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# ACADEMIC ARTICLES AND PAPERS ON DEMOCRATIZATION

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# ACADEMIC ARTICLES AND PAPERS ON DEMOCRATIZATION

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**ABSTRACT:** This document is an annotated bibliography of peer-reviewed journal articles and papers examining the topic of democratization. It is a sampling of works by top university scholars who are representative specialists on democratization within comparative politics. Journals cited include the *Journal of Democracy*, *American Political Science Review*, *Comparative Politics* and *Journal of Politics* among others. Sections are broken down into four geographic regions including Africa, Europe and Eurasia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East-Asia.

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## Table of Contents

<b>AFRICA.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Posner, Daniel N. and Daniel J. Young.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Gibson, James .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Van De Walle, Nicolas.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Bratton, Michael and Robert Mattes.....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Van De Walle, Nicolas.....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Boone, Catherine .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>EUROPE AND EURASIA .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Way, Lucan .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>White, Stephen.....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>McFaul, Michael .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Remington, Thomas .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Tucker, Joshua, Alexander C. Pacek and Adam J. Berinsky.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Gibson, James .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Rose, Richard and Doh Chull Shin.....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Mishler, William and Richard Rose .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Barany, Zoltan.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Bond, Doug J., C. Jenkins, C. Taylor and K. Schock.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Strom, Kaare.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Gibson, James .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Kitschelt, Herbert .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Gershman, Carl and Orlando Gutierrez .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Brinks, Daniel and Michael Coppedge.....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Mainwaring, Scott and Mariano Torcal.....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Remmer, Karen .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Valenzuela, Arturo.....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Foley, Michael W. ....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Coppedge, Michael .....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Booth, John A. and Patricia Bayer Richard.....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>O'Donnell, Guillermo .....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Karl, Terry Lynn.....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Brown, David S. and Wendy Hunter .....</b>	<b>9</b>

<b>THE MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA</b> .....	<b>10</b>
Volpi, Frédéric and Francesco Cavatorta .....	10
Anderson, Lisa .....	10
Shin, Doh Chull .....	10
Posusney, Marsha Pripstein .....	11
Diamond, Larry.....	11
Tessler, Mark .....	11
Heo, Uk and Alexander C. Tan .....	12
Shin, Doh Chull .....	12
<b>GENERAL</b> .....	<b>12</b>
Gilley, Bruce .....	12
Kapstein, Ethan B. and Nathan Converse .....	13
Carothers, Thomas .....	13
Carey John T. and Andrew Reynolds.....	13
Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way.....	14
Fish, M. Steven.....	14
Fukuyama, Frances .....	14
Hadenius, Axel and Jan Teorell .....	14
Brinkerhoff , Derick W. and Arthur A. Goldsmith .....	15
Carothers, Thomas .....	15
Plattner, Marc. ....	15
Ingelhart, Ronald and Pippa Norris .....	16
Norris, Pippa.....	16
Barro, Robert J.....	16
Power, Timothy J. and Mark Gasiorowski .....	17
Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin .....	17
Whitehead, Laurence.....	17
Foley, Michael W. and Bob Edwards .....	17
Gasiorowski, Mark .....	18
Shugart, Matthew .....	18
Jaggers, Keith and Ted Robert Gurr .....	18
Helliwell, John F. ....	19
Muller, Edward N. and Mitchell A. Seligson.....	19
Olson, Mancur .....	19
Mueller, John. ....	20

<b>Sirowy, Larry and Alex Inkeles .....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>Gastil, Raymond.....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>Coppedge, Michael and Wolfgang H. Reinicke .....</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>Jackman, Robert W.....</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>Bollen, Kenneth.....</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>Cutright, Phillips .....</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>Lipset, Seymour Martin .....</b>	<b>22</b>

## DEMOCRATIZATION SCHOLARS: AN INTRODUCTION

Within political science, democratization has become a popular topic in most political science faculties over the past two decades. The study of democratization became even more popular in the 1990s with Samuel Huntington's publication of *The Third Wave*, a book that traces a global movement of political liberalization that started in Portugal in 1974 and culminated in the fall of the Soviet Bloc in 1991.<sup>1</sup> Yet the study of democracy as a concept has its roots in both classical and modern political philosophy in such texts as Plato's *Republic*, Aristotle's *Politics*, Hobbes's *Leviathan*, Locke's *Second Treatise* and Rousseau's *Social Contract*. These writers elucidate the notion that different regime types exist and there is no one form of government that works well universally.

In the twentieth-century, pioneering social scientists began to empirically test the important ideas of "democracy" and "political change". Early work was typically done in sociology journals but early political science journals of note include the *American Political Science Review*, *American Journal of Political Science*, *British Political Science Review*, and the *Journal of Politics*.

There are now dozens of peer-reviewed journals available that focus on comparative politics in regions throughout the world. In fact, there are also several publications that specialize on the process of democratization including *Journal of Democracy*, *Democratization*, and *Demokratizatsiya-The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*. Formerly understudied regions of the world such as Africa, the Middle East, and Asia now have several publications devoted to scholarly political analysis.

This annotated bibliography presents a sampling of journal articles and scholarly papers from some of the most well-known scholars who focus on democratization. It also presents seminal articles of the specialty, including pieces by Cutright, Lipset, Rose, Whitehead, Foley/Edwards, and Muller/Seligson. This document is not meant to be exhaustive but merely an introduction for those interested in reading relevant authors.

