EVALUATION

Performance Evaluation of USAID Electoral Assistance to Kenya from January 2008–August 2013

June 2014

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EVALUATION OF USAID ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE TO KENYA

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GLOSSARY

Performance evaluation: focuses on descriptive and normative questions: what a particular project or program has achieved (either at an intermediate point in execution or at the conclusion of an implementation period); how it is being implemented; how it is perceived and valued; whether expected results are occurring; and other questions that are pertinent to program design, management and operational decision making. Performance evaluations often incorporate before-after comparisons, but generally lack a rigorously defined counterfactual.

Theory of change: A tool to design and evaluate social change initiatives. It is a blueprint of the building blocks needed to achieve long-term goals of a social change initiative.

Development Hypothesis: Identifies causal linkages between USAID actions and the intended Strategic Objective (highest level result).

Findings: Empirical facts collected during the evaluation.

Conclusions: Interpretations and judgments based on the findings.

Recommendations: Proposed actions for management.

ACRONYMS

ACHPR	African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
AMWIK	Association of Media Women in Kenya
AU	African Union
BVR	Biometric Voter Registration
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CEPPS	Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIPEV	Commission of Inquiry into Post Elections Violence
COR	Contract Officer Representative
CORD	Coalition for Reform and Democracy
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DFID	Department for International Development
DO	Development Objective
DRG	Democracy, Rights and Governance
EAP	Election Assistance Programme
ECK	Electoral Commission of Kenya
ED	Executive Director
EDR	Election Dispute Resolution
ELOG	Elections Observation Group
EMB	Election Management Body
ESAP	Election Security Arrangement Project
EU	European Union
EU-EOM	European Union Election Observation Mission
EVID	Electronic Voter Identification
FCR	Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations
FIDA	The Federation of Women Lawyers
FY	Fiscal Year
GD	Group Discussion
GI	Group Interview
GOK	Government of Kenya
ICC	International Criminal Court

ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IDLO	International Development Law Organization
IEBC	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IIEC	Interim Independent Electoral Commission
IP	Implementing Partner
IPYF	Inter Party Youth Forum
IR	Intermediate Result
IREC	Independent Review Commission on the General Elections (Kriegler Commission)
IRI	International Republican Institute
JWCEP	Judiciary Working Committee on Elections Preparations
KEPPS	Kenya Elections and Political Process Strengthening
KII	Key Informant Interview
LCA	Leadership Campaign Academy
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCK	Media Council of Kenya
MSI	Management Systems International
NDI	National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
NPS	National Police Service
NSC	National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
ORPP	Office of the Registrar of Political Parties
PAD	Project Approval Document
PMP	Performance Management Plan
PNU	Party of National Unity
PPA	Political Parties Act
PPDT	Political Parties Dispute Tribunal
PVT	Parallel Vote Tabulation
RTS	Results Transmission System
SERP	Support to Electoral Reforms and Processes
SOW	Statement of Work
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
TCC	The Carter Center
TI	Transparency International

UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
WTS	Well Told Story

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Evaluation Purpose, Questions and Background

The purpose of this evaluation is to determine the effectiveness of the election assistance provided by USAID/Kenya from January 2008–August 2013. The results of the evaluation are meant to guide USAID in designing future electoral assistance in Kenya and globally. The primary audience for this evaluation is USAID/Kenya and USAID/Washington.

The evaluation addressed six questions:

1. To what degree did USAID's electoral assistance, using the seven identified approaches, contribute to the 2013 elections? These seven approaches are: (i) strengthening the capacity of the election management body (EMB); (ii) election dispute resolution (EDR) and security; (iii) professionalizing political parties; (iv) election observation; (v) civic and voter education; (vi) media engagement; and (vii) participation of marginalized groups.
2. To what extent has U.S. government (USG) electoral assistance strengthened the technical and, where applicable, administrative capacity for delivery and/or reporting of accountable elections in the future of (i) the electoral commission; (ii) major political parties; (iii) domestic monitoring network; (iv) media; and (v) civil society organizations (CSOs) funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)?
3. How appropriate was the mix and timing of activities in addressing the needs identified by both past and ongoing evidence?
4. To what extent did USAID coordinate with other donors to maximize the leverage of USG resources and funds?
5. To what extent were the electoral assistance activities effective in promoting participation by women and youth?
6. What are some lessons that can inform the design of future electoral assistance projects both in Kenya and globally?

During the 2007 elections, controversies over the voter register and the tallying, transmission and announcement of results catalyzed the post-election violence and humanitarian crisis. The violence came to an end and an independent review commission gave numerous recommendations. In response to the recommendations, many key changes in the legal framework and structure of the government of Kenya (GOK) were implemented.

To respond to the challenges identified, USAID/Kenya designed an electoral assistance program whose development objective is "democratic and inclusive reform agenda advanced" and the fifth intermediate result (IR) is "free, fair, credible and peaceful elections held."[1]

[1] PAD, p. 12.

Evaluation Design, Methods and Limitations

The evaluation incorporated a desk review of key documentation, key informant interviews, group discussions/interviews and site visits. Data was collected using semi-structured interview tools that were approved by USAID. The team used multiple analysis methods to arrive at conclusions and recommendations. In using a mixed-methods approach, data collected from the various methods has been integrated to arrive at key "triangulated" findings. As a meta-evaluation, the purpose is to examine USAID's assistance broadly and to propose recommendations for the design of future electoral assistance based on the data collected, evaluator knowledge of best practices and standards, and learning that has taken place. The evaluation is not designed to look at individual activities in detail.

Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

The evaluation questions are the following:[2]

1. To what degree did USAID's electoral assistance, using the seven identified approaches, contribute to the 2013 elections? These seven approaches are: (i) strengthening the capacity of the election management body (EMB); (ii) election dispute resolution (EDR) and security; (iii) professionalizing political parties; (iv) election observation; (v) civic and voter education; (vi) media engagement; and (vii) participation of marginalized groups.
2. To what extent has U.S. government (USG) electoral assistance strengthened the technical and, where applicable, administrative capacity for delivery and/or reporting of accountable elections in the future of (i) the electoral commission; (ii) major political parties; (iii) domestic monitoring network; (iv) media; and (v) civil society organizations (CSOs) funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)?
3. How appropriate was the mix and timing of activities in addressing the needs identified by both past and ongoing evidence?
4. To what extent did USAID coordinate with other donors to maximize the leverage of USG resources and funds?
5. To what extent were the electoral assistance activities effective in promoting participation by women and youth?
6. What are some lessons that can inform the design of future electoral assistance projects both in Kenya and globally?

QUESTION 1: CONTRIBUTION OF USAID

Findings: USAID contributed approximately US $41 million for the 2008–13 electoral cycle, more than 50 percent that of the next largest donor. Partners appreciated the flexibility of USAID's assistance. USAID's results framework for elections does not contain indicators for measuring progress so USAID's contribution is measured mostly in perceptions of those implementing or beneficiaries of USAID assistance. *Conclusion*: USAID made a significant financial contribution to the elections and implementing partners (IPs) appreciated the flexibility of USAID's support; however, there were not adequate systems in place to measure program contribution. *Recommendation*: USAID should ensure that the results

[2] USAID asked for the six questions to be repeated here and granted extra space for the executive summary for this addition.

framework for electoral assistance is up to date and communicated to partners. USAID should share monitoring and evaluation (M&E) metrics that appropriately reflect the higher-level program goals and design and ensure that partner M&E plans align.

Capacity of EMB: *Findings:* USAID provided approximately 25 percent of the donor support to the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). Support was aimed at capacity building of the EMB, but support shifted away from capacity-building toward technical assistance and crisis management. Other donors and partners credited USAID with flexibility in this approach and for bringing expertise and guidance to the table. *Conclusion:* The USAID financial and technical contribution to this approach was significant. Long-term capacity building of the IEBC is now urgently needed. *Recommendations:* The donor community should provide targeted, sustained capacity-building support to IEBC.

EDR and Security: *Findings*: EDR - The peaceful resolution of election disputes were a "major success of the 2013 Kenyan elections." The relative financial contribution of USAID vis-à-vis other donors could not be ascertained, but USAID was one of the donors providing electoral judiciary support. USAID support highlighted that the IEBC and Political Parties Dispute Tribunal (PPDT) have concurrent jurisdiction to resolve disputes over party nominations. Security - USAID's assistance responded to a funding gap identified late due to lack of GOK funding. All USAID funding for security was through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)-managed basket fund's joint Election Security Arrangement Project (ESAP). The activity was credited by its own staff and police as contributing to law and order on election day. *Conclusions:* The PPDT is not a fully functioning body. International donor support was essential to the judiciary's success in resolving election disputes in 2013. USAID funding, through the basket fund, contributed to law and order during the elections. *Recommendations:* Donor assistance should prioritize a full review of legal framework for elections and formal and regular risk analyses.

Political Parties: *Findings:* USAID, through the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), was the largest contributor to political party programming. A new legal framework was developed before the 2013 national election. Party participants in the evaluation cited NDI contributions, inter alia as: development of secretariats and party manifestos, peaceful elections, budgeting, engaging the media and the public, and helping candidates identify their political base. *Conclusions:* USAID contributed to professionalization of political parties. Compliance with the new legal framework is important to the institutionalization of political parties, but behavioral change will take time. *Recommendations:* USAID should continue to support political parties with an emphasis on adherence to the constitution and the overall legal framework and enhancing internal party democracy.

Observation: *Findings:* USAID contributed approximately 41 percent of the total donor-funded election observation support. Four expert groups noted positive contributions by the Elections Observation Group (ELOG), such as subtly helping to direct public perception of the credibility of elections. Beneficiaries noted the symbolic presence of international observers — the idea that someone was "watching." Donors commended the election day "command center" set up in the U.S. Embassy for effective election monitoring and process coordination. *Conclusions:* International donors effectively engaged domestic observers for the elections and ELOG contributed to the credibility of the process. International observers had a symbolic presence. The US Embassy command center contributed to effective international collaboration and coordination. *Recommendations:* Donors should consider developing a compendium of electoral reform recommendations, drawing on recognized election observation reports, technical reports, evaluations, etc. from the last electoral cycle.

Civic and Voter Education: *Findings:* IEBC was to conduct voter education, but donors stepped in to provide support. USAID contributed 43 percent of the funding for this approach. Beneficiaries and partners felt that USAID did apply a multi-pronged approach to reach as many citizens as possible, but that it did not reach far enough into the grassroots and needs to be continuous. *Conclusions:* IEBC planning for civic/ voter education was insufficient. The design considered best practice, and its mixed

methods were effective for reaching different target groups, but did not reach the grassroots. *Recommendations:* Future donor support to IEBC should prioritize developing its voter education capacity. In addition to other resources, donors should draw lessons from available civic education assessments in Kenya to inform the design of future civic and voter education programming.

Media: *Findings:* USAID contributed approximately 41 percent of the funding for media engagement, through NDI and Internews. A variety of respondents felt that the media played a positive role compared with 2007. However, there was a sense that the media censored itself too much to keep the peace, and this compromised the quality of reporting. *Conclusions:* USAID helped the media to prepare for elections and to play a positive and central role in mitigating violence. At the same time, the media did not provide adequate news coverage of the elections. *Recommendations:* Donors should continue to build the capacity of the media to play a positive role in elections, with a focus on striking the balance between ethical and robust reporting.

Marginalized Groups: *Findings:* The relative financial contribution of USAID vis-à-vis other donors could not be ascertained. Ten of 21 groups felt that women and youth were encouraged to participate actively in 2013 elections. USAID and IPs noted that women were not adequately prioritized during program design. Party executive directors noted that parties were not ready in 2013 for the two-thirds constitutional gender requirement and did not have time or resources to effectively engage women and youth. IEBC outreach to marginalized groups was roundly considered late and short. *Conclusions:* USAID did not prioritize women during program design, but it did contribute to an improved legal framework that provides a basis for democratic reform. Implementation of affirmative action and equality is lagging. Parties need sustained support to comply with the new constitutional and legal framework. *Recommendations:* USAID should update its results framework to ensure that support to marginalized groups is adequately incorporated.

QUESTION 2: CAPACITY STRENGTHENING

EMB: *Findings:* There was little time before the 2013 elections for IEBC capacity-building. Five of 19 beneficiary groups think IEBC is least prepared for future elections, in comparison to other institutions (second to political parties). Best practice requires sustained engagement to build capacity, particularly in a post-conflict environment. *Conclusions:* There was not an opportunity for genuine capacity-building of IEBC prior to the 2013 elections. The IEBC structure needs to be reviewed and IEBC needs broad capacity-building support to fulfill its technical responsibilities and administrative functions. *Recommendations:* USAID and other donors should focus on IEBC capacity between elections. USAID should conduct a needs assessment to identify/validate priority areas for support.

Political Parties: *Findings:* Twelve of 19 groups identified parties as the least prepared institution for future elections. Two of four party trainee groups recommended more follow-up by the party leadership and requested that NDI monitor whether learned skills are being used. Best practice shows the time to build institutional capacity is between elections. *Conclusions:* Parties need sustained support to become institutionalized and this requires close monitoring. *Recommendations:* USAID should sustain its efforts to strengthen political parties generally, with a renewed focus on inclusion of marginalized populations. There should be a well-developed and clear framework for measuring program implementation.

Domestic Monitoring: *Findings:* ELOG's Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) produced results largely consistent with the IEBC. Members signed a declaration of neutrality and nonpartisanship. The external evaluation of ELOG made recommendations about ELOG's capacity related to public relations/media engagement, membership, fundraising/financing, information-sharing, triangulation of data, capacity-building/retention of expertise, and accountability. *Conclusions:* ELOG is developing a sustainable approach to election observation. ELOG's overall professionalism can be further upgraded. *Recommendations:* USAID should continue to provide modest support to ELOG through the next

electoral cycle to continue developing its institutional methodology and independence.

Media: *Findings:* Ten out of 19 groups felt media was most prepared institution for future elections. Various groups felt that media censored itself to the detriment of quality news coverage. International donors felt that the media and other players were "neglected" by donors. *Conclusions:* There is a perception that media capacity to report on elections has improved in a short period. Further support is needed to continue to build the media's capacity to provide professional, objective coverage. *Recommendations:* Donors and media management should focus on professional development of news and editorial staff to achieve a balance between ethical and robust reporting.

Civil Society: *Findings:* Twelve of 21 beneficiary groups, IEBC Secretariat and IPs recommended continuous civic education. IPs highlighted the "devastating effect" that would result from curtailed donor support and noted time/resource constraints to reach the grassroots. *Conclusions*: Civil society is heavily dependent on external funding for civic and voter education. There is an acute need for sustained civic education and expanded voter education to enhance pubic understanding of their civil and political rights and responsibilities. *Recommendations:* USAID and other donors should prioritize ongoing support to civil society to conduct civic education. Donor support to IEBC should include capacity-building to deliver quality voter education.

QUESTION 3: MIX AND TIMING

Findings: IPs and donors commended USAID's flexibility in providing partners with the required resources in a fast-changing context. Some groups felt there was too much emphasis given to IEBC. Sixteen groups indicated that timing was too limited for a comprehensive rollout. *Conclusions:* Timing was scarce for all organizations working toward the 2013 Kenya elections. USAID's flexible program design allowed it to respond to emerging needs and deliver a broad mix of programming that responded to emerging needs. *Recommendations***:** Electoral programming should be designed with the entire electoral cycle in mind. Now is the time to build institutions and consolidate and capitalize on the gains made in the previous cycle. Donors should balance support across the range of election players.

QUESTION 4: DONOR COORDINATION

Findings: Donors and partners felt the basket fund mechanism for support to IEBC worked well for coordination of technical and political messaging. The basket fund was a sub-set of the Elections Donor Group. On the downside, international donors felt that the donor basket compromised bilateral dialogue with the IEBC and that some election players (e.g. civil society, news media) did not receive enough support. Donors and IPs identified efforts to incorporate lessons from the past into program design and implementation. C*onclusions:* Donor coordination for the 2013 elections was effective overall. It was well informed by lessons learned from the previous election cycle. The donor basket was an effective way to channel support to the IEBC and for coordinating. *Recommendations:* USAID should explore donor coordination for elections in Kenya as a model for other program sectors in Kenya and for other countries. Donor coordination for elections should resume.

QUESTION 5: PARTICIPATION BY WOMEN AND YOUTH

Findings: USAID and partners acknowledged that the peace agenda drove program design, and consequently youth received much more targeted attention than women. USAID, political party trainees and political party executive directors were positive about the gains made with youth. Inter Party Youth Forum (IPYF) participants noted that the training had a big impact on youth awareness of their rights and how to positively contribute to the political process. Some of the most striking examples of this were in the Coast area, where youth have been vulnerable to extremist forces. Female party trainees were positive about the training content, but often felt it came late. UNDP and NDI provided sex-disaggregated figures in their reporting (though in the NDI reports the data was not aggregated across fiscal year or activities). Other IPs did not provide disaggregated data. *Conclusions:* USAID programming before the elections 2013 did not prioritize women. A sustained investment is required to realize the

aspirations of the constitution and of donor support for marginalized populations. There is a need for continuous civic education to encourage marginalized groups to vie as candidates and participate as voters. Meaningful indicators are needed to track the effectiveness of targeted interventions. *Recommendations:* Donors should continue to invest in women and youth through the party structure and through targeted civic and voter education initiatives. Party support should include compliance with the constitutional and legal framework and internal party democracy. Donors should consider the 2013 Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) gender audit as one source in designing future electoral assistance. Presumably, findings from the MSI conflict evaluation would also be useful in informing future program design in this area. USAID should establish/update crosscutting results frameworks for women and youth where possible.

QUESTION 6: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Recommendations (Kenya)

USAID and other donors should take an electoral cycle approach to programming in Kenya. In basic terms, this means planning electoral assistance within the broader framework of democratic governance rather than taking an event-driven approach to support.

Donor support should recognize Kenya as a post-conflict environment. Peace is fragile in Kenya. The 2013 election was not free from violence; major institutions such as the IEBC, judiciary, political parties and the security sector have not yet been institutionalized; the legal framework is new and needs refinement; and many interlocutors for this evaluation pointed out that the potential triggers of violence (such as tribal-based politics, disaffected youth, economic hardship) remain.

Lessons Learned (Global)

Different contexts require different approaches. This point is not new, but is worth restating. It may need further donor reflection, based on the increasing numbers of elections in conflict and transitional settings globally. Donor needs assessments should consider the political and historic moment into which an election fits and match the interventions, messaging and expectations to these realities.

Donor coordination in Kenya is a model that could work for other sectors and in other countries. The caution is that this requires a heavy investment of time and resources. As such, it is likely a model to be reserved for a conflict or post-conflict setting where resources are plentiful.

USAID should maintain an up-to-date results framework. This is a lesson for other USAID missions beyond Kenya. In addition to maintaining an up-to-date results framework and appropriate monitoring and evaluation metrics, if USAID intends to capture beneficiary perceptions of USAID contribution, it needs to closely monitor partner compliance with branding and marking requirements for trainings and public meetings. USAID will need to consider the practicality of this option, particularly for community-level civic education initiatives.

EVALUATION PURPOSE & EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Evaluation Purpose

This evaluation seeks to determine the effectiveness of the election assistance provided by USAID/Kenya for the Kenyan elections of 2013to help inform USAID/Kenya's strategy for future electoral assistance. The evaluation also identifies practices used by USAID/Kenya that can be adopted for electoral assistance activities in other countries. Given the global trend of reduced USAID funding for election-related assistance, the results of this evaluation will also guide USAID/Kenya in designing future electoral assistance. USAID/ Kenya does not yet have sufficient budget allocation for election support at the moment. However, the Mission indicated plans to increase allocation to support electoral process towards 2016 and reach the peak in 2017 ahead of anticipated 2017 elections. Levels of assistance may be significantly lower than the support towards the preparation for the 2013 elections. The audience for this evaluation is USAID/Kenya and USAID/Washington. The evaluation is also expected to inform the larger donor community in Kenya, and other key actors, including IEBC.[3]

Evaluation Questions

1. To what degree did USAID's electoral assistance, using the seven identified approaches, contribute to the 2013 elections? These seven approaches are: (i) Strengthening the Capacity of the Election Management Body; (ii) Election Dispute Resolution and Security; (iii) Professionalizing Political Parties; (iv) Election Observation; (v) Civic and Voter Education; (vi) Media Engagement; and (vii) Participation of Marginalized Groups.
2. To what extent has USG electoral assistance strengthened the technical and, where applicable, administrative capacity for delivery and/or reporting of accountable elections in the future of (i) the electoral commission; (ii) major political parties; (iii) domestic monitoring network; (iv) media; and (v) civil society organizations funded by USAID?
3. How appropriate was the mix and timing of activities in addressing the needs identified by both past and ongoing evidence?
4. To what extent did USAID coordinate with other donors to maximize the leverage of USG resources and funds?
5. To what extent were the electoral assistance activities effective in promoting participation by women and youth?
6. What are some lessons that can inform the design of future electoral assistance projects both in Kenya and globally?

[3] This sentence was modified slightly in the comments on the draft report, from its original version throughout data collection.

PROJECT BACKGROUND

Development Context

The 2013 presidential and general elections were the first under the new constitution, and the fifth since the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in 1991. While the 1992 and the 1997 general elections were characterized by administrative weaknesses and irregularities, the 2002 elections marked substantial improvements with regard to electoral administration and competitiveness. The now-defunct Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) exhibited high levels of professionalism and institutional independence in the preparation and conduct of the 2002 general elections. Kenyans, therefore, looked toward the 2007 general elections as crucial in consolidating the gains of the 2002 elections to strengthen multiparty democracy.

However, the ECK faced a number of administrative and operational challenges before the 2007 general elections. Controversies undermined public confidence in the ECK and catalyzed the 2007–2008 post-election violence and humanitarian crisis. Areas of contention included key electoral activities, including commissioner appointments; compilation of the register of voters; electioneering campaigns; recruitment and deployment of returning officers4; and tallying, transmission and announcement of results.

The violence ended after the signing of the National Peace Accord on Feb. 28, 2008. A number of commissions were formed to enact comprehensive reforms as part of the National Peace Accord. Key among these was the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections (IREC, also known as the Kriegler Commission) and the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV). The Kriegler Commission concluded in its report (hereafter called the Kriegler Report) that the conduct of the 2007 elections was so materially defective that it was impossible — for IREC or anyone else — to establish true or reliable results for the presidential and parliamentary elections.

IREC determined via a statistical analysis of a sample of constituencies that numerous elementary mistakes were made in tallying and/or transcribing results, in addition to mistakes of omission and duplication. The commission recommended disbandment of the ECK and overhaul of Kenya's electoral system, as well as implementation of an integrated citizen registration system. In response, Kenya established the Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) with a mandate of creating a new voter registry and spearheading electoral reforms and promotion of democracy. The Interim Independent Boundaries Commission (IIBC) formed to address the issues of electoral boundaries.

An ambitious constitutional and legal reform effort saw Kenyans draft a new constitution, which passed through a constitutional referendum on Aug. 4, 2010, and became official Aug. 27. The constitution encompassed most of the Kriegler Commission's recommendations, including introduction of fundamental reforms to the electoral system and processes in Kenya. Article 81 of the constitution reiterates the principles of free and fair elections, including the freedom of citizens to exercise their political rights; gender equality; fair representation of persons with disabilities; universal suffrage and equality of vote; secrecy of the ballot; freedom from violence, intimidation, improper influence or corruption; independence of the body conducting the elections; and transparency and impartiality.

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[4]Returning officers are election officials responsible for all polling, tallying of results and relaying activities within a constituency.

The reforms, as provided for in the constitution, also called for a new independent election management body to conduct elections and delimit constituency boundaries. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), established in 2011, has overseen a broad range of election activities which culminated with the March 4, 2013, general elections.

Given the nation's reform agenda, USAID/Kenya sought to strengthen the organizations and processes necessary for a credible and peaceful election in 2013. It directed its electoral assistance across Kenya through organizations that had national reach, such as Uraia Trust and Well Told Story (WTS). In addition, it worked with state institutions such as the IEBC and the Judiciary Working Committee on Election Preparations (JWCEP).

Program Objectives

The development objective from USAID/Kenya's Democracy and Governance Results Framework, as stated in the 2012 project approval document (PAD), is "democratic and inclusive reform agenda advanced." While the PAD is a 2012 document, USAID noted that it is conceptually appropriate for the period covered by the evaluation (January 2008–August 2013). Under this objective, the fifth IR is "Free, fair, credible and peaceful elections held." This IR is supported by three IR subresults:

- IR 5.1: Electoral administration and institutions strengthened;
- IR 5.2: Conflict mitigation, dispute resolution and response mechanisms strengthened; and
- IR 5.3: Population informed through civic education.

USAID/Kenya provided election assistance with these results in mind. In the short term, the U.S. government anticipated that an independent, efficient and effective electoral management body, coupled with an informed and active civil society and citizenry, would provide a stable environment for conducting free, fair and peaceful elections in 2013. In the long term, the U.S. expects that Kenya's electoral framework and institutions, such as the electoral commission, political parties and a domestic monitoring network, will be able to deliver transparent and accountable future elections. Election assistance was focused on seven approaches. These approaches were:

1. Strengthening the capacity of the election management body;
2. Election dispute resolution and security;
3. Professionalizing political parties;
4. Election observation;
5. Civic and voter education;
6. Media engagement (for balanced and objective media coverage); and
7. Participation of marginalized groups (women, youth).

These approaches were implemented under 10 mechanisms, as shown in Table 1 of Annex I, Section 1.4. A mapping of each approach to the appropriate sub-IR, along with where other donor activities fall in the results framework, is included in Annex IX.

EVALUATION METHODS & LIMITATIONS

Methodology

The evaluation incorporated a desk review of key documentation, key informant interviews, group discussions/interviews and site visits. The process started with a review of documentation provided by USAID on the program, relevant secondary research identified online and financial documentation on parallel election-support efforts to consider other contributions to the elections process. The main data collection period was from Feb. 3–28, 2014. Data was collected using semi-structured tools approved by USAID before data collection.

The evaluation team identified key informants and beneficiary groups based on document review, key contacts provided by USAID and information received from IPs including:

- Six key informant interviews with heads of key institutions and experts involved in USAID-funded election assistance.
- 10 group interviews with members of key institutions, USAID, US Embassy, donors and select IPs.
- 21 group discussions with beneficiary groups such as voter and civic education participants, political party trainees, journalists, women, and domestic election observers.

It was not feasible for the team to visit a representative sample of sites. In addition to Nairobi, the team visited the following counties: Kiambu, Kisumu, Nakuru, Narok, Kisii, Kericho, Mombasa, Kilifi and Kwale. The final selection of counties was a purposeful sample allowing the team to consider factors such as urban and rural population; political dynamic (e.g. winners and losers of 2013 elections); areas of special interest for USAID/Kenya; concentration of USAID-funded activities; and level of beneficiary exposure to the program. A list of sources for the desk review is included as Annex IV. The full list of meetings conducted as part of data collection is included as Annex VIII.

The team used multiple analysis methods to arrive at conclusions and recommendations. They included: comparison of intended/best practice achievements vs. actual outcomes; descriptive statistics when relating frequency and characteristics of findings; content, pattern and trend analysis to identify themes emerging from data collection and document review exercises; and response convergence/divergence analysis to determine where varied stakeholders and beneficiaries exhibit significant different responses. A mixed-methods approach integrates data from the various methods to arrive at "triangulated" findings.

There were two modifications to the original task order. The first was to amend the start date from January 14 to January 2, to allow consultants to begin desk review. The second was to extend the date of the task order because team members came later than planned, due to contracting delays.

Limitations

There are limitations to the evaluation, both in its design and challenges encountered. The purpose of a meta-evaluation is to examine USAID's assistance broadly and to propose recommendations for the design of future electoral assistance based on the data collected and evaluator knowledge of best practices and standards[5] and learning that has taken place. The evaluation is not designed to look at individual activities in detail. The findings, conclusions and recommendations need to be considered in this light. Further, while the evaluation period spans more than five years beginning in 2008, USAID provided the bulk of its assistance in 2012–13; hence the beneficiaries, evaluation instruments and results are oriented this way.

An important limitation is that there is no consensus on a development hypothesis/theory of change for all approaches or IPs covered by the evaluation, and the USAID results framework for election assistance[6] does not contain results indicators. Thus, it is not possible to accurately measure the effectiveness of USAID assistance. The evaluation team relied instead on descriptive information and perception data regarding outcome-level results.

Generally, IPs were helpful in providing beneficiary lists and requested activity data. However, the team faced considerable challenges in obtaining, deciphering and confirming beneficiary data for some partners. Some delays resulted from data privacy concerns and the team worked with partners to resolve these. In other cases, partners were unable to provide timely responses to team queries, or lacked beneficiaries in target counties. The result was that beneficiaries for WTS, IEBC voter educators and, in particular, United Nations Women (UNWomen) were not part of data collection to the extent intended, though secondary data for UNWomen was reviewed and included in the analysis. There were also instances of confirmed group discussion participants who canceled late or did not attend, and replacements could not be identified on short notice.

Other limitations included the reliance on perception in the group discussions, the small number of women available for discussions on women/ gender-focused activities, and the lack of awareness of beneficiaries who were identified through IP contact lists that USAID had funded the activities, in which case it was not possible to confirm perceptions of contribution.

Since this evaluation covered all partners in the sub-sector (elections), finding evaluation team members with no connection (and therefore no perceived conflict of interest) was difficult. Two evaluation team members had some connection to implementing partners, which was disclosed to USAID on Sep. 19 and 24, 2014. A paragraph in the SOW explains how MSI would handle these issues. Kenyan expert Thomas Maosa was designated as the lead for interviews and communications with IFES, with whom both international experts had previously worked. Evaluators also included MSI Kenya in correspondence with implementers.

A more detailed limitations section can be found in Annex II.

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[5] International standards for elections are set forth in various international, regional and U.N. declarations and conventions on human rights and other relevant legal documents. Best practice in elections refers to practices relating to the administration of an election that, by the extent of their use in international electoral processes, are recognized as ensuring that international standards can be achieved. This evaluation uses the terms "best practice" and "good practice" to refer to lessons for electoral assistance and programming.

[6] USAID 2012 Results Framework, IR 5.0 "Free, fair, credible and peaceful elections held."

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Question 1

Question 1: To what degree did USAID's electoral assistance, using the seven identified approaches, contribute to the 2013 elections? These seven approaches are: (i) Strengthening the Capacity of the Election Management Body; (ii) Election Dispute Resolution and Security; (iii) Professionalizing Political Parties; (iv) Election Observation; (v) Civic and Voter Education; (vi) Media Engagement; and (vii) Participation of Marginalized Groups.

Contribution Across Seven Approaches

FINDINGS

From 2011–13, the international donor community contributed approximately US $107 million to the elections, roughly 10 percent of the total elections cost. USAID's contribution for 2011–13 was approximately US $35 million; for the 2008–13 electoral cycle it was approximately US $41 million.

TABLE 1: KENYA ELECTIONS DONOR FUNDING, 2011–2013 ($)



Source: Donor matrix, February 2013

Table 1 above shows that USAID's financial contribution for 2011–13 was at least 50 percent more than the next largest donor.[7] USAID/Kenya's 2011 Performance Management Plan (PMP) Update and Data Quality Assessment: Objective 6 Democracy and Governance is clear; it contains indicators for measuring progress of each level of the results framework, but the elections IR (free, fair, credible and peaceful elections held) had not yet been added. It was later added to the 2012 results framework, but that framework does not include indicators. Therefore, USAID's elections IR did not have mission-level indicators assigned to it, making outcome--level analysis difficult. USAID partners had little awareness of the 2012 results framework.[8] Each USAID partner had its own results framework, but very few of those results frameworks include outcome-level indicators. See Annex XXVI.

Contribution of the approaches was analyzed through the lens of perception of beneficiaries and experts consulted, as well as from what exists in document review. Information on implementation and design approaches can be found in Annex X. Partners appreciated the flexibility of USAID's assistance and consistent follow-up. For example, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) noted that the mission was heavily engaged on a regular basis, through the Election Donor's Group and regular program meetings, and later through daily involvement of USAID's in-house election experts. IFES observed: "This level of active monitoring on a daily basis allowed the mission to respond quickly to shifting priorities and needs."[9] International Development Law Organization (IDLO) noted that USAID kept close tabs on partners' progress in implementing the activities through regular reporting and partner meetings: "This allowed USAID and its partners to remain strategically flexible to respond to emerging challenges occasioned by the dynamic nature of the pre-and-post election period in Kenya."[10]

One difficulty with looking at the contributions of beneficiaries is that many said they were not aware of USAID funding. In seven of 21 group discussions, beneficiaries (drawn from lists provided by IPs) said they did not know who had funded the activities and that the IPs did not disclose their funding.[11] USAID confirmed that it did not issue any waivers for branding and marking requirements to IPs for USAID-funded trainings and public meetings.

CONCLUSIONS

USAID made a significant financial contribution to the elections and IPs appreciated the flexibility of USAID's support; however, there were not adequate systems in place to measure program contribution.

RECOMMENDATIONS

USAID should ensure that the results framework for electoral assistance is up to date and communicated to partners. USAID should share monitoring and evaluation (M&E) metrics that appropriately reflect the higher-level program goals and design and ensure that partner M&E plans align. If USAID intends to capture beneficiary perceptions of USAID contributions, it will require monitoring of compliance with branding and marking requirements for trainings and public meetings. USAID needs to consider the practicality of this option, particularly for community-level civic education initiatives.

(1)(i) Strengthening the Capacity of the Election Management Body

[7] Donor matrix, February 2013 in Annex XXVI
[8] Partner Validation Workshop (PVW)
[9] IFES email, March 10, 2014
[10] IDLO email, March 11, 2014
[11] GD12, GD16, GD20, GD22,GD 28

FINDINGS

The Kriegler Report discussed the election management body (EMB) during the 2007 elections as a "functioning institution with policies and procedures," but that had not managed to produce a successful election. It suggested that the problems fell within the "structural weaknesses in the relationship between commissioners and the Secretariat" and "the bureaucratic procedures and an unwieldy committee structure."[12] More details of the context of the Interim Independent Election Commission (IIEC) and the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) can be found in Annex XI.

This approach was designed to strengthen electoral administration and institutions; USAID's strategy emphasized strengthening the capacity of the EMB.[13] The UNDP Support to Electoral Reforms and Processes (SERP) evaluation for 2012-13 programming (referred to in this report as *SERP* or *SERP 2)* notes: "IEBC worked in crisis management mode for most of the project. … This made it difficult for the project to provide timely support or a systematic program of development assistance as it focused on helping the IEBC to put out fires and figuring out how to meet immediate needs in order for the IEBC to deliver credible elections." Given the realities, programming shifted away from capacity-building toward technical assistance and crisis management to comply with the constitutionally mandated timeframe and the imperative for a credible and peaceful election. See Annex XI for a discussion of technical assistance provided.

> "Focused support around election time is necessary but not sufficient to deepen accountability systems or strengthen democratic processes. Experience shows that those who support elections in conflict situations must not treat them as "one off" events. If they are to have a sustained, positive impact on the political, social and economic development of the country, they must be seen as embedded in an entire electoral cycle and as part of a much broader process of democratization…"
>
> "Effective election support means taking a long-term perspective, because many of the most important determinants of an election's outcome take place in the years before it occurs."
>
> *DFID Report: Electoral Assistance and Politics: Lessons for International Support, 2010, p.21, 22*

Other donors and partners credited USAID with flexibility in this approach,[14] and bringing expertise and guidance to the table.[15] Good practice requires a sustained investment in electoral reform, particularly in post-conflict settings such as Kenya. See text box.

USAID provided approximately 25 percent of the support to IEBC. USAID funding to the UNDP basket was approximately 10 percent, while USAID funding to IFES was 88 percent.[16] Table 2 shows that USAID was tied as the third-largest donor to the UNDP basket fund.

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[12] Report of the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections Held in Kenya on Dec. 27, 2007, p.35 (hereinafter Kriegler Report)
[13] USAID's Democracy and Governance Assessment and Strategy, May 2011envisioned strengthening the IEBC in all aspects of its work, but particularly in registering voters, overseeing political parties and ensuring that IEBC could run transparent, credible and violence-free elections.
[14] GI7 USAID was flexible and allowed IFES to shift activities from capacity-building to technical assistance. This allowed IFES to radically shift focus; more money added when needed. GI34 There were 15 modifications just in the months before elections, in an effort to be responsive.
[15] GI33 USAID had a lot of electoral experts. The Chief Technical Advisor for the UNDP project said this was the first time there were so many technical experts. People like Mike Yard [IFES] were a resource to IEBC and to the international community. USAD had deployment capacity. Kenyan constitution borrowed a lot of from US. US gave a lot [to] UNDP project steering committee on how to better engage with IEBC.
[16] Donor matrix, February 2013 in Annex XXVI

TABLE 2: BREAKDOWN OF DONOR FUNDING TO THE BASKET FUND



CONCLUSIONS

USAID financial contribution to this approach and its ability to deploy technical expertise were significant. The circumstances did not allow for focused capacity-building of the IEBC (the original aim) so the focus instead shifted to technical assistance, without which the election may not have been possible. Long-term capacity-building of the IEBC is urgently needed before future elections.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The donor community should provide targeted, sustained capacity-building support to IEBC in preparation for future electoral events, including periodic by-elections and possible referenda before the scheduled 2017 national elections. This support should take an electoral cycle approach and include the development of IEBC staff, systems and processes. USAID should use its comparative advantage (gained through partners) and its own in-house expertise to identify priority areas for capacity-building and initiate these activities as soon as possible. This should begin with a proper needs assessment to identify and validate priority areas for support, particularly given the likely reduction in funding for future election support. This assessment can build on the internal review process that the IEBC has undertaken.

(1)(ii) Election Dispute Resolution and Security

ELECTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION

FINDINGS

The capacity to deal with electoral disputes is central to the public's perception of the credibility of elections. Kenya's new legal framework is complex and involves multiple institutions involved in this process. Disputes are broadly divided into two categories: (1) those arising during the party nominations and before the announcement of results and (2) those subsequent to the announcement of results and election petitions. The Constitution and the IEBC Act confer responsibility on IEBC to resolve the first

category of disputes. However, the Political Parties Act (PPA) can be read to confer power to the PPDT to settle disputes arising from party nominations. This creates an issue of current jurisdiction, as pointed out in the PPDT strategic plan,[17] which IFES helped PPDT to develop. Reportedly, the IEBC resolved the majority of disputes that arose from party nominations. The PPDT has received limited technical and financial support and is reportedly not well known to political parties.[18]

The relative financial contribution of USAID vis-à-vis other donors could not be ascertained because Election Dispute Resolution (EDR) was not tracked separately in the donor matrix. Support to the judiciary was not originally envisioned as part of donor support for the elections, but this need became evident through other, ongoing support to the judiciary.[19] IDLO noted that most USAID development partners "went beyond the call of duty" to support the judiciary. IDLO singled out USAID's flexibility in responding and the assistance of both USAID and Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) in mobilizing additional donor support. JWCEP reported that its processes have been documented and identified gaps are being addressed for future elections; they noted that many of the skills they acquired have been transferred to other parts of the judiciary.[20]

Some of the strongest findings on EDR related to support to the judiciary to manage election petitions. According to best practice, an independent, professional judiciary capable of quickly resolving electoral disputes is important to public confidence in the election results and the electoral process broadly.[21] The Kriegler Report recommended a special court with final jurisdiction on EDR. There has been a major overhaul of the Kenyan judiciary since it was discredited following the 2007 elections.[22]

Final reports from TCC, the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) Election Observation Mission note the judiciary's improved capacity to deal with election petitions. TCC's election observation report acknowledges a sound legal framework for elections as a major achievement, citing court petitions by losing candidates (contrary to violence in 2007) as an indication of the public's trust of the legal mechanisms. The EU report noted that "the reforms implemented since 2007 to make Kenyan courts more independent were absolutely vital to the major success of the 2013 Kenyan elections, which was the peaceful resolution of electoral disputes."[23] The International Republican Institute (IRI) noted in congressional testimony: "Five years on and Kenya has a judiciary that is on the path to reform. … Deliberations were swift and decisions respected. Reforms must continue, however, through continued support by the government."[24] JWCEP has an open mandate and does not yet have a strategy for transitioning to the next electoral cycle.

