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FINAL REPORT

Interim Evaluation
Botswana Workforce and Skills Training (BWAST)
Phase II

Prepared for
U.S. Agency for International Development
under
IQC PDC-0085-I-12-6108-00

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11

CONTENTS

Preface	iii
Acknowledgements	iv
Acronyms	v
Basic Project Identification Data	vii
Executive Summary	viii
I. INTRODUCTION	1
A. Project Context and Outputs	1
B. Purpose of Evaluation	2
C. Approach of the Evaluation	3
D. Evaluation Methodology	4
II. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION	7
A. Selection Cycle	7
B. OPEXer Recruitment and Placement	9
C. Short-Term Consultants	16
D. Participant Selection and Processing	18
E. Third-Country Training	26
F. In-Country Training	27
G. General Administration	28
III. THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND BWAST II	30
A. Overview of Findings	30
B. Private Sector Elements of BWAST II	31
C. New Directions for Private Sector Initiatives	38
D. EOCCIM as a Service Center	41
E. Recommendations	42
IV. PUBLIC SECTOR TRAINING	44
A. Participant Training	44
B. In-Country Training	49
C. Role of OPEXers in Training	52
D. Training Resources	56
E. Management and Delivery of Training in the Public Sector	57
F. Comparison of BWAST I and II	60

APPENDICES

1 - DOCUMENTS

- 1a - Evaluation Scope of Work
- 1b - Amendment (Memorandum) to Scope of Work
- 1c - Employment Generation Criteria
- 1d - TvT Introductory Letter
- 1e - BWAST II Logframe

2 - DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

- 2a - Participant Training Follow-up Questionnaire
- 2b - OPEX Probe Questionnaire
- 2c - USAID Letter to Former Participants

3 - OVERVIEWS

- 3a - The Republic of Botswana
- 3b - Economic Overview

4 - USAID Strategy -- and Predecessor Projects

5 - OPEX/Counterpart Linkages

6 - Focus Group Meeting Notes

7 - Responses to Evaluation Questions

8 - Bibliography

9 - Individuals Contacted

PREFACE

This report is based on the findings of an evaluation team which assessed the Botswana Workforce and Skills Training Project (Phase II) of USAID/Gaborone, from August 8 to September 3, 1988.

The team consisted of Dr. Kenneth F. Smith, Team Leader, Dr. Stanley B. Andrews, and Dr. Dennis R. Herschbach, provided under an A.I.D. contract with TvT Associates. Dr. David van Tijn, TvT Associates, edited the report.

The team worked under the technical direction of Mr. Will Elliott, BWAST II Project Officer, and was assisted by Ms. Barbara Belding, an International Development Intern with the USAID/Gaborone Mission.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The evaluation team would like to acknowledge the support and cooperation provided us during this evaluation by the Government of Botswana, the USAID/Gaborone Mission and the staff of the Academy for Educational Development.

GOB and BOCCIM personnel were very accomodating in meeting with various members of the team on short notice. We appreciated their willingness to share with us their experiences -- both as participants, and end-users of the program.

Dick Betz and Dave Benedetti of the Academy for Educational Development in Gaborone were particularly generous in providing us logistical support, and especially the daily and nightly access to their IBM-compatible computer and printer.

John Hummon, John Roberts, Will Elliott, Ann Domidion, Mark Anderson and the rest of the A.I.D. Mission staff gave us a good orientation and assisted us in many ways to get the most out of our all too brief visit. Their background and current experience with the project and knowledge of the key individuals involved, and their professional participation and liaison activity greatly facilitated the evaluation.

We wish to make special mention of the assistance provided by Ms. Barbara Belding -- the USAID/G staff member who was assigned to work closely with the team during our visit. Barbara did an admirable job in identifying key contacts, facilitating our schedule, obtaining documentation, and accompanying us on our visits to Ministry and other personnel; and following up on innumerable administrative details for us. It was only through her close attention to detail that we were able to accomplish as much as we did.

ACRONYMS & DEFINITIONS

AED	- Academy for Educational Development
BAC	- Botswana Agricultural College
BEF	- Botswana Employers' Federation (now the BOCCIM)
BIAC	- Botswana Institute of Administration and Commerce
BOCCIM	- Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower (formerly the BEF)
BRIDEC	- Brigades Development Centre
BWAST	- Botswana Workforce and Skills Training Project
CDIE	- Center for Development Information and Evaluation, A.I.D./Washington
CDSS	- Country Development Strategy Statement
DOP	- Directorate of Personnel
DPSM	- Directorate of Public Service Management
ESAMI	- Eastern and Southern African Management Institute
GOB	- Government of Botswana
IDM	- Institute of Development Management
MCI	- Ministry of Commerce and Industry
MFDP	- Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
MLGL	- Ministry of Local Government and Lands
MLHA	- Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs
MOA	- Ministry of Agriculture
MOE	- Ministry of Education
NDB	- National Development Bank

- NDP6 - National Development Plan 6, Government of Botswana (1985-91)
- OPEX - Operational Expert [An expatriate technician provided under the project]
- PULA - Botswana Currency Unit = approx US\$ 0.50
- SAMDP - Southern Africa Manpower Development Project
- TA - Technical Assistance
- UB - University of Botswana

BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

1. Country: Botswana
2. Project Title: Botswana Workforce and Skills Training, Phase II
3. Project Number: 633-0241
4. Project Dates:
 - a. First Project Agreement: 5/13/86
 - b. Final Obligation Date: FY 90 Planned
 - c. Most recent Project Assistance Completion Date (PACD): 12 May 1994
5. Project Funding: (amounts authorized to date in dollars or dollar equivalents from the following sources)
 - a. A.I.D. Bilateral Funding (grant) US\$27,000,000
 - b. Other Major Donors US\$ 0
 - c. Host Country Counterpart Funds US\$ 9,034,000

Total US\$36,034,000
6. Mode of Implementation: A.I.D. direct contractor
Academy for Educational Development
7. Project Designers: The Government of Botswana and the USAID/Gaborone
8. Responsible Mission Officials:
 - a. Mission Directors:
 - (1) Paul Guedet 1986
 - (2) John Hummon 1986 to present
 - b. Project Officers:
 - (1) Will Elliott
9. Previous Evaluations:
 - a. None, of this project
 - b. Mid-Term Evaluation of predecessor project -- Botswana Workforce and Skills Training [BWAST] Project, Project Number 633-0231 -- September 5, 1985

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Mission :

USAID/Gaborone: Interim Evaluation of Botswana Workforce and Skills Training Project [BWAST II], Project Number 633-0241, September 1988.

2. Purpose of Project

Imbalances in the labor force and unemployment are two interrelated constraints upon the economic development of Botswana. Unskilled individuals with low levels of education far outnumber the jobs available. Conversely, the requirement for educated and skilled personnel far exceeds the supply.

The BWAST II project was designed to increase the number of trained Batswana in both the Public and Private Sectors in skill areas related to employment generation, and to bridge, temporarily, some of the most critical gaps with expatriates. USAID/Gaborone's overall strategy is to support the Government of Botswana in strengthening market forces to stimulate employment generation in the private sector and in localizing positions.

3. Purpose and Methodology of Evaluation

This is an interim evaluation of a five year project. The purpose of the evaluation is to review project progress; determine whether prior constraints to employment generation and skills development are still relevant; assess the project's impact on the total policy and procedural framework of Botswana -- in terms of greater emphasis on market forces and strengthening of the private sector to achieve employment-generation objectives; and to offer recommendations for appropriate changes during the remaining years of the project.

Data were collected through review of documents and interviews with AID/W, USAID/G, GOB, and AED staff, with participants, and with representatives of business and training institutions in Botswana. The team also interviewed representatives of other donor organizations to learn the nature of all training assistance currently being provided, to improve our assessment of remaining training needs, and to determine the potential for training Batswana in countries other than the United States.

4. Conclusions

a. Strategy for Employment Generation:

1) The BWAST II project is a flexible and innovative use of a conventional public sector participant training program -- reoriented to facilitate bi-lateral policy dialogue and alleviate critical constraints to the growth and development of the private sector. In concert with GOB officials, creative use of BWAST II funding (and other resources such as PD&S funds) has been made to study policy and procedural areas inhibiting market forces in Botswana's mixed economy, and to provide technical assistance and training for people in selected areas, with high potential to impact on employment generation and enhance localization.

2) Ideally, a separate Project should be initiated to undertake the broader Private Sector development objectives. Although training individuals who have a role in formulating policy which impacts on private sector development, and providing technical assistance to foster employment generation and stimulate foreign investment are key elements of this strategy, nevertheless, training *per se* is largely a subordinate support function. Training is only effective to the extent that other essential services, such as investment, marketing and technical assistance are available to the targeted group. In any event, BWAST II needs *more resources* to sustain the current innovative thrust as well as to broaden the support base for the private sector. A first step should be for USAID/G to extend BWAST II by one year while plans for new projects are developed.

b. Training:

1) Long and short-term training provided to date to individual Public Sector officials has generally been effective. Due to rapidly rising costs for education, however, the AID/W-imposed limitation of \$7,500 per annum for participant tuition is an "efficiency" criterion which threatens to impair future effectiveness by placing out of reach most quality schools in the United States.

2) Some public sector organizations currently excluded from participation in the project could also make some significant contributions in furthering GOB employment generation objectives.

3) Selecting and scheduling GOB personnel for training while simultaneously recruiting OPEXers to fill their positions and provide on-the-job training has not worked as effectively as anticipated. Some modifications could improve both effectiveness and efficiency.

4) The private sector training component is currently modeled on that of the public sector but private sector needs are significantly different; and, in particular, the current selection process through a single gateway is less appropriate. The private sector would be better served by greater emphasis on shorter-term training, observations and internships -- both external (i.e. in the U.S. and third countries) as well as in Botswana, and by selection on the basis of critical skill needs (both technical and entrepreneurial) with less emphasis on organizational affiliation.

c. Technical Assistance:

1) OPEXers are in key policy areas, operational positions and training roles, and are highly valued by the Government of Botswana.

2) While localization objectives are important, current project policy not to allow OPEXers to remain in the same position for more than four years though permitting them to assume another position, may occasionally require exceptions.

d. Institutionalization of Management Training:

Management training has traditionally been oriented towards public sector regulatory and maintenance needs. Training institutions are currently making a transition towards fundamental reform of curriculum and instructional techniques in favor of specialized and practical needs of the private sector. There is a need to strengthen the administrative capacity of these institutions so that they can respond more effectively to changing market forces. In addition, there needs to be closer linkage with the business community to provide more decentralized, flexible and relevant services of high quality.

e. Management and Administration:

1) The contractor (AED) is doing a good job of recruiting, participant placement and providing field support to OPEXers, and has been highly responsive to resolving problems as they are identified.

2) BWAST II's employment generation criteria have sharply increased the level of effort required by all parties to screen, process and approve individuals. Some modifications to both the criteria and the process, in particular, lengthening the selection cycle by an earlier start would improve effectiveness and efficiency.

5. Major Recommendations

1) MODIFY current policy which attempts to link GOB Counterparts with an OPEXer at the outset when first recruited. Instead, focus on improving the back-link -- i.e. after the counterpart has completed formal training and returns to the job. This may necessitate removing the four-year restriction on OPEXers.

2) EXPAND availability of BWAST II assistance to all ministries, but at the same time clearly LIMIT training and technical assistance to key policy-making and technically-critical areas, where the training/assistance will enhance private sector policy reform and/or employment generation.

3) CONDUCT a private sector "needs assessment" to identify critical skill areas -- both technical and entrepreneurial -- in which training can be provided.

4) REDIRECT both the level of funding and the type of assistance to support the private sector initiative AND SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE the level of training and technical assistance provided by the project, to the extent that additional funding can be obtained from AID/W.

5) PROVIDE additional resources to the Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM) as a "lead organization" of a private sector coalition, to improve their long term capability to coordinate Private Sector training under BWAST II and to extend small business service assistance to the private sector.

