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# MISTI STABILIZATION TRENDS AND IMPACT EVALUATION SURVEY

ANALYTICAL REPORT, WAVE 2: MAY 18 – AUGUST 7, 2013

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ANALYTICAL REPORT

WAVE 2: MAY 18 – AUGUST 7, 2013



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Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI)

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## ACRONYMS

AAPOR	American Association of Public Opinion Researchers
ACSOR	Afghan Center for Socioeconomic and Opinion Research
Afs	Afghanis (local currency)
ALP	Afghan Local Police
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
AOG	Armed Opposition Groups
ASF	Afghan Security Forces
AYC	Afghan Youth Consulting
CCI	Community Cohesion Initiatives
CDC	Community Development Council
CDP	Community Development Program
DDA	District Development Assembly
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MISTI	Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives
MSI	Management Systems International
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
RC	Regional Command
SIKA	Stability in Key Areas
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The USAID/Afghanistan Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives project (MISTI) Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey (Wave 2) seeks to identify trends in stability and measure stabilization programming impact across USAID's stabilization program districts. Data collection for the Wave 2 survey was conducted in 82 districts of Afghanistan between May 18 and August 7, 2013 and builds upon the Baseline Survey (Wave 1), which was conducted between September 13 and December 23, 2012. The intent of the MISTI project (the Project) is to provide USAID with information for evidence-based decisionmaking about how, where and when to invest increasingly scarce resources to promote stability and set the stage for transition to Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) led security and longer-term development. ***In terms of key findings concerning USAID programming impact the two most relevant, directly related stability measures – “increased confidence in local government” and “improved GIROA delivery of basic services” - suggest a positive, albeit faint, association between USAID stabilization assistance and increased stability.***

### Limitations

The report identifies several limitations associated with the impact evaluation and endorsement (or survey) experiments. The most significant limitation affecting the impact evaluation is that the number of treated observations (villages) covered by the Wave 2 impact evaluation (N=76) is small. Due to reasons beyond the control of the Project, a delay in beginning the implementation of the main nationwide USAID stabilization program, “Stability in Key Areas” (SIKA), resulted in far fewer completed activities at the time of the Wave 2 survey than USAID had anticipated. The other significant stabilization project, the “Community Cohesion Initiative” (CCI) also had not progressed as far as originally planned. The result is that the MISTI Wave 2 survey could take only initial steps towards assessing the impact of stabilization programming, due to the low number (219 total) of SIKA (24) and CCI (195) activities actually underway or completed in the 76 intervention villages included in both Waves 1 and 2 of the survey.

As the number of ongoing and completed project activities increases, so too does the MISTI survey's precision and the reliability of the findings concerning the stabilization program's impacts. MISTI will revisit the initial impact evaluation findings available from the Wave 2 survey as the number of treated villages increases in subsequent survey waves.<sup>1</sup>

Another perceived limitation of the Wave 2 findings may be that the survey was conducted during the ISAF base closure process, which could have and likely did affect survey respondent perceptions. Information on this process was not available from ISAF sources, and therefore MISTI could not control for the events. The MISTI survey methodology only controls for observations when the matched pairing is done of villages to create the counterfactual for the impact evaluation. It is to be expected that over the life of the MISTI project and USAID stabilization programming there will be a steady stream of events in

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<sup>1</sup>It is important to note, that the other Wave 2 survey findings regarding stability trends and the endorsement experiments are not affected by the low number of activities in the sample.

Afghanistan (e.g., the upcoming Presidential election, the Bilateral Security Agreement decision, etc.) that may be reflected in survey findings

steady stream of events in Afghanistan (e.g., the upcoming Presidential election, the Bilateral Security Agreement decision, etc.) that may be reflected in survey findings. That said, it is important for USAID to understand citizen stability perceptions associated with these types of events. MISTI stabilization trends and impact evaluation survey analytical reports will continue to cite major events which occur during fieldwork that could have affected respondent perceptions.

## Stability Trends

Between the fall of 2012 and summer of 2013 Afghan's perceptions of stability declined in two-thirds of USAID's programming areas covered by the MISTI survey. Of the 58 districts surveyed in *both* Waves 1 and 2, stability scores decreased in 39 districts and increased in 19. Areas that experienced the greatest decline include: northern Helmand province (particularly the northeastern districts of Sangin, Kajaki and Musa Qal'ah); Farah province (Bala Boluk and Pusht-e Rod districts); Kunduz province; rural Kandahar (with the exception of Maiwand district); Wardak province (Sayed Abad district); northeastern Ghazni province (Deh Yak, Andar and Ghazni districts); and, southern Paktiya (Zurmat district). Stability improved most significantly in: Marawara (Kunar province); Khwajah Omari (Ghazni province); Garmser (Helmand province); Dand (Kandahar province); Shamal (Paktiya province); Terayzai (Khost province); and, Tarnak Wa Jaldak (Zabul province).

Eight dimensions of stability are explored in the survey, and several of these are highlighted in the report. There has been a decline in perceptions of **local security**, and this trend may correspond with a reported increase in the presence of Armed Opposition Groups (AOG). Geographic areas of local security concern include: Wardak province; southern Paktiya; the Route 1 corridor including most districts in Wardak, Logar, Ghazni and Zabul provinces; the rural districts of Kandahar province (especially those through which Route 1 does not run); northern Helmand province; and, Farah province (Bala Boluk and Pusht-e Rod districts) and the neighboring district of Shindand (Herat province).

Overall, the survey found that **confidence in local government** is mixed. The measure's aggregate score declined somewhat across surveyed districts, yet respondents in 30 out of 58 districts indicated improved confidence in local government. Several districts in northern Helmand and Paktiya provinces reported a large decrease in confidence. The MISTI Wave 3 survey results will be useful in helping to better understand the mixed results.

Perceptions of **local government corruption** have increased significantly across the survey area. With few exceptions, local government corruption is perceived as pervasive and growing worse. Interestingly, the geographic areas that do show improvement -- northeastern Helmand province and two districts in Kandahar province (Shah Wali Kot and Spin Boldak) -- also reported, with the exception of Spin Boldak, a greater presence of AOGs, a deteriorating local security situation, and an increased loss of confidence in local government.

Perceptions of **local government service delivery** are somewhat mixed, with most significant declines reported in the western provinces and northern Helmand. When analyzing the individual districts surveyed in both Waves 1 and 2, one finds that 36 districts experienced negative change in perceived

levels of government services delivery while 22 experienced positive change. Four districts experienced quite significant decline, while only one demonstrated a significant improvement.

Overall, perceptions of **local area resilience** were unchanged, though several districts in northeastern Helmand, and Paktiya, do report significant decreases in local resilience scores. Notable improvement in local area resilience scores are recorded for Bala Boluk (Farah province) and Andar (Ghazni province).

The **level of optimism**, measured by asking respondents whether they perceive their districts to be headed in the ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ direction, has decreased slightly across the survey area, albeit with more negative results in districts in the west of the study area, northern Helmand province, and several districts spanning the border area between eastern Ghazni and southwestern Paktiya provinces.

Perceptions of **quality of life** have generally declined across the survey area, such as in the West, northeastern Helmand province, and most of Kandahar province. Six districts experienced very positive changes, two in Paktiya province (Waz Drazadran and Sayyid Karam), and one in each of Wardak province (Nerkh), Logar province (Baraki Barak), Kandahar province (Maiwand) and Kunar province (Sar Kani). In other geographic areas surveyed, perceptions of the respondents’ quality of life received mixed results. Several districts in northern Helmand and Paktiya provinces reported large decreases in the quality of life.

One geographic area that is repeatedly highlighted in the stability trends findings is northeastern Helmand (Sangin, Kajaki and Musa Qal’ah districts). The stability scores of this area have dramatically deteriorated in terms of:

- Overall Stability Composite Index
- Moving in the right direction (respondent optimism)
- Local security
- Presence of AOG
- Confidence in local government.

What is interesting is that this area, heavily contested for years and site of the Kajaki hydroelectric dam, has recently experienced significant draw-down of ISAF forces (the British and U.S. Marines), and perhaps with that GIRoA state presence. The MISTI evidence clearly indicates that what can be assumed as increased Taliban influence if not outright control in an area is significantly correlated with a high instability. Indeed, the only positive note for this particular area is a significant reduction in perceptions of local area corruption. The Taliban may be brutal, provoke pessimism among residents, and inept in providing services, but they appear to be perceived as less corrupt than their previous GIRoA counterparts.

In the MISTI Wave 3 analysis and report, this area in northern Helmand will be looked at more closely to ascertain the impact of USAID programming, and support for the GIRoA and Taliban using the endorsement experiments data. For the sake of comparison, a similar focus will be put on a similarly sized

area with largely positive numbers. This outlier analysis should provide USAID with a better understanding of stability dynamics and the ability to influence them.

## Impact Analysis

The findings from this initial round of the MISTI impact evaluation suggest that USAID programming is, in most cases, not having a statistically significant impact on citizen *perceptions* of stability. In some instances the (limited) data indicate that USAID programming is associated with a decrease in perceived stability among respondents. The net difference for the Aggregate Stability Index is a -0.655 decrease in perceived stability, indicating that villages with USAID stabilization assistance witnessed a net decrease in perceived stability, compared with control villages, when comparing the values across the two MISTI survey waves. As recommended in the report, USAID should consider further qualitative analysis based on the MISTI survey's wealth of quantitative data to better ascertain the reasons behind the impact evaluation findings.<sup>2</sup>

In spite of the overall results, two of the nine stability indicators measured suggest a possible positive effect for USAID assistance. These are, "increased confidence in local government" and "improved GIRoA-delivery of basic services." *It is notable that of the stability measures, it is these two which are most directly associated with the objectives of USAID's stabilization programming.* Although the presence of Armed Opposition Groups, another indicator, may have a significant impact on the perception of local stability, it is clearly not something USAID has control over or can directly influence.

In stating these findings, it is important to acknowledge the small size of the sample used in this initial impact evaluation. Due to the nascent stage of programming by the four SIKa projects at the time of the Wave 2 survey, MISTI was able to identify a relatively small number of 219 project activities in 76 treated villages to include in the impact analysis; approximately eighty-five percent of which were drawn from the CCI project areas. This means that MISTI is unable as a result of the Wave 2 survey to break the results down by stabilization project. As a result of the small sample, treatments included in the Wave 2 survey may be unrepresentative of the broader array of (planned) project activities, as well as the impact they may have when they fully materialize. Another caveat is that the effects of stabilization project activities might develop slowly over time, such that later MISTI survey waves will pick up a larger impact than was the case for Wave 2. In this first round of impact evaluation, MISTI was only able to examine the *near term effects* of these (limited) project activities. The recently completed Wave 3 of the MISTI Survey will deliver a much larger sample of activities in treated villages and findings related to impact may be quite different using this more significant and geographically distributed sample.

## Endorsement Experiments

MISTI uses an indirect survey approach known as "endorsement experiments" to measure respondents' relative levels of support for the GIRoA and the Taliban. Endorsement experiments have proved useful for eliciting truthful answers to sensitive questions in conflict settings, specifically Afghanistan and Pakistan, relying on subtle word changes in survey questions to measure support for different actors without

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<sup>2</sup> An example might be the correlation, if any, between impact and the number, size (cost) and/or time spent implementing stabilization activities in a particular district. The analysis might also look at how long the effect, if any, of stabilization programming lasts after an activity is completed.

triggering a respondent's social desirability bias (the tendency to satisfy an enumerator's questions in the hopes of conforming to social norms) or strategic calculation (i.e., fitting answers to the questioners' presumed preferences in the hopes of receiving material gain, or avoiding retribution including physical harm). With further data from subsequent survey waves and its analysis, endorsement experiments can help USAID better understand the MISTI stabilization trends and impact evaluation results.

Findings from the Wave 2 endorsement experiments include: (1) a marked shift toward greater relative support for the Taliban in over half of the 888 villages that were surveyed in both Waves 1 and 2 of the MISTI survey; (2) a number of key provinces, including Helmand, Kandahar, and Kunduz, appear to be increasingly polarized along pro-GIRoA and pro-Taliban lines; (3) exposure to ISAF and ANSF violence, gender (females), higher *per capita* income, full-time employment, and head-of-household status are associated with an increase in support for the Taliban; (4) being literate and living in a more remote area appear to reduce support for the Taliban; and, (5) factors such as respondent age and population size of a village are unconnected to support levels for either the GIRoA or Taliban.

## Recommendations Resulting from the Wave 2 Survey

Four recommendations emerged from the findings of the MISTI Wave 2 survey. None of these pertain directly to USAID stabilization programming. One post-baseline wave of the MISTI survey does not provide a sound basis for doing so, particularly given the impact evaluation limitations noted repeatedly in the report. However, Wave 3 of the MISTI survey, for which field work was recently completed, amounts to the mid-term impact evaluation of the stabilization program and as such will most certainly result in programming recommendations. The overarching objective of MISTI is to assist USAID better understand stabilization trends and program impacts so as to inform decision-making related to performance improvement and resource allocation. The results of the Wave 3 survey, expected in May 2014, along with the completed mid-term performance evaluations of SIKA and CCI also conducted by MISTI will provide USAID with a basis to do so.

First, future analysis should: (a) examine the relationship between violence and aid in the post-aid implementation period to determine if stabilization programming is somehow correlated with an increase in violence; (b) explore persistence of perceptions associated with stability across multiple waves; and, (3) work to include additional variables for matching, including proximity to now-closed ISAF bases and facilities.

Second, breaking down the violence counts into types and lethality of violence, something now underway at MISTI, should be prioritized. These data would prove highly useful in disentangling the relationship, if any, between the sheer existence of programming and the occurrence of violence, and would act as a useful behavioral complement to the perception-based data that the MISTI survey now generates.

Third, the findings discussed in this report fall into three baskets: stability trends; the impact evaluation; and, the endorsement experiments. The impact evaluation findings are based upon correlating the stability trends data with the (initial) stabilization programming. Using the MISTI survey data, USAID should consider correlating the results of the endorsement experiments with the findings of both the stability trends and impact evaluation work. In other words, does (greater) GIRoA or Taliban support correlate with stability trends and/or the impact of stabilization programming? USAID should also consider

conducting deeper analysis of the MISTI survey's wealth of data to better ascertain the reasons behind the findings across all three baskets in order to inform and improve future programming.

Lastly, it is important for the implementing partners (IPs) and their respective USAID programs (CCI, SIKa and KFZ) to better integrate their data efforts with the MISTI project. Nearly one-third of the ongoing project activities covered in Wave 2 could not be used by MISTI for the impact evaluation because MISTI cannot locate the villages on its village dataset. IPs and projects are either using different village datasets or programming in villages that are not listed on any village dataset, including MISTI's. IPs may be identifying these villages using different names, or spellings that are different to those used in the MISTI village dataset. All IPs should be required to use a standard village dataset for selecting locations and reporting on project activities. This will enable MISTI, USAID, and those parties conducting project verification to know exactly where the IP has conducted project activities. MISTI consolidated several village datasets to create the MISTI village dataset. STAB-U should require its IPs to use this dataset in selecting villages for activities<sup>3</sup>. Addressing this problem will improve the value to USAID of subsequent survey waves. It is important to note that this problem does not involve the accuracy of GPS coordinates.

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<sup>3</sup> USAID is currently considering acquiring a village dataset from Alcis that has identified every cluster of compounds in Afghanistan using satellite imagery. If the Alcis dataset is acquired it should become the standard village dataset used by all USAID IPs. If the Alcis village dataset is not acquired by USAID, the MISTI village dataset provides the next most comprehensive list of villages available. Stabilization Unit IPs should then be required to select villages from the MISTI village dataset.

# INTRODUCTION

MISTI is tasked with providing quantified and scientifically rigorous measures of stability trends and USAID stabilization programming impacts across selected districts of Afghanistan. In order to achieve this MSI developed a data-rich and geographically detailed systematized approach to data collection and analysis. This included combining existing sources of data with innovative methods for the collection of new data and their analysis. In doing so, MSI took care to ensure consistency with ADS 203 Assessing and Learning (<http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/203.pdf>), and USAID/Afghanistan Mission Order 201.03 on Gender Analysis and Integration, issued Sept. 24, 2011.

USAID/Afghanistan has invested considerable thought, time and resources to the design and implementation of stabilization projects and activities. This has included involving a range of stakeholders to: identify and assess local causes of instability; design and implement activities to address those causes; and, assess the resulting impact on regional stabilization trends.

Although some civilian and military data related to stabilization trends and programming impacts exists, their dissemination and shared analysis remain a challenge. Difficulties in sharing and comparing information and the lack of uniform systems for the collection, analysis and reporting of data have complicated attempts to understand stabilization trends and measure the impacts of programming in the complex environment of Afghanistan. Attempts to do so have also been hampered at times by secrecy and, in many instances, environmental factors, not the least of which is insecurity.

In order to meet these challenges MSI took stock of existing data, analysis and knowledge management systems to ensure that MISTI built on best practices and lessons learned. Where existing data proved unreliable, MSI developed tools and systems for the collection of new data and its analysis. This included the semi-annual MISTI survey, for which the baseline (Wave 1) was conducted in fall 2012. This report documents the findings of the first (Wave 2) of four follow-up surveys, and provides an *initial* basis to better understand stability trends and USAID stabilization programming impact in selected areas of Afghanistan.

The report is organized as follows. First, it briefly describes the survey methodology before presenting the initial stability trends analysis by comparing the Wave 1 (baseline) stability index<sup>4</sup> scores with scores from Wave 2.<sup>5</sup> The stability index is then broken down by its component parts, allowing a deeper exploration of stability across several dimensions, including security, optimism, governance, corruption, quality of life, resilience, the provision of government services, and the presence of armed groups opposed to the government. The analysis is reported in narrative form using charts to graphically illustrate results and maps to provide a geographically detailed presentation of the data.

Next, the report describes the main findings about the impacts and effects of CCI and SIKA programming on nine different stability indicators. These findings provide a basis for initial assessment of why certain emerging patterns involving the impact of USAID programming can be observed.

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<sup>4</sup> The Stability Index components, variables and how they are weighted, rescaled and the index score calculated is attached to this report as Appendix D.

<sup>5</sup> The Wave 2 Stability Index scores and component indicator scores are provided in Appendix C.

Lastly, the report presents the preliminary results of the “endorsement experiments” to measure respondents’ relative levels of support for the GIROA and the Taliban. Using multilevel modeling, MISTI analysts then have determined which village-level factors are associated with a shift toward one actor or the other, as well as explore individual-level factors that appear to account for GIROA or Taliban support.

## METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW<sup>6</sup>

The target population was Afghan citizens, 18 years of age or older, living in 82 pre-selected districts throughout 19 provinces in Afghanistan. Seventy-six of these districts were selected because they were locations where at least one of the six stabilization projects was either operating or planning to operate in the future. The final six districts were identified as relatively stable districts and served as control for analytical purposes.

The target sample size for the project was 36,912 interviews. The achieved sample size was 36,475 interviews after all quality control measures were employed and unacceptable interviews were rejected. The target sample size for each district ranged between 320 and 480 interviews with the average size per district being 448 interviews.

Sampling was done by first using a disproportionate stratification by district. The sample was spread across 82 districts specified by MISTI and based on input from USAID and its stabilization program IPs. These districts were located in the following 19 provinces: Parwan, Wardak, Logar, Ghazni, Paktiya, Khost, Kunar, Baghlan, Kunduz, Samangan, Badghis, Herat, Farah, Nimroz, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzghan and Ghor. These were the same provinces included in the Wave 1 baseline survey.

Primary sampling units were villages within each district which were also selected by MISTI. In some instances, villages were determined to be inaccessible to interviewing teams due to security concerns, travel restrictions (imposed by either insurgent groups or NATO forces) or weather. In these instances, a replacement village was selected from a list of allowable replacement villages provided by MISTI to the data collection companies used: the Afghan Center for Socioeconomic and Opinion Research (ACSOR) and Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC). These replacements were made so that the new village was from the same Community Development Council (CDC) area in order to maintain geographic continuity among the replacement location.

Due to the purposive nature of the district selection (non-probability, non-stratified, selected by MISTI to meet programmatic needs), an accurate margin of error and design effect cannot be calculated for the aggregated data set as each district was launched using a unique sample plan. Sampling was approached as though each district was a standalone sample design. That said, assuming a simple random sample with  $P=0.5$  and a 95% confidence interval, the margin of sampling error for the aggregated data set of 36,475 interviews is  $\pm 0.5\%$ .<sup>7</sup> A chart showing each district’s resulting statistics can be found in the “Sample Design” section, sub-section “2.3 Margin of Error”, of the Methods Report attached to this report as

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<sup>6</sup> The complete Methodolgy Report is attached to this report as Appendix B.

<sup>7</sup> This statistic is primarily for reference; analysis for these data is seldom done in aggregate with all cases being analyzed simultaneously. The more useful statistics for practical analysis are the design effects and the resulting margin of error and complex margin of error calculations that were generated for each individual district.

Appendix B. In addition to the individual district results, design effect and margin of error calculations were also generated for each of the six program areas and the control districts. These were derived using an average design effect for all districts covered by a program and then using the aggregated sample for each program to calculate the estimates. The program level results can also be found in sub-section “2.3 Margin of Error,” of the Methods Report.

The Wave 2 survey was conducted face to face by 1,139 ACSOR interviewers and 68 AYC interviewers. Due to ACSOR’s size and public profile, some districts were inaccessible to ACSOR interviewers because it was difficult to enter and exit certain areas without attracting the attention of insurgent elements and endangering the safety of the ACSOR interviewers. Certain districts were also accessible only to male interviewers due to cultural and security concerns. ACSOR maintains an accessibility tracker to monitor each district in Afghanistan. This tracker is updated monthly as the security situation in Afghanistan changes frequently. As a result of ACSOR’s inaccessibility assessment, the interviews in eleven districts were conducted completely by AYC and another four districts were interviewed using both ACSOR and AYC interviewers during the Wave 2 field work.

The ACSOR interviewing teams consisted of male and female interviewers who were local residents of the areas where the interviews were conducted. The ACSOR interviewers utilized a random walk methodology to select households and a Kish grid to randomize respondent selection within households. These interviewers were all from the province where they conducted interviews and in most instances they were from the districts where the interviews were conducted. The ACSOR interviewing teams were overseen by a supervisory team from their province. The supervisory team consisted of 19 lead supervisors (one for each province) and one or two assistant supervisors in each province that helped with back checks, field monitoring and general field logistics throughout the field period. ACSOR’s Wave 2 survey field work began on May 18, 2013 and concluded on July 8, 2013.

The AYC interviewing teams consisted of small groups of male interviewers who were from the districts where the interviews were conducted. Due to the poor security situation in the districts where they conducted field work, the AYC interviewing teams selected households through convenience sampling using their local knowledge of the villages and contacts they have within those villages to lessen the possibility of encountering insurgent elements that would result from employing a random walk. Since the AYC interviewers were all male and they selected households through convenience sampling, respondents were selected by either asking for the male head of household or interviewing another male member of the household who was available at the time. The AYC interviewers were overseen by a team of 15 supervisors who were responsible for back checking, direct observations and all field logistics. AYC began field work on June 10, 2013 and concluded on August 7, 2013.

Contact sheets were completed by both ACSOR and AYC interviewers throughout the field period. ACSOR used American Association of Public Opinion Researchers (AAPOR) calculation standards to derive the following field performance and disposition rates:

- Response Rate 3 = 79.6%
- Cooperation Rate 3 = 98.0%
- Refusal Rate 2 = 1.6%

AAPOR offers a variety of formulas to calculate disposition rates depending on the circumstances for which they are being used. ACSOR typically uses the rates reported above as they most logically fit the face to face field methodology used in Afghanistan.

The questionnaire<sup>8</sup> consisted of 37 management and quality control variables, 85 substantive questions and 31 demographic questions. A copy of the questionnaire is attached to this report as Appendix A. For the purposes of this count, each item in a battery question is counted as 1/3 of a variable. For the household roster in the demographic questions, each question is counted as two variables using the estimate that each household would have an average of about six family members and the entries for each family member are counted as 1/3 of a variable. The average length of time it took for an interview to be conducted was 40 minutes with the shortest interview taking 20 minutes and the longest interview taking two hours and 20 minutes.

## STABILITY TRENDS

MISTI is tasked with surveying the Afghan population to improve the USG's understanding of overall stability within USAID's targeted stabilization districts. Part of this task is to provide a detailed description and analysis of stability trends.

### Section Organization

The section begins by detailing the analytical methodology. The report then describes the main findings, exploring stability and each of the eight dimensions used in its exploration: optimism (is the area moving in the right or wrong direction?), change in local area security, presence of AOG, confidence in local government, local government corruption, local government services delivery, local area resilience, and quality of life.

### Summary of Findings

Between the fall of 2012 and summer of 2013, stability declined across most USAID stabilization programming areas. The greatest declines occurred in northern Helmand province (particularly the northeastern districts of Sangin, Kajaki and Musa Qal'ah); Farah province (Bala Boluk and Pusht-e Rod districts); Kunduz province; rural Kandahar province (with the exception of Maiwand district); Wardak province (Sayed Abad district); northeastern Ghazni province (Deh Yak, Andar and Ghazni districts); and southern Paktiya (Zurmat district). Stability improved in Marawara district (Kunar province); Khwajah Omari (Ghazni province); Garmser (Helmand province); Dand (Kandahar province); Shamal (Paktiya province); Terayzai (Khost province); and Tarnak Wa Jaldak (Zabul province).

Of the eight dimensions of stability explored, there was a notable decline in perceptions of local area security. This largely corresponds with the reported increased presence of AOGs. Areas of particular concern include: Wardak province; southern Paktiya; most of the Route 1 corridor between Kabul and Kandahar cities, including most districts in Wardak, Logar, Ghazni and Zabul provinces; the rural districts

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<sup>8</sup> A copy of the Wave 2 Master Questionnaire is attached to this report as Appendix A.

of Kandahar province (especially those through which Route 1 does **not** run); northern Helmand province; and Farah province (Bala Boluk and Pusht-e Rod districts) and the neighboring district of Shindand in Herat province.

Confidence in local government declined only marginally across Afghanistan, with mixed district-level results in most areas. The perception of local government corruption increased significantly across the surveyed area. With few exceptions, local government corruption is perceived as pervasive and getting worse. Perceptions of local government service delivery are mixed, with notable declines reported in the west of the country and northern Helmand. Overall, local area resilience changed little. Perceptions involving the quality of life have declined across the survey area and particularly in the western region, northeastern Helmand province, and most of Kandahar province. In other geographic areas, the perception of quality of life received mixed results.

## Methodology

To provide a stability score, the MISTI team created a Stability Index composed of several different sub-indices and indicators exploring different aspects of stabilization. Areas explored include: changes in local area security (in the last 12 months); the presence of armed opposition groups; the general direction the district is heading in (right/wrong); confidence in local government; perceptions of corruption in local government; local government provision of public services; local area resilience; and the quality of life.

Seventy-five percent of the Stability Index is drawn from data derived from the MISTI Survey, while 10 percent is drawn from enumerators' assessments (observations) of the level of control by different groups (most notably the GIRoA and the Taliban) in a given district. Ten percent is derived from the ACSOR District Accessibility Tracker, and five percent is drawn from the level of security incidents reported by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security and the British Embassy (see Table 1 below for a breakdown of district-level scores using these four data sources).

The Stability Index scores districts on a 1–5 scale, with 1 being “most unstable (very negative)” and 5 “most stable (very positive).” The index *does not present absolute or fixed measures of district stability* because stability is perceived differently from area to area and person to person. Stability is not like distance or weight that can be measured using commonly accepted units of measure such as meters or kilograms. The Stability Index's scores are relative, meaning that district scores should be compared relative to one another—for example, a district scoring 2.83 on the index is perceived by its inhabitants as less stable than one scoring 4.05. Table 1 provides the overall results for Wave 2. To simplify where districts rank, we have split the results into quartiles represented by different colors: red represents the lowest quartile, orange represents the second lowest, yellow the second highest, and green the highest quartile.

