centerline. QoL scores above the mean are positive and extend above the centerline; QoL scores below the mean are negative and extend below the centerline. The size of the bar above or below the centerline thus shows the extent to which each district diverges from the overall average QoL score. The green bars represent the districts with the highest QoL scores in the first quartile, the yellow bars represent districts with QoL scores in the second quartile, the orange bars represent district with QoL scores in the third quartile, and the districts with red bars fall into the lowest quartile of QoL scores.

Figure 11.18B displays a map of all the districts surveyed in Wave 4, with each one shaded according to the quartile where it falls on LLP bar chart in Figure 11.18A. The QoL map largely parallels the SI map, with the largest cluster of high QoL scores found in the districts surveyed in the northern region. Most districts surveyed in Kandahar and Helmand fall in the second and third quartiles, with northern Helmand scoring much lower than southern Helmand, and Spin Boldak and Shah Wali Kot in Kandahar also scoring in the bottom quartile. QoL scores in the western districts are uniformly low with the exception of Qadis in Badghis Province. The border districts of Kunar Province are again bright spots in the east, along with several districts in Ghazni and Paktika Provinces. Maidan Shahr in Wardak is an outlier district with a high QoL score, unlike its neighboring districts that score in the bottom quartile.

Figure 11.18C includes a series of graphs that display the QoL trend lines for each of the 55 districts included in all four waves of survey data collection. In line with the overall trend line, most of these graphs show a fighting-seasonal movement up and down, and an overall decline from the baseline. Exceptions are certain districts in Kunar and Khost Provinces that show flat or slightly upward sloping trend lines. Tarnak wa Jaldak is the best-performing district in Zabul Province, and Baraki Barak in Logar Province is the worst performing district in the east. Andar in Ghazni and Dzadran in Paktiya show large differences between very low Wave 3 scores and much higher Wave 4 scores.

When QoL trends are mapped over the surveys four waves (see Figure 11.18D) several areas stand out as having strongly deteriorated over the past two years. The most notable deterioration appears to have occurred in northern Helmand Province, Shah Wali Kot district of Kandahar Province, Qalat and Shah Joy districts in Zabul Province, Logar Province, and northern Paktiya Province. Areas that show strong improvement in QoL include the two districts surveyed in Uruzgan Province, southern Paktiya province, Kunar Province and Wardak Province. Elsewhere results are mixed.

Figures 11.18 A, B, C and D: A) QoL Bar Chart (W4), B) QoL Map (W4), C) QoL District Trend Lines (W1-4), D) Percentage Change in QoL Scores Map (W1-4)




QUALITY OF LIFE
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 4 (Spring 2014)
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
IRAN
PAKISTAN
CHINA
TAJIKISTAN
INDIA
Mazar-e Sharif
Balkh
Sholgarah
Aqcha
Faizabad (2)
Chahar Bolak
Chimtal
Khwajah Do Koh
Shibirghan
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in
Fayroz Nakhchir
Hazrat-e Sultan
Aybak
Qal'ah-ye Zal
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Kunduz
Archi
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
JAWZJAN
BALKH
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
BADAKHSHAN
Qush Tepah
Chaghcharan
Qadis
Shahrak
Pashtun Zarghun
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Muqur
Injil
Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)
FARYAB
SAMANGAN
BAGHLAN
SARI PUL
Ruy Do Ab
BADGHIS
Shindand
Adraskan
Maidan Shahr
PANJSHIR
NURISTAN
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
Khoshi
BAMYAN
Nerkh
PARWAN
KAPISA
KUNAR
Jalrayz
LAGHMAN
Sayyidabad
Chak-e Wardak
KABUL
WARDAK
NANGARHAR
Jaji
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Ahmadabad
Sayyid Karam
Jaji Maidan
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)
Gurbuz
Nadir Shah Kot
Tanai
Shamul (Dzadran)
Dzadran
Zurmat
GHOR
HERAT
Tarin Kot
DAYKUNDI
LOGAR
GHAZNI
PAKTIYA
KHOST
Bak
Chorah
Khas Uruzgan
Shahid-e Hasas
Deh Rawud
Bala Boluk
Khak-e-Safayd
Pusht-e Rod
URUZGAN
Musa Qal'ah
ZABUL
PAKTIKA
FARAH
Deh Yak
Khwajah Omari
Sharan
Yosuf Khel
Andar
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu)
Qarah Bagh (1)
Muqer
Gelan
Kang
Zaranj
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
Shah Joy
Qalat
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Arghistan
Shah Wali Kot
Takhtapol
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Nad 'Ali
Garmser
Nahr-e Saraj
Lashkar Gah
Sangin
Kajaki
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Zharay
Daman
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
LEGEND
Index Score
Rank 1
Rank 2
Rank 3
Rank 4
Provincial Border
International Borders
Regional Highway (IRD)
Source: USAID MISTI Project
Date: Monday November 10, 2014
Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com
Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritive.
No endorsement of the US Government or any other ogranization is implied.
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N
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Kunduz & Samangan (North)



Helmand (South)



Kandahar (South)



Zabul (South)



Badghis, Farah & Herat (West)



Ghazni (East)



Kunar (East)



Khost (East)



Paktiya (East)



Logar & Wardak (East)




QUALITY OF LIFE
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts:
Percentage of Quality Of Life Change from W1 to W4
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
CHINA
TAJIKISTAN
INDIA
PAKISTAN
IRAN
JAWZJAN
BALKH
FARYAB
SAMANGAN
SARI PUL
BADGHIS
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
BADAKHSHAN
BAGHLAN
PANJSHIR
NURISTAN
KAPISA
PARWAN
KUNAR
LAGHMAN
BAMYAN
KABUL
NANGARHAR
LOGAR
WARDAK
GHOR
HERAT
DAYKUNDI
GHAZNI
PAKTIYA
KHOST
URUZGAN
ZABUL
PAKTIKA
FARAH
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
Kunduz
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
Aybak
Qadis
Muqur
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Nerkh
Sayyidabad
Chak-e Wardak
Jaji
Lajah-Mangal
Sayyid Karam
Shindand
Bala Boluk
Pusht-e Rod
Khas Uruzgan
Shahid-e Hasas
Musa Qal'ah
Bak
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Nadir Shah Kot
Gurbuz
Tanai
Shamul (Dzadran)
Dzadran
Zurmat
Deh Yak
Khwajah Omari
Sharan
Yosuf Khel
Andar
Shah Joy
Qarah Bagh (1)
Muqer
Gelan
Qalat
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Shah Wali Kot
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Daman
Zharay
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Kajaki
Sangin
Lashkar Gah
Nahr-e Saraj
Garmser
Nad 'Ali
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
LEGEND
Regional Highway (IRD)
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Provincial Border
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20.1% - Max
10.1% - 20.0%
0.1% - 10.0%
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-19.9% - -10.0%
Min - -20.0%
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Resilience Index

The Resilience Index (RI) is calculated separately from the SI, though both the RI and SI share several sub-indices in common (see Tables 11.1 and 11.2). These shared sub-indices are DDA-CDC Performance, Local Leaders' Performance, and Quality of Life. The RI also includes two sub-indices that are not part of the SI: Social Capital and Local Leader Satisfaction. Together these two sub-indices form Component 2.1 of the RI: Community Cohesion. The RI score does not include the Government Capacity component of the SI.

The RI is thus an indicator of local capacity to withstand external shocks and solve problems that affect the community. The RI scores measure the strength of local leadership, village governance, community cohesion, and quality of life. Unlike the SI, the RI does not measure the relationship between local governance and formal government institutions.

The separation of the RI and the SI with this Wave 4 Report was driven by the findings of the factor analysis, which showed that the community cohesion indicators in Component 2.1 of the RI (see Table 11.2) did not "load" onto stability along with the government capacity indicators. These findings revealed that certain aspects of local governance in Afghanistan – community cohesion – is perceived very differently from the type of state-sponsored stability that USAID seeks to enact through its programs. Thus, when rural Afghans answer questions about their ability to solve problems and work together, the type of "social capital" that that they are discussing is not related to the state-sponsored social order. Similarly, the data collected from survey questions about satisfaction with local leadership is closely related to social capital, but unrelated to satisfaction with government officials. This finding shows that government officials are not perceived as sources of resilience. The categorical differences between resilience and stability show that many of the forces that organize everyday life in rural Afghanistan remain outside the reach of state institutions.

By designing projects to enhance community cohesion and resilience, projects such as CCI do not always work with government partners to address sources of instability, or attempt to extend the reach of the government into rural areas. In certain cases working only with local leaders and institutions such as CDCs and DDAs, and not with government officials, is the best way to increase resilience. More resilient villages will be more able to resist negative influences from malign actors. Identifying local sources of resilience, such as beneficent local leaders and institutions, and then working to strengthen and empower them, is an important means of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable development.

Figure 11.19 shows the trend line for the average RI score across the 55 districts where data was collected in all 4 Waves of the MISTI Survey. For reference the graph also includes the SI trend line. The overall trend in RI is slightly up from the baseline, with the Wave 4 score of 3.51 slightly above the Wave 1 score of 3.51. Resilience also shows the same fighting-seasonal zigzag pattern as the SI, so a significant uptrend would be signified by a Wave 5 score greater than the Wave 3 score, both of which are measured during the off-season for fighting. The RI scores are significantly higher than the SI scores in all waves. This finding is the result of the higher ratings given to local leaders and institutions compared to government officials and institutions.



Figure 11.19: Resilience Index Trend

The bar graph in Figure 11.20A arrays each district surveyed in Wave 4 from highest RI score on the left, to lowest RI score on the right. Each district RI score is represented by a bar on the graph. The graph is scaled such that the overall Wave 4 average RI score of 3.29 is set equal to zero on the centerline. RI scores above the mean are positive and extend above the centerline; RI scores below the mean are negative and extend below the centerline. The size of the bar above or below the centerline thus shows the extent to which each district diverges from the overall average RI score. The green bars represent the districts with the highest RI scores in the first quartile, the yellow bars represent districts with RI scores in the second quartile, the orange bars represent district with RI scores in the third quartile, and the districts with red bars fall into the lowest quartile of RI scores.

Figure 11.20B displays a map of all the districts surveyed in Wave 4, with each one shaded according to the quartile where it falls on RI bar chart in Figure 11.20A. The RI map is similar to the maps of Local Leaders' Performance and DDA-CDC indicator scores displayed above. Resilience is highest in the districts surveyed in the northern provinces of Samangan and Jawzjan as well as eastern Uruzgan Province. Many of these district score in the top two quartiles of both the RI and the SI, which suggests that governance and government institutions are both effective in these areas. Most eastern districts score higher on resilience than stability, which suggests that a large gap exists in these districts between the quality of local leadership and local government. Stability projects should focus on working with local sources of resilience to bridge the gap between governance and government. Kandahar province shows the opposite dynamic – scores for overall stability and government capacity are higher than resilience scores in most districts. The most problematic districts have low scores on both stability and resilience. These poor-performing districts are located mainly in the western region, and Ghor, Wardak, and Logar Provinces.

Figure 11.20C includes a series of graphs that display the RI trend lines for each of the 55 districts included in all four waves of survey data collection. In line with the overall trend line, most of these graphs show flat or slightly upward sloping trend lines. The most positive trends are visible in the

districts surveyed in Ghazni, Kunar, Khost, and Zabul Provinces. Kandahar shows a slight downtrend and the trend lines across the West districts are mixed. Helmand shows the divergence between the northern and southern districts that is familiar from the SI, and likely a result of the resurgence of the Taliban.

Trends in resilience are mapped in Figure 11.20D. It is noticeable that resilience has deteriorated in most districts surveyed in the two southernmost provinces of Helmand and Kandahar (with the exception of Maiwand District). In the North, the districts surveyed in southeastern Kunduz, Baghlan and Samangan Provinces all show moderate deterioration in resilience. In the East, the districts surveyed in northern Paktiya Province all register a negative trend in resilience, as do the districts surveyed in Logar and Paktika Provinces. Positive trends are registered in the East in Kunar, Khost, southern Paktiya and Wardak Provinces, while in the South, Uruzgan and Zabul Provinces both register a positive trend in resilience. In the West, Badghis registers a moderately positive trend in resilience whereas the trend in the two districts surveyed in neighboring Helmand Province is moderately negative. The resilience trend in the North is split between a moderately positive trend in the two northernmost districts surveyed in Kunduz Province (Chahar Darah and Imam Sahib Districts) and districts surveyed in the southeast of Kunduz Province, and Baghlan and Samangan Provinces. Elsewhere the results are mixed.

Figures 11.20A, B, C and D: A) RI Bar Chart (W4), B) RI Map (W4), C) RI District Trend Lines (W1-4), D) Percentage Change in RI Scores Map (W1-4)




RESILIENCE INDEX
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 4 (Spring 2014)
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
IRAN
PAKISTAN
CHINA
TAJIKISTAN
INDIA
Mazar-e Sharif
Balkh
Sholgarah
Chahar Bolak
Chimtal
Aqcha
Faizabad (2)
Khwajah Do Koh
Shibirghan
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in
Fayroz Nakhchir
Hazrat-e Sultan
Aybak
Qal'ah-ye Zal
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Kunduz
Archi
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
JAWZJAN
BALKH
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
BADAKHSHAN
Qush Tepah
Chaghcharan
Qadis
Shahrak
Pashtun Zarghun
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Injil
Muqur
FARYAB
SAMANGAN
BAGHLAN
SARI PUL
Ruy Do Ab
Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)
Shindand
Adraskan
BADGHIS
Maidan Shahr
PANJSHIR
NURISTAN
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
Khoshi
Jaji
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Ahmadabad
Sayyid Karam
Jaji Maidan
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)
Gurbuz
Nadir Shah Kot
Tanai
Shamul (Dzadran)
Dzadran
Zurmat
Deh Yak
Khwajah Omari
Sharan
Yosuf Khel
Andar
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu)
Qarah Bagh (1)
Muqer
Gelan
Shah Joy
Qalat
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Arghistan
Shah Wali Kot
Takhtapol
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Daman
Zharay
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Kajaki
Sangin
Lashkar Gah
Nahr-e Saraj
Garmser
Nad 'Ali
Nerkh
PARWAN
KAPISA
KUNAR
Jalrayz
LAGHMAN
Sayyidabad
Chak-e Wardak
KABUL
WARDAK
NANGARHAR
LOGAR
PAKTIYA
KHOST
Bak
GHOR
HERAT
Tarin Kot
DAYKUNDI
GHAZNI
Shahid-e Hasas
Chorah
Khas Uruzgan
Deh Rawud
URUZGAN
Musa Qal'ah
ZABUL
PAKTIKA
Bala Boluk
Khak-e-Safayd
Pusht-e Rod
FARAH
Kang
Zaranj
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
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Provincial Border
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Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com
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N
W
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0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers

Kunduz, Samangan & Baghlan (North)



Helmand (South)



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

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

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

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

Kunar (East)



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

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

Logar & Wardak (East)




RESILIENCE INDEX
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts:
Percentage of Resilience Index Change from W1 to W4
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
CHINA
TAJIKISTAN
INDIA
PAKISTAN
IRAN
JAWZJAN
BALKH
FARYAB
SAMANGAN
SARI PUL
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
BADAKHSHAN
BAGHLAN
PANJSHIR
NURISTAN
BADGHIS
BAMYAN
PARWAN
KAPISA
KUNAR
LAGHMAN
KABUL
WARDAK
NANGARHAR
LOGAR
GHOR
HERAT
DAYKUNDI
GHAZNI
PAKTIYA
KHOST
URUZGAN
PAKTIKA
ZABUL
FARAH
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
Kunduz
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
Aybak
Qadis
Muqur
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
Nerkh
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Sayyidabad
Chak-e Wardak
Jaji
Lajah-Mangal
Sayyid Karam
Shindand
Bala Boluk
Pusht-e Rod
Khas Uruzgan
Shahid-e Hasas
Musa Qal'ah
Bak
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Nadir Shah Kot
Gurbuz
Tanai
Shamul (Dzadran)
Dzadran
Zurmat
Deh Yak
Khwajah Omari
Sharan
Yosuf Khel
Andar
Shah Joy
Qalat
Qarah Bagh (1)
Muqer
Gelan
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Shah Wali Kot
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Daman
Zharay
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Kajaki
Sangin
Lashkar Gah
Nahr-e Saraj
Garmser
Nad 'Ali
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
LEGEND
Regional Highway (IRD)
International Borders
Provincial Border
Percentage W1 to W4
20.1% - Max
10.1% - 20.0%
0.1% - 10.0%
-9.9% - 0.0%
-14.9% - -10.0%
Min - -15.0%
Source: USAID MISTI Project
Date: Tuesday December 21, 2014
Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com
Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritive.
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Community Cohesion

Community Cohesion (CC) is Component 2.1 of the RI (see Table 11.2). It is calculated by averaging together the district scores for the Social Capital and the Local Leader Satisfaction Sub-Indices. CC is an important indicator of resilience because it measures the extent to which rural Afghans are satisfied with their local leadership for solving problems that affect the community.

Communities that are more cohesive will be more capable of coping with external shocks that destabilize an area, such as violent incidents or threats from malign actors. More cohesive communities will also be more capable of solving internal problems that make them vulnerable to exploitation. The resilience of an area will be improved to the extent that villages are able to work together to solve local problems behind leaders that represent their interests.

Figure 11.21 shows the trend line for the average CC score across the 55 districts where data was collected in all 4 Waves of the MISTI Survey. For reference the graph also shows the RI trend line. Like RI, the overall trend in CC is slightly up from the baseline, with the Wave 4 score of 3.42 slightly above the Wave 1 score of 3.40. Because cohesion shows the same fighting-seasonal zigzag pattern as the RI and SI, a significant uptrend would be signified by a Wave 5 score greater than the Wave 3 score, both of which are measured during the off-season for fighting. The cohesion scores are significantly lower than the RI scores in all waves. This finding shows that cohesion scores are relatively weak component of the RI compared to Local Governance.



Figure 11.21: Cohesion Trend

The bar graph in Figure 11.22A arrays each district surveyed in Wave 4 from highest CC score on the left, to lowest CC score on the right. Each district CC score is represented by a bar on the graph. The graph is scaled such that the overall Wave 4 average CC score of 3.42 is set equal to zero on the centerline. CC

scores above the mean are positive and extend above the centerline; CC scores below the mean are negative and extend below the centerline. The size of the bar above or below the centerline thus shows the extent to which each district diverges from the overall average CC score. The green bars represent the districts with the highest CC scores in the first quartile, the yellow bars represent districts with RI scores in the second quartile, the orange bars represent district with CC scores in the third quartile, and the districts with red bars fall into the lowest quartile of CC scores.

Figure 11.22B displays a map of all the districts surveyed in Wave 4, with each one shaded according to the quartile where it falls on CC bar chart in Figure 11.22A. Like the resilience map above, the cohesion map shows important contrasts with the SI and government capacity maps. Certain districts that score poorly on stability, such as several in Kunduz and Baghlan, northern Helmand, Zabul, and Paktiya Provinces all score in the top quartile on CC. Others that score relatively highly on stability indicators, such as several districts in the northern provinces of Jawzjan and Balk, have lower scores on cohesion. Much like the local leaders performance indicator, there is no significant divergence between the districts surveyed in northern and southern Helmand on cohesion, despite the reported resurgence of the Taliban in the north of the province.

Elsewhere, most of Kandahar province scores in the bottom quartile in contrast to relatively higher scores on government indicators. Most of the districts surveyed in the West, and all districts surveyed in Wardak and Logar Provinces remain at the bottom of the scale.

Figure 11.22C includes a series of graphs that display the CC trend lines for each of the 55 districts included in all four waves of survey data collection. In line with the overall trend line, most of these graphs show flat or slightly upward-sloping trend lines. The most positive trends are visible in the districts surveyed in Ghazni Province. Other districts in Kunar, Khost, and Kandahar provinces show flat trend lines. The largest variation in scores between waves is seen in many of the lowest scoring districts in Badghis, Farah and Herat as well as Logar and Wardak Provinces. These variations at the low end of the scale suggest that violence and other external forces are causing significant disruptions in many communities in these districts.

When CC trends are mapped over the survey's four waves (see Figure 11.22D) we can see some clear geographic demarcations between positively and negatively trending areas. The most obvious negative trending areas in CC are registered in Kandahar, Logar, Paktika and northern Paktiya provinces. In contrast, southern Paktiya Province registers a positive trend in CC, as do most districts surveyed in Khost Province. Interestingly, Helmand Province is divided between Sangin and Musa Qal'ah Districts in the north of the province which registered a moderately negative trend and the remaining districts surveyed in the south of the Province that all registered a moderately positive trend in CC. The West of the country has mixed results though both districts surveyed in Badghis Province registered a moderately positive trend in CC. Results are also mixed in the North, with CC improving relatively strongly in Chahar Darah District (Kunduz Province) while deteriorating relatively strongly in Pul-e Khumri District.

Figures 11.22A, B, C and D: A) CC Bar Chart (W4), B) CC Map (W4), C) CC District Trend Lines (W1-4), D) Percentage Change in CC Scores Map (W1-4)




COMMUNITY COHESION
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 4 (Spring 2014)
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
IRAN
PAKISTAN
CHINA
TAJIKISTAN
INDIA
Mazar-e Sharif
Balkh
Sholgarah
Chahar Bolak
Chimtal
Aqcha
Faizabad (2)
Khwajah Do Koh
Shibirghan
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in
Fayroz Nakhchir
Hazrat-e Sultan
Aybak
Qal'ah-ye Zal
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Kunduz
Archi
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
JAWZJAN
BALKH
KUNDUZ
BADAKHSHAN
TAKHAR
Qush Tepah
Chaghcharan
Qadis
Shahrak
Muqur
Pashtun Zarghun
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Injil
Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)
Shindand
Adraskan
FARYAB
SAMANGAN
BAGHLAN
SARI PUL
Ruy Do Ab
BADGHIS
Maidan Shahr
Nerkh
Jalrayz
Sayyidabad
Chak-e Wardak
WARDAK
BAMYAN
PARWAN
PANJSHIR
NURISTAN
KAPISA
KUNAR
LAGHMAN
KABUL
NANGARHAR
LOGAR
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
Khoshi
Jaji
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Ahmadabad
Sayyid Karam
Jaji Maidan
Bak
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)
HERAT
GHOR
Tarin Kot
DAYKUNDI
GHAZNI
PAKTIYA
KHOST
Chorah
Khas Uruzgan
Shahid-e Hasas
Deh Rawud
Musa Qal'ah
URUZGAN
ZABUL
PAKTIKA
Bala Boluk
Khak-e-Safayd
Pusht-e Rod
FARAH
Gurbuz
Nadir Shah Kot
Tanai
Shamul (Dzadran)
Dzadran
Zurmat
Deh Yak
Khwajah Omari
Sharan
Yosuf Khel
Andar
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu)
Qarah Bagh (1)
Muqer
Gelan
Kang
Zaranj
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
Shah Joy
Qalat
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Arghistan
Shah Wali Kot
Takhtapol
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Nad 'Ali
Garmser
Nahr-e Saraj
Lashkar Gah
Sangin
Kajaki
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Zharay
Daman
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
LEGEND
Index Score
Rank 1
Rank 2
Rank 3
Rank 4
Provincial Border
International Borders
Regional Highway (IRD)
Source: USAID MISTI Project
Date: Monday November 10, 2014
Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com
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Kunduz, Samangan & Baghlan (North)



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

Kandahar (South)



Zabul (South)



Badghis, Farah & Herat (West)



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

Kunar (East)



Khost (East)



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

Logar & Wardak (East)




COMMUNITY COHESION
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts:
Percentage of Community Cohesion Change from W1 to W4
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
CHINA
TAJIKISTAN
INDIA
PAKISTAN
IRAN
JAWZJAN
BALKH
FARYAB
SAMANGAN
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
BADAKHSHAN
BAGHLAN
SARI PUL
BADGHIS
PANJSHIR
NURISTAN
BAMYAN
PARWAN
KAPISA
KUNAR
LAGHMAN
KABUL
WARDAK
NANGARHAR
LOGAR
GHOR
HERAT
DAYKUNDI
GHAZNI
PAKTIYA
KHOST
URUZGAN
PAKTIKA
ZABUL
FARAH
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
Aybak
Kunduz
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
Qadis
Muqur
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Nerkh
Sayyidabad
Chak-e Wardak
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Jaji
Lajah-Mangal
Sayyid Karam
Shindand
Bala Boluk
Pusht-e Rod
Khas Uruzgan
Shahid-e Hasas
Musa Qal'ah
Bak
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Nadir Shah Kot
Gurbuz
Tanai
Shamul (Dzadran)
Dzadran
Zurmat
Deh Yak
Khwajah Omari
Sharan
Yosuf Khel
Andar
Shah Joy
Qalat
Qarah Bagh (1)
Muqer
Gelan
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Shah Wali Kot
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Daman
Zharay
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Kajaki
Sangin
Lashkar Gah
Nahr-e Saraj
Garmser
Nad 'Ali
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
LEGEND
Regional Highway (IRD)
International Borders
Provincial Border
Percentage W1 to W4
20.1% - Max
10.1% - 20.0%
0.1% - 10.0%
-4.9% - 0.0%
-9.9% - -5.0%
Min - -10.0%
Source: USAID MISTI Project
Date: Tuesday December 21, 2014
Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com
Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritive.
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Social Capital

Social Capital (SC) is Sub-Index 2.1.1 of the RI (see Table 11.2). It is calculated by averaging together the data collected using three survey questions. The first two questions ask how often local people are able to solve problems that come 1) from outside the village, and 2) from inside the village. The third question asks how often villages in the area work together to solve problems that affect the wider community.

As a measure of social capital, SC measures the extent to which the relationships between people in a village, and between people in different villages, are valuable or useful for solving problems that affect the group as a whole. SC scores are low where distrust and poor relations between community members are prevalent. High SC scores are an indicator of cohesion and resilience because communities that work together more effectively to solve problems will be better able to withstand internal and external shocks, and resist negative influences from malign actors. Stability and resilience in local areas will improve to the extent that project interventions effectively add to social capital rather than reduce social capital by creating competition for resources.