6) FOCUS attention on allocating resources for training and technical assistance which will result in increased employment in medium and small-sized businesses in both rural and urban areas.

7) REWORK the Project Log-frame for BWAST II (particularly the Purpose and Outputs), and develop appropriate indicators to reflect the above redirection in emphasis, and prepare a Project Amendment.

6. Lessons Learned

1) Participant training programs can be reshaped as projects to enhance the attainment of particular policy objectives -- in this instance, to stimulate employment generation in the private sector.

2) A participant training "project" with a single focus can provide more effective development assistance than larger programs without such focus.

3) Participant training projects should provide for institution building and subsequent in-country training to enhance long term development and sustainability.

These lessons, together with findings, conclusions and many other specific recommendations are discussed in greater detail in the body of the report.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Project Context and Outputs

Since independence in 1966, Botswana has experienced rapid overall economic growth. The per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) indicator, however, is misleading. Unemployment stands in excess of 25 percent and the labor force is growing rapidly. At the same time, numerous vacancies exist at the managerial and technical skill levels. The Government of Botswana is committed to creating growth opportunities for its citizens through increased self-reliance, and since independence, a series of six-year national development plans have been undertaken, with two special themes of employment creation and rural development.¹

In 1986, Phase II of the USAID/G Botswana Workforce and Skills Training Project (BWAST II) was approved as a \$27 million, five year project. BWAST II made a significant shift from prior training assistance efforts by requiring that Operational Expert (OPEX) positions in the Public Sector and Government participants be justified in terms of their *employment generation potential in the private sector*. Furthermore, the project, which had primarily only set its sights on public sector localization, specifically *targeted private sector participants*. While BWAST II is the object of this evaluation, a brief review of four principal USAID/G human resource development projects which preceded BWAST II² should be instructive for the reader of this report, and is contained in Appendix 4.

Key output components of the BWAST II project are:

- 1) Botswana trained through in-country training programs/workshops in technical and administrative fields associated with employment creation and labor productivity.

¹For further background see Appendix 3b.

²SADPT, SAAST, SAMDP and BWAST I.

- 2) Batswana trained in the U.S. or third countries in disciplines needed by the public and private sector that are directly linked to, or that provide support services for, the employment generation effort.
- 3) Technical assistance provided to ministries, related institutions and the private sector in fields related to job formation.
- 4) Institutionalization of a management-of-training system that will strengthen the capacity of the public and private sector to plan and manage their own manpower development, particularly as it relates to employment generation.

B. Purpose of Evaluation

The basic purpose of the evaluation was to complete an interim assessment of BWAST II, to review the work undertaken in the first two years of the project, to determine if the activities are meeting project goals, and to recommend whether the Mission and the Government of Botswana (GOB) should consider any shift in emphasis during the remaining life of the project. The Scope of Work (Appendices 1a and 1b) identified five broad areas to be emphasized in the evaluation:

- 1) The "Delivery Order" process and various ordering mechanisms under the project.
- 2) The overall performance of the implementing contractor, the Academy for Educational Development.
- 3) The impact of BWAST II on GOB training systems, particularly the impact on the process by which individuals are targeted for training.
- 4) The role of returned participants.
- 5) All private sector-focused components.

The Mission emphasized that it did not want simply a narrow focus on the number of participants trained, jobs created, etc.; but was seeking a broader assessment of the project's impact on the total policy and procedural framework of the country, in terms of greater emphasis on market forces and a strengthening of the private sector as a means of achieving various employment generation objectives.

C. Approach of the Evaluation

In light of the above Scope, the evaluation focused on GOB and USAID/G philosophy, policy, management procedures and activities in providing technical assistance and selecting Public and Private Sector participants in terms of employment generation potential, rather than scrutinizing the detailed numbers and costs associated with individuals processed, and their relative merits before and after training.

The team approached this evaluation as a technical consultation, rather than as an adversarial audit of past performance, in order to provide the GOB and USAID/G with an "outside opinion" in considering what, if any, mid-course corrections to their project might be appropriate.

To this end, the team conducted numerous interviews with A.I.D./Washington and USAID/Gaborone officials, Academy for Educational Development (AED) representatives, Botswana government officials, education and training institution faculty, private sector business leaders, as well as representatives of the foreign donor community. (Appendix 9 lists persons interviewed.)

The Botswana Desk of the Africa Bureau in A.I.D./Washington, PPC's Center for Development Information and Evaluation (AID/PPC/CDIE), and the Office of the Inspector General all provided some initial reference materials. The USAID/Gaborone Mission and the AED provided many more reports and particular data elements. The team also obtained further extensive documentation during the course of our interviews. (Appendix 8 lists the documentation obtained.)

In Botswana, the team worked exclusively in Gaborone -- no field trips were taken outside the capital city. However, an International Trade Fair was held in Gaborone during the course of our stay which we took the

opportunity to visit, and were able to view products and contact several exhibitors from other parts of Botswana.

While in Botswana, the team also met three times with a BWAST II Project Evaluation "Reference Group" comprising USAID/G, GOB inter-ministerial, and private sector representatives. At these meetings, we were able to outline and clarify the objectives of the evaluation, present tentative findings and recommendations, and seek additional guidance and feedback. In addition, prior to departure from Botswana, the team also separately debriefed the implementing contractor (AED) on key findings of the evaluation.

The team comprised three individuals, each with a different focus -- 1) general project management administration policies and procedures, 2) education and training institutions for public sector development, and 3) private sector training and employment generation. Initially, the team met and interviewed as a group. During and after the first week in Botswana, however, the team members independently pursued their various objectives, with daily coordination and discussion. Ms. Barbara Belding, an International Development Intern with USAID/Gaborone, actively participated in most of the team's activities.

D. Evaluation Methodology

Because of the limited time available, a purposive rapid reconnaissance methodology was employed. The evaluation team relied heavily upon A.I.D./Washington, the staff of the USAID/Gaborone Mission, the Government of Botswana, and AED, as well as selected organizations and individuals in the private sector, to identify many of the issues and provide reference materials upon which our analysis was based.

Information and data were obtained in several ways:

- 1) Review of documents in the U.S. and Botswana (Appendix 8).³
- 2) Open-ended meeting in the U.S. with a group of ten newly arrived participants for training.
- 3) Purposive sampling of key informants in Botswana of returned participants with structured questionnaires (Appendix 2a), and also current providers of technical assistance (OPEXers) (Appendix 2b).
- 4) Focus group discussions in Botswana, with returned participants (Appendix 6).
- 5) Interviews, in Washington and Botswana, with A.I.D./Washington and USAID/Gaborone officials, AED representatives, Botswana government officials, education and training institution faculty, private sector business leaders, as well as representatives of the foreign donor community.
- 6) Meetings in Botswana with a BWAST II Project Evaluation "Reference Group" comprised of USAID/G, GOB inter-ministerial, and private sector representatives.
- 7) Team review and synthesis in Botswana and Washington of data obtained and information developed through the foregoing methods.

The time constraints of this evaluation were three days preparation in Washington; a further three weeks in-country to gather data and prepare and present an interim

³Particularly important were the GOB National Development Plan 6; USAID/G Country Development Strategy Statement (CDSS); BWAST II Project Paper, Project Agreement and Subsequent Project Implementation Letters; A.I.D. Evaluation Special Study No. 53 "A.I.D.'s Experience with Selected Employment Generation Projects", and USAID/Botswana's Private Sector Strategy Study, and Strategy Assessment and Evaluation.

briefing of findings and recommendations; a week in Washington to review and synthesize comments into a final draft for the Botswana Government, private sector representatives and USAID/G to review; and two days to prepare the final report.

Chapter II contains the team's findings on BWAST II's project implementation procedures. The chapter is based on the entire team's effort, and contains the major findings, conclusions and recommendations of this evaluation. Chapter III contains the findings on the private-sector component of BWAST II. More detailed recommendations for ways in which the impact on the private sector can be enhanced are contained at the end of the chapter. Chapter IV contains the findings on the public-sector component. Recommendations arising from these findings form one of the bases for the recommendations in Chapter II.

II. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

A. Selection Cycle

About July/August of each year, USAID/G advises the Government of Botswana, through the Directorate of Public Service Management (DPSM), that it is prepared to underwrite the cost of training a certain number of participants in long- and short-term courses in the U.S. and third countries, and in short-term courses in Botswana; as well as to provide U.S. experts for both long- and short-term technical assistance in Botswana. The primary criterion that USAID/G has used under the BWAST II project is that the individuals trained, and the technical assistance provided, be in areas which most effectively provide incentives and support to the private sector to enhance employment generation. To this end, an "Employment Generation" criteria summary sheet was provided to the government.¹

DPSM relays the criteria, together with any additional guidance, to the seven Ministries* designated by the Project Paper for participation in the project, and assigns a quota for each to nominate employees in each category, i.e. long- and short-term training.

Requests to USAID/G to recruit OPEXers and short-term consultants, and nominations of employees for training are then initiated by the Ministries.* The requests are coordinated by the various Ministry Training Officers and routed through the Directorate of Public Service Management (DPSM), by the end of September.

DPSM and A.I.D. look at the initial submissions and nominations to screen and cull the candidates and requests for OPEXers, but the final selection after that is made by the DPSM in October or November. With tacit approval from USAID/G, the documentation on these finalists is formally routed to USAID/G for official approval.

USAID/G then reviews the applications and supporting documentation closely. Usually by December, after additional informal communication, USAID/G has confirmed

¹See Appendix 1c.

* and their affiliated parastatals

which individuals it will approve for training, and for which positions OPEXers will be recruited. A Delivery Order is submitted to AED on each individual for further processing.² AED conducts personal interviews and counseling in January and February, advises of additional requirements and undertakes placement, predeparture orientation, and arrival assistance and orientation in Washington, D.C. prior to start of training. The bulk of AED's placement effort occurs between February and July, with long-term participants arriving in the U.S. during August.

Private-sector requests follow a similar course, but are coordinated by the Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM), and are passed through the Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs (MLHA) to USAID/G.

The bulk of AED's activity deals with inter-personal relationships under conditions of uncertainty. Discussions with AED, USAID/G, GOB officials, OPEXers, Consultants, Participants, and former Participants indicate that most people were satisfied with their experience with the process under AED. Indeed, a considerable number of individuals were quite laudatory about the service that AED had provided them, and several "old-timers" compared AED very favorably with the prior contractor as "the difference between night and day". One individual even went as far as to say that in his more than twenty years of experience in working in Africa on a variety of contractual assignments, he had never before encountered such high quality support as AED provided under BWAST II.

Consequently the foregoing comments from satisfied consumers reflect great credit upon AED personnel and management. Nevertheless, the processing cycle is not a case of "nothing to fix". Behind the scenes, AED and the other organizations involved have encountered several procedural obstacles and have had to cope with a number of "glitches" while attempting to provide this high level of service.

The following is a discussion of the OPEXer, short-term consultant and participant administrative management process, together with the evaluation team's suggestions for improvement.

²A PIO/P for a participant, and a PIO/T for an OPEXer, or short-term consultant.

B. OPEXer Recruitment and Placement

1. Imprecise Job Description

Findings: In some instances, AED has been requested to recruit an OPEXer without sufficient information about the job to be performed. Often, to save time, recruiting is begun based on an informal request before a delivery order is processed.

Conclusions: Ultimately, the lack of timely information handicaps AED in its advertising and recruitment.³ Systems are usually established for a good reason. Attempting to "go around" the system sometimes works, but usually results in "Hurry Up and Wait" -- with an inordinate amount of managerial time and administrative effort spent in informal communication and "wheel spinning" -- i.e. a lot of motion, but no traction.

Recommendations: The evaluation team recommends, therefore, that -- except for genuine emergencies -- prior to initiation of recruitment action by AED, GOB documentation be prepared, processed and completed in an orderly manner.