**TABLE 1: WAVE 2 STABILITY INDEX SCORES**

1 = very negative 5 = very positive	Survey Index	M36	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (May- Aug 13)	Security Incident score	Stability Index
Weights	0.75	0.10	0.10	0.05	
Andar	2.64	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.23
Sangin	2.57	1.42	2.00	1.00	2.32
Zurmat	2.71	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.38
Dash Arche	2.73	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.40
Waz Drazadran	2.59	1.05	1.00	5.00	2.40
Sabari (Ya qubi)	2.86	1.30	1.00	2.00	2.47
Bala Boluk	2.77	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.48
Kajaki	2.56	1.79	2.00	4.00	2.50
Musa Qala	2.89	1.72	2.00	1.00	2.59
Shah Joy	2.60	2.09	3.00	4.00	2.66
Chak	2.83	1.52	2.00	4.00	2.68
Sayed Abad	2.98	1.45	3.00	1.00	2.73
Pusht Rod	2.96	2.48	2.00	3.00	2.82
Baraki Barak	3.24	1.23	1.00	4.00	2.85
Nerkh	3.03	1.26	3.00	3.00	2.85
Qalat	2.92	2.11	3.00	4.00	2.90
Shah Wali Kot	3.26	1.82	2.00	2.00	2.93
Lajah-Mangal	2.96	2.72	2.00	5.00	2.95
Shindand	3.05	2.86	3.00	2.00	2.97
Lajah-Ahmad Khel	2.93	3.27	2.00	5.00	2.98
Muqur	3.20	2.80	2.00	2.00	2.98
Shahrak	3.14	1.69	2.00	5.00	2.98
Khak-e-Safayd	3.15	2.22	2.00	4.00	2.99
Panjwai	3.26	2.06	3.00	1.00	3.00
Shwak	3.12	2.07	2.00	5.00	3.00
Tarnak Wa Jaldak	3.06	1.85	3.00	5.00	3.03
Jalrez	3.29	1.52	3.00	4.00	3.12
Deh Yak	3.15	3.24	3.00	3.00	3.13
Gelan	3.41	2.28	2.00	3.00	3.13
Khushi	3.03	3.19	3.00	5.00	3.15
Zhari	3.27	2.97	3.00	2.00	3.15
Bak	3.40	1.86	3.00	3.00	3.18
Qarabagh	3.40	3.24	3.00	2.00	3.27
Muhammad Aghah	3.26	2.89	4.00	3.00	3.28
Pashtun Zarghun	3.21	3.93	3.00	4.00	3.30
Arghandab	3.42	1.90	4.00	3.00	3.31
Kushk-i-Robat Sangi	3.18	4.22	3.00	4.00	3.31
Sarkani	3.60	3.21	2.00	2.00	3.32
Maiwand	3.66	3.33	2.00	1.00	3.33
Sawkai	3.50	2.51	3.00	3.00	3.33
Nad 'Ali	3.70	2.21	3.00	1.00	3.34
Baghlan i Jadid	3.69	3.08	2.00	2.00	3.38
Marawara	3.66	3.87	2.00	1.00	3.38
Shigal wa Sheltan	3.70	2.71	2.00	3.00	3.39
Nahr-i-Saraj	3.74	2.42	3.00	1.00	3.40
Chaghcharan	3.30	2.83	5.00	3.00	3.41
Khanabad	3.53	3.10	3.00	3.00	3.41
Spin Boldak	3.53	2.06	4.00	4.00	3.45
Char Darah	3.58	2.87	4.00	2.00	3.47

1 = very negative 5 = very positive	Survey Index	M36	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (May- Aug 13)	Security Incident score	Stability Index
Weights	0.75	0.10	0.10	0.05	
Gorbuz	3.51	2.65	4.00	4.00	3.50
Sayed Karam	3.48	3.01	4.00	4.00	3.51
Terezayi	3.34	4.72	4.00	3.00	3.53
Moqur	3.67	2.97	3.00	4.00	3.55
Khas Kunar	3.57	3.76	3.00	4.00	3.56
Lash Kar Gah	3.82	3.92	2.00	2.00	3.56
Tani	3.56	3.48	4.00	3.00	3.57
Shamal (Dwamunda)	3.50	4.06	3.00	5.00	3.58
Daman	3.50	3.78	4.00	4.00	3.60
Ali Abad	3.63	3.32	3.00	5.00	3.61
Farah	3.50	3.89	5.00	2.00	3.61*
Dand	3.55	2.99	4.00	5.00	3.61
Imam Sahib	3.61	3.18	4.00	4.00	3.63
Narang	3.64	4.04	3.00	4.00	3.64
Ahmad Abad	3.65	3.67	4.00	4.00	3.71
Ghazni	3.65	4.23	5.00	1.00	3.71
Kunduz	3.73	3.74	5.00	1.00	3.73
Jaji Maidan	3.60	3.55	5.00	4.00	3.75
Chorah	3.92	3.26	3.00	4.00	3.77
Tirin Kot	3.79	3.44	4.00	4.00	3.79
Garmser	4.19	2.32	3.00	3.00	3.82
Jaghatu (Bahram-e Shahid)	3.81	4.22	3.00	5.00	3.83
Mando Zayi	3.70	3.82	5.00	4.00	3.86
Puli Khumri	3.85	3.65	5.00	2.00	3.86
Doshi	3.72	4.14	5.00	4.00	3.91
Qadis	4.07	2.74	4.00	4.00	3.93
Zaranj	3.72	4.49	5.00	4.00	3.94
Dehrawud	4.10	3.34	3.00	5.00	3.96
Charikar	3.76	5.00	5.00	5.00	4.07
Khwajah Omari	3.90	4.63	5.00	4.00	4.09
Salang	3.85	5.00	5.00	5.00	4.13
Ab-e Kamari	4.11	3.06	5.00	5.00	4.14
Aybak	4.07	4.81	5.00	5.00	4.28
<b>Overall Average</b>	<b>3.36</b>	<b>2.83</b>	<b>3.09</b>	<b>3.24</b>	<b>3.31</b>


\*Control districts are indicated in light blue text

## Findings

### Stability Index: Wave 2


The following chart ranks Wave 2 districts by their stability scores and divides them into quartiles.<sup>9</sup> The lowest ranking and least stable districts are Andar and Zurmat (Paktiya province) and Sangin (Helmand province), while the highest ranking and most stable districts are Khwajah Omari (Ghazni province), Dehrawud (Uruzgan province) and Zaranj (Nimruz province).

<sup>9</sup> This chart, which includes 76 districts, does not include the six control districts listed above in Table 1.




### Stability Trends: Waves 1 to 2

The overall stability trend across districts surveyed in both Waves 1 and 2 (58 districts total) shows the average stability index score dropping from 3.32 to 3.20. When observed on a hyperbolic curve (see chart below), one can see that scores are more varied in Wave 2, indicated by the lower height and wider base of the Wave 2 curve.



After analyzing the individual districts surveyed in both Waves 1 and 2, findings indicate that 19 districts experienced an increase in perceived stability while 39 experienced a decrease (see map below). The decrease was most intensely perceived in Sangin, Kajaki and Musa Qal'ah districts (Helmand province) and Pusht-e Rod district (Farah province). These districts experienced a significant decrease (greater than 20 percent) in their stability scores. Two districts (Sar Kani and Khwajah Omari) experienced a moderate increase (10-19 percent). No districts experienced a significant increase of 20 percent or more.

The decline in overall stability is particularly concentrated in Farah, northern Helmand, Kandahar, Balkh and eastern Wardak provinces. Change in stability is mixed in most other provinces, with moderate increases or decreases reported across the constituent districts surveyed.




Using a trend chart (see below), analysts are able to compare how districts' rankings relative to one another have changed between Waves 1 and 2 and how far their stability scores have declined or improved since Wave 1. The squares indicate districts' scores from Wave 1 while the bars indicate their scores in Wave 2. The colors of the bars and squares represent the quartile in which they are located in their respective survey waves. The bars are ordered according to the Wave 2 ranking of districts, with red (to the right) representing the lowest scores and green (to the left) representing the highest scores. One can get an indication of how far a district has fallen or advanced in ranked order by looking at the color of the bar relative to its corresponding square. Hence, a district with a red bar and green square has deteriorated from the highest quartile to the lowest quartile between Waves 1 and 2, and a district with a yellow bar and red square has improved two quartiles in ranking.

The chart is also designed to show the degree to which each district's stability has improved or declined between waves. Where a square is above the top of its corresponding bar that district's stability has declined. Where the square is lower than the top of its corresponding bar that district's stability has improved. The reader can get a sense of how far a district's stability may have declined or improved by looking at the distance between the top of the bar and its corresponding square.

Looking at the chart, one can see that Sangin, Kajaki and Musa Qal'ah districts (Helmand province) and Pusht-e Rod district (Farah province) record the greatest decline in stability between fall 2012 and summer 2013. In terms of ranking, we can see that these four districts as well as Shah Wali Kot (Kandahar province); Lajah-Ahmad Khel and Lajah-Mangal (Paktiya province); Shindand (Herat province); and Muqer (Ghazni province) have declined by two quartiles and show the greatest decrease in stability relative to all other districts surveyed in both Waves 1 and 2. Looking at the distance between the top of bars and their corresponding squares, the reader can see that Deh Yak (Ghazni province), Khanabad and Imam Sahib (Kunduz province) have also experienced notable declines in their stability scores.


In contrast, one can see that Marawara (Kunar province) has increased its stability between Waves 1 and 2, both in terms of its stability score and its ranking relative to the other districts surveyed in both waves. Likewise Khwajah Omari (Ghazni province), Garmser (Helmand province), Dand (Kandahar province), Shamal (Paktiya province), Terayzai (Khost province) and Tarnak Wa Jaldak (Zabul province) also show notable improvement.



## Optimism: Right or Wrong Direction


The analysis now breaks down the Stability Index by its component parts, beginning with the direction people perceive their district to be headed in “right” or “wrong.” This helps the reader assess people’s sense of optimism about their future.

The overall optimism trend across districts surveyed in both Waves 1 and 2 shows the average optimism score dropping from 3.38 to 3.26. When observed on a hyperbolic curve (see chart below) one can see that the variation of scores has not changed markedly between Waves 1 and 2.



When analyzing the individual districts surveyed in both Waves 1 and 2, one finds that 26 districts experienced a positive change in perceived levels of optimism while 32 experienced a negative change (see map below). A decline in optimism is indicated across all districts surveyed in the western region of Afghanistan, especially in Farah province. This change was most intense in Sangin, Kajaki and Musa Qal’ah districts (northeastern Helmand province); Pusht-e Rod and Bala Boluk districts (Farah province); Lajah-Mangal in central Paktiya province; and a band of districts spanning northern Ghazni and southern Paktiya provinces including Andar, Deh Yak and Zurmat. These districts experienced significantly negative (greater than 20 percent) changes in their stability scores. Six districts experienced very positive changes, two in Paktiya province (Waz Drazadran and Sayyid Karam), and one in each of Wardak province (Nerkh); Logar province (Baraki Barak); Kandahar province (Maiwand); and Kunar province (Sar Kani).

Mixed results are indicated in all other regions, though districts showing declines in optimism tend to cluster together in several smaller areas including northeastern Helmand province, northeastern Ghazni province and southwestern Paktiya province. People appear most optimistic about the direction their area is headed in south-central Kunduz province and northwestern Balkh province, as well as large parts of central Kandahar province and southern Zabul province along the Route 1 corridor.




When we look at the changes in ranking between Waves 1 and 2, we can immediately see that optimism in Kajaki, Musa Qal'ah and Sangin (northeastern Helmand province) has declined significantly from the top (green) quartile all the way to the lowest (red) quartile. Deh Yak (northeastern Ghazni province) and Pusht-e Rod (Farah province) have also suffered large drops in their respective ranking. Marawara in Kunar province, on the other hand, has experienced a large improvement in optimism, moving from the lowest to the highest quartile between Waves 1 and 2, while Maiwand district (Kandahar province) and Gelan district (Southern Ghazni province) have also experienced large gains in ranking, moving from the lowest to the second highest quartile. Sayed Karam district (Paktiya province) has also improved by two quartiles.

Additional large drops in optimism scores include Deh Yak (Ghazni province); Pusht-e Rod (Farah province); and Lajah-Mangal (Paktiya province). Declines were also recorded in Andar and Muqer districts (Ghazni province); Zurmat (Paktiya province); Bala Boluk (Farah province); Muhammad Aghah (Logar province); Muqer (Badghis province); Imam Sahib (Kunduz province); and Lashkar Gah (Helmand province).


Additional districts where optimism scores have notably improved include Nerkh (Wardak province); Waz Drazadran(Paktiya province); Char Darah (Kunduz province);Qalat (Zabul province);Spin Blodak (Kandahar province); and Baraki Barak (Logar province).

Such wide distributions of both negative and positive optimism scores indicate that optimism is highly variable and dependent on local conditions. This explains the wide variance in district-level results within provinces. Even within some districts there is likely to be high variation among communities.




### Change in Local Area Security

The overall trend in local area security across all districts surveyed in both Waves 1 and 2 shows the average score dropping from 3.72 to 3.34. When observed on a hyperbolic curve (see chart below) one can see that the variation of scores has increased somewhat between waves 1 and 2, with the wave 2 curve having a slightly lower height and wider base.




When analyzing the individual districts surveyed in both Waves 1 and 2, one finds that 41 districts experienced a negative change in perceived levels of local area security while 17 experienced positive change (see map below). The decline is most intense in the West (with the exception of Shindand district in Herat province), as well as in northern Helmand province, large parts of central and northern Kandahar province, Ghazni province, eastern Wardak province, northern Logar province, Lajah-Mangal and Lajah-Ahmad Khel districts in Pakiya province, and the eastern districts of Khost province bordering Pakistan. In all, 16 districts in these areas experience significant negative change (more than 20 percent decrease between waves 1 and 2) in their security scores. These include Kushk Robat-e Sangi (Herat province), Pusht-e Rod and Bala Boluk (Farah province), Musa Qal'ah, Sangin and Kajaki (Helmand province), Panjwa'i, Zharay and Arghandab (Kandahar province), Shah Joy (Zabul province), Muqer and Andar (Ghazni province), Sayyid Abad (Wardak province), Muhammad Aghah (Logar province), and Lajah-Mangal and Lajah-Ahmad Khel (Pakiya province). In contrast, four districts experience a significant positive change (more than 20 percent decrease between Waves 1 and 2), two in Pakiya province (Waz Drazdran and Zurmat), and one in each of Zabul province (Qalat) and Kunar province (Sar Kani).




Looking at changes in ranking between Waves 1 and 2, one can see that scores for “security in local area” have dropped significantly in a large number of districts. Such districts include Sangin, Kajaki and Musa Qal’ah (Helmand province); Pusht-e Rod (Farah province); Lajah-Mangal (Paktiya province); Arghandab (Kandahar province); and Moqur (Badghis province). Other districts where this indicator’s score has significantly dropped include Bala Boluk (Farah province); Nad Ali and Lashkar Gah (Helmand province); Dand, Shah Wali Kot, Panjwa’i and Zhari (Kandahar province); Andar, Muqer, Deh Yak and Ghazni (Ghazni province); Shah Joy (Zabul province); Chak and Sayyid Abad (Wardak province); Sayed Karam, Lajah-Ahmad Khel and Shwak (Paktiya province); Muhammad Aghah (Logar province); Kushk-i Robot Sangi (Herat province); Gorbuz, Tani and Terayzai (Khost province); Khanabad and Imam Sahib (Kunduz province); Baghlan-i Jadid (Baghlan province); and Tsowkey (Kunar province).

Marawara in Kunar province, on the other hand, has experienced a large improvement in residents’ perception of local area security, moving from the lowest to the highest quartile between Waves 1 and 2. Other districts where respondents indicate a noticeable improvement in local area security include Waz Drazadran and Zurmat (Paktika province); Tarnak Wa Jaldak (Zabul province); Baraki Barak (Logar province); Garmser ((Helmand province); Qalat (Zabul province); Maiwand (Kandahar province); and Ali Abad and Kunduz (Kunduz province).




### Presence of Armed Opposition Groups


The score for presence of AOG across all districts surveyed in both Waves 1 and 2 was virtually unchanged, with the average score only shifting from 3.16 to 3.17. When one observes this on a hyperbolic curve (see chart below) it can be observed that the variation of scores has increased somewhat between Waves 1 and 2, with the Wave 2 curve having a slightly lower height and wider base.



When the data looks at the presence of AOG across all the districts surveyed in Wave 2 one can see that the Route 1 corridor between Wardak/Logar and Zabul provinces has a particularly high presence of these groups reported. Likewise, the districts surveyed in northern Kandahar, northern Helmand, Farah and Ghor, with only a few exceptions, all report a high presence of AOG. Interestingly, most districts along the border with Pakistan in Khost do not show a strong AOG presence, though pockets of territory just inland from those border areas do: Sarabi (Khost province), and Sayyid Karam, Zurmat, Shwak, Waz Drazadran and Lajah-Mangal (Paktiya province). In Kunar and most parts of Kunduz, AOG presence is reported as low with the exception of Dasht-e Archi district in Kunduz province.




Observing trends between Waves 1 and 2, Lajah-Ahmad Khel (Paktika province) has moved from green (relatively low presence of AOG) to red (relatively very high presence of AOG). Deh Yak (Ghazni province) and Shwak (Paktiya province) have moved from green to orange (relatively high presence of AOG), while Imam Sahib (Kunduz province) and Zurmat (Paktika province) have also reported a notable increase in the presence of AOG. Districts reporting substantially less presence of AOG in Wave 2 than Wave 1 include Marawara (Kunar province); Tarnak Wa Jaldak (Zabul province); Muhammad Aghah and Baraki Barak (Logar province); Garmser and Musa Qal'ah (Helmand province); Khwajah Omari (Ghazni province); Puli Khumri (Baghlan province); and Waz Drazadran and Sayed Karam (Paktiya province).




### Confidence in Local Government


The overall trend for “confidence in local government” across all districts surveyed in both Waves 1 and 2 shows the average score dropping somewhat from 3.59 to 3.51. When observed on a hyperbolic curve (see chart below) one can see that the variation of scores has increased only slightly between Waves 1 and 2, with the Wave 2 curve having a slightly lower height and wider base.



When analyzing the individual districts surveyed in both Waves 1 and 2, one finds that 30 experienced positive change in “confidence in local government” while 28 experience negative change (see map below). Confidence in local government has generally improved along the Route 1 corridor between Wardak/Logar and Zabul provinces. The only exceptions to this are in Deh Yak (Ghazni province) and Shah Joy (Zabul province); however, these districts show only a slight negative change in level of confidence in local government (0 to -9 percent). Districts in northern Helmand; Farah (with the exception of Bala Boluk); and Paktiya provinces all show a decline in confidence in local government. The rest of the provinces surveyed show mixed results at the district level, with only slight changes of 9% +/- or less (Spin Boldak district in Kandahar province is the one exception).




When looking more closely at changes between Waves 1 and 2, one can see that three districts in northeastern Helmand province (Kajaki, Sangin and Musa Qal'ah) slipped from the highest quartile to the lowest quartile. Other districts with noticeable declines in confidence in local government include Lajah-Mangal, Lajah-Ahmad Khel, Shwak, Zurmat and Waz Drazadran in Paktiya province, as well as Pusht-e Rod in Farah province, Deh Yak in Ghazni province, and Khanabad in Kunduz province. Districts with noticeable improvement in confidence in local government include Andar (Ghazni province), Bala Boluk (Farah province), Spin Boldak (Kandahar province), and Tarnak Wa Jaldak (Zabul province).



### Corruption in Local Government


The overall trend in perceptions of local government corruption shows the average score between Waves 1 and 2 dropping from 1.78 to 1.57.<sup>10</sup> This is a low score and illustrates how pervasive and ubiquitous perception of local government corruption is across Afghanistan. What is of equal concern, however, is that when one observes this on a hyperbolic curve (see chart below) the variation in scores has decreased significantly between Waves 1 and 2, with the Wave 2 curve having a much greater height and narrower base. Perceptions of corruption are much more intense and uniform in Wave 2 than they were in Wave 1, and have gravitated to the negative side of the index.

<sup>10</sup> See Module 5 of the questionnaire (Annex A). Two of the three questions ask respondents about their perception of corruption “in this area.”




When analyzing the individual districts surveyed in both Waves 1 and 2, one finds that 38 districts experienced declines in perceptions of corruption while only 20 reported improvement (see map below). The perception of local government corruption generally increased across all geographic survey areas, especially along the Route 1 corridor in Ghazni and Zabul provinces. The same trends were also reported in western Kandahar province, central Helmand province, most of Kunar province (with the exception of Sar Kani district), and across the West in Farah, Herat and Badghis provinces (with the exception of Qadis district).

Interestingly, several large areas in southern Afghanistan report significant positive change in the level of corruption (i.e., a decrease). These areas include Sangin, Musa Qal'ah and Kajaki districts in northeastern Helmand province, and Shah Wali Kot and Spin Boldak districts in Kandahar province. With the exception of Spin Boldak district, all of these districts also report a greater presence of AOG, a deteriorating security situation, and an increased loss of confidence in local government.




When one looks at changes in ranking between Waves 1 and 2, it is evident that corruption scores for many districts have decreased dramatically, indicating higher perceptions of local government corruption. Bala Boluk in Farah province has dropped from the highest to lowest quartile and now occupies the lowest ranking of any of the districts included in both survey waves. Deh Yak in Ghazni province has also dropped from the highest to lowest quartile. Andar and Gelan (Ghazni province) and Muhammad Aghah (Logar province) have dropped two quartiles. Other districts where scores have noticeably declined include Chak (Wardak province); Daman, Arghandab and Maiwand (Kandahar province); Shindand and Kushk-i Robot Sangi (Herat province); Sar Kani and Imam Sahib (Kunduz province); Qarahbagh (Ghazni Province); Tarnak Wa Jaldak (Zabul province); Shwak and Laja Ahmad Khel (Paktiya province); Pusht-e Rod (Farah province); Tsowkey and Khas Kunar (Kunar province); Moqur (Badghis province); Baraki Barak (Logar province); and Garmser (Helmand province).

Notable improvement in corruption scores are recorded for Shah Wali Kot and Spin Boldak (Kandahar province); Sangin, Musa Qal'ah and Kajaki (northeastern Helmand province); Ali Abad and Kunduz (Kunduz province); and Sayed Karam and Zurmat (Paktiya province).




## Government Services Delivery

The overall trend in government services delivery shows the average score between Waves 1 and 2 dropping from 3.87 to 3.66. When observed on a hyperbolic curve (see chart below) one can see that the variation in scores has increased slightly, with the Wave 2 curve having a slightly lower height and wider base.




When analyzing the individual districts surveyed in both Waves 1 and 2, one finds that 36 districts experienced negative change in perceived levels of government services delivery while 22 experienced positive change (see map below). Negative change is most intense in the West, as well as in northern Helmand province. Elsewhere, perceptions of government service delivery are mixed.




When looking at changes in ranking between Waves 1 and 2, one can see that service delivery scores have decreased noticeably in several districts. Bala Boluk and Pusht-e Rod (Farah province), and Kajaki (Helmand province) have dropped from the highest to lowest quartile. Kushk-i Robot Sangi (Herat province), Sangin and Musa Qal'ah (Helmand province), and Muqer (Ghazni province) have dropped two quartiles. Other districts where scores have noticeably declined include Lajah-Ahmad Khel (Paktiya province); Marawara and Khas Kunar (Kunar province); Deh Yak (Ghazni province); Shindand (Herat province); Muhammad Aghah and Baraki Barak (Logar province); Zhari and Shah Wali Kot (Kandahar province); Khanabad (Kunduz province); and Nad Ali and Lashkar Gah (Helmand province).

Notable improvement in government services delivery scores are recorded for Arghandab (Kandahar province); Khwajah Omari and Gelan (Ghazni province); Baghlan-i Jadid and Puli Khumri (Baghlan province); Zurmat and Sayed Karam (Paktiya province); Tarnak Wa Jaldak (Zabul province); and Sayyid Abad and Chak (Wardak province).




## Local Area Resilience

The overall trend in local area resilience shows the average score between Waves 1 and 2 dropping from 3.51 to 3.42. When observed on a hyperbolic curve (see chart below) one can see that the variation in scores has decreased marginally, with the Wave 2 curve having a slightly greater height and narrower base.




When analyzing the individual districts surveyed in both Waves 1 and 2, one finds that 35 districts record a decline in local area resilience, while 21 show a positive change (see map below). Negative change is most intense in northeastern Helmand and western Kunduz provinces, as well as in the triangle where Ghazni, Paktiya and Wardak provinces meet. Interestingly, all districts surveyed in Khost province record improved local area resilience, as does a triangle of districts in northern Herat and southwestern Badghis provinces.




When one looks at changes in ranking between Waves 1 and 2, the data show that local area resilience scores have declined significantly in several districts. Sangin and Kajaki (Helmand province) and Lajah-Ahmad Khel (Paktiya province) have dropped from the highest to lowest quartile. Khanabad (Kunduz province) and Pusht-e Rod (Farah province) have dropped two quartiles. Other districts where scores have noticeably decreased include Tarnak Wa Jaldak (Zabul province); Shah Wali Kot (Kandahar province); Zurmat, Lajah-Mangal and Shwak (Paktiya province); and Nad Ali and Lashkar Gah (Helmand province).

Notable improvement in local area resilience scores are recorded for Bala Boluk (Farah province) and Andar (Ghazni province).




## Quality of Life

The overall trend in quality of life shows the average score between Waves 1 and 2 dropping notably from 3.41 to 3.23. When observed on a hyperbolic curve (see chart below) one can see that the variation in scores has increased marginally, with the Wave 2 curve having a slightly lower height and broader base.




When analyzing the individual districts surveyed in both Waves 1 and 2, one finds that 38 districts record a decrease in perceptions of the quality of life while 18 reflect an increase (see map below). Negative change is most intense in the West, northeastern Helmand province, Kandahar province (with the exception of Maiwand district), Kunar province (with the exception of Tsowkey district), and southern Paktiya province (with the exception of Shwak district).



When looking at changes in ranking between Waves 1 and 2, one can see that quality of life scores have decreased significantly in several districts. Once again, Sangin, Musa Qal'ah and Kajaki (Helmand province) have dropped from the highest to lowest quartile. Pusht-e Rod (Farah province) and Moqur (Badghis province) have dropped two quartiles. Other districts where scores have noticeably declined include Shah Joy (Zabul province), Sayyid Abad (Wardak province), Kushk-i Robat Sangi (Herat province), Muhammad Aghah (Logar province), Shwak, Lajah-Ahmad Khel and Lajah-Mangal (Paktiya province), Zhari, Panjwa'i, Shak Wali Kot and Arghandab (Kandahar province), and Muqer and Deh Yak (Ghazni province).

Notable improvement in quality of life scores are recorded for Marawara (Kunar province), Garmser (Helmand province), Gelan and Khwajah Omari (Ghazni province) and Waz Drazadran and Sayed Karam (Paktiya province).



# IMPACT EVALUATION

MISTI is tasked with providing an impact evaluation of two key USAID stabilization projects in Afghanistan: the Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) and the Stabilization in Key Areas (SIKA) project, and beginning with the next survey wave a third, the new Kandahar Food Zone project (KFZ). This section of the Analytical Report details the methods, data, and preliminary results from an initial impact evaluation that draws on Waves 1 and 2 of the MISTI Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey. In brief, this impact evaluation draws on various stabilization measures embedded in the survey instrument to track changes in attitudes at the village level across Wave 1 (Fall 2012) and Wave 2 (Spring 2013).

MISTI uses a methodological technique known as "matching" to pair villages that have received USAID assistance from at least one program to villages that are similar in background characteristics but did not receive any assistance. These "control" observations act as counterfactual observations that enable the MISTI team to compare attitudes in villages that received assistance (the "treated" cases) with control observations. In effect, the counterfactuals pose the question, "What would have happened in these villages if programming had *not* been conducted?," and thus act as a baseline from which MISTI analysts can estimate the effects of USAID programming on perceptions of stability.

## Summary of Findings

The findings from this initial round of impact evaluation analysis suggest that USAID programming is, in most cases, not associated with a statistically significant change to perceptions of stability<sup>11</sup>. In some cases, however, USAID programming is associated with a decrease in perceived stability among respondents in recipient villages relative to control villages at the time of the survey. *These results are stable across multiple forms of matching.*

## Section Organization

The impact evaluation section of the report is organized as follows. The section begins with a brief description of the survey data before detailing the methodological approach. The section then describes the main findings about the effects of CCI and SIKA programming on nine different indicators of perceptions of stability (including the composite stability index). Next, the section covers several methodological extensions that take advantage of MISTI's geo-referenced data and the flexibility of the matching approach. Last, the report offers an initial assessment of why certain patterns in the impact of USAID programming can be observed, before concluding with a discussion of the limitations of the data and approach and providing recommendations for future data analysis.

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<sup>11</sup> MISTI uses conventional levels of statistical significance for our tests. We report a finding as statistically significant if a p value of .10 or less is achieved ( $p \leq 0.10$ ), meaning that the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis (that USAID programming has no effect) when it is true is 10% or less. This choice of statistical significance is warranted given the exploratory nature of these initial tests. As more data becomes available through Waves 3-5, MISTI will shift the level of confidence values for statistical significance to  $p = 0.05$ , meaning that our probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true is only 5% or less. This is a very demanding cutoff for statistical significance and is in line with current best practices in political science and other related disciplines.

## Data and Sample

The impact evaluation draws on the most recent project data from CCI (dated 24 November 2013), SIKA-N (10 November 2013), SIKA-W (24 November 2013), and SIKA-E (10 November 2013) when constructing the sample of project activities eligible for assessment. The MISTI team recorded a combined total of 907 project activities, either completed or in progress by November 24, 2013. From this total, the team identified 219 project activities in 76 villages as eligible for an initial impact assessment.<sup>12</sup> Both "hard" activities (e.g., infrastructure development, karez and irrigation construction, roadway construction, etc.) and "soft" activities (e.g., education, training, etc.) are included in these totals. ***The vast majority (85 percent) of eligible project activities<sup>13</sup> are associated with CCI programming because of the slower than expected start up of the SIKA programs.<sup>14</sup>***

Eligibility for inclusion in the Wave 2 survey sample was determined by several criteria. To be included in this impact evaluation, an activity had to have been started no earlier than December 2012 and no later than May 2013 to allow MISTI's Wave 1 survey data to serve as a pre-aid baseline for stability perceptions. This time window enables MISTI to use the May 2013 Wave 2 as the post-aid follow-on for measuring any possible changes in stability perceptions. Second, MISTI also required that the geo-coordinates for USAID programs fall within three kilometers of a MISTI-identified village. This spatial requirement allows MISTI to correctly identify project locations and to use MISTI's spatial and demographic data for these villages in the impact evaluation. *However, nearly a third of USAID's project locations could not be matched to a MISTI-identified village, resulting in a substantial loss of possible treated cases for the matching analysis.<sup>15</sup>*

In total, MISTI has 888 villages in the sample that includes Wave 1 and Wave 2 stabilization index values. The sample is therefore divided into 76 treated villages and 812 villages that are eligible to act as controls for the impact evaluation.

MISTI uses nine different measures to track perceptions of stability across Waves 1 and 2, including the overall composite index. These metrics are described in detail elsewhere in this report. These nine measures are:

1. The composite stability index
2. The percentage of respondents reporting their area has become more stable
3. The percentage of respondents reporting their district is moving in the right direction
4. The percentage of respondents reporting increased confidence in their local government
5. The percentage of respondents reporting their quality of life has changed for the better

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<sup>12</sup> Why 76 villages? MISTI requires that villages have (1) data from both Wave 1 and Wave 2 surveys and (2) that analysts were able to match USAID programming sites spatially to the list of MISTI villages. The MISTI village dataset contains key information about village population size, elevation, and other spatial characteristics that are used in the matching analysis to control for differences between villages with USAID programming ("treated") and without programming ("controls"). We identified 76 villages that met these two criteria.

<sup>13</sup> A conservative 3km spatial buffer was used to identify matches between USAID-identified programming sites and MISTI village locations. That is, if a USAID-identified site could not be linked to a MISTI village within 3km, it was not eligible for inclusion in our sample. The disconnect between USAID coordinates and those of MISTI stems in part from the fact that implementing partners are not currently using MISTI village coordinates to identify their project sites. The result is a loss of possible sites for the matching analysis conducted here.

<sup>14</sup> The CCI program had completed more project activities by May 2013 than the four SIKA projects combined. Hence a large majority of the sample is drawn from CCI villages.

<sup>15</sup> As noted above, the loss of "treated" cases stems largely from the lack of standardized data on village coordinates across the implementing partners as well as between MISTI and the implementing partners.

6. The percentage of respondents reporting that resilience has improved in their local area
7. The percentage of respondents reporting improved GIROA-delivery of basic services
8. The percentage of respondents reporting corruption in their local government
9. The percentage of respondents reporting the presence of armed opposition groups in their area<sup>16</sup>

The matching analysis detailed below takes each of these nine measures in turn to provide an assessment of the effects of USAID programming across a wide variety of stabilization issues.

## Methodology

The MISTI methodology adopts a form of matching known as Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) as the basis of the evaluation strategy.<sup>17</sup> The idea behind CEM is simple: for each village that received USAID programming, identify at least one comparable village from the list of control villages to pair (or "match") with it. These controls provide the baseline (What would have happened had aid not been delivered?), and are identified via an algorithm that attempts to find the closest match(es) for each village. The closer the fit between treated and control observations across important variables, the more robust are estimates of the effects of aid.

MISTI matches the treated and control villages on eight different variables. These include:

- Village population size
- Village elevation (in meters)
- Dominant ethnicity (as measured by language)
- Distance to district center (in meters)
- Amount of violence in 90 days prior to aid disbursement in the two kilometers around a given village (data source: iMMAP)
- Amount of violence 90 days after aid has been distributed in the two kilometers around a given village (data source: iMMAP)
- The Wave 1 stabilization index measure
- The density of agricultural land use in a one kilometer buffer around a given village during the spring growing cycle (used as a proxy measure of village wealth and productivity)

Once matching has been completed for as many treated cases as possible, the MISTI team estimates the impact of aid programming using difference-in-difference estimation. In other words, the team subtracts the treated villages' Wave 2 stabilization values from their Wave 1 values, and then subtracts this total from the net difference (Wave 2 minus Wave 1) in stabilization values from the control villages. *Since the treated and control cases are being measured at the same time – both have Wave 2 and Wave 1 stabilization values – matching controls for seasonal patterns and other time trends that are not associated with receiving USAID assistance.* This eliminates concerns that Wave 2 and Wave 1 stabilization values are not comparable.