Figure 11.23 shows the trend line for the average SC score across the 55 districts where data was collected in all 4 Waves of the MISTI Survey. For reference the graph also shows the RI trend line. The SC and RI trend lines diverge significantly, with SC showing a significant upward trend from Waves 2 through 4 that does not follow the fighting season pattern. This steady upward trend is similar to the observed for Local Leaders' Performance Sub-Index. The increase in SC scores provides some evidence that the social fabric of rural Afghanistan is mending after long years of war and disruption. Adverse conditions, such as heightened uncertainty created by the ISAF base closures and the transition of security responsibility to the Afghan army and police, may have caused an increase social capital by creating problems that communities had to work together to solve.



Figure 11.23: Social Capital Trend

The bar graph in Figure 11.24A arrays each district surveyed in Wave 4 from highest SC score on the left, to lowest SC score on the right. Each district SC score is represented by a bar on the graph. The graph is scaled such that the overall Wave 4 average SC score of 3.46 is set equal to zero on the centerline. SC scores above the mean are positive and extend above the centerline; SC scores below the mean are negative and extend below the centerline. The size of the bar above or below the centerline thus shows the extent to which each district diverges from the overall average SC score. The green bars represent the districts with the highest SC scores in the first quartile, the yellow bars represent districts with RI scores in the second quartile, the orange bars represent district with SC scores in the third quartile, and the districts with red bars fall into the lowest quartile of SC scores.

Figure 11.24B displays a map of all the districts surveyed in Wave 4, with each one shaded according to the quartile where it falls on SC bar chart in Figure 11.24A. The SC map is very similar to the cohesion map above, though several consistently low-scoring districts in Herat, Wardak, and Uruzgan provinces moved upward one quartile on their SC scores compared to their cohesion and overall resilience scores. The districts surveyed in Ghor Province remain in the red, while the districts surveyed in Zabul, and some of the lowest-scoring districts in the east on the SI Index score in the green and yellow quartiles on SC. This finding suggests that communities are strong where the government is weak, and in Kandahar communities are weak where the government is strong. The gap between government and communities appears widest in the south and east. Most districts in the west, especially Shindand in Herat, and all districts surveyed in Farah, score poorly on both communality and government.

Figure 11.24C includes a series of graphs that display the SC trend lines for each of the 55 districts included in all four waves of survey data collection. In line with the overall trend line, most districts show slightly upward-sloping trend lines, but with significant variation from wave to wave. The most positive trends are visible in Helmand, Ghazni, and Kunar Provinces.

SC trends over the past two years are mapped in Figure 11.24D. Interestingly, we can see stark differences in area trends. In the South, all districts registered a positive trend in SC with the exception of a band of districts running through the center and east of Kandahar Province. In the West, a triangle of districts in Farah and southern Herat (Pusht-e Rod, Bala Boluk and Shindand Districts) Provinces all registered a moderate deterioration in SC while districts in the north of Herat Province and Badghis Province registered mixed moderate results. In the North, all districts registered improvement in SC with the exception of Kunduz, Aliabad and Pul-e Khumri Districts, which all registered a moderate deterioration in SC. In the East, all districts surveyed in Khost (with the exception of Shamul District) and southern Paktiya Provinces registered positive trends while all districts in northern Paktiya registered negative trends in SC, particularly in Jaji District. Logar Province registered mixed results, though Baraki Barak District registered a particularly strong negative trend in SC.

Figure11.24A, B, C and D: A) SC Bar Chart (W4), B) SC Map (W4), C) SC District Trend Lines (W1-4), D) Percentage Change in SC Scores Map (W1-4)




SOCIAL CAPITAL
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 4 (Spring 2014)
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
IRAN
PAKISTAN
CHINA
TAJIKISTAN
INDIA
JAWZJAN
SARI PUL
FARYAB
BALKH
SAMANGAN
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
BADAKHSHAN
BAGHLAN
BADGHIS
HERAT
GHOR
BAMYAN
PANJSHIR
PARWAN
NURISTAN
KAPISA
KUNAR
LAGHMAN
KABUL
WARDAK
LOGAR
NANGARHAR
DAYKUNDI
GHAZNI
PAKTIYA
KHOST
URUZGAN
ZABUL
PAKTIKA
FARAH
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
Mazar-e Sharif
Balkh
Sholgarah
Aqcha
Faizabad (2)
Chahar Bolak
Chimtal
Khwajah Do Koh
Shibirghan
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in
Fayroz Nakhchir
Hazrat-e Sultan
Aybak
Qal'ah-ye Zal
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Kunduz
Archi
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
Qush Tepah
Chaghcharan
Qadis
Shahrak
Muqur
Pashtun Zarghun
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Injil
Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)
Shindand
Adraskan
Ruy Do Ab
Maidan Shahr
Nerkh
Jalrayz
Sayyidabad
Chak-e Wardak
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
Khoshi
Jaji
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Ahmadabad
Sayyid Karam
Jaji Maidan
Bak
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)
Gurbuz
Nadir Shah Kot
Tanai
Shamul (Dzadran)
Dzadran
Zurmat
Deh Yak
Khwajah Omari
Sharan
Yosuf Khel
Andar
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu)
Qarah Bagh (1)
Muqer
Gelan
Tarin Kot
Shahid-e Hasas
Deh Rawud
Musa Qal'ah
Chorah
Khas Uruzgan
Bala Boluk
Khak-e-Safayd
Pusht-e Rod
Kang
Zaranj
Shah Joy
Qalat
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Arghistan
Shah Wali Kot
Takhtapol
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Nad 'Ali
Garmser
Nahr-e Saraj
Lashkar Gah
Sangin
Kajaki
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Zharay
Daman
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
LEGEND
Index Score
Rank 1
Rank 2
Rank 3
Rank 4
Provincial Border
International Borders
Regional Highway (IRD)
Source: USAID MISTI Project
Date: Monday November 10, 2014
Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com
Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritive.
No endorsement of the US Government or any other ogranization is implied.
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N
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Kunduz, Samangan & Baghlan (North)



Helmand (South)



Kandahar (South)



Zabul (South)



Badghis, Farah & Herat (West)



Ghazni (East)



Kunar (East)



Khost (East)



Paktiya (East)



Logar & Wardak (East)




SOCIAL CAPITAL
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts:
Percentage of Social Capital Change from W1 to W4
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
IRAN
PAKISTAN
CHINA
TAJIKISTAN
INDIA
Kunduz
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
Aybak
JAWZJAN
BALKH
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
BADAKHSHAN
SAMANGAN
BAGHLAN
Qadis
Muqur
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
FARYAB
SARI PUL
BADGHIS
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
PANJSHIR
NURISTAN
KUNAR
BAMYAN
Nerkh
PARWAN
KAPISA
LAGHMAN
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Sayyidabad
Chak-e Wardak
KABUL
Jaji
WARDAK
NANGARHAR
Lajah-Mangal
Sayyid Karam
LOGAR
CHOR
HERAT
DAYKUNDI
GHAZNI
PAKTIYA
KHOST
Bak
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Nadir Shah Kot
Shindand
Bala Boluk
Pusht-e Rod
Khas Uruzgan
Shahid-e Hasas
Musa Qal'ah
URUZGAN
ZABUL
PAKTIKA
Gurbuz
Tanai
Shamul (Dzadran)
Dzadran
Zurmat
Deh Yak
Khwajah Omari
Sharan
Yosuf Khel
Andar
FARAH
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
Shah Joy
Qalat
Qarah Bagh (1)
Muqer
Gelan
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Shah Wali Kot
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Nad 'Ali
Garmser
Nahr-e Saraj
Lashkar Gah
Sangin
Kajaki
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Zharay
Daman
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
LEGEND
Regional Highway (IRD)
International Borders
Provincial Border
Percentage W1 to W4
20.1% - Max
10.1% - 20.0%
0.1% - 10.0%
-9.9% - 0.0%
-14.9% - -10.0%
Min - -15.0%
Source: USAID MISTI Project
Date: Tuesday December 21, 2014
Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com
Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritive.
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Local Leader Satisfaction

Local Leader Satisfaction (LLS) is Sub-Index 2.1.2 of the RI (see Table 11.2). It is calculated by averaging together the data collected using three survey questions that ask respondents to rate their local leaders. The first question concerns the extent to which leaders consider the interests of ordinary people when they make decisions, and a second question concerns the degree to which leaders consider women's interests. The third question asks about local leaders' effectiveness at securing government funds for the village. The factor analysis showed that these measures of satisfaction are a key measure of Community Cohesion alongside Local Governance (Component 1.2 of the RI and the SI) and its indicators of DDA-CDC and local leaders' performance.

Communities will be more cohesive where community members are more satisfied with their local leaders. High LLS scores are an indicator of cohesion and resilience because local leaders that are better at representing citizen interests will make better decisions for the community as a whole to find the best solutions to problems and cope with adverse conditions.

Figure 11.25 shows the trend line for the average LLS score across the 55 districts where data was collected in all 4 Waves of the MISTI Survey. For reference the graph also shows the CC trend line. The LLS and CC trend lines are track each other very closely, though the fighting-season pattern in LLS is starker with a higher score in Wave 3 and a lower score in Wave 4 compared to cohesion. A significant uptrend on this indicator would be signified by a Wave 5 score greater than the Wave 3 score, both of which are measured during the off-season for fighting. The trend line shows that LLS is strongly affected by seasonal conditions, unlike the Local Leaders' Performance (Sub-Index 1.2.2) indicator, which shows a stead uptrend (see above). The differences between these metrics of performance versus satisfaction may indicate that local leaders are achieving positive outcomes for their communities, but that these outcomes are not always seen as representative of the interests of the community as a whole.



Figure 11.25: Local Leaders Satisfaction Trend

The bar graph in Figure 11.26A arrays each district surveyed in Wave 4 from highest LLS score on the left, to lowest LLS score on the right. Each district LLS score is represented by a bar on the graph. The graph is scaled such that the overall Wave 4 average LLS score of 3.38 is set equal to zero on the centerline. LLS scores above the mean are positive and extend above the centerline; LLS scores below the mean are negative and extend below the centerline. The size of the bar above or below the centerline thus shows the extent to which each district diverges from the overall average LLS score. The green bars represent the districts with the highest LLS scores in the first quartile, the yellow bars represent districts with LLS scores in the second quartile, the orange bars represent district with LLS scores in the third quartile, and the districts with red bars fall into the lowest quartile of LLS scores.

Figure 11.26B displays a map of all the districts surveyed in Wave 4, with each one shaded according to the quartile where it falls on LLS bar chart in Figure 11.26A. The LLS map is very similar to the cohesion map above, though the LLS scores in districts surveyed in northern Helmand are lower than the cohesion and social capital scores. This finding may indicate that accommodations that were reached locally with a resurgent Taliban may not be satisfactory to the population as whole.

Figure 11.26C includes a series of graphs that display the LLS trend lines for each of the 55 districts included in all four waves of survey data collection. Slight uptrends are visible in most districts surveyed in Khost Province. The trends are mixed within regions and provinces such as Kunduz, Baghlan, and Samangan in the North, and Badghis, Farah, and Herat in the West. Downtrends are visible across the districts surveyed in Kandahar, especially Shah Wali Kot. The districts surveyed in the East show significant variation across the survey waves, especially in Paktiya and in Logar and Wardak Provinces. These variations show that local leaders have faced significant challenges in these districts and have not always achieved results that satisfy the local population.

Trends in LLS over the past two years are mapped in Figure 11.26D. Results are generally mixed, though some areas stand out as being more positively or negatively trending than others. In the South, all districts in Kandahar Province register a negative trend in LLS, especially in Shah Wali Kot District (Kandahar Province) and Musa Qal'ah District (Helmand Province). In the East, negatively trending areas include northern Paktiya Province, Logar Province, the two districts surveyed in Paktika Province, and two districts in southern Ghazni Province (Muqer and Qarah Bagh). Most of the districts surveyed in the North (with the exception of Chahar Darah District in Kunduz Province) also register a moderately negative trend. In the West, Badghis Province registers a relatively strong positive trend while results in Herat and Farah are mixed.

Figures 11.26A, B, C and D: A) LLS Bar Chart (W4), B) LLS Map (W4), C) LLS District Trend Lines (W1-4), D) Percentage Change in LLS Scores Map (W1-4)



LOCAL LEADERS SATISFACTION

MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 4 (Spring 2014)



LEGEND

Index Score

- Rank 1
- Rank 2
- Rank 3
- Rank 4
- Provincial Border
- International Borders
- Regional Highway (IRD)

Source: USAID MISTI Project
Date: Monday November 10, 2014
Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com

Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritive.
No endorsement of the US Government or any other ogranization is implied.

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N W E S

Kunduz, Samangan & Baghlan (North)



Helmand (South)



Kandahar (South)



Zabul (South)



Badghis, Farah & Herat (West)



Ghazni (East)



Kunar (East)



Khost (East)



Paktiya (East)



Logar & Wardak (East)




LOCAL LEADER SATISFACTION
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts:
Percentage of Local Leader Satisfaction Change from W1 to W4
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
IRAN
PAKISTAN
CHINA
TAJIKISTAN
INDIA
JAWZJAN
BALKH
FARYAB
SAMANGAN
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
BADAKHSHAN
BAGHLAN
SARI PUL
BADGHIS
BAMYAN
PARWAN
KAPISA
PANJSHIR
NURISTAN
KUNAR
LAGHMAN
KABUL
WARDAK
LOGAR
NANGARHAR
GHOR
HERAT
DAYKUNDI
GHAZNI
PAKTIYA
KHOST
URUZGAN
ZABUL
PAKTIKA
FARAH
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
Kunduz
Chahar Darah
Imam Sahib
Baghlani Jadid
Aliabad
Khanabad
Pul-e Khumri
Aybak
Qadis
Muqur
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Muhammad Aghah
Baraki Barak
Marawarah
Sar Kani
Khas Kunar
Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Nerkh
Sayyidabad
Chak-e Wardak
Jaji
Lajah-Mangal
Sayyid Karam
Shindand
Bala Boluk
Pusht-e Rod
Khas Uruzgan
Shahid-e Hasas
Musa Qal'ah
Bak
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Nadir Shah Kot
Gurbuz
Tanai
Shamul (Dzadran)
Dzadran
Zurmat
Deh Yak
Khwajah Omari
Sharan
Yosuf Khel
Andar
Shah Joy
Qalat
Qarah Bagh (1)
Muqer
Gelan
Tarnak wa Jaldak
Shah Wali Kot
Spin Boldak
Arghandab (1)
Dand
Daman
Zharay
Panjwa'i
Maiwand
Kajaki
Sangin
Lashkar Gah
Nahr-e Saraj
Garmser
Nad 'Ali
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Kilometers
LEGEND
Regional Highway (IRD)
International Borders
Provincial Border
Percentage W1 to W4
20.1% - Max
10.1% - 20.0%
0.1% - 10.0%
-9.9% - 0.0%
-19.9% - -10.0%
Min - -20.0%
Source: USAID MISTI Project
Date: Tuesday December 21, 2014
Projection: WGS84
Contact: mistigis@msi-afghan.com
Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritive.
No endorsement of the US Government or any other ogranization is implied.
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Summary of Sub-Index Trends

The stability and resilience indices include a total of nine different sub-indices. The trend lines for each of these sub-index scores are displayed in Figure 11.27, which shows the average scores for all 55 districts surveyed in all four waves. The array of sub-index scores of different magnitudes holds important information about what drives stability and resilience in rural Afghanistan.

Local Leaders Performance is the top scoring sub index, and it does not display the fighting-season pattern like most other sub-indices. This finding shows that local leadership is the most important form of governance in rural Afghanistan that the population relies on to overcome challenges such as those associated with transition. The relatively high scores for DDA-CDC Performance show that this government-sponsored informal governance institution is performing well overall in the eyes of the population. This finding shows the promise of DDAs and CDCs as an institutional mechanism for linking local governance and formal government. The scores for District Government Performance are in the middle of the range and show relatively less fighting-season variation than some of the other scores. This mid-range, slightly downward-sloping trend line shows the importance of district-level government representatives for local people. The finding reinforces the importance of district governments as a key focus for stability projects.



Figure 11.27: Summary of Sub-Index Trends

Social Capital and Local Leaders Satisfaction are closely aligned in the Community Cohesion component of the resilience index, and show very similar trends in Figure 11.27. Projects aimed at enhancing

stability and resilience will be most successful where resources are allocated such that the intervention fosters increased cohesion, empowers local leadership, and improves quality of life.

The Quality of Life sub-index shows some of the lowest scores and is trending downward in a fighting-season pattern. It is also notable that satisfaction scores – both for local leaders and district governors – appear at the bottom of the range of sub-index scores in Figure 11.27. Changes in levels of satisfaction are closely linked to changes in quality of life. The low scores and downtrend in quality of life are the best explanation for why satisfaction scores lag behind performance scores. Finally, Provincial Government Performance scores at the bottom of the range of sub-indices. The low scores on this indicator are best explained by the relative remoteness of the provincial level of government from the everyday lives of rural Afghans. The electoral uncertainty that unfolded during data collection for Wave 4 also affected provincial councils, which may account for the drop in Wave 4 scores.

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XII. IMPACT EVALUATION

Introduction

MISTI was designed not only to measure changes and trends in stability, but also to implement impact evaluations of stabilization projects. USAID's Automated Directives System (ADS) Chapter 203.3.1.1 defines impact evaluation as follows:

> *Impact evaluations measure the change in a development outcome that is attributable to a defined intervention. Impact evaluations are based on models of cause and effect and require a credible and rigorously defined counterfactual to control for factors other than the intervention that might account for the observed change.*

The impact evaluation findings described in this chapter fully meet the ADS standard. The evaluation found that the interventions undertaken by the SIKA and CCI programs have stabilizing effects in the villages and districts where they took place. These findings suggest that USAID stabilization programming is achieving its intended effects.

The MISTI impact evaluation tested the validity of the causal model, or theory of change that informs the stabilization programming implemented by SIKA and CCI. This stabilization theory of change states that stability will increase when local sources of instability are first identified, and then addressed by targeted activities. Thus, stabilization programming aims to increase stability by first identifying causes, or "sources" of instability (SOIs) in a local area, and then implementing project activities that are targeted to mitigate or counteract these SOIs. Separate performance evaluations of SIKA and CCI have examined how the implementers identify SOIs and undertake activities to counteract them. In contrast, the impact evaluation described here tested whether or not stability, as perceived by local beneficiaries, increased as a result of SIKA and CCI activities.

Impacts were measured over six-month and a one-year time periods by collecting survey data in villages before and after a project activity was implemented. The evaluation found that stabilization programming caused an average gain in stability of 3.4 – 6.9 percentage points across all villages where stabilization activities took place. These impacts on Stability Index scores were also observed on several of its component sub-indices, including Quality of Life, Government Capacity, Provincial Government Performance, District Government Performance, Local Governance, and the performance of Community Development Councils (CDCs) and District Development Assemblies (DDAs).

The two graphs shown in Figure 12.1 visualize the impact of stabilization programming on the Provincial Government Performance component of the Stability Index. The graphs plot the change in average Provincial Government Performance scores for the "treatment" group of villages that received a stabilization project activity, and a "control" group that did not receive an activity, over the six months and one year time periods between Waves 2-4 and 3-4. The impact of stabilization interventions is represented by the difference between the (red) line for the treatment group relative to the (blue) line for the counterfactual control group. The distance between the endpoints of the two lines is equal to the difference between the change in the two scores – the difference in differences (or mean difference).

Wave 3-4 (Six months, Fall/Winter 2013 – Spring/Summer 2014) (Graph 1)



Wave 2-4 (One year, Spring/Summer 2013 – Spring/Summer 2014) (Graph 2)



Figure 12.1: Change in Provincial Government Performance, Six Months and One Year

The graphs in Figure 12.1 also show the "percent gain" represented by the change caused by treatment as a percentage of the baseline Provincial Government Peformance score of the treatment group. The "p-value" shows the statistical significance of the mean difference; smaller p-values indicate higher levels of confidence that the impact estimate is significantly different from zero. Both of the graphs in Figure 12.1 show that stabilization interventions had positive impacts of approximately equal size on the Provincial Government Performance indicator in Waves 2-4 and 3-4, with confidence levels greater than 99%. Nevertheless, the absolute changes in the treatment and control group trend lines are congruent with the overall trends described in the stability trends chapter above – upward from Waves 2-4 but downward from Waves 3-4. As a result of the impact of stability programming, the uptrend in Waves 2-4

was greater, and the downtrend in Waves 3-4 was lesser in the treatment group relative to the counterfactual control group.

The graphs should be understood in the context of the "fighting season" in Afghanistan when higher rates of violence influence perceptions of stability (see the discussion of seasonality in the Stability Trends Chapter). Graph 1 shows the change in Provincial Government Performance in villages over the six month between Waves 3 when data was collected during the relatively peaceful "off season" (Fall/Winter 2013), and Wave 4 when data was collected during the violence of the fighting season (Spring/Summer 2014). At Wave 3 the average stability scores of the treatment and control groups are nearly the same. By Wave 4 the average stability score has declined more in the control group than the treatment group. The lesser decrease in provincial government performance in the treatment group compared to the control group is a positive impact. It shows that in a generally worsening environment marked by high levels of violence and uncertainty surrounding the presidential election, the population in areas where stabilization activities took place perceived their provincial government as more capable of maintaining stability compared to the population that was unserved by stabilization programming.

The one-year measurement in Figure 12.1 (Graph 2) is not influenced by seasonality because both survey waves were implemented during the fighting season (Spring/Summer 2013 and 2014). The upward slopes of both the treatment and control lines in Waves 2-4 show that stability improved overall, but the increase was greater among treatment villages, while control villages saw only a slight improvement. This positive impact on stability over the 2013 to 2014 fighting seasons shows that stabilization programming is achieving its objectives, particularly surrounding improvements in sub-national government capacity.

The six-month impacts on Stability, Government Capacity, and Provincial Government Performance were sustained in the one-year measurement. Different results were however observed on the local governance indicators that form the second sub-component of the Stability Index. The six-month impacts on Local Governance and DDA-CDC Performance dissipated after one year. Further, the six-month impact on DDA-CDC Performance was driven by a positive change in perceptions of CDCs, most likely because these village organizations were credited with securing a new project. After one year however the effect went into reverse – project activities caused negative impact on perceived CDC Performance after one year. This negative impact on indicators of Local Governance is a matter of concern together with the negative impacts of activities on Social Capital (an indicator of ability to work together to solve internal and external problems). A small, statistically insignificant, but still negative change on the Social Capital sub-index after six months became a significant negative impact after one year. This negative impact on Social Capital is of similar magnitude to the positive impact on Stability. These negative findings may indicate that project interventions create new challenges that communities struggle to overcome using their existing capacities for local governance and problem solving.

Notably, a negative change in District Government Satisfaction (perceived fairness, honesty, and understanding of local problems) over the six-month impact measurement became a positive impact in the one-year measurement. Gains in formal government capacity stand in contrast to negative findings on Local Governance and Social Capital over the one-year timeframe. This suggests that the effort to

build synergy between local informal governance institutions and formal government institutions should remain a key priority for sub-national governance and stability programming.

Finally, a small and statistically insignificant gain in Quality of Life after six months became a positive impact after one year. This finding suggests that stabilization activities have effects that mature over time into durable improvements in rural life. These results on Government Capacity and Quality of Life sustained positive impacts on Stability, despite the worsening of Local Governance indicators after six months.

The remaining sections in this chapter describe in more detail the impact evaluation methodology, data, indicators, and findings. The focus of the analysis is on the causal effects of stabilization programming measured from pre-intervention data from Survey Wave 3 (Fall/Winter 2013), to post-intervention measurements taken in Survey Wave 4 (Spring/Summer 2014). In addition to this six-month impact measurement, stabilization impacts are also evaluated over a one-year period from Survey Wave 2 to Survey Wave 4 (Spring/Summer 2013-2014). These findings on the overall impacts of stabilization programming are then disaggregated to examine the impacts of SIKA and CCI activities separately. Different impacts between projects are a key question in USAID's learning agenda for stability programming. Other learning agenda questions addressed in the chapter include the effect of stabilization programming on public service delivery, the relationship between the number of activities implemented in an area and the size of the resulting impact, and the key drivers of perceived stability. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the remaining elements of the evaluation research agenda that will be addressed in the upcoming MISTI Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey Wave 5 Report.

Evaluation Methodology

Statistical modeling was used to control for factors other than the intervention that might account for the observed change. The analysis used data from villages in the areas where stabilization programs are implementing activities, including data from the MISTI Survey and other sources. The counterfactual case of what would have happened with no intervention – the control group – was identified among the surveyed villages where SIKA or CCI activities did not take place. The control group consisted of villages with key characteristics that matched those of villages where SIKA and CCI activities did take place – the treatment group. As described in further detail below, a leading-edge statistical technique called "coarsened exact matching" was used to determine the best matches between treatment and control villages. Treatment and control villages were excluded from the impact evaluation where no match could be identified. These procedures ensured that a credible and rigorously defined counterfactual was used to establish the cause and effect relationship from a project activity to a change in stability or resilience indicator scores.

Matching villages in the control group with those in the treatment group is a quasi-experimental design for impact evaluation. Quasi-experimental matching techniques are able to control only for "observed" variables for which measurements have been taken. In contrast, a fully experimental design involving random selection of both treatment and control villages would have also controlled for "unobserved" variables for which no measurements are available. Such a randomized control trial was however not

viable or appropriate for MISTI because random assignment to treatment is contrary to stabilization programming theory and practice, which requires purposeful selection of villages for activities that are targeted to counteract local SOIs. Therefore, the best option was a quasi-experimental impact evaluation with flexibility for building the counterfactual case by matching control villages with the treatment villages selected by SIKA and CCI.