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<sup>1</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991)

## AFRICA

**Posner, Daniel N. and Daniel J. Young. 2007. "The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa". *Journal of Democracy* 18(3):127-140.**

<http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/PosnerandYoung-18-3.pdf>

The authors explain that Africa has been a place where formal institutional rules are largely irrelevant. Constitutions as well as laws and administrative procedures exist that place formal limits on executive power but leaders' behavior is rarely challenged as demonstrated by the personal rule or "Big Man" model in African politics over the past thirty years.

**Gibson, James. 2004. "Does Truth Lead to Reconciliation? Testing the Causal Assumptions of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Process". *American Journal of Political Science* 48(2):201-217.**

<http://jameslgibson.wustl.edu/ajps2004.pdf>

The author tests the hypothesis that knowledge of the past will lead to acceptance, tolerance, and reconciliation in the future by using data collected in a 2001 survey of over 3,700 South Africans. He finds that those who accept the "truth" about the country's apartheid past are more likely to hold reconciled racial attitudes, and that racial reconciliation also depends to a considerable degree on interracial contact.

**Van De Walle, Nicolas. 2003. "Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss"? The Evolution of Political Clientelism in Africa". *Workshop Paper*.**

<http://cas.uchicago.edu/workshops/cpolit/papers/walle.doc>

The author looks at clientelism and the forms it takes throughout the world. He explains that for the last several decades, pervasive clientelism has been a hallmark of Africa's non-democratic states. He questions how clientelism will change as democratic political institutions force office holders to be more responsive to the needs and desires of voters.

**Boone, Catherine. 2003. "Decentralization as Political Strategy in West Africa". *Comparative Political Studies* 36(4):355-380.**

The author emphasizes that administrative and political decentralization have emerged as high developmental priorities in Africa. She adds that, although the possible benefits of such reforms have been well theorized, the actual politics of decentralization are not well understood. In rural Africa, a decade of decentralizing reforms has produced generally disappointing results. She investigates when regimes pursue state-building strategies that involve real devolution of political and administrative prerogative.

**Bratton, Michael and Robert Mattes. 2000. "Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or Instrumental?" *Afrobarometer Paper No1.***

[http://pdf.dec.org/pdf\\_docs/Pnacq896.pdf](http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/Pnacq896.pdf)

The authors assess the attitudes of African citizens towards democracy using survey data from Ghana, Zambia, and South Africa. They find that there is as much popular support for democracy in Africa as in other Third-Wave regions but less satisfaction with the performance of elected governments. They also suggest that approval of democracy remains performance-driven but approval hinges less on the government's capacity to deliver economic goods than its ability to guarantee basic political rights.

**Van De Walle, Nicolas. 1999. "Economic Reform in a Democratizing Africa". *Comparative Politics* 32(1):21-41.**

**Article available via interlibrary loan**

The author finds that Africa's wave of democratization has had little impact on economic performance despite predictions to the contrary. He concludes that institutional factors have shaped the capacity and willingness of governments to sustain sound macroeconomic policy reform, allowing states to address economic problems. The nature, timing, and outcome of political transitions and differences in the political institutions that emerged during the transitions were also critical in permitting states flexibility.

## **EUROPE AND EURASIA**

**Way, Lucan. 2008. "The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions". *Journal of Democracy* 19(3):55-69.**

<http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Way-19-3.pdf>

The author focuses on the scholarship of "democracy wave transitions" in Central and Eastern Europe. He is especially interested in the Color Revolutions and how certain post-communist authoritarian regimes collapsed in the face of opposition mobilization.

**White, Stephen. 2006. "Russians and Their Party System".**  
***Demokratizatsiya- The Journal of Post Soviet Democratization 14(1).***  
[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_qa3996/is\\_200601/ai\\_n16537200/?tag=content:col1](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/is_200601/ai_n16537200/?tag=content:col1)

The author looks at levels of trust and partisan identification in Russia using a 2005 survey. He concludes that linkages between voters and parties are weak at best, reinforcing Putin's use of a "managed democracy".

**McFaul, Michael. 2005. "Transitions from Post-communism".** *Journal of Democracy 16(3):5-19.*  
<http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/McFaul-16-3.pdf>

The author comments on general political changes in post-communist countries after 2000. He then focuses specifically on the Serbian, Georgian, and Ukrainian cases and contrasts them to other democratic transitions or revolutions.

**Remington, Thomas. 2003. "Majorities without Mandates: The Russian Federation Council since 2000".** *Europe-Asia Studies 55(5):667-691.*  
[http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/bmoraski/Russia/RemingtonEAS\\_03.pdf](http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/bmoraski/Russia/RemingtonEAS_03.pdf)

The author looks at the workings of the Russian upper house in parliament while taking an institutional perspective on the role of votes and seats.

**Tucker, Joshua, Alexander C. Pacek, and Adam J. Berinsky. 2002.**  
**"Transitional Winners and Losers: Attitudes Toward EU Membership in Post-Communist Countries".** *American Journal of Political Science 46(3):557-571.*  
<http://web.mit.edu/berinsky/www/EU.pdf>

The authors use *Eurobarometer* data to empirically test support for joining the European Union using such socio-economic factors as age, income level, education and free market support. Their survey subjects come from ten post-communist countries across Central Europe, the Baltics and Balkans. They find that those who benefit or might benefit from EU accession are more likely to support it than those who would be harmed.

