

**EVALUATION
OF
AID-AIFLD
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT NO. 524-0308-A-00-0022-00
DATED SEPTEMBER 28, 1990**

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

From July 1, 1990 to June 30, 1991 the American Institute for Free Labor Development carried out a program in Nicaragua designed to "support CUS and other independent democratic unions through technical assistance and training. This assistance [was designed to] support these unions in their efforts to play leadership roles in Nicaragua's organized labor movement".¹ These operations were financed under a Cooperative Agreement with AID.

As measured by the only statistical information available and relevant - numbers of new unions formed and numbers of new members recruited - the operations were highly successful.

The Cooperative Agreement financed the salaries of activists for all five of the labor confederations grouped under the CPT, which included the salaries of the top officials of those confederations. It covered, essentially, total operations of the CUS and most if not all of the operating costs of the CNMN. The grant paid for a series of training courses for local union leaders and members which, along with the work of the activists, were the principal organizing tools of the confederations. The CA also covered the costs of some higher level courses, both national and international, and the costs of a full-time consultant to work with the CUS on higher-level organizational problems and to do some specific "fire-fighting" on particular cases. Finally, some \$255,000 out of the \$700,000 grant were used to finance the costs of AIFLD's in-country team.

For all of its success in increasing the number of democratic labor unions and individual affiliates, the program lacked a clear sense of direction and goals. This was not due to any lack on AIFLD's part but rather to inadequate project design. The project description and AIFLD's operations under it seem to present a case of "trying to carry water on both shoulders". On one hand the project sought, in the short term, to introduce modern, democratic labor-management practices in key government offices and industries in which labor decisions are taken by union leadership (and dictated to members) based on the political agenda of the leaders and not on the bread-and-butter issues of interest to the membership. The objective was to give those workers a choice as to what kind of union structure and leadership they wanted. On the other hand, the project tried to build a democratic, independent Nicaraguan labor movement as part of a long term attempt to strengthen key democratic institutions for the future. Those two objectives, while not mutually exclusive in the longer term, call for different strategies and different tactics and modalities of operation in the short term.

In applying the lessons learned under the 1990-91 CA to the on-going three-year CA, this evaluation recommends that a clear decision be taken as to whether

¹ AID Cooperative Agreement 524-0308-A-00-0022-00, September 28, 1990.

short term or longer term objectives, as defined above, should prevail. It then makes a series of recommendations as to tactical changes in current operations that would have to take place, depending upon which alternative is chosen. Either option would require amendment of the present three-year agreement.

II. INTRODUCTION

A. Task

This report is predicated on USAID/N contract no. 524-0301-C-00-2033-00 dated January 21, 1992, to "carry out an impact evaluation of the USAID/Nicaragua Cooperative Agreement with the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) . . ."

More specifically "The purpose of this evaluation is to identify lessons learned from the 1990-1991 USAID/N Cooperative Agreement (CA) in order to assist AID/W LAC/DI and USAID/Nicaragua in the implementation of the current three-year AIFLD CA, managed by LAC/DI, which is a follow-on to [the] CA.

"- Provide additional information covering the degree of progress toward project objectives and development of the free labor movement in Nicaragua.

"- Identify problems and constraints facing AIFLD and recommend courses of action to confront and resolve them.

"The evaluation should assist AID/W in making decisions about ongoing project activities, funding requirements, and possible modification of existing project activities and time-frames."

The evaluation was carried out between January 23 and February 15, 1992. Telephone interviews with LAC/DI and AIFLD/W were conducted before and after those dates.

B. Methodology

The methodology consisted of back-ground reading of materials provided by the Mission and by AIFLD/N (see Annex B), submission of written questions to AIFLD/N and a review of their answers (see Annex D), examination of the records of AIFLD/N and extensive field interviews of union members and officers (and members/officials of campesino cooperatives) at all three levels of the democratic labor movement in Nicaragua, i.e. at the levels of individual unions, federations and confederations. In all over 100 individuals were interviewed, individually and in groups. (See Annex A for a list of People Interviewed.) Interviewees included all the heads of the CPT affiliated confederations plus the head of one confederation (the CTN) which has chosen not to affiliate with the CPT, federation leaders, local union leaders and union

members distributed as broadly as possible across the CPT spectrum². Within this group special emphasis was placed on interviews with participants in AIFLD sponsored courses from the "Seminarios Basicos" to the national- and international-level courses. Also included was an interview with members of a campesino cooperative receiving technical assistance from one of the confederations.

² That an "ideal" evaluation design did not fully eventuate as originally conceived will come as no surprise to readers familiar with Nicaraguan communications and logistics. Nevertheless, I feel secure about the factual basis underlying the conclusions and recommendations of this report.

III. BACKGROUND

A. History

1. The Somoza Period

During the regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle labor unions were tolerated though not welcomed. Over the course of that period workers' representation rights were fought out bargaining unit-by-bargaining unit; how tough those fights were depended largely on the predispositions of both the owners and the unions seeking representation. In general, owners (or managers) with the experience or training that had led to a more modern outlook were fairly easy targets though labor-management relations in plants thus organized tended to continue the paternalistic patterns, in a slightly modernized way, that had characterized an earlier period. Unions that attempted to overcome owner resistance through more militant organizing tactics were cracked down on, often severely. The National Guard was often used to break up sit-ins and individual union leaders whose methods exceeded the implicit limitations of the period were beaten or jailed.

Little by little, however, organization did take place and the unions went on to form confederations. Most of those, in the beginning at least, were affiliated with political parties. At that point Somoza resorted to his favorite tactic, cooptation, in an attempt to get some better measure of control over the unions and to try to garner union support for his Liberal Party. A number of the labor groups went along with this, signing an accord in about 1959 with the government, but some didn't. (For example, the present CGT-i broke away from the CGT partly over this matter. The CUS went along with the agreement.)

U.S. relations with Nicaragua during the Somoza period also need to be touched on here since some of the attitudes and habits that existed during that period (they didn't start then) still affect AIFLD's role in Nicaragua. The Somozas - padre y hijos - based their foreign policy and as much of their domestic policies as necessary on complete support of the United States. (Some of the roughest crack-downs on union organizing attempts during that period were at U.S.-owned enterprises that resisted the formation of unions.) The influence of the U.S. Government during that period, particularly as personified in the U.S. Ambassador and his officials, was very great even in a Central American context in which U.S. Ambassadors frequently were perceived as proconsuls. Indeed, the extent of U.S. influence in Nicaragua has to have been seen to be fully appreciated. AIFLD was seen by union leaders then, as it is now, as an agency of the U.S. Government. Even today, as was manifested to me in many interviews, many individual union members, if they think of it all, don't distinguish between USAID and AIFLD.

During the Somoza period, AIFLD's work in Nicaragua was concentrated on assistance to the CUS.

Although the Somoza period left a number of threads that were to be picked up and knitted back together in the future, how Somoza's relations with the Nicaraguan labor movement might have played out was mooted by the Sandinista Revolution in 1979.

2. The Sandinista Period

The Sandinistas regarded the labor movement as a primary tool for consolidating their own control and for creating the "New Nicaraguan Man". To these ends existing unions were harassed and, where possible, replaced by unions affiliated with what is now known as the National Workers Front (FNT). (The FNT as such was not formally created until 1990.) The Labor Code was revised to provide, among other things, that workers in any bargaining unit could only be represented by one union. Organizing tactics frequently were based on coercion: unwillingness to join an FNT-affiliated union marked a worker as having "bourgeois" or otherwise anti-Sandinista tendencies or attitudes (with spin-off effects on his job and his family's applications for housing, credit, etc.) Of course, the union given preference in any given case was a Sandinista union. Worth noting, because of its impact on the current situation in Nicaragua, is the fact that Sandinista unions required payment of dues, normally by pay-roll check-off. A constant complaint expressed to me by union members I talked to about the behavior of the Sandinista unions during that period was that they never knew what happened to their dues; they received no perceived benefits from them. Also, union members were required to attend "political education" sessions on their own time and, often, to carry out "social tasks" such as helping harvest sugar cane.

AIFLD, which had been expelled from the country in 1983, continued to support CUS from its office in Costa Rica. It is considered likely by knowledgeable sources, but cannot, of course, be confirmed, that at least some of the other democratic confederations also were receiving external support during this period. In any event, though greatly diminished in terms of constituent unions and individual members by official pressure during this period, four of the five constituent confederations of the present day CPT (the CNMN is a new organization) as well as the CTN and the CTG managed to survive.

3. The Post Sandinista Period

The electoral victory of the UNO in 1990 resulted in an important change in the political ambiente in Nicaragua which resulted in a significant lessening of the antipathetic attitude of the government towards the independent unions. Ironically, one other important change was a change in the labor code enacted by the

Sandinistas just before they left office: this was a change allowing for multiple union representation within a single bargaining unit. The independent labor movement made good use of both the ambient and legal changes to expand their membership and to challenge the Sandinistas in many of the strongholds in which they were entrenched. During the period from July 1, 1990 to June 30, 1991 (the effective period of the Cooperative Agreement subject of this review), the independent labor movement grew from 194 unions with 72,355 members³ to 427 unions with 183,264 members⁴ according to figures supplied by AIFLD (revised by the writer).

However, and despite some important inroads by the democratic labor movement⁵, the FNT still controls labor representation in a number of ministries and some important economic sectors. This control enabled the Sandinistas to resist government measures to liberalize the economy. Their principal weapon in this resistance was a series of violent general strikes in May and July of 1990 and October, 1991 appearing to carry out ex-President Daniel Ortega's prediction that, even though they had lost the elections, the Sandinistas would continue to "rule from below". The threat of this kind of disruption continues. One result is that the government is seen by the democratic labor movement as constantly acceding to FNT threats and demands while not paying sufficient attention to their own more responsibly stated needs.