After identifying comparable sets of treatment and control villages, MISTI used the "difference in differences" (DID) design to estimate the impact of stabilization activities. DID is a common method for evaluating impact by measuring the change caused by an intervention over time in the treatment group, relative to the control group. The first step was surveying all villages to record baseline scores for stability indicators before project activities took place. Then, SIKA and CCI implemented activities in the treatment group of villages, but not the control group. Next, all villages were re-surveyed to obtain updated scores for the same stability indicators measured at the baseline. Then the baseline scores were subtracted from the more recent scores to yield change scores for the control and treatment groups. Finally, the control group change score was subtracted from treatment group change score to yield the gain in stability resulting from treatment. This process is summarized as follows:

$$DID = Treatment_{0,1}*(Endline - Baseline) – Control_{0,1}*(Endline - Baseline)$$

Where the change score is equal to the Endline minus the Baseline score, and $Treatment_{0,1}$ and $Control_{0,1}$ indicate the group of villages for which each change score is calculated. The change score for each group is the first set of differences. The effect of the SIKA or CCI activity is the difference between the treatment and control change scores (the difference in differences). The DID approach has the advantage of eliminating observed or unobserved biases that remain fixed over time - for example the influence of ongoing trends or seasonality (see Chapter 10 on Stability Trends). However, the validity of the DID estimator rests on the strong assumption that both treatment and control groups exhibit the same trends over time. Similarly, the validity of extracting statistical matches between treatment and control rests on the assumption that such matching removes unobserved heterogeneity that is related to treatment, in addition to balancing on observed characteristics.

Data and Sampling

Survey Wave 4 included a total of 37,399 individual interviews in 2,371 villages in 100 districts. Sixteen individuals were interviewed in each village. These 16 individual answers to each survey question were averaged together to yield the village-level dataset that was used to quantify the impact of stabilization activities implemented prior to the Wave 4 Survey. A total of 484 villages surveyed in Wave 4 were part of the treatment group in which at least one stabilization activity took place.

Village status	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4
Treatment	13	136	299	484
Control	2,213	2,237	2,261	1,887
Total	2,226	2,373	2,560	2,371

Table 12.1 Surveyed villages across all waves, cumulative

Table 12.1 displays the total number of villages surveyed in each wave, and how many were part of the treatment and control groups. It is important to note that not every village and district was re-surveyed in each Survey Wave. The selection of villages surveyed in each wave was subject to programming decisions made by the SIKA, CCI, and KFZ programs. The substitution of different villages from wave to wave has resulted in different sets of eligible villages for the impact evaluation, depending on which survey waves provide the indicator data for each village before and after an intervention. For example, Wave 3 to Wave 4 treatment group includes only 125 villages that were surveyed in Wave 3, then received a project activity, and then were resurveyed in Wave 4. The Waves 3-4 control group that did not receive activities includes 1,375 villages, for a total sample of 1,500 villages eligible for impact evaluation across Waves 3-4. Similarly, a total of 1,097 villages were surveyed in both Waves 2 and 4, including 933 villages in the control group, and 164 villages in the treatment group. The map in Figure 12.2 shows the number of treated villages surveyed by district in Wave 4.



Figure 12.2: Number of Treated Villages Surveyed by District

Indicators

The indicators used to score the surveyed villages, and quantify the impact of interventions, are the same indicators described in Tables 10.2 and 10.3 in the stability trends chapter. The one major difference is that the indicator of overall stability used in the impact evaluation includes only survey data, while the indicator used to measure overall stability trends at the district level includes 75 percent survey data and 25 percent observational data on violence and accessibility.

As detailed above, the indices of stability and resilience, and their component sub-indices, are made up of various survey questions that all measure the same underlying phenomena. The set of survey questions that compose each indicator was identified using a factor analysis of correlations between the survey data, as described in the Stability Trends Chapter. The impact indicators are grouped into three levels of measurement shown in Table 12.2.

Impact indicator
1. Stability
1.1 Government Capacity
1.1.1 Provincial Government Performance
1.1.2 District Government Performance
1.1.3 District Government Satisfaction
1.2 Local Governance
1.2.1 DDA-CDC Performance
1.2.2 Local Leaders' Performance
1.3 Quality of Life
2 Resilience
2.1 Community Cohesion
2.1.1 Social Capital
2.1.2 Local Leader Satisfaction

Table 12.2 Stability and Resilience Indicators

Each indicator listed in Table 12.2 was used as a separate measure of impact. At the highest level, the Stability and Resilience indicators are composites of the lower-level indicators. The level-two indicators -- Quality of Life, Government Capacity, Local Governance, and Community Cohesion -- are composites of the seven level-three indicators. The Stability Index is calculated by taking the simple average of five level-three indicators – Provincial Government Performance, District Government Performance, District Government Satisfaction, DDA-CDC Performance, and Local Leaders' Performance, plus the Quality of Life indicator. The Resilience Index is the simple average of Social Capital and Local Leader Satisfaction plus Quality of Life, DDA-CDC Performance and Local Leaders' Performance.

Thus, both the Stability and Resilience Indices include Quality of Life and Local Governance, but Government Capacity is not part of the Resilience Index, and Community Cohesion is not part of the

Stability Index. Other impact metrics include variants of the Stability and Resilience Indices – "Stability2" and "Resilience2" – that do not include DDA-CDC performance and Social Capital because their inclusion restricts the sample only to villages where survey respondents recognized the existence of a DDA or CDC, or respondents said that village life was disrupted by problems that required resolution by the community. The larger sample sizes afforded by the Stability2 and Resilience2 indicators provide more robust measures of impact.

Collectively the indicators in Table 12.2 capture change over time in 30 different survey questions. Compared to using single survey questions that are relatively susceptible to capriciousness, such summary indicators use triangulation across related survey questions to create confidence that observed changes are reflected in a wider set of survey data. The use of summary indicators may however obscure heterogeneity among the survey questions used to make up each indicator. Further research might obtain useful insights into the drivers of observed impacts by disaggregating the summary indicators into their component survey questions.

Matching Villages to Construct the Counterfactual

Constructing the counterfactual case requires finding a control village that matches each treatment village on a set of baseline characteristics. Most crucially, control and treatment villages must have the same, or nearly the same pre-treatment score on the impact indicator being evaluated. Close parallels between treatment and control villages on other key indicators are also important; ideally the treatment and control groups will show no significant differences on any variables. Whether the treatment and comparison groups are sufficiently alike is investigated empirically based on observable characteristics. Annex A presents the differences between mean values of the treatment and control groups for Waves 3-4 based on village characteristics and pre-treatment values of the impact indicators.

The treatment-control villages are nearly identical on many measures, but also show evidence of substantive differences on characteristics such as urban/rural location, socio-economic status, and frequency of violent incidents. Villages that received USAID programming have higher levels of violent crime, higher ANA and ANP presence, and lower presence of local militias. These measures of local presence are consistent with survey interviewers' observations that local militias and Taliban are more present in control villages, and also that control villages are more situated among areas without any armed actors. Treatment villages report higher income, education, and literacy levels, but also higher perceptions of corruption. Also, treatment villages are slightly higher in elevation, significantly closer to district centers, tend to identify more with religion as opposed to nationality or ethnicity, and experience higher rates of violence. Among the survey items that make up the impact indicators, treatment villages have a higher regard for the Afghan government, lower perception of government service provision, and report working together with other villages to solve local problems more often than control villages.



Figure 12.3: Pre-treatment (Wave 3) Balance of Treatment and Control Groups

Figure 12.3 highlights key differences between the treatment and control groups, expressed in standardized units. Any standardized difference exceeding 0.05 is a potential threat to the comparability of the treatment and control groups, while differences exceeding 0.1 should be considered definite threats to validity if the pre-treatment characteristic is related to an impact indicator being tested. In such cases matching should be used to build equivalence between the treatment and control groups, if necessary by excluding treatment and control villages from the sample for which no good match exists. Effective matching will reduce the imbalance between the groups to acceptable levels, and thereby enable the generation of unbiased impact estimates.

In Figure 12.3 bars that extend to the right on the positive side of the zero line indicate that the treatment group is higher on a given measure than the control group. Negative differences indicate that the control villages are higher on a given measure than treatment villages. Thus, treatment villages are higher than control villages on most measures. Control villages, on the other hand, are considerably further from their district centers than treatment villages – by 4.2 kilometers on average. Villages in the control group have relatively more local militia (*arbaki*) presence, or do not have any armed actors present.

In order to identify comparable groups of treatment and control villages, MISTI applied the Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) routine in the STATA statistical package.[108] It was however impractical to

[108] See the CEM website for further details of this causal effects estimation strategy.

eliminate certain imbalances because doing so caused the exclusion of too many unmatched villages from the sample to allow enough statistical power for testing impact.[109] For example, matching on corruption perceptions significantly helped balance treatment and control villages, but overly restricts sample sizes in the process. In other cases, similarity between conditioning variables prevents their inclusion together in creating balanced data (for example, levels of prior violence and levels of local control by armed actors). In one instance (distance to district center), the matching severely restricts sample size without providing any improvement in balancing. Figure 4 shows the results of statistical matching to achieve balance on key characteristics of the treatment and control groups. In most cases matching created more balance. In other cases there was no effect on balance, or the direction of the imbalance changed.

Figure 12.4 shows that balancing treatment and control villages succeeded in balancing on socio-economic characteristics, ANA presence, and the absence of armed actors. Distance to district center, how Afghans regarded their government, and ANP presence remained unbalanced, while the balance on presence of local militias, market prices, level of ANA/ANP control, and corruption perceptions worsened. Presence of government security forces should be considered the most important areas of improvement for further impact modeling because of its connection with impact metrics such as government capacity, performance, and satisfaction.

The effort to balance certain treatment and control group characteristics created a tradeoff between increasing balance and maintaining sufficient sample sizes. This resulted occasionally in too much attrition of treatment villages for significant statistical power to estimate impact. See Annex B for a review of different models of matching variables and their effects on sample size, balance between treatment and control, and the impact measure of stability.

[109] In more technical terminology, some imbalances do not share a sufficient degree of common support (overlap between groups) to enable comparison. Balancing the treatment and control groups for such variables is possible, but reduces the sample size of villages so much that useful impact measurements are not considered feasible.



Figure 12.4: Pre-treatment (Wave 3) Treatment and Control Balance Before and After Matching

The impact findings reported below used matching to reduce threats to the validity of the impact estimates while maintaining a sufficient sample size for statistical power. The treatment and control villages are matched on elevation, population, proportion Pashtun, and level of past violence. One other key variable, whether or not the village received NSP in the past, was not included in the matching because both treatment and control villages were equally likely to have received NSP.

Matching on this set of characteristics does not remove all known threats to the validity of the estimates, but does represent the most rigorous balance with a sufficient sample size. Furthermore, the entire range of balancing models across all known potential validity threats resulted in similar estimates ranging from three to seven percent increases in stability. This consistency across balancing models offers reassurance that the base model results highlighted here are robust to all known threats to validity.

Findings

Waves 3-4 Findings

After using CEM to construct the counterfactual by matching control group villages with equivalent treated ones, regression analysis was used to estimate the difference-in-differences, or net-difference between the Wave 3 and Wave 4 indicator scores for the treatment and control groups. To estimate program impact on each indicator, the Wave 3 to Wave 4 treatment group was drawn from 125 eligible villages that received project activities after the Wave 3 survey, and matched to 1,375 potential control villages that did not receive activities.

The statistic used to estimate of the treatment effect (program impact) is more technically termed the Sample Average Effect on the Treated (SATT). After matching, regression analysis was used to calculate the SATT for each indicator and test whether it is significantly greater or less than zero.[110] Statistically significant impacts (SATTs) are marked in boldface type, and starred in the first column in Table 11.3.

The second column lists the net difference between the treatment and control group change scores (the SATT). The percent gain in the third column shows the net difference as a percentage of the average pre-treatment (Wave 3) value for villages in the treatment group. The fourth column estimates the probability of replicating such a result in a new experiment simply by chance.[111] Therefore, low *p*-values (less than 0.1) indicate that the observed result may be interpreted as a genuine finding. The final column indicates the total number of villages in the treatment and control groups after matching for each indicator.

Stabilization programming had significant impacts on Stability, Government Capacity, District Government Performance, Provincial Government Performance, Local Governance, and DDA-CDC Performance. Quality of Life and Resilience show small gains that are not statistically significant. District Government Satisfaction, Local Leader Performance, Community Cohesion, Social Capital, and Local Leader Satisfaction show small decreases that are also not statistically significant.

The positive impacts on overall stability and the government indicators show that stabilization programming is effectively addressing instability created by poor government performance. The positive impacts on local governance indicators, including DDA-CDC performance, signal that stabilization programming is working effectively with local governance institutions to address sources of instability.

Impact indicator	Net difference (1-5)	Percent gain	*p*-value	Sample (Treated / Control)
1. Stability2* **	**0.152**	**4.3%**	**.003**	**409 (87/323)**
1.1 Government capacity***	0.183	5.4%	.003	368 (86/282)
1.1.1 District government performance***	0.188	5.3%	.008	381 (87/294)
1.1.2 District government satisfaction	-0.063	-1.9%	.514	364 (80/284)
1.1.3 Provincial government performance***	0.225	6.7%	.003	362 (87/275)
1.2 Local governance**	0.117	3.1%	.047	356 (88/268)
1.2.1 DDA-CDC performance*	0.128	3.5%	.082	341 (82/259)
1.2.2 Local leader performance	0.060	1.5%	.394	351 (84/267)
1.3 Quality of life	0.055	1.6%	.287	390 (89/301)

[110] See the full explanation of the methodology and tools by Blackwell et al., "cem: Coarsened Exact Matching in Stata" online: http://gking.harvard.edu/files/abs/cemStata-abs.shtml

[111] Strictly speaking, the estimate is based on the presumption that the observed result is in fact due to random error.

Impact indicator	Net difference (1-5)	Percent gain	*p*-value	Sample (Treated / Control)
2 Resilience2	**0.024**	**0.7%**	**.578**	**421 (86/335)**
2.1 Community cohesion	-0.049	-1.4%	.490	236 (55/181)
2.2 Social capital	-0.078	-2.2%	.394	272 (58/214)
2.3 Local leader satisfaction	0.057	1.6%	.285	422 (86/336)

* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%

Table 12.3: Wave 3-4 Impact measures, Base Model

The impacts reported in Table 12.3 are robust to alternative specifications – see Annex B. Across multiple combinations of matching variables, treatment effect estimates for stability range from 3.4 – 6.9 percent, with most estimates reaching conventional levels of statistical significance.

Waves 2-4 Findings

The Waves 3-4 impacts (Table 12.3) cover a six-month timeframe (roughly December 2013 – May 2014). The following table (Table 12.4) presents summary results of MISTI impacts from Wave 2-4 covering a twelve-month time frame (roughly June 2013 – May 2014). The Waves 2-4 sample consists of 164 villages that received project activities, and are thus eligible for inclusion in the treatment group for testing program impacts on each indicator, together with a pool of 933 potential control villages. There is a large degree of overlap between the Waves 2-3 and Waves 3-4 villages – 73 percent of villages surveyed in Wave 2 were surveyed again in Waves 3 and 4.

The program impacts found in Waves 2-4 show significant similarities and differences with the Waves 3-4 impacts reported above. The impact on Stability is significant in both the six-month and one-year timeframes, though the effect size decreases slightly from 4.3 percent over six months to 3.1 percent over one year.

The impact of stabilization programming on Government Capacity shows a decrease from 5.4 percent in Waves 3-4, to 4.4 percent in Waves 2-4. Positive impacts of 5.3 percent were observed on District Government Performance in both the Waves 2-4 and 3-4 measurements. Similarly, stabilization programming had a positive impact on Provincial Government Performance of 6.7 percent over the baseline that was consistent across the six-month and yearlong measurement. These impacts are particularly noteworthy because they demonstrate that stabilization programming is meeting key objectives for increasing the capacity of sub-national government institutions.

Further considering impacts over the two time series, the District Government Satisfaction indicator is an important component of Government Capacity, which is the largest sub-component of the stability index. While the effect of stabilization programming on this indicator was not statistically significant in either Waves 3-4 or 2-4, there was a noteworthy shift in the direction of the effect from negative to positive. Further, the change comes from a very low pre-treatment level in Wave 2. Very low levels of satisfaction with district governments are pervasive across Afghanistan because of poor government

services and pervasive corruption (see the discussion of this indicator in the Stability Trends Chapter). The satisfaction indicator includes perceived honesty, fairness, understanding of local problems, as well as other reputational qualities that are hard-won by Afghan politicians, and less easily influenced by short-term project activities. The gain in District Government Satisfaction is an important indication that stabilization programming is having a lasting impact on addressing instability by assisting district government officials and institutions to increase their legitimacy.

Impact indicator	Net difference (1-5)	Percent gain	*p*-value	Sample (Treated / Control)
1. Stability2**	**0.102**	**3.1%**	**.031**	**441 (122/319)**
1.1 Government capacity**	0.143	4.4%	.023	436 (114/322)
1.1.1 District government performance***	0.181	5.3%	.005	415 (114/301)
1.1.2 District government satisfaction	0.021	0.6%	.277	364 (110/254)
1.1.3 Provincial government performance***	0.211	6.7%	.004	422 (116/306)
1.2 Local governance	0.043	1.2%	.537	301 (98/203)
1.2.1 DDA-CDC performance	0.001	0.0%	.986	332 (96/236)
1.2.2 Local leader performance	0.004	0.1%	.945	402 (114/288)
1.3 Quality of life***	0.128	3.9%	.008	483 (130/353)
2. Resilience2	**0.052**	**1.5%**	**.161**	**471 (127/344)**
2.1 Community cohesion	-0.103	-2.9%	.126	251 (76/175)
2.1.1 Social capital*	-0.131	-3.7%	.094	258 (79/179)
2.1.2 Local leader satisfaction	0.032	0.9%	.460	461 (124/338)

* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%

Table 12.4: Wave 2-4 Impacts

The impacts on Local Governance and DDA-CDC Performance that were identified in the data from Waves 3-4 (see Table 11.3) were insignificant over the year between Waves 2 and 4. Further, the Waves 3-4 gain in DDA-CDC performance was driven by positive impact on CDC Performance (indicator not shown in Tables 12.3 and 12.4), and the reversal in Waves 2-4 was driven by negative impacts on CDC performance. The analysis identified an additional negative impact on Social Capital in Waves 2-4. The lack of impact on Local Governance beyond the six-month measure, and the longer-term negative impact on Social Capital and CDC Performance, suggests that stabilization programming interventions may create new challenges with which traditional forms of local governance and community cooperation struggle to cope. CDCs may require more sustained support and capacity building to encourage the formation of new types of social capital within and between villages, and between village governance and formal government. These findings deserve additional exploration using the larger treatment group samples that will be achieved in Wave 5.

Social Capital is related to Local Governance under the Resilience Index. Resilience showed a small gain over Waves 2-4 that is statistically insignificant, but nevertheless larger than the gain observed in Waves

3-4. The change in Resilience was driven by program impact on Quality of Life, which forms part of both the Resilience and Stability Indices. Likewise, the gain in Stability was driven by program impact on Quality of Life as well as Government Capacity. The gain in Quality of Life (4.2 percent) in Waves 2-4 shows that short-term stabilization impacts over six months mature over one year into more durable improvements in life satisfaction, ability to meet basic needs, and future outlook, among the other factors that compose the Quality of Life Sub-Index (see Table 2 in the Stability Trends Chapter).

The MISTI Learning Agenda

The Performance Management Plan for the USAID/Afghanistan Stabilization Unit established an initial set of questions to be answered through analysis of the MISTI data to inform program planning and performance. This section reviews a selection of those questions, as well as other learning questions that have developed over the course of MISTI.

Does SIKA and CCI programming have different stabilization impacts?

Yes.

SIKA works with the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, which focuses on a participatory process between citizens, citizen committees, and district government actors organized into CDCs and DDAs. SIKA funds are targeted to address local sources of instability in coordination with district and provincial government institutions through the CDCs and DDAs. CCI, meanwhile, has no official government partner, but works with government entities at the district level where cooperation is necessary to address local sources of instability. CCI follows a community development process that places more emphasis on identifying local sources of resilience, which may include traditional governance actors and government officials, and assisting these actors to solve local problems. Compared to SIKA, CCI implemented activities in Waves 3-4 in areas with lower elevations, more security, lower perceptions of corruption, more freedom of movement, less education, and fewer NSP projects.

The comparison table below shows a summary of the findings from separate evaluations of SIKA and CCI impacts over Waves 3-4. There are a total of 85 eligible treatment villages in the sample where one of the regional SIKA projects implemented at least one activity after the pre-treatment survey in Wave 3, and before being surveyed again in Wave 4. There are 28 such villages in the CCI sample. The control group is drawn from the same pool of 1,375 villages that did not receive stabilization activities over Waves 3-4, as in the evaluation of stabilization programming as a whole reported in Table 11.3 above (which also includes 12 activities implemented by the KFZ project). Thus, villages that received SIKA activities are excluded from the CCI evaluation, and villages treated by CCI are excluded from the SIKA evaluation. However the sample is not segmented by area, which allows control villages in SIKA districts to be matched with treated villages in CCI districts, and vice versa. The same methodology described above for the evaluation of stability programming as a whole was used to measure project impacts on the sub-samples of SIKA and CCI treatment villages. The Waves 3-4 findings are displayed in Table 12.5.

With only 28 villages in the CCI sample, only large CCI effects are statistically significant. The different sample sizes account for the fact that the 6.3 percent gain in Stability from CCI activities is not

statistically significant despite being larger than the 3.5 percent gain from SIKA activities. Similarly, the 5.6 pecent gain in Government Capacity that resulted from SIKA interventions is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, while the 7.1 percent gain from CCI is significant only at the 10 percent level. The findings show that both SIKA and CCI contribute to the overall stabilization programming impacts on Stability, Government Capacity, District Government Performance, and Provincial Government Performance. While neither effect was statisiticlly significant, it is noteworthy that CCI's effect on District Government Satisfaction was positive, while SIKA's was negative. This satisfaction indicator includes perceptions of honesty, fairness and understanding local problems, which suggests that CCI may be more successful than SIKA at increasing the legitimacy of district government officials. Stabilization programming impacts on DDA-CDC Performance over Waves 3-4 are largely driven by CCI, given the 14.3 percent gain on this indicator caused by CCI activities. The small size of the CCI sub-sample, and differences between villages where activities took place, however invalidates broad generalizations about the effectiveness of CCI activities compared to SIKA ones.

Impact indicator, W3-4	SIKA	CCI
1. Stability2	**3.5%****	**6.3%***
1.1 Government Capacity	5.6%***	7.1%*
1.1.1 District Government Performance	4.9%**	6.1%
1.1.2 District Government Satisfaction	-2.1%	6.4%
1.1.3 Provincial Government Performance	6.4%**	8.9%*
1.2 Local Governance	3.1%*	3.9%
1.2.1 DDA-CDC Performance	1%	12.9%***
1.2.2 Local Leader Performance	1.8%	2.2%
1.3 Quality of Life	-0.3%	2.5%
2. Resilience2	**0.7%**	**2.5%**
2.1 Community Cohesion	-1%	-1.5%
2.1.1 Social Capital	-3.4%	-8.5%**
2.1.2 Local Leader Satisfaction	2.2%	0.7%

* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%

Table 12.5: Differences in impacts across SIKA and CCI programs, Wave 3-4

Both SIKA and CCI villages show a negative treatment effect on Social Capital. For SIKA villages this effect is not statistically different from zero, much like the effect on Social Capital reported in Table 12.3. The -8.5 percent effect of CCI activities on Social Capital is statistically significant, and stands in stark contrast to the 12.9 percent gain on the DDA-CDC indicator. The Social Capital finding is based on a very small sample of six treated villages and therefore cannot be generalized outside of this group of six. Nevertheless the findings suggest that outside intervention by CCI may disrupt more tradition forms of local problem solving, or elevate new methods of local problem solving through DDAs and CDCs.

Finally, it is important to note that results across SIKA and CCI projects are not directly comparable because the characteristics of treatment villages differed significantly on several measures. For this

reason, the findings reported in this report do not provide grounds for evaluating the effectiveness of one project methodology versus the other.

Annex C displays the complete set of MISTI outcomes across programs with more detailed information on the impact findings from Waves 3-4 and 2-4.

Do stabilization impacts increase with the number of projects implemented in a community?

Preliminary findings suggest a qualified yes.

There is no relationship between number of activities implemented, either hard or soft, and the Stability Index scores. However, if we cross-reference the number of activities implemented in SIKA and CCI villages against their most impactful measures (Provincial performance and DDA-CDC performance, respectively), we do see a weakly positive relationship between the number of hard activities and stronger impacts. This relationship is not statistically significant for SIKA, but reaches significance at a level of 10% for CCI.

Impact indicator	Projects (0-9)	SIKA (0-1)	CDC (0-1)	Variance explained
1. Stability	**1.2 – 11.2%**	**-1%**	**2.1%**	**.395**
1.1 Government Capacity	1.6 – 14.3%	-1%	+3%	.321
1.1.1 District Government Performance	1 - 8.1%	-0.6%	+2.6%	.252
1.1.2 District Government Satisfaction	2 - 18%	0%	+4.1%	.257
1.1.3 Provincial Government Performance	1.4 – 12.8%	-1%	+1.5%	.157
1.2 Local Governance	1 – 7.7%	+1%	+1%	.149
1.2.1 DDA-CDC Performance	1 – 6.6%	+1.7%	-1.4%	.131
1.2.2 Local Leaders Performance	1.1 – 9.8%	-1.4%	+3.7%	.094
1.3 Quality of Life	1 - 8%	-2%	+1.3%	.539
2. Resilience	**1 – 7.9%**	**0%**	**+1.7%**	**.300**
2.1 Community Cohesion	1 – 7.6%	0%	+2.6%	.082
2.1.1 Social Capital	1 – 6.3%	0%	+1.5%	.042
2.1.2 Local Leader Satisfaction	1 – 8.9%	0%	+3.6%	.075

Table 12.6: Awareness of Development Projects and MISTI impacts, all waves

On a more general level that does not seek attribution of effects to USAID programming, there is a clear relationship between awareness of development projects and stability. Table 12.6 shows the range of effects that awareness of projects has on MISTI outcomes based on how many projects (from zero to nine) a respondent reported being aware of. All of the results reported above reach conventional levels of significance.

Note that while attempts to attribute the extent of programming to USAID initiatives used objective data from USAID implementing partners, the table above depends only on respondent awareness of development projects. Almost certainly there are dynamics inherent to awareness that go beyond the mere existence of USAID projects. As a corollary, using awareness as a proxy

for the actual existence of development programming suggests that estimates generated from awareness indicate what dividends a donor could expect if its programming were fully communicated to beneficiaries.

Does USAID stabilization programming improve perceptions of public service delivery?
Preliminary findings suggest a qualified yes.