**Gibson, James. 2001. "Social Networks, Civil Society and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition". *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1):51-68.**

<http://jameslgibson.wustl.edu/ajps2001.pdf>

The author investigates the role that social networks and trust have in promoting democracy in Russia. He concludes that Russians are not atomized and socially isolated and this aspect of Russian political culture has important political consequences in the future of democracy in Russia.

**Rose, Richard and Doh Chull Shin. 2001. "Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third-Wave Democracies". *British Journal of Political Science* 31(2):331-354.**

<http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=6801>

[1](#) (link to abstract)

#### **Article available via interlibrary loan**

The authors are interested in the timing of democratization as a factor in consolidation of democracy. They point out that "third wave" countries like Russia, South Korea and the Czech Republic had elections before basic institutions of a modern state such as the rule of law, institutions of civil society and the accountability of governors were established. On the other hand, "first wave" countries had established institutions before universal suffrage appeared. Third wave democracies have democratized backwards and as a result, are currently incomplete democracies.

**Mishler, William and Richard Rose. 2001. "What Are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-communist Societies". *Comparative Political Studies* 34(1): 30-62**

<http://www.u.arizona.edu/~mishler/TRUST100.pdf>

The authors compare and test cultural theories that emphasize exogenous determinants of trust to institutional theories that emphasize endogenous influences in explaining democratization in 10 post-Communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. They find that institutions likely explain more especially at the micro-level in fomenting trust. They are cautiously optimistic about the potential for nurturing popular trust in new democratic institutions.

**Barany, Zoltan. 1997. "Democratic Consolidation and the Military: The East European Experience". *Comparative Politics* 30(1):21-43.**

**Article available via interlibrary loan**

The author focuses on the relations between soldiers and politicians in post-communist Eastern Europe since 1989 and what caused disparities between the individual states' civil-military relations. He also investigates the theoretical and practical issues of democratizing civil-military relations, the options available to democratizing regimes in establishing control over the armed forces, and the patterns and differences in civil-military relations during the consolidation of democracy.

**Bond, Doug J., Craig Jenkins, Charles L. Taylor and Kurt Schock. 1997. "Mapping Mass Political Conflict and Civil Society: Issues and Prospects for the Automated Development of Event Data". *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(4):553-579.**

**Article available via interlibrary loan**

The authors argue that mass conflict is multidimensional and that violence should be treated as an outcome of conflict, as well as a form of action. In doing so, they define three dimensions of conflict: contentiousness, coerciveness, and changing goals as well as constructing indices of the civil society that are central to mapping global trends in mass conflict. They discuss use of PANDA in generating event data to trace democratic transitions in Poland and South Korea and conflict escalation in the former Yugoslavia.

**Strom, Kaare. 1997. "Democracy, Accountability, and Coalition Bargaining". *European Journal of Political Research* 31(1-2).**  
<http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1117&context=csd>

The author creates a framework to study democratic representation and accountability, namely the neo-institutional rational choice literature on delegation and agency. He is interested specifically in the enforcement of accountability and uses data from Norwegian election surveys that suggest that voters are increasingly available to play the part that democratic accountability requires. He concludes that political leaders in coalition bargaining anticipate and are constrained by this electoral accountability, sometimes with surprising results.

**Gibson, James. 1996. "A Mile Wide and an Inch Deep: The Structure of Democratic Commitment in the Former USSR". *American Journal of Political Science* 40(2):396-420.**

<http://jameslgibson.wustl.edu/ajps1996.pdf>

Using survey data, the author focuses on attitudes toward democratic institutions and processes in Russia during the mid 1990s. He finds that opinion is reasonably stable, not affected by perceptions of economic decline, and connected to protest against the anti-democratic coup. He concludes that while Russia is not yet a democratic-thinking society, he is optimistic regarding the creation of stable democracies in the states of the former Soviet Union.

**Kitschelt, Herbert. 1992. "Political Regime Change: Structure and Process-Driven Explanations". *American Political Science Review* 86(4):1028-1034.**

<http://bss.sfsu.edu/squo/Renmin/June%2029%20transition/Structure%20and%20process%20driven%20approaches.pdf>

The author examines several texts on democratization and applies structuralist versus process-driven models of political change. His focus is on the classic work *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* by Barrington Moore.

## LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN

**Gershman, Carl and Orlando Gutierrez. 2009. "Can Cuba Change? Ferment in Civil Society". *Journal of Democracy* 20(1):36-54.**

<http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Gutierrez-20-1.pdf>

The authors claim that political opposition within Cuba has become more diverse as well as more unified. He adds that the regime, despite its enduring capacity for repression, is showing signs of underlying weakness.

**Brinks, Daniel and Michael Coppedge. 2006. "Diffusion Is No Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy". *Comparative Political Studies* 39(4):463-489.**

<http://cps.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/39/4/463> (link to abstract)

### Article available via interlibrary loan

The authors test a model of the role of diffusion as a determinant of the magnitude and direction of regime change, using a database covering the world from 1972 to 1996. They conclude that countries tend to change their regimes to match the average degree of democracy or non-democracy found among their contiguous neighbors and that countries within the U.S. sphere of influence

tended to become more democratic in the period examined. They also find that countries tend to follow the direction in which the majority of other countries in the world are moving.

