Public Perceptions of Corruption and of the High Office of Oversight in Afghanistan

Assistance for Afghanistan's Anti-Corruption Authority (4A) Project

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PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION AND OF THE HIGH OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT IN AFGHANISTAN

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Executive Summary

A nationwide public opinion survey was conducted in Afghanistan in July 2011 to assess citizen perceptions of corruption and of the High Office of Oversight (HOO). The survey to develop a baseline of citizen attitudes toward the HOO, improve the HOO's procedures by which corruption complaints are registered, support an update to the HOO's Communications Strategy, and support development of the HOO's regionalization strategy.

Some of the key survey findings include:

- Only 25% of the public have general confidence in the HOO, much lower than confidence in tribal leaders, the police and the national government, but a little higher than the formal rule of law institutions.
- 44% say they would trust the High Office of Oversight to provide a fair review of complaints about government corruption. But public trust is much higher in religious leaders and local shuras and jirgas to resolve corruption complaints.
- Awareness of the High Office is at high levels across Afghanistan (72%), though awareness does not always equate with a clear understanding of the HOO's mandate (62%) or perceived effectiveness (56% or less). The HOO is viewed as most effective in educating the public and monitoring government finances and least effective in investigating complaints.
- Bribes are almost always paid, but rarely reported. Only 8% say that they reported corruption to the HOO. Many more say they report corruption incidents to the police (23%), but also to local governors (19%) or local shuras or jirgas (18%). The most common experience that citizens have after filing a complaint is a threat or retaliation, thus it is not surprising that fewer than one in four say they would be likely to report government corruption in the future. There is significant interest in being able to report corruption at a local level directly to an HOO branch office, if available.
- Afghans are hungry for more information about anti-corruption activities, particularly details about current investigations, and how to defend their rights and register complaints.

The following recommendations are drawn from these survey results:

- The High Office needs to disseminate more information about its mission and its achievements in order to boost understanding and trust with the public, and increase complaints registered with the HOO.
- Communication regarding all aspects of anti-corruption efforts is desired by the population. Messaging regarding how to file a complaint and the status of current investigations is likely to be well received.
- Confidence in all aspects of the judicial process is somewhat low. Communications that reinforce commitment, effectiveness, and success stories may be effective in reversing current perceptions.
- Past experiences with corruption complaints drive future intentions to report. Therefore, emphasizing examples of how claims have been handled safely and effectively can help to build positive reporting momentum.
- Along this same line, HOO attempts to resolve appropriate complaints through administrative means (that is, not referring the case to the Attorney General, but seeking to resolve it by approaching the heads of the accused government agency to change its procedures of interacting with citizens) might help to instill greater confidence and perceptions of effectiveness in the HOO.
- Efforts to curb retaliation for filing complaints should be increased. If left unchecked, it can severely limit the public's willingness to file complaints in the future.

- Television is an effective means for HOO to communicate in urban areas, but radio should be used as the primary communications medium in rural areas.
- Citizens would rather register their complaints with the HOO in-person
- HOO branch offices are likely to be an effective alternative to reporting to the police. Furthermore, creating partnerships with local jirgas and shuras is likely to enhance both visibility and trust for the HOO.

The following practical actions are recommended as immediate next steps:

- The HOO's communication strategy should be updated to enhance citizen trust in the Office and increase the number of complaints that citizens register with the office.
- Pilot HOO branch offices should be established, in coordination with appropriate training, in several provinces in close coordination with local shuras or jirgas.
- HOO procedures to yield timely follow-up for complainants should be re-emphasized.
- Pilot testing of new techniques should be conducted that seek administrative resolution of citizen complaints before passing these cases to the judicial system.
- Success stories of effective resolution of citizen complaints should be added to the HOO website.

Objectives

A nationwide public opinion survey was undertaken in late July 2011 in Afghanistan to support future planning and operational effectiveness of the Afghan High Office of Oversight (HOO). Since its inception in 2008, the High Office has been the highest authority in the Government of Afghanistan to coordinate and oversee the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy. Based on this mandate and additional authority delegated to it in 2010 by the President, the HOO is the institution that:

- Registers complaints, conducts preliminary investigations and refers cases about corruption to the Attorney General's Office for further investigation and prosecution;
- Registers, verifies and discloses the financial asset declarations of government officials;
- Simplifies government administrative procedures along with relevant institutions to reduce opportunities for corruption;
- Provides expert assistance to government ministries and departments to develop their own anti-corruption action plans and oversees and monitors their efforts; and
- Promotes public education and awareness about corruption and anti-corruption programs.