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<sup>16</sup> Survey question Q-6.1d

<sup>17</sup> For Coarsened Exact Matching, see <http://gking.harvard.edu/cem>. As a robustness check, the MISTI team also used second form of matching, known as Covariate Balancing Propensity Score (CBPS). See next section for further information.

Matching is not only important for creating baseline assessments. The procedure also enables MISTI to control for observed differences between the treated and control villages. Indeed, the villages that USAID has selected for receiving assistance are significantly different across multiple dimensions than the average village in a given district. For example, the treated villages in the MISTI sample are: (1) more populous; (2) located in less rugged terrain; (3) located closer to the district center; (4) substantially more violent in the 90-day pre-aid disbursement period; (4) had lower Wave 1 stabilization index values; and (5) possessed substantially more productive spring agricultural cycles than the totality of the possible control villages. All of these differences are statistically significant at the  $p=.05$  level and are substantively important.

Without adjusting for these imbalances *via* matching, there is a risk of mistaken inferences about both the conditions under which aid is generating its impact, and the likelihood that these effects scale or generalize to other villages. Matching, therefore, aims to reduce these imbalances by finding many relevant counterfactual observations from the pool of control villages.

## Findings

This section summarizes the estimates of the effects of USAID programming on the nine specified indicators in the table below.<sup>18</sup> For each stability indicator, the net difference between the treated and control villages over Wave 2 and Wave 1 is provided along with a 95 percent confidence interval. Whether this net difference is statistically significant and, if so, at what level, is also provided in the table. Finally, the size of the sample, including the number of treated and control villages, is also noted.

The net difference is straightforward to interpret: positive values indicate an increase in perceived stability for that indicator, while negative values indicate a decrease in perceived stability when moving from Wave 1 to Wave 2. All but one indicator are scaled from 1 (representing “least” stable outcomes) to 5 (representing “most” stable outcomes), and so the net difference should be interpreted as a move within this scale. Put differently, a “5” represents a belief that stability is being attained across these indicators, while a “1” value represents the opposite, namely, that perceived stability on that indicator is poor. The only exception is the last indicator, as reported by respondents, (Presence of Armed Opposition Groups), for which a “1” indicates “a lot” of presence while “5” denotes “none”, and so *negative values actually denote a move toward greater insurgent presence*.

For example, the net difference for the Aggregate Stability Index is a -0.0655 decrease in perceived stability, suggesting that villages with USAID assistance witness a net decrease in perceived stability compared with control villages when comparing values across the two MISTI survey waves. The 95% confidence interval for that estimate is -0.18, 0.05, meaning that the data are 95% confident that the point estimate for this difference in treated and control villages lies between -0.18 and 0.05. This difference between treated and control villages is not statistically significant; 545 villages were drawn on to estimate this net difference (50 treated and 495 control villages).<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> The STATA .do and R files necessary to replicate these results are available from MISTI.

<sup>19</sup> It is worth emphasizing that while MISTI identified 76 villages as “treated,” not every village will be included in each analysis. The inclusion of a treated village hinges largely on whether sufficiently similar matches can be identified from the pool of “control” observations. Each time a new covariate is being introduced to the statistical analysis (that is, we change the measure for stability), a different set of control observations

Perhaps the most obvious trend is simply that, for seven of the nine stability indicators, the receipt of USAID assistance appears to be associated with a decrease in perceived stability. This trend is offset by the fact that these net differences only reach statistical significance for two of these seven indicators: “Is My District Moving in the Right Direction?” and “Has My Quality of Life Improved?” The most substantial negative effect on stability perceptions is associated with beliefs that the respondent district is moving in the wrong direction (as opposed to right). The net difference amounts to a -.408 decrease between treated and control villages, a significant decrease given the 1-5 scale used here. The Quality of Life indicator decrease, although statistically significant, is more modest.

Stabilization Measure	Net Difference	Statistically Significant?	Sample Size (Treated/Control)
Aggregate Stab Index	-0.0655 [-0.18, 0.05]	No	545 (50/495)
Area Become More Stable?	-0.163 [-0.47, 0.14]	No	529 (49/480)
District Moving in Right Direction?	-0.408 [-0.67, -0.14]	Yes, p=.003	476 (51/425)
Increased Confidence in Local Govt?	0.133 [0.00, 0.27]	Yes, p=.05	566 (53/513)
Quality of Life changed for Better?	-0.162 [-0.35, 0.03]	Yes, p=.10	532 (52/480)
Local Resilience has Improved?	-0.82 [-0.21, 0.03]	No	587 (53/534)
Improved GIRoA-delivery of Basic Services?	0.121 [-0.21, 0.45]	No	549 (49/500)
Corruption in Local Govt?	-0.037 [-0.18, .106]	No	601 (60/541)
Presence of Armed Opposition Groups?	-.107 [-.34, .13]	No	643 (60/584)

*Note:* All questions are on a 1-5 scale, with 5 the best and 1 the worst. A negative net difference therefore means a decrease in the stability score; a positive net difference means an increase in the stabilization values from Wave 1 to 2 in the treated villages relative to the controls.

By contrast, using CEM two of the nine indicators suggest a possible positive effect for USAID assistance, although only one indicator – “Increased Confidence in Local Government” – reaches conventional levels of statistical significance. This net difference of 0.133 between the treated and control villages is modest given the 1-5 scale in use here. ***Nevertheless, both indicators suggest a hint of a positive association between USAID assistance and perceptions of the GIRoA and local government related to increased stability.***

Multiple forms of matching are possible, however, and there are numerous decisions about how to determine the closeness of fit between treated and control villages that can affect our results. As a robustness check, the MISTI analysts therefore re-estimated these findings for all nine indicators using a second form of matching known as Covariate Balancing Propensity Score (CBPS).<sup>20</sup> Implemented using a statistical package known as R, this form of matching uses a nearest neighbor approach and seeks to pair each treated village with a single control observation rather than weighting multiple controls against a single treated village, as CEM does. As a result, the matches are often closer than those obtained using CEM but at the cost of drawing on far fewer control and treated observations.

will be identified. In some cases, there may not be a close enough match for a “treated” village, and it is dropped from the analysis. As a result, the number of treated and control observations will vary across the different statistical analyses for each measure of stability used.

<sup>20</sup> For Covariate Balancing Propensity Score (CBPS), see <http://imai.princeton.edu/research/CBPS.html>

The results obtained from CBPS are broadly similar to those of CEM (Table 2). Once again, a net decrease in perceived stability is observed in seven of nine indicators. In this analysis, the “Area Becoming More Stable” and “District Moving in the Right Direction” are both associated with statistically significant net decreases when comparing treated and control villages.

Table 2: Estimating the effects of USAID programming on perceptions of stability using Covariate Balancing Propensity Score (CBPS): Nine indicators

Stabilization Measure	Net Difference	Statistically Significant?	Sample Size (Treated/Control)
Aggregate Stab Index	-0.13	No	141 (74/67)
Area Become More Stable?	-0.437	Yes, p=0.04	141 (74/67)
District Moving in Right Direction?	-0.515	Yes, p=.005	139 74/65
Increased Confidence in Local Govt?	0.029	No	140 (74/66)
Quality of Life changed for Better?	-0.209	No	532 (74/65)
Local Resilience has Improved?	-0.09	No	142 (74/68)
Improved GIRoA-delivery of Basic Services?	-0.341	No	141 (74/67)
Corruption in Local Govt?	-0.023	No	142 (74/68)
Presence of Armed Opposition Groups?	-.192	No	141 (74/67)

*Note:* All questions are on a 1-5 scale, with 5 the best and 1 the worst. A negative net difference therefore means a decrease in the stability score; a positive net difference means an increase in the stabilization values from Wave 1 to 2 in the treated villages relative to the controls.

Moreover, the CBPS method estimates net decreases in “Aggregate Stability Index” and “Improved GIRoA-delivery of Basic Services” that nearly reach conventional statistical significance levels (p=.10). *The one statistically significant increase in perceived stability observed using CEM, “Increased Confidence in Local Government”, is still positive but no longer statistically significant using CBPS.*

## Analysis

Taken together, these two matching strategies suggest that for the most part USAID stabilization programming is generally associated with a decrease in respondents' perceptions of stability across these nine issue areas. The only two measures that offer a faint promise of positive effect have low confidence levels associated with them. The addition of more data in Waves 3-5 will enable MISTI to test with greater confidence the nature of this association.

What factors might account for these negative trends? Three stand out.

First, it is important to recognize the small sample size renders these findings limited and that they may not apply when a larger sample is available. A full investigation of the relationship between USAID stabilization programming and perceptions of stability must await the completion of programming that is now underway, along with Waves 3-5 of the MISTI Survey. There is a chance that the project activities included in this sample could be unrepresentative of the broader array of (planned/newly underway) project activities, for example. There is also a possibility that two or three approximately co-located

activities will have greater positive impact than one. In addition, there could be a time lag, with the positive effects of aid project activities developing slowly over time. In this first round of impact evaluation, MISTI was only able to examine the very near term effects of the project activities, some of which were not yet complete. Revisiting them in six or twelve months after their completion during subsequent survey waves may produce a very different picture.

Second, it is possible that the sharp drawdown of ISAF forces and the closure and/or transfer of military bases have significantly affected perceptions of stability. Both the aggregate Stability Index and the survey experiment modules on the MISTI Survey record a marked downturn in perceptions of stability and support for the Afghan government between Waves 1 and 2 – precisely the timing of most, though not all, ISAF base closures and transfers. This explanation bears closer empirical scrutiny through deeper analysis. The MISTI team has acquired data on the geo-locations of the ISAF facilities and is now beginning to examine the possible effect of these closures on perceptions.

It is important to acknowledge, though, that ISAF base closures can only account for the negative effect of USAID programming under very specific circumstances. Since the decrease in perceived stability is associated with the treated villages, but not the control ones, the base closures would need to differentially affect treated villages. For example, treated villages would need to be closer on average to closed bases than control villages if these closures are to affect perceived stability only near the treated villages. While this spatial relationship is not outside the realm of possibility – villages with USAID programming were closer to district centers, roads, and in less rugged terrain than control villages, precisely where bases might be located – further investigation is needed to disentangle the effects of base closures.

Third, based on the data the possibility exists that USAID programming itself can become a source of conflict that in turn lowers perceptions of stability. In the 90 days after programming in treated villages had begun, an average of 6.5 violent incidents were recorded (95% confidence interval at 4.22 to 8.76 attacks). By contrast, control village observations record only 1.6 attacks on average (0.97 to 2.21) over the same time period, a highly significant difference statistically. Moreover, the number of attacks in the first 90 days after a project begins (again, an average of 6.5 violent incidents) is higher than the average of 5 attacks observed in those same villages 90 days *before* the project commences. In other words, the data indicates that number of violent incidents increases in the treated villages in the period after start up, relative to the pre-aid period and to control villages.

This same pattern of increased violence in the immediate aftermath of aid programming has also been observed elsewhere in the world, such as with the KALAHI-CIDSS Community Driven Development (CDD) program in the Philippines.<sup>21</sup> In this case, the announcement and initial stages of programming were met with increased insurgent attacks as these actors sought to disrupt aid efforts that might undermine their political positions and popular support. If this relationship is also present in Afghanistan, then respondents may associate USAID programming with increased violence and thus attribute to it destabilizing properties that are being assessed in the battery of MISTI stabilization measures. Future waves of the MISTI Survey will enable us to determine whether these negative effects hold only for the initial programming period or if they extend past the 90-day window used in this analysis.

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<sup>21</sup> See, for example, Benjamin Crost, Joseph Felter, and Patrick Johnston, “Aid Under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict,” *American Economic Review*, forthcoming (2014).

## Limitations

Several limitations of this analysis should be noted here. Perhaps most importantly, matching can (by definition) only adjust for variables that MISTI can measure. Unlike randomized control trials (RCTs), which adjust for both observed and unobserved balances in treated and control villages through random assignment of aid, matching requires evaluators to possess data on the important variables that might (in this case) be driving perceptions of stability. Omitted variables are not necessarily problematic if they do not influence stability perceptions. But factors such as private information about a village, including its local power brokers, will be excluded from our analysis until (and if) the relevant data exists.

Second, matching rests on a "parallel trends assumption" that can decay over time. In brief, the parallel trends assumption maintains that treated and control villages will have the same post-aid trajectory. This is likely to be the case in the short to mid-term. As the time after an aid project has started (or completed) lengthens, though, it is likely that events occur, e.g., an airstrike in a treated village or a military operation in a control village, that do not happen equally across both treated and control villages. As a result, difference-in-difference estimates decay over the long term in their accuracy as the parallel trends assumption becomes increasingly violated.

Finally and once again, the number of treated observations here (N=74) is quite small. As the number of project activities completed increase, so too does our precision and reliability in our estimates of the programming's impact. As with all data analysis, the more observations the better, and MISTI will continue in subsequent survey waves to revisit our initial impact evaluation as the number of treated villages increases.

## Recommendations

Four recommendations emerged from the initial findings of the impact evaluation, and broader Wave 2 survey.

First, USAID should consider future analysis that examines: (a) the relationship between violence and aid in the post-aid implementation period to determine if stabilization programming is attracting additional attacks; (b) explore the persistence of perceptions of stability across multiple waves; and, (3) work to include additional variables for matching, including proximity to now-closed ISAF bases and facilitates.

Second, breaking down the violence counts into types and lethality of violence, something now underway at MISTI, should be prioritized. These data would prove highly useful in disentangling the relationship between programming and violence and would act as a useful behavioral complement to the attitudinal data that MISTI generates.

Third, the findings discussed in this report fall into three baskets: stability trends; the impact evaluation; and, the endorsement experiments (see the next section). The impact evaluation findings are based upon correlating the stability trends data with the (initial) stabilization programming. Using the MISTI survey data, USAID should consider correlating the results of the endorsement experiments with the findings of both the stability trends and impact evaluation work. In other words, does (greater) GIRoA or Taliban support correlate with stability trends and/or the impact of stabilization programming? USAID should

also consider conducting deeper analysis of MISTI's wealth of data to better ascertain the reasons behind the findings across all three baskets in order to inform and improve programming going forward.

Lastly, it is important for the implementing partners and their respective USAID projects (CCI, SIKa and KFZ) to better integrate their data efforts with MISTI. Nearly one-third of the on-going projects covered in Wave 2 cannot be used by MISTI for impact evaluation, owing to the fact that the IPs and programs are using a different dataset of village locations (and names). USAID managers should encourage greater coordination among the IPs and the MISTI project.

## **SURVEY EXPERIMENTS: SUPPORT FOR THE TALIBAN AND GIROA**

MISTI is tasked with assessing the effects of USAID programming on perceptions of stability in approximately 80 key districts of Afghanistan. As part of this process, MISTI has developed a survey instrument that measures multiple measures of stabilization, including views about local and district governance, security conditions, corruption and the delivery of assistance.

One component of MISTI's broader effort to assist USAID understand factors associated with stability is detailed here: the use of an indirect survey approach known as "endorsement experiments" to measure respondents' relative levels of support for the GIROA and the Taliban.<sup>22</sup> While survey responses have traditionally played an important role in the impact evaluation toolkit, new approaches, such as endorsement experiments, are gaining currency as the preferred method for eliciting truthful answers to sensitive questions in conflict settings. This method, detailed below, is designed to use subtle word changes in survey questions to measure support for different actors without triggering an individual's social desirability bias (the tendency to satisfy an enumerator's questions in the hopes of conforming to social norms) or strategic calculation (i.e., fitting answers to the questioners' presumed preferences in the hopes of receiving material gain).

### **Summary of Findings**

A brief summary of our findings include: (1) a marked shift toward greater relative support for the Taliban in over half of the 888 villages that were surveyed in both Wave 1 (Fall 2012) and Wave 2 (Spring 2013) of the MISTI Stabilization Survey; (2) a number of key provinces, including Helmand, Kandahar and Kunduz, appear to be increasingly polarized along pro-GIROA and pro-Taliban lines; (3) exposure to ISAF and ANSF violence, increased per capita income and full-time employment, along with head-of-household status all are separately associated with a net increase in support for the Taliban; while (4) being literate and living in a more remote area separately reduce support for the Taliban; and, (5) factors such as age of the survey respondent or population size of a village are unconnected to support levels.

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<sup>22</sup>Readers interested in the methodological approach or the finer points of multilevel modeling are referred to Jason Lyall, Graeme Blair, and Kosuke Imai, "Measuring Support for Combatants in Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan," *American Political Science Review* (August 2013). This article draws on an earlier survey (in 2010-2011) and uses a battery of endorsement experiments from which MISTI's modules were derived.

## Section Organization

This section is organized as follows. First, the survey experiment module used to measure relative support for these actors is detailed. The section then briefly details the multilevel modeling framework used to generate village level estimates of these support levels. Third, MISTI provides initial findings from the statistical models for: The overall spatial distribution of support levels in the 888 villages common to Waves 1 and 2; and, village-level spatial analysis for four key regions where support has shifted markedly, though not uniformly, toward the Taliban. Fourth, multilevel modeling is used to determine which village-level factors are associated with this shift toward the Taliban. The section then steps back to explore individual level factors that might account for Taliban support. Fifth, some of the limitations of these data and on-going efforts to close these gaps are detailed. And finally, the report presents the MISTI team conclusions.<sup>23</sup>

## Methodology

The mechanics of survey endorsement experiments are straightforward. Randomly selected respondents are assigned to a treatment group and asked to express their opinion toward a policy endorsed by specific actors whose support levels we wish to measure (here, the Taliban and GIRoA). These responses are then contrasted with those from a control group of respondents that answered an identical question with a different endorsement (that of GIRoA). Higher levels of enthusiasm for a policy with an endorsement relative to those without it are viewed as evidence of support for the endorsing actor. Since each respondent is assigned only one condition for any endorsement experiment, it is impossible for enumerators or others to compare support levels across different conditions for any individual respondent. Half of the sample thus receives questions with the Taliban “treatment;” the other half, with a GIRoA endorsement embedded in the questions.

To increase the robustness of the study estimates, MISTI uses four different questions to measure support. These four questions are then pooled together to produce a single estimate for relative support. When pooling together, these questions are weighted by their ability to discriminate support for the combatants. That is, questions where a marked shift toward one actor is observed are weighted more highly than questions where less clear separation between GIRoA and Taliban is observed. Rather than imposing arbitrary weightings to these questions, the statistical process of pooling allows the data themselves to speak.

Drawing on electronic and print media, four domestic policies with the properties desired for an endorsement experiment were identified: prison reform, direct election of district councils, reform of the Independent Election Committee, and the strengthening of anti-corruption policies.

Successful endorsement experiments share four properties. First, selected initiatives should be in the same policy space so that they can be combined for statistical analysis. Domestic policies were emphasized here. Second, these initiatives should be well known by individuals to minimize “Don’t Know” responses and to differentiate support for an endorser from learning about a policy from the endorsement itself. In

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<sup>23</sup>*Id.*

the survey, few respondents replied “Don't Know,” while refusal rates were low in all provinces. Third, these initiatives should actually be endorsed by the particular actors in question so that the questions are realistic and respondents take them seriously. Finally, the general public holds a wide range of views about these initiatives, enabling us to detect support for endorsers without suffering from ceiling and floor effects.

One of the endorsement experiments used to measure support is reproduced below to provide a sense of the survey's mechanics.

*Q-51A. It has recently been suggested by the Afghan government [Taliban] that people be allowed to vote in elections to select the members of their district council. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?*

Respondents were presented with a five-fold range of possible responses from “I strongly oppose this policy” to “I strongly support this policy.” Respondents could also refuse to answer or could reply “Don't Know.” Once again, half of the respondents received the question with a Taliban endorsement; the other half, with a GIRoA endorsement. No respondent was asked both questions. It is therefore the difference in the aggregate between all answers to the Taliban- and GIRoA-endorsed questions where we measure support levels.

Endorsement experiments possess several advantages over direct questioning techniques. First, the method avoids triggering social desirability bias, the well-known problem that arises when asking a direct question about a sensitive topic. This is especially likely to occur if the respondent believes that the continued receipt of goods or security is conditional on providing answers that the enumerator wishes to hear. Second, each of the two modules draws on four questions to measure support. As a result, estimates of support are pooled across four questions, increasing the reliability of the estimate.

A third major advantage of this approach lies in the fact that these support values can be combined with a statistical framework to test for associations between individual- and village-level variables. Traditional surveys typically only provide cross-tabulations of a single question (or index) and cannot by definition subset the dataset by all of the different variables – education levels, per capita wealth, ethnicity, exposure to violence – that might affect support for one party or another. Multilevel modeling involves the integration of data from different levels – individual respondents, villages, districts, or provinces – in a single flexible framework to assess the relationship between these factors and expressed support for these actors.<sup>24</sup> As a result, we retain all the information that is typically discarded by existing approaches to impact evaluation that rely on summary statistics or differences in means. We draw on this multilevel (or hierarchical) statistical framework when generating the results detailed below.

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<sup>24</sup> More specifically, these models include the following individual level covariates: Age, Gender, Literacy, Income, Ethnicity, Exposure to Violence by the Taliban, ISAF, or other groups, and Interactive Terms to capture the joint effects of Ethnicity and Exposure to Violence by the Taliban, ISAF, and other groups. The following village level covariates are also included in the model: Population size (logged), elevation (logged), and the number of Taliban and ISAF-initiated violent events in a five kilometer radius around the village in the past year.

## Findings

### Spatial Patterns of Support for the Taliban and GIRoA


Some 888 villages were included in both Waves 1 and 2, making it possible to analyze trends over time in support for the Taliban relative to GIRoA. In terms of overall distribution of support, more than half of these villages exhibited a strengthening of relative support for the Taliban compared with GIRoA over this time period (Fall 2012 and Spring 2013).

The MISTI methodology also has the ability to visually represent changes in support levels at the village level over time. MISTI selected four key regions for closer study based on their marked shift toward higher levels of Taliban support relative to their Wave 1 values among certain villages. These four regions are: (1) the Kunduz-Baghlan corridor (figure A); (2) the intersection of Logar and Wardak area, not too distant from Kabul (figure B); (3) Helmand/Kandahar (figure C); (4) Herat/Badghis (Figure D). Three of these provinces – notably, Kandahar, Helmand, and Kunduz – exhibit some of the highest movement both toward and away from the Taliban, suggesting a polarizing of attitudes toward these actors is now underway.

When interpreting support values in these figures, the red dots denote villages that have shifted toward relatively higher levels of support for the Taliban compared to Wave 1 values, while green dots represent villages moving toward GIRoA. The numeric values indicate the magnitude of the shift, with a "2" representing a large shift, a "1" an intermediate one, and values less than "1" indicating modest movement.


Beginning with figure A, one can observe a marked increase in relative support for the Taliban in Baghlan's Pul-e Khumri district. Only a single village records an increase in relative support for GIRoA among our sampled villages. One may observe a similar pattern of support as the focus moves north through Baghlani Jadid, with only a few villages indicating increased (modest) support for GIRoA. Kunduz itself reveals a much more mottled distribution of relative support, underscoring its status as a potential battleground province where support is quite mixed. While some villages exhibit a large shift in support toward the Taliban and, in slightly larger measure, toward GIRoA, the bulk of MISTI's sampled villages record only intermediate or modest movement toward either of these actors. The spatial distribution of support is particularly interesting: one can often observe neighboring villages that are leaning politically in opposite directions. As a result, Kunduz is recording a high degree of polarization among individual villages that appears to exhibit no clear clustering pattern.

**FIGURE A. KUNDUZ/BAGHLAN. RED INDICATES A LARGE SHIFT TOWARD TALIBAN SUPPORT; BRIGHT GREEN A LARGE SHIFT TOWARD GIROA.**



The study next shifts the focus to the Logar-Wardak area (Figure B), where one may witness some of the most substantial increase in support for the Taliban across our sample. Mohammad Agha, a key district in Logar, reveals a sharp swing toward the Taliban; indeed, every village that MISTI surveyed in the district records some measure of increased relative support for the Taliban. By contrast, Nerkh and Chak-e Wardak, two key districts in Wardak, are exhibiting a similar fence-sitting pattern as Kunduz, with villages recording only modest increases in support for either the Taliban or GIROA. While Wardak has a well-earned reputation for both Taliban violence and sympathy, this support is clearly not uniform at the village level. In fact, there are several collections of villages that do record modest increases in relative support for GIROA.


**FIGURE B. LOGAR/WARDAK**



The intersection of Helmand and Kandahar provinces represents perhaps the most complex picture of trends in relative support (Figure C). Here the magnitude of shifts toward both the Taliban and GIRoA is comparatively larger than other regions. Yet one may also observe the familiar dynamic of many villages shifting only modestly toward both combatants. In Kandahar, MISTI’s surveyed villages in Zharay, Panjwa’i, Dand and Daman districts all exhibit only weak changes in support toward either actor between the two survey waves. In addition, one finds evidence of a complex spatial distribution of support, where villages leaning in opposing directions can often be found right next to one another. Put differently, district level clustering in favor of either actor is not occurring (yet) in these districts.

Based on the data, movement toward the Taliban is greatest in Lashkar Gah and, to a lesser extent, in Nad Ali in Helmand (though pockets of increased GIRoA support can be found here). Garmsir district remains perhaps the brightest spot in the sample, with nearly all surveyed villages exhibiting modest to intermediate shifts in relative support toward GIRoA.

**FIGURE C. HELMAND/KANDAHAR**




Finally, the Herat-Badghis area (Figure D) provides another important example of mixing of support at the village level. Qadis district in Badghis, for example, possesses villages that exhibit greater net support for the Taliban and for GIROA between Waves 1 and 2. The most pronounced shift toward supporting the Afghan government is found in Muqur, where most, though not all, villages record at least an intermediate move toward GIROA. On the other hand, the most notable shift toward supporting the Taliban is found in Kushk district in Herat, where the majority of sampled villages display increased relative support for the Taliban.

These examples demonstrate the importance of conducting sub-district level analysis when examining trend factors involving stabilization. Many of these patterns are obscured if aggregated to the district level. Moreover, these village level values can provide the foundation of a policy planning tool by indicating which locations are most likely to be receptive to economic assistance – and which villages will prove a more difficult challenge. A key question for subsequent analysis lies in sorting out why attitudes toward GIROA or the Taliban tend to cluster spatially in some districts but not in others. Determining when and why this spatial clustering occurs is a crucial first step if policymakers wish to pursue an "ink-spot" strategy. Such a strategy could call for assisting pro-government areas first and then

slowly moving to more difficult areas once initial gains have been consolidated. Determining the attitudes of the local population at the village level is thus a necessary first step in pursuing this approach.<sup>25</sup>

**FIGURE D. HERAT/BADGHIS**




### Individual Level Factors Affecting Support for the Taliban and GIRoA

Given the richness of the MISTI Stabilization Survey – the largest of its kind in a conflict setting – MISTI is also in a position to drill down to individual level factors that are associated with relative support for the Taliban. Drawing on the same multilevel statistical framework as above, the study first examines Wave 1 findings (Figure E) for several important variables before turning to Wave 2 (Figure F). In each case, the marginal effects of these variables on relative support for the Taliban are presented. As a result, positive marginal effects represent an increase in support for the Taliban; negative values represent a decrease in support for the Taliban relative to GIRoA. The vertical lines through each estimate of marginal effect represents the 95% confidence interval. Estimates that touch or straddle the dashed line (at the 0.0 marginal effect point) are not statistically significant. For both waves, we draw on all respondents across the entire sample frame.

<sup>25</sup> The strategy of assisting pro-government areas first has been followed by the GIRoA's NSP for years. NSP has not been the subject of a quasi-experimental impact evaluation with control areas which could help determine if there is any correlation between programming and increased stability.

Figure E identifies several variables associated with an increase in the relative level of support for the Taliban from the Wave 1 survey. As per capita income increases, so too does the marginal effect of support for the Taliban. Replacing per capita income with an indicator for whether an individual has full-time employment reveals the same pattern: a shift from unemployed to employed status is associated with an increase in relative support for the Taliban. We also find that support for the Taliban is higher in villages that are located in more mountainous or rugged terrain, as measured by elevation. Interestingly, though, this finding does not hold in Wave 2 results.

**FIGURE E. THE MARGINAL EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL- AND VILLAGE-LEVEL VARIABLES ON RELATIVE SUPPORT FOR THE TALIBAN WAVE 1 MISTI STABILIZATION SURVEY (FALL 2012)**




Two factors that reduce relative support for the Taliban stand out. First, the move from illiterate to literate status is associated with a marked decrease in support for the Taliban. This may track with a broader sense that educated individuals are less likely to support the Taliban (see below). Second, female respondents are markedly **less likely** to support the Taliban than their male counterparts. While caution is warranted—females were only accessible to enumerators in certain regions—the finding is substantively large and statistically significant. In addition, more urban centers, as measured by population size, are

also associated with reduced support for the Taliban, though this finding does not quite reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

Figure F re-estimates these statistical models using Wave 2 respondent data. One observes many of the same patterns as Wave 1 results, suggesting persistence in the factors that account for relative Taliban support. MISTI data once again find that per capita income is associated with an increase in relative support for the Taliban.

**FIGURE F. THE MARGINAL EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES ON RELATIVE SUPPORT FOR THE TALIBAN WAVE 2 MISTI STABILIZATION SURVEY (SPRING 2013)**




Moreover, Wave 2 data confirm earlier Wave 1 findings about the association between literacy and support for the Taliban: the marginal effect of a shift from **being illiterate to literate is a fairly large decrease in support for the Taliban**. Similarly, female respondents are less likely to support the Taliban, while urban centers also exhibit markedly less relative support for the Taliban.

The picture that emerges from these two MISTI Stabilization Survey waves can be viewed as a sobering one. A basic tenet of "hearts and minds" theory, as well as USAID programs such as the Community Development Program (CDP), is that poverty and unemployment are associated with support for insurgent organizations such as the Taliban. Yet both survey waves return the same findings: full-time employment, increased per capita income, and head of household/family status are all associated with increased support for the Taliban. Based on the findings, education and basic literacy programs could be more effective in reducing relative support for the Taliban, at least among the MISTI survey respondents.

### The Effects of Violence

Given the security environment that CCI and SIKa programming is currently operating in, an important consideration is how violence affects relative support for the Afghan government. Figure G draws on respondents from Wave 2 and explores the marginal effects of violence on Taliban support among Pashtun, Tajik and non-Pashtun/Tajik respondents. MISTI data also distinguish among Taliban, ISAF, and Afghan National Security Forces ("Others") violence toward respondents. All respondents were asked about personal exposure to violence by these groups (including close family members). Respondents could report victimization by all, some or none of these groups.

