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Evaluation Report **PUBLIC VERSION**

Performance Evaluation of the USAID Sudan Transition and Conflict Mitigation Program (STCM)

October 17, 2013

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PUBLIC VERSION

**PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION OF THE
USAID SUDAN
TRANSITION AND
CONFLICT MITIGATION
(STCM) PROGRAM IN
SUDAN**

October 17, 2013

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DISCLAIMER

The authors' views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

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Martina Nicolls, STCM Evaluation Team Leader

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ACRONYMS

AAA	Abyei Area Administration
ACWS	African Center for Women’s Development Studies
AIS	AECOM International Sudan
AJOC	Abyei Joint Oversight Committee
AU	African Union
BN	Blue Nile
CDA	Charge d’Affaires
CPA	Cooperative Peace Agreement
DDPD	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur
DIFC	Directorate of International Financial Cooperation
DRA	Darfur Regional Authority
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GESCRS	Group for Economic, Social & Cultural Rights Studies
GOS	Government of Sudan
GOSS	Government of South Sudan
IQC	Indefinite Quality Contract
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MCSY	Ministry of Culture, Sport and Youth
MHA	Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOH	Ministry of Health
NGO	Non-Government Organization
OTCM	Office of Transition & Conflict Mitigation
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PMP	Performance Management Plan
RPCM	Reconciliation and Peaceful Coexistence Mechanism
SK	South Kordofan
SOW	Scope of Work
SPLM	Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
STCM	Sudan Transition & Conflict Mitigation Program
STTA	Short Term Technical Assistance/ Assistants
SWIFT	Support Which Implements Fast Transition
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The USAID-funded Sudan Transition and Conflict Mitigation (STCM) program, implemented by AECOM International Sudan (AIS) from August 2010 to July 2013, with a budget of \$25 million, aimed to establish and manage a quick-response mechanism that would strengthen Sudanese confidence and capacity to address the causes and consequences of political conflict, violence, and instability. When USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) handed over programming to USAID/Sudan in 2010, USAID/Sudan created the Office of Transition and Conflict Mitigation (OTCM) which continued the SWIFT III transitional mechanism for rapid support.

OTCM's expectations were that the STCM program would reduce the effects and causes of instability in the Three Areas (Abyei, Blue Nile, and Southern Kordofan) during the lead up to the southern secession referendum in January 2011 and potential independence of South Sudan in July.

This independent performance evaluation of STCM aims to assist USAID/Sudan in determining: (a) the effectiveness and appropriateness of the overall approach to conflict mitigation programming and choice of funding mechanism; (b) the degree to which the implementing partner ensured a timely and cost-effective response to emerging needs in providing peace dividends, promoting community-level reconciliation, and strengthening local capacity for conflict mitigation; and (c) lessons learned that may guide future conflict mitigation programming in Sudan. The STCM program was intended to respond strategically to emerging needs. For such rapid responses, the SWIFT III mechanism provided in-kind small grants for short-term assistance to local entities.

Since commencement of the program, South Sudan became an independent nation, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement expired, and conflict reignited in the Three Transitional Areas. From June to September 2011 program activities ceased in Abyei, Kadugli, and Kurmuk when their offices were looted during extensive conflict, resulting in the cancellation of almost \$1 million worth of grants. From April 2012 program activities expanded to Khartoum and Darfur. From August 2012 to February 2013 the program's central government counterpart, the Ministry of International Cooperation was dissolved leading to a five-month hiatus in government decision making until the program was placed within the directorate of international financial cooperation under the Ministry of Finance. From September 2012 to September 2013 the program's international staff declined from fifteen to two. Despite these challenges, STCM funded a total of \$11.9 million worth of activities through 168 grants, complemented by 19 short term technical assistants (STTA). The evaluation places the outcomes of the program in context with the socio-economic and political landscape, and in terms of transitional programming.

FINDINGS

1. Two crucial factors emerged in defining the program's success: (1) interventions were effective because they visibly demonstrated the state's presence and did so in a way that focused on community infrastructure and community-based activities, and (2) interventions remained true to the program's aim of conflict mitigation.
2. The program commenced activities in the Three Areas, building upon USAID's 2009 Popular Consultations (citizen hearings) efforts in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. A total of 27 grants for Popular Consultations (valued at \$1.9m) represented 40% of grants and 36% of funding in

the first year, securing the credibility of state leaders from all parties and establishing a momentum for change. This was critical in establishing stakeholder confidence in the program’s ability to deliver on promises.

3. Beyond the Popular Consultation process, STCM programming stayed true to its strategic objectives of building capacity for mitigation of conflict and encouraging social dialogue.
4. Conflict mitigation activities were systemic throughout the program, embedded in almost every grant, totaling \$8.1m over 107 grants, representing 68% of funding and 64% of programming. The program’s conflict resolution activities proved highly successful in terms of participatory processes, consensus building, confidence building, and improved mediation. These included grants for water yards (to ensure longer term water management), preparation and support related to migration routes, social peace and peace messaging, a cross-international-border intervention, and short term technical assistance.
5. It was appropriate to commence programming in Abyei in 2010, but programming ceased within five months due to conflict. The program ‘retreated’ to safe areas after the looting of their offices in Abyei, Kadugli, and Kurmuk, never returning, diminishing their presence and support to these locations.
6. The program’s most effective strategy was the expansion into Khartoum which enabled social peace programs for the diverse ethnic communities on the capital’s periphery which included double IDPs and refugees from the Three Areas.
7. Within its broad strategic orientations, the program’s actions were tactical, being responsive to emerging needs and taking advantage of critical openings.
8. The program made tactical use of sequencing of grant activities for follow-on support.
9. Despite significant support for Sudanese women and youth, the program had no specific coherent action plans. Attention to gender and youth issues from year two of the program constituted themes underlying much of STCM programming. Overall, about 12% of grants were devoted to youth and about 10% were devoted to women. These are the second and fourth most dedicated themes respectively.
10. STCM programming for women was the most meaningful, innovative and risk-taking of all activities, evidenced with the Hakamat female singers and the female sports ambassadors for peace. Grants for women succeeded because they provided social activities that supported peaceful coexistence, they were both subtle and overt, they created ‘private’ social places that also connected them with their immediate community as well as the wider community, they operated in peripheral communities, they were visible and explicit, and they mainstreamed women into government, social and/or political activities.
11. STCM programming supported state governments, evidenced in that nearly half of all grants were provided to state government agencies (51%) for conflict mitigation (28% of government-led grants) and community-level infrastructure projects (12% of government-led grants).

RECOMMENDATIONS

EVIDENCE	FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
Given that ...	It was concluded that ...	And it is recommended that ...
Youth and women activities comprised extensive programming from year two	There were no specific, coherent gender or youth action plans	To further enhance women and youth programming, the program should develop gender and youth action plans, focusing on conflict dynamics and practical/applied leadership programming

Cross-border activities were predominant throughout the program	The definition of 'cross-border' was often confused after secession when the borders became international borders – and therefore some 'soft' borders were 'hardened' from July 2011	The program should delineate cross-border interventions to indicate whether they are cross-state-borders (as in migration routes) or cross-international-borders (as in the media initiative)
The media initiative for both Sudan and South Sudan networking, training and cooperation was the first highly visible cross-international-border intervention	Cross-international-border activities were not predominant throughout the program	The program should explore more cross-international-border interventions
Program offices were looted in Abyei, Kadugli, and Kurmuk	The program 'retreated' to safe locations and never returned, resulting in almost \$1m worth of grants cancelled	The program should be open to windows of opportunity to re-enter or engage with stakeholders in the Three Areas
Darfur Regional Authority is nascent and has a Darfur Development Strategy for 2013 to 2019	Darfur activities were not prominent and occurred only after April 2012 when offices were looted in the Three Areas	The program should escalate support to Darfur due to the DRA's willingness and readiness for activities that set pre-conditions for development
The shift to Khartoum supported social peace in peripheral communities with double IDPs	Social peace activities for peaceful coexistence were effective in mainstreaming women and youth into their communities	The program should maintain support to Khartoum in peripheral communities
Social peace activities were supported by women and youth	Areas where social peace grants were implemented had high proportions of war-affected IDPs and double IDPs	More overt psycho-social support should be provided tailored to emphasize resilience, adaptation to change, long-term war exposure & feelings of marginalization

I. INTRODUCTION

The USAID-funded Sudan Transition and Conflict Mitigation (STCM) program, implemented by AECOM International Sudan (AIS) from August 2010 to July 2013, with a budget of about \$25 million,¹ aimed to establish and manage a quick-response mechanism that would strengthen Sudanese confidence and capacity to address the causes and consequences of political conflict, violence, and instability.

USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) operated in Sudan from 2003-2010 to support southern peace processes and address pre-conditions for longer term USAID development programming. OTI used a SWIFT IQC² mechanism to simplify procurement processes for sector-based administration of small grants. OTI handed over programming to USAID/Sudan on March 1, 2010. In order to maintain transition programming, USAID/Sudan created the Office of Transition and Conflict Mitigation (OTCM) which continued the SWIFT III mechanism.

OTCM's expectations were that the STCM program would reduce the effects and causes of instability in the rapidly shifting environment of Sudan, particularly in the north-south border/transitional areas, the Three Areas (Abyei, Blue Nile, and Southern Kordofan), during the lead up to the southern secession referendum in January 2011 and potential independence of South Sudan in July. Post-secession expectations were that the program would further mitigate tension in the border areas, as well as Darfur and Khartoum. Although STCM is mentioned throughout the report as a 'program' it is better understood as a specialized tactical tool to provide strategically targeted support to transition and conflict mitigation activities.³

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1 Purpose of the Evaluation

The independent performance evaluation of STCM will serve two purposes: (1) to ascertain to what extent the program's objectives and goals have been achieved; and (2) to inform future conflict mitigation programming in Sudan. The evaluation will assist USAID/Sudan in determining: (a) the effectiveness and appropriateness of the overall approach to conflict mitigation programming and choice of funding mechanism; (b) the degree to which the implementing partner ensured a timely and cost-effective response to emerging needs in providing peace dividends, promoting community-level reconciliation, and strengthening local capacity for conflict mitigation; and (c) lessons learned that may guide the future of USAID/Sudan's conflict mitigation programming in Sudan.

The evaluation, from mid-August to mid-November 2013, included four weeks in Sudan, from September 8 to October 4, for field-based interviews, focus group discussions (FGD), and site visits to Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan, and Khartoum.

¹ USAID allocated \$51,541,777 for Sudan TCM; the secession of South Sudan resulted in budget re-allocation

² SWIFT = Support Which Implements Fast Transition; IQC = Indefinite Quality Contract

³ Evaluation Scope of Work, p1

2.2 Approach and Methodology

The evaluation was conducted by a team leader and four local evaluators, with local logistical support and Washington-based technical support in three phases: (1) document review, (2) field assessment, and (3) data analysis and reporting (Annex 3). For the document review, USAID/OTCM provided the evaluators with program documents before the in-country field phase. The review enabled the evaluation team to conceptualize a methodological design to elicit responses to key evaluation questions expressed in USAID's Scope of Work.

The Implementing Partner, AECOM, provided the team leader and Washington-based technical support officer with an overview of the STCM grants activity database in Washington DC for familiarization of content before the field visit to Sudan. During the first week in Khartoum, the team conducted an in-brief with USAID/OTCM, reviewed the methodology, conducted a focus group discussion with 24 STCM grantees, conducted interviews and site visits to pilot test the approach and evaluation questions, modified the guideline questions, discussed communication protocols for regional visits, gained permission letters from the directorate of international financial cooperation within the Ministry of Finance (MoF), and prepared for the regional field trips.

The team of four evaluators commenced field work in teams of two, from September 17, with one team travelling to the Blue Nile State and the second team travelling to Southern Kordofan State for 11-12 days each. The team leader remained in Khartoum to conduct site visits and interviews with implementing staff and stakeholders of national and Khartoum-based grants (Annexes 1 and 2). After two weeks in the field, the evaluation team examined and analyzed the results of the document review, grants activity database, interviews, FGD, and site visits. The team presented a briefing for USAID/OTCM on preliminary findings before departing Khartoum. Placing the evaluation in situational context, the overall methodological approach was threefold:

- (1) Progress against indicators: the evaluation focuses on STCM progress against its Performance Management Plan (PMP) indicators or, conversely, the degree to which the indicators were overtaken by shifting constraints, opportunities or priorities.
- (2) Grants: the evaluation focuses on the effectiveness and relevance of STCM grants in terms of the program's strategic objectives.
- (3) Performance management system: the evaluation focuses on the effectiveness of the implementing partner's strategies, implementation mechanisms, and overall management.

2.3 Challenges and Limitations

Initially it was intended for the two teams of local evaluators to travel to two separate regions of Darfur, return to Khartoum, and then travel to Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. Realizing the extent of grants and the program's programming in the Three Areas, the teams travelled to the border regions first. Travel from Khartoum to Southern Kordofan required two travel days by car (and thus four travel days in total). With an additional two days a week in which government officials did not work, it was decided that at least 10 days were required in the regions, which extended to 11 days in Blue Nile and 12 days in Southern Kordofan. Due to security and time constraints, it was not possible for evaluators to conduct site visits in all STCM operating areas. Therefore visits were conducted in Khartoum; Blue Nile State– Damazine and Roseires; and Southern Kordofan State – Muglad and Babanousa. Site visits were not conducted in Darfur; Abyei;

Kurmuk and Tadamon in Blue Nile State; and Debab in Southern Kordofan State. Debab stakeholders were interviewed in Muglad, and to ensure Darfur coverage, the evaluation team flew a key stakeholder to Khartoum, interviewed Darfur stakeholders already in the capital, and telephoned available grantees.

3. BACKGROUND

3.1 *Sudan in Transition*

The Transitional Areas of Sudan – Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile – were the frontline regions of Sudan’s twenty year civil war which ended in January 2005 with the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Sudan (GOS). At the heart of the conflict, and continuing sporadic violence, are the country’s natural resources (land, water, and oil) – at the community level and at the government level. Home to different ethno-linguistic pastoral and nomadic tribes with traditional cattle migration routes to water and food sites, and the center of political power struggles for land and oil, these areas were the most war-affected and service-deprived in the country, resulting in massive displacements of its citizens north, south, and across international borders.