**Mainwaring, Scott and Mariano Torcal. 2005. "Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory after the Third Wave of Democratization". Working Paper 319.**

<http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/319.pdf>

The authors argue that party systems of less developed countries are less institutionalized than those of the advanced industrial democracies. In doing so, they examine three differences between the party systems of the advanced industrial democracies and party systems of less developed countries. They find that most democracies and semi-democracies in less developed countries have much higher electoral volatility than the advanced industrial democracies. They also find that in party systems of most democracies and semi-democracies in less developed countries, programmatic or ideological linkages between voters and parties are weaker. They conclude that linkages between voters and candidates are more personalistic in less developed countries than in the advanced industrial democracies.

**Valenzuela, Arturo. 2004. "Latin American Presidencies Interrupted". *Journal of Democracy* 15(4):5-19.**

<http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Valenzuela-15-4.pdf>

The author comments on the continuing pattern of instability that affects governance at the highest levels across Latin America. He adds that fourteen presidents have not survived their terms in office and some have left at times that threaten constitutional democracy itself.

**Remmer, Karen. 2003. "Subnational Electoral Choice: Economic and Referendum Voting in Argentina, 1983-1999." *Comparative Political Studies* 36(7):801-821.**

[http://pages.videotron.com/gelineau/cps\\_2003.pdf](http://pages.videotron.com/gelineau/cps_2003.pdf)

The author utilizes a referendum-voting model and concludes that the fate of candidates in both national and sub-national elections is shaped by the performance of the incumbent presidential administration. She adds that at the same time, voters respond to the policy choices of sub-national governments as well in ways that lessen, rather than strengthen, the nexus between policy responsibility and electoral accountability.

**Foley, Michael W. 1996. "Laying the Groundwork: The Struggle for Civil Society in El Salvador". *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 38(1):67-104.**

**Article available via interlibrary loan**

The author examines the role that civil society actors play in post-conflict El Salvador's democratization process. He uses interviews of NGO representatives as well as USAID personnel in his analysis of Salvadoran politics.

**Coppedge, Michael. 1997. "District Magnitude, Economic Performance, and Party-System Fragmentation in Five Latin American Countries". *Comparative Political Studies* 30(2):156-185.**

<http://cps.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/30/2/156> (link to abstract)

**Article available via interlibrary loan**

The author endeavors to explain the number of parties in party systems in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay by using a simultaneous equations model to differentiate between the psychological and mechanical effects of district magnitude on party-system fragmentation. He finds that both types of effects are statistically significant and approximately equal but neither effect is very large in comparison to underlying patterns of politicization, which are argued to be reflections of the number of political cleavages in society.

**Booth, John A. and Patricia Bayer Richard. 1997. "Civil Society, Political Capital and Democratization in Central America. *Journal of Politics* 60(3):780-800.**

<http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/lasa97/boothbayerrichard.pdf>

The authors operationalize Putnam's idea of civil society (citizen activity in organizations) and social capital in the context of six Central American countries. They explore the relationships among two civil society measures (formal group activism and community self help activism) and social and political capital. They conclude that that while higher levels of formal group membership and several political capital measures are associated with higher levels of democracy, social capital does not have the relationship Putnam hypothesizes.

**O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1996. "Illusions about Consolidation." *Journal of Democracy* 7(2):34-51.**

<http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/mcooper/ps744readings/oDonnell.pdf>

The author argues that new democracies vary and some have reverted to new brands of authoritarianism. At the same time, others inhabit a gray area and bear a family resemblance to old established democracies, but either lack or only possess a few of their key attributes. Many new democracies are failing to become consolidated, or institutionalized.

**O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1994. "Delegative Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 5(1):55-69.**

<http://www.ispla.su.se/gallery/bilagor/Delegative%20democracy.pdf>

The author examines what he calls "emerging forms of democracy". In doing so, he argues that it may be necessary to conceptualize a new type of "delegative" democracy, as different in some crucial respects from the "representative" democracy that is theorized in the existing literature.

**Karl, Terry Lynn. 1990. "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America". *Comparative Politics* 23(1):1-21.**

**Article available via interlibrary loan**

The author addresses the issue of defining democracy and fragility in democratic transition and consolidation in Latin American countries during the most recent wave of liberalization during the late 1980s-early 1990s. She concludes that more established democracies, such as Costa Rica, have advantages that younger democracies in the Southern Cone and Central America do not.

**Brown, David S. and Wendy Hunter. 1999. "Democracy and Social Spending in Latin America, 1980-92". *American Political Science Review* 93(4):779-790.**

**Article available via interlibrary loan**

The authors address the effect of regime type on public expenditures for social programs. They examine the relationship between democracy and the change in social spending (controlling for GDP, the debt, inflation, and age structure of the population) through a time-series cross-sectional panel data set for 17 Latin American countries from 1980 to 1992. They conclude that during economic crisis, democracies increase the allocation of resources to social programs relative to authoritarian regimes because democracies are more constrained by popular demands.