CONCLUSIONS

Given a lack of funding and the issue of concurrent jurisdiction with IEBC to resolve disputes arising from nominations, the PPDT is not a fully functioning body as envisioned in the PPA. International donor

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[17] PPDT Strategic Plan 2013-18, p. 10
[18] KII5, GI3, GI7, PVW
[19] GI17
[20] KII8

[21] The Department for International Development (DFID) report notes that the absence of a genuinely independent and timely judicial process was a significant factor in post-election violence in Kenya in 2007. DFID Report: Electoral Assistance and Politics: Lessons for International Support, 2010, p. 25
[22] The judiciary was accused of failing to effectively administer justice, check impunity, and remain politically independent in 2007.
[23] European Union Election Observation Mission to Kenya: General Election 2013 Final Report, p.2 (EU EOM)
[24] IRI congressional testimony, April 16, 2013, http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-kenyas-2013-elections-effective-assistance-model

support organizations were essential to the judiciary's success in resolving election disputes in 2013. USAID was the significant technical and financial contributor to this effort. The judiciary needs continued assistance to develop capacity to manage electoral disputes.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Donor assistance should prioritize a full review of legal framework for elections. Given the significant contribution that USAID (through IFES and NDI) and International IDEA have already made to the legal framework and the institutions directly involved, they should consider collaborating on a legal review, engaging Kenyan experts where possible. The legal framework may need to be amended to clarify the jurisdiction of the PPDT with respect to disputes arising from party nominations. The judiciary should integrate EDR into its technical and financial planning. Donor support to the judiciary should consider how to best complement available Kenyan resources. Besides well-qualified judges, an effective EDR process requires political skill, information and communications technology, and sound legal research.

SECURITY

FINDINGS

A key lesson from 2007 is the importance of regular risk analysis to determine what is actually at stake in a particular election, while avoiding assumptions based on previous peaceful elections.[25] The USAID 2013 rapid assessment review of support for the Kenyan elections recommends that missions planning for elections should consider an electoral security assessment if there are concerns about violence.[26] The USAID Best Practices in Electoral Security document contains an electoral cycle approach to security considerations and planning.[27]

According to USAID, the need for an electoral security activity for the 2013 elections emerged from the joint USAID–Department of State expert consultation and reporting process that began in the spring of 2012. The Election Security Arrangement Project (ESAP), launched shortly before elections, was designed to respond to this need and fill a gap in anticipated GOK funding for electoral security.[28] US $1.9 million out of US $37 million total to the basket fund was allocated for security. It marked the first time that the security sector was formally brought into the election planning process.[29] The activity was designed to define the roles of security services and for the services to actively participate in national, subnational and local-level electoral coordinating bodies, maximizing intragovernmental cooperation in line with recommendations that emerged from the 2009 colloquium on African elections in Ghana.[30] The police reported that the Kenyan government did not have the funds for electoral security and donor funding was imperative; without donor support, the activity would not have been feasible and the police would not have been prepared to play their key role in security.

According to self-reports, the training enabled police to identify election offenses and prepared them to escort the results for tallying purposes and IEBC was better able to resolve disputes. At the same time,

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[25] DFID Report: "Electoral Assistance and Politics: Lessons for International Support," 2010, p. 18
[26] USAID Support for Kenya's 2013 Elections: Rapid Assessment Review, p. 7.
[27] http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2496/Electoral_Security_Best_Practices_USAID.pdf
[28] GI34
[29] GI2
[30] Final Report, Colloquium on African Elections: Best Practices and Cross-Sectoral Collaboration, Accra, Ghana, 2009. According to the report, these recommendations emerged from experiences and lessons learned in Africa, universal democratic values and practical considerations. They are opinions, and not necessarily endorsed by the conveners or sponsors of the event.

SERP 2 program reporting notes that in some areas, police officers were perceived to be compromised, unwilling to act and susceptible to bribes.[31] More police perceptions of the activity are in Annex XII. UNDP is planning an evaluation of ESAP in the near future. International observer reports about the role of the police were generally positive. TCC noted an appropriate number of security personnel on hand and said they behaved accordingly.[32]

CONCLUSIONS

Though the amount to ESAP is relatively small for all donors, USAID funding, through the basket fund, contributed to law and order during the elections. Peace is fragile in Kenya; careful regulatory, logistical and financial planning for election security is essential for future elections. ESAP is a positive example of interagency cooperation and police preparedness for elections, despite some questions of police integrity.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Donors should work with GOK to encourage government resource allocation for future election security. The donor community should make formal and regular risk analyses part of standard planning for future elections, regardless of GOK plans to fund security. USAID should conduct an election-specific security assessment before the next scheduled election so that it can better plan for gaps in funding and adjust relevant programming and resources (including, e.g. for civic/voter education) accordingly. The forthcoming UNDP ESAP evaluation should include recommendations regarding the timing and scope of election security activities for donor and GOK consideration.

(1)(iii) Professionalization of Political Parties

FINDINGS

The Kriegler Report, election observation reports and sundry other sources identified parties as a source of instability in 2007 elections, noting several breaches of international norms and Kenyan law, and the culture of impunity with which parties operated. For further information on the 2007 context and legal framework, see Annex XIII.

Political party development has been a long-term focus for USAID in Kenya. Support to NDI makes up 81 percent of the funding of this approach; USAID funded approximately 67 percent of NDI. Among other contributions, party executive directors said NDI training assisted in developing party secretariats and developing party manifestoes, or platforms. TCC's election observation report points out access to candidacy, internal party democracy and peaceful campaigns as areas with gaps that would require improvement. [33]

Participants in group discussions believe NDI training contributed to peace in the 2013 electoral cycle and they expressed gratitude for instruction on how to develop an action plan and a budget; utilize the news media; identify a support base; conduct a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats (SWOT) analysis; and how to dress on the campaign trail. Participants noted that their parties tended to nominate the same people for trainings and said donors and IPs should work closely with party

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[31] SERP Progress Report January 2012-December 2013, p. 9

[32] The Carter Center Final Report, Observing Kenya's March 2013 Elections, p. 45

[33] The Carter Center Final Report, Observing Kenya's March 2013 Elections, p. 8

leadership to better track who has been trained. Trainees also said that to assure positive impact, both donors and IPs should follow up on the training.[34] NDI reports that marginalized groups — women and youth in particular — are becoming more involved in party structures, as parties are nationalizing their profiles and their perspectives. While the candidate nomination process was widely considered as chaotic and as having disenfranchised female candidates in particular, party members now possess mechanisms for redress if they are unhappy with the results. NDI believes that parties are working to adhere to the new legal framework resulting from the new constitution and the PPA and Elections Act.[35] See section 2.ii below about parties' interest in continued donor support.

CONCLUSION

USAID long-term technical and financial assistance to political parties contributed to peaceful elections and the professionalization of political parties. Compliance with the new legal framework is important to the institutionalization of political parties. Behavioral change will take time.

RECOMMENDATIONS

USAID should continue to support political parties with an emphasis on adherence to the constitution and the overall legal framework. Party cooperation with the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP) will be important in this regard because the registrar helps parties both comprehend and adhere to the key pieces of legislation. Support should continue to focus on building policy platforms, messaging and communicating to voters from both a national and a regional perspective. Enhancing internal party democracy by including more members of traditional marginalized groups in political party development and local and national campaigns should be emphasized, with a particular focus on women and young people.

Regular monitoring and follow-up of political party training activities by USAID and its IPs is important to assure efficient use of activity funding and meet activity objectives, including improved capacity of political parties. This requires extra effort in the cities and counties outside of Nairobi. Training selection criteria should be clarified to ensure its objectivity and then it should be strictly followed to ensure continued confidence and increased reach in the training.

(1)(iv) Election Observation

FINDINGS

USAID supported approximately 41 percent of the total election observation effort. In four of 18 group discussions (who were not observer groups) that were asked an open-ended question about contributions of the international community, beneficiaries noted that they felt a large presence of observers.[36] A common phrase repeated in beneficiary group discussions was that the symbolic presence of observers showed someone was "watching".

Domestic Observation

Following the 2007 elections in Kenya, the main domestic election observation group was discovered to have significant internal differences, ethnic and political divisions and related challenges. The Kriegler

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[34] GD19, GD26

[35] G13

[36] GD10, GD16, GD18, GD 21

Report recommended the establishment of a permanent domestic observer group representing diverse civil society interests. ELOG was formed in 2010 as a permanent national platform.[37] Drawing on lessons from 2007, donors felt it was useful to separate support for domestic observation and other types of election assistance from that given to IEBC for the 2013 elections. In addition to USAID, numerous donors provided financial support to ELOG. USAID contributed 31 percent of the domestic observation funding. International donors noted that USAID has a bigger profile than other missions for domestic observation.

Two of three domestic observation groups felt they were well trained and used words like "excellent", "empowered" and "very useful" to describe their training[38] According to the ELOG program evaluation, some significant segments of those interviewed said there was insufficient information-sharing about the PVT projections, fueling a perception that there was some secrecy around the PVT.[39] Three of four expert groups that commented on domestic observation noted the mixed quality and mixed public perception of domestic observers in Kenya. All four groups noted positive contributions by ELOG, including: subtly helping to direct public perception of the credibility of elections; having a powerful public voice; the quality of ELOG reports, materials and website; and the professionalism of ELOG relative to other domestic groups.[40] TCC, African Union and the European Union observation reports are favorable about ELOG. TCC noted, "The PVT not only confirmed the IEBC's tally but helped to restore public confidence in the commission after technical difficulties and a lack of transparency created surrounding the tabulation process."[41]

International

Donors noted that the election day "command center" in the U.S. Embassy contributed to effective election monitoring and process coordination. They felt that it was creative and that the USAID had good chemistry with colleagues from other missions.[42] TCC believed that its mission achieved the objective of contributing to the transparency and credibility of the elections and boosting citizen confidence in the process. The TCC report includes clear and extensive recommendations for future elections. TCC reported that it is not aware of Kenyan institutional responses to its report to date. They believe that IEBC is open to the recommendations (in particular about improving logistics, the election calendar and civic education), but noted that implementation will depend on political factors.[43]

CONCLUSION

International donors effectively engaged domestic observers for the 2013 elections, in line with good practice, and ELOG contributed to the credibility of the process. Observers had a symbolic presence and the USAID command center contributed to effective collaboration amongst the international community, and TCC contributed extensive recommendations for future election planning.

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[37] http://www.elog.or.ke/index.php/about-us/history
[38] GD13, GD20
[39] Report of the Programme Evaluation for ELOG-CGD Monitoring and Observing the 2012-2013 Electoral Process: Elections Observation Group-Centre for Governance and Development , December 2013, p.11
[40] KII1, G13, G133, G135
[41] The Carter Center Final Report, Observing Kenya's March 2013 Elections, p. 42.
[42] GI33

[43] GI35

RECOMMENDATIONS

Donors should encourage IEBC to engage with domestic observers as part of IEBC's planned stakeholder consultations as soon as possible. IEBC should consider all major observation reports as part of its internal review and planning exercise. Donors should consider developing a compendium of electoral reform recommendations, drawing on recognized election observation reports, technical reports, evaluations, etc., from the last electoral cycle. This can serve as a valuable reference document for Kenyan election institutions, civil society and the international assistance community.

USAID should continue to provide modest support to ELOG through the next electoral cycle to continue developing its institutional methodology and independence. Considering the shortcomings with the political party nomination period for 2013 elections (see section 2(ii) and Annexes XIII and XVIII regarding the party nomination process), donors should consider deploying some observers to cover the nomination period for the next national election.

(1)(v) Civic and Voter Education

FINDINGS

According to best practice, different types of civil society organizations (international, national and local level) often conduct civic and voter education, requiring long-term support stretching around the electoral cycle.[44] In 2007, a Management Systems International (MSI) impact evaluation of one of the main civic education partners found that its reach was limited; that providers focused on only easily accessible locations; and that civic education was donor-driven. The Kriegler Report recommended long-term investment in civic and voter education.

USAID said that the Kriegler Report influenced its design of civic and voter education activities, while international donors said that an impact evaluation influenced their design.[45] For more key findings on civic education in the impact evaluation and the Kriegler Report, see Annex XIV. USAID's strategy emphasized the importance of civic education over the strategy period to persuade and enable citizens to engage in the political process at all levels and to promote a sense of a national identity that supersedes ethnicity.[46]

USAID, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) and Sweden were the largest financial contributors, each funding more than US $15 million in civic and voter education.[47] USAID contributed 43 percent of the funding for this approach; voter and civic education is the second-largest 2013 elections approach by cost.

According to partner activity documents, donor-funded civic and voter education broadly aimed to cover all 47 counties of Kenya. Most (Uraia Trust, Inuka Trust, IRI, WTS) of the partners funded by USAID under this approach received funding from other donors as well.[48] It is unclear in the partner documents whether partners who received other funding are reporting results under USAID's framework only or whether they duplicate reporting to their other funders. Partner reporting lumped results for all partners into one report.

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[44] DFID UKAid report: Electoral Assistance and Politics: Lessons for International Support, p. 23.
[45] GI33
[46] See USAID Kenya: Democracy and Governance Assessment and Strategy, May 2011. The strategy is in place through the end of Fiscal Year 2015, i.e., through September 2015.
[47] Donor matrix, February 2013in Annex XXVI
[48] Donor matrix, February 2013in Annex XXVI

Five out of 21 beneficiary groups felt that international community efforts influenced levels of participation. USAID-funded activities were mentioned in only two of these.[49] Meanwhile, 12 of 14 groups that discussed the reach of civic education mentioned that civic education did not reach the grassroots.[50] Seven of 21 groups, comprising both civic/ voter education participants and political party trainees, felt that training in hotels was a waste of money, noting the symbolic nature of hotels as not representing a venue that reaches the grassroots, and corruption with hotel vendors.[51] Additionally, three of nine civic/voter education groups mentioned the importance of working through the local leaders, such as village elders, chiefs, religious leaders and commissioners to coordinate programming.[52]

IPs and four beneficiary groups felt that mixed methods of civic and voter education — e.g., TV, radio and roadshows — were important, given varying levels of access to information. Different categories of people preferred different forms of reach.[53] Partner reports showed diversity in civic education topics that included constitutional issues, voter registration, leadership, citizen participation, peace and cohesion, governance, gender and devolution, and others. Outside of donor-funded activities, IPs noted that social media played a role for Diaspora in particular, but cautioned that hate speech spills from the streets into the social media sphere, where it was rampant.[54]

Partners, donors, international observers and the IEBC noted significant technical and financial support that IEBC received for voter education. Partners felt that the IEBC tended to "throw money" at the media houses to enhance the voter education effort, and should have instead convinced media houses that voter education is part of their civic responsibility, then negotiated favorable rates with them. As with voter registration, timing was a factor for voter education before election day and appears be linked to the extra efforts by the international community to fill the gap. USAID, through partners, reportedly reached 10 million Kenyans by redoubling efforts shortly before the elections, when it was clear that the IEBC campaign was not reaching enough people.[55] In the interest of credible and peaceful elections, USAID reported that it felt it had little choice but to do the work on behalf of the IEBC.[56]

CONCLUSION

IEBC did not plan sufficiently for civic and voter education, and the international community had to fill this role. USAID and the international community made a substantial investment in civic and voter education before the 2013 elections to inform the public about the new system of governance and elections. Donor-funded civic and voter education contributed to peaceful elections and better-informed citizens, and USAID-funded activities contributed significantly. The design considered both the Kriegler Report recommendations and best practice. Mixed methods of civic and voter education were effective for reaching different target groups but the programs did not adequately reach the grassroots.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Future donor support to IEBC should prioritize developing its voter education capacity and communications strategy/practices. Donors should draw lessons from available civic education

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[49] GD10, GD14, GD16, GD24, GD28
[50] GD 12, GD15, GD16, GD18, GD19, GD20, GD21,GD22, GD24, GD 25, GD26, GD29
[51] GD12, GD15, GD19, GD21, GD22, GD28, GD31
[52] GD12, GD25, GD28
[53] GD15, GD18, GD25, GD27
[54] GI6

[55] USAID Support for Kenya's 2013 Elections: Rapid Assessment Review, p. 10.
[56] GI34. This remark related to USAID's election assistance in general; it was not limited to civic and voter education support.

assessments in Kenya to inform the design of future civic and voter education programming. Particular attention should be paid to methods and resources to reach specific target groups, monitoring and evaluation, and engaging the government to play its role.

(1)(vi) Media Engagement

FINDINGS

After the 2007 elections, the Media Council of Kenya (MCK) identified challenges with new media, including the prevalence of untrained people practicing as journalists, the corruption of journalists covering elections, and partisan vernacular (local language) FM stations.[57] Among other recommendations, the Kriegler Report suggested developing a media and elections policy with guidelines for verifying data before going on the air, responsibility for announcing accurate results and training journalists on an electoral code of conduct.[58]

USAID contributed approximately 41 percent of the total funding for media engagement. Other contributors to were DFID, CIDA and Denmark; DFID is understood to be the largest single contributor to media support for the elections.[59]

USAID support for media engagement was through NDI to Internews, NDI's subgrantee. USAID was Internews's only donor. An evaluation of the Internews activity was complete in December 2013. The evaluation team met with journalists and editors who participated in the Internews activity. Unfortunately, the MCK — the media regulatory body — did not make itself available for an interview, despite repeated attempts by the evaluation team and USAID.

Civic and voter education IPs, The Association of Media Women in Kenya (AMWIK), international observers and journalists commented about the positive role that the media played, compared to 2007 e.g. in campaigning for peace and following the media code of conduct for elections. There was a sense, however, that the media censored itself too much to keep the peace and possible fear of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and in the process compromised the quality of their reporting. More details about the context of 2007and self-censorship can be found in Annex XV.
Both media groups that participated in the evaluation were very positive about NDI/Internews programming. They felt the training for smaller radio stations was effective and contributed to media deterring violence, and that there was good follow-up support by Internews for developing and posting stories. "That is part of Internews training. I can commend them greatly for that," one journalist observed.[60] One group felt there should have been more trainings.[61]

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[57] Kriegler Report, p. 65
[58] Kriegler Report, p. 73
[59] Donor matrix, February 2013in Annex XXVI
[60] GD11
[61] GD11

CONCLUSION

USAID assistance helped media prepare for elections and play a positive and central role in mitigating violence. However, the media did not provide adequate news coverage of the elections. The media code of conduct, USAID training and the ICC fear factor all contributed to media behavior in 2013.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Donors should continue to build the capacity of the media to play a positive role in elections. This should include a focus on striking the balance between ethical and robust reporting. The media and IEBC should maintain an active relationship in the interest of effective electoral reporting.

(1)(vii) Participation of Marginalized Groups

FINDINGS

According to the Kriegler Report women and young voters (aged 18–30) were significantly under-registered in 2007.[62] Political parties are said to have suffered an endemic lack of equality and equity in the representation of marginalized groups, often using sexist tactics and violence to keep women out of the race. Women also suffered from low status and limited rights. Cultural tradition and preference have afforded young people and women limited opportunities to pursue community leadership positions or engage in political life.[63] The new constitution is designed to remedy some inclusion problems; political parties must now be multi-ethnic and include women, the disabled and youth, who are accorded a set number of seats in all political bodies. For more on the new legal framework, see Annex XVI. USAID had cross-cutting initiatives to support women and youth. USAID attempted to measure participation of women under CEPPS/NDI Indicator 2.1.2 and UNDP output target 5,[64] and used the standard Foreign Assistance Framework indicators to measure results, which informed the PMPs and results frameworks of IPs. USAID and IPs felt that women were not sufficiently prioritized, however.[65]

Beneficiary group discussions yielded both negative and positive comments about the approach toward marginalized groups when asked about the contribution of the international community. The most common positive reflection from 10 of 21 group discussions was that during the 2013 elections, women and youth were encouraged to participate actively, with women and youth mentioned approximately the same number of times by discussion participants. The second-most-common positive response, observed in seven of 21 groups, was that youth and women's gained awareness of the voting process through door-to-door campaigns and civic education forums.

Kenya's new electoral legal framework is in line with its international and regional obligations for the conduct of democratic elections. The evaluation team's review of party manifestos for the two major coalitions — the Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) and Jubilee — reveals that they are generally in line with the Kenyan Constitution's provisions on affirmative action, though specific action is lacking. For more on the new legal framework and party manifestos regarding marginalized groups, see Annex XVI.

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[62] Kriegler Report, p. 15
[63] USAID PAD, p. 5
[64] CEPPS/ NDI indicator 2.1.2 is "Number of parties that increase participation of women and youth in their structures and activities." UNDP Output 5 is "Opportunities for women and minorities enhanced"

[65] E.g. GI34, NDI email March 6, 2014, PVW

Political party executive directors, NDI and AMWIK believe that the new legal framework provides promise for women and youth to be included in the parties and that parties are working to comply with the requirements. They highlighted the public confusion about which seats women were vying for, lack of preparation by female candidates and lack of party support. Party executive directors noted that parties were not ready in 2013 for the two-thirds requirement and did not have the time or resources to engage women and youth, particularly from the counties, in developing the party constitution. They felt that they had not been effective at the grassroots due to cost constraints.

FIDA's recent gender audit of the 2013 elections, supported by USAID through NDI, calls on political parties to fully use their platforms and influence to enhance women's participation. Means to achieve this could include: revisions to party documents to include specific affirmative action measures; exercising gender parity in the appointment of top party positions; ensuring gender parity in decentralized party units; respecting the legal framework and party rules in all party exercises; and instituting affirmative action measures to promote increased candidacy of women in elections.[66]

IEBC

The IEBC strategic plan envisions targeted voter registration for women, youth and pastoralist communities with a progressive plan through 2017. [67] The IEBC, through support from the international community, conducted targeted outreach to marginalized groups to register and vote in the 2013 elections, though this effort was considered late and short, impacting the overall targets for voter registration, including amongst women and youth.[68] USAID felt that outreach to women and youth was not a part of IEBC's voter registration drive.[69] It is important to consider that the National Registration Bureau was also cited as slow in facilitating access to national ID cards required for voter registration.[70]

CONCLUSIONS

USAID contributed to an improved legal framework for elections that provides a basis for democratic reform. The principles of affirmative action and equality are in place, though implementation lags behind. Political parties need sustained support to comply with the new constitutional and legal framework, including affirmative action provisions. Parties need to make deliberate efforts to reach out to women and youth, recruit them into the party, mentor them and support them to contest elections. The ORPP and IEBC need to improve strategies and operations for registering marginalized groups as voters. USAID did not prioritize women in its election support ahead of 2013 elections. Since programming towards marginalized groups cuts across multiple approaches reporting does not capture the full scope of USAID support towards these groups. Some programs report their achievements under different IRs, for example, programming that focused strengthening capacity of EMB and work to strengthen political parties.

Donor assistance to political parties should be sustained, including support for compliance with the constitutional and legal framework and a focus on engaging marginalized populations in the political process. Donors should consider the 2013 FIDA gender audit as one source in designing future electoral assistance. Civic and voter education programming should reflect the time, methods and resources

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[66] FIDA: Key Gains and Challenges: A Gender Audit of Kenya's 2013 Election Process, 2013, p. 72.
[67] IEBC Strategic Plan, November 2013, p. 38-44. The evaluation team understands that the IEBC strategic plan will be updated following planned IEBC stakeholder consultations.
[68] SERP Project Evaluation Final Report, p. 23- 24.
[69] USAID Support for Kenya's 2013 Elections: Rapid Assessment Review, p. 18.
[70] Inter alia, UNDP email, March 11, 2014

required to reach marginalized populations. It takes significant time and resources to build capacity at the grassroots level. Donor support to the IEBC for voter registration should continue. The strategy should be informed by stakeholder consultations, an audit of the register and an analysis of the best methods for reaching various populations. USAID should update its results framework to ensure that support to marginalized groups is adequately incorporated. This would make it possible to more accurately measure USAID's contribution for this approach.

Question 2

Question 2: To what extent has U.S. government electoral assistance strengthened the technical and, where applicable, administrative capacity for delivery and/or reporting of accountable elections in the future of (i) the electoral commission; (ii) major political parties; (iii) domestic monitoring network; (iv) media; and (v) civil society organizations funded by USAID?

(2)(i) Election Management Body (IEBC)

FINDINGS

Political and operational pressure before an election makes it difficult to undertake capacity development with an EMB in a way that promotes skill transfer and its sustainability.[71] In Kenya, as noted under question 1, there was little time before the 2013 elections to provide capacity-building support to the IEBC. The final evaluation of the SERP 2 activity found limited IEBC institutional demand for capacity-building, given the immediate need for election preparations.[72] Best practice requires sustained engagement to build capacity, particularly in a post-conflict environment. [73]

USAID has identified IEBC as a focal point for long-term capacity-building going forward[74] and the IEBC, IPs and USAID have identified areas where support is needed. The majority of issues relate to the technical capacity of IEBC, while others relate to structure and administrative issues.

One element of an electoral cycle approach is focusing on the links between stakeholders, particularly EMBs with political parties, civil society, media judiciary and the security sector.[75] USAID IPs, donors and IEBC itself emphasized IEBC's need to better communicate with stakeholders.[76] When asked about the preparedness of different institutions, five of 19 beneficiary groups said IEBC is least prepared relative to other institutions for future elections.[77] Some of the most common reasons for the perceived lack of preparation were that the IEBC was corrupt (four of 19), it was not financially independent (four of 19), and the efforts were late in the last election (six of 19).[78] As perceptions of beneficiaries, these are not reflective of the actual capacity of IEBC, but rather the view of Kenyans who were one step

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[71] United Nations Development Program Electoral Assistance Implementation Guide 2007, p. 36
[72] SERP Project Evaluation Final Report, p. 1
[73] DFID recommends that development partners make a minimum ten year commitments after the first elections in a post conflict society in order to "help to eliminate the cycle of feast and famine that plagues such countries' electoral efforts and fuels unnecessary instability." DFID Report: Electoral Assistance and Politics: Lessons for International Support, 2010, p. 22
[74] GI34
[75] DFID Report: Electoral Assistance and Politics: Lessons for International Support, 2010, p. 23
[76] KII1, GI7, GI33,GI34
[77] GD11, GD12, GD15, GD16, GD26
[78] (corrupt) GD10, GD11, GD18, GD20; (not financially independent) GD11, GD12, GD14, GD15; (efforts were late) GD10, GD12, GD16, GD19, GD24, GD30.

closer to the elections (as beneficiaries) than the general public. This emphasizes the point from the experts that IEBC needs to better communicate.

The IEBC demonstrated an openness and commitment to develop. The Chairman and Secretariat each reflected on lessons learned from the 2012–13 process, including the need to manage public expectations with respect to technology. They also discussed the need to review the institutional structure to ensure sustainability. TCC observation report identified capacity gaps in management and operational performance of IEBC, singling out improper use of technology and inadequate planning, among other areas of weaknesses.

Best practice emphasizes that donors should take an electoral cycle approach to programming.[79] The IEBC and IPs felt that USAID had not placed enough emphasis on this.[80] They pointed out that the political landscape for future elections could be just as contentious as 2013; without longer-term support, the responsible institutions (including IEBC, ORPP, PPDT) will be ill-prepared to manage the elections. USAID and other donors noted the weakness of starting and stopping assistance and the preference to maintain a base level of support between elections.[81] Key support needed for the EMB was mentioned in the following areas: legal reforms; technology; structure, systems and decision-making; and voter education. These are each detailed in Annex XVII.

CONCLUSIONS

There was no opportunity for genuine capacity-building of IEBC prior to the 2013 elections. The IEBC structure needs to be reviewed. It needs broad capacity-building support to fulfil its technical and administrative functions. There is an opportunity between elections to focus on the institutional capacity of IEBC and other key institutions, such as ORPP and PPDT. The GOK may be willing to provide financial support for voter registration and procurement efforts, but is unlikely to fund voter education.

RECOMMENDATIONS

USAID and other donors should focus on IEBC capacity between elections. As USAID has already identified IEBC as a focal point for long-term capacity-building support, it should conduct a needs assessment as soon as possible to identify/validate priority areas for support, particularly given a likely reduction in available funding for future election support. It should build on the internal review process that the IEBC has undertaken and the proposals of key IPs. Immediate needs may include a review of election legislation and IEBC institutional restructuring. The assessment should also consider the needs of other key institutions such as ORPP and PPDT.

(2)(ii) Major Political Parties

FINDINGS

The Kriegler Report, election observation reports and other sources identified parties as a source of instability in the 2007 elections, noting several breaches of international norms and Kenyan law, and

> "Political parties many times behave as if they have been ambushed into election. You look at the time they take during nomination, it is rushed… So people start fighting for those nominations and it brings down the whole democratic process."
>
> *Political party trainee Kisumu, Feb.15, 2014*

[79] DFID Report: Electoral Assistance and Politics: Lessons for International Support, 2010, p. 22-23
[80] KII, GI7, PVW

[81] GI33, GI34

the culture of impunity with which parties operated. Major changes to the legal framework since 2010 and a significant investment by the international community are aimed at inculcating a professional political culture in the country. Change will be measured incrementally, though. IPs, the IEBC and USAID emphasized the need for further support to parties to understand the law (including the new campaign finance legislation) and that the ORPP — the new institution charged with registering and monitoring political parties — also needs support to carry out its significant responsibilities.[82] Two of the four political party group discussions cited parties' failure to comply with the law in 2013; the political party executive directors group noted: "Parties have not honorably embraced the law." [83]

Twelve of 19 group discussions identified parties as the least prepared institution for future elections.[84] The strongest perception finding related to the structure and culture of political parties, including comments about corruption. Describing the political culture, TCC noted, that practices of local influences on businessmen/job offers were everywhere and "as soon as election day was approaching, it was sure that everything was already sold."[85] Thirteen of 19 group discussions commented on party structure/culture; reporting that parties: are tribal/ethnic (seven), are self-interested/vehicles for power (seven), suffer from infighting (three), and are disorganized (two).[86] Additionally, journalists, civil society, parties and the party executive directors noted the lack of state funding as a challenge to party sustainability.[87] USAID noted that parties do receive funding from the consolidated fund through the registrar of political parties, but that perhaps those funds are insufficient.[88] See Annex XVIII for other perceptions of political parties.

NDI, USAID, political party executive directors and AMWIK felt that parties need to engage youth and women more genuinely.[89] The party executive director group noted that it is a long process, but training for party youth is showing impact, in part because they have less tribal affiliation than the party leadership. They also believe parties need to be "agitated" to think about affirmative action because it is "challenging and expensive" to engage marginalized groups.[90]

Political party development has been a long-term focus for USAID in Kenya and it has identified parties as a priority going forward.[91] The best time to build institutional capacity is between elections when the pressure and deadlines of a contested election can distort and distract from long-term capacity objectives.[92] Parties expressed enthusiasm for continued support, with the party executive director group saying, "The need now is for policy development, internal democracy. Parties need support from beginning to the end. Parties want to democratize and engage women and youth. To hold good elections in 2017 parties need support now. USAID should listen to priorities of the parties."[93]

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[82] KII1,GI34, PVW
[83] GI9, GD19, GD26
[84] GD13, GD14, GD18, GD19, GD20, GD21, GD22,GD23, GD24,GD25, GD27, GD31

[85] GI35
[86] (Structure/culture) GD10, GD11, GD14, GD16, GD18, GD19, GD20, GD22, GD23, GD24, GD25, GD26, GD28; (tribal/ethnic) GD10, GD11, GD14, GD20, GD22, GD23, GD26; (self-interested/vehicles) GD10, GD11, GD14, GD20, GD24, GD25, GD28; (infighting) GD11, GD14, GD19; (disorganized) GD16, GD28.
[87] GI9, GD11, GD16, GD22
[88] USAID responses to the draft Performance Evaluation of USAID's Electoral Assistance, comments received Apr. 30, 2014.

[89] GI3, GI9, GI34, GI36
[90] GI9
[91] GI34
[92] Inter alia, Managing Assistance in Support of Political and Electoral Processes, January 2000; Center for Democracy and Governance – Bureau for Global Programs-Field Support and Research USAID
[93] GI9

CONCLUSIONS

Professional political parties are fundamental to Kenya's stability. Political party development is a process and requires long-term investment. Parties need sustained support to become institutionalized and to overcome entrenched structural and cultural impediments. This requires compliance with the constitutional and legal framework; better, more inclusive platform development based on ideology rather than personality; and mainstreaming of women and youth. Behavioral change will take time.

RECOMMENDATIONS

USAID should sustain its efforts to strengthen political parties, with a renewed focus on inclusion of marginalized populations. There should be a well-developed and clear framework for measuring activity implementation, as progress (and in particular behavioral change) may be quite nuanced.

(2)(iii) Domestic Monitoring Network

FINDINGS

The Kriegler Report formally recommended in its final report that a permanent domestic election observer group be formed to monitor Kenyan elections. The Kriegler Commission's comments about domestic election observation informed the creation of the ELOG in 2010. ELOG, consisting of civil society organizations, fielded more than 5,000 election observers for the March 2013 elections and administered a PVT using another 1,600 observers. The PVT produced results which were largely consistent with the IEBC's vote tabulations.

The final report of the EU-EOM notes: "The importance of ELOG's contribution to the electoral process should not be underestimated. Following election day, trust in the IEBC was in a precarious state, after the failure of election technology and the lack of transparency during the tallying process, both of which left it open to rumors and speculation. ELOG's PVT indicated that broadly the IEBC tally was confirmed by an independent national source, acting in the public interest." NDI, with funding from USAID to train and develop ELOG's election observation and monitoring capability, noted that ELOG ensured its membership (leadership and observers) signed a declaration of neutrality and nonpartisanship in line with commitments outlined in the Declaration of Global Principles for Nonpartisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations.[94] ELOG also made efforts to coordinate and share information with international observer groups and other local NGOs in the period leading the elections. TCC international observers report productive cooperation with domestic observers; although they note that some domestic observers were not as committed to the process as others.[95]

Discussions outside of Nairobi (when asking what electoral institutions were most and least prepared) reveal a mixed opinion about domestic election observation. For example, three out the 19 felt that domestic observers needed more training; two mentioned they were well trained.[96] AMWIK's senior program officer recommends that ELOG expands its observation to include the political party nomination process.[97]

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[94] NDI email, March 6, 2014
[95] GI35
[96] (observers need more training) GD14, GD25, GD28 ; (mentioned well-trained) GD 19, GD20.
[97] KII36

The external evaluation of ELOG included recommendations related to: public relations and media engagement; identity formation; membership-building; fundraising and financial decision-making; information-sharing; triangulation of observation data; capacity-building and retention of expertise; and internal accountability.[98]

CONCLUSIONS

The evaluation team believes ELOG is developing a sustainable approach to election observation that will increase public confidence and serve the Kenyan process well. This is tempered with observations by international observers and some group discussion participants that ELOG's overall professionalism could be improved.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The evaluation team recommends that USAID, in times of limited election-support resources, continue to provide modest support to ELOG through the next electoral cycle to continue developing its institutional methodology and independence. Considering the shortcomings with the political party nomination period for 2013 elections, donors should consider deploying some observers (both domestic and international) to cover the nomination period for the next national election.

(2)(iv) Media

FINDINGS

There has been a separate, full evaluation of the USAID-funded Internews activity to examine the media's structure and capacity with respect to electoral coverage. That evaluation offers nuanced reflections on the state of the media. It concludes that the activity was a success and recommends an additional three years of support to the media to consolidate the gains achieved.[99] This would include addressing the challenges of devolution, bridging the gap between elections and the possibility of localizing training for journalists to allow for improved local reporting of elections.[100]

Perceptions of media capacity and readiness for future elections were mixed. Ten out of 19 groups said the media was most prepared relative to other institutions.[101] Two out of 19 group discussions felt the media played a role in educating the public before the elections.[102] For example, a civic and voter education beneficiary group in Kilifi mentioned radio programs to educate the public about the constitution.[103] The Internews evaluation points out the media's critical role of informing the public about the major constitutional changes and devolutions; it cites a widespread concern among interviewees that the media is not ready for this role.[104] Five out of 19 group discussions felt the media

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[98] Report of the Programme Evaluation for ELOG-CGD Monitoring and Observing the 2012-2013 Electoral Process: Elections Observation Group-Centre for Governance and Development , December 2013.
[99] Kenya Election and Political Process Strengthening Program – KEPPS – Internews Free and Fair Media Project; External Evaluation Project; iMedia Associates Ltd, December 2013, p,32
[100] Kenya Election and Political Process Strengthening Program – KEPPS – Internews Free and Fair Media Project; External Evaluation Project; iMedia Associates Ltd, December 2013, p,32
[101] GD11,GD13,GD15,GD16,GD18,GD20,GD21,GD22,GD28,GD29
[102] GD20, GD25
[103] GD24
[104] Kenya Election and Political Process Strengthening Program – KEPPS – Internews Free and Fair Media Project; External Evaluation Project; iMedia Associates Ltd, December 2013, Pp,31-32

was ready for future elections because of their steady presence.[105] This sentiment seems to speak to administrative capacity, but not necessarily technical capacity to provide coverage.

Conversely, journalists, civic and voter education IPs, election observers and evaluators (Internews evaluation) felt that media censored itself to the detriment of quality news coverage in 2013 and needs to strike a better balance in the future. The TCC reported, "Most irregularities that should have been reported in the media were heard for the first time in the Supreme Court."[106]

CONCLUSIONS

Media has an important role throughout the electoral cycle in educating the public and reporting on the process. There is a perception that media capacity to report on elections has improved in a short period; however, further support is needed to build the media's capacity to provide professional, objective coverage.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Media management should focus on professional development of news and editorial staff to achieve a balance between ethical and robust reporting. Donors should ensure that media programming includes an electoral component that builds on the gains made to date and facilitates inter-stakeholder cooperation. Donors should be aware of the Internews evaluation when designing new election assistance programming.

(2)(v) Civil Society

FINDINGS

The strongest finding to emerge on the sustainability of civil society was the need for long-term, continuous civic education. Twelve out of 21 beneficiary groups composed of civic and voter education participants, political parties, domestic observers and participants in gender-based activities highlighted this, as did the IEBC secretariat and IPs.[107] One political party group noted:

> "I would like to say that civic education should be a continuous process. We should not peg it to an election period... [It] should be done even years before an election so that people are empowered to know their rights so that ... when an election comes- they already know what is expected... I would really plead that any agency involved in civic education should do it earlier and should do it continuously."[108]

Another issue that emerged is the reliance on donor funding for civic and voter education. IPs highlighted the "devastating effect" that curtailed funding from USAID and other donors would have on these activities, saying that "GOK will not come up with the funding," "some NGOs may close or operate at a minimum level" and "USAID has had huge impact… Without USAID the gains achieved will be lost."[109] This is consistent with the findings of a 2013 study, which discovered that 80.4 percent of the organizations engaged in civic education are local NGOs and that all of them get their funding,

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[105] GD11, GD18, GD21, GD22, GD28, GD29
[106] The Carter Center Final Report, Observing Kenya's March 2013 Elections, p. 41
[107] GD15, GD16, GD18, GD19, GD20, GD21, GD22, GD23, GD25, GD28, GD29, GD30, GD31. For the group discussion responses, this issue may have come up in any of the protocol questions.
[108] GD22
[109] GI6

contents of their training curriculum/modules, evaluation of programs and directional focus from the donors. At the time, 46.6 percent indicated that they would close without donor support.[110] IPs all suggested ideas for continued civic and voter education work, but few reported having funding for these activities.[111]

> "Civil society is the one being depended on by Kenyans because they are the ones who give vital information, they are the whistle blowers, and if there's anything that's being hidden by the government they are the ones who say it clearly and loudly. So Kenyans really depend on civil society...they are clear and open and that's why the government is trying to suppress the civil society through enacting laws that will gag them."[1]
>
> *Civic/ voter education group discussion Kilifi, Feb. 21, 2014*

Related to this, IPs and USAID noted the risk posed to civil society by the recent government bill to regulate civil society (particularly those working on governance issues) and set a 15 percent threshold for international funding. The bill was defeated in late 2013, but may be re-introduced in2014.[112] Three of four civic/ voter education groups in Coast expressed that government entities and politicians are biased and would not conduct balanced civic education related to the electoral process.

The Kriegler Report recommended expanding civic education efforts beyond urban areas, particularly for youth programs.[113] It also recommends long-term investments in voter/civic education/information campaigns and suggests that EMB local offices, with few responsibilities between elections, could conduct these activities if properly resourced.[114] USAID also highlighted the need for earlier and more closely coordinated voter education with IEBC so that USAID and the international community are not doing the job of IEBC.[115] For more perceptions of civil society, see Annex XX.

CONCLUSIONS

Civil society is heavily dependent on external funding for civic and voter education. Without support from civil society, much of the population would be excluded from the political and electoral processes. There is little faith in the government- particularly in Coast- to conduct civic education on the electoral process and there is an indication that CSOs working on governance issues may close down if the recent government bill to regulate international funding for civil society is passed in its present form. There is an acute need for sustained civic education and expanded voter education to enhance pubic understanding of their civil and political rights and responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

USAID and other donors should prioritize ongoing support to civil society to conduct civic education. Donor support to IEBC should include capacity-building to deliver quality voter education.

Question 3

Question 3: How appropriate was the mix and timing of activities in addressing the needs identified by both past and ongoing evidence?