Overall, the HOO is the principal coordinative body across all of the major government institutions charged with reducing corruption.

In some of its most important functions, the HOO interacts directly with citizens -- when citizens register their complaints about government corruption and when the High Office conducts public education and awareness programs. The purpose of this survey is to shed light on the extent of citizen knowledge about the HOO, as well as public attitudes and expectations toward the High Office. By better understanding citizen interests and needs concerning the HOO and its functions, the High Office will be able to strengthen its activities and better serve the Afghan citizenry.

The survey was conducted with four objectives in mind:

- Develop a baseline of citizen attitudes toward the HOO, incorporating citizen awareness of the High Office, public trust in the HOO, and its assessment of HOO's effectiveness.
- Improve procedures by which corruption complaints by citizens are registered with the HOO.
- Support development of an informed Communications Strategy for the HOO informing audience segmentation and the design of critical messages.
- Support development of the HOO's regionalization strategy so that branch offices in the provinces are established taking into consideration citizen interests and needs.

The survey was conducted by Gallup under subcontract to Management Systems International's (MSI) USAID-sponsored Assistance for Afghanistan's Anti-Corruption Authority (4A) Project. This report presents the findings of the survey collected between July 20-29, 2011. Results are based on in-person interviews conducted with a representative sample of 3,500 Afghanistan residents across 34 provinces.

Key Findings

- Corruption Climate: The current situation in Afghanistan is marked by moderate to low levels of wellbeing and relatively low levels of confidence in formal institutions. Confidence in Afghan institutions is mainly low, with just 33% confident in the national government, 42% confident in police, 25% confident in the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption and fewer than one in four confident in the formal rule of law system. However, fully 71% are confident in tribal leaders.

- Prevalence of Corruption and Bribery: Corruption and bribery are widespread and believed to be getting worse. Solicitation for bribes is widespread, with roughly equal activity coming from local/provincial government officials, members of the judiciary process, police/army, and tribal officials.
- Trusted Sources to Combat Corruption: 44% say they would trust the High Office of Oversight to provide a fair review of complaints about government corruption. Public trust is much higher in religious leaders and local shuras and jirgas to resolve corruption complaints.
- Public Awareness of the HOO: Awareness of the High Office is at high levels across Afghanistan (72%), though awareness does not always equate with a clear understanding of the HOO's mandate (62%) or perceived effectiveness (56% or less). The HOO is viewed as most effective in educating the public and monitoring government finances and least effective in investigating complaints.
- Reporting Corruption: Bribes are almost always paid, but rarely reported. Only 8% say that they reported corruption to the HOO. Many more say they report corruption incidents to the police (23%), but also to local governors (19%) or local shuras or jirgas (18%). The most common experience after filing a complaint is a threat or retaliation, thus it is not surprising that fewer than one in four say they would be likely to report government corruption in the future. There is significant interest in being able to report corruption at a local level directly to an HOO branch office, if available.
- Desire for More Information: Afghans are hungry for more information about anti-corruption activities, particularly details about current investigations, and how to defend their rights and register complaints.

Detailed Findings

A. Corruption Climate

An individual's well-being is measured by how people feel about their lives today and in the future, as indicated on a 10 point scale where 0 means they are living the worst possible life and 10 means the best possible life. Well-being is then classified into three categories of thriving, struggling and suffering. Using this scale, only 5% of Afghans are thriving, with fully 36% of those in the Western region of the country being classified as suffering.

Graph A: *Well-Being*

On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time, assuming that the higher the step, the better you feel about your life, and the lower the step the worse you feel about it?/Just your best guess, on which step do you think you will stand in the future, say about five years from now?



Afghanistan citizens have low confidence in institutions. One-third have confidence in the national government (33%), with rates highest in the North-East (51%) and lowest in the East (20%) and South (21%). Similarly, confidence in local police is highest in the North-East (54%) and lowest in the East (21%) and South (36%). Overall, 25% of the people have confidence in the High Office, but the percentage is somewhat higher in the East, North-West and Central regions.

