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EVALUATION REPORT

Somali Refugee Settlement Mid-Term Evaluation

(649-0140)

November 1988




Table of Contents

Glossary	Page
1.0 Executive Summary	i
2.0 Background	1
2.1 Impetus for the Project	1
2.2 Project Identification Document	1
2.3 Project Paper	2
2.4 Conditions Precedent	2
3.0 Purpose of the Evaluation	3
4.0 Evaluation Methodology	3
5.0 External Factors	4
5.1 Conflict in Northern Somalia	4
5.2 National Economy	5
5.3 UN High Commission for Refugees	5
6.0 Project Inputs	5
6.1 Project Cost Estimates	6
6.2 Studies	6
6.3 Technical Assistance	7
7.0 Project Outputs	7
7.1 Outputs in PP	7
7.2 Rapid Impact Projects	7
7.3 Settlement Sub-Projects	7
7.4 Land Tenure	8
7.5 Current Project Activity	9
8.0 Project Purpose	10
8.1 Project Paper	10
8.2 Progress Toward EOPS	11
8.3 Discussion of Project Purpose	11
8.4 Discussion of Options	14
9.0 Goal	15
9.1 Project Paper	15
9.2 Discussion	15
10.0 Beneficiaries	15
10.1 Project Design	15
10.2 Actual Beneficiaries	16
10.3 Issues	18
11.0 Project Implementation and Management	18
12.0 Project Assistance Completion Date Extension	21
13.0 Conclusions	21
13.0 Recommendations	22

Appendices

- Appendix A - Evaluation Scope of Work
- Appendix B - Expanded List of Evaluation Issues
- Appendix C - Logical Framework
- Appendix D - Bibliography
- Appendix E - List of Individuals and Agencies Contacted

GLOSSARY

A.I.D.	United States Agency for International Development
AID	Agency for International Development
AID/S	U.S. Agency for International Development/Somalia
AID/W	Agency for International Development/Washington
CDSS	Country Development Strategy Statement
CP	Conditions Precedent
CIP	Commodity Import Program
DDD	Domestic Development Department/Ministry of Finance
DAI	Development Alternatives, Inc.
ECPR	Executive Committee Project Review
EOPS	End of Project Status
F/X	Foreign Exchange
FY	Fiscal Year
GSDR	Government of the Somali Democratic Republic
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
LOP	Life of Project
L/T	Long Term
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture/Somalia
MOF	Ministry of Finance/Somalia
NRC	National Refugee Commission/Somalia
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PACD	Project Assistance Completion Date
PP	Project Paper
PID	Project Identification Document
REDSO	Regional Economic Development Services Office/AID
RMR	Resource Management Research, Ltd.
RIP	Rapid Impact Project
S/T	Short Term
SCF	Save the Children Federation (USA)
SRSP	Somalia Refugee Settlement Project
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
OF THE
SOMALIA REFUGEE SETTLEMENT PROJECT (649-0140) MIDTERM EVALUATION

1. DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT

1.1 The project addresses the problem of continued dependency of refugees upon the Government of the Somali Democratic Republic and donor agencies for food and basic services.

1.2 The purpose of the project is to test viable alternatives to refugee camps which enable refugees to become fully integrated, self-supporting residents of Somalia, thus enabling GSDR and donor resources, which now support refugees, to focus more fully on development.

2. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION AND METHODOLOGY USED

2.1 The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the Project's implementation to date with a view to enhancing performance and potential impact.

2.2 The evaluation team held interviews with private voluntary organizations, the National Refugee Commission, UNHCR, key officers in the Ministry of Agriculture and USAID, and others to discuss the project and associated issues. The team studied the Project Paper, project files, and related documents. It visited one refugee camp and settlement area.

3. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

3.1 To date less than 15% of the total \$4 million U.S. dollars obligated for the project have been committed.

3.2 Eighteen months after the Conditions Precedent were met the Project has resulted in only one Rapid Impact Project (RIP) being approved. From the date of proposal submission to approval of the grant has taken at least 12 months. A second RIP is in the final step of the approval process. AID funding levels for each RIP activity are under \$200,000, while the GSDR contribution is under an equivalent of \$51,000.

3.3 Except for the two PVOs referred to in 3.2, other eligible PVOs presently show little interest in applying in the future for grants. The Refugee Settlement Project has been in competition with the PVO Development Partners Project which provides larger grants for non-refugee development activities. These PVOs would probably apply if the process and criteria were modified. Nevertheless, at this time it appears that no more than \$2.0 million would be absorbed by new grants.

3.4 The Ministry of Agriculture's position is that it prefers that refugees should settle in rural areas. The Ministry supports assistance related to income generating activities if these are within agricultural settlements and if training is also available to local people. Because of the MOA position on income generating activities in towns and urban areas, it is unlikely that the project will have tested the viability of various income generating activities on the basis for economic self-reliance.

3.5 The UNHCR recent decision to phase out its relief assistance to refugees in mid 1990 does not affect the validity and viability of the Project goal and purpose, but does invalidate some of indicators of project purpose as stated in the Project Paper.

3.6 Guidance to PVOs in preparing proposals has not been clear about identifying the key characteristics of the beneficiaries, in particular the number of refugees vs. local populace, males vs. females, and female headed households, as required by the Project Paper. Also the grantees are not required to report on indicators of the economic, social and technical benefits received by these groups.

3.7 The two RIPs focus on refugees who had already taken initiative in obtaining legal rights to land. Settlement of refugees under the project depends on them having legal rights to land, but the formal registration process is extremely cumbersome, slow and relatively costly. PVOs do not consider it their responsibility to secure land titles for the refugees.

3.8 The GSDR has designated large blocks of land totalling thousands of hectares for refugee settlement. Individuals and groups of refugees have also been able to obtain access to land through arrangements with local farmers. In order to receive project assistance, however, the land must be registered at least temporarily at the district level. Unless the land registration process for individual group and company farms can be carried out more expeditiously, the project is unlikely to benefit a significant number of refugees even if it is redesigned and extended.

3.9 Project management has been satisfactory.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 The project should be redesigned and the completion date extended with the following changes:

4.1.1 A formal statement should be submitted to AID by MOA outlining methods and procedures to be used in expediting registering individual and group/company land for settlement of refugees under this project. It is recommended that the agreement include a) the MOA's intent to register both land currently designated for refugee settlement and applications from those who have obtained agreement with the local people, and that this land would be registered and titled in the name of the individual head of household, group, or company as requested by the applicants, for 50 year leases in accordance with Agricultural Land Law (No. 73) of 1975, b) the intent to continue to make local funds available to finance surveying of land for refugee settlement, c) the MOA's intent to officially communicate with the respective District and Regional Agricultural Officers and instruct them to give priority attention to registration of the land, and d) procedures for handling the documents once they are received in MOA's national office of land registration and tenure.

4.1.2 The indicators of project purpose and expected End of Project Status (EOPS) should be modified to reflect the recent UNHCR decision to phase out of refugee relief and to have the EOPS reflect the redesigned project.

4.1.3 The RIP and settlement sub-project components should be combined into a single fund which would be available to eligible PVOs. While the criteria for use of the fund should be modified, the emphasis on low cost per direct beneficiary should be retained.

4.1.4 After a project concept document has been approved by the MOA and USAID, a limited amount of project funds should be available to enable the PVO to do studies and analyses required for development of the sub-project document. The PVO would submit the terms of reference and budget to the Review Committee for approval. The amount of money for each sub-project development grant should not exceed \$20,000 and be related to the total amount projected for the sub-project.

4.1.5 Written guidelines which contain the criteria for use of grant funds and the format for project concept papers should be developed and made available to all eligible PVOs operating in Somalia. Also an outline for sub-project proposals should be developed specifying questions to be answered within the various sections.

4.1.6 The project should continue funding the Project Coordinator position for an additional 18 months to provide adequate management for implementation of design changes in the Project.

4.1.7 The project completion date should be extended to 1993 to permit time for sub-project proposal development, approval and implementation.

4.1.8 One year after redesign the project should be reviewed to determine if the project redesign changes are having the intended effect. If not, a decision should be made to deobligate the remaining funds.

4.1.9 The redesigned project should have a mechanism to enable the MOA and USAID to consider requests for funding of activities that support refugee related business and other income-generating activities that would complement refugee settlement.

4.2. The MOA should further clarify its position on training and other assistance which would permit refugees to live and work in towns in income-generating occupations which make them economically self-reliant. (Mogadishu, Kismayo and Hargeisa are considered urban and therefore ineligible sites for project activities.)