This may just be a case of the "squeaking wheel getting the grease" or there may be some other internal dynamics involved not apparent to an outsider. What does seem apparent to this outsider, however, is that a continuation of the situation described could lead to the defection of some presently democratic unions to the FNT, who seem to be getting their way much more often than the democrats and/or a growing militancy on the part of some of the democrats which could be just as disruptive as those actions undertaken by the FNT. Although I don't want to exaggerate these possibilities, I heard some indications of both attitudes in my interviews.

AIFLD returned to Nicaragua in June 1990. Under the Cooperative Agreement which is the subject of this review, and under its subsequent three-year agreement

³ Memorandum of April 23, 1991, Gordon Ellison, CPD - AIFLD/N to Mila Brooks, USAID/N, DI. For my adjustments to these numbers and those in the documentation cited in note 4. below see Section IV., notes 11. and 12.

⁴ Memorandum of July 23, 1991, Donald Ellenberger, Program Officer, AIFLD/N to Jose Estrada and Michael Donovan, AIFLD/W.

⁵ The democratic unions now have important representation among health workers and teachers and in such important sectors as the port workers, bank workers, sugar workers, municipal government workers and construction and transport workers among others. The importance of these gains should not be minimized by their mere inclusion in a footnote.

with AID, it is working with the five independent confederations joined in loose alliance under the Permanent Congress of Labor (CPT), to wit, the CUS, the CTNa, CGTi, CAUS and the CNMN. (See list of acronyms, Annex H., for further definition.)

B. The Present

The labor scene in Nicaragua today is dominated by an intense struggle - "trench warfare" would not be too strong a term - between the Sandinista unions, organized under the Frente Nacional de Trabajadores, seeking to maintain their membership and representation in those bargaining units they won (or coerced their way into) during the 11 years of Sandinista rule and the democratic unions seeking to win back their old members and gain new ones and seeking to expand their representation rights to as many bargaining units as possible. The democratic unions are winning this struggle but it continues to be a hard and often dangerous slog.

The FNT can still count on the political sympathies of many people in office at national and local levels. For example, I was told by a CUS organizer in Ocotol that he had taken a group of union registration documents to the appropriate official in Esteli, the departmental capital, and that they were all rejected as being defective, without further explanation. When he took the same documents to the Ministry of Labor in Managua they were accepted and the unions were duly accredited.

The FNT unions, or many of them, also have resorted to violence to maintain their positions. In the infamous case of the German Pomares sugar mill, the Sandinista union locked out the independents and when the latter tried to get in they were fired on and one non-Sandinista worker was killed. This case is still pending solution. Although an accord, of sorts, was reached in a mediation chaired by the Minister of Labor, the head of the Frente-affiliated union refused to sign it, saying that he personally would abide by it but that he couldn't guarantee that his members would. (As of this writing, about a week after the action of the Minister of Labor, I am told that the Sandinistas were still holding the sugar mill and that their lock-out continues. The killer was found to be subject to the terms of an amnesty law - supposedly retroactive in coverage - providing amnesty for political acts that also happened to constitute crimes.) This is just one, probably the most egregious, example of the propensity of the Sandinista unions to resort to violence to accomplish their ends.

Given the present political "mix" in all three branches of the Government of Nicaragua (including the National Police) no quick, much less easy solution is in sight. This struggle will go on.

Meanwhile, with the normalization of relations between the Government of Nicaragua and the Government of the United States, the US is again the predominant external power in the country. While the U.S. is not the overwhelming presence it was in an earlier era - nor does it seek to be - its influence is considerable. It is once again seen by many Nicaraguans as the force that makes things happen, or keeps them from happening, in the country. It is once again "el patron", this time not

because it seeks such a role - it emphatically does not - but because the Nicaraguans themselves are used to that relationship (not just vis-a-vis the United States) and are comfortable with it. (That is not the same as being pleased with it.)

AIFLD partakes of that relationship for all that the present and past Country Directors didn't seek it and didn't and don't want it. The relationship is enhanced by the fraternal (i.e. personalistic) mode in which both the U.S. and Nicaraguan labor movements (and Nicaraguan social relationships in general) operate. AIFLD is seen - and sometimes is forced to operate - as an intermediary between Nicaraguan labor organizations and the Government of Nicaragua. AIFLD pays the bills and also dispenses funds for some extra expenses - "social projects" - another traditional role of the patron.

There is nothing "wrong" with any of this; it simply is the way two cultures come together in a particular context. However, the impact of this set of circumstances on (possible) U.S. objectives in Nicaragua is considerable. For the fact is that the "independent" labor movement in Nicaragua isn't independent at all. It is almost completely dependent on the United States. (This is particularly true of the CUS and the CNMN; it may be slightly less true of the other CPT affiliates.) Thus, to the extent that it is U.S. policy to establish an independent labor movement in Nicaragua (whether or not that is U.S. policy will be discussed elsewhere), the AIFLD program, in some important senses, is counter-productive. It must also be said that in many other important senses it is right on course and doing a splendid job. This too will be dealt with elsewhere.

There are two other aspects of the labor scene in Nicaragua at present which need to be understood to fully grasp the present situation, AIFLD's role and the extent of its success in carrying out project objectives, and the scope of this evaluation.

The first is a continuing competition between the four politically-affiliated confederations (the CNMN is not included here). While they are united in their determination to take control and political influence away from the Frente Nacional de Trabajadores, the Sandinista central, they each have their own individual agendas. In part this is manifested in a kind of "numbers game" in strong sense (and in some cases can document) they all are carrying out. Numbers are power. The numbers of members (afiliados) and individual sindicatos each confederation can claim (in addition to the politico-economic sensitivity of the sectors in which their relative numbers are greatest) determines its relative standing vis-a-vis other members of the CPT (this will be of major importance when the eventual "pecking order" within the CPT comes to be formalized), within the power structure of the political party with which each is associated (although to varying degrees) and, one suspects, vis-a-vis AIFLD, particularly when the latter relationship is translated into relative shares of the funds AIFLD has to dispense. In this respect, in my interviews I checked numbers of individual union members, as far as I was able, against numbers provided to AIFLD

and by AIFLD to AID (and to me). In a significant number of cases (in my very small sample) the current numbers of individual members and even of constituent unions given to me by some of the union and federation officers with whom I talked (in February, 1992) were below the numbers reported to AIFLD as of June 30, 1991⁶. This "numbers game" factor probably also explains, to a great extent, why some of the confederations - most notably the CTN-a - list cooperatives among their affiliated unions, even though, to the extent that I was able to get a reading on it, cooperatives cannot legally affiliate with and hence cannot be counted as members of labor confederations.⁷

In this respect a further comment is in order. Although my sample was much too small to draw any general conclusions based on those numbers, it seems clear to me that the same numbers game was going on in 1990 and 1991. Thus, although the absolute numbers may be off by some percentage, the gains in members registered by the CPT confederations still represent a significant accomplishment and are real.

One further manifestation of the numbers game is the extent - troublesome and growing - of the inter-CPT piracy ("pirateo") currently taking place between those confederations. In addition to trying to win over FNT unions, the CPT confederations

⁶. For example, The CPT Data Base ("DB") as of June, 1991 (Annex F) shows a figure for "Total Unions" for CAUS of 88 with 29,589 members. Current figures given to me by CAUS show 70 unions (plus 70 "Campesino Organizations" including 15 Coops) with a total membership of 46,000. The FENITRAS (CGT-i) Sindicato de Trabajadores y Empleados del Hospital "Dr. Manolo Morales" in Managua is held, in the DB, at 614 members. That union currently claims 500 members. The Sindicato de Trabajadores de TELCOR in Leon is show in the DB as having 192 members; the current number they gave me was 60. The (CNMN) Sind. de Maestros Independientes de Estell shows in the DB as having 462 members; the figure they gave me was 250. Likewise the teachers union in Masaya shows in the DB as 700 members while the figure they gave me was 300.

There also are examples of numbers that exceed those in the DB, but this must be considered a more "normal" situation given the fact that continued recruiting drives have been going on between June 30, 1991 and the time of my interviews. Thus, for example, the (CAUS) Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Fabrica Nacional de Fosforos now has 80 members as opposed to the 60 shown in the DB. The CGT-i SCAAS of Granada now claims 225 members as opposed to 90 in the DB. The Federacion de Maestros de Managua shows 2,657 in the DB and now claims 5,000 members.

All of this suggests nothing more to me than that these numbers are tenuous at best and that, while efforts should continue to be made to refine them and have them collected on an annual basis, it would be unwise to attempt to draw any very firm conclusions from them at the present.

⁷. I did not have time to confirm this, but it should be checked. There is a bit of an anomaly here since the Direccion General de Cooperativas, the government body controlling the formation and governance of coops, is in the Ministry of Labor. Further in this regard, it should be pointed out that the vast majority of cooperatives thus listed are rural/campesino coops, and that the Sandinistas made a particular effort to organize campesinos. It is estimated that campesinos constitute about 50% of the total work force of Nicaragua.

are raiding each other. They recognize this as a problem and at a meeting called by AIFLD during the course of my work in Nicaragua they agreed to try to solve it within the framework of the CPT. This effort will need continuous follow-up and encouragement.