Afghans have even less confidence in formal judicial systems including the court system (24%) and prosecutors or the Attorney General (22%). Fewer than one in ten have confidence in the formal judicial system in the South (7%), whereas confidence is highest in the North-East region (38%). Across the country, confidence is far higher in the informal tribal justice system of shuras and jirgas (71%), with nearly all residents of the East region expressing confidence (90%).

Figure 1: *Confidence in Institutions by Region*

Confidence in Institutions	Central (n=880)	South (n=800)	East (n=340)	West (n=480)	North-East (n=500)	North-West (n=500)	Urban (n=860)	Rural (n=2,640)
National Government	39%	21%	20%	26%	51%	39%	38%	31%
Judicial System and Courts	33%	7%	21%	20%	38%	28%	32%	22%
Prosecutors or the Attorney General	32%	8%	6%	16%	43%	25%	37%	18%
High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption	31%	11%	34%	23%	28%	34%	33%	23%
Police	54%	21%	36%	37%	54%	52%	53%	38%
Local Shuras or Jirgas	69%	64%	90%	68%	77%	70%	58%	75%

B. Perceptions and Experience of Corruption and Bribery

Corruption and bribery are widespread in Afghanistan and are a part of everyday life. According to a USAID study of corruption in Afghanistan in 2009, corruption at the time was reported to be at an "unprecedented scope" in the country's history[1]. Today, fully three-fourths of Afghanistan residents indicate that it is common practice to give a bribe of money or gifts to officials (75%) or to use personal contacts in order to get something done by government departments (73%). The problem appears to be especially severe in the West region, and may be slightly less of a problem in the Northern regions.

Graph B: *Prevalence of Corruption*



[1] Assessment of Corruption in Afghanistan, Washington, DC: USAID (March 2009). http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADO248.pdf

Furthermore, six in ten Afghanistan residents have experienced being asked to pay a bribe (or offered a bribe) in the past 12 months, with rates the highest in the West (75%) and North-East regions (71%). These rates are slightly higher than those reported in a January 2010 report by UNODC on bribery as reported by victims, in which 52% of Afghans reported paying at least one bribe to a public official during the prior 12 months.[2]

Graph C: *Past 12 Month Incidence of Bribery*



Solicitation for bribes is widespread, with roughly equal activity coming from local/provincial government officials, members of the judiciary process, police/army, or tribal officials.

Graph D: *Source of Bribery*



[2] Corruption in Afghanistan. Vienna: UNODC (January 2010). http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/Afghanistan-corruption-survey2010-Eng.pdf

With bribery and corruption such a regular part of life in Afghanistan, it is not surprising that the population has a fairly high tolerance for what they consider to be normal levels of corruption. While three-fourths say bribery and favoritism are common, fewer believe that these rates actually constitute "high" levels of corruption. Just one-third nationally qualify this rate of corruption as "very high," and an additional 29% call these levels "high."

Graph E: *Perceived Levels of Corruption*



While tolerance levels are high, Afghanistan citizens do acknowledge that rates of corruption are getting worse. Fully half say that levels of corruption have increased over the past 12 months, while only 10% say they have decreased. While the trend appears to be somewhat less negative in the North-West and North-East regions, the overall direction still skews toward increasing rates of corruption. The downward trend is most severe in the West.

Graph F: *Change in levels of Corruption*



C. Trusted Sources to Combat Corruption

Consistent with their low levels of confidence in government and formal justice entities, less than 50% of Afghans trust the courts, prosecutors, the Attorney General or the High Office to provide fair reviews of

complaints about government corruption. The most trusted sources cited to help with corruption complaints are religious leaders, local shuras, and jirgas.

Figure 2: *Trusted Sources to Provide Fair Reviews of Corruption Complaints*

Please tell me whether you would fully trust, somewhat trust, or not trust each of the following to provide a fair review of your complaints about government corruption.

