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FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT

AND

MANAGEMENT PROJECT

(272-0106)

EVALUATION REPORT

Submitted by

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To

The Omani-American Joint Commission  
Muscat, Oman

October 7, 1992

## PREFACE

This evaluation was carried out during the period September 19-October 7, 1992 by a four person team consisting of Marcus Winter-NE/DR, Karen Hilliard-OAJC, Hussain Moosa-Government of Oman and Michael Gould-OAJC. Starting with the Statement of Work (Annex 1) the team formulated a set of questions which formed the basis of interviews with members of the Directorate General of Fisheries in the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Resources, members of the Chemonics International Contract Team, staff of the OAJC and a representative of the Oman Fish Company. As background for the interviews, to expand the Team's knowledge of the fisheries sector in Oman and to enable judgements to be reached about the Project the Team reviewed all the materials and files on the Project available at the OAJC. This review included, the Project Paper, the Grant Agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding, the Chemonics International Technical Proposal, the Contract between the OAJC and Chemonics International, the First Annual Work Plan, a large number of administrative and technical reports prepared by the contractor, correspondence files on the project and various other related documents and reports.

The Team appreciated very much the cooperation received from all the parties particularly Dr. Gary Morgan, Field Team Leader for Chemonics International, Sheikh Abdullah bin Ali Bakathir, Director General of Fisheries Resources and Mark Matthews, U.S. Representative to the OAJC. Without their assistance in freely making time and their respective staffs available, the Team could not have completed their work in the three week period.

The Team takes full responsibility for the contents of the report. Any errors of fact reflect our errors while the conclusions and recommendations drawn from the information gather reflect the best judgements of the Team Members.

The reader will note some redundancy between the separate sections of the report because of the structure of the Statement of Work. We acknowledge the overlap but felt that clarity through redundancy was better than brevity resulting in confusion. We have tried to eliminate all overlap in the Summary and Recommendations.

## GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

A.I.D.	Agency for International Development
DGFR	Directorate General Fisheries Resources
DSDP	Department of Statistics and Data Processing
FDMP	Fisheries Development and Management Project
GNP	Gross National Product
MAF	Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
MSFC	Marine Science and Fisheries Center
OAJC	Omani-American Joint Commission
OJT	On-the-Job Training
PACD	Projects Assistance Completion Date
PP	Project Paper
PPB	Planning, Programming and Budgeting
TA	Technical Advisor
TOEFL	Teacher of English as a Foreign Language

## SUMMARY AND MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS

### SUMMARY

A modified Oman Fisheries Development and Management Project continues to be worth doing. The focus of the Project must be Manpower Development. Until the manpower constraint is addressed, we do not believe that meaningful progress will be made in the two other project components - Planning, Programming and Budgeting and Fisheries Resources Management. The objectives of the Project, as currently designed, will not be met by the end of the Project.

An array of activities in all project component areas was completed in the first year of implementation. The Chemonics International technical assistance team produced, largely on-schedule, a substantial number of reports on a variety of topics in accordance with the Work Plan and Directorate General of Fisheries (DGFR) requests. Initial training programs were held in a few areas and 10 degree participants departed for training in the United States. Nevertheless, progress was not uniform and the quality of outputs varied, with particular problems in the Manpower Development area.

Communications among the involved parties - DGFR, Chemonics and the Omani-American Joint Commission - have not been optimal. Consequently, there has been a lack of shared understanding about a range of implementation and administrative issues among the parties.

Given the manpower constraint and implementation experience over the first year, the Evaluation Team believes that substantial modifications are needed in the project, particularly in the size of the technical assistance team. Provision of large numbers of technical advisors is not cost-effective if appropriate numbers of qualified counterpart staff are not available.

Based on these findings and our independent judgement regarding the current status of project implementation, the Evaluation Team has arrived at several major recommendations. The following major recommendations summarize and condense those presented in the text of the report.

### MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS

**Recommendation 1:** Redesign the project consistent with the absorptive capacity of the DGFR.

- a) Retain the Manpower Development Component but shift the focus from long-term academic to job-relevant, short-term, technical training. Those candidates among the 47 scheduled for long-term training who do not gain admission to academic programs should not be replaced; rather the funds should be reprogrammed for in-country or short-term technical training. Retain the long-term training advisor.
- b) Eliminate the Planning, Programming and Budgeting Component and the long term advisor position.

- c) Scale back the Fisheries Resources Management Component to provide limited long-term assistance in statistics (1 advisor) and fisheries management (1 advisor). Utilizing short-term technical assistance, focus component activities on 2-3 priority problems/areas of emphasis likely to have direct impact on fisheries management in the field. Possible areas include quality control or research regarding over-fished species linked to specific extension activities. The Chief of Party should function as overall fisheries advisor and coordinate the short-term technical assistance.
- d) Drop the policy dialogue and focus private sector activities on training.
- e) Evaluate the size and functions of the Oman Support Unit and Home Office backstopping during the redesign.
- f) Involve the DGFR in the redesign process.

**Recommendation 2:** Project documents, including the Project Paper, contract, technical proposal and implementation plans, should all reflect a life-of-project strategy for achieving the project purpose.

- a) The revised Project Paper should embody a life-of-project strategy which clearly states milestones toward purpose achievement.
- b) The contract should reflect this strategy in greater detail, specifying key tasks and deliverables which the contractor must perform each year in order to achieve project objectives, and incorporate the contractor's technical proposal.
- c) The contractor should link annual implementation plans to this overall strategy. The plans should present specific tasks which will result in the achievement of the objectives or milestones for that year.
- d) The revised contract should reflect the time and budgetary limits of the project and the manpower constraints at the DGFR.

**Recommendation 3:** Extend the PACD for training only up to two years (to 1997) to permit the departure and timely return of bachelor's degree candidates.

**Recommendation 4:** Conduct an external final evaluation in 1995. The evaluators should reassess the institutional capacity of the DGFR and recommend whether to pursue a possible follow-on project emphasizing fisheries resource management, and the linkages between research and extension to the private sector.

**Recommendation 5:** Future Work Plans should focus on those deliverables the DGFR and OAJC consider to be the highest priority. The absolute numbers of reports should be reduced. Reports should be more concise.

**Recommendation 6:** Replace the Chief of Party of the Chemonics contract team.

**Recommendation 7:** The contractor should finalize the project Training Plan as soon as possible to form the basis for agreement among the contractor, the DGFR and the OAJC on training to be provided.

**Recommendation 8:** OAJC project management must be more proactive in fostering cooperation and communication among the involved parties and in ensuring that both the DGFR and the contractor fulfill their commitments.

**Recommendation 9:** The OAJC should review its management structure for the project to ensure that decision-making authority is delegated to the working level.

**Recommendation 10:** The project should initiate a program of in-country English language training immediately to support academic training, U.S. technical training and to increase the benefits from technical advisors.

**Recommendation 11:** The OAJC should continue to be as flexible as possible in terms of TOEFL scores, but should not seek waivers of minimum requirements per A.I.D. regulations. If the DGFR wishes to send potential participants to the United States for English Language training, the contractor should be tasked with making necessary arrangements, but all costs of training should be borne by the DGFR.

**Recommendation 12:** The project should provide administrative assistance to the DGFR Project Coordinator.

## PROJECT DESIGN

One of the principal objectives of this evaluation was to reassess the validity of the project design based on implementation experience over the past year. This section of the report will address the five questions regarding project design posed in the Statement of Work as well as other issues which surfaced during the course of the evaluation field work.

1. Evaluation Question: Given the stated goal of the project and the analysis of constraints to sector growth presented in the Omani-American Joint Commission (OAJC) Program Strategy and the Project Paper, is the institutional development approach of the project the most effective means to achieve the goal? Are there major technological, infrastructure or policy constraints which the project should also address directly?