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[110] Civic Education and Its Relevance in Kenyan Context: A Provider's Perspective (Abstract only), available at http://sociology.uonbi.ac.ke/node/4488.
[111] G16
[112] Presentation of Preliminary Findings, Conclusions, Recommendations to USAID, US Embassy March 14, 2014

[113] Kriegler Report, p. 109
[114] Kriegler Report, p. 108
[115] GI34

FINDINGS

USAID assistance before the 2013 elections included a mix of programming. Longer-term activities began with two IPs: NDI in 2008 [under the Consortium for Election and Political Processes (CEPPS)] focused on political party strengthening; and UNDP SERP I in 2010, supporting the interim election management body. Beginning in 2011, additional partners were brought on and programming was ramped up across all seven program approaches before the elections (which at the time were scheduled for mid-2012).

With the rapidly changing legislative/ regulatory environment, local institutions, donors and IPs had to act quickly to mobilize and deliver a broad range of activities aimed at achieving a credible and peaceful election. As noted in the USAID 2013 rapid assessment, the mission had to prioritize initiatives in its manageable interest. While support was generally on time, it was sometimes late due to "environmental" delays such as establishment of IEBC (late 2011), and election-related laws and regulations (some completed just days before the elections.) The Gantt chart below, which was developed from activity documents, shows an increase in awards in 2011, with six programmatic modifications and six awards occurring between August 2012–March 2013, followed by a decline in activities after elections.



Figure 2: USAID election program awards and modifications, October 2011-July 2013

Overall, IPs and other donors who were interviewed praised USAID as flexible in providing partners with the required resources in an fast-changing context. USAID had to be responsive, and donors and partners said it moved resources where they were needed, when they were needed. [116] This included stepping in to allocate resources for electoral security and EDR, where government resources were reduced or lacking. [117]

Regarding mix, donors noted the heavy support provided to the IEBC as a new institution with overall responsibility for the elections. Describing the scale of support, one donor characterized funding decisions — such as getting involved in Electronic Voter Identification (EVID) procurement — as

[116] GI7, GI33, GI17
[117] KII5,GI34

prioritizing political risks over the fiduciary investment. [118] Some donors felt there was an effort to balance support to the other "building blocks" of elections, drawing on lessons from 2007, while others thought civil society, political parties, judiciary, media and domestic observation were neglected and will need more support going forward. Some beneficiaries, including PPDT, also perceived that donor money favored IEBC, while other groups were left out.

As detailed under the donor coordination section of this report, members of the donor group felt that there should be additional emphasis on the electoral cycle as a whole. They lamented that the support seemed to come to an abrupt end, with donor coordination dormant since the elections.[119]

Time

Participants across the five group discussion beneficiary categories were positive about the training content.[120] However, 16 of the groups indicated that time was too limited for a comprehensive rollout.[121] For more details about timing, see Annex XXI.

> "It's a fact that the timing for most of the activities related to the elections is not well done. Because these activities are done alongside campaigns and you know campaigns in Kenya are about money. Everybody runs when someone calls for a political rally. After a political rally people either eat or money is dished out. Now when you are 100-500 meters [away] having a group discussing very important issues people will not come, instead they will go to the rallies where there is fun and money."
>
> *Civic/ voter education group discussion Kilifi, Feb. 21, 2014*

CONCLUSIONS

Timing was scarce for all organizations working toward the 2013 Kenya elections. USAID's flexible program design allowed for response to emerging needs and delivery of a broad mix of programming to that end. Donor assistance to the IEBC was essential to conduct a credible election and USAID contributed significantly to this success. The donor community decided to prioritize assistance to the IEBC, which meant that it was well supported. Other "building blocks" of elections, such as civic and voter education, did not receive the same timely attention. Compressed timelines and last-minute changes to regulations and procedures made rolling out a thorough civic education effort to all areas of Kenya and timely training of political candidates a challenge. The design of this evaluation and available reporting data do not allow the evaluation team to assess the true scale and scope of civic education activities. This period between elections is an opportunity to strengthen organizations involved in the elections and renew strategies to inform the public about their civic rights and responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Donors should design electoral programming with the entire electoral cycle in mind. Now is the time to build institutions and consolidate and capitalize on the gains made in the previous cycle. To the maximum extent possible, activities should take place early and not be squeezed into an already-hectic pre-election period, when it is difficult to secure stakeholder attention.

Donors should resume coordination, take stock of the achievements and lessons from the last election cycle, and design new programming accordingly, allowing for flexibility. They should balance support to the range of election players. Civic and voter education should start earlier for ideal impact. It should use a multi-pronged approach, giving consideration to the scale and type of human resources required

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[118] GI33
[119] USAID noted to the evaluation team plans to revitalize donor coordination.
[120] GI9, GD11, GI3, GD14 GD16
[121] GI9, GD21, GD22, GD23, GD24, GD25, GD26, GD27, GD28, GD29, GD31, GD30, KII36, GI2, KII1

to reach Kenyans at all levels of literacy, as well as the country's rural population. Donors should work with IPs to identify meaningful and appropriate program measures, paying special attention to interventions aimed at changes in knowledge, attitude or practice.

Question 4

Question 4: To what extent did USAID coordinate with other donors to maximize the leverage of USG resources and funds?

FINDINGS

The IEBC, USAID, other donors and IEBC IPs felt that the joint election basket for IEBC was effective.[122] Donors noted, for example, that it immediately insulated the IEBC from government political pressure. "The government knew donors were in the picture, so they let IEBC do their thing."[123] They also noted the lesson they had applied from 2007 to separate the different types of assistance so that the basket was exclusively for IEBC support and didn't get "bogged down" with support for other measures. IEBC praised the basket for facilitating much of the technical support to IEBC and easing coordination with donors and tracking of funding.[124] Donors and IPs felt that the Election Donors Group (EDG) was also effective in helping to pool technical and financial resources. It was a mechanism for coordination between the political heads of missions (HOMs) and the technical teams; the EDG was able to brief the mission heads and make it possible for them to have consistent messaging and engage with key government interlocutors.[125]

> "Basket funds of some kind for pooling donor support are useful mechanisms for providing harmonized support for elections. These tools have worked well in many contexts; even for DPs [Development Partners] who do not contribute towards pooled funding mechanisms, this model can provide a helpful hub around which to organize their own support. However, in practice, basket fund management has proven difficult to get right; for example, problems highlighted in the management of basket funds in the case studies include a lack of capacity-building to local institutions (UNDP basket fund management in Sierra Leone), and failure to represent concerns with government (UNDP in Kenya). "
>
> *DFID UKAid report: Electoral Assistance and Politics: Lessons for International Support, p. 31*

On the downside, international donors felt that the donor basket compromised bilateral dialogue with the IEBC, particularly during procurement challenges. There was a question of whether UNDP would lead on the dialogue, which may have conflicted with the messages of individual diplomatic missions.[126] This also came out clearly as an issue in the 2007 UNDP Joint Election Assistance Project (EAP) evaluation, which identified a lack of a mechanism for necessary high-level political engagement.[127] As noted by DFID, this is a common challenge with basket funds.[128] The solution in 2013 was an ambassadors' and head's of development agencies coordination group – the Development Partners' Group (DPG), which the technical teams fed into. Some donors also felt that there was an over-emphasis on support to the IEBC, to the detriment of other key actors.

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[122] KII1,GI2, GI7, GI33, GI34
[123] GI33
[124] KII1, GI2
[125] GI7, GI33
[126] GI33
[127] Final Evaluation Report: The 2007 Joint Elections Assistance Programme (EAP), p. 16

[128] DFID UKAid report: Electoral Assistance and Politics: Lessons for International Support, p. 30

Donors and IPs identified efforts to incorporate lessons from the past into program design and implementation. Donors remarked that they had structured programming according to the Kriegler Report. Other design inputs for programming included numerous donor-funded review processes from the 2007 elections and program evaluations, such as the review of the EAP and MSI evaluations of civic education programming in Kenya.[129] The five IPs who spoke to this question mentioned that USAID had applied specific lessons from the Kriegler Report and focused on conflict-sensitive or peace-building programming.[130]

International donors recommended enhanced monitoring and evaluation tracking systems for voter registration and civic and voter education activities to determine impact and value for money. They recommended that this be part of the program design process.[131] For views of coordination among IPs and donor views of USAID, see Annex XXII.

CONCLUSIONS

Donor coordination for the 2013 elections was effective overall. It was guided by lessons learned from the previous election cycle and benefited from the expertise and mutual respect of key technical experts. The joint donor basket was an effective way to channel support to the IEBC and to coordinate technical and political messaging in 2013. Donor support and coordination for elections has waned and USAID funding for election support may not be available until 2016. Effective monitoring and evaluation systems are needed to determine program impact and value for money.

RECOMMENDATIONS

USAID should explore donor coordination for elections in Kenya as a model for other program sectors domestically and in other countries. Donors should continue a rigorous approach to integrating lessons learned and global best practices for electoral assistance. USAID/Kenya should seek funds outside of the standard U.S. appropriations process as soon as possible to maintain a base of support for elections. This will make it possible to build on the gains achieved and address identified needs, in line with good practice. Donor coordination for election programming should resume as soon as possible and continue at a regular pace. Given the amount of time until the next planned elections (2017), it may be appropriate to incorporate election coordination with another existing forum (e.g., on governance/devolution) in the short to medium term. Election programs should incorporate clear, appropriate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms at the design stage to track progress and promote value-for-money.

Question 5

Question 5: To what extent were the electoral assistance activities effective in promoting participation by women and youth?

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[129] GI33. A Canadian aid agency representative noted that the MSI evaluations of 2007 civic education programming were a guide on how to roll out support for 2013 on how to engage communities early, using trust in civic bodies, making sure messages are repetitive, targeting certain communities and using the media, managing bias by having standard messaging at the national level, and careful coordination between these programs and the IEBC.
[130] IP emails, March 10–15, 2014
[131] GI33

FINDINGS

USAID outlined a crosscutting agenda for gender programming, and various initiatives to empower youth economically and politically.[132] Five implementing mechanisms — UNDP–SERP 2 (UN Women), NDI, WTS, Inuka Trust, and Uraia Trust — designed activities in line with the USAID strategy, including targeted civic and voter education messaging about women and youth participation, and building the capacity of political parties to become more inclusive.[133] The SERP gender activity supported the IEBC's efforts to mainstream gender in elections management (including through voter education messages) and worked with national peace-building initiatives to address electoral gender-based violence (EGBV).

USAID and partners acknowledged the peace agenda drove program design; consequently youth received much more targeted attention than women. Because of their involvement in 2007 post-election violence and high unemployment rate, youth are perceived as drivers of conflict, whereas women do not share that reputation. USAID said the program design did not deliberately target women and that it "fell short." Thus, there were not the same gains with women as with youth.[134] According to USAID's 2013 rapid assessment, this could be linked to the lack of a thorough gender analysis before elections.[135]

> "Personally before I joined IPYF I didn't belong to any political party. I used to be paid to cause violence. But after joining IPYF, I learnt that what I had been doing was wrong. So it changed me."
>
> "I was taught my rights, how to interact with other people, that in the community the youth can do a lot. We went to Magongo area and administered questionnaires to the youth there. The environment was very tense but we managed the exercise. After that I made a decision that I couldn't stop. I had to continue as a young leader. I became a focal person where I reside."
>
> *IPYF participants Mombasa, Feb.22, 2014*

From the project PMPs reviewed, most partners working with marginalized populations aimed to report figures disaggregated by age and/or sex. When looking at quarterly and annual reports, evaluators noted that partner reporting did not always match planned levels of disaggregation. Reports from both Kenyan and international IPs tend to contain output level information (e.g. number of women were trained, numbers of comic books printed), but rarely show the reach, or larger outcome of the program. Uraia Trust is one partner that did report on outcome level indicators, reporting that Uraia Trust programs increased voter registration and turn-out and contributed to a notable reduction in the level of electoral related violence; however how attribution is made is unclear. See Annex XXIV for a table on how partners reported on their programs targeting marginalized populations.

Narrative reporting provided details on challenges, for example, Uraia Trust project progress reports indicated that there was inadequate presence of local organizations at the grassroots to support civic education activities and that the institutional & management structures of the available CSOs were inadequate. UNDP reports show that they were unable, due to time constraints, to strengthen IEBC capacity to develop at least one gender policy. See Annex XX for details on legal framework, participation challenges and successes.

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[132] E.g. Kenya: Democracy and Governance Assessment and Strategy, May 2011
[133] Democracy and Governance Assessment and Strategy, May 2011, p.42
[134] GI34
[135] USAID Support for Kenya's 2013 Elections: Rapid Assessment Review, p.8, GI34. Also, the SERP evaluation, p.43 notes, "Although UNDP, IEBC and UN Women partnered to support a gender sensitive electoral process, this area received less focus during the implementation of the program."

CONCLUSIONS

USAID programming ahead of elections 2013 prioritized youth but not women. Women were not prioritized because they were not viewed as 'drivers of change/ instigators of violence. Women can play an important role in information dissemination/ civic education and as peace agent, if appropriately engaged. A sustained investment is required to realize the aspirations of the constitution and of donor support for marginalized populations. There is a need for continuous civic education to encourage marginalized groups to vie as candidates and participate as voters. There is also a need for public sensitization and accurate information about the seats that women can contest. Meaningful indicators are needed to track the effectiveness of targeted interventions. There was not adequate planning, resources or tracking for this ahead of 2013 elections.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Donors should continue to invest in women and youth through the party structure and through targeted civic and voter education initiatives. These activities should be funded during non-election years in order to build momentum and deepen results. USAID envisions ongoing support to political parties; this should include a focus on compliance with the constitutional and legal framework and internal party democracy, and there should be more time and focus dedicated to mentoring female aspirants ahead of elections. IPs should closely track individual participation in trainings and other activities. Civic and voter education should target marginalized populations and the community at large to address the challenges that women and youth face as candidates and voters. Women and youth should be included in civic education programming as civic educators and potential peace agents. Donors should consider the 2013 FIDA gender audit as one source in designing future electoral assistance. USAID should establish/ update cross-sector linkages for programming targeting marginalized groups, and establish complimentary results frameworks where appropriate (e.g. linkages between economic and political empowerment).

Question 6

Question 6: What are some lessons that can inform the design of future electoral assistance projects both in Kenya and globally?

Cross-cutting Recommendations for Activities in Kenya (Cutting Across All Questions)

USAID and other donors should take an electoral cycle approach to programming in Kenya. In basic terms, this means planning electoral assistance within the broader framework of democratic governance rather than taking an event-driven approach to support. It recognizes the interdependence of the different building blocks of elections (e.g., legal framework, voter registration, civic education, voting operations) and requires broad, well-coordinated assistance. It recognizes that the periods between elections are just as critical as the immediate election period, and that there is important work to be done at each stage of the process. For example, the post-election period is the critical time for review, reform and planning. This includes updates to the voters' list, improvements to the legal framework and institutional capacity-building, all of which have been identified by donors, IPs and beneficiaries as priorities in Kenya. To the maximum extent possible, activities should take place early and not be rushed around the already hectic pre-election period. With resources likely to be reduced for future elections, donors will need to be creative and coordinate. USAID and other donors need to take stock of lessons learned and initiate at least modest support for electoral reform through available funding instruments. Doing this as soon as possible will enable these stakeholders to work toward an electoral process that is sustainable over the long term, with the goal of local ownership of the process. USAID should conduct a proper needs assessment to identify/validate priority areas for support, drawing on evaluation reports, institutional reviews (e.g., the IEBC internal review process that was recently completed) and IP proposals.

Donor support should recognize Kenya as a post-conflict environment. Peace is fragile in Kenya. The 2013 election was not free from violence; major institutions such as the IEBC, judiciary, political parties and the security sector have not yet been institutionalized; the legal framework is new and needs refinement; and many interlocutors for this evaluation pointed out that the potential triggers of violence (such as tribal-based politics, disaffected youth, economic hardship) remain. The relative peace of the election period should not be mistaken for political stability. The political landscape for the 2017 elections may be just as contentious, and may depend on factors such as the outcome of the cases before the ICC. Donor support going forward will need to focus on enhancing the capacity of major institutions (including IEBC, ORPP, PPDT and political parties) to manage the elections in accordance with the legal framework and stakeholder expectations. Well-functioning institutions can mitigate the risks to the credibility of elections such as of violent conflict, disregard for the law and voter intimidation. The donor community should make formal and regular risk analyses part of standard planning for future elections, regardless of GOK plans to fund security. For more cross-cutting recommendations, see Annex XXV.

Lessons learned globally

Different contexts require different approaches. Election assistance is not one size fits all. This point is not new. For instance, the USAID publication on managing assistance in support of political and electoral processes (published in 2000) identifies several categories of elections. Still, it is a point worth recalling and it may be an issue that needs further donor reflection, based on the increasing numbers of elections being held in conflict and transitional settings globally. Donors need to consider a country's level of democratic maturity when designing electoral assistance. The 2007 elections in Kenya revealed that Kenya was not a mature democracy; 2013 election confirmed that lesson and 2017 election assistance will need to be planned with the instability factors in mind. Donor needs' assessments need to consider the political and historic moment into which an election fits and match the interventions, messaging and expectations to these realities.

Donor coordination in Kenya is a model that could work for other sectors and in other countries. Donors invested heavily in donor coordination for the 2013 elections in the interest of peaceful, credible elections. The international donor group referred to the election donor group as "arguably the most stable and consistent group within whole governance sector." Key elements of the coordination included: an incorporation of lessons learned from the previous election cycle into program design, highly competent technical teams, well integrated technical and political messaging, a high degree of donor flexibility in responding to emerging needs, and a commitment to coordination between the US embassy and USAID. Coordination between the embassy and mission is seen as essential to election assistance in challenging political settings.[136] For basket funding, one of the key lessons was to separate out support to the major institution (the IEBC) from other areas of assistance, so that assistance could remain nimble. USAID should consider employing elements of this model in other contexts. The caution is that this requires a heavy investment of time and resources. As such, it is likely a model to be reserved for a conflict of post-conflict setting where resources are plentiful.

USAID should maintain an up-to-date results framework. This is a lesson for other USAID missions beyond Kenya. In addition to maintaining an up-to-date results framework and appropriate monitoring and evaluation metrics, if USAID intends to capture beneficiary perceptions of USAID contribution, it

[136] A similar model has been followed in Pakistan, for example.

will need to closely monitor partner compliance with branding and marking requirements for trainings and public meetings. USAID will need to consider the practicality of this option, particularly for community-level civic education initiatives.

ANNEXES

ANNEX I: EVALUATION STATEMENT OF WORK

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The violence that ensued following the elections of 2007 in Kenya ended with the signing of the National Peace Accord in February 2008. This marked the beginning of an ambitious constitutional and legal reform effort, as recommended by the Kriegler Commission, which saw Kenyans draft and pass a new Constitution in 2010. Article 81 of the Constitution reiterates the principles that underpin free and fair elections, including the freedom of citizens to exercise their political rights; gender equality; fair representation of persons with disabilities; universal suffrage and equality of vote; secrecy of the ballot; freedom from violence, intimidation, improper influence or corruption; independence of the body conducting the elections; and transparency and impartiality.

Given Kenya's reform agenda and the new Constitution, USAID/Kenya' s Democracy, Rights and Governance Office sought to strengthen the organizations and processes necessary for a credible and peaceful election in 2013. To accomplish this, USAID used ten implementing mechanisms for its electoral assistance programming, including:

- Political Parties Strengthening Program, implemented by National Democratic Institute for International Affairs through CEPPS II, $3.26 million
- Support to Electoral Reforms in Kenya – Immediate Needs, implemented by UNDP, $3.25 million
- Support to Electoral Reforms in Kenya, implemented by UNDP (Basket Fund), $2.9 million
- Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening, implemented by NDI, IFES and IRI, $21.28 million
- Uchaguzi Bora Initiative, implemented by Uraia Trust, $961,564
- Uongozi 2012 Campaign Project, implemented by Inuka Trust, $1.6 million
- Supporting the Kenya Constitutional Implementation Process, implemented by International Development Law Organization, $995,648
- Strengthening Institutions of Governance and Service Delivery to Entrench Transparency and Accountability, implemented by Transparency International, $643,558
- Shujaaz FM Multimedia Youth Communications Initiative, implemented by Well Told Story, $1.17 million
- International Election Observation, implemented by The Carter Center, $1.46 million

The purpose of this evaluation is to determine the effectiveness of the election assistance provided by USAID/Kenya for the Kenyan Elections of 2013. The evaluation will also identify practices used by USAID/Kenya that can be adopted for electoral assistance projects in other countries. Lastly, given the global trend of reduced USAID election-related funding, the results of the evaluation will also guide USAID/Kenya in designing future electoral assistance.

The audience for this evaluation is USAID/Kenya Democracy, Rights and Governance (DRG) Office and USAID/Washington. The evaluation is also expected to inform the larger donor community in Kenya. In

addition, the lessons and recommendations resulting from this evaluation will help inform USAID/Kenya's strategy for future electoral assistance activities.

The evaluation seeks to answer the following six questions:

1. To what degree did USAID's electoral assistance, using the seven identified approaches, contribute to the 2013 elections? These seven approaches are: (i) Strengthening the Capacity of the Election Management Body; (ii) Election Dispute Resolution and Security; (iii) Professionalizing Political Parties; (iv) Election Observation; (v) Civic and Voter Education; (vi) Media Engagement; and (vii) Participation of Marginalized groups.
2. To what extent has USG electoral assistance strengthened the technical and, where applicable administrative, capacity for delivery and/or reporting of accountable elections in the future of (i) the electoral commission; (ii) major political parties; (iii) domestic monitoring network; (iv) media; and (v) civil society organizations funded by USAID?
3. How appropriate was the mix and timing of activities in addressing the needs identified by both past and ongoing evidence?
4. To what extent did USAID coordinate with other donors to maximize the leverage of USG resources and funds?
5. To what extent were the electoral assistance activities effective in promoting participation by women and youth?
6. What are some lessons that can inform the design of future electoral assistance projects both in Kenya and globally?

The evaluation will be conducted by a three person team, including two international team members and one national team member. A local survey firm will support the team in the organization of discussion groups. This evaluation will employ mixed data collection methods including: desk review, key informant interviews, and group discussions. Qualitative and quantitative data generated during the evaluation will be analyzed using a mix of descriptive statistics, pattern/content analysis, comparison analysis and divergence/convergence analysis.

1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1.1 Identifying Information

1. Program: Democracy, Rights and Governance
2. Project Name: Evaluation of USAID Electoral Assistance to Kenya
3. Period to be evaluated: January 2008 – August 2013

Activity/Implementer/AOR	Summary of Activity	Start Date	End Date	Funding
Political Parties Strengthening Program National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) - awarded though the CEPPS II Leader with Associate AOR: Sheila Karani	To strengthen internal party democracy by promoting greater gender and youth participation and, facilitate dialogue between parties, Kenya's electoral administrative body, and other government entities involved in elections	2008	May 2011	$3,260,272
Support to Electoral Reforms in Kenya (Immediate needs) UNDP AOR: Sheila Karani	Support to the Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC); provide continued support for the referendum on the draft Constitution, elections and longer-term assistance to the electoral reform process in Kenya	March 2010	March 2011	$3,250,000
Support to Electoral Reforms and Processes in Kenya (Long-term) UNDP Basket AOR: Zeph Aura	Enhance the capacity of the IEBC toward the management of free, fair and credible elections in Kenya	May 2012	Dec 2013	$2,900,000
Kenya Election and Political Process Strengthening Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS); NDI/ IFES/ IRI. AOR: Zeph Aura	Provide assistance and support in elections and political processes	May 2011	April 2014	$21,281,291

Activity/Implementer/AOR	Summary of Activity	Start Date	End Date	Funding
Uchaguzi Bora Initiative URAIA TRUST AOR: Zeph Aura	The Uraia Trust *basket fund* civic and voter education campaign provided quality civic education and that helped Kenyan citizens make informed decision on the 2013 elections and participate effectively on devolution.	June 2012	Nov 2013	$961, 564
Uongozi 2012 Campaign Project INUKA TRUST –basket funding AOR: Zeph Aura	A multi-media reality TV campaign aimed at mobilizing young Kenyans to make informed decisions devoid of hate and ethnicity around elections.	March 2012	Dec 2013	$1,600,000
Supporting the Kenya Constitutional Implementation Process International Development Law Organization (IDLO) AOR: Sheila Karani	Strengthen the capacity of the judiciary to prepare for the 2013 general elections and related disputes through close collaboration with the Judiciary Working Committee on Elections Preparations	June 2011	February 2013 (elections component 2012-2013 only)	$ 995,648
Strengthening Institutions of Governance and Service Delivery to Entrench Transparency and Accountability Transparency International AOR: Anne Ngumbi	Facilitate TI Kenya to contribute to the implementation of the new Constitution in Kenya and strengthen institutions of governance and service delivery to espouse transparency and accountability	October 2011	October 2013	$ 643,558
Shujaaz FM Multimedia Youth Communications Initiative Well Told Story AOR: Monica Azimi	To reach, motivate and support millions of Kenyan youth with inspiring ideas, suggestions and best practices that advance and deepen the activities and goals of the USAID youth program.	June 2011	Sept 2013	$1,169,486

Activity/Implementer/AOR	Summary of Activity	Start Date	End Date	Funding
International Election Observation The Carter Center AOR: Zeph Aura	Long-term election observation mission to carry out independent assessment of Kenya's 2013 Elections and make recommendations for future improvements	January 2013	August 2013	$1,462,628

1.2 Development Context

1.1.1 Problem or Opportunity Addressed

The 2013 Presidential and General Elections were the first to be held under the new Constitution, and the fifth since the re-introduction of multi-party democracy in 1991. Whereas the 1992 and the 1997 general elections were characterized by administrative weaknesses and irregularities, the 2002 Elections marked substantial improvements with regard to electoral administration and competitiveness. The now-defunct Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) exhibited high levels of professionalism and institutional independence in the preparation and conduct of the 2002 General Elections. Kenyans, therefore, looked towards the 2007 General Elections as crucial in consolidating the gains of the 2002 Elections in strengthening multi-party democracy in Kenya.

However, the ECK faced a number of administrative and operational challenges in the run-up to the 2007 General Elections. Controversies over key electoral activities, including appointment of Commissioners, compilation of the register of voters, electioneering campaigns, recruitment and deployment of Returning Officers,[137] and tallying, transmission and announcement of results, undermined public confidence in the ECK and thus catalyzed the 2007/2008 post-election violence and humanitarian crisis.

The violence came to an end following the signing of the National Peace Accord on February 28, 2008. A number of commissions were formed to put into place comprehensive reforms agreed upon as part of the National Peace Accord. Key among these were the Independent Review Commission (IREC) on the General Elections (also known as the Kriegler Commission), and the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV). The Kriegler Commission in its report concluded that the conduct of the 2007 elections was so materially defective that it was impossible – for IREC or anyone else – to establish true or reliable results for the presidential and parliamentary elections.

IREC established by a statistical analysis of a sample of constituencies that innumerable elementary mistakes were made in tallying and/or transcribing results in addition to patent mistakes of omission and duplication. The Commission recommended disbandment of the ECK and overhaul of Kenya's electoral system. The Commission also recommended implementation of an integrated citizen registration system. In response to the recommendation, Kenya established the Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) with a mandate of creating a new voter registry and spearheading electoral reforms

[137] Returning Officers are election officials responsible for all polling, results tallying, and relaying activities within a constituency.

and promotion of democracy. Also created was the Interim Independent Boundaries Commission (IIBC) to address the issues of electoral boundaries.

An ambitious constitutional and legal reform effort was launched which saw Kenyans draft a new Constitution which was passed through a Constitutional Referendum on August 4, 2010 and promulgated on August 27, 2010. Most of the recommendations of the Kriegler Commission were adopted in the Constitution, including introduction of fundamental reforms to the electoral system and processes in Kenya. Article 81 of the Constitution reiterates the principles that underpin free and fair elections, including the freedom of citizens to exercise their political rights; gender equality; fair representation of persons with disabilities; universal suffrage and equality of vote; secrecy of the ballot; freedom from violence, intimidation, improper influence or corruption; independence of the body conducting the elections; and transparency and impartiality.

Part of the reforms, as provided for in the Constitution, called for the creation of a new independent election management body mandated to both conduct elections and delimit constituency boundaries. The Independent Election and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) was established in 2011, and has since overseen a broad range of election activities which culminated with the conduct of general elections on March 4, 2013.

1.1.2 Target Areas and Groups

Given Kenya's reform agenda, USAID/Kenya sought to strengthen the organizations and processes necessary for a credible and peaceful election in 2013. It directed its electoral assistance across Kenya through organizations that had national reach, such as Uraia Trust and Well Told Story. In addition, it worked with state institutions such as the IEBC and the Judiciary Working Committee on Election Preparations.

1.3 Program Objectives

The Development Objective from USAID/Kenya's Democracy and Governance Results Framework, as stated in the 2012 Project Approval Document, is "democratic and inclusive reform agenda advanced". Under this objective, the fifth intermediate result is "Free, fair, credible and peaceful elections held." This intermediate result is supported by three intermediate sub-results:

- IR5.1: Electoral administration and institutions strengthened;
- IR 5.2: Conflict mitigation, dispute resolution and response mechanisms strengthened; and
- IR 5.3: Population informed through civic education.

Election assistance was provided by USAID/Kenya with these results in mind. In the short-term, the United States Government (USG) anticipated that an independent, efficient, and effective electoral management body, coupled with an informed and active civil society and citizenry, would provide a stable environment for conducting free, fair, and peaceful elections in 2013. In the long-term, USG expects that Kenya's electoral framework and institutions, such as the electoral commission, political parties, and a domestic monitoring network, will be able to deliver transparent and accountable future elections.

1.4 Approach and Implementation

1.4.1 Approaches for providing electoral assistance

Election assistance was focused on seven approaches. These approaches were:

1. Strengthening the capacity of the Election Management Body
2. Election Dispute Resolution and Security
3. Professionalizing Political Parties
4. Election Observation
5. Civic and Voter Education
6. Media Engagement (For Balanced and Objective Media Coverage)
7. Participation of Marginalized groups (Women, Youth)

These approaches were implemented under ten mechanisms as shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Mechanisms used to implement approaches

Approach	Mechanisms											
	Political Parties Strengthening Program	Support to Electoral Reforms and Processes in Kenya – Immediate Needs & Basket Fund (Long Term)		Kenya Election and Political Process Strengthening			Uchaguzi Bora Initiative	Uongozi 2012 Campaign	Supporting the Kenya Constitutional Implementation Process	Strengthening Institutions of Governance and Service Delivery to Entrench Transparency and Accountability	Shujaaz	International Election Observation
		UNDP	UN Women	IFES	IRI	NDI						
Strengthening the capacity of the Election Management Body	×	×		×								
Election Dispute Resolution and Security	×	×		×					×			
Professionalizing Political Parties		×				×						
Election Observation	×					×						×
Civic and Voter Education	×				×		×	×		×	×	
Media Engagement	×					×						
Participation of Marginalized groups		×	×			×	×	×				

Six of these seven approaches map to the sub-intermediate results under the intermediate result as shown in Table 2.

Table 1: Mapping Approaches to Sub IRs

Approach	Sub IR
Civic and Voter Education	IR 5.3: Population informed through civic education.
Strengthening the capacity of the Election Management Body	IR5.1: Electoral administration and institutions strengthened.
Media Engagement	
Election Observation	IR5.1: Electoral administration and institutions strengthened.
Election Dispute Resolution and Security	IR 5.2: Conflict mitigation, dispute resolution and response mechanisms strengthened.
Professionalizing Political Parties	IR5.1: Electoral administration and institutions strengthened.
Participation of Marginalized groups (Women, Youth)	IR 5.3: Population informed through civic education.

1.4.2 Implementing Mechanisms

As shown in Table 1, each implementing mechanism used at least one of the seven approaches to provide elections assistance. Information on each of the ten implementing mechanisms provided by USAID/Kenya is as follows.

Political Parties Strengthening Program was implemented by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) to enhance the role of political parties in representing citizens' interests and increasing accountability in the Kenyan political process with a focus on strengthening the role of women and youth. Under this activity, NDI aimed to: (i) assist election stakeholders, including political parties, civil society organizations (CSOs), and institutional partners to apply analysis of election results to their work; (ii) strengthen the capacity of domestic observation/monitoring organizations; (iii) promote dialogue on national reform issues among political parties and between political parties and their civic and institutional partners; (iv) assist political parties to play a constructive role in the reform of electoral processes, to operate in compliance with the Political Parties Act, and develop consensus on implementation of key requirements; (v) strength political parties' capacity for policy formulation, implementation and performance monitoring; and (vi) increase the participation, recognition and role of women and youth in their parties' decision making structures and procedures and assist potential candidates for future elections.

Support to Electoral Reforms and Processes in Kenya – Immediate Needs and Basket Fund (Long Term) provided support to electoral reforms and processes in Kenya with a focus on enhancing the capacity of the IEBC toward the management of free, fair and credible elections in Kenya. This program, implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), has focused on four main components: institutional strengthening of the IEBC, electoral operations and civic participation and engagement and project management and coordination. Through UNDP, the program included electoral

security training and roll-out, and was jointly implemented with the National Police Service, and through UN Women the program included support to address elections-related gender-based violence.

Kenya Election and Political Process Strengthening (KEPPS) was implemented by the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS) partners, which are the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), and the International Republican Institute (IRI). KEPPS worked to improve Kenya's ability to hold free, fair, and peaceful elections. In particular, KEPPS has focused on the following areas: (i) strengthen the capacity of the newly formed Election Management Body; (ii) professionalize political parties, enabling them to play a constructive role in the reform agenda; (iii) support civic and voter education initiatives that inform and empower citizens to make informed decisions; (iv) enhance the capacity of the new, permanent domestic monitoring and observation coalition; and (v) engage the media to ensure it plays a positive and constructive role during the period leading to and during the 2013 elections.

NDI is working with political parties to recruit and promote women, youth, and other marginalized groups into the party decision-making processes and develop issue-based platforms. Through a Leadership and Campaign Academy women and youth are groomed to assume more active roles in the parties, many standing for their party's nomination as candidates. The Inter Party Youth Forum works at the national and county level to further ensure that youth issues that transcend ethnic divisions drive the political agenda. NDI promotes electoral accountability through domestic observation and expanding democratic space within parties to enhance participation of women and the youth. NDI also conducts regular surveys which helped inform USAID and the Embassy prior to the elections. NDI also provided technical assistance, strategic development, and training that resulted in the development of a credible, long-term observation program by the Elections Observation Group (ELOG). The technical expertise and support to ELOG members focused on Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT), and on Audit of Voters' register. In addition, through a sub-grant to Internews, NDI worked to strengthen the capacity of mainstream media outlets to understand and report fairly and objectively on the electoral process.

IFES works with the IEBC to implement progressive electoral reforms. This includes supporting internal systems and processes at IEBC and the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties, formulation of election-related regulations, voter education, dispute resolution and the use of technology systems.

IRI informs and empowers citizens through civic education. The program provides training and tools to civil society leaders who in turn encourage public participation and active engagement of citizens at membership meetings and community forums. Civic education is rolled-out through a training of trainer model and focused on using existing networks – especially of youth and persons with disabilities.

Uchaguzi Bora Initiative, implemented by Uraia Trust, was an umbrella under which 57 Kenyan civil society organizations support the training and deployment of civic educators and the dissemination of a national civic education curriculum in all 47 counties of Kenya. The program is a direct response to the post-election violence that occurred in 2007 and 2008 when the public space was captured and dominated by the political class through campaigns based on hate, ethnicity, and incitement. A national civic education curriculum, "The Citizen Handbook", was developed in coordination with IRI and by working closely with the IEBC to ensure accurate and timely dissemination of information on voting processes and systems ahead of the election.

Uongozi 2012 Campaign was a multi-media project designed to inspire young Kenyans to engage in the political process and to involve them in a public discussion about leadership. The cornerstone of Uongozi 2012 was the staging of a virtual national campaign and election on primetime television in which young Kenyans competed demonstrating their leadership skills.

Supporting the Kenya Constitutional Implementation Process, implemented by the International Development Law Organization (IDLO), supported the Judiciary Working Committee on Elections Preparations (JWCEP) to strengthen the capacity of the judiciary to prepare for the 2013 general

elections and related disputes. With this support, the judiciary was expected to resolve election disputes in accordance with relevant laws and the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. IDLO also supported strengthened institutional capacity of the judiciary to resolve electoral disputes and offences; increased sensitization among judges of electoral legislative and constitutional framework; and contributed to timely resolution of electoral disputes and offences in compliance with the Constitution. IDLO originally focused on constitutional drafting. Election programming was conducted only in 2012 and 2013.

Strengthening Institutions of Governance and Service Delivery to Entrench Transparency and Accountability was implemented by Transparency International (TI). The activity promotes greater understanding of citizens, particularly poor women and men, on electoral processes and issues, and of their role in holding government to account.

Shujaaz FM Multimedia Youth Communications Initiative, implemented by Well Told Story (WTS), created, published, and distributed more than 600,000 copies of the Shujaaz comic book to youth across Kenya. The comics illustrate stories of youth as change agents in governance and development issues. The same stories and themes that are featured in the comic book are broadcast in a 5-minute daily radio show on 26 FM radio stations across Kenya. The project uses social media such as Facebook and Twitter, as well as text messaging, to engage youth on the issues featured in Shujaaz comic strips and FM radio shows. Various episodes of Shujaaz.FM have focused on responsible leadership and politics in the run up to Kenyan general elections in 2013.

International Election Observation, implemented by the Carter Center, put in place a long-term election observation mission to provide a credible and impartial assessment of the electoral process, and shape perceptions of key national, regional and international stakeholders about the quality and credibility of the elections. The mission also highlighted challenges in the pre-electoral process, encouraged resolution of issues through clear and transparent measures, and provided recommendations to improve future electoral processes. The observation activities were expected to help to strengthen Kenya's independent electoral authority, open political space for multi-party electoral competition, and broaden the scope for citizens to participate in the political process without fear or intimidation. The Carter Center coordinated closely with other stakeholders including political parties, the IEBC (who officially invited the Center to deploy a mission), domestic and international observers, and diplomatic missions.

2. EVALUATION RATIONALE

2.1 Evaluation Purpose

The purpose of the evaluation is three-fold. The first is to determine the effectiveness of the election assistance provided for the Kenyan elections of 2013. The second is to identify activities funded by and practices used by USAID/Kenya that can be adopted for electoral assistance projects in other countries. Lastly, given the global trend of reduced USAID election-related funding, the results of the evaluation will also guide USAID/Kenya in designing future electoral assistance.

2.2 Audience and Intended Use

This evaluation is intended for both USAID/Kenya and USAID/Washington's Office of Democracy, Rights and Governance. It is also expected to inform the larger donor community in Kenya, as well as key partners who participated in the preparation and conduct of the 2013 elections.

2.3 Evaluation Questions

The evaluation seeks to answer the following six questions:

1. To what degree did USAID's electoral assistance, using the seven identified approaches contribute to the 2013 elections? These seven approaches are: (i) Strengthening the Capacity of

the Election Management Body; (ii) Election Dispute Resolution and Security; (iii) Professionalizing Political Parties; (iv) Election Observation; (v) Civic and Voter Education; (vi) Media Engagement; and (vii) Participation of Marginalized groups.

2. To what extent has USG electoral assistance strengthened the technical and, where applicable administrative, capacity for delivery and/or reporting of accountable elections in the future of (i) the electoral commission; (ii) major political parties; (iii) domestic monitoring network; (iv) media; and (v) civil society organizations funded by USAID?
3. How appropriate was the mix and timing of activities in addressing the needs identified by both past and ongoing evidence?
4. To what extent did USAID coordinate with other donors to maximize the leverage of USG resources and funds?
5. To what extent were the electoral assistance activities effective in promoting participation by women and youth?
6. What are some lessons that can inform the design of future electoral assistance projects both in Kenya and globally?

USAID expects that under Question 1 the evaluation team will examine the activities that were undertaken under each of the seven approaches to determine their contribution, both positive and negative, to the 2013 elections. The Project Approval Document (PAD), dated October 2012, specifies activities rather than objectives. These activities map onto the seven approaches as shown in Table 3. It should be noted that two activities listed in the PAD are not covered by these approaches and, based on USAID guidance, will not be considered during this evaluation. USAID's use of the term contribution in this question recognizes that the approaches and activities in which it invested were not carried out in isolation. Government election activities and those of other actors were also ongoing, and USAID's contribution to the elections will need to be examined in light of those parallel efforts.

Table 2: Mapping PAD Activities to Approaches

From SOO: Program Area / Approach	From PAD: Specific Activities
Civic and Voter Education	Ensure that citizens have the knowledge they need to run for office and vote.
Strengthening the capacity of the Election Management Body	Improve the new IEBC's capacity to effectively administer credible elections.
Media Engagement	Ensure that the Media plays a positive role in information dissemination for the election.
Election Observation	Support local, regional, and international efforts to monitor electoral processes.
Election Dispute Resolution and Security	Ensure credible election dispute resolution, particularly related to election of the President.
Professionalizing Political Parties	Strengthen the ability of civil society to support citizen participation in the elections and monitor the

From SOO: Program Area / Approach	From PAD: Specific Activities
	actions of Parliament, key commissions, the Executive and political parties.
Participation of Marginalized groups (Women, Youth)	

For question 2, the evaluation team will assess the technical capacity of the organizations as it relates to sustainability. The team will look at the sustainability of both the organizations and the activities undertaken by the organizations. In cases where relevant assistance was provided, the team will also look at administrative capacity.