	Fully Trust	Somewhat Trust	Would Not Trust	Don't Know
Mullahs, Mawlawis, or other individuals with religious standing	54%	28%	13%	5%
Local Shuras or Jirgas	46%	34%	15%	4%
Other local influential figures	33%	37%	18%	12%
Police	27%	26%	45%	2%
Private Attorneys	25%	32%	29%	14%
Special Commissions of Meshrano or Wolesi Jirgas	24%	38%	26%	12%
Provincial or District Governors	23%	40%	29%	7%
High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption	**18%**	**26%**	**44%**	**12%**
Nongovernmental Organizations	16%	35%	37%	12%
Ministers or Deputy Ministers	15%	36%	36%	13%
Prosecutors or the Attorney General	14%	24%	53%	9%
The courts or the Supreme Court	14%	21%	56%	8%

D. Awareness and Perceived Effectiveness of the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption

Public awareness of the HOO is relatively high, with nearly three-fourths of Afghans saying they had heard of the office (72%). Awareness varies by region, with those in the West and North-East regions most familiar with the agency (83%), and those in the South (60%) and North-West (63%) least familiar – though majorities in those regions are aware of the agency. Males are more likely to be familiar with the agency (77%) than females (68%).

Graph G: *Awareness of the HOO by Region and Gender*

Before today, had you ever heard of the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption? (% Yes)



Awareness is high across all age groups, with even two-thirds of 15-17 year olds reporting they have heard of the agency.

Graph H: *Awareness of the HOO by Age*



Television is the primary way that the urban population learns about the existence of the HOO (58%) however, the rural population is most likely to have heard about the HOO (49%) through radio. Very few Afghanis, urban or rural, learn about the HOO from local religious leaders or elders. This finding further suggests that the HOO's partnership with local religious leaders and elders in both urban and rural settings could add to increased penetration of awareness and increase confidence and trust as these local entities are ranked highest in those measures.

Graph I: *Sources of Information About the HOO*



Sixty-two percent of the population is able to articulate what the main functions are of the HOO. The rest (a little more than one-third) either misstate the HOO's purpose (to punish corrupt officials) or do not know what the HOO does.

Figure 3: *Purpose of the HOO*

What do you think the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption does?

	Total (n=3500)	Urban (n=860)	Rural (n=2640)	Male (n=1750)	Female (n=1750)
They eliminate or reduce corruption	46%	49%	45%	50%	41%
They punish corruption	12%	13%	12%	14%	10%
They investigate corruption	7%	7%	7%	7%	6%
They prevent corruption	5%	5%	5%	5%	6%
They monitor corruption	3%	1%	3%	3%	3%
They educate or empower the public	1%	2%	1%	1%	2%
The High Office is ineffective	3%	2%	3%	4%	3%
Don't Know	23%	21%	24%	18%	29%

Afghans perceive the HOO's effectiveness at this point in time to be mixed. Roughly half rate the office as completely or somewhat effective at public education (56%), monitoring government finances (55%), and registering complaints (49%), though at best only 27% can rate the office as *completely* effective at any of these roles. Fewer give the HOO effective ratings for referring complaints to the Attorney General's Office (45%), monitoring the anti-corruption efforts of government, and investigating citizen complaints (41%). A plurality of the population is unsure how the HOO is doing at referring complaints to the Attorney General (33%) or monitoring the anti-corruption activities of government (34%). These may be areas of opportunity for increasing publicity around success stories.

Graph J: *Perceived Effectiveness of the HOO*



E. Registering Complaints about Corruption

Bribes are almost always paid by citizens when solicited, but are rarely reported. More than nine in ten (91%) of those who were asked to pay a bribe or provide a gift to a government official report having paid the bribe. Yet just one in four filed a formal complaint about the situation (24%). Residents of Western provinces of Afghanistan are most likely to have paid the bribes (97%), but least likely to have filed a complaint (9%).

Graph K: *Payment and Reporting of Bribes*



Currently, just 8% of corruption reports are being filed with the HOO, according to survey respondents. More often, they are reporting their experiences to local officials, such as the police (23%), local government (19%), or local shuras or jirgas (18%).

Graph L: *Resources for Filing Complaints*



Citizens report that the most common outcome of filing a complaint about corruption is not a satisfactory resolution of the problem through actions to prevent future occurrence, nor receipt of services originally requested, nor refund of compensation for the bribe, nor sanctioning of the corrupt official. Rather, it is experiencing a threat or some form of retaliation for having registered a complaint (36%).