The goal of this project is "sustainable growth of the fisheries sector in the national economy". The purpose is "to improve the management of Oman's marine resources in a way which encourages efficient, sustainable private sector development". The strategy which the project pursues to accomplish this goal relies almost exclusively on institutional development within the Directorate General of Fisheries Resources (DGFR). Certainly an effective, well managed DGFR is in a better position to contribute to growth in the fisheries sector and especially to prudent management and conservation of Oman's fisheries resources; however, there are other, perhaps more important, constraints to fisheries development in Oman which the project does not address directly. For example, growth in the contribution of fisheries to GNP and growth in the value of fisheries exports by the private sector are more dependent on policies which encourage private investment in fishing and technological and infrastructure improvements than on institutional factors within the DGFR. Where the DGFR can make a positive contribution is in the area of fisheries management. Technical experts suggest the fisheries resources of Oman are so abundant that, except for over-fishing of certain high value species like lobster and abalone, there is currently little cause for concern about over-fishing. Nevertheless, a stronger DGFR would be in a better position to manage stocks over the long term through research and stock assessments linked closely to extension and regulation.

The current policy environment is supportive of private investment in fishing and provides fairly clear guidance regarding the regulation of private industrial fishing. The DGFR has directed most of its enforcement efforts at large industrial fleets rather than small artisanal fishermen. An interview with a private sector representative suggested no ambiguity regarding regulations which apply to industrial fishing.

The current Government of Oman five-year development plan provides for significant infrastructure development including 15 new harbors and jetties to enable larger craft to land their catches. This construction is to be fully funded by the government of Oman. The government has made no formal request for donor support for harbor construction. The DGFR (the entity in charge of design and execution of harbor and jetty construction) has mentioned a possible future requirement for technical assistance in harbor management.

One of the key constraints to growth of both the size and value of landings of Oman's fishery is a lack of appropriate technology among artisanal fishermen. According to fisheries experts, what the traditional fishermen

need is larger craft which can carry ice and venture farther out to sea, enabling them to fish longer. While the government of Oman already provides soft loans for fishermen to purchase fiberglass boats, many of these craft are still too small to carry ice. Moreover, ice is expensive and fishermen remain unconvinced of the potential increased profits to be realized by purchasing ice and selling higher quality fish at a higher price. No one has conducted a definitive study on the technical and economic feasibility of introducing this technology. This may be a possible area for FDMP assistance during the life of this project.

In sum, the institutional development approach of this project remains partially valid in that a stronger DGFR will be more capable of developing and implementing fisheries management policies which will help to prevent overfishing and conserve fisheries resources over the long term. Nevertheless, growth of the fisheries sector, in terms of percent of GNP and value of exports does and will continue to depend more directly on the introduction of new technology, the construction of harbors and jetties which can accommodate more and larger craft, and on a continued stable policy environment. With the exception of introducing new technologies to traditional fishermen, there is no need at the present time for the project to expand its efforts in policy reform or infrastructure development. In fact, the policy environment has, if anything, evolved in such a positive manner (exemplified by the increased private sector participation in the formerly parastatal Oman fishing company) that a concerted effort in policy dialogue is currently unnecessary.

2. Evaluation Question: Do the assumptions for outputs, purpose and goal achievement remain valid? Are they measurable in terms of quantity, quality and time?

In order to discuss our findings regarding the continued validity of the assumptions for output, purpose and goal achievement, we must first briefly comment on the scope of the project. We will also summarize the aims of the three components of the project, the technical approach to each envisaged in the project paper, and the implementation progress to date.

The final evaluation of the previous Fishery Development Project, conducted in 1989, concluded that the project was unrealistically ambitious. Its comprehensive program of fisheries development overwhelmed the technical and managerial capabilities of the DGFR at all levels, "even with the technical assistance and training provided by the project". The evaluation recommended that any follow-on project include an institutional development component to remedy what the evaluators viewed as a weak institutional structure at the DGFR which constrained program accomplishments. The report also cited a lack of leadership and political will at senior levels in the DGFR which prevented the uniform application of regulatory policies and created numerous administrative and logistical problems which obstructed institution building efforts. Training, both informal on-the-job and offshore technical, proved ineffective. Finally, the Fishery Development Project design assumed that: 1) the DGFR could devote unlimited human and financial resources to the project; and 2) that motivated management existed at the DGFR.

In response to the problems cited in the 1989 evaluation, the OAJC designed the current, follow-on project which incorporated an institution building/planning, programming and budgeting component (PPB); a large manpower

15

development component which included on-the-job training (OJT), short-term technical training and offshore degree training; and a fisheries resource management component which purportedly emphasized statistical data gathering, research and stock assessments intended to result in species-specific management plans for Oman's fisheries. The OAJC predicated this design on several assumptions: 1) that the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) could recruit suitable candidates for new positions and select suitable candidates for training programs; 2) that the MAF could establish a planning, programming, and budgeting system and would be open to improvements in administrative and financial procedures; and 3) that the MAF would be prepared to limit artisanal and industrial fishing effort. The input-output level assumptions are quite similar: 1) that the government establishes a medium term planning framework for its fisheries activities and uses it; 2) that the government recruits staff with appropriate backgrounds to undergo training and has available suitable counterparts; 3) that the government activates a fisheries protection program; and 4) that the government activates mechanisms for private sector dialogue.

In the case of the PPB component, the evaluators found that, while middle and department managers supported the work of the contractor, top management was not committed to the kind of major administrative and institutional reforms contemplated in the project. Hence, the fine work of the technical advisor resulted in a PPB-based work product being submitted as a supplemental budget but no significant reform in the annual budget process. This is not surprising given that the Ministry of Finance dictates the budget process of the DGFR and, indeed, the MAF as a whole. Similarly, the organizational structure derives from royal decrees. Regulations emanating from the Ministry of Civil Service govern personnel processes.

The work products of this component were uneven in quality due to a severe lack of trained counterparts with whom the advisor could work. Early in the first year of the project, the DGFR had assigned counterparts who lacked even a secondary school education. While the advisor eventually overcame this problem by working directly with department heads, the massive offshore training effort contemplated for next year will nearly paralyze institutional development activities.

In short, top management in the DGFR remains uncommitted to major institutional changes which they perceive as unrealistic in an administrative environment where budget and personnel processes are imposed from outside the line ministries. The lack of trainable counterpart DGFR staff, expected to worsen as a result of planned training activities, has forced the advisor into an operational rather than advisory role. One advisor cannot bring about major institutional reform single handedly.

In the area of manpower development, assumptions regarding the availability of suitable candidates for training have not been borne out in fact. The short life span of this project necessitated that the DGFR and the OAJC select a list of candidates for long-term training before the contractor could complete its manpower development and comprehensive training plans. In retrospect, this was a mistake. This approach led to considerable confusion within the DGFR and resulted in several different lists of candidates, many of whom did not possess the requisite academic and English backgrounds to qualify for training in the U.S.

In the meantime, the Minister committed himself publicly to sending 47 candidates for long-term training in the United States in the belief that those selected were qualified. When it was discovered that, due to low academic grades or insufficient English language capability, many were not, the Ministry proposed that the OAJC send them to universities elsewhere in the Arab world. Paradoxically, if this strategy succeeds and all 47 depart for training, the shortage of qualified counterparts will force the suspension of not only PPB, but also the research and fisheries management activities unless the long-term advisors assume operational responsibilities and work without counterparts. In the latter scenario, no meaningful on-the-job training or technology transfer can take place, thereby defeating the purpose of the project. Despite the fact that the MAF has hired approximately 77 new employees since completing the last project, 47 of them will not be available for the next 2-4 years to work on project activities.

The third set of assumptions (that the MAF is willing to activate a fisheries protection program and regulate both industrial and artisanal fishing) is crucial to the success of the fisheries management component. Again, the project designers appear to have overestimated the political feasibility of a fisheries management/enforcement effort. Our interviews revealed that, while the DGFR does a credible job of monitoring private industrial fishing, it is less committed to regulating the activities of small entrepreneurs.

Officials cited the logistical problems inherent in monitoring the activities of such a dispersed, inaccessible target population, the manpower implications of such an effort and cultural constraints as the main reasons for less than uniform application of regulations. Moreover, low fines for infractions and a legal system which favors local entrepreneurial interests result in a regulatory system which does little to discourage overfishing of those species which are at risk of being depleted. These practical constraints, coupled with an apparent lack of political will to enforce existing regulations, call into question the timeliness of developing fisheries management plans which cannot currently be enforced.