Past evidence for question 3 refers to, but is not limited to, internal USAID documents such as Kenya: Democracy and Governance Assessment and Strategy 2011 and documents external to USAID such as the Report of the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections held in Kenya on December 27, 2007 and the Final Evaluation Report of the 2007 Joint Elections Assistance Programme. When examining ongoing evidence, the evaluators will consider the flexibility of USAID's programming in responding to issues as they emerged during project implementation.

To answer question 4, evaluators will look at how USAID coordinated with other donors to maximize its comparative advantage without duplicating efforts.

Women and youth targeting is often an after-thought to the design of a project. Therefore, for question 5, in addition to assessing the effectiveness of USAID-funded activities that targeted women and youth, the evaluators will also look at the inclusion of such activities during the project design phase.

To answer question 6, the evaluators will look at lessons for future electoral assistance, keeping in mind that funds available for the Kenyan elections in 2018 may be less than the funds available for the 2013 elections. The team will look at recommendations which are relevant both within Kenya and globally.

While **gender** will be specifically addressed in question 5, it will also be viewed as a cross-cutting theme to be explored, where appropriate, throughout the evaluation. The evaluation team is expected to be responsive to USAID's dual expectations for treating gender appropriately: (a) gathering sex disaggregated data and (b) identifying gender differential participation in/benefits from aspects of the program where differences on this basis are possible.

3. EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Evaluation Design

Given that this is an overall project evaluation, the evaluation team will not look at each implementing mechanism in its entirety. Instead, the evaluators will look at the seven overarching approaches used within the Election Project and the activities associated with these approaches. This project evaluation will be retrospective and prospective, looking backward to examine the change from the beginning of the project until August 2013, as well as maintaining an eye towards learning for future programming. Also, the team will need to reconstruct 'before' and 'after' scenarios for activities that do not have a baseline in order to understand the contribution made by USAID's Electoral Assistance.

The evaluation team will use well-developed data collection and analysis methods to address each of USAID's evaluation questions. A preliminary version of a matrix for associating data collection and analysis methods with evaluation questions (*Getting to Answers*) is provided in Annex D. This matrix shares the initial thinking about appropriate methodological choices. The evaluation team will review and

refine this methodology, or suggest higher quality alternatives that could be employed at no additional cost beyond what USAID has allotted for this evaluation. Details the evaluation team adds to this preliminary plan for gathering and analyzing data on each evaluation question shall be submitted to USAID for review/approval as part of the evaluation team's Methodology and Workplan (Section 4.1).

3.2 Data Collection Methods

Some key aspects of the data collection are the following:

Document Review

The evaluation team will review documentation provided by USAID on the program, and any relevant secondary research they collect. The evaluation team will also be responsible for using online resources and on-site inquiries to identify documents that describe parallel election support efforts in order to respond to Question 1's expectation that USAID-funded activities and approaches will be analyzed through a contribution analysis that takes other contributions to the election process into account. The product of the team's document review will be an organized presentation of information found in relation to each of the evaluation questions. A matrix is viewed as being an efficient way to present this information. It is expected that the evaluation team will present initial findings from the document review as part of the Team Planning Meeting (Section 4.1) at the beginning of the evaluation. In addition, the team will develop a framework and use documentary evidence to start populating it with data to enable the comparison exercise mentioned in section 3.3.

Key Informant Interviews

USAID provided electoral assistance, through ten implementing mechanisms, to a large number of organizations and partners. The evaluation team will identify Key Informants based on document review, key contacts provided by USAID and information received from partners. These will likely include representatives from: (i) partners; (ii) key beneficiaries, including IEBC, The Judiciary Working Committee on Election Preparations, Office of the Registrar of Political Parties, and National Police Service; and (iii) other key actors, including those who were involved in planning or implementing USAID funded election assistance. Key Informant Interviews will be conducted using a semi-structured interview tool that will be developed as part of the Team Planning Meeting. A list of key informants to be interviewed will be presented to USAID for approval prior to data collection.

Group Discussions

In order to get an understanding of the effect of the assistance on specific beneficiaries such as youth, civic education trainers, journalists, civil society organizations, etc., the team will conduct a minimum of twelve, but no more than twenty four, group discussions. The variance in the number of group discussions is indicative of the uncertainty in the willingness of beneficiaries to participate. Some beneficiaries, such as election officials and police, may be unwilling to participate in a group discussion. In such instances, group discussions may need to be replaced by one-on-one interviews. Therefore, the exact number of group discussions beyond the minimum of twelve mentioned above cannot be determined at this time. The participants for group discussions will be selected from beneficiary lists provided by IPs.

Other Types of Evidence of the Results of USAID-Funded Activities

In addition to methods suggested above, the evaluation team may propose other data gathering methods, including obtaining/reviewing existing data sets, photographs, or other types of evidence that will effectively document or demonstrate the results of USAID investments in the election support approaches and activities described above.

Site Visits

Given that electoral assistance was provided all across Kenya, it is not feasible for the team to visit a representative sample of sites, mentioned in the SOO. Therefore, in addition to Nairobi, the team will focus on a handful of counties. The team will visit Kisumu county, Nakuru county, Mombasa county, and several counties near these three counties. The final selection of counties will be purposive to allow the team to consider factors such as (i) urban and rural populations; (ii) ethnicity of majority of the residents; (iii) areas of special interest for USAID/Kenya; and (iv) concentration of USAID-funded activities. During these site visits, the team will conduct key informant interviews and group discussions[138], as described earlier.

3.3 Data Analysis Methods

The evaluation team will design a data analysis plan as part of the evaluation methodology. This will ensure that the data collection methods, including tools, feed into the data analysis and synthesis of findings to allow for quick reporting. The six main data analysis methods that the team will use are described below.

Comparison

The team will use comparisons to assess activities in relation to the targets, both with respect to planned and actual input delivery and in terms of planned and actual levels of results at the output level and beyond. For each of the seven approaches, the team will look at:

- The activity(s) listed in the PAD that the approach maps to;
- The specific activities carried out by partners;
- The extent of the delivery of inputs for partner activities, by comparing the targets and actuals;
- The extent of the delivery of outputs for partner activities, by comparing the targets and actuals; and
- The extent of achievement of the results (at the Sub IR level and, to the extent possible, the IR level) by comparing the expected outcome to the actual.

In order to gather evidence on the actual delivery of inputs and outputs, and the actual achievement of results, the team will rely on project documents, secondary sources and primary data collected during interviews, and group discussions.

This comparison exercise will be started as part of the desk review and feedback will be sought at the partner meeting during the Team Planning Meeting. This comparison will help provide an overall framework for the evaluation and help in informing the development of tools.

Descriptive Statistics

The team will use descriptive statistics to analyze quantitative data obtained from documents. The two main analytical tools that the team will use include frequency distributions and cross-tabulation analysis.

[138] It is likely that the team will conduct two group discussions in Nairobi's informal settlements, six group discussions around Nakuru, and eight group discussions around Mombasa and Kisumu. The final breakdown, however, will be proposed by the evaluation team as part of the methodology document that is submitted to USAID for approval during the Team Planning Meeting.

Content, Pattern and Trend Analysis

For qualitative data from Group Discussions and Key Informant Interviews, the team is expected to document narrative responses at a sufficient level of detail to permit a systematic content analysis of these data. Narrative reviews of interview and discussion responses are expected to provide an in-depth understanding of the experiences and opinions of beneficiaries and stakeholders. The team will also examine written documentation of interview and discussion results for patterns, using content analysis and other relevant approaches, to determine whether some responses received appear to be correlated with other factors, such as geography, partner institution, and gender. Looking at trends over time will also allow the team to consider changes in implementation that may have occurred over time.

Response Convergence/Divergence Analysis

The team will review all qualitative and quantitative data collected to determine where there is significant response convergence from the varied stakeholders and beneficiaries. Where divergence is found, the team will follow-up to better understand the context and reasons for divergence in facts, perceptions or opinions.

Mixed Methods Data Integration

Since the team is using a mixed methods approach, data collected from the various methods will be integrated to arrive at findings. Where different methods converge yielding a finding that is supported by multiple types of data, this should be noted. When different methods produce conflicting evidence, the evaluation team will, to the extent possible, double back to examine the degree to which findings from different methods on the same question diverged to determine why these data conflict. If teams decide to weight data from various methods to express the strength (validity/reliability) of various lines of evidence, the weighting approach should be documented and explained as USAID will need to understand why one method was given precedence over others in reaching conclusions.

Validation Workshop

A half-day validation workshop with partners and USAID will be held at the end of data collection and the beginning of data analysis to discuss and validate emerging findings, brainstorm the appropriateness and feasibility of potential recommendations, and fill in any gaps in data that the evaluation team identified.

3.4 Methodological Strengths and Limitations

The use of mixed methods will allow the team to obtain an understanding of both the *what* and the *why* for the responses received from various stakeholders and beneficiaries. In addition, the site visits will allow the evaluators to be less Nairobi-centric and understand opinions and experiences outside the capital city.

Disentangling USAID's concrete contribution to the 2013 Elections will be challenging due to a number of other actors and donors working on similar activities. Further, many other contextual factors may have impacted the peaceful elections. Causal inference based on empirical data will be employed to the extent possible to credibly show a relationship between the conduct of elections and the activities the projects undertook.

Given the possible variance in branding and marking, and the large number of organizations, both USAID and non-USAID funded, that were involved in civic and voter education, there may be issues of association by beneficiaries to specific USAID activities. The team will attempt to address this challenge, to the extent possible, by using specific partner names, events, and products.

It should be noted that the scope of this evaluation does not cover Yes Youth Can, a mechanism used by USAID/DRG to work on elections related programming targeting youth. Therefore, this evaluation will give only a partial picture on USAID/Kenya's youth programming for the 2013 Elections.

Other constraints, as identified by USAID, include:

1. The on-going audits and debate on credibility of the IEBC may lead to information fatigue at the IEBC.
2. Due to the collaborative partnerships established with key actors, such as the Government of Kenya, other donors, and the basket type of funding adopted, attribution of impact and success may pose a challenge.
3. Public trust on the IEBC is currently low following the challenges it faced during the conduct of the 2013 elections.
4. Resolve to maintain peace by Kenyans, and the role played by the political leadership, may be a key intervening variable in the overall outcome.
5. Possibility of a looming referendum and a large number by–elections arising from ongoing petitions

4. EVALUATION PRODUCTS

4.1 Processes and Deliverables

The following dates are illustrative since they are based on the assumption that the task order will be awarded no later than November 30, 2013.

Deliverable	Responsible Party	Illustrative Dates
Initial meeting with USAID to discuss expectations, review evaluation questions, and answer any specific questions.	MSI/USAID	Jan 21
Partner workshop to discuss evaluation purpose and methodology and answer specific questions.	MSI/USAID/ Partners	Jan 22
Work plan submitted to USAID, including detailed methodologies for each evaluation question and precisely what elements of each project are to be examined.	MSI	Jan 27 (COB)
Meeting with USAID on work plan where agreement is reached and approval provided (perhaps with articulated changes).	MSI/USAID	Jan 29
Letter of Introduction to be used with local authorities and will facilitate any meetings at the national level that may be determined necessary.	USAID	Jan 30
Weekly reports at the end of weeks 5, 6, 7 and 8	MSI	Feb 4, Feb 11, Feb 18 and Feb 25
A half-day (morning) validation workshop with all partners and USAID	MSI/USAID/ Partners	Mar 5
Presentation of findings to USAID at USAID/DRG	MSI	Mar 12
Presentation of findings to IPs and their AOR/CORs at MSI	MSI	Mar 12
Presentation for all Mission staff at USAID	MSI	Mar 13
Draft report submitted	MSI	Apr 7

Deliverable	Responsible Party	Illustrative Dates
Comments from USAID on draft report	USAID	Apr 30
Final report and submission of all raw data and electronic copies of all background documents on CDs	MSI	May 13
USAID approval of final report	USAID	May 22
Statement of Differences sent to MSI if applicable	USAID	June 5
MSI will incorporate statement of differences if applicable	MSI	June 10
USAID approval for DEC submission	USAID	June 13

A detailed breakdown of the process is listed below:

Weeks 1 & 2

Desk Review & Set up

In order to initiate data collection, the evaluation will review all the documents from their home base. These initial findings will be presented to MSI as part of the Team Planning Meeting. The team will also prepare for the partner meeting.

Weeks 3 & 4

Team Planning Meeting (TPM)

The TPM will be held in MSI offices once the evaluation team is in country. It is expected that the team will have the initial meeting with USAID to discuss expectations, review evaluation questions, and answer any specific questions. A half-day meeting with partners, including USAID, is scheduled during Week 3.

The outcomes of the team planning include:

- Presentation of the initial findings of the document review by evaluation question (MSI-only);
- Clarification of team members' roles and responsibilities;
- Establishment of a team atmosphere, share individual working styles, and agree on procedures for resolving differences of opinion;
- Review of the final evaluation questions;
- Review and finalization of the assignment timeline and share with USAID;
- Development of data collection and analysis methods, instruments, tools, and guidelines;
- Review and clarification of any logistical and administrative procedures for the assignment;
- Development of a preliminary draft outline of the team's report; and
- Assignment of drafting responsibilities for the final report.

Weeks 3 & 4	**Work plan and Methodology** During the TPM, the team will prepare a detailed work plan which will include the methodologies (evaluation design, tools) and operational work plan to be used in the evaluation. This will be submitted to USAID during Week 4. The team will meet with USAID during Week 4 for the Work Plan Review Meeting, to discuss the methodology and get approval prior to implementation.
Weeks 5 through 8	**Data Collection** MSI will present four weekly reports by email to USAID, starting in week 6 until the end of data collection. The report will discuss ongoing activities during the course of the evaluation describing the process, any issues encountered, and relevant emerging findings.
Weeks 8, 9 & 10	**Data Analysis** The evaluation team will analyze both the quantitative and qualitative data in these two weeks. An MSI-only workshop on mapping findings, conclusions and recommendations will also take place during this period.
Week 9	**Validation Meeting** A half-day meeting (morning) with all partners and USAID to validate and discuss findings, answer/clarify any data gaps; and discuss feasibility of potential recommendations.
Week 10	**Presentation with USAID/DRG and Partners** The evaluation team will present the major findings of the evaluation to USAID and partners in a PowerPoint presentation in two separate presentations. The presentation will follow a similar structure to the final report and present major findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Both the partners and USAID will have an opportunity to comment and provide input/feedback as part of the presentation. These comments will be incorporated into the draft report, as appropriate.
Week 10	**Presentation to all of USAID** This presentation will be open to all USAID staff interested in learning the main findings of the evaluation.
Week 15	**Draft Evaluation Report** The written report should clearly describe findings, conclusions, and recommendations, fully supported by triangulated evidence. USAID will provide comments on the draft report within two weeks of submission.
Week 19	**Final Evaluation Report:** The team will submit the final report that incorporates the team responses to Mission comments and suggestions. The format will adhere to the standard reporting guidelines listed in 4.2. USAID has one week thereafter for approval. If there are some outstanding questions, MSI will attempt to answer/incorporate them into the report as appropriate. Otherwise, USAID can consider a Statement of Differences.

The evaluation report will adhere to USAID Evaluation Policy and as such all raw quantitative data will need to be shared with USAID. Qualitative data will also be shared, if specifically requested by USAID.

It is expected that USAID will approve no later than one week after submitting the final evaluation report.

4.2 Reporting Guidelines

The format for the evaluation report shall be as follows, and the report should be a maximum of 35 pages not including annexes. The report format should be restricted to Microsoft products and 12-point font should be used throughout the body of the report, with 1" page margins. An electronic copy in MS Word shall be submitted. In addition, all data collected by the evaluation shall be provided to USAID in an electronic file in an easily readable format; organized and fully documented for use by those not fully familiar with the project or the evaluation. If the report contains any potentially procurement or politically sensitive information, a second version report excluding this information shall be submitted (also electronically, in English). Below represents a guideline for the report structure.

a. **Executive Summary**—concisely state the most salient findings and recommendations (3-5 pgs.);
b. Table of Contents (1 pg.);
c. **Evaluation Purpose and Evaluation Questions**—purpose, audience, and synopsis of task (1 pg.);
d. **Project Background**—brief overview of development problem, USAID project strategy and activities implemented to address the problem, and purpose of the evaluation (2-4 pgs.);
e. **Evaluation Design, Methods, Limitations**—describe evaluation methods, including constraints and gaps (1-2 pgs.);
f. **Findings/Conclusions/Recommendations**—for each evaluation question (25-30 pgs.);
g. **Annexes** that document the evaluation methods, schedules, interview lists and tables should be succinct, pertinent and readable. These include references to bibliographical documentation, meetings, interviews and group discussions.

5. TEAM COMPOSITION

The evaluation team will be composed of four individuals – two international team members and two national team members. The composition of the team seeks to match experiences and expertise in the following areas: evaluation /research methods, civic and voter education, political party strengthening, electoral administration, and the Kenyan context. Thus, the team leader, who is an international member, has expertise in electoral administration in addition to evaluation expertise. The second international team member has experience with civic voter education, and training of political party and civil society organizations. The national team member has knowledge on Kenyan reforms and experience with electoral assistance in multiple African countries. CVs for personnel can be found in Annex B. In addition, technical oversight and review will be provided by MSI Technical Director Dr. Ellen Seats, who is an election and evaluation expert. Dr. Seats will review and provide feedback to the evaluation team several times during the evaluation, including during the development of methodology and the draft report.

Given that this evaluation is looking at ten different partner organizations, many of whom work globally on election-related assistance; MSI found that individuals with the expertise necessary for the evaluation had worked with one or more of these organizations in the past. In order to mitigate any Conflict of Interest (COI), real or perceived, MSI has put into place a two-step plan. During the TPM, the evaluation team will reach an agreement with the MSI Kenya team on potential areas of conflict of interest. For every instance of a possible COI with a partner, the team will assign one of the team members without a possibility of COI to be the 'lead' in data collection and analysis for the given partner. If there is any

disagreement regarding findings and conclusions between the 'lead' and other team members, the matter will be brought to the attention of both MSI-Kenya staff and Dr. Ellen Seats for resolution.

6. EVALUATION MANAGEMENT

6.1 Logistics

USAID/Kenya will provide input through an initial in-briefing to the evaluation team, identify key documents, and assist in introducing the evaluation team to the implementing partner. It will also be available for consultations regarding sources and technical issues with the evaluation team during the evaluation process. USAID/Kenya is expected to participate in the stakeholder workshop and as key informant interviewees. USAID is also expected to provide letters of introduction for key actors and beneficiaries, if needed.

MSI will assist in arranging meetings with key stakeholders identified prior to the initiation of field work. MSI will be responsible for arranging vehicle rental and drivers as needed for site visits around Nairobi and the field. MSI will also provide hotel arrangements office space, internet access, printing, and photocopying and be responsible for all payments to vendors directly after team members arrive in country.

The evaluation team will be responsible for arranging other meetings as identified during the course of the evaluation. It will advise USAID/Kenya of any meetings with the Government of Kenya and seek advice from USAID/Kenya on whether they choose to participate.

6.2 Scheduling

Work is to be carried out over a period of approximately 17 weeks, beginning with document review. Team members will deploy to Kenya at the end of Week 2. Field work will be completed by Week 7. Given the amount of qualitative data that the evaluation is likely to generate, the team will need two weeks to analyze it. Therefore, the initial findings presentation will be made in Week 9 and the final report will be submitted in Week 17. Exact scheduling and division of labor will be reviewed during the Team Planning Meeting and presented in the Methodology and Workplan.

6.3 Budget

The budget is attached as a separate document.

ANNEX A: STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES AID-623-I-12-0001

STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

Under Contract AID-623-I-12-00001

Project Name: Evaluation of USAID Electoral Assistance to Kenya

Type of Evaluation: Election Project Evaluation
Period to be evaluated: Jan 2008 – August 2013
(Note: different partners began working at various times during this period)
Date Completed Evaluation is needed: December 2013

REQUIRED ATTACHMENTS
(Embed or attach documents in cells indicated below)

AAD or PAD Approving this Project	**Attachment to be uploaded to MSI Drop Box**
Relevant Mission Strategy	**None were applicable**
Office PMP with Results Framework –	**Attachment to be uploaded to MSI Drop Box**
Assessments Completed to Inform this Project	**Attachment to be uploaded to MSI Drop Box: "DG Assmt and Strategy 2011"**
Previous Evaluations of this Project (indicate if none done)	**Attachment to be uploaded to MSI Drop Box:** ***Final Evaluation Report: the 2007 joint Elections Assistance Programme Evaluation 2010 Referendum***
Baseline Assessment (if Impact Evaluation is Requested)	***None were done***
Project Description from Agreements with Partner (original and mods; for ILs must include project proposals) **Project PMP with Results Framework** **Project Annual Work Plans – Project Performance Reports** (write number per year: 2-4) – **Site Visit Monitoring Reports** (indicate number provided per year)	**These documents (that are available) for each activity are listed in Annex 1, and files will be uploaded to the MSI Drop Box**
List of Activity Locations by	**See Annex 2: "List of Activity Locations by County"**

County

USAID Elections Assistance Implementing Partners

Project/Implementer/AOR	Summary of Program	Activity Start Date	Activity End Date	Funding
Political Parties Strengthening Program **National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) - awarded though the CEPPS II Leader with Associate** AOR: Sheila Karani	Strengthen internal party democracy by promoting greater gender and youth participation and, facilitate dialogue between parties, Kenya's electoral administrative body, and other government entities involved in elections	2008	May 2011	$3,260,272**
Support to Electoral reforms in Kenya-Immediate needs **UNDP** AOR: Sheila Karani	Support to the Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC); provide continued support for the referendum on the draft Constitution, elections and longer-term assistance to the electoral reform process in Kenya	March 2010	March 2011	$3,250,000
Support to Electoral Reforms and Processes in Kenya UNDP Basket AOR: Zeph Aura	Enhance the capacity of the IEBC toward the management of free, fair and credible elections in Kenya	May 2012	Dec 2013	$2,900,000
Consortium for Elections and Political **Process Strengthening (CEPPS)** NDI/ IFES/ IRI. AOR: Zeph Aura	Provide assistance and support in elections and political processes	May 2011	April 2014	$21,281,291

Uchaguzi Bora Initiative URAIA TRUST AOR: Zeph Aura	The Uraia Trust *basket fund* civic and voter education campaign provided quality civic education and that helped Kenyan citizens make informed decision on the 2013 elections and participate effectively on devolution.	June 2012	Nov 2013	$961, 564
Uongozi 2012 Campaign Project INUKA TRUST –basket funding AOR: Zeph Aura	A multi-media reality TV campaign aimed at mobilizing young Kenyans to make informed decisions devoid of hate and ethnicity around elections.	March 2012	Dec 2013	$1,600,000
Supporting the Kenya Constitutional Implementation Process International Development Law Organization (IDLO) AOR: Sheila Karani	Strengthen the capacity of the Judiciary to prepare for the 2013 general elections and related disputes through close collaboration with the Judiciary Working Committee on Elections Preparations	June 2011	February 2013 *(elections component 2012-2013 only)*	$ 995,648
Strengthening Institutions of Governance and Service Delivery to Entrench Transparency and Accountability TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL AOR: Anne Ngumbi	facilitate TI Kenya to contribute to the implementation of the new Constitution in Kenya and strengthen institutions of governance and service delivery to espouse transparency and accountability	October 2011	October 2013	$ 643,558
Shujaaz FM Multimedia Youth Communications Initiative WELL TOLD STORY AOR: Monica Azimi		June 2011	Sept 2013	$1,169,486
International Election Observation The Carter Center	Long-term election observation mission to carry out independent assessment of the Kenya's 2013 Elections and make recommendations for future improvements	January 2013	August 2013	$1,462,628

AOR: Zeph Aura				

ESSENTIAL POINTS OF CONTACT (Add Well Told Story and TI)

GRANTEES/ ORGANIZATION	NAMES	MAILING/PHYSICAL ADDRESS	LANDLINE TELEPHONE	CELL PHONE	E-MAIL
National Democratic Institute (NDI)	Mary O'Hagan Chief of Party (Departing Kenya with a new COP arriving in late August)	P.O Box 1806 00200 City Square Nairobi, Kenya Methodist Ministries Center, Oloi Toktok Street next to Methodist Guest House	3877051	0733-637831	ohaganm@ndi.org
International Republican Institute (IRI)	John Tomaszewski Country Director Ms. Husna Hassan Program Manager	Box 3778-00200 Eden Square Business Centre Chiromo Lane off Chiromo Rd 2nd flr, Block B Westlands Nairobi	3673345; 3878012	0723-562-944 0727-588-050	jtomaszewski@iri.org hhassan@iri.org
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)	Michael Yard Chief of Party Kate Simba	Embarkment Plaza 11th Floor Upper Hill Office Administrator		0716-867605 0734-431647	myard@ifes.org

Inuka Kenya Trust - Uongozi	John Githongo Chief Executive	Othaya Road House 41 Off Gitanga Road		0717-786688 0715-524664	jgithongo@inukakenya.com
UNDP	Alfredo Teixeira, Deputy Resident Representative (Program) Carmina Sanchis Ruescas Technical Advisor, Support to Electoral Reforms and Processes in Kenya	UN – Gigiri Opp: US Embassy		0714-054449 0708-878974	**alfredo.teixeira@undp.org**, **carmina.sanchis.ruescas@undp.org**
Uraia Trust	Grace Maingi Executive Director	P.O. Box 28151-00100 GPO, Nairobi Uraia Hse, Jacaranda Avenue Off Gitanga Road	213-5561 213-5571 (D/L)	0722 379575 or 0727 838699	gmaingi@uraia.or.ke
International Law Development Institute (IDLO)	Enid Muthoni Field Program Manager	P.O. Box 101650-00101 Green House, 4th Flr Suite No. 10 Adams Arcade Off Ngong Road	2664037	0727-532240	emuthoni@idlo.int
Well Told Story-Shujaaz	Rob Burnet	1st Floor, Acacia Building	2603214	0726- 052 372	rob.burnet@wts.co.ke

	Chief of Party	Karen Near Nakumatt Karen P. O. Box 1700–00502 Nairobi Kenya			
Transparency International – Kenya (TI)	Samuel Kimeu Executive Director	P.O. Box 198-00200 City Square, Nairobi ACK Garden House, 1st Ngong Avenue, Nairobi	2727763 2727765 2730324/5	0733-834659 0722-296589	skimeu@tikenya.org

A.1. BACKGROUND

The 2013 Presidential and General Elections were the first to be held under the new Constitution, and the fifth since the re-introduction of multi-party democracy in 1991. Whereas the 1992 and the 1997 general elections were characterized by administrative weaknesses and irregularities, the 2002 Elections were a departure from the 1992 and 1997 with regard to electoral administration and competitiveness. The defunct Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) exhibited high levels of professionalism and institutional independence in the preparation and conduct of the 2002 General Elections. Kenyans therefore looked towards the 2007 General Elections as crucial in consolidating the gains of the 2002 Elections in strengthening multi-party democracy in Kenya.

However, ECK faced a number of administrative and operational challenges in the run-up to the 2007 General Elections. Controversies over key electoral activities ranging from appointment of Commissioners, the compilation of the register of voters, electioneering campaigns, recruitment and deployment of Returning Officers,[139] to tallying, transmission and announcement of results undermined public confidence on the ECK, and thus catalyzed the 2007/2008 post-election violence and humanitarian crisis.

The violence came to an end following the signing of the National Peace Accord on February 28th, 2008. The signing of the National Accord was preceded by intense African Union-led international mediation

[139] Returning Officers are election officials responsible for all polling, results tallying, and relaying activities within a constituency.

under the leadership of the former UN Secretary General Dr. Kofi Annan. The Accord resulted in a power sharing arrangement in a Grand Coalition Government constituted by Hon. Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU) as the President and Hon. Raila Odinga of Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) as the Prime Minister. A roadmap of returning Kenya to normalcy and bringing the country back to comprehensive reforms, and addressing immediate, structural and proximate causes of the crisis was also agreed upon.

A number of commissions were formed to move this process forward. Key among these was the Independent Review Commission (IREC) on the General Elections, held in Kenya on 27 December 2007 (also known as the Kriegler Commission), and the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV). The Kriegler Commission in its report concluded that the conduct of the 2007 elections was so materially defective that it was impossible – for IREC or anyone else – to establish true or reliable results for the presidential and parliamentary elections.

IREC however, established by a statistical analysis of a sample of constituencies, that innumerable elementary mistakes were made in tallying and/or transcribing results as well as patent mistakes of omission and duplication. The Commission recommended disbandment of the ECK and overhaul of the Kenya's electoral system. The Commission also recommended implementation of an integrated population registration system. In response to the recommendation, Kenya established the Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) with a mandate of creating a new voter's register and spearheading electoral reforms and promotion of democracy. Also created was the Interim Independent Boundaries Commission (IIBC) to address the issues of electoral boundaries.

An ambitious constitutional and legal reform effort was launched which saw Kenyans draft a new Constitution which was passed through a Constitutional Referendum on August 4, 2010 and promulgated on August 27, 2010. Most of the recommendations of the Kriegler Commission were adopted in the Constitution, including introduction of fundamental reforms to the electoral system and processes in Kenya. Article 81 of the Constitution reiterates the principles that underpin free and fair elections, including the freedom of citizens to exercise their political rights; gender equality; fair representation of persons with disabilities; universal suffrage and equality of vote; secrecy of the ballot; freedom from violence, intimidation, improper influence or corruption; independence of the body conducting the elections; and transparency and impartiality.

Part of the reforms as provided for in the Constitution called for the creation of a new independent election management body mandated to both conduct elections and delimit constituency boundaries. The Independent Election and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) was established in 2011, and since has overseen a broad range of election activities which culminated with the conduct of general elections on March 4, 2013.

A.1.1 Program Objectives

Under the Democracy and Governance results framework (in the Attached Project Appraisal Document), the democratic and inclusive reform agenda advanced DO is captured under the fifth Intermediate Result (IR) on free, fair, credible and peaceful elections. This IR is supported by three sub IRs namely Electoral administration and institutions strengthened; Conflict mitigation, dispute resolution and response mechanisms strengthened and population informed through civic education.

In the short-term, the USG anticipated that an independent, efficient, and effective electoral management body – coupled with an informed and active civil society – would provide a stable environment for conducting free, fair, and peaceful elections in 2013. In the long-term, it was expected that Kenya's electoral framework and institutions – namely, the electoral commission, political parties,

and a domestic monitoring network – would be able to deliver transparent and accountable future elections for the Kenya people.

Program Area / Approach	**Project/ Mechanism**	**Implementer**
Strengthening the capacity of the Election Management Body	**Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS)** **Support to Electoral Reforms and Processes in Kenya**	IFES UNDP
Election Dispute Resolution and Security	**Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS)** **Support to Electoral Reforms and Processes in Kenya** **Supporting the Kenya Constitutional Implementation Process**	IFES UNDP IDLO
Professionalizing Political Parties	**Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS)** **Support to Electoral Reforms and Processes in Kenya**	NDI UNDP

Program Area / Approach	Project/ Mechanism	Implementer
Election Observation	**Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS)** **International Election Observation**	NDI The Carter Centre
Civic and Voter Education	**Uchaguzi Bora Initiative** **Uongozi 2012 Campaign Project** **Strengthening Institutions of Governance and Service Delivery to Entrench Transparency and Accountability** **Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS)** **Shujaaz FM Multimedia Youth Communications Initiative**	URAIA TRUST INUKA TRUST TI IRI WTS
Media Engagement	**Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS)** **Shujaaz FM Multimedia Youth Communications Initiative**	NDI (through InterNews) WTS

Program Area / Approach	Project/ Mechanism	Implementer
Participation of Marginalized groups (Women, Youth)	**Uchaguzi Bora Initiative**	URAIA TRUST
	Uongozi 2012 Campaign Project	INUKA TRUST
	Support to Electoral Reforms and Processes in Kenya	UNDP and UN Women
	Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS)	NDI

A.1.2 Implementing Mechanisms Chosen to Accomplish Objectives

Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS). The CEPPS Partners, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) implement the Kenya Election and Political Process Strengthening (KEPPS). The KEPPS Program 2012 has worked to improve Kenya's ability to hold free, fair, and peaceful elections. In particular, KEPPS has focused on the following areas: (1) strengthen the capacity of the newly formed Election Management Body; (2) professionalize political parties, enabling them to play a constructive role in the reform agenda; (3) support civic and voter education initiatives that inform and empower citizens to make informed decisions; (4) enhance the capacity of the new, permanent domestic monitoring and observation coalition; and (5) engage the media to ensure it plays a positive and constructive role during the period leading up to, and during, the 2012 elections.

NDI is working with political parties to recruit and promote women, youth, and other marginalized groups into the party decision-making processes and develop issue-based platforms. Through a Leadership and Campaign Academy women and youth are groomed to assume more active roles in the parties, many standing for their party's nomination as candidates. The Inter Party Youth Forum works at the national and county level to further ensure that youth issues that transcend ethnic divisions drive the political agenda. NDI promotes electoral accountability through domestic observation and expanding democratic space within parties to enhance participation of women and the youth. NDI also conducts regular surveys which helped inform USAID and the Embassy prior to the elections. NDI also provided technical assistance, strategic development, and training that resulted in the development of a credible, long-term observation program by the Elections Observation Group (ELOG). The technical expertise and support to ELOG members focused on Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT), and on Audit of Voters' register.

IFES works hand in hand with the IEBC to implement progressive electoral reforms. This includes supporting internal systems and processes at IEBC and the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties,

formulation of election-related regulations, voter education, dispute resolution and the use of technology systems.

IRI informs and empowers citizens through civic education. The program provides training and tools to civil society leaders who in turn encourage public participation and active engagement of citizens at membership meetings and community forums. Civic education is rolled-out through a training of trainer model and focused on using existing networks – especially of youth and persons with disabilities.

Uraia Trust – is an umbrella, under which 57 Kenyan civil society organizations support the training and deployment of civic educators and the dissemination of a national civic education curriculum in all 47 counties of Kenya. The program is a direct response to the post-election violence that occurred in 2007 and 2008 when the public space was captured and dominated by the political class through campaigns based on hate, ethnicity, and incitement. A national civic education curriculum, "The Citizen Handbook", was developed in coordination with IRI and by working closely with the IEBC to ensure accurate and timely dissemination of information on voting processes and systems ahead of the election.

Uongozi 2012 Campaign – A multi-media project designed to inspire young Kenyans to engage in the political process and to involve them in a public discussion about leadership. The cornerstone of Uongozi 2012 was the staging of a virtual national campaign and election on primetime television in which young Kenyans contested demonstrating their leadership skills.

UNDP Basket Fund – Support to Electoral Reforms and Processes in Kenya- To enhance the capacity of the IEBC toward the management of free, fair and credible elections in Kenya. This program has focused on four main components: institutional strengthening of the IEBC, electoral operations and civic participation and engagement and project management and coordination.

IDLO - Supported the Judiciary Working Committee on Elections Preparations (JWCEP) to strengthen the capacity of the Judiciary to prepare for the 2013 general elections and related disputes. With this support, the Judiciary was expected to resolve election disputes in accordance with relevant laws and the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. The support also strengthened institutional capacity of the judiciary to resolve electoral disputes and offences; Increase sensitization among judges of electoral legislative and constitutional framework and contribute to timely resolution of electoral disputes and offences in compliance with the Constitution.

The Carter Center conducted a long-term election observation mission to provide a credible and impartial assessment of the electoral process, and shape perceptions of key national, regional and international stakeholders about the quality and credibility of the elections. The mission also highlighted challenges in the pre-electoral process, encourage resolution of issues through clear and transparent measures, and provide recommendations to improve future electoral processes. The observation activities were expected to help to strengthen Kenya's independent electoral authority, open political space for multi-party electoral competition, and broaden the scope for citizens to participate in the political process without fear or intimidation. The Carter Center coordinated closely with other stakeholders including political parties, the IEBC (who officially invited the Center to deploy a mission), domestic and international observers, and diplomatic missions.

Well Told Story (WTS) creates, publishes, and distributes more than 600,000 copies of the Shujaaz comic book to youth across Kenya. The comics illustrate stories of youth as change agents in governance and development issues. The same stories and themes that are featured in the comic book are broadcast in a 5-minute daily radio show on 26 FM radio stations across Kenya. The project uses social media such as Facebook and Twitter, as well as text messaging, to engage youth on the issues featured in Shujaaz comic strips and FM radio shows. Various episodes of Shujaaz.FM have focused on responsible leadership and politics in the run up to Kenyan general elections in 2013

Transparency International (TI) creates greater understanding of citizens, particularly poor women and men, on electoral processes and issues, and of their role in holding Government to account

A.2. STATEMENT OF WORK

A.2.1. Evaluation Purpose

To determine the extent to which USAID's elections assistance, as provided by these ten organizations, contributed to free, fair and peaceful 2013 elections. This information will help inform USAID/Kenya's future elections and political processes assistance, particularly on electoral reforms, administration and management; support to civic and voter education; election observation; electoral-related conflict prevention; support to electoral dispute resolution; strengthening of political parties and coalitions; training on electoral security and support to media for objective coverage of election activities. This evaluation will also serve as a resource for other USAID Missions and the public in general for developing election support programs in the future.

A.2.2 Audience

This evaluation is for USAID/Kenya's Office of Democracy, Rights and Governance. It is also expected to inform the larger donor community in Kenya, as well as key partners who participated in the preparation and conduct of 2013 Elections.

A.2.3. Evaluation Questions: These are to be defined in joint consultations between MSI, DRG and the COR.

A.2.3. Operating Considerations and Constraints:

The evaluation team must visit key beneficiaries, including IEBC, The Judiciary Working Committee on Election Preparations, Office of the Registrar of Political Parties, and National Police Service (electoral Security Training was implemented through UNDP), and visit a representative sample of project sites.

Key constraints may include:

1. The on-going audits and debate on credibility of the IEBC may lead to information fatigue at the IEBC.
2. Due to the collaborative partnerships established with key actors, such as the Government of Kenya, other donors, and the basket type of funding adopted, attribution of impact and success may pose a challenge.
3. Public trust on the IEBC is currently low following the challenges it faced during the conduct of the 2013 elections.
4. Resolve to maintain peace by Kenyans, and the role played by the political leadership, may be a key intervening variable in the overall outcome.
5. Possibility of a looming referendum and a large number by–elections arising from ongoing petitions

B.1. KEY PERSONNEL

The team shall include an evaluation expert who has led the conduct of elections evaluations, and staff with extensive experience with the use of technology in electoral administration, and evaluation of elections and governance programs. At least one team member must have demonstrated knowledge and experience on electoral and democratization processes in Kenya or in the region. The entire team must be external to USAID and the implementing partners, and all team members shall be required to provide a written disclosure of conflicts of interest before the proposal is submitted. All team members must be available for the entire evaluation period.

B.2. PERIOD AND PLACE OF PERFORMANCE

Evaluation to be completed as soon as feasible. MSI should be aware that once a proposal is received, it will be shared for peer review with USAID/Washington for a period of five days, after which some revision may be required before a task order is issued.

C.1. DELIVERABLES

The final evaluation report will conform to the standards set forth in the 2011 USAID Evaluation Policy. In addition, a one page summary of the findings/recommendations considered most important for USAID senior managers to be aware of will be submitted with the final report. If the report contains any potentially procurement sensitive information, a second version report excluding this information shall be submitted (also electronically, in English).

All raw data collected by the evaluation shall be provided to USAID in an electronic file in an easily readable format; organized and fully documented for use by those not fully familiar with the project or the evaluation. In addition, all background documents collected by MSI for this evaluation shall be provide to USAID on CDs, organized by implementing mechanism, along with the final report.

ANNEX B: CVS

KATHERINE VITTUM

Management Systems International
A Subsidiary of Coffey International, Ltd.
600 Water Street, SW
Washington, DC 20024 USA
+1 (202) 484-7170

Proposed Position: Team Leader

Summary:

Ms. Vittum has more than 12 years of experience with democracy and governance programming across Asia, North and West Africa, and Europe. Ms. Vittum applies expertise in program design, monitoring and evaluation, and management to political and electoral processes, election integrity, governance, and civil society projects. She has worked with an array of partners in government, politics, and civil society and has authored and contributed to papers and articles on political, electoral and constitutional developments in South Asia and the Arab region. Ms. Vittum recently led a two-year electoral reform program implemented by Democracy Reporting International (DRI) in Pakistan, during which she led an assessment of the electoral environment in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. From 2006 – 2009, Ms. Vittum served as the Deputy Chief of Party for the International Federation of Electoral Systems' (IFES) program in Pakistan. In this role, she led monitoring and evaluation initiatives and designed a strategy for a comprehensive post-election strategic assessment. From 2000 – 2006, Ms. Vittum served as Program Assistant and Program Officer for IFES, during which she made regular field visits to conduct monitoring and evaluation activities. Ms. Vittum has managed programs in Libya, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Liberia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and has advised on numerous other programs.