Figure 4: *Outcome of Registering a Complaint*

Please tell me whether each of the following happened after you or your family member registered the complaint.
(Among those who registered a formal complaint, n=613)

	Yes	No	Don't Know
You or your family experienced threats or retaliation.	36%	64%	-
It is still in progress, no resolution yet.	25%	75%	-
Actions were taken by the government to prevent the same corruption from occurring again.	24%	63%	12%
Nothing at all has happened.	22%	78%	-
You received the service that you had originally requested from the government.	18%	82%	-
The corrupt officials were fired, sanctioned, or brought to justice.	9%	80%	11%
Paid extra money to take my complaint letter back.	3%	97%	-
You received compensation for any extra payment you made.	2%	98%	-

This leaves many Afghans feeling hopeless, with only 22% likely to register an official complaint in the future, including only 4% of those who had previously experienced threats or retaliation after prior complaints were filed. However, for as many who believe they would experience threats or retaliation if they registered a complaint in the future (39%), nearly as many have faith that actions would be taken by the government to prevent the same corruption from happening again (37%).

Figure 5: *Likely Outcome of Registering Complaint in Future*

If you were to register an official complaint about government corruption in the future, please tell me whether you think each of the following would be likely or unlikely to happen after registering the complaint.

	Likely	Unlikely	Don't Know
You or your family would experience threats or retaliation.	39%	39%	22%
Actions would be taken by the government to prevent the same corruption from occurring again.	37%	44%	19%
Nothing at all would happen.	32%	45%	23%
You would receive the service that you had originally requested from the government.	31%	48%	22%
The corrupt officials would be fired, sanctioned, or brought to justice.	16%	61%	23%
You would receive compensation for any extra payment you made.	13%	69%	18%

Prior experience plays a very strong role in future complaint behavior. When we asked those who had experienced corruption in the past what they would do if faced with corruption in the future, the response appeared to be heavily influenced by what happened in their previous situation. For example, those who had negative experiences (nothing happened, they were faced with threats or retaliation or there was no resolution of the complaint) indicate they would probably not register future complaints about corruption (from 4% to 18%). However, those who saw that positive action was taken (efforts were made to prevent

the corrupt transaction or they received quality service from the government agency) indicated that they would likely register future complaints (from 36% to 42%).

Graph M: *Prior Experience Drives Likelihood of Future Citizen Complaints*



The public appears to be very receptive to the idea of the HOO opening local offices in the provinces. If there were a local HOO branch office in their area, fully 32% said they would register their complaints with that office instead of with other institutions. Men were more than twice as likely as women to say they would switch to a local HOO office if there were one in their area (46% vs. 18%). With relative consistency across regions, residents of the South were the only region where fewer than 30% said they would switch (23%). Based on these and earlier results, the office locations would be well positioned if they were partnered with religious leaders or local shuras and jurgas upon opening. As shown in earlier tables, Afghanis hold confidence in these institutions across the board and the numbers are especially high in those regions.

Figure 6: *Willingness to Report to a Local HOO Branch Office*

If the High Office of Oversight had a branch office located near your home, would you register your complaints about corruption with that office instead of with other institutions?

	Yes	No	Would not Register	Don't Know/Refused
Total	32%	37%	27%	4%
Central	36%	35%	26%	3%
South	23%	38%	32%	6%
East	36%	34%	28%	3%
West	38%	35%	23%	4%
North-East	32%	42%	26%	1%
North-West	31%	38%	25%	5%
Urban	38%	37%	22%	3%
Rural	30%	37%	29%	4%
Male	46%	32%	19%	3%
Female	18%	42%	35%	5%

F. The Public's Desire for More Information

Corruption among government officials continues to be an endemic problem in Afghanistan, and the public believes there is much work to be done to reduce and eliminate this problem. As of now, they have little trust in any formal structures to fix this problem, instead turning to religious leaders and the tribal justice system for help. Because so many complaints end with threats and retaliation, there is little motivation to report in the future. However, Afghans are not ready to accept this problem as the reality of their lives. They are hungry for more information about how to fight corruption, particularly details about current investigations, and how to defend their rights and register complaints.

Graph N: *Desire for Information*



Recommendations and Next Steps

The survey findings suggest many proposed efforts to strengthen the HOO's public outreach and communications strategy, as well as its operational functioning, especially in terms of how it registers citizen complaints. The following recommendations emanate from these survey results:

- The High Office needs to disseminate more information about its mission and its achievements in order to boost understanding and trust with the public, and increase complaints registered with the HOO.
- Communication regarding all aspects of anti-corruption efforts is desired by the population. Messaging regarding how to file a complaint and the status of current investigations is likely to be well received.
- Confidence in all aspects of the judicial process is somewhat low. Communications that reinforce commitment, effectiveness, and success stories may be effective in reversing current perceptions.
- Past experiences with corruption complaints drive future intentions to report. Therefore, emphasizing examples of how claims have been handled safely and effectively can help to build positive reporting momentum.