Representatives of the USAID mission had attended the PID ECPR which was held on January 10, 1986. The ECPR approved moving forward with PP design following GSDR acceptance of a low cost self-help approach as part of their refugee settlement strategy. This had been one of the major issues holding up design as the GSDR favored large-scale capital intensive settlement schemes.

2.3 Project Paper (PP)

The project paper was approved in June, 1986. The amount of funds proposed for the project was significantly lower than was originally proposed in the PID. Furthermore many unresolved issues remained which included the issue of land tenure for settlement. The mission and the GSDR engaged in protracted negotiations concerning project design over an 18 month period. The ECPR recommended a lower level of funding and suggested that funding be made incrementally. Furthermore, the ECPR set a deadline for completion of negotiations so that the project could move forward to authorization and initial obligation. It was at this point that the parties worked earnestly to resolve remaining issues and to proceed with final design. The limited amount of time remaining for project design activities placed a considerable burden on the design team to complete the design before expiration of the ECPR imposed deadline. This resulted in insufficient time being allocated to complete full analysis and resolution of all outstanding design issues. Had these been completed, the project may have been in a better position to address current implementation constraints.

Authorization of the \$4 million Somalia Refugee Settlement Project (SRSP) was on July 16, 1986. The host country contribution is a local currency equivalent of \$1 million and a further contribution of \$1 million in in-kind support, land and labor. Total project funding including GSDR and PVO contributions is \$6 million. The PACD is June 30, 1991. The Migration and Refugee Assistance Act provides funding for this project. USAID obligated \$4 million of which only \$578,000 had been committed as of September 30, 1988.

2.4 Conditions Precedent (CPs)

The Grant Agreement for the SRSP specified two CPs for first disbursement: 1) specimen signature of the GSDR representative authorized to act for the Government and 2) confirmation from the MOA that local currency funding for the project had been set aside by the Ministry of Finance for 1987. The Grant Agreement signed on January 7, 1987, further specified that these CPs had to be met within 90 days from date of signing the Grant Agreement. The first condition was met within this time period, however an extension to June 7, 1987 was necessary to enable the second CP to be met. Unfamiliarity on the part of the project manager with Ministry of Finance (MOF) procedures for accessing local currency funds was the primary reason for this delay. MOF normally receives applications for local currency in October/November for following year funding, however the grant agreement was not finalized until early January 1987, and the local currency funding request to the MOF followed thereafter. MOF confirmed local currency funding for the project in mid-May, 1987.

A further delay in project start-up occurred in obtaining confirmation of GSDR acceptance of PIL No.1 which had been sent to the MOA by the mission on February 17, 1987. The GSDR confirmed acceptance on May 14, 1987. During this interim period, the MOA proceeded with obtaining local currency for the project.

Project implementation activities commenced nearly one year after authorization and nearly three years after the PID was approved, a significant time gap considering the level of urgency given the situation during PID preparation.

3. Purpose of the Evaluation

The evaluation team was asked to assess the Project's implementation to date with a view to enhancing performance and potential impact. In particular, USAID is not satisfied with the pace at which the project is being implemented. It called for an evaluation to determine whether the project should be redesigned or the funds reprogrammed for refugees. The evaluation report is expected to present findings, conclusions and recommendations which will provide a basis for USAID and the GSDR to make decisions about the future of the project.

The Project Paper called for the first evaluation during the 18th month of the four and one-half year project. This evaluation has taken place 20 months after the Project Agreement was signed and 18 months after the Conditions Precedent were met.

The scope of work of the evaluation team is contained in Appendix A. Appendix B elaborates on project issues to be addressed.

4. Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation team studied the Project Paper and the USAID project files to familiarize themselves with the design and the evolution of project activities. In particular they reviewed documents related to the procedures and process of approving the Rapid Impact Projects (RIPs). They also consulted other documents related to the situation of refugees in Somalia.

The team held interviews with Private Voluntary Organizations eligible for funds under the SRSP in order to determine reasons for the low number of submissions for RIPs, and to obtain views on changes in project design which might make the project more attractive for PVO involvement. The perceptions of these PVOs and others were sought concerning the potential impact of the recent announcement of UNHCR to phase out of refugee camp maintenance and support by mid-1990 and regarding other issues related to refugee settlement and income generating activities.

Meetings were held with the National Refugee Commission (NRC) and with UNHCR to discuss the project and related issues. Also the team consulted with the Refugee Coordinator in the American Embassy.

In addition several meetings were held with people in the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and USAID about the project and external factors which have affected it. Useful information on project management and administration was obtained from the MOA Project Manager, Mr Hassan.

The team made a field trip to Qorioley, Lower Shabelle, the site of the Save the Children Federation/USA (SCF) program and its proposed RIP activity. The team was taken to Qorioley by the Country Director of SCF. During the visit they held discussions with Project staff and visited the proposed RIP site. The plans of the team to travel to Luuq to visit the people involved in the RIP activity of World Concern had to be cancelled since their project manager had to be in Mogadishu for meetings during that period. Attempts were made to visit the Jalalaqsi refugee camps but arrangements could not be made due to other commitments of the PVO and UNHCR staff involved.

A draft of the evaluation was presented to MOA and USAID. The conclusions and recommendations were discussed with them prior to the team's departure.

The evaluation team was composed of a project development officer from REDSO/ESA, Mr. Gregg Wiitala, and a social scientist from REDSO/ESA, Dr. Carolyn Barnes. Also, Mr. Ibrahim Dagane Ali from the Planning Division of the Ministry of Agriculture served on the team. The assistance of Mr. Frank Catania, the Project Coordinator, and Mr. Weston Fisher, USAID Agricultural Officer, enabled the team to carry out its work efficiently within the time allotted for the evaluation, October 31st to November 20th.

5. External Factors

5.1 Conflict in Northern Somalia

At the time the project was authorized approximately 40% of the refugees in Somalia resided in camps in the North. The project anticipated that northern Somalia would be an area of substantial project activity. A full-time administrative coordinator for the project was stationed in Hargeisa. However, the situation has changed drastically since the start of hostile activities in May 1988. Prospects for project funded activities in the northern part of Somalia are minimal at this time and the administrative coordinator position has been terminated. Several PVOs working with refugees in northern Somalia have also left and their return is unlikely in the near future.

While most of the PVOs that left the north are still in Somalia, they have not as yet established alternative sites in other parts of the country to continue their work. Some may do so at a later date, but the inability to work in the north has significantly reduced opportunities for project funded activities.

5.2 National Economy

The GSDR is facing an extremely difficult task in trying to reverse the serious decline in the national economy that has occurred in recent years. The annual inflation rate is estimated to be over 100%, external debt is now close to \$2 billion, and increasingly there is an annual budget deficit. These factors have contributed to the present economic situation.

The condition of the national economy directly affects project implementation. GSDR financial contributions and personnel resources are an integral part of the project. As project activity has been less than originally anticipated, the demands for GSDR resources have also been comparatively low. Demands for direct GSDR resources (local currency contributions and personnel) will increase as project activity increases. Furthermore, continuation of settlement activities after completion of the project requires foreign exchange to finance commodities (spares for pumps, agricultural inputs, fuel) which have often been in short supply. Should this situation continue, it will affect not only settlement start-up activities, but also the settlement schemes' prospects for continuation in the post project period.

A deteriorating economy combined with increased diversion of resources for internal security contribute to increased constraints on project implementation.

5.3 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

The UNHCR is a major contributor to the Somalia refugee program. The recent decision of the UNHCR to phase out its support for refugee camp maintenance and care will significantly affect the future of the Refugee Settlement Project by removing the option of continued full maintenance in the refugee camp and thus require refugees to decide between repatriation and some form of settlement. The views of the evaluation team are presented in Section 3.3 "UNHCR Relief Phase Out."

6. Project Inputs

The SRSP consists of four components: (1) Rapid Impact Projects, (2) Site Assessments for Settlement Sub-Projects, (3) Settlement Sub-Projects, and (4) Monitoring and Evaluation. The PP identified three sources of funding: AID, GSDR and "other." "Other" included contributions of land, labor and other in-kind contributions from beneficiaries. The cost estimate was as follows:

6.1 Project Cost Estimates:

Summary in \$ 000

	AID	GSDR	Other
Settlement Activities	2990	800	1000
RIP	(790)	(400)	(280)
Settlements	(2200)	(400)	(720)
Technical Assistance	640	100	
Long-Term	(440)	(50)	
Short-Term	(200)	(50)	
Commodities	80		
Vehicles/Spares	(50)		
Computers	(20)		
MOA Office Materials	(10)		
Support Costs	90	95	
P.O.L.		(5)	
FSU	(90)	(90)	
Evaluation/Audit	200	5	
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Totals	4000	1000	1000

TOTAL (all sources) \$6 million

The evaluation team has examined project inputs, but found it difficult to assess at this time the degree to which these inputs are adequate as only two categories, technical assistance and commodities, showed significant activity. Draw down of funds for these two categories has been according to plan, but total commitments to date represent less than 15% of project funding.