**FIGURE G. THE MARGINAL EFFECTS OF VIOLENCE ON RELATIVE SUPPORT FOR THE TALIBAN BY TALIBAN, ISAF, AND ANSF (“OTHER”) FORCES ON PASHTUN, TAJIK, AND NON-PASHTUN/TAJIK RESPONDENTS**  
**WAVE 2 MISTI STABILIZATION SURVEY (SPRING 2013)**



Several patterns are apparent.<sup>26</sup> Violence by the Taliban does not affect support levels among Pashtuns; the marginal effect estimate is sitting nearly exactly on zero effect. Intriguingly, Taliban violence among Tajik victims appears to increase slightly levels of support for the Taliban. This may appear

<sup>26</sup> Note that these same patterns are observed in the Wave 1 MISTI Survey data as well.

counterintuitive but may reflect a desire to avoid further victimization by expressing support for the Taliban position. Non-Pashtun/Non-Tajik respondents who are victimized by the Taliban record (unsurprisingly) a decrease in support for the Taliban relative to GIRoA.

Violence by ISAF, by contrast, increases relative support for the Taliban among Pashtun and Tajik respondents alike. These findings are consistent with the belief that violence by ISAF is viewed as delegitimizing the Afghan government, leading to an erosion of support for GIRoA and a corresponding increase in support for the Taliban. Similarly, exposure to violence by the ANSF also leads to an increase in relative support for the Taliban among both Pashtun and Tajik respondents. As a result, stabilization programs in these villages and districts must contend with the countervailing pressures of ISAF and ANSF violence that, based on the MISTI evidence to date are likely to push victims away from GIRoA and toward the Taliban.

Note, too, that relative support for the Taliban (and GIRoA) is conditional on the identities of both the perpetrators and victims of violence. Victimization by the Taliban, for example, has different effects among Pashtuns, Tajiks, and respondents of other ethnic groups. What matters here is personal exposure to victimization; compare the magnitude of these marginal effects with the negligible effects of Taliban and ISAF violence around villages in Figures E and F, for example. Aggregate village-level violence counts and assessments of security conditions may be too coarse to capture the complex dynamics of how victimization has effects on outcomes measures at the individual level.

## Limitations

It is important to recognize one omitted variable that may be skewing the MISTI findings: the closure and/or transfer of ISAF bases. These base closures and transfers (upwards of 900 facilities) have largely occurred between Waves 1 and 2. As a result, the marked shift toward Taliban support in certain areas may be a function of volatile allegiances linked to the withdrawal of ISAF forces. Whether these effects can be validated, and if are temporary, or if they instead reflect the "new normal" in these areas, will be a focus of the next analytical report, as the arrival of Wave 3 data will allow MISTI to test for effects over a longer time interval.

## Conclusions

These survey experiments, when combined with multilevel modeling, offer an important means for eliciting truthful responses to sensitive questions such as support for the Taliban and the GIRoA. Key variables that appear associated with increases in relative support for the Taliban include exposure to ISAF and ANSF violence, increased per capita income, full-time employment status, and female gender. Variables that are associated with a decrease in relative Taliban support include literacy and rugged terrain and more isolation of respondents. Notably, Taliban violence does not appear to have a substantial diminishing effect on relative Taliban support.<sup>27</sup> The survey experiment findings may suggest some answers to "why" questions associated with the Wave 2 survey stability trends and impact evaluation results. Analysis of subsequent survey wave data could explore the possible correlations.

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<sup>27</sup> This finding aligns with the results of similar research utilizing survey experiment methodology in Afghanistan. See footnote #18.

## APPENDIX A: WAVE 2 QUESTIONNAIRE

### MISTI Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey Wave 2

M-1. Respondent Identification Number \_\_\_\_\_

M-2. Wave Number 02

M-2a. Sample

1. Sample A
2. Sample B

M-3. Region

- |                  |                  |                     |
|------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Central/Kabul | 4. South Western | 7. Central/Hazarjat |
| 2. Eastern       | 5. Western       |                     |
| 3. South Central | 6. Northern      |                     |

M-4. Sampling Point/District Where the Interview Was Completed: \_\_\_\_\_

M-5. Geographic Code

- |             |          |         |                   |
|-------------|----------|---------|-------------------|
| 1. Villages | 2. Towns | 3. City | 4. Metros (Kabul) |
|-------------|----------|---------|-------------------|

M-6. Province

- |            |                |               |              |
|------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|
| 1. Kabul   | 9. Khost       | 17. Kunduz    | 25. Farah    |
| 2. Kapisa  | 10. Ningarhar  | 18. Balkh     | 26. Nimroz   |
| 3. Parwan  | 11. Laghman    | 19. Samangan  | 27. Helmand  |
| 4. Wardak  | 12. Kunar      | 20. Juzjan    | 28. Kandahar |
| 5. Logar   | 13. Nooristan  | 21. Sar-I-Pul | 29. Zabul    |
| 6. Ghazni  | 14. Badakhshan | 22. Faryab    | 30. Uruzghan |
| 7. Paktiya | 15. Takhar     | 23. Badghis   | 31. Ghor     |
| 8. Paktika | 16. Baghlan    | 24. Herat     | 32. Bamyan   |
|            |                | 33. Panjshir  | 34. Dehkondi |

**M-7. Year of Interview: 2013**

**M-8. Month of Interview**

- |             |          |              |              |
|-------------|----------|--------------|--------------|
| 1. January  | 4. April | 7. July      | 10. October  |
| 2. February | 5. May   | 8. August    | 11. November |
| 3. March    | 6. June  | 9. September | 12. December |

**M-9. Date of Interview:** \_\_\_ \_\_\_ \_\_\_

**M-10. Day of Week of Interview**

- |             |              |             |
|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| 1. Friday   | 4. Monday    | 7. Thursday |
| 2. Saturday | 5. Tuesday   |             |
| 3. Sunday   | 6. Wednesday |             |

**M-11. Interviewer Code:** \_\_\_ \_\_\_ \_\_\_ \_\_\_ \_\_\_

**M-12. Interview Completed on the ...**

- |                  |                   |                  |
|------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| 1. First Contact | 2. Second Contact | 3. Third Contact |
|------------------|-------------------|------------------|

**M-13. Supervisor Code:** \_\_\_ \_\_\_ \_\_\_

**M-14. Record Time (using 24 hour clock) Interview Began:** \_\_\_ \_\_: \_\_\_ \_\_\_

(Record Time Began Starting With Q-1)

**M-15. Record Time (using 24 hour clock) Interview Ended:** \_\_\_ \_\_: \_\_\_ \_\_\_

(Fill in all four data positions)

**M-16. Record Length of Interview in Minutes:** \_\_\_ \_\_\_

**M-17. Date Formatted Field: MAY 2013**

**M-18. Keypuncher Code** \_\_\_ \_\_\_

**M-19. Language of Interview**

- |           |         |          |          |
|-----------|---------|----------|----------|
| 1. Pashto | 2. Dari | 3. Other | 4. Uzbek |
|-----------|---------|----------|----------|

**M-20. Coder Code** \_\_\_ \_\_\_

**M-21. District Code** \_\_\_ \_\_\_ \_\_\_

**M-22.** Language of the questionnaire

1. Pashto
2. Dari

**M-23. Village name:** \_\_\_\_\_

**M-24. Sampling Point coordinates:** \_\_\_\_\_

**M-25. Field Provider**

1. ACSOR
2. Afghan Youth Consulting

### **Informed Consent**

**INTERVIEWER READ:** *Much work is being done in Afghanistan to create an environment where better government and development can flourish. The purpose of this survey is to ask people like yourself about how this might be better achieved in your local area.*

*We would like your views on this issue.*

*We will not ask for your name and the answers you and others provide will be held in strict confidence. Your responses to the survey questions are strictly voluntary. If we come to a question you do not wish to answer, please tell me and we'll move on. However your answers can be beneficial by providing information which may help to improve stability and minimize conflict in your area, so please answer as truthfully as you can.*

*Do you give your consent for me to proceed?"*

**M-25b. Informed Consent** \_\_\_\_\_ (tick)

**RECORD THE TIME THE ACTUAL INTERVIEW BEGAN (M-14)**  
**AND USE A 24 HOUR CLOCK (14:24, for 2:24 pm)**

## SURVEY

**Q-1.** Generally speaking, are things in [*name the district*] going in the right direction or in the wrong direction? Is that a lot or a little?

1. Right direction (a lot)
2. Right direction (a little)
3. Wrong direction (a little)
4. Wrong direction (a lot)

\_\_\_\_\_

97. Neither right nor wrong direction (vol.)

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

### **MODULE 1: SECURITY & CRIME**

**Q-2a.** Would you say security in your local area is good, fair or poor? Is that 'very good/poor'?

1. Very good
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
5. Very Poor

\_\_\_\_\_

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-2b.** Is your local area more secure, about the same, or less secure than it was a year ago? Is that 'much more/less secure' or 'somewhat more/less secure'?

1. Much more secure
2. Somewhat more secure
3. About the same
4. Somewhat less secure
5. Much less secure

\_\_\_\_\_

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't know (vol.)

**Q-3a.** I would like to know about security on the roads you use in this area. Overall, would you say that security on the roads you use in this area is very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad?

1. Very good
2. Somewhat good
3. Somewhat bad
4. Very bad

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-3b.** Would you say that security on the roads you use in this area has improved, worsened, or stayed the same in the past year? Is that 'improved/worsened a little or a lot'?

1. Improved a lot
2. Improved a little
3. Stayed the same
4. Worsened a little
5. Worsened a lot

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't know (vol.)

**Q-4a-d.** Please tell me how secure do you feel when you are ... [*insert situation*]? Is that very secure, somewhat secure, somewhat insecure, or very insecure?

	Very secure	Somewhat secure	Somewhat insecure	Very insecure	Ref. (vol.)	Don't Know (vol.)
a) ...in your home during the day?	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) ...in your home during the night?	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) ...traveling to a neighboring village?	1	2	3	4	98	99
d) ... traveling to the district or provincial capital?	1	2	3	4	98	99

**Q5.1a-c.** How would you rate the level of...[insert item] in your area? Is there a lot, a little, or none at all?

	A lot	A little	None at all	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) ...petty crime and offenses (theft of food or goods worth less than a few thousand afs)	1	2	3	98	99
b) ...serious, non-violent crimes (theft of goods worth more than 5,000 afs)	1	2	3	98	99
c) ...serious violent crimes (murder, assault or kidnapping)	1	2	3	98	99

**Q-5.2a-c.** Compared to last year, how would you rate the level of ...[Insert Item] in your area? Is it much less, a little less, the same, a little more or much more?

	Much less	A little less	The same	A little more	Much more	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) ...petty crime and offenses (theft of food or goods worth less than a few thousand afs)	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
b) ...serious, non-violent crimes (theft of goods worth more than 5,000 afs)	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
c) ...serious violent crimes (murder, assault or kidnapping)	1	2	3	4	5	98	99

**Q-6.1a-f.** How would you rate the presence of [Insert item] in your area?

	A lot	Some	None	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Afghan National Army	1	2	3	98	99
b) Arbaki	1	2	3	98	99
c) Afghan National Police	1	2	3	98	99
d) Armed Opposition Groups	1	2	3	98	99
e) Afghan Local Police	1	2	3	98	99
f) ISAF	1	2	3	98	99

**Q-6.2a-b.** Overall, how much confidence do you have in ...[*Insert Item*] to make your area safe? Would you say you have a lot of confidence, some confidence, a little confidence or no confidence at all? (If respondent answered 3 “None” to an item in Q-6.1, please record the corresponding item in Q-6.2 as 97 “Not Applicable”)

	A lot of Confidence	Some confidence	A Little confidence	No confidence at all	Not Asked /Not Applicable (vol.)	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) ...the Afghan National Army	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
b) ...the Afghan National Police	1	2	3	4	97	98	99

**Q-7a-b.** Overall, has the ability of the [*Insert Item*] to provide security in your area improved, worsened, or stayed the same in the past year? Is that ‘improved/worsened a little or a lot’?

	Improved a lot	Improved a little	Stayed the same	Worsened a little	Worsened a lot	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Afghan National Army	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
b) Afghan National Police	1	2	3	4	5	98	99

## MODULE 2: GOVERNANCE

**Q-8.** [INTERVIEWER: Please read the following introduction followed by the statement pair] I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.

1. The Afghan government is well regarded in this area.
2. The Afghan government is **not** well regarded in this area.

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-9a-d.** How much confidence do you have in your [*Insert Position/Organization*]? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all?

	A lot of conf.	Some conf.	Not much conf.	No conf.	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) District Governor	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) District Government	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Local village/neighborhood leaders	1	2	3	4	98	99
d) Provincial Governor	1	2	3	4	98	99

**Q-10a-d.** How responsive do you think your [*Insert Item*] is/are to the needs of the local people in this area? Is [*insert item*] very responsive, somewhat responsive, somewhat unresponsive, or very unresponsive?

	Very responsive	Somewhat responsive	Somewhat unresponsive	Very unresponsive	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) District Governor	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) District Government	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Local village / neighborhood leaders	1	2	3	4	98	99
d) Provincial Governor	1	2	3	4	98	99

**Q-11a-d.** Over the past year, has the [*Insert Item*] ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? Is that ‘improved/worsened a little or a lot’?

	Improved a lot	Improved a little	No change	Worsened a little	Worsened a lot	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) District Governor’s	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
b) District Government’s	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
c) Local village / neighborhood leaders’	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
d) Provincial Governor’s	1	2	3	4	5	98	99

**Q-12a.** Please, tell me, do you know of/have you heard of District Development Assembly in your district?

- 1. Yes **(Go to Q-12b)**
  - 2. No **(Skip to Q-13a)**
- 
- 98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q-13a)**
  - 99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-13a)**

**Q-12b.[Filtered, if 'yes' to Q12a]** How much confidence do you have in your District Development Assembly? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all?

	A lot of conf.	Some conf.	Not much conf.	No conf.	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
District Development Assembly	1	2	3	4	7	98	99

**Q-12c.[Filtered, if 'yes' to Q12a]** How responsive do you think your District Development Assembly is to the needs of the local people in this area? Is it very responsive, somewhat responsive, somewhat unresponsive, or very unresponsive?

	Very responsive	Somewhat responsive	Somewhat unresponsive	Very unresponsive	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
District Development Assembly	1	2	3	4	7	98	99

**Q-12d.[Filtered, if 'yes' to Q12a]** And over the past year, has the District Development Assembly's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? Is that 'improved/worsened a little or a lot'?

	Improved a lot	Improved a little	No change	Worsened a little	Worsened a lot	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
District Development Assembly	1	2	3	4	5	7	98	99

**Q-13a. (ASK ALL)** Please, tell me, do you have Community Development Council established in your area?

1. Yes **(Go to Q-13b)**

2. No **(Skip to Q-14)**

98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q-14)**

99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-14)**

**Q-13b.[Filtered, if 'yes' to Q13a]** How much confidence do you have in your Community Development Council? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all?

	A lot of conf.	Some conf.	Not much conf.	No conf.	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
Community Development Council	1	2	3	4	7	98	99

**Q-13c.[Filtered, if 'yes' to Q13a]** How responsive do you think your Community Development Council is to the needs of the local people in this area? Is it very responsive, somewhat responsive, somewhat unresponsive, or very unresponsive?

	Very responsive	Somewhat responsive	Somewhat unresponsive	Very unresponsive	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
Community Development Council	1	2	3	4	7	98	99

**Q-13d.[Filtered, if 'yes' to Q13a]** And over the past year, has the Community Development Council's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? Is that 'improved/worsened a little or a lot'?

	Improved a lot	Improved a little	No change	Worsened a little	Worsened a lot	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
Community Development Council	1	2	3	4	5	7	98	99

**Q-14a-h.[ASK ALL][INTERVIEWER: For each of 14a-h, please read the following introduction followed by the statement pair] I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.**

Q-14a.

1. The District Government officials in this district are from this district.
2. The District Government officials in this district are **not** from this district.

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14b.

1. The District Government understands the problems of people in this area.
2. The District Government **does not** understand the problems of people in this area.

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14c.

1. The District Government cares about the people in this area.
2. The District Government **does not** care about the people in this area.

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14d.

1. District Government officials in this district abuse their authority to make money for themselves.
2. District Government officials in this district **do not** abuse their authority to make money for themselves.

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14e.

1. District Government officials visit this area.
2. District Government officials **do not** visit this area.

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14f.

1. In general, the District Government officials are doing their jobs honestly.
2. In general, the District Government officials are **not** doing their jobs honestly.

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14g.

1. The District Government delivers basic services to this area in a fair manner.
2. The District Government **does not** deliver basic services to this area in a fair manner.

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q14h.

1. It is acceptable for people to publicly criticize the Afghan government.
2. It is **not** acceptable for people to publicly criticize the Afghan government.

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

### MODULE 3: SERVICE PROVISION & DEVELOPMENT

**Q-15.** Overall, do you think that services from the government in this area have improved, worsened, or not changed in the past year? Is that 'improved/worsened a lot or a little'?

1. Improved a lot
2. Improved a little
3. Not changed
4. Worsened a little
5. Worsened a lot

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-16a-i.** Generally speaking, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the district government's provision of [*Insert Item*]? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

	Very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	Service not provided (vol.)	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Clean Drinking Water	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
b) Water for irrigation and uses other than drinking	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
c) Agricultural assistance ( <i>seed fertilizer, equipment</i> )	1	2	3	4	97	98	99

	Very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	Service not provided (vol.)	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
d) Retaining and flood walls	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
e) Roads and bridges	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
f) Medical Care	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
g) Schooling for girls	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
h) Schooling for boys	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
i) Electricity	1	2	3	4	97	98	99

**Q-17a.** In the last year, have you seen or heard about any development projects in your local area, or not?

- 1. Yes **(Go to Q-17b)**
- 2. No **(Skip to Q-18)**
- \_\_\_\_\_
- 98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q-18)**
- 99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-18)**

**Q-17b.** (Ask respondent if answered code 1 "Yes" in Q-17a). What development projects have you seen or heard about in your local area?

**(INTERVIEWER: READ OUT PRECODES. Circle each response mentioned.)**

**Q-17c.** (Ask if respondent answered code 1 "Yes" in Q17b. If item is not circled in Q-17b, circle '97') Did the project improve life for people in this local area?

	<i>Q-17b. What development projects have you seen or heard about in this area?</i>			<i>Q-17c. If project type is mentioned in Q-17b, ask Did the project/s improve life for people in this local area? If project type is not mentioned in Q-17b, circle '97'.</i>		
	Not asked	Yes	No	Yes	No	Not Men'd
a) Drinking Water	97	1	2	1	2	97
b) Irrigation/water maintenance systems	97	1	2	1	2	97
c) Agricultural assistance ( <i>seed fertilizer, equipment</i> )	97	1	2	1	2	97

<i>Q-17b. What development projects have you seen or heard about in this area?</i>				<i>Q-17c. If project type is mentioned in Q-17b, ask Did the project/s improve life for people in this local area? If project type is not mentioned in Q-17b, circle '97'.</i>		
d) Farm produce processing or storage facilities	97	1	2	1	2	97
e) Retaining and flood walls	97	1	2	1	2	97
f) Roads and Bridges	97	1	2	1	2	97
g) Medical Facilities	97	1	2	1	2	97
h) Schools	97	1	2	1	2	97
i) Electricity	97	1	2	1	2	97
j) Other (Specify)	97	1	2	1	2	97

**Q-18a-b. (ASK ALL)** Looking forward to the next year, what type of development projects are most needed in this area? You can mention two. Please start with the most needed, then the next most needed. **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down two responses)**

Q-18a. (most needed): \_\_\_\_\_

Q-18b. (next most needed): \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-19-a-b. (ASK ALL)** Which of the following are the two biggest obstacles to your obtaining health care or medicine? **(INTERVIEWER: READ OUT RESPONSES. Record up to two starting with the biggest and then second biggest obstacle)**  
(NEW in Wave 2)

Q-19a. (biggest obstacle): \_\_\_\_\_

Q-19b. (second biggest obstacle): \_\_\_\_\_

1. Lack of clinics/hospitals
2. Distance to facilities, lack of transportation and/or good roads
3. Cost of health care or medicine
4. Corruption or need to pay bribes to receive treatment
5. Lack of professional doctors
6. No services for women or a lack of female healthcare workers
7. Lack of medicines
8. Lack of medical equipment
9. Poor security
96. Other
98. Refused
99. Don't Know

#### MODULE 4: RULE OF LAW

**Q-20a-c.** If you or a family member was involved in a dispute concerning [*Insert Item*], please tell me who or where you would go to get justice? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED]**

	Govt. Court	Local/Tribal Elder/s	Armed Opposition Groups	Other ( <i>write in</i> )	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Land or water	1	2	3	96 _____	98	99
b) Assault, murder, or kidnapping	1	2	3	96 _____	98	99
c) Theft	1	2	3	96 _____	98	99

**Q-21a-c.** How much confidence do you have in [*Insert Item*] to fairly resolve disputes? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all?

	A lot of conf.	Some conf.	Not much conf.	No conf.	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Local/tribal elders	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) Government courts	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Armed opposition groups	1	2	3	4	98	99

**Q-22a-c.** Do you think that people in your village/neighborhood always, mostly, sometimes or never respect the decisions made by [*Insert Item*]?

	Always	Mostly	Sometimes	Never	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Local/tribal elders	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) Government courts	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Armed opposition groups	1	2	3	4	98	99

## MODULE 5: CORRUPTION

**Q-23.** Is corruption a problem in this area, or not?

1. Yes
2. No

\_\_\_\_\_  
 98. Refused (vol.)  
 99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-24.** From what you know or have heard about, which department or sector of the local government do people most complain about corruption? [**INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED**] (**Write down one response**)

Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
 98. Refused (vol.)  
 99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-25.** In the last year has the level of corruption in this area increased, decreased, or stayed about the same? Is that increased/decreased a little or a lot?

1. Increased a lot
2. Increased a little
3. Stayed about the same
4. Decreased a little
5. Decreased a lot

\_\_\_\_\_  
 98. Refused (vol.)  
 99. Don't Know (vol.)

## MODULE 6: QUALITY OF LIFE (WELL-BEING & STANDARD OF LIVING)

**Q-26.** All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Would you say you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

1. Very satisfied
2. Somewhat satisfied
3. Somewhat dissatisfied
4. Very dissatisfied

---

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-27.** How satisfied are you with your household's current financial situation? Would you say you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

1. Very satisfied
2. Somewhat satisfied
3. Somewhat dissatisfied
4. Very dissatisfied

---

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-28.** Thinking about the past year, would you say overall that your ability to meet your basic needs increased, decreased, or stayed the same? Is that 'increased/decreased a little or a lot'?

1. Increased a lot
2. Increased a little
3. Stayed the same
4. Decreased a little
5. Decreased a lot

---

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-29.** How worried are you about being able to meet your basic needs over the next year? Are you not worried, a little worried, or very worried?

1. Not worried
2. A little worried
3. Very worried

---

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-30.** I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.

1. The situation in this area is certain enough for me to make plans for my future.
2. The situation in this area is **too uncertain** for me to make plans for my future.

---

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

## **MODULE 7: ECONOMIC ACTIVITY**

**Q-31.** Compared to a year ago, how would you describe your ability to get to your local markets? Is it much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse, or much worse?

1. Much better
2. A little better
3. About the same
4. A little worse
5. Much worse

---

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-32.** Compared to a year ago, how have prices for basic goods changed in your local markets? Have they increased a lot, increased a little, stayed about the same, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?

1. Increased a lot
2. Increased a little
3. Stayed about the same
4. Decreased a little
5. Decreased a lot

---

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-33.** Compared to a year ago, how would you describe the availability of paid jobs in your local area? Are there a lot more, a little more, about the same, a few less, or a lot less paid jobs available in your local area?

1. A lot more
2. A little more
3. About the same
4. A little less
5. A lot less

\_\_\_\_\_

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

## **MODULE 8: COMMUNITY COHESION & RESILIENCE**

**Q-34a.** How often do things from outside your village/neighborhood create problems in this area to disrupt normal life? Is that often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often **(Go to Q-34b)**
2. Sometimes **(Go to Q-34b)**
3. Rarely **(Go to Q-34b)**
4. Never **(Skip to Q-35a)**

\_\_\_\_\_

98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q-35a)**

99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-35a)**

**Q-34b. (Ask those who answered 1, 2 or 3 to Q-34a)** What is the most common type of interference from outside the village/neighborhood that creates problems in this area? What is the next most common type of interference? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED]**  
**(Write down two responses)**

Q-34b\_1. Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

Q-34b\_2. Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

97. Not Asked

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-34c. (Ask those who answered 1, 2 or 3 to Q-34a)** How often are the people here able to solve these problems that come from outside the village? Is it often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely
4. Never

\_\_\_\_\_  
97. Not Asked  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-35a. (ASK ALL)** How often do things from inside your village/neighborhood create problems in this area to disrupt normal life? Is that often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often (Go to Q-35b)
2. Sometimes (Go to Q-35b)
3. Rarely (Go to Q-35b)
4. Never (Skip to Q-36)

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.) (Skip to Q-36)  
99. Don't Know (vol.) (Skip to Q-36)

**Q-35b. (Ask those who answered 1, 2 or 3 to Q-35a)** What is the most common type of interference from inside the village/neighborhood that creates problems in this area? What is the next most common type of interference? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED]**  
**(Write down two responses)**

Q-35b\_1. Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

Q-35b\_2. Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

97. Not Asked  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-35c. (Ask those who answered 1, 2 or 3 to Q-35a)** How often are the people here able to solve these problems that come from inside the village? Is it often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely
4. Never

\_\_\_\_\_  
97. Not Asked  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-36. (ASK ALL)** When there is a problem in this area, how often do the villages/neighborhoods in this area work together to solve the problem? Is that often, sometimes, rarely or never?

1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely
4. Never

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-37a.** When decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of ordinary people in the village/neighborhood considered? Are they considered often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often                   **(Go to Q-37b)**
2. Sometimes           **(Go to Q-37b)**
3. Rarely                 **(Go to Q-37b)**
4. Never                 **(Skip to Q-38)**

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)   **(Skip to Q-38)**  
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-38)**

**Q-37b. (Ask if answered codes 1, 2 or 3 in Q-37a)** In your opinion, when decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of women considered? Are they considered often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely
4. Never

---

97. Not Asked  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-38. (ASK ALL)** How effective or ineffective are your local leaders at securing funds for your village/neighborhood's needs from the district and/or provincial government? Are they very effective, somewhat effective, somewhat ineffective, or very ineffective?

1. Very effective
2. Somewhat effective
3. Somewhat ineffective
4. Very ineffective

---

98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-39a-b.** Do you belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss issues of common interest or to do certain activities together? Examples may include sports clubs, women’s groups, business associations, trade unions, farmers’ associations, development councils, religious welfare organizations, or charities, etc.

**Q-39a.**

- 1. Yes (Please list below in Q-39b)
- 2. No (Skip to Q-40)

- 98. Refused (vol.) (Skip to Q-40)
- 99. Don’t Know (vol.) (Skip to Q-40)

**Q-39b.**(Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” to Q-39a) [INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED]  
(Write down up to two responses) What type of group/s do you belong to?

Q-39b\_1. Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

Q-39b\_2. Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

- 97. Not Asked
- 98. Refused (vol.)
- 99. Don’t Know (vol.)

## MODULE 9: GRIEVANCES

**Q-40a-b. (ASK ALL)** Thinking about the different problems that people in this area talk about, what are the two biggest problems that create stress or tension in this area? Please try to be specific, starting with the biggest problem. [INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down two responses)

Q-40a. Biggest problem: \_\_\_\_\_

Q-40b. Next biggest problem: \_\_\_\_\_

- 98. Refused (vol.)
- 99. Don’t Know (vol.)

**MODULE 10: MEDIA**

**Q-41a-i.** Do you use any of the following to communicate with others and/or get news and information?

	Yes	No	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Television	1	2	98	99
b) Radio	1	2	98	99
c) Mosque/mullah	1	2	98	99
d) Friends and family	1	2	98	99
e) Elders	1	2	98	99
f) Cell phone	1	2	98	99
g) Posters & billboards	1	2	98	99
h) Newspapers	1	2	98	99
i) Internet/email	1	2	98	99

**Q-42a-b.** From where do you get most of your information about government services? From where do you next get your information about government services? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED]** (Write down two responses)

Write Response/s:

Q-42a. \_\_\_\_\_

Q-42b. \_\_\_\_\_

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**MODULE 11: INDIRECT QUESTIONS**

**Q-43a.** It has recently been suggested by the Afghan government that people be allowed to vote in elections to select the members of their district council. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

98. Refused

99. Don't know

**Q-43b.** It has recently been suggested by the Taliban that people be allowed to vote in elections to select the members of their district council. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused

99. Don't know

**Q-44a.** It has recently been suggested by the Afghan government that expensive new prisons be constructed in every district to help alleviate overcrowding in existing prisons. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support with this policy

---

98. Refused

99. Don't know

**Q-44b.** It has recently been suggested by the Taliban that expensive new prisons be constructed in every district to help alleviate overcrowding in existing prisons. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused

99. Don't know

**Q-45a.** It has recently been suggested by the Afghan government that the weak Independent Election Commission (IEC) be strengthened to prevent election fraud. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose with this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused

99. Don't know

**Q-45b.** It has recently been suggested by the Taliban that the weak Independent Election Commission (IEC) be strengthened to prevent election fraud. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused

99. Don't know

**Q-46a.** It has recently been suggested by the Afghan government that the weak Office of Oversight for Anti-Corruption be strengthened by allowing it to collect information about government officials suspected of wrong-doing. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused

99. Don't know

**Q-46b.** It has recently been suggested by the Taliban that the weak Office of Oversight for Anti-Corruption be strengthened by allowing it to collect information about government officials suspected of wrong-doing. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused

99. Don't know

**Q-47a.** Despite the possible risks, the democratically-elected government of Afghanistan wants the full transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces to happen sooner than is now planned. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused

99. Don't know

**Q-47b.** Despite the possible risks, the Karzai administration wants the full transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces to happen sooner than is now planned. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused

99. Don't know

**Q-48a.** Despite the poor results of past anti-corruption campaigns, the democratically-elected government of Afghanistan wants to do a new campaign to eliminate corruption. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused

99. Don't know

**Q-48b.** Despite the poor results of past anti-corruption campaigns, the Karzai administration wants to do a new campaign to eliminate corruption. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused

99. Don't know

**Q-49a.** The democratically-elected government of Afghanistan wants to make a new law that makes it a crime for Mullahs to preach anti-government messages or to incite violence during their Friday sermons. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused

99. Don't know

**Q-49b.** The Karzai administration wants to make a new law that makes it a crime for Mullahs to preach anti-government messages or to incite violence during their Friday sermons. Do you oppose or support with such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused

99. Don't know

**Q-50a.** The democratically-elected government of Afghanistan has called for improved access to education for women and girls. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused

99. Don't know

**Q-50b.** The Karzai administration has called for improved access to education for women and girls. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused

99. Don't know

## DEMOGRAPHICS

**INTERVIEWER READ:** *“Now I would like to ask you some questions for statistical purposes.”*

**D-1.** Apologies to be asking this, but regardless of your attained level of education, can you fluently perform each of the following in your native language?