- Along this same line, HOO attempts to resolve appropriate complaints through administrative means (that is, not referring the case to the Attorney General, but seeking to resolve it by approaching the heads of the accused government agency to change its procedures of interacting with citizens) might help to instill greater confidence and perceptions of effectiveness in the HOO.
- Efforts to curb retaliation for filing complaints should be increased. If left unchecked, it can severely limit the public's willingness to file complaints in the future.
- Television is an effective means for HOO to communicate in urban areas, but radio should be used as the primary communications medium in rural areas.
- Citizens would rather register their complaints with the HOO in-person
- HOO branch offices are likely to be an effective alternative to reporting to the police. Furthermore, creating partnerships with local jirgas and shuras is likely to enhance both visibility and trust for the HOO.

The following practical actions are recommended as immediate next steps:

- The HOO's communication strategy should be updated to enhance citizen trust in the Office and increase the number of complaints that citizens register with the office.
- Pilot HOO branch offices should be established, in coordination with appropriate training, in several provinces in close coordination with local shuras or jirgas.
- HOO procedures to yield timely follow-up for complainants should be re-emphasized.
- Pilot testing of new techniques should be conducted that seek administrative resolution of citizen complaints before passing these cases to the judicial system.
- Success stories of effective resolution of citizen complaints should be added to the HOO website.

Survey Methods

Data were collected July 20-28, 2011 by a local research company in Afghanistan under the supervision of Gallup. Data were weighted by key demographics to reflect provincial and national population estimates. Data were collected in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan, grouped into 7 regions: Central (Kabul, Bamyan, Kapisa, Logar, Panjshir, Parwan, Wardak), South (Daikundi, Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Khost, Paktia, Paktika, Urozgan, Zabul), East (Kunar, Laghman, Nargarhar, Nooristan), North-East (Badakhshan, Baghlan, Kunduz, Takhar), North-West (Balkh, Faryab, Jozjan, Samangan, Sar-e-Pul), West (Badghis, Farah, Ghor, Herat, Nimroz). Additional information on the survey's methodology is provided in the Annex.

Sample sizes and sampling error estimates for the total July sample and for each region are listed below.

	Total	Central	South	East	North-East	North-West	West
Sample size	**3,500**	**880**	**800**	**340**	**500**	**500**	**480**
Margin of error	**+/-2.1%**	**+/-4.3%**	**+/-4.2%**	**+/-6.6%**	**+/-5.5%**	**+/-5.7%**	**+/-5.5%**

Annex: Methodology Report

Data for this report is from one study covering the time period July 20 – 28, 2011.

Target Population

All adults 15 or older who are permanent residents of Afghanistan were eligible to participate in the survey represented in this report.

Sampling

Distribution of Sampling Points by Region and Urban/Rural Strata

The Afghanistan Anti-Corruption Survey is a national survey that includes both urban and rural respondents. The *Sheharwali* (municipal administration in Afghanistan) defines the urban population as those living within municipal limits (Nahia). By default, the rural population comprises those who are living outside the municipal limits. The rural areas are defined neither in terms of population density nor remoteness. The projected and achieved sampling points are listed by region and urban/rural in the following chart.

The universe is divided into 7 geographical regions consisting of 34 provinces in total. The sample was distributed proportionally to geographical and residential characteristics of population of each province based on the latest (2011-12) population estimates released by the Central Statistics Office of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. A total of 128 districts were selected randomly with probabilities proportionate to population size. This ensured that larger districts had a higher probability of selection compared to smaller districts within a province.

Within each sampled district, appropriate number of wards (in the case of urban) or villages (in the case of rural) were sampled using simple random sample under the assumption that a maximum of 10 interviews would be completed in a given ward or village.

This survey covered all 34 provinces of Afghanistan.