The project has accessed GSDR local currency contributions for support of the MOA project management office. Although administrative support for MOA was not included in the PP budget, USAID did approved this line item following a request from the MOA. \$20,000 in local currency was approved in 1987 for MOA project management expenses. The World Concern RIP proposal contains a local currency component which was received in October, 1988. This would indicate that FVOs can access GSDR local currency funds.

6.2 Studies

Under an earlier Project (Refugee Settlement Design, 698-0502) the consulting firm Resource Management Research (RMR) was contracted to conduct a country-wide survey that would identify 10 locations that would be suitable for refugee settlement. This was to have been followed by a comprehensive analysis under the SRSP of each of the sites to determine the optimum use of the sites for settlement activities. RMR failed to produce their report and the

contract is now in dispute. RMR's assignment was based on an assumption from their proposal that they had certain data required for this study. In retrospect RMR did not have the required data at the time they were awarded the the contract and therefore could not complete the assignment. No further progress has been made on site assessments.

A study of refugee attitudes (REBASE: Refugee Evaluative Baseline Attitudinal Survey Effort) also funded in part from the Refugee Settlement Design Project, was completed by DOLCO International Consultants in August, 1987. This report concluded that a majority of refugees would accept voluntary participation in repatriation programs. The study also concludes that their data would not be very helpful in the selection process for refugees to participate in settlements but it would provide baseline data for planning future refugee settlement activities. The study was of only limited value to the project for planning refugee settlement activities.

6.3 Technical Assistance

The project provided funding for two technical advisors, a project coordinator to work with a MOA counterpart and an administrative coordinator in Hargeisa for project activity in the North. Suitable candidates have filled both of these positions, however the Hargeisa position was subsequently eliminated because of insufficient project activity in that area to justify the position.

7. Project Outputs

7.1 Project outputs described in the PP include the following:

- GSDR has resources to design and implement settlement activities
- 5 Rapid Impact Projects completed
- 2 settlement sub-projects implemented
- 1,600 refugees families benefitting from participating in project activities

7.2 Rapid Impact Projects (RIP)

These are short-term (up to one year) sub-project activities that had two purposes: 1) to continue to provide support to organizations that assisted camp refugees seeking settlement in Somalia, and 2) to gain practical experience and information on settlement possibilities. Experience gained from RIPs would be used in the design and implementation of the settlement sub-projects. Each RIP was estimated to cost about \$150,000.

7.3 Settlement Sub-Projects

Settlement sub-projects are considered to be activities of longer duration and larger scope than RIPs. Approximately \$1

million was budgeted for each sub-project. Settlement sub-projects are to follow the same low capital cost approach as RIPS, although the effort is to be a more comprehensive approach to agricultural enterprises with an appropriate mix of agricultural activities on individually cultivated plots. The PP also states that income generating activities other than agricultural production should be considered for urban and semi-urban areas. These activities might include agricultural small-scale enterprises, labour intensive construction, mechanical workshops, and textile/leather working. A limited amount of infrastructure assistance may also be included in this activity. Funding is allocated for two settlement sub-projects.

7.4 Land Tenure

Rights of land tenure for refugee settlements has been a major issue from the beginning of project design. A land tenure analysis was included as part of the PP design. The analysis concluded that it would be unlikely that "unused and available land" could be identified for refugee settlement as most productive land is already claimed through registration or customary use. Therefore, a mechanism would need to be developed by government which would enable land to be obtained and rights of tenure secured through negotiations with current claimants. Both legal statutes and customary practice affect the ownership and use of land, the latter often prevailing.

Although a land registration procedure exists, it is a slow and expensive process especially for refugees who often lack the influence or financial resources often necessary to complete the process. Furthermore, PVOs do not consider it appropriate for them to accept responsibility for refugee land registration. PVOs are willing to assist, but they consider the onus to be upon the Somali government and the refugees to resolve land issues. GSDR has allocated some local currency funds to assist with land surveying for refugee settlements, but no application to access these funds have been made to date.

To date the project has had only two RIPS against which to review the land tenure issue and how it affects project implementation. In the first case the refugees had already started the process of negotiating with the land owners who eventually became part of the RIP. In the second case, the land for refugee settlement was part of a government land parcel that had been reserved for refugee settlement. In both situations land tenure issues were resolved before the PVO submitted the RIP proposal. Future proposals for project funding should continue to review land tenure as part of the review process. A statement on the status of the legal rights to land should be part of the initial concept paper.

7.5 Current Project Activity

As previously stated in this report, delays in implementation and the low level of PVO interest in the project to date have resulted in a correspondingly low level of project output. Rapid Impact Projects are only just starting, the land use survey was not done, and no larger settlement sub-project activities have been proposed.

World Concern's Luug RIP is the only project so far approved. This was done in June 1988. A second RIP proposal from Save the Children Federation/USA is now in the final review stage. With only one recently approved RIP proposal, little in the way of RIP funded project activity can be seen in the field at this time.

The delays in project implementation and low response from PVOs for RIP grants make it unlikely that the larger sub-project settlement activities will start as planned in the third year of the project. This element represents over 50% of total project funds.

Even if all five RIPs were approved and implemented according to the original implementation plan, it is unlikely that the remaining amount of time in the project would enable the sub-projects to become fully operational. There is insufficient time between the RIP activity and the proposed start-up of sub-projects to benefit from the experiences gained from RIP activities.

The PP listed several on-going settlement activities that would be likely candidates for RIP funding. None of these activities sought funding, but the notion that project funding could be best used to support settlement activities that are under way is still valid. The early stages of settlement development can often be lengthy and have low input costs as this is the community formation and land acquisition period. RIP activities were thought capable of completion within less than a year. However, it is not generally possible to accomplish meaningful results in agricultural settlement in such a short time. The format of PVO activities funded under the project needs to be revised with a view towards a phased and orderly process of settlement activity over a longer period of time.

The evaluation team met with the six US PVOs (SCF, CARE, World Concern, Church World Service, Mennonite Central Committee, and Africare) who are currently working with refugee agriculture or have previous experience in this area. The PVOs were asked if they intended to continue working with refugee agriculture and income generating activities and what level of support would be required for their efforts. Two of the organizations (Mennonite Central Committee and Church World Service) stated that as a matter of policy they do not seek U.S. government funding and one organization (Africare) expressed less interest in refugee settlement as they were not presently working in that sector. The remaining three organizations did express an interest in long term funding for refugee settlement. Further discussion of the activities being proposed would likely result in a maximum requirement of \$2.0 million over a 3-4 year period.

Given the relatively small number of eligible PVOs that are interested in receiving funding from the project, it is likely that even if the PACD were extended to accommodate a further 4 years of project activity, a balance of \$1 million may remain upon project completion.

One non-U.S. international PVO, Japanese International Volunteer Center (JVC), expressed interest in project funding. While they are actively involved in refugee settlement, the question of their eligibility would need to be resolved. However, JVC does not need funding until after 1990.

8. Purpose

8.1 Project Paper

The purpose of the project is to "test viable alternatives to refugee camps which enable refugees to become fully integrated, self-supporting residents of Somalia, thus enabling GSDR and donor resources, which now support refugees, to focus more fully on development." This is the purpose level statement which appears in the main text of the PP and in the Grant Agreement. The language in the Logical Framework Matrix (Appendix C) differs slightly from this but the intent is the same. It reads:

"To develop and implement viable pilot alternatives to refugee camps which enable refugees to become integrated, self-supporting residents of Somalia, to redirect governmental and donor assistance for refugees, and to provide information necessary for overall national planning of settlement activities."

In spite of the latter being dropped from the other statements of project purpose, it is implied in the rationale for piloting or testing alternatives.

The following are stated as objectively verifiable indicators of achievement of purpose:

- refugees settled in integrated communities and making progress toward achieving self-sufficiency
- food aid to refugee camps reduced
- food aid to settlers being phased out
- various types of income generating activities have been tried by sub-projects which lead to self-reliance of beneficiaries.