## THE MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA

**Volpi, Frédéric and Francesco Cavatorta, 2006. "Forgetting Democratization? Recasting Power and Authority in a Plural Muslim World". *Democratization* 13 (3):363-372.**

[http://doras.dcu.ie/476/1/democrat\\_13\\_3\\_2006.pdf](http://doras.dcu.ie/476/1/democrat_13_3_2006.pdf)

The authors argue that after the end of the Cold War, many believed authoritarian regimes worldwide would quickly disappear, to be replaced by western-style liberal democracies. While not Eastern Europe or Latin America, regimes across the Muslim world have had to contend with liberalizing and democratizing pressures coming both from within and from without, especially Tunisia and Algeria.

**Anderson, Lisa. 2006. "Searching Where the Light Shines: Studying Democratization in the Middle East". *Annual Review of Political Science* 9:189-214.**

<http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.072004.095345?cookieSet=1&journalCode=polisci> (link to abstract)

### **Article available via interlibrary loan**

The author explains that perception of democratic change in the Middle East is hindered by American disciplinary and policy preoccupations and not regional political dynamics. Middle East political scientists have neglected some of the major political forces in the region but have indeed contributed to the development of general comparative theories of democracy and democratization.

**Shin, Doh C. 2006. "Democratization: Perspectives From Global Citizenries". Center for the Study of Democracy.**

<http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1070&context=csd>

The author discusses characteristics of the third wave of democratization in comparison to the earlier waves. He investigates how ordinary citizens of new democracies reacted to the process of democratizing their age-old authoritarian rule and how broadly and strongly they have embraced the values and norms of democracy as a political system and as a political process while rejecting those of authoritarian rule.

**Posusney, Marsha Pripstein. 2006.**“Enduring Authoritarianism: Middle East Lessons for Comparative Theory”. *Comparative Politics* 36(2):127-138.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4150139> (link to abstract)

The author explains that, because the Middle East has defied global trends toward democratization, it has been marginalized in the field of comparative politics. She argues that nondemocratic regimes like those in the Middle East can serve as counterexamples to enhance explanations of the factors that contribute to democratic transitions. She adds that political-institutional variables, such as the rules governing party recognition, electoral competition, non-governmental organizations, and military professionalization, can enhance or reduce the chances that authoritarian regimes will disappear.

**Diamond, Larry. 2005.** “Building Democracy After Conflict: Lessons from Iraq”. *Journal of Democracy* 16(1):9-23.  
<http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Diamond-16-1.pdf>

The author focuses on the post-invasion transition in Iraq and finds it unique in comparison to other occupation experiences. He also comments on the role of the Iraqi governing council (IGC) in making progress in stabilizing the economy and political situation.

**Tessler, Mark. 2002.**“Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries”. *Comparative Politics* 34(3):337-354.  
[http://edoc.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/HALCoRe\\_derivate\\_00002578/Islam%20and%20Democracy%20in%20the%20Middle%20East.pdf?hosts=](http://edoc.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/HALCoRe_derivate_00002578/Islam%20and%20Democracy%20in%20the%20Middle%20East.pdf?hosts=)

The author explores the impact of religious orientations on attitudes toward democracy through public opinion data collected in Morocco, Algeria, Palestine (West Bank and Gaza), and Egypt. He finds that “personal piety is not related to prodemocracy attitudes among men in any country or among women in Morocco, Gaza, and Egypt in 1992 but is inversely related to such attitudes among women in Algeria, the West Bank, and Egypt in 1988.” He also concludes that support for Islamist movements and platforms are unrelated to prodemocracy attitudes.

**Heo, Uk and Alexander C. Tan. 2001. "Democracy and Economic Growth: A Causal Analysis". *Comparative Politics* 33(4):463-473.**

**Article available via interlibrary loan**

The authors utilize a Granger causal analysis to investigate the relationship between economic growth and democracy using data from thirty-two developing countries for the period 1948 to 1982. They find that any relationships cannot be generalized in either direction.

**Shin, Doh Chull. 1994. "On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research". *World Politics* 47(1):135-170.**

[http://pics3441.upmf-grenoble.fr/articles/demo/r\\_on\\_the\\_third\\_wave\\_of\\_democratization.pdf](http://pics3441.upmf-grenoble.fr/articles/demo/r_on_the_third_wave_of_democratization.pdf)

The author reviews the trends in studying democratization and includes comments on various approaches in its study. He focuses on countries that have become more democratic since the late 1980s and early 1990s.

## GENERAL

**Gilley, Bruce. 2009. "Is Democracy Possible?" *Journal of Democracy* 20(1):113-127.**

<http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Gilley-20-1.pdf>

The author opines that the global spread of democracy over the last generation has been accompanied by global spread of criticisms of democracy. He explains that this is unsurprising since popular ideas tend to generate their own opposition. For him, democracy's current popularity makes it an ideal target for critique. As a result, in recent years, a slowly accelerating wave of skeptical and at times even hostile thought has arisen to challenge democracy's claim to be the best form of government.