PROVINCE * REGION Cross tabulation

Count

		REGION						
		Central	South	East	North-East	North-West	West	Total
PROVINCE	Badakhshan	0	0	0	120	0	0	120
	Badghis	0	0	0	0	0	60	60
	Baghlan	0	0	0	120	0	0	120
	Balkh	0	0	0	0	180	0	180
	Bamyan	60	0	0	0	0	0	60
	Daikundi	0	60	0	0	0	0	60
	Farah	0	0	0	0	0	80	80
	Faryab	0	0	0	0	120	0	120
	Ghazni	0	160	0	0	0	0	160
	Ghor	0	0	0	0	0	80	80
	Helmand	0	120	0	0	0	0	120
	Herat	0	0	0	0	0	240	240
	Jozjan	0	0	0	0	80	0	80
	Kabul	520	0	0	0	0	0	520
	Kandahar	0	160	0	0	0	0	160
	Kapisa	60	0	0	0	0	0	60
	Khost	0	80	0	0	0	0	80
	Kunar	0	0	60	0	0	0	60
	Kunduz	0	0	0	120	0	0	120
	Laghman	0	0	60	0	0	0	60
	Logar	40	0	0	0	0	0	40
	Nangarhar	0	0	200	0	0	0	200
	Nimroz	0	0	0	0	0	20	20
	Nooristan	0	0	20	0	0	0	20
	Paktia	0	60	0	0	0	0	60
	Paktika	0	60	0	0	0	0	60
	Panjshir	20	0	0	0	0	0	20
	Parwan	100	0	0	0	0	0	100
	Samangan	0	0	0	0	40	0	40
	Sar-e-Pul	0	0	0	0	80	0	80
	Takhar	0	0	0	140	0	0	140
	Urozgan	0	60	0	0	0	0	60
	Wardak	80	0	0	0	0	0	80
	Zabul	0	40	0	0	0	0	40
Total		880	800	340	500	500	480	3500

Selection of Sampling Points and Replacement of Sampling Points

Due to local cultural traditions, the universe at the outset is divided into male and female sub-samples. Each region, province, and further strata are allocated a representative number of male and female sampling points. The two sub-samples are covered by field-force of the respective gender. The instability and frequent fighting in some provinces can cause a sampling point to be adjusted or replaced to keep interviewers out of areas with active violence and serious security threats.

Selection of Starting points within each Sampling Point
The settlements within districts were selected at random by the field director and were assigned a starting point and interviewers were asked to follow the random route procedure. The starting points are recognizable locations — like mosque, school, bazaar, etc., within each of the selected settlements for the survey.

Household Selection
In urban areas, from the given starting point, the interviewer heads in the assigned direction and stops at the third street/lane on the right-hand side of his/her route. From there on, the first contacted household is the first house on the right from the beginning of the street. Further on, the selected household is each third inhabitable house on the right side of the interviewer route. In blocks-of-flats, the selection routine is again each third apartment. In buildings with more than one household, no more than two households are interviewed.

In rural areas, the interviewer is starting from the center of the village or the bazaar, mosque, etc. and goes to the right selecting each third inhabitable house on his/her route. Compounds containing two or more houses behind a common wall are treated like detached houses counting them counterclockwise from the gate to the compound.

Respondent Selection
After selecting a household, interviewers are instructed to utilize a Kish grid for randomizing the target respondent within the household. Members of the household are listed with names per their age (15+) in descending order by field-force of the respective gender.

Under no circumstances are interviewers allowed to substitute an alternate member of a household for the selected respondent, according to the Kish grid. If the respondent refuses to participate or is not available after two callbacks, then the interviewer must move on to the next household according to the random walk.

Callbacks (Rate, Method, and Results)
Interviewers are required to complete three call-backs before replacing the designated respondent. The majority of interviews were completed on the first attempt (79%). Smaller portions, 12% of interviews, were completed on the second attempt. In this survey, 8% of interviews were completed on the third attempt. The completion of interviews on the first attempt is high because of weak economies, high unemployment and large rural populations that work at or near their homes. In addition to this, the field team sensibly times its work to when people (by gender) are most likely to be at home, which also significantly increases completion rates for the first visit.

In some districts of most-insecure provinces, the field force sometimes face difficulties meeting the requirement of three call-backs prior to substitution because of security- related fears.

Interviewers

	Female	Male
Number of female/male	154	151

Training of Interviewers

The briefing for supervisors was held in Kabul. The regional supervisors then organized their own briefing sessions with the interviewers. The review of the questionnaire content was done by the Project Managers. A review of interviewing and sampling techniques was conducted by the Field Director and Field Manager.