By the end of the project, the following conditions (EOPS) are to be achieved:

- at least 2 pilot settlement projects designed, implemented and evaluated

- at least 5 rapid impact projects implemented building on refugee initiative, providing refugees and their neighbors the means to increase self-reliance
- the GSDR having tested and established a viable process whereby settlement projects are appraised, implemented, monitored and evaluated

- at least 1,600 refugee families engaging in activities which demonstrably lead to self-sufficiency.

8.2 Progress Toward End of Project Status

The section on inputs discusses reasons for the slow progress being made in achievement of the project outputs. If the project continues without any significant changes in its design or termination date (1991) the anticipated EOPS will not be reached. This conclusion is based on the following. Only one RIP proposal has been approved and a second one is in the final stage of approval. Presently no other eligible PVOs are considering applying for a RIP grant. It has been taking up to 15 months to review and approve the Rapid Impact Project proposals and PVOs are required to invest a significant amount of time to apply for relatively small grants averaging \$150,000 from USAID. Also no proposal under the larger settlement sub-project component is likely since the proposal review process would take up to 12 months and such an activity would probably require a minimum of three years of assured funding. Thus, the target number of families will not be reached.

Even if the EOPS were to be met, would the project purpose be reached? The answer to this critical question centers primarily on the recent UNHCR decision about refugees and refugee camps. Secondly, one should understand what was meant and implied in use of the terms "pilot" or "to test" in regard to alternatives to refugee camps.

8.3 Discussion of Project Purpose

Pilot Alternatives The PP discusses two basic alternatives to refugee camps: agricultural settlement and income-generating activities in urban and semi-urban areas. A project concept paper was submitted by a PVO which centered on facilitating settlement of refugees in urban areas through assistance with enterprise development. At the USAID and MOA meeting to review the concept paper, the MOA expressed a negative reaction to urban settlement. It was concerned that such sub-projects would move refugees from rural areas to already crowded towns in which they would compete for jobs with Somali nationals.

In a general discussion on the possible role of income generating projects in refugee settlement, the Ministry participants said that the Ministry supports business or other skills training

with the caveat that these be within the agricultural settlements. Training should take place at sites which allow both refugee and local non-refugee populations to participate. Apprenticeship or vocational training programs in towns would not be supported because these would encourage refugees to remain in urban areas. In seeking further clarification of the Ministry's position, the evaluation team was informed that the income generating skills under any project activity should be tied to agriculture and that "urban" particularly meant Mogadishu, Kismayo and Hargeisa. It was unclear if the MOA "policy" position also applied to other towns.

Several of the PVOs working with refugees have encouraged and supported income generating projects, such as butcheries, tea shops, and knitting/weaving. However, these have never been established on the basis of enabling the owners and their families to become economically self-reliant as a result of that activity; rather the aim has been to provide a source of income. The absorptive capacity of the agricultural areas and small market towns makes it unlikely that more than a few refugees could earn enough money from a given enterprise or income generating activity to enable them and their families to become self-supporting on the basis of that single activity. Even if the income earning activity provides a complementary income for the family, the feasibility of providing skill or vocational training will depend on the absorptive capacity of the area and the economy in general.

Other income generating activities that may be appropriate and complementary to refugee agricultural settlement activities include agri-business and agri-industrial activities. Examples of these activities are agricultural input supply, mechanical workshops, food processing, and equipment hire services.

In terms of agricultural settlements, the project was specifically geared to low cost models. Both RIP and settlement sub-projects were to cost no more than \$300 in foreign exchange costs per beneficiary. Among the various settlement model options, the RIP addresses low cost services to voluntary settlements or those refugees in the process of voluntarily settling. The sub-projects are directed at low cost organised settlements and production/income generating schemes.

Prior to designing the PP, Somalia had undertaken settlement of some 100,000 victims of the 1973-74 drought and in 1984 the GSDR proposed to settle 3000 refugee families from Qorioley camps at Furjano. Both represented a full service, capital intensive, organized settlement model involving high cost per direct beneficiary. In the Furjano area the GSDR set aside 16,000 hectares for settlement of refugees. (Since the PP various studies related to Furjano have been carried out. The latest assessment recommends against both irrigation and mechanized fallow and proposes a lower cost per beneficiary model. Current plans are to have a pilot project to settle 200 refugee families who would be engaged in dryland farming and livestock production on family plots of 3 hectares.)

Lessons were derived from the large-scale settlement of the victims of the 1973-74 drought in Somalia. By 1984 only two of the

agricultural settlements remained, each with about 50 percent of its original settlers. The fishing settlements had continued with a slightly better record of retaining the original settlers. The lessons included:

- emphasis placed on providing social services and infrastructure resulted in high costs per beneficiary;
- initial attempts to organize the schemes as state farms, employing the settlers as laborers did not provide sufficient remuneration;
- insufficient attention was given to carrying out soil analysis, and;
- concentration of assistance on settlers created economic and parity imbalances with local villagers since they were not originally included.

Drawing on these lessons the SRSP was designed to implement various types of low cost settlement schemes to determine factors which contribute to economic and social viability. The term pilot was used since the designers hoped that success under this project would result in redirecting GSDR and donor assistance from refugee camps and high cost settlement models to low cost settlement and income generating schemes. To facilitate this redirection, documentation would be required to demonstrate success and constraints. Furthermore, the site and activity assessments to be financed by the project were expected to identify more suitable sites than were targeted for settlement support under the SRSP.

UNHCR Relief Phase Out In a letter dated 6 October 1988 from the High Commissioner for Refugees to the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, GSDR, UNHCR conveyed its plan to phase out of relief assistance to refugees in Somalia by the middle of 1990. The reasons for this are:

- a) the agreement on 3 April 1988 between GSDR and Ethiopia which resulted in the opening of the border between the two nations and brought an end to refugee status for most refugees in Somalia; and
- b) the continued dependency of refugees on outside assistance years after their arrival

The UNHCR position is that "repatriation is the best solution for the great majority of refugees in Somalia." Those refugees who put forward valid reasons for not wanting to avail themselves of the protection of their home country, i.e. who politically are unable to return and hence are still "refugees" will receive assistance through UNHCR's effort to mobilize organizations to support regional development and income-generating activities for the genuine refugees and local population. To stress its intent, UNHCR plans to phase down the amount of rations which the refugees receive, beginning in January 1989.

- a) this decision more than any project activities and information will lead to redirecting governmental and donor assistance to refugees and others who may remain;
- b) food aid to refugee camps will be greatly reduced, but the reduction will not indicate achievement of project purpose;
- c) the food aid to those being settled under the SRSP will be phased out as part of rations, but might continue at some level through food for work or another mechanism.

GSDR responded to the UNHCR decision in November, 1988, but that response has yet to be made public. Many PVOs are waiting to learn the GSDR's position prior to considering what they might do in response to this policy change.

It is difficult to project the number of persons who will want to remain in Somalia and will be classified as "genuine refugees" and hence receive UNHCR supported assistance with settlement. The experience gained under the SRSP may provide lessons and models for the settlement of these people.

8.4 Discussion of Options

As discussed above, the status of refugees and refugee settlement is in the process of change. These changes affect indicators of achievement of SRSP purpose as well as the rationale for testing or having pilot schemes. Furthermore, the EOPS will not be met by the end of the life of project.

Attention has been given during the evaluation to options for allocating the remaining refugee funds which would contribute to reaching the stated goal (see section 9 for goal level discussion). Several options were considered but rejected. For example, turning the funds over to UNHCR for regional development and income-generating activities for the "genuine" refugees and the local population is not a viable alternative since the genuine refugees are unlikely to be determined until early to mid 1990 and hence programming the funds and implementation of activities would take place over a rather extended period of time.

Use of the funds to settle the 575 refugee families, who are currently farming at least one hectare, in the area proposed for the Baardheere dam reservoir was given careful consideration. These families are slated for settlement along with 13,000 local people who will be displaced by the reservoir which will be created by the Baardheere dam. The World Bank has commenced the early stages of the appraisal process for a "Baardheere Resettlement and Agricultural Development Project." It proposes that these schemes include the local population together with the displaced people and be based on a full range of services and infrastructure and development of irrigated agriculture. Several steps are required prior to movement of the local people and selected refugee

families. Movement of the families is unlikely to take place until at least 1991. The evaluation team concluded that SRSP involvement is not feasible because all of this is still in the early planning stage, the timing is uncertain and refugee settlement will need to be coordinated with settlement of local families from Baardheere.