Neither Wave 3-4 nor Wave 2-4 impact measures show any increase in perceptions of GIRoA service delivery, or awareness of development projects.[112] However, continuing the analysis in the previous learning agenda question, the number of development projects of which an Afghan was aware shows a clear linear relationship with perceptions of GIRoA service delivery.



Figure 12.7: Perception of GIRoA Service Delivery by Awareness of Development Projects

Afghans who report being aware of a development project in their community, regardless of benefactor, report a 6.3 percent higher perception of government service delivery. Among Afghans who report being aware of multiple development projects in their community, governance measures increase as much as 18 percent. These effects are robust to a set of control variables such as security, local force presence, corruption perceptions, and quality of life. What helps determine whether an Afghan is aware of development projects? The following graph shows the strength of various predictors for awareness.

[112] The Wave 3 Analytical Report, on the other hand, did document a modest increase in perception of GIRoA service delivery using Wave 1-3 measures.



Figure 12.8: Determinants of Awareness of Development Projects

In the above chart, the marginal effects of each predictor is measured in standard deviation units, with values exceeding 0.1 representing substantive significance. Security, the general standing of the Afghan government, and quality of life are the strongest predictors of whether an Afghan will be aware of development programming in his or her community. A SIKA district is also a strong predictor of awareness.

What are the determinants of stability?

Predictive modeling provides a set of preliminary answers that will be explored further in the Wave 5 report.

The MISTI Stability Index includes a range of impact indicators, such as government performance, quality of life, and satisfaction with local leaders. The impact evaluation identified significant causal effects of project activities on changes in the Stability and Resilience Index scores, and their component sub-indices, as reported in Tables 12.3, 12.4, and 12.5. The impact evaluation was accomplished by matching villages on key characteristics such as incidence of violence, freedom of movement, and which actors exert control over a given village.

Outside of the impact evaluation framework, statistical analysis is useful for identifying which factors are the strongest determinants of changes in stability reported by individual survey respondents. Regression analysis was used to determine which local characteristics and individual perceptions make a survey respondent more likely to report improved stability. Figure 12.11 illustrates the strongest determinants

of stability identified using a regression analysis of survey indicators that are not components of the Stability Index.



Figure 12.9: Determinants of Stability

Perception of government service delivery and whether district government officials are originally from the district are the strongest predictors of stability, followed by the presence of Afghan army, police, and local police. Interestingly, measures of civil society are also pertinent: perceptions that it was acceptable to voice criticisms of government and membership in voluntary groups predict stability.

See Annex D for the regression output used to generate Figure 12.9.

Conclusions: Looking Forward to Wave 5

The impact evaluation in this report provides evidence supporting the validity of the theory of change underlying stabilization programming: that identifying local sources of instability and developing project activities to address them will help stabilize communities. Stabilization activities produced significant impacts on various indicators of stability and resilience over both one-year and six-month evaluation periods. Whether these statistically significant effects translate to a real-world impact that concretely improves the lives of Afghans remains an open question.

Additional survey data will be added to the analysis in Wave 5, which will increase confidence in the impact evaluation findings and allow for deeper exploration of the drivers of stabilization. Additional data will enable more robust matching to define the counterfactual using additional key characteristics, such as the presence of different security forces and armed actors. Gaining a more nuanced

understanding of what drives gains in stability requires further disaggregating the eight sub-indices into their component survey questions. This disaggregation of impacts will allow for further specification of predictive models applied to understanding the drivers of impact across different stabilization projects and geographies. These more nuanced findings will provide a wide range of recommendations for policy making.

Additional analysis is required to explain why the evaluation found only six-month impacts on Local Governance that evaporated over the one-year timeframe. Impacts on CDC Performance should be tested separately from DDA Performance to better understand how governance is operating at the village and district levels, and how perceptions of CDCs and DDAs are related to perceptions of formal government institutions. Related, unanswered questions surround the relationship between changing perceptions of Local Governance and Social Capital. Analysis of the Wave 5 data should be instrumental for understanding whether the new forms of local governance represented by CDCs and DDAs are supplanting traditional forms of village governance, and whether interventions may be having a negative impact in some cases.

Appendix A: Village Treatment / Control Balance, Waves 3-4

The following table presents the statistical balance between treatment and control villages across a range of observable characteristics. Values displayed in boldface type approach statistical and/or substantive significance. The standardized difference expresses the mean differences in standard deviation units. As a general rule, standardized differences above 0.05 should be noted as potential threats to statistical balance, while differences approaching or exceeding 0.1 are definite threats.

Measure	Treatment	Control	Difference	Standardized difference	p-value
Level of security (1-5)	3.48	3.57	-0.083	-0.039	.131
Security trend (1-5)	3.30	3.37	-0.065	-0.035	.181
Petty crime (1-3)	1.99	2.01	-0.029	-0.019	.466
Serious nonviolent crime (1-3)	1.90	1.87	0.032	0.023	.371
Serious violent crime (1-3)	1.85	1.79	0.065	0.043	.094
ANA presence (1-3)	2.31	2.18	0.136	0.069	.008
Arbaki presence (1-3)	1.79	1.93	-0.132	-0.057	.027
ANP presence (1-3)	2.46	2.34	0.124	0.081	.002
AOG presence (1-3)	1.78	1.75	0.029	0.015	.568
ALP presence (1-3)	1.94	1.94	0.005	0.003	.920
ISAF presence (1-3)	1.46	1.49	-0.027	-0.017	.522
District officials from district (0-1)	0.664	0.657	0.007	0.007	.787
Ok to criticize government (0-1)	0.516	0.510	0.006	0.007	.778
Heard of development project (0-1)	0.520	0.491	0.029	0.027	.303
Number of projects aware of (0-9)	2.04	2.09	-0.051	-0.008	.761
Corruption level (0-1)	0.84	0.81	0.034	0.043	.095
Corruption trend (1-5)	3.61	3.47	0.136	0.069	.007
Ability to get to local markets (1-5)	3.33	3.30	0.026	0.013	.607
Prices for basic goods (1-5)	3.83	3.62	0.217	0.098	.000
Belong to voluntary group (0-1)	0.190	0.175	0.015	0.023	.374
Village education level (0-13)	3.33	2.72	0.616	0.079	.002
Village literacy level (0-1)	0.356	0.304	0.052	0.064	.014
Village income level (1-11)	6.00	5.51	0.486	0.079	.002
Proportion village faced casualty (0-1)	0.234	0.224	0.010	0.014	.576
Proportion village unemployed (0-1)	0.080	0.070	0.010	0.024	.358
Village identifies with religion (0-1)	0.255	0.220	0.035	0.048	.064
Log village altitude (5-9)	7.08	6.99	0.098	0.046	.074
Log village population (1-11)	6.49	6.37	0.128	0.036	.195
Log distance to district center (4-12)	8.47	9.10	-0.629	-0.179	.000
Proportion village Pashtun (0-1)	0.711	0.671	0.040	0.026	.320

Measure	Treatment	Control	Difference	Standardized difference	p-value
NSP village (0/1)	0.670	0.665	0.005	0.018	.479
Incidents - within 1 km 30 days prior	0.13	0.13	-0.005	-0.002	.948
Incidents - within 1 km 60 days prior	0.22	0.29	-0.069	-0.012	.656
Incidents - within 1 km 90 days prior	0.34	0.47	-0.137	-0.014	.601
Incidents - within 3 km 30 days prior	0.73	0.73	-0.001	0.000	.994
Incidents - within 3 km 60 days prior	1.49	1.52	-0.031	-0.002	.933
Incidents - within 3 km 90 days prior	2.41	2.40	0.007	0.000	.990
Incidents - within 5 km 30 days prior	2.11	1.47	0.637	0.058	.024
Incidents - within 5 km 60 days prior	4.15	3.09	1.06	0.049	.057
Incidents - within 5 km 90 days prior	6.70	4.92	1.77	0.052	.046
Violence affected - 1 km 30 days prior (0-1)	0.10	0.06	0.04	0.040	.117
Local control (1-5)	2.80	2.80	0.00	0.000	.993
ISAF / GIRoA no Taliban (0-1)	0.07	0.08	-0.01	-0.013	.608
ISAF / GIRoA some Taliban (0-1)	0.32	0.20	0.12	0.094	.000
ISAF / GIRoA Taliban activity (0-1)	0.20	0.20	0.00	-0.001	.970
Taliban some ISAF / GIRoA (0-1)	0.19	0.22	-0.02	-0.019	.461
Taliban no ISAF / GIRoA (0-1)	0.11	0.11	0.00	0.002	.926
Arbaki (0-1)	0.06	0.09	-0.03	-0.033	.206
No armed actors (0-1)	0.04	0.10	-0.06	-0.059	.022
District going in right direction (1-4)	2.72	2.69	0.03	0.018	.487
GIRoA well regarded (0-1)	0.76	0.71	0.05	0.051	.049
Provision of government services (1-5)	3.21	3.35	-0.14	-0.066	.011
Life satisfaction (1-4)	2.79	2.80	-0.02	-0.011	.671
Villages work together (1-4)	2.98	2.91	0.07	0.046	.077
Stability	3.52	3.52	0.003	0.002	.939
Quality of life	3.36	3.40	-0.040	-0.022	.385
Government Capacity	3.35	3.43	-0.081	0.009	.724
Provincial performance	3.37	3.36	0.008	0.004	.885
District performance	3.57	3.58	-0.014	-0.007	.795
District satisfaction	3.37	3.33	0.040	0.013	.613
Local Governance	3.75	3.76	-0.016	-0.008	.758
DDA-CDC performance	3.64	3.68	-0.035	-0.016	.550
Local leader performance	3.90	3.86	0.043	0.022	.394
Resilience	3.64	3.63	0.011	0.008	.757
Cohesion	3.60	3.59	0.008	0.004	.889
Social capital	3.59	3.51	0.072	0.031	.285
Local leader satisfaction	3.61	3.60	0.013	0.008	.758

Appendix B: Matching variables for treatment / control villages, Waves 3-4

The following tables present the impact measure of Stability across a range of different combinations of matching variables. Model 1 represents the specification chosen as the base model that finds the most suitable tradeoffs between matching on baseline characteristics, achieving statistical balance, and maintaining sufficient sample size to enable robust estimation of the impact of USAID programming.

Model:	0	1	2	3	4
Matching variables:	**Population, elevation, % Pashtun**	**Population, elevation, % Pashtun, prior violence (media reporting)**	**Model 1 + level of local control (enumerator observation)**	**Model 2 + distance to district center**	**Model 3 + corruption trend**
Balance (Pre)	.918	.933	.96	.993	1
Balance (Post)	.722	.743	.795	.911	.269
Improvement	.196	.190	.165	.082	.731
Sample size	415 (102 / 388)	399 (100 / 372)	273 (75 / 245)	91 (77 / 35)	27 (13 / 18)
Impact estimate	0.155	0.167	0.164	0.243	0.509
Percent gain	4.4%	4.7%	4.7%	6.9%	14.5%

In the above table, Model 0 does not include prior violence, which enables the largest sample size but lacks a critical element – violence in insecure areas – necessary to estimate the effect of stability programming in kinetic areas. Model 2 includes a measure of local control – also a critical balancing characteristic, but which restricts the sample size. Note that the impact estimates with and without balancing on local control are equivalent, while Model 1 maintains a better sample size. Model 3 matches villages on distance to district center but this results in only a small improvement in the overall balance. Nevertheless, a sample of 91 total villages provides an impact estimate of .243 (6.9%). Model 4 balances on perception of corruption, which provides the best balancing characteristics at the cost of providing only 27 villages in the sample. Yet, the impact estimate for this sample is the largest at .509 (14.5%).

The next table explores additional matching variables and tests proxies for some matching variables – for example, respondent perceptions of security as a proxy for reported levels of violence, or presence of local forces as a proxy for local control.

Model:	5	6	7	8	9
Matching variables:	**Model 1 (prior violence proxied by security perceptions)**	**Model 5 + level of control (proxied by level of force presence)**	**Model 5 + distance to district center**	**Model 0 + income level**	**Model 0 + education level**
Balance (Pre)	.979	.997	1.000	.991	.990
Balance (Post)	.608	.311	.396	.748	.650
Improvement	.371	.686	.604	.243	.340
Sample size	141 (61 / 196)	42 (22 / 28)	41 (20 / 25)	115 (51 / 86)	135 (59 / 104)
Impact estimate	0.128	0.206	0.179	0.172	0.120
Percent gain	3.6%	5.9%	5.1%	4.9%	3.4%

Across all specifications, estimates for the increase in stability are positive, and most reach statistical significance.

The distributions of estimates may be shown graphically below. The size of the circle represents the village sample size ranging from 18 (violent crime) to 415 (Population, elevation, proportion Pashtun). Each keyword assigned to each circle represents the key matching variable added to the null model of population, elevation, and proportion Pashtun. The x-axis is the percent increase in stability for Waves 3-4. All but two estimates range between three and seven percent.



Impact estimates across range of matching variables

Appendix C: MISTI Outcomes by SIKA and CCI Programs

SIKA outcomes, W3-4	Net difference (1-5)	Percent gain	*p*-value	Sample (Treated / Control)
1. Stability2**	**0.121**	**3.5%**	**.045**	**316 (63/253)**
1.1 Government capacity***	0.192	5.6%	.008	299 (62/237)
1.1.1 District government performance**	0.175	4.9%	.028	311 (64/247)
1.1.2 District government satisfaction	-0.071	-2.1%	.527	302 (60/242)
1.1.3 Provincial government performance**	0.210	6.4%	.011	286 (66/220)
1.2 Local governance*	0.115	3.1%	.087	278 (66/212)
1.2.1 DDA-CDC performance	0.038	1.0%	.634	278 (61/217)
1.2.2 Local leader performance	0.070	1.8%	.401	290 (62/228)
1.3 Quality of life	-0.010	-0.3%	.872	311 (64/247)
2. Resilience2	**0.025**	**0.7%**	**.616**	**328 (61/267)**
2.1 Community cohesion	-0.037	-1.0%	.648	198 (43/155)
2.1.1 Social capital	-0.120	-3.4%	.245	220 (45/175)
2.1.2 Local leader satisfaction	0.078	2.2%	.197	325 (64/261)

* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%

CCI Outcomes, W3-4	Net difference (1-5)	Percent gain	*p*-value	Sample (Treated / Control)
Stability2*	**0.231**	**6.3%**	**.067**	**105 (15/90)**
Government capacity*	0.253	7.1%	.073	96 (15/81)
District government performance	0.228	6.1%	.140	91 (15/76)
District government satisfaction	0.218	6.4%	.361	58 (13/45)
Provincial government performance*	0.322	8.9%	.078	74 (15/59)
Local governance	0.148	3.9%	.372	66 (13/53)
DDA-CDC performance*	0.468	12.9%	.007	63 (12/51)
Local leader performance	0.086	2.2%	.572	70 (14/56)
Quality of life	0.090	2.5%	.436	101 (16/85)
Resilience2	**0.093**	**2.5%**	**.423**	**103 (15/88)**
Community cohesion	-0.054	-1.5%	.765	37 (5/32)
Social capital**	-0.322	-8.5%	.040	34 (5/29)
Local leader satisfaction	0.023	0.7%	.857	102 (16/86)

* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%

SIKA outcomes, W2-4	Net difference (1-5)	Percent gain	*p*-value	Sample (Treated / Control)
1. Stability2	**0.068**	**1.9%**	**.254**	**328 (79/249)**
1.1 Government capacity	0.036	1.1%	.623	338 (72/266)
1.1.2 District government performance	0.113	3.1%	.123	297 (76/221)
1.1.3 District government satisfaction	0.023	0.7%	.317	314 (77/237)
Provincial government performance	0.087	2.6%	.287	329 (76/253)
1.2 Local governance	0.009	0.2%	.907	230 (63/167)
1.2.1 DDA-CDC performance	0.011	0.3%	.905	272 (65/207)
1.2.2 Local leader performance	0.010	0.2%	.897	302 (75/227)
1.3 Quality of life	0.079	2.4%	.176	357 (84/273)
2. Resilience2	**0.006**	**0.2%**	**.895**	**361 (79/282)**
2.1 Community cohesion	-0.101	-2.8%	.219	181 (53/128)
2.1.1 Social capital**	-0.199	-5.6%	.041	200 (54/146)
2.1.2 Local leader satisfaction	0.005	0.1%	.930	320 (80/240)

* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%

CCI Outcomes, W2-4	Net difference (1-5)	Percent gain	*p*-value	Sample (Treated / Control)
1. Stability2**	**0.180**	**5.0%**	**.029**	**159 (34/125)**
1.1 Government capacity**	0.306	8.6%	.015	149 (32/117)
1.1.1 District government performance	0.208	5.9%	.117	151 (33/118)
1.1.2 District government satisfaction	-0.032	-1.0%	.338	126 (30/96)
1.2.3 Provincial government performance**	0.375	10.1%	.013	137 (31/106)
1.2 Local governance	0.104	2.9%	.464	127 (26/102)
1.2.1 DDA-CDC performance	0.048	1.4%	.751	122 (23/100)
1.2.2 Local leader performance**	0.042	1.1%	.708	136 (29/107)
1.3 Quality of life**	0.213	6.2%	.016	172 (33/139)
2. Resilience2*	**0.118**	**3.3%**	**.081**	**203 (34/169)**
2.1 Community cohesion	-0.200	-5.7%	.126	73 (15/58)
2.1.1 Social capital	-0.134	-3.9%	.299	63 (15/48)
2.1.2 Local leader satisfaction	0.068	1.9%	.372	178 (33/145)

* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%

Appendix D: Determinants of Stability and Resilience

Linear regression

Observations 100,095
F-statistic 741
R-squared .355

Standard errors adjusted for 3,859 village clusters

Stability	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-statistic	*p*-value
Petty crime	-0.082	0.003	-31	0.000
Violent crime	-0.071	0.003	-26	0.000
Presence - ANA	0.073	0.003	26	0.000
Presence – Arbaki	0.021	0.002	8	0.000
Presence – ANP	0.139	0.003	49	0.000
Presence – AOG	-0.165	0.003	-63	0.000
Presence - ALP	0.073	0.003	28	0.000
Presence – ISAF	0.046	0.003	16	0.000
District govt. officials from district	0.227	0.004	59	0.000
Acceptable to criticize govt.	0.084	0.004	24	0.000
Govt. services	0.241	0.002	138	0.000
Corruption trend	-0.051	0.002	-29	0.000
Member volunteer group	0.095	0.005	20	0.000
Female	0.040	0.004	10	0.000
Literate	0.055	0.004	14	0.000
Pashtun	-0.090	0.004	-21	0.000
Intercept	2.52	0.013	197	0.000

Linear regression

Observations	100,980
F-statistic	501
R-squared	0.226

Standard errors adjusted for 3,858 village clusters

Stability	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-statistic	*p*-value
Petty crime	-0.055	0.004	-15	0.000
Serious nonviolent crime	-0.010	0.004	-2.9	0.004
Violent crime	-0.051	0.003	-15	0.000
Presence - ANA	0.045	0.004	11	0.000
Presence – ANP	0.106	0.004	27	0.000
Presence – AOG	-0.082	0.004	-21	0.000
Presence - ALP	0.047	0.004	12	0.000
District govt. officials from district	0.115	0.005	21	0.000
Acceptable to criticize govt.	0.067	0.005	15	0.000
Govt. services	0.133	0.003	44	0.000
Problems outside village	0.033	0.002	14	0.000
Member volunteer group	0.123	0.006	21	0.000
Literate	0.031	0.005	6.2	0.000
Unemployed	-0.062	0.011	-5.7	0.000
Pashtun	-0.048	0.009	-5.7	0.000
Household casualty	-0.034	0.005	-7.2	0.000
Intercept	2.83	0.020	139	0.000

APPENDIX 1: REVIEW OF STABILITY INDICES

Approach

Management Systems International (MSI) commissioned the RAND Corporation to conduct an independent methodology review of the Measuring Impact of Stability Initiatives (MISTI). One challenge the RAND review identified was in identifying stability trends and impacts across disparate programming and measured by a wide variety of survey items. RAND recommended a review of the stability indices that included a principal component or factor analysis of the current survey items, the use of "data-driven" weights generated by factor scores, stronger delineation of programmatic constructs within the overarching construct of stability, and triangulation and validation of index constructs and scores with existing data sources such as previous polling data and ISAF tracking data.

This brief responds to RAND's recommendations by conducting a factor analysis of the survey items making up the index and re-assessing the programmatic theory and constructs that constitute the broad objective of stability. The review concludes that the current index items are largely validated but would benefit from a more careful delineation and disaggregation of underlying programmatic constructs, and that the construct of community resilience may exhibit dynamics sufficiently unique to stability as to merit separate treatment in evaluating stability trends and program impacts. The revised indices are largely unchanged, but do have sharper programmatic divisions and offer a greater modularity in isolating potential program effects and higher order changes in Afghan communities.

Analysis

The MISTI indices were originally developed around eight dimensions of measurement, with some dimensions captured as single questions on the MISTI survey and other dimensions consisting of multiple survey items. A summary of the measurement levels and their constituent items is as follows:

Indicator	Items	Response scale(s)
Security in local area	1	1-5
Direction of district	1	1-4
Government confidence	17	0-1, 1-4, 1-5
Quality of life	6	0-1, 1-3, 1-4, 1-5
Community resilience	14	0-1, 1-4
Service delivery	1	1-5
Corruption	1	0-1
Armed Opposition Groups	1	1-3

Annex 1 lists all survey items used in computing the index.

Note that the dimensions of the stability index vary widely in terms of the number of items, and that dimensions span different response scales. In addition to the collection of respondent survey items, the stability index includes observed measures of local control, community accessibility, and levels of violence.

In response to recommendations from the RAND report, the MISTI team tested the existing dimensions of stability, and also examined all survey items without any pre-defined structure. From these analyses, the MISTI team posited potential theories of change that could be tested against Wave 4 and 5 survey data.

Review of existing dimensions

Factor analyses were conducted in the "psych" package in R using the polychoric correlation matrix, as is recommended for binary or ordinal data.[113] Parallel analysis was used to determine the number of factors to extract. Extracted factors were rotated using the "oblimin" method in which factors were allowed to be correlated.

Parallel analysis of the government confidence index, consisting of 17 survey items, suggested three separate measurement factors.

Table 3 Government confidence factor analysis

Survey item	#	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
The Afghan government is well regarded in this area	8	.07	**.42**	.22
Confidence - district government	9b	.01	.00	**.81**
Responsiveness - district government	10b	-.01	-.01	**.83**
Get things done - district government	11b	.04	.04	**.69**
Confidence in DDA	12b	**.64**	.01	.10
Responsiveness of DDA	12c	**.64**	.03	.11
DDA get things done	12d	**.67**	.04	.07
Confidence in CDC	13b	**.73**	-.02	-.03
Responsiveness of CDC	13c	**.76**	-.01	-.06
CDC get things done	13d	**.75**	.00	-.06
The district government officials in this district are from this district	14a	-.02	.34	.13
The district government understands the problems of people in this area	14b	.11	**.60**	.01
The district government cares about people in this area	14c	-.01	**.81**	.00
District government officials in this district abuse their authority	14d	.09	-.40	-.12
District government officials visit this area	14e	-.01	**.73**	.01
District government officials are doing their jobs honestly	14f	.00	**.78**	-.01
The district government delivers services to this area in a fair manner	14g	-.01	**.81**	-.04

Factor 1 **Factor 2** **Factor 3**

In the table of factor loadings above, each shading corresponds to an extracted factor. The first factor consists of performance measures for District Development Assemblies (DDA) and Community Development Councils (CDCs), in what might be labeled a DDA-CDC Performance factor. The second

[113] Polychoric correlation supposes that binary or ordinal response values approximate a latent continuous distribution.

factor consists of a series of binary questions relating to the overall satisfaction with district government, or a District Government Satisfaction factor. The final factor consists of performance measures for district government, or a District Government Performance factor.

Two items were excluded from any factor: District officials being from the district had a moderate loading on factor 2 (.34), however this item does not have a strong attributional link to stability programming. District officials abusing their authority for private gain had either a zero or negative loading on the three factors.

Parallel analysis of the quality of life index, consisting of six survey items, successfully loads on a single factor:

Table 4 Quality of life factor analysis

Survey item	Question #	Loading
Local area more or less secure	2b	.63
Life satisfaction	26	.72
Household finances	27	.72
Ability to meet basic needs	28	.61
Ability to meet basic needs next year	29	-.65
Future too uncertain	30	-.58

The negative loadings on the final two items represent a reversed polarity in the response coding.

Parallel analysis of the resilience index, consisting of 14 items, suggested three separate measurement factors.

Table 5 Community resilience factor analysis

Survey item	Question #	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Able to solve problems from outside the village	34c	-.02	.04	**.46**
Able to solve problems from inside the village	35c	.03	-.03	**.54**
How often villages work together to solve common problems	36	-.02	-.03	**.62**
How often citizen interests considered by local leaders	37a	.01	-.02	**.55**
How effective local leaders in securing funding	38	.06	.22	**.34**
Belong to voluntary group?	39a	.08	.00	.17
Confidence - district governor	9a	-.09	**.85**	.01
Confidence - district government	9b	-.01	**.79**	.02
Confidence - local leaders	9c	**.56**	.16	.11
Confidence - provincial governor	9d	-.01	**.63**	.05
Responsiveness - district governor	10a	.03	**.81**	-.04
Responsiveness - district government	10b	.08	**.76**	-.02
Responsiveness - local leaders	10c	**1.01**	-.02	-.01
Responsiveness - provincial government	10d	.11	**.59**	.01

Factor 1 **Factor 2** **Factor 3**

The first factor relates to local level performance, or a Local Leader Performance factor. The second factor relates to district and provincial level performance reminiscent of the District Government Performance factor from the previous analysis of the government confidence index. The third factor relates to villages mobilizing to solve problems and local level leadership, in what may be called a Community Cohesion factor. Membership in voluntary groups does not load on any factor and is excluded. It is also debatable whether government performance measures are appropriate for measures of community resilience, which often develops in the absence of strong local government support.

In summary, a review of MISTI's original multi-item dimensions of stability establishes that two of the three dimensions measure discrete constructs. In the case of the government confidence index, the constructs are programmatically suitable but would benefit from sharper delineation as disaggregates of higher order constructs. In the case of community resilience, it may not be suitable to mix community and government level measures that seek to measure constructs of community mobilization and collective action.