2. OPEXer Assignments

Findings: Most OPEXers are recruited to perform two primary purposes: 1) to carry out the functions of a particular job in the absence of a Motswana; and, 2) to train Batswana on-the-job on an individual "counterpart" basis.⁴

Conclusions: Individual capabilities vary, but rarely is the ability to perform of equal level (or interest) with the ability to impart knowledge to others. Furthermore, once an OPEXer is in place, training usually becomes a secondary (and often neglected) function, as the volume of regular work tends to drive it out.

³Additional information which is received later may change the target of the recruitment.

⁴A few OPEXers are recruited specifically to be faculty for key institutions and conduct training in a more formal mode.

Recommendations: The evaluation team recommends that OPEXers who are expected to accord equal importance to teaching and to work have that requirement clearly spelled out during the recruitment process. Furthermore, the OPEXer's performance in this regard should be monitored by AED during his/her assignment.

3. Competition vs Sole Source

Findings: AED endeavors to obtain three OPEX candidates for every position solicited. Then the names and background experience on all individuals are provided to USAID/G and the GOB for their review and selection. AED obtains potential candidates by a variety of means, including formal advertising. Extensive use is made of references and personal networking. In many instances, AED has been able to locate one, or even two, candidates in a relatively short time from an extremely limited supply. Putting such individuals "on hold" until a more exhaustive search has identified other candidates to satisfy the competitive process, defeats the objective of providing an employee rapidly for a foreign government.

Conclusions: Personnel procurement by AED (acting under an A.I.D. contract) for OPEXers to work for the Government of Botswana, is more lenient with respect to competition than direct U.S. procurement. In effect, the OPEXer is a subcontractor of AED, and under Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), it is not necessary to formally advertise and obtain at least three competitive candidates. An honest effort at *informal solicitation* to locate a candidate (or candidates) is sufficient. Care should be taken, however, to monitor and document the actual process, as it could easily be abused.

Recommendations: The evaluation team recommends that AED recruit OPEXers on an informal basis, to the maximum extent possible. [USAID/G should check with the regional contracting officer at REDSO/Nairobi if further clarification is desired.]

4. Inflationary Syndrome

Findings: There is a natural inclination to select the individual who appears most highly qualified (including experience, not just paper credentials), regardless of the position for which he/she is being recruited. At the same time, the salary history of many potential OPEXers -- particularly those with U.S. private sector experience -- exceeds the U.S. Federal Government "cap", currently \$275 per day. Although cost data are

withheld by AED during screening and selection by the GOB, because individual salary expectations usually correlate with qualifications, the tendency is for higher rates to prevail.⁵

Conclusion: No wrong-doing is implied here, but the fact remains -- there is little or no systemic incentive to hold down OPEXer salaries until the case finally reaches the USAID/G project officer's desk.⁶ The evaluation team was informed that last year salary ranges were established for each position prior to recruitment and included in some advertisements, but this practice has not been observed in all instances.

Recommendations: The evaluation team recommends that the practice of establishing and advising prospective OPEXers of salary ranges for each position prior to recruitment be continued and consistently adhered to.

5. Target Deadlines

Findings: AED is provided a 60-day target to recruit a candidate. Given the process involved, this is extremely tight, and tends to encourage "cutting corners" in order to comply. We obtained feedback from several Ministries that they were well satisfied with the responsiveness of AED in this regard, comparing it to a more typical nine-month response by many other donors.

After OPEX candidates have been nominated to USAID/G and the Government of Botswana, the need for rapid response does become a matter of urgency. Individuals often have several job options and cannot usually afford to wait around indefinitely. In this regard AED (and OPEXers) have experienced some apparently inordinate delays in being accepted for employment.

⁵A cursory review of OPEX salary data by the evaluation team indicated a wide range for similar OPEX positions.

⁶Under the OPEX scheme, AED's "finder's fee" is a percentage of the salary. The GOB pays the standard government salary based on the level at which the position is classified, regardless of the incumbent, and the U.S. Government picks up any difference -- to the limit of a five percent increase in current documented salary.

Conclusions: In short, tight deadlines reflect good management, but unrealistic deadlines serve no useful purpose and simply generate unnecessary haste, which invites errors, poorer quality end results, and potentially more delay.

Recommendations: The evaluation team recommends that AED's target recruitment deadline formally be extended to 90 days; and a target response date be established for acceptance or rejection by the Ministry (such as two weeks after receipt of nominations) and closely monitored by USAID/G.

6. Contract Length

Findings: OPEXers are currently recruited for a two year period. Subject to agreement by all parties, this initial contract may be extended for a third year, or a new two year contract renegotiated, for a total not to exceed four years.

Conclusions: Where an overlap with a GOB counterpart is envisaged, unless the training scheduled for the counterpart is for a year or less, the probability of overlap and on-the-job training is unlikely without contract extension or renewal. After an initial extension, it is conceivable that a new contract may still have to be renegotiated --⁷ carrying the OPEXer into a fourth or even a fifth year.⁷

From the standpoint of the GOB, it is administratively simpler to provide an initial three- or four-year contract. This also gives greater job security to the OPEXer in that he/she does not have to be concerned with prospecting for reemployment after the first year on the job.⁸

⁷BWAST II has not been functioning long enough yet to encounter all these options. Nevertheless, a review of OPEXer activity under BWAST I and prior projects indicates a clear pattern of OPEXers who desire to extend their stay, or return to Botswana, under a variety of mechanisms.

⁸Of course, provision should be made for early termination for non-performance, or, with appropriate compensation, at the convenience of the government.

Recommendations: We therefore recommend that the standard OPEX contract be negotiated for three or four years -- as deemed most appropriate by the organization to which he/she will be assigned.

7. Four Year Policy

Findings: Current USAID/G policy limits any particular individual's assignment in a particular position to four years. With sufficient justification, exceptions to this policy can be waived by USAID for a particular case. While, conceptually, the OPEXer's contract length is intended to dovetail with a counterpart, in practice the contract duration reflects neither the Government of Botswana's need for skilled and experienced expatriates, nor the OPEXer's need for continuing employment.

Conclusions: While BWAST II is not yet old enough to have had an opportunity to exercise this policy, experience under previous projects provides clear evidence that numerous requests for waivers are likely to be received.⁹

The evaluation team sees nothing wrong with the practice of OPEXer reemployment beyond four years. Indeed, it makes eminent sense to reemploy an experienced individual in-country who is a known quantity to the Ministry -- as long as the position to be filled meets A.I.D.'s criteria, and the Ministry is satisfied with the individual's prior performance. However, USAID should ensure that the individual is not hindering the Government's localization program by overstaying and encumbering a position when a citizen has been trained and/or is otherwise available to fill it.

Recommendations: The evaluation team therefore recommends that the four year limitation on OPEXer employment be rescinded.

8. Lead Time for Transfer

Findings: After selection, the OPEXer and his/her family require some time to arrange their personal affairs before departing the U.S. for an extended period. This problem is familiar to all who have lived and worked in an overseas environment before. For some OPEXers,

⁹Many former OPEXers under previous contracts have been picked up by BWAST I and BWAST II.

however, this is their first overseas living experience, and they need additional time to prepare and adjust to the change.¹⁰

Recommendations: The evaluation team recommends that a planning factor of two months after notification of selection be used by AED for anticipating dependent arrival in Botswana.

9. Spouse Sponsorship

Findings: OPEXers often arrive ahead of their families, and begin work within a week. Someone usually assists in this process, but the individual OPEXer does not usually encounter many start-up problems. When the family arrives, however, and such support is needed, the OPEXer has little time to assist his family as they settle in. Furthermore, formal orientations, while useful, are too infrequent to be timely. [One individual informed the evaluation team that his family received a formal orientation four months after they had been in country.]

Recommendations: The evaluation team recommends that AED formalize a family sponsorship system, to ensure that each newly arrived family gets an orientation and personal assistance during their settling-in phase.

10. Household Support

Findings: Most OPEXers indicated that AED support on arrival was satisfactory, given the current shortage of suitable, reasonably-priced housing in Gaborone. Difficulties can be anticipated for future OPEXers as this situation worsens.

Conclusions: One difficulty that does appear to be resolvable is in furnishing household appliances. At present, every OPEXer procures appliances -- air conditioner, refrigerator, etc. -- and furniture after arrival, and is required to sell it before departure. This results in unnecessary inconvenience at both ends of the assignment.

Recommendations: The evaluation team recommends that AED explore the possibility of procuring and

¹⁰Most OPEXers and spouses interviewed by the evaluation team indicated that they could have used more pre-departure preparation time.

maintaining a basic inventory of equipment and furnishings for the families they support. [It is recognized that the extent to which AED can provide additional GSO-type services is, and will remain, extremely limited.]

11. Work Support Equipment

Findings: Under the agreement by which OPEXers are recruited, the employing Ministry agrees to furnish appropriate working equipment and supplies, materials and logistical support. In fact, "essential working tools" such as OPEXers are accustomed to are not always appreciated as being essential in a resource-short environment, and are not readily available through government procurement systems. Consequently, expectations are frequently unmet.

Many OPEXers we interviewed had compensated by procuring their own office support equipment -- such as personal computers, calculators, photocopy machines, paper, etc. -- Although these individuals are to be commended for their uncomplaining "can do" approach, they should not have to resort to such measures.

Conclusions: Equipment shortfalls impair the effectiveness and efficiency of the OPEXer, who has been recruited -- at considerable expense to the U.S. Government -- to make an impact. Although the principle of a host country contribution should be maintained, it is important not to handicap OPEXers in the performance of their duties.

Recommendations: The evaluation team recommends that provision be made in each OPEXer's Delivery Order (PIO/T) for the purchase of "appropriate working tools, equipment and supplies" at his/her discretion, subject to some dollar limitation -- for instance, \$10,000. [Note: if a vehicle has to be included for an individual whose duties require extensive travel in the bush, the amount would be considerably higher.] Such equipment would belong to the organization but would be in the custody of the OPEXer until he/she was reassigned.

12. Identification with BWAST II Objectives

Findings: One of the concerns with predecessor projects was that OPEXers were largely unaware of A.I.D. and its project "Purpose"; they regarded BWAST merely as a funding mechanism for their employment by the Government of Botswana, and AED as their in-country link.

A notable shortcoming was the failure by OPEXers to submit required reports to A.I.D. regularly, and the lack of an independent AED or A.I.D. evaluation system to monitor OPEXer performance.

While a residual of this perspective exists among some of the veteran OPEXers, it was apparent to the evaluation team that USAID is making a determined effort to heighten awareness and reinforce BWAST II's enunciated objectives in the hearts and minds of the OPEXers, as well as the Government of Botswana. The Mission Director's after-hours orientation and social functions at his home for OPEXers, for example, as well as new brochures on the A.I.D. program highlighting the project, USA/Botswana flag pins and formal ceremonies to recognize former participants with Certificates of Achievement, are indications of this effort to build team spirit.

Recommendations: The evaluation team recommends that USAID/G develop a simple, generic quarterly progress report format of activities and statistics to be completed and submitted to USAID by each OPEXer; then summarized and circulated in newsletter style for general interest.

C. Short-Term Consultants

Consultants on short-term assignments encounter difficulties different from those of individuals on extended assignments. Nevertheless, their problems are just as real and complex. If some of the stress factors can be alleviated with some basic management attention, improved effectiveness and efficiency should follow.

The available pool of short term consultants was limited during this evaluation. Nevertheless, coupling their experiences with our own, the following issues were identified.

1. Scheduling

Findings: Several individuals on short-term consultancies were asked to extend their stay. Many individuals who perform short-term consultancies are self-employed; or if employed, utilize leave time, or time between other work commitments to undertake such consultancies. In effect, they "sell their time" to perform a particular consultancy, and operate within a

limited "time window". As such, consultants must plan and schedule their availability to accept *ad hoc* work, and make tentative commitments. Few are readily available to consult at any time, and once committed to a time period, are often unable to modify it without jeopardizing subsequent commitments. It compounds the consultant's difficulties (and jeopardizes the consultancy) to have to be on "stand-by" over an extended period of time, or -- once on the job -- to be expected to "stay over" a few more days (or weeks) to complete the task.