A second aspect of union life in Nicaragua, particularly at the confederation level, is its semi-clandestine character. Given the history of the union movement in Nicaragua and particularly the climate in which it was born and which continued with greater intensity during the Sandinista period this is hardly surprising. The labor movement always has been viewed with hostility by the existing power structures in Nicaragua. Indeed, given the continuing power of Sandinistas within the existing democratic structure in Nicaragua, this still is the case to a fairly great extent. Thus, some types of information still are difficult to get, or even to ask for. Therefore, for example, I did not examine the books of any individual union or confederation. I found early on in my interviews that even peripheral questions about accounting such as: "Did you get any help in setting up your accounting records? What system of accounting do you use?" were met with immediate suspicion. To have persisted in this line, it was quite clear to me, would have poisoned my interviews. Thus, I dropped that question. AID project managers should be aware that this sort of sensitivity exists and should negotiate carefully with AIFLD the types of information that the latter should and should not be pressed to supply.

IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES

A. Membership

During the period of the Cooperative Agreement under review membership in the democratic labor movement in Nicaragua rose from 72,355, organized into 194 unions⁸, to 183,264 members organized into 427 unions⁹. Specific increases, by confederation, are shown below.

<u>Confederation</u>	<u>July 1, 1990</u>		<u>June 30, 1991</u>	
	<u>Unions</u>	<u>Affiliates</u>	<u>Unions</u>	<u>Affiliates</u>
CUS	38	18,455	184	44,667
CTN-a	32	9,800 ¹⁰	69	8,388 ¹¹
CGT-i	26	9,697 ¹²	77	78,269
CAUS	52	28,203	103	39,940
CNMN ¹³	46	6,200	96	12,000
TOTALS	194	72,355	427	183,264

⁸ Memorandum of April 23, 1991, Ellison to Brooks, op. cit., with changes made my DL (see footnote 3. below).

⁹ Memorandum of July 23, 1991, Ellenberger to Estrada and Donovan, op. cit., as modified per note 4. below.

¹⁰ Despite reservations about the June 30, 1991 figures (see footnote 4.) these numbers are taken as given, since there is no break-down showing numbers of cooperatives.

¹¹ I have subtracted from the Data Base (Annex F.) 145 cooperatives with 3,820 members since cooperatives cannot legally affiliate with labor unions. See Footnote 5, Section III, Background. There are a few, small cooperatives scattered elsewhere through the Data Base that I have not bothered to pick up since their inclusion doesn't change the thrust of the main point.

It probably is time, however, for AIFLD to start pushing for more accurate numbers reported on a regular basis. Coops should be excluded. Affiliated "unions" should be separated between those that have their personeria juridica and those - call them "pre-unions" - that are not yet recognized by the Ministry of Labor.

¹² Numbers submitted by CGT-i for the start period and reflected in the Ellison-Brooks memorandum, op. cit., appear to have been exaggerated. Subsequent inquiries suggested a figure of 26 unions as of June 30, 1990 as the approximately correct one. The number of members was extrapolated by taking an average of members per union (373) for all other confederations and multiplying it by 26.

¹³ Formerly the FSMN.

Thus, under the period of the Cooperative Agreement, 233 new unions were formed and 110,909 new members were recruited.¹⁴ This accomplishment is well in excess of the "estimates" in the CA that operations thereunder would "result in an increase in membership of at least fifty percent of the CPT's current total and the creation of twenty-five new unions".

Does this increase in numbers equate to a pro tanto strengthening of the democratic labor movement in Nicaragua? I would say: not entirely but substantially. Numbers are important (and that is not unique to Nicaragua). Further, while the numbers of members in the democratic unions were going up, there is general agreement that membership in the FNT is going down. So, by this measure "the Good Guys are winning". It must also be said, however, that the power of the FNT to disrupt the civil and economic life of Nicaragua does not appear to have been diminished to any significant extent.

There is also a qualitative aspect to all of this. While that is harder to get a handle on, I was impressed by the extent to which union leaders told me they wanted more advanced courses. They themselves felt the need to deepen their own capabilities in such fields as accounting, collective bargaining and union management. This indicates to me that while organizing work has been successful, strengthening the democratic labor movement in its qualitative aspects needs considerable additional attention.

AIFLD supported the CPT confederations in their organizing efforts by financing the courses and paying the union activists, the two main instruments of the organizing effort that the confederations carried out. In addition, AIFLD provided technical assistance in the form of a consultant to the CUS and to several embattled unions and in the form of higher level training courses for confederation and federation personnel. AIFLD financed, almost entirely, the operations of the CUS and the CNMN and provided important support to the other three confederations. In these three latter cases, the activists whose salaries were supported by AIFLD included the top officials of those confederations. These operations accounted for some \$312,000 of the

¹⁴ .My reservations about the accuracy of the numbers of members, as absolute numbers, already have been set out above (Sec. III. BACKGROUND). Nevertheless, as indicated, I think the gains realized as stated in relative terms are probably approximately correct. As to numbers of unions I think these probably are accurate with the reservation, stated above, about the start-date numbers and inclusion of cooperatives which principally affects the CGT-I.

These figures cannot be gender disaggregated at the moment. Although individual unions do know, and told me, how many of their members are women, they are not required to report those figures up the line and do not do so. In general the pattern of woman membership in unions is about what one would expect: it depends on the nature of the work. Female participation is greatest in the teachers' unions and in the health workers unions' (FENITRAS) and almost non-existent in the construction trades (SCAAS). Getting better information on the number of women union members should be a part of the general effort to increase accuracy of reporting suggested under footnote 11. above.

700,000 expended under the CA.¹⁵ (A more detailed evaluation of most of these components is provided below.) Finally, according to information provided by AIFLD¹⁶, the goals for the recruitment drives were determined in consultation with each of the recipient confederations and the Executive Director of AIFLD, and consisted in the determination that each confederation would attempt to first win back territory lost during the previous administration, then, secondly, to organize where no unions existed. Specifically, emphasis was to be placed on areas of the economy which showed particular sensitivity and vulnerability to illegal and unwarranted interruption.

Did these operations contribute "to increased and more active membership in independent unions?" That's difficult to prove directly without a sort of "post hoc ergo propter hoc" kind of argument. However, I am convinced that it did if on no other basis than that the contrary hypothesis - that AIFLD support had nothing to do with the growth of the democratic trade union movement during the period in question and that growth would have taken place without AIFLD support - is quite unlikely. While it is likely that large numbers of workers would have disaffiliated from the Sandinista unions in any event, once they had the freedom to do so, it is not likely that they would have turned to the democratic alternative - as opposed to non-affiliation - unless motivated to do so. And I believe that the courses and the activists - financed almost 100% and guided by AIFLD provided that motivation.

The Scope of Work for this study also raises the question: What does membership imply (e.g. what privileges and responsibilities are accorded to members). This obviously is linked to the question of whether the organizing activities set out above have resulted in a "more active" membership.

In the view of the union leaders and members I talked to "active" membership meant 1.) attendance at meetings and 2.)(very far behind in importance) payment of dues. Attendance at meetings, almost all agreed, is up as might be expected since overall membership is up. But whether attendance is up as a percentage of membership - which is how an increase in participation would have to be measured - no one could say. Many of the unions I talked to were new and even those with longer histories had no base-line data. In any event general membership meetings don't appear to be held too often - perhaps once every six months to once a year (the

¹⁵ Information provided to evaluator by Donald Ellenberger.

¹⁶ See Annex D, answer to Question 3.

pattern varies from union to union and from confederation to confederation)¹⁷. The longer-established unions do have annual meetings at which they elect officers. The officers of the newer unions normally were elected at the first organizing meeting and probably are those members who took the initiative to start the organizing effort. (It takes 25 signatures to apply for registration as a union.)

With further respect to general membership meetings it should be pointed out that these require expenses, such as the cost of renting a locale, and that very few of the unions have any income. The Boards of Directors of the unions do meet frequently however, at least monthly and often weekly. Furthermore I did get the impression that a good deal of informal communication with members does take place. It should be remembered that, in most cases, union members work together in the same work-site. And almost all of the union officers I talked to indicated, in their remarks and not in answer to a direct question, their consciousness of the need to stay in touch with their base. One example of this, though in reverse, was found in the complaints expressed to me by a number of teachers' unions that the CNMN had not consulted them adequately before agreeing to the new law governing teaching as a career which was promulgated recently by the Minister of Education.

Payment of dues is another question. Without exception and at all levels the need for dues - eventually - is understood and accepted. However, especially against the background of the compulsory dues paid to the Sandinistas during their period in power and the strong reaction against that, union leaders are unwilling to press now for payment of dues as a condition of membership. They argue that high unemployment and low salaries relative to the cost of living (both are true) make that impractical now. They also argue that compulsory payment of dues is prohibited under the labor code.¹⁸ I suspect they also worry about the fact that pushing this issue now would affect "the numbers" and this is certainly true.

Nevertheless, it must be said that there will not be a truly "independent" labor movement in Nicaragua, nor, probably, a truly democratic one until the individual unions are in a position to finance their own activities and those of their federations and confederations from their own resources. As it is today whatever possibilities of

¹⁷. Regulations under the Labor Code, which date from no later than 1966 but which were still in effect as of 1988, require that unions hold general assemblies no more often than once a month and no less often than once every three months (Reglamento de Asociaciones Sindicales, G.D.O. No. 93 (10-5-51) as amended, Art. 12, paragraph 4. The same provision would seem to apply to Federations (Art. 51) and Confederations (Art. 59). If these regulations still are in effect they don't seem to be widely known.

¹⁸. True, but not entirely relevant. Voluntary dues check-offs are legal, although there seems to be a problem here too. See below.

assistance that exist flow from the top down - the usual pattern in Nicaragua¹⁹. And, of course, the direction of resource flows determines the power relationships particularly where, as in this case, the resource/power relationships reinforce an existing cultural pattern. Breaking these two sets of mutually reinforcing relationships will not be easy.