	Yes	No	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a. Read a letter	1	2	8	9
b. Write a letter	1	2	8	9
c. Read a book	1	2	8	9

**D-2a.** Do you farm, grow something on your own, or rent land?  
(NEW in Wave 2)

- 1. Yes **(Go to D-2b)**
  - 2. No **(Skip to D-3)**
- 
- 98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to D-3)**
  - 99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to D-3)**

**D-2b.** (Ask if respondent answered code 1 “Yes” in D-2a) What is the main crop that you grow? **(CODE ONE RESPONSE)**

Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

- 97. Not Asked
- 98. Refused (vol.)
- 99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D-3.** **(ASK ALL)** Are you the head of household?

- 1. Yes
  - 2. No
- 
- 98. Refused (vol.)
  - 99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D-4.** What is your household's total monthly income in Afghanis from all sources, that is, all types of income for all the people living at this address?

1. 1,000 Afghanis or less,
2. From 1,001 to 1,600
3. From 1,601 to 2,400
4. From 2,401 to 4,000
5. From 4,001 to 6,000
6. From 6,001 to 8,000
7. From 8,001 to 12,000
8. From 12,001 to 16,000
9. From 16,001 to 20,000
10. From 20,001 to 24,000
11. From 24,001 to 40,000
12. Greater than 40,000 Afghanis?

\_\_\_\_\_

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D-5.** When asked 'Who are you?' some people answer first by indicating their occupation, others state their nationality, others tell their ethnicity, others their Qawm, others religion, others the region/province they are from, etc. If asked this question, what would you indicate about yourself in the first place?

1. Occupation
2. Nationality
3. Ethnicity/Qawm
4. Religion
5. Province/region
6. Name

\_\_\_\_\_

96. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D-6.** Do you consider yourself to be...

1. Pashtun
2. Tajik
3. Uzbek
4. Turkmen
5. Hazara
6. Baloch
7. Kirghiz
8. Nuristani
9. Aimak
10. Arab
11. Kuchi
12. Other

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D-7.** What is your religious affiliation? **(If Respondent Says Muslim Ask):** Do you consider yourself to be Shia or Sunni?

1. Shia Muslim
2. Sunni Muslim
3. Other

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D-8.** What is your qawm?

Qawm: \_\_\_\_\_ (write in)

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D-9.** Were you born in this district, or not?

1. Yes
2. No

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D-10.** How many people live in your household?

Interviewer: (code response) \_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

## HOUSEHOLD SURVEY

**INTERVIEWER, Read Out: “Now I’m going to ask about age, education, marital and working status of all household members starting with yourself.”**

### Interviewer, NOTE:

- The household is defined as all the family household members who lived in this dwelling at some time over the last year.
- First, list all the people (**INCLUDING RESPONDENT**) who lived in this dwelling over the past year (H-1)... even if they are not living in the dwelling at this time and record their names (*Use first names or initials only*)
- Next, ask questions H-2 to H-9. If they are not household members (*e.g., guests, workers*) they should not be included.

Codes for Question H-5		
Inside Afghanistan	Outside Afghanistan	
1. Currently living in the household	4. Pakistan	7. Gulf Countries (including Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, or Bahrain)
2. In another village, inside the province	5. Iran	8. Other Countries
3. In another province of Afghanistan	6. Central Asian Countries (including Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan)	

#	<b>H-1.</b> First, list names of <b>all individuals</b> in the household <b>(Start with RESPONDENT, the person being interviewed)</b>  Name (Use first names or initials only)	<b>H-2.</b> Gender  1. Male 2. Female	<b>H-3.</b> How old is “___”?  <b>Years</b>	<b>H-4.</b> What is “___”s marital status?  1. Married 2. Divorced/ Separated 3. Widowed 4. Single	<b>H-5.</b> Where is “___” now?  <b>Code</b> (use code box)	<b>H-6.</b> Does “___” currently go to school or participate in another kind of education program?  If <b>YES</b> , go to H-7, If <b>NO</b> , skip to H-8	<b>H-7.</b> What kind of education program is “___” involved in?  1. Attends school 2. Attends college or university 3. Attends madrassa 4. Attends technical or vocational training 5. Other 97. Not Asked	<b>H-8.</b> What is “___”s attained degree of education?  1. No formal schooling 2. 1-6 grade 3. 7-8 grade 4. 9-12 grade 5. Higher 8. Madrassa	<b>H-9.</b> In the past three months, by what of the following has “___” contributed <b>MOST</b> to the household well-being or income? <b>Read out options. Single Response</b> 1. Taking care of other household member(s) 2. Household work, chores 3. Farming/Agriculture 4. Daily labor (other than farming) 5. Trade/Shopkeeping 6. Work in government sector 7. Work in private business 8. Artisanry 9. Other (specify) _____ 0. Nothing
01						1. Yes 2. No			
02						1. Yes 2. No			
03						1. Yes 2. No			
04						1. Yes 2. No			
05						1. Yes 2. No			
06						1. Yes 2. No			
07						1. Yes 2. No			
08						1. Yes 2. No			
09						1. Yes 2. No			
10						1. Yes 2. No			
11						1. Yes 2. No			
12						1. Yes 2. No			
13						1. Yes 2. No			
14						1. Yes 2. No			
15						1. Yes 2. No			
16						1. Yes 2. No			
17						1. Yes 2. No			
18						1. Yes 2. No			
19						1. Yes 2. No			

#	<b>H-1.</b> First, list names of <b>all individuals</b> in the household <b>(Start with RESPONDENT, the person being interviewed)</b>  Name (Use first names or initials only)	<b>H-2.</b> Gender  1. Male 2. Female	<b>H-3.</b> How old is “___”?  <b>Years</b>	<b>H-4.</b> What is “___”s marital status?  1. Married 2. Divorced/ Separated 3. Widowed 4. Single	<b>H-5.</b> Where is “___” now?  <b>Code</b> (use code box)	<b>H-6.</b> Does “___” currently go to school or participate in another kind of education program?  If <b>YES</b> , go to H-7, If <b>NO</b> , skip to H-8	<b>H-7.</b> What kind of education program is “___” involved in?  1. Attends school 2. Attends college or university 3. Attends madrassa 4. Attends technical or vocational training 5. Other 97. Not Asked	<b>H-8.</b> What is “___”s attained degree of education?  1. No formal schooling 2. 1-6 grade 3. 7-8 grade 4. 9-12 grade 5. Higher 8. Madrassa	<b>H-9.</b> In the past three months, by what of the following has “___” contributed <b>MOST</b> to the household well-being or income? <b>Read out options. Single Response</b> 1. Taking care of other household member(s) 2. Household work, chores 3. Farming/Agriculture 4. Daily labor (other than farming) 5. Trade/Shopkeeping 6. Work in government sector 7. Work in private business 8. Artisanship 9. Other (specify) _____ 0. Nothing
20						1. Yes 2. No			
21						1. Yes 2. No			
22						1. Yes 2. No			
23						1. Yes 2. No			
24						1. Yes 2. No			
25						1. Yes 2. No			

**D-11a.** And still thinking of family matters, on another subject, have you or has any other member/s of this household been injured or killed as a result of the fighting since the Taliban was removed from power?

- 1. Yes (Go to D-11b)
- 2. No (Skip to M-26)

- 
- 98. Refused (vol.) (Skip to M-26)
  - 99. Don't Know (vol.) (Skip to M-26)

**D-11b. (Ask if answered code 1 "Yes" at D-11a)** Which group/s was/were responsible for the injury/s or death/s? (Do not read PRECODES, code up to two responses)

D-11b\_1. Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

D-11b\_2. Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

Precodes:

- 1. Taliban
- 2. ISAF
- 3. ANSF
- 4. Haqqani
- 5. [intentional blank]
- 6. Armed people
- 7. Foreign forces
- 8. Thieves
- 9. Local disputes
- 10. Warlords
- 11. Criminals
- 12. Karzai's men
- 13. Jamyat-e-Islami
- 14. Pakistanis
- 15. AGE
- 16. Soviet Union
- 17. None
- 18. Hizb-e Islami
- 19. Wahdat political party
- 20. Arbakies
- 21. Suicide attacks
- 96. Other (Specify: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 97. Not Asked
- 98. Refused (vol.)
- 99. Don't Know (vol.)

**M-26. (ASK ALL)** Have you previously participated in a public opinion survey?

1. Yes (Go to M-27)
  2. No (Skip to M-28)
- 
8. Refused (Vol.) (Skip to M-28)
  9. Don't Know (Vol.) (Skip to M-28)

**M-27. (Ask if answered 'yes' to M-26)** How long ago did you participate in the survey?

1. Less than 1 month
  2. 1-3 months ago
  3. 4-6 months ago
  4. 7-9 months ago
  5. 10-12 months ago
  6. More than 1 year ago
- 
7. Not Asked
  8. Refused (vol.)
  9. Don't Know (vol.)

**M-28. (ASK ALL)** Would you be willing to participate in another of our surveys next year?

1. Yes
  2. No
- 
8. Refused (Vol.)
  9. Don't Know (Vol.)

**RECORD THE TIME (USING 24 HOUR CLOCK) INTERVIEW WAS COMPLETED  
AND THE LENGTH OF THE INTERVIEW (M-15 AND M-16)**

**Read Closing Statement to the Respondent:**

“Thank you for participating in our survey. Do you have any questions? In the next few hours or days my supervisor may contact you to evaluate the quality of my work and answer any other questions you may have. To help him/her do that, could I have your telephone number?”

Telephone number: \_\_\_\_\_

“If my supervisor calls you by telephone, he/she will begin by asking if you were surveyed in the last few hours/days. He/she will **not ask** you for your name or address. If someone you don’t know contacts you by telephone and asks for your name and/or address you should end the call and not talk to them.”

Interviewer Certification: “I certify that I have completed this interview according to the instructions provided me by \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signed

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Interviewer Code

**M-29. Interviewer:** How many people were present for the interview? \_\_\_\_

**M-30. Interviewer:** Which of the following statements do you think best describes the level of comprehension of the survey questionnaire by the respondent?

1. The respondent understood all of the questions
2. The respondent understood most of the questions
3. The respondent understood most of the questions but with some help.
4. The respondent had difficulty understanding most of the questions, even with help from me

M-31. Interviewer: Which of the following statements best describes the level of comfort or unease that the respondent had with the survey questionnaire?

1. The respondent was comfortable (at ease) with the entire questionnaire
2. The respondent was comfortable with most of the questions
3. The respondent was comfortable with only some of the questions
4. The respondent was generally uncomfortable with the survey questionnaire

**M-32. Interviewer:** Please indicate which, if any, of the questions caused this respondent any uneasiness or decreased cooperation during the interview. **(Write down the number of the question numbers, in order of mention).**

- a. First Mention \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Second Mention \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Third Mention \_\_\_\_\_

**M-33. SES Level: INTERVIEWER:** Try to ask participant about access to water and electric (for electric it can be either municipal electric or a generator). Make your own decision about quality of the road. Select the code that is closest to the appearance and situation of the household. Code 1 represents the highest household economic situation and Code 5 the lowest household economic situation.

- 1. A/B [High quality road, access to water and electric 6 to 7 days]
- 2. C+ [Good road, access to water and electric 4 to 5 days per]
- 3. C, C- [Fair road, access to water and electric only a 1 to 3 days per week]
- 4. D [Poor road, access to water and electric 1 day a week, or less]
- 5. E [Poor or no road, no or very infrequent access to water and electric]

**M-34a.** This sampling point was checked by a MISTI validator, or not.  
(NEW in Wave 2)

- 1. The sampling point was checked by a MISTI validator.
- 2. The sampling point was not checked by a MISTI validator.

To Be Completed By The Supervisor:

**M-34b.** Was the interview subject to ACSOR quality control/back-check?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No

**M-35.** Method of quality control/back-check

- 1. Direct supervision during interview
- 2. Back-check in person by the supervisory team
- 3. Back-check from the central office
- 4. Not applicable

**MISTI Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey**  
**M-36 Supplemental Question**

**INTERVIEWER Instructions:** The supplemental question (M-36) is to be completed by the interviewer after completing his/her interviews in the sampling point. Interview is to fill out one for each sampling point completed.

**M-2.** Wave Number 01

**M-4.** Sampling Point/District Where the Interview Was Completed: \_\_\_\_ \_

**M-11.** Interviewer Code: \_\_\_\_ \_

**M-34. INTERVIEWER:** Please judge which situation best describes this village:

1. ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby; no Taliban activity or presence has been reported
2. ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby; some Taliban activity or presence has been reported, especially at night
3. ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby but do not move freely at night; village administrators usually do not sleep in their homes, and Taliban activity takes place regularly
4. Taliban forces are permanently based in this village or nearby and operate freely; ISAF or Afghan security forces may visit the village on occasion but do not stay
5. Taliban forces are permanently based in this village or nearby and operate freely; no ISAF or Afghan security force presence or activity at all
6. Local arbaki control this village; minimal Taliban, ISAF, or Afghan security force presence at all
7. There are no ISAF, Taliban, Afghan security forces, or arbaki controlling this village

## APPENDIX B: METHODS REPORT



Country: Afghanistan

Field Dates: May 18 – August 7, 2013

Research Provider: ACSOR Surveys and  
Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC)

D3 Project Manager: Brian Kirchoff

Study: Measuring the Impact of Stabilization  
Initiatives (MISTI) Wave 2

Sample Size: 36,475

Number of ACSOR Interviewers: 1,139  
Number of AYC Interviewers: 68

Date of Assessment: October 25, 2013

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## Introduction

The Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI) Wave 2 survey was a public opinion study that sought to identify trends in stabilization indicators throughout Afghanistan. The Wave 2 survey built upon the Wave 1 baseline survey, which was conducted between September 13 and December 23, 2012. The intent of the project was to inform leaders from 6 stabilization programs being run across Afghanistan and help identify improvements and declines in stabilization in their areas of responsibility.

There were six stabilization programs that were included in both the Wave 1 and Wave 2 projects: Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI), Community Development Program (CDP) and four Stabilization in Key Areas (SIKA) programs covering the North (SIKA-N), South (SIKA-S), East (SIKA-E) and West (SIKA-W) regions of Afghanistan.

The target population was Afghan citizens, 18 years of age or older, living in 82 pre-selected districts throughout 19 provinces in Afghanistan. Seventy six of these districts were selected because they were locations where at least one of the six stabilization programs were either operating or planning to operate in the future. The final six districts were identified as relatively stable districts and served as control districts for analytical purposes.

The target N size for the project was 36,912 interviews. The achieved N size was 36,475 interviews after all quality control measures were employed and unacceptable interviews were rejected. The target n size for each district ranged between 320 and 480 interviews with the average size per district being 448 interviews.

Sampling was done by first using a disproportionate stratification by district. The sample was spread across 82 districts specified by MISTI. These districts were located in the following 19 provinces: Parwan, Wardak, Logar, Ghazni, Paktiya, Khost, Kunar, Baghlan, Kunduz, Samangan, Badghis, Herat, Farah, Nimroz, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzghan and Ghor. These were the same 19 provinces which were included in the Wave 1 baseline survey.

Primary sampling units were villages within each district which were also selected by MISTI. In some instances, villages were determined to be inaccessible to interviewing teams due to security concerns, travel restrictions (imposed by either insurgent groups or NATO forces) or weather. In these instances, a replacement village was selected from a list of allowable replacement villages provided by MISTI. These replacements were made so that the new village was from the same Community Development Council (CDC) district in order to maintain geographic continuity among the replacement location. Replacements are notated in the Achieved Sample Plans for each of the 82 districts surveyed.

Margin of error was calculated in three different ways due to the analytical goals of the MISTI Wave 2 project. Due to the nature of the district selection (non-stratified, selected by MISTI to meet programmatic needs), an accurate design effect cannot be calculated for the aggregated data set as each district was launched using a unique sample plan. As such, sampling was approached as though each district was a standalone sample design. That said, assuming a simple random sample with  $P=0.5$  and a 95% confidence interval, the margin of sampling error for the aggregated data set of 36,475 interviews is

+/- 0.5%. This statistic is primarily for reference; analysis for these data is seldom done in aggregate with all cases being analyzed simultaneously. The more useful statistics for practical analysis are the design effects and the resulting margin of error and complex margin of error calculations that were generated for each individual district. A chart showing each district's resulting statistics can be found in the "Sample Design" section of this report under sub-section "2.3 Margin of Error." In addition to the individual district results, design effect and margin of error calculations were also generated for each of the six program areas and the control districts. These were derived using an average design effect for all districts covered by a program and then using the aggregated sample for each program to calculate the estimates. The program level results can also be found in sub-section "2.3 Margin of Error."

The MISTI Wave 2 survey was conducted face to face by 1,139 ACSOR interviewers and 68 AYC interviewers. Due to ACSOR's size and public profile, some districts are inaccessible to ACSOR interviewers because it is difficult to enter and exit certain areas without attracting the attention of insurgent elements and endangering the safety of the ACSOR interviewers. Certain districts are also accessible only to male interviewers due to cultural and security concerns. ACSOR maintains an accessibility tracker to monitor each district in Afghanistan. This tracker is updated monthly as the security situation in Afghanistan changes frequently. As a result of ACSOR's inaccessibility assessment, the interviews in 11 districts were conducted completely by AYC and another 4 districts were interviewed using both ACSOR and AYC interviewers during the Wave 2 field work.

The ACSOR interviewing teams consisted of male and female interviewers who were local residents of the areas where the interviews were conducted. The ACSOR interviewers utilized a random walk methodology to select households and a Kish grid to randomize respondent selection within households. These interviewers were all from the province where they conducted interviews and in most instances they were from the districts where the interviews were conducted. The ACSOR interviewing teams were overseen by a supervisory team from their province. The supervisory team consisted of 19 lead supervisors (one for each province) and one or two assistant supervisors in each province that helped with back checks, field monitoring and general field logistics throughout the field period. ACSOR's field work began on May 18 and concluded on July 8, 2013.

The AYC interviewing teams consisted of small groups of male interviewers who are from the districts where the interviews were conducted. Due to the poor security situation in the districts where they conducted field work, the AYC interviewing teams selected households through convenience sampling using their local knowledge of the villages and contacts they have within those villages so as to lessen the possibility of encountering insurgent elements that would result from employing a random walk. Since the AYC interviewers were all male and they selected households through convenience sampling, respondents were selected by either asking for the male head of household or interviewing another male member of the household who was available at the time. The AYC interviewers were overseen by a team of 15 supervisors who were responsible for back checking, direct observations and all field logistics. AYC began field work on June 10 and concluded on August 7, 2013.

Contact sheets were completed by both ACSOR and AYC interviewers throughout the field period. ACSOR used standard AAPOR calculation standards to derive the following field performance and disposition rates:

- Response Rate 3 = 79.6%
- Cooperation Rate 3 = 98.0%
- Refusal Rate 2 = 1.6%

AAPOR offers a variety of formulas to calculate disposition rates depending on the circumstances for which they are being used. ACSOR typically uses the rates reported above as they most logically fit the face to face field methodology used in Afghanistan.

The questionnaire consisted of 37 management and quality control variables, 85 substantive questions and 31 demographic questions. For the purposes of this count, each item in a battery of questions was counted as 1/3 of a variable. For the household roster in the demographic questions, each question was counted as 2 variables using the estimate that each household would have an average of about 6 family members and the entries for each family member would be counted as 1/3 of a variable. The average length of time it took for an interview to be conducted was 40 minutes with the shortest interview taking 20 minutes and the longest interview taking 2 hours and 20 minutes.

*Table 1: Project Schedule*

Project Phases	Start Date	End Date	Comments
Translation	April 22	April 30	
ACSOR Briefings	May 2	May 16	
AYC Briefings	June 6	June 7	
ACSOR Fieldwork	May 18	July 8	
AYC Fieldwork	June 10	August 7	Ramadan: July 8 – August 7
Quality Control	May 18	August 7	
Data Processing	May 29	September 19	

## Sample Design

The following table shows the target and achieved sample for each district in the MISTI Wave 2 project. The target and achieved sample sizes differ due to post-field quality control measures which caused some cases to be removed from the data set. A complete list of reasons cases were removed listed by district can be found in section 4.6 of this report.

*Table 2: Sample Design*

District	Province	Program	Target	Achieved
Ab-e Kamari	Badghis	Control	320	311
Ahmadabad	Paktiya	SIKA-E	480	491
Aibak	Samangan	Control	320	334
Aliabad	Kunduz	SIKA-N	480	494
Andar	Ghazni	SIKA-E	320	316
Archi	Kunduz	SIKA-N	320	318
Arghandab	Kandahar	SIKA-S	480	483
Baghlan-e Jadid	Baghlan	SIKA-N	480	491

District	Province	Program	Target	Achieved
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatsu)	Ghazni	CCI	480	492
Bak	Khost	CCI	480	492
Bala Boluk	Farah	SIKA-W	480	433
Baraki Barak	Logar	SIKA-E	320	303
Chaghcharan	Ghor	SIKA-W	480	483
Chahar Darah	Kunduz	SIKA-N	480	495
Chak-e Wardak	Wardak	SIKA-E	480	496
Charikar	Parwan	Control	320	293
Chorah	Uruzgan	SIKA-S	480	478
Daman	Kandahar	SIKA-S	480	489
Dand	Kandahar	CCI	480	493
Deh Rawud	Uruzgan	SIKA-S	480	414
Deh Yak	Ghazni	SIKA-E	480	496
Doshi	Baghlan	Control	320	336
Dzadran	Paktiya	SIKA-E / CDP	320	317
Farah	Farah	Control	320	331
Garm Ser	Helmand	SIKA-S	480	495
Gelan	Ghazni	CCI	480	489
Ghazni	Ghazni	CCI	480	484
Gurbuz	Khost	SIKA-E / CCI	480	493
Imam Sahib	Kunduz	SIKA-N	480	478
Jaji Maidan	Khost	SIKA-E	480	492
Jalrayz	Wardak	SIKA-E	480	496
Kajaki	Helmand	CDP	320	215
Khak-e Safayd	Farah	SIKA-W	480	495
Khanabad	Kunduz	SIKA-N	480	490
Khas Kunar	Kunar	CCI	480	494
Khoshi	Logar	SIKA-E	480	494
Khwajah Omari	Ghazni	SIKA-E	480	466
Kunduz	Kunduz	SIKA-N	480	490
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	Herat	SIKA-W	480	486
Laja Mangel	Paktiya	SIKA-E	480	472
Lajah - Ahmad Khel	Paktiya	SIKA-E	432	407
Lashkar Gah	Helmand	CCI / CDP	480	491
Maiwand	Kandahar	CDP	320	336
Manduzai (Isma'il Khel)	Khost	SIKA-E / CDP	480	488
Marawarah	Kunar	CCI	480	496
Muhammad Aghah	Logar	SIKA-E	480	496
Muqer	Ghazni	CCI	480	492
Muqur	Badghis	SIKA-W	480	463

District	Province	Program	Target	Achieved
Musa Qal'ah	Helmand	CCI	480	286
Nad 'Ali	Helmand	SIKA-S	480	476
Nahr-e Saraj	Helmand	CCI	480	450
Narang	Kunar	CCI	480	481
Nerkh	Wardak	SIKA-E	480	496
Panjwa'i	Kandahar	CCI / CDP	480	496
Pashtun Zarghun	Herat	SIKA-W	480	469
Pul-e Khumri	Baghlan	SIKA-N	480	490
Pusht-e Rod	Farah	SIKA-W	480	493
Qadis	Badghis	SIKA-W	480	465
Qalat	Zabul	SIKA-S	480	484
Qarah Bagh	Ghazni	SIKA-E / CCI	480	469
Sabari (Ya'qubi)	Khost	CCI	320	298
Salang	Parwan	Control	320	313
Sangin	Helmand	CCI	480	309
Sar Kani	Kunar	CCI	480	496
Sayyid Karam	Paktiya	SIKA-E	480	491
Sayyidabad	Wardak	SIKA-E	480	496
Shah Joy	Zabul	SIKA-S / CCI	480	494
Shah Wali Kot	Kandahar	CCI / CDP	480	496
Shahrak	Ghor	SIKA-W	480	495
Shamul (Dzadran)	Khost	CCI / CDP	480	494
Shigal wa Sheltan	Kunar	CCI	480	495
Shindand	Herat	SIKA-W	480	482
Shwak	Paktiya	CDP	320	249
Spin Boldak	Kandahar	CCI	480	493
Tanai	Khost	SIKA-E / CCI	480	489
Tarin Kot	Uruzgan	SIKA-S / CCI	480	467
Tarneke wa Jaldak	Zabul	SIKA-S / CCI	480	399
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)	Khost	CCI	480	488
Tsowkey	Kunar	CCI	480	495
Zaranj	Nimroz	SIKA-S	480	407
Zharay	Kandahar	CCI / CDP	480	493
Zurmat	Paktiya	SIKA-E	320	304
<b>TOTALS</b>			<b>36912</b>	<b>36475</b>

\* The 11 districts highlighted in grey were conducted entirely by Afghan Youth Consulting and the 4 districts highlighted in blue were partially conducted by Afghan Youth Consulting.

## I.1 Sampling methodology

The Wave 2 sampling was derived from a sample frame provided by MISTI to ACSOR Surveys. The sampling process was divided into four main steps:

*Step One: Disproportionate Stratification by District*

Selection of districts for inclusion in the sample frame was driven primarily by stakeholder requests to MISTI. The preceding chart in the Sample Design section lists all districts selected for inclusion in the final sample frame and notes which province they are located in and which program(s) each district falls under. Although SIKA districts are all mutually exclusive and no district can fall under two different SIKA programs, the CCI and CDP districts are not mutually exclusive. As such, some districts may simultaneously fall under both the CCI and CDP programs or may fall under one of those programs and one of the SIKA programs.

Sample size for each district was determined by MISTI in order to meet reporting needs for each program in the final, aggregated data set. Of the 83 districts selected for inclusion in the Wave 2 sample frame, 66 were assigned 480 respondents per district, 15 were assigned 320 respondents per district and one district was assigned 432 respondents.

No districts were replaced from the original sample frame. However, some districts were determined to be inaccessible to ACSOR interviewers due to safety concerns. ACSOR maintains an accessibility tracker to monitor the current status of each district in Afghanistan. This tracker is updated monthly as the security situation in Afghanistan changes frequently. As a result of ACSOR's inaccessibility assessment, the interviews in 11 districts were conducted completely by AYC and another 4 districts were interviewed using both ACSOR and AYC interviewers during the Wave 2 field work.

*Step Two: Primary Sampling Units (Settlements)*

After the districts were selected, MISTI selected the primary sampling units (in this case, villages within each district) to be sampled within each district. MISTI used six different lists of known villages at this phase of the sample selection: Yale POP\_MASTER, CSO AIMS Villages (provided by ACSOR to MISTI), USAID AID Village View, along with lists provided by the CCI field team, SIKA-E field team and the MIST GIS team. The villages were selected using a simple random sample (SRS) selection of villages from the lists of villages.

MISTI also provided ACSOR with replacement villages for each district in the event that a particular village was deemed to be inaccessible due to transportation restrictions or other security concerns. In the event that a village needed to be replaced, a suitable replacement was selected from the list provided and approved by MISTI prior to fielding the survey in that district. In Wave 2, there were 808 settlements replaced.

Each selected village was then assigned two sample points of 8 interviews each, one for male interviews and one for female interviews. Due to the cultural norms in Afghanistan, it is necessary to assign female interviewers to sample points where they conduct interviews only with female respondents and assign male interviews to conduct interviews only with male respondents.

In some instances, districts were determined to be accessible only to male interviewers at the time of the field work. This information is also tracked monthly by ACSOR and these assessments of gender

accessibility change over time. For instances when a district or village was determined to be accessible only to male interviewers, both sample points in the village were assigned to male interviewers.

One notable difference between the sampling process used in the Wave 1 Baseline survey and the Wave 2 survey was that villages were stratified into three population strata and were then selected by SRS within those strata during the Wave 1 PSU selection. In the Wave 2 survey, there was no population stratification performed during sample selection at any level of sampling.

#### *Step Three: Household Selection*

For ACSOR: Households were selected for participation in the survey by interviewers conducting a systematized random walk within the village to which they were assigned. In order to further randomize household selection within sample points, each sample point was randomly pre assigned one of five geographic starting points within the village: north, south, east, west and center. This instructed each interviewer to start their random walk at the north, south, east, west or central most location within each village in order to ensure that locations directly surrounding common, prevalent landmarks (such as mosques, schools or markets) within villages were not oversampled.

For AYC: Due to the insecure nature of the areas they were assigned, supervisors instructed the interviewers on where the safest locations were in the selected sample points. The interviewers followed the supervisors' advice to select households.

#### *Step Four: Respondent Selection*

For ACSOR: Interviewers used a Kish grid to select individual respondents from households. Male interviewers listed all males 18 years of age or older living in the household on the Kish grid within each questionnaire and female interviewers listed all females 18 years of age or older living in the household.

For AYC: Interviewers were allowed to select any member of the household who was willing to participate in order to speed the fieldwork up and to more easily abide by the cultural norms in Afghanistan. Heads of the household were most commonly interviewed as this creates the least amount of tension when interviewers visit households in less secure areas.

## **1.2 Weighting**

Due to the nature of the sampling for the MISTI Wave 2 survey and the lack of reliable demographic targets available in Afghanistan at the district level, there are no weights used on these data.

## **1.3 Margin of Error and Design Effect**

The following section gives estimates for the achieved design effect. Design effect is a statistic that estimates the inflation of a margin of error based on complex design. The variable Q1 (Generally speaking, are things in [*name the district*] going in the right direction or in the wrong direction?) is used to estimate the design effect for each district sample. Each district sample is treated as an individual sample where the sampling points were selected through a cluster sample. These estimates effectively treat each district sample as a unique and individual sample.

A weighted design effect by each response level of Q1 can then be estimated for each of the district samples. In addition, through this complex design, a margin of error and a complex margin of error that takes the design effect into consideration are reported.

It must be noted that probability of selection weights were not used in the calculation of these estimates. The reported margins of error and design effects for the districts, noted above, that were sampled, or partially sampled, using non-probability methods are reported as if the sampling was identical to the probability method districts for comparative purposes. These districts are highlighted in grey.