**Kapstein, Ethan B. and Nathan Converse. 2008. "Why Democracies Fail". *Journal of Democracy* 19(4).**

<http://www.crisisstates.com/download/seminars/Kapstein&ConverseFeb11.09.pdf>

The authors explain that after a period of relative optimism about the prospects for democracy around the world, observers have raised concerns that democratic institutions are being rolled back in a growing number of countries. They back up their thesis with 1960-2004 data and descriptive statistics as well as a continuous time hazard model to model any reversals in young democracies. They conclude that good economic performance and favorable initial conditions are significantly associated with the survival of democracy, but emphasize that high growth, low inflation, and high per capita income do not guarantee that democracy will endure.

**Carothers, Thomas. 2007. "The Sequencing Fallacy". *Journal of Democracy* 18(1):12-27.**

<http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Carothers-18-1.pdf>

The author addresses democratic sequentialism and questions its validity.

**Carey John T. and Andrew Reynolds. 2007. "Parties and Accountable Government in New Democracies". *Party Politics* 13(2):255-274.**

<http://ppq.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/13/2/255> (link to abstract)

#### **Article available via interlibrary loan**

The authors test the notion of accountability by looking at "strong political parties" especially in new democracies. They disaggregate the strong party ideal into two components, legislative discipline and programmatic platforms, and suggest that the former in the absence of the latter can undermine accountability.

**Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. 2006. "Linkage versus Leverage: Rethinking the International Dimension of Regime Change". *Comparative Politics* 38(4).**

[http://web.gc.cuny.edu/jcp/Levitsky&Way\\_abstract.htm](http://web.gc.cuny.edu/jcp/Levitsky&Way_abstract.htm)

#### **Article available via interlibrary loan**

The authors analyze Slovakia, Mexico, Russia, and Zambia using what they call an "international dimension of democratization". They claim there are two sources of international influence: leverage, or governments' vulnerability to western pressure, and linkage, or the density of economic, political, organizational, social, and communication ties between particular countries and the West. They conclude that linkage contributes more consistently to democratization and when it is low, external democratizing pressure is minimal, and domestic forces predominate.

**Fish, M. Steven. 2006. "Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies". *Journal of Democracy* 17(1):5-20.**

<http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Fish-17-1.pdf>

The author proposes a new way of thinking about how political institutions influence democratization by looking at the capacity or power of specific offices. He focuses on the strength of the legislature and its consequences for the advance of democracy and shows that the "presence of a powerful legislature is an unmixed blessing for democratization."

**Fukuyama, Frances. 2006. "Identity, Immigration & Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 17(2):5-20.**

<http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Fukuyama-17-2.pdf>

The author looks at the role of identity politics in influencing behavior in countries across the world. He emphasizes that classic liberalism does affect a person's political view, not only as an individual but as a member of a group.

**Hadenius, Axel and Jan Teorell. 2005. "Cultural and Economic Prerequisites of Democracy: Reassessing Recent Evidence". *Studies in Comparative International Development* 39(4):87-106.**

<http://pschmid.net/ir127/old/SCIDexample.pdf>

The authors reassess two influential theories of democratic development: the theory of democratic culture and the theory of economic development. They focus on Inglehart and Przeworski and critique their measurements and conceptualizations of democracy. They conclude that the democratic culture theory lacks support and that neither overt support for democracy nor "self-expression values" affect democratic development.

**Brinkerhoff , Derick W. and Arthur A. Goldsmith. 2005. "Institutional Dualism and International Development: A Revisionist Interpretation of Good Governance". *Administration & Society* 37(2):199-224.**

<http://aas.sagepub.com/cqi/content/abstract/37/2/199> (link to abstract)

#### **Article available via interlibrary loan**

The authors compare the tensions, trade-offs, and complementarities between so-called good governance and bad governance in international development and draws on U.S. history to comment on current change efforts. They claim that aid donors have ambitious plans to encourage countries to replace corrupt or closed public institutions with more accountable systems. They conclude that it is important to remember that certain clientelistic practices have hidden positive functions, such as giving poor people access to resources and governance institutions are neither bad nor good in themselves but rather outcomes are what matter.

**Carothers, Thomas. 2002. "The End of the Transition Paradigm". *Journal of Democracy* 13(1):5-21.**

<http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Carothers-13-1.pdf>

The author points out that there are definite trends during the last quarter of the twentieth century in regions across the world. He generalizes about democracy trends citing: 1) the fall of right-wing authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s 2) the replacement of military dictatorships by elected civilian governments across Latin America 3) the decline of authoritarian rule in parts of East and South Asia starting in the mid-1980s 4) the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s 5) the breakup of the Soviet Union and the establishment of 15 post-Soviet republics in 1991 6) the decline of one-party regimes in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa in the first half of the 1990s and 7) a weak but recognizable liberalizing trend in some Middle Eastern countries in the 1990s.

**Plattner, Marc. 2002. "Globalization and Self-Government". *Journal of Democracy* 13(3):54-67.**

<http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Plattner.pdf>

The author comments on the simultaneous co-existence between globalization and democratization concluding that both trends generally have furthered American interests and contributed to the strengthening of American power.

**Ingelhart, Ronald and Pippa Norris. 2001. "Cultural Obstacles to Equal Representation". *Journal of Democracy* 12(3):126-140.**  
<http://academic2.american.edu/~dfagel/CulturalobstaclestoDemocracynorris.pdf>

The authors elucidate that democratization continues to be hindered by the continued lack of gender equality in political leadership. They claim that several factors have contributed to this situation including structural and institutional barriers. They then address the issue of political culture and how it might influence the selection of female political representatives.