Education:

M.A., International Affairs, American University, Washington, DC, 2001.
B.A., Psychology and International Affairs, University of New Hampshire, 1997.

Experience:

Management Systems International (MSI) **Mar – May 2013**
Evaluation Team Leader, Pakistan

- Led performance evaluation of a $21.5M USAID-funded political party strengthening program. The evaluation was based on rigorous qualitative research, including interviews with over 130 individuals throughout the country.

Democracy Reporting International **Aug-Dec 2012**
Country Director, Libya

- Led program funded by the German Foreign Office to support civil society to play constructive role in constitution making and electoral reform and to support their efforts to engage the public on these issues.

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Democracy Reporting International **Mar-Aug 2012**
Country Director, Pakistan

- Senior Advisor for EU-funded electoral reform advocacy program, designed to enhance stakeholder awareness of electoral reform issues and their capacity to work on reforms in line with international standards. Also led election assessment for tribal areas of the country.

Democracy Reporting International **Feb 2010 – Dec 2011**
Country Director, Pakistan

- In charge of €2.4m European Union-funded grant providing direct support to the Parliament and provincial assemblies to improve the legislative process and framework for elections and to local and national media outlets to improve their coverage of election-related issues.

International Foundation for Electoral Systems **Oct-Dec 2009**
Deputy Country Director, Liberia

- In charge of operations for $17.5m award for technical assistance to the National Elections Commission in Liberia. Program focus included boundary delimitation, voter registration, civic and voter education. Supervised all national staff.

Electoral Complaints Commission **June-Sept 2009**
Management Specialist, Afghanistan

- Established and managed the ECC Complaints Processing Center, where all complaints related to counting and polling for presidential and provincial council elections were processed. Included: resourcing for personnel, supplies and equipment; liaising with the diplomatic and donor community; advising on procedures and forms; supervision of approximately 10 international experts and 60 national staff; data collection and analysis.

International Foundation for Electoral Systems **Nov 2006 – June 2009**
Deputy Chief of Party, Pakistan

- Responsible for program administration and in-country financial management; compliance with organizational and donor regulations; program monitoring and evaluation; commodity procurement; and reporting for $19m USAID contract for technical assistance to the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and a State Department grant for electoral dispute resolution. Designed strategy for comprehensive post-election strategic assessment. Served as Interim Chief of Party from 7/08-10/08.

International Foundation for Electoral Systems **Oct 2000 – Oct 2006**
Program Assistant & Program Officer, Europe & Asia Division and Strategic Business Development Unit

- Designed and managed democracy and governance programs under USG, UN and European funding mechanisms. Traveled to the field regularly for proposal development and program monitoring and evaluation. Also supported the development of a Strategic Business Development unit and management of in-house proposal systems. Coordinated business development for winning proposal for the Political and Electoral Process IQC II with a ceiling of $400m.

Let's Talk Business **Feb-July 1999**
Corporate Trainer for Business and Technical English, Berlin, Germany

- Developed and instructed intensive language and professional skills training programs for diverse clients.

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U.S. Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe **Sept-Dec 1998**
Intern, Vienna, Austria

- Represented U.S. Mission at Kosovo Watch Group meetings, prepared position papers, drafted reporting cables, and supported procurement for Kosovo Verification Mission.

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MICHAEL H. GETTO

Management Systems International
A Subsidiary of Coffey International, Ltd.
600 Water Street, SW
Washington, DC 20024 USA
+1 (202) 484-7170

Proposed Position: Elections Specialist/Team Member

Summary:

Michael Getto has over 20 years' extensive international electoral expertise and experience as well as comprehensive international democracy and governance experience. He has proven leadership capability and is an expert in project management and strategic planning. Most recently Michael conducted an electoral observation in Georgia and served as a Public Affairs Consultant and Election Observer for the Committee for Open Democracy in Tbilisi. Prior to that he served as Chief of Party for the International Foundation for Electoral Systems and supervised technical support of the May 2012 National Assembly elections in Armenia.

Education:

B.Sc., Journalism, University of Colorado (1979)

Experience:

The Committee for Open Democracy, Tbilisi, Georgia/Kyiv, Ukraine/Ljubljana, Slovenia 2012- Present
Public Affairs Consultant/Election Observer

- **Activities in Georgia, Slovenia and Ukraine** Conducted comprehensive electoral observation in the Kvemo Kartli region of Georgia, the Kyiv Oblast of Ukraine and the Slovenian capital of Ljubljana on behalf of a privately-financed election monitoring organization during the Georgian and Ukrainian parliamentary elections in the autumn of 2012 and the Slovenian presidential runoff election in the early winter of 2012. Also, formally observed a Ukrainian oblast council election in Vinnytsia, ethnic Tatar elections in Crimea and provide ongoing counsel on The Committee's future positioning.

International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), Yerevan, Armenia/Dushanbe, Tajikistan/Tbilisi, Georgia 2009-2012
Chief of Party

- **Activities in Armenia** Supervised technical support of the May 2012 National Assembly elections, including training election administrators and conducting comprehensive voter education; supervising electoral code reform; and, supporting election administration operations and administration at all levels in close cooperation with the Central Electoral Commission.
- **Activities in Tajikistan** Conceptualized and supervised overall support for parliamentary and local elections in February 2010. Fielded and presented nationwide survey research for the benefit of all political parties, civil society and international organizations to advance voter education; produced and aired television and radio voter education public service announcements; conducted and supervised news media briefings and trainings; implemented messaging and communications training

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for political parties; and, administered informational and promotional "Election Fairs" to further political party communication with voters.

- **Activities in Georgia** Led and conducted regular election law discussion groups for the benefit of Georgia's political parties and civil society organizations – part of a larger effort to redraft Georgia's election law to better reflect European standards in time for May 2010 direct local elections.
- **Key Achievements: A new electoral law was adopted in Armenia** with IFES input. This followed an IFES-sponsored and administered international symposium covering issues and challenges in Armenia's evolving electoral legislation. Positive elements of the May 2012 National Assembly election were IFES technical support at the Territorial and Precinct Election Commission levels and targeted voter education and motivation. **Election support activities in Tajikistan** administered by IFES assisted political parties in taking a more active role to engage voters and improve voter awareness of party platforms as well as the overall significance of elections. The elections produced a solid voter turnout in a difficult democratic environment. **In Georgia**, Parliament adopted an improved European-standard electoral code in late 2009 with IFES input in advance of the first ever direct elections for Tbilisi mayor in May 2010.

International Republican Institute (IRI), Vilnius, Lithuania/Chisinau, Moldova 2004-2009
Director, Regional Parliamentary Program/Resident Country Director

- Supervised and managed a regional parliamentary training program and supervised and managed two nationwide political and governance training and consultation programs. Also, conducted public policy media relations and political campaign training and served as an election observer for IRI throughout Eurasia and Europe in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine.
- **Activities in Vilnius** Administered a regional parliamentary training program targeted at three European-oriented emerging democracies – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – in close cooperation with the Lithuanian Seimas. Supervised and managed a democracy program for Belarus which included nationwide survey research for use by opposition political parties, party coalition-building, developing women's political party activism, youth activist training and parliamentary candidate training in support of the United Democratic Forces, a coalition of political parties and civil society organizations dedicated to democratic pluralism in Belarus.
- **Activities in Chisinau** Conducted nationwide public opinion survey research on behalf of the primary political parties and Members of Parliament to assist messaging and voter communication; activated and supported women's participation in the political and governance process; designed and supervised political party building programs; and, identified and supported qualified civil society organizations dedicated to improving the evolving democratic environment in Moldova.
- **Key Achievements:** Engaged, consulted and trained over 120 parliamentarians and parliamentary staff members from Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in European parliamentary procedures and standards; helped conceptualize a 2008 parliamentary candidate selection process in Belarus which was considered by virtually all parties in the opposition coalition to be equitable and transparent; and, helped create and advise a coalition of democratic political parties opposite the ruling Party of Communists in Moldova in the 2005 parliamentary elections.

Chemonics/USAID, Washington, D.C./Moscow/Khabarovsk, Russia 2003
Communications/Public Affairs Consultant

- Successfully completed a short-term consulting assignment in Moscow and the Russian Far East providing communications strategy, tactics and guidance to Component One of the USAID-financed Russian FOREST project, designed to promote forest fire prevention awareness in the Russian Far East.

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- **Key Achievement:** Updated the strategic communication workplan for implementation by the Russian equivalent of the U.S. Forest Service.

Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C., Washington, D.C./Reston, VA 2000-2002
Senior Public Relations Manager

- Supervised and managed public relations and marketing for a large multi-practice law firm in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, consisting of two offices of approximately 110 attorneys in the practice areas of telecommunications, information technology, biotechnology, health care, antitrust, employment and government relations.
- **Key Achievements**: Implemented communications and marketing initiatives raising both the firm's public profile and its clients' awareness and supported the firm's business development objectives in Washington, D.C.'s competitive legal and governmental relations market. Established, developed, and maintained productive relationships with members of the business, legal and general circulation news media and the national and international trade media.

The PBN Company, Washington, D.C./Moscow, Russia 1999-2000
Senior Counselor

- Supervised, managed, and designed communications programs for business and government clients in both the United States and countries of the former Soviet Union. Clients included the World Bank, the Russian Federal State-Public Foundation for the Protection of Shareholders and Investors, the Foreign Investment Council of Kazakhstan, BP/Amoco, the Coalition for Intellectual Property Rights, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium and the United States Open University**.**
- **Key Achievement:** Successfully supervised and managed seven Russian investment and communications professionals in implementing a comprehensive national public and investor education program on behalf of the World Bank and the Russian Federal State-Public Foundation for the Protection of Shareholders and Investors.

International Public Affairs Consultant, Moscow, Russia; Chisinau,
Moldova; Bucharest, Romania; and, St. Petersburg, Russia 1993-1996

- Managed four USAID-financed communications and public education programs for The PBN Company and Booz Allen Hamilton which were part of the United States Government's effort to assist in restructuring Russia's, Moldova's and Romania's economies in the immediate post-Soviet era.
- **Senior Project Manager, Moscow** Designed, implemented, and supervised all communications activities supporting the newly constituted Russian Federal Commission on Securities and the Capital Market (Russia's equivalent to the Securities and Exchange Commission).
- **Key Achievement:** Supervising a staff of 11 expatriates and Russian nationals in 1995, increased investor and market participant comprehension of legal, regulatory, and infrastructure development of Russia's emerging securities market.
- **Senior Consultant and Deputy Project Manager, Chisinau** Supervised and implemented a comprehensive public education program in support of Moldova's mass privatization efforts.
- **Key Achievement**: Managing a staff of 10 Moldovan nationals, increased public awareness and participation in Moldova's voucher privatization program which successfully privatized several thousand government-owned enterprises.
- **Communications Consultant, Bucharest** Designed a nationwide public education program to bolster the country's burgeoning mutual fund industry. Counseled Romanian project staff that, in turn, led marketing seminars for Romanian mutual fund managers.
- **Key Achievement**: Increased marketing skills of Romanian managers resulting in increased understanding and trust by the investing public of the advantages of mutual fund investment.

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- **Communications Consultant, St. Petersburg** Counseled a local packaging and labeling business in preparation of a secondary issue of shares to both institutional and retail investors. **Key Achievement**: Drafted a comprehensive report which included recommendations for administering specific marketing and strategic communications tactics in support of the enterprise's share issue to raise necessary operating capital.

Additional Public Affairs Background:

Kenny Guinn for Governor, Las Vegas/Reno, Nevada **1998**
Press Secretary

- Served as official spokesman for Kenny Guinn, candidate for Governor of Nevada. Responsible for all news media relations during the campaign. Developed, implemented and directed media strategies and tactics, coordinated and arranged media interviews, drafted and edited informational and campaign promotional materials (news releases, bylined newspaper columns and speeches). **Key Achievement**: Successful election of a candidate with no previous political experience over his opponent, the incumbent Mayor of Las Vegas.

Kamer-Singer and Associates, Inc., San Francisco **1996-1997**
Senior Account Executive

- Managed and supervised communications and public affairs for business, consulting, trade and, non-profit organizations. Clients included Kaiser Permanente, Alexander & Baldwin, Inc., Booz Allen Hamilton, the American Red Cross and The Air Transport Association. **Key Achievement:** Developed crisis management plans for subsidiary companies owned by Honolulu-based Alexander & Baldwin, Inc.

1979-1993

- Account Executive, Ketchum Public Relations, San Francisco
- Administration Appointee, California Governor George Deukmejian, San Francisco
- Deputy Press Secretary, California U.S. Senator Pete Wilson, Washington, D.C.
- Press Assistant, Kansas U.S. Rep. Larry Winn, Jr., Washington D.C.
- Broadcast Journalist, KLWN/KLZR, Lawrence, Kansas

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THOMAS N. MAOSA

Management Systems International
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Washington, DC 20024 USA
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Proposed Position: Team Member

Summary:

Thomas Maosa is an experienced consultant and legal expert who has implemented programs relating to electoral processes, funding activities, civic education, publicity, and civil society education which led to the accomplishment of the peace process. He has drafted strategic rules and procedures for the conduct of the general election, conflict management and resolution, political party registration and regulation and effectively participated in the resolution of the political party disputes; an exercise which facilitated the peaceful transition to democratic governance. Mr. Maosa is an advocate of the High Courts of Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania having been admitted to the Bar in Kenya in November, 1985, and Tanzania in 1996 respectively. While in Tanzania, he gave consultancy services to the Parastatal Sector reform commission which had been mandated by the government to privatize non-profitable corporations. In July, 2001 he was recruited by the Commonwealth Secretariat, London as a Legal Expert to the National Electoral Commission, (NEC), Sierra Leone to manage Sierra Leone's Post- War/Conflict elections of May, 2002 and the transition from civil war to democratic governance. Mr. Maosa was also mandated to conduct the Presidential and Parliamentary election of May 14, 2002, Paramount Chieftaincy elections of 2003 and Local Government Elections of 2004 respectively. During his tenure in Sierra Leone, he worked closely with international organizations, donor agencies and other stakeholders. In 2010 and 2011 he was appointed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) as an International Evaluation Expert for the UNDP's Election Support Project.

Education:

Masters of Law (LLM), University of Dar es Salaam, (2000)
Diploma in Legal Practice, Kenya School of Law, Nairobi, (1984-1985)
Bachelor of Law Degree (LLB), University of Nairobi, (1980-1984)

Experience:

Maosa & Company Advocates, Commissioners for oaths, Notaries Public, Patent & Trade Mark Agents **Mar 2009 – present**

- Serving as Founding Dean, School of Law, Kisii University from March, 2009; and a Private Legal Practitioner, Kenya and Tanzania & Zanzibar

Appointed as UNDP International Evaluation Consultant of a USD 30,000,000 Election Support Project, 2010-United Republic of Tanzania & Zanzibar **Dec 2010 – Feb 2011**

- Evaluated the USD 28, 0000,000 International Election Support to Tanzania and Zanzibar.
- Evaluated the capacity of the election management bodies in the conduct of elections.
- Evaluated the capacity of political parties as agents of change.

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- Evaluated the support of political parties to women candidates.
- Evaluated the role the role of the media.
- Evaluated voter and civic education
- Post-Election Peace and reconciliation processes
- Effectiveness of Donor Funding

United Nations Special Court for Sierra Leone **2003**
Appointed as Defense Counsel

National Electoral Commission, Free Town, Republic of Sierra Leone **July 2001 – Nov 2004**
Appointed as Commonwealth Legal Expert

Consultancies:

- 1998: Consultancy for policy formulation for recovery of debts in Zanzibar on behalf of Tanzania Telecommunication Corporation
- 1998: Appointed as Legal Consultant to the Office of the Director of telecommunications Regulation, Dublin, Ireland.
- 1998: Appointed as Legal Consultant to the Secretariat of the East African Co-operation, Arusha, Tanzania.
- 1997: Appointed as Defense Counsel, United Nations Int. Cri. Tribunal for Rwanda, Arusha, Tanzania.
- 1997: Appointed as a Legal Consultant for the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK).
- 1999: Appointed as legal consultant for the Presidential Sector Reform Commission, United Republic of Tanzania.
- 1999: Appointed as consultant in East Africa for International Insurance Adjusters, Austria.

Established Private Legal Practice in Kenya **Feb 1988**

Oraro & Advocates – Nairobi **July 1986 – Aug 1987**
Associate

Keshar Shian Advocate – Nairobi **Dec 1985 – June 1986**
Legal Assistant

Languages:

English (fluent), Kiswahili (fluent), Kisii (fluent), Krio (fair)

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ANNEX C: ILLUSTRATIVE SCHEDULE

The following illustrative schedule is proposed based on the assumption that the task order will be awarded no later than November 30, 2013.

January 2014

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
			1 Kenyan Holiday	2 Desk Review	3 Desk Review	4
5	6 Desk Review	7 Desk Review	8 Desk Review	9 Desk Review	10 Desk Review	11
12	13	14	15	16 Team travels to Nairobi	17 Team Planning Meeting (TPM)	18
19	20 • US Holiday – Mission closed • TPM	21 • TPM • **Meeting with USAID** • Revised tools submitted to USAID	22 TPM • Meeting with partners	23 TPM	24	25
26	27 Methodology submitted to USAID (COB)	28 USAID reviews methodology	29 **Meeting with USAID for methodology approval**	30 Tools /itinerary finalized	31 Data collection - Nairobi	

February 2014

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
						1 Data Collection - Nairobi
2	3 Data Collection - Nairobi	4 Data Collection - Nairobi	5 Data Collection - Nairobi	6 Data Collection - Nairobi	7 Data Collection - Nairobi	8 Data Collection - Nairobi
9 Team drives to Nakuru	10 Data collection - Nakuru	11 Data collection - Nakuru	12 Data collection - Nakuru	13 • Data collection – Nakuru • Team drives to Nairobi	14 • Team flies to Kisumu • Data collection – Kisumu	15 Data collection - Kisumu
16	17 Data collection - Kisumu	18 Data collection - Kisumu	19 Data collection - Kisumu	20 • Data collection – Kisumu • Team flies to Nairobi	21 • Team flights to Mombasa • Data collection - Mombasa	22 Data collection - Mombasa
23	24 Data collection - Mombasa	25 Data collection - Mombasa	26 Data collection - Mombasa	27 Data collection - Mombasa	28 Data analysis	

March 2014

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
						1 Data analysis
2	3 Data analysis	4 Data analysis	5 • Data analysis • **Stakeholder validation workshop**	6 • Data analysis	7 Data analysis	8 Data analysis
9	10 Data analysis	11 Data analysis	12 • USAID/DRG presentation • Presentation to partner	13 **USAID brown bag presentation**	14	15 • Report writing starts
16	17	18	19	20	21	22 Team leaves Nairobi
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

April 2014

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7 Draft due to USAID	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18 Kenyan Holiday	19
20	21 Kenyan Holiday	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30 Comments due from USAID			

May 2014

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13 Final report due to USAID	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	31

ANNEX D: GETTING TO ANSWERS

Evaluation Questions	Type of Answer/ Evidence Needed (Check one or more, as appropriate)		Methods for Data Collection		Sampling or Selection Approach,(if one is needed)	Data Analysis Methods
			Data Source(s)	Method		
1. To what degree did USAID's electoral assistance, using the seven identified approaches, contribute to the 2013 elections?		Yes/No	• Project documents, such as Performance Management Plans, work plans and reports; • USAID documents, such as DRG Strategy and Project Approval Documents; • Secondary Source Documents, such evaluations by donors and Commission reports.	Desk Review		Descriptive Statistics Comparison Content/Pattern Analysis Convergence/Divergence Analysis Mixed Methods Integration
	X	Description				
		Comparison[140]				
	X	Explanation[141]		KIIs	Identified by partners and USAID as	

[140] Comparison – to baselines, plans/targets, or to other standards or norms

[141] Explanation – for questions that ask "why" or about the attribution of an effect to a specific intervention (causality)

Evaluation Questions	Type of Answer/ Evidence Needed (Check one or more, as appropriate)		Methods for Data Collection		Sampling or Selection Approach,(if one is needed)	Data Analysis Methods
			Data Source(s)	Method		
			• Project partners; • Local stakeholders ; • Key beneficiaries such as IEBC, The Judiciary Working Committee on Election Preparations, Office of the Registrar of Political Parties, and National Police Service • Non-beneficiaries Beneficiaries in Nairobi, Kisumu, Mombasa and Nakuru	Group Discussions	essential points of contact; identified through desk review and/or fieldwork as key actors Purposive sampling (based on gender, type of beneficiary, approaches used by USAID, rural/urban location) from beneficiary lists for Nairobi informal settlements and for counties around Kisumu, Mombasa and	

Evaluation Questions	Type of Answer/ Evidence Needed (Check one or more, as appropriate)		Methods for Data Collection		Sampling or Selection Approach,(if one is needed)	Data Analysis Methods
			Data Source(s)	Method		
					Nakuru	
2. To what extent has USG electoral assistance strengthened the technical, and where applicable, administrative capacity of (i) the electoral commission; (ii) major political parties; (iii) domestic monitoring network; (iv) media; and (v) civil society organizations funded by USAID for delivery and/or reporting of accountable elections in the future.		Yes/No	See Above	Desk Review KIIs Group Discussions	See above	Comparison Analysis Content/Pattern Analysis Convergence/Divergence Findings Analysis Mixed Methods Integration
	X	Description				
		Comparison				
	X	Explanation				

Evaluation Questions	Type of Answer/ Evidence Needed (Check one or more, as appropriate)		Methods for Data Collection		Sampling or Selection Approach,(if one is needed)	Data Analysis Methods
			Data Source(s)	Method		
3. How appropriate was the mix and timing of activities in addressing the needs identified by both past and ongoing evidence?		Yes/No	See Above	Desk Review KIIs Group Discussions	See Above	Comparison Analysis Content/Pattern Analysis Convergence/Divergence Analysis Mixed Methods Integration
	X	Description				
		Comparison				
	X	Explanation				
4. To what extent did USAID coordinate with other donors to maximize the leverage of USG resources and funds?		Yes/No	See above	Desk Review KIIs	See above	Comparison Analysis Content/Pattern Analysis Convergence/Divergence Analysis Mixed Methods Integration
	X	Description				
		Comparison				
	X	Explanation				
5. To what extent were the electoral assistance activities effective in promoting participation by women and youth?		Yes/No	See above	Desk Review KIIs Group Discussions	See above	Comparison Analysis Content/Pattern Analysis Convergence/Divergence Analysis Mixed Methods Integration
	X	Description				
	X	Comparison				
	X	Explanation				

Evaluation Questions	Type of Answer/ Evidence Needed (Check one or more, as appropriate)		Methods for Data Collection		Sampling or Selection Approach,(if one is needed)	Data Analysis Methods
			Data Source(s)	Method		
6. What are some lessons that can inform the design of future electoral assistance projects both in Kenya and globally?		Yes/No	See above	Desk Review KIIs Group Discussions	See above	Convergence/Divergence Analysis Mixed Methods Integration Synthesis from Q1-5
	X	Description				
		Comparison				
	X	Explanation				

ANNEX E: CRITERIA TO ENSURE THE QUALITY OF THE EVALUATION REPORT

APPENDIX 1

CRITERIA TO ENSURE THE QUALITY OF THE EVALUATION REPORT

- The evaluation report should represent a thoughtful, well-researched and well organized effort to objectively evaluate what worked in the project, what did not and why.
- Evaluation reports shall address all evaluation questions included in the scope of work.
- The evaluation report should include the scope of work as an annex. All modifications to the scope of work, whether in technical requirements, evaluation questions, evaluation team composition, methodology or timeline need to be agreed upon in writing by the technical officer.
- Evaluation methodology shall be explained in detail and all tools used in conducting the evaluation such as questionnaires, checklists and discussion guides will be included in an Annex in the final report.
- Evaluation findings will assess outcomes and impact on males and females.
- Limitations to the evaluation shall be disclosed in the report, with particular attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.).
- Evaluation findings should be presented as analyzed facts, evidence and data and not based on anecdotes, hearsay or the compilation of people's opinions. Findings should be specific, concise and supported by strong quantitative or qualitative evidence.
- Sources of information need to be properly identified and listed in an annex.
- Recommendations need to be supported by a specific set of findings.
- Recommendations should be action-oriented, practical and specific, with defined responsibility for the action.

EVALUATION DESIGN

This was an evaluative study designed to look at the seven overarching approaches used within the Election Project and the activities associated with these approaches. It was both retrospective and prospective, looking backward to examine the change from the beginning of the project until August 2013, as well as maintaining an eye toward learning for future programming. The study was designed to evaluate the project as a whole; hence it did not look at each implementing mechanism in its entirety.

A. STUDY HYPOTHESIS

There was no consensus on a development hypothesis/theory of change for all approaches or IPs covered by the evaluation. To assess the contribution made by USAID, the evaluation team drew on the development hypothesis outlined in the scope of work, Annex 1 section 1.3.

The evaluation used well-developed data collection and analysis methods to address each of USAID's evaluation questions. A proposed matrix for associating data collection and analysis methods with evaluation questions (*Getting to Answers*) is provided in Annex I.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS: INTERPRETATION STUDY APPROACH

Below are the six evaluation questions, outlining interpretation of each and a summary of how each question was answered:

1. To what degree did USAID's electoral assistance, using the seven identified approaches, contribute to the 2013 elections? These seven approaches are: (i) Strengthening the Capacity of the Election Management Body; (ii) Election Dispute Resolution and Security; (iii) Professionalizing Political Parties; (iv) Election Observation; (v) Civic and Voter Education; (vi) Media Engagement; and (vii) Participation of Marginalized Groups.

To answer this question, the evaluation team examined the activities under each of the seven approaches to determine their contribution, both positive and negative, to the 2013 elections. The project document (PAD), dated October 2012, specifies activities rather than objectives. These activities map onto the seven approaches as shown in Table 1. While the PAD is a 2012 document, USAID noted that it was conceptually appropriate for the period covered by the evaluation (January 2008–August 2013). Two activities listed in the PAD were not covered by these approaches and, based on USAID guidance, were not considered during this evaluation.

USAID's use of the term "contribution" in this question recognizes that the approaches and activities in which it invested were not carried out in isolation. Government election activities and those of other actors were also ongoing, and USAID's contribution to the elections was examined in light of those parallel efforts. The evaluation team structured its tools to bring out other important contributions and emphasize USAID's importance when the respondent volunteers that the most important contributions were USAID's. The tools were designed to provide perspectives on USAID contributions in relation to outcomes. For all seven approaches, the team reviewed activity documents, USAID documents and secondary source documents, such as the Kriegler Commission Report, and international best practices.

The team conducted *group discussions* with beneficiaries such as civic and voter education participants, political party trainees, journalists, women and domestic election observers. The team further conducted *key informant interviews* with key institutions and experts involved in USAID-funded election assistance; and *group interviews* with members of key institutions, USAID, US Embassy, donors and select IPs (KIIs focused on individuals while GIs included multiple participants). Using these combined methods, the team examined USAID programming

effectiveness in addressing major recommendations and requirements from the 2007 elections and the 2010 referendum during the 2013 election process.

Specifics:

(i) EMBs: The evaluation focused on the capacity of the new Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) to administer the 2013 elections, and issues of organizational structure, composition and systems that are the foundations of Election Management Body (EMB) capacity and functionality.

(ii) Election Dispute Resolution (EDR) and Security: The evaluation examined support to the constitutional and legal framework for EDR; security preparations for the elections and post-election period; and the post-election dispute resolution process.

(iii) Political Parties: The evaluation looked at implementation of the new constitutional and legal framework affecting parties; issues of internal party democracy (including women and youth participation); the independence of the political party registrar body; coordination between political parties and relevant election institutions; and how USAID-funded training benefited training participants in terms of their ability to compete effectively, develop issue-based platforms and provide input into the drafting of relevant legislation.

(iv) Election Observation: The evaluation looked at the EMB's role in facilitating observers (e.g., access to counting and tallying processes, public awareness/acceptance of observers); cooperation/coordination of domestic and international observer groups; and training for domestic election observers.

(v) Civic and Voter Education: The evaluation focused on EMB planning and programming for civic and voter education, as well as how USAID-funded civic and voter education benefited training participants, including the needs and interests of target groups (especially women and youth).

(vi) Media Engagement: The evaluation focused on the EMB's media relations policy and strategy; media recruitment of professional reporters and editors; media self-regulation; and how USAID-funded training contributed to the capacity of media to report fairly on elections, identify and address hate speech and mitigate political ownership of the media.

(vii) Participation of Marginalized Groups: The evaluation examined implementation of the constitutional and legal framework regarding the allocation of seats and party membership for youth and women; EMB efforts to mobilize marginalized groups, such as encouraging issuance of national ID cards to women and youth necessary for registration as voters; and political party manifestos regarding appeals to the needs and priorities of women and youth.

TABLE 1: MAPPING PAD ACTIVITIES TO APPROACHES[142]

From SOO: Program Area / Approach	From PAD: Specific Activities
Civic and Voter Education	Ensure that citizens have the knowledge they need to run for office and vote.
Strengthening the capacity of the Election Management Body	Improve the new IEBC's capacity to effectively administer credible elections.
Media Engagement	Ensure that the media plays a positive role in information dissemination for the election.
Election Observation	Support local, regional and international efforts to monitor electoral processes.
Election Dispute Resolution and Security	Ensure credible election dispute resolution, particularly related to election of the president. Working with communities and security forces to strengthen early-warning capacity and responsiveness.[143]
Professionalizing Political Parties	Strengthen the ability of civil society to support citizen participation in the elections and monitor the actions of Parliament, key commissions, the Executive and political parties.[144]
Participation of Marginalized groups (Women, Youth)	As voters and candidates[145]

2. To what extent has USG electoral assistance strengthened the technical and, where applicable, administrative capacity for delivery and/or reporting of accountable elections in the future of (i) the electoral commission; (ii) major political parties; (iii) domestic monitoring network; (iv) media; and (v) civil society organizations funded by USAID?

For question 2, the evaluation looked at the technical capacity of the organizations in relation to sustainability of both the organizations and their activities, and whether the organizations will be able to continue the activities without USAID support in future. The evaluation did not look at the projected long-term impact of the activities funded by USAID before the 2013 elections. In cases where relevant assistance was provided, the team also looked at administrative capacity.

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[142] This is Table 3 in the MSI Statement of Work for the Evaluation.

[143] Language was added from the 2012 PAD, p. 24

[144] In order to align this more clearly to the PAD, the evaluation team suggested revised activity language for professionalizing political parties in the approved methodology and workplan, based on the NDI 2008-11 activity summary, 2011 DG Assessment & Strategy and 2012 PAD: Strengthen the capacity of parties to compete effectively, develop issue-based platforms, provide input to the drafting of legislation to implement the new constitution, exercise internal party democracy by promoting greater women and youth participation, and coordinate with the EMB and other government entities involved in elections.

[145] This was changed slightly from the original table presented in the SOW to remove language not aligned with the PAD. It was left in this abbreviated form in the absence of other activity language for participation of marginalized groups.

Building on the findings under question 1, the team examined *organizational* sustainability in terms of administrative and support functions b) technical/ program functions and c) structure and culture.

The evaluation did not review all of these areas in detail; it focused on:

a. Administrative and support functions: staff recruitment and training, financial management
b. Technical/ program functions: service delivery, institutional performance monitoring
c. Structure and culture: leadership capacity, strategic planning

This framework was drawn from the USAID "TIPS" series for evaluating institutional capacity.[146] The framework above was incorporated into the appropriate group discussion (GD), key informant interviews (KII) and group interview (GI) tools, rather than using a separate institutional development tool, which would be appropriate for a comprehensive institutional capacity assessment.

The evaluation looked at *activity* sustainability in terms of financing, political will and human resources.

3. How appropriate was the mix and timing of activities in addressing the needs identified by both past and ongoing evidence?

Past evidence for question 3 refers, but is not limited, to internal USAID documents such as Kenya: Democracy and Governance Assessment and Strategy 2011 and documents external to USAID such as the Report of the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections held in Kenya on December 27, 2007[147] and the Final Evaluation Report of the 2007 Joint Elections Assistance Programme. When examining ongoing evidence, the evaluation considered the flexibility of USAID's programming in responding to issues as they emerged during activity implementation.

The team looked at the broad range of USAID-funded activities on a timeline against the preferred timing for such activities according to good practice and lessons learned from election processes elsewhere. The evaluation considered USAID's development hypothesis and the actual sequencing and timing of major activities (such as voter and civic education) against the ideal timing for such interventions.

Through GDs, KIIs and GIs, the evaluation sought the views of program beneficiaries andIPs regarding the flexibility of programming in responding to new information, such as political conditions and beneficiary needs.

4. To what extent did USAID coordinate with other donors to maximize the leverage of USG resources and funds?

To answer question 4, the evaluation looked at how USAID coordinated with other donors to maximize its comparative advantage without duplicating efforts.

The evaluation reviewed available reporting on donor coordination (such as meeting minutes) and sought the opinions of donors, IPs and select beneficiaries to examine donor effectiveness in dividing up the electoral space and addressing any coordination challenges throughout the electoral

[146] http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACG612.pdf
[147] Also known as the Kriegler Report.

process. In question 1, the evaluation team probed USAID contributions vis-à-vis other donors, creating a potential overlap with this question.

However, question 4 emphasizes issues of complementarity, coordination and efforts to address identified gaps in financial or technical support throughout the election process.

5. To what extent were the electoral assistance activities effective in promoting participation by women and youth?

Women and youth targeting is often an afterthought to the design of a project. Therefore, for question 5, in addition to assessing the effectiveness of USAID-funded activities that targeted women and youth, the evaluation assessed the inclusion of such activities during the project design phase.

While gender was specifically addressed in question 5, it was also viewed as a crosscutting theme to be explored, where appropriate, throughout the evaluation. The evaluation was cognizant and responsive to USAID's dual expectations for treating gender appropriately: (a) gathering sex-disaggregated data and (b) identifying gender-differential participation in and benefits from aspects of the program where differences on this basis are possible.

The evaluation assessed available information regarding the effectiveness of relevant institutions in promoting participation by women and youth, such as IEBC strategy documents, party manifestos, the availability of party leadership roles for women and youth, voter registration statistics and activity reports. As a secondary source, the evaluation looked at public opinion surveys on civic participation by women and youth that were prepared during the course of the program.

The evaluation complemented the desk review through women-only discussion/interview forums with select program beneficiaries such as FIDA and AMWIK. In addition to program activities, the evaluation sought information from the groups on larger policy issues for women's political participation. This was a useful context for understanding USAID's contribution to the 2013 elections. The evaluation looked at youth issues within group discussions with political parties and voter and civic education participants, in particular.

6. What are some lessons that can inform the design of future electoral assistance projects both in Kenya and globally?

In USAID practice, a recommendation is for audiences within the country context; lessons learned are for audiences and activities outside the purview of this evaluation. Since this question encompasses both concepts (lessons for Kenya and globally), the evaluation covered both crosscutting recommendations for Kenya and lessons learned for global contexts. There were not separate findings and conclusions for question 6. Instead, the evaluation provided overarching recommendations and lessons learned that flow from the findings, conclusions and recommendations in the report sections on evaluation questions 1-5. The evaluation report does not include a separate lessons learned section.

C. DATA COLLECTION METHODS

Below is how the data collection methods mapped to the six evaluation questions:

TABLE 2: DATA COLLECTION METHODS FOR EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Data Collection Methods	Evaluation Questions
Desk Review	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Group Discussions	1, 2, 3, 5, 6
Key Informant Interviews	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

Group Interviews	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Site Visits	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

Key aspects of the data collection are the following:

Document Review

The evaluation team reviewed documentation provided by USAID and any relevant secondary research they collected. The evaluation team also used online resources and onsite inquiries to identify documents that described parallel election support efforts to respond to question 1's expectation that USAID-funded activities and approaches would be studied through a contribution analysis that took into account other contributions to the election process. The product of the document review was organized in relation to each of the evaluation questions.

Key Informant Interviews

USAID provided electoral assistance, through 10 implementing mechanisms, to a large number of organizations and partners. The evaluation identified key informants based on document review, key contacts provided by USAID and information received from partners. These included heads of key institutions and experts, including IEBC, the Judiciary Working Committee on Election Preparations, Office of the Registrar of Political Parties, the Association of Media Women in Kenya. Key informant interviews were conducted using a semi-structured interview tool that was developed as part of the planning process. The list of meetings, including key informants interviews is included as Annex VIII of this report.

Group Discussions

To get an understanding of the effect of the assistance on specific beneficiaries, the team conducted twenty-one group discussions. Group discussions were conducted with the following categories of beneficiaries: voter and civic education participants; political party trainees; journalists; domestic observers; and women. The participants for group discussions were selected from beneficiary lists provided by IPs.

Group Interviews

Group interviews were conducted with members of key institutions, USAID, US Embassy, donors and select IPs. KIIs focused on individuals, while GIs included two or more participants on a specific topic.

Additional ad hoc and informal meetings were also held with IPs and beneficiaries, including those listed in Annex VIII.

Site Visits

Given that electoral assistance was provided across Kenya, it was not feasible for the evaluation team to visit a representative sample of sites, mentioned in the **Statement of Objectives**. Therefore, in addition to Nairobi and Kiambu, the team focused on a handful of counties that included Kisumu, Kisii, Kericho, Nakuru, Narok, Mombasa, Kilifi and Kwale. The final selection of counties was purposive to allow the team to consider factors such as (i) urban and rural populations; (ii)political dynamics (e.g. winners and losers of the 2013 elections); ; (iii) areas of special interest for USAID/Kenya; (iv) concentration of USAID-funded activities; and (v) level of beneficiary exposure to the program.

During these site visits, the team conducted key informant interviews and group discussions, as described earlier in the earlier sections of the evaluation methodology. USAID approved the data collection tools prior to field work. The tools were tweaked as needed during data collection and documented this in weekly reports to USAID.

In each field location, the evaluation team reviewed the data collection instrument and reporting template with the TNS team prior to group discussions, and debriefed with the TNS teams daily, keeping notes and making adjustments as needed. The evaluation team reported to TNS management in Nairobi throughout data collection.

D. DATA ANALYSIS METHODS

Below is how the data analysis methods map to the six evaluation questions:

TABLE 3: DATA ANALYSIS METHODS FOR THE EVALUATION METHODS

Data Analysis Methods	Evaluation Questions
Comparison Analysis	1
Descriptive Statistics	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Content, Pattern and Trend Analysis	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Response Convergence/Divergence Analysis	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Mixed Methods Data Integration	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Validation Workshop	1, 2, 3, 4, 5

The six main data analysis methods that the team used are described below.

Comparison

The team used comparisons to assess activities in relation to the planned and actual levels of results at the outcome level. For each of the seven approaches, the team looked at:

- The extent of achievement of the results (at the sub-intermediate results (Sub-IR) level and, to the extent possible, the IR level) by comparing the expected outcome to the actual outcome.
- The extent of achievement of results by comparing the actual to international good practices and standards.

To gather evidence on the actual achievement of results, the team relied on activity documents, secondary sources and primary data collected during interviews, and group discussions.

This comparison exercise was started as part of the desk review and feedback was sought at the partners meetings during the Team Planning Meeting for comments on the theory of change for their programs. Very little feedback was received, however.

Descriptive Statistics

The team used descriptive statistics to analyze quantitative data obtained from documents. The two main analytical tools the team used included frequency distributions and cross-tabulation analysis.

Content, Pattern and Trend Analysis

For qualitative data from group discussions, key informant interviews and group interviews, the team documented narrative responses at a sufficient level of detail to permit a systematic content analysis of these data. Narrative reviews of interview and discussion responses provided in-depth understanding of the experiences and opinions of beneficiaries and stakeholders. The team also examined written documentation of interview and discussion results for patterns, using content analysis and other relevant approaches, to determine whether some responses received appeared to be correlated with other factors, such as geography, partner institution, and gender.

Looking at trends over time allowed the team to consider changes in implementation throughout the project. These included media content analysis, such as assessing the writing of a sample of trained journalists before and after training interventions to look at changes in hate speech language, if appropriate beneficiaries are identified.

Response Convergence/Divergence Analysis

The evaluation reviewed all qualitative and quantitative data collected to determine where there was significant response convergence from the varied stakeholders and beneficiaries. Where divergence was found, the team followed up to better understand the context and reasons for divergence in facts, perceptions or opinions.