Recommendations: The evaluation team recommends that short-term consultancies be *negotiated* and *firmly scheduled* as early as possible; and *then adhered to*.

2. Field Support

Findings: Since March 1988, secretarial support has been budgeted in short-term consultant delivery orders. In addition, however, consultants may need: their own transportation; office space in which to work, appropriately furnished with desks, tables and chairs; and access to office supplies as well as photocopying equipment, dedicated computers, and transformers or voltage regulators for any U.S. equipment the consultant might bring, and appropriate software. In particular, computer equipment and word-processor compatibility may pose problems. Short-term consultants may also require some dedicated overtime secretarial support during crucial off hour periods -- nights, weekends and holidays.

Conclusions: While AED and the sponsoring organizations budget secretarial support for short-term consultants, perhaps provisions for equipment and staff ought also to be made.

Recommendations: The evaluation team recommends that A.I.D. and AED explore the possibility of establishing a contractual relationship with a local business to provide a modern equipped office suite and secretarial staff, as required, for temporary use by TDYers and other short-term consultants to Gaborone.¹¹

¹¹Such a service would probably meet the needs of many other organizations with temporary business activity in Gaborone.

D. Participant Selection and Processing

1. Public Sector:

a. Employment Generation Criteria

Findings: A.I.D.'s strategy under BWAST II is to increase employment generation opportunities in the private sector. As indicated earlier, although "employment generation" is a unifying *concept*, training is only a subordinate support function. While it is possible to count the number of "individuals trained", there is no direct link to "jobs created".¹² It is thus difficult to justify training nominations in such terms. Consequently, for the most part, the selection "criteria" are subjective and unverifiable, and the source of controversy.

A step toward an "objective" point system was made last year based on the applicant's position, i.e. "x" points for this job title, "y" points for that job title. The evaluation team cautions that this approach could do more harm than good because while seemingly objective, such numbers merely reflect ordinal conjecture, have no interval validity and tend to drive out substantive qualitative reasoning and discussion.

Conclusions: After reviewing the criteria and the responses by the Ministries, the evaluation team concludes that in the absence of more directly-linked, specific, objective criteria, USAID/G has probably reached the point of diminishing returns in fine tuning definitions about employment generation.

Recommendations: The evaluation team recommends that USAID maintain its qualitative employment generation thrust and continue providing guidance regarding the priorities for types of candidates it will accept.

b. Candidate Nomination & Justification

Findings: Usually, donor agencies provide the GOB with a training quota; the government selects candidates for the available slots, and the donor attempts to place

¹²Both USAID and the GOB are aware that -- except in rare instances -- a government official does not directly create jobs in the private sector, although many may be able to facilitate that process.

them. USAID's approach -- of linking participant training with specific criteria, in effect "projectizing" a broad "program" -- is thus unique. Targeted selection also requires much more effort on the part of the nominating and selection agencies to do appropriate screening; however (as indicated elsewhere in this report) effectiveness is not always synonymous with efficiency.¹³

Recommendations: The evaluation team recommends that very senior GOB Ministry officials review and approve all training nominations originating in their respective ministries, instead of allowing the requests to be submitted directly to DPSM by Ministry training officers. Department requests are normally reviewed and approved by senior ministry officials, even though in some cases the request is transmitted under the training coordinator's signature. Perhaps senior officials should take a more active role in the initial screening.

The evaluation team also recommends that USAID explore the feasibility of formalizing an inter-ministerial selection committee of training officers,

¹³The team reviewed a number of applications in the file, and discussed the issue with several Ministry training officers and other personnel. From this cursory survey, it is evident that a considerable amount of "creative writing" is occurring in attempts to comply with USAID's employment generation "criteria". Ministries tend to operate as organic units and their departments, divisions and units support each other -- linked through a complex pattern of relationships. Unfortunately the team sees no easy solution to the current dilemma while retaining the targeted employment generation thrust. In some respects, such creative writing is positive as it serves to heighten awareness of, and concern for, the overall objective. Feedback -- to clarify understanding and sharpen the focus of future attempts -- is currently lacking. The easy solution is to discard the "criteria", and -- like other donors -- revert to a quota system for Ministry support, letting the Ministries select their prime candidates. While efficient, such an approach is not effective, because it is incompatible with USAID's carefully targeted strategy, and would result in "throwing out the baby with the bath water".

chaired by DPSM to screen and select candidates.¹⁴ Such an approach deals with subjectivity in a more structured manner and would serve to take some of the mystique out of the selections, as well as providing a forum for reinforcing the importance of employment generation as the focal issue.

The evaluation team further recommends that for future cycles, (or until the foregoing recommendation is implemented) USAID and AED provide *post mortem* feedback and guidance to the Ministry training officers on the rationale for low priority and/or non-selection of individual candidates.

c. Targeted Ministries

Findings: BWAST II is presently targeted at only seven ministries. We note that Works, Transport & Communications is currently excluded from the project. Given the objective of stimulating employment generation in the private sector, short-listing could be overly restrictive.

Recommendations: The evaluation team recommends that -- in principle -- training and technical assistance under BWAST II be accessible to any Public Sector office. The linking of the nominee to employment generation should be the governing criterion, not simply the organization in which he/she is housed.

d. Placement Cycle

Findings: As noted earlier, the nomination-selection-placement and pre-departure cycle for long term training is an annual one, beginning and culminating in August. The collective experience of the evaluation team

¹⁴In this regard, USAID's procedures for Technical Panels to evaluate contract proposals, and also for personnel promotions -- i.e. predetermination of a range of points for particular criteria; nominal classification and grouping of individual cases; individual panel member review of each case to score, weight and rank order all cases; panel comparisons of individual member ratings and discussion of extreme variances, followed by individual rescoring to develop a composite panel ranking and determine the "Competitive Range"; documenting shortcomings to debrief those who were unsuccessful -- should be helpful for selecting the most appropriate participants.

-- bolstered by feedback obtained during this evaluation -- is that screening, testing, placement processing and pre-departure orientation could all be considerably enhanced by lengthening the cycle to 18 months, but commencing earlier -- i.e. in February of each year. While this approach would result in some overlap between February and August, the activities are of a different kind and in different locations. The change should therefore not create major difficulty for AED.

Conclusions: The advantages that would be realized by this change are many:

- a) The ministry nominations for U.S. participant training would be moved from the current peak cycle when they are dealing with all other donor processing. Thus, more attention could be devoted to A.I.D.'s criteria.
- b) The candidates would be selected by August so that they can be processed for standardized testing -- TOEFL, SATs, GMATs, etc. -- early in the fall/winter cycle, instead of the last phase of the spring cycle as at present. This would facilitate placement, as test results should be available to AED by November/December. It would also permit the applicant an opportunity to retest if considered necessary or desirable.
- c) More time would be available for the candidates to complete their case-file before nomination to a U.S. university. This would reduce some of the present frustrations AED is experiencing in attempting to place candidates with incomplete files.
- d) By seeking placement before December, more spaces would be opened up and some early decision opportunities would be possible. The current placement cycle forces AED to seek admissions in an environment where many spaces have already been taken.
- e) In the final analysis, AED would have longer lead-time to seek placement for more difficult cases.

Recommendations: In view of the foregoing, the team recommends that USAID seek agreement with the DPSM [and also the BOCCIM Training Committee for the Private Sector participants] to change the beginning of the selection cycle from August to February, commencing in February 1989.

e. Pre-departure Preparation

Findings: During an intensive "Focus Group" meeting held during the course of this evaluation, the views of former participants were solicited regarding steps that could have helped prepare them better before departure for the U.S. academic environment.¹⁵

Recommendations: Although most of these individuals were not BWAST II participants, nevertheless we think their needs are generic. Their principal recommendations are listed below:

- a) Provide familiarization with Objective Testing practices (i.e. Multiple Choice Tests). This could be done in conjunction with preparation for TOEFL and SAT tests.
- b) Provide practice in SAT and similar multiple choice tests.
- c) Provide a mathematics and science refresher course.
- d) Provide a hands-on computer literacy course.
- e) Provide guidance in American vs British English spelling, word usage and idioms.
- f) Provide opportunity to listen to, and help in understanding different American regional accents.
- g) Provide some guidance in personal financial entitlements, pitfalls, and budgeting techniques.

The evaluation team endorses these recommendations to AED.

¹⁵See Appendix 6.

f. Targeting the Departure Date

Findings: In mid-August, an evaluation team representative met with one group of newly arrived participants in the U.S. A principal concern relayed was the imprecision of their departure date, which resulted in "wait, and hurry up" and created some last minute panic in settling their personal affairs prior to leaving Botswana. Although they had known for several months that they would be leaving "sometime" in July or August, the precise date was unknown and they had only one week of definitive notice. [Former participants echoed this problem of "call forward" uncertainty.] These problems, when they arise, may be due either to problems with airline scheduling or with student placement.

Recommendations: The evaluation team recommends that a definitive date for departure and travel schedule from Botswana be issued early in the year, then held to [barring strikes and other catastrophes], and constantly reiterated. Increasing the time allowed for the entire scheduling and placement process (as also recommended) will make this easier to implement.

g. Three-Year Bachelor Degree Policy

Findings: The team noted that some participants for bachelors degrees in the U.S. have been enrolled for three year intensive study programs.¹⁶ The evaluation team is concerned that such "accelerated" study -- particularly for foreign students who have to adjust to a strange environment -- may be too intensive, and detrimental to learning. Separation from family, friends and job environment for three, or more, years is also an additional burden on the participant.

Recommendations: The evaluation team recommends that participants be given the option of proceeding at a "normal" pace,¹⁷ and also be afforded the opportunity to return to Botswana in mid-program -- perhaps for research, or short-term on-the-job familiarization.

¹⁶In some instances, they have had prior equivalent credits on record; in other cases, the individuals have been expected to study throughout the year -- Fall, Spring and Summer sessions.

¹⁷"Normal" is two terms per year for most four year undergraduate degree programs.

h. Overlap with OPEXer

Findings: In support of the Government of Botswana's localization policy, there is an explicit policy that OPEXers are recruited for particular positions until a Motswana can be trained to assume those duties. Ideally -- according to the GOB-USAID/G model, the OPEXer should arrive three months before the counterpart departs, and work as his/her mentor on-the-job until the counterpart leaves for extended formal coursework. After the counterpart returns, on-the-job internship continues for another three months after which the OPEXer departs, and the Motswana assumes his/her post. [In some instances, either the OPEXer or the Counterpart occupies a "shadow position" during the overlap stage.]

The evaluation team noted that despite innumerable efforts to comply, this model has rarely been adhered to, and is the source of much administrative friction. Furthermore, the team concludes that the model is unnecessarily rigid and impractical in the Botswana situation. [A fuller discussion is presented in Appendix 5.]

Recommendations: The evaluation team recommends that the OPEX counterpart model be modified to improve the "back-link" after the counterpart has completed formal training and returns to the job.

2. Private Sector:

Most of the foregoing comments and recommendations for Public Sector participants apply equally to Private Sector candidates. Therefore they are not reiterated here. Only the uniqueness of the Private Sector process is addressed below.

a. Training Selection

Findings: The Private Sector Training Committee is very broadly based, with representatives drawn from the following organizations:

- o Executive Council of the BOCCIM, who acts as Chairman of the Committee
- o BOCCIM (Secretariat), who acts as Secretary of the Committee

- o Department of Labour and Social Security (Deputy Commissioner of Labour)
- o Directorate of Public Service Management (Training Division)
- o Botswana Federation of Trade Unions
- o AFGRAD Scholarship Program (Country Representative)
- o Association of Training and Development Officers
- o Four BEF associations and/or members identified by the Secretariat, as appropriate
- o Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (National Manpower Planner)
- o University of Botswana
- o Academy for Educational Development
- o U.S. Agency for International Development.