**Norris, Pippa. "A Virtuous Circle? The Impact of Party Organizations and the News Media on Civic Engagement in Post-Modern Campaigns". Paper for the ECPR Joint Workshops, Copenhagen 14-18th April 2000. Workshop on 'Do Campaigns Matter?'**  
<http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/acrobat/ecpr2000.pdf>

The author asks what the effect of campaigns on civic engagement is in democracies. She claims that the growth of professional political marketing by parties has created public cynicism. After an analysis of data from industrial societies, she concludes that the process of campaign communications by parties and the news media is not responsible for civic disengagement.

**Barro, Robert J. 1999. "Determinants of Democracy". *Journal of Political Economy* 107(6-2):158-183.**  
<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/250107> (link to abstract)

#### **Article available via interlibrary loan**

Using data collected from 100 countries during 1960-1995, the author claims that improvements in the standard of living predicts increases in democracy as measured by a subjective indicator of electoral rights. He adds that the propensity for democracy rises with per capita GDP, primary schooling, and a smaller gap between male and female primary attainment. He concludes that democracy has little relation to country size but rises with the middle-class share of income; negative effects from Muslim and non-religious affiliations stand out.

**Power, Timothy J. and Mark Gasiorowski. 1997. "Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation in the Third World". *Comparative Political Studies* 30(2):123-155.**

<http://cps.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/30/2/123> (link to abstract)

#### **Article available via interlibrary loan**

The authors look at the role of institutional design in promoting stable democracy by examining the outcomes of 56 transitions in the Third World between 1930 and 1995. They contradict recent scholarship on institutional design by finding that the choice of constitutional type (presidential or parliamentary) is not significantly related to the likelihood of democratic survival in less developed countries. They also conclude that the combination of multipartism and presidential democracy does not appear to lessen significantly the likelihood of democratic consolidation, nor does parliamentarism suggest any obvious superiority in sustaining competitive multiparty regimes.

**Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. 1996. "Explaining Inter-ethnic Cooperation". *American Political Science Review* 90(4):715-735.**

<http://web.austin.utexas.edu/chenry/core/Course%20Materials/FearonLaitin/0.pdf>

The authors devise a social matching game model to explain why differing ethnic groups may or may not cooperate with each other. They find that group members aim for an in-group policing equilibrium to avoid cheating that might cause conflict with other groups.

**Whitehead, Laurence. 1996. "Is the Third Wave Over?" *Journal of Democracy* 7(3).**

<http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/236.pdf>

The author asks whether the democratization wave that began with the overthrow of Portugal's dictatorial regime in April 1974 will continue. He suggests that it is *how* one defines democracy that is crucial to thinking about *whether* democracy will continue to expand in the world, or even hold steady at its current level.

**Foley, Michael W. and Bob Edwards. 1996. "The Paradox of Civil Society". *Journal of Democracy* 7(3):38-52.**

[http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journals/journal\\_of\\_democracy/v007/7.3foley.html](http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journals/journal_of_democracy/v007/7.3foley.html)

#### **Article available via interlibrary loan**

The authors argue that civil society as a concept is often vague and fuzzy. It can be private voluntary associations such as neighborhood committees, interest groups or even philanthropic enterprises. They add that in the context of democratizing societies, there are questions remaining as to how and when civil society has an impact on political change.

**Gasiorowski, Mark. 1995. "Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis". *American Political Science Review* 89(4):882-897.**

**Article available via interlibrary loan**

The author looks at the impact of economic crises on domestic political regime change by using a statistical technique known as event history analysis and a new data set that identifies all instances of regime change in the 97 largest Third World countries. He finds that inflationary crises inhibited democratization from the 1950s through the early 1970s but may have facilitated it in the late 1980s. He adds that recessionary crises facilitated democratic breakdown but had no effect on democratic transition throughout this period.

**Shugart, Matthew S. 1995. "The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government". *American Political Science Review* 89(2):327-343.**

The author explains that presidents often lack legislative majorities, but situations of opposition-party majorities ("divided government") are much less common outside the United States where the president's party's share of seats tends to increase in early-term elections but decline in later elections, boosting the opposition majorities after midterm elections. He adds, however, that opposition majorities rarely occur in elections held concurrently with the presidential election, but are more likely to do so if legislators enjoy electoral independence from their parties due to features of electoral laws.

**Jagers, Keith and Ted Robert Gurr. 1995. "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data." *Journal of Peace Research* 32(4):469-482.**

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The authors present their often-used Polity II (later expanded to Polity III) dataset that consists of annual indicators of institutional democracy and autocracy for 161 states spanning the years 1946 through 1994. Political scientists generally cite the validity of Polity indicators in comparison to other data sets and methodologies.

**Helliwell, John F. 1994. "Empirical Linkages Between Democracy and Economic Growth". *British Journal of Political Science* 24:225-248.**

<http://www.nber.org/papers/w4066.pdf>

The author uses cross-sectional and pooled data for up to 125 countries over the period from 1960 to 1985 to evaluate the two-way linkages between democracy and economic growth. He finds that the effects of income on democracy are robust and positive. He assesses the effects of several measures of democracy on growth in a comparative growth framework in which growth of per capita GDP depends negatively on initial income levels, as implied by the convergence hypothesis, and positively on rates of investment in physical and human capital.