Review of items without pre-defined structure

The next step in the analysis was to enter all survey items in the stability index into a factor analysis without a pre-defined structure. The MISTI team took the opportunity to enter additional survey items for possible inclusion in revised indices. The analysis extracted nine factors, two of which were discarded as not sufficiently capturing any substantive programmatic construct. And while the extracted factors largely validate the pre-defined dimensions, there are also some findings that do not. Findings from the analysis of all survey items are as follows:

- The previously identified factors of DDA-CDC Performance, District Government Satisfaction, District Government Performance, Local Leader Performance, and Community Cohesion were also identified in the factor analysis without any pre-defined structure.
- In addition to the District Government Performance factor, there is also a Provincial Government Performance factor.
- Perceptions of safety and security loaded highly on quality of life indices such as life satisfaction and overall direction of district, but did not load highly on any other factor.
- Presence of armed opposition groups and corruption perceptions did not load highly on any factor.
- However, in one of the two discarded factors, there is an intriguing combination of high loading on the incidence of problems affecting the village, and low to moderate loadings on corruption and presence of armed opposition groups.

- The other discarded factor consisted of moderate loadings on any level of government getting things done, while the stronger retained factors consisted of perceptions of confidence, responsiveness, and getting things done disaggregated across levels of governance.

- With one exception, new measurement items that were introduced for possible relevance to stability constructs were validated. These new items consisted of security and corruption trends (in addition to levels), adding performance measures for the district governor in addition to district government, and whether local leaders represented women's interests. Neither the level nor trend questions for corruption loaded on any factor.

See Annex 2 for the master table of factor loadings.

Conclusions

Based on the results of the factor analyses as well as a review of the programmatic suitability of items and their associated constructs, the MISTI team formulated new indices that have clearly identified constructs making up the overall stability index. The most substantive changes were to remove district government performance from measures of community resilience, but replace it with measures of DDA-CDC performance. In recognition of the hybrid roles these citizen committees play in both local governance and community development, DDA-CDC performance enter into both local governance and community resilience constructs.

Another substantive change was to remove the resilience index from stability altogether. While reflecting desirable traits in the abstract, resilience also threatens to be a measurement confound given that it might reflect both a nurturing relationship with local government structures and a struggle to cope in the absence of government support and possibly requiring accommodative relationships with armed opposition groups. Resilience, and its accompanying construct of cohesion, will be evaluated separately for program impacts and trends, but will also be tested in subsequent data rounds to see how well it relates to stability constructs.

With removal of community mobilization constructs, stability becomes almost entirely an aggregate measure of support for government, with support disaggregated by constructs of government capacity, local non-state or hybrid governance, and quality of life. Community resilience remains an aggregate measure of citizen committees interacting with district government, local leaders representing their villages to outsiders and soothing tensions within villages, and capacity for collective action to solve problems external and internal to the village. The reformulated indices with their associated constructs are diagrammed as follows:


Stability
Quality of Life
Government Capacity
Local Governance
Provincial Government Performance
DDA-CDC Performance
District Government Performance
Local Leaders Performance
District Government Satifaction


Resilience
Quality of Life
Local Governance
Community Cohesion
DDA-CDC Performance
Social Capital
Local Leader Performance
Local Leader Satisfaction

The correlation matrix for the extracted factors is as follows:

	District govt. performance	Local leader performance	DDA-CDC performance	District govt. satisfaction	Provincial performance	Quality of life
Local leader performance	0.35	1				
DDA-CDC performance	0.51	0.41	1			
District govt. satisfaction	0.45	0.21	0.45	1		
Provincial performance	0.58	0.37	0.45	0.42	1	
Quality of life	0.54	0.23	0.53	0.56	0.48	1
Cohesion	0.11	0.23	0.30	0.14	0.12	0.24

Note that while the factor rotation method permitted factors to be correlated, the Cohesion index remains weakly to moderately correlated with the other factors, consistent with the possibility that this index exhibits unique dynamics. The local leader performance index also shows weaker correlations with more government-centric measures.

The RAND report further recommended that "data-driven" weights be used in applying stability measures. The MISTI team rather prefers to keep measures as intuitive as possible for an audience of development practitioners, so that constructs are continuous measures from 1-5. However, MISTI will also compute new variables based on factor scores and run separate analyses on these measures for robustness checks.

Annex 1

The breakdown of survey items across each dimension is as follows:

Indicator	Survey item(s)	Response scale
Security in local area (1 item)	Q-2b. Is your local area more secure, about the same, or less secure than it was a year ago?	1-5
Direction of district (1 item)	Q1 Generally speaking, are things in your district going in the right direction or in the wrong direction?	1-4
Government confidence (17 items)	Q-8 The Afghan government is well regarded in this area	0-1
	Q9b Confidence - district government	1-4
	Q10b Responsiveness - district government	1-4
	Q11b Get things done - district government	1-5
	Q12b Confidence in DDA	1-4
	Q12c Responsiveness of DDA	1-4
	Q12d DDA get things done	1-5
	Q13b Confidence in CDC	1-4
	Q13c Responsiveness of CDC	1-4
	Q13d CDC get things done	1-5
	Q-14a.The District Government officials in this district are from this district.	0-1
	Q-14b.The District Government understands the problems of people in this area.	0-1
	Q-14c.The District Government cares about the people in this area.	0-1
	Q-14d.District Government officials in this district abuse their authority to make money for themselves.	0-1
	Q-14e.District Government officials visit this area.	0-1
	Q-14f.In general, the District Government officials are doing their jobs honestly.	0-1
	Q-14g.The District Government delivers basic services to this area in a fair manner.	0-1
Quality of life (6 items)	Q-26. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?	1-4
	Q-27. How satisfied are you with your household's current financial situation?	1-4
	Q-28. Thinking about the past year, would you say overall that your ability to meet your basic needs increased, decreased, or stayed the same?	1-5
	Q-29. How worried are you about being able to meet your basic needs over the next year?	1-3
	Q-30 The situation in this area is certain enough for me to make plans for my future.	0-1
Resilience (14 items)	Q-34c. How often are the people here able to solve problems that come from outside the village?	1-4
	Q-35c. How often are the people here able to solve these problems that	1-4

Indicator	Survey item(s)	Response scale
	come from inside the village?	
	Q-36. When there is a problem in this area, how often do the villages/neighborhoods in this area work together to solve the problem?	1-4
	Q-37a. When decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of ordinary people in the village/neighborhood considered?	1-4
	Q-38. How effective or ineffective are your local leaders at securing funds for your village/neighborhood's needs from the district and/or provincial government?	1-4
	Q-39a. Do you belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss issues of common interest or to do certain activities together?	0-1
	Q9a-d Confidence: District governor, district government, Local leaders, provincial governor	1-4
	Q10a-d Responsiveness: District governor, district government, Local leaders, provincial governor	1-4
Service delivery (1 item)	Q-15. Overall, do you think that services from the government in this area have improved, worsened, or not changed in the past year?	1-5
Corruption (1 item)	Q-23. Is corruption a problem in this area, or not?	0-1
Presence of Armed Opposition Groups (1 item)	Q-6d. How would you rate the presence of Armed Opposition Groups in your area?	1-3

Annex 2

Survey item	#	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7	Factor 8	Factor 9
Direction of district	q1	0.04	0.03	0.02	0	0.01	0.01	**0.7**	-0.05	0.02
Security in local area	q2a	0	-0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.04	**0.75**	-0.02	-0.02
Area more or less secure	q2b	-0.01	0.04	0	-0.03	0	0	**0.76**	-0.02	-0.02
Presence of AOG	q6_1d	-0.01	0.04	-0.06	0.04	-0.08	0.21	-0.25	0.08	-0.01
GIRoA well regarded	q8	0.1	0.03	0	**0.37**	0.05	-0.05	0.2	-0.08	0.09
Confidence - district governor	q9a	**0.76**	0	0.04	0.02	0.02	-0.05	0.04	-0.11	0.05
Confidence - district government	q9b	**0.54**	0.12	0.05	0.06	0.09	-0.03	0.09	-0.13	0
Confidence - local leaders	q9c	0.04	**0.74**	0.03	0	0.01	-0.02	0	-0.14	0.07
Confidence - provincial governor	q9d	0.04	0.01	0	0.02	**0.78**	-0.03	0.02	-0.14	0.04
Responsiveness - district governor	q10a	**0.77**	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.01	-0.09	0
Responsiveness - district government	q10b	**0.56**	0.14	0.05	0.07	0.1	0.03	0.06	-0.11	-0.04
Responsiveness - local leaders	q10c	0.02	**0.77**	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.03	0	-0.09	0

Survey item	#	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7	Factor 8	Factor 9
Responsiveness - provincial governor	q10d	0.05	0.02	0	0.02	**0.81**	0.02	0	-0.1	-0.01
Get things done - district governor	q11a	**0.71**	-0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.04	**0.35**	0.02
Get things done - district government	q11b	**0.49**	0.1	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.01	0.09	**0.33**	-0.02
Get things done - local leaders	q11c	0	**0.7**	0.02	0.02	0.03	0	0.04	**0.35**	-0.01
Get things done - provincial governor	q11d	-0.03	0	0.05	0.01	**0.78**	0	0.03	**0.26**	0
Confidence - DDA	q12b	0.12	-0.03	**0.63**	-0.01	0	-0.04	0.05	-0.02	0.02
Responsive - DDA	q12c	0.08	-0.01	**0.66**	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.02	-0.05
Get things done - DDA	q12d	0.02	0	**0.68**	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.07	-0.07
Confidence - CDC	q13b	-0.01	0.04	**0.67**	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04	-0.01	-0.04	0.12
Responsive - CDC	q13c	-0.04	0.02	**0.74**	0	0	0	-0.03	-0.06	0.04
Get things done - CDC	q13d	-0.06	0.01	**0.75**	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.06	-0.01
The district understands local problems	q14b	0.01	0.04	0.1	**0.62**	0.01	0	-0.02	-0.08	0.01
The district cares about people in this area	q14c	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	**0.79**	0	-0.01	0.01	0	0

Survey item	#	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7	Factor 8	Factor 9
District officials visit this area	q14e	0	0.03	-0.02	**0.73**	-0.01	-0.01	0	0.02	0.02
District officials are doing their jobs honestly	q14f	0	-0.02	0	**0.78**	0.01	0	0	-0.01	0
The district government delivers services fairly	q14g	-0.03	-0.01	0	**0.81**	0	0.01	-0.01	0.02	-0.02
Provision of government services	q15	0.04	-0.06	0.11	0.17	0.03	0.07	0.39	0.11	-0.03
Corruption a problem	q23	-0.01	0.11	-0.03	-0.01	-0.07	0.16	-0.1	0.02	0.09
Corruption trend	q25	-0.08	0.02	0.01	-0.17	-0.04	0.13	0.03	0	0.09
Life satisfaction	q26	0.01	-0.04	0.05	0.03	0.01	-0.03	**0.52**	0.03	0.11
Household finances	q27	0	0.02	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.05	**0.47**	0.02	0.07
Ability to meet basic needs	q28	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.08	0	0.07	**0.46**	0.1	-0.01
How often external problems	q34a	-0.02	0	0.02	0	-0.01	**0.73**	0.01	0	-0.03
Ability to solve external problems	q34c	0.02	0.01	-0.04	0.02	0.01	0.08	0.1	0.06	**0.41**
How often internal problems	q35a	0.03	0	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	**0.69**	-0.01	-0.03	0.08
Ability to solve internal problems	q35c	-0.01	0.05	0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0	0.02	**0.52**

Survey item	#	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7	Factor 8	Factor 9
How often villages work together	q36	0	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.04	0.06	-0.01	0	**0.58**
Local leaders represent citizen interests	q37a	0	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.05	-0.03	0.02	**0.53**
Local leaders represent women's interests	q37b	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.04	-0.05	-0.04	0.06	0.05	**0.38**
Local leaders secure funding	q38	0.02	0.07	0.13	0.05	0.01	0	0.18	0.02	**0.27**

APPENDIX 2: STABILITY INDEX COMPONENTS, VARIABLES AND RESCALING

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
1. Stability Index	0.75 * Survey Index + 0.10 * Level of Control (M36) + 0.10 * ACSOR Accessibility Tracker + 0.05 * Security Incidents Score			
Survey Index	MEAN of 1.1.1. District Government Performance, 1.1.2. District Government Satisfaction, 1.1.3. Provincial Government Performance, 1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance, 1.2.2. Local Leaders' Performance, 1.3. Quality of Life			
1.1. Government Capacity	MEAN of 1.1.1. District Government Performance, 1.1.2. District Government Satisfaction, 1.1.3. Provincial Government Performance			
1.1.1. District Government Performance	MEAN of survey items 1.1.1.1., 1.1.1.2., 1.1.1.3., 1.1.1.4., 1.1.1.5., 1.1.1.6.			
		1.1.1.1. Confidence - District Governor Q9a. How much confidence do you have in your [Insert Position/Organization]? District Governor	1. A lot of confidence	5
			2. Some confidence	4
			3. Not much confidence	2
			4. No confidence at all	1
		1.1.1.2. Confidence - District Government Q9b. How much confidence do you have in your [Insert Position/Organization]? District Government	1. A lot of confidence	5
			2. Some confidence	4
			3. Not much confidence	2
			4. No confidence at all	1

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
		1.1.1.3. Responsive - District Governor Q10a. How responsive do you think your [Insert Item] is/are to the needs of the local people in this area? District Governor	1. Very responsive	5
			2. Somewhat responsive	4
			3. Somewhat unresponsive	2
			4. Very unresponsive	1
		1.1.1.4. Responsive - District Government Q10b. How responsive do you think your [Insert Item] is/are to the needs of the local people in this area? District Government	1. Very responsive	5
			2. Somewhat responsive	4
			3. Somewhat unresponsive	2
			4. Very unresponsive	1
		1.1.1.5. Get things done - District Governor Q11a.Over the past year, has the [Insert Item] ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? - District Governor's	1. Improved a lot	5
			2. Improved a little	4
			3. No change	3
			4. Worsened a little	2
			5. Worsened a lot	1
		1.1.1.6. Get things done - District Government Q11b.Over the past year, has the [Insert Item] ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? - District Government's	1. Improved a lot	5
			2. Improved a little	4

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			3. No change	3
			4. Worsened a little	2
			5. Worsened a lot	1
1.1.2. District Government Satisfaction	MEAN of survey items 1.1.2.1., 1.1.2.2., 1.1.2.3., 1.1.2.4., 1.1.2.5., 1.1.2.6		0.00 - 0.20	1
			0.21 - 0.40	2
			0.41 - 0.60	3
			0.61 - 0.80	4
			0.81 - 1.00	5
		1.1.2.1. District government understands local problems Q14b. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.	1. The District Government understands the problems of people in this area.	1
			2. The District Government **does not** understand the problems of people in this area.	0
		1.1.2.2. District government cares about the people Q14c. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.	1. The District Government cares about the people in this area.	1
			2. The District Government **does not** care about the people in this area.	0
		1.1.2.3. District officials visit the area Q14e. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.	1. District Government officials visit this area.	1
			2. District Government officials **do not** visit this area.	0

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
		1.1.2.4. District officials do their jobs honestly Q14f. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.	1. In general, the District Government officials are doing their jobs honestly.	1
			2. In general, the District Government officials **<u>are not</u>** doing their jobs honestly.	0
		1.1.2.5. District government delivers services fairly Q14g. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.	1. The District Government delivers basic services to this area in a fair manner.	1
			2. The District Government **<u>does not</u>** deliver basic services to this area in a fair manner.	0
		1.1.2.6. GIRoA well regarded Q8. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.	1. The Afghan government is well regarded in this area.	1
			2. The Afghan government is **<u>not</u>** well regarded in this area.	0
1.1.3. Provincial Government Performance	MEAN of survey items 1.1.3.1., 1.1.3.2., 1.1.3.3.			
		1.1.3.1. Confidence - Provincial Governor Q9d. How much confidence do you have in your [Insert Position/Organization]? Provincial Governor	1. A lot of confidence	5
			2. Some confidence	4
			3. Not much confidence	2
			4. No confidence at all	1

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
		1.1.3.2. Responsive - Provincial Governor Q10d. How responsive do you think your [Insert Item] is/are to the needs of the local people in this area? Provincial Governor	1. Very responsive	5
			2. Somewhat responsive	4
			3. Somewhat unresponsive	2
			4. Very unresponsive	1
		1.1.3.3. Get things done - Provincial Governor Q11d.Over the past year, has the [Insert Item] ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? - Provincial Governor's	1. Improved a lot	5
			2. Improved a little	4
			3. No change	3
			4. Worsened a little	2
			5. Worsened a lot	1
1.2. Local Governance	MEAN of 1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance, 1.2.2. Local Leaders' Performance			
1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance	MEAN of survey items 1.2.1.1., 1.2.1.2., 1.2.1.3., 1.2.1.4., 1.2.1.5., 1.2.1.6.			
		1.2.1.1. Confidence - DDA Q12b. How much confidence do you have in your District Development Assembly?	1. A lot of confidence	5
			2. Some confidence	4
			3. Not much confidence	2
			4. No confidence at all	1

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
		1.2.1.2. Responsive - DDA Q12c. How responsive do you think your District Development Assembly is to the needs of the local people in this area?	1. Very responsive	5
			2. Somewhat responsive	4
			3. Somewhat unresponsive	2
			4. Very unresponsive	1
		1.2.1.3. Get things done - DDA Q12d. And over the past year, has the District Development Assembly's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change?	1. Improved a lot	5
			2. Improved a little	4
			3. No change	3
			4. Worsened a little	2
			5. Worsened a lot	1
		1.2.1.4. Confidence - CDC Q13b. How much confidence do you have in your Community Development Council?	1. A lot of confidence	5
			2. Some confidence	4
			3. Not much confidence	2
			4. No confidence at all	1
		1.2.1.5. Responsive - CDC Q13c. How responsive do you think your Community Development Council is to the needs of the local people in this area?	1. Very responsive	5
			2. Somewhat responsive	4

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			3. Somewhat unresponsive	2
			4. Very unresponsive	1
		1.2.1.6. Get things done - CDC Q13d. And over the past year, has the Community Development Council's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change?	1. Improved a lot	5
			2. Improved a little	4
			3. No change	3
			4. Worsened a little	2
			5. Worsened a lot	1
1.2.2. Local Leaders Performance	MEAN of survey items 1.2.2.1., 1.2.2.2., 1.2.2.3			
		1.2.2.1. Confidence - Local Leaders Q9c. How much confidence do you have in your [Insert Position/Organization]? Local village/neighborhood leaders	1. A lot of confidence	5
			2. Some confidence	4
			3. Not much confidence	2
			4. No confidence at all	1
		1.2.2.2. Responsive - Local Leaders Q10c. How responsive do you think your [Insert Item] is/are to the needs of the local people in this area? Local village/neighborhood leaders	1. Very responsive	5
			2. Somewhat responsive	4
			3. Somewhat unresponsive	2
			4. Very unresponsive	1

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
		1.2.2.3. Get things done - Local Leaders Q11c.Over the past year, has the [Insert Item] ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? - Local village/neighborhood leaders'	1. Improved a lot	5
			2. Improved a little	4
			3. No change	3
			4. Worsened a little	2
			5. Worsened a lot	1
1.3. Quality of Life	MEAN of survey items 1.3.0.1., 1.3.0.2., 1.3.0.3., 1.3.0.4., 1.3.0.5., 1.3.0.6.			
		1.3.0.1. Direction of district Q1. Generally speaking, are things in [name the district] going in the right direction or in the wrong direction?	1. Right direction (a lot)	5
			2. Right direction (a little)	4
			3. Wrong direction (a little)	2
			4. Wrong direction (a lot)	1
			97. Neither right nor wrong direction (vol.)	missing
		1.3.0.2. Security in local area Q2a. Would you say security in your local area is good, fair or poor?	1. Very good	5
			2. Good	4
			3. Fair	3
			4. Poor	2
			5. Very poor	1

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
		1.3.0.3. Area more or less secure Q2b. Is your local area more secure, about the same, or less secure than it was a year ago?	1. Much more secure	5
			2. Somewhat more secure	4
			3. About the same	3
			4. Somewhat less secure	2
			5. Much less secure	1
		1.3.0.4. Life satisfaction Q26. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?	1. Very satisfied	5
			2. Somewhat satisfied	4
			3. Somewhat dissatisfied	2
			4. Very dissatisfied	1
		1.3.0.5. Household finances Q27. How satisfied are you with your household's current financial situation?	1. Very satisfied	5
			2. Somewhat satisfied	4
			3. Somewhat dissatisfied	2
			4. Very dissatisfied	1
		1.3.0.6. Ability to meet basic needs Q28. Thinking about the past year, would you say overall that your ability to meet your basic needs increased, decreased, or stayed the same?	1. Increased a lot	5
			2. Increased a little	4

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			3. Stayed the same	3
			4. Decreased a little	2
			5. Decreased a lot	1
Level of Control		M-36. INTERVIEWER: Please judge which situation best describes this village	1. ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby; no Taliban activity or presence has been reported	5
			2. ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby; some Taliban activity or presence has been reported, especially at night	4
			3. ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby but do not move freely at night; village administrators usually do not sleep in their homes, and Taliban activity takes place regularly	2
			4. Taliban forces are permanently based in this village or nearby and operate freely; ISAF or Afghan security forces may visit the village on occasion but do not stay	1
			5. Taliban forces are permanently based in this village or nearby and operate freely; no ISAF or Afghan security force presence or activity at all	1

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			6. Local arbaki control this village; minimal Taliban, ISAF, or Afghan security force presence at all	4
			7. There are no ISAF, Taliban, Afghan security forces, or arbaki controlling this village	5
Security Incidents Score		Number of Security incidents (Fieldwork Period)	0-10	5
			11-25	4
			26-50	3
			51-100	2
			101-150	1
ACSOR Accessibility Tracker		ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (Fieldwork Period)	1. Completely Safe	5
			2. Safe	4
			3. Somewhat safe, but there are some problems - most are dangerous, but women can still work there	3
			4. No women - only men can work there	2
			5. Totally inaccessible	1

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APPENDIX 3: RESILENCE INDEX COMPONENTS, VARIABLES AND RESCALING

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
2. Resilience Index	MEAN of 2.1.1. Social Capital, 2.1.2. Local Leader Satisfaction, 1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance, 1.2.2. Local Leaders' Performance, 1.3. Quality of Life			
2.1. Community Cohesion	MEAN of 2.1.1. Social Capital, 2.1.2. Local Leader Satisfaction			
2.1.1. Social Capital	MEAN of survey items 2.1.1.1, 2.1.1.2., 2.1.1.3.			
		2.1.1.1. Ability to solve external problems Q34c. [If answered '1', '2' or '3' to Q34a] How often are the people here able to solve these problems that come from outside the village? Is it often, sometimes, rarely, or never?	1. Often	5
			2. Sometimes	4
			3. Rarely	2
			4. Never	1
		2.1.1.2. Ability to solve internal problems Q35c. [If answered '1', '2' or '3' to Q35a] How often are the people here able to solve these problems that come from inside the village?	1. Often	5
			2. Sometimes	4
			3. Rarely	2
			4. Never	1

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
		2.1.1.3. How often villages work together Q36. When there is a problem in this area, how often do the villages/neighborhoods in this area work together to solve the problem? Is that often, sometimes, rarely or never?	1. Often	5
			2. Sometimes	4
			3. Rarely	2
			4. Never	1
2.1.2. Local Leader Satisfaction	MEAN of survey items 2.1.2.1., 2.1.2.2., .2.1.2.3.			
		2.1.2.1. Local leaders represent citizen interests Q37a. When decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of ordinary people in the village/neighborhood considered?	1. Often	5
			2. Sometimes	4
			3. Rarely	2
			4. Never	1
		2.1.2.2. Local leaders represent women's interests Q37b. [If answered '1', '2' or '3' in Q37a] In your opinion, when decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of women considered?	1. Often	5
			2. Sometimes	4
			3. Rarely	2

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			4. Never	1
		2.1.2.3. Local leaders secure funding Q38. How effective or ineffective are your local leaders at securing funds for your village/neighborhood's needs from the district and/or provincial government?	1. Very effective	5
			2. Somewhat effective	4
			3. Somewhat ineffective	2
			4. Very ineffective	1
1.2. Local Governance	MEAN of 1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance, 1.2.2. Local Leaders' Performance			
1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance	MEAN of survey items 1.2.1.1., 1.2.1.2., 1.2.1.3., 1.2.1.4., 1.2.1.5., 1.2.1.6.			
		1.2.1.1. Confidence - DDA Q12b. How much confidence do you have in your District Development Assembly?	1. A lot of confidence	5
			2. Some confidence	4
			3. Not much confidence	2
			4. No confidence at all	1
		1.2.1.2. Responsive - DDA Q12c. How responsive do you think your District Development Assembly is to the needs of the local people in this area?	1. Very responsive	5
			2. Somewhat responsive	4

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			3. Somewhat unresponsive	2
			4. Very unresponsive	1
		1.2.1.3. Get things done - DDA Q12d. And over the past year, has the District Development Assembly's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change?	1. Improved a lot	5
			2. Improved a little	4
			3. No change	3
			4. Worsened a little	2
			5. Worsened a lot	1
		1.2.1.4. Confidence - CDC Q13b. How much confidence do you have in your Community Development Council?	1. A lot of confidence	5
			2. Some confidence	4
			3. Not much confidence	2
			4. No confidence at all	1
		1.2.1.5. Responsive - CDC Q13c. How responsive do you think your Community Development Council is to the needs of the local people in this area?	1. Very responsive	5
			2. Somewhat responsive	4
			3. Somewhat	2

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			unresponsive	
			4. Very unresponsive	1
		1.2.1.6. Get things done - CDC Q13d. And over the past year, has the Community Development Council's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change?	1. Improved a lot	5
			2. Improved a little	4
			3. No change	3
			4. Worsened a little	2
			5. Worsened a lot	1
1.2.2. Local Leaders Performance	MEAN of survey items 1.2.2.1., 1.2.2.2., 1.2.2.3			
		1.2.2.1. Confidence - Local Leaders Q9c. How much confidence do you have in your [Insert Position/Organization]? Local village/neighborhood leaders	1. A lot of confidence	5
			2. Some confidence	4
			3. Not much confidence	2
			4. No confidence at all	1
		1.2.2.2. Responsive - Local Leaders Q10c. How responsive do you think your [Insert Item] is/are to the needs of the local people in this area? Local village/neighborhood leaders	1. Very responsive	5