The Baardheere reservoir is expected to displace some 100,000 other refugees who are not slated for assistance under the World Bank proposal. This number includes an estimated 1,200 families who are farming less than one hectare. While UNHCR expects that almost all of these people will be repatriated, this seems unlikely. If SRSP is redesigned and the completion date extended, some of the PVOs eligible for project funding may decide to initiate settlement or income generating activities for those who intend to stay without refugee status.

9. Goal

9.1 Project Paper

The goal to which the SRSP contributes is "to resolve the refugee problem in Somalia and thereby to decrease the burden of support on the GSDR and the donor community." An indication of achievement of goal attainment is: "all able-bodied refugees are settled in Somalia or have been repatriated, camps contain only orphaned children and the infirm."

9.2 Discussion

The UNHCR decision to phase out its relief assistance will significantly contribute to the achievement of this goal. The SRSP can also assist in meeting this goal if it is redesigned and the completion date extended as recommended in the previous sections. A redesigned project would include assistance to those who have refugee status and those formerly with refugee status who wished to settle in Somalia.

10. Beneficiaries

10.1 Project Design

The Project Paper specified "at least 1,600 refugee families engaged in activities which demonstrably lead to self-sufficiency" as a project output. While the Logical Framework Matrix and other statements on the project purpose mention only refugees, the purpose statement on the Project Data Sheet mentions neighboring communities. The criteria for sub-project and RIP selection acknowledge that some of the local non-refugee population may be included in the beneficiary group. The inclusion of local inhabitants who are not refugees as beneficiaries was recognized as an important consideration. In some cases inclusion of Somali nationals as beneficiaries is a prerequisite for the refugees to gain rights to land and to be accepted by the local population and hence become "fully integrated..residents of Somalia."

One of the project strategies is to focus and build upon refugee initiatives in farming and other economic activities. At the time of the PP design it was known that some refugees had arrangements which gave them access to crop land, while others had received training and were engaged in non-farming income generating activities. It is these refugees in particular which the RIPS were to benefit.

The SRSP was designed to specifically help refugees "who wish to become economically self-sufficient and settle in Somalia". The criteria stated in the PP for sub-project and RIP selection included the following:

the proposal must discuss how the RIP/sub-project will select refugees for participation; and

the proposal must identify the number of beneficiary families, disaggregated to identify numbers of refugees vs. local populace and males vs. females, and identify those households which are women-headed.

A section entitled women in development discusses responsibilities of female refugees. It points out that most reports indicate that women-headed households predominate in the refugee camps. Although a number of the women may have spouses outside of camps who provide them some financial support, many women provide the primary source of family income in addition to carrying out family care and maintenance responsibilities. The PP implies that the constraints on these women (e.g. time required for family maintenance and care) might prevent them from undertaking economic activities which would enable them to become self-reliant. Hence they would tend to be excluded from participating in and benefiting from the project. However, "the proposals for grant funding will show the intent to incorporate women, the measures taken to overcome constraints and the type of involvement anticipated, as well as the target number of beneficiaries" (pp. 17-18).

10.2 Actual Beneficiaries

As mentioned previously, only one RIP has been approved and a second one is at the final step of the approval process. The proposal by World Concern contained the following information about the intended beneficiaries as obtained from community leaders.

Number of refugee families	150
Number of local families	22
Number of female headed families	31
Number of adult males	225
Number of adult females	187
Number of ration cards	83
Number of individuals receiving rations	401
Total number of families	172
Total number of individuals	1019

The four groups of farm families which will participate in and benefit from the World Concern RIP grant come from two refugee camps

near Luuq. Together they had obtained legal rights to 94 hectares and were in the process of legalizing an additional 78 hectares. One group had obtained legal rights to 20 hectares of land and the other had legal rights to 17 hectares. As a result of previous assistance from World Concern they were irrigating with pumped water. Another group of farmers had obtained legal rights to 35 ha and the fourth group was in the process of registering land when the proposal was submitted. Thus, the "selection" process actually involved identifying groups who had taken the initiative to obtain land and those who were already farming on land to which they had legal rights.

Furthermore, the selection process involved agreement of the farmers that they would turn in their ration cards at an appointed time, based on a determination of farm income. It has been projected that a net income of 30,000 Somali shillings per hectare per year should be considered adequate for granting independence from refugee ration cards. But, as the figures above indicate, most of those involved in the project do not hold ration cards for a variety of reasons and thus are not receiving rations.

Most of the refugees who will benefit from the World Concern RIP were involved in farming in Ethiopia. Many of these refugees have also received additional agricultural training.

The 172 families involved in the World Concern sub-project will receive benefits in the form of: 10 new pumps and 2 older pumps rebuilt, agricultural extension advice, access to a donkey cart, wheelbarrow, one sewing machine, a maize grinder, a crop storage facility, two ferries, fruit seedlings, wells, a school and health facility. Certain inputs such as pumps and donkey carts are expected to be sold at subsidized rates. The community will provide labor for buildings and the installation of the ferries.

The Save the Children RIP activity will benefit 100 families who have organized themselves into two agricultural companies which separately obtained legal rights to land. One group has 150 hectares it acquired in 1983 and each of the 50 families has been allocated 3 hectares. The second group has 200 hectares of adjacent land acquired in 1986 and each of the 50 families received 4 hectares. Originally these groups wanted to develop their land into irrigated farms, but due to questions of water availability and suitability of the soil it is being developed into rainfed farms. While a few of the individual plots have been cleared by hand, the density of the bush and its rapid regeneration make it difficult to prepare the land for cropping. SCF expects to receive funds from UNHCR to carry out clearing by tractor.

The characteristics of the beneficiaries are highlighted below, based on a survey conducted by SCF for the RIP proposal.

Total Number of Families	100
Total Number of Men	205
Total Number of Women	243
Total Number of Children*	714
Total Number of People	1162

* Under 20 years of age

The following head of household characteristics are significant: only 27 percent were either farmers or farmer/herders in Ethiopia. Most had been engaged in business/trade (43%). Since being in the refugee camp, however, 71 percent have been engaged in farming on some scale. This indicates the interest and ability to switch into crop production. In addition, it is likely that a significant percent of the wives of male headed households had been engaged in crop production in Ethiopia.

Under the SCF RIP activity the 100 families will benefit from access to agricultural extension advice, seeds and hand tools.. Also each family will receive a donkey and cart which will allow them to transport drinking water and food to the farms (some 5-8 km from homes in the camps), enabling them to stay there during the high labor season and to transport their harvest. The family may also generate an income from its use. Moreover, since rainfed farming involves a risk, the grant will provide means by which to assure a sufficient income for the one year in three when rainfed crops can be expected to fail. One settler group will be given a diesel corn shelling machine and the other a diesel sesame oil pressing machine. One machine will be owned by each agricultural company. The operators will receive training from the SCF business advisor.

10.3 Issues

Information was not collected and analyzed in the SCF proposal to permit identification of female headed households and local farmers. SCF was unaware of this requirement when they carried out their survey. The PVOs are provided with the OPG format, but specific project data requirements are communicated verbally.

The sub-project grant agreements require that quarterly progress reports include "economic, social and technical impacts of the project on rural development activities." Nothing in the grant agreement requires that an analysis be done on indicators of the distribution of benefits, such as the economic benefits received by women, or of the economic and social impact on the local community.

11. Project Implementation and Management

For a chronology of project implementation activities refer to Section 2.6. One EOPS for this project was to have assisted the GSDR in developing its capability to establish a viable process whereby refugee settlement projects are appraised, implemented, monitored and evaluated. Furthermore, the USAID CDSS strategy for refugee assistance encouraged greater utilization of line ministries and PVOs as leading implementors for all settlement programs. The project intended to integrate relief with development assistance, and thus it was important to set up an implementation mechanism that was both flexible in its ability to respond to a multitude of issues and demands likely to come from new refugee agricultural settlements, and on the other hand, be in position to take advantage of potential longer-term institutional support and assistance that would be provided by a line ministry. The long-term nature of settlement schemes further supported this approach. The premise

stated in the PP that organizations which came into existence to address refugee needs (NRC, UNHCR, and the Steering Committee) will eventually diminish in importance as problems associated with refugees are resolved is still valid. Settlement is a much more permanent situation and will continue to require some assistance, such as extension services, in the post refugee settlement period.