A CPA condition was that citizens of southern states would hold a referendum in January 2011 on secession. The CPA stipulated that Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan states would receive special status in recognition of their position along Sudan’s volatile north-south border. The CPA granted both states the right of Popular Consultations (citizen hearings) through which the people of each state could determine whether the CPA met their state’s aspirations. If it didn’t the states were authorized to enter into negotiations with the central government in Khartoum in order to address identified shortcomings. USAID began supporting the Popular Consultation process in late 2009 and in December the legal framework governing the citizen hearing process was signed into law. The CPA determined that Abyei would participate in a referendum in January 2011 in parallel with the southern states to enable its citizens to determine whether to be part of northern Sudan (with Khartoum as its center of government) or join southern Sudan. The southern states conducted their referendum, as planned, resulting in 98.83% of its citizens voting for secession to take effect in July 2011. In Abyei, however, the vote has been delayed indefinitely.

Both countries had not achieved a negotiated settlement of issues related to the management of the South Sudan independence. Hence many key issues were unresolved before South Sudan independence on July 9, 2011. In January 2012 dispute over oil-related payments escalated, leading to South Sudan shutting down all of its oil production. This interdependence on oil (with oil production in the south, but refinement and export infrastructure in the north) affected both nations. The oil dispute fueled border tensions linked to rebel movements on both sides of the new international border. From April 2012 the disputes negatively affected long-established trade links. The African Union (AU) intervened to adopt a Roadmap, endorsed by the UN Security Council in May, to ease government-to-government tensions, but both the AU and UN were limited in their ability to facilitate constructive outcomes, and the Roadmap’s deadline expired.

Map 1: Sudan, South Sudan and Productive Oil Fields



Source: <http://www.economist.com/node/18745303>

3.2 The Sudan Transition and Conflict Mitigation Program

The three-year Sudan Transition and Conflict Mitigation program commenced in August 2010, five months after USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives completed their programming and handed it to USAID/Sudan. To maintain the OTI transitional mechanism, USAID established the Office of Transition and Conflict Mitigation (OTCM) in which OTI's SWIFT III grant mechanism would also be carried forward.

STCM commenced five months before the January 2011 self-determination referendum of the southern states in Sudan. The STCM program was therefore designed to promote stability in the Transitional Areas of Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile in the lead up to the referendum. Support was therefore expected to build on the CPA-decreed Popular Consultation process commenced by USAID in late 2009. The STCM program was intended to respond strategically to emerging needs to provide peace dividends, promote community-led reconciliation, and strengthen local capacity for conflict mitigation. For such rapid, immediate responses, the SWIFT III mechanism provided in-kind small grants for short-term assistance to local entities. Grant proposals could be innovative, risk-taking, and community-focused. Rather than a development focus, the predominant domain of USAID Mission programs, the transitional program under SWIFT III was to lay the foundations for longer term development. Rather than a development focus on sustainability, transitional programming was to "continue the momentum."⁴

Since commencement of the program, South Sudan has become an independent nation, and Comprehensive Peace Agreement has expired. From June 2011, program activities ceased in Abyei due to ongoing conflict. From April 2012, program activities expanded to Khartoum and Darfur. STCM therefore supported infrastructure, education, and health. STCM also provided both visible support and social peace activities designed to establish government credibility for longer term development assistance. The program built state governance capacities by engaging rural communities in planning

⁴ OTI (2004) Special Tenth-Year Edition: A Decade of Transition, 1994-2004

and implementing projects guided by community priorities. At the same time, it connected communities to their government by means of quick-impact, quality-of-life infrastructure projects.

3.2.1 Summary of STCM Outcomes

USAID/OTCM granted the STCM program a no-cost extension to October 2013. To end August 2013⁵ STCM funded a total of \$11.9 million worth of activities through 168 grants, complemented by 19 short term technical assistants (STTA). Due to ongoing conflict in 2011, the Abyei Office was looted on May 23; the Kadugli Office was looted on June 6; and the Kurmuk Office was looted on September 6. These offices were never re-opened. The Damazine Office was also looted on September 6 although a new office was opened in November. Darfur activities operated without an office.

Table 1: Summary of Grants and Expenditure by Office

OFFICE	CANCELLED		OBLIGATED		DISBURSED	
	\$	NO.	\$	NO.	\$	NO.
Abyei	\$710	2	\$710	0	\$710	2
Damazine (BN)	\$75,308	1	\$3,248,669	38	\$2,962,294	38
Darfur	0	0	\$1,483,322	21	\$1,265,262	21
Kadugli (SK)	\$721,439	11	\$1,431,835	23	\$1,431,834	23
Khartoum	\$95,919	3	\$1,182,382	26	\$1,154,773	26
Kurmuk (BN)	0	0	\$185,726	1	\$185,726	1
Muglad (SK)	\$104,647	2	\$3,097,542	29	\$2,975,210	29
STTA	0	0	\$808,060	19	\$758,084	19
Other	0	0	\$434,121	9	\$406,495	9
TOTAL	\$998,023	19	\$11,872,367	168	\$11,140,388	168

Source: STCM Finance Office, September 17, 2013

Note 1: Total available funding for grants is \$12.1 million, with \$11.9 obligated to end August 2013, with \$201,000 pending

Note 2: Other includes cash and direct distribution of goods

Note 3: Grants were cancelled due to conflict and office lootings

3.2.2 Historical Milestones and Implementation Challenges

STCM had two major hurdles to overcome at the onset of their program in August 2010: (1) Operationally – as a transition program based within USAID/Sudan as the Mission itself was transitioning from a development focus to the rapid response conflict and mitigation mechanism handed over from its predecessor OTI, and (2) Historically – as one nation was transitioning into two separate nations. Added to these challenges were implementation challenges that impacted the program as follows – shown diagrammatically in Figure 1:

January to July 2011: Secession-related conflict led to the looting and closure of four STCM offices over three months resulting in their ‘retreat’ to safer areas and the cancellation of almost \$1million worth of grants.

April to July 2012: Sudan’s soaring inflation (46% in April), depreciating currency and high commodity prices (a 300% increase since 2010) led to government economic belt-tightening policies resulting in programmatic procurement and financial challenges.


⁵ The Grant Activity Database was uploaded on August 26, 2013, for evaluation purposes. Finance information was provided on September 17, 2013.

August 2012 to February 2013: The program’s central government counterpart, the Ministry of International Cooperation (MIC), was dissolved leading to a five-month hiatus in government decision making until GOS eventually created the directorate of international financial cooperation under the Ministry of Finance resulting in program staff re-setting national government counterpart relations.

September 2012 to September 2013: The program’s international staff declined from fifteen to two resulting in a hiatus in local recruitment, and subsequently the recruitment and promotion of local staff.

The two most critical and challenging periods for the program were therefore: (1) January 2011 to February 2012 as a direct result of secession-related conflicts, and (2) September 2012 to July 2013 as a result of the central government’s closure of MIC and the government’s suspension of the US Embassy. The negative effects of these challenges on the program’s ability to clear (approve) grants are shown in Graph 1.

Graph 1: Number of Grants Cleared Per Month (2010-2013)



Source: STCM Grant Activity Database, August 26, 2013

The evaluation team emphasizes the importance of placing the outcomes of the program in context with the socio-economic and political landscape, and in terms of the expectations of transitional programming in a multi-conflicted setting.

Figure 1: Historical Milestones and STCM Implementation Challenges

Year	Externality	Effect on STCM	Location	Strategic Objectives	Staffing Levels
Aug 2010	January South Sudan vote; July 9 secession; Conflict in Abyei & SK		Three Areas: Abyei, South Kordofan (SK) and Blue Nile (BN)	SO 1: Assist political processes; SO 2: Build capacity for mitigation & management of conflict	15 international staff; full complement of national staff
Sep 2010					
Oct 2010					
Nov 2010					
Dec 2010					
Jan 2011					
Feb 2011					
Mar 2011					
Apr 2011					
May 2011					
Jun 2011	June 6: Kadugli (SK) Office looted				
Jul 2011					
Aug 2011					
Sep 2011	Sep 6: Blue Nile Offices looted				
Oct 2011					
Nov 2011	New Damazine (BN) Office opens				
Dec 2011					
Jan 2012					
Feb 2012					
Mar 2012					
Apr 2012	Exchange rate increases: 2.2 to 6.5	Inflation: Affects staff salaries (not increased)	Blue Nile (Damazine Office), South Kordofan (Muglad Office), Darfur (no Office), and Khartoum (from Sudan Office in Khartoum)	SO 1: Mitigate & prevent strategic, political and/or systemic conflict; SO 2: Encourage national, political, economic & social dialogue; SO 3: Support peace & reconciliation efforts in Darfur	International staff decrease to 2
May 2012					
Jun 2012					
Jul 2012	Aug 6: MIC	Government dissolves the Ministry of International Cooperation (MIC); STCM and National Government relationship is uncertain as the program has no clearly defined government links			
Aug 2012					
Sep 2012					
Oct 2012					
Nov 2012					
Dec 2012					
Jan 2013	US Embassy suspended				
Feb 2013					
Mar 2013					
Apr 2013					
May 2013					
Jun 2013					
Jul 2013	STCM No-Cost Extension	Historical levels of flooding	SO 1: Mitigate & prevent strategic, political and/or systemic conflict; SO 2: Encourage national, political, economic & social dialogue; SO 3: Support peace & reconciliation efforts in Darfur	International staff decrease to 2	
Aug 2013		STCM Evaluation			
Sep 2013		USAID Mission Director in Sudan			
Oct 2013					

4.1 Strategic Objectives – Responding to Emerging Needs

For the first year, the program set two specific Strategic Objectives for 2010-2011:

SO1: Assist political processes

SO2: Build capacity for mitigation and management of conflict.⁶

4.1.1 Popular Consultations

In the Three Areas, STCM delivered tangible peace dividends, promoted key political processes, and supported state capacity building. Tangible peace dividends focused initially on the rehabilitation of government administrative offices and water yards, but extensive support for the Popular Consultation (PopCon) process in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan dominated their political process assistance. In the first year, a total of 27 grants for PopCons and related stakeholder capacity building (valued at \$1.9m, representing 40% of grants and 36% of funding) secured their credibility with state leaders from all parties. This was critical at the commencement of the program which led to a foothold for peaceful coexistence activities and stakeholder confidence in the program's ability to deliver on promises.

Simultaneously, conflict mitigation and management efforts centered on three approaches: (1) water sources, (2) health and education, and (3) peaceful coexistence efforts. The provision or rehabilitation of 17 water yards in Southern Kordofan's western sector, the education facilities for secondary school girls and medical equipment, as well as vocational skills training, contributed to linkages between governments (Ministries of Education, Health, and Water Resources) and their constituents as well as linkages between urban and peripheral communities. Commencement of work in Abyei focused on building the capacity of the Abyei Area Administration. Clearly the momentum for change was established by nurturing a mindset for change at the top level while supporting community-level needs. This first year, especially the first six months before the January 2011 secession referendum, catalyzed citizens' participation in their states' own decision making and their communities' own service development. Taken together, these contributions created both a sound basis for the state's presence to lay a foundation for development and an effective template for how the state could establish its presence in peripheral communities.

4.1.2 Year of Secession

STCM staff held three main strategy sessions throughout the program, formal and collaborative as well as internal and re-directional. The first strategy session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in March 2011, was jointly developed with OTCM and an external facilitator. Its aim was to align the program with the post-referendum environment and orient new staff to the SWIFT III mechanism.⁷ Analysis of their programming centered on support for conflict mitigation mechanisms in which vocational training for youth was a key feature. Discussion also focused on conflict dynamics in Darfur. Two months later, in May 2011, major conflict broke out in the Three Areas, especially in Abyei. The remaining period of the program's first year was the most challenging as offices were looted, and the areas of Abyei, Kadugli, and Kurmuk became increasingly insecure. Regional staff members were not able to access these offices to retrieve equipment, and after placing grants on hold they were

⁶ AIS (October 2010), STCM Performance Management Plan

⁷ STCM (March 2011), Sudan Transition and Conflict Mitigation Program Strategy Session Final Report, p1

eventually cancelled. Almost \$1million worth of grants had to be re-obligated. Documented in their Performance Management Plan in December 2011, the program amended its first year strategic objectives to reflect post-secession programming. After South Sudan's secession the Comprehensive Peace Agreement expired and therefore it was timely for STCM to re-focus. In the final two years (2011-2013), the program focused on three Strategic Objectives:

SO1: Mitigate and prevent strategic political and/or systemic conflict

SO2: Encourage national political, economic, and social dialogue

SO3: Support peace and reconciliation efforts in Darfur.

4.1.3 Darfur and Khartoum

The move to Darfur programming followed the closure of three offices in the Three Areas and the program's signing of an Implementation Protocol with the Government of Sudan to operate in Darfur. The second annual strategy session in May 2012 focused on continued support in Blue Nile (from the Damazine Office) and Southern Kordofan (from the Muglad Office) for peace councils, community workshops, and maintenance of water projects, as well as Darfur assistance, national dialogue through social peace, and Sudan-South Sudan relations.⁸ The program added youth and women as strategies for mitigating peace through income generation, vocational skills training, and empowerment activities.

Programming in Khartoum and Darfur (the program's 'second wind') focused on social peace with some support for the rehabilitation of cultural infrastructure that would bring people together – predominantly through culture, music, sports, and art. Social peace was also scaled up in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. The combination of tangible peace dividends (social spaces), a focus on multi-ethnic diversity (including women and youth), and enhancing the social fabric of communities, produced innovations in social peace proposals.

4.1.4 Hiatus Year

In November 2012, six months after introducing programming in Khartoum and Darfur, and with nine months remaining of the program, STCM managers were at their lowest ebb. The Government of Sudan had dissolved MIC – their government counterpart. With the leading decision making bodies evaporating and their international staff leaving the country, the program was virtually rudderless. It was timely for another programming redirection. The STCM strategy session concentrated primarily on a border strategy to respond to the September 27 Cooperation Agreements between Sudan and South Sudan.⁹ Therefore the session led to a plan of action for consolidating efforts with local peace actors and increasing cross-border activities. At the same time, they documented their need to “remain poised to respond to identified needs in Abyei.”¹⁰

The program focused on cross-border activities between Darfur and the western sector of Southern Kordofan. Lack of access to water and grasslands resulted in traditional annual conflicts. This cycle of conflict between pastoral and agricultural groups, and displaced persons, further marginalized these communities. The program therefore centered their activities on the Misseriya and Rezeigat

⁸ STCM (May 2012) Strategy Summary, p2

⁹ AIS (November 2012) STCM Border Strategy: Detailed Area Discussion, p1-5

¹⁰ STCM Border Strategy: Detailed Area Discussion, p2

tribes – the nomadic cattle herders – and their unique, but overlapping, migratory corridors (*murhals*).