Mixed-Methods Data Integration

Since the team used a mixed methods approach, data collected from the various methods were integrated to arrive at findings. Where different methods converged yielding a finding that is supported by multiple types of data, this was noted. When different methods produced conflicting evidence, the evaluation team, to the extent possible, doubled back to examine the degree to which findings from different methods on the same question diverged and determine why these data conflicted.

Validation Workshop

A half-day validation workshop was conducted with partners and USAID separately. This occurred at the end of data collection and the beginning of data analysis to discuss and validate emerging findings, brainstorm the appropriateness and feasibility of potential recommendations, and fill in any gaps in data that the evaluation team identified.

E. LIMITATIONS

Program beneficiaries share perception information only. These perceptions- while subjective- offer useful insights e.g. about program contributions and about stakeholder confidence in electoral institutions, which are an indicator of the overall stability of the electoral environment. Wherever possible, the evaluation considered these perceptions in light of available independent sources of information.

Given the emphasis that the evaluation placed on women as a marginalized group, the methodology included women-only group discussions with NDI media platform participants, AMWIK and FIDA, and UNWomen Gender and Peace Data Analysts and members of the National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management. In NDI's case, these women were part of other political party training activities and it was not necessary to arrange separate meetings with them to discuss one activity. AMWIK and FIDA had limited field presence so it was not possible to meet them during the main data collection phase. The team prioritized and secured a meeting with an AMWIK representative in Nairobi toward the end of the evaluation. In the case of UNWomen, the majority of beneficiaries in target counties were men; it was challenging to secure female participants. Further, UNWomen did not share full profile information with the team about their beneficiaries, making it difficult to determine the appropriateness of these beneficiaries for sampling.

Despite assistance from USAID, the team was not able to secure a meeting with the Media Council of Kenya to discuss support to the media for elections, media self-regulation and media-IEBC relations.

Finally, it's worth noting that the substantial reliance on data collected from program partners and beneficiaries may lead to a biased view of the effectiveness of USAID's programming. Wherever possible, the evaluation considered secondary sources of information as an additional lens for analyzing information shared by IPs and beneficiaries.

ANNEX III: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

GROUP DISCUSSIONS

Guide 1: Group Discussion Interview Guide *ORIGINAL*

Date: Location: No in the group:
Gender breakdown (circle as appropriate): Mixed, Male, Female
Beneficiary type (circle as appropriate): Voter/ civic education participant party trainee journalist trainee domestic election observer woman

Purpose: **The purpose of the Group Discussion is to 'test' the validity of the development hypothesis at the higher level and for each approach engage in outcome mapping.**

Covering Approaches:

- Strengthening the Capacity of the Election Management Body
- Election Dispute Resolution and Security
- Professionalizing Political Parties
- Election Observation
- Civic and Voter Education
- Media Engagement (for balanced and objective media coverage)
- Participation of Marginalized Groups (women and youth)

Feeding into Evaluation Questions: 1, 2, 3, 5, 6

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1. Introductory Questions

1. Ahead of March 2013 elections, what were your expectations about how the election *process* would go (*Moderator prompt: not about who would win/lose)*?
2. Now looking back, how would you summarize your view of the March 2013 election process?

2. Contributions

a. What is your opinion of the international community's overall contribution to the March 2013 elections?
b. Of the USAID-funded activities you were involved with:
   i. What in your opinion worked well?
   ii. Can you give some examples of how these activities contributed to the 2013 elections?
c. What might have happened without USAID support for these activities?

3. Sustainability and Institutional Capacity

a. Which ONE of the following Kenyan institutions do you believe is *best* prepared for future elections: The news media, civil society, political parties, the IEBC, domestic election monitors?
b. Which of these organizations is *least* prepared? What would make them better prepared?
c. Which factors are most important to continuing the activities undertaken by Kenyan

institutions for the 2013 elections in the future? (*Moderator prompt if no response: political will, financial resources, something else?*)

d. Separate from the *activities* that these institutions are involved with, which of the following factors is most important to the overall strength of the institutions involved in elections in Kenya(*Moderator prompt:* institutions include: IEBC, major political parties, domestic monitoring network, media, civil society). (*Moderator note: itemize these options on flip chart and ask discussants to rank these. Note the totals and gender disaggregated responses)*
    i. Staff recruitment and training
    ii. Financial management (*Moderator note: I and ii are about administrative and support functions)*
    iii. Service delivery
    iv. Performance monitoring and evaluation*(Moderator note: iii, iv are about technical and program functions)*
    v. Strategic planning
    vi. Leadership capacity (*Moderator note: v and vi are about structure and culture)*
    vii. *Other?*

4. Mix and Timing of Program Activities

a. In your opinion, was the funding level and timing of the USAID-funded activities you were involved with appropriate/ sufficient? If no, how could these be improved?
b. Are you aware of any needs for election support in 2013 were not met? Which ones?

5. Marginalized Populations (Women and Youth)

a. What are the biggest challenges to women's participation in the electoral process?
b. What are the biggest challenges to youth participation in the electoral process?
c. Can you give some examples of program activities you were involved with that best addressed these challenges for the 2013 elections?

6. Recommendations and Lessons Learned

a. Could you share your best examples or stories that illustrate the impact of the activities you were involved in?
b. What lessons from election assistance in Kenya do you think are relevant and important for election assistance in other countries?

Guide 1: Group Discussion Interview Guide *REVISED civic and voter education*

Date: Location: Number in the group:
Gender breakdown (circle as appropriate): Mixed Male Female
Beneficiary type (circle as appropriate): Voter/ civic education participant party trainee journalist trainee domestic election observer woman

Moderator:
Note Taker:

Purpose: **The purpose of the Group Discussion is to 'test' the validity of the development hypothesis at the higher level and for each approach engage in outcome mapping.**

Covering Approaches:

- Civic and Voter Education

Feeding into Evaluation Questions: 1, 2, 3, 5, 6

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1. Introductory Questions

a. Which organization did you work with on voter/civic education? Did you receive training? Provide training?

2. Contributions

a. Besides civic and voter education, are you aware of any support that the international community provided for 2013 elections?
b. For the USAID-funded voter and civic activities you were involved with:
   i. Can you give some examples of how the activities contributed to the 2013 elections?
c. What might have happened without USAID support for these activities?

3. Sustainability and Institutional Capacity

a. Which ONE of the following Kenyan institutions do you believe is *best* prepared for future elections: The news media, civil society, political parties, the IEBC, domestic election monitors?
b. Which of these organizations is *least* prepared? What would make them better prepared?
c. Do you think that civic and voter education will continue in the future? Why/ why not? (*Moderator prompt if no response: political will, financial resources, something else*?)

4. Mix and Timing of Program Activities

a. In your opinion, was the timing of the USAID-funded activities you were involved with appropriate/ sufficient? If no, how could this be improved?
b. In your opinion, was the funding level of the USAID-funded activities you were involved with appropriate and sufficient? If no, how could this be improved?
c. Are you aware of any needs for civic and election support in 2013 that were not met? Which ones?

5. **Marginalized Populations (Women and Youth)**
   a. What are the biggest challenges to women's participation in the electoral process?
   b. What are the biggest challenges to youth participation in the electoral process?
   c. Can you give some examples of program activities you were involved with that best addressed these challenges for the 2013 elections?
6. **Recommendations and Lessons Learned**
   a. How should support for civic and voter education be improved in the future in Kenya?
   b. USAID also supports elections in other countries. What lessons from election assistance in Kenya do you think are important for other countries?

Guide 1: Group Discussion Interview Guide *REVISED political parties*

Date: Location: No in the group:
Gender breakdown (circle as appropriate): Mixed, Male, Female
Beneficiary type (circle as appropriate): Voter/ civic education participant party trainee journalist trainee domestic election observer woman

Purpose: **The purpose of the Group Discussion is to 'test' the validity of the development hypothesis at the higher level and for each approach engage in outcome mapping.**

Covering Approaches:

- Professionalizing Political Parties

Feeding into Evaluation Questions: 1, 2, 3, 5, 6

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1. **Introductory Questions**
   a. Which type of USAID-funded training for political parties did you participate in? TOT? IPYF? LCA? Party agent training? Other?

2. **Contributions**
   a. Besides support to political parties, are you aware of support that the international community has provided for election in Kenya? What is your opinion of the international community's overall contribution to the March 2013 elections?
   b. For the USAID-funded party training activities you were involved with:
      i. Can you give some examples of how these activities contributed to the 2013 elections?
   c. What might have happened without USAID support for these activities?

3. **Sustainability and Institutional Capacity**
   a. Which ONE of the following Kenyan institutions do you believe is *best* prepared for future elections: The news media, civil society, political parties, the IEBC, domestic election monitors?
   b. Which of these organizations is *least* prepared? What would make them better prepared?

c. Do you think that training for political parties will continue in the future? Why/ why not? Who should provide this training? (*Moderator prompt if no response: political will, financial resources, something else*?)
d. Which of the following factors is most important to the overall strength of political parties in Kenya?
    i. Staff recruitment and training
    ii. Financial management (*Moderator note: i and ii are about administrative and support functions)*
    iii. Service delivery
    iv. Performance monitoring and evaluation *(Moderator note: iii, iv are about technical and program functions)*
    v. Strategic planning
    vi. Leadership capacity (*Moderator note: v and vi are about structure and culture)*
    vii. *Other?*

4. **Mix and Timing of Program Activities**
    a. In your opinion, was the scope of the USAID-funded activities you were involved with appropriate/ sufficient? If no, how could this be improved?
    b. In your opinion, was the timing of the USAID-funded activities you were involved with appropriate/ sufficient? If no, how could this be improved?
    c. In your opinion, was the funding level of the USAID-funded activities you were involved with appropriate/ sufficient? If no, how could this be improved?
    d. Are you aware of any type of assistance that parties needed in 2013 that they didn't receive?

5. **Marginalized Populations (Women and Youth)**
    a. What are the biggest challenges to women's participation in the electoral process?
    b. What are the biggest challenges to youth participation in the electoral process?
    c. Can you give some examples of program activities you were involved with that best addressed these challenges for the 2013 elections?

6. **Recommendations and Lessons Learned**
    a. How should USAID assistance to political parties be improved in the future in Kenya?
    b. USAID also supports elections in other countries. What lessons from election assistance in Kenya do you think are important for other countries?

Guide 1: Group Discussion Interview Guide ***REVISED for Key Informant Interview with UN Women Gender ad Data Peace Analyst Feb.25 (b/c other UNWomen and NDI beneficiaries not available)***

Date: Location: Number in the group:
Gender breakdown (circle as appropriate): Mixed Male Female
Beneficiary type (circle as appropriate): Voter/ civic education participant party trainee journalist trainee domestic election observer woman
Moderator:
Note Taker:

Purpose: **The purpose of the Group Discussion is to 'test' the validity of the development hypothesis at the higher level and for each approach engage in outcome mapping.**

Covering Approaches:

- Participation of Marginalized Groups

Feeding into Evaluation Questions: 1, 2, 3, 5, 6

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1. **Introductory Questions**
   a. What was your role as a Gender and Peace Data Analyst? What kind of training did you receive? How was the work structured?

2. **Contributions**
   a. What is your impression of the international community's overall contribution to the 2013 elections?
   b. For the USAID-funded activities you were involved with:
      i. Can you give some examples of how the activities contributed to the 2013 elections?
   c. What might have happened without USAID support for these activities?

3. **Sustainability and Institutional Capacity**
   a. Which ONE of the following Kenyan institutions do you believe is *best* prepared for future elections: The news media, civil society, political parties, the IEBC, domestic election monitors?
   b. Which of these organizations is *least* prepared? What would make them better prepared?
   c. Will the work of the Gender and Peace Data Analysts continue? Why/ why not? Do you think they have a role in future elections? (*Moderator prompt if no response: political will, financial resources, something else?*)

4. **Mix and Timing of Program Activities**
   a. In your opinion, was the timing of the USAID-funded activities you were involved with appropriate/ sufficient? If no, how could this be improved?
   b. In your opinion, was the funding level of the USAID-funded activities you were involved with appropriate and sufficient? If no, how could this be improved?

c. Were there unmet needs of women in the 2013 elections? What were they?

5. **Marginalized Populations (Women and Youth)**
   a. What are the biggest challenges to women's participation in the electoral process?
   b. What are the biggest challenges to youth participation in the electoral process?
   c. Can you give some examples of program activities you were involved with that best addressed these challenges for the 2013 elections?
6. **Recommendations and Lessons Learned**
   a. How should support for women's participation in the election process be improved in the future in Kenya?
   b. USAID also supports elections in other countries. What lessons from election assistance in Kenya do you think are important for other countries?

GROUP INTERVIEWS

GUIDE 1: GROUP INTERVIEW: INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVERS
ORIGINAL

Name of organization: International Election Observers
Respondent:
Role of respondent in their institution and main responsibilities:
Date:
Location:

Purpose: **The purpose of this GI is to identify: learning, considerations and informed assessments of the effectiveness of the election assistance provided by USAID for the Kenyan elections of 2013, with an emphasis on international election observation. It also seeks to capture insights that will be relevant for future USAID election programming in Kenya and models and lessons that may be useful for USAID assistance in other countries.**

Covering Approaches:

- Election Observation

Feeding into the Statement of Work's Evaluation Questions: 1, 2, 3, 5, 6

Contribution

1. In what ways did the international observation contribute to the election process? Were there any negative consequences of the observation mission?
2. In what ways did the observation mission coordinate with the main domestic observation mission? What benefits came from this coordination?
3. How do you expect that the observation mission report will be utilized by Kenya institutions? Which other audiences might use it?
4. What response have there been to the report from Kenyan institutions, such as IEBC? Are you aware of whether any how the IEBC intends to implement Carter Center recommendation related to observer access to the national tally center?
5. What is your impression of public awareness and acceptance of the role international and domestic election observers?

Mix and Timing of Activities

6. What is your opinion of the timing for the international observation mission? Did long term observers have sufficient time in country to achieve the intended impact?
7. Were there any changes to the timing or scope of your mission? What impact did this have?

Marginalized Populations

8. In your opinion, did the observation promote the participation of women and youth in elections? In what ways?

Sustainability and Institutional Capacity

9. Which ONE of the following Kenyan institutions do you believe is *best* prepared for future elections: The news media, civil society, political parties, the IEBC, domestic election monitors?
10. Which of these organizations is *least* prepared? What would make them better prepared?

Recommendations and Lessons Learned

11. If you had the opportunity to change anything about USAID's international observation activity for the 2008-2013 election process– what would it be? Why?
12. How could international observation be improved for future elections in Kenya?
13. Are there any lessons from election observation Kenya that you think are important for USAID to consider when designing election assistance in other countries?

GUIDE 1: GROUP INTERVIEW: INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVERS
REVISED

Name of organization:
Respondents:
Role of respondent in their institution and main responsibilities:
Date:
Location:

Purpose: **The purpose of this GI is to identify: learning, considerations and informed assessments of the effectiveness of the election assistance provided by USAID for the Kenyan elections of 2013, with an <u>emphasis on international election observation</u>. It also seeks to capture insights that will be relevant for future USAID election programming in Kenya and models and lessons that may be useful for USAID assistance in other countries.**

Covering Approaches:

- Election Observation

Feeding into the Statement of Work's Evaluation Questions: 1, 2, 3, 5, 6

Contribution

1. What were the greatest contributions of the CC observation mission to the 2013 election process?
2. Did CC incorporate any specific lessons learned or best practices from election observation in other countries to the 2013 elections in Kenya? Which ones?
3. In what ways did the observation mission coordinate with the main domestic observation mission?
4. What response has there been to the CC final report from Kenyan institutions, such as the IEBC?
5. How do you expect the observation mission report will be utilized by Kenyan electoral institutions? What other audiences might use it?
6. What is your impression of public awareness and acceptance of international and domestic election observers to the March 2013 elections?

Mix and Timing of Activities

7. What is your opinion of the timing for the international observation mission? Did long term observers have sufficient time in country to achieve the intended impact?
8. Were there any changes to the timing or scope of your mission? If there was, what impact did they have?

Marginalized Populations

9. In your opinion, in what ways did the observation promote the participation of women and youth in elections? In what ways?

10. Regarding voter registration, what factors besides the compressed timeframe contributed to lower than expected registration?

Sustainability and Institutional Capacity

11. Which ONE of the following Kenyan institutions do you believe is *best* prepared for future elections: The news media, civil society, political parties, the IEBC, domestic election monitors? Which of these organizations is *least* prepared? What would make them better prepared?

Recommendations and Lessons Learned

12. If you had the opportunity to change anything about USAID's international observation activity for the 2008-2013 election process– what would it be? Why?
13. Are there any lessons from election observation Kenya that you think are important for USAID to consider when designing election assistance programs in other countries?

GUIDE 2: GROUP INTERVIEWS: IEBC SECRETARIAT; AND IFES, UNDP, NDI

Name of organization:
Respondent:
Role of respondent in their institution and main responsibilities:
Date:
Location:

Purpose: **The purpose of this GI is to identify: learning, considerations and informed assessments of the effectiveness of the election assistance provided by USAID for the Kenyan elections of 2013, with a focus on the Independent Electoral Boundaries Commission and Election Dispute Resolution. It also seeks to capture insights that will be relevant for future USAID election programming in Kenya and models and lessons that may be useful for USAID assistance in other countries.**

Covering Approaches:

- Strengthening the Capacity of the Election Management Body
- Election Dispute Resolution and Security

Feeding into Evaluation Questions: 1, 2, 3,4, 5, 6

Contribution

1. What were IEBC's biggest achievements for the 2013 elections? What is IEBC most proud of and why?
2. In what ways did the USAID-funded programs contribute to the IEBC's ability to administer the 2013 elections?
3. How did these programs contribute to IEBC's organizational composition and systems?
4. In what ways did support to IEBC for election dispute resolution contribute to the election process? What challenges does IEBC face in carrying out its mandate related to EDR?
5. In your opinion, what strategies for election security in 2013 worked well?

Sustainability and Institutional Capacity

6. How prepared do you believe that IEBC is for future elections?
7. Which areas of support to IEBC will be most important for the next general elections in Kenya (scheduled for 2017)?
    a. What would happen if USAID and other donor support is significantly reduced for the next election cycle?
8. Which of the following factors is most important to the overall strength of the IEBC(*Moderator note: itemize these options on flip chart and ask discussants to rank these. Note the totals and gender disaggregated responses)*
    i. Staff recruitment and training
    i. Financial management (*Moderator note: i and ii are about administrative and support functions)*
    ii. Service delivery

iii. Performance monitoring and evaluation*(Moderator note: iii, iv are about technical and program functions)*
iv. Strategic planning
v. Leadership capacity (*Moderator note: v and vi are about structure and culture)*
vi. *Other?*

Mix and Timing of Program Activities

9. ONLY FOR IFES, UNDP, NDI (NOT IEBC): Based on your experience in Kenya and knowledge of good practices and standards for elections, what is your opinion of the timing and sequencing of major areas of support to IEBC? What could have been better?
10. In your opinion, was the USAID funding level for IEBC support sufficient? If no, what was missing?

Marginalized Populations (Women and Youth)

11. Which efforts by IEBC best promoted the participation of *women*- both as voters and candidates- for the 2013 elections? Which efforts by IEBC best promoted participation of *youth*-as voters and candidates- for 2013 elections?

Recommendations and Lessons Learned

12. How can future USAID assistance to IEBC be improved?
13. What lessons from elections in Kenya do you think are relevant and important for other countries?

GUIDE 3: GROUP INTERVIEWS: IDLO, MCK SECRETARIAT; JWCEP; POLITICAL PARTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS

(Note: MCK interview not held)

Name of organisation:
Respondent:
Role of respondent in their institution and main responsibilities:
Date:
Location:

Purpose: **The purpose of this GI is to identify: learning, considerations and informed assessments of the effectiveness of the election assistance provided by USAID for the Kenyan elections of 2013in terms of the role of the judiciary in election dispute resolution, the professionalization of political parties, and media engagement. It also seeks to capture insights that will be relevant for future USAID election programming in Kenya and models and lessons that may be useful for USAID assistance in other countries.**

Covering Approaches:

- Election Dispute Resolution and Security
- Professionalizing Political Parties
- Media Engagement (for balanced and objective media coverage)

Feeding into Evaluation Questions: 1, 2, 3, 5, 6

Contribution

1. What were your institution's biggest contributions to the 2013 electoral *environment* (NOT results)? (*Moderator prompt: for political party EDs, note that we are taking about political parties in general; NOT the individual party achievements)*
2. How did USAID-funded programs best contribute to your institution's ability to carry out its election-related responsibilities for the 2013 elections?
3. How (and how well) did your institution collaborate with other key elections institutions and stakeholders? Can you provide some examples?
4. Which type or areas of assistance were most useful to your institution in preparing for elections?

POLITICAL PARTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ONLY

A. Have the new constitutional and legal framework impacted the way that parties operate in practice? How so?
B. In your opinion, in what specific ways has USAID-funded training helped parties to compete effectively in elections?

C. In your opinion, have parties changed their approach to developing party platforms as a result of USAID assistance? How so? Have they changed their approach to *communicating* party platforms? How so?
D. What do you think are important aspects of internal party democracy? What do you think parties need to do to become more internally democratic?
E. What steps do you think parties need to take to meet the constitutional requirements regarding affirmative action related to party leadership roles?
F. What steps do you think parties need to take to meet the constitutional requirements regarding reserved seats for women and youth?
G. What else should parties do to appeal to the needs of women and youth as candidates and voters?

Sustainability and Institutional Capacity

5. How prepared do you believe that your institution is for future elections?
6. Which areas of support to your institution will be most important for the next general elections in Kenya (scheduled for 2017)?
    a. What would happen if USAID and other donor support is significantly reduced for the next election cycle?
7. Which of the following factors is most important to the overall strength of your institution (*Moderator note: itemize these options on flip chart and ask discussants to rank these. Note the totals and gender disaggregated responses)*
    i. Staff recruitment and training
    ii. Financial management (*Moderator note: i and ii are about administrative and support functions)*
    iii. Service delivery
    iv. Performance monitoring and evaluation*(Moderator note: iii, iv are about technical and program functions)*
    v. Strategic planning
    vi. Leadership capacity (*Moderator note: v and vi are about structure and culture)*
    vii. *Other?*

Mix and Timing of Program Activities

8. In your opinion, was the funding level and timing of the USAID-funded activities you were involved with appropriate/ sufficient? If no, how could these be improved?

Marginalized Populations (Women and Youth)

9. MCK ONLY: Can you give some examples of USAID-funded activities you were involved with that best promoted the participation of women and youth in the election process?

Recommendations and Lessons Learned

10. How can future USAID assistance to your institution be improved?
11. What lessons from elections in Kenya do you think are relevant and important for other countries?

GUIDE 4: GROUP INTERVIEW: INTERNATIONAL DONORS *ORIGINAL*

Name of organisation: Members of Election Donors Group for 2013 elections
Respondent:
Role of respondent in their institution and main responsibilities:
Date:
Location:

Purpose: **The purpose of this GI is to identify: learning, considerations and informed assessments of the effectiveness of the election assistance provided by USAID for the Kenyan elections of 2013, with a focus on international donor coordination. It also seeks to capture insights that will be relevant for future USAID election programming in Kenya and models and lessons that may be useful for USAID assistance in other countries.**

Covering Approaches:

- Strengthening the Capacity of the Election Management Body
- Election Dispute Resolution and Security
- Professionalizing Political Parties
- Election Observation
- Civic and Voter Education
- Media Engagement (for balanced and objective media coverage)
- Participation of Marginalized Groups (women and youth)

Feeding into Evaluation Questions: 1,3,4,6

Contribution

1. Briefly, how would you assess the international community's overall contribution to the 2008-2013 election process in Kenya?
2. How well did this package of assistance address the recommendations from the 2007 elections? And what about the election-related requirements coming from the 2010 referendum?
3. Which donors were seen as most significant in terms of influence (not necessarily in terms of financial) support?
4. What, if any, comparative advantage did USAID have vis-à-vis other donors?
5. Recognizing that the greatest contribution to the elections was by the Government of Kenya, and that there were parallel efforts by multiple donors, is it possible to distinguish some of the significant *USAID* contributions to the elections?

Mix and Timing of Activities, Donor Coordination

6. How would you describe the quality of donor coordination for the 2013 elections?
7. How did the donors ensure complimentary, coordinated programming?
8. How effective were the various election coordination forums, relative to donor coordination in other sectors where there are multiple donors?

9. Were there any gaps in technical or financial support to the elections? If so, how were these gaps dealt with?

Recommendations and Lessons Learned

10. Which areas of support or activities will be most important for the next general elections in Kenya (scheduled for 2017)?
    - Ideally, when should these (different) activities begin?
    - What would happen if USAID and other donor support is significantly reduced for the next election cycle?
11. What, if anything, should be done to improve donor coordination for future elections?
12. What lessons about donor coordination in Kenya do you think are relevant and important for election assistance in other countries?

GUIDE 4: GROUP INTERVIEW: INTERNATIONAL DONORS *REVISED*

Name of organisation: Members of Election Donors Group for 2013 elections
Respondent:
Role of respondent in their institution and main responsibilities:
Date:
Location:

Purpose: **The purpose of this GI is to identify: learning, considerations and informed assessments of the effectiveness of the election assistance provided by USAID for the Kenyan elections of 2013, with a focus on international donor coordination. It also seeks to capture insights that will be relevant for future USAID election programming in Kenya and models and lessons that may be useful for USAID assistance in other countries.**

Covering Approaches:

- Strengthening the Capacity of the Election Management Body
- Election Dispute Resolution and Security
- Professionalizing Political Parties
- Election Observation
- Civic and Voter Education
- Media Engagement (for balanced and objective media coverage)
- Participation of Marginalized Groups (women and youth)

Feeding into Evaluation Questions: 1,3,4,5,6

Contribution

1. In your opinion, how well did the international community's package of assistance address the recommendations from the 2007 elections?
2. Did the assistance for 2008-2013 incorporate any lessons learned or best practices for election assistance from other countries? Which ones?
3. What, if any, comparative advantage did USAID have vis-à-vis other donors?
4. (Recognizing that the greatest contribution to the elections was by the Government of Kenya, and that there were parallel efforts by multiple donors) what were *USAID's* main contributions to the elections?

Mix and Timing of Activities, Donor Coordination

5. How would you describe the quality of donor coordination for the 2013 elections?
6. Are there any examples of program duplication?
7. How effective was the coordination, relative to donor coordination in other sectors where there are multiple donors?
8. What, if anything, should be done to improve donor coordination for future elections?
9. Could anything have been done differently to maximize the use of donor resources?

Marginalized Populations

10. Which program activities had the greatest impact in promoting the participation of women in the elections? How? What about youth?

Recommendations and Lessons Learned

11. Which areas of support or activities will be most important for future elections in Kenya ?
    - Ideally, when should these (different) activities begin?
12. What lessons about donor coordination in Kenya do you think should be applied to election assistance in other countries?

GUIDE 5: GROUP INTERVIEW: USAID, US EMBASSY *ORIGINAL*

Name of organisation: USAID
Respondent: Zephania Aura,
Role of respondent in their institution and main responsibilities: Agreement Officer Representative and Senior Elections Specialist
Date:
Location:

Purpose: **The purpose of this GI is to identify: learning, considerations and informed assessments of the effectiveness of the election assistance provided by USAID for the Kenyan elections of 2013. It also seeks to capture insights that will be relevant for future USAID election programming in Kenya and models and lessons that may be useful for USAID election assistance in other countries.**

Covering Approaches:

- Strengthening the Capacity of the Election Management Body
- Election Dispute Resolution and Security
- Professionalizing Political Parties
- Election Observation
- Civic and Voter Education
- Media Engagement (for balanced and objective media coverage)
- Participation of Marginalized Groups (women and youth)

Feeding into Evaluation Questions: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.

Contribution

1. What were the major achievement s of USG's support to the 2008-2013 election cycle in terms of the seven (7) identified approaches? (*Moderator note: probe why, how)*

    a. Strengthening the Capacity of the Election Management Body
    b. Election Dispute Resolution and Security
    c. Professionalizing Political Parties
    d. Election Observation
    e. Civic and Voter Education
    f. Media Engagement
    g. Participation of Marginalized Groups

2. What is your opinion of the international community's overall contribution to the 2013 election process? Did USG have a comparative advantage over other donors in any way? How so?

Mix and Timing of Activities

3. How well did USG's package of assistance address the recommendations from the 2007 elections? What about the election-related requirements coming from the 2010 constitutional referendum?
4. Were there any needs not covered by USG's assistance package that should have been? If so, what were these? (How) were these gaps addressed?

Donor Coordination

5. How would you describe the quality of donor coordination for the 2013 elections? What, if anything, should be done to improve coordination for future elections?

Marginalized Populations

6. Which program activities had the greatest impact in promoting the participation of women in the elections? What about youth?
7. What are the greatest needs for these two groups going forward?

Sustainability and Institutional Capacity

8. Which areas of support or individual activities do you think will be most important for the next general elections in Kenya (scheduled for 2017)? Ideally, when should these (different) activities begin?

Recommendations and Lessons Learned

9. If you had the opportunity to change anything about USG's assistance for the 2008-2013 election process– what would it be? Why?
10. What lessons from election assistance in Kenya in the past 5 years do you think are important for USAID election programming in other countries?

GUIDE 5: GROUP INTERVIEW: USAID, US EMBASSY *REVISED*

Name of organisation:
Respondent:
Role of respondent in their institution and main responsibilities: Agreement Officer Representative and Senior Elections Specialist
Date:
Location:

Purpose: **The purpose of this GI is to identify: learning, considerations and informed assessments of the effectiveness of the election assistance provided by USAID for the Kenyan elections of 2013. It also seeks to capture insights that will be relevant for future USAID election programming in Kenya and models and lessons that may be useful for USAID election assistance in other countries.**

Covering Approaches:

- Strengthening the Capacity of the Election Management Body
- Election Dispute Resolution and Security
- Professionalizing Political Parties
- Election Observation
- Civic and Voter Education
- Media Engagement (for balanced and objective media coverage)
- Participation of Marginalized Groups (women and youth)

Feeding into Evaluation Questions: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.

Contribution

1. What's your opinion of the international community's overall contribution to the 2013 elections? Which donors had comparative influence/ impact?
2. In your opinion, how well did USAID's package of assistance address the recommendations from the 2007 elections?
3. Did the assistance for 2008-2013 incorporate any lessons learned or best practices for election assistance from other countries? Which ones?
4. In which program areas did USAID have the greatest impact? Why/how?

Mix and Timing of Activities

5. If you had the opportunity to change anything about USG's assistance for the 2008-2013 election process– what would it be? Why?

Donor Coordination

6. What worked well in terms of donor coordination for the 2013 elections?
7. What, if anything, should be done differently in the future to maximize the use of USG resources?

Marginalized Populations

8. Which program activities had the greatest impact in promoting the participation of women in the elections? How? What about youth?

Sustainability and Institutional Capacity

9. Which areas of support or individual activities do you think will be most important for future electoral events in Kenya? Ideally, when should these (different) activities begin?

Recommendations and Lessons Learned

10. What lessons from election assistance in Kenya in the past 5 years do you think are important for designing USAID election programming in other countries?

GUIDE 6: GROUP INTERVIEW: NDI CORE STAFF

Name of organisation:
Respondent:
Role of respondent in their institution and main responsibilities:
Date:
Location:

Purpose: **The purpose of this GI is to identify: learning, considerations and informed assessments of the effectiveness of the election assistance provided by USAID for the Kenyan elections of 2013in terms of the professionalization of political parties, domestic election observation and the participation of women and youth. It also seeks to capture insights that will be relevant for future USAID election programming in Kenya and models and lessons that may be useful for USAID assistance in other countries.**

Covering Approaches:

- Professionalizing Political Parties
- Election Observation
- Participation of Marginalized Groups (women and youth)

Feeding into Evaluation Questions: 1, 2, 3,4, 5, 6

Contribution- Political Parties

1. Overall, how would you assess the performance of political parties in 2013 compared to 2007?

    A. Have the new constitutional and legal framework impacted the way that parties operate in practice? How so?
    B. In your opinion, in what specific ways has USAID-funded training helped parties to compete effectively in elections?
    C. In your opinion, have parties changed their approach to developing party platforms as a result of USAID assistance? How so? Have they changed their approach to *communicating* party platforms? How so?
    D. What do you think parties need to do to become more internally democratic?
    E. What steps do you think parties need to take to meet the constitutional requirements regarding affirmative action related to party leadership roles?
    F. What steps do you think parties need to take to meet the constitutional requirements regarding reserved seats for women and youth?
    G. What else should parties do to appeal to the needs of women and youth as candidates and voters?

Contribution- domestic election observers

2. In your opinion, how well did domestic election observation contribute to the election process? Were there any negative consequences of the observation mission?
3. In what ways did the domestic and international observation missions coordinate? observation mission coordinate with the international observation mission? What benefits came from this coordination?
4. How do you expect that the domestic observation mission report will be utilized by Kenya institutions? What other audiences might use it? What response have there been to the report from Kenyan institutions, such as IEBC?
5. What is your impression of public awareness and acceptance of the role domestic election observers?

Sustainability and Institutional Capacity

6. How prepared do you believe that political parties are for future elections?
7. Which areas of support to political parties will be most important for the next general elections in Kenya (scheduled for 2017)?
    a. What would happen if USAID and other donor support is significantly reduced for the next election cycle?
8. In your opinion, what steps do political parties need to take to become more professional?

Mix and Timing of Program Activities

9. In your opinion, was the funding level and timing of the USAID-funded activities you were involved with appropriate/ sufficient? If no, how could these be improved?

Marginalized Populations (Women and Youth)

10. In your opinion, what are the biggest challenges to the participation of women in the election process?
11. What are the biggest challenges to the participation of youth in the election process?
12. Can you give some examples of USAID-funded activities that best promoted the participation of women and youth in the election process?

Recommendations and Lessons Learned

13. How can future USAID electoral assistance to Kenya be improved?
14. What lessons from elections in Kenya do you think are relevant and important for other countries?

GUIDE 7: GROUP INTERVIEW: VOTER AND CIVIC EDUCATION IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS--IRI, INUKA, URAIA, TI, WTS, UNDP (FOR SUPPORT TO IEBC)

Name of organisation:
Respondent:
Role of respondent in their institution and main responsibilities:
Date:
Location:

Purpose: **The purpose of this GI is to identify: learning, considerations and informed assessments of the effectiveness of the election assistance provided by USAID for the Kenyan elections of 2013 in terms of the <u>voter and civic education.</u> It also seeks to capture insights that will be relevant for future USAID election programming in Kenya and models and lessons that may be useful for USAID assistance in other countries.**

Covering Approaches:

- Civic and Voter Education

Feeding into Evaluation Questions: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

Introductory Question

1. How would you describe the overall atmosphere for the 2013 elections?

Contributions

2. Of the USAID-funded activities you were involved with:
   i. What in your opinion worked well?
   ii. Can you give some examples of how these activities contributed to the 2013 elections?
3. What might have happened without USAID support for these activities?

Marginalized Populations (Women and Youth)

4. Of the USAID-funded activities you were involved with or know about, which ones best promoted the participation of women and youth in the election process?

Mix and Timing of Program Activities, Donor Coordination

5. In your opinion, was the *timing* of the USAID-funded activities you were involved with appropriate/ sufficient? If no, how could it have been improved?
6. Was the *funding level* sufficient? If no, in what ways was it insufficient?
7. Are there examples of different implementers of voter and civic education activities working together? Which ones? What impact did this have? Do you know who funded these programs? Was it USAID or another donor?

Sustainability and Institutional Capacity

8. Going forward, what are the major voter and civic education needs in Kenya?
9. Does your organization plan to continue any of the voter and civic education activities funded by IFES for the elections? Why or why not? Which ones?
10. What would happen if USAID and other donor support for voter and civic education were significantly reduced for the next election cycle?

Recommendations and Lessons Learned

11. How can future USAID assistance for voter and civic education in Kenya be improved?
12. What lessons from voter and civic education in Kenya do you think are relevant and important for other countries?

KEY INFORMANT INTERVEIWS

(Note: KII guides 1, 3 removed/replaced prior to data collection)

GUIDE 2: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE: ORPP, CHIEF JUSTICE, NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE, PPDT

(Note: Chief Justice interview not held)

Name of organisation:
Respondent:
Role of respondent in their institution and main responsibilities:
Date:
Location:

Purpose: **The purpose of this KII is to identify: learning, considerations and informed assessments of the effectiveness of the election assistance provided by USAID for the Kenyan elections of 2013. It also seeks to capture insights that will be relevant for future USAID election programming in Kenya and models and lessons that may be useful for USAID assistance in other countries.**

Covering Approaches:

- Election Dispute Resolution and Security
- Professionalizing Political Parties

Feeding into Evaluation Questions: 1, 2, 3 ,5, 6

Contribution

1. What were your institution's biggest contributions to the 2013 electoral process?
2. How did USAID-funded programs best contribute to your institution's ability to carry out its election-related responsibilities for the 2013 elections?
3. How (and how well) did your institution collaborate with other key elections institutions and stakeholders? Can you provide some examples?
4. Which type or areas of assistance were most useful to your institution in preparing for elections?

ONLY FOR ORPP

A. How would you compare the professionalism of political parties in 2007 with 2013? What are some reasons for the changes?
B. How did USAID's electoral assistance best assist the ORPP to administer its legal mandate to regulate political parties?
C. What steps do political parties need to take to better comply with the Political Parties Act?

ONLY FOR CHIEF JUSTICE

D. In what ways did support to JWCEP for election dispute resolution contribute to the election process? What challenges does JWCEP face in carrying out its mandate related to EDR?

Sustainability and Institutional Capacity

5. How prepared do you believe that your institution is for future elections?
6. Which areas of support to your institution will be most important for the next general elections in Kenya (scheduled for 2017)?
    a. What would happen if USAID and other donor support is significantly reduced for the next election cycle?

Mix and Timing of Program Activities

7. In your opinion, was the funding level and timing of the USAID- funded support to your institution appropriate/ sufficient? If no, how could these be improved?

Marginalized Populations (Women and Youth)

8. Can you give some examples of how your institution promoted the participation of women and youth in the 2013 elections?

Recommendations and Lessons Learned

9. How can future USAID assistance to your institution be improved?
10. What lessons from elections in Kenya do you think are relevant and important for other countries?

GUIDE 4: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW: IEBC CHAIRMAN

Name of organisation:
Respondent: IEBC Chairman
Role of respondent in their institution and main responsibilities:
Date:
Location:

Purpose: **The purpose of this KII is to identify: learning, considerations and informed assessments of the effectiveness of the election assistance provided by USAID for the Kenyan elections of 2013, related to the Independent Electoral Boundaries Commission (IEBC). It also seeks to capture insights that will be relevant for future USAID election programming in Kenya and models and lessons that may be useful for USAID assistance in other countries.**

Covering Approaches:

- Strengthening the Capacity of the Election Management Body

Feeding into Evaluation Questions: 1, 2, 3,4, 5, 6

Contribution

1. What were IEBC's biggest achievements for the 2013 elections? What is IEBC most proud of and why?
2. In what ways did the USAID-funded programs contribute to the IEBC's ability to administer the 2013 elections?
3. How did these programs contribute to IEBC's organizational composition and systems?
4. In what ways did support to IEBC for election dispute resolution contribute to the election process? What challenges does IEBC face in carrying out its mandate related to EDR?
5. In your opinion, what strategies for election security in 2013 worked well?

Sustainability and Institutional Capacity

6. How prepared do you believe that IEBC is for future elections?
7. Which areas of support to IEBC will be most important for the next general elections in Kenya (scheduled for 2017)?
    a. What would happen if USAID and other donor support is significantly reduced for the next election cycle?

Mix and Timing of Program Activities

8. In your opinion, was the USAID funding level for IEBC support sufficient? If no, what was missing?

Marginalized Populations (Women and Youth)

9. Which efforts by IEBC best promoted the participation of *women*- both as voters and candidates- for the 2013 elections? Which efforts by IEBC best promoted participation of *youth*-as voters and candidates- for 2013 elections?

Recommendations and Lessons Learned

10. How can future USAID assistance to IEBC be improved?
11. What lessons from elections in Kenya do you think are relevant and important for other countries?

GUIDE 5: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW: ASSOCIATION OF MEDIA WOMEN IN KENYA (AMWIK)

Name of organization:
Respondent:
Role of respondent in their institution and main responsibilities:
Date:
Location:

Purpose: **The purpose of this KII is to identify: learning, considerations and informed assessments of the effectiveness of the election assistance provided by USAID for the Kenyan elections of 2013in terms of the participation of women. It also seeks to capture insights that will be relevant for future USAID election programming in Kenya and models and lessons that may be useful for USAID assistance in other countries.**

Covering Approaches:

- Participation of Marginalized Groups (women and youth)

Feeding into Evaluation Questions: 1, 3, 4, 5, 6

Contribution

1. What was the biggest contribution of your program to women?
   a. Of the USAID-funded activities you were involved with:
      i. What in your opinion worked well?
      ii. Can you give some examples of how these activities contributed to the 2013 elections?