*Table 3: District Design Effect and Margin of Error*

District	Design Effect	Standard Error	Sample Size	Margin of Error	Complex Margin of Error
Ab-e Kamari	3.25	0.05	311	9.33%	16.81%
Ahmad Abad	1.77	0.03	491	5.18%	6.90%
Ali Abad	1.98	0.03	494	5.48%	7.70%
Andar	1.29	0.03	316	5.24%	5.94%
Arghandab	2.19	0.03	483	5.93%	8.78%
Aybak	2.64	0.04	334	8.02%	13.03%
Baghlan i Jadid	1.15	0.02	491	3.98%	4.27%
Bak	1.39	0.02	492	4.32%	5.08%
Bala Boluk	2.32	0.03	433	6.19%	9.43%
Baraki Barak	6.19	0.07	303	13.39%	33.32%
Chaghcharan	1.4	0.02	483	4.47%	5.28%
Chak	1.8	0.03	496	5.16%	6.93%
Char Darah	1.74	0.03	495	5.09%	6.71%
Charikar	1	0.02	293	4.88%	4.89%
Chorah	2.83	0.03	478	6.55%	11.02%
Daman	2.2	0.03	489	5.81%	8.62%
Dand	1.94	0.03	493	5.43%	7.57%
Dash Arche	2.85	0.05	318	8.83%	14.91%
Deh Yak	1.74	0.02	496	4.83%	6.37%
Dehrawud	5.37	0.05	414	10.39%	24.09%
Doshi	1.88	0.03	336	6.27%	8.60%
Farah	2.35	0.04	331	6.96%	10.66%
Garmser	2.41	0.03	495	6.53%	10.15%
Gelan	3.03	0.03	489	6.67%	11.61%
Ghazni	1.71	0.02	484	4.89%	6.40%
Gorbuz	1.54	0.02	493	4.37%	5.42%
Imam Sahib	1.6	0.02	478	4.90%	6.19%
Jaghatu (Bahram-e Shahid)	1.16	0.02	492	4.21%	4.53%
Jaji Maidan	1.53	0.02	492	4.43%	5.49%

District	Design Effect	Standard Error	Sample Size	Margin of Error	Complex Margin of Error
Jalrez	1.85	0.03	496	4.93%	6.70%
Kajaki	1.48	0.03	215	6.72%	8.19%
Khak-e-Safayd	2.47	0.03	495	5.91%	9.30%
Khanabad	1.59	0.03	490	4.92%	6.20%
Khas Kunar	2.26	0.03	494	6.02%	9.04%
Khushi	2.74	0.03	494	6.59%	10.90%
Khwajah Omari	2.64	0.03	466	6.22%	10.10%
Kunduz	1.97	0.03	490	5.44%	7.62%
Kushk-i-Robat Sangi	1.77	0.02	486	4.79%	6.37%
Lajah-Ahmad Khel	4.08	0.04	407	8.55%	17.29%
Lajah-Mangal	3.05	0.03	472	6.69%	11.68%
Lash Kar Gah	1.43	0.02	491	4.59%	5.50%
Maiwand	4.19	0.05	336	10.07%	20.62%
Mando Zayi	1.33	0.02	488	4.28%	4.94%
Marawara	2.91	0.03	496	6.84%	11.67%
Moqur	2.71	0.03	463	6.57%	10.82%
Muhammad Aghah	3.01	0.04	496	6.94%	12.05%
Muqur	3.13	0.03	492	6.49%	11.49%
Musa Qala	1.02	0.03	286	4.93%	4.99%
Nad 'Ali	0.98	0.02	476	3.96%	3.91%
Nahr-i-Saraj	1.2	0.02	450	4.37%	4.78%
Narang	3.29	0.04	481	7.04%	12.77%
Nerkh	2.71	0.03	496	6.01%	9.88%
Panjwai	2.01	0.03	496	5.52%	7.84%
Pashtun Zarghun	2.13	0.03	469	5.48%	7.99%
Puli Khumri	1.81	0.03	490	5.01%	6.74%
Pusht Rod	2.07	0.03	493	5.45%	7.84%
Qadis	3.05	0.04	465	7.22%	12.60%
Qalat	2.34	0.03	484	5.28%	8.08%
Qarabagh	2.27	0.03	469	5.99%	9.02%
Sabari (Ya qubi)	6.07	0.06	298	12.46%	30.68%
Salang	1.02	0.02	313	4.84%	4.88%
Sangin	1.07	0.02	309	4.78%	4.94%
Sarkani	2.87	0.03	496	6.71%	11.36%
Sawkai	3.37	0.04	495	6.89%	12.64%
Sayed Abad	1.39	0.02	496	4.28%	5.03%
Sayed Karam	2	0.03	491	5.19%	7.34%
Shah Joy	1.08	0.02	494	3.94%	4.09%
Shah Wali Kot	2.55	0.03	496	6.07%	9.69%

District	Design Effect	Standard Error	Sample Size	Margin of Error	Complex Margin of Error
Shahrak	1.32	0.02	495	4.29%	4.94%
Shamal (Dwamunda)	1.21	0.02	494	3.97%	4.36%
Shigal wa Sheltan	1.54	0.02	495	4.78%	5.94%
Shindand	1.83	0.03	482	4.98%	6.73%
Shwak	3.57	0.05	249	10.13%	19.12%
Spin Boldak	2.53	0.03	493	6.23%	9.91%
Tani	1.41	0.02	489	4.22%	5.01%
Tarnak Wa Jaldak	2.17	0.03	399	5.96%	8.79%
Terezayi	1.32	0.02	488	4.13%	4.75%
Tirin Kot	4.19	0.04	467	8.32%	17.02%
Waz Drazadran	6.02	0.06	317	12.28%	30.12%
Zaranj	1.32	0.02	407	4.81%	5.53%
Zhari	2.8	0.03	493	6.34%	10.60%
Zurmat	6.06	0.06	304	12.25%	30.16%

Design effect is also estimated by program. Each program was treated as an independent sample, disproportionately stratified by the selected districts, and clustered by settlement. The non-probability districts were included in this estimation as if they were sampled identical to the probability method districts.

*Table 4: Program Design Effect and Margin of Error*

Program	Design Effect	Standard Error	Sample Size	Margin of Error	Complex Margin of Error
CCI	5.54	0.01	13504	1.67%	3.94%
CDP	5.98	0.02	4075	3.21%	7.86%
SIKA-N	4.47	0.01	3746	2.90%	6.12%
SIKA-E	6.10	0.01	9468	2.12%	5.24%
SIKA-S	6.79	0.02	5086	3.03%	7.89%
SIKA-W	5.24	0.01	4764	2.75%	6.30%
Control	4.37	0.02	1918	4.09%	8.55%

## Field Implementation

### 1.4 Contact Procedures

For those interviews done by ACSOR, maps and available information about the settlements were used to identify the pre-assigned a starting point (north, south, east, west or center) for random walks where the interviews were conducted. Interview teams used a random route procedure to select households.

In urban areas, from the given starting point, the interviewer headed in the assigned direction and stopped at the 2<sup>nd</sup> street/lane on the right hand side of his/her route. The first contacted household was pre-assigned as either the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> or 3<sup>rd</sup> house on the right from the beginning of the street. From then on, the selected household was each 3<sup>rd</sup> inhabitable house on the right side of the interviewer's route. In blocks-of-flats, the selection routine was each 5<sup>th</sup> apartment. In buildings with more than one household, no more than two households were interviewed.

In rural areas, from the given starting point, the interviewer headed in the assigned direction. If they started in the north, south, east or west end of the village, they started by heading toward the center of the village; if they started at the center, they headed in a randomly assigned direction. The first contacted household was pre-assigned as either the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> or 3<sup>rd</sup> house on the right from the beginning of the street. From then on, the selected household was each 3<sup>rd</sup> inhabitable house on the right side of the interviewer's route. Compounds containing two or more houses behind a common wall were treated like detached houses, counting them counter-clock-wise from the gate to the compound.

For those interviews done by AYC, due to the insecure nature of the areas they were assigned, supervisors instructed the interviewers on where the safest locations were in the selected sample points. The interviewers followed the supervisors' advice to select households.

For interviews done by ACSOR, after selecting a household, interviewers were instructed to utilize a Kish grid for randomizing the target respondent within the household. Members of the household were listed with their names and ages in descending order. Male interviewers listed all male household member living in the household who were 18 years of age or older and female interviewers listed all females 18 years of age or older.

Under no circumstances were ACSOR interviewers allowed to substitute an alternate member of a household for the selected respondent. If the respondent refused to participate or was not available after call-backs, the interviewer then moved on to the next household according to the random walk.

For those interviews done by AYC, interviewers were allowed to select any member of the household who was willing to participate in order to speed the fieldwork up and to more easily abide by the cultural norms in Afghanistan. Heads of the household were most commonly interviewed as this creates the least amount of tension when interviewers visit households in less secure areas.

Typically interviewers were required to make two call-backs before replacing the designated respondent. These call-backs are made at different times of the same day or on different days of the field period, in

order to provide a broader schedule in which to engage the respondent. Due to security-related concerns, the field force has had difficulty meeting the requirement of two call-backs prior to substitution in many rural areas.

In this survey, while interviewers were able to complete some call-backs, the majority of the interviews were completed on the first attempt.\*

- First attempt = 98.0%
- Second attempt = 1.8%
- Third attempt = 0.1%

\*Due to the high rate of unemployment, and choosing the appropriate time of day for interviewing, completion on the first attempt is common in Afghanistan.

## **1.5 Sample Disposition**

The following table contains the sample disposition for the MISTI Wave 2 survey. These figures combine the sample disposition for both the ACSOR and AYC field teams. It should be noted that slight variations were made in sampling methodologies between these two field teams, however the same disposition codes and contact sheets were used throughout the field work.

For the purposes of this disposition report and the subsequent calculations, the total number of completed interviews includes all interviews received from the field (N=38,171). There are 1,696 interviews included in the completed interviews total which were later deleted for quality control purposes (see section 4.6). The final data set used for analysis contains only those 36,475 interviews.

Table 5: Disposition Calculations

<b>SURVEY MANAGEMENT SECTION</b>			
<b>ACSOR Code</b>	<b>AAPOR Code</b>	<b>Description</b>	
55	1.0/1.10	Completed Interviews	38171
		Average Survey Length (minutes)	40
<b>UNKNOWN HOUSEHOLD ELIGIBILITY</b>			
		3.170 Unable to Reach/Unsafe Area	7080
2		3.130 No answer at household	827
3		4.100 No adults (18+) after three visits	542
4		4.500 Non-Residential or empty house	207
<b>Total Unknown Household</b>			<b>8656</b>
<b>NON-CONTACTS</b>			
1		2.230 Unable to access building or house	89
6		2.200 Respondent long -term absence /for the field work period	229
13		Selected respondent not available for interview	147
<b>Total Non-Contacts</b>			<b>465</b>
<b>REFUSALS</b>			
7		2.111 Outright refusal at the door	381
8		2.112 Not feeling informed to answer the questions	70
		Respondent got angry because of a question	
9		2.112 and aborted interview	31
10		2.112 Prefers head of the house to be interviewed	137
11		2.112 In a hurry/ No time	153
<b>Total Refusals</b>			<b>772</b>
<b>OTHER</b>			
12		2.32 Physically or mentally unable	33
		Respondent unable to complete interview in languages	
5		2.332 available	22
<b>Total Other</b>			<b>55</b>
<b>DISPOSITION RATES</b>			
<b>RATE</b>	<b>FORMULA/CALCULATION</b>		<b>PERCENT</b>
Value for e	estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that are		0.981
Response Rate 3	$I / (I)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO)$		0.796
Cooperation Rate 3	$I / (I+R)$		0.980
Refusal Rate 2	$R / (I)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO)$		0.016

## 1.6 Field Outcomes

ACSOR supervisors were asked to report to the field office any notable events that may have impacted field work or could have had an impact on respondents' opinions during the field period. The following noteworthy events occurred while this project was in the field:

Zabul- People of Zabul are complaining that the foreign troops exploding the entrance of the Kariz (underground canals) and then gas them as Taliban hiding there, as it enormously damages the drinking water and irrigation system sources.

05.19.2013

Helmand - Two Taliban fighters were killed and five policemen injured during a clash in Lashkargah, the capital of southern Helmand province, on Sunday, an official said. The clash broke out in Gudar area after

a group of armed rebels attacked a police post in the area, injuring five cops, the governor's spokesman, Omar Zwak, said. Two attackers were killed and as many injured when the police returned fire, he said. Resident Abdul Khaliq said the clash lasted 30 minutes, with both side using small and heavy weapons. Taliban spokesman Qari Yousuf confirmed the death of one fighter, saying seven policemen were killed and their post destroyed in the Mukhtar Camp area.

05.20.2013

Baghlan - 05.20.2013 The provincial council chief was among more than a dozen people killed in a suicide attack that left another 10 people wounded in northern Baghlan province on Monday, officials said. The senior public representative, Mohammad Rassoul Mohseni, was entering his office when a suicide bomber ran up, held him and detonated his suicide vest, Deputy Governor Abdul Qadim said. The blast took place at 10:10am outside the provincial council office situated in the 3rd police district of Pul-i-Khumri, the provincial capital. Deputy Public Health Director Dr. Zubair Akbari confirmed the casualties and the death of Mohseni in the blast, saying two of the 10 injured were in critical condition. Several civilians, bodyguards and provincial council members were among the wounded. Mohseni had previously received multiple death threats, his colleagues said. A witness, Mohammad Nasim, said an old man carried out the suicide attack. There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the bombing.

05.21.013

Ghor - 05.21.2013 Seven police guards were killed on Tuesday by a powerful roadside bombing that ripped through their vehicle in the Chasht-i-Sharif district of western Herat province, an official said. The public protection force officers, who were guards of the Salma Dam, a hydroelectric site, came under attack on their way to the site, Herat police spokesman, Col. Abdul Rauf Ahmadi, said. The dead included two officers and five policemen, he said, adding police had launched a search operation in the area. However, no arrests could be made in connection with the blast that completely destroyed the police truck. There were no survivors. The policemen were heading to Obe district, where India is rebuilding the hydropower dam.

Baghlan- Chashmai Shir on 5.21.2013 as result of fight between Taliban ANP one Taliban fighters was killed. In the Charshanba Tapa area there was fight between Taliban and ANA in result the deputy of police chief was killed. Kuhna Masjed – a ALP vehicle was targeted by roadside remote control mine as result all member of ALP were killed.

Farah - 05.21.2013 a man opened fire at policemen manning a check post in western Farah province, killing four of them and injuring a fifth, officials said on Tuesday. The attacker, who had links with Taliban insurgents and had developed friendly ties with the policemen, arrived at the check post in the Shiwan village of Bala Balook district, picked up a police gun and opened fire, the governor's spokesman, Abdul Rahman Zhwandai, said. Hailing from the same village, the attacker won trust of the policemen after regularly visiting them at the check post, he said. Civil Hospital head Abdul Hakim Rassouli confirmed receiving the dead bodies of four policemen and one injured cop at the facility.

05.22.2013

Helmand -As many as 47 insurgents and five policemen have so far been killed during deadly clashes entering a third day on Wednesday in the Sangin district of southern Helmand province, the governor

said. Mohammad Naeem told a news conference in Lashkargah 47 militants and five policemen had been killed and 18 insurgents and nine security personnel wounded in the clashes that began on Monday when a large group of insurgents launched attacks on security posts in various parts of the town. The governor said the dead rebels included some commanders, saying the full-pledged attacks by the insurgents were their last ditch effort to capture the town, but failed. He added many insurgents from Kandahar had sneaked into Helmand to join their comrades in their attacks on Afghan security forces who successfully pushed them back. He said foreign militants fought alongside hundreds of Taliban insurgents during the coordinated attacks targeting security forces in 13 areas. But the US-led coalition has said the Taliban force totaled 80 to 100 fighters and managed to launch only sporadic attacks on outlying police posts in the district. Naeem said the insurgents had advanced in some areas, but they were pushed back by Afghan forces, who were putting up stiff resistance. ISAF airlifted wounded policemen to hospitals, but did not take part in the clashes to support Afghan forces, the governor said, saying Afghan forces would soon clear the areas of insurgents. The coordinated assaults were aimed at preventing a road from being asphalted in the area and halting reconstruction work at the Kajaki hydropower dam, Naeem said.

Ghazni- A suicide bomb explosion injured five civilians on a rickshaw on Wednesday in southern Ghazni province, an official and a witness said. Ghazni Civil Hospital head Dr. Baaz Mohammad Himmat said they had been delivered the dead body of the suicide bomber and five injured civilians at the hospital from the scene, the Kabul Bus Stand in Ghazni City. Two of the injured are in critical condition, he said. Witness Ghulam Farooq said the attacker was riding a bicycle that went off after crashing into a rickshaw before reaching a police vehicle. He said the target was the police van. The bomber was killed on the spot and five civilians on the rickshaw were wounded, he said. Seven people were killed and several others, including women and children, were injured when a suicide bomber struck a restaurant in southern Ghazni province late on Wednesday, an official said. The attack took place around 7:30pm in the Town of Maqur, killing three members of a public uprising members, who were the target and four civilians, deputy governor Mohammad Ali Ahmadi said. The target was members of the uprising movement in the district, he said, adding 15 people, including women and children, were injured. Mir Ali, a resident, said the bomber wanted to kill Habibullah, commander of the uprising group. He said the attack took place when Habibullah emerged from a shop. As a result, four civilians and two guards of the commander were killed, he said, putting at 28 the number of people injured, including women and children. Severely injured people were taken to an ISAF clinic in the nearby Gilan district, the resident said. It was a second suicide blast in Ghazni on Wednesday. The first attack involved a cyclist, who blew up himself in Ghazni city, the provincial capital, currently serving as the Asian Capital of Islamic Civilisation. Five people on a rickshaw were injured in the blast aimed at a police van. Ghazni Civil Hospital head Dr. Baaz Mohammad Himmat confirmed receiving the dead body of the attacker and five injured civilians from the scene, the Kabul Bus Stand. Two of the injured are in critical condition, he said.

05.25.2013

Ghazni - Nine people were killed and several others injured in a bomb blast inside a mosque in Andar district of southern Ghazni province, an official said. The powerful blast occurred on Friday evening when people were offering prayers in the mosque in Alijan village, the district chief, Mohammad Qasim Desiwal, said. He said the explosives belonged to some travelling Taliban insurgents who had stopped in the village to offer prayers. He said the Taliban fighters had transported the explosives which accidentally detonated while they were inside, killing nine people, including four militants and five civilians. Several

others were wounded in the blast, Desiwal said, but he has no exact figures. The incident is being investigated. However, resident Mohibullah put at 10 the number of people killed in the blast, says many others remained trapped under the rubble and residents were trying to rescue them. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid confirmed the incident, saying Taliban members were on their way for an operation when they had stopped at the mosque to offer prayers. He said the explosion was a result of a technical problem. Sixteen Taliban fighters were killed and 21 others wounded during a clash with police in the Gilan district of southern Ghazni province on Saturday, an official said. The early morning clash erupted when a group of insurgents attacked local police posts in the Eshankhel Qala area, the town's administrative head, Mahbobullah, said. In the ensuing fire exchange, 16 attackers were killed, 21 others were wounded who left behind their weapons at the scene, the official said. A local police commander Sakhi Dad was injured and one of his guards was killed. But resident Mohammad Khalid said Sakhi Dad was killed along with two other policemen in the gun battle. A Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, said six local policemen were killed and three others were wounded. He confirmed the death of three fighters and injuries to as many during the clash that he said was still ongoing. In northern Kunduz province, a former jihadi commander was shot dead by two motorcyclists in front of his house on Friday in the 2nd police district of Kunduz City, police spokesman, Syed Sarwar Husaini, said.

05.26.2013

Logar - Gunmen shot dead a High Peace Council (HPC) official on his way home in the central province of Logar on Sunday, an official said. Mullah Bashir was attacked by Taliban insurgents in the Dabar area of Charkh district, the provincial HPC office head, Maulvi Asadullah Hanif, said. He said Bashir struggled a lot to bring about peace in the district. He was one of the influential figures in Logar, he said. Charkh district chief Abdul Khalil confirmed Bashir's assassination.

Farah- Fifteen Taliban fighters were killed and another 20 were wounded after they attacked police posts in the Purchaman district of western Farah province, an official said on Sunday. The clash that began around 11pm on Saturday night continued until Sunday morning, the governor's spokesman, Abdul Rahman Zhwandai, said. At least 20 Taliban attackers were killed in the ensuing clash, he said. Nearly 100 Taliban men took part in the assault, a member of provincial council and native of the district, Abdul Satar Rahimi, said. The feeling Taliban attackers left behind 10 dead bodies, he said.

05.27.2013

Farah- Two Italian soldiers and as many Afghan civilians were injured when a suicide bomber detonated his explosives-laden car near a convoy of the US-led troops in the western province of Farah on Monday, officials said. The attack took place around 8:30am in the Kansak area of Bala Baluk district, the governor's spokesman, Abdul Rahman Zhwandai, said. The attacker targeted a military convoy of foreign troops, injuring two soldiers and as many civilians, he said, adding an ISAF vehicle in the convoy was damaged. A child and an old man were brought to the Farah Civil Hospital in injured condition, confirmed the hospital chief, Dr. Abdul Hakim Rassuli. They are in stable condition, he said. ISAF confirmed a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device ripped through an ISAF convoy in western Afghanistan. "There were no ISAF casualties resulting from the incident," ISAF said. A Taliban spokesman, Qari Yousuf Ahmadi, said the attacker detonated his explosives-laden car near a convoy of Italian soldiers, killing five of them and injuring several others. Bala Baluk district chief Mullah Syed Mohammad confirmed the incident, saying a foreign soldier was injured in the blast.

05.28.2013

Kandahar - Seven policemen were killed by their two guests invited to a check post for dinner in southern Kandahar province, officials said on Tuesday. The incident took place in the Tori Gari area of Arghistan district on Monday night, the town's administrative head, Hajji Abdul Ghani Muslimyar, said. The policemen had invited the two guests to their checkpoint for dinner with them. After a verbal clash, the guests picked up police guns and opened fire, killing seven and injuring an eighth, the official said. The attackers then escaped from the scene in a police vehicle, taking away police weapons. After the incident, police launched a search operation to arrest them, according to Muslimyar. However, a Taliban spokesman, Qari Yousuf Ahmadi, said it was "an insider attack". The gun attack involved a policeman who had links with the Taliban. He shot dead his police commander and nearly a dozen policemen, Ahmadi said.

05.29.2013

Ghazni - Three schoolgirls were wounded by a remote-controlled bomb in the capital of southern Ghazni province on Wednesday morning, an official said. A suspected attacker was killed by police after the blast in Ghazni City, the governor's spokesman, Fazal Rahman Sabawoon, said. The bomb -- attached to a bicycle -- exploded when the students were about to enter the Haidarabad School. Policemen identified the suspect and shot him dead, Sabawoon added. A doctor at Ghazni Civil in Hospital confirmed received three injured girl and an employee of the school, which is located in a peaceful area western of the city. No one has so far claimed responsibility for the explosion, the first attack on schoolgirls in Ghazni.

05.30.2013

Kunduz - Three militants were killed in an airstrike by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), while as many suspects detained in northern Kunduz province, an official said on Thursday. The fighters were killed on Wednesday night when ISAF aircraft bombed a Taliban hideout in the Damshakh area of Dasht-i-Archi district, government official Nasruddin Nazari said. The insurgents -- Ghulam Dastagir, Siddique and Mohammad Alam -- had been carrying out disruptive activities and operations against the government, he said. Meanwhile, a statement from ISAF said an Afghan and coalition security force arrested three fighters during an operation in search of a senior Taliban leader in Dasht-i-Archi district. A group of fighters opened fire on the security force during the operation. The security personnel returned fire, killing the fighters, the statement added. The security force also seized two AK-47s, one sub-machine gun, one rocket-propelled grenade launcher and eight rocket-propelled grenades, the statement concluded.

05.31.2013

Logar - Security forces have killed seven fighters in the Mohammad Agha district of central Logar province, an official said on Friday. The militants planning an attack on the district headquarters were killed late on Thursday night, said the governor's spokesman, Din Mohammad Darwesh. He said the security forces, acting on an intelligence tip, killed the Taliban in the Ahmadzai Kala area of the district. A heavy machine gun, a rocket and five Kalashnikov assault rifles were recovered from the insurgents, Darwesh said, adding residents collected the fighters' bodies in the morning.

06.03.2013

Helmand - Twenty-four insurgents were killed in clashes with Afghan security forces in the troubled Sangin district of southern Helmand province, taking the death toll for rebels in a week to 100, an official said on Monday. The latest clashes broke out in the Heratian area late on Sunday, the governor's spokesman, Omar Zwak, said. He said militants' bodies lay at the scene after the clash that left another 16 rebels and one policeman injured. Zwak said the area had been cleared of fighters two days ago, but the Taliban regrouped there to show their presence. On Monday, Afghan forces attacked boats ferrying Taliban militants to Sangin from Musa Qala area across the Helmand River. All those onboard were killed, said Zwak, without giving an exact figure. Taliban spokesman Qari Yousuf Ahmadi acknowledged the death of only one fighter, claiming 14 Afghan security men were killed and 11 others wounded during clashes in Sarwan Kala area. Local officials say around 1,000 Taliban began attacking Afghan forces a week ago, and 100 of them have so far been killed in clashes with security forces.

06.04.2013

Farah - A man and three of his children were killed in a roadside bombing in western Farah province on Tuesday morning; hours after the UN stressed an end to attacks on civilians. The four people were killed when the car they were travelling in struck the roadside bomb in the Chah Shorab area of Javin district, the governor's spokesman said. Abdur Rahman Zhwandai the children's mother sustained serious injuries in the explosion that happened at 7.30am. The woman was evacuated to the Farah Civil Hospital for medical care. Samadyar, the district chief, confirmed the blast and said the body of one of the children was blown to bits. He would not say who was behind the bombing, which came a month after a similar attack killed three civilians in Pusht Rod district. On Monday, 10 schoolchildren, two US soldiers and a local policeman were killed during a suicide bombing in front of a high school in the Chamkani district of Paktiya. Separately, seven people of family were killed when a civilian car struck a roadside bomb in the Hakimabad Khwar area on the outskirts of Mehtarlam, the capital of Laghman province. Ján Kubiš, the Secretary-General's Special Representative and head of UNAMA, said: "Any attacks which deliberately take place near a school can only be condemned for the heinous attacks that they are." In the past two weeks, conflict-related violence has killed 125 civilians and injured 287, a 24 per cent increase in total civilian casualties from the same period in 2012. The UN mission held anti-government elements responsible for 84 per cent of all civilian casualties during this two-week period.

06.05.2013

Kunduz - A seven-year-old girl and her 12-year-old neighbor were killed when a stray rocket hit their homes during clashes between insurgents and security forces in the Chahar Dara district of northern Kunduz province, residents said on Wednesday. Six insurgents were killed, seven wounded and four others were arrested during clashes with a joint Afghan- ISAF force in Esakhel, Haji Amanullah and Zadran villages of the district, according to the governor's spokesman, Syed Sarwar Hussaini. Residents said two civilians were killed and five others were wounded when a rocket hit two homes in the Esakhel village. Ajmal Pardis, a school principal, said a mortar shell hit his house, killing his 12-year-old son and a 7-year-old girl at his neighbor house. Pardis, his two other sons and a brother were injured in the incident. A small brother of the seven-year-old girl was also injured, said the principal, who is under treatment in a hospital run by the Doctors without Borders in Kunduz City. A relative of Ajmal Pardis, Ihsanullah Pardis, condemned the killing of innocent people during clashes between security forces and insurgents. He urged both sides to spare civilians. A Taliban spokesman, Zabihuallah Mujahid, claimed

many Afghan security personnel were killed and wounded during the clash in Chahar Dara. The governor's spokesman said they had no reports that civilian casualties had occurred in the district. Elsewhere, a Taliban group leader, Mullah Tajuddin, was arrested along with his two accomplices during an operation in Jawzjan province, police chief Col. Abdul Manan Raufi said. They were detained by Afghan forces in the Aqcha district, he said. Taliban spokesman Qari Yousuf Ahmadi said two policemen, including a commander, were killed and their two ranger pick-up vehicles destroyed during a clash in Sarband area of Chekish district.

06.06.2013

Kunar - Three children were killed and seven others, all from the same family, were injured in an overnight drone strike by US-led coalition forces in the Manogai district of eastern Kunar province, the governor said on Thursday. Syed Fazlullah Wahidi said the pilotless aircraft targeted a civilian house on Wednesday night in the Danglik village, killing Tarbaz Khan's two sons and a daughter. Seven other family members of Khan and his brother injured in the strike were taken to the district hospital and their condition was said to be stable, Wahidi said, insisting they were innocent. A surviving family member, Raziqullah, said the drone hit their house when all family members were present. "There was a big bang that came all of a sudden and knocked me unconscious." He said three children, including a girl, were killed and another seven children, including three girls, were injured. The children aged between three and 14 years. In response to an emailed query ISAF said it took allegations of civilian casualties seriously. "We do not have any operational reporting that supports the allegation that civilians were killed in Kunar province." The NATO-led force said: "Enemies of Afghanistan are the only party to the conflict targeting civilians and increasing their use of indiscriminant weapons. They killed or injured 3,485 Afghan civilians in 2012."

06.10.2013

Zabul- Six suicide bombers were killed after they stormed the provincial council office in southern Zabul province on Monday, leaving 20 people, including two public representatives injured, officials said. The coordinated attack began around 11am when a suicide bomber detonated his explosives-laden car at the entrance to the provincial council office, allowing other assailants to enter the compound, the deputy governor, Mohammad Jan Rassoulyar, said. There were six attackers and all of them were killed by police in a short period of time, he said. Two members of the council and some policemen were among 18 people wounded in the attack, deputy police chief Col. Ghulam Jilani Farahi said. Police have launched their investigation into the incident and had cordoned off the area. An official at the Qalat Civil Hospital said on condition of anonymity that 20 injured people had been brought to the hospital.

06.11.2013

Kandahar - A five-member militant group involved in planning deadly attacks in the Aino Mina area of Kandahar and the capital of Zabul province has been eliminated, officials said on Tuesday. The Kandahar police chief made the claim a day after six suicide bombers attacked Zabul's provincial council office. All suicide bombers were killed and 20 people, including two public representatives, wounded. On May 21, nine people were killed and more than 70 others wounded -- most of them civilians -- in a suicide bombing in the Aino Mina locality of Kandahar City. Brig. Gen. Abdul Razzaq, the Kandahar police head, said some suspect behind the suicide attack in Aino Mina had been detained while others managed to escape. Police were looking for the suspected attackers, who were arrested on the basis of an

intelligence tip-off in Chaghni area between Kandahar and Zabul provinces on Monday, Razzaq said. The detained were also involved in planning Monday's suicide attack on the provincial council office in Zabul, he said, adding the men were trying to flee to Pakistan, but police caught them.

Ghazni - Four civilians were wounded when police opened fire on them in southern Ghazni province on Tuesday, officials said. The incident took place at noon when a rickshaw driver and motorcyclist refused to be searched and wanted to flee in Ghazni City, the provincial capital, said the deputy police chief, Col. Asadullah Insafi. A child was among the four injured civilians brought to the Ghazni Civil Hospital, the hospital director, Dr. Baz Mohammad Himmat, said. The child is said to be in critical condition.

06.13.2013

Kunduz - A Taliban-designated district chief and his four accomplices, including a foreigner, were killed during a police operation in northern Kunduz province, an official said on Thursday. Involving helicopters and Afghan Special Forces, the operation was conducted in the Nahr-i-Kohna area of Archi district on Wednesday night, said police spokesman, Sayed Sarwar Hussaini. Addressing a news conference, Hussaini said Qari Halim, the Taliban's chief for Dasht-i-Archi district, Qari Ismail, a militant commander, Qari Tariq, a foreign rebel, and two other fighters were killed. He some weapons, including an RPG, explosives and ammunition were seized. Resident Ghulam Rasul said the security personnel, having air support, raided a home and killed five insurgents. "Taliban's activities are on the rise in our area and the security situation is getting worse." A statement from Ministry of Interior in Kabul confirmed the killings, saying the raid was independently conducted by Afghan forces. Twenty Taliban, including two commanders Mullah Basir and Qari Aminullah, were killed in Dasht-i-Archi 10 days ago. District chief, Sheikh Sadruddin Saadi, had said around 100 rebels had entered the district from Pakistan.