USAID/OTCM granted the program a three-month no-cost extension to October 2013, and the central government placed STCM under MOF's new directorate of international financial cooperation in February 2013, thus ending the hiatus in counterpart relations and giving the program its 'third wind.' Furthermore, after more than a year of no oil flows between South Sudan and Sudan, both governments reached an agreement, brokered by the AU to resume oil production by July 2013. On September 3, 2013, the central government agreed to "remove all obstacles"¹¹ in relations with South Sudan to set cooperative agreements for the future. Six days later, the first commercial flight of the South Supreme Airlines arrived in Khartoum in a demonstration of normalized relations between the two countries.

4.1.5 Conclusions and Recommendations

The first year of programming, dedicated predominantly to the Population Consultation process in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, was appropriate, timely, and effective in moving forward political processes through giving people a voice among dissenting groups. However, it was not strategic; rather, it was influenced by USAID/OTCM in order to build upon their efforts in the preceding months before STCM commenced in August 2010. The program's forward-reaching strategies commenced from March 2011, and reached their peak a year later in May 2012 when post-secession stabilization was a critical need, the program had 'lost ground' through office closure, and expansion to Darfur and Khartoum was seen as a legitimate means for advancement. The focus on state government relationship-building of the first year transitioned seamlessly into a community-based model which continued to evolve over the life of the program, shifting from immediate needs to longer term 'sustainable' activities (such as vocational skills training for youth and women). The program's most effective strategy was the commencement of programming in Khartoum, although its importance may not have seemed immediately obvious to all staff and stakeholders. Through social peace activities at the local level, the program was able to support the most marginalized and diverse communities in Khartoum – recent Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan settlers. The program's greater focus on youth and women from the second year was impressive and directly responsive to emerging needs as well as responsive to government concerns about rising youth unrest.¹²

The evaluation team notes that while the program documented strategies and direction shifts, highly focused on conflict dynamics, there were no comprehensive youth or gender action plans. The evaluation team recommends that these plans would form a strong base, and dynamic strategy, for future transitional and conflict mitigation programming.

¹¹ Sudan Vision, September 3, 2013

¹² Youth unrest across Arab countries, known as the 'Arab Spring' has been a concern of governments in the region since 2011; furthermore in September 2013 demonstrations in Khartoum against the central government's lifting of oil subsidies, resulting in doubling the cost of fuel, was largely initially orchestrated by university students and youth

4.2 Local Level Conflict Mitigation, Management and Capacity Building

Funding for local conflict mitigation was itself systemic across the program, embedded into almost every grant, totaling \$8.1m over 107 grants – representing 68% of funding and 64% of programming. By themes, conflict mitigation was represented in 30% of grants (Table 2).

Table 2: Number of Grants by Theme

THEME	NO. GRANTS	% GRANTS	THEME	NO. GRANTS	% GRANTS
Conflict Mitigation	135	30%	Education	14	3%
Youth	59	12%	NGO Development	13	2%
Training	52	10%	Media	10	2%
Community Infrastructure	43	8%	Health	9	2%
Women	39	7%	Human Rights	4	1%
Civic Education	34	6%	Agriculture	3	1%
CPA Dissemination	25	5%	Justice	3	1%
Gender	20	4%	Micro-Enterprise	3	1%
Water	19	4%	Transparency	2	<1%
Reconstruction	18	3%	Elections	1	<1%

Source: STCM Grant Activity Database, August 26, 2013

Note: Grants have multiple themes and therefore the table represents multiple listings

The program's initial focus on the Three Areas was significant for local level conflict mitigation due to long-held traditional conflicts. Rightly, the program commenced in Abyei, the heart of three migration routes, especially for the nomadic Misseriya and Rezeigat tribes, from east Darfur into the western sector of Southern Kordofan.¹³ Therefore Abyei was an important intervention. Unfortunately the program ceased its activities in Abyei within five months of commencement for security reasons, although attempting to maintain linkages with the Misseriya and Rezeigat tribes through support at the end of 2011 from Muglad.

All Three Areas had strategic, social, and political significance, affecting a corridor of about 12 million people. This highlights the importance of the program maintaining the momentum toward positive change and stability in the region. Four factors contributed to the program's mainly successful efforts: (1) it was the right location, (2) it was the right time, (3) it was the right programming, and (4) it was the right focus on change agents for conflict mitigation. State governments were cooperative and the program worked in parallel on key issues, especially tangible peace dividends, such as the construction or rehabilitation of cultural centers, health and education facilities, and administrative offices, indicating that the outcomes would be permanent and geared toward connecting the state government with its people.


The coordinated and sequenced approach, from political processes to conflict dynamics, governance and dialogue, as well as the program's flexibility and transparency encouraged trust in the program and the connectedness and cohesion of people in the region. The focus on some of the main drivers of conflict – water, resources, and migration routes – and on peaceful coexistence, proved highly successful in terms of participatory processes, consensus building, and improved mediation. Not only did the program contribute to building citizen confidence in the progress of political enhancement, it built alliances between legitimate government structures and their associated

¹³ When the program commenced in 2010, West Kordofan was part of Southern Kordofan

communities. Other examples of local level conflict mitigation included quick-impact messages for peace extending across ethnic groups. Peace messages, included in workshops, training, translations, public discussion, and on walls around new constructions¹⁴ focused on direct and indirect, individual and collective, community involvement and coordination. The program built a network of local level leaders, in each location, who were committed to promulgating messages of peace.

4.2.1 Cross-Border Activities

The borders of the Three Areas are regarded as ‘soft’ and program activities straddled the two states (Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan) and are called ‘cross-border’ activities. Following the independence of South Sudan in 2011, the Three Areas ‘hardened’ their borders (Figure 2).



From January 2013, two grants, Cross Border Media Initiative (North-South) I and II,¹⁵ were the program’s first international border interventions. Although not ideally managed nor implemented, the idea was nevertheless a model for cross-international-border intervention. The first proposal was submitted in May 2012 and approved eight months later – the gap was a direct result of the transition from international to local STCM regional management. However, the grants capitalized on television, radio and print journalists from both countries as third-party actors to play a prominent role in providing positive messages, information, and reports to potentially de-escalate international tensions. Reducing inflammatory messages was the main goal, but at the same time, the professionals improved their cross-border networks. A total of 25 journalists (15 from Sudan – 10 women; and 10 from South Sudan – 4 women) undertook a workshop in Nairobi, Kenya, to initiate cooperation opportunities. The second grant followed with nine participants¹⁶ from South Sudan visiting Sudan, resulting in the beginnings of ideas for further cooperation, such as a joint website and continued networking through professional associations. Professional and organizational cross-border cooperation is a model for conflict mitigation and management at the local level that spans international borders and has the potential to establish longer term collaborations.

¹⁴ Such as the Mayo Community Peace Garden in Khartoum (S3KRT025), GESCRS (S3KRT023), and Blue Nile Cultural Activities for Sustainable Conflict Prevention (S3DAM020)

¹⁵ Cross Border Media Initiative (North-South) I and II¹⁵ (S3KRT018 and S3KRT029)

¹⁶ The 10 South Sudan participants from the first grant were invited to travel to Sudan, and 9 were able to participate

4.2.2 Short Term Technical Assistance (STTA)

A comprehensive assessment of the program's short term technical assistance was not conducted as part of the evaluation, although stakeholders commented on their usefulness. The program provided 19 grants valued at approximately \$800,000 for targeted assistance, predominantly to ministries, in response to immediate, critical needs. The Darfur Regional Authority, for example, received four STTAs. The DRA, recently established in February 2012, requested support to build the capacity of their institutions and commissions "to rapidly mobilize and provide the necessary critical capacity support for ... recovery, peacebuilding and development priorities in the Doha Document for Peace."¹⁷ Embedding international technical experts in different sectors – agriculture, social welfare, Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund (accountancy), and logistics – was just a fraction of their request for 27 STTAs. The STTA mechanism for the fledgling authority was timely and based on three factors: (1) an identified gap, (2) the authority's demonstrated interest to make improvements, and (3) discrete deliverables. However, more support was required for specialized skills to enable DRA institutions to mitigate conflict in the region through: livestock support, agriculture, natural resource management, water management, land management, community development, and vocational skills (such as leatherwork and handicrafts). Darfur's priority, according to the DRA, is a move toward development in line with their recently formulated Darfur Development Strategy (2013-2019) with the belief that the 'permanence' of development or development-type activities would promote peace and stability in the region.

4.2.3 Conclusions and Recommendations

The program's interventions for local level conflict mitigation were extensive, continuous, and effective, striving from the outset to develop replicable models for success.¹⁸ The program achieved this through the following grants: (1) water yard grants (to ensure longer term water management), (2) their support to the Reconciliation and Peaceful Coexistence Mechanism (RPCM), an institution created by the Blue Nile state governor, (3) preparation and support related to migration routes, (4) social peace and peace messaging, (5) cross-international-border intervention, and (6) short term technical assistance. The evaluation team recommends further cross-international-border interventions should be explored, while maintaining a strong Sudan focus on northern cultures and traditions. Further conflict mitigation activities in Darfur should be explored in line with the DRA's readiness for support.

4.3 Stakeholder Engagement

The program engaged with 85 grantees that subsequently supported end beneficiaries. These included NGOs, youth unions, peace councils, and state government ministries – education, health, water resources, culture, youth, agriculture, and humanitarian affairs. The majority of grantees were government entities at the state or locality level (51%), thereby enabling government officials to provide community infrastructure for multi-purpose use (such as cultural and youth centers) or for peaceful coexistence activities. Grants to government entities supported the following: conflict prevention (28%), CPA information dissemination (16%), civic education (14%), community

¹⁷ DRA (2013) Report on AECOM Technical Assistance to DRA, p4

¹⁸ AIS (March 2011) STCM Addis Strategy Session, p2 – under Mission Priorities and Strategy in Northern Sudan: "STCM's role is being the frontline representatives of USAID/OTCM in the field, keeping the spirit of OTI alive (fast, flexible) in OTCM, to lay the groundwork for longer-term development programs (model and pilot) ..."

infrastructure (12%), water yards (8%), youth (8%), women (7%), reconstruction (4%), education (2%), and NGO development (1%).

The program's engagements with state governments were highly positive, with the perception that the program was intimately connected with communities. This was particularly evident in Blue Nile State due its more consistent periods of stability, especially in urban areas. Nevertheless, the program enabled the wider outreach of urban administrations to peripheral communities. Stakeholders from Darfur, where there is no regional program office and the programming concentrates on social peace, expressed the need for more engagement, particularly for tangible peace dividends – such as spaces for peace committees, women's centers, and youth clubs. All stakeholders preferred the program to have a regional Darfur office to ensure the program's visibility, proximity, engagement, and continued support.

4.3.1 Grant Series/Sequencing: Follow-on and Follow-up

The most effective stakeholder engagement stemmed from a series or sequencing of grants that either supported the same community or location, or built upon rehabilitation of infrastructure to ensure its optimal use – awarding grants to the same grantee or another associated grantee. The advantage for communities was longer term engagement that cemented trust and cooperation.

For example, the series of grants for PopCons included the rehabilitation of office space for the Popular Consultation Commission, support to the information processing center, citizen hearings, and translations. A grant, Access to Water for Peace and Stability in East Darfur – Training,¹⁹ that provided 22 workshops in hygiene, pump mechanics, and water management worked in conjunction with the follow-on grant to the same grantee for water yard rehabilitation.²⁰ The grant to rehabilitate the Damazine Cultural Center in conjunction with the Blue Nile State Ministry of Culture, Sport and Youth (MCSY) led to a grant for material support²¹ such as equipment, furniture and air conditioners in the Center's folklore gallery, library, six small offices, meeting room, and cafeteria. The grants increased the Center's pivotal role in facilitating community participation through cultural diversity initiatives. Cultural groups that engaged through the grant, Cultural Activities for Sustainable Conflict Prevention in Blue Nile State, also participated in performances in the grant, Supporting Cultural Diversity, and artistic competitions in the grant Painting for Peace.²² Not only did these grants support in-house training to staff of the state's nascent department of cultural diversity within MCSY, but they also gave impetus for staff to conduct youth activities, as well as workshop for leaders from marginalized communities to participate in the development of an inclusive cultural diversity strategy and action plan for 2012/2013. These are sustainable activities that benefit urban and peripheral communities.

Furthermore, follow-on grants also served as intervention 'follow-up' through low-profile monitoring to ensure that community and state government engagement produced the desired

¹⁹ Access to Water for Peace and Stability in East Darfur – Training (S3DAR001)

²⁰ Water Yard Rehabilitation in Darfur (S3DAR002)

²¹ Rehabilitation of Damazine Cultural Center in Blue Nile State (S3DAM037) and Material Support to Damazine Cultural Center (S3DAM043)

²² Cultural Activities for Sustainable Conflict Prevention in Blue Nile State (S3DAM020), Supporting Cultural Diversity (S3DAM028), and Painting for Peace (S3DAM023)

outcomes. An example of where a follow-on grant would serve an existing community, and provide follow-up support, is the Mayo Community in Khartoum. The program constructed an impressive peace garden²³ in the midst of barren land in an impoverished neighborhood from May 2012 to March 2013. The diverse ethnic community, with groups from Darfur, the Three Areas, and South Sudan (including double IDPs whereby citizens have been displaced more than once) were supported to collectively manage a large (40m x 40m) peace garden next to the Mayo Community Development Center on community-owned land. Play equipment for children, a stage area for dramatic performances, and overhead lighting comprised some of the program's support. A follow-on grant, Supporting Conflict Mitigation and Development in Mayo Community²⁴ from July to August 2013 strengthened relationships through advanced training on peaceful coexistence for 25 community leaders, women, and youth, as well as equipment to operate a small café in the peace garden to ensure sustainable revenue to finance the garden's maintenance. However, the garden is a 'closed' space – locked at night and guarded, with community access three days a week from 4:00pm to 10pm. Youth, especially girls, bring their exercise books and pencils each Sunday at 6:00pm precisely for informal English lessons on the lawns of the garden. The electric lighting is rarely turned on because commercial electricity is expensive.²⁵ 'Borrowed' electricity from the Mayo Community Development Center is used to pump water to maintain the garden's expanse of lawn and foliage. Without power, the garden wouldn't flourish and the café wouldn't operate to raise the much-needed revenue. Typical of a transitional program, STCM currently does not consistently follow-up grant outcomes. A follow-on grant to ensure income generation would not only provide continued support, but would also enable follow-up monitoring to prevent a good idea from potentially collapsing.