Notwithstanding the disincentives set out above, some of the unions are taking steps in this regard. A number of the teachers unions have submitted the required forms, duly signed by each agreeing member, to request that their dues be deducted from their paychecks and paid to the union by the Ministry of Education. Others are in the process of getting those signatures.²⁰ Several of the construction workers unions (SCAAS) I talked to told me they collected dues from members who had "permanent" jobs, meaning jobs that would last for two to three months or more. They felt it would be unfair to try to collect dues from members who did not have "permanent" jobs, since unemployment in this industry is very high and consequently, even though a member might have a temporary job, he didn't know when he would get work again after the present one or two week job was done.

B. Organization/Institutionalization

A number of the questions raised in this section of the Scope of Work for this evaluation have been answered above. Have the independent unions become a more effective voice for their membership? Certainly. During the Sandinista period the few democratic unions that managed to survive had no voice at all. Neither did the thousands of workers forced into Sandinista unions who now have been free to break away and form their own democratic unions. They have a voice now and that voice is being heard, with varying degrees of effectiveness, across a broad spectrum of issues at both local and national levels.

Unions, with a good deal of help from their confederations, are participating in talks on privatization and making important gains including, in a number of cases, gaining shares and seats on the boards of directors for their members in the newly privatized enterprises. The CPT participates on an equal basis with government and business in the "concertization" process currently an important part of the political

¹⁹. It also is the usual pattern for AIFLD and for AID which have to work at the "wholesale" rather than the "retail" level. This simply is a fact of life.

²⁰. A number of such applications recently were rejected by the Ministry of Labor which has to approve them. This was done on the afternoon of the day on which the Minister of Labor told several of us, in answer to a direct question, that this voluntary dues checkoff system was legal.

scene in Nicaragua.²¹ And everywhere unions are entering into collective bargaining agreements, subject to the approval of their membership, with more and more bargaining units. (See Appendix D, answer to Question 5, for a more detailed listing of these.)

The assistance provided by the confederations to their constituent unions in organizing has already been described. Confederations also provide both legal and other technical assistance to their unions in negotiations and, importantly, in jurisdictional disputes with Sandinista unions.

Legally constituted confederations hold annual "Congresses" (the pattern varies somewhat) in which officers are elected and various points of policy are put to the membership to be voted on. Those confederations which do not yet have their personeria juridica are actively working from the base up, holding regional or trade-wide ("gremial") meetings to organize legal federations which then, in turn, will come together in a national congress to constitute themselves into a legal confederation.

So that "institutionalization", in the sense implied in the questions in the Scope of Work, is going forward. AIFLD is central to this entire process. It pays for most it.

But there is another sense in which "institutionalization" is not going forward at the speed or to the extent that the above answers to the Mission's questions might imply. This is partly touched on above in my conclusions regarding the whole issue of the need for self-financing and in the discussion of the extent to which local union leaders themselves feel their need for more advanced training in union management, collective bargaining, etc. Another aspect is elaborated on in the following section on TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING. The issue is sustainability. While many of the activities carried on under the CA and the follow-on three year program are, or could be, congruent with a deliberate attempt to build a sustainable institutional base for labor development in Nicaragua they are not presently designed to do that. I will have more to say about this below.

C. Project Design and Goals

1. The CPT

The CPT is, at present, an alliance among the heads of the five democratic confederations. It emerged (although it had started earlier, in 1987) as

²¹ "Concertizacion" is a process of continuing dialogue sponsored by the government to work out continuing problems as the economy and government shift from the practices of the Sandinista regime to an open, democratic set of policies.

one of the groups that supported the UNO in the electoral fight against Sandinismo and has continued in that line. The AIFLD supports the notion of a stronger CPT and has encouraged the idea but, wisely, is not "pushing" it.

The idea of a single labor central combining all of the democratic labor groups in Nicaragua is like virtue: everyone is for it, although opinions vary on exactly how to define it.

The concept receives its strongest support as a clear, powerful answer to the FNT. It also is supported as a forum or arbitrating device to eliminate pirateo, the growing practice of raiding between various unions and confederations within the CPT grouping.

There is no consensus, however, particularly at the base, about the extent to which a CPT can or even should attempt to bring together - or set aside - the different political tendencies of the four politically-affiliated confederations (the CNMN is effectively apolitical but they worry about possible politicization). One frequently heard opinion (repeated in the same words, so that I suppose it to represent a more-or-less organized body of opinion) is that the CPT should be formalized²² but that each confederation should maintain its own political line ("su propria bandera"). Even that is far from being a precise operating prescription. In addition to referring to political "line" or party affiliation, the phrase seems to include leadership. I.e. union members are less than sanguine about wanting to see their confederation's leaders subordinated to someone else. There also seems to be a related question of "operating style"; each confederation has its own and individual unions and union leaders know how to operate within it in Nicaragua's personalistic culture. I sense some fear among union leaders that a shift to a powerful CPT might result in a change in operating style that could have a negative impact on his or her relative position in the whole union structure.

The sensitivities here are enormous. They range from the personal to the jurisdictional to the political. The heads of the confederations have been criss-crossing with each other for years and this is bound to have built both some personal alliances and some other feelings of something less than full labor fraternity. Some of the raiding going undoubtedly is due to on-going disagreements as to which confederation has primary jurisdiction over particular trades; construction and banking are two that come to mind. Finally, politically, not only are there differences among the confederations relating to the political positions taken by the parties with which they are affiliated (though to varying extents), but affiliation with a strong CPT might raise political problems with some of the confederations vis-a-vis their own party affiliates.

²² Meaning it should get its Personaria Juridica, the status necessary to do business as a legal entity.

My sense is that the confederations are moving forward towards something more unified but very slowly and cautiously, feeling their way along without a fixed idea of how far this can or ought to go. And I think that AIFLD's present posture of supporting and facilitating the emergence of a stronger CPT, but not pushing it, is the correct one. This is particularly true given another area of potential sensitivity, namely AIFLD's known "special relationship" with the CUS and the better-than-even chance that Jose Espinoza, the Director General of CUS, will wind up as Sec. Gen. of a formalized CPT.

2. Other Matters

There is one other group of problems that needs to be discussed under the rubric of Project Design and Goals. This project doesn't have any goals. The opening paragraph of the Program Description in the Cooperative Agreement²³ says:

A. Purpose and Objectives.

"The purpose of this Cooperative Agreement (CA) is to assist AIFLD support CUS and other independent democratic unions through technical assistance and training. This assistance will support these unions in their efforts to play leadership roles in Nicaragua's organized labor movement."

This isn't a "goal statement" as that phrase is normally used in AID. It gives no hint of a final outcome of the project or, indeed, that the project might have a final outcome. The only thing approaching an "end of project" status projection is the sentence that says:

"It is estimated that the Grant will result in an increase in membership of at least twenty-five percent of the CPT's current total and the creation of twenty-five new unions in both the urban and rural sectors."²⁴

As already indicated, that estimate was exceeded by a considerable extent. But that doesn't get to the problem of project goals.

AID puts great emphasis on "Institution Building" as an essential component of all of its projects and particularly its projects in the area of Democratic Initiatives. (This project fell under that category and the follow-on three-year project also is carried under that rubric. As already indicated, one overriding purpose of this evaluation is to feed into continuing program/operations design under that project.) The sine qua non of institution building is sustainability, i.e. the end-of-project status must be an institution capable of operating on its own without further outside

²³ Cooperative Agreement 524-0308-A-00-0022-00 of September 28, 1991.

²⁴ Ibid. Page 8, fourth paragraph.

support. Neither the project under review, nor the follow-on, are designed to lead to that result.²⁶

The real problem here, it seems to me, is not a technical matter of project design nor even compliance with AID policy guidance on institution building and sustainability. Even though both of those questions are involved, the basic problem is a failure to set out clearly what this project is really about. Is it essentially a short-term effort designed to introduce modern labor-management practices in those key ministries and industries in which, presently, labor decisions are taken by union leadership and dictated to membership and are based on political grounds rather than the interests of union members?²⁸ Or is this project a long-term institution building effort which foresees a sustainable and truly independent and democratic Nicaraguan labor movement? Either of these objectives is feasible and both can be argued to be in the U.S. interest. This study does not pretend to say which is preferable.

However, I already have pointed out some particular instances in which operations under the present project will be affected by the decision taken on the question posed above. Several other particulars will be delineated below. But the essential point is that operations under the shorter-term objective will not lead to the longer-term objective; and operations designed to achieve the longer-term objective will seriously inhibit progress toward the short-term objectives. This project cannot simultaneously accomplish both sets of objectives.

²⁶ Indeed, the project under review goes in the opposite direction. In paragraph B.3. of the Program Description, under the heading of "Institution Building of Independent Unions", the agreement states:

"The CPT. . . does not have alternate income sources, so that in order to proceed with the organizing drive contemplated under this Agreement, AIFLD may provide basic budget support to the independent democratic trade unions. This support will not only cover basic administrative expenses required to effectively operate an institution, but will also encompass the provision of basic services, such as health clinics, for union members."

²⁸ The writer hopes that this euphemistic statement will be fully appreciated by the readers to whom it is addressed.

V. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING

A. Training

Between September, 1990, when the first courses were held under the cooperative agreement, through April 1991, when the funds allotted to this purpose ran out, 120 basic courses were held. In these courses, according to figures supplied to AIFLD by the confederations sponsoring the courses, training was provided to 9,947 individuals in more than 187 unions²⁷. Of the 9,947 individuals receiving training 3035 were women.²⁸

By far the bulk of these courses were basic courses in such subjects as labor law, parliamentary procedures, functions of union officials, leadership and unionism, etc. Included were two courses dealing with the role of women in labor unions. There was only one course on accounting for unions and strangely (to me) no courses on collective bargaining. The AIFLD Country Director and the Coordinator of Educational Activities sat in on some of these courses as a kind of spot-check. However, given the number of courses and the work-load of these two individuals this kind of spot-checking declined over the period of the initial CA and now is quite limited. In addition the Coordinator of Educational Activities, who is a Nicaraguan Congressman, gave some of the courses.

These basic courses were designed not only to train local union leaders, including leaders of unions in the process of formation, in required skills but also to motivate them to recruit new members and to form new unions. The success of this effort can be seen in the increases in unions formed and new members recruited (See Section IV. "EFFECTIVENESS OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES".)

Training needs are determined largely by the confederations themselves. Requests are submitted to AIFLD by each confederation for each course it wishes to sponsor. The requests detail the type of course desired, the number of participants,

²⁷ I take these figures as givens. I had no independent way of checking them.

²⁸ Source: AIFLD's "Monthly Report of Completed Educational Activities" (Annex C), based on information supplied to AIFLD by sponsoring confederations. Information on the number of unions participating in some courses is not given. Where no information is given I have used "1" as the number of unions reached. Where the only notation on number of unions is "varios" I have used "2". I think some of this information - particularly that provided by CAUS - needs to be taken with a grain of salt. That confederation, it will be noted, only reported on a consolidated monthly basis, rather than course-by-course as the other confederations did. Note, for example, that in October 1990, when CUS reported training 276 CAUS gives a consolidated figure of 1,100. In November the figures are CAUS 575, CUS 307. Similarly anomalous figures pertain throughout. It also should be noted, however, that CAUS used a system rather different from the other confederations. It held a series of one night courses at a number of different locations, rather than day-long or longer courses. This may account for some of the difference.

the location and a budget. These are reviewed by AIFLD but the review is generally limited to the reasonableness of the budget based on known cost factors. Participants are chosen by the confederations based on the particular unions or union leaders they want to form or strengthen. The number of courses sponsored by each confederation was determined largely by the total amount made available to each during the period of the Cooperative Agreement and this continues to be true.

Participants interviewed were uniformly positive about the value of the courses to them and about the presentation of the courses. In this latter regard I was particularly impressed by the positive comments of a number of teachers interviewed since it seems to me that they have a particularly good perspective on the quality of the courses.

The training courses are not evaluated formally, although I was told that informal evaluations are conducted by the confederations' training directors. These have never been reduced to writing, however, nor have they been transmitted to AIFLD. This seems to me to be a weakness but one that should be relatively easy to overcome.

The one universal "complaint" I heard from course participants was that there was no follow-up to the courses, no further deepening of their knowledge and understanding through further, advanced courses. I frequently put the following question to those who raised this issue: "Suppose that you were the training director of the confederation and you had a given budget for courses for a given year. The more basic courses you can give the more new unions you can help to organize and the more new members you could gain. By giving more advanced training to existing unions and union leaders you can strengthen those unions but at the cost of slowing down recruitment. How would you balance off those two functions in terms of what kind of courses - basic or advanced - to give?" The answer I got, universally, was "More advanced courses."

The question, it seems to me, goes to the heart of the issue raised above (Section IV. "EFFECTIVENESS OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES") as to the definition of U.S. goals for this project. If the goals are short-term, maximizing the number of democratic unions and union members particularly in key ministries and industries, then the present pattern of training, concentrating on basic motivational courses, is approximately correct. As suggested elsewhere, however, it needs to be better focussed. If, however, the goal is institutionalization of the Nicaraguan labor movement for longer term sustainability, then more attention needs to be paid to follow-up, advanced courses to strengthen existing but weak organizations. Specific suggestions raised in my interviews with union members were courses in union leadership and management, collective bargaining and union accounting.

B. Technical Assistance²⁹

Technical assistance provided under the project took two forms. First, there was a full-time consultant who worked primarily with CUS on organizational problems but who also did a certain amount of "fire-fighting" on specific problem cases. The decision to provide the services of the consultant under the project and the general outlines of what functions he would serve were worked out between the Executive Director of AIFLD and the CUS. Specifics were decided upon by the Country Director, reacting to the specific requests of the CUS. Further details will be found in Appendix D., in answers to questions 4 and 16.

Secondly, technical assistance was provided in the form of high-level specialized seminars and training programs targeted on specific issues and/or specific individuals. This advanced training, including training at the George Meany Center in the United States, was provided to 224 individuals of whom 69 were women. Decisions as to courses and participants were negotiated between the confederations and the AIFLD Country Director. Descriptions of these training programs will be found in Annex G.

The consultant services were very much appreciated by the CUS. It is difficult to go beyond that in an evaluative sense since the work was general and advisory.

Participants in the national and international seminars - and particularly the latter - were high in their praise. The general sense of those I interviewed was that they were able to be more effective in their union activities because of the training received. It should be remembered that people selected for this training - and particularly training at the George Meany Center - are "tapped", that is, their selection for this training indicates that they are considered to be the up-and-coming generation in the Nicaraguan labor movement. From what I saw of the people selected the choices made were excellent. They will pay off in the future not only in a stronger Nicaraguan labor movement but also in continued close ties between that movement and the AFL/CIO.

C. Impact Projects

²⁹. The definition of "technical assistance", as differentiated from training, is, admittedly, vague. I have chosen to define it as direct advisory assistance outside of the formal training programs. In this I depart from AIFLD's definition (see answers to Question 14, et seq., Annex D) chiefly by excluding social projects. Note that this definition makes some of the questions posed in the Scope of Work for this study unanswerable, since the questions presume assistance to individuals (e.g. gender disaggregation of recipients) whereas the technical assistance given was to institutions.

Although not included in the Scope of Work covering this evaluation and not included in the project budget, I thought it both useful and fair to mention these projects since they constituted a direct AIFLD contribution to the project. (Note that funding for these types of projects is included under the present three-year agreement.) A list of impact projects funded from March through December of 1991 is attached as Annex E.

As will be noted the bulk of these projects cover small-scale plant and equipment purchases. Some of them are humanitarian in nature such as payments to families of union members killed in the course of union activities. One, devoted to assistance to the San Juan de Sur Port Workers' commissary, has the potential of enabling that union to attract more new members and also to provide some financing, through profits, to the union itself.

Decisions as to which impact projects to finance rest with the AIFLD Country Director who, however, has received broad formal guidance from AIFLD/W on the criteria for impact project financing.

The availability of this small projects fund is a useful tool for the Country Director. However, great care must be taken in administering the fund to avoid the paternalistic approach referred to in other sections of this evaluation.

The San Juan del Sur commissary is an interesting and potentially valuable model for further investments of impact funds. That project should be evaluated to see whether it is working as planned or, if not, whether problems encountered were specific rather than contextual. (Including it within the present evaluation, although I considered it, turned out to be too time-consuming.) If the project is working, or could be made to work, consideration should be given to similar, income-earning projects elsewhere. This would fit in with the need to find ways, in addition to payment of dues, to help Nicaraguan unions achieve economic self-sufficiency and with the need to put relations between AIFLD/N and the Nicaraguan labor movement on a more business-like basis.

VI. ACCOUNTABILITY

A. Agreements

AIFLD works essentially on the basis of verbal understandings with the confederations. The only thing approaching written agreements are the exchanges concerning proposed cursillos. In the case of these courses confederations submit a proposal describing the course they want to carry out, topics to be covered, number of participants and a budget. AIFLD reviews these proposals, principally to see that the expenses projected are in line with known costs. If there is a question about the budget this will be negotiated out. Proposals are accepted or rejected mainly on the basis of whether AIFLD has the funds to cover the course (taking into account how much AIFLD had projected for each confederation for the year. This figure also is negotiated out with each confederation each year.) AIFLD does not get into course content or other details of the courses proposed either before or after the event.

Payroll costs - how many activists and others AIFLD will fund over the course of the year - also are worked out verbally with each confederation at the beginning of the year.

The question of whether AID should insist that AIFLD enter into written contracts with its grantees has been around for years.³⁰ While this evaluator considers AIFLD's arguments in this regard about the need for flexibility as less than convincing, the potential for mischief should any such written agreements be made public is a valid point in my view. This could come from at least two directions. The Sandinistas would use such documents to lessen the credibility of the CPT confederations. Taking money from outside the country - and most particularly from the United States - still would have a distinctly negative resonance in the minds of many Nicaraguans (even though the FNT and some of its constituent unions also are receiving money from abroad). But secondly, it is just as well that none of the five CPT constituent confederations know how much the others are getting. That would be apt to set up some kind of a "bidding war" between the confederations, add jealousies to those that already exist and probably lead to an augmentation of the numbers game previously alluded to.

Furthermore, as pointed out below, AIFLD has been able to develop a satisfactory understanding with the confederations as to what is needed and also has been able to introduce certain standard forms without a formal written agreement. Therefore it is difficult to see what objectives would be served by insisting on written agreements.

³⁰. For its latest manifestation in Nicaragua, see memorandum of 2/25/91 from Don Ellenberger, CD, AIFLD/N to Mila Brooks, USAID/N, DI.

B. Accounting System

The basic system used by AIFLD to assure that its funds are used for the intended purposes is comparatively simple but appears to be relatively effective. Basically AIFLD makes advances to the confederations for agreed purposes and the confederations, to get renewals of the advances, have to come back in with documentation on expenditures of the previous advance including receipts, etc. The system was a bit rocky during the earlier months of the CA, but by the end of the CA period AIFLD had developed standard documentation and firmer understandings with the confederations as to the degree of detail and proof of expenditure required. AIFLD's correspondence files bear witness to the constant attention it has paid to this problem and the effort expended to arrive at its present system.