The one viable alternative to enforcement is to convince fishermen, through information-education-communication programs and face-to-face extension efforts, that it is in their best interest to cooperate with the DGFR's conservation plans. Unfortunately, the project does not contemplate even a pilot extension effort, presumably due to institutional weaknesses in the extension department cited in the previous project evaluation.

In sum, the project designers greatly overestimated both the presence of available counterparts and the political commitment to fisheries management in the DGFR. This, coupled with the conspicuous absence of an information/extension component, calls into question the feasibility of a sector-wide fisheries management program at this time.

In conclusion, the assumptions upon which this project was based are largely invalid. Despite the addition of an institutional development component and increased emphasis on upgrading manpower within the DGFR, the new project did not meaningfully address the constraints cited in the final evaluation of the Fishery Development Project. This has resulted in numerous project implementation problems which mirror those encountered in the Fishery Development Project. Hence, we conclude that the OAJC must redesign the project based on realistic assumptions.

3. Evaluation Question: If the current purpose and outputs remain valid, are the inputs the project now provides appropriate to achieve them during the life of the project?

Consistent with the above conclusion that the project must be redesigned, the purpose and outputs must be changed to reflect more realistic objectives given the time frame of the project and the inputs which the DGFR and OAJC can reasonably be expected to provide. Having said this, an in-depth review of project documents revealed that the current inputs are only loosely related to the stated outputs and purpose. In the case of policy dialogue and private sector objectives, the project paper set forth objectives but failed to provide inputs or resources (manpower or budgetary) to achieve them. Not surprisingly, neither the contractor nor the OAJC have undertaken any formal activities in either area.

As stated in the section responding to question #1, the rapidly evolving policy environment in the fisheries sector vitiates the need for macro-level policy dialogue. The OAJC should, however, engage the DGFR in policy dialogue addressing the operational and institutional problems hindering project progress, such as the lack of counterparts, the need for a freer flow of information to the private sector, etc.

The stated private sector objectives of this project depended heavily on the concomitant implementation of a Business Training and Development Project beginning in FY 1992. This is a risky design strategy at best because it makes the current project dependent on factors which are completely out of its control. In this case, the proposed private sector project was never approved.

In the absence of a component or major activity to address linkages between the DGFR and the private sector, an explicit private sector objective at the purpose or output level is premature. Nevertheless, the provision of training opportunities to the private sector is still an appropriate area of endeavor.

In general, the purpose and outputs of the project were not stated in simple, measurable terms. For example, it would be very difficult, indeed, to measure the efficiency and sustainability of private sector development. The description of inputs in the Project Paper consisted of tables allocating funds among technical assistance, training and commodities categories rather than a narrative which clearly states the activities of programs we intend to undertake in order to produce the desired outputs. One is reminded of a recipe wherein you combine \$11 million of technical assistance with \$4 million of training and \$1.5 million of commodities to yield institutional development. It is clearly not that simple.

The team which redesigns the project must give more thought to the logical framework and the linkages between inputs and outputs. It must, in turn, relate these to a reasonable statement of project purpose. The team must reexamine the objectively verifiable indicators to ensure that they include measures of quantity, quality and time.

4. Evaluation Question: Assuming the continued validity of the institution-building approach, is the relative emphasis among the three components optimal to achieve the purpose?

When asked about the relative emphasis among the three components, respondents had widely divergent opinions. The DGFR managers expressed strong interest in the training component, particularly long-term academic training, and felt that this should be the dominant component of the project. OAJC staff tended to support the training emphasis but downplayed the relative importance of academic training. In stark contrast, the contractor staff felt that the project and the DGFR overemphasized the importance of training and undervalued the role of institutional development. Paradoxically, the bulk of the project budget, particularly in terms of contractor staff, is allocated to fisheries resources management. This component, as it is currently being implemented, is concerned primarily with research and stock assessment and only secondarily with OJT and institutional development.

This led the evaluation team to conclude that there was not a shared perception of the project and its priorities among the contractor, DGFR and OAJC staff, especially regarding the proper balance among project components. In the face of severe human resource constraints at the DGFR, it became clear that if the project is to emphasize training as the Omanis would like, including long-term academic training, the project budget will have to be reallocated to reflect this and the other components scaled back or eliminated.

5. Evaluation Question: Are there sufficient coordination mechanisms designed into the project to link key functions among the three components?

The project paper does outline explicit mechanisms to link functions such as research and management decision-making through the creation of fisheries management plans. However, linkages between these plans and extension and enforcement efforts are less clear. Moreover, the evaluation field work revealed that the DGFR severely restricts the flow of information from statistical data gathering and other research efforts to the private sector. This reluctance to share information compounds the lack of formal linkage mechanisms in the project design and limits the effectiveness and impact of the project as a whole. Ultimately, institution building should lead to a stronger organization which is better able to serve its clients.

The lack of a client orientation on this project, both formal and informal, is a cause for concern. The Chemonics team has attempted to rectify this failing by establishing task forces to deal with specific problems such as statistics and, more recently, fisheries management and policy. The team has concluded that these task forces can be effective, but only if the private sector is included in the membership.

6. Issue: Lack of a clear implementation strategy embodied in the Project Paper.

When the original Project Paper was revised to make the FDMP a four year rather than an eight year project, one of the things which was lost was a clear strategy on how to complete the work. As previously stated, one of the symptoms of this is a logical framework which lists inputs in terms of person-months of technical assistance or numbers of trainees rather than groups of related activities designed to achieve a particular objective.

This lack of strategy begins with the PP and carries through to the contract. Lacking is a clear, systematic approach to the work to be undertaken during the life of the project which highlights the major milestones to be achieved each year and specifies which activities are critical to project success.

Once the strategy is clear in the PP and the contract, the contractor can develop annual work plans geared toward achieving the milestones. Only in this way can the myriad activities contemplated in a complex project such as this converge at the end to achieve the purpose.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROJECT DESIGN

Recommendation 1. Redesign the project consistent with the absorptive capacity of the DGFR.

a) Retain the Manpower Development Component but shift the focus from long-term academic to job-relevant, short-term, technical training. Those candidates among the 47 scheduled for long-term training who do not gain admission to academic programs should not be replaced; rather the funds should be reprogrammed for in-country or short-term technical training. Retain the long-term training advisor.

b) Eliminate the Planning, Programming and Budgeting Component, and the related long-term advisor position.

c) Scale back the Fisheries Resources Management Component to provide limited long-term assistance in statistics (1 advisor) and fisheries management (1 advisor). Utilizing short-term technical assistance, focus component activities on 2-3 priority problems/areas of emphasis likely to have direct impact on fisheries management in the field. Possible areas include quality control or research regarding over-fished species linked to specific extension activities. The Chief of Party should function as overall fisheries advisor and coordinate the short-term technical assistance.

d) Drop the policy dialogue and explicit objectives regarding private sector development and include private sector members on task forces and other coordination committees.

e) Downsize the Oman Support Unit and Home Office backstopping consistent with the redesign.

f) Involve the DGFR in the redesign process.

Recommendation 2: Project documents, including the Project Paper, contract, technical proposal and implementation plans, should all reflect a life-of-project strategy for achieving the project purpose.

a) The revised Project Paper should embody a life-of-project strategy which clearly states milestones toward purpose achievement.

20

b) The contract should reflect this strategy in greater detail, specifying key tasks and deliverables which the contractor must perform each year in order to achieve project objectives, and incorporate the contractor's technical proposal.

c) The contractor should link annual implementation plans to this overall strategy. The plans should present specific tasks which will result in the achievement of the objectives or milestones for that year.

Recommendation 3: Extend the PACD for training only for two years (to 1997) to permit the departure and timely return of bachelor's degree candidates.

Recommendation 4: Conduct an evaluation in 1995. The evaluators should reassess the institutional capacity of the DGFR and recommend whether to pursue a possible follow-on project emphasizing fisheries resource management, and the linkages between research and extension to the private sector.

#### CONTRACT INPUTS/OUTPUTS

A second major objective of the evaluation is to determine the extent to which the technical assistance contract reflects the objectives of the project. Contractor tasks and deliverables will be analyzed in relation to their consistency and contribution to achievement of overall project purpose. This assessment uses the questions in the Statement of Work as a starting point but modifies them to make them more meaningful.