The number of long-term participants assigned for BOCCIM nomination appears to parallel those of the Public Sector, on a more or less "equal shares" basis, allocated from the original Project Paper targets.

Conclusions: After discussing the needs for Private Sector training with various individuals, the evaluation team is of the opinion that dividing training equally between the Public and Private Sectors and restricting training opportunities to BOCCIM members is inappropriate. The evaluation team is of the opinion that the Private Sector would benefit more from a variety of short courses and observation visits in the U.S., third countries and in Botswana, than from long term degree programs in the U.S.

Recommendations: The evaluation team recommends that:

- a) the GOB and USAID provide BOCCIM and selected other Private Sector representatives with the opportunity to reassess their training needs and reapportion both the funds and target quotas for various training programs

currently earmarked for Private Sector training -- with AED support and advice. We suggest that USAID play an active role in this process, and retain final approval authority.

- b) a needs assessment of critical skills in the private sector -- including entrepreneurial skills -- be undertaken at the earliest opportunity.
- c) Once criteria for specifically-needed critical skill areas have been established, any qualified individual should be considered, regardless of current employment status. Some training should be specifically provided for individuals who possess the required technical and/or managerial skills, to encourage them to go into business.

E. Third Country Training

Findings: The regional representative for the Rockefeller Foundation recently remarked on a crisis in African higher education, and the inability of many African governments to adequately support and maintain standards of international credibility. Interviews with several senior officials and returned participants also revealed some negative perceptions towards third country participant training, despite acknowledged advantages of proximity and cost considerations.

Botswana's unique position on the front line with South Africa has conditioned their expectations of educational excellence. In assessing possible third country training sites, the evaluation team noted that USAID/G and AED had limited their search of third country training to other African institutions. The team learned that there is intense competition by nationals for scarce places in Kenya's Institute of Administration, and for management programs at the University of Dar es Salaam. Although the American University in Cairo has excellent programs in Management and Enterprise Development, few sub-Saharan students wish to attend because of the Muslim environment. Furthermore, a recent study by SADCC countries noted that the course content and quality of

institutions such as ESAMI in Tanzania have limited utility for Southern Africa.

Recommendations: On the basis of this rapid appraisal, the evaluation team recommends that, in addition to considering African sites, USAID and AED seek appropriate third country training sites outside of the African continent; for instance, the International Labor Organization Management Training Programme based in Turin, Italy, the Asian Institute for Technology in Bangkok, The Indian Institute of Management, and the Asian Institute for Management in Manila.

F. In-Country Training

Findings: There is a wide variety of in-country training and education institutions in Botswana. The Institute of Development Management (IDM), the Polytechnic Institute, Botswana Institute for Administration and Commerce (BIAC), the Brigades (BRIDEC), and the University of Botswana are only a few of the most prominent. In-country training in some of these institutions could be expanded to meet some of the needs of private sector entities, in both rural and urban locations. With appropriate support, some of these organizations could be developed into regional centers of excellence to link with private sector training needs.

The evaluation team learned that the World Bank is planning to discuss with the GOB how to strengthen the higher education system in Botswana towards degree-granting capability in priority fields such as management, possibly including graduate courses linked with external universities in the United Kingdom.

Recommendations: To this end, the evaluation team recommends that -- to the extent possible -- USAID/G actively participate in discussions with the GOB, World Bank, and other donors regarding in-country educational development to further national income generation objectives.

The evaluation team recommends that USAID continue to explore and utilize available opportunities for short-term in-country training. Long-term in-country training should not be addressed under BWAST II, however (even if appropriate), as this does not appear to be the best use

of A.I.D.-provided foreign exchange, and can probably be supported from other funding sources.

The evaluation team also recommends that USAID/G encourage institution-building capacity that could involve the exchange of scholars, development of curriculum and involvement of indigenous researchers in studies oriented to the Private Sector thrust of BWAST II.

G. General Administration

1. Delivery Order Preparation

Findings: The Team observed that A.I.D. officials spend considerable time and effort preparing documentation for participant training, OPEXer and Short Term consultants, and interacting with the contractor (AED) to process it. In most instances, the data required for document preparation come from (or are available to) AED in the first instance. While USAID must retain final approval authority for Delivery Orders, with AED contractor support available, the team can find no apparent reason why the USAID Project Officer should continue to be burdened with detailed document preparation.

Recommendations: The evaluation team recommends that -- to the maximum extent possible -- USAID formally delegate to AED the responsibility for preparing BWAST II Delivery Orders and related documents, for A.I.D. approval. Consideration should also be given to "farming out" similar document preparation to AED (currently handled by the A.I.D. Training Officer) for other training programs and projects.

2. Progress Monitoring

Findings: Project progress of key indicators and other useful "nice to know" analyses were not readily available, but had to be laboriously extracted manually from various sources as a special effort on a case-by-case basis. In many instances, most of the data were available -- often in computer printouts provided by AED -- but unrequested, or unanalyzed. The A.I.D. computerized system outlined in Handbook 10 was not being used because A.I.D. and AED feel the current system provides the same data in a much more "user-friendly"

manner. The evaluation team was unable to obtain some key summary information.

Recommendations: If the current system essentially keeps track of individual participants (and perhaps others such as OPEXers), but does not furnish totals -- such as participants selected or sent or concluding first year of training successfully -- and if the program is written in a DBMS language, such as dBASE III Plus, then the programs should be extended to provide such totals. This is not a major job. A more ambitious extension of current programs would be to develop status indicators for the expected outputs of BWAST II, and to develop programs to automate tracking these indicators. This would require a major effort.

3. Logical Framework

Findings: The current project, as reflected by the logframe, does not provide the conceptual latitude to respond to changing circumstances and potential in Botswana's emerging private sector -- opportunities which the current mission leadership has recognized. Several modifications to BWAST II have also been recommended by this evaluation.

Recommendations: The evaluation team recommends that USAID/G and GOB modify the BWAST II logical framework to reflect intended future directions for the project.

4. Project Agreement Amendment

Recommendations: To the extent that the Government of Botswana and USAID are in concurrence with new directions for the project, the evaluation team recommends that such changes as are necessary for formal documentation be incorporated in an amendment to the current Project Agreement.

III. THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND BWAST II

A. Overview of Findings

In general, the private sector component of BWAST II is effectively managed by the contractor, the Academy for Educational Development. Project targets are being met: the recruitment, placement and training of participants in long- and short-term training is on schedule; two OPEXers (Operational Experts) have been recruited and placed in key positions impacting on employment generation; private sector training management capability is being developed through the Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry, and Manpower (BOCCIM). This last component (BOCCIM) needs to be strengthened through -- among other methods -- greater financial support.

Of the 51 BWAST II participants currently undergoing training in the USA, 21 are representatives of private business. Of the 75 long-term BWAST II participants in or having completed training in the U.S., 38 are B.S. and 26 M.S. students; eight studied for an Associate's degree, and three for diplomas. Ten participants have been placed in short-term training programs. While placements are in technical institutes and community colleges as well as in universities, the marked tendency is to enroll participants in two- and three-year university programs leading to a baccalaureate or master's degree. Currently, thirteen participants are in programs leading to a B.A.; four are in M.A. or M.S. programs; and two are in an A.A. program.

Training costs for the BWAST II program were not available in a form sufficiently detailed for any meaningful analysis to be conducted. Eventually, the costs should be gathered, and such figures as average training, overhead and management costs per participant per month for both long-term U.S. training and in-country short-term training should be calculated.

Under BWAST II four individuals have participated in third-country training, with one each placed in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Kenya. BWAST II targets 15 percent of participants for third-country training.

Two OPEXers are currently assigned to private sector activities, one with BOCCIM, and the other with Botswana

Craft. In addition, three OPEXers are placed with the public sector component of the Botswana Development Corporation, a parastatal organization. All of these individuals are placed in key policy-making or training positions impacting on employment generation and economic development. The average cost per OPEXer placement is US\$ 90,000 per year. [Note: This figure does not include contractor management and overhead costs.]

The Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry, and Manpower (BOCCIM) -- formerly known as the Botswana Employer's Federation (BEF) -- is a 650-member organization with considerable potential as it has a membership network extending throughout Botswana. BOCCIM, through its Training Committee, coordinates the selection of private sector candidates for participant training. In addition, BOCCIM serves as the implementing agent for all private sector aspects of the BWAST II project. BOCCIM carries out its responsibilities effectively and efficiently. Presently, BWAST II's contribution towards the operational expenses of BOCCIM for services rendered to the project is the provision of an OPEXer.

BWAST I, which served as the basis for BWAST II design, was a landmark in participant training programs in that it included some provision for private sector training. In BWAST II, considerably more emphasis has been placed on implementing private sector initiatives. Consequently, as greater implementation experience has been acquired, the time is now opportune to consider some "mid-course" corrections.

The evaluation team suggests the following approaches as ways to strengthen the delivery of services to the private sector. However, the conceptual design of BWAST projects and current funding limitations impose constraints on the nature and extent of changes that can be made. In a following section suggestions are given for either the redesign of BWAST II or the design of a new project which moves a step beyond BWAST II in addressing private sector development and employment generation objectives.

B. Private Sector Elements of BWAST II

The following private sector elements of the BWAST II project will be discussed in this section: 1) the

nature and level of participant training; 2) participant selection; 3) in-country, short-term training; 4) third-country training; 5) OPEXers; and 6) BOCCIM.

1. Nature and Level of Participant Training

In general, although BWAST II is accomplishing the private sector participant training objective which was established earlier, the project can be further strengthened by changing the focus of the training. The emphasis should be shifted from two and three year programs leading to a baccalaureate or master's degree, to more specific two year training which combines institutional training with work placement.

To be sure, degree programs are justified for some private sector participants when the technical specialty may best be acquired within a university setting -- for instance, in the case of an industrial chemist. For other participants, however, a university degree program is inappropriate for the content and level of training needed. Excluding technical specialties requiring university work, the most pressing labor needs in Botswana are in middle-level technical and service jobs -- such as skilled craftsmen, technicians, and mid-level managers. The implementation of development plans requires a large pool of mid-level talent which does not currently exist. The lack of such a skill pool is probably the most critical manpower need currently facing Botswana today.

In the United States there are numerous community colleges and technical institutes which provide high-quality, mid-level training. This includes both short-term courses and two-year A.A. degree programs. Training is specific and highly practical, and there is often an opportunity to link classroom instruction with internships or work experience. Greater use should be made by BWAST II of these institutions.

Work placement is an essential, but weak, component of present private sector participant training programs. Attachments and other work placements have been utilized in only a few cases. Through work placement, the participant gains the experiences necessary to fully link classroom instruction with practical application. Ideally, each participant should have the opportunity for placement in at least two or three firms. In such a program, training is appropriate to skill levels required in business and industry, instruction is job specific,

and practical work experience is gained. The combination of short-term, less-than-baccalaureate level training and work placement will not result in a shorter overall training period. Nevertheless, it is a potent combination.

There appear to be three reasons for the heavy emphasis on university degree programs. First, at the conceptualization stage of the BWAST project, the major emphasis was on localization of government services and providing technical assistance to a rapidly expanding public sector. The combination of OPEXer support and counterpart training provided a mechanism for maintaining bureaucratic stability and growth while at the same time addressing localization. Under such an arrangement, the long absence of the counterpart can be accommodated by the organization; moreover, a university degree confers essential status, thus reflecting well on the work unit. In addition, a broad general education coupled with broad technical exposure is appropriate for officials who can expect changing career responsibilities. The situation is not the same, however, for participants from the private sector.

A second reason is that long programs require proportionally less investment in management overhead and time. Short programs involve the same management tasks as long programs, however, substantially more short programs have to be managed in a corresponding amount of time in order to achieve the desired results. Thus, when making choices, the tendency of those responsible for implementation is to opt for longer programs.