4.3.2 'Retreat' and Engagement for Systemic Conflict

In situations where STCM offices were closed, in Abyei, Kadugli, and Kurmuk, stakeholder engagement was remotely 'observed' to determine whether interventions could resume. In all cases, they couldn't due to persistent and intense fighting. While the program documented that staff should remain open to possibilities, there was limited, if any, active engagement or discussion with stakeholders post-lootings. Therefore the program's 'retreat' from these locations leaves a gap in their support, and to some extent diminishes the program's overarching goal of conflict mitigation in the border regions, and its strategic objective to mitigate political and/or systemic conflict. In September 2013, at the time of the evaluation, the South Kordofan governor described the ongoing conflict in his state as "intricate" involving family members on both sides, and urging his citizens to "join the peace process."²⁶

4.3.3 Youth Engagement

The concept of youth engagement commenced from the latter part of the program's first year in response to the needs of disenfranchised citizens and collaborations with state ministries in the Three Areas. Noting that youth were the most critical potential source of destabilization, there was a risk that, as a group, they were highly susceptible to negative influences. From the second year, the

²³ Peace Garden for Peaceful Coexistence in Mayo Community (S3KRT015)

²⁴ Supporting Conflict Mitigation and Development in Mayo Community (S3KRT025)

²⁵ The initial connection fee to commercial power is approximately 8,000 SDG (about USD \$1,500)

²⁶ The Sudan Tribune (September 11, 2013) South Kordofan conflict "intricate," says governor (<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article48007>)

program provided appropriate activities to support the enfranchisement and empowerment of youth through: (1) workshops on management, social media, and human rights, (2) agricultural inputs for nomadic herders, (3) rehabilitation of educational institutions, (4) construction of youth centers and clubs, and (5) vocational skills training.

Interventions for youth composed the second highest theme (behind conflict mitigation) with representation in 59 grants to the value of \$4.5m, and with specific attention to youth-at-risk in 16 grants worth \$1.4m. This high emphasis on the youth sector was warranted. Grants such as Engaging Youth through Football in Southern Kordofan from February to March 2012 and Blue Nile from March to June 2012, culminating in Khartoum²⁷ from October 2012 to May 2013, proved what a powerful medium sports were to the social cohesion of youth from different and divisive backgrounds.

4.3.4 Women's Engagement

In combination with the increased focus on youth engagement, the program also heightened its programming for women from the second year of implementation. The prime focus was empowerment, women as peace ambassadors, and their increased community engagement. For example, a grant provided to the Blue Nile Governor's Office for logistical and material support to facilitate a series of tea/coffee sessions in 40 rural communities²⁸ was an informal avenue for disseminating peace messages to over 25 ethnic groups. A follow-on grant supported the training of 40 female master trainers.²⁹ The method of visible, direct empowerment juxtaposed another method of subtle, indirect empowerment employed in Khartoum through the grant, Supporting Community Cultural Centers to Promote Peaceful Coexistence³⁰ which supported seven cultural clubs³¹ through rehabilitation, equipment, libraries, and training on peaceful coexistence. The targeted clubs were chosen for their community role in health and education advocacy, youth and women's activities, and fund raising. Part of the clubs' rehabilitation was the provision of a room or 'social space' for women's committees to meet so that they could plan their own community activities, such as environmental advocacy. Simultaneously, they were connected to other (men's) committees through their presence in the club. Since 2008, MCSY has had a regulation stipulating 20% women's participation on Boards,³² although this is not monitored. The grant resulted in one to two women in each club becoming Board members (comprising 7-13 people) which represented an 8-14% membership.

Another example of social peace was the grant, Exchange Visits for Female University Students to Bridge Cultural Gaps³³ which supported Southern Kordofan and Khartoum-based students from different cultural groups to initiate social dialogue. Ten female university students – potential leaders – from Alsalaam University in Babanousa, a remote corner of the western sector of Southern

²⁷ Engaging Youth through Football in Southern Kordofan (S3MUG024), in Blue Nile (S3DAM026), and Khartoum (S3KRT021)

²⁸ Empowering women to effectively participate in Conflict Mitigation: Events (S3DAM021)

²⁹ Empowering women to effectively participate in Conflict Mitigation: ToT (S3DAM022)

³⁰ Supporting Community Cultural Centers to Promote Peaceful Coexistence (S3KRT023)

³¹ In Khartoum there are 176 cultural clubs (according to the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Youth) operable since the 1940s and 50s, of which the NGO Group for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Studies (GESCRS) interacts with 47; subsequently 7 active clubs were selected for participation in the STCM grant

³² Sudan National Elections Act, 2008

³³ Exchange Visits for Female University Students to Bridge Cultural Gaps (S3KRT010)

Kordofan, traveled to Khartoum to join eight students from Afhad University and twelve Khartoum-based university students from other regions of Sudan for five days to discuss topics such as ethnography and gender. The follow-on grant³⁴ supported a similar exchange from Blue Nile. This second iteration of exchanges proved an important opportunity to build on the 27 September 2012 Cooperation Agreements.

The most impressive and innovative grants were related to sports ambassadors for peace and female Hakamat singers. The program supported a grant for Hakamat singers in Khartoum from October 2012 to June 2013, and a similar ‘sister’ grant with a different grantee in Darfur³⁵ from February to June 2013. These grants demonstrated the penetrating influence of women as peace builders, in which songs of war were transformed into songs of peace. Men in the communities were powerfully affected by the songs, previously designed to incite warrior and combative instincts, resulting in their dramatically changed peaceful and passive behavior. The sports ambassadors for peace grant³⁶ in October 2012 enabled university sporting women to empower other girls, in association with the Sudanese Football Association, while addressing the perception of barriers to sport for women.

4.3.5 Conclusions and Recommendations

The program’s most innovative and risk-taking grants were associated with women. Although the program had no coherent strategy to support women or youth, its engagement with both was consistent and meaningful from the second year, focusing on empowerment, agents for change, and “ripple effects” for change. The grants succeeded on a number of levels: (1) they provided social activities that supported peaceful coexistence, (2) they were both subtle and overt, (3) they created ‘private’ social places that also connected them with their immediate community as well as the wider community, (4) they operated in peripheral communities, (5) they were visible and explicit, and (6) they mainstreamed women and youth.

The evaluation team recommends continued engagement in Darfur and Khartoum, as well as pursuing opportunities, when they present themselves, in areas where they initially commenced operations and in which their offices were not re-opened – Kurmuk, Kadugli, and Abyei. The evaluation team recommends further social peace interventions, with a more overt aspect of psycho-social counseling for war-affected groups and double or multiple IDPs, especially for women and youth. The evaluators are not suggesting one-on-one counseling, but rather STTA expertise or grants tailored to emphasize resilience, adaptation to change, and coping mechanisms for post-traumatic stress after long-term war exposure, gender violence, post-displacement stressors, and feelings of marginalization. For women and youth, the evaluation team also recommends leadership activities that go beyond training, but also include practical and applied components such that individuals or groups are provided with real opportunities for decision making, management, and leadership.

³⁴ S3DAM041

³⁵ Enhancing the Role of Hakamat in Peace Building in Khartoum (S3KRT022) and Darfur (S3AR019)

³⁶ S3KRT024

4.4 Programming and SWIFT III Mechanism

USAID/Sudan created the Office of Transition and Conflict Mitigation to continue its Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) SWIFT III IQC mechanism when OTI phased out in March 2010. The SWIFT mechanism has three elements: (1) grants, (2) approvals, and (3) procurement.

4.4.1 SWIFT Grant Mechanism

The IQC³⁷ mechanism enables the use of local partners through a small grant approach with defined goals, objectives, deliverables, and reporting. The use of non-registered local partners – such as individuals, government departments, private organizations, youth and women’s groups – provides access to anyone meeting the goals of the program to act as peace change agents. This mechanism is important because it means that there is greater ability for communities and local officials to undertake activities that may otherwise not receive funding due to their higher risk factor (i.e. not a tested approach) or that may span several sectors. The mechanism primarily supports in-kind grants, although cash may also be provided depending on the situation and amount. Grantees experienced in applying for grants under previous schemes were familiar with the procedures, but many had never applied for a grant, and for some it was even their first experience with a donor’s implementing partner. Grantees at all levels, especially state governments, highly valued the accessibility to grant funding.

Table 3: Grants by Type of Grantee

GRANTEE TYPE	GRANTS (%)	FUNDING (%)
Host Government Entity	51%	56%
Local NGO	25%	27%
Others	17%	12%
Private Entity	3%	1%
International NGO	2%	3%
International Organization	1%	1%
Media Entity	1%	0% (< 1%)
TOTAL	100%	100%

Source: STCM Grant Activity Database, August 26, 2013

Only 2% of grants were cash – for the provision of experts to support PopCons in Blue Nile, and the deployment of conflict monitors to assess the situation in the Three Areas in April 2012 and potential expansion into Khartoum and two eastern states. It was at this time that STCM decided to expand programming to Darfur and Khartoum.

Grant mechanisms are generally designed such that beneficiary organizations (grantees) define the scope and nature of the activity for potential funding in a proposal. In the STCM program, ideas for grants emanated not only from grantees, but also STCM and USAID/OTCM staff, according to interviews.³⁸ Some community beneficiaries interviewed were not aware of the grant proposal and its development, indicating that the grantees did not work in collaboration with community members or their end beneficiaries. However, some grantees stated that their proposal stemmed from community demand, rather than specific collaboration. Grant activity database records cannot

³⁷ SWIFT = Support Which Implements Fast Transition; IQC = Indefinite Quality Contract

³⁸ The Grant Activity Database does not include a specific entry for recording who initiated the grant, unless program managers include it in the general description field

confirm the source of grant ideas, nor the degree of community collaboration during the proposal phase. While grant ideas can, in theory, be generated from multiple sources under the SWIFT mechanism, grantees and end beneficiaries would have appreciated greater input and collaboration at the proposal stage.

4.4.2 SWIFT Approval Mechanism

It was incumbent upon STCM regional program managers to determine the ‘worthiness’ of potential grantees and their ideas. Accordingly 27 grants were rejected,³⁹ with most of these in Kadugli (9), Kurmuk (5), and Abyei (5), despite some being deemed worthy. STCM staff rejected 60% of the 27 grants due to security and subsequent regional inaccessibility, 11% due to the inability of grantee contributors to reach consensus, 7% due to logistical constraints, and 7% due to the activity being subsumed under another grant. One grant (4%) was rejected for unknown reasons (not logged in the database) and two grants (7%) were rejected by STCM due to delays of seven months pending USAID/OTCM approval. The speed of processing a grant rests largely with STCM staff, and the approval process (termed ‘clearing’ a grant for implementation), rests with USAID/OTCM. A review of the activity database revealed that the processing time from STCM receiving a proposal to its approval averaged 38 days⁴⁰ over the life of the program, while the approval time averaged 20 days (Table 4). In the second year, the average approval time was 71% of the processing time.

Table 4: Grant Average Processing and Approval Times

YEAR	AVERAGE PROCESSING TIME (STCM)	AVERAGE APPROVAL TIME (USAID/OTCM)
Year 1: August 2010 – July 2011	43 days	24 days (56% of processing time)
Year 2: August 2011 – July 2012	34 days	24 days (71% of processing time)
Year 3: August 2012 – July 2013	38 days	13 days (34% of processing time)
AVERAGE	38 days	20 days

Source: STCM Grant Activity Database, August 26, 2013

It should be noted that both processing and approval times were not at the sole control of either STCM or USAID/OTCM. External factors, such as rains, security, and access to areas, may have also affected processing and approval rates.


4.4.3 SWIFT Finance Mechanism

STCM’s disbursement and commitment rates were affected by the ongoing fluid operating environment throughout the program (Graph 2). The first nine months of programming to March 2011 was the most prolific in terms of grant clearance and implementation.

³⁹ Definition of rejected: a grant that is not cleared for implementation (i.e. cannot be implemented) and which has no expenditure of funds

⁴⁰ Processing time ranged from 1 day to 388 days according to the Grants Activity Database

Graph 2: \$ Amount of Funds Cleared and Committed (2010-2013)



Source: STCM Grant Activity Database, August 26, 2013

From the third quarter of the first year, longer approval times,⁴¹ affected the program’s ability to clear and commit funds. During this period funding was cancelled in the areas of office closures. On May 23, 2011, the Abyei Office closed, thus only \$710 was expended with pending grants rejected (no funding had been committed). On June 6, the Kadugli Office in South Kordofan closed which resulted in the cancellation⁴² of \$721,439 worth of funding and a further cancellation in the Muglad region of \$104,647. On September 6, the Blue Nile Offices of Kurmuk and Damazine were closed due to security concerns. Kurmuk Office never re-opened and no further grants were awarded. In Damazine \$75,000 worth of grants were cancelled before an entirely new office opened in November 2011.⁴³ STCM recovered in 2012 with the commencement of programs in Darfur and Khartoum. In year two, this equated to almost \$3 million (Table 5). As the shift to Darfur and Khartoum programming occurred - with more social peace activities - the average value of each grant decreased. From February 2012 to the end of the program, STCM managers were, for the first time, able to commit funding within the same month as the grant was approved (Graph 2) which accelerated the commencement of implementation.