1. Evaluation Question: Is the contract an effective means to help achieve the project purpose and outputs?

The contract emphasizes the provision of personnel to provide technical assistance in support of institutional strengthening of the DGFR through training and interaction of advisors and counterparts. The contract is deficient in that it lacks an effective strategy to bring about the improvements needed at the DGFR. The Annual Work Plan exercise, although a useful tool to keep personnel focused on deliverables, has caused the advisors to shift their focus to the deliverables at the expense of institutional strengthening. The deliverables are so numerous that DGFR management is unable to consider them carefully. Moreover, without clearly stated priorities among deliverables, DGFR staff are not able to allocate their scarce time and attention to those reports and products which are most crucial to project success. Consequently, DGFR management does not appear to be taking any action as a result of the reports and interactions with the advisors. In brief, the advisors are generating deliverables which are not being applied.

21

The contract activities are generally consistent with those described in the project paper. One glaring difference between the contract and the project paper is that the term of the assistance was reduced from 8 to 4 years with a concomitant reduction in contract budget from \$35 million to \$18.2 million. There was no revision in activities, outputs or purpose of the project although the time and budget were halved.

Recommendation: The contract should be reviewed to determine how it can be modified to be an effective instrument to achieve outputs which are reasonable within the time and budgetary constraints. Particular attention should be given to means needed to compensate for the lack of trained counterparts at the DGFR.

2. Evaluation Question: Are the number, level of effort, and mix of skills of contractor personnel commensurate with the scope of project activities and terms of the contract?

The contract staffing is as described in the illustrative staffing plan contained in the project paper with the exception that the overall time is reduced from 8 to 4 years. Based on the numerous activities originally envisioned in the project, the staffing level appears on the surface to be appropriate.

The reduction of the life of project to 4 years has rendered the phasing of the advisors' arrival and the trainees' departure inappropriate. The effectiveness of the staff has been handicapped by a lack of shared goals with the DGFR, particularly regarding the institutional strengthening aspects of the project. Lacking is the leadership to take the initiative to make the Project Management Committee an effective management tool as envisioned in the Project Paper. Lacking are advisors who, under the management of their firm, focus their energies on the development of the DGFR rather than on deliverables. Lacking are counterparts to work with and support the advisors. Lacking is collaborative teamwork between the contractor, the OAJC and the DGFR. Until these deficiencies are addressed, the make-up of the contractor's team is of secondary importance.

#### IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE

A final major objective of this evaluation is to examine implementation progress over the first year of the project. The team assessed how well each of the involved parties (Contractor, DGFR and OAJC) carried out their respective responsibilities as well as the reasons for any difficulties. The questions contained in the Scope of Work (rephrased at times) provide the parameters for this assessment.

1. Evaluation Question: In general, how has project implementation progressed as compared to projections in the project paper and implementation plans? Are any activities significantly behind schedule? What are the causes for delays?

The project paper is not a very good source of implementation targets. For Year 1, there are only quantitative projections of technical assistance and participant training plus expenditure targets. The only performance indicator

is for PPB where planning, programming and budgeting systems are to have been designed. Comparing implementation performance with these targets shows that technical assistance is slightly less than targeted, long-term participants and in-country training exceed projections, and short-term external training is less than expected. Estimated expenditures for Year 1 are close to the PP estimate for the OAJC. Data on Government of Oman expenditures is not available. Regarding the design of the planning, programming and budgeting system, the advisor completed several pieces of the system. On the surface project implementation progress appears good.

While the above may be satisfying, it does not provide a great deal of information on actual implementation progress. The following, more meaningful assessment is based on implementation targets established in the First Annual Work Plan. It is important to emphasize that even here, product quality is more important than completing a fixed number of implementation activities on schedule.

As detailed below in the component by component analysis, project implementation progress has not been uniformly smooth. The Manpower Development component has experienced the most problems. The Training Plan was submitted three months late and external participant departures are less than half of expectations. A related problem is that progress in the remaining components will undoubtedly slow down as the pace of academic training picks up and more and more staff are sent outside Oman for training. Under the PPB Component, the advisor has completed a number of valuable training activities which are part of a logical progression toward improved systems. DGFR progress in implementing the systems has been slow.

Major causes of these implementation delays include: different perceptions by the DGFR, Contractor and OAJC regarding the objectives of the project and individual components; an over-ambitious Work Plan based on unrealistic expectations regarding DGFR staff availability; shortages of suitable manpower for training and counterparts; too much focus on contract "deliverables" versus results of assistance being provided; a few unproductive contract staff; changes in OAJC project management; a lack of adequate communication among the involved parties; and mixed quality of contractor output.

Details of project implementation in each component follow.

2. Evaluation Question: Is the Manpower Development Component of the project on schedule?

The Work Plan strategy for manpower development was to: a) determine numbers of staff required for the DGFR to discharge responsibilities; b) determine skills required to perform existing jobs; and c) evaluate existing staff in the context of job requirements as a basis for developing appropriate academic and technical training plans. The strategy was basically sound. Likewise the intensive effort to provide OJT through the creation of task forces and daily interaction between the advisors and assigned counterparts was appropriate.

Though consistent with the contract, the concurrent scheduling of both the Manpower Specialist and Training Specialist to perform what appear to be sequential tasks seems questionable. Some interaction between the advisors seems reasonable; however, the work of the Training Specialist was theoretically dependent on the completion of the manpower planning work and,

hence, should have begun somewhat later.

The contractor recognized that these activities would take some time to complete. Hence, the First Annual Work Plan revised the original target date in their Technical Proposal for submission of a Training Plan to July 31, 1992. Skills assessments and training plans prepared earlier for each Unit in the DGFR would constitute the raw material for the comprehensive plan.

Progress during the first year was halting, but evident. The contractor began programs of OJT and short-term technical training in Oman in advance of the Training Plan. They instituted the Task Force concept as a training mechanism with reported good success in spite of Omani manpower constraints. A total of 10 Omanis have gone to the United States for academic training. Processing is underway for several others. The contractor exceeded the target for Masters level training during the first year but did not meet the PP target for Bachelors degree placements. They completed the Training Plan three months behind the Work Plan schedule. The DGFR established a Training Department and identified staff. The contractor arranged a limited number (5) of short-term, in-country courses for 83 Omani participants, and sent several Omanis abroad for technical training or study tours. These achievements are lower than PP projections for U.S. and Third Country training while targets for in-country training were exceeded.

In spite of these achievements there is a general perception that the Manpower Development component of the project is considerably behind schedule. This perception started when the planned sequence of events outlined above, culminating in a training plan, could not be dogmatically followed. Before a training plan could be prepared, the DGFR and the MAF insisted on the early implementation of the academic training program with participants expected to depart in January, 1992. The OAJC agreed in Project Implementation Letter No. 7 (24 December, 1991) that academic training could proceed before the Training Plan was completed.

Implementation did not proceed rapidly because of a shortage of high-quality candidates with necessary English language and academic qualifications. Moreover, a need to waive certain Omani Government requirements added further processing time. When the first group of participants did not depart as initially proposed, the DGFR got the impression that the contractor was "behind schedule" in implementing this component. The DGFR also expressed dissatisfaction with the productivity and quality of work of both the manpower development and training advisors. This led to their eventual dismissal. While the DGFR welcomed these actions, they did result in implementation delays. In turn, the contractor feels unfairly criticized for having been expected to inaugurate training programs when the DGFR has not identified qualified candidates or obtained necessary government clearances. The contractor also believes that the DGFR does not recognize the value of the OJT and technical training efforts.

To summarize, while the contractor has made some progress in the training area, implementation is behind schedule. Until the 47 degree participants are sent to the U.S. or Arab countries, the DGFR will continue to perceive this component to be a festering problem area.

24

Recommendations: 1. The contractor should finalize the Training Plan as soon as possible to form the basis for agreement among the Contractor, the DGFR and the OAJC on the type, amount and timing of training to be provided.