As the National Refugee Commission (NRC) has a mandate for coordination of refugee activities and is responsible for the GSDR's overall refugee policy, the PP stipulates that mechanisms to foster communication and coordination with the NRC be maintained. As such the PP stressed that the project should not overburden the NRC with routine operational matters. In this respect the project appears to have been functioning adequately.

The project's main implementation agency is the MOA (special refugee settlement office). This office has a full-time project manager. This project manager serves as the counterpart to the USAID project coordinator. This arrangement is working satisfactorily and the evaluation team does not recommend any changes. A project coordinator will be required if the project is to continue although this may not require a full-time person. The USAID project coordinator has been able to assist with setting up a project management system in the MOA, but low levels of actual project activity have contributed to underutilization of the office.

The project coordinator maintains an office in the USAID mission. The GSDR project manager has a separate office outside the main MOA complex. As project activity increases, it would be appropriate for the project coordinator, who is counterpart to the GSDR project manager, to spend the majority of his/her time in the office of the project manager.

The six RIP proposals submitted to date have given the evaluation team adequate data upon which to evaluate the review procedure. The review process as outlined in the PP proved to be too cumbersome for this project. Even before this evaluation some improvements were made as the result of an internal review by USAID and MOA. Some streamlining procedures took place which allow for simultaneous proposal review by both MOA and USAID followed by a joint meeting for action on the proposal. While this process is an improvement over the original review process, it could still be a lengthy process, especially if there were additional information requirements. Even with these changes in the review process, it took 15 months to complete the review process for the World Concern RIP proposal. To date 8 months have lapsed since the start of the SCF RIP review.

Both the World Concern and SCF proposals have experienced delays in obtaining an environmental clearance from AID's regional office in Nairobi (REDSO/ESA). This arrangement is not practical for reviewing these proposals. It would be better to have the mission's environmental officer review the proposal for environmental soundness as part of the routine project review. The mission has the authority for environmental reviews of grants up to \$500,000. These settlement activities generally do not have

significant environmental concerns that cannot be addressed by the mission's agricultural staff. Should potentially complex environmental constraints be identified, the Regional Environmental Officer is available for consultation.

This review process is too long for the relatively short-term and low cost RIP proposals. As RIPs are intended to fund the expansion of on-going PVO refugee settlement activities, the two PVO involved in the RIPs had to commit other resources in order to avoid a hiatus in their project activity while waiting for RIP funds to become available.

Proposal preparation can be a costly undertaking for a PVO. The PVOs interviewed by the evaluation team confirmed that when alternative sources of funding existed, they would apply for the grant that offered the best potential return for their effort. In this situation, the USAID funded PVO Partners Grant was more attractive than RIP grants from SRSP.

A feature unique to an agricultural settlement activity is its dependency on following the normal production cycle in its location. This means that an entire crop year can be lost if an activity is not able to start according to plan. This factor needs to be taken into consideration when reviewing PVO proposals as proposals presented by both World Concern and SCF were closely tied to planting seasons.

The review process can be improved by preparing a set of guidelines to assist PVOs in preparing both concept papers and proposals. These guidelines would be a follow-on to the criteria that establishes who is eligible for funding under this project. Furthermore, these guidelines would help to ensure that all required information is included for review of the concept paper or proposal. Proposal guidelines should contain the standard OPG requirements and special requirements that are essential to a technical review of an agricultural settlement proposal. Additional proposal requirements should be prepared jointly by the project manager and coordinator, using as appropriate specialists from the MOA and USAID Agricultural/Rural Development Division with approval by the MOA/USAID review committee.

The Ministry of Agriculture expressed concern over what they perceived to be problems with commodity procurement, specifically the vehicles and computer equipment. While these delays may have caused some inconvenience, it is unlikely that this has had much effect on project implementation as actual settlement activities have been limited to date.

MOA also thought that it would be appropriate to procure commodities locally, but given that project commodities (i.e. vehicles, computers, office machines) are generally not available as shelf items, off-shore procurement is more likely. However, for commodities to be procured under grants to PVOs there should be assurance that MOF will approve funds for these if they can be more appropriately purchased locally. Furthermore, because PVO assistance with agricultural settlement and

income generating activities involves a proportionally high expenditure of local currency to foreign exchange, the evaluation team considers it appropriate that the US dollar portion of the project permit some conversion of funds to local currency.

12. Extension of the Project Assistance Completion Date

Adoption of recommendations in this evaluation would provide for an extension of the PACD through to the end of 1993. This would provide sufficient time for PVOs to submit proposals and implement activities for the redesigned project. The project should be reviewed by USAID and the GSDR after one year to determine whether the design changes are having the intended effect. If the project is progressing satisfactorily, it should continue through to the revised PACD. However, if progress is not satisfactory, consideration should be given to terminating the project and deobligating the remaining funds.

13. CONCLUSIONS

1. As currently designed there is little chance of the project meeting its EOPS. Mid-way through the LOP, the project is in reality only beginning.

2. The project has experienced significant delays which have resulted in a limited amount of project activity to date. The project is likely to continue to experience a low level of activity if the original design is followed. Less than 15% of obligated funds are committed. A large balance of unspent funds will likely remain at PACD.

3. The recent UNHCR decision to phase out its relief efforts affects the impact which the project intended to have on the direction of refugee settlement.

4. Under the relief phase out plan of UNHCR an indeterminate number of genuine refugees will require and receive assistance to enable them to become self-supporting. Lessons learned under SRSP grants to PVOs should assist with plans for such assistance.

5. It is likely that many of the refugees will choose not to be repatriated even if they are not classified as "genuine" refugees. Such individuals will be ineligible to receive UNHCR supported assistance. It is very likely that the PVOs who have been working with those refugees in farming or income generating activities would apply for project assistance (if certain aspects of the SRSP were changed) to consolidate their previous investments in assisting refugees toward self-reliance.

6. Because of the MOA position on income generating activities, it is unlikely that the SPSP will have tested the viability of various income generating activities leading to self-reliance.

7. To date there are only 172 families participating in project activities. An additional 100 families are expected to begin participation when final approval is given to the SCF

proposal. Thus, the project is far behind in meeting the projected target of 1,600 families.

8. In the Luuq area, 19 percent of the participating families are reported to be female headed. No data exist on the SCF RIP participants since such information was not requested from SCF.

9. In the Luuq area, 13 percent of the participating families are local residents, whereas none of the families in the Qorioley area appear to be originally from the area.

10. Although under one third of the intended beneficiaries in Qorioley were engaged in farming prior to coming to Somalia, as refugees they have taken up crop production and received agricultural extension advice. In Luuq most of the refugees had been farming in Ethiopia.

11. Notwithstanding that there has been limited project activity, overall project management by USAID and MOA has been satisfactory.

12. Civil conflict in the northern part of Somalia and a decline in the economy are having a detrimental effect on the project. An estimated 40% of project activity was to have occurred in northern Somalia. PVOs eligible for project funding and working with refugees in the North have not begun new initiatives with refugees in the South. Resources originally planned for this area will need to be reprogrammed.

14. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The project should undergo a redesign to simplify grant application and review procedures and expand activities that would be eligible for project funding. The redesign would include modifications in the project purpose level statement, verifiable indicators and EOPS. Action: USAID.

2. If the project is redesigned the completion date of the project should be extended to at least 1993. After one year the project should be reviewed to determine if the redesign is having the intended effect. If not, consideration should be given to deobligating the remaining funds. Action: USAID and GSDR.

3. The MOA ought to permit refugees to receive income generating training, apprenticeships or vocational training related to settling in towns outside the three main urban areas of Mogadishu, Kismayo and Hargessa. Action: MOA.

4. A formal statement should be submitted to AID by MOA outlining methods and procedures to be used in expediting registering individual and group/company land for settlement of refugees under this project. It is recommended that the agreement include a) the MOA's intent to register both land currently designated for refugee settlement and applications from those who have obtained agreement with the local people, and that this land could be registered and titled in the name of the individual head of

household, group, or company as requested by the applicants, for 50 year leases in accordance with Law No. 73, b) the intent to continue to make local funds available to finance surveying of land for refugee settlement, c) the MOA's intent to officially communicate with the respective District and Regional Agricultural Officers and instruct them to give priority attention to registration of the land, and d) procedures for handling the documents once they are received in MOA's national office of land registration and tenure. Action: MOA.

5. USAID and the MOA should issue guidelines for proposal development to prospective PVOs. The guidelines should specify that data on the intended participating and benefitting families is to be disaggregated to identify numbers of refugees vs. local populace, males vs. females, and female headed households. Furthermore, proposals for over \$300,000 should include a discussion of constraints to women participating and directly receiving economic benefits, and the measures taken to address these constraints. Action: USAID and MOA.