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			2. Somewhat responsive	4
			3. Somewhat unresponsive	2
			4. Very unresponsive	1
		1.2.2.3. Get things done - Local Leaders Q11c.Over the past year, has the [Insert Item] ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? - Local village/neighborhood leaders'	1. Improved a lot	5
			2. Improved a little	4
			3. No change	3
			4. Worsened a little	2
			5. Worsened a lot	1
1.3. Quality of Life	MEAN of survey items 1.3.0.1., 1.3.0.2., 1.3.0.3., 1.3.0.4., 1.3.0.5., 1.3.0.6.			
		1.3.0.1. Direction of district Q1. Generally speaking, are things in [name the district] going in the right direction or in the wrong direction?	1. Right direction (a lot)	5
			2. Right direction (a little)	4
			3. Wrong direction (a little)	2
			4. Wrong direction (a lot)	1

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			97. Neither right nor wrong direction (vol.)	missing
		1.3.0.2. Security in local area Q2a. Would you say security in your local area is good, fair or poor?	1. Very good	5
			2. Good	4
			3. Fair	3
			4. Poor	2
			5. Very poor	1
		1.3.0.3. Area more or less secure Q2b. Is your local area more secure, about the same, or less secure than it was a year ago?	1. Much more secure	5
			2. Somewhat more secure	4
			3. About the same	3
			4. Somewhat less secure	2
			5. Much less secure	1
		1.3.0.4. Life satisfaction Q26. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?	1. Very satisfied	5
			2. Somewhat satisfied	4
			3. Somewhat dissatisfied	2

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			4. Very dissatisfied	1
		1.3.0.5. Household finances Q27. How satisfied are you with your household's current financial situation?	1. Very satisfied	5
			2. Somewhat satisfied	4
			3. Somewhat dissatisfied	2
			4. Very dissatisfied	1
		1.3.0.6. Ability to meet basic needs Q28. Thinking about the past year, would you say overall that your ability to meet your basic needs increased, decreased, or stayed the same?	1. Increased a lot	5
			2. Increased a little	4
			3. Stayed the same	3
			4. Decreased a little	2

APPENDIX 4: STABILITY INDEX SCORES (WAVE 4)

1 = very negative 5 = very positive District	1. Stability Index	1.1. Government Capacity	1.1.1. District Government Performance	1.1.2. District Government Satisfaction	1.1.3. Provincial Government Performance	1.2. Local Governance	1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance	1.2.2. Local Leaders' Performance	1.3. Quality of Life Index		Survey Index	Level Of Control (M36)	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker	Security Incidents
										Weights	0.75	0.10	0.10	0.05
Adraskan	3.28	3.09	3.39	2.86	3.02	3.37	3.35	3.41	2.88		3.15	4.18	3.00	4.00
Ahmadabad	3.46	3.27	3.46	3.41	2.95	3.66	3.50	3.98	3.26		3.43	2.86	4.00	4.00
Aliabad	3.49	3.41	3.73	3.28	3.22	3.78	3.88	3.58	3.56		3.54	2.86	3.00	5.00
Andar	2.97	3.30	3.83	3.44	2.64	3.74	3.22	4.78	3.04		3.49	1.00	1.00	3.00
Aqcha	4.06	3.61	4.00	3.14	3.69	4.00	3.99	4.03	3.82		3.78	4.73	5.00	5.00
Archi	2.88	3.17	3.51	2.80	3.21	3.51	3.31	3.92	2.84		3.26	1.29	1.00	4.00
Arghandab (1)	3.44	3.52	3.70	3.43	3.43	3.39	3.24	3.71	3.51		3.50	2.09	4.00	4.00
Arghistan	3.20	3.39	3.54	3.40	3.25	3.30	3.15	3.59	3.41		3.39	2.10	3.00	3.00
Aybak	4.13	3.71	3.92	3.63	3.60	4.12	4.11	4.15	3.83		3.87	4.80	5.00	5.00
Baghlani Jadid	3.11	3.22	3.39	2.96	3.30	3.48	3.50	3.46	3.28		3.32	2.70	2.00	3.00
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu)	3.55	3.38	3.73	3.18	3.24	3.79	3.72	3.92	3.52		3.55	3.90	3.00	4.00
Bak	3.47	3.31	3.35	3.36	3.21	3.87	3.92	3.75	3.25		3.47	3.13	3.00	5.00
Bala Boluk	3.07	3.06	3.13	3.45	2.58	3.17	3.22	3.06	3.26		3.12	3.35	2.00	4.00
Balkh	3.74	3.44	3.53	3.04	3.74	3.74	3.72	3.78	3.50		3.55	4.25	4.00	5.00
Baraki Barak	2.87	2.69	3.28	1.96	2.83	3.97	3.84	4.22	2.33		3.08	2.62	1.00	4.00
Chaghcharan	3.25	3.01	3.10	2.97	2.98	3.15	3.17	3.12	3.35		3.11	2.14	5.00	4.00

1 = very negative 5 = very positive District	1. Stability Index	1.1. Government Capacity	1.1.1. District Government Performance	1.1.2. District Government Satisfaction	1.1.3. Provincial Government Performance	1.2. Local Governance	1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance	1.2.2. Local Leaders' Performance	1.3. Quality of Life Index		Survey Index	Level Of Control (M36)	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker	Security Incidents
Chahar Bolak	3.56	3.32	3.46	2.96	3.54	3.76	3.72	3.86	3.47		3.50	3.87	3.00	5.00
Chahar Darah	3.33	3.28	3.60	2.96	3.28	3.81	3.83	3.77	3.41		3.48	2.69	3.00	3.00
Chak-e Wardak	2.80	2.94	2.95	2.92	2.96	3.13	3.15	3.09	3.28		3.06	1.07	2.00	4.00
Chimtal	3.33	3.10	3.36	2.46	3.48	3.57	3.45	3.81	3.25		3.30	3.52	3.00	4.00
Chorah	3.60	3.82	3.89	4.08	3.50	3.89	3.76	4.14	3.52		3.81	2.40	3.00	4.00
Daman	3.46	3.53	3.68	3.46	3.45	3.34	3.14	3.75	3.47		3.49	1.86	4.00	5.00
Dand	3.48	3.48	3.66	3.44	3.34	3.37	3.25	3.61	3.46		3.46	3.87	4.00	2.00
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in	3.86	3.83	4.07	4.24	3.18	4.08	4.05	4.14	3.87		3.92	4.64	2.00	5.00
Deh Rawud	3.71	3.52	3.66	3.50	3.39	3.86	3.70	4.17	3.48		3.65	4.24	3.00	5.00
Deh Yak	3.47	3.39	3.56	3.42	3.17	3.81	3.85	3.73	3.53		3.54	3.16	3.00	4.00
Dzadran	2.90	2.86	3.14	2.77	2.68	3.81	3.89	3.65	2.77		3.15	1.85	1.00	5.00
Faizabad (2)	3.82	3.62	3.96	3.34	3.55	4.07	4.14	3.93	3.69		3.77	4.43	3.00	5.00
Fayroz Nakhchir	4.20	3.94	4.09	4.20	3.54	4.10	4.12	4.07	3.88		3.98	4.65	5.00	5.00
Garmser	3.51	3.73	3.41	4.23	3.55	3.78	3.56	4.21	3.51		3.74	1.98	3.00	4.00
Gelan	3.28	3.28	3.52	3.13	3.18	3.65	3.63	3.69	3.55		3.45	2.95	2.00	4.00
Gurbuz	3.65	3.37	3.37	3.51	3.24	3.79	3.82	3.73	3.28		3.49	3.79	4.00	5.00
Hazrat-e Sultan	4.26	3.96	4.11	3.96	3.81	4.21	4.23	4.18	3.94		4.04	4.87	5.00	5.00

1 = very negative 5 = very positive District	1. Stability Index	1.1. Government Capacity	1.1.1. District Government Performance	1.1.2. District Government Satisfaction	1.1.3. Provincial Government Performance	1.2. Local Governance	1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance	1.2.2. Local Leaders' Performance	1.3. Quality of Life Index		Survey Index	Level Of Control (M36)	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker	Security Incidents
Imam Sahib	3.63	3.57	3.96	3.51	3.25	4.04	4.08	3.97	3.64		3.74	3.29	3.00	4.00
Injil	3.72	3.38	3.52	3.33	3.30	3.61	3.64	3.54	3.42		3.46	4.32	5.00	4.00
Jaji	3.16	2.98	3.27	2.94	2.72	3.64	3.57	3.79	2.96		3.21	3.08	2.00	5.00
Jaji Maidan	3.83	3.51	3.52	3.62	3.39	3.83	3.92	3.66	3.44		3.59	3.86	5.00	5.00
Jalrayz	2.84	2.94	3.09	2.71	3.01	2.90	2.84	3.02	3.07		2.96	1.22	3.00	4.00
Kajaki	2.84	2.94	2.77	3.30	2.76	3.44	3.03	4.27	2.93		3.17	1.61	1.00	4.00
Kang	4.05	3.98	3.66	3.89	4.39	3.94	3.96	3.91	3.41		3.87	4.95	4.00	5.00
Khak-e-Safayd	2.83	2.67	2.65	2.59	2.76	3.01	3.04	2.95	2.99		2.83	2.57	2.00	5.00
Khanabad	3.46	3.35	3.74	3.21	3.10	3.91	3.96	3.80	3.43		3.54	3.01	3.00	4.00
Khas Kunar	3.82	3.90	3.67	3.82	4.20	3.74	3.65	3.91	3.82		3.84	3.83	3.00	5.00
Khas Uruzgan	3.53	3.71	3.98	3.63	3.54	3.98	3.89	4.14	3.73		3.82	2.66	2.00	4.00
Khoshi	2.95	2.88	2.59	3.49	2.56	3.33	3.52	2.93	2.94		3.01	1.50	3.00	5.00
Khwajah Do Koh	4.12	3.80	4.01	3.67	3.71	4.12	4.12	4.12	3.69		3.89	4.53	5.00	5.00
Khwajah Omari	3.84	3.44	3.77	3.13	3.42	3.82	3.73	3.99	3.47		3.58	4.00	5.00	5.00
Kunduz	3.24	3.44	3.74	3.27	3.30	3.55	3.61	3.44	3.22		3.43	2.66	3.00	2.00
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	3.26	3.00	3.34	2.66	3.01	3.42	3.40	3.48	2.98		3.15	4.05	3.00	4.00
Lajah-Ahmad Khel	3.20	3.13	3.24	3.04	3.11	3.64	3.50	3.92	3.10		3.32	2.66	2.00	5.00

1 = very negative 5 = very positive District	1. Stability Index	1.1. Government Capacity	1.1.1. District Government Performance	1.1.2. District Government Satisfaction	1.1.3. Provincial Government Performance	1.2. Local Governance	1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance	1.2.2. Local Leaders' Performance	1.3. Quality of Life Index		Survey Index	Level Of Control (M36)	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker	Security Incidents
Lajah-Mangal	3.12	3.08	3.22	3.21	2.80	3.55	3.49	3.66	3.07		3.24	2.38	2.00	5.00
Lashkar Gah	3.83	4.06	3.73	4.40	4.06	4.12	3.97	4.42	3.52		4.02	3.21	3.00	4.00
Maidan Shahr	3.26	3.34	3.55	3.02	3.45	3.32	3.26	3.45	3.61		3.39	1.20	4.00	4.00
Maiwand	3.15	3.60	3.91	3.60	3.28	3.22	2.93	3.80	3.49		3.50	2.24	2.00	2.00
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)	3.86	3.54	3.57	3.72	3.33	3.86	3.86	3.88	3.41		3.63	3.86	5.00	5.00
Marawarah	3.75	4.05	3.95	3.85	4.34	3.98	3.97	4.00	3.90		4.00	3.45	2.00	4.00
Mazar-e Sharif	4.07	3.70	3.69	3.28	4.13	3.77	3.66	3.98	3.80		3.76	4.97	5.00	5.00
Mirzaka	3.69	3.46	3.40	3.56	3.41	3.65	3.50	3.96	3.37		3.53	3.91	4.00	5.00
Muhammad Aghah	3.25	3.19	3.47	2.95	3.14	3.40	3.45	3.30	3.24		3.26	2.05	4.00	4.00
Muqer	3.28	3.20	3.35	3.13	3.10	3.47	3.43	3.56	3.39		3.33	3.32	2.00	5.00
Muqur	3.54	3.51	3.77	3.31	3.46	3.71	3.66	3.82	3.30		3.55	3.26	3.00	5.00
Musa Qal'ah	2.67	2.49	2.41	2.75	2.31	3.29	2.84	4.20	2.64		2.86	1.27	2.00	4.00
Nad 'Ali	3.61	3.81	3.63	4.07	3.74	4.05	3.83	4.49	3.54		3.88	1.96	3.00	4.00
Nadir Shah Kot	3.52	3.44	3.54	3.59	3.19	3.74	3.69	3.86	3.35		3.53	3.73	3.00	4.00
Nahr-e Saraj	3.41	3.60	3.45	4.02	3.33	3.94	3.67	4.49	3.44		3.73	2.14	3.00	2.00
Nerkh	2.80	3.06	3.23	2.73	3.21	3.27	3.22	3.36	3.08		3.14	1.48	1.00	4.00
Nizam-e Shahid	3.50	3.25	3.45	3.00	3.29	3.42	3.36	3.53	3.29		3.32	4.15	4.00	4.00

1 = very negative 5 = very positive District	1. Stability Index	1.1. Government Capacity	1.1.1. District Government Performance	1.1.2. District Government Satisfaction	1.1.3. Provincial Government Performance	1.2. Local Governance	1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance	1.2.2. Local Leaders' Performance	1.3. Quality of Life Index		Survey Index	Level Of Control (M36)	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker	Security Incidents
(Guzarah)														
Panjwa'i	3.39	3.59	3.79	3.57	3.43	3.35	3.16	3.73	3.35		3.50	2.63	3.00	4.00
Pashtun Zarghun	3.47	3.34	3.49	3.38	3.15	3.50	3.56	3.39	3.40		3.39	3.70	3.00	5.00
Pul-e Khumri	3.72	3.42	3.73	2.98	3.56	3.78	3.79	3.78	3.42		3.54	3.63	5.00	4.00
Pusht-e Rod	3.15	3.17	3.40	3.33	2.78	3.70	3.86	3.39	3.47		3.37	2.68	2.00	3.00
Qadis	4.05	4.02	4.16	3.89	4.00	4.17	4.15	4.22	3.77		4.03	3.81	4.00	5.00
Qal'ah-ye Zal	3.53	3.37	3.66	3.34	3.11	3.77	3.87	3.58	3.51		3.51	2.44	4.00	5.00
Qalat	2.98	2.22	2.25	2.11	2.28	4.33	4.20	4.58	2.22		2.94	2.78	3.00	4.00
Qarah Bagh (1)	3.41	3.28	3.48	3.18	3.16	3.84	3.86	3.81	3.46		3.49	3.41	3.00	3.00
Qush Tepah	2.88	3.18	3.04	3.68	2.84	3.16	2.94	3.61	3.24		3.22	1.10	1.00	5.00
Ruy Do Ab	4.03	3.64	3.93	4.00	2.99	4.12	4.14	4.09	3.88		3.84	4.97	4.00	5.00
Sangin	2.80	2.91	2.74	3.13	2.85	3.37	2.95	4.22	2.87		3.13	1.52	2.00	2.00
Sar Kani	3.68	4.03	3.84	3.87	4.38	3.88	3.79	4.07	4.02		3.99	3.30	2.00	3.00
Sayyid Karam	3.33	3.14	3.21	3.36	2.86	3.51	3.47	3.57	3.16		3.27	2.20	4.00	5.00
Sayyidabad	2.88	3.06	3.16	2.82	3.20	3.13	3.03	3.32	3.30		3.14	1.23	3.00	2.00
Shah Joy	3.07	2.50	2.52	2.51	2.48	3.98	3.74	4.46	2.76		3.08	2.63	3.00	4.00
Shah Wali Kot	2.65	2.58	2.74	2.41	2.58	2.98	2.96	3.01	2.81		2.75	2.88	2.00	2.00
Shahid-e Hasas	3.55	3.52	3.80	3.56	3.20	3.74	3.61	4.00	3.36		3.59	4.13	2.00	5.00

1 = very negative 5 = very positive District	1. Stability Index	1.1. Government Capacity	1.1.1. District Government Performance	1.1.2. District Government Satisfaction	1.1.3. Provincial Government Performance	1.2. Local Governance	1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance	1.2.2. Local Leaders' Performance	1.3. Quality of Life Index		Survey Index	Level Of Control (M36)	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker	Security Incidents
Shahrak	2.95	3.05	2.96	3.20	2.99	3.10	3.11	3.09	3.17		3.09	1.85	2.00	5.00
Shamul (Dzadran)	3.46	3.33	3.50	3.26	3.22	3.71	3.66	3.80	3.28		3.45	3.19	3.00	5.00
Sharan	3.56	3.55	3.46	3.84	3.35	3.76	3.86	3.56	3.46		3.59	3.22	3.00	5.00
Shibirghan	4.00	3.58	3.78	3.34	3.62	3.89	3.85	3.96	3.73		3.71	4.65	5.00	5.00
Shindand	3.18	3.06	3.30	2.86	3.03	3.56	3.54	3.61	3.13		3.24	2.95	3.00	3.00
Sholgarah	3.68	3.35	3.54	2.97	3.54	3.72	3.60	3.96	3.39		3.50	4.05	4.00	5.00
Spin Boldak	3.51	3.56	3.41	3.96	3.32	3.13	2.82	3.75	3.14		3.40	3.14	4.00	5.00
Takhtapol	3.29	3.47	3.69	3.44	3.27	3.44	3.25	3.82	3.37		3.47	1.36	3.00	5.00
Tanai	3.63	3.40	3.46	3.46	3.28	3.77	3.75	3.80	3.39		3.52	3.38	4.00	5.00
Tarin Kot	3.47	3.47	3.80	3.40	3.20	3.27	3.10	3.62	3.30		3.40	3.12	4.00	4.00
Tarnak wa Jaldak	3.18	3.00	3.94	2.45	2.62	3.74	3.28	4.66	3.13		3.35	1.19	3.00	5.00
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)	3.56	3.32	3.42	3.35	3.21	3.77	3.84	3.64	3.29		3.46	3.66	4.00	4.00
Yusuf Khel	3.63	3.63	3.51	4.02	3.36	3.85	3.99	3.56	3.59		3.67	2.76	4.00	4.00
Zaranj	4.07	3.84	3.45	3.50	4.57	3.75	3.76	3.72	3.54		3.76	5.00	5.00	5.00
Zharay	3.40	3.59	3.85	3.55	3.38	3.22	2.96	3.76	3.42		3.48	2.38	3.00	5.00
Zurmat	3.06	3.08	3.59	3.11	2.56	4.04	3.88	4.35	3.16		3.44	1.78	1.00	4.00

APPENDIX 5: RESILIENCE INDEX SCORES (WAVE 4)

1 = very negative 5 = very positive District	2. Resilience	2.1. Community Cohesion	2.1.1. Social Capital	2.1.2. Local Leader Satisfaction
Adraskan	3.16	3.07	3.43	2.72
Ahmadabad	3.54	3.48	3.58	3.37
Aliabad	3.48	3.20	3.10	3.29
Andar	3.75	3.85	3.77	3.92
Aqcha	3.52	2.89	2.29	3.49
Archi	3.48	3.66	3.69	3.63
Arghandab (1)	3.37	3.20	3.03	3.38
Arghistan	3.28	3.13	3.14	3.12
Aybak	3.76	3.37	3.41	3.33
Baghlani Jadid	3.46	3.52	3.63	3.41
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu)	3.56	3.33	3.30	3.35
Bak	3.56	3.43	3.45	3.41
Bala Boluk	3.05	2.85	2.71	2.98
Balkh	3.49	3.22	3.25	3.20
Baraki Barak	3.37	3.24	3.01	3.46
Chaghcharan	3.19	3.14	3.07	3.21
Chahar Bolak	3.55	3.35	3.40	3.31
Chahar Darah	3.60	3.50	3.60	3.40
Chak-e Wardak	3.20	3.23	3.29	3.17
Chimtal	3.42	3.29	3.28	3.29
Chorah	3.82	3.83	3.78	3.89
Daman	3.35	3.20	3.08	3.32
Dand	3.44	3.42	3.43	3.42

1 = very negative 5 = very positive District	2. Resilience	2.1. Community Cohesion	2.1.1. Social Capital	2.1.2. Local Leader Satisfaction
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in	3.78	3.42	3.35	3.50
Deh Rawud	3.75	3.69	3.70	3.68
Deh Yak	3.55	3.33	3.31	3.34
Dzadran	3.51	3.62	3.65	3.58
Faizabad (2)	3.63	3.20	2.72	3.68
Fayroz Nakhchir	3.75	3.34	3.44	3.24
Garmser	3.76	3.75	3.93	3.58
Gelan	3.55	3.44	3.50	3.38
Gurbuz	3.58	3.53	3.47	3.59
Hazrat-e Sultan	3.85	3.45	3.48	3.41
Imam Sahib	3.80	3.64	3.71	3.58
Injil	3.43	3.29	3.36	3.22
Jaji	3.35	3.21	3.14	3.28
Jaji Maidan	3.61	3.51	3.58	3.44
Jalrayz	2.92	2.82	2.80	2.85
Kajaki	3.46	3.55	3.66	3.44
Kang	3.50	3.12	3.27	2.97
Khak-e-Safayd	2.91	2.78	2.68	2.89
Khanabad	3.65	3.54	3.74	3.35
Khas Kunar	3.67	3.48	3.54	3.42
Khas Uruzgan	3.82	3.68	3.63	3.73
Khoshi	3.23	3.37	3.25	3.49
Khwajah Do Koh	3.75	3.41	3.09	3.74
Khwajah Omari	3.70	3.65	3.73	3.57
Kunduz	3.37	3.30	3.27	3.32
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	3.29	3.30	3.42	3.19
Lajah-Ahmad Khel	3.44	3.35	3.31	3.38

1 = very negative 5 = very positive District	2. Resilience	2.1. Community Cohesion	2.1.1. Social Capital	2.1.2. Local Leader Satisfaction
Lajah-Mangal	3.33	3.21	3.24	3.17
Lashkar Gah	3.87	3.73	3.85	3.61
Maidan Shahr	3.45	3.47	3.47	3.47
Maiwand	3.30	3.14	3.10	3.18
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)	3.66	3.58	3.57	3.59
Marawarah	3.74	3.42	3.57	3.28
Mazar-e Sharif	3.62	3.32	3.28	3.36
Mirzaka	3.56	3.48	3.53	3.43
Muhammad Aghah	3.40	3.51	3.58	3.45
Muqer	3.39	3.28	3.38	3.19
Muqur	3.45	3.23	3.21	3.25
Musa Qal'ah	3.31	3.44	3.71	3.17
Nad 'Ali	3.85	3.68	3.73	3.63
Nadir Shah Kot	3.57	3.48	3.54	3.43
Nahr-e Saraj	3.74	3.56	3.63	3.48
Nerkh	3.12	2.98	2.97	2.99
Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)	3.39	3.40	3.55	3.24
Panjwa'i	3.37	3.30	3.29	3.31
Pashtun Zarghun	3.39	3.30	3.40	3.20
Pul-e Khumri	3.60	3.51	3.65	3.38
Pusht-e Rod	3.48	3.34	3.24	3.44
Qadis	3.87	3.62	3.60	3.63
Qal'ah-ye Zal	3.51	3.29	3.19	3.38
Qalat	3.65	3.64	3.98	3.30
Qarah Bagh (1)	3.58	3.38	3.42	3.34
Qush Tepah	3.26	3.26	3.36	3.15
Ruy Do Ab	3.77	3.36	3.48	3.24

1 = very negative 5 = very positive District	2. Resilience	2.1. Community Cohesion	2.1.1. Social Capital	2.1.2. Local Leader Satisfaction
Sangin	3.45	3.61	3.88	3.33
Sar Kani	3.81	3.59	3.67	3.51
Sayyid Karam	3.39	3.37	3.36	3.37
Sayyidabad	3.27	3.35	3.41	3.30
Shah Joy	3.65	3.64	3.74	3.54
Shah Wali Kot	2.92	2.92	2.99	2.85
Shahid-e Hasas	3.53	3.33	3.39	3.28
Shahrak	3.11	3.08	3.00	3.17
Shamul (Dzadran)	3.53	3.46	3.50	3.42
Sharan	3.55	3.44	3.51	3.38
Shibirghan	3.69	3.46	3.27	3.65
Shindand	3.28	3.06	3.12	3.00
Sholgarah	3.55	3.39	3.47	3.31
Spin Boldak	3.22	3.20	3.21	3.20
Takhtapol	3.38	3.23	3.24	3.23
Tanai	3.60	3.54	3.60	3.48
Tarin Kot	3.29	3.20	3.26	3.14
Tarnak wa Jaldak	3.73	3.79	3.89	3.69
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)	3.51	3.40	3.40	3.40
Yusuf Khel	3.61	3.45	3.46	3.44
Zaranj	3.47	3.17	3.25	3.10
Zharay	3.38	3.39	3.42	3.37
Zurmat	3.76	3.70	3.77	3.62

APPENDIX 6: WAVE 4 QUESTIONNAIRE

MISTI Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey
Wave 4 -- MASTER VERSION

M-1. Respondent Identification Number ___ ___ ___ ___ ___

M-2. Wave Number 04

M-2a. Sample

1. Sample A
2. Sample B

V-1. Questionnaire Version

1. Base Questionnaire Only – No Modules Added
2. CCI Module Added
3. KFZ Module Added
4. CCI and KFZ Module added

M-3. Region

1. Central/Kabul	4. South Western	7. Central/Hazarjat
2. Eastern	5. Western	
3. South Central	6. Northern	

M-4. Sampling Point/District Where the Interview Was Completed:

___ ___ ___ ___

M-5. Geographic Code

1. Villages 2. Towns 3. City 4. Metros (Kabul)

M-6. Province

1. Kabul	10. Nangarhar	19. Samangan	27. Helmand
2. Kapisa	11. Laghman	20. Juzjan	28. Kandahar
3. Parwan	12. Kunar	21. Sar-I-Pul	29. Zabul
4. Wardak	13. Nooristan	22. Faryab	30. Uruzgan
5. Logar	14. Badakhshan	23. Badghis	31. Ghor
6. Ghazni	15. Takhar	24. Herat	32. Bamyan
7. Paktia	16. Baghlan	25. Farah	33. Panjshir
8. Paktika	17. Kunduz	26. Nimroz	34. Dehkondi
9. Khost	18. Balkh		

M-7. Year of Interview: 2014

M-8. Month of Interview

1. January	4. April	7. July	10. October
2. February	5. May	8. August	11. November
3. March	6. June	9. September	12. December

M-9. Date of Interview: ___ ___ ___

M-10. Day of Week of Interview

1. Friday	4. Monday	7. Thursday
2. Saturday	5. Tuesday	
3. Sunday	6. Wednesday	

M-11. Interviewer Code: __ __ __ __ __ __

M-12. Interview Completed on the …

1. First Contact 2. Second Contact 3. Third Contact

M-13. Supervisor Code: ___ ___ ___

M-14. Record Time (using 24 hour clock) Interview Began: __ __: __ __

(Record Time Began Starting With Q-1)

M-15. Record Time (using 24 hour clock) Interview Ended: __ __:__ __

(Fill in all four data positions)

M-16. Record Length of Interview in Minutes: ___ ___

M-17. Date Formatted Field: **APR 2014**

M-18. Keypuncher Code __ __

M-19. Language of Interview

1. Pashto 2. Dari 3. Other 4. Uzbek

M-20. Coder Code __ __

M-21. District Code **__ __ __**

M-22. Language of the questionnaire

1. Pashto
2. Dari

M-23. Village name: _____

M-24. Sampling Point coordinates:

_____

M-25. Field Provider

1. ACSOR
2. Afghan Youth Consulting

Informed Consent

INTERVIEWER READ: *Much work is being done in Afghanistan to create an environment where better government and development can flourish. The purpose of this survey is to ask people like yourself about how this might be better achieved in your local area.*

We would like your views on this issue.