Ghor -A roadside blast killed a district education officer along with a teacher in western Ghor province on Thursday, officials said. After visiting a high school in Teura district, the men were returning home when their motorcycle struck the roadside bomb. Mohammad Masoom, the education officer, was killed on the spot, the district deputy education chief said. Abdul Hakim said the victim's brother, Mohammad Yousuf who was an instructor at the Yakhan High School, succumbed to his injuries on the road to hospital. Abdul Hai Khatibi, the governor's spokesman, said Masoom was a former Jihadi commander. He added an investigation was underway, but so far no one had been detained.

Helmand - Six policemen were mysteriously killed at their checkpoint in the Musa Qala district of southern Helmand province on Thursday, an official said. The victims included two members of the regular police and four of the Afghan Local Police (ALP), the governor's spokesman, Omar Zwak, said. Without saying how many security personnel manned the post, he believed the policemen had been killed as a result of a conspiracy inside the check-post in Dezro area. A police pick-up was hijacked from the post in the wake of the incident, according to the gubernatorial spokesman, who gave no further details. Police have launched a search for the vehicle. On the other and, the Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack. A spokesman for the group said eight policemen including two commanders were killed, their weapons seized and a Ranger pick-up taken away. In a similar incident, six policemen were killed in the Greshk district of the province two weeks ago.

06.15.2013

Logar - A man, suspected of several rocket attacks on the Miss Ainak copper mine, has been arrested in central Logar province, an official said on Tuesday. The suspect identified as Khayal Gul, was arrested from his house near the mine, security official at a military base near the mine, Sayed Abas Sadat, said. A machinegun and some ammunition were also recovered from the detainee, he said. The governor's spokesman, Din Mohammad Darwish, confirmed the arrest, saying the detainee had been involved in disturbing development activities at the copper mine.

06.16.2013

Uruzgan- Six civilians were killed and four others sustained injuries when a roadside bomb ripped through their vehicle in the central province of Uruzgan on Sunday. The early morning blast took place in the Chura district, a statement from the governor's house media center said. The Injured who belonged to the Gizab district were taken to the Gardez Civil Hospital with two them in critical condition, the statement said. It accused the Taliban of planting the bomb that inflicted casualties on civilians. The private vehicle was traveling from Gizab to Tirinkot when it struck the invisible device in Kotal area of Chura district, the district administrative head, Najibullah, said. He confirmed six people in the vehicle were killed and four others were wounded.

06.18.2013

Kandahar - An overnight airstrike by foreign troops killed eight suspected insurgents while planting roadside bombs on a key highway in southern Kandahar province, an official said on Tuesday. The strike that took place around 1am last night targeted some individuals planting bombs on the Kandahar-Uruzgan highway in the Kisai area of Shah Wali Kot district, the governor's spokesman, Javed Faisal, said. The attack also destroyed 10 bombs, five Kalashnikovs, three walkie-talkies and four motorbikes belonging to the dead, he said. Two members of the Taliban were killed when one of the two roadside bombs they were planting exploded prematurely in the Buldak district of southern Kandahar province, the governor's house said on Tuesday. The blast took place on Monday afternoon in the Kareez area, the governor's office said in a statement. After the blast, Afghan forces who reached the site confiscated four improvised explosive devices (IED), a radio, a motorbike and an AK-47, leaving behind the dead bodies. The statement said another four IEDs were found and seized in the Ghorak district last night. Three of the devices were defused and the fourth went off but caused no casualties. The statement said IEDs frequently planted by Taliban on roads had mostly killed and wounded local civilians. In one of the latest explosions, a young boy lost his two legs in Panjwai. "Taliban are recently paying more attention to planting IEDs on roads to harm the Afghan National Security Forces but the result is opposite and most of the victims are innocent civilians," the statement concluded.

Logar- A NATO airstrike killed three teenage boys in the Baraki Barak district of central Logar province, an official said on Tuesday. The strike took place on Sunday evening in the Tokal village, the district chief, Mohammad Rahim Amin, said. The dead included two 18 years old and one 12-year-old boys, he said, adding an investigation had been launched into the attack. Resident Abdullah said NATO helicopters targeted villagers who were playing games, killing three of them. He asked the government to thoroughly investigate the incident because the slain boys had no connection with any insurgent group. But ISAF media office in Kabul said a precision strike a day earlier had killed three enemies of Afghanistan, after positively identifying hostile intent in Baraki Barak district. "ISAF is aware of outside reports claiming

civilians may have been harmed. ISAF is currently gathering facts and assessing the situation,” the force said. Elsewhere, a civilian car hit a roadside bomb in the Marja district of southern Helmand province, killing one occupant of the car and injuring three others. The Tuesday morning blast happened in Qari Sadi area of the district, the governor’s spokesman Omar Zwak said. Two children were among the injured, he said. The blast came a week after four civilians were killed in a similar incident elsewhere in the province.

06.20.2013

Logar - A nighttime NATO airstrike killed at least 15 Taliban insurgents on the outskirts of Pul-i-Alam, the capital of central Logar province, an official said. The strike took place Wednesday night near Pul-i-Alam after the insurgents attacked a military base used by American forces, Police Chief Col. Raees Khan Sadiq said. After the attack, the US forces dropped bombs on the assailants, killing at least 15. Their dead bodies remain at the scene, Sadiq said. Governor’s spokesman Din Mohammad Darwish also confirmed the airstrike and the death toll. But a Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said only one Taliban fighter had been killed and three others wounded in the airstrike. He said their attack on the US base caused a huge fire that inflicted heavy casualties and financial losses on American forces, a claim dismissed by Raees Khan Sadiq.

06.22.2013

Kunar- A Taliban’s shadow governor for eastern Nuristan province was killed during an airstrike in neighboring Kunar province, a senior official said on Saturday. Nuristan governor Tamim Nuristani said the airstrike was carried out on Friday in the Ghaziabad district of Kunar. The Taliban-designated governor, Maulavi Dost Mohammad Khan, was killed along with two of his guards in the NATO airstrike, said Nuristani. He said Khan planned every militant attack that took place in Nuristan. With no Taliban spokesman immediately available for comment, Kunar governor Syed Fazlullah Wahidi said Khan was killed in a drone strike.

06.24.2013

Ghor - Eleven insurgents were killed and six others wounded during an Afghan-led security operation in western Ghor province, an official said on Monday. The operation was conducted in Ghalmin and Murghab areas of Chaghcharan, the provincial capital, the governor’s spokesman, Abdul Hai Khatibi, said. Crime branch chief, Noor Ali Asiri, said two Taliban commanders were among the dead. At least three Afghan soldiers have been wounded during the ongoing offensive so far. An elder of the area who did not want to be named said Taliban hideouts on the outskirts of Chaghcharan were being pounded. Civilians had suffered no harm, he added. He called the military action effective and said: “The Taliban have strongholds in Ghalmin and Murghab areas. They have been asking people for Ushr, and are hampering development projects.”

06.26.2013

Paktiya- A parliamentarian survived escaped unhurt but four of his bodyguards were wounded in a bomb attack in southeastern Paktiya province on Wednesday noon. The bomb, placed in a roadside dustbin in the provincial capital, went off as Wolesi Jirga member Abdul Hanan Haq Wayoon's vehicle passed through Hassankhel area. Col. Mohammad Zaman, the deputy police chief for Paktiya, said the explosion

took place at 11am. Several shops were damaged by the blast, he said. There was no immediate claim of responsibility.

Herat- Five policemen, including an officer, have been killed during a militant ambush in western Herat province, an official said on Thursday. Col. Ali Ahmad, in charge of the 7th police district, and his bodyguards came under attack during an overnight security patrol of an area in Injil district. Herat police spokesman Col. Abdul Rauf Ahmadi said at least one policeman was wounded in the incident. The attackers also suffered casualties in return fire, he said, without giving figures. Elsewhere in the western zone, three Afghan soldiers were killed and four others injured during an explosion in the Pusht Rud district of Farah province. Ghausuddin, the district's administrative head, the casualties happened when the tank they were travelling in struck a roadside bomb. Without commenting on the Injil ambush, Taliban spokesman Qari Yousaf Ahmadi claimed the fighters had destroyed two army tanks and killed four soldiers aboard in the Khak-i-Sufaid district of Farah.

07.13.2013

Logar - Ten Taliban fighters were killed during an air raid by NATO-led troops in the Mohammad Agha district of central Logar province, officials said on Saturday. Two foreign and eight Afghan militants were killed during the overnight raid on a house in the Muzgin village of the district, the deputy police chief said. Col. Raees Khan Sadiq said security personnel and area people suffered no casualties during the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation. A resident of the area, Haji Babar verified the overnight airstrike, but had no further details. A Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, said he was unaware of the incident.

07.14.2013

Kunar - An administrative officer has been shot dead by unidentified gunmen in the eastern province of Kunar, an official said on Sunday. Razi Khan came under attack on his way back home from a mosque in the Korbagh area of Watapur district late on Saturday night. Deputy Governor Qazi Mohammad Nabi said the executive officer was gunned down soon after he offered Taraveeh prayers. Nabi denounced the killing as an un-Islamic act.

07.16.2013

Logar - A pre-dawn airstrike by NATO-led forces killed at least 18 civilians, including women and children, and seven insurgents, in central Logar province, officials said on Wednesday. The air raid that caused the latest civilian casualties was conducted at 1:00 am in the Sajawand area on the periphery of Baraki Barak district, said the provincial deputy police chief. Raees Khan Sadeq said some insurgents who gathered at a residence opened fire on foreign soldiers. As a result, the soldiers retaliated with an airstrike that led to death of civilians and fighters. He said a Taliban commander -- Qari Sardari -- was staying at the tribal elder's house at the time of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) strike. He confirmed the death of 18 civilians, including seven children, five women and six men, besides acknowledging death of seven rebels. He added the residences belonged to two area tribal elders -- Bashir Akhundzada and Qayyum Akhundzada -- who were also killed along with all their family members. The governor's spokesman Din Mohammad Darwiash, denying insurgents' deaths, said 15 civilians -- mostly children -- were killed in the NATO raid.

Dr. Abdul Wali Wakil, head of the provincial council, confirmed the incident, saying Akhundzada was among 16 civilians killed in the ISAF raid. He added the locals protested in front of the governor's office in Pul-i-Alam, carrying the dead bodies to prove the victims were ordinary residents and not insurgents. The Taliban denied their commander was hiding in the tribal elder's residence. Their spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, said all the victims were civilians. At the same time, residents demonstrated in Logar's capital to condemn the killings, but security personnel opened fire at them, injuring one protestor. The protestors chanted anti-US and anti-Afghan government slogans, saying "death to America, death to the Afghan government, death to Hamid Karzai and death to Barak Obama." Habib Rahman, one of the area residents, said Bashir was arranging a wedding party for his son, to be held in the next three days, and had invited some of his relatives to his house. Meanwhile, ISAF media office in Kabul denied the civilians fatalities, saying they conducted the operation jointly with Afghan forces to nab an insurgent commander in the area. During the operation, the insurgents attacked the security force, which returned fire and requested a precision airstrike, said a statement from the multinational force. It added during a follow-on assessment, security forces discovered two women with non-life-threatening injuries. However, it did not mention civilian deaths in the attack.

07.17.2013

Paktiya - A dozen civilians were wounded during a bomb explosion in the capital of southeastern Paktiya province on Wednesday, an official said. Deputy police chief for the province, Col. Mohammad Zaman, said the blast resulted from a roadside bomb in the main Gardez bazaar at about 10am. The target of the explosive device was yet to be ascertained, he said, adding police had launched an investigation into the incident. Gardez Civil Hospital Director Dr. Haya Gul Paktin confirmed receiving 12 wounded individuals from the scene. Two of the injured were in critical condition, he said.

Kunduz - Seven Taliban militants, including a commander, have been killed during a security operation in northern Kunduz province, an official said. Six rebels and their group leader Mullah Bashir were killed in Gor Tapa area on the outskirts of Kunduz City, the provincial capital, a police spokesman said. Col. Syed Sarwar Hussaini said the fighters' bodies were still lying at the scene. Four insurgents were wounded, and some weapons seized during the operation. He said the operation was launched after a group of insurgents stormed a security post and killed one Afghan Local Police (ALP) member. A Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, claimed three ALP members including their commander were killed and many others wounded in the attack and the ensuing clash. Residents, meanwhile, voiced concern at the situation in the area and asked the authorities to beef up security in villages on the periphery of Kunduz City. One dweller Maqsood Ahmadi said a gravel-laden truck struck a roadside bomb on Tuesday evening and then the Taliban entered a fire exchange with Afghan forces. The clash continued until 9pm, he said, adding: "Some passenger cars were stuck in the fighting." The resident claimed the militants looked strong and police personnel could not patrol remote areas, but the police spokesman Col. Hussaini, said some areas had been cleared during the operation and if Taliban activities continued, security forces would take action. According to another report, an insurgent was killed during a clash with ALP members on Tuesday night in Dasht-i-Archi district. District chief, Sheikh Sadruddin Saadi, said the incident took place after an ALP official was killed in a clash with the Taliban clash in the area.

07.18.2013

Logar - Eight workers on an American military base were killed on Thursday on the outskirts of Pul-i-Alam, the capital of central Logar province, an official said. The incident took place in the morning when the workers were on their way to the base, the provincial police chief said. Raees Khan Sadiq said the insurgents stopped in the Khadar bazaar the car the men were travelling in and shot them to death. But a Taliban's spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, said he was aware of the attack and that the fighters did not target civilians. Abdul Jalil, the father of one of the victims, said his son had been working for two years at the Shang camp of American troops. Jalil added his son was an ordinary labourer, a breadwinner for a 12-member family. All victims were residents of Gulnar area. He blamed security forces and police for their failure to prevent such attacks in the increasing volatile province. Shang camp, where many Afghans have found work opportunities, is located three kilometers south of Pul-i-Alam on the Kabul-Gardez highway.

Kunduz- Three policemen, including an officer, were killed in an insurgent attack in the capital of northwestern Kunduz province on Thursday, an official said. The incident took place at 6am when a group of Taliban stormed a security post in Pul-i-Asiab area of the 5th police district of Kunduz City, the provincial police spokesman said. Syed Sarwar Hussaini said three cops were killed and two others seriously wounded. The insurgents fled the area before security forces reached the scene. But a resident of the area, Ainuddin, said they heard a rocket blast and saw the bodies of four policemen near the post. District hospital chief, Dr. Abdul Qudus Miakhel, confirmed receiving three bodies. However, he said nothing about the injured policemen. Elsewhere in the north, eight suspected fighters were arrested during an overnight operation in the Zadran Ashkmash district of northeastern Takhar province. Police spokesman Abdul Khalil Asir confirmed the incident, saying the suspects were under investigation. About 21 anti-vehicle mines were seized from a ruined house in Taloqan, the provincial capital, A Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, said all the detainees were civilians.

07.19.2013

Parwan - Five people were killed in a clash between two rival groups in the Jabalus Saraj district of central Parwan province on Friday, authorities said. Another two men have been wounded during the ongoing clash that erupted between armed supporters of Ainuddin and Safa at about 10am. District police chief, Col. Masoom Farza, said the motive behind the firefight was yet to be determined. Police personnel had been dispatched to the area to control the situation. Resident Shah Nawaz confirmed there had been an exchange of gunfire for two hours in the area. Dwellers could not come out of homes, he said, adding the warring parties had a Jihad background.

07.21.2013

Khost - Unidentified gunmen shot dead six people, including a brother of the district chief, in restive southeastern Khost province, bordering Pakistan, on Sunday morning, official and residents said. Mohammad Yunus, the Ismail Khail Mandozai district chief, said the gunmen mounted an attack on the home of his counterpart for Spera town, Mohammad Azim, in Lalma area. Six individuals were killed on the spot. He said Khalil -- a brother of Mohammad Azim -- was also Dwamanda district mayor. He was assailed along with his five bodyguards as they strolled in a garden next to the official's residence. Residents of the area confirmed the incident. No one has so far claimed responsibility.

## Quality Control

### I.7 Field Team Composition

For the MISTI Wave 2 project, ACSOR used 19 supervisors and 15 assistant supervisors to oversee field work in 19 provinces. A description of the field team composition is summarized in the following two tables:

*Table 6: Description of Field Team (ACSOR)*

	<b>Female</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Total</b>
Number of female/male interviewers	498	916	1,414
Number of interviewers previously used in ACSOR/D3 project	488	847	1,337
Number of interviewers new to a ACSOR/D3 project	10	67	77

*Table 7: Description of Field Team (AYC)*

	<b>Female</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Total</b>
Number of female/male interviewers	0	68	68

### I.8 Field Level Quality Control

The quality of the data is assured during the field period by the following control procedures applied in various stages.

1. After the delivery of the questionnaires from field, most of the completed questionnaires were checked for proper administration as well as proper household and respondent selection.
2. 34 supervisors observed interviewer's work during field.
3. When there was no opportunity for direct supervision, a supervisor and assistant supervisor revisited selected houses after the completion of interviews or called back, if there was a working telephone at the household. The issues verified during in person back-checks were proper household and respondent selection, as well as the correct recording of answers to three randomly selected questions from the main body of the questionnaire.

At the end of the three procedures, 40.8% of the completed questionnaires were controlled (n=14,888); using the following methods:

- Direct supervision during interview (0.3%)
- Back-checked in person by supervisor (39.4%)

- Back-check in person or by telephone by supervisory team (1.1%)

The following chart summarizes the interviews which were back checked by district and the method by which they were back checked.

Table 8: Back Checks by District

District (Code and Name)	Direct supervision during interview	Back-checked in person by supervisor	Back-checked from the central office	Total Back-checked	Percent Back Checked
40 Charikar	0	90	0	90	31%
48 Salang	0	130	0	130	42%
52 Sayed Abad	0	236	0	236	48%
53 Chak	0	226	0	226	46%
54 Nerkh	0	231	0	231	47%
55 Jalrez	0	252	0	252	51%
61 Baraki Barak	2	11	25	38	13%
62 Muhammad Aghah	0	225	0	225	45%
65 Khushi	0	217	0	217	44%
68 Qarabagh	0	238	0	238	51%
69 Andar	27	7	0	34	11%
70 Ghazni	0	201	0	201	42%
73 Gelan	0	219	0	219	45%
74 Muqur	0	223	0	223	45%
75 Deh Yak	0	234	0	234	47%
78 Jaghatu (Bahram-e Shahid)	0	185	0	185	38%
83 Khwajah Omari	0	228	0	228	49%
105 Zurmat	3	16	14	33	11%
106 Sayed Karam	0	172	0	172	35%
110 Lajah-Ahmad Khel	0	82	0	82	20%
111 Waz Drazadran	1	1	1	3	1%
113 Ahmad Abad	0	208	0	208	42%
115 Shwak	0	54	0	54	22%
117 Sabari (Ya qubi)	2	28	4	34	11%
118 Tani	0	211	0	211	43%
119 Mando Zayi	0	192	0	192	39%
120 Terezayi	0	220	0	220	45%
123 Gorbuz	0	225	0	225	46%
125 Jaji Maidan	0	217	0	217	44%
126 Bak	0	205	0	205	42%
127 Shamal (Dwamunda)	0	232	0	232	47%

District (Code and Name)	Direct supervision during interview	Back-checked in person by supervisor	Back-checked from the central office	Total Back-checked	Percent Back Checked
152 Sawkai	0	250	0	250	51%
153 Khas Kunar	0	219	0	219	44%
156 Narang	8	209	0	217	45%
157 Shigal wa Sheltan	0	205	0	205	41%
160 Sarkani	0	271	0	271	55%
162 Marawara	0	240	0	240	48%
224 Puli Khumri	0	250	0	250	51%
225 Baghlan i Jadid	0	256	0	256	52%
226 Doshi	0	147	0	147	44%
239 Imam Sahib	0	16	0	16	3%
240 Kunduz	0	237	0	237	48%
241 Khanabad	0	5	0	5	1%
242 Dash Arche	2	12	6	20	6%
243 Char Darah	0	5	0	5	1%
245 Ali Abad	0	6	0	6	1%
246 Aybak	0	196	0	196	59%
301 Qadis	0	216	0	216	46%
303 Ab-e Kamari	0	148	0	148	48%
306 Moqur	0	230	0	230	50%
309 Shindand	0	191	0	191	40%
311 Kushk-i-Robat Sangi	0	232	0	232	48%
312 Pashtun Zarghun	7	239	0	246	52%
323 Farah	0	151	0	151	46%
324 Bala Boluk	24	9	5	38	9%
327 Pusht Rod	0	247	0	247	50%
330 Khak-e-Safayd	0	242	0	242	49%
335 Zaranj	0	65	0	65	16%
339 Nad 'Ali	0	244	0	244	51%
340 Nahr-i-Saraj	0	225	0	225	50%
342 Garmser	0	249	0	249	50%
344 Kajaki	0	56	21	77	36%
345 Lash Kar Gah	0	247	0	247	50%
346 Sangin	0	46	64	110	36%
347 Musa Qala	0	45	49	94	33%
353 Spin Boldak	0	233	0	233	47%
354 Panjwai	0	235	0	235	47%
355 Zhari	0	242	0	242	49%

District (Code and Name)	Direct supervision during interview	Back-checked in person by supervisor	Back-checked from the central office	Total Back-checked	Percent Back Checked
356 Arghandab	0	249	0	249	52%
357 Maiwand	0	168	0	168	50%
358 Shah Wali Kot	0	219	0	219	44%
359 Daman	0	229	0	229	47%
368 Shah Joy	0	252	0	252	51%
373 Qalat	0	251	0	251	52%
376 Tarnak Wa Jaldak	0	44	209	253	63%
379 Tirin Kot	0	223	0	223	48%
380 Chorah	0	243	0	243	51%
383 Dehrawud	0	212	0	212	51%
384 Chaghcharan	44	175	0	219	45%
388 Shahrak	0	261	0	261	53%
418 Dand	0	226	0	226	46%
424 Lajah-Mangal	0	86	0	86	18%
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>14370</b>	<b>398</b>	<b>14888</b>	<b>41%</b>

## I.9 Independent Field Validation

As an additional layer of quality control, the MISTI client team developed an independent team to validate the field work throughout the field period. This team consisted of independent, third party monitors who randomly selected sample points for validations. The independent field monitors communicated with the ACSOR field supervisors to determine when and where interviews were to take place. When a sample point was randomly selected, the monitor and interviewer assigned to the sample point would agree to meet prior to the interviewer conducting field work that day and the monitor would validate that:

- 1) Interviews were being conducted in the correct location
- 2) Random walk procedures were being followed as per the directions given during training
- 3) In some instances, validators were also able to directly observe some interviews to ensure proper interviewing protocols were being followed.

The following list shows the 214 sample points which were conducted by ACSOR interviewers and successfully validated by MSI's independent validation team:

Table 9: Validated Sample Points

Province	Sample Point
Badghis	23199
Badghis	23151
Badghis	23183
Badghis	23189
Baghlan	16052
Baghlan	16059
Baghlan	16056
Baghlan	16001
Baghlan	16003
Baghlan	16011
Baghlan	16029
Baghlan	16019
Baghlan	16035
Baghlan	16039
Baghlan	16031
Baghlan	16013
Baghlan	16111
Baghlan	16109
Baghlan	16113
Baghlan	16129
Baghlan	16139
Baghlan	16137
Baghlan	16135
Baghlan	16143
Baghlan	16160
Ghazni	6419
Ghazni	6443
Ghazni	6455
Ghazni	6451
Ghazni	6075
Ghazni	6055
Ghazni	6113
Ghazni	6111
Ghazni	6107
Ghazni	6129
Ghazni	6223
Ghazni	6225
Ghazni	6167
Ghazni	6183

Province	Sample Point
Ghazni	6191
Ghazni	6187
Ghazni	6193
Ghazni	6231
Ghazni	6233
Ghazni	6289
Ghazni	6261
Ghazni	6287
Ghazni	6321
Ghazni	6323
Ghazni	6331
Ghazni	6337
Ghazni	6377
Ghazni	6375
Ghazni	6379
Ghazni	6381
Ghazni	6357
Ghazni	6387
Ghazni	6389
Helmand	27119
Helmand	27149
Helmand	27155
Helmand	27121
Helmand	27151
Helmand	27159
Helmand	27045
Helmand	27065
Helmand	27081
Helmand	27093
Helmand	27019
Helmand	27143
Helmand	27099
Helmand	27083
Helmand	27055
Helmand	27077
Helmand	27363
Helmand	27413
Helmand	27369
Helmand	27371

Province	Sample Point
Helmand	27365
Helmand	27379
Helmand	27477
Helmand	27537
Helmand	27513
Helmand	27521
Helmand	27505
Helmand	27493
Hirat	24105
Hirat	24093
Hirat	24095
Hirat	24091
Hirat	24085
Hirat	24097
Hirat	24077
Hirat	24073
Hirat	24069
Hirat	24107
Hirat	24081
Hirat	24105
Hirat	24065
Kandahar	28357
Kandahar	28359
Kandahar	28371
Kandahar	28433
Kandahar	28431
Kandahar	28435
Kandahar	28423
Kandahar	28447
Kandahar	28431
Kandahar	28432
Kandahar	28249
Kandahar	28283
Kandahar	28235
Kandahar	28239
Kandahar	28251
Kandahar	28155
Kandahar	28143
Kandahar	28105
Kandahar	28111

Province	Sample Point
Kandahar	28113
Kandahar	28153
Kandahar	28061
Kandahar	28067
Kandahar	28051
Kandahar	28097
Kandahar	28057
Kandahar	28091
Kandahar	28211
Kandahar	28227
Kandahar	28215
Kandahar	28181
Kandahar	28195
Kandahar	28203
Kandahar	28225
Khost	9197
Khost	9229
Khost	9075
Khost	9091
Khost	9269
Khost	9249
Khost	9149
Khost	9167
Khost	9015
Khost	9363
Khost	9335
Khost	9429
Khost	9423
Kunar	12193
Kunar	12195
Kunar	12199
Kunar	12001
Kunar	12015
Kunar	12257
Kunar	12267
Kunar	12073
Kunar	12085
Kunar	12099
Kunar	12131
Kunar	12143

Province	Sample Point
Kunar	12155
Kunar	12183
Kunar	12311
Kunar	12321
Kunar	12339
Kunduz	17055
Kunduz	17033
Kunduz	17053
Kunduz	17025
Kunduz	17027
Kunduz	17051
Kunduz	17111
Kunduz	17117
Kunduz	17123
Kunduz	17127
Kunduz	17131
Kunduz	17179
Kunduz	17187
Kunduz	17189
Kunduz	17209
Kunduz	17193
Kunduz	17205
Kunduz	17213
Kunduz	17315
Kunduz	17319
Kunduz	17293
Kunduz	17127
Kunduz	17131

Province	Sample Point
Kunduz	17179
Paktiya	7071
Paktiya	7075
Paktiya	7049
Paktiya	7063
Paktiya	7065
Paktiya	7089
Paktiya	7342
Paktiya	7326
Paktiya	7344
Paktiya	7336
Paktiya	7318
Paktiya	7318
Paktiya	7130
Paktiya	7117
Paktiya	7111
Paktiya	7132
Paktiya	7215
Paktiya	7205
Paktiya	7171
Paktiya	7173
Paktiya	7207
Paktiya	7217
Paktiya	7211
Paktiya	7027
Paktiya	7025
Paktiya	7014
Paktiya	7001

MSI successfully validated interviews at 27 AYC sample points in Khost (2), Ghazni (4), Kunduz/Baghlan (5), Helmand (12), and Paktiya (4).

## I.10 Post Field Data Processing

Each district in the MISTI Wave 2 project was processed as an independent sample; the procedures which follow were replicated for all 82 districts contained in the final, merged data set.

After field work was completed, ACSOR's field management team received the packs of interviews at ACSOR's main office in Kabul. The packs of interviews were sorted by location and numbered sequentially.

A team of experienced coders, under the supervision of ACSOR project managers, then went through each open ended question and, using a common typology list, coded each open ended response with a

numeric code. When new responses were found within questionnaires, the project manager reviewed the response to ensure it was mutually exclusive to all previous responses and then created a new code for all coders to begin using when appropriate.

After all questionnaires were coded, ACSOR key-punched all questionnaires on-site to protect the data and closely control the quality of the data entry process. During this process, the keypunching team utilized logic checks and verified any errors inadvertently committed by interviewers. This team of keypunchers entered the data into a computerized format which can be read by common analytical software such as SPSS. The keypunchers use a proprietary data entry program, written specifically for use in Afghanistan, to simplify processing and decrease error.

### **1.11 Post Processing Quality Reviews**

After the data set was processed into a usable, computerized format, experienced staff members from ACSOR's IT department began the initial review of the data. The initial review focused primarily on the management section of the survey. The goal of this phase is to ensure that all of the interviews match the anticipated management characteristics found in the achieved sample plan for that district. Throughout this phase, logic tests are enacted on the data to ensure that each interview is categorized as expected within the data set. When discrepancies were found, the original questionnaire was located to determine if the error was a result of a keypunching error and, if so, the error is repaired in the data set.

After ACSOR's IT team completes their review, each data set was sent to Assen Blagoev for the next phase of review. Throughout this phase, further logic tests are employed throughout the management, substantive and demographic sections of the data set. When errors were found, the project management team at ACSOR again found the original questionnaires to determine and repair the source of the error.

### **1.12 Hunter Quality Tests**

Following the data cleaning process and logic checks of the dataset, ACSOR-Surveys uses a program called Hunter that searches for additional patterns and duplicates that may indicate that an interview was not properly conducted by an interviewer.

The Hunter program includes four tests:

1. Equality test – compares interviews for similarities, grouped by interviewer, within sampling point, province, or any other variable. Typically, interviews with an interviewer average of 95% or higher are flagged for further investigation.
2. Non-Response test – determines the percentage of 'Don't Knows' for each interviewer's cases. Typically, if an interview is found to have 25% or more 'Don't Know' responses, it is flagged for further investigation.
3. Duplicates test – compares cases across all interviewers and respondents to check for similarity rates. This test will flag any pair of interviews that are similar to each other. Typically, any cases that have a similarity of 96% or higher are flagged for further investigation.

4. Time and Date test – compares interviews for overlapping times, grouped by interviewer. Interviews with overlapping times are flagged for review and reported times are compared in the original questionnaires.

Any interview that does not pass Hunter is pulled out for additional screening. If the interview does not pass screening, it is removed from the final database before delivery. The following chart summarizes the deletions that were made as a result of the aforementioned quality tests.