**Muller, Edward N. and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1994. "Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal Relationships". *American Political Science Review* 88(3):635-652.**

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The authors use cross-national data to model relationships between structural properties of states, civic culture attitudes of the general public, and changes in the level of democracy. He finds that most civic culture attitudes do not have any significant impact on change in democracy while interpersonal trust appears to be an effect rather than a cause of democracy.

**Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development". *American Political Science Review* 87(3):567-576.**

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The author theorizes that under anarchy, uncoordinated competitive theft by "roving bandits" destroys the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little for either the population or the bandits. He suggests that both can be better off if a bandit sets himself up as a dictator who becomes a 'stationary bandit' who monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes and a secure autocrat who has an encompassing interest in his domain that leads him to provide a peaceful order and other public goods that increase productivity. He concludes that expectations of tenure in office influence behavior, and that autocracies will rarely have good economic performance for more than a generation. On the other hand, the conditions necessary for a lasting democracy are necessary for the security of property and contract rights that generate economic growth.

**Mueller, John. 1992. "Democracy and Ralph's Pretty Good Grocery: Elections, Equality, and Minimal Human Being". *American Journal of Political Science* 36(4):983-1003.**

**Article available via interlibrary loan**

To explain the growth of democracy over the last two centuries, the author argues that democracy has succeeded because it is simple, has evolved naturally, and requires low maintenance. He adds that a well-functioning democracy does not really rely on political equality but more political inequality. In other words, democracy works best because it is minimalist.

**Sirowy, Larry and Alex Inkeles. 1990. "The Effects of Democracy on Economic Growth and Inequality: A Review". *Studies in Comparative International Development* 25(1):126-157.**

<http://www.springerlink.com/content/u21q360310481n45/> (link to abstract)

**Article available via interlibrary loan**

In an exercise in hypothesis-testing, the authors ask what effect political democracy has on such development outcomes as economic growth and socioeconomic equality. They apply competing theoretical models including: "democracy as facilitating development", "democracy as a hindrance to development", and "democracy as bearing no independent relationship to development outcomes". They conclude that no definite relationships may be inferred and the evidence is not robust enough to make any generalizations.

**Gastil, Raymond. 1990. "The Comparative Survey of Freedom: Experiences and Suggestions". *Studies in Comparative International Development* 25(1):25-50.**

<http://www.springerlink.com/content/c427h03080kj5g75/> (link to abstract)

**Article available via interlibrary loan**

The author was the first well-known user of standardized, temporal democracy data and comments on his surveys of "freedom" from 1975-1989. He admits his methodology is a "loose, intuitive rating system for levels of freedom or democracy, as defined by the traditional political rights and civil liberties of the Western democracies." He also admits weaknesses of this methodology, but accurately adds that it provides a "useful and consistent time series".

**Coppedge, Michael and Wolfgang H. Reinicke. 1990. "On Measuring Democracy". *Studies in Comparative International Development* 25(1):51-72.**

<http://www.springerlink.com/content/524718721n080651/> (link to abstract)

The authors develop a scale based on Robert Dahl's concept of polyarchy that measures the degree to which national political systems meet the minimum requirements for political democracy and where real-world "democracies" rather than abstract ideals are the standard. Their "Polyarchy Scale" is constructed from "indicators of freedom of expression", "freedom of organization", "media pluralism", and the "holding of fair elections". They also discuss their methodological limitations and suggest improvements and future research.

**Jackman, Robert W. 1987. "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies". *American Political Science Review* 81(2):405-423.**

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The author asks if differences in voter turnout among industrial democracies are a function of political institutions and electoral law. He is interested in the presence of nationally competitive electoral districts that might provide incentives for parties and candidates to mobilize voters everywhere, thereby increasing turnout. He finds that "disproportionality in the translation of votes into legislative seats provides a disincentive to voting, which lowers turnout" while multi-partyism assigns elections a less decisive role in government formation, depressing turnout. He concludes that mandatory voting laws produce a disincentive to not vote.

**Bollen, Kenneth. 1980. "Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy". *American Sociological Review* 45(3):370-390.**

[http://www.odum.unc.edu/odum/content/pdf/Bollen\\_1980\\_ASR.pdf](http://www.odum.unc.edu/odum/content/pdf/Bollen_1980_ASR.pdf)

The author addresses some shortcomings of democracy measures including validity, reliability, limited sampling, and coverage of data sets. He then presents a revised index of political democracy and tests the applicability of its indicators using factor analysis. He concludes his index is better than others at some things but is not better than all competing indices that measure everything.

**Cutright, Phillips. 1963. "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis". *American Sociological Review* 28(2):253-264.**

**Article available via interlibrary loan**

In one of the earliest applications of empirical data use and structural theory, the author constructs a model that attempts to connect development with democracy. His variables include the level of communications, economic development, levels of education, and urbanization. He finds that political development is heavily affected by these variables.

**Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy". *American Political Science Review* 53(1):69-105.**

**Article available via interlibrary loan**

In the first and perhaps most famous academic article measuring the concept of democratization, the author introduces conditions associated with the existence and stability of democratic society. Like Cutright, he uses a structural approach with socio-economic data to find a positive relationship between development and democracy.

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