2. The contractor should place academic trainees as quickly as possible.

3. Question: - Is implementation of the Resources Management Component of the project on schedule?

A number of significant activities have been completed or are underway in this component. The contractor has met most Work Plan targets and objectives with most "deliverables" completed as scheduled or rescheduled. The DGFR regards the statistics and data collection work with the Department of Statistics and Data Processing (DSDP) as very successful. Activities at the Marine Science and Fisheries Center (MSFC) have gotten off to a reasonable start with a number of useful analytic/planning documents prepared. Installation of the CANOFISH Stock Assessment System is delayed, however, due to sub-contracting problems. The development of research programs is also behind schedule. In general, the DGFR expressed dissatisfaction with the research staff because of limited field work and interaction between contractor and Omani staff. In short, implementation progress to date has been reasonable, if somewhat uneven.

Nevertheless, the future rate of progress is very uncertain. The strategy for development of institutional capacity at both the MSFC and the Department of Statistics and Data Processing (DSDP) calls for TAs to work as advisors to Omani staff. The transfer of key staff from the DSDP elsewhere in the Ministry and the departure for academic training of nearly all senior Omani counterpart staff of the MSFC call into question the impact and progress that the technical advisory staff can make toward institutional development and technology transfer. The contractor argues that the advisors can continue to work on the same issues with remaining lower level staff so that the degree participants return to a functioning system. Yet, in this scenario, the TA staff become much more operational than advisory. We also question whether highly trained Technical Advisors are needed and can be effective in interacting with technician level personnel with limited English language ability. The evaluation team concluded that providing largely operational staff for the MSFC is not an appropriate use of technical assistance dollars.

Recommendation: Reduce the level of technical assistance commensurate with the ability of the MSFC and DSDP to provide suitable counterparts.

4. Question: Is implementation of the project's PPB Component on schedule?

According to the final evaluation of the previous Fishery Development Project, modifications in DGFR organizational structure and function are necessary if the DGFR is to manage the fisheries sector effectively. The PPB component is designed to accomplish this. During the first nine months of implementation of this component, the advisor undertook a number of valuable training exercises. He completed numerous deliverables, including Action Plans for each directorate and a supplemental budget. Additionally, the DGFR asked the

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advisor to perform a substantial number of extra tasks, which he did. This unfortunately delayed several scheduled tasks.

The work accomplished during the first year is part of what could be a logical sequence leading to substantial improvements in the DGFR programming, planning and budgeting system.

Regrettably, project designers failed to recognize several factors which severely limit the scope of organizational reforms in the DGFR. For example, the MAF is not free to modify its budgetary system. The Ministry of Finance sets the guidelines and systems which must be followed. The organizational structure of the DGFR is established by Royal Decree with changes implemented only by Royal Decree. The MAF has procedures which cannot be changed for only one Directorate. Certainly, modest improvements in many DGFR administrative procedures are possible, but expectations in the project, and contract, for dramatic transformations are unrealistic.

Under this scenario, it becomes doubly important that the DGFR senior managers strongly support administrative reform because it will be necessary for them to attempt to convince outside groups that the proposed changes are advantageous. This enthusiastic support is lacking. Finally, the same counterpart problem which severely constrains the Resource Management component is also a barrier to the continued, successful implementation of the PPB component of the project. Availability of suitable counterparts was a problem in Year 1 and will be even more of a problem during Year 2 due to the anticipated departure of participant trainees. The lack of counterparts is even more acute in the regional offices.

Recommendation: Eliminate this component of the project because the DGFR is unable to provide suitable counterparts and is unable to implement reforms needed to achieve project objectives.

5. Evaluation Question: Has the contractor followed an approved Annual Work Plan, with activities conducted and deliverables submitted on time?

While the contract provides general guidance for project implementation, the Work Plan required by the OAJC/Chemonics contract is the day-to-day operational guide. With good home office support, the contractor was very systematic in completing the first Annual Work Plan on December 21, 1991, shortly after technical assistance team mobilization. OAJC approved the Plan on February 3, 1992.

The Work Plan is a comprehensive document which tracks the OAJC/Chemonics contract faithfully. It is also very ambitious, calling for a large number of deliverables which report on and reflect the various activities being undertaken. The plan projected a total of 50 deliverables for the period December 1, 1991 to August 31, 1992, plus various administrative reports.

The staff intensity of the Work Plan allowed only limited resources for "ad hoc" assignments originating from the DGFR, although a reported 12 ad hoc deliverables have also been agreed upon over the past few months. Of the 62 deliverables identified, the contractor submitted 48 on-time and an additional five within one month of the target date. Five deliverables were submitted more than one month behind schedule and as of August 31, 1992 four had not

been delivered.

These "numbers" are somewhat misleading, however, because they do not reflect time actually spent in preparation, activities not immediately resulting in deliverables, or the relative importance of the activity reflected in the deliverable. Hence, while the contractor submitted most of the deliverables on time, the quality of several key deliverables such as the training and procurement plans was deficient. This affected overall project implementation as additional contractor resources were dedicated to solving the problems, and implementation of activities in these areas was delayed. The absence of another key deliverable, the Measures of DGFR Performance and Evaluation, limits our ability to measure the impact of a variety of institution-building activities on organizational performance.

Another issue is the utility of the various deliverables to the DGFR. The DGFR considers some deliverables, such as the 1991 Statistical Yearbook, to be very useful. Others, including several of the Unit Action Plans, have not met a "felt need" in the DGFR and, as a consequence, have not been seriously considered. The DGFR tends to value reports they have specifically requested more than deliverables identified in the First Annual Work Plan.

There are other factors which limit the utility of the reports. The DGFR staff consider the number of deliverables to be excessive. Reports are too long and contain too much background material. The fact that all reports are in English, at least initially, is also a barrier to their widespread utilization by Omani staff with limited English language skills.

The large number of Work Plan deliverables limited contractor flexibility to respond to "ad hoc" requests. This, plus the Chief of Party's perception that the Plan was to be changed as little as possible, left the DGFR frustrated that the contractor could not be responsive to its requests while the contractor staff felt that the DGFR expected too much of them.

- Recommendations:
1. Future Work Plans should focus on those deliverables the DGFR and OAJC consider to be the highest priority. The absolute numbers of reports should be reduced. Reports should be more concise.
  2. Replace the Chief of Party of the Chemonics contract team.

6. Evaluation Question: Has the contractor put data collection/evaluation mechanisms in place which will assist the OAJC in determining whether the project is achieving its objectives? Has the contractor collected baseline data against which to measure progress?

The deliverables have provided much of the basic baseline data needed, particularly quantitative data. The manpower skill and training needs assessments provide a clear picture of the current manpower situation in terms of skills, academic background and experience of current staff. The Marine Science and Fisheries Center Review provided a snapshot of the Center, including staff and programs, at the start of the project. In the PPB area, descriptions of current practices and operating procedures appear in several deliverables. The contractor established a system to evaluate the impact of on-the-job training. Overall, a substantial amount of scattered quantitative

21

and descriptive baseline data exist.

Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that the deliverable, "Measures of DGFR Performance and Evaluation", was delayed from April 30, 1992 until November 30, 1992. Without this report, it is impossible to determine whether the current data collection and reporting efforts constitute an adequate system for evaluating the project. It appears that current reporting will answer the quantitative questions at the input and output level (How many people have been trained? How many action plans have been completed? How many computers have been provided?); however, data regarding the performance of groups and individuals and the impact of institutional development activities which would facilitate the measurement of purpose achievement are lacking. Finally, the project paper fails to establish a clear mechanism for self-evaluation or explicitly assign responsibility for this function to the contractor or the project officer.

Recommendation: Undertake a systematic effort to establish project impact and evaluation mechanisms in the project redesign and the Second Annual Work Plan.

7. Evaluation Question: Has the contractor encountered any major external obstacles to completing its work? If so, how can these be overcome or minimized?

The evaluation team identified three significant problems which made project implementation difficult for the contractor: different understandings and expectations regarding the project among the involved parties; fewer DGFR manpower resources than expected; and changes in OAJC project managers.

The first two problem areas have already been mentioned in the previous discussions of implementation progress. Nevertheless we should emphasize that extensive communication among the DGFR, the Contractor and OAJC is necessary if a convergence of expectations regarding the project is to occur. The current, often confrontational, attitude among the parties needs to be replaced with a more cooperative one directed at achieving agreed upon objectives.