Issues Emphasized During Briefings

- Proper household and respondent selection.
- Review of the questionnaire content.
- Appropriate interviewing techniques.
- Pilot interviews in pairs at the end of the sessions to make sure the concepts and techniques are well-understood.

Translation

The survey instrument was translated into Dari and Pashto. An associate fluent in each language reviewed each version and provided feedback on the translation. Third party translators blind to the original content of the questionnaire back translated the questionnaires and provided feedback. Gallup reviewed the back translations and worked with the vendor to finalize the translation.

Final Disposition of Interview Attempts

A total of 3,500 surveys were completed, for a 79% completion rate. Approximately 10% of households refused to cooperate with the request, and the remainders were some form of non-contact.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
1 Completed interview	3500	79.4	79.4
2 Broke off interview	151	3.4	82.8
3 Refusal	433	9.8	92.6
4 Nobody at home after 3 attempts	28	.6	93.3
5 Denied access (security, gate locked)	16	.4	93.6
7 Language barrier	22	.5	94.1
8 Illness or mental disability	21	.5	94.6
9 Other miscellaneous reasons	23	.5	95.1

10 Unsafe (animals, violence, rioting, etc)	16	.4	95.5
11 Unable to determine if household is occupied	16	.4	95.9
12 Unable to determine if eligible respondent exists	44	1.0	96.9
13 Housing unit not occupied (vacant, for sale, respondent away for extended period, etc.)	57	1.3	98.2
14 No household member meets eligibility requirements	81	1.8	100.0
Total	4408	100.0	

Fieldwork

The field team involved in collecting data was divided by religious sect and ethnicity and even by place of origin to ensure higher cooperation. The fieldwork process was controlled and monitored by a core management team consisting of a field work manager assigned from the head office to be in direct contact with the individual teams through regional coordinators who were local area experts.

Each team consisted of a team supervisor and interviewers. The supervisor's responsibility was to guide and command the team during fieldwork ensuring that interviewers adhere to the protocol and for all quality oversight.

The number of interviewers employed in each province depended on the number of completes allocated to that province for the specific study.

Supervision and Quality Control

Most of the completed questionnaires are subject to logical control for proper administration after delivering them from the field.

Actual interviewing was monitored directly by a supervisor in 15.4 % of the sample. Another 17.3 % of the completed interviews were back-checked by a supervisor in person. The issues that were verified during validation were proper conduct of household and respondent selection, as well as correct recording of answers to three substantive questions from the main body.

Data Entry

The first stage of data editing was done within the governorate before the questionnaires were sent to the main center for data entry in Kabul. Editing mainly involved ensuring questionnaires were complete and all logic checks were confirmed. Data entry was supervised by a professional staff ensuring adherence to

protocols and procedures in addition to supervising the quality of the data input and data cleaning. Ten percent of the data entry was validated using double data entry method, with agreement rates well over 95%.

Although every effort was made to obtain feedback from randomly selected respondents that are representative of the population, due to logistical challenges, non-response arising from fear, lack of interest or lack of knowledge, as well as limitations on time to complete the fieldwork, the demographic profile of the sample of completes do differ from the population. In order to make the sample projectable to the 15+ population, weights were constructed at the respondent level as described below.

Weighting

The dataset was weighted by Gallup based on the latest CSO estimates available. Data were weighted to correct for disproportionalities in sampling due to the selection of one member from each household regardless of the size of that household, non-response that is non-random and results in distortion of demographic characteristics of the completes relative to population.

First stage of weighting involved correcting for household size. Essentially the number of eligible adults determined the first stage weight with an upper limit of 5. Next at the national level, sample was adjusted to ensure proportionate representation of the major ethnic groups – Pashto, Tajik, Hazara and all others followed by religious sect – Sunni or Shia. A raking type adjustment was used to correct for the marginal distribution of age, gender, education, region and urban/rural representation. Extreme weights were carefully reviewed and trimmed as appropriate. The weighting process does impact the overall margin of error. Including weights, the margin of error at the regional level are shown below.

Sample sizes and sampling error estimates for the total sample and for each region are listed below.

	Total	Central	South	East	North-East	North-West	West
Sample size	**3,500**	**880**	**800**	**340**	**500**	**500**	**480**
Margin of error	**+/-2.1%**	**4.3%**	**4.2%**	**6.6%**	**5.5%**	**5.7%**	**5.5%**