Third, aspiring candidates are attracted by the opportunity to earn a university degree, even if it is not functionally related to their work assignment in the private sector. This attraction is difficult to overcome.

2. Participant selection

The existing participant placement process is generally well-managed by the contractor (AED), and the process to select private sector participants appears to be conscientiously managed by the BOCCIM Training Committee. Some procedural changes have been recommended in Chapter II to improve that process. A larger question must be examined, however, namely: "Does the selection process appropriately address employment-related needs?"

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Although administered well, the evaluation team suggests that the selection process per se is inappropriate for identifying the most essential private-sector training priorities.

To be most effective, training should focus on selected critical technical and service skill needs which constitute bottlenecks in private sector development and employment generation. Moreover, these should be skill areas which are linked directly to activities such as production management, quality control, product design and marketing. Training in general areas should be avoided despite "pressure" for degree-awarding programs. In short, degree programs should be deemphasized.

The current private-sector selection process is largely patterned after the public-sector component of BWAST II. However, the conditions to support training in the private sector differ in several significant respects.

Firms which may have some of the greatest training needs may be reluctant to nominate candidates because they cannot afford the investment in time, money and uncertainty. Those firms with the most critical needs tend to be small- and medium-size employers who do not have sufficient resources to train within the firm.¹

While income support for public-sector participants can be guaranteed by the GOB, private employers -- particularly smaller employers (who may have the greatest training needs) -- may not be able to afford this type of support. Furthermore, employers may be reluctant (or unable) to send their best employees, or even any employees, to participate in training because they will lose their valued services for an extended period. There is also a high likelihood that -- even if bonded -- the newly-trained employee may leave the firm after his/her obligation is completed, unless substantially higher wages are paid, often before the employer feels that a

¹Although it was not possible to conduct a complete analysis of firm characteristics and participant trainees, it appears that candidates tend to be selected from larger firms which have sufficient training resources, and where skill areas are not necessarily critical to development needs.

fair return has been received on the investment in training.²

In any event, the evaluation team noted that currently there is a much smaller qualified private-sector candidate pool than is desirable.³

Presently, the dominant factor determining the skill areas targeted for training is the availability of individuals who have obtained the support of particular employers -- not necessarily the actual importance of the skill area. Candidates are nominated from the ranks of those already employed.

Individuals should be selected because they are the most qualified to undergo training in a particular skill area, not simply because they are employed by a BOCCIM member* and fortunate enough to be able to obtain release. By separating nominations and selections from specific employment, it will be possible to enlarge the candidate pool, improve the quality of candidates and, most importantly, target technical and service skill areas which are critical to development. This does not mean that employed persons will be bypassed; however it does ensure that some highly-qualified candidates will not be excluded because they are not employed or cannot gain the support of a particular employer.

3. In-country, Short-term Training

BWAST II has made use of some in-country training in the past, and, to the extent possible, the project should increase the number of and type of training activities supported in-country. First, however, two challenges must be addressed. Quality of training -- which is currently uneven -- must be improved. BOCCIM, working with BWAST II support, is in a position to take the lead in developing standards for constructively evaluating the training activities it sponsors. Additionally, in-

²Private sector employers are reluctant to commit to pay higher wages for training that itself may be of uncertain value. Much more than in the public sector, the private sector demands evidence of a clearly perceived relationship between training received and value added, in terms of improved work performance.

³There were fewer than 30 qualified nominations for 20 long-term and six short-term training positions. Ideally, there should be a ratio of at least five to one.

* or a non-BOCCIM member firm

country training flexibility needs to be enhanced. Training has to be provided at convenient hours (often in evenings) and at a variety of appropriate locations -- including actual employment sites. The length, specificity and content of training must vary, as appropriate to the nature and scope of the subject matter taught. To be most effective, training must address specific needs. If BOCCIM, through BWAST II, becomes a large enough user of local training services, it can have a major role in influencing the quality and delivery of training.

4. Third Country Training

Many of the training institutions in Africa which previously provided training services have deteriorated to the point where they cannot be considered effective.⁴ Consequently, in many instances, better-quality services can be obtained directly through institutions in Botswana.

Where training cannot be obtained in Botswana, or the content is inappropriate to Botswana, third-country training should be considered before looking to the United States as a source of training. Such programs would include, for example, courses in business regulations, building codes, insurance regulations and local marketing systems unique to Southern Africa. In any case, when consideration is being given to third-country training in Africa, a thorough examination of the institutions under consideration must be conducted.

At this time, the evaluation team's considered judgment is that it is unrealistic to expect that 15 percent of the participants can be placed in third-country training programs in Africa and still maintain a satisfactory level of quality. If this target -- imposed by the Inspector General for cost-efficiency considerations -- cannot be waived, other training locations outside of Africa should be considered. These may include, for example, the ILO training center in Turin, Italy, and other training institutions in Asia.

5. Operational Experts (OPEXers)

A positive policy environment is crucial to economic growth. This is particularly true in the case of

⁴Education Policies for Sub-Saharan Africa; Adjustment, Revitalization and Expansion. The World Bank, 1987.

employment generation in the private sector, whether formal or informal. To the extent that OPEXers can help shape positive private-sector growth policy, they are being used well. Generally, however, the high cost of an OPEXer cannot be justified in positions of mid-level responsibility. Therefore, the evaluation team concludes that insofar as the private sector is concerned, using OPEXers in operational roles is not the most effective or efficient use of this resource -- unless they are in key positions with a high level of responsibility and a direct and demonstrated relationship to employment generation and economic development.

Continued use of OPEXers in formal training roles which directly impact on employment generation in the private sector is warranted, however, if the multiplier effect anticipated justifies the cost.

While the public sector has made extensive use of OPEXers, the candidates for training from the private sector have not been matched with OPEXers. Nor do we see that a one-on-one OPEX/counterpart linkage model is pertinent to the private sector. There is a need, however, to provide one or more specialists in the private sector to a few critical development support organizations, such as BOCCIM, BIAC, the Brigades, etc.; and to provide consulting services to organizations (such as commercial banking and credit facilities and training institutions) to stimulate entrepreneurship and improve the scope, quality and quantity of services offered the general public.

6. Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM)

BOCCIM has the potential to play a key economic development role in Botswana. However, the organization is still in an early stage of growth and in the process of defining its role. Presently, the evaluation team considers that BOCCIM is too dependent on large enterprises for support and its activities are too restricted to adequately represent "the Private Sector" for purposes of BWAST II training activities. Smaller employers and "non-traditional" enterprises (such as cooperatives), as well as rural enterprises located outside of Gaborone, all play a vital role in development and should also be given consideration when allocating training opportunities to stimulate employment generation and strengthening of market forces.

BOCCIM's considerable potential is currently limited by a severe lack of funds. BOCCIM's primary source of revenue is membership fees and donations. Without additional support, BOCCIM will remain too dependent on the large employers, who contribute the largest share of membership fees, and BOCCIM will be unable to expand its activities in new directions. In this regard, the evaluation team suggests that USAID/G explore the possibility that BOCCIM be viewed in some ways as a non-profit contractor/agent and reimbursed according to services rendered under the BWAST II project. At the same time, if BOCCIM is the institution which USAID/G wishes to strengthen to stimulate long-term private sector growth development, it might be appropriate to make an institutional matching grant with a variable ratio (such as 80/20) to support a reasonable development plan.

The evaluation team noted that the BWAST service-support contractor (AED) presently has a private-sector specialist -- Mr. Fred Dolton -- on its staff. We suggest that consideration be given to attaching Mr. Dolton directly to BOCCIM. From this perspective, he could provide a valuable service in linking BWAST II, through BOCCIM, to the private sector, as well as enhancing the visibility and role of BOCCIM. In addition to the present assigned OPEXer, the evaluation team believes that BOCCIM could also benefit from the services of an OPEXer specializing in small enterprise development, and who could also serve as the focal point for coordinating short-term consultants under the BWAST II project.

C. New Directions for Private Sector Initiatives

If USAID intends to have a significant impact on private sector development and employment generation, it must reach beyond the confines of BWAST II. To be sure, BWAST II has potential to stimulate private sector growth and development -- but only primarily from a subordinate training perspective. A new initiative requires concurrently, a more focused and a broadened approach to private sector development: focused in the sense that services must be coordinated and linked; and broadened, because small employers need a variety of services, including management and marketing assistance, credit, help with securing raw materials, and product design assistance (among others). Training is useful, but will

only be fully effective when given in conjunction with these other essential services. Any new project initiative must be designed to coordinate and deliver a wide range of such services to enterprises.

Recent studies by Smith⁵ and Davis and Scott⁶ suggest establishing a development center to assist employers with services other than training support. The two proposals differ in detail, but in general such a center would provide access to a range of services, which may include locating training in management and technical skills; assisting with credit and financial services; assisting employers with marketing and distribution; and providing information on technology.

Although there are many ways of aiding the private sector, the basic suggestion of these two studies is sound. Such a center is essential to coordinate and strengthen the intermediary resource institutions that promote and assist firms in Botswana. Rather than establish a separate center, however, the evaluation team suggests that strong consideration be given to strengthening the capacity of BOCCIM to coordinate the delivery of private sector services.

A variety of training and management services already exists in Botswana. These vary markedly in scope, quality and substance, and as they are not currently linked to service the needs of individual employers, numerous "gaps" exist. Medium- and small-size employers basically have the greatest need for services and also experience the most difficulty in locating assistance. Such services should be selectively improved. As a "referral" agency, a development center would also be in a good position to influence the quality of these services.

⁵Smith, Cameron L. "Management Assistance to the Private Sector: Analysis & Preliminary Plan". Unpublished ms. 21 July 1988

⁶Davis, Richard N., and William E. Scott. Feasibility Study for a Small Business Development Center in the Republic of Botswana. Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Gaborone, February 1988.

A development center to assist employers can take many forms. Some key considerations are:

1) There is a tendency for staffs to grow over time, and for centers to take on the characteristics of bureaucracies. Unless staffs are kept small, eventually the costs of wages and benefits can outweigh the value of the services provided.

2) The function of the center should be to make referrals, rather than to provide direct assistance that can be obtained elsewhere. Otherwise, the center becomes a competitor among service providers when, in fact, what is needed is a strengthening of intermediary resource institutions. Thus, the center's role should be to facilitate the identification and use of existing resources, and to bring them to the attention of firms. In situations where essential services are lacking, the center needs to encourage the development of these services, or foster them in-house, then spin them off. Consequently, center staff members need to know what kind of assistance is needed, where assistance can be obtained, and/or in the last resort, have the expertise to provide such assistance directly for a limited time period.

3) Typically, centers of this type initially attempt to operate on a cost-recovery basis. In practice, costs incurred in such programs can seldom if ever be recovered. There are usually substantial development and start-up costs, and the center must be supported until it can attract clients. Furthermore, client demand must be consistent and sufficient to cover operating costs. There are no service fees to cover operating expenses during periods when business is slack. Small firms -- the group that has the greatest need for services -- tend to have very limited resources. Even collectively, small firms are not a good source of financial support for the center. Therefore, the center will need outside support that cannot be recovered from service fees. It should be recognized at the outset therefore that consistent -- even if modest -- support from a donor agency or government will be needed throughout the life of the center.

4) To succeed, the center must establish a highly effective management system because of the diversity of assistance provided and the variety of employers served. The center must coordinate simultaneous assistance in management, production, marketing, financing, and training to many clients, each of whom has a unique mix

of labor needs, production technology, products, and market networks. Moreover, it is to be expected that the needs of individual firms will change over time.

D. BOCCIM as a Service Center

BOCCIM has the potential to be the location for such a broad-spectrum center in Botswana. BOCCIM has a small but highly professional staff. They have an established membership of employers, providing a network throughout Botswana. They are an independent, private sector organization, and they have experience in working with USAID through the BWAST II project. In other words, BOCCIM is strategically placed to establish and develop the center.