Essentially AIFLD reimburses for two kinds of costs: personnel costs for activists (including the top officials of the confederations) and all headquarters personnel for the CUS and the CNMN; and the costs of training courses organized and carried out by the confederations.

Personnel costs are documented by submission of planillas, pay-roll sheets, showing the amount paid to each individual and signed by each as having received the funds indicated. AIFLD officials know the individuals receiving these funds - i.e. they exist - and, while AIFLD officials have no way of knowing that the activists spend full time carrying out their functions they argue that the confederations themselves can be counted on to police that since it is in the interest of the confederations that the activists do their jobs. I concur in that. While I can think of ways in which this system could be misused, I cannot think of a way to "police" it that wouldn't cost disproportionately more to administer than any possible savings.

The other general category of costs is that for training courses and seminars. In this case, after having agreed on a budget for a given course, the confederation sponsoring the course submits receipts against the budget. Reimbursement is made against expenses thus documented up to the agreed amount. I think this system is adequate while, again, not absolutely fool-proof. (False or marked-up receipts are possible of course. For example, my driver gave me a receipt for 13.8 gallons of gasoline for a car I later ascertained had an 11.0 gallon capacity.) But the potential for the diversion of any serious amounts of money under this system is minimal while any system set up to catch the minor amounts that might be diverted would be very expensive.

I do have the feeling, however, that AIFLD's admittedly limited personnel in country have not given enough priority - or perhaps simply do not have the time - to get around and see what's going on, sitting in on cursillos, for example, or talking to recently organized unions to find out who helped them organize and what additional

training needs they feel they have. This has already been touched on under the section of this report on Technical Assistance and Training.

I raised with AIFLD the findings of the Financial Audit of the Fiscal Year 1990 Economic Support Fund (ESF) Program for Nicaragua for the Period May 31 to November 30, 1990. Their response is included as part of Annex D. My review of AIFLD/N record keeping with respect to these problems³¹ (see above) would indicate to me, as a layman, that action has been taken by AIFLD to correct the problems noted.

³¹ Note the limitation in the scope of work for this evaluation: "This is not to be construed as an audit."

VII. ISSUES OF GENDER, MINORITIES AND CAMPESINOS

A. Gender

"Nicaragua is a machista society." I heard that phrase repeated constantly, by men apologetically (when I raised the issue as one of interest to AIFLD and to AID) and by women resignedly. And yet many of those same women, including importantly Secretaries for Women's Affairs in the confederations, expressed the opinion that women aren't doing badly in terms of representation at senior levels in unions, federations and confederations.

The "revelation" came when I asked what issues of particular interest to women were under discussion within the labor movement, or between the CPT and the government. The answer was: "None". My conclusion is that women in the labor movement in Nicaragua are affected as much by the prevailing cultural "machismo" as the men - not a unique situation.

One factor raised by both men and women was the fact that women's roles as "home-makers" (amas de casa) severely limited the amount of time they had to spend on union activities. In some cases this may have been rationalization but there is undoubtedly a strong germ of truth there. Only Nicaraguan women workers can sort out the truth from the rationalization.

Nevertheless, there are women in some relatively high positions in the labor movement even though, particularly at the confederation level, their positions tend to be "Secretary for Women's Affairs" and similar jobs. At the individual union level women seem (based on a small sample of interviews) to have relatively more power, proportional to their numbers, than they do at higher levels of the labor movement. Thus, not surprisingly, the teachers' unions and health workers' unions appear to have a larger number of female officers, in substantive posts, than do, for example, the construction unions. I also found women in substantive posts in individual industrial plant unions.

There are no numbers available to start to get a handle on the problem. Individual unions know how many women members they have; federations and the confederations do not. Overall numbers probably could be derived - though they would be out-of-date - from data available(?) in the office in Minlab that keeps the records of union registration and annual changes in membership.

The problem here, it seems to me, is one of consciousness-raising at all levels.

But the first requirement is data. And the easiest way to get it is to go back to the base unions.

B. Minorities/Indigenous Groups

About the indigenous groups in Nicaragua there is little to say in the context of this evaluation. The Miskitos, the Sumos and the Ramas were highly politicized during the war³² and were - and probably continue to be - strongly anti-Sandinista. However none of the information available to me would indicate that they are engaged in the kinds of activities or enterprises that would lend themselves to organization in a trade union context or that association with the trade union movement would offer any significant advantages to them.

The other large minority group in Nicaragua is made up of English-speaking blacks on the Atlantic Coast. This group has traditionally been beyond the "peripheral vision" of the Spanish speaking governing groups in Managua (and in San Jose, Tegucigalpa and Guatemala as well). They are not only black and speak English but they are predominantly protestant (el colmol pues).

There are black, English-speaking unions on the Atlantic Coast associated with the CPT confederations. They suffer from neglect. For example, of the 120 basic training courses financed by AIFLD under the CA, not one was held on the Atlantic Coast. (This does not exclude the possibility that some people from Atlantic Coast unions received training. Indeed, some did. I talked to some of them.)

Not all of this can simply be written off as prejudice, however. For example, I talked to two Atlantic Coast black women who held responsible positions at the Federation level. The additional problem - and it's a serious one - is the difficulty of communication between Managua and the Atlantic Coast. Anyone with recent experience of the Nicaraguan telephone system will start to appreciate the problem. Add to that the fact that there are no roads from Managua to the Atlantic Coast and that you cannot get to Bluefields (for example) and back in a single day by air.³³

If AID wants to insure a greater degree of participation by this group than it presently enjoys - and that should be done if only on equity grounds³⁴ - some special measures are going to have to be taken to achieve that result.

³² For a good condensed account see "Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family", Shirley Christian, Vintage Press, p.298 et. seq. That book also contains a useful summary of Sandinista treatment of the trade union movement beginning at p.292.

³³ This last factor prevented me from going out to Bluefields to talk to some of these groups, so I really don't have a feeling for what their specific problems are or how they see themselves as relating to the rest of the democratic labor movement in Nicaragua.

³⁴ There may be additional grounds for doing this. The English-speaking black population on the Atlantic Coast is strongly anti-Sandinista. For a back-ground on this see Christian, op. cit., pp. 300 et. seq.

C. Campesinos

Campesinos are not a minority in Nicaragua - indeed they still may constitute a majority of the Nicaraguan population. They are, however, a group that traditionally has been far out towards the end of the line - or beyond it - when it came to the distribution of government services or attention of any (positive) kind.

The Sandinistas talked a lot about land distribution and justice but their activities with respect to the campesinos seem to have been limited to a few experiments in advanced Marxist theory and a good deal of political organization/indoctrination.

' Today the four politically-affiliated confederations of the CPT, with the help of AIFLD, are all making serious efforts to organize campesino groups and bring them into their confederations. (See Annex F for the extent to which this was already happening as of the end of 1990-1991 CA.)

The reasons for this afan to organize campesinos whose interests, after all, are not completely congruent with and in some cases are opposed to those of urban workers, are not entirely clear to me although I asked about it frequently. In part I think it is due to sincere feelings that these are very poor people who Nicaraguan society has traditionally oppressed and who deserve a remedy. The natural remedy seen by the labor unions will only come through organization. And so they help them to organize. Part of the motivation also, I think, is the "numbers game" alluded to above with respect to both labor union politics and party politics³⁵. Another part of the motivation derives from the fact that the Sandinistas organized a number of campesino groups and the democratic labor unions are now trying to "get them back" or, at least, deny them to continuing Sandinista organizing efforts.

In addition to the cooperatives, which all of the confederations are helping to organize although not all try to count them as members, there are at least three types of "campesino" unions. First are the unions of full-time workers of agricultural enterprises; while they are "campesinos" in terms of their background and life-style, they are industrial workers whose interests are fully congruent with their urban proletarian brothers. A second group of campesino unions are composed of people who farm during the farming season and work for large farmers or other types of enterprises in the off season. Their unions are, I was told, organized to deal with their problems in the latter capacity.

³⁵ In this connection, note particularly the large number of campesino cooperatives listed as affiliates by the CTN-a (Appendix F). Cooperatives cannot legally affiliate with labor unions, a fact that the CTN-a blithely admitted to me.

There is a third group, however, that I think present a problem. These are "unions" composed of full-time farmers who do not habitually work off-farm or, if they do, the work is occasional and not with one habitual employer. The materials available to me do not break these unions out as a separate group and no one was able to give me even a good feeling for how many of them there might be. But the four concerned confederations admit³⁶ that there are a fair number of them and that they're trying to work with them. These people own their own land or rent or share-crop. They are their own "bosses". They have real problems but those problems have little in common with the problems handled by the labor union movement. Their problems are access to land and to credit for seed and fertilizer and marketing access³⁷. None of these is the daily grist of the labor union movement and I can't help but wonder whether the unions, with their very short resources for covering their own basic problems, ought to be encouraged to move out into this whole different area. The same reservation appears appropriate with respect to the on-going organizational effort directed at rural cooperatives.

³⁶ "Admit" probably is not the mot juste here. The people I talked to couldn't see why organizing efforts directed at this group seemed to present me with a problem.