Table 5: Annual Value of Gants by Year

YEAR	NO. GRANTS	ANNUAL VALUE	AVERAGE VALUE
Year 1: August 2010 – July 2011	68 grants	\$5.3 million	\$78,000
Year 2: August 2011 – July 2012	57 grants	\$2.9 million	\$50,500
Year 3: August 2012 – July 2013	40 grants	\$3.4 million	\$89,200
TOTAL	165 grants	\$11.6 million	

Source: STCM Grant Activity Database, August 26, 2013

4.4.4 SWIFT Procurement Mechanism

USAID/OTCM uses the SWIFT IQC to simplify procurement processes for sector-based administration of small grants. IQCs enable procurement to be undertaken at short notice, particularly in countries where cash is the prime transaction. Maintaining adequate liquidity and a simplified in-kind

⁴¹ The longer approval times were in comparison with overall processing times (see Table 4)

⁴² A cancelled grant is one which has been cleared and is partially implemented with some funds expended

⁴³ Only one grant was cancelled for reasons other than security and lack of accessibility. This was S3KRT002, Construction of MAKAAAN Arts and Cultural Center in Khartoum in October 2011. The Ministry of Urban Planning and Development requested a change of land registration from residential to service, and additional fees (about USD\$7,000). In March 2012 OTCM endorsed STCM’s decision to cancel the grant due to protracted and undeliverable documentation.

procurement process (with inspection, due diligence, equipment training, and written service agreements) are critical in Sudan for timely delivery of goods and services consistent with programming requirements. Grantees estimated 3-4 months for procurement, which they perceived to be a lengthy process.

Procurement occurs after approval and the commencement of grant implementation. Implementation durations are recorded in the grant activity database, but procurement times are not disaggregated. Hence there is no quantitative evidence of procurement delays. To some extent, grants to NGOs, and especially INGOs, posed the most difficulties in terms of procurement due to the grantee's bureaucratic requirements. However, from the documentation review and stakeholder interviews, it appears that procurement processes could function more optimally to ensure that simplified methods are used for more positive stakeholder perceptions.

4.4.5 Conclusions and Recommendations

In summary, it is the management of the SWIFT III mechanism and the expectations of grantees and beneficiaries that are the prime concerns. From an open and accessible grant mechanism to an average of 6 weeks for STCM processing and an average of 3 weeks for USAID/OTCM approval, grantees question the management of the mechanism to respond rapidly to proposals. In the second year, with a programming shift to Darfur and Khartoum, the approval times lengthened, but reduced significantly in the third year, despite of, or because of, a change of Mission staffing. Nevertheless, regardless of approval times, the processing efficiency of STCM managers – due to several factors, including procurement processes – averaged 38 days throughout the program, which could be reduced. Admittedly, the incidents of extreme processing times (such as 388 days) skewed the averages – due to the lag from the loss of international staff to the recruitment of replacement local staff.

The evaluation team recommends a twofold solution to the perception of extended processing times: (1) Mission staff, generally accustomed to USAID processes, require knowledge of transitional programming and its mechanism in order to facilitate programming decisions and shortened approval times,⁴⁴ and (2) STCM should capitalize on the SWIFT mechanism for procurement. The evaluation team also recommends that the database incorporates data on the source of grant ideas and proposals.

4.5 STCM Management

The main issues with the management of the program were staffing and leadership. At the program's commencement, there were fifteen international staff and a full contingent of local staff. The continuous conflict in the Three Areas in 2011 resulted in the looting and closure of three offices. Management relocated some staff in preparation for programming in Darfur and Khartoum, but essentially local staffing was reduced by 40%. At the same time international managers were reducing to two by the end of the program. Gaps in staffing caused programming delays in reviewing grant proposals and in communicating with grantees. One grantee submitted a proposal

⁴⁴ USAID/OTCM program managers changed over the life of the program, and from June 2012 to the present time the understanding of transitional programming has positively affected the STCM program. In addition, as USAID/Sudan resumes full staffing from September 2013, the concerns regarding approval times are not major.

under cordial relations with international staff and subsequently waited eight months for approval before a local replacement manager was recruited.

4.5.1 'Southern Focus'

While STCM's local level conflict mitigation activities, such as the Popular Consultation processes, focused attention on the Three Areas and were highly positive, there was a negative consequence for the program. International program managers were the prime initial contacts with state governments and communities in the border regions, building upon efforts from a previous program, the South Sudan Transition and Conflict Mitigation program, from 2009, under USAID's Sudan Transition Initiative. Initially opening an office in Juba in southern Sudan, this provided STCM with quick momentum to 'hit the ground running' in delivering its early success in the Three Areas. PopCon processes and CPA dissemination set the underlying stakeholder perception that the STCM was southern focused and southern influenced even though STCM quickly established regional offices in the Three Areas, with headquarters in Khartoum. Part of the perception was re-set when STCM was placed in the directorate of international financial cooperation within the Ministry of Finance. Discussions in February 2013 with their newly-formed counterpart agency provided an opportunity to reinforce STCM's northern programming.

4.5.2 Conclusions and Recommendations

It is critical that any foreign assistance to Sudan is a Sudan-influence and Sudan-led program. Linkages and cross-border initiatives with South Sudan – as well as program staffing and leadership – should therefore emphatically maintain a Sudan identity – a northern identity – with support for its diverse traditions, cultures, peoples and regions.

4.6 *STCM Monitoring and Evaluation*

STCM has developed, with OTI software, a grant activity database that serves to track and monitor grants, provide information for handover to new staff, assist decision making, and facilitate reporting. It is an effective management tool that records grantee profiles, key dates and decisions, USAID categories and themes, objectives, beneficiaries, deliverables, justification notes, funding details, and specific grant evaluation reports.

4.6.1 Grant Activity Database

The dynamic nature of the grants activity database lends itself to quick manipulation and instant referencing for program information. STCM personnel across levels were familiar with its terminology, thus providing a standardized, consistent tool for monitoring purposes. Missing elements were procurement proficiency rates, notes on the source of the idea for a proposal, and the degree to which end beneficiaries collaborate during proposal development.

As part of the close-out of grants, grantees were required to provide an end-of-activity report according to a specific template, and while these are available through regional program managers, they are not uploaded into the database. The database contains the regional program manager's grant evaluation report of the activity and grantee's performance. Hence, grantees conduct self-assessments and STCM regional managers conduct performance assessments of grantees that they

manage. STCM currently has a local program monitoring officer,⁴⁵ although the person's prime role is public relations rather than overall monitoring. Monitoring and evaluation is the main role of regional program managers as they assess their own programs. Therefore, as an instrument for M&E the database is highly proficient as a monitoring and management tool, but only adequate as an evaluation tool.

4.6.2 Measuring Outcomes of Conflict Mitigation Activities

Although transitional programming is intended to operate rapidly and flexibly, it is nonetheless expected to measure outcomes. Two major evaluations were undertaken throughout the program – both highlighting key issues of water and youth. The first evaluation was an internal “Cluster Evaluation” conducted in December 2010 that presented findings from a three-week field study in 21 locations in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. The study focused on “geographic flashpoints” related to water along conflict-prone nomadic migration corridors, reconciliation activities, and youth at risk of being influenced by violence.⁴⁶ These were critical elements of conflict mitigation, and hence the study analyzed the program's water yard strategy and vocational training, which further informed their conflict mitigation activities. The second evaluation, through a bidding process, was a grant⁴⁷ to an external organization to conduct an independent “Impact Evaluation of STCM Youth Pilot Projects” from May to November 2012. It evaluated eight youth programs in Khartoum, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile.

4.6.3 Conclusions and Recommendations

The grants activity database enabled STCM to monitor its activities, finances, and decision making to a high capacity with consistency and attention to detail. The evaluation team recommends that grantees collaborate with end beneficiaries during proposal writing which would subsequently enable the program to effectively monitor stakeholder expectations. To enhance the evaluation of the program throughout its implementation, the evaluation team recommends a dedicated M&E officer with a broad over-reaching role.

5. FUTURE DIRECTIONS

In October 2013, USAID/OTCM awarded AECOM International Sudan a new SWIFT III IQC contract to continue the work commenced in Sudan in August 2010. Under the new contract, USAID/OTCM will build on previous efforts over the past three years. The Three Areas remains unstable, and Abyei received little STCM support from May 2011. Cross-border activities remain vital for trade and migration routes, particular in Babanousa, Miram, Seteib, and Debab, and parts of southern Blue Nile. When windows of opportunity arise in Abyei, Kadugli, and Kurmuk, future programming should explore appropriate engagement. Darfur has a nascent Darfur Regional Authority prepared to enhance the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and its own Darfur Development Strategy (2013-2019). Opportunities for upscaling programming in Darfur are therefore appropriate. Khartoum continues its ebb and flow of diverse ethnic groups displaced from conflict regions, and therefore peaceful coexistence activities should be maintained. To date, an emphasis on the harder international border issues between Sudan and South Sudan since secession

⁴⁵ Initially the program had an international Program Analyst/Information Specialist with a broader M&E role

⁴⁶ USAID (January 2011) Cluster Evaluation, p3

⁴⁷ S3KRT019

in 2011 has not been fully explored. Following the 2012 September 27 Cooperation Agreements between the two governments, future programming should explore soft international border and border territory issues while maintaining a strong northern emphasis.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Conclusions

- The program was not significantly strategic in its first year. It commenced activities in the Three Areas, building upon USAID's 2009 Popular Consultations efforts in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan efforts. However strategic planning was highly evident from year two.
- A total of 27 grants for Popular Consultations (valued at \$1.9m) represented 40% of grants and 36% of funding in the first year, securing the credibility of state leaders from all parties and establishing a momentum for change. This was critical in establishing stakeholder confidence in the program's ability to deliver on promises.
- Beyond the Popular Consultation process, STCM programming stayed true to its strategic objectives of building capacity for mitigation of conflict and encouraging social dialogue.
- Conflict mitigation activities were systemic throughout the program, embedded in almost every grant, totaling \$8.1m over 107 grants, representing 68% of funding and 64% of programming. These included grants for water yards (to ensure longer term water management), preparation and support related to migration routes, social peace and peace messaging, a cross-international-border intervention, and short term technical assistance.
- It was appropriate to commence programming in Abyei in 2010, but programming ceased within five months due to conflict. The program 'retreated' to safe areas after the looting of their offices in Abyei, Kadugli, and Kurmuk, never returning, diminishing their support to and presence in these locations.
- The program's most effective strategy was the expansion into Khartoum which enabled social peace programs for the diverse ethnic communities on the capital's periphery.
- Within its broad strategic orientations, the program's actions were tactical, being responsive to emerging needs and taking advantage of critical openings.
- The program made tactical use of sequencing of grant activities for follow-on support.
- Despite significant support for Sudanese women and youth, the program had no specific coherent action plans.
- STCM programming for women was the most meaningful, innovative and risk-taking of all activities, evidenced with the Hakamat female singers and the female sports ambassadors for peace. Grants for women succeeded because they provided social activities that supported peaceful coexistence, they were both subtle and overt, they created 'private' social places that also connected them with their immediate community as well as the wider community, they operated in peripheral communities, they were visible and explicit, and they mainstreamed women into government and social activities.
- STCM programming supported state governments, evidenced in that nearly half of all grants were provided to state government agencies (51%) for conflict mitigation (28% of their grants) and community-level infrastructure projects (12% of government-led grants).

- The STCM program worked in close consultation with state ministries, such as the Ministries of Education; Health; Water Resources; Culture, Sport and Youth; Agriculture; and Humanitarian Affairs.
- Grantees highly valued the accessibility of the SWIFT III IQC mechanism.
- Grantees thought an average of 6 weeks for STCM processing and an average of 3 weeks for USAID/OTCM approval did not constitute a rapid response funding mechanism.

6.2 Recommendations

EVIDENCE	FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
Given that ...	It was concluded that ...	And it is recommended that ...
Popular Consultations were highly effective in disseminating CPA information	Stakeholders viewed the program as southern-focused and southern-influenced	To negate the perception of a southern-focused intervention, the program should strongly emphasize its northern support – i.e. a Sudan-supported program (and be aware of cross-border entry from South Sudan if working in collaboration with USAID’s VISTAS program)
Youth and women activities comprised extensive programming from year two	There were no specific, coherent gender or youth action plans	To program should develop gender and youth action plans, focusing on conflict dynamics and practical/applied leadership programming
The media initiative for Sudan and South Sudan networking and training was the first cross-international-border intervention	Cross-international-border activities were not predominant throughout the program	The program should explore more cross-international-border interventions
Program offices were looted in Abyei, Kadugli, and Kurmuk	The program ‘retreated’ to safe locations and never returned, resulting in almost \$1m worth of grants cancelled	The program should be open to windows of opportunity to re-enter or engage with stakeholders in the Three Areas
Darfur Regional Authority is nascent and has a Darfur Development Strategy for 2013 to 2019	Darfur activities were not prominent and occurred only after April 2012 when offices were looted in the Three Areas	The program should escalate support to Darfur due to the DRA’s willingness and readiness for activities that set pre-conditions for development
The shift to Khartoum supported social peace in periphery communities with double IDPs	Social peace activities for peaceful coexistence were effective in mainstreaming women and youth into their communities	The program should maintain support to Khartoum in peripheral communities
Social peace activities were supported by women and youth	Areas where social peace grants were implemented had high proportions of war-affected IDPs and double IDPs	More overt psycho-social support should be provided tailored to emphasize resilience, adaptation to change, & feelings of marginalization