Increasing the capability of DGFR manpower is a primary objective of the project. There is an obvious conflict between the provision of counterparts for advisors and long-term academic training for these same counterparts. The current pool of DGFR manpower does not permit assignment of counterparts in the quantities or at the levels needed. This slows implementation of activities and forces advisors to become "doers" rather than advisors. The short time frame of this project suggests this problem will not be resolved until near the end of the project, if at all.

The impact of frequent changes in OAJC project management over the past year was probably more severe than usual because most of the technical advisors lacked experience working on an A.I.D. contract. They did not know what to expect from A.I.D. management. When different OAJC managers seemed to have very different styles, the contract team became even more confused. The complexity of the project added to the difficulty. With the recent arrival of the long-term OAJC Project Manager, this constraint should be resolved, but it certainly was a factor during the first year of implementation.

8. Evaluation Question: How has the DGFR Performed in Providing Implementation Support for the project?

Without the full cooperation and support of the DGFR, project objectives cannot be met. During the first year, DGFR support for contractor activities and project components was inconsistent. True, the DGFR provided office space, including an off-site office for the Chemonics team. They assigned counterpart staff to work with the technical advisors, although the numbers and qualifications of these counterparts were far less than optimal. The DGFR strongly supported the academic portion of the Manpower Development component, but the limited pool of qualified participants prevented the rapid and successful implementation of this program. The DGFR has also performed reasonably well in supporting the Resource Management component of the project. The PPB component of the project suffered from inadequate counterpart staff and the inability of the DGFR to implement major changes in administrative systems and organization.

The limits on DGFR support stem from two causes. First, the project does not encompass all or even a majority of DGFR activities. All or nearly all staff assigned as counterparts or Task Force members have other responsibilities. They cannot be full-time counterparts in most instances. Second, the DGFR has limited budgetary resources making it difficult for "new" programs or ideas to be allocated resources. To be sure, the level of support reflects the learning process inherent in the start-up of any project. The DGFR did not really know in advance what would be needed and could not immediately adjust plans/budgets/staffing to meet needs. More serious, however, is the question of DGFR ability to absorb and support the level of assistance being offered over the long term, given staffing constraints, competing work demands, and budget limits.

9. Evaluation Question: How has the OAJC performed in supporting project implementation?

In general the OAJC has performed prudently and well. There have been differences in understanding, vision and expectations among the several OAJC staff who have provided backstopping for the project over the first year. The DGFR and contractor staff perceive the first Project Manager to have been more involved and more supportive of the contract team than the current manager. Similarly, the DGFR believes that the current OAJC U.S. Representative is less flexible than his predecessor.

Nevertheless, a large part of the perceived inconsistency in OAJC project management reflects increased OAJC management concern with cost-effectiveness and reasonable uses of resources during this difficult start-up phase. For example, the modification in the scope of the computer procurement resulting from changes in OAJC staff led to a more comprehensive procurement than was originally proposed. New OAJC management correctly questioned the need for a large number of project vehicles. This resulted in a smaller vehicle procurement which meets the needs of the project while optimizing the use of U.S. Government funds. The OAJC stand against English language training in the U.S. for Omani participants reflects a legitimate concern for the cost-effective use of U.S. Government funding. This early evaluation of the project reflects a strong OAJC management desire to identify problems early and take corrective action to ensure resource-use effectiveness.

21

However, the OAJC might have intervened more rigorously, and on a sustained basis, when interpretations of A.I.D. rules and regulations were being questioned by the DGFR or when commitments are not being met. The U.S. English language issue and the failure of the DGFR to fulfill its side of the MOU are two examples where greater OAJC action might have helped resolve problems earlier.

Recommendations: 1) The OAJC should review its management structure for the project to ensure that decision-making authority is delegated to the working level.

2) OAJC project management must be more proactive in fostering cooperation and communication among the involved parties and in ensuring that both the DGFR and the contractor fulfill their commitments.

10. Evaluation Question: Is the English language training program on track?

The level of English language skills of most candidates for degree training do not meet minimum A.I.D. requirements. English language ability also affects the OJT program and the ability of the technical advisors to interact with counterparts. Remedial or refresher English language training must be provided. The DGFR believes for academic training candidates that English language training should be provided in the United States. The DGFR notes that such training is more effective in quickly raising English language ability. OAJC staff cite A.I.D. regulations which do not allow participants with TOEFL scores below a certain level to be sent to the United States for academic training. They also note that, in terms of cost, it is much more efficient to conduct English language training in the host country. If scores cannot be improved, the alternative is to train academic, and perhaps technical, participants in Arab countries where English is not needed.

Recommendations: 1) The project should initiate a program of in-country English language training immediately to support academic training, U.S. technical training and to increase the benefits from technical advisors.

2) The OAJC should be as flexible as possible in terms of TOEFL scores, but should not seek waivers of minimum requirements per A.I.D. regulations. If the DGFR wishes to send potential participants to the United States for English Language training, they should task the contractor with making necessary arrangements, but bear all costs of training themselves.

11. Evaluation Question: Is the balance in current project planning between academic and technical training appropriate?

Various project documents cite a great need for academic training. The Manpower and Skills Assessment work completed by the contractor confirms this need. The Training Plan proposes a program to train a total of 47

participants at various degree levels but identifies a possible funding constraint. The DGFR and the MAF feel strongly that academic training is a priority for the project. The DGFR also prefers academic training because it is more conducive to advancement within government service than technical training. Given existing skill levels of DGFR staff, and limited possibilities for additional staff recruitment from new university graduates, it appears that the proposed levels of academic training will include a significant percentage of available, suitable DGFR staff.

Whether the DGFR has sufficient positions in terms of job content to both absorb the graduates on their return and to utilize their skills in a meaningful manner is not fully clear. Our impression is that a more phased approach to academic training would have been desirable. We are also very concerned about the weak academic credentials of some individuals being proposed for training in the U.S. and Arab countries. Ignoring quality in an attempt to maximize numbers is not a good long-run practice.

As with academic training, project designers identified a serious need for technical training. Regrettably, the DGFR seems to view this type of training as a lower priority. Given the work to be done in the DGFR, the skill and academic levels of many staff and the possibility of immediate benefits, the project should emphasize technical training more. The draft Training Plan submitted by the contractor includes a substantial amount of technical training both in Oman and in the United States. While this needs to be reviewed carefully to ensure applicability and utility, the OAJC and DGFR should take great care to ensure that this training is not eclipsed by the DGFR's desire for degree training.

Recommendation: Technical training should be given the highest priority in the training program.

13. Evaluation Question: Is coordination among the prime contractor, the DGFR and the OAJC adequate to facilitate the achievement of project objectives? If not, can the evaluation team recommend any additional coordination mechanisms to ensure smooth implementation in the future?

Inadequate coordination and a resulting lack of joint understanding among the three parties has been a problem over the past year. This seems partly due to personalities, changing OAJC staff and the management styles of all three groups. Improving this coordination should be a high priority for all the parties. In principle, the weekly meetings involving the Director General, the contractor Team Leader and the OAJC Project Manager, combined with the monthly meetings of the Project Management Committee, should be adequate to achieve good coordination. The key is to ensure these meetings actually take place and that they are forums for honest discussion and decision-making.

These meetings should not be the only regular contact among the involved parties. The OAJC Project Manager should also serve as a bridge between the two other parties and be in regular, if not daily, communication with them. Moreover, since the regular meetings involve only top management, OAJC, Contractor and DGFR staff at the component level should also meet periodically. The OAJC should also invite the Contractor and the DGFR Project Coordinator to attend its quarterly Project Implementation Reviews.

31

A problem for the DGFR Project Coordinator is that he has no staff. He consequently has little capacity to follow-up on meetings, do routine documentation review, maintain project files or provide necessary project reporting within the DGFR. This limits his effectiveness to facilitate implementation. To assist the DGFR Project Coordinator in fulfilling his functions more effectively, the DGFR or the project should provide additional administrative support.