³⁷ Another interest of the farmers - higher prices for their products - is in direct conflict with the interests of urban workers.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. AIFLD did a very good job of carrying out its responsibilities under the Cooperative Agreement. The basic problem identified during the course of this evaluation is not one of execution but of project design, namely, the project had no clearly stated objective. The project might have been intended as a short-term effort to introduce modern, democratic labor-management practices in key ministries and industries in which, at present, labor-management decisions are taken by union leadership (and dictated to union members) based on the political agenda of the union leaders and not on the bread-and-butter concerns of the membership. Or it might have been intended to move forward on a longer-range program: the creation of a sustainable independent, democratic labor movement through-out Nicaragua. While those two objectives are not mutually exclusive in a long-term framework, they would have resulted in quite different operational patterns in the term of the CA under consideration and also in the three-year CA presently being carried out.

The present three-year Cooperative Agreement between AID and AIFLD presents the same problem. Although some specific output measures are provided, unlike the case of the original agreement, the confusion of purpose noted above continues.

The problem is not, in the first instance, a resource question. Although considerable additional funding would be required, it theoretically would be possible to add the advanced courses in union management, accounting and collective bargaining that a longer term strategy requires to the present load of "basic" courses. Attempting to advance simultaneously on both agendas also would require funding additional confederation activists and AIFLD technical assistance to help design and oversee advanced courses and to design and provide follow-up advice on strategies for the short term objective. Here again, the additional funds involved probably could be made available if U.S. priorities were deemed to demand it.

More problematical is whether AIFLD (or anyone; this is not intended to cast doubts on AIFLD'S abilities) can simultaneously "push" on long range agenda items such as the need to collect dues, the need to pay more attention to the role of women and the place of English-speaking blacks in the labor movement and, in general, the whole series of attitudinal changes needed to fully institutionalize democracy in the Nicaraguan labor movement and push the CPT leadership into the sort of confrontation involved in the short term objectives indicated above. Either of these courses of action would pose serious threats and problems to those leaders personally, professionally and politically. The latter also might very well involve a serious element of personal danger.

Finally there is the matter of "operating mode". The fact of the hierarchical set of relationships - "paternalismo" - that presently governs AIFLD'S relationships with

the democratic Nicaraguan labor movement would be quite useful - maybe essential - to AIFLD's ability to negotiate with the CPT leaders the short range objectives intimated here. AIFLD can act as the leader. On the other hand a critical component of any strategy to bring about a truly independent labor movement in Nicaragua would require AIFLD to pull back from that role, a difficult and delicate maneuver. The two roles are incompatible.

Recommendation 1. AID and the State Department should decide which objective is to prevail in this project. The choice is between (1) the short term objective of introducing modern, democratic labor-management practices in key ministries and industries in which, at present, labor-management decisions are taken by union leadership (and dictated to union members) based on the political agenda of the leadership and not on the bread-and-butter concerns of the membership. Or (2) the longer range goal of building an independent, sustainable democratic labor movement in Nicaragua.

Recommendation 2(a). If the short term objective is the one decided upon, the CA should be renegotiated to provide for the following:

i. The Embassy should identify a "target list" of key public and private sector institutions now controlled by labor leadership elements whose private political agendas predominate over the bread-and-butter concerns of their members and who, therefore, are in a position to over-ride their members' interests by disrupting the economy of the country or otherwise paralyzing government operations.

ii. AIFLD should use this list as a basis for negotiating with the CPT confederations a strategy designed to hold out to the members of those unions the opportunity to affiliate themselves with the independent, democratic philosophy and practices of the CPT. This strategy, with a time-table for its accomplishment, should be made part of the Cooperative Agreement.

iii. Assistance to the CPT confederations in organizing outside of the target institutions should be limited to what is essential to gain their cooperation in the strategic objective and to provide the necessary degree of "credibility" to that objective.

iv. Training and technical assistance provided under the present CA should be limited to that consonant with point III above.

v. No emphasis would need to be placed on financial sustainability either through payment of dues or other means of providing income to individual unions or confederations.

vi. No effort or resources should be expended on the further development of the CPT except as and to the extent that that may be determined to be essential to the strategic objective set out under point i above.

vii. The Cooperative Agreement, while it should continue to be administered by AID under the present arrangements, should be managed by the Embassy Labor Affairs Officer.

viii. Once the short term strategy objectives have been achieved State and AID should re-examine the need to move on the longer range objective of helping the Nicaraguan labor movement to evolve into an independent, democratic structure.

Recommendation 2(b). If the longer range objective is the one decided on, the present CA should be renegotiated to provide for the following:

i. AIFLD should present a strategy and accompanying time-table for the creation of a sustainable democratic labor movement in Nicaragua. (This objective certainly will not be achieved within the period of the present Cooperative Agreement.) An essential part of this strategy would be a plan to change AIFLD'S "operating mode" from paternal to fraternal.

ii. The "key" institutions referred to under Recommendation 2(a) above, most of which are known to all the "players", would be regarded as targets of opportunity, to be picked up as opportunities present themselves, but not as priority objectives under the strategy.

iii. Operations under the revised CA should stress the need for financial sustainability, particularly at the base. This would include not only emphasis on payment of dues but also other measures that might serve this same purpose. (In this connection I note that USAID/N is at least tentatively thinking about a project to build up savings and loan co-ops. Should that thinking result in a savings-and-loan coop program, consideration might well be given to "jump-starting" such a program by using unions as a primary organizing target. Unions and cooperatives are a "natural" combination. Unions have not only the "cooperative culture" necessary to support any cooperative organization, but also, through their federations and confederations, the vertical skeletal structure that a cooperative organization needs to create.) In any event, financial self-sufficiency is an essential step to breaking the pattern of paternalistic relationships noted above, with their attendant dangers for AIFLD, USG and the Nicaraguan labor movement.

iv. Training should be refocused to pay more attention to the on-going training needs of existing, though still young, unions, through more advanced courses for union leaders and potential leaders, and relatively less to training focussed on mobilization. Advanced training should emphasize such subjects as collective

bargaining, union leadership and financial management. Democratic procedures also should continue to be stressed.

v. Technical assistance should be refocussed to put more emphasis on issues of sustainability and relatively less emphasis on "fire-fighting".

vi. The CPT as a "single center" is a useful idea but it may turn out, at least in the short term, not to be a Nicaraguan labor movement idea. That is, in the short term it may not be possible for the constituent confederations of the CPT to adopt "labor" positions that put them at odds with or even are independent of the political parties with which, to a greater or lesser extent, they are affiliated. This should not be a matter of great concern in the short term as long as party-confederation relationships are carried out in a reasonably democratic manner allowing the confederations a voice in party affairs consonant with the number of votes they can deliver.

Over the longer run, an independent labor movement capable of articulating its own, independent positions and of influencing policy "from the outside" - the AFL-CIO model - has much to recommend it. It should be encouraged and facilitated as opportunities present themselves but should not be "pushed". It would be useful but is not essential to the establishment of a sustainable independent, democratic labor movement in Nicaragua.

vii. This long range program should be managed by USAID/Managua.

3. Although women do occupy a number of important positions in the democratic labor movement and although data is lacking to arrive at any hard conclusions, I came away with the strong sense that women are under-represented in positions of real executive power in that movement. The first requirement is data.

Recommendation 3(a). (This recommendation would apply only if the decision made under Recommendation 1 above were for the long range option.) AIFLD, through the Cooperative Agreement, or USAID/N should finance a study to pull together (existing) data on numbers of women in the democratic labor movement in Nicaragua and the number (and hierarchy) of positions occupied by women at all levels of that movement. This study should be carried out by, or at least in close collaboration with, some of the women currently in executive positions in the CPT confederations.

Recommendation 3(b). This data collection process might serve as a "hinge" for an overall annual reporting requirement from each union to its confederation.

4. The indigenous groups in Nicaragua, the Miskitos, the Ramas and the Sumos, do not, at present, appear to be engaged in the sorts of enterprises that could

be helped by participation in the democratic labor union movement. However the predominantly black, English-speaking population of the east coast is engaged in such activities and they are organized to some extent. However, communications problems and the expense involved in traveling to east coast population centers from Managua have inhibited efforts of the democratic labor movement to reach out to these groups.

Recommendation 4. (To be implemented in the event that a long term strategy of labor movement development is decided upon pursuant to recommendation 1, above.) Specific funds should be earmarked under the Cooperative Agreement for activities to help east coast groups, particularly English-speaking blacks, organize and further perfect their union structures. Such activities should include inclusion in national and international training programs.

5. The lack of a formal system for evaluating project financed courses at all levels is a weakness that should be corrected.

Recommendation 5(a). AIFLD should insist that all project financed courses be evaluated formally and in writing and copies of all such evaluations should be given to AIFLD at the time vouchers are submitted for "reimbursement" of course costs. Evaluations should include individual (anonymous) evaluations by attendees³⁸. AIFLD should design standard questionnaires for this purpose. Comments also should be required from the federation or confederation officer responsible for training. Evaluations should, of course, note any weaknesses discovered and corrective actions to be taken.

Recommendation 5(b). AIFLD should monitor courses more intensively than it does at present. Even monitoring two to three courses a month would have provided coverage of 10% or better during the heaviest month of training under the 1990-91 project.³⁹

6. Cooperatives, although they are regulated by MinLab, are not labor organizations and cannot legally affiliate with labor organizations. (This does not mean that union members cannot organize themselves into coops. When they do, however, the union and the coop are distinct legal entities.) Yet some, at least, of the CPT confederations (notably the CTN-a and the CUS) are using project financed activists to help organize coops, principally among campesinos. It should be noted

³⁸ The possibility that some or most of the attendees at some courses may be illiterate should be kept in mind in designing questionnaires. One way to handle this would be to design, for those situations, a simple "check the box" type of questionnaire that could be filled out with appropriate assistance from the course instructor or a union official.