ANNEX I: INTERVIEW LIST

INFORMANT	POSITION	ORGANIZATION
USAID/OTCM		
Amb. Joseph D. Stafford	Charge d'Affaires	US Embassy, Khartoum
Mr. Larry Meserve	Mission Director	USAID Sudan
Ms. Lea E. Swanson	Deputy Mission Director	USAID Sudan
Mr. Marc Weiner	A/OTCM Director/Alternate STCM COR	USAID Washington/Khartoum
Ms. Kawther A. Badri	Reporting/Liaison Specialist, Program Office	USAID Sudan
Mr. Ibrahim Hamid	OTCM Program Specialist / STCM COR	USAID Sudan
Mr. Ken Spear By Telephone	Former OTCM Director / OTI-Sudan Country Representative	USAID Libya
Ms. Melissa Zelikoff By Telephone	Former OTCM Deputy Director / OTI-Sudan Program Manager	USAID Turkey/Washington
Ms. Jeanne Briggs By Skype	Development Counselor / Former OTI-Sudan Country Representative	US Embassy, Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire
Ms. Felicia Genet By Telephone	Former OTCM/STCM Program Manager	USAID Nigeria
AECOM/AIS		
Mr. Tom Bayer	Director, Crisis Response and Stabilization	AECOM Virginia
Mr. Jason Matus	STCM Sr. Sudan/South Sudan Coordinator	AECOM Virginia
Ms. Jennifer Blitz	STCM Program Coordinator	AECOM Virginia
Mr. Richard E.O. Obwaya	STCM Chief of Party / Former Senior Regional Program Manager	AECOM International Sudan
Mr. Elkhider Mohammed	STCM Operations Director / Former Finance Manager	AECOM International Sudan
Mr. Waleed Badr Ali	STCM Regional Program Manager, Khartoum	AECOM International Sudan
Ms. Wahiba E. Elgozouli	STCM Finance Manager	AECOM International Sudan
Mr. Hythem Elnour	STCM Grants Specialist	AECOM International Sudan
Ms. Einas Mansour	STCM Program Monitoring Officer	AECOM International Sudan
Mr. Mohamed Abdulwahab	STCM Human Resources Manager	AECOM International Sudan
Mr. Alla E. Mohammed	STCM Human Resources Officer	AECOM International Sudan
Ms. Nahla Hassan Bashir	STCM Human Resources Officer	AECOM International Sudan
Mr. Mohamed Elamin	STCM Three Areas Advisor	AECOM International Sudan
Mr. Mohammed Higazi	STCM Head/Field Office Supervisor	AECOM, Muglad Office
Mr. Ali Abdallah Ali	STCM Senior Program Officer	AECOM, Muglad Office
Mr. Ghada Atigani	STCM Program Officer	AECOM, Muglad Office
Yasin	STCM Finance Officer	AECOM, Muglad Office
Yasir	STCM Logistics Officer	AECOM, Muglad Office
Ms. Carrie Conway By Skype	Former STCM Chief of Party (2010-2011)	AECOM International Sudan
KHARTOUM		
Mr. Musa Martin Kabeeshi	Director, General Directorate of International Financial Cooperation	Ministry of Finance & National Economy, Khartoum

INFORMANT	POSITION	ORGANIZATION
Group (16M, 8F)	24 Grantees, Focus Group Discussion, September 11	Senopper Hotel, Khartoum
Mr. Rashid Diab	Director	Rashid Diab Arts Center
Group (2M, 7F)	Community members	Rashid Diab Arts Center
Mr. Gaber Matar & Members	Mayo Peace Garden Managers, Trainers, Coordinators	Mayo Community Development Center, Khartoum
Group	Youth, Community, Mayo Peace Garden users	Mayo Community, Khartoum
Mr. Mahgoub Mohammed Salih	Head, "Alyam" (Days) newspaper	Sudanese Brotherhood Society (North & South)
Mr. Ali Mohammed Ali	Governance and Development Consultant	Group for Economic, Social & Cultural Rights Studies
Ms. Samah Hussein A. Elghaffar	Chair	Group for Economic, Social & Cultural Rights Studies
Dr. Amna Rahma	President of BBSAWS	Babiker Badri Scientific Association for Women Studies
Group (13M, 8F)	Falah Cultural-Social Club members	Falah Cultural-Social Club
Group (8M, 2F)	Al Gouz Cultural-Social & Sport Club members	Al Gouz Cultural-Social Sport Club
Group (11M)	South Khartoum Musical Club members	South Khartoum Musical Club,
Mr. Bashir Abbas	Premier Oud Player of Sudan	South Khartoum Musical Club,
Mr. Yassir Ibrahim	Director	CAFA Sudanese Community Development Association
Mr. Osman Hassan Arabi	Director	Human Security Initiative (MAMAN)
BLUE NILE		
Mr. Aburaheem M. Elhaj	Director General of State Ministry of Finance	BN State Ministry of Finance, Damazine
Ms. Susan M. Awad	Deputy Director, Development Planning Unit	Development Planning Unit, BN State MOF, Damazine
Mr. Mohamed Saeed	Deputy Head of Development Planning Unit	Foreign Assistance Unit, BN State MOF, Damazine
Mr. Asad Hamaza	Commissioner	HAC, Blue Nile, Damazine
Mr. Atif Abdelbagi	Director of Cultural Palace	BN State Ministry of Culture, Damazine
Group	10-15 Youth (musical performance rehearsal)	Cultural Palace, Damazine
Mr. Abdel Monem Agib	Head Department of Cultural Activities	BN State Ministry of Culture, Damazine
Mr. Elgaili Ali Alobaid	Director General	BN State Ministry of Culture, Damazine
Mr. Adam Abakar	Former Deputy Governor, M. of Agriculture/ Secretary General of Peace Council	BN State Ministry of Agriculture
Ms. Zeinab Ibrahim	Head	Lebna Org. for Womens Development, Damazine
Group	10 Women (popular consultations, advocacy)	Lebna Organization
Mr. Almak Alfatih Adlan	Advisor, Governor on Native Administration Affairs, & Deputy Chief of Peace Council	BN Peace Council, Damazine
Mr. Ashraf Hassan	Head Department of Peace Building/Training & Coordination at Ministry Of Culture	BN Peace Council, Damazine
Ms. Hanadi Almak	Training Coordinator at Peace Development	BN Peace Council, Blue Nile

INFORMANT	POSITION	ORGANIZATION
	Center of Blue Nile University	University, Damazine
Mr. Sahnoon Fedail	General Manager	Roseires Youth Training Centre
Group	25 Women (sewing course)	Roseires Youth Training Centre
Mr. Ahmed Hussain	Secretary General	Paralegal Association, Damazine
Ms. Samya Elturabi	Dean Faculty of Social Development	Blue Nile University, Roseires
SOUTH KORDOFAN		
Mr. Ali Mohammed Yousif	Director of the Department of Youth	SK State Ministry of Youth & Sport
Mr. Hamid Aljack	Director, Department of Water Resources	SK Ministry of Water Resources
Mr. Ibrahim Gabir	Secretary	Football Union, Muglad
Mahana	Former Secretary	Football Union, Muglad
Group	Members	Muglad Development Assoc.
Mr. Bashtana M. Salim	Director	SK Chamber of Commerce
Mr. Mukhtar Babo Nimir	Community Leader/Amir	Native Administration
Mr. Hamid G. Aweesh	Head	Youth Peace Committee, Setaib
Mr. Osman Hamdi	Secretary	Youth Peace Committee, Setaib
Mr. Al Tayeb Abdelrasool	Member	Youth Peace Committee, Setaib
Mr. Khadija Mohammed	Member	Market Committee
Dr. Abuabaiada Ahmed Ibrahim	Program Officer	Community Society for Debab Development, Debab
Mr. Elnour Hamdan	Deputy Chairman	Community Society for Debab Development, Debab
Mr. Asad Seid	Office Manager	Algoni Charitable Society, Muglad
Ms. Amal Seid	Program Officer	Algoni Charitable Society, Muglad
Mr. Ali Gangi	Head, Youth	Sudan National Youth
Mr. Hamid Gahgool	Manager	Babanousa Hospital, Babanousa
Mr. Yousif Moromoro	Doctor	Babanousa Hospital, Babanousa
Mr. Hamid Gor	Committee Member	Babanousa Hospital, Babanousa
DARFUR		
Ms. Nagala Basher By Telephone	Director	Nyala Peace Center (South Darfur)
Mr. Abd Alla Adam	Director	Zulfa (North Darfur)
Dr. Idris Yousif	Executive of Project Implementation	Wadi Gandi (South Darfur)
Dr. Laila Osman	Executive Director	African Center for Women's Development Studies, Nyala (South Darfur)
Ms. Safaa Elagib Adam Ayoub	Secretary General & Gender Adviser	Community Development Assoc., El Gemeina (West Darfur)
Mr. Osman Wash	Minister of Technology & Capacity Building	Darfur Regional Authority

ANNEX 2: LIST OF GRANTS ASSESSED

LOCATION	ID	GRANT TITLE /GRANTEE	PERIOD	VISIT
BLUE NILE				
Blue Nile	S3DAM001	Rehabilitation of Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs: Blue Nile MHA	Dec-Nov 2010/2011	Site Visit
Kurmuk	S3DAM002 Cancelled	Enhanced Admin. of Granville – Abbas Girls Secondary School: BN State MOE	Nov-Mar 2010/2012	FGD in Khartoum
Blue Nile	S3DAM003	Technical Support to Popular Consultations: Popular Consultation Commission in BN State	Oct-July 2010/2011	Site Visit
Roseires	S3DAM004	Support to Popular Consultations in Pilot Hearings in Damazine & Roseires: Popular Consultation Comm. BN State	Dec-May 2010/2011	Site Visit
Blue Nile	S3DAM018	Support for Establishment of BN Peace Council: BN State Governor's Office	July-Jan 2011/2012	Site Visit
Blue Nile	S3DAM019	Community Conflict Mitigation Committees for BN's Migratory Routes: BN State Governor's Office	Aug-Mar 2011/2012	Site Visit
Blue Nile	S3DAM020	Cultural Activities for Sustainable Conflict Prevention: BN State Governor's Office	June-Jan 2011/2012	Site Visit
Blue Nile	S3DAM021	Empowering Women to Effectively Participate in Conflict Mitigation - Events: BN State Governor's Office	Nov-March 2011/2012	Site Visit
Blue Nile	S3DAM022	Empowering Women to Effectively Participate in Conflict Mitigation - TOT: BN State Governor's Office	Nov-March 2011/2012	Site Visit
Blue Nile	S3DAM023	Youth Artists Painting Messages of Peace Workshop: BN Peace Council	Nov-June 2011/2012	Site Visit
Blue Nile	S3DAM025	Strengthening Local Conflict Mitigation Mechanisms: BN State Peace Council	Nov-May 2011/2012	Site Visit
Blue Nile	S3DAM026	Engaging Youth through Football: BN State Ministry of Youth & Sports	Mar-June 2012	Site Visit & FGD in Khartoum
Roseires	S3DAM027	Rehabilitation of Roseires Youth Training Center: BN State Ministry of Youth & Sports	May-Dec 2012	Site Visit & FGD in Khartoum
Blue Nile	S3DAM028	Supporting Cultural Diversity: BN State Ministry of Culture	May-Oct 2010/2012	Site Visit
Roseires	S3DAM029	Mitigating Migratory Conflict in Roseires: BN State Peace Council	July-Jan 2012/2013	Site Visit
Blue Nile	S3DAM030	Support to Blue Nile State Peace Council II: BN State Peace Council	June-Sep 2012	Site Visit
Blue Nile	S3DAM031	Support to Dinder National Park Conflict Mitigation Workshops: BN State Peace Council	July-May 2012	Site Visit
Blue Nile	S3DAM032	Non-Violence & Peer Mediation Training: LEBNA Organization for Women's Development	July-March 2012/2013	Site Visit
Blue Nile	S3DAM033	Promotion of Positive Cultural Diversity Publications: BN State Ministry of Culture	July-Sep 2012/2013	Site Visit

LOCATION	ID	GRANT TITLE /GRANTEE	PERIOD	VISIT
Blue Nile	S3DAM034	Handicrafts & Livelihood Training for Women: BN University, Faculty of Rural Development	Aug-Mar 2012/2013	Site Visit & FGD KRT - Interview
Damazine	S3DAM036	Engaging Young Women through Competitive Games: BN State MOE	Nov-May 2012/2013	Site Visit & FGD KRT
Damazine	S3DAM037	Rehabilitation of Damazine Cultural Center: BN State Ministry of Culture	Dec-May 2012/2013	Site Visit & FGD KRT
Damazine	S3DAM042	Infrastructure Support to Enhance Role of Native Administration: Native Administration Blue Nile State	Feb-Aug 2013	Site Visit & FGD in Khartoum
Damazine	S3DAM043	Material Support to Damazine Cultural Center: Ministry of Culture	July-Aug 2013	Site Visit
Damazine	S3DAM044	Support Native Administration's Management Skills: Native Administration Blue Nile State	July-Aug 2013	Site Visit & FGD in Khartoum
Damazine	S3STA018	Technical Support to BN State: BN State Peace Council	Jan-May 2012	Site Visit & FGD KRT
DARFUR				
East Darfur	S3DAR001	Access to Water for Peace & Stability – Training: Al Massar Charity Org.	Apr-Sep 2012	FGD in Khartoum
East Darfur	S3DAR002	Access to Water for Peace & Stability – Yard Rehab: Al Massar Charity Org.	Apr-Sep 2012	FGD in Khartoum
West Darfur	S3DAR003	Vocational Skills Training for Youth: Community Development Organization	May-Feb 2012/2013	FGD in Khartoum
East Darfur / South Kordofan	S3DAR004	Support to Misseriya-Rezeigat Peace Conference Preparatory Meetings: Attamas Development Organization	May-June 2012	FGD in Khartoum
North Darfur	S3DAR008	Improved Access to Water for Conflict Mitigation in North Darfur: Zulfa Development & Peace Organization	Oct-Aug 2012/2013	FGD in Khartoum
East Darfur / South Kordofan	S3DAR012	Support to Misseriya-Rezeigat Peace Conference in East Darfur: Attamas Development Organization	July-Aug 2012	FGD in Khartoum
Dar ElSalaam, North Darfur	S3DAR014	Supporting DRA Involvement in Conflict Mitigation in Returnee Communities: SOS Sahel	Oct-Apr 2012/2013	FGD in Khartoum
Darfur	S3DAR016	Technical Support to the DRA Darfur Joint Annual Mission Process: Darfur Regional Authority (DRA)	Oct-Apr 2012/2013	DRA Interview
East Darfur / South Kordofan	S3DAR018	Rezeigat Migration Preparatory Meetings & Workshop in East Darfur: Attamas Development Organization	Dec-Apr 2012/2013	FGD in Khartoum
South Darfur	S3DAR019	Strengthening the Role of Hakamat in Peace Building: ACWS	Feb-June 2013	FGD in Khartoum
South Darfur	S3DAR021	Strengthening the Role of Judia in Peace Building and Conflict Resolution: Wadi Gandhi Development Organization	July-Sept 2013	FGD in Khartoum
Dar El Salaam, North Darfur	S3DAR022	Support to North Darfur Social Peace Committees: SOS Sahel	June-Aug 2013	FGD in Khartoum
Darfur	S3STTA019	Darfur Recovery Assessment Analysis: Short Term Technical Assistant	May-Aug 2012	Telephone Interview
Darfur	S3STTA020	Darfur Project Monitoring & WASH	May-Aug	DRA