- Recommendations:
- 1) Establish a firm schedule for weekly meetings among the involved parties and for the Project Management Committee.
  - 2) Provide administrative assistance to the DGFR Project Coordinator.
  - 3) Include the Contract Team Leader and the DGFR Project Coordinator in the Quarterly OAJC Project Implementation Reviews.

72

## PERSONS CONTACTED

### Directorate General of Fisheries Resources

1. Sheikh Abdullah bin Ali Bakathir, Director General of Fisheries Resources
2. Hamed Al-Yahyai, FDMP Project Coordinator
3. Rashid Al-Barwani, Director of the Department of Resource Development and former Acting Director General of Fisheries Resources
4. Mohammed Al-Barwani, Director of Fisheries Development Fund and former FDMP Project Coordinator
5. Hilal Al-Mukhaini, Director of the Department of Statistics & Data Processing
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7. Thabit Abdel Salam, Director of the Marine Sciences & Fisheries Center
8. Saleh Al-Mukhaini, Director of the Department of Fisheries Affairs

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33'

Omani-American Joint Commission

1. H.E. Hamood bin Hilal al-Habsi, Managing Director
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**STATEMENT OF WORK  
INTERIM EVALUATION OF FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT PROJECT  
(272-0106)**

### **Background**

The Omani agricultural sector is comprised of three subsectors: crops, livestock and fisheries. Prior to the 1970s, Oman's economy depended primarily on trade, agriculture and fisheries; however, by 1980 their share of GDP had declined to 3 percent as oil replaced these more traditional sources of national income. Oman is exploiting its oil resources faster than new discoveries are made. Given the finite nature of this resource, the Government of Oman is pursuing a development strategy which will reduce its reliance on oil over the long term by further developing its potential in key sectors such as fisheries.

Despite the predominance of oil in the Omani economy, agricultural exports grew in absolute terms between 1986-1990 by 62 percent. Fish exports alone grew 56 percent during this period. More than 20,000 Omanis earn their living from fisheries. In 1990, fish production reached 119,000 mt, 100,000 mt (84%) of which derived from the traditional sector. The value of this production reached 35 million Riyals (\$92 million); the traditional sector produced 77% of the total value of the catch. Hence, the value of the catch (23%) of the industrial sector is disproportionate to its share of the total catch (16%). Of the total catch of 119,000 mt, nearly one-third is exported.

### **Constraints to Development**

Oman's marine resources are abundant. Catch rates are high and production costs are low. These factors combine to make Oman's marine products very competitive in the world market. Oman could realize substantial gains in income, employment and exports from fisheries by judiciously increasing catches of certain species and increasing the value of catches by improving their quality. Nevertheless, several important factors constrain Oman's progress in developing its fisheries to their full potential. These constraints can be classified into three groups: policy, technology and institutional weaknesses.

### **Policy**

The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) is pursuing a generally sound policy agenda with regard to fisheries. It is strongly committed to private sector development in fisheries, provides very few subsidies in the sector and concerns itself primarily with the prudent management of fisheries as a common resource in order to ensure the long term sustainability of commercial fishing. One remaining policy issue, which relates to the policy-making process, is how to systematically incorporate the views of both private commercial and artisanal fishermen into policy formulation.

### **Technology**

Marketing of Omani seafood, particularly for export, is constrained by the low quality of fish landed by a largely traditional fishing fleet. The solution to this problem is for fishermen to further modernize their vessels to substantially improve post-harvest quality. This will require concurrent infrastructure development in the form of harbors, jetties, and maintenance/support facilities. The Government of Oman has given this a high priority in its Fourth Five Year Plan with \$40 million R.O. allocated to build three large and nine small harbors. The government has also financed low-cost loans to fishermen to purchase motorized fiberglass fishing boats.

25

## Institutions

It is mainly institutional weaknesses in the Ministry which hinder growth in the sector; namely, inconsistent application of management and regulatory policies which creates an uncertain investment climate, weak extension services, lack of formal mechanisms for consultation with the private sector, and lack of skills and experience in fisheries research and management by ministry personnel.

In 1986, The Omani-American Joint Commission responded to these constraints by designing an eight-year, \$51 million project, which was subsequently authorized in 1990 as a four-year, \$27 million project (\$20 million U.S. contribution and \$7 million host country contribution). The goal of the \$27 million Fisheries Development and Management Project is to achieve sustainable growth of the fisheries sector in the national economy. Measures of goal achievement include: an increase in the absolute level of the contribution of fisheries to GNP; an increase in the value of private sector exports of fish; and the maintenance of fishing effort at a level which does not lead to overfishing. The purpose of the project is to improve the management of Oman's marine resources in a way which encourages efficient, sustainable private sector development. The project is intended to address the objective of sustainable private sector fisheries development in four ways: 1) ensuring stable access to fish resources for fishing operators; 2) ensuring sustainability of resources, catches and profits by enabling the government to accurately assess fisheries resources and implement fisheries management plans; 3) supporting the development of a strategy for technology transfer to small scale traditional fishermen; and 4) ensuring the provision of adequate infrastructure, especially fishing harbors.

The OAJC and the Ministry have chosen to tackle the project purpose by pursuing a three-pronged strategy for institutional development of the Directorate General of Fisheries Resources (DGFIR). Hence, the project has three components: 1) Planning, Programming and Budgeting; 2) Manpower Development; and 3) Fisheries Management.

The Planning, Programming, Budgeting component is designed: to establish a PPB system in the Directorate General of Fisheries Resources; improve personnel, asset management and procurement systems; strengthen sector planning; and train staff in systems management. The Manpower Development component will provide a combination of long-term academic, short-term technical and on-the-job training for over 100 DGFIR technical and management personnel. A new organizational structure will facilitate the integration of these returned participants into the DGFIR. Further, the project will emphasize on-the-job training for vessel observers, quality control officers, statisticians and others. The third and final component, Fisheries Management, will establish a statistical system to provide data on catches by traditional fishermen and industrial fleets, train Omanis to perform stock assessments, develop fisheries management plans for heavily exploited species, and establish a mechanism for private sector participation in fisheries management decision-making.

In order to facilitate the achievement of these component objectives, the OAJC executed an \$18 million contract with a U.S. firm for technical assistance and procurement services. The contractor has just completed its first year of work in Oman. Expenditures to date under the contract total nearly \$4 million.

## Project Progress

One year after the authorization of the FDMP, the Omani government remains firmly committed to further developing its fisheries resources and managing them more efficiently. During its first year of implementation, the project has exhibited a high rate of expenditures: one-fifth of the total project budget and nearly one-fourth of the contract budget. This level of expenditure is consistent with the contract budget. Nevertheless, implementation progress (not always coincidental with expenditure rates) has been slow for all components.

Specifically, the contractor spent most of the first year mobilizing and settling its large team of expatriate advisors (which currently number eight). The bulk of the first year's expenditures are related to mobilization; namely, home and office furnishings, vehicles and advisor's salaries. The project has expended few resources thus far on training, commodity procurement or actual research activities. Implementation progress is constrained by the absence of several key deliverables, including comprehensive training and procurement plans, and management action plans for each department in the DGFIR. Local training programs in English language, mathematics and science for DGFIR personnel are nearly a year behind schedule.

Progress has been best in the PPB component which has completed a review of the DGFIR organizational structure, begun work on management action plans utilizing a learning-by-doing approach to train Omanis in their preparation, and assisted the DGFIR to prepare its annual budget request to the Minister. There has been little progress in the Manpower Development component. Only a limited number of activities have taken place. The Fisheries Management component has conducted a detailed review of the marine research center and its programs, performed an in-depth assessment of DGFIR computer needs which resulted in a comprehensive automation plan, and begun assessments of fish stocks; nevertheless, several activities of this component are also behind schedule.

In sum, several key deliverables have yet to be completed and thus far few participants have departed for training. Consequently, the OAJC, in consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, has decided to undertake an interim evaluation of the project. The OAJC and the Ministry will use the evaluation results as a guide to redesign the project, if necessary, and modify the prime contract accordingly.

### Scope of Work

The objective of this interim evaluation is three-fold:

1. to reexamine the validity of the project design after one year of implementation and recommend any modifications;
2. to assess the extent to which the prime contract, as currently written, corresponds to the inputs envisioned in the project paper and leads to the outputs needed to achieve the project purpose;
3. to assess implementation progress in general, with special attention to the performance of the contractor in achieving project objectives and producing required deliverables during this first year of project implementation. (The evaluation will also assess the performance of the MAF and the OAJC in facilitating project implementations.)