³⁹ See Annex C. There were 20 courses given in December 1990.

ANNEX A.

People Interviewed

U.S. Government

U.S. Embassy

Hon. Harry Shlaudeman, U.S. Ambassador
Ronald Goddard, D.C.M.
James Swan, Labor Affairs Officer

USAID/Managua

Janet Ballentyne, Director, USAID/Managua
Kenneth Schofield, Deputy Director, USAID/Managua
Lilyana Ayalde, Director, USAID/GPO
Kevin Armstrong, Deputy Director, USAID/GPO
Mila Brooks, Director, Office of Democratic Initiatives, USAID/GPO.

AID/Washington

Peter Sellar, AID/W, LAC/DP, DI

AIFLD

Samuel Haddad, AIFLD/Washington
Mike Donovan, AIFLD/Washington
Donald Ellenberger, Country Director, AIFLD/N
Dr. Nicolas Morales Amador, Coordinator for Education, AIFLD/N.

Government of Nicaragua

Dr. Francisco Rosales Arguello, Minister of Labor

Nicaraguan Labor Movement

CAUS - *has dropped Communist affiliation*

Roberto Moreno, Secretary General
Pio Santos, Secretary for Disputes

--Sind. de Trab. Fosforero Fernando Molla Jimenez Ind.
Alejandro Gutierrez, Sec. Gen., Josefa Pacheco Mendoza, Lita Moises
Martinez, Abelardo A. Justo C.

CGT-i - Socialist

Julio Paladino, President
Eddy Paramo, Activist

--Sind. de Trab. y Emp. del Hospital "Dr. Manolo Morales", FENITRAS
(Managua).

- Sonia Garcia, Seca. General
- Eleanor Joiner, Seca. de la Mujer
- Eduardo Murillo, Sec. de Prop.

--Federacion de la Industria de Trabajo de la Construccion y de la Madera
de Nicaragua.

-- Nilo Salazar, Pres. (Also President of SCAAS)

Officers and members of the following unions in Masaya: Hospitaleros,
Cocheros, Carteleros, Limpieza des Calles (La Comuna), SCAAS, CEMA,
ATM: Jose Rufino Zella Montoya, Porfirio Vazquez M., Eleanor Joiner
Laury, Ramon Zacaria M., Pablo Diez Garcia, Carlos Flores Garcia, Mateo
Doroteo, Encarnacion Silvio, Pablo Denis, Jorge Luis Mercado P., Jairo
Quintero, Giocanda Duarte S., William Morales, Francisco Luis P. Alfredo
Gonzales, Aguirre Garcia, Manuel Ramos Sanchez, Felipa Remigio.

-- Sindicato de Trabajadores y Empleados TELCOR, Leon.
Officials and Members: Raul Zelaya, Luis Carvajal.

-- Officers and members of the Ag. Coop La Montanita. (Some of these
people also were members of a Campesino union in the same area,
outside of Leon. It would not have been politic to ask them to write
their names or for me to have written them down.)

CNMN

Mario Casco, Secretary General

Federacion Sindical de Maestros de Managua
-- Cesar Cuevas, Sec. de Conflictos
-- Esperanza Crespo Vallado, Seca. de Cultura
-- Gladys Delgadillo, Fiscal

- Rosario Mendoza Reyes, Mauricio Hernandez Lieve, Jose M. Reyes.

Sindicato de Maestros Independientes de Esteli

-- Officers and members: Vincente Raul Gutierrez Ramirez, Sergio Rocha Salgado, Enrique Espinoza M., Ismael Rocha Molina.

Sindicato de Maestros Independientes de Granada (in the process of being organized)

-- Officers and members: Bayardo Antonio Morales Sequeira, Jose Leon Sandeval Ugarte, Jose V. Castillo Campos, Juan Manuel Fuentes Lopez, C. Ramirez, Domingo Hernandez Rosales, Federico Emilio Diaz Barrios, J. Rene Bejorano P., Pablo Joaquin Herrera C., Rolando Garcia Quintanilla, Ausiliadora Mena Rivera.

Sindicato de Maestros Independientes de Masaya

-- Officers and members: Arsenio Vivas Lopez, Bertha Rosa Zaleno Reyes, Miguel Flores Vivas, Enrique Martinez Garcia, Brenda Morales Palacios, Sergio Paranu Lopez, Marlene Arias Flores, Rigo Carrion, Freddy Antonio Lopez Floria.

CTN-a - *Social Christian*

Antonio Jarquin R., Secretary General
Manuel Castillo F., Rel. Nac. y Int.
Irwin Francisco Reyes, Sec. de Organizacion
Juan Rafael Suazo Torillo, Miemb. del Directorio

FAS (Federation)

Sind. de Trabajo de METASA

--Mauricio Vallejos Vargas, Sec. Gen.
--Francisco Lopez H., Sec. de Conflictos
Afiliados: Manuel Castillo, L. Estrada.

CUS -- *Social Democrat*

Jose Espinosa, Secretary General
Melania de Chamorro, Secretary of Women's Action
Roger Guevarra Zeledon, Activist.

Federacion Democratica de Trabajadores de Ocotul
-- Altagracia Arauz, Sec. General

- Medaniz Acuna, Sec. de Acta y de Acuerdos
- Marcos Osorio, Sec. de Conflictos
- Narciso Rodrigues, Fiscal
- Aurora Altamirano, Tesorera

Afiliados: Martin Lopez Cruz, Rogelio Zelaya Lopez, Porfirio Zelaya Lopez, Manuel de Jesus Zelaya Lopez, Eledanio Ruiz Gillen, Gregorio Talavera, Rosio Medina Lagos, Danelia Flores Cardoza, Ramon Suazo Ordonez, Manuel Inestrosa Hernandez, Jose Guevara Gutierrez, Dora Andrea Alvir Rodriguez, Maria Magdalena Lopez, Jesus Benavides Alfaro, Francisco Cardoza Flores, Jose R. Salgado.

Federacion Democratica de Trab. Bancarios, Afines y Anexas de Nicaragua.

- Ing. Ag. Guillermo Bone Pantoja, Sec. Gen.
- Econ. Pedro Rafael Valladares Ponce, Sec. de Actas y Acuerdos.

Six members of a campesino union in the Department of Leon.

ANNEX B.

Bibliography

Cooperative Agreement between AID and AIFLD No. 524-0308-A-00-0022-00 of September 28, 1990 covering AIFLD operations for the period from July 1, 1990 through June 30, 1991.

PIO/T No. 524-0316-3-10094 authorizing the present three-year Cooperative Agreement between AID and AIFLD for work in Nicaragua.

Documents Provided by AIFLD/N:

-- Lists of training courses for September, October, November and December, 1990 and January, February, March and April, 1991. Lists indicate name of course, site, dates, number of class room hours, number (of students) that started course, number that finished, number of women in each course and the number of unions participating. Lists also indicate no courses were given in May or June, 1991.

-- CPT Organizational Data Base as of June 1991, by confederation. Under each confederation lists constituent federations and unions, number of members and location of each union and sector.

-- CPT Organizational Data Base as of June 1991 by Sector. Same information as above organized by sector.

-- RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. DAVID LAZAR - EVALUATION OF AIFLD COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT - JULY 1990 - JUNE 1991. (Attached as Annex D.)

Leyes Basicas del Trabajo, Republica de Nicaragua; Barcelona, July, 1988.

Memorandum of February 25, 1991, D. Ellenberger to Mila Brooks, "Subject: AIFLD/N Operating Structure."

Financial Audit of March 4, 1991, of the Economic Support Fund program for Nicaragua for the period May 31 to November 30, 1990.

AID Project Status Report, October 1, 1990 to March 31, 1991.

AID Project Status Report, April 1 to June 30, 1991.

Base Line Data, Democratic Labor Confederations as of July 31, 1990; memorandum of April 23, 1991, Gordon F. Ellison, CPD - AIFLD/N to Mila Brooks.

AIFLD/N Quarterly Report, January to March, 1991; Memorandum of April 18, 1991, from D. Ellenberger to Jose Estrada, Assistant Director, AIFLD/W and Michael Donovan, Director Finance, AIFLD/W, cc: to Mila Brooks.

AIFLD/N Final Report on Cooperative Agreement; memorandum of July 23, 1991 from D. Ellenberger to Jose Estrada, Assistant Director, AIFLD/W and Michael Donovan, Director of Finance, AIFLD/W, cc. to Mila Brooks.

AIFLD/N budget status as of November 30, 1990.

AIFLD/N budget status as of April 30, 1991 with notation from AIFLD/W "We expect the funds of \$700,000 to be depleted in 5-71."

Christian, Shirley - "Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family", Vintage Press.

ANNEX H.

List of Acronyms

- AIFLD:** The American Institute for Free Labor Development. As used in this report, this normally refers to the office in Managua, with "AIFLD/W" referring to the Washington headquarters.
- CAUS:** Central de Accion y Unidad Syndical. Affiliated with the Nicaraguan Communist Part.
- CGT-i:** Confederacion General de Trabajo (Independiente). Associated with the Socialist Party.
- CNMN:** Confederación Nacional de Maestros Nicaraguenses. The democratic teachers' union. No party affiliation.
- CTN-a:** Confederacion de Trabajadores Nicaraguenses (Autentico). Social Christian orientation.
- CPT:** Congreso Permanente de Trabajadores. A nascent umbrella group bringing together the independent, democratic labor confederations.
- CUS:** Confederación de Unificación Syndical. Social Democratic.
- FNT:** Frente Nacional de Trabajo. The Sandinista labor confederation.
- MINITRAB:** The Nicaraguan Ministry of Labor.