6. The sub-project grant agreements with PVOs should require that the final progress report or evaluation include indicators which demonstrate the distribution of economic, social and technical benefits/impacts disaggregated by sex and the impact of the sub-project on the local community. Action: USAID.

7. The RIP and settlement sub-project components should be combined into a single PVO settlement activity. Eligible PVOs that have proposals meeting project criteria would submit a concept paper that follows pre-established guidelines. If approved, the PVO would then submit a full proposal on the activities they are proposing. This proposal would also follow pre-established guidelines including any technical analyses required. A limited amount of financial assistance should be made available to PVOs for proposal preparation. Action: USAID and MOA.

8. After a project concept document has been approved by the MOA and USAID, a limited amount of project funds should be available to enable the PVO to do studies and analyses required for development of the sub-project document. The PVO would submit the terms of reference and budget to the Review Committee for approval. The amount of money for each sub-project development grant should not exceed \$20,000 and be related to the total amount projected for the sub-project. Action: USAID and MOA.

9. The environmental examination process needs to be revised to reduce the amount of staff time and length of the review process. The Mission officer responsible for environmental issues should review PVO proposals for environmental concerns. If the issues raised are routine, the determination should be made at the mission level. The Regional Environmental Officer would be consulted for more complex environmental issues. Action: USAID.

10. The project should continue funding the Project Coordinator position. A redesigned project will make project funding more attractive to PVOs which will increase the workload for both the project coordinator and the MOA project manager. Furthermore,

recently announced changes in UNHCR policy towards camp maintenance will increase demands on the Mission to participate in donor refugee activities as the GSDR will be exploring various options for further assistance to the refugees with interested donors. If USAID wishes to maintain an active role in refugee activities, it will be necessary to have a full-time project coordinator to both manage routine project activities, support the MOA counterpart, and act as a liaison between AID and PVO grantees. If the project is redesigned, the project coordinator position should be continued for a minimum of 18 months during which time project management will review the level of PVO interest in the SRSP and make a determination as to whether continuation of the project coordinator's position is warranted. The mission may want to consider having this person working on a shared basis with the PVO Partners Project with split funding from each project. Action: USAID.

11. The redesigned project should have a mechanism to enable the MOA and USAID to consider requests for funds for refugee activities that would complement refugee settlement activities. Action: USAID and MOA.

EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK
SOMALIA REFUGEE SETTLEMENT PROJECT
(649-0140)

I. OBJECTIVE: To assess the Project's implementation to date with a view to enhancing performance and potential impact.

II. BACKGROUND: The Somalia Refugee Settlement Project Grant Agreement was signed on January 7, 1987. Over the life of the Project (PACD: June 30, 1991), this Grant provides \$4,000,000 from USAID and \$2,000,000 from the Government of the Somali Democratic Republic (GSDR) for settlement activities.

The Project's goal is to help resolve the refugee problem in Somalia. To achieve this goal the Project emphasizes the following purposes:

- 1) Redirecting GSDR and donor assistance for refugees;
- 2) Providing information necessary for overall national planning of settlement activities;
- 3) Developing and implementing viable pilot alternatives to refugee camps which enable refugees to become integrated, self-supporting residents of Somalia;

Achievement of the above purposes will be indicated by the following outputs at the end of the project:

1. Refugees settled in integrated communities and making progress toward achieving self-sufficiency;
2. Food aid to settlers being phased out;
3. Various types of income generating activities tried which lead to self-reliance of the beneficiaries.

Under the Project there are two types of settlement activities: Rapid Impact Projects (RIPs) and Settlement Sub-Projects. RIPs are funded by one year grants of about \$150,000 which provide groups of spontaneous refugee settlers the technical assistance needed to become independent from existing refugee maintenance support. The Somalia Refugee Settlement Project offers \$790,000 for RIP activities. Settlement Sub-projects, which will come after RIP activities are completed, are multi-year activities for developing planned refugee settlements. A total of \$2,200,000 has been set aside for establishing up to two Settlement Sub-projects. These Sub-projects will build on the experience learned through RIPs for developing large agricultural settlements for several hundred families. Together, RIPs and Settlement Sub-projects are expected to assist approximately 1,600 refugee families. Both RIPs and Settlement Sub-Projects will be funded through OPGs to PVOs.

At present, one CPG has been awarded for a RIP and a proposal for a second RIP is under review. Five RIPs were to begin during the first year of the Project, thus implementation is behind schedule.

III. STATEMENT OF WORK: USAID and the Ministry of Agriculture require a three person team to evaluate the progress to date of the Somalia Refugee Settlement Project and to recommend actions which would enhance or improve implementation in the time remaining for the life of the Project. In order to perform this evaluation the team will consider, but not necessarily be limited to, the following points:

A. Project Design: Assess the appropriateness and adequacy of the original design vis-a-vis the stated development problem being addressed and vis-a-vis the current development environment in Somalia:

1. Does the project design address the identified problem(s) in a realistic, practical and logical way?
2. Does the design provide necessary and sufficient resources to achieve the stated objectives? Are resources designed to be provided in a logical and well organized manner?
3. Is the project purpose realistically achievable within the specified project timeframe? If not, why not?
4. Does the design adequately account for external factors (e.g., CSEW and AID policies and regulations regarding FVC activities in Somalia) and their potential impact on implementation?
5. Are the assumptions stated in the original design valid? Are the assumptions sufficiently complete?
6. Are there other viable alternatives for achieving the project purpose and/or goal?
7. What changes, if any, might be made in project design to increase skill training and income generation?
8. What role can other bilateral or multilateral donors play in settlement design?

B. Project Implementation: As implementation of the project is currently behind schedule, determine what factors have affected project progress.

1. Is there agreement among the agencies involved in refugee settlement on how alternatives to refugee camps should be implemented? If not, what are the areas of disagreement?

2. Are there unresolved policy issues regarding alternatives to refugee camps which are hampering project implementation?
3. Have project inputs been made available as planned?
4. Have external factors influenced implementation in unforeseen ways? How? With what effect?
5. Do aspects of implementation need to be redirected to enhance project progress and potential impact? If so, please be specific in recommending changes.

C. Potential for Achievement: Given the current status of the project, assess the project's potential for achieving its objectives by the termination date (June, 1991).

1. With the present level of FVO participation and interest in this project, is the project likely to establish a model for refugee self-reliance? If not, how can this be changed?
2. Are FVOs the most appropriate implementors for achieving project objectives or should alternative implementing agencies (e.g. the Settlement Development Agency) be utilized?
3. Does the RIP mechanism provide a valid approach for achieving project objectives? If not, what form should funding take?
4. What can USAID and the Ministry of Agriculture do to enhance project progress and impact?

IV ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES: USAID and the Ministry of Agriculture request that two persons from REDSO/ESA and one individual from the Ministry of Agriculture's Project Monitoring Office be appointed to undertake this evaluation. From the Ministry of Agriculture, an agriculturalist or settlement specialist will be designated to participate in the evaluation. REDSO/ESA will provide a general social scientist and a project development officer who will also serve as team leader with responsibility for the assignment of tasks, report write-up and submission of the report to both USAID and the Ministry of Agriculture. The team will work together to complete the Statement of Work outlined above.

The team will have approximately 21 days in-country in which to complete its work. It is expected that 7 - 10 days will be needed to review project documentation and to discuss settlement issues with project participants. No less than 5 days prior to his scheduled departure, the team leader will present a draft evaluation report to USAID and the Ministry of Agriculture. Within two days after the receipt of this draft report, a debriefing meeting will be held by USAID and the GSDR with the team to provide comments on the draft and to resolve questions or concerns.

Prior to departure from Somalia, the team leader will submit the report in final form taking into consideration USAID and Government of Somalia comments. The final report must also include an executive summary stating major findings, conclusions and recommendations. Technical details and the evaluation scope of work should be included as annexes to the main body of the report.