LOCATION	ID	GRANT TITLE /GRANTEE	PERIOD	VISIT
		Specialist: STTA	2012	Interview
Darfur	S3STTA021	Darfur Project Monitoring & WASH Specialist II: STTA	Aug-Sep 2012/2013	DRA Interview
Darfur	S3STTA022	Technical Support to the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) Executive Secretary: STTA	Sep-June 2012/2013	DRA Interview
Darfur	S3STTA027	Technical Support to the DRA – Logistics Managers: STTA	Sep-Apr 2012/2013	DRA Interview
KHARTOUM				
Khartoum	S3KRT004	Non-Violence and Peer Mediation Training: Peace Center Dilling University	Dec-May 2011/2012	FGD in Khartoum
Khartoum/South Kordofan/Blue Nile	S3KRT013	Spoken Word Poetry for Peaceful Coexistence : Afhad University for Women	May-Nov 2012	FGD in Khartoum; Interview
Khartoum/South Kordofan	S3KRT014	Capacity Building for Women Peace Ambassadors: NuWEDA Women's Organization	Apr-Aug 2012	FGD in Khartoum
Mayo Community	S3KRT015	Peace Garden for Peaceful Coexistence: Mayo Community Development Center	May-March 2012/2013	Site Visits (2 visits)
Khartoum / Nairobi	S3KRT018 S3KRT029	Cross Border Media Initiative II (North-South): Sudanese Brotherhood Society	Dec-June; July-Aug 2012/2013	Site Visit, FGD in Khartoum
Khartoum	S3KRT020	Promotion of Positive Cultural Diversity Publications in Khartoum & SK: CAFA Sudanese Community Dev. Assoc.	Aug-Oct 2012	FGD in Khartoum; Interview
Khartoum	S3KRT022	Enhancing the Role of Hakamat in Peace Building: Human Security Initiative (MAMAN)	Oct-June 2012/2013	FGD in Khartoum
Khartoum	S3KRT023	Supporting Community Cultural Centers to Promote Peaceful Coexistence: GESCRS	Dec-June 2012/2013	Site Visit to GESCRS Office
Khartoum	S3KRT023	Supporting Community Cultural Centers to Promote Peaceful Coexistence: GESCRS (Falah Cultural Club; Al Gouz Sport Club, & South Musical Club)	Dec-June 2012/2013	Site Visits to 3 Clubs
Mayo Community	S3KRT025	Supporting Conflict Mitigation and Development: Mayo Community Development Center	July-Aug 2013	Site Visit
SOUTH KORDOFAN				
Kadugli	S3KAD005	Provision of New Water Sources in Heiban Locality: SK State Ministry of Water Resources	Oct-Aug 2010/2011	Interview
Kadugli	S3KAD025	Support to SK Popular Consultations Coordination Office: Presidential Assessment & Evaluation Commission	Mar-July 2011	Interview
Debab	S3MUG004	Intermediate Tools for Farming: Charitable Society for Debab Development	Dec-June 2010/2011	Interview
Muglad	S3MUG005	Construction of Native Administration Building in Muglad: Misseriya-Ajaira Tribal Administration	Nov-May 2010/2011	Site Visit

LOCATION	ID	GRANT TITLE /GRANTEE	PERIOD	VISIT
Muglad	S3MUG006	Rehabilitation of Muglad Vegetable & Butcher Market: Abyei/Muglad Locality	Jan-Nov 2011	Site Visit
Muglad	S3MUG007	Miram Peace Conference: Miram Peace Committee	Dec-May 2010/2011	Site Visit
Muglad	S3MUG009	Construction of Muglad Youth Center/Club: Muglad Devt. Assoc.	Feb-Mar 2011/2012	Site Visit
Muglad	S3MUG010	Block Making Training for Muglad's Youth: Abyei Locality Youth Union	Feb-June 2012	Site Visit
Debab	S3MUG011	Construction of Dormitory for Debab Girls Secondary School: Charitable Society for Debab Development	Feb-July 2011	Interview
Debab	S3MUG012	Debab Girls Dormitory Provision of Water Yard, Recreational Court & Furniture: Charitable Society for Debab Development	June-Jan 2011/2012	Interview
Muglad	S3MUG016	Training for Water Yard Operational Clerks: Muglad Rural Water Corporation	May-July 2011	Site Visit
Debab	S3MUG017	Construction of Supervisors Quarters & Hygiene Facilities of Debab Girls Secondary School: Charitable Society for Debab Development	Mar-Dec 2011	Interview
Muglad	S3MUG018	Muglad Youth Center Furnishings & Hygiene Facilities: Muglad Devt. Assoc.	Sep-Jan 2011/2012	Site Visit
Abyei	S3MUG019	Community Peace Building Workshops: Elgoni Charitable Organization	Sep-Jan 2011/2012	FGD in Khartoum
Muglad	S3MUG020	Muglad Youth Peace Conference: Focus on Western Murhal: Muglad Devt. Association	Oct-Sep 2011/2012	Site Visit
Muglad	S3MUG021	Capacity Building of Native Administration: Misseriya-Ajaira Native Administration	Dec-Jan 2011/2012	Site Visit
Muglad	S3MUG024	Youth Engagement through Football: Leadership & Conflict Resolution Workshops: SK State Ministry of Youth, Sports & Culture	Jan-Mar 2012	Site Visit
Muglad	S3MUG025	Ongoing Youth Engagement through Football: Tournaments & Social Events: SK State MYSC	Feb-May 2012	Site Visit
Babanousa	S3MUG028	Rehabilitation of Babanousa Hospital: SK State Ministry of Health	Oct-June 2012/2013	Site Visit
Muglad	S3MUG029	Siteib Community Multi-Purpose Center for Peace: Abyei/Muglad Locality	Nov-July 2012/2013	Site Visit
Muglad	S3MUG035	Support to Western Sector Youth Marathon for Peace: SK State Ministry of Youth, Sports & Culture	Jun-Sep 2013	Site Visit
Babanousa	S3MUG036	Provision of Furniture & Equipment for Babanousa Hospital: SK State Ministry of Health	July-Sep 2013	Site Visit

ANNEX 3: EVALUATION SCHEDULE

Work Plan: Field Phase

Sep 8-14	8 (SUN)	9 (MON)	10 (TUE)	11 (WED)	12 (THU)	13 (FRI)	14 (SAT)
	Team Leader in KRT Training Evaluators Khartoum	In-brief USAID/OTCM	Training	Focus Group Discussion – Grant Beneficiaries (BN, SK, Darfur, KRT)	Training/ Site Preparation		Khartoum Interviews Site Visits /Meetings

Sep 15-21	15 (SUN)	16 (MON)	17 (TUE)	18 (WED)	19 (THU)	20 (FRI)	21 (SAT)
	Khartoum Interviews Site Visits	Khartoum Interviews Site Visits	Team Leader in Khartoum				
			Blue Nile Team travel	Blue Nile Team to Damazine and Roseires			
			South Kordofan Team travel (2 days)	South Kordofan Team to Muglad, Babanousa and Debab			

Sep 22-28	22 (SUN)	23 (MON)	24 (TUE)	25 (WED)	26 (THU)	27 (FRI)	28 (SAT)
			Protests in Sudan	Escalation of protests Tech Writer due in KRT - cancelled	Protests continue – travel restrictions; communications restricted; interviews re-scheduled; Darfur travel deferred then cancelled due to security and time constraints		
			Team Leader in Khartoum				
			BN Team in Blue Nile			BN Team to KRT	BN Debrief in KRT
			SK Team in South Kordofan (Debab travel cancelled, Debab interviews conducted in Muglad)			SK Team return to Khartoum (2 days)	

Sep 29-5	29 (SUN)	30 (MON)	1 (TUE)	2 (WED)	3 (THU)	4 (FRI)	5 (SAT)
	Analysis / Prep for Out-brief	Out-brief USAID/OTCM & CDA	Darfur interviews in Khartoum	Interviews & whole team analysis	Out-brief MOF Wrap-Up	Team Leader depart Sudan	

Oct 6-12	6 (SUN)	7 (MON)	8 (TUE)	9 (WED)	10 (THU)	11 (FRI)	12 (SAT)
		Draft Report Writing					

Oct 13-19	13 (SUN)	14 (MON)	15 (TUE)	16 (WED)	17 (THU)	18 (FRI)	19 (SAT)
		Draft Report Writing			Draft Report due	USAID - 2 weeks for review & comments	

Nov 3-9	3 (SUN)	4 (MON)	5 (TUE)	6 (WED)	7 (THU)	8 (FRI)	9 (SAT)
		Finalizing Report (Internal Report & Public Report)				Final Report due	

ANNEX 4: SUDAN HISTORICAL TIMELINE

DATE	EVENT
Jan 2005	Khartoum (north) and south Sudan sign a Comprehensive Peace Agreement for a period of south Sudan autonomy followed by a referendum in 2011 on full independence. The region around Abyei is accorded special status
May 2008	Conflict in Abyei between south Sudan troops and Khartoum central government troops, with 100 dead and the town razed
Feb 2009	Khartoum signs deal with the strongest rebel group in Darfur which is hailed a turning point in efforts to end 6-year conflict, but violence erupts soon afterwards
June 2009	An international arbitration court in The Hague draws new borders around Abyei, locating its main oilfields in north Sudan (outside the disputed region) awarding the Khartoum government control over almost all major oil reserves in the disputed region
April 2010	Sudan voting in a 3-day election results in President al-Bashir winning another 5-year term in office and Salva Kiir Mayardit becomes the south's first elected president
June 2010	Leaders from the Misseriya and Rezeigat groups sign a reconciliation deal in the West Darfur town of Zalingei, raising hopes for an end to heightened conflict since March
Aug 2010	USAID/OTCM South Sudan Transition & Conflict Mitigation program commences
Oct 2010	The United States relaxed sanctions on Sudan to exempt farm equipment, and a month later lifted a ban on US government assistance for Sudan to allow computers to be exported into the country
2011	
January	The south Sudan independence referendum results in 98.83% vote in favor of full independence to take effect on July 9
Feb-March	Conflict breaks out in contested town of Abyei
May 21	Conflict in Abyei and Sudan troops seize the town
May 23	STCM Abyei Office is looted and not accessible. The Office is never re-opened and all activities are operational from STCM Muglad Office in South Kordofan
June 3	UN Security Council's demands that Sudan withdraws troops from Abyei are rejected
June 5	Conflict erupts between northern army and southern-aligned militia in South Kordofan (north's only oil-producing state)
June 6	STCM Kadugli Office in South Kordofan is looted. The Office is never re-opened and all activities are operational from STCM Muglad Office in South Kordofan
June 12	President al-Bashir and President Kiir fly to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for emergency talks regarding the Three Areas (Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and Abyei)
June 20	Khartoum and Juba governments sign an African Union sponsored deal in Addis Ababa to demilitarize Abyei and a week later the UN Security Council sends peacekeeping force to monitor withdrawal of northern troops from Abyei. AU forms the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee (AJOC).
July 9	South Sudan proclaims full independence, becoming Africa's 54 th state – the country of South Sudan is born. Sudan (Khartoum government) will lose a third of its land, nearly a quarter of its population, and much of its main moneymaker, oil
August	President al-Bashir declares 2-week ceasefire in South Kordofan after 2 months of conflict
Sept 6	STCM Kurmuk and Damazine Offices are looted and under rebel control. They are never accessible and never re-opened
September	Conflict breaks out in Kadugli region of South Kordofan state. President al-Bashir declares a state of emergency in Blue Nile state and shuts down all the offices of the country's largest opposition party, the SPLM-North, charging that it was not a legally represented political party. The SPLM-North vowed to fight for regime change through armed struggle and mass protests. Sudan and South Sudan agree to withdraw their troops from Abyei and set 10 crossing points between the two nations for people and goods. Conflict breaks out in Kurmuk
Nov 10-15	STCM opens a new Office in Damazine

DATE	EVENT
2012	
Jan-Feb	In Sudan's South Kordofan state heightened conflict erupts. UN says thousands are fleeing fighting in Blue Nile and South Kordofan. Sudan and South Sudan agree to cooperate in the transfer of more than 300,000 people to the South and set an April 8 deadline for 500,000 people to go back to their homeland or to "normalize" their stay in Sudan but clashes continue in border regions
April	Sudan and South Sudan on brink of border war. South Sudan takes over disputed oil fields in Heglig (AU and UN call the move illegal). South Sudan withdraws from contested region
April-July	Exchange rate (USD/SDG) rises rapidly from 2.88 to a peak of 6.5 before settling at 5.5 causing inflation and affecting STCM local staff salaries (not increased to compensate effects of inflation)
May 12	The first group of South Sudanese, up to 15,000 camped in Sudan, begin their journey home ahead of a major airlift to begin May 13
May-June	STCM begins activities in Darfur and Khartoum
June 6	An "exceptional" airlift of almost 12,000 South Sudanese ends with a final flight from Khartoum, and thousands more continue to live in makeshift homes while they await transport to the South
Aug 4	Sudan and South Sudan reach an oil deal. South Sudan, where the oil reserves are located, agree to compensate Sudan for the use of its oil pipeline in the form of both an amortized lump sum and a per-barrel payment
Aug 6	Sudan's Ministry of International Cooperation (STCM's line of support) is dissolved. Debate ensues whether it becomes a division under the Ministry of Finance or Ministry of Foreign Affairs, leaving STCM without clear lines of support
September	AU holds post-secession arrangement mediation with South Kordofan, Blue Nile, Abyei, and Jonglei
September	International staff are replaced with Sudanese staff through promotions and new recruits
December	STCM program now comes under the Ministry of Finance's directorate of International Financial Cooperation
2013	
February	STCM establishes clear lines of support with Ministry of Finance's division of International Cooperation and relationship improves
March	After more than a year of no oil, Sudan and South Sudan reach an agreement, brokered by the AU, to resume oil production within the month
July	STCM program granted no-cost extension to October 2013
August	Flooding in Sudan affects over 250,000 in Khartoum, River Nile, Gezira, Red Sea, North Kordofan, Gedaref, North Darfur, South Darfur, Blue Nile, White Nile, Kassala, South Kordofan, Abyei and West Kordofan. Floods destroy almost 12,000 homes in Blue Nile areas of Damazine, Roseires, Giessan, and Bau (STCM program areas)
Sept 3	President al-Bashir and President Kiir agree to "remove all obstacles" in relations and to fully carry out cooperation agreements including the flow of South Sudan's oil for export through Sudan's pipelines.