We will not ask for your name and the answers you and others provide will be held in strict confidence. Your responses to the survey questions are strictly voluntary. If we come to a question you do not wish to answer, please tell me and we'll move on. However your answers can be beneficial by providing information which may help to improve stability and minimize conflict in your area, so please answer as truthfully as you can.

Do you give your consent for me to proceed?"

M-25b. Informed Consent _____ (tick)

RECORD THE TIME THE ACTUAL INTERVIEW BEGAN (M-14)
AND USE A 24 HOUR CLOCK (14:24, for 2:24 pm)

KFZ MODULE

First, I am going to ask you some questions about farming, the types of assistance available to farms in this area, and how this household earns its livelihood.

K-1. When I say farming, this includes growing crops for your own use or to sell, and raising animals for your own use or to sell. Does this household farm any land?

1. Yes **(Go to K-2)**
2. No **(Skip to K-34)**

_____
98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to K-34)**
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to K-34)**

K-2a-d. (Ask if code 1 "Yes" in K1) Of all the land that this household farms, what percent does this household own, lease/rent (Ljara), sharecrop (Bazgari), or have access to through some other arrangement? (**The categories should add up to 100%. If none please enter 0%)**

a. Own _____%
b. Lease/rent (Ljara) _____%
c. Sharecrop (Bazgari) _____%
d. Other _____%

Total Must Equal 100%

____
997. Not Asked
998. Refused (vol.)
999. Don't Know (vol.)

K-3. (**Ask only those who own land and said more than 0% in K-2a**) How did your household acquire this land that you own?

1. Inherited
2. Purchased
3. Given by village
4. Firmams – decree of kings

96. Other: (*please specify*) _____

____
97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-4. For any land that you lease, rent, or sharecrop, how much money if any do you pay to the owner to use the land for one year?

Write Response Amount in Afghanis: __ __ __ __ __ __ __

0. Do not make any money payments to owner

____
95. Do not lease, rent or sharecrop
97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-5. For any land that you lease, rent, or sharecrop, how much of your crop if any do you give to the owner to use the land for one year?

0. Do not share any of my crop with owner
1. A little (1-30%)
2. Just under a half (31-40%)
3. About half (41-60%)
4. Just over a half (61-70%)
5. Most (71-95%)
6. All (96+%)

_____
95. Do not lease, rent or sharecrop
97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-6. What kind of written or recorded agreement, legal title, or ownership rights do you have for this plot of land? **(Interviewer: Allow multiple responses, select all that apply)**

1. Title document
2. Sales agreement
3. Lease agreement
4. Sharecropping agreement
5. Firmams – decree of kings
6. Village ownership
7. Do not have a written or recorded agreement

96. Other: (*please specify*) _____

____
97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-7. What is the size in jeribs of all of the land that this household farms? Is it…

1. Less than 1 jerib
2. 1 to 2 jeribs
3. 3 to 5 jeribs
4. 6 to 10 jeribs
5. 11 to 20 jeribs
6. 21 to 50 jeribs
7. 51 to 100 jeribs
8. 101 to 150 jeribs
9. More than 150 jeribs

____

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-8. Is the land irrigated?

1. Yes **(Go to K-9)**
2. No **(Skip to K-11)**

_____

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to K-11)**
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to K-11)**

K-9a-b. (**Ask only those who answered "Yes - irrigated" to K-8)** What is the main source of irrigation in use on the land? What is the next most used source of irrigation on the land?
[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down up to two sources)

K-9a. Main Source:_____

K-9b. Next most used source:_____

1. Rain
2. River
3. Dam
4. Canal
5. Karez
6. Bore-well
96. Other: _____

[ACSOR: Add codes as needed]

____
97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-11a. Please tell me if you grow any of the crops or raise any of the animals on your land from the list I will read out. **(READ OUT and mark all that apply)**

K-11b. [Ask only those who said "Yes" to 7 – Poppy or 17 – Marijuana/Chaars] Please tell me what percentage of your household's farming income comes from each crop you grow or animal you raise. **[Interviewer: For each item the respondent said "yes" to in K-11b, ask them what percentage of their total income came from that crop. ALL ANWERS MUST TOTAL EXACTLY 100%. If the respondent does not understand percentages use your ten fingers to arrive at the correct percentage. Work with the respondent until you have a total of 100%]**

K-12a. And, of all the items we discussed, which is the most important for you and the economic status of your household, which is to say which one do you make the most money from? (**MARK ONLY ONE**)

K-12b. And which is the next most important for you and the economic status of your household, which is to say which one do you make the next most money from? (**MARK ONLY ONE**)

Crop/Livestock	**K-11a. Grown, produced, or raised (read down the table and *circle all that apply*)**	**K-11b. Percent of income from this source**	**K-12a. Most important (*circle only one*)**	**K-12b. Next most important (*circle only one*)**
1. Wheat	1	_____%	1	1
2. Rice	1	_____%	2	2

Crop/Livestock	**K-11a. Grown, produced, or raised (read down the table and *circle all that apply*)**	**K-11b. Percent of income from this source**	**K-12a. Most important (*circle only one*)**	**K-12b. Next most important (*circle only one*)**
3. Maize	1	_____%	3	3
4. Corn	1	_____%	4	4
5. Safflower	1	_____%	5	5
6. Barley	1	_____%	6	6
7. Poppy	1	_____%	7	7
8. Cotton	1	_____%	8	8
9. Soya	1	_____%	9	9
10. Potato	1	_____%	10	10
11. Onion	1	_____%	11	11
12. Cumin	1	_____%	12	12
13. Sunflower	1	_____%	13	13
14. Okra	1	_____%	14	14
15. Green gram (Mung beans)	1	_____%	15	15
16. Other pulses (lentils, peas, beans)	1	_____%	16	16
17. Marijuana (Chaars)	1	_____%	17	17
18. Alfalfa	1	_____%	18	18
19. Clover	1	_____%	19	19
20. Melon	1	_____%	20	20
21. Water melon	1	_____%	21	21
22. Pomegranates	1	_____%	22	22
23. Grapes	1	_____%	23	23
24. Apricots	1	_____%	24	24
25. Palms	1	_____%	25	25
26. Apples	1	_____%	26	26
27. Pears	1	_____%	27	27
28. Peaches	1	_____%	28	28

Crop/Livestock	**K-11a. Grown, produced, or raised (read down the table and *circle all that apply*)**	**K-11b. Percent of income from this source**	**K-12a. Most important (*circle only one*)**	**K-12b. Next most important (*circle only one*)**
29. Cows (Cattle)	1	_____%	29	29
30. Chickens (Poultry)	1	_____%	30	30
31. Oxen	1	_____%	31	31
32. Donkeys	1	_____%	32	32
33. Horses	1	_____%	33	33
34. Camels	1	_____%	34	34
35. Sheep	1	_____%	35	35
36. Goats	1	_____%	36	36
96. Other (please specify)	1	_____%	96. Specify	96. Specify
97. Not Asked	1	97	97	97
98. Refused (vol.)	1	98	98	98
99. Don't Know (vol.)	1	99	99	99

K-13. **[ASK ONLY IF GROW ANY CROPS]** Thinking about the crops you grow, do you store the harvested crop/s or do you sell it/them within a few days?

1. Stored **(Go to K-14)**
2. Sold within a few days **(Skip to K-15)**

_____

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to K-15)**
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to K-15)**

K-14a-c. (**Ask only those who answered "Stored", code 1 in K-13**) In what type of storage facility did you store the harvested crop/s?

	Yes	No	Not Asked	Ref. (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a. Farm bin, shelter or other temporary storage facility on the farm	1	2	97	98	99
b. Cold storage facility	1	2	97	98	99
c. Other (specify):	1	2	97	98	99

K-15a-c. Thinking about your household over the past year, what percentage of the crops you grew, the farm products you made, and the animals you raised did you sell or trade at the market? Please tell me for each category if you sold or traded 0% to 100% of the product:

K-15a. Crops _____% [enter 0 to 100]
K-15b. Products/Farm Supplies _____% [enter 0 to 100]
K-15c. Animals _____% [enter 0 to 100]

____
997. Not Asked
998. Refused (vol.) **SKIP TO Q19**
999. Don't Know (vol.) **SKIP TO Q19**

K-16a-c. [**ASK IF SOLD ANY % IN K-15a-c**] Thinking again about the crops, products, or animals that you sold in the past year, would say you received a very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad price for each of the following:

	Very Good	Somewhat Good	Somewhat Bad	Very Bad	Not Asked	Refused (vol.)	DK (vol.)
K-16a. Crops	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
K-16b. Products / Farm Supplies	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
K-16c. Animals	1	2	3	4	97	98	99

K-17. [**ASK IF SOLD ANY % IN K-15a-c**] What was the main location where you sold most of your crops/livestock/products? **(Single response, mark only main location)**

1. At the farm
2. Alongside the road
3. At a local market in my village
4. At a local market in the Howsa
5. At a market in the district center
6. At a market in the provincial center
7. To a cooperative

17.

96. Other: (*please specify*) _____

____

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-18. [**ASK IF SOLD ANY % IN K15a-c**] How did you transport your goods to market?

1. Walked with cart or baskets
2. Donkey/horse/mule/camel with cart or baskets
3. Tractor and cart
4. Bicycle
5. Motorcycle
6. Zaranj / Rickshaw
7. Passenger Car
8. Van
9. Truck

96. Other: (*please specify*) _____

____

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-19. Did you use any fertilizers, pesticides, seeds, feed or paid labor on your farm during the last year?

1. Yes **(Go to K-20a)**
2. No **(Skip to K-22)**

_____

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to K-22)**
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to K-22)**

K-20a-e. [**ASK IF code 1, "YES" IN K-19**] How much does your economic success depend on the following? Does [insert item] play a very large role, a medium size role, a small role, or no roll at all in the economic success of the activities on your land?

	Very large role	**Medium size role**	**Small role**	**No role at all**	**Not Asked**	**Refused (vol.)**	**DK (vol.)**
K-20a. Fertilizers	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
K-20b. Pesticides	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
K-20c. Seeds	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
K-20d. Feed	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
K-20e. Paid labor	1	2	3	4	97	98	99

K-21a-e. [**ASK IF CODE 1, "YES" IN K-19**] For the following items, please tell me if you are able to access the item. Do you have access to all you need, access to some of what you need, insufficient access, no access at all or do you not need these to be successful?

	Access to all you need	**Access to some of what you need**	**Insufficient access to what you need**	**No access at all**	**Do not need to be successful**	**Not Asked**	**Ref (vol.)**	**DK (vol.)**
a. Fertilizers	1	2	3	4	5	97	98	99
b. Pesticides	1	2	3	4	5	97	98	99
c. Seeds	1	2	3	4	5	97	98	99
d. Feed	1	2	3	4	5	97	98	99
e. Paid labor	1	2	3	4	5	97	98	99

K-22. Have you received any assistance from outside of your household for the farming activities you conducted on your land over the past year?

1. Yes **(Go to K-23)**
2. No **(Skip to K-25)**

_____

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to K-25)**
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to K-25)**

K-23a-c. (**Ask only those who answered CODE 1 "Yes" to K-22**) From where did you receive this assistance? Did you receive assistance from…

	Yes	**No**	**Not Asked**	**Refused (vol.)**	**DK (vol.)**
a. The Afghan Government	1	2	97	98	99
b. International Organization / NGO	1	2	97	98	99
c. Another source (specify):	1	2	97	98	99

K-24a-e. (**Ask only those who answered Code 1 "Yes" to K-22**) What type of assistance did you receive? Did you receive assistance with…

	Yes	**No**	**Not Asked**	**Ref (vol.)**	**DK (vol.)**
a. Fertilizers	1	2	97	98	99
b. Pesticides	1	2	97	98	99
c. Seeds	1	2	97	98	99
d. Feed	1	2	97	98	99
e. Storage of crops	1	2	97	98	99
e. Other: _____	1	2	97	98	99

K-25. In the past year, did you try to obtain credit or a loan from any source outside of your household?

1. Yes **(Go to K-26)**
2. No **(Skip to K-32)**

_____

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to K-32)**
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to K-32)**

K-26. (**Ask only those who responded code 1 "Yes" to K-25**) Were you successful in obtaining credit or a loan?

1. Yes **(Go to K-27)**
2. No **(Skip to K-31)**

_____

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to K-32)**
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to K-32)**

K-27. (**Ask only those who responded code 1 "Yes" to K-26**) From what source/s did you obtain the credit/loan? Did you obtain a loan from…

	Yes	No	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a. Family and/or friends	1	2	97	98	99
b. Landlord	1	2	97	98	99
c. Wealthy lender	1	2	97	98	99
d. Bank	1	2	97	98	99
e. Afghan Government	1	2	97	98	99
f. International Organization / NGO	1	2	97	98	99
g. Lending group	1	2	97	98	99
h. Other: _____	1	2	97	98	99

K-28. (**Ask only those who responded code 1 "Yes" to K-26**) What was the total amount of credit or loans that you obtained in the past year? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down one response in Afghanis)**

Write Response: _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Afs

_____

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-29. (**Ask only those who responded code 1 "Yes" to K-26**) Did you have to offer collateral (an item you would lose if you did not repay the loan) to obtain the credit/loans?

1. Yes **(Go to K-30)**
2. No **(Skip to K-32)**

_____

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to K-32)**
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to K-32)**

K-30. (**Ask only those who responded "Yes" to K-29**) What collateral did you have to offer? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down one response)**

1. Land
96. Other (specify) _____

[ACSOR: Add codes as needed]

____
97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-31. (**Ask only those who responded code 2 "No" to K-26**) Why did you not receive credit or a loan? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down one response)**

Write Response: _____

_____
97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-32a-c. What types of assistance would be most useful in helping you farm in the coming year? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down top three responses)**

K-32a. First Response:_____

K-32b. Second Response:_____

K-32c. Third Response:_____

1. Seed
2. Fertilizer
3. Herbicide
4. Pesticide
5. Feed
18.
96. Other (specify) _____
19.

[ACSOR: Add codes as needed]

____
97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-33. What types of facilities would be most useful in helping you prepare your crops/animals/products for market in the coming year? Please tell me for each of the following if it would be very helpful, somewhat helpful, not very helpful, or not at all helpful:

Facility	Very helpful	Somewhat helpful	Not very helpful	Not at all helpful	Not Asked	Ref. (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a. Cold storage	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
b. Grading facility	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
c. Canning factory	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
d. Drying facility	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
e. Packaging factory	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
f. Flour mill	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
g. Feed mill	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
h. Spinning mill	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
i. Other (please specify) 20. 21. _____	1	2	3	4	97	98	99

(ASK ALL)

K-34. Apart from farming, does this household operate any other type of business?

1. Yes **(Go to K-35a)**
2. No **(Skip to K-37a)**

_____

98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to K-37a)**
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to K-37a)**

K-35a-b. (**Ask only those who answered code 1 "Yes" to K-34**) What type/s of business/es?
[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down all first two responses)

a. First Response: _____

b. Second Response: _____

_____

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-36. (**Ask only those who answered code 1 "Yes" to K-34**) How much of the household income comes from this/these business/es?

1. All of it (96-100%)
2. Most of it but not all (71-95%)
3. Just over a half (61-70%)
4. About half (41-60%)
5. Just under a half (26-40%)
6. Just a little (6-25%)
7. None (0-5%)

____

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-37a-b. In terms of earning a livelihood, in order of priority, what are the two biggest problems facing this household in terms of earning a livelihood? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down two responses)**

Write Responses:

a. (Biggest problem) _____

b. (Next biggest problem) _____

_____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

[ASK ALL]

Q-1. Generally speaking, are things in [*name the district*] going in the right direction or in the wrong direction? Is that a lot or a little?

1. Right direction (a lot)
2. Right direction (a little)
3. Wrong direction (a little)
4. Wrong direction (a lot)

____

97. Neither right nor wrong direction (vol.)
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

MODULE 1: SECURITY & CRIME

Q-2a. Would you say security in your local area is good, fair or poor? Is that 'very good/poor'?

1. Very good
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
5. Very Poor

____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-2b. Is your local area more secure, about the same, or less secure than it was a year ago? Is that 'much more/less secure' or 'somewhat more/less secure'?

1. Much more secure
2. Somewhat more secure
3. About the same
4. Somewhat less secure
5. Much less secure

_____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't know (vol.)

Q-3a. I would like to know about security on the roads you use in this area. Overall, would you say that security on the roads you use in this area is very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad?

1. Very good
2. Somewhat good
3. Somewhat bad
4. Very bad

____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-3b. Would you say that security on the roads you use in this area has improved, worsened, or stayed the same in the past year? Is that 'improved/worsened a little or a lot'?

1. Improved a lot
2. Improved a little
3. Stayed the same
4. Worsened a little
5. Worsened a lot

_____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't know (vol.)

Q-4a-d. Please tell me how secure do you feel when you are … [*insert situation*]? Is that very secure, somewhat secure, somewhat insecure, or very insecure?

	Very secure	Somewhat secure	Somewhat insecure	Very insecure	Ref. (vol.)	Don't Know (vol.)
a) …in your home during the day?	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) …in your home during the night?	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) …traveling to a neighboring village?	1	2	3	4	98	99
d) … traveling to the district or provincial capital?	1	2	3	4	98	99

Q5.1a-c. How would you rate the level of…[insert item] in your area? Is there a lot, a little, or none at all?

	A lot	A little	None at all	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) …petty crime and offenses (theft of food or goods worth less than a few thousand afs)	1	2	3	98	99
b) …serious, non-violent crimes (theft of goods worth more than 5,000 afs)	1	2	3	98	99
c) …serious violent crimes (murder, assault or kidnapping)	1	2	3	98	99

Q-5.2a-c. Compared to last year, how would you rate the level of …[*Insert Item*] in your area? Is it much less, a little less, the same, a little more or much more?

	Much less	A little less	The same	A little more	Much more	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) …petty crime and offenses (theft of food or goods worth less than a few thousand afs)	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
b) …serious, non-violent crimes (theft of goods worth more than 5,000 afs)	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
c) …serious violent crimes (murder, assault or kidnapping)	1	2	3	4	5	98	99

Q-6.1a-f. How would you rate the presence of [Insert item] in your area?

	A lot	Some	None	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Afghan National Army	1	2	3	98	99
b) Arbaki	1	2	3	98	99
c) Afghan National Police	1	2	3	98	99
d) Armed Opposition Groups	1	2	3	98	99
e) Afghan Local Police	1	2	3	98	99
f) ISAF	1	2	3	98	99

Q-6.2a-b. Overall, how much confidence do you have in …[*Insert Item*] to make your area safe? Would you say you have a lot of confidence, some confidence, a little confidence or no confidence at all? **(If respondent answered 3 "None" to an item in Q-6.1, please record the corresponding item in Q-6.2 as 97 "Not Applicable")**

	A lot of Confidence	Some confidence	A Little confidence	No confidence at all	Not Asked /Not Applicable (vol.)	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) …the Afghan National Army	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
b) …the Afghan National Police	1	2	3	4	97	98	99

Q-7a-b. Overall, has the ability of the [*Insert Item*] to provide security in your area improved, worsened, or stayed the same in the past year? Is that 'improved/worsened a little or a lot'?

	Improved a lot	Improved a little	Stayed the same	Worsened a little	Worsened a lot	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Afghan National Army	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
b) Afghan National Police	1	2	3	4	5	98	99

MODULE 2: GOVERNANCE

Q-8. **[INTERVIEWER: Please read the following introduction followed by the statement pair]** I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.

1. The Afghan government is well regarded in this area.
2. The Afghan government is **not** well regarded in this area.

____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-9a-d. How much confidence do you have in your [*Insert Position/Organization*]? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all?

	A lot of conf.	Some conf.	Not much conf.	No conf.	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) District Governor	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) District Government	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Local village/neighborhood leaders	1	2	3	4	98	99
d) Provincial Governor	1	2	3	4	98	99

Q-10a-d. How responsive do you think your [*Insert Item*] is/are to the needs of the local people in this area? Is [*insert item*] very responsive, somewhat responsive, somewhat unresponsive, or very unresponsive?

	Very responsive	Somewhat responsive	Somewhat unresponsive	Very unresponsive	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) District Governor	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) District Government	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Local village/neighborhood leaders	1	2	3	4	98	99
d) Provincial Governor	1	2	3	4	98	99

Q-11a-d. Over the past year, has the [*Insert Item*] ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? Is that 'improved/worsened a little or a lot'?

	Improved a lot	Improved a little	No change	Worsened a little	Worsened a lot	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) District Governor's	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
b) District Government's	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
c) Local village/neighborhood leaders'	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
d) Provincial Governor's	1	2	3	4	5	98	99

Q-12a. Please, tell me, do you know of/have you heard of District Development Assembly in your district?

1. Yes **(Go to Q-12b)**
2. No **(Skip to Q-13a)**

_____

98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q-13a)**
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-13a)**

Q-12b. [Filtered, if 'yes' to Q12a] How much confidence do you have in your District Development Assembly? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all?

	A lot of conf.	Some conf.	Not much conf.	No conf.	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
District Development Assembly	1	2	3	4	7	98	99

Q-12c. [Filtered, if 'yes' to Q12a] How responsive do you think your District Development Assembly is to the needs of the local people in this area? Is it very responsive, somewhat responsive, somewhat unresponsive, or very unresponsive?

	Very responsive	Somewhat responsive	Somewhat unresponsive	Very unresponsive	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
District Development Assembly	1	2	3	4	7	98	99

Q-12d. [Filtered, if 'yes' to Q12a] And over the past year, has the District Development Assembly's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? Is that 'improved/worsened a little or a lot'?

	Improved a lot	Improved a little	No change	Worsened a little	Worsened a lot	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
District Development Assembly	1	2	3	4	5	7	98	99

Q-13a. (ASK ALL) Please, tell me, do you have Community Development Council established in your area?

1. Yes **(Go to Q-13b)**
2. No **(Skip to Q-14)**

_____

98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q-14)**
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-14)**

Q-13b. [Filtered, if 'yes' to Q13a] How much confidence do you have in your Community Development Council? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all?

	A lot of conf.	Some conf.	Not much conf.	No conf.	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
Community Development Council	1	2	3	4	7	98	99

Q-13c. [Filtered, if 'yes' to Q13a] How responsive do you think your Community Development Council is to the needs of the local people in this area? Is it very responsive, somewhat responsive, somewhat unresponsive, or very unresponsive?

	Very responsive	Somewhat responsive	Somewhat unresponsive	Very unresponsive	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
Community Development Council	1	2	3	4	7	98	99

Q-13d. [Filtered, if 'yes' to Q13a] And over the past year, has the Community Development Council's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? Is that 'improved/worsened a little or a lot'?

	Improved a lot	Improved a little	No change	Worsened a little	Worsened a lot	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)

Community Development Council	1	2	3	4	5	7	98	99

Q-14a-h. [ASK ALL] [INTERVIEWER: For each of 14a-h, please read the following introduction followed by the statement pair] I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.

Q-14a.

1. The District Government officials in this district are from this district.
2. The District Government officials in this district are **not** from this district.

____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14b.

1. The District Government understands the problems of people in this area.
2. The District Government **does not** understand the problems of people in this area.

____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14c.

1. The District Government cares about the people in this area.
2. The District Government **does not** care about the people in this area.

____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14d.

1. District Government officials in this district abuse their authority to make money for themselves.
2. District Government officials in this district **do not** abuse their authority to make money for themselves.

____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14e.

1. District Government officials visit this area.
2. District Government officials **do not** visit this area.

____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14f.

1. In general, the District Government officials are doing their jobs honestly.
2. In general, the District Government officials are **not** doing their jobs honestly.

____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14g.

1. The District Government delivers basic services to this area in a fair manner.
2. The District Government **does not** deliver basic services to this area in a fair manner.

____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q14h.

1. It is acceptable for people to publicly criticize the Afghan government.
2. It is **not** acceptable for people to publicly criticize the Afghan government.