Clearances:

WFisher, AFD _____
FWarren, A/SARD _____
DHimelarb, PDS _____
FKheyre, FPSD _____
CGordon, PPOG _____
ERikard, DDIR _____

drafted: FCatania, ARD
Doc. No. 02157 9/21/88

Appendix B

Additional Issues - Mid-Term Evaluation

Somalia Refugee Settlement Project

(Elaboration on the Scope of Work)

Background: The evaluation is a mid-term evaluation assessing the progress of the project in meeting the goals and purpose as stated in the project paper. This evaluation process will take into consideration that the Refugee Settlement Project incorporates a strategy which supports voluntary self-help agricultural settlements and non-agricultural productive activities. The Project was designed to assist with the integration of refugees who wish to settle in Somalia. The purpose of the project is "to test viable alternatives to refugee camps which enable refugees to become fully integrated, self-supporting residents of Somalia.

The evaluation team reviewed the scope of work (SOW) for the evaluation. Discussions were held with the USAID Project Manager and the Project Coordinator. The evaluation team was unable to meet with mission management to seek comments and guidance on specific issues or concerns that the mission wished the evaluation team to include during the evaluation prior to the start of the field work and interviews.

The evaluation team reviewed project documents and files and obtained copies of project financial reports. The team identified a number of specific issues and questions that would be raised during meetings with GSDR, PVOs and other agencies involved with refugees in Somalia. The issues and concerns are presented in the following paragraph.

Issues and Questions:

1. The recent announcement by the UNHCR of their decision to reduce their support for refugee camp maintenance and phase out completely by mid-1990 is likely to result in significant changes in the Somalia refugee assistance program. What impact will it have on refugee settlement activities? This will be a topic of discussion in all meetings of the evaluation team.
2. Get MOA, NRC, and UNHCR views as to what are the critical issues in refugee settlement at this time and suggestions as to what are the most appropriate areas for AID assistance. Explore income generating options. Obtain and make recommendations for project restructuring.
3. Delays in start of project and actual dates of start. Reasons for the delays? Identify why PVOs are not coming forward with proposals. Get PVO ideas on what would improve the project.
4. Question the value of pilot efforts of the project (RIP). Is the preparation and processing time too costly for the PVO?

5. To what degree is land tenure an issue? Are there areas where settlers have been able to obtain land and is it secure if they develop it? Who has the responsibility for obtaining land? The settlers? Government? UNHCR? or the PVO?

6. Which PVOs have on-going activities that could likely be eligible for funding under the RSP? Which PVOs with refugee experience are able to start activities that would likely be eligible for RSP funding? Estimate absorptive capacity for remaining LOP?

7. Which settlement model is best suited for Somalia at this time? Capital intensive, low-capital investment, or something in between? GSDR experience to date with the capital intensive model. Performance to date?

8. The role of Food Aid - Is there any indication that there has been, or is likely to be, during the life of the project, a reduction in food aid to project participants?

As of Tuesday, November 8, the evaluation team had met with the following organizations:

Ministry of Agriculture (implementing agency)
National Refugee Commission
UNHCR
Save the Children
Africare
CARE
Church World Service

Remaining meetings are scheduled with Haqabtir (Somalia PVO) JVC, IBRD and World Concern.

Other Implementation Issues:

1. EOPS: How successful to date? At the halfway point or not, (PACD June, 1991. EOPS are:

- 2 pilot settlement projects designed, implemented, and evaluated,
- 5 RIPs implemented,
- GSDR will have tested and established a viable process whereby settlement projects are appraised, implemented, monitored and evaluated.

At least 1,600 refugee engaged in activities which demonstrably lead to self-sufficiency.

2. Review the results and use of the "Land Resource Review" by RMR which is to help the project locate settlement sites.

3. Assess the usefulness of the baseline data report for settlement planning by AID and GSDR.
4. Review the criteria and methodology used for review of sub-project proposals and RIP concept. Assess the practicality of this approach for papers/proposals reviews.
5. Review AID and GSDR implementation and management of the project.
6. Review expenditures and financial management.
7. Status of the "Steering Committee" and its role relative to the project.
8. Is there any way to identify and measure the number of project beneficiaries at this time? If so, are beneficiaries consistent with the groups identified in the Project Paper?
9. Assess the contribution to implementation by the following agencies that were identified in the PP. What were the contributions to the project? What constraints?-- Likely change in PACD:
 - Settlement Steering Committee
 - National Refugee Commission
 - GSDR Technical Ministries (especially MOA)
 - PVOs and NGOs
10. Recommendations in changes in responsibilities to improve implementation during balance of the time in the project.
11. Review Procurement - any issues or problems? Were the commodities identified in the PP the items that were purchased. Rationale for changes. Recommendations for additional changes.
12. Changes in PACD? Changes in funding levels? Justifications.

Appendix C

PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Life of Project
From FY 86 to FY 91
Total U.S. Funding \$4.0 million
Date Prepared April 1986

Project Title and Number
Number _____

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
<p>Program or Sector Goal: The broader objectives to which this project contributes:</p> <p>To resolve the refugee problem in Somalia, thereby to decrease the burden of support on the GSDR and the donor</p>	<p>Measures of Goal</p> <p>All able-bodied refugees are settled in Somalia or have been repatriated. Camps contain only orphaned children and the infirm.</p>	<p>GSDR, ZLU/CAPE, WFP, UNHCR Reports</p> <p>Project implementation reports</p> <p>USAID field surveys</p>	<p>Assumptions for goal targets:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -GSDR wants to resolve refugee problem -GSDR provides politi support for this pro ject and other settl ment efforts -Repatriation to Ethiopia takes place -Settlement project i successful and attracts sufficient additional funds fr U.S. and other dono to settle all refug who so wish

Appendix C

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Project Purpose:

To develop and implement viable pilot alternatives to refugee camps which enable refugees to become integrated, self-supporting residents of Somalia, to redirect governmental and donor assistance for refugees, and to provide information necessary for overall national planning of settlement activities.

Conditions that will indicate purpose has been achieved: End of project status.

- Refugees settled in integrated communities and making progress toward achieving self-sufficiency
- Food aid to refugee camps reduced
- Food aid to settlers being phased out
- Various types of income generating activities have been tried by sub-projects which lead to self-reliance of beneficiaries.

As above
GSDR land grants to settlers

Assumption for achieving purpose:

- GSDR provides political support for this project
- Major policy issues resolved settlement model; land availability and tenure; phasing out of care and maintenance; refugee choice and institutional arrangements
- Refugee wish to settle in Somalia
- Local communities willing to accept refugee settlement
- Donor community provides sufficient assistance

<u>Outputs</u>	<u>Magnitude of Output</u>	<u>Means of Verification</u>	<u>Assumptions</u>
Established viable process whereby settlement activities are appraised, designed, implemented, monitored and evaluated.	GSDR has resources to design implement settlement activities.	Reports Field Surveys	GSDR and donors agree on policy dialogue.
Implementation of settlement activities	At least 3 RIPS completed At least 2 settlement sub-projects implemented 1,600 refugee families benefitting from participation in project activities.	Evaluation	-Land tenure issues resolved -Settler selection criteria agreed upon.
<u>Inputs</u>			
Technical Assistance Commodities Support costs	See Budget	GSDR budget expenditures reports. AID reports.	GSDR and AID agree on issues.

Appendix D

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Spooner, B. C. Refugee Settlement in the Lower Shabelle Region, Somalia, A Report to the NRC and Save the Children Federation (USA), June, 1984.

Appendix - E

List of Persons and Agencies Interviewed

Ministry of Agriculture -	Mr. Bashir Abdulle Osman, Director of Planning Mr. Hassan Haji Osman, Project Manager Mr. Mark Marquardt, Land Tenure Advisor
CARE	Ms. Margret Tsitouris, Country Director
Japanese International Volunteer Center	Mr. Oginosako, Director Ms. Isoda, incoming Director Mr. Aoke
Africare	Mr. Mohamoud Hamud, Country Representative
UNHCR	Mr. Barry Rigby, Deputy Representative Mr. Peter Meijer, Assistant Representative Mr. Michael Alford, Programme Officer
Save the Children	Mr. John Marks, Director
Church World Service	Mr. Gaston Razafinanja, Representative Mr. Robert Larson, Agriculturalist
Menonite Cental Committee	Ms. Debbie Luper, Engineer Mr. Jon Rudy, Community Development Ms. Carolyn Rudy, Community Development
World Concern	Mr. Gregg Keen, Project Manager
USAID/Somalia	Mr. Weston Fisher, Project Manager Mr. Frank Catania, Project Coordinator Mr. Louis Carpenter, Financial Management Mr. Ahmed Adbullahi, Chief, Proj.Accounting Ms. Marion Warren, Chief, PPSD Office Mr. Thomas Logren, Chief, PDS Office
US Embassy/Somalia	Mr. Thomas Killeen. Refugee Coordinator