During the course of the evaluation, the evaluators shall answer the following questions. These questions are grouped under each of the three major objectives for the evaluation study.

### Objective 1. Project Design

Since the OAJC designed this project in 1986, the organization has developed a comprehensive strategy statement. One of the Commission's strategic objectives is to "Improve the management and conservation of renewable natural resources, particularly the Sultanate's water and marine resources". This evaluation provides an excellent opportunity to reexamine the PDMP and assess how well its goal and purpose mesh with the strategic objective. Moreover, development projects are not controlled experiments; they unfold in a dynamic environment in which needs and constraints can change rapidly. The OAJC and the contractor have completed slightly more than one year of implementation. The passage of time and experience in the field afford the OAJC an opportunity to evaluate whether the assumptions upon which the project was based are still valid.

Hence, during the course of their study, the evaluators shall answer the following questions related to Objective #1.

1. Given the stated goal of the project and the analysis of constraints to sector growth presented in both the OAJC strategy and the Project Paper, is the institutional development approach of the project the most effective means to achieve the goal? Are there major technological, infrastructure, or policy constraints which the project should also address directly?
2. Do the assumptions for outputs, purpose and goal achievement remain valid? Are they measurable in terms of quantity, quality and time?
3. If the current purpose and outputs remain valid, are the inputs the project now provide appropriate to achieve them during the life of the project?
4. Assuming the continued validity of the institution-building approach, is the relative emphasis among the three components optimal to achieve the purpose?
5. Are their sufficient coordination mechanisms designed into the project to link key functions among the three components? For example, is the research carried out under the Fisheries Management component linked to management decision-making and extension to the private sector?

#### **Objective 2. Contract Inputs/Outputs**

The evaluation team shall assess in depth the extent to which project objectives and contractor tasks/deliverables diverge and recommend any necessary contract modifications. The team shall perform this assessment based on project documentation as it now stands; however, the final recommendations of this section of the evaluation will also be contingent in large part upon the outcome of Objective #1 of the evaluation. Any final contract modifications will hinge upon both this assessment and any recommendations for project redesign emanating from the questions under Objective #1.

Hence, the evaluators shall address the following specific questions related to Objective #2:

1. Are the terms of the contract (tasks and deliverables) consistent with the achievement of the project purpose and outputs?
2. Are the number, level of effort, and mix of skills of contractor personnel commensurate with the scope of project activities and the terms of the contract?

#### **Objective 3. Implementation Performance**

As stated in the section on Project Progress, implementation of all three of the project components is behind schedule. The OAJC and the Government of Oman are interested in discovering the reasons for these delays and seeking ways to get the project back on track. Hence, this evaluation shall also examine in considerable detail the performance of the prime contractor, the MAF and the OAJC in discharging their various implementation responsibilities. Given the pivotal role of the large contractor team, the evaluators shall pay particular attention to its performance as compared to the terms of its contract.

Hence, the evaluators shall answer the following questions pertaining to implementation:

1. In general, how has implementation progressed as compared to projections in the project paper and implementation plans? The evaluators shall identify those activities which are significantly behind schedule. Evaluators shall identify causes for delays to the extent possible.
2. How has the contractor performed in relation to project objectives as stated in the project paper and its contract?
  - a. Has the contractor followed an approved Annual Work Plan, with activities conducted and deliverables submitted on time? Has the contractor put data collection/evaluation mechanisms in place which will assist the OAJC in determining whether the project has achieved its objectives? Has the contractor collected baseline data against which to measure progress?
  - b. Has the contractor encountered any major obstacles to completing its work? If so, how can these be overcome or minimized?
  - c. Is coordination among the prime contractor, the Ministry and the OAJC adequate to facilitate the achievement of project objectives? If not, can the evaluation team recommend any additional coordination mechanisms to ensure smooth implementation in the future?
3. How have the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the OAJC performed in providing their inputs/approvals in a timely manner and generally facilitating implementation?

## References

Fisheries Development and Management Project Paper (272-0106)

Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Ten Year Fisheries Sector Development Plan (1991-2000)

Omani-American Joint Commission for Economic and Technical Cooperation, Approved Program Strategy (1992-1997)

Devres, Inc., Final Evaluation of the Oman Fisheries Development Project (272-0101.1) Executive Summary, 1989

Technical Assistance Contract between the OAJC and Chemonics, International, 1991

Chemonics, First Annual Work Plan for Fisheries Development and Management Project

Chemonics Training and Procurement Plans

Quarterly Project Progress Reports

The Marine Science and Fisheries Center: A Review of the Center and Its Programs

Future Programs for MSFC (draft report)

## Methods and Procedures

This evaluation shall employ rapid, low-cost evaluation procedures; namely, document review, interviews and site visits. It is too early in the course of the project to gather statistical data to compare project results with targets; however, the team shall ascertain whether the appropriate data collection mechanisms exist to provide such information over the life of the project and the

extent to which baseline data exist.

The evaluation team shall complete its review of the background documents cited in the references section prior to commencing the field work. One week prior to commencing the field work, the Evaluation Officer and the Project Officer, in consultation with the MAF, will develop a tentative work plan/schedule for the evaluation. The information gathering phase of the evaluation involving all team members is expected to last two weeks, followed by one week for report writing and a final briefing. After the departure of any TDY team members at the end of the third week, the Evaluation Officer will complete the drafting of the final version of the report.

The evaluation will commence with a half-day team planning meeting in Muscat. The purpose of this meeting will be for participants to arrive at a common understanding of the scope of work, discuss the proposed work plan and clarify assignments. Once the team leader has assigned team members to specific tasks, the team shall split up into groups as dictated by the work plan and begin the field work. During the course of the evaluation, the team shall meet at least weekly to discuss progress and solve any problems which arise.

The evaluators will work a five-day week. The OAJC shall provide all necessary local transportation and logistical arrangements as well as access to word processing equipment.

### **Composition of the Evaluation Team**

This evaluation will be conducted in-house. Consequently, participants will include: the Evaluation Officer, the Program Officer and a representative from the Government of Oman. The team will also include one representative from the NE Bureau in AID/Washington, who will serve as team leader, coordinating assignments, monitoring the progress of the field work, presenting the final briefing and overseeing preparation of the draft report. The Evaluation Officer will oversee preparation of the final report.

### **Reporting Requirements**

At the conclusion of the field work phase of the evaluation and concurrent with the preparation of the draft final report, the evaluation team shall conduct a briefing at the MAF regarding its findings, conclusions and recommendations for interested OAJC, MAF and contractor personnel. The evaluators shall present a final report which summarizes their findings, conclusions and recommendations.

The report shall contain the following sections:

- Evaluation Summary. Three pages, single spaced;
- Statement of Conclusions and Recommendations. Conclusions should be short and succinct, with the topic identified by a short sub-heading related to the questions posed in the Statement of Work. Recommendations should correspond to the conclusions; whenever possible, the recommendations should specify who, or what agency, should take the recommended actions. The Conclusions and Recommendations Section shall contain an outline of the proposed project redesign, if any, with concomitant recommended changes in the technical assistance contract;
- Body of the Report. The report is to include a description of the country context in which the project was developed and carried out, and provide the information (evidence and analysis) on which the conclusions and recommendations are based. The length of the report shall not exceed 40 pages. The evaluators may include details in appendices.

-- Appendices. These are to include at a minimum the following:

- (a) The evaluation Statement of Work;
- (b) The Logical Framework, together with a brief summary of the current status/attainment of original or modified inputs and outputs (if these are not already indicated in the body of the report);
- (c) A bibliography of documents consulted.

Other appendices may include more details on special topics, and a list of agencies consulted.

Prior to the departure of the team leader, the team will submit the draft report to the OAJC and DGFR. These organizations have five working days to provide their comments in order that the team may incorporate them into the final report.

After the team completes the final report, the Evaluation Officer and the Project Officer shall prepare the AID Project Evaluation Summary (PES).

- 41'