In order to play this service role effectively, however, it is essential that BOCCIM broaden its scope. It will have to serve more medium- and small-sized employers, cooperatives and other associations; and will have to extend its services to all geographical regions in Botswana. In short, employment generation must be broadly addressed, particularly in the rural areas.

As a comparatively small donor agency to Botswana (three percent of total donor support), USAID needs a way to maintain a commanding presence while at the same time focusing on critical development problems. By supporting the development of BOCCIM's capacity to provide broad-spectrum private sector assistance, USAID can achieve a powerful multiplier effect. The center, in essence, would draw on all other donor- and government-supported development services.

Presently, the impact of these activities is diluted because there is virtually no coordination. The center can become the focal point of economic development activities in Botswana. Again, medium- and small-size employers are the key to any employment and income generating policy. The evaluation team believes that USAID, by moving in this direction, will have the correct focus and the right organization.

E. Recommendations

1. Participant training

a. Selection. The evaluation team recommends that nomination criteria for the private sector be broadened to include individuals who are employed by other organizations; those who have appropriate backgrounds but are not yet employed; and individuals who are willing to break their links with employment.

To the extent that currently-identified training priority areas do not highlight particular technical and service skills (such as maintenance of computers or electronic equipment, or diagnosis and repair of automobile electronics, for example), the evaluation team recommends that the selection process include these critical training needs. If these data are not readily available, the evaluation team further recommends that a short-term special study be conducted as a high priority, in order to provide a basis for selecting the next batch of private-sector participants.

b. Training. The evaluation team recommends that private sector participant training be refocused on mid-level fields which require less than a baccalaureate degree; that the use of community colleges for training sites be expanded; and that institutional-based training be combined with work placement.

2. OPEXers

The evaluation team recommends that BWAST II use OPEXers in some selected Private Sector organizations.

The evaluation team recommends that AED's private sector specialist be co-located with BOCCIM.

The evaluation team recommends that additional OPEXers be provided to BOCCIM, and other non-profit private enterprise coordinating organizations to stimulate private sector initiatives through direct operational, training and consultancy services.

3. In-country training

The evaluation team recommends that continued -- if not increased -- use be made of in-country training.

The evaluation team recommends that, to the extent feasible, training be tailored to the requirements of specific employers, rather than generic courses.

The evaluation team recommends that USAID/G, through BOCCIM, support the development of intermediary resource providers who can assist firms in Botswana.

4. BOCCIM

The evaluation team recommends that USAID/G support the development of BOCCIM as a referral center to mobilize and coordinate indigenous services to private sector firms.

The evaluation team recommends that BOCCIM establish a Subject Matter Standards Committee to assess training quality.

The evaluation team recommends that some direct financial support be given to BOCCIM to cover some of the the capital outlay and service expenses for the activities anticipated to be extended to BWAST II.

IV. PUBLIC SECTOR TRAINING

A. Participant Training

1. U.S. Long-term/Short-term

The majority of participants under BWAST II have been placed in U.S. institutions by AED. Currently, 39 of the 75 participants have been from the GOB for training in management and technical fields. Ten of these persons have received short-term specialized training.

Selection/preparation. Selection included several factors such as GOB nomination, individual academic ability, application of criteria, and USAID/DPSM approval. It was reported that the main reason for participant enrollment was because of nominations, rather than individual choice. Several persons felt that they had not received sufficient counseling about career options or what to expect when they arrived in the U.S. In some cases, this process had apparently resulted in unsuitable placements. Newly-arrived participants interviewed in the U.S. felt that they could have benefitted from more in-country preparation prior to taking the Scholastic Aptitude Tests (SATs) in areas such as: "Americanese" comprehension, computer literacy, math/science preparation, test-taking skills, and personal budget management.

In discussion with AED staff it was noted that the selection and placement choices were constrained by inadequate undergraduate performance and preparation. Some persons reported inadequate lead time in settling their affairs before being requested to depart.

Relevance/quality. Interviews with former participants funded under BWAST I found controversy over whether their U.S. training had been appropriate for their needs. Several interviewees complained that Botswana's rigorous, critical grading system was not understood by U.S. institutions, i.e., that an average of C was good. They said that most institutions did not understand Botswana's British academic terminology.

Some students felt that the technology for training was not available in Botswana, e.g., videos for micro-teaching. Several participants said that they had been trained as technicians but had returned to assignments which were administrative.

AED staff attributed part of the problem to a lack of adequate undergraduate preparation, and student expectations which in some cases exceeded their abilities. Placement staff noted that because of undergraduate inadequacies, it had been increasingly difficult to place participants in both undergraduate and graduate programs. It was reported that many students had self-selected for community colleges because of poor grades and deficiencies. Community colleges are more able to provide developmental services than senior institutions.

Participant Experience. The team leader met with six BWAST II participants before departure. These felt that their experience to date was positive, and that their institutions provided good support. Feedback from returned participants referred to in the rest of this section was obtained from returnees from earlier programs, and thus provides inputs to, rather than feedback from BWAST II.

In interviews with former participants, and newly-arrived participants under BWAST II, most felt that their experience had been positive, and that their institution had provided good support. Several persons described emotional difficulties due to being away from spouses and children for prolonged periods. Staff reported that some participants in building construction or graphic design could not understand why they had to take American history or other general subjects. It was noted that government participants received a full salary for the first year, and a half salary thereafter. However, the participants' families had continuous expenses to meet and that had caused considerable worry. Many respondents reported a need to write a thesis upon a topic that needed research in Botswana, but said that they lacked the resources to return. Tarnoff and Elmer reported that five participants had reported serious problems in adjusting to the U.S. Except for some students who experienced difficulties with alcohol abuse, few were unable to adjust to American communities.

Reentry/Utilization. Most prior participants reported maintaining contact with their agencies prior to their return, although it was learned that few were certain about what their position would be. They expressed a need for more information on major changes in their ministry during their absence. Most felt the need for orientation by their agency upon their return, including help with housing and transportation. It was reported that there was not much relationship between their job expectations and placement upon their return.

Unfortunately, few prior participants said that they had maintained linkages with their U.S. training institutions or with other USAID participants in Botswana on a continuing basis. Most persons reported being part of

professional associations related to their jobs in their ministries. They felt that there were ample opportunities to maintain continuing professional development by attending international and local conferences, workshops, etc. Professional journals, magazines, and other literature was available and they frequently worked with expatriate experts in their respective positions. The majority reported difficulties in participating in UB or USAID alumni associations because of family demands and other activities.

A study of participants in SAMDP and BWAST I in 1986¹ indicated that most participants had returned to training-related jobs in Botswana with very little movement between ministries or the public and private sector. Most had been promoted and had assumed more responsibility. Most participants were highly satisfied with the quality and appropriateness of their training. Few reported serious adjustment problems to the U.S., or re-entry difficulties -- with the possible exception of receiving adequate support from supervisors back on the job.

A questionnaire and focus group study (including 17 returned participants from SAMDP and BWAST I) of prior participants followed up this study and the results are shown in Appendix 6. It was noted that government participants received a full salary for the first year, and a half salary thereafter. However, this was inadequate as the participant's family has continuous expenses to meet, and a 50 percent reduction in salary caused hardship and considerable worry. Because participants cannot work in the U.S. to make up any difference in lost salary, study is perceived to be as much a penalty as an opportunity.

Most participants in the U.S. were isolated from other Batswana, which caused loneliness (under BWAST II, they are usually placed in groups of two or more). Suggestions for improvement included: providing funds so that participants could return to Botswana during the course of their studies to visit their families, to maintain contact with their agencies, and to collect thesis material; changing salary policies to help alleviate anxiety over personal finances; and concentrating participants in fewer institutions, each with special programs to enhance curricular relevance and to encourage fellowship among Batswana participants.

2. U.S. - Short-term specialized courses

To date, ten short-term participants have been placed in specialized training in the U.S. Fields of study were: Public Management (1); Collective Bargaining (1); Project

¹C. Tarnoff and L. Elmer, 1986.

Evaluation (3); Trade and Investment (1); Budgeting and Finance (1); Hydrology (1); Range Management (1); and Project Management (1).

Requests for short-term training have tended to be for problem-focussed courses of an average three months' duration. Some prior participants reported that their institutions had not tailored course work to the problem or needs, but had assigned them into available academic offerings. The curricula tended to be too theoretical and lacked relationship to actual on-job skills. A few prior participants were dissatisfied with their training because of lack of academic credits or certificate which was credible in Botswana.

Botswana presently involved in the management of activities that affect employment opportunities will also have access to short courses in administration and management in the U.S. Approximately 24 (38 percent) out of a total of 64 participants will be drawn from the private sector while the remainder will be public sector.

In SAMDP and BWAST I, C. Tarnoff and L. Elmer found that one fourth of a participant population of 500 was sent for international short-term training. They noted that short-term training was least likely to result in localization, and that businesses were slower to localize. Accordingly, it was suggested that USAID consider a strong private-sector localization criterion under BWAST II, especially for businesses which have expatriate employees. Of those respondents who reported no promotion activity (32 percent), more than half attended short-term programs. Short-term and non-degree participants appeared to be more satisfied with the amount of practical training in their programs and their relevance to conditions in Botswana. The authors explained this in terms of the fact that academic degree training in the U.S. tends to be more theoretical and less geared to the developing country contexts. Twenty-seven of the participants complained that programs were too short. They noted that short-term training at four-year colleges and universities frequently consists of intensive programs with ambitious and over-loaded schedules. Participants also reported acquiring only moderate amounts of new knowledge and skills, which suggested that some participants may have experienced difficulty in absorbing new concepts and techniques in too short a time span.

3. Third-country training

General. The number of third-country placements has been unsatisfactory under BWAST II, and the number placed less than anticipated.

AED staff interviewed agreed that regional institutions, such as ESAMI, have potential for future expansion of third-country training under BWAST II, though perhaps not the current capability or openings for students. Students who did not want to be so widely separated from their homes had expressed interest, as had women with children, and Batswana who were interested in special offerings relevant to East and Southern Africa. An examination of *A Brief on ESAMI's Capability and Capacity to Service Management Development in SADCCC Member Countries* identified curricula which appeared highly relevant to public sector management training needs in Botswana.

In related discussions, it was learned that there are constraints to utilization of third-country training institutions based upon considerations of relevance, quality, access and cost. David Court, a recognized authority on higher education in East and Southern Africa, has noted that there is a crisis of credibility affecting undergraduate and graduate training. Many African students recognize the lack of international standards and desire overseas training. Other students who are inadequately prepared for rigorous programs desire regional study. In some countries, such as Zimbabwe, where training facilities, curricula and staff are of high quality, competition of local students for scarce places precludes attendance by foreign students. Louis Picard, a management training expert, recently completed a similar survey of SAMDP and advised that third-country training may not be cost-effective if measured with quality. Outside of South Africa, few institutions with relevant, high-quality instruction are accessible to BWAST II participants, despite USAID and UN policy emphases. With reference to institutions offering curricula geared to private sector expansion, the situation is equally bleak. One option would be the U.S. International University in Nairobi, which provides both undergraduate and graduate management-related, accredited programs at a cost much lower than U.S. institutions. Previous experience by one of the team members from a similar project in Somalia showed that the American University-Cairo had private enterprise/business programs, but that they would not be culturally appropriate for Southern Africa. It might be questioned whether it would be more useful simply to strengthen existing institutions in Botswana.

The possibility of placing students in non-African third-country institutions ought to be explored as a solution to these problems with African institutions.

In a 1986 audit of long-term participant training programs in Africa, it was found that training activities or components of development projects were being implemented without considering third-country training as a viable

option to U.S. training.² A subsequent audit of BWAST I found

The project had not used cost-efficient third-country training of students. Even though opportunities existed in other African countries for undergraduate and other training at greatly reduced costs, no students had been placed in those countries. Instead, all the students were sent to the United States at much greater expense.³

In response, the Mission included a specific third-country placement objective of fifteen percent for the contractor to attain. The Mission reported in March 1988 that finding appropriate courses and training institutions was proving difficult.