Source: Adapted from <http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2011/07/05/timeline-south-sudan> and <http://timelines.ws/countries/SUDAN.HTML>

ANNEX 5: SCOPE OF WORK

Sudan Transition and Conflict Mitigation (STCM) Program: AIS Performance Evaluation

Introduction

The objective of the USAID Sudan Transition and Conflict Mitigation (STCM) program, implemented by AECOM International Sudan (AIS), is to establish and manage a quick-response mechanism that strengthens Sudanese confidence and capacity to address the causes and consequences of political conflict, violence, and instability.

Background

USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) maintained a program in Sudan commencing in 2003. OTI handed over Sudan programming to USAID Sudan on March 1, 2010. In order to continue transition programming, USAID/Sudan created the Office of Transition and Conflict Mitigation (OTCM) which maintained using the SWIFT III mechanism, small grants programming to implement its transition and conflict programming-. STCM's initial strategy in Sudan sought to promote stability by supporting the capacity of key local peace actors at strategic flashpoints to be effective change agents, with an initial geographic focus limited to the border states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile and the Abyei area (the "Transitional Areas"). The program supported the understanding and implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and its outcomes and in 2011/12 expanded to Darfur in support of early recovery initiatives and the opportunities related to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) and to Khartoum. Since the drafting of the initial strategy, South Sudan has become an independent nation, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement has expired, and conflict reignited in all three of the Transitional Areas. STCM's current strategy seeks to promote stability by supporting and strengthening the capacity of Sudanese actors to play a substantive, defining role in conflict mitigation, conflict resolution, and peace building activities. Collaborative relationships with reform-minded state and local government authorities and civil society leaders have positioned STCM to identify, promote, and support timely and contextually-appropriate initiatives in support of program goals. STCM was intended to support swift, strategic interventions calibrated to local conflict dynamics, while striving to foster both positive change and stability in a volatile environment.

OTCM expectations were to see AIS develop presence and expertise that could be utilized to reduce the effects and causes of instability in the rapidly shifting environment of Sudan. Although, STCM is mentioned as a 'program' it is better understood as a specialized tactical tool or instrument to provide strategically targeted support to transition and conflict mitigation activities from August 01, 2010 to July 31, 2013.

From September 2012, USAID Direct Hire Staff evacuated out of Sudan and are currently managing programs from Washington D.C.; all programs remain active in Sudan.

The initial objectives for the Sudan SWFT III Task order were to:

- Promote the emergence of responsive, effective and inclusive civil authority
- Promote the emergence of an empowered and active civil society in support of peace processes and dialogue with civil authorities
- Increase the availability of high quality and independent information on transition issues

Due to the transitional nature of the Sudan context, program objectives were expected to shift over the life of the program to account for shifts in the political environment. There are several strategy frameworks, attached, to account for the shift in thinking over the years. Please note that the unique nature of the STCM program and implementing mechanism allows for changes on the ground to effect the strategic direction of the program within the parameters of the strategic objectives documented in the Program Management Plans (PMP), which also are updated at least annually to ensure relevant objectives.

Documented in the 2010-2011 PMP there were two strategic objectives:

Strategic Objective 1: Political Processes Assisted

Strategic Objective 2: Capacity for Mitigation and Management of Conflict Built

In the 2011-2012/13 PMP, there are three strategic objectives:

Strategic Objective 1: Mitigate and prevent strategic political and /or systemic conflict

Strategic Objective 2: Encourage national political, economic, and social dialogue

Strategic Objective 3: Support peace and reconciliation efforts in Darfur

Key Objectives

The contractor shall conduct an independent evaluation, and provide a report of the findings of the evaluation, of AIS's performance in the implementation of the STCM program throughout the period August 2010 to July 2013. The primary audience of the evaluation report will be the USAID and other U.S. Government officials. A public version of the report shall also be provided.

The evaluation is meant to serve a dual purpose: (1) to ascertain to what extent the program's objectives and goals have been achieved, and; (2) to inform future conflict mitigation programming in Sudan. The evaluation will assist USAID in determining: (1) the effectiveness and appropriateness of the overall approach to conflict mitigation programming and choice of mechanism; (2) the degree to which the implementing partner ensured timely and cost-effective response to emerging needs in providing peace dividends, promoting community-level reconciliation, and strengthening local capacity for conflict mitigation; (3) lessons learned that may guide future USAID conflict mitigation programming in Sudan.

The contractor shall develop an evaluation methodology, which answers the following evaluation questions/criteria:

1. How effectively has each of the activities engaged with Sudanese stakeholders at the local and national level?
2. What effects have activities had on local level conflict dynamics and/or peace political processes throughout the life of the project?
3. Evaluate AIS performance from 2010-2013 in terms of internal control methods, appropriateness of staffing, leadership and management as well as program management assessment tools.
4. What have been the key challenges (operational and management) in implementing the STCM program, and what effect if any, positive or negative, have these had on program outcomes?
5. How is the program and SWIFT III mechanism perceived and valued by Sudanese sub-contractors, stakeholders and government?
6. How effective has AIS been in monitoring and evaluating the outcomes and impact of the conflict mitigation activities? Does the database reflect adequate monitoring and evaluation?
7. From 2011-2013, have targeted youth and women programs developed measures on the community level to enhance the role of youth and women's participation in conflict mitigation?

The evaluation shall document accomplishments and lessons learned, with the primary audiences being USAID. The evaluation shall discuss and analyze program impact and success but also address opportunities missed or accomplishments that fell short of potential or expectations. In addition to looking back at lessons

learned, the evaluation report shall make recommendations for future direction of programming intended to inform the USAID/Sudan Mission. The evaluation shall report any significant unresolved differences of opinion on the part of the funder and /or members of the evaluation team.

Team Composition (Key Personnel)

The evaluation will be conducted by a team that consists of international and Sudanese consultants. Special communication and consultation protocols will be established for the evaluation team prior to departure to Sudan. This will require regular recording of data of the evaluation/interviews to data forms. Recording of interview data should ensure protection of interviewees' personal information.

1. One senior-level evaluator (at least 10 years' experience) and report writer with pertinent experience designing and conducting evaluations of political transition/post-conflict programs and specific knowledge of OTI-type programming. The senior-level evaluator shall serve as team leader and be responsible for the field review, interviews, the draft and final evaluation reports, and the debriefs in the field and in Washington, DC. Knowledge of Sudan strongly preferred. At least one member of the team must have data collection expertise, and one must have technical evaluation writing skills.
2. The Contractor shall provide Sudanese team members, up to four, both skilled in evaluation analysis and collection and familiar with evaluation techniques, and up to two dedicated interpreters, to be employed for the fieldwork.

Tasks

The contractor shall conduct the following:

1. Field Work Plan by Monday 19 August: The evaluation team shall submit a draft fieldwork plan to OTCM four weeks before arriving in country. OTCM will provide feedback within one week of receiving the initial draft. The final plan must be approved no later than one week before arriving in country. The fieldwork plan shall include: Proposed field itinerary with communication protocols, data methodologies (utilizing both quantitative and qualitative methods) with communication protocols, data methodologies (utilizing both qualitative and quantitative methods), logistics information and notional interview list (what types of stakeholders will the team seek out) for all areas that are deemed accessible.
2. Pre-Evaluation Study and Training: The Contractor shall identify facts and figures about AIS's programs and operations. Gaps shall be identified to be filled or hypotheses to be verified and explored further in the course of the ensuing fieldwork and analysis. The expatriate team shall participate in a one-day OTCM orientation and database training in Washington, DC. The Contractor will utilize OTCM's Grants Database as one of its instruments in the evaluation of the overall program performance. All key documents will be housed on the online database, One Source: PMPs, strategy documents, weekly and yearly reports and presentations.
3. Data collection and analysis: Plans will need to include contingencies to account for possible / likely constraints in physically accessing some regions of the country and/or protection concerns related to data collection. As a result of challenging evaluation conditions in Sudan, the contractor shall have a mix of methodologies, that combine data collection through a pre-evaluation study process (that includes interviews with key informants outside Sudan), fieldwork, and other methodologies that can counter possible constraints to data collection in Sudan and facilitate verification of data, particularly for areas where physical access is inadequate or impossible. Methodologies may include, but are not limited to:
 - a. Pre-evaluation study: The contractor shall complete a desk study that utilizes a key AIS documents.
 - b. US-based interviews: The team will conduct interviews from the US with key USAID and AIS staff based in Washington.
 - c. Key respondent interviews inside Sudan: In concert with the Mission's guidance, the assessment team shall identify key stakeholders to interview for the evaluation in the target areas of analysis. Particular attention shall be given to balancing the identities/viewpoints of those being interviewed to derive a broad-based

and diverse analysis.

- d. Focus groups: If feasible, groups of key individuals shall be interviewed (e.g. sub-grantees, beneficiaries, etc.) to respond to questions about perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes towards a particular program, situation, or idea.
4. USAID Sudan In-brief and Out-brief: The Contractor shall be responsible for briefing USAID before and after the fieldwork. The Contractor should develop a PowerPoint presentation to be used during the briefings. The in-brief shall set out the teams key questions to be answered or gaps to be filled during fieldwork, discuss stakeholders that will be assessed, protection measures in place and review planned approach and contingencies. The out brief shall offer a brief overview of the evaluation process (for those who did not attend the in-brief and to update those who are not up to date with any changes during the course of the fieldwork), key headlines or takeaways and preliminary recommendations in line with the SOW. The Contractor shall plan the fieldwork so as to be able to triangulate the findings from key interviews. The Contractor shall be prepared to deliver out briefs for USAID, both in the field and in Washington.
5. USAID/Sudan/OTCM, Washington: OTCM staff in Washington will provide technical advice during the planning and preparatory period and advise on analytical frameworks, data capture and synthesis, and/or participate in the post evaluation synthesis sessions to assist the Contractor's Technical Lead.
6. USAID/Sudan/OTCM: OTCM staff in Sudan will be available for assistance, if needed.
7. Draft Report: The Contractor shall send a draft report to USAID/Sudan/OTCM Washington no later than 4 weeks after the completion of the field work. The Mission will collate comments and provide these to the Contractor within two weeks following receipt of the draft report.
8. Final Report: Upon formal receipt of comments by reviewers (or if comments are not received within two weeks) the Contractor shall deliver a final evaluation report to the USAID/Sudan/OTCM Washington within two weeks. This will be an internal shall be fully formatted, branded and include all annexes. A public version of the documents, not to exceed 25 pages shall be submitted with the final internal report.

Deliverables

The contractor shall provide the following deliverables:

1. Methodological Approach by 27 August: A brief outline of the methodological approach for the evaluation.
2. Itinerary and Schedule by 27 August: A proposed itinerary and schedule for interviews for the field visit based on the desk review of documents and the grants database, proposed interview lists, and initial conversations with OTCM and implementing partner staff regarding the Sudan program. This deliverable shall be submitted to OTCM Sudan Program
 - a. Manager in Washington at least one week prior to departure to Sudan. Upon arrival in
 - b. Sudan, any adjustments to the itinerary should be made after consultation with the OTCM Sudan in-country and Washington team.
3. Evaluation Report: The final version of the evaluation report shall be submitted to the COR in hard copy as well as electronically. The report format should be restricted to Microsoft products and 12-point type font should be used throughout the body of the report, with page margins 1" top/bottom and left/right. The report shall not exceed 30 pages, excluding references and annexes. The report shall include photographs (preferred to be taken by the evaluators and/or to be selected from OTCM and partners' photograph collections, please include a disc of the photos used). The format of the evaluation report is as follows:
 - a. Executive Summary - Concisely state the purpose, methodology and background of the project, main evaluation questions, methods, and most salient findings, conclusions, recommendations & lessons learned. Recommendations to be presented in a "Matrix of Recommendation" following a simple format including, issue, action, responsibility and proposed date of implementing the specified issue.

- b. Table of Contents;
- c. Acronyms;
- d. Evaluation design matrix which indicates the measures or indicators used type of sampling used & data collection instruments & analysis. Address limitations of the data collection methods.
- e. Background-OTCM's mission and general approach to programming, country context, brief overview of STCM program in Sudan, program strategy, activities implemented and purpose of the evaluation; Evaluation Purpose and Scope - identify the purpose of the evaluation and the specific decision(s) it is designed to inform.
- f. Methodology-describe evaluation approach, methods, data collection and analysis including constraints, limitations and gaps. The evaluation report should reflect the use of sound social science methods.
- g. Answers to Evaluation Questions – include: Findings for each question (*findings should be specific concise, from multiple sources, clearly and explicitly backed by quantitative and qualitative evidence*); Conclusions and Recommendations to questions; and also include data quality and reporting system that should present verification of spot checks, issues and outcome, theory of change or development hypotheses & high level impact;
- h. Issues-provide a list of key technical and/or administrative, if any;
- i. Future Directions;
- j. Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations - *Recommendations should be implementable and clearly linked to findings. One way to show this is to use a chart that links evidence, findings, and recommendations*;
- k. Annexes- to include this evaluation SOW in addition to annexes that document the evaluation methods, schedules, physical location (maps), interview lists and tables should be succinct, pertinent and readable.

The PowerPoint presentation and Final Evaluation Report should adhere to the USAID graphic standards identified at: http://transition.usaid.gov/branding/USAID_Graphic_Standards_Manual.pdf

Performance Standards

All of the work performed under this contract shall be:

1. In full compliance with all USAID policies and Automated Directive System (ADS) that are current at the time of issuance of the task orders, including but not limited to the following): Series 200 – 204; the current Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) Guidance; USAID Evaluation Policy; and USAID Forward Guidance on Quality Evaluations
2. Written in proper American English and in plain language (<http://www.plainlanguage.gov/>). Language in all contract products shall be such that non-technical readers can comprehend the information presented, and brief but sufficient background shall be included to allow someone working on similar projects in other countries to benefit from reading the product.

Period of Performance

The period of performance for this task order is 120 days from contract award. The final evaluation report must be delivered before the end of the period of performance.

ANNEX 6: BIBLIOGRAPHY

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