Mix and Timing of Program Activities

2. In your opinion, was the funding level and timing of the USAID-funded activities you were involved with appropriate and sufficient? If no, how could these be improved?

Marginalized Populations (Women and Youth)

3. What are the biggest challenges to the participation of women in the election process?
4. Has the new constitutional and legal framework impacted the way that parties communicate with women?
5. What steps do you think parties need to take to meet the constitutional requirements regarding affirmative action related to party leadership roles?
6. What else should parties do to appeal to the needs of women as candidates and voters?

Recommendations and Lessons Learned

7. How can future USAID electoral assistance to Kenya be improved?
8. What lessons from elections in Kenya do you think are relevant and important for other countries?

ANNEX IV: SOURCES OF INFORMATION

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ANNEX V: DISCLOSURE OF ANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Thomas N. Maosa
Title	Team Member/Field Associate
Organization	MSI- Nairobi, Kenya
Evaluation Position?	☐ Team Leader ☐ Team member
Evaluation Award Number *(contract or other instrument)*	Project No. 720700.29-500-03-15
USAID Project(s) Evaluated *(Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)*	Evaluation of USAID Election Assistance to Kenya, General Election, March, 2013.
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	☐ Yes ☑ No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: *Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:* 1. *Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 2. *Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.* 3. *Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.* 4. *Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 5. *Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 6. *Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.*	N/A

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	
Date	01.04.2014

2

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Michael H. Getto
Title	Team Member
Organization	MSI
Evaluation Position?	☐ Team Leader ■ Team member
Evaluation Award Number *(contract or other instrument)*	AID–623–I–12–00001/AID-623-TO-14-00003
USAID Project(s) Evaluated *(Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)*	None before the 2014 Kenya Election Evaluation
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	■ Yes ☐ No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: *Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:* *1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* *2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.* *3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.* *4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* *5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* *6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.*	I have conducted preliminary discussions for full-time positions with MSI in the recent past. Hence, its knowledge of my background and experience. From January 2004 through July 2009, I served as Country Director for the International Republican Institute in Moldova and Lithuania. I directed a Regional Parliamentary Program for IRI from Lithuania as well. From July 2009 through July 2012, I worked as Chief of Party for the International Foundation for Electoral Systems in three countries: Georgia, Tajikistan and Armenia. In my positions at IRI and IFES, I worked closely with the National Democratic Institute since 2004. And, I discussed possible employment opportunities with NDI in 2007, 2009 and 2012.

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	MGetto
Date	May 13, 2014

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Katherine Vittum
Title **Organization**	Team Leader Management Systems International
Evaluation Position?	X **Team Leader** ☐ Team member
Evaluation Award Number *(contract or other instrument)*	AID–623–I–12–00001/AID-623-TO-14-00003
USAID Project(s) Evaluated *(Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)*	Political Party Development Program (PPDP) in Pakistan, implemented by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in partnership with the International Republican Institute (IRI) and Strengthening Participatory Organization (SPO). Agreement Number AID-391-A-11-00004.
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	☐ Yes **X No**
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: *Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:* *1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* *2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.* *3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.* *4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* *5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* *6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.*	I worked for the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) from 2000-2009. I have never worked for IFES related to Kenya.

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	Kathrin S. Vittum

Date	**September 27, 2013**

ANNEX VI: STATEMENT OF DIFFERENCES (RESERVED IF APPLICABLE)

ANNEX VII: TNS REPORT

Technical Report:
MSI Evaluation of USAID Electoral Assistance in Kenya

Submitted to; MSI
By TNS RMS East Africa Limited
March, 2014

Background and Evaluation Objectives

After the 2007/2008 post-election violence and humanitarian crisis, to return Kenya to normalcy, there was need to bring the country back to comprehensive reforms, and address immediate, structural and proximate causes of the crisis.

In the short-term, it was anticipated that reforms will bring about an independent, efficient, and effective electoral management body – coupled with an informed and active civil society – would provide a stable environment for conducting free, fair, and peaceful elections in 2013. In the long- term, it was expected that Kenya's electoral framework and institutions – namely, the electoral commission, political parties, and a domestic monitoring network – would be able to deliver transparent and accountable future elections for the Kenya people.

Evaluation Objectives
The objective of this evaluation is to determine the extent to which USAID"s elections assistance, as provided by its ten partner organizations, contributed to free, fair and peaceful 2013 elections. This information will help inform USAID/Kenya's future elections and political processes assistance, particularly on:

- Electoral reforms,
- Administration and management
- Support to civic and voter education
- Election observation
- Electoral-related conflict prevention
- Support to electoral dispute resolution
- Strengthening of political parties and coalitions
- Training on electoral security
- Support to media for objective coverage of election activities

This evaluation will also serve as a resource for other USAID missions and the public in general for developing election support programs in the future.

Data Collection and Sampling

In order to obtain a deeper understanding of the experiences, views and perceptions of study participants with respect to the 2013 general elections, a qualitative research approach was used. This included group discussions with a variety of beneficiaries. Group discussions were moderated by members of the MSI evaluation team.

TNS' provided coordination and logistics support towards the completion of 24 group discussions in select regions. Specifically, TNS provided the following: translation and transcription of the discussion guide, recruitment of respondents, note taking, simultaneous translation, hall hire, recording equipment, refreshment and incentives for the respondents. Fieldwork was conducted between
February 8th 2014 and February 27th 2014.

The evaluation was carried out in four core regions, with surrounding counties included. A total of 11 counties were therefore captured in the evaluation:
- Nairobi (Kiambu)

- Nakuru (Narok)
- Kisumu (Kisii, Kericho, Vihiga)
- Mombasa (Kwale, Kilifi)

Sampling and Recruitment

The evaluation targeted five specific categories of respondents who had either received training or had participated in training others, as part of the USAID electoral assistance activities. Participants were recruited from beneficiary lists provided by MSI, which were obtained from implementing partners databases:

The category types and screening criteria used to recruit for each are described below:

(1) Voter and civic education participants
These groups were comprised of direct participants in voter and civic education activities and included:

a. Voter/ civic education participants (all first and second level beneficiaries, including those below)
b. Voter/ civic educators (includes CSO/CBO partners for IRI and Uraia; IEBC ward- level educators; UN Women partners)
c. Data peace analysts (UN Women)
d. Local script writers, artists, producers and DJs who developed and communicated voter and civic education messages (WTS)

(2) Political party trainees
These groups were comprised of three sub-categories of trainees, each with different levels of exposure to the program:

a. Training of Trainers (TOT)
b. Inter-Party Youth Forum (IPYF)
c. Leadership and Campaign Academy (LCA)

(3) Journalists
These groups were comprised of two main sub-categories:
a. Workshop trainees
b. Media roundtable attendees

(4) Domestic election observers
These groups were comprised of participants in the domestic Election Observation Group (ELOG) network.

(5) Women
This group includes women who participated in program activities aimed at promoting the role of women in elections:
a. Participants in the women's media platform (NDI)
b. Members of AMWIK (NDI)
c. Members of the Federation of Women Lawyers in Kenya- FIDA (NDI)
d. Date peace analysts (UN Women)
e. Representatives of the National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict

Management (UN Women)

Each of these beneficiaries received training through one of nine grantee organizations that received USAID funding to implement various components of the electoral assistance. However, due to constraints including the limited geographic reach of the implementing partners and the evaluation exercise, as well as limitations in the timing of the evaluation, two implementing partners were not represented in this evaluation (IDLO and IFES).

Table 1: Activity type by implementing partner

	Implementing Partner	Type of Activity
1	International Republican Institute (IRI)	Voter/Civic Education
2	Transparency International	Voter/Civic Education
3	UNDP	Voter/Civic Education, Women
4	Inuka Kenya Trust	Voter/Civic Education
5	Uraia Trust	Voter/Civic Education
6	National Democratic Institute (NDI)	Domestic Observers, Party Trainees, Women, Journalist Trainees (Internews)
7	Well Told Story (Shujaaz)	Voter/Civic Education
8	International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)	Voter/Civic Education and Institutional Reform
9	International Law Development Institute (IDLO)	Institutional Reform

Distribution of Group Discussions by Region, Group Type and Implementing Partner

A quota per category type was proposed by MSI. Out of the 24 groups proposed, 21 groups were achieved. This was specifically due to challenges faced in securing groups with voter and civic education trainees in Nairobi informal settlements.

Table 2: Total groups by type

	Category type	Proposed	Achieved
1	Voter/Civic Education	12	9
2	Party Trainees	4	4
3	Journalist Trainees	2	2
4	Domestic Observers	3	3
5	Women	3	3
	Total	**24**	**21**

A complete sample breakdown by region, category type, implementing partner and group composition is provided in the table below.

Table 3: Group composition by region and IP

							IP						
	Group	County	Category	Gender	Date of Group	No. of Participants	IRI	TI	Inuka	Uraia	NDI /IEBC /ELOG	UNDP	WTS
ZONE 1	1	Kiambu	Voter/Civic Education	Mixed	27 Feb	11	0	X	0	5	6	X	X
	2	Nairobi	Journalist Trainees	Mixed	8 Feb	9	X	X	X	X	9	X	X
	3	Nairobi	Journalist Trainees	Mixed	8 Feb	7	X	X	X	X	7	X	X
ZONE 2	4	Nakuru	Voter/Civic Education	Mixed	10 Feb	7	X	X	2	5	X	X	X
	5	Nakuru	Domestic Observers	Mixed	10 Feb	11	X	X	X	X	11	X	X
	6	Nakuru	Women	Female	11 Feb	6	X	X	X	X	2	4	X
	7	Nakuru	Party Trainees	Mixed	11 Feb	8	X	X	X	X	8	X	X
	8	Narok	Voter/Civic Education	Female	12 Feb	5	X	X	1	4	X	X	X
ZONE 3	9	Kisumu	Voter/Civic Education	Mixed	15 Feb	10	2	2	1	5	X	0	X
	10	Kisumu	Party Trainees	Mixed	15 Feb	10	X	X	X	X	9	X	X
	11	Kisumu	Domestic Observers	Mixed	17 Feb	9	X	X	X	X	10	X	X
	12	Kisumu	Women	Female	17 Feb	2	X	X	X	X	0	2	X
	13	Kisii	Party Trainees	Mixed	18 Feb	8	X	X	X	X	8	X	X
	14	Kericho	Voter/Civic Education	Mixed	19 Feb	8	2	X	1	5	X	0	X
ZONE 4	15	Mombasa	Party Trainees	Mixed	22 Feb	9	X	X	X	X	9	X	X
	16	Mombasa	Domestic Observers	Mixed	22 Feb	8	X	X	X	X	8	X	X
	17	Mombasa	Women	Female	25 Feb	1	X	X	X	X	0	1	X
	18	Kwale	Voter/Civic Education	Male	24 Feb	8	4	X	0	3	4	0	1
	19	Kwale	Voter/Civic Education	Female	24 Feb	4	0	X	0	1	3	0	X
	20	Kilifi	Voter/Civic Education	Male	21 Feb	5	0	X	0	3	2	0	X
	21	Kilifi	Voter/Civic Education	Female	21 Feb	6	0	0	4	3	3	0	X

Field Challenges

A number of challenges arose during data collection but these were quickly addressed. Below, we have outlined the most significant obstacles faced during field work and the provided detailed steps taken by MSI and TNS to address them:

• The majority of challenges were encountered at the sampling stage. These are summarized as follows:

• Lists provided by implementing partners were not accurate or complete
• Some participants who were contacted from the databases indicated that they had not in fact received any training. These respondents were replaced.
• TNS worked with IRI to review existing records of end-beneficiaries of their program. The review was guided by the selection criteria developed by MSI evaluators in consultation with TNS. Once this was done, TNS drew a sample from these records and sought to recruit study participants from this list.
• Lists did not always include enough participants names to allow for adequate substitution in cases where respondents were not reachable or available to participate. As a result, some groups were comprised of less than 10 participants, as per the quota, with as few as 5 participants in some groups
• It was particularly challenging to gather enough women for the women participant groups. This was due to the fact that few women were trained, specifically in the evaluation regions.

ANNEX VIII: LIST OF MEETINGS

Data Collection Method	Tracking #	County	Group Type	Date
Notes (Introductory meeting)	N/A	Nairobi	USAID	21-Jan
Notes (Introductory meeting)	N/A	Nairobi	Implementing Partners	22-Jan
Notes (Methodology & work plan meeting)	N/A	Nairobi	USAID	29-Jan
KII	1	Nairobi	IEBC Chairman	3-Feb
GI	2	Nairobi	IEBC Secretariat	3-Feb
GI	3	Nairobi	NDI Core Staff	3-Feb
KII	4	Nairobi	ORPP Registrar	4-Feb
KII	5	Nairobi	PPDT Secretary	4-Feb
GI	6	Nairobi	Civic/ voter Education Implementing Partners	4-Feb
GI	7	Nairobi	IEBC Implementing Partners	5-Feb
KII	8	Nairobi	JWCEP Chair	5-Feb
GI	9	Nairobi	Political Party Executive Directors	6-Feb
Mtg	N/A	Nairobi	WTS	7-Feb
GD	10	Nairobi	Media	8-Feb
GD	11	Nairobi	Media	8-Feb
GD	12	Nakuru	Civic/ Voter Education Participants	10-Feb
GD	13	Nakuru	Domestic Observers	10-Feb
GD	14	Nakuru	Women	11-Feb
GD	15	Nakuru	Political Party Trainees	11-Feb
GD	16	Narok	Civic/ Voter Education Participants	12-Feb
Mtg	N/A	Nairobi	IEBC, TNS, MSI	12-Feb
GI	17	Nairobi	IDLO	13-Feb
GD	18	Kisumu	Civic/ Voter Education Participants	15-Feb
GD	19	Kisumu	Political Party Trainees	15-Feb
GD	20	Kisumu	Domestic Observers	17-Feb
GD	21	Kisumu	Women	17-Feb
GD	22	Kisii	Political Party Trainees	18-Feb
GD	23	Kericho	Civic/ Voter Education Participants	19-Feb
GD	24	Kilifi	Civic/ Voter Education Participants (M)	21-Feb
GD	25	Kilifi	Civic/ Voter Education Participants (F)	21-Feb
Mtg	N/A	Nairobi	TNS, MSI	21-Feb
GD	26	Mombasa	Party Trainees	22-Feb

GD	27	Mombasa	Domestic Observers	22-Feb
GD	28	Kwale	Civic/ Voter Education Participants (M)	24-Feb
GD	29	Kwale	Civic/ Voter Education Participants (F)	24-Feb
GD (KII)	30	Mombasa	Women*	25-Feb
GD	31	Kiambu	Civic/ Voter Education Participants	27-Feb
KII	32	Nairobi	Police	27-Feb
GI	33	Nairobi	International Donors	28-Feb
GI	34	Nairobi	USAID/US Embassy	28-Feb
GI	35	Nairobi	The Carter Center (Skype)	28-Feb
KII	36	Nairobi	AMWIK	5-Mar
Mtg	37	Nairobi	Partner Validation Workshop	5-Mar

* There was a lack of direct NDI and UNWomen female beneficiaries in Mombasa. The evaluation team instead met with a male participant of UNWomen's activities in Mombasa, a Gender and Peace Data Analyst. He provided valuable regional context and insights on marginalized populations.

ANNEX IX: MAPPING APPROACHES TO SUB-IRS AND DONOR ACTIVITIES

Democracy and Governance Results Framework – IR5: Mapping Approaches to sub IRs



Sources: USAID D&G PMP, and partner input. Donor contributions from donor matrix – February 28, 2013

ANNEX X: IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES AND DESIGN OF APPROACHES

This section summarizes actual activities conducted based on *available* activity documents. It reflects the activities highlighted in activity documents and is not necessarily exhaustive.

(I) EMB CAPACITY

The design included support to the IIEC related to the 2010 constitutional referendum and follow-on reforms (UNDP, 2009–11) and capacity-building of the IEBC for the management of free, fair and credible elections (UNDP and IFES, beginning in 2011). UNDP and IFES were the main USAID partners in this approach. UNDP's strategy through the basket fund focused on institutional strengthening, electoral operations and civic participation and engagement, while IFES's strategy focused on supporting internal systems and processes at IEBC, support to the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP), formulation of election-related regulations, voter education, electoral dispute resolution and the use of technology systems — in particular voter registration and the results transmission system, which were two of the main deficiencies identified by the Kriegler Report.[148]

Through a USAID grant, IFES supported the establishment of key election-related laws and provided technical support to IEBC and ORPP. The main support to IEBC related to voter registration and results transmission. IFES provided advice and support on procurement, the development of software for results management, including the Results Transmission System (RTS), and a framework for dispute resolution for IEBC. IFES also supported the mapping and digitalization of maps for polling stations and the integration of the geographical mapping system (GIS) into the Election Results Transmission and Display System (ERTDS). [149] IFES developed software to facilitate the registration & validation of political parties for ORPP. IFES also supported human resource capacity strengthening including training of ORPP to respond to the demands of the political parties.

From activity description documents of KEPPS, IFES was committed to strengthen IEBC capacity on voter education and to empower IEBC to coordinate with other stakeholders on election security. [150] This activity was not reflected in any of the activity performance documents. On follow-up, the evaluation team learned that USAID had informed IFES that gender programming was covered by other IPs and that IFES need not incorporate gender into its programming.[151]

The UNDP SERP 2 activity also supported IEBC on ICT, boundary delimitation, leadership, media and communication skills, gender mainstreaming and election administration. Review of UNDP activity performance reports further indicated that the activity provided technical assistance in procurement and conducted training of election officials. As a temporary stop-gap measure, UNDP engaged 290 logisticians (one per constituency) to support IEBC during the elections.

(II) EDR/SECURITY

The EDR approach mapped directly to Sub IR 5.2: Conflict mitigation, dispute resolution and response mechanism of the Democracy, Rights and Governance results framework of USAID. Three partners

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[148] Kriegler Report, p. 157, 162.
[149] KEPPS Project quarterly reports
[150] 2011 CEPPS AID-623-LA-11-00007
[151] SERP Progress Report, January 2012- December 2013

implemented this approach under bilateral funding from USAID. Each focused on a separate area, including: political parties through NDI; the Political Parties Dispute Tribunal (PPDT), ORPP and IEBC through IFES; and the JWCEP through IDLO. Through the UNDP basket fund, the joint Election Security Arrangements Project (ESAP) was supported to strengthen the capacity of police and the IEBC to handle elections-related security events. IDLO aimed to strengthen the judiciary and enhance its capacity to resolve election disputes in accordance with relevant laws and the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. NDI aimed at establishing impartial legal framework for elections and political parties and strengthening political party systems for transparency, good governance, management and accountability for democratic participation in party processes. IFES aimed at capacity-building for IEBC through support on development of procedures for dispute resolutions and sensitization of stakeholders on these procedures.

IFES provided technical assistance to the IEBC for EDR case management; trained political parties, media, observer groups and other stakeholders on the new EDR process and procedures; and established the case management system for PPDT.[152] UNDP supported the dispute resolution process by procuring computers, financing extra-legal support and providing a venue for the IEBC legal team to work on the cases related to political party nominations. IDLO supported the Judiciary Working Committee on Election Preparations (JWCEP), which assisted the judiciary in planning its workload related to election petitions. IDLO support focused on three areas: capacity-building, legal expertise and institutional strengthening of the committee and the judiciary related to election petitions. Specific contributions included support for the amendment and implementation of new laws; the development of a case management system to track cases; training for judges, magistrates and court registrars to handle election offenses and disputes; the adoption of election petitions rules and Supreme Court rules on presidential election petitions; and support to JWCEP to engage with major stakeholders and the public.

Security

All USAID funding for security was through the UNDP basket fund's joint Election Security Arrangement Project (ESAP) program, which was US $1.9 million out of US $37 million total to the basket fund. The purpose of the initiative was to the capacity of the police and IEBC to handle elections-related security events. Under the initiative, nearly 100,000 police officers received training on electoral security through a cascade mechanism.[153]

UNDP implemented ESAP, including training and the provision of Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials, such as electoral security hand books, guides and brochures. Key outputs included: 95,000 police officers trained and more than 150,000 IEC materials produced and disseminated to empower the police force on electoral security [154]

(III) POLITICAL PARTIES

Programming to strengthen political parties was administered by NDI, seeking to enhance the role of political parties in representing citizens' interests and increasing accountability in the Kenyan political process with a focus on expanding the role of women and youth. According to NDI, the approach was best linked to sub-IR result 5.1: Electoral administration and institutions strengthened, of the USAID Democracy & Governance results framework.

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[152] IFES FY12 Quarterly 3 Report, p. 21.
[153] SERP Project Evaluation Final Report, p. 33
[154] SERP Progress Report, January 2012- December 2013

NDI supported election stakeholders, including political parties, civil society organizations and institutional partners: apply election results and analysis to their work; strengthen domestic observation and monitoring capacity; promote dialogue on national reform issues among political parties and their civic and institutional partners; help political parties play a constructive role in electoral process reform, adhere to the PPA and develop consensus on implementation of key requirements; strengthen political parties' capacity to develop public policy, implementation and performance monitoring; and increase women's and youth's participation in and recognition by their parties' decision-making structures and procedures while assisting potential candidates for future elections.

NDI support focused on: strengthening the ability of political parties and CSOs in policymaking and electoral processes; consensus building on pre-election issues; alignment of political party policies to the new constitution; enforcement of PPA; capacity-building for political party election agents (e.g .IEBC Political Party Liaison Committees modeled on Ghana and South Africa[155]);stakeholder relations data use; use of technology, e.g., the digitalization of maps; and strengthening parties to increase women's participation.

Two other internationally financed organizations administered political party assistance in the 2013 electoral cycle and were briefly mentioned in the course of research for this report: The Center for Multiparty Democracy (CMD) and the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA).

As part of the international community support, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems IFES provided support to the ORPP to better administer the PPA.

(IV) ELECTION OBSERVERS

Domestic and International

USAID funded TCC's long-term observation mission to conduct an independent assessment of the elections and make recommendations for future improvement. NDI supported the long-term domestic election observation effort, implemented by the Elections Observation Group (ELOG), the permanent platform of civil society organizations established in 2010. The strategies of the two organizations contributed to Subresult 5.1 of the USAID/Kenya democracy and governance results framework: Electoral administration and institutions strengthened. NDI aimed at building local capacity to observe multiple stages of the electoral process. TCC aimed to conduct an impartial assessment of the process and make recommendations for future improvements.

Through The Carter Center, 52 international observers (14 long-term observers (LTOs) from 11 countries and 38 short-term observers (STOs) from 19 countries), took part in observation of the 2013 elections. TCC observers were present at 265 polling stations and in 34 of 47 counties[156]. TCC enhanced its election-monitoring efficiency through an electronic reporting system. TCC also documented the observation findings by providing recommendations to improve future elections. The African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) also fielded election observation missions, with the

[155] KII1

[156] The Carter Center Final Report, Observing Kenya's March 2013 Elections, p. 45

AU providing 69 observers from 29 countries[157] and the EU providing 65 observers from 26 countries.[158]

The domestic election observation group ELOG was established through the support of NDI in 2010 ahead of the constitutional referendum. In addition to USAID, numerous donors provided financial support to ELOG for the 2013 elections. More than 50 local organizations were accredited by IEBC to conduct election observation in Kenya. [159] In 2013, ELOG deployed more than 500 long-term observers, 7,000 short-term observers and 1,500 rapid response monitors to conduct a parallel vote tabulation (PVT) on election day.

(V) CIVIC AND VOTER EDUCATION

The civic education activities were consistent with USAID's IR 5.0: Free, fair, credible and peaceful elections held. USAID's planned approach included incorporating the IEBC, political parties and civil society to ensure voter registration, explain the transition from the IIEC to the new IEBC, highlight the new voting process for devolved positions, discourage vote-buying or other illegal practices and underscore voting as every Kenyan's civic right and duty.

USAID provided support to the International Republican Institute (IRI), Uraia Trust (Uchaguzi Bora Initiative), Inuka Trust (Uongozi 2012 Campaign), Transparency International and Well Told Story to undertake multimedia, community-based, and door-to-door initiatives. Other donors also supported the Uraia Trust, Well Told Story and Inuka Trust initiatives, as well as separate efforts, such as by AMKENI and UNWomen.[160]

Part of the commitment in the May 2011 activity description of CEPPS was for IFES to strengthen IEBC capacity on voter education.[161] This support was necessary, gauging from the gaps identified by this evaluation. From the review of the activity reports, none of the partners emphasized capacity-building for IEBC in implementing voter education. As indicated under approach 1(i) above, the priority became technical assistance to achieve a credible and peaceful election rather than capacity building.

Other than a civic education initiative through the Ministry of Justice,[162] the evaluation team is not aware of government support for civic and voter education initiatives. Civic education has historically been a donor agenda, but the new legal framework and devolution process more squarely place responsibility with the GOK in setting the civic education agenda.

(VI) MEDIA

USAID sought to ensure that the media played a positive role in disseminating information for the election, dispelling rumors and dampening rising tensions. Planned strategies provided capacity-building for new and traditional media and journalists, particularly to monitor government performance, provide information to the public on events in a conflict-sensitive manner and record citizen views.[163]

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[157] Report of the African Union Elections Observation Mission to the 4 March 2013 General Elections in Kenya, p.3
[158] European Union Election Observation Mission to Kenya: General Election 2013 Final Report, p.3
[159] SERP Progress Report January 2012- December 2013
[160] See Donor matrix, February 2013 in Annex X
[161] 2011 CEPPS AID-623-ILA-11-00007
[162] Donor matrix of February 2013 indicates funding by Japan for this initiative.
[163] USAID Kenya: Democracy and Governance Assessment and Strategy, May 2011

USAID was support for media engagement was through NDI to Internews, NDI's subgrantee. Internews worked to strengthen the capacity of mainstream media outlets to understand and report fairly and objectively on the electoral process, identify and avoid hate speech, build the capacity of journalists and editors to use polling data in an effective and legitimate way, and identify and mitigate conflicts of interest arising from political ownership of media houses.

(VII) MARGINALIZED GROUPS

The USAID DG strategy outlines crosscutting agendas for gender and youth programming. USAID's project activity document (PAD) and results framework do not include clear language on the participation of marginalized groups for IR 5.0 (Free, fair, credible and peaceful elections held), however; nor does the donor matrix outline financial contributions for this effort. For this evaluation, USAID mapped this approach to sub-IR 5.3 (Populations informed through civic education). Some activities could be aligned differently, however. For example, NDI noted that women's media platform and Leadership Campaign Academy for women fall outside of the existing results framework completely. As discussed in more detail under question 5, USAID and its partners did not feel that the program design sufficiently prioritize women.

USAID support to NDI included efforts to promote women and youth and other marginalized groups into the party decision-making processes and develop issue-based platforms. USAID and other donors provided support for civic and voter education targeting marginalized groups, as reported previously under approach 1 (V) and discussed later under question 5.

UNDP (UNWomen), Uraia Trust, IRI and NDI (through KEPPS), Inuka-Trust and Well Told Story each had programs designed to improve the participation of marginalized groups (women and youth) in elections. Through the basket fund, UNDP and UNWomen programming included activities to reduce elections-related gender-based violence, both through civic education initiatives and the seconding of a gender adviser to IEBC. Uraia Trust and IRI support aimed to provide civic education to women and marginalized populations to enable them take part in electoral processes. NDI aimed to promote inclusions of women, youth and other marginalized groups into the party decision-making processes, and to eliminate discriminatory laws against this population. Inuka Trust's goal was to empower youth for leadership and civic engagement through the Uongozi platform.

ANNEX XI: QUESTION 1(I) - CONTEXT OF THE EMB (IIEC AND IEBC) AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED

CONTEXT OF IIEC AND IEBC

The 2010 referendum was a litmus test for the interim election management body, the IIEC. The IIEC is credited with ensuring a free and fair referendum against the backdrop of the 2007 post-election violence. [164] The IEBC, who was an IIEC commissioner, highlighted IIEC study tours to Ghana, South Africa and India as part of the training provided by the international community [UNDP] during this time.[165] The August 2010 Synovate poll indicates that nearly 88 percent of Kenyans were satisfied with the referendum and had 85 percent confidence in the IIEC to conduct electoral processes, showing a significant improvement since December 2009, when only 12 percent of Kenyans trusted IIEC.[166]

The IEBC was appointed in late 2011. IEBC started nearly from scratch, with new commissioners who did not have election experience. [167] The new commission was charged with simultaneously administering six nationwide elections, an enormously complex task. At the time of IEBC's appointment, the elections were projected for August 2012. IEBC's first major task was to review the constituency and ward boundaries. Thereafter, priority tasks included preparation of election regulations, voter registration (including procurement, staff training and public outreach) and election operations (including procurement of equipment, staff recruitment and training, candidate nominations and dispute resolution, and public outreach). The timeline for these activities was extremely compressed. As detailed in other reports, procurement delays and challenges and late amendments to the Elections Act put enormous burden on the IEBC and other key institutions.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED

The mechanisms for support to the IEBC consisted of IFES, the multi-donor UNDP basket fund and direct support. The UNDP basket was 80 percent of the funding of this approach; IFES was 19 percent; and direct IEBC funding was less than 1 percent of the total. The IEBC chairman also noted that the international community's support to the IEBC (including through the basket fund) was largely in the form of technical assistance rather than capacity-building, though some of elements of assistance may point to a degree of building IEBC capacity through the difficult 2013 elections.[168] USAID felt they had little choice but to provide heavier than planned technical assistance to promote a peaceful election.[169]

USAID reports, election observation reports, activity reports, international donors and the IEBC note the significant technical assistance and the important role that USAID and the international community played in the elections.[170] For example, UNDP and IFES gave significant support to IEBC for registration

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[152] Inter alia, USAID Support for Kenya's 2013 Elections: Rapid Assessment Review, p. 3.
[165] KII1
[166] See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=muu1631i92c.
[167] GiD7: "IEBC was starting from ground zero." Regarding IEBC's biggest achievements: "Six elections in one…new commissioners, new boundaries, new voter register, new laws, new regulations, and an election that was largely accepted." KII1: New commissioners were not trained and so technical assistance was necessary; Most former IIEC commissioners did not come back and a lot of institutional memory was lost; New commissioners knew little about elections management- less than IEBC staff; IEBC secretariat staff is the continuity.
[168] The IEBC chairman highlighted extensive support for voter education; legal reform and the development of new regulations (particularly Judge Tora from Sweden, who assisted with the PPA and campaign finance legislation); boundary delimitation (with expertise from Canada, Ghana, India and South Africa); and the code of conduct for election observers. The IEBC also noted the important learning that took place during the elections, including the time required for proper election planning, the fact that election technology is not a panacea, and the need to manage public expectations.
[169] GI34
[170] See e.g. USAID Support for Kenya's 2013 Elections: Rapid Assessment Review, p.15, SERP Project Evaluation Final Report, p. 8, KII1, GI33

of more than 14 million voters in a compressed, 30-day period. This figure is approximately 80 percent of the IEBC's initial goal of 18 million voters to be achieved in a 60-day period.[171] The 2012 registration exercise was designed to improve the accuracy and completeness of the register.[172]

The IEBC chairman highlighted numerous contributions of USAID-funded technical assistance, including: IFES support to the ORRP to understand the PPA; boundary delimitation; National Democratic Initiative (NDI) focus groups on the public perception of IEBC (which reportedly helped change IEBC's decision-making process); NDI training for political party agents; NDI-supported exchange visits for commissioners to demonstrate how political party liaison committees work in other countries; IFES-supported technology, including biometric voter registration (BVR), electronic voter identification (EVID) and results transmission system (RTS). He appreciated IFES's assessment of different election technologies and the "red flags" that IFES raised throughout the process. He also noted the importance of IFES support on communications. He said the United States is more "objective, restrained and reasonable" than some donors.

[171] SERP Project Evaluation Final Report, p. 23, and UNDP email March 11, 2014.

[172] IFES audits of biometric voter registration (still unofficial) and a forthcoming IFES pilot program to examine the registration exercise should provide important insights about the quality of the register and recommendations for improving IEBC outreach to marginalized groups, such as women and youth, to encourage them to register.

ANNEX XII: QUESTION 1(II) - POLICE PERCEPTIONS ON THE ACTIVITY

> "It's unusual for government institutions to speak one language and so when they do, people believe them." *Police interview, Feb. 27, 2014*

The police noted that peace messaging, including by the inspector general of police and presidential candidates saying they would accept the election results, was also important for achieving peace. The police felt that security preparations and deployment in large numbers was a deterrent to potential violence by youth, and noted that youth were effectively utilized as voter registration clerks and polling station clerks in 2013, making them less vulnerable to potential manipulation. IEBC noted the good cooperation between the police and IEBC, and the police agreed.

A perceived shortcoming of the training is that the 34 senior police officers from Kenya Police and Administration Police, who conducted the cascade training for the regional, divisional and station level officers, were "sidelined' and not used as part of the regional teams to help IEBC with coordination of election day security. The UNDP SERP 2 final report notes that this disrupted the ESAP plan for systematic recording of results through the officer's log books.[173]

At the same time, SERP 2 program reporting notes that in some areas, police officers were perceived to be compromised, unwilling to act and susceptible to bribes.[174] The police also noted that the International Criminal Court (ICC) proceedings had a big impact on keeping the peace in 2013, but that underlying tensions still exist and the results of the ICC cases will influence the environment and inform the security needs ahead of future elections.

[173] SERP Project Evaluation Final Report, p.33
[174] SERP Progress Report January 2012-December 2013, p. 9

ANNEX XIII: QUESTION 1(III) — CONTEXT AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND POLITICAL PARTIES

The 2007 national elections in Kenya exposed political parties as weak institutions in a weak electoral environment overall. Kriegler noted that political parties were personality-driven with little regard for developing public policies in formal party manifestos or platforms; strictly election vehicles; lacking internal democracy; and ethnically based with historical ties to certain groups in Kenya and little capacity to reach out to all Kenyans.

A brand new legal framework, consisting of a new constitution and subsequent laws, was developed ahead of the 2013 national election The new constitution, approved by Kenyan voters in August 2010 and the PPA and the Elections Act of 2011 challenged political parties, e.g. with new requirements to more effectively broaden their memberships by including traditionally marginalized groups, and to improve the candidate nomination processes. The new constitution and the resulting laws also present an opportunity for parties to grow and solidify their memberships. If they capitalize on this, it can result in electoral gains.

Several of the regulations in the new legal framework were softened ahead of the elections. This included an amendment to the Elections Act to reduce the deadline for parties to submit their party membership lists to ORPP from 90 to 60 days. It also included the highly contentious amendment to the Act to reduce the minimum length of party membership required for candidate eligibility from three months to one day. This allowed for the notorious 'party hopping' and a chaotic nomination period. This is detailed in election observation reports.[175]

Nevertheless, there is evidence that the new constitution and the resulting legal framework has and will positively affect the institutionalization of political parties. The ORPP was created in the summer of 2011 to assist parties in understanding and adhering to the new legal framework. Its new director, in discussions with evaluators, acknowledged that political parties, in contrast to the 2007 electoral cycle- when they were like "societies"- are more regulated, structured and accountable now.[176]

[175] See, inter alia, The Carter Center Final Report, Observing Kenya's March 2013 Elections, p. 29-33.
[176] KII4

ANNEX XIV: QUESTION 1(V) — CIVIC EDUCATION ADDITIONAL ISSUES

KEY FINDINGS OF KRIEGLER AND OTHER REVIEWS OF THE 2007 CIVIC EDUCATION EFFORT

The impact evaluation noted that there are limits of civic education in influencing core democratic values; mere exposure is not enough and a more intensive approach was required.177 A 2013 academic review of NGOs engaged in civic education in Kenya indicates that NGOs were only able to reach 20 constituencies out of the 210 in the country and it was cited as a reason for low levels of effectiveness of civic education.[178]

The Kriegler Report recommended that the EMB should be given the resources for mobility to do civic education, particularly when there are no elections. It recommended civic and voter education on a consistent basis every year and involvement of youth in the outreach. It suggested not limiting voter and civic education to urban areas and using select organizations that are vetted in advance. Finally, it recommended monitoring and evaluation to ensure CSOs are carrying out their responsibility.[179]

CROSS-SECTOR COORDINATION

IPs and international donors commended USAID's mobilization of other sectors to assist with civic and voter education. IPs remarked that there were good linkages with health and economic implementing partners and a genuine effort to try to coordinate. [180] USAID believed the strategy worked well and that is a worthy model for future election support. [181] Non-USAID donors felt that the strategy was creative and a low-cost option, though they were not sure of its impact. [182] The evaluation team did not meet with other IPs from other sectors to seek their views.

METHODS

USAID reported comments by stakeholders that civic and voter education materials were too difficult for the average Kenyan to comprehend. Some implementing partners echoed this, saying that voter education materials should be in local dialect, that messaging should be anecdotal (not too heavy) and that it should be in common language (no "NGO-ese" or jargon).[183] Civic educators highlighted a particular challenge in making the constitutional concepts accessible to the average Kenyan, particularly under time constraints. Some of the civic education indicators could not be measured by partners.[184] It was not clear how the IPs approximated reach through mass media channels.

VOTER REGISTRATION

Voter registration for the 2013 elections was marginally higher than for 2007 and the 2010 referendum. The registration period and related civic education were truncated. IPs felt that the last-minute ramp-up of civic education, including through radio and mobile phone, played a critical role in the IEBC achieving

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[177] Finkel, Horowitz and Rojo-Mendoza, Civic Education and Democratic Backsliding in the Wake of Kenya's Post-2007 Election Violence, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 74, No. 1, January 2012, Pp. 63-64
[178] Civic Education and Its Relevance in Kenyan Context: A Provider's Perspective (Abstract only), available at http://sociology.uonbi.ac.ke/node/4488.
[179] Kriegler Report, p. 108-109
[180] G37
[181] GI34, USAID Support for Kenya's 2013 Elections: Rapid Assessment Review
[182] GI33
[183] GI6
[184] Inuka Trust performance reports

an 80 percent target for voter registration. [185] While this is likely, it is difficult to validate. To the evaluation team's knowledge, there has not yet been an assessment of the efficacy of the civic education efforts in terms of voter registration and it was not part of partner performance tracking. The forthcoming IFES pilot activity to examine the registration may provide useful insights on this, particularly with respect to registration among marginalized groups, such as women and youth.

PEACE

As with beneficiaries, there was a strong sense among IPs and international observers that civic education and peace messaging contributed significantly to the 2013 elections. Indeed, peace is the headline for the 2013 elections. There was a strong sentiment throughout the evaluation that Kenyans wanted to avoid a repeat of 2007's election violence, and that the international community contributed significantly to peace efforts. The USAID mission director pointed out that peace messaging was central to the 2013 elections. [186]

At the same time, the range of beneficiaries and IPs pointed out that there is a false sense of peace in Kenya; e.g., "there was a sense of peace at all costs. People buried their heads about the problems" and "the mindset of people hasn't changed since 2007. People are willing to put their true feelings on social media." [187] A review of Uraia Trust's large-scale civic education program before the 2007 elections points out the "effects of civic education, where program participants who subsequently were affected by the post-election violence were less likely (relative to nonparticipants) to adopt a negative view on ethnic relations, tolerance and conflict resolution. The review cautions that exposure alone is not enough to produce substantial gains in tolerance, support for rule of law, or other democratic values; rather it requires frequent, focused training with active participatory teaching methods and high-quality instructors.[188]

TIMING

Good practice requires long-term civic education support stretching around the electoral cycle. [189] The EU, AU and TCC observer reports each note that civic and voter education was late. TCC notes that the late start, combined with rooted tribal customs, poverty and illiteracy, impacted the efficiency of voter education programs.[190] Similarly, the Africa Union mentions concerns that the majority of Kenyans may not have benefited fully from the initiatives on civic and voter education given the short period of the initiatives,[191] and the EU recommended that civic and voter education programs should be launched far earlier to ensure the delivery of timely, impartial information to the public. [192] 'The voter education came in when the politicians were out for campaigns. You could not differentiate between the political rallies and the civic education activities since the two were running concurrently'.