B. In-country Training

1. In-country Institutions

General.

Short-term, in-country training is the wave of the future in Botswana. Ten years from now only a few specialized individuals will be sent abroad for long-term training purposes. Training will be utilized to upgrade already existing skills or to introduce select new ones, rather than to prepare civil servants or private sector staff to fill major gaps in manpower needs. The training that short-term technical assistants provide should therefore be assessed with a view to responding to future requirements most effectively.⁴

Although time did not permit comprehensive site visits, interviews were held with staff at IDM, BIAC, BAC, BRIDEC, the Polytechnic, and UB. It was learned that BAC, Polytechnic, BIAC, and the University of Botswana were expanding formal degree offerings, but all were also interested in conducting more evening and weekend short-courses aimed at private sector needs.

²A.I.D. Regional Inspector General for Audit, 1986.

³A.I.D. Regional Inspector General for Audit, 1987.

⁴C. Tarnoff and L. Elmer, 1986.

The Botswana Institute for Administration and Commerce (BIAC), the Botswana Agricultural College (BAC), the Botswana Polytechnic, and the Botswana Institute of Development Management (IDM); and BRIDEC, were the major training organizations utilized for approximately two-thirds of both public and private sector training. Courses ranged from one to 52 weeks over a wide range of administrative, managerial, secretarial, and clerical areas.

Local Courses/Seminars. A major component of BWAST II training activities is the in-country implementation of short-term training involving approximately 1,000 Batswana (24 percent of the total training allocated). In addition to management and administration, technical courses, workshops and seminars are also planned for acquiring new skills and upgrading previous ones. Planned private-sector beneficiaries will constitute 300 persons (30 percent), with the remainder from government.

Discussions with GOB officials indicated that trainees and their agencies were generally satisfied with in-country implementation of short-term courses and seminars. Three-hundred eight trainees have received in-country courses and seminars to date in both public and private sectors. Although the data were not disaggregated, it was evident that many participants from medium and large-scale businesses have attended. IDM was the major training organization utilized for approximately two-thirds of both public and private sector training. Courses ranged from one to 52 weeks over a wide range of administrative, managerial, secretarial, and clerical areas.

Through observation, and in discussions with staff and faculty at IDM, the team learned that IDM had evolved primarily in response to the training needs of senior governmental officials in Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana. In a cursory survey of the curricula and facilities, it was not possible to determine the relevance and quality of courses and seminars offered. No data from instructors of courses, participants, or from public/private sector supervisors was available. Interviews with selected officials yielded different opinions. It was evident that private-sector courses/seminars have been primarily targeted through BEF towards middle- and large-scale firms. The possibility exists that participants may be in training through employers' efforts to comply with legislative requirements, rather than as a result of employers' desires to train staff. Insufficient data was available to determine whether acquisition of skills by government employees resulted in functional improvements at the work site. Several informants were critical of training organizations and felt that courses and seminars were substandard.

Currently, all of the institutions visited had some of the academic expertise to move toward short-term, non-traditional course offerings. For example, an OPEXer in curriculum development at IDM had achieved substantial progress in updating basic management education curricula. There is a similar need for staff and academic administration training across the board. Issues of scheduling, maintaining student records, processing of accounts, etc., were major problems across the board. Due to the soft money nature of short-term training, there is even more of a need for flexible, but efficient administration. Ideally, such upgrading could be done as part of a linkage with institutions in the U.S.

In individual interviews with representatives of private sector entities, there was concern that courses and seminars did not really meet the needs of middle- and upper-level business personnel. Due to the need for complying with training plans in order to obtain work permits for expatriates, it is understandable why private-sector organizations could send employees.

None of the courses or seminars examined really targeted small-scale firms or non-formal-sector entrepreneurs or were accessible to such organizations in rural areas of Botswana--where they need such assistance most.

With the arrival of an OPEXer in marketing at IDM, it was concluded that IDM, and related institutes, have developed capacity for private sector training. Obstacles to achievement include approaches which evolved primarily in reference to the public sector, lack of substantive linkages, and the negative attitudes of business towards any type of training offered by a government-associated organization. This situation may allow institutes to focus upon quality and implementation of private sector management training for government officials who are aware of the policy and regulatory constraints. In addition, there is a need to train public community level workers especially at the district and village level if equity as well as entrepreneurial advice and support functions are to benefit.

There is a wide range of training organizations in Botswana and in Southern Africa. Under BWAST II these activities have ranged from in-house training by GOB ministries, by training officers, OPEXers, and assistance from public training organizations such as IDM. In addition, there are many institutional providers, such as BRIDEC, or private sector firms, such as Coopers and Lybrand or Barclays Training Center.

C. Role of OPEXers in Training

1. General

BWAST II has continued to utilize OPEXers in high-priority GOB ministerial positions, but with a re-orientation toward job creation. The OPEXers temporarily fill key positions while Botswana incumbents receive advanced participant training. After the return of counterparts, OPEXers have been expected to provide on-job-training before their departure. In addition, task-oriented short-term OPEXers are also provided.

It was generally agreed that support for OPEXers by AED had been excellent, with the possible exception of sub-contractor performance in the case of one short-term OPEXer. A number of well-qualified consultants (by credentials) have been recruited, many of whom had prior experience in Botswana. However, in September 1987, the Government of Botswana noted that "short term consultants had not always been of good quality or of the right calibre with a balanced out-put", and "some have come close to being a disaster." It was questioned whether recruitment of OPEXers for operational management/teaching roles was the best use of project resources. As mentioned, it was found that policy-shaping roles and management training roles had been particularly effective. However, many operational managers/teachers did not perform spin-off activities effectively.

2. Findings

Long-term. Long-term OPEXers include 27 under BWAST II who have been placed in ministries or who are pending placement (one is working with the BOCCIM). Four persons are lecturers, five are in training/education officer roles; two are developing curricula; five are technical advisors or planners at senior levels; and nine persons serve as operational managers/administrators. The largest number of BWAST II OPEXers (4) are or have been in the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. The Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture have three OPEXers each. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Botswana Development Corporation and the Botswana Institute for Administration and Commerce each have two BWAST II OPEXers, and the remaining have been allocated among other participating organizations. It was noted that the Ministry of Local Government and Lands had one OPEXer. The majority of OPEXers were in roles directly or indirectly related to economic development. Eight of the OPEXers were female professionals.

In interviews with seven OPEXers, data was collected in five areas:

First, recruitment. It was reported that the contractor had done an excellent job in U.S. recruitment and orientation toward living and working in Botswana, and this was confirmed in an examination of orientation materials produced by the contractor. However, it was stated by several OPEXers that the in-country orientation had not been as useful as it could be. The evaluators recommend that AED strengthen in-country orientation through, among other things, increased training of orientation staff and provision of more comprehensive materials.

Second, job role. Respondents felt that their job descriptions had not matched their actual roles. Some persons felt that this was a positive situation because they were able to more effectively develop their own jobs in reference to needs. Others reported that they had experienced a lack of sufficient guidance upon arrival and had not received sufficient supervision or support. Several persons said that they had been forced to provide their own equipment to work with. All of the respondents felt that the book allowance had been useful in providing professional development.

Third, training. Few of the OPEXers reported involvement with the Ministry Training Officer, the training plan, or being included in selection, or on-going communication with counterparts. Most of the respondents felt that it had been difficult in practice to overlap with the counterpart in trying to coordinate on-the-job training or to relate participants' formal U.S. training to the work site needs. Two of the respondents reported having had the time to overlap with participants for one or two months prior to their own departures. All respondents felt that the policy of two-year contracts inhibited OJT. Two OPEXers articulated a philosophy and plan for on-job-training of counterparts or staff. One OPEXer (not under BWAST II) had developed and implemented a performance-based training system for training more than one counterpart. He identified both individual and departmental learning needs and related these to training.

Fourth, policy. Two OPEXers reported that they were primarily occupied with policy activities and described how their work had increased BWAST II's movement toward the private sector by providing analysis which had persuaded Botswana policy-makers to explore business opportunities, as well as the removal of constraints to the private sector.

Fifth, impact. Most OPEXers felt that they had made a substantial impact, and attributed this in part to individual long-term experience--several had been Peace

Corps volunteers in Botswana. Four respondents expressed disappointment because they had not been able to have counterparts to train, while two operational role OPEXers said that the on-going demands of their duties precluded training of counterparts. All interviewees reported that their positions had had a direct impact upon expanding programs, and improving functional efficiency and effectiveness. Few reported that they had made a direct impact upon employment generation, partly because they felt the term was poorly defined and understood. One OPEXer based in a rural area felt that BWAST had not targeted training efforts upon the people who needed it the most in traditional agriculture and small enterprise. All respondents reported that they did not have a clear understanding of project objectives, and thought that potential beneficiaries did not know about the project. None of the OPEXers looked to USAID for guidance, but to their respective ministries, and to AED for support.

Short-term. The purpose of providing short-term OPEXers was to perform specific tasks. Currently, five persons have been provided to two ministries.* In all of the ministries, OPEXers were in areas directly related to private sector expansion--mainly consultative roles. The duration of short-term assignments has varied from two weeks to more than seven months.

Based upon interviews with AED and USAID staff, short-term OPEXers had made satisfactory contributions to the improvement of analysis related to financial strategies, trade and investment, and small business, in ministries directly related to private sector policy reform. In addition, two short-term OpeXers have assisted improvement of public sector policies and procedures. One person consulted with the MFDP on minimum wage impact, while one OPEXer was conducting an institutional study of IDM to determine how to more effectively relate the mission and resources to private sector training. The short-term mechanism appeared useful in stimulating analysis and dialogue related to the need for training.

3. Conclusions

OPEXers have indirectly contributed to localization goals, but more importantly have made a substantial impact upon policy analysis of areas directly related to private sector expansion.

OPEXers have been a good value in that they have filled operational roles of importance, while some have simultaneously contributed to policy reform and on-the-job training of counterparts and departmental staff.

* In addition two consultancies at BDC, one at IDM and one for the Association of Training and Development Officers.

OPEXers have been strategically placed to encourage relaxation and reform of public policies which have restricted the private sector, i.e., access to work permits.

Cost-benefit could be increased by emphasizing recruitment of OPEXers with strengths and interests related to policy reform and training. It was concluded that several long-term OPEXers could do more in this regard. Offering OPEXers longer contracts could also lower costs. It was questioned whether the level and cost of OPEXers was appropriate for teaching/training positions when individuals could be recruited at far lower costs from universities.

The one-to-one theoretical linkage between OPEXers and their counterparts had not worked in practice. More could be done to improve training of trainer skills.

OPEXers have been assigned to key ministries and institutional providers of training to assist in the improvement of efficiency and effectiveness through technical assistance to teach and develop curricula, and to train counterparts and staff in how to manage training. In structured interviews with OPEXers and ministry officials, it was found that linkages were sometimes weak between OPEXers and training officers, between training officers and the training plans, or in communication of performance-based/departmental function training needs to institutional providers. Training officers often chiefly processed training request forms, instead of exercising management of training functions. OPEXers often did not work closely with training officers, nor were they always aware of ministry training needs. The ministries tended to have short-term planning capacities relevant to participant training and there was no guarantee that vacancies were well-matched to either subject training or dates of participant re-entry. However, ministries and departments do share their training plans with training institutions, and it is this well-articulated public sector demand that has caused these institutions to offer, to date, mostly public-sector-oriented courses.

Several OPEXers emphasized the importance of their role as models for counterparts and staff. Another OPEXer indicated a fundamental need to change this concept of role models, and stated that Botswana staff did not need "role models" who earned salaries and benefits beyond the reach of local employees so much as effective training of trainers; a need to build the self-confidence of Botswana.

D. Training Resources

Botswana differs from most countries in Africa in that there are ample donor contributions in training, i.e., World Bank, CIDA, SIDA, Norwegian