____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

MODULE 3: SERVICE PROVISION & DEVELOPMENT

Q-15. Overall, do you think that services from the government in this area have improved, worsened, or not changed in the past year? Is that 'improved/worsened a lot or a little'?

1. Improved a lot
2. Improved a little
3. Not changed
4. Worsened a little
5. Worsened a lot

____
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-16a-i. Generally speaking, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the district government's provision of [*Insert Item*]? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

	Very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	Service not provided (vol.)	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Clean Drinking Water	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
b) Water for irrigation and uses other than drinking	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
c) Agricultural assistance (*seed fertilizer, equipment*)	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
d) Retaining and flood walls	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
e) Roads and bridges	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
f) Medical Care	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
g) Schooling for girls	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
h) Schooling for boys	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
i) Electricity	1	2	3	4	97	98	99

Q-17a. In the last year, have you seen or heard about any development projects in your local area, or not?

1. Yes **(Go to Q-17b)**
2. No **(Skip to Q-18)**

_____
98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q-18)**
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-18)**

Q-17b. (**Ask respondent if answered code 1 "Yes" in Q-17a**). What development projects have you seen or heard about in your local area?
(**INTERVIEWER: READ OUT PRECODES. Circle each response mentioned.**)

Q-17c. (**Ask if respondent answered code 1 "Yes" in Q17b. If item is not circled in Q-17b, circle '97')** Did the project improve life for people in this local area?

Q-17b. *What development projects have you seen or heard about in this area?*				***Q-17c. If project type is mentioned in Q-17b, ask*** *Did the project/s improve life for people in this local area?* ***If project type is not mentioned in Q-17b, circle '97'.***		
	Not asked	Yes	No	Yes	No	Not Men'd
a) Drinking Water	97	1	2	1	2	97
b) Irrigation/water maintenance systems	97	1	2	1	2	97
c) Agricultural assistance (*seed fertilizer, equipment*)	97	1	2	1	2	97
d) Farm produce processing or storage facilities	97	1	2	1	2	97
e) Retaining and flood walls	97	1	2	1	2	97
f) Roads and Bridges	97	1	2	1	2	97
g) Medical Facilities	97	1	2	1	2	97
h) Schools	97	1	2	1	2	97
i) Electricity	97	1	2	1	2	97

Q-17b. *What development projects have you seen or heard about in this area?*				***Q-17c. If project type is mentioned in Q-17b, ask*** *Did the project/s improve life for people in this local area?* ***If project type is not mentioned in Q-17b, circle '97'.***		
j) Other (Specify)	97	1	2	1	2	97

Q-18a-b. (ASK ALL) Looking forward to the next year, what type of development projects are most needed in this area? You can mention two. Please start with the most needed, then the next most needed. **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down two responses)**

Q-18a. (most needed): _____

Q-18b. (next most needed): _____

____
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-19-a-b. (ASK ALL) Which of the following are the two biggest obstacles to your obtaining health care or medicine? **(INTERVIEWER: READ OUT RESPONSES. Record up to two starting with the biggest and then second biggest obstacle)**
(NEW in Wave 2)

Q-19a. (biggest obstacle): _____

Q-19b. (second biggest obstacle): _____

1. Lack of clinics/hospitals
2. Distance to facilities, lack of transportation and/or good roads
3. Cost of health care or medicine
4. Corruption or need to pay bribes to receive treatment
5. Lack of professional doctors
6. No services for women or a lack of female healthcare workers
7. Lack of medicines
8. Lack of medical equipment
9. Poor security
96. Other
98. Refused
99. Don't Know

MODULE 4: RULE OF LAW

Q-20a-c. If you or a family member was involved in a dispute concerning [*Insert Item*], please tell me who or where you would go to get justice? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED]**

	Govt. Court	Local/Tribal Elder/s	Armed Opposition Groups	Other (*write in*)	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Land or water	1	2	3	96 _____	98	99
b) Assault, murder, or kidnapping	1	2	3	96 _____	98	99
c) Theft	1	2	3	96 _____	98	99

Q-21a-c. How much confidence do you have in [*Insert Item*] to fairly resolve disputes? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all?

	A lot of conf.	Some conf.	Not much conf.	No conf.	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Local/tribal elders	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) Government courts	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Armed opposition groups	1	2	3	4	98	99

Q-22a-c. Do you think that people in your village/neighborhood always, mostly, sometimes or never respect the decisions made by [*Insert Item*]?

	Always	Mostly	Sometimes	Never	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Local/tribal elders	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) Government courts	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Armed opposition groups	1	2	3	4	98	99

MODULE 5: CORRUPTION

Q-23. Is corruption a problem in this area, or not?

1. Yes
2. No

___

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-24. From what you know or have heard about, which department or sector of the local government do people most complain about corruption? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down one response)**

Write Response:_____

____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-25. In the last year has the level of corruption in this area increased, decreased, or stayed about the same? Is that increased/decreased a little or a lot?

1. Increased a lot
2. Increased a little
3. Stayed about the same
4. Deceased a little
5. Decreased a lot

_____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

MODULE 6: QUALITY OF LIFE (WELL-BEING & STANDARD OF LIVING)

Q-26. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Would you say you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

1. Very satisfied
2. Somewhat satisfied
3. Somewhat dissatisfied
4. Very dissatisfied

_____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-27. How satisfied are you with your household's current financial situation? Would you say you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

1. Very satisfied
2. Somewhat satisfied
3. Somewhat dissatisfied
4. Very dissatisfied

_____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-28. Thinking about the past year, would you say overall that your ability to meet your basic needs increased, decreased, or stayed the same? Is that 'increased/decreased a little or a lot'?

1. Increased a lot
2. Increased a little
3. Stayed the same
4. Decreased a little
5. Decreased a lot

_____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-29. How worried are you about being able to meet your basic needs over the next year? Are you

not worried, a little worried, or very worried?

1. Not worried
2. A little worried
3. Very worried

_____
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-30. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.

1. The situation in this area is certain enough for me to make plans for my future.
2. The situation in this area is **too uncertain** for me to make plans for my future.

____
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

MODULE 7: ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Q-31. Compared to a year ago, how would you describe your ability to get to your local markets? Is it much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse, or much worse?

1. Much better
2. A little better
3. About the same
4. A little worse
5. Much worse

_____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-32. Compared to a year ago, how have prices for basic goods changed in your local markets?
Have they increased a lot, increased a little, stayed about the same, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?

1. Increased a lot
2. Increased a little
3. Stayed about the same
4. Decreased a little
5. Decreased a lot

_____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-33. Compared to a year ago, how would you describe the availability of paid jobs in your local area? Are there a lot more, a little more, about the same, a few less, or a lot less paid jobs available in your local area?

1. A lot more
2. A little more
3. About the same
4. A little less
5. A lot less

_____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

MODULE 8: COMMUNITY COHESION & RESILIENCE

Q-34a. How often do things from outside your village/neighborhood create problems in this area to disrupt normal life? Is that often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often **(Go to Q-34b)**
2. Sometimes **(Go to Q-34b)**
3. Rarely **(Go to Q-34b)**
4. Never **(Skip to Q-35a)**

____

98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q-35a)**
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-35a)**

Q-34b. (Ask those who answered 1, 2 or 3 to Q-34a) What is the most common type of interference from outside the village/neighborhood that creates problems in this area? What is the next most common type of interference? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down two responses)**

Q-34b_1. Write Response: _____

Q-34b_2. Write Response: _____

____

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-34c. (Ask those who answered 1, 2 or 3 to Q-34a) How often are the people here able to solve these problems that come from outside the village? Is it often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely
4. Never

____

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-35a. (ASK ALL) How often do things from inside your village/neighborhood create problems in this area to disrupt normal life? Is that often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often **(Go to Q-35b)**
2. Sometimes **(Go to Q-35b)**
3. Rarely **(Go to Q-35b)**
4. Never **(Skip to Q-36)**

____

98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q-36)**
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-36)**

Q-35b. (Ask those who answered 1, 2 or 3 to Q-35a) What is the most common type of interference from inside the village/neighborhood that creates problems in this area? What is the next most common type of interference? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down two responses)**

Q-35b_1. Write Response: _____

Q-35b_2. Write Response: _____

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-35c. (Ask those who answered 1, 2 or 3 to Q-35a) How often are the people here able to solve these problems that come from inside the village? Is it often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely
4. Never

____

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-36. (ASK ALL) When there is a problem in this area, how often do the villages/neighborhoods in this area work together to solve the problem? Is that often, sometimes, rarely or never?

1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely
4. Never

____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-37a. When decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of ordinary people in the village/neighborhood considered? Are they considered often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often **(Go to Q-37b)**
2. Sometimes **(Go to Q-37b)**
3. Rarely **(Go to Q-37b)**
4. Never **(Skip to Q-38)**

_____

98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q-38)**
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-38)**

Q-37b. (Ask if answered codes 1, 2 or 3 in Q-37a) In your opinion, when decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of women considered? Are they considered often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely
4. Never

_____

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-38. **(ASK ALL)** How effective or ineffective are your local leaders at securing funds for your village/neighborhood's needs from the district and/or provincial government? Are they very effective, somewhat effective, somewhat ineffective, or very ineffective?

1. Very effective
2. Somewhat effective
3. Somewhat ineffective
4. Very ineffective

____
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-39a-b. Do you belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss issues of common interest or to do certain activities together? Examples may include sports clubs, women's groups, business associations, trade unions, farmers' associations, development councils, religious welfare organizations, or charities, etc.

Q-39a.

1. Yes **(Please list below in Q-39b)**
2. No **(Skip to Q-40)**

_____
98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q-40)**
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-40)**

Q-39b. (Ask if answered code 1 "Yes" to Q-39a) [INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down up to two responses) What type of group/s do you belong to?

Q-39b_1. Write Response: _____

Q-39b_2. Write Response: _____

____
97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

MODULE 9: GRIEVANCES

Q-40a-b. (ASK ALL) Thinking about the different problems that people in this area talk about, what are the two biggest problems that create stress or tension in this area? Please try to be specific, starting with the biggest problem. **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down two responses)**

Q-40a. Biggest problem: _____

Q-40b. Next biggest problem: _____

____
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

MODULE 10: MEDIA

Q-41a-i. Do you use any of the following to communicate with others and/or get news and information?

	Yes	No	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Television	1	2	98	99
b) Radio	1	2	98	99
c) Mosque/mullah	1	2	98	99
d) Friends and family	1	2	98	99
e) Elders	1	2	98	99
f) Cell phone	1	2	98	99
g) Posters & billboards	1	2	98	99
h) Newspapers	1	2	98	99
i) Internet/email	1	2	98	99

Q-42a-b. From where do you get most of your information about government services? From where do you next get your information about government services? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down two responses)**

Write Response/s:

Q-42a. _____

Q-42b. _____

_____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

CCI MODULE

C-1a. On another subject, elections, tell me, to the best of your knowledge how many people ***from your community*** participated and voted in the in the last Presidential election in April of this year? Would you say that it was…

C-1b. And, to your understanding, how many people ***from the neighboring settlements*** in your area participated and voted in the last Presidential election in April of this year? Would say that it was…

	Hardly any	**Some**	**About half**	**A lot**	**Most/ Almost All**	**Refused (vol.)**	**Don't Know (vol.)**
a. In your community	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
b. In neighboring settlements	1	2	3	4	5	98	99

C-2a. From your memory, did people from your community mostly vote for the same candidate, or did people have different opinions and vote for different candidates during the last Presidential election in April of this year?

C-2b. And to the best of your recollection, in the latest Presidential election in April of this year did people from your community vote for the same candidate as the people in neighboring villages in your area? Or, did people in your community vote for one candidate, while those in neighboring villages voted for different candidates?

	Same Candidate	**Different Candidates**	**Ref. (vol.)**	**DK (vol.)**
a. Within your community	1	2	98	99
b. Your community and neighboring settlements	1	2	98	99

C-3 a-g. Still thinking of the last Presidential election in April of this year, did you have any of the following in your community during the time before the election day?

	Yes	**No**	**Ref. (vol.)**	**DK (vol.)**
a) Discussions in your community about which candidate to vote for	1	2	98	99
b) Arguments in your community about which of the candidates to vote for	1	2	98	99
c) Clashes/physical violence in your community about which of the candidates to vote for	1	2	98	99
d) Clashes/physical violence between your community and people from neighboring villages about which of the candidates to vote for	1	2	98	99
e) Violence on the election day between supporters of different candidates for President	1	2	98	99
f) Disputes after the elections about how voting stations were managed	1	2	98	99
g) Disputes after the elections about the final results	1	2	98	99

READ: *"Now I will read some pairs of statements. There may be some truth in both, but please tell me which you agree with more."*

C-4. (READ STATEMENTS) Please tell me which statement you agree with more.

Statement A: *Voting is a personal, individual responsibility. Each person should vote for whomever he or she wants to regardless of what their community thinks.*

Statement B: *One cannot vote for whomever he or she wants to. We are all members of a community and should vote the way our community votes.*

1. Statement A
2. Statement B

_____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

C-5. (READ STATEMENTS) Please tell me which statement you agree with more.

Statement A: *Obeying the laws of the Afghan government is necessary to achieve peace and prosperity.*

Statement B: *There may be times when it is necessary to take matters into your own hands, even if this means breaking the law.*

1. Statement A
2. Statement B

_____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

C-6 a-b. If you or a family member was involved in the following [*Insert Item*], please tell me who or where you would go to get justice? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED]**

	Government Court	**Local/ Tribal Elders**	**Afghan National Police (ANP)**	**Other (*write in*)**	**Ref (vol.)**	**DK (vol.)**
a) Disputes during the election process in your community	1	2	3	96 _____	98	99
b) Violence during the election process in your community	1	2	3	96 _____	98	99

C-7. Which do you trust more to make the right decisions about managing voting on the election day for your community: government leaders and officials in this area, or tribal and community leaders in this area?

1. Government leaders and officials in this area
2. Tribal and community leaders in the area

_____

3. Neither (vol.)
4. Both equally (vol.)
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

C-8. How concerned are people in your community about possible threats from anti-government elements against those who plan to participate in the election? Very concerned? Somewhat concerned? Not very concerned? Not at all concerned?

1. Very concerned
2. Somewhat concerned
3. Not very concerned
4. Not at all concerned

_____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

MODULE 11: INDIRECT QUESTIONS

Q-43a. It has recently been suggested by the Afghan government that people be allowed to vote in elections to select the members of their district council. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

_____

98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-43b. It has recently been suggested by the Taliban that people be allowed to vote in elections to select the members of their district council. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

_____

98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-44a. It has recently been suggested by the Afghan government that expensive new prisons be constructed in every district to help alleviate overcrowding in existing prisons. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support with this policy

_____

98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-44b. It has recently been suggested by the Taliban that expensive new prisons be constructed in every district to help alleviate overcrowding in existing prisons. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

_____
98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-45a. It has recently been suggested by the Afghan government that the weak Independent Election Commission (IEC) be strengthened to prevent election fraud. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose with this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

_____
98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-45b. It has recently been suggested by the Taliban that the weak Independent Election Commission (IEC) be strengthened to prevent election fraud. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

_____
98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-46a. It has recently been suggested by the Afghan government that the weak Office of Oversight for Anti-Corruption be strengthened by allowing it to collect information about government officials suspected of wrong-doing. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

_____
98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-46b. It has recently been suggested by the Taliban that the weak Office of Oversight for Anti-Corruption be strengthened by allowing it to collect information about government officials suspected of wrong-doing. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

_____
98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-47a. Despite the possible risks, the democratically-elected government of Afghanistan wants the full transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces to happen sooner than is now planned. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

_____
98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-47b. Despite the possible risks, the Karzai administration wants the full transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces to happen sooner than is now planned. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

_____
98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-48a. Despite the poor results of past anti-corruption campaigns, the democratically-elected government of Afghanistan wants to do a new campaign to eliminate corruption. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

_____
98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-48b. Despite the poor results of past anti-corruption campaigns, the Karzai administration wants to do a new campaign to eliminate corruption. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

_____
98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-49a. The democratically-elected government of Afghanistan wants to make a new law that makes it a crime for Mullahs to preach anti-government messages or to incite violence during their Friday sermons. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

_____
98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-49b. The Karzai administration wants to make a new law that makes it a crime for Mullahs to preach anti-government messages or to incite violence during their Friday sermons. Do you oppose or support with such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

_____
98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-50a. The democratically-elected government of Afghanistan has called for improved access to

education for women and girls. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

_____
98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-50b. The Karzai administration has called for improved access to education for women and girls. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

_____

98. Refused
99. Don't know

DEMOGRAPHICS

INTERVIEWER READ: ***"Now I would like to ask you some questions for statistical purposes."***

D-1. Gender **(INTERVIEWER, Do Not Ask: code based on your observation of the person's gender)**

1. Male
2. Female

D-2a. (Ask All) How old were you on your last birthday? **(Record actual age; if respondent refuses, please estimate)**

___ ___

D-2b. In the previous question (D-2a) is this:

1. An estimated age
2. An actual age

D-3. How many years of formal education from primary school through university education have you completed?

Years (write in): _____

_____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-4. And, apologies to be asking this, but regardless of your attained level of education, can you fluently perform each of the following in your native language?

	Yes	No	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a. Read a letter	1	2	8	9
b. Write a letter	1	2	8	9
c. Read a book	1	2	8	9

D-5a. What is your job status now? Are you…

1. Full-time farmer
2. Working full-time
3. Working part-time
4. Unemployed-Looking For Work
5. Unemployed-Not Looking For Work
6. Housewife (not working outside of the home)
7. Student/Apprentice
8. Retired/ Disabled

_____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-5b. **(ASK IF RESPONDENT IS WORKING, UNEMPLOYED, OR RETIRED in D-5a codes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 8):** What is/was your primary occupation? **(INTERVIEWER: FOR THOSE WHO ANSWERED UNEMPLOYED OR RETIRED/DISABLED, ASK THE RESPONDENT WHAT THEIR OCCUPATION WAS WHEN THEY WERE WORKING. RECORD BELOW AND CODE).**

INTERVIEWER WRITE

OCCUPATION:_____

1. Government Employee Support Staff
2. Government Employee Mid-Level (Supervisory)
3. Government Employee Senior Level Officer
4. Agricultural Laborer
5. Farming On Own Farm
6. Farm Owner Employing Laborers
7. Unskilled Worker
8. Semi-Skilled Worker
9. Skilled Worker
10. Private Employee Support Staff
11. Private Employee Mid-Level (Supervisory)
12. Private Employee Senior Officer
13. Private Business Sole Proprietor
14. Private Business Employing 1-5 Workers
15. Private Business Employing More Than 5 Workers
16. Military/Police
96. Other

_____

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-5c. (Ask if respondent answered code 5 "Farming on own land" in D-5b) What is the main crop that you grow? **(CODE ONE RESPONSE)**

Write Response: _____

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-6. Are you the head of household?

1. Yes
2. No
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-7. How many people live in your household?
Interviewer: (code response) ___ ____
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-8. What is your marital status now? Are you currently…

1. Married?
2. Widowed or Divorced?
3. Single?

_____
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-9. What is your household's total monthly income in Afghanis from all sources, that is, all types of income for all the people living at this address?

1. 1,000 Afghanis or less,
2. From 1,001 to 1,600
3. From 1,601 to 2,400
4. From 2,401 to 4,000
5. From 4,001 to 6,000
6. From 6,001 to 8,000
7. From 8,001 to 12,000
8. From 12,001 to 16,000
9. From 16,001 to 20,000
10. From 20,001 to 24,000
11. From 24,001 to 40,000
12. Greater than 40,000 Afghanis?

_____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-10. When asked 'Who are you?' some people answer first by indicating their occupation, others state their nationality, others tell their ethnicity, others their Qawm, others religion, others the region/province they are from, etc. If asked this question, what would you indicate about yourself in the first place?

1. Occupation
2. Nationality
3. Ethnicity/Qawm
4. Religion
5. Province/region

____

96. Other (specify) _____
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-11. Do you consider yourself to be…

1. Pashtun
2. Tajik
3. Uzbek
4. Turkmen
5. Hazara
6. Baloch
7. Kirghiz
8. Nuristani
9. Aimak
10. Arab
11. Kuchi
12. Other

_____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-12. What is your religious affiliation? **(If Respondent Says Muslim Ask):** Do you consider yourself to be Shia or Sunni?

1. Shia Muslim
2. Sunni Muslim
3. Other

_____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-13. What is your qawm?

Qawm: _____ (write in)

_____
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-14. Were you born in this district, or not?

1. Yes
2. No

_____
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-15a. Have you or has any other member/s of this household been injured or killed as a result of the fighting since the Taliban was removed from power?

1. Yes (**Go to D-15b**)
2. No **(Skip to M-26)**

_____
98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to M-26)**
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to M-26)**

D-15b. **(Ask if answered code 1 "Yes" at D-15a)** Which group/s was/were responsible for the injury/s or death/s? **(Do not read PRECODES, code up to two responses)**

D-15b_1. Write Response: _____

D-15b_2. Write Response: _____

Precodes:

1. Taliban
2. ISAF
3. ANSF
4. Haqqani
5. [intentional blank]
6. Armed people
7. Foreign forces
8. Thieves
9. Local disputes
10. Warlords
11. Criminals
12. Karzai's men
13. Jamyat-e-Islami
14. Pakistanis
15. AGE
16. Soviet Union
17. None
18. Hizb-e Islami
19. Wahdat political party
20. Arbakies
21. Suicide attacks
22. Personal enmity

96. Other (Specify:_____)
97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

M-26. Have you previously participated in a public opinion survey?

1. Yes **(Go to M-27)**
2. No **(Skip to M-28)**

_____

8. Refused (Vol.) (**Skip to M-28)**
9. Don't Know (Vol.) (**Skip to M-28)**

M-27. (Ask if answered 'yes' to M-26) How long ago did you participate in the survey?

1. Less than 1 month
2. 1-3 months ago
3. 4-6 months ago
4. 7-9 months ago
5. 10-12 months ago
6. More than 1 year ago

_____

7. Not Asked
8. Refused (vol.)
9. Don't Know (vol.)

M-28. **(Ask All)** Would you be willing to participate in another of our surveys next year?

1. Yes
2. No

_____

8. Refused (Vol.)
9. Don't Know (Vol.)

RECORD THE TIME (USING 24 HOUR CLOCK) INTERVIEW WAS COMPLETED AND THE LENGTH OF THE INTERVIEW (M-15 AND M-16)

Read Closing Statement to the Respondent:

"Thank you for participating in our survey. Do you have any questions? In the next few hours or days my supervisor may contact you to evaluate the quality of my work and answer any other questions you may have. To help him/her do that, could I have your telephone number?"

Telephone number: _____

"If my supervisor calls you by telephone, he/she will begin by asking if you were surveyed in the last few hours/days. He/she will **not ask** you for your name or address. If someone you don't know contacts you by telephone and asks for your name and/or address you should end the call and not talk to them."

Interviewer Certification: "I certify that I have completed this interview according to the instructions provided me by _____.

_____	_____	__ __ __ __ __ __
Signed	Date	Interviewer Code

M-29. Interviewer: How many people were present for the interview? ____ ____

M-30. Interviewer: Which of the following statements do you think best describes the level of comprehension of the survey questionnaire by the respondent?

1. The respondent understood all of the questions
2. The respondent understood most of the questions
3. The respondent understood most of the questions but with some help.
4. The respondent had difficulty understanding most of the questions, even with help from me

M-31. Interviewer: Which of the following statements best describes the level of comfort or unease that the respondent had with the survey questionnaire?

1. The respondent was comfortable (at ease) with the entire questionnaire
2. The respondent was comfortable with most of the questions
3. The respondent was comfortable with only some of the questions
4. The respondent was generally uncomfortable with the survey questionnaire

M-32. Interviewer: Please indicate which, if any, of the questions caused this respondent any uneasiness or decreased cooperation during the interview. **(Write down the number of the question numbers, in order of mention).**

a. First Mention _____
b. Second Mention _____
c. Third Mention _____

M-33. SES Level: INTERVIEWER: Try to ask participant about access to water and electric (for electric it can be either municipal electric or a generator). Make your own decision about quality of the road. Select the code that is closest to the appearance and situation of the household. Code 1 represents the highest household economic situation and Code 5 the lowest household economic situation.

1. A/B [High quality road, access to water and electric 6 to 7 days]
2. C+ [Good road, access to water and electric 4 to 5 days per]
3. C, C- [Fair road, access to water and electric only a 1 to 3 days per week]
4. D [Poor road, access to water and electric 1 day a week, or less]
5. E [Poor or no road, no or very infrequent access to water and electric]

M34a- Was the interview controlled or back checked by MISTI?

1. It was back checked by MISTI
2. It was not back checked by MISTI

To Be Completed By The Supervisor:

M-34b. Was the interview subject to quality control/back-check?

1. Yes
2. No

M-35. Method of quality control/back-check

1. Direct supervision during interview
2. Back-check in person by supervisor
3. Back-check from the central office
4. Not applicable

MISTI Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey
M-36 Supplemental Question

I

NTERVIEWER Instructions: The supplemental question (M-36) is to be completed by the interviewer after completing his/her interviews in the sampling point. Interview is to fill out one for each sampling point completed.

M-2. Wave Number 01

M-4. Sampling Point/District Where the Interview Was Completed: ___ ___ ___ ___

M-11. Interviewer Code: __ __ __ __ __ __

M-36. INTERVIEWER: Please judge which situation best describes this village:

1. ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby; no Taliban activity or presence has been reported
2. ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby; some Taliban activity or presence has been reported, especially at night
3. ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby but do not move freely at night; village administrators usually do not sleep in their homes, and Taliban activity takes place regularly
4. Taliban forces are permanently based in this village or nearby and operate freely; ISAF or Afghan security forces may visit the village on occasion but do not stay
5. Taliban forces are permanently based in this village or nearby and operate freely; no ISAF or Afghan security force presence or activity at all
6. Local arbaki control this village; minimal Taliban, ISAF, or Afghan security force presence at all
7. There are no ISAF, Taliban, Afghan security forces, or arbaki controlling this village

APPENDIX 7: MISTI SURVEY WAVE 4 METHODS REPORT

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APPENDIX 8: MISTI SURVEY WAVE 4 VALIDATION REPORT