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[185] PVW, UNDP email March 10, 2014
[186] GI34
[187] GI6
[188] Finkel, Horowitz and Rojo-Mendoza, Civic Education and Democratic Backsliding in the Wake of Kenya's Post-2007 Election Violence, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 74, No. 1, January 2012, Pp. 52–65. The Canadian Cooperation Office noted the significance of related MSI reports on civic education in Kenya as having been a guide to donors on how to roll out civic education ahead of 2013 elections.
[189] DFID Report: Electoral Assistance and Politics: Lessons for International Support, 2010, p. 23
[190] Carter Center Final Report, Observing Kenya's March 2013 Elections, p. 87
[191] Report of the African Union Elections Observation Mission to the 4 March 2013 General Elections in Kenya, p.11
[192] European Union Election Observation Mission to Kenya: General Election 2013 Final Report, p. 3

ANNEX XV: QUESTION 1(VI) — MEDIA CONTEXT AND SELF-CENSORSHIP DURING 2013 ELECTION PERIOD

Members of the Kenyan media, particularly the vernacular radio stations, fanned ethnic hatred and fueled violence, and inaccurate media reporting on opinion polls was seen as a factor in the post-election violence.[193] The Kriegler Report cited a staggering level of hate speech that was aired by the media without restriction before the 2007 elections.[194]

The media was seen as playing an active and important role in advocating for peace throughout the election cycle. The African Union report notes that nearly all media houses signed the election code of conduct and avoided being used as a platform for hate speech and other forms of communication that could lead to public incitement.[195] However, there was a sense that the media were so focused on the prevention of violence that they didn't provide good coverage of the election process. Civic and voter education partners felt that the media didn't ask tough questions (e.g., about election technology and election results) or carry out their mandate to report on violence. TCC and EU reports contain similar examples. TCC report notes that "incidents and irregularities were often softened in the media due to fear of strong reaction from the public and of being labeled as inflammatory. Therefore, most irregularities that should have been reported in the media were heard for the first time in the Supreme Court."[196] This finding is also reflected throughout the Internews activity evaluation.[197]

Journalists in one of the media groups expressed frustration over the restrictions that the code of conduct placed on them, particularly with respect to not announcing preliminary results ahead of the IEBC announcement, saying they were like puppets and failed their audience. An editor in the group took a different view, expressing that editors felt personal pressure to adhere to the code of conduct and that ICC loomed in their minds.

Both journalist groups commented that the infamous quote by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson that "choices have consequences" had a negative impact in Kenya.[198] They felt that it contributed to tension and came across as a warning from the international community about the ICC or that funding could be cut.

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[193] Kenya Election and Political Process Strengthening Program (KEPPS) Internews Free and Fair Media Project; External Evaluation Project; iMedia Associates Ltd, December 2013, p.18.
[194] Kriegler Report, p. 65
[195] Report of the African Union Elections Observation Mission to the 4 March 2013 General Elections in Kenya, p.13
[196] The Carter Center Final Report, Observing Kenya's March 2013 Elections, p. 41.
[197] Kenya Election and Political Process Strengthening Program – KEPPS – Internews Free and Fair Media Project; External Evaluation Project; iMedia Associates Ltd, December 2013

ANNEX XVI: QUESTION I(VII) — LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PARTY MANIFESTOS RELATING TO MARGINALIZED GROUPS

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Kenya has ratified major international instruments that relate to electoral rights, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The Elections Act, PPA and Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act elaborate the legal framework for elections. USAID, both through its electoral assistance and other democracy and governance initiatives, supported the development of the constitutional legal framework. The constitution provides affirmative measures for marginalized groups, including women, the disabled, youth and minority communities.[199] It contains a provision stipulating that not more than two-thirds of the members of elective or appointed bodies can be of the same gender[200] and requires Parliament to enact legislation to promote the representation of marginalized communities.[201] The Supreme Court has set a deadline of 2015 for passage of the requisite legislation on the two-thirds requirement.

The lack of legislation does not preclude parties from implementing affirmative action.

PARTY MANIFESTOS

Both contain language on social equality/social protection and measures to improve economic opportunities for youth. Neither contains proposals for how to promote the participation of women, however. Indeed, the Jubilee manifesto sets a target of 30 percent female appointees to all public bodies and parastatals, which is below the constitutional requirement of one-third (33 percent). The Jubilee website does not provide further data or insight on affirmative action efforts.

[199] Articles 27, 54, 55, 56, 90, 91, 97, 203
[200] Article 197
[201] Article 100

ANNEX XVII: QUESTION 2(I) — KEY SUPPORT NEEDED FOR EMB

LEGAL REFORMS

The IEBC and IPs noted serious conflicts and gaps in the legal framework for elections that need to be addressed. Good international practice advises that there should be no substantial changes to the election law within at least six months of an election. This helps to establish certainty and transparency in the electoral process. Late changes in legislation, or delays in adopting regulations on key issues, can undermine the process.[202] Before the 2013 elections, laws were passed so close to the elections that it was difficult for key stakeholders to understand or comply with the laws and regulations. The IEBC noted that Kenyan expertise is available to review the legislation but that financial support is needed for this. The IEBC highlighted a specific need for help from the United States and India in administering the new campaign finance law, saying "IEBC has no clue how to do it." [203]

TECHNOLOGY

Building technical capacity and fully transparent and accountable systems takes time and resources. EBC and IPs highlighted needs to review electoral boundaries (boundary delimitation is a new function for Kenya's EMB[204]); nomination and ballot software, and results transmission (which achieved only partial success in 2013). IEBC and IFES also pointed to the need for continued technology feasibility testing.

STRUCTURE, SYSTEMS, DECISION-MAKING

IEBC and IPs pointed to the need to review the structure of the IEBC. This includes examining the schedule for the appointment of commissioners to ensure that there are not significant transitions close to an election (as in the changeover from IIEC to IEBC), the implications of the devolution process on IEBC structure, and the capacity and functions of commissioners vis-à-vis staff. This appears to be one of the key recommendations from the Kriegler Report that has not yet been taken up. [205]

IEBC and the IPs also put a heavy emphasis on the need to improve IEBC systems across the board as part of genuine capacity development. This included: HR system and enterprise management system; election technology systems (for boundary delimitation, voter registration, voter identification and results transmission); electoral planning and logistics systems; document management/archival system; EDR case management system; and a performance management system.

Linked to the issue of structure and systems, IPs and donors pointed out weaknesses in IEBC decision-making and stakeholder communications. They noted that IEBC does not have a process for timely, formal decision-making or for effectively communicating those decisions. A key example of poor communication mentioned by the IEBC and USAID related to raising public expectations about election technology following political pressure to introduce technology. Good practice requires EMBs to engage with stakeholders on a regular basis, providing them the information they need to fully participate in and

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[202] Handbook for EU Election Observation, European Commission, Second edition 2008, p 30. See: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/election_observation_missions/documents/eu_election_observation_handbook_en.pdf.
[203] KII1
[204] The Krieger Report recommended removing this function from the EMB.
[205] The Kriegler Report recommended: establishing clear commission/management separation of roles; ensuring clear lines of individual responsibility for service delivery; revising operating procedures to reduce time devoted to committees; making ECK offices functionally efficient between elections; introducing performance management; ensuring that the commission secretary is an experienced election manager with the status of permanent secretary. P.154-155

assess the process.[206] International donors pointed out that IEBC dialogue with donors and stakeholders stalled during technology procurement challenges[207] and TCC's report notes that "information coming out of the commission gave the impression of a lack of defined structural organization in which it was often difficult to identify the person in charge of specific electoral operations." [208]

VOTER EDUCATION

Along with legal reform and other capacity-building support, IEBC highlighted voter education as a priority area for support, if donor funding is reduced in the future. The IEBC secretariat noted that the government has little interest in funding voter education (but would be more likely to set aside funds for voter registration and procurement.) As noted elsewhere in the report, the international community stepped in to provide significantly more support to IEBC than planned in this area for the 2013 elections.

[206] Final Report, Colloquium on African Elections: Best Practices and Cross-Sectorial Collaboration, Accra, Ghana, 2009, p.4
[207] GI33
[208] The Carter Center Final Report, Observing Kenya's March 2013 Elections, p.26

ANNEX XVIII: QUESTION 2(II) — PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

PARTY NOMINATIONS

Nine out of 15 groups, comprising all beneficiary categories, and party executive directors, IPs and election institutions, cited the party nomination process as a key shortcoming in the 2013 elections.[209] They referenced the last-minute changes to the law that allowed candidates to party-hop and frequently characterized the nominations a "sham" because of the chaos and attempts by parties to change confirmed party tickets. One political party trainee said, "Political parties many times they behave as if they have been ambushed into election. You look at the time they take during nomination, it is rushed… So people start fighting for those nominations and it brings down the whole democratic process."[210] Party executive directors emphasized the support that parties need to improve the nomination process, including training down to the constituency level.[211]

INTERNAL DEMOCRACY

Kenyan law requires all parties to have constitutions and manifestos, and parties are expected to establish links to their membership and conduct outreach. NDI noted party improvements in organization and communication with voters, as well as the significant progress still to be made, such as ensuring that party members are aware of the constitutions.[212] The executive director of one major party said, "Parties are not better at communicating manifestos. Local elected officials are clueless about how to implement manifestos. This needs training and oversight. Manifestos need to be developed from the grassroots up; it can't take hold if it's developed at the top." The Association of Media Women in Kenya (AMWIK) suggested that there should be mechanisms in place to ensure that parties adhere to their constitutions and manifestos.[213]

IMPLEMENTATION

Two of the four party trainee groups recommended more follow-up by the party leadership and NDI to ensure that learned skills are being implemented. For example, one training of trainers (TOT) participant said that the parties did not make use of the TOTs after they were trained by NDI and that parties sent TOTs to locations they were not familiar with so they were not useful.

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[209] KII1,KII5,GI6, KII8, GI9,GD10, GD12, GD18,GD19,GD20,GD21,GD22,GD26,KII30.
[210] GD19
[211] GI9
[212] GI3
[213]GI36

ANNEX XIX: QUESTION 2(IV) — PERCEPTIONS OF MEDIA

AMWIK and the AU observation mission both highlighted a need for the media to provide greater coverage of female candidates in the future. AMWIK noted that the 2013 coverage was good, but limited, while the AU pointed out that the lesser coverage given to female candidates was against the code of conduct and practice of journalism in Kenya to grant equal treatment to men and women as news subjects and sources.[214] Journalists who participated in the evaluation spoke of the concerted efforts by the media to encourage women to run for office and provide coverage of them: "We targeted women. In that we wanted to get them out of this mind-set, by putting them on TV and ask[ing] them hard questions. 'Do you think just because you are women you deserve to be voted for?' In the past women had this culture of saying, 'I will just have these candidates push them and I can be nominated.'"[215]

Four out of 19 groups believed that the media are corrupt or biased.[216] Three out of the 19 commented that the media are politically affiliated.[217] The TCC report recommends that that the media "uphold the responsibility to report without bias on the conduct of all aspects of an election but not to become political actors themselves."[218]

International donors felt that the media and other players[219] were "neglected" by donors before the 2013 elections due to a conscious decision to prioritize support to the IEBC. TCC recommended further activities to improve the media's capacity to cover elections,[220] while civic and voter education IPs recommended that the media (including television anchors) should partner with civil society and political parties to provide civic education.[221] AMWIK recommended funding earlier in the electoral cycle for media to profile women while they are candidates, "so that elections are the climax and not the start" of this coverage. These observations and recommendations are consistent with recognized good practice for electoral assistance in terms of taking a wide view of the range of stakeholders in the process, a long-term perspective to assistance and focusing on the linkages between stakeholders.[222]

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[214] Report of the African Union Elections Observation Mission to the 4 March 2013 General Elections in Kenya, p.13
[215] GD11
[216] GD18, GD21, GD22, GD23
[217] GD10, GD12, G16
[218] The Carter Center Final Report, Observing Kenya's March 2013 Elections, p. 90
[219] GI33 Others mentioned were: civil society, judiciary, domestic observers and political parties.
[220] GI35 (Skype). TCC also suggested that donor assistance in all countries should place a greater emphasis on support to the media, civil society and election observation.
[221] GI6
[222] See inter alia, DFID Report: Electoral Assistance and Politics: Lessons for International Support, 2010, Pp. 22-23. P 22: "The international community needs to take a wide view of the range of processes and stakeholders which contribute to democratic outcomes, beyond the election commissions alone. Just as period of commitment is critical to achieving democratic outcomes, breadth of support is also fundamental. Election support alone is too narrow to achieve good electoral outcomes: the wider electoral landscape reveals many institutions that underpin democratization, and there is a growing recognition that democracy in a country may well be better advanced through measures that lie outside of the electoral system proper"[….]and "institutionalizing democratic practices in political parties, or professionalizing and regulating the media, are reform processes that require patient support over many years to yield real benefits." P23: "Increasingly, 'deepening democracy' programs are being designed and supported by donors seeking to promote multi-stakeholder alliances to achieve reform, based on the recognition that social and political change occurs through the joint action of reformers 'on the inside' working with activists 'on the outside'. Beyond the governmental electoral management bodies, these actors include parliaments, civil society organizations, media, political parties, judiciary and the security sector.

ANNEX XX: QUESTION 2(V) — PERCEPTIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Three of 19 beneficiary groups (a mix of domestic observers, political parties and civic and voter education participants) felt that civil society brings transparency, light and truth to the electoral process.[223] With respect to the possible government crackdown on civil society, one group said:

"Civil society is the one being depended on by Kenyans because they are the ones who give vital information, they are the whistle blowers, and if there's anything that's being hidden by the government they are the ones who say it clearly and loudly. So Kenyans really depend on civil society...they are clear and open and that's why the government is trying to suppress the civil society through enacting laws that will gag them."[224]

IPs noted a dual need — on the one hand, the need to focus on the greatest impact and on the "game changers"; on the other, a need to target the grassroots so they are more aware of the new system of governance.[225] They noted time and resource constraints to achieve this. The NDI fall 2013 focus group research shows that respondents believed voter education was biased toward urban areas and did not last long enough[226].

[223] GD19, GD21,GD 23
[224] GD24
[225] PVW
[226] NDI Results of Focus Groups, September 14 – 23, 2013 (PPT)

ANNEX XXI: QUESTION 3 — DETAILS OF TIMING

Most civic and voter education beneficiaries said there was not sufficient time to cover planned topics such as the constitution, voter registration, technology, conflict management, gender-based violence, and voting procedures, especially considering the complications with having six different elected positions on the ballot. A Kisumu party trainee countered that civic education came at the right time, and calmed the public.[227]

Five civic and voter education groups noted that program effectiveness was compromised because the timing conflicted with the political campaign period.[228] They reported that that public chose to attend the political rallies instead of civic/ voter education activities because of financial handouts and other incentives. For example, a group in Kilifi noted: "It's a fact that the timing for most of the activities related to the elections is not well done. Because these activities are done alongside campaigns and you know campaigns in Kenya are about money. Everybody runs when someone calls for a political rally. After a political rally, people either eat or money is dished out. Now when you are 100–500 meters [away] having a group discussing very important issues, people will not come; instead, they will go to the rallies where there is fun and money." Several of the groups recommended completing civic/voter education measures before the campaign period so that beneficiaries have time to absorb the information and hold candidates to account. Similarly, three of five groups that included party trainees[229] believed that the training was too late because it occurred during the campaign period when candidates were too busy to attend or digest the training.[230]

In addition to time constraints, nine groups cited limited financial resources as an impediment to achieving their goals.[231] Civic and voter education groups made comments such as: "civic educators advanced money from their own pockets because it took several months to receive payment," "insufficient funds for communications/ transport — especially to the grassroots" and "not enough money for transport to interior."

The experience of domestic observers was varied; observers in Kisumu and Nakuru felt overall that that their training was timely and the materials were useful. However, domestic observers from Mombasa had a mixed view of the training timeline. Some were satisfied while others complained about the training being so close to the start of their duties and having limited resources to travel to their remote polling stations. [232]

Four civic education beneficiary groups also reported having little follow-up after training, but thought it would be a good idea.[233]

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[227] GD19
[228] GD16, GD23, GD24, GD25, GD31
[229] This count includes the two women's groups that contained party members (Nakuru, Kisumu)
[230] GD21,GD22, GD26
[231] KII5, GI9, GD13, GD14, GD15, GD28, GD29, GD30, GD31
[232] GD20, GD13, GD27
[233] GD12,GD16, GD23, GD25

ANNEX XXII: QUESTION 4 — OTHER COORDINATION AND DONOR VIEWS OF USAID

IMPLEMENTING PARTNER COORDINATION

USAID and IPs[234] highlighted the good coordination among IPs, particularly those supporting IEBC. IPs noted that some of that was due to donors' emphasis on coordination.[235] Some of the technical experts had worked together previously and shared good chemistry and great mutual professional respect. They also acknowledged the helpfulness of funding being plentiful for the 2013 elections, meaning there were no struggles over resources. The SERP 2 evaluation also notes the positive coordination on technical matters with respect to USAID's role in the UNDP Project Steering Committee, noting: "At technical levels, the PSC ensured a good coordination with other technical assistance provided to the IEBC and process, most notably with IFES and NDI. This avoided the potential for duplication of effort and ensured synergistic programming that is a best practice."[236] This is a marked difference from 2007, when there were relational challenges between the UNDP hierarchy and the Project Management Unity (PMU).[237]

CROSS-SECTOR COORDINATION

USAID, other donors and IPs[238] all highlighted USAID's efforts to work across sectors to improve the reach of civic and voter education materials and peace messaging. USAID has identified this as a best practice that they intend to take forward.[239] The perception is that this was an effective way to distribute materials and a potential cost-saving measure,[240] though the evaluation team did not have access to data on this.

> "[It is a] fatal mistake that USAID support came to an end. USAID needs to start election program design if they want to play the role of donor coordination. The group has more or less died."
>
> *International donors, Feb. 28, 2014*
>
> "[We] need to look at the drivers of conflict. Weak institutions become a potential trigger [for violence.]"…"USAID does not seem to address the long game, the long-term."
>
> *USAID IPs, March 5, 2014*

ELECTORAL CYCLE APPROACH

IPs, IEBC and donors[241] criticized USAID's lack of an electoral cycle approach to funding. USAID described its assistance as event-oriented due to U.S. funding cycles, and felt that it needed to seek funds outside of the standard appropriations process, which would not allow for funding before 2016. Donors lamented that a year has already been lost since the last elections and said it is a "fatal mistake that USAID support came to an end. USAID needs to start election program design if they want to play the role of donor coordination. The group has more or less died." Similarly, IPs expressed concern that the deep, underlying causes of conflict have not been adequately addressed and these priorities are not being supported. "[We] need to look at the drivers of conflict. Weak institutions become a potential trigger [for violence.]"…"USAID does not seem to address the long game, the long-term."[242]

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[234] GI7, GI34
[235] GI7
[236] SERP Project Evaluation Final Report, p. 49
[237] Final Project Report: The 2007 Joint Elections Assistance Programme (EAP), 2008, p.11
[238] GI34, G133, GI31
[239] USAID Support for Kenya's 2013 Elections: Rapid Assessment Review, p. 12 and GI34.
[240] GI33
[241] GI2, GI7, GI33, GI34, PVW
[242] PVW

ANNEX XXIII: QUESTION 5 — MARGINALIZED GROUPS: LEGAL FRAMEWORK, PARTICIPATION CHALLENGES AND SUCCESS

FRAMEWORK

Kenya's new constitution and legislation, designed to reflect the country's aspirations for peace and its regional and international commitments, provided the most favorable and inclusive election design environment in Kenya's history.[243] The constitution provides affirmative measures for marginalized groups, including women, the disabled, youth and minority communities. The measures were not fully implemented for the 2013 elections,[244] however, and while women and youth participated as voters, they did not achieve the anticipated gains as candidates.

PARTICIPATION CHALLENGES

Almost all of the group discussions (20 out of 21) described cultural beliefs, stereotypes and a lack of financial resources that limit participation by women and youth as candidates and voters. In addition to attitudes, there were administrative, financial and knowledge barriers to participation. Common challenges to women's participation in the 2013 elections included misinformation about the two-thirds gender rule and women's eligibility to contest open seats,[245] limited access to funding to run as candidates (especially among the grassroots), challenges obtaining and accessing ID cards.[246] Female candidates faced challenges including: intimidation/violence and security concerns (meaning female candidates restricted the hours and locations where they campaigned) and a lack of voice in the parties (which are male dominated; men make party policies). A female candidate in Kisumu described party sentiment about women as, "don't bring your voice in this party, just do as you are told."[247] She said this has created "bitterness" in her, and that "it has made me do away with all political parties."

Groups noted that youth lacked IDs required for voter registration (including delays with issuance of ID cards). A 2012 Gallup poll estimated that 33 percent of 18-21 year olds did not have the requisite IDs, and that that 54 percent of those not registered from this group planned to register.[248] The SERP 2 evaluation report indicates that while there was an increase in youth[249] registration, the target of a 20 percent increase was not achieved.[250] All categories of beneficiaries highlighted that unemployment makes youth vulnerable to manipulation and reduces their constructive participation in elections. A voter educator in Kwale, summarized the challenges: "*The government disregarded them for long and they have lost hope, most don't have IDs, and are not interested in getting IDs, because there are no jobs. Even in school, they have lost hope. If they have a problem, when they go to the chiefs, they are ignored. They don't have a voice of their own. That's why politicians misuse them; that's why they have chosen to become crooks.*"[251]

PERCEPTION: SUCCESSES/EFFECTIVE METHODS FOR ENHANCING WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION

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[243] FIDA-Kenya: Key Gains and Challenges; A Gender Audit of Kenya's 2013 Election Process, 2013
[244] E.g., the Supreme Court decided that the constitutional gender quota should be applied progressively by 2015 (not in 2013); reserved seats were used as an excuse to exclude women, youth and other marginalized groups from contesting open seats.
[245] According to the constitution, not more than two-thirds of the members of elective or appointed bodies shall be of the same gender. Male candidates were said to spread misinformation about the rule and women's eligibility to contest open seats to discourage voting for women.
[246] The national ID card is required for registering as a voter; many groups indicated that it was common practice for a husband to hold his wife's ID and restrict access at election time, thereby limiting women's right to vote.
[247] GD21
[248] Gallup Poll: Kenya Votes 2013: Attitudes Towards the Election, Judicial System and Security
[249] Here youth includes ages 18-35.
[250] SERP Project Evaluation Final Report, p. 24
[251] GD28

Groups believed that effective ways to reach women included: using female civic educators from the local area, targeting women in groups (e.g. religious meetings); developing women-specific messaging; encouraging/"pushing" women to run for office, contest open seats, and participate on political panels; empowering women to spread peace messaging[252] and promoting media [253] An all-male civic/ voter education group in Kilifi recommended that programs to support women and youth be intensified and said that "empowering a woman is like empowering a whole community."[254]

Female participants in party trainings were positive about the content (a candidate from Kisumu said the training helped her understand why she did not a seat in 2013 and she plans to contest again in 2017; a candidate from Mombasa said of the Leadership Campaign Academy (LCA), *"The mood was fantastic. Every morning you want to rush and listen to the next [session]"*[255]*,* but it came late.[256] AMWIK noted that the media training (non-USAID funding) taught female aspirants how to handle the media pressure and stay on topic.[257]

PERCEPTION: SUCCESSES/EFFECTIVE METHODS FOR ENHANCING YOUTH PARTICIPATION

Groups felt that effective methods for reaching youth included: targeting at soccer matches, music events, through celebrities, use of slang, boda-boda locations; and engaging them as civic educators and through youth mentoring and financial empowerment activities such as USAID's Yes Youth Can (YYC)[258]. A civic/ voter education group in Kilifi noted, "A youth who is sensitized will need more convincing to do peculiar things despite having money to lure them."

USAID, political party trainees and political party executive directors were positive about the gains made with youth. IPYF participants note that the training had a big impact on youth awareness of their rights and how to positively contribute to the political process. Some of the most striking examples of this were in the Coast area, where youth have been vulnerable to extremist forces. A male participant in Mombasa noted, "Personally before I joined IPYF I didn't belong to any political party. I used to be paid to cause violence. But after joining IPYF, I learnt that what I had been doing was wrong. So it changed me." Party executive directors believed that youth training is showing impact because youth have less tribal affiliation than the party leadership.[259]

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[252] For example, GD25 "Women are more responsible and are vital in families and therefore during our target groups for the youth, women and people with disabilities, we used the women groups to have women talk to their husbands and the youth to keep peace during the voting period. We believe they are able to do that […]…We talked to the women and we showed them pictures from the post election violence of 2007 in Rift Valley. They carried this message in their heads and didn't want this for their sons or their husbands. It was a powerful message.
[253] GD11,GD20, GD28, GD29, GD36
[254] GD24
[255] GD21,GD26
[256] GD21, GD26
[257] GD36
[258] GD19,GD22,GD24,GD25, GD28, GD29
[259] GI9

ANNEX XXIV: QUESTION 5 — PLANNED ACTIVITIES, PLANNED INDICATOR, INDICATOR REPORTING AND PARTNER-REPORTED OUTCOMES

Planned Activities/Objectives	Planned Indicator (per PMP)	Indicator Reporting	Partner reported outcome
WTS Elections programming included activities in: Multimedia youth communications; research for high-impact youth KAP programs; and demystifying voting	% of Kenya's Shujaaz youth audiences showing positive changes in knowledge, attitude and/or behavior based on specific content and ideas presented in Shujaaz	**Reported[260]:** Over 5 million individuals receiving voter and civic education through USG assisted programs. Comment: Not disaggregated by sex. This indicator is also different than the indicator described in the PMP.	No outcome indicator identified in partner annual report.
INUKA Trust –Uongozi Provide a platform that creates a conducive environment for young Kenyan men and women to participate in electoral politics. The project also aimed to mobilize young Kenyan men and women to register as voters	# of young Kenyan men and women who run for public office. # of young Kenyan men and women reached through campaign who registered to vote and actually voted	**Reported[261] :** 140 men shortlisted for Uongozi campaign. 93 women shortlisted for Uongozi campaign. Comment: Different indicator than described in PMP.	No outcome indicator identified in partner final report.
Uraia Trust Women, youth & marginalized populations receiving civic	# of women, men, youth and marginalized groups and communities receiving voter and civic education through USG assisted programs	**Reported[262] :** Total of 1,562,762 persons reached (not sex or age disaggregated)	Increased voter registration and turn out. Peaceful electoral period contributing to a notable

[260] WTS USAID FY 2013 Annual Report

[261] Uongozi Final Uongozi M&E Report June 2013

[262] Uraia Trust Summary Report

education Implementing partners capacity to support civic education for women, youth & marginalized populations as well as multimedia interventions in elections, citizenship and peace.		769,120 persons reached directly (37.4 % male, 62.4% female) 793,606 persons reached through IPs (not age/ sex disaggregated)	reduction in the level of electoral related violence during and after the election 2013. Comment: How to attribute these outcomes to the output indicators is unclear.
UNDP SERP 2 Opportunities for women, youth, minorities and persons with disabilities to participate in the electoral processes enhanced	Number of women, youth, minorities, and persons with disabilities registered as voters. Number of women, youth, minorities and persons with disabilities offering themselves as a candidate in the general elections. Extent of compliance with the constitutional quota.	**Reported[263]:** Increased participation of women was recorded in voter registration, although the targets to increase the percentage of youth registered by 20 percent and female youth by 10 % over 2012 were not achieved. 3780 youth candidates 69 elected & nominated women MPs (47 county women representatives, 16 constituency seats and 6 nominees) out of a total of 349 National Assembly members of Parliament.	Strengthened civic participation and engagement Comment: No direct reporting of outcome identified from available reports.
KEPPS IRI-NDI-IFES NDI had targeted programming to increase the participation of	Number of individuals receiving voter and civic education through USG-assisted programs (IRI)	**Reported[264]:** IRI: 54,349 individuals receiving voter and civic education through USG assisted programs. (F =	NDI Outcome Indicator 2.1.2 Number of parties that increase participation of women and youth in their structures and activities

[263] SERP Progress Report January 2012 - December 2013

[264] CEPPS Kenya (KEPPS) FY13 Q3 Report

women, youth and other marginalized groups as candidates	Number of People Reached by USG-assisted Voter and Civic Education (IFES, IRI*) Number of USG-assisted political parties implementing programs to increase the number of candidates and members who are women, youth and from marginalized groups (NDI)	26,170) (M = 28,179) IRI/IFES: 1,631,759 people reached by USG assisted voter and civic education (not-disaggregated) NDI: 38 USG assisted political parties implementing programs to increase the number of candidates and members who are women, youth and from marginalized groups	NDI Outcome Indicator 2.2.2: Number of Inter-Party Youth Forum branches operational at the county level Comment: No other relevant IRI/ IFES outcome indicators identified for marginalized groups. (Though IFES and IRI were not mapped to this approach.)

SOURCE: PARTNER DESIGN AND REPORTING DOCUMENTS

ANNEX XXV: QUESTION 6 — MORE CROSS CUTTING RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Donors should invest in long-term civic education and earlier voter education through local institutions. Donors, IPs and beneficiaries who participated in the evaluation emphasized the need for ongoing civic education to strengthen Kenyans' understanding of their rights and responsibilities in line with the new constitution. Good practice in election programming suggests that civic and voter education programming can be integrated, with longer term civic education serving as a foundation for election-specific education/ information to be provided closer to election day. Civic education planned as part of other parts of the reform agenda (e.g. devolution, conflict mitigation, civil society strengthening) could provide an ideal foundation for voter education/ information ahead of future elections. USAID and other donors should prioritize ongoing support to civil society to conduct civic education, and support IEBC to deliver quality voter education in line with its constitutional responsibility. Donors should draw lessons from available civic education assessments in Kenya to inform the design of future programming. Programming should utilize a multi-pronged approach, and the design and resources should be appropriate to achieve mass exposure, considering the various levels of literacy and the significant rural population in the country. Particular attention should be paid to monitoring and evaluation of the interventions, and engaging the government to play its role. Donors could also support the institutionalization of strategic relationships between the various players involved in civic and voter education activities, such as civil society, the media, government ministries and IEBC.

USAID should maintain an up-to-date results framework. USAID should ensure that the results framework for electoral assistance is up-to-date and communicated to partners. USAID should share monitoring and evaluation metrics that appropriately reflect the higher-level program goals and design and ensure that partner M&E plans align. Careful attention should be paid to developing appropriate and measurable metrics for programs designed to bring about changes in attitudes, norms and behaviors (e.g., civic education) since such changes are typically evident only over the longer term.

USAID should include women in the program design for future election assistance. Women were not viewed as drivers of change in the 2013 electoral cycle and were not effectively integrated into program design. Women were identified by some beneficiaries as effective peace agents in the 2013 elections, however. New USAID programming should focus on closing the gap between principles and practice of gender mainstreaming, in particular through support to political parties and civic education initiatives. Programming will need to include a focus on institutional compliance with the new legal framework, and seek to address entrenched social norms and lack of political will to create space for women's political participation. Besides political parties, programming should focus on other institutions that can influence the process and create the conditions for women's participation, including IEBC. The PAD indicates USAID plans to conduct a DRG portfolio social impact analysis including gender issues as part of a mid-cycle review.[265] This review, along with resources such as the FIDA gender audit, could help to refine USAID gender programming across sectors.

[265] USAID PAD, p. 37

ANNEX XXVI: DONOR MATRIX

Kenya Elections Donor funding (USD)

	DONOR															
Donor	**DFID**	**USAID**	**Germany**	**Denmark**	**CIDA**	**EU**	**Finland**	**Netherlands**	**Sweden**	**Italy**	**AusAID**	**Norway**	**Slovak**	**UNDP**	**Japan**	**Total funding**
UNDP Basket fund II	7,840,000	3,200,000	-	2,845,188	2,900,000	2,327,586	1,250,000	2,200,000	5,900,000	194,805	1,115,000	1,454,545	12,987	300,000	-	31,540,111
Strengthening the capacity of the election management body	917,000	6,681,291	157,200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,755,491
Election observation	1,230,000	3,142,628	-	648,298	350,000	948,000	152,672	190,840	500,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,162,438
Civic and Voter Education	3,364,400	4,741,564	124,791	1,620,746	350,000	5,884,135	1,908,397	374,046	3,200,000	-	343,470	4,681,818	-		3,589,412	30,182,779
Media Engagement	3,526,000	3,200,000	-	648,298	350,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,724,298
Professionalizing political parties	89,700	5,300,000	-	453,809	350,000	-	-	-	600,000	-	-	2,400,000	-	-	-	9,193,509
Electoral Reforms & capacity building	-	300,000	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	300,000
Security Sector Reform	410,000		-	243,112	-	-	-	-	3,000,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,653,112
Peacebuilding & Conflict Mitigation	3,198,000	8,350,000	432,300	1,620,746	85,000	-	-	-	2,000,000	-	-	513,636	-	-	-	16,199,682
Total funding	**20,575,100**	**34,915,483**	**714,291**	**8,080,197**	**4,385,000**	**9,159,721**	**3,311,069**	**2,764,886**	**15,200,000**	**194,805**	**1,458,470**	**9,049,999**	**12,987**	**300,000**	**3,589,412**	**113,711,420**

Source: Donor Matrix 2011 – 2013. It is unclear whether this donor matrix includes programs from CEPPS and UNDP 1.

Note: Electoral programming falling under the peace-building and conflict mitigation category is not within the scope of this evaluation.

ANNEX XXVII: SUMMARY ON ALIGNMENT OF PARTNER RESULTS FRAMEWORK TO THE USAID RESULTS FRAMEWORK

USAID partners had little awareness of the 2012 results framework. For example, TCC and IDLO reported that they had not seen it. WTS said the framework did not factor in measurement challenges and needs of mass media producers, while IFES said it was difficult to reduce complex interventions such as overhauling the voter registration system into simple quantities.[266]

It was noted during the discussions with the partners that the USAID results framework was not shared with the implementing partners. It was apparent however that the partners were able to locate their program activities within the respective USAID intermediate results. Most partners outlined outcome level results, but did not establish performance indicators at the intermediate and long term outcome levels. Instead, the indicators for performance measurement were at the activity milestones and immediate actitivity output level. Some examples are the following:

- Civic education indicators for Uraia Trust were not categorized under results/ objectives/ outcomes/ outputs in the Uraia Trust PMP. Instead, all the indicators were standalone without linkages to any objective or result other than the fact that they were all civic education indicators. Again, these indicators only revolved around number of trainings, number of people trained and number of partners implementing civic education activities.
- A similar case was observed in WTS performance indicators which were basically limited to number of activities and number of persons receiving information.
- In IRI's objective 1, 'Kenyan academia and civil society groups become more active and reliable sources of information on constitutional changes and the reform agenda, and are better able to implement civic education programs"; there were two indicators: one measuring the accuracy of the devolution curriculum and the other measuring the number of TOTs providing cascade trainings. There was no indicator to measure the activity and reliability of the 'Kenyan academia and the civil society groups'. Though a proxy measure, the number of TOTs is not an adequate measure of the performance/capacity of these institutions.
- Transparency International was expected to undertake an audit on implementation on constitutional and legal reforms, administrative and organizational reforms and dispute resolution reforms in line with the implementation of Kriegler's recommendations toward an enabling environment for political participation and competition in Kenya. USAID hoped to build these gaps through its IPs including IDLO, IFES, UNDP and NDI. TI indictors were at the output level (conduct of the audit and holding of stakeholder forums to present the audit).
- TCC indicators were at output level, measuring the number of observers, number of meetings held and number statements issued. No indicators were established for intermediate and long term outcome measurements.

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[266] Partner Validation Workshop (PVW)

The UNDP SERP PMP had outputs and outcome indicators. Some examples of outcome indicators were the following: capturing enacted bills; organizational and institutional policies established; LAN/ WAN coverage; proportion of voters registered against the eligible voters; proportion of registered voters desegregated by age, gender and region. These could be directly linked to USAID intermediate results (IRs 1-3). Other high level indicators defined by UNDP included: percent reduction in number of party nomination disputes; proportion of election disputes resolved; timeliness of electoral disputes; number of incidences of violence/ intimidation recorded; the target setting of 50:50 male to female voter registration; percent increase in youth registration; and percent of presidential results received within 24hours. See below for a chart of outcomes.[267]

[267] SERP Project Evaluation Final Report, p. 58. Though these indicators were put in place, the SERP evaluation suggests that outcome level indicators were not tracked.

Alignment of Partners' Results to USAIDs' Results Framework under DO: Democratic & Inclusive Reform Agenda Advanced

IR 5.0: Free, Fair, Credible and Peaceful Elections Held

IR 5.1: Electoral Admin & Institutions Strengthened

IFESS

OBJ 1: Strengthen capacity of the Kenyan election management body to effectively register voters, register & oversee PPs, & run transparent, credible, & violence-free elections

IR 1.1: Successful implementation of electoral reforms

IR 1.2: Increased capacity of IIEC/IEBC to administer election

IR 1.3: Increased voter confidence in the IIEC/IEBC's ability to run transparent, credible and violence-free elections

NDI

OBJ 2: Political Parties Professionalized & Play a Constructive Role in the Reform Agenda

IR 2.1: Parties revise their internal rules and procedures to better conform to PPA , Election Act, Code of conduct and constitutional requirements

IR 2.2: Parties establish and maintain sustainable and inclusive national and local structures that promote improved internal communication and training

IR 2.3: Parties utilize public opinion research and local branch input to develop informed and responsive policies that are relevant at both national and county levels

IR 2.4: Parties build inter-party and party- electoral commission consensus on the pre-2012 electoral reform process

TI

OBJ 3: Enhanced transparency and accountability in political parties system and election management

Outcome: Political participation that is regulated, accountable and transparent

UNDP

Component 1: Institutional capacity strengthening

OP 1: IEBC institutional capacity strengthened (Staff capacity, processes; institutional & organizational polices

OP 2: Legal framework strengthened

Component 2: Electoral operations & processes

OP 1: New electoral unit boundaries established

OP 2: Credible voter register established

OP 3: Effective and efficient polling operation plan implemented

IR 5.2: Conflict Mitigation, Dispute Resolution & Response Mechanisms Strengthened

NDI

OBJ 4: Monitoring & Observation Efforts are Credible & Sustainable

IR 4.1: Domestic monitoring activities provide citizen oversight of the electoral and reform processes

IR 4.2: Domestic monitors increase public access to information & analysis on the electoral process through ICT & public reports

IR 4.3: Establish a capacitated common/harmonized domestic observation effort through ELOG

OBJ 5: Media Plays a Positive Role in Information Dissemination

IR 5.1: Strengthen the capactiy of mainstream media outlest to understand and report fairly and objectively on the electoral process, using conflict-sensitive approaches

IR 5.2: Prevent use of hate speech in the media

IR 5.3: Build capacity of journalists and editors to use polling data in an effective and legitimate way

IR 5.4: Identify and mitigate conflict of interest arising from political ownership of media houses

OBJ 7: Enhance monitoring & information sharing on electoral assistance

IR 7.1: Election and conflict mitigation actors receive research data that they can utilize to adjust program interventions if necessary

TCC

OBJ 1: Provide a credible and impartial assessment of the electoral process in Kenya, and where relevant, make recommendations to improve future electoral processes

OBJ 2: Demonstrate international interest and support for the electoral process as a means of supporting sustainable peace and democracy in Kenya and East Africa

OBJ 3: Highlight challenges in the electoral process & encourage resolution of issues through clear & transparent measures

UNDP: OP 4: EDR and conflict prevention strategy implemented

IDLO

Component B: Support to the Judiciary Working Committee on Elections Preparations (JWCEP)

OP 2: Judiciary able to Resolve Election Disputes in Accordance with Relevant Laws and the Constitution of Kenya, 2010

IR 1: Strengthened institutional capacity for EDR

Result 2: Increased sensitization among judges of electoral legislative & constitutional framework

Result 3: Timely resolution of electoral disputes and offences in compliance with the Constitution

IR 5.3: Population Informed Through Civic Education

IRI

OBJ 1: Kenyan academia and civil society groups become more active and reliable sources of information on constitutional changes and the reform agenda, and are better able to implement civic education programs

OBJ 2: A diverse cross-section of Kenyan society increases its civics understanding & is actively engaged in devolution reform efforts

NDI

OBJ 6: Strengthen women's participation in electoral and political processes

IR 6.1: Build the capacity of women candidates to develop and effectively communicate their election platform

IR 6.2: Make recommendations to safeguard gender gains in the post-election period through publication of a report on implementation of affirmative action in Kenya

Uongozi (Inuka Trust

OBJ 1: Generate public debate about leadership & the process of leadership choice

OBJ 2: Provide a platform that will create a conducive environment for young Kenyan men & women to participate in electoral politics

OBJ 3: Mobilize young Kenyan men & women to register & vote

URAIA

Empower CSOs and partners at national and subnational levels to conduct civic education

Provide civic & voter education to the general Kenyan population & to marginalized populations including youth & women

WTS

Goal: To reach, motivate and support millions of Kenyan youth with inspiring ideas, suggestions and best practices that advance and deepen the activities and goals of the USAID Governance and Democracy and Yes Youth Can programs

OBJ: To develop, design, publish and distribute a range of media and communications activities focused on advancing the reconciliation peace processes and Voter & civic education

UNDP: Component 3: Civic participation & Engagement

OP 1: An inclusive national civic & voter education program implemented

OP 2: Opportunities for youth, women, minorities & PWDs participation in the electoral process enhanced

OP 3: Effective monitoring & observation mechanisms implemented

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