*Table 9: Cases Deleted After Quality Control Tests*

Province	District	Cases in Original Data Set	Field Provider	Time & Date	Equality	Non-Response	Duplicates	Total Removed	Cases in Final Data Set
Badghis	Ab-e Kamari	336	ACSOR				25	25	311
Badghis	Muqur	491	ACSOR				28	28	463
Badghis	Qadis	496	ACSOR				31	31	465
Baghlan	Baghlan-e Jadid	496	ACSOR				5	5	491
Baghlan	Doshi	336	ACSOR					0	336
Baghlan	Pul-e Khmri	496	ACSOR				6	6	490
Farah	Bala Boluk	495	AYC	57		2	3	62	433
Farah	Farah	335	ACSOR				4	4	331
Farah	Khak-e Safayd	496	ACSOR				1	1	495
Farah	Pusht-e Rod	496	ACSOR				3	3	493
Ghazni	Andar	335	AYC	16			3	19	316
Ghazni	Deh Yak	496	ACSOR					0	496
Ghazni	Gelan	496	ACSOR				7	7	489
Ghazni	Ghazni	496	ACSOR				12	12	484
Ghazni	Jaghatu	494	ACSOR				2	2	492
Ghazni	Khvajah Omari	496	ACSOR				30	30	466
Ghazni	Muqer	495	ACSOR				3	3	492
Ghazni	Qarah Bagh	495	ACSOR				26	26	469
Ghor	Chaghcharan	496	ACSOR				13	13	483
Ghor	Shahrak	495	ACSOR					0	495
Helmand	Garm Ser	496	ACSOR				1	1	495
Helmand	Kajaki	335	AYC	98		21	1	120	215
Helmand	Lashkar Gah	496	ACSOR				5	5	491
Helmand	Musa Qal'ah	496	AYC	63		11	136	210	286
Helmand	Nad Ali	496	ACSOR				20	20	476
Helmand	Nahr-e Saraj	496	ACSOR				46	46	450
Helmand	Sangin	495	AYC	38		15	133	186	309
Herat	Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	496	ACSOR			2	8	10	486
Herat	Pashtun Zarghun	496	ACSOR			5	22	27	469
Herat	Shindand	496	ACSOR				14	14	482
Kandahar	Arghandab	496	ACSOR				13	13	483
Kandahar	Daman	495	ACSOR				6	6	489
Kandahar	Dand	496	ACSOR				3	3	493
Kandahar	Maiwand	336	ACSOR					0	336
Kandahar	Panjwai	496	ACSOR					0	496
Kandahar	Shah Wali Kot	496	ACSOR					0	496

Province	District	Cases in Original Data Set	Field Provider	Time & Date	Equality	Non-Response	Duplicates	Total Removed	Cases in Final Data Set
Kandahar	Spin Boldak	496	ACSOR				3	3	493
Kandahar	Zharay	495	ACSOR				2	2	493
Khost	Bak	496	ACSOR			1	3	4	492
Khost	Gurbuz	496	ACSOR			1	2	3	493
Khost	Jaji Maidan	496	ACSOR			1	3	4	492
Khost	Manduzai (Ismail Khel)	496	ACSOR			1	7	8	488
Khost	Sabari (Ya'qubi)	335	AYC	36			1	37	298
Khost	Shamul (Dzadran)	495	ACSOR				1	1	494
Khost	Tanai	496	ACSOR				7	7	489
Khost	Terayzai (Ali Sher)	494	ACSOR			1	5	6	488
Kunar	Khas Kunar	496	ACSOR			2		2	494
Kunar	Marawah	496	ACSOR					0	496
Kunar	Narang	368	ACSOR			4	2	6	362
Kunar	Narang	128	AYC	8			1	9	119
Kunar	Sar Kani	496	ACSOR					0	496
Kunar	Shigal Wa Sheltan	495	ACSOR					0	495
Kunar	Tsowkey	496	ACSOR			1		1	495
Kunduz	Archi	336	AYC	16		2		18	318
Kunduz	Aliabad	495	ACSOR				1	1	494
Kunduz	Chahar Darah	495	ACSOR					0	495
Kunduz	Imam Sahib	492	ACSOR				14	14	478
Kunduz	Khanabad	496	ACSOR				6	6	490
Kunduz	Kunduz (Gor Tepa)	496	ACSOR				6	6	490
Logar	Baraki Barak	335	AYC	18			14	32	303
Logar	Khoshi	496	ACSOR			2		2	494
Logar	Muhammad Aghah	496	ACSOR					0	496
Nimroz	Zaranj	495	ACSOR				88	88	407
Paktiya	Ahmadabad	496	ACSOR				5	5	491
Paktiya	Dzadran	335	AYC	17		1		18	317
Paktiya	Laja Mangel	288	ACSOR					0	288
Paktiya	Laja Mangel	208	AYC	22			2	24	184
Paktiya	Lajah Ahmad Khel	304	ACSOR				1	1	303
Paktiya	Lajah Ahmad Khel	128	AYC	15			9	24	104
Paktiya	Sayyid Karam	496	ACSOR				5	5	491
Paktiya	Shwak	159	ACSOR					0	159
Paktiya	Shwak	176	AYC	86				86	90
Paktiya	Zurmat	336	AYC	22			10	32	304
Parwan	Charikar	336	ACSOR				43	43	293
Parwan	Salang	336	ACSOR				23	23	313
Samangan	Aibak	336	ACSOR				2	2	334
Uruzgan	Chorah	496	ACSOR				18	18	478
Uruzgan	Deh Rawud	496	ACSOR		32	4	46	82	414
Uruzgan	Tarin Kot	494	ACSOR				27	27	467

Province	District	Cases in Original Data Set	Field Provider	Time & Date	Equality	Non-Response	Duplicates	Total Removed	Cases in Final Data Set
Wardak	Chak-e Wardak	496	ACSOR					0	496
Wardak	Jalrayz	496	ACSOR					0	496
Wardak	Nerkh	496	ACSOR					0	496
Wardak	Sayyidabad	496	ACSOR					0	496
Zabul	Qalat	495	ACSOR			1	10	11	484
Zabul	Shah Joy	494	ACSOR					0	494
Zabul	Tarneka wa Jaldak	496	AYC	71		19	7	97	399
<b>Total</b>		<b>38171</b>		<b>512</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>984</b>	<b>1696</b>	<b>36475</b>

## Questionnaire

The questionnaire was designed by the MISTI team with input from stakeholders within each program area covered by the Wave 2 assessment. Although some questions were developed specifically for a particular program, the goal of the questionnaire is to gain an overall assessment of the stability picture and factors that impact the stability situation within each district covered by the project.

The substantive portion of the questionnaire was broken down into the following modules:

1. Security and Crime (Q2a – Q7b)
2. Governance (Q8 – Q14h)
3. Service Provision and Development (Q15 – Q19b)
4. Rule of Law (Q20a – Q22c)
5. Corruption (Q23 – Q25)
6. Quality of Life (Q26 – Q30)
7. Economic Activity (Q31 – Q33)
8. Community Cohesion and Resilience (Q34a – Q39b)
9. Grievances (Q40a/b)
10. Media (Q41a – Q42b)
11. Indirect Questions (Q43 – Q50)

The questionnaire consisted of 37 management and quality control variables, 85 substantive questions and 31 demographic questions. For the purposes of this count, each item in a battery of questions was counted as 1/3 of a variable. For the household roster in the demographic questions, each question was counted as 2 variables using the estimate that each household would have an average of about 6 family members and the entries for each family member would be counted as 1/3 of a variable.

The average length of time it took for an interview to be conducted was 40 minutes with the shortest interview taking 20 minutes and the longest interview taking 2 hours and 20 minutes.

## APPENDIX C: STABILITY INDEX SCORES (WAVE 2)

1 = very negative 5 = very positive	7a	7b	7c	7d	7e	7.2.1c	7.2.1d	Q6.1d	Survey Index	M36	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (May-Aug 13)	Security Incident score	Stability Index
Weights	0.25	0.25	1.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.25	0.50	0.75	0.10	0.10	0.05	
Charikar*	4.92	3.54	3.82	4.01	3.68	3.20	1.18	4.95	3.76	5.00	5.00	5.00	4.07
Salang	4.96	3.69	4.06	3.95	3.86	3.07	1.29	4.98	3.85	5.00	5.00	5.00	4.13
Sayed Abad	2.44	2.95	3.22	2.68	3.11	3.60	2.28	2.18	2.98	1.45	3.00	1.00	2.73
Chak	1.97	2.49	3.05	2.62	3.06	3.07	2.25	2.69	2.83	1.52	2.00	4.00	2.68
Nerkh	2.42	3.16	3.13	2.84	3.02	3.59	2.44	2.70	3.03	1.26	3.00	3.00	2.85
Jalrez	3.31	3.00	3.33	3.27	3.12	3.99	2.23	3.12	3.29	1.52	3.00	4.00	3.12
Baraki Barak	2.57	2.48	3.85	2.54	3.68	4.11	1.05	2.31	3.24	1.23	1.00	4.00	2.85
Muhammad Aghah	2.55	2.91	3.62	2.96	3.22	3.70	1.28	3.57	3.26	2.89	4.00	3.00	3.28
Khushi	2.87	1.98	3.36	2.74	3.03	3.48	1.15	3.39	3.03	3.19	3.00	5.00	3.15
Qarabagh	3.74	3.30	3.48	3.48	3.48	4.00	1.75	2.69	3.40	3.24	3.00	2.00	3.27
Andar	1.38	1.57	3.49	2.45	3.74	2.26	1.08	1.26	2.64	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.23
Ghazni	3.60	3.92	3.81	3.48	3.64	4.43	1.43	3.23	3.65	4.23	5.00	1.00	3.71
Gelan	3.50	3.61	3.42	3.56	3.38	4.11	1.24	3.09	3.41	2.28	2.00	3.00	3.13
Muqur	3.27	2.89	3.50	3.20	3.29	3.38	1.71	2.75	3.20	2.80	2.00	2.00	2.98
Deh Yak	3.11	2.81	3.28	3.33	3.38	3.37	1.27	2.91	3.15	3.24	3.00	3.00	3.13
Jaghata (Bahram-e Shahid)	3.93	4.14	4.06	3.60	3.75	4.28	1.37	3.72	3.81	4.22	3.00	5.00	3.83
Khwajah Omari	3.75	4.01	4.30	3.90	3.67	4.37	1.39	3.60	3.90	4.63	5.00	4.00	4.09
Zurmat	3.25	1.83	2.53	2.37	2.82	3.74	1.72	2.67	2.71	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.38
Sayed Karam	4.25	3.98	3.59	3.68	3.59	3.17	1.46	3.55	3.48	3.01	4.00	4.00	3.51
Lajah-Ahmad Khel	2.56	2.72	3.14	3.00	3.20	2.65	1.32	3.32	2.93	3.27	2.00	5.00	2.98
Waz Drazadran	2.57	2.13	2.49	2.29	3.12	3.09	1.27	2.72	2.59	1.05	1.00	5.00	2.40
Ahmad Abad	4.22	4.03	3.76	3.81	3.71	3.50	1.45	3.87	3.65	3.67	4.00	4.00	3.71
Shwak	3.08	3.25	3.32	2.97	3.28	3.36	1.28	2.99	3.12	2.07	2.00	5.00	3.00
Sabari (Ya qubi)	2.87	2.05	3.47	2.89	3.65	2.44	1.01	1.73	2.86	1.30	1.00	2.00	2.47
Tani	3.79	3.39	3.73	3.49	3.70	3.57	1.47	3.96	3.56	3.48	4.00	3.00	3.57

<b>1 = very negative 5 = very positive</b>											<b>ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (May-Aug 13)</b>	<b>Security Incident score</b>	<b>Stability Index</b>
<b>Weights</b>	<b>7a</b>	<b>7b</b>	<b>7c</b>	<b>7d</b>	<b>7e</b>	<b>7.2.1c</b>	<b>7.2.1d</b>	<b>Q6.1d</b>	<b>Survey Index</b>	<b>M36</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.05</b>	
Mando Zayi	4.24	3.74	3.69	3.53	3.65	4.00	1.71	4.37	3.70	3.82	5.00	4.00	3.86
Terezayi	3.54	3.06	3.52	3.25	3.58	3.31	1.49	3.65	3.34	4.72	4.00	3.00	3.53
Gorbuz	3.75	3.33	3.59	3.41	3.58	3.73	1.47	3.96	3.51	2.65	4.00	4.00	3.50
Jaji Maidan	3.80	3.43	3.77	3.52	3.70	3.64	1.42	4.04	3.60	3.55	5.00	4.00	3.75
Bak	3.83	3.37	3.45	3.40	3.58	3.53	1.28	3.63	3.40	1.86	3.00	3.00	3.18
Shamal (Dwamunda)	3.93	3.45	3.62	3.46	3.63	3.57	1.34	3.80	3.50	4.06	3.00	5.00	3.58
Sawkai	4.09	3.97	3.65	3.72	3.47	3.30	1.14	3.70	3.50	2.51	3.00	3.00	3.33
Khas Kunar	4.26	4.21	3.73	3.74	3.46	3.17	1.16	4.15	3.57	3.76	3.00	4.00	3.56
Narang	3.79	3.55	3.97	3.75	3.68	3.73	1.15	3.53	3.64	4.04	3.00	4.00	3.64
Shigal wa Sheltan	4.48	4.08	3.70	4.02	3.55	3.76	1.39	3.91	3.70	2.71	2.00	3.00	3.39
Sarkani	4.28	4.12	3.90	3.86	3.50	3.28	1.16	3.60	3.60	3.21	2.00	2.00	3.32
Marawara	4.40	4.22	3.69	3.89	3.50	3.84	1.21	3.80	3.66	3.87	2.00	1.00	3.38
Puli Khumri	4.44	3.94	3.95	3.63	3.84	3.79	2.06	4.57	3.85	3.65	5.00	2.00	3.86
Baghlan i Jadid	3.96	3.90	3.83	3.44	3.80	3.98	1.62	3.83	3.69	3.08	2.00	2.00	3.38
<b>Doshi</b>	<b>4.43</b>	<b>4.01</b>	<b>3.84</b>	<b>3.54</b>	<b>3.82</b>	<b>3.51</b>	<b>1.84</b>	<b>4.27</b>	<b>3.72</b>	<b>4.14</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>4.00</b>	<b>3.91</b>
Imam Sahib	3.87	3.74	3.73	3.60	3.41	4.11	1.76	3.56	3.61	3.18	4.00	4.00	3.63
Kunduz	4.27	3.89	3.66	3.76	3.50	4.39	2.13	3.74	3.73	3.74	5.00	1.00	3.73
Khanabad	3.91	3.92	3.54	3.42	3.22	3.96	1.93	3.92	3.53	3.10	3.00	3.00	3.41
Dash Arche	1.86	1.59	2.77	2.40	3.44	3.63	1.04	2.58	2.73	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.40
Char Darah	3.78	3.76	3.68	3.41	3.39	4.26	1.74	3.54	3.58	2.87	4.00	2.00	3.47
Ali Abad	4.15	3.78	3.65	3.50	3.31	4.27	1.94	3.83	3.63	3.32	3.00	5.00	3.61
<b>Aybak</b>	<b>4.68</b>	<b>4.61</b>	<b>4.03</b>	<b>3.94</b>	<b>3.85</b>	<b>4.28</b>	<b>2.06</b>	<b>4.78</b>	<b>4.07</b>	<b>4.81</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>4.28</b>
Qadis	4.35	4.37	4.31	3.98	3.88	4.76	1.36	3.84	4.07	2.74	4.00	4.00	3.93
<b>Ab-e Kamari</b>	<b>4.11</b>	<b>4.53</b>	<b>4.31</b>	<b>3.97</b>	<b>3.84</b>	<b>4.84</b>	<b>1.23</b>	<b>4.29</b>	<b>4.11</b>	<b>3.06</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>4.14</b>
Moqur	3.68	3.73	4.07	3.32	3.61	4.45	1.08	3.16	3.67	2.97	3.00	4.00	3.55
Shindand	3.12	3.05	3.03	2.85	3.14	3.47	1.76	3.26	3.05	2.86	3.00	2.00	2.97
Kushk-i-Robat Sangi	2.96	3.46	3.28	2.75	3.34	3.12	1.96	3.98	3.18	4.22	3.00	4.00	3.31

<b>1 = very negative 5 = very positive</b>											<b>ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (May-Aug 13)</b>	<b>Security Incident score</b>	<b>Stability Index</b>
<b>Weights</b>	<b>7a</b>	<b>7b</b>	<b>7c</b>	<b>7d</b>	<b>7e</b>	<b>7.2.1c</b>	<b>7.2.1d</b>	<b>Q6.1d</b>	<b>Survey Index</b>	<b>M36</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.05</b>	
Pashtun Zarghun	3.21	3.24	3.30	2.80	3.24	3.55	2.15	3.54	3.21	3.93	3.00	4.00	3.30
Farah	2.96	3.66	3.74	3.14	3.68	3.89	1.51	3.63	3.50	3.89	5.00	2.00	3.61
Bala Boluk	1.36	1.89	3.60	2.66	3.66	2.13	1.00	2.08	2.77	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.48
Pusht Rod	2.47	2.92	3.08	2.75	3.24	3.23	1.28	3.15	2.96	2.48	2.00	3.00	2.82
Khak-e-Safayd	3.09	2.52	3.30	3.08	2.70	4.31	1.80	2.81	3.15	2.22	2.00	4.00	2.99
Zaranj	3.91	3.72	3.57	3.82	3.38	4.24	1.91	4.53	3.72	4.49	5.00	4.00	3.94
Nad 'Ali	4.01	3.99	4.06	4.05	3.55	3.99	1.07	2.87	3.70	2.21	3.00	1.00	3.34
Nahr-i-Saraj	4.04	4.02	4.13	3.99	3.66	4.02	1.08	2.95	3.74	2.42	3.00	1.00	3.40
Garmser	4.59	4.60	4.51	4.49	4.01	4.51	1.02	3.73	4.19	2.32	3.00	3.00	3.82
Kajaki	2.22	2.09	2.73	2.40	3.13	2.47	1.46	2.53	2.56	1.79	2.00	4.00	2.50
Lash Kar Gah	4.12	4.01	4.05	3.92	3.81	4.00	1.11	3.84	3.82	3.92	2.00	2.00	3.56
Sangin	2.04	2.21	2.97	1.84	3.12	2.60	1.38	2.64	2.57	1.42	2.00	1.00	2.32
Musa Qala	2.32	2.21	3.28	2.29	3.23	3.02	1.65	3.17	2.89	1.72	2.00	1.00	2.59
Spin Boldak	3.81	3.62	3.72	3.28	3.44	4.25	2.01	2.91	3.53	2.06	4.00	4.00	3.45
Panjwai	3.10	2.97	3.34	3.10	3.14	4.35	1.74	2.79	3.26	2.06	3.00	1.00	3.00
Zhari	2.85	3.09	3.55	3.08	3.29	3.86	2.19	2.70	3.27	2.97	3.00	2.00	3.15
Arghandab	3.42	3.12	3.66	3.29	3.39	4.38	1.54	2.64	3.42	1.90	4.00	3.00	3.31
Maiwand	4.13	3.73	3.88	3.59	3.49	4.55	2.08	2.57	3.66	3.33	2.00	1.00	3.33
Shah Wali Kot	3.30	3.18	3.45	3.18	3.07	3.82	2.44	2.67	3.26	1.82	2.00	2.00	2.93
Daman	3.99	3.53	3.45	3.49	3.55	4.10	1.48	3.39	3.50	3.78	4.00	4.00	3.60
Shah Joy	2.39	2.47	2.58	2.44	3.60	2.37	2.18	2.12	2.60	2.09	3.00	4.00	2.66
Qalat	2.86	2.90	2.97	2.91	3.31	2.91	2.31	2.53	2.92	2.11	3.00	4.00	2.90
Tarnak Wa Jaldak	3.29	2.54	2.95	3.05	2.91	3.63	1.53	3.63	3.06	1.85	3.00	5.00	3.03
Tirin Kot	4.52	4.19	3.79	3.90	3.64	4.40	1.63	3.51	3.79	3.44	4.00	4.00	3.79
Chorah	4.36	4.26	4.18	3.96	3.82	4.43	1.64	3.26	3.92	3.26	3.00	4.00	3.77
Dehrawud	4.59	4.43	4.37	4.14	3.99	4.59	1.50	3.56	4.10	3.34	3.00	5.00	3.96
Chaghcharan	3.73	3.20	3.10	3.28	3.25	3.91	2.44	3.35	3.30	2.83	5.00	3.00	3.41

<b>1 = very negative 5 = very positive</b>											<b>ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (May-Aug 13)</b>	<b>Security Incident score</b>	<b>Stability Index</b>
<b>Weights</b>	<b>7a</b>	<b>7b</b>	<b>7c</b>	<b>7d</b>	<b>7e</b>	<b>7.2.1c</b>	<b>7.2.1d</b>	<b>Q6.1d</b>	<b>Survey Index</b>	<b>M36</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.05</b>	
Shahrak	3.54	3.32	3.01	3.17	3.03	3.65	2.01	3.19	3.14	1.69	2.00	5.00	2.98
Dand	3.94	3.41	3.67	3.52	3.54	4.26	1.60	3.05	3.55	2.99	4.00	5.00	3.61
Lajah-Mangal	2.19	2.45	3.08	3.00	3.28	3.62	1.39	2.55	2.96	2.72	2.00	5.00	2.95

*\* Light blue indicates the seven control districts*

## APPENDIX D: STABILITY INDEX COMPONENTS, VARIABLES, WEIGHTS AND RESCALING

	Indicator	Overall Weight	Variables	Var weight	Values	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
<b>Component A. MISTI Survey Index (0.75% of Stability Index)</b>						
1	<b>7a. Percent of Afghans reporting their area has become more stable</b>	0.25				
			Q2b. Is your local area more secure, about the same, or less secure than it was a year ago?	5.000	1. Much more secure	5
					2. Somewhat more secure	5
					3. About the same	missing
					4. Somewhat less secure	1
					5. Much less secure	1
2	<b>7b. Percent of Afghans reporting their district is moving in the right direction</b>	0.25	Q1. Generally speaking, are things in [name the district] going in the right direction or in the wrong direction?	5.000	1. Right direction (a lot)	5
					2. Right direction (a little)	5
					3. Wrong direction (a little)	1
					4. Wrong direction (a lot)	1
					97. Neither right nor wrong direction (vol.)	missing
3	<b>7c. Percent of Afghans reporting increased confidence in their local government</b>	1.50	Q8. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.	0.500	1. The Afghan government is well regarded in this area.	5
					2. The Afghan government is not well regarded in this area.	1
			Q9b. How much confidence do you have in your [Insert Position/Organization]? District Government	1.500	1. A lot of confidence	5
					2. Some confidence	5
					3. Not much confidence	1
					4. No confidence at all	1

	Indicator	Overall Weight	Variables	Var weight	Values	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			Q10b. How responsive do you think your [Insert Item] is/are to the needs of the local people in this area? District Government	0.500	1. Very responsive 2. Somewhat responsive 3. Somewhat unresponsive 4. Very unresponsive	5 5 1 1
			Q11b. Over the past year, has the [Insert Item] ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? District Government	0.250	1. Improved a lot 2. Improved a little 3. No change 4. Worsened a little 5. Worsened a lot	5 5 missing 1 1
			(Filtered) Q12b. How much confidence do you have in your District Development Assembly?	0.125	1. A lot of confidence 2. Some confidence 3. Not much confidence 4. No confidence at all	5 5 1 1
			(Filtered) Q12c. How responsive do you think your District Development Assembly is to the needs of the local people in this area?	0.125	1. Very responsive 2. Somewhat responsive 3. Somewhat unresponsive 4. Very unresponsive	5 5 1 1
			(Filtered) Q12d. And over the past year, has the District Development Assembly's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change?	0.125	1. Improved a lot 2. Improved a little 3. No change	5 5 missing

Indicator	Overall Weight	Variables	Var weight	Values	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
				4. Worsened a little	1
				5. Worsened a lot	1
		(Filtered) Q13b. How much confidence do you have in your Community Development Council?	0.125	1. A lot of confidence	5
				2. Some confidence	5
				3. Not much confidence	1
				4. No confidence at all	1
		(Filtered) Q13c. How responsive do you think your Community Development Council is to the needs of the local people in this area?	0.125	1. Very responsive	5
				2. Somewhat responsive	5
				3. Somewhat unresponsive	1
				4. Very unresponsive	1
		(Filtered) Q13d. And over the past year, has the Community Development Council's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change?	0.125	1. Improved a lot	5
				2. Improved a little	5
				3. No change	missing
				4. Worsened a little	1
				5. Worsened a lot	1
		Q14a-g. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion. (Averaged)	1.500		
		Q14a.		1. The District Government officials in this district are from this district.	5
				2. The District Government officials in this district are <b>not</b> from this district.	1

	Indicator	Overall Weight	Variables	Var weight	Values	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			Q14b.		1. The District Government understands the problems of people in this area.	5
					2. The District Government does not understand the problems of people in this area.	1
			Q14c.		1. The District Government cares about the people in this area.	5
					2. The District Government does not care about the people in this area.	1
			Q14d.		1. District Government officials in this district abuse their authority to make money for themselves.	1
					2. District Government officials in this district do not abuse their authority to make money for themselves.	5
			Q14e.		1. District Government officials visit this area.	5
					2. District Government officials do not visit this area.	1
			Q14f.		1. In general, the District Government officials are doing their jobs honestly.	5
					2. In general, the District Government officials are not doing their jobs honestly.	1
			Q14g.		1. The District Government delivers basic services to this area in a fair manner.	5
					2. The District Government <b>does not</b> deliver basic services to this area in a fair manner.	1

	Indicator	Overall Weight	Variables	Var weight	Values	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
4	7d. Percent of Afghans reporting that their quality of life has changed for the better	0.75				
			Q26. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?	0.750	1. Very satisfied	5
					2. Somewhat satisfied	5
					3. Somewhat dissatisfied	1
					4. Very dissatisfied	1
			Q27. How satisfied are you with your household's current financial situation?	0.750	1. Very satisfied	5
					2. Somewhat satisfied	5
					3. Somewhat dissatisfied	1
					4. Very dissatisfied	1
			Q28. Thinking about the past year, would you say overall that your ability to meet your basic needs increased, decreased, or stayed the same?	0.500	1. Increased a lot	5
					2. Increased a little	5
					3. Stayed the same	missing
					4. Decreased a little	1
					5. Decreased a lot	1
			Q29. How worried are you about being able to meet your basic needs over the next year?	0.500	1. Not worried	5
					2. A little worried	3
					3. Very worried	1
			Q30. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.	1.000	1. The situation in this area is certain enough for me to make plans for my future.	5
					2. The situation in this area is <b>too uncertain</b> for me to make plans for my future.	1

	Indicator	Overall Weight	Variables	Var weight	Values	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			Q2b. Is your local area more secure, about the same, or less secure than it was a year ago?	1.500	1. Much more secure 2. Somewhat more secure 3. About the same 4. Somewhat less secure 5. Much less secure	5 5 missing 1 1
5	7e. Percent of Afghans reporting that resilience has improved in their local area	0.75				
			(Filtered) Q34c. How often are the people here able to solve these problems that come from outside the village?	0.500	1. Often 2. Sometimes 3. Rarely 4. Never	5 4 2 1
			(Filtered) Q35c. How often are the people here able to solve these problems that come from inside the village?	0.375	1. Often 2. Sometimes 3. Rarely 4. Never	5 4 2 1
			Q36. When there is a problem in this area, how often do the villages/neighborhoods in this area work together to solve the problem?	1.000	1. Often 2. Sometimes 3. Rarely 4. Never	5 4 2 1
			Q37a. When decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of ordinary people in the village/neighborhood considered?	0.375	1. Often	5

	Indicator	Overall Weight	Variables	Var weight	Values	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
					2. Sometimes	4
					3. Rarely	2
					4. Never	1
			Q38. How effective or ineffective are your local leaders at securing funds for your village/neighborhood's needs from the district and/or provincial government?	0.500	1. Very effective	5
					2. Somewhat effective	5
					3. Somewhat ineffective	1
					4. Very ineffective	1
			Q39a. Do you belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss issues of common interest or to do certain activities together?	0.250	1. "Yes"	5
					2. "No"	1
			Q9. How much confidence do you have in your <i>[Insert Position/Organization]</i> ?		1. A lot of confidence	5
			a) District Governor	0.250	2. Some confidence	5
			b) District Government	0.250	3. Not much confidence	1
			c) Local village/neighborhood leaders	0.250	4. No confidence at all	1
			d) Provincial Governor	0.250		
			Q10. How responsive do you think your <i>[Insert Item]</i> is/are to the needs of the local people in this area?		1. Very responsive	5
			a) District Governor	0.250	2. Somewhat responsive	5
			b) District Government	0.250	3. Somewhat unresponsive	1
			c) Local village/neighborhood leaders	0.250	4. Very unresponsive	1
			d) Provincial Governor	0.250		
6	7.2.1c. Percent of Afghans reporting improved GIROA-delivery of basic services	0.75				

	Indicator	Overall Weight	Variables	Var weight	Values	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			Q15. Overall, do you think that services from the government in this area have improved, worsened, or not changed in the past year?	5.000	1. Improved a lot 2. Improved a little 3. Not changed 4. Worsened a little 5. Worsened a lot	5 5 missing 1 1
7	7.2.1d. Percent of Afghans reporting corruption in their local government	0.25				
			Q23. Is corruption a problem in this area, or not?	5.000	1. Yes 2. "No"	1 5
8	Presence of Armed Opposition Groups	0.50	Q.6.1d. How would you rate the presence of [Insert item] in your area? Armed Opposition Groups	5.000	1. A lot 2. Some 3. None	1 3 5
	<b>Total weight</b>	5.00				
<b>Component B. Area Control (0.10% of Stability Index) (observation by survey enumerators)</b>						
	<b>Area Control (M-36)</b>		ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby; no Taliban activity or presence has been reported		1	5
			ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby; some Taliban activity or presence has been reported, especially at night		2	4
			ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby but do not move freely at night; village administrators usually do not sleep in their homes, and Taliban activity takes place regularly		3	2

	Indicator	Overall Weight	Variables	Var weight	Values	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			Taliban forces are permanently based in this village or nearby and operate freely; ISAF or Afghan security forces may visit the village on occasion but do not stay		4	1
			Taliban forces are permanently based in this village or nearby and operate freely; no ISAF or Afghan security force presence or activity at all		5	1
			Local arbaki control this village; minimal Taliban, ISAF, or Afghan security force presence at all		6	4
			There are no ISAF, Taliban, Afghan security forces, or arbaki controlling this village		7	5
<b>Component C. ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (0.10% of Stability Index)</b>						
	<b>ACSOR Accessibility Tracker</b>		Completely safe		1	5
			Safe		2	4
			Somewhat safe but sometimes problems. Women enumerators can work here.		3	3
			Unsafe. Women enumerators cannot work here.		4	2
			Totally unsafe. Inaccessible.		5	1
<b>Component D. Security Incidents Score (0.05% of Stability Index)</b>						
	<b>Security Incidents</b>		Security incidents (May-Aug 2013)		0-10	5
					11-25	4
					26-50	3
					51-100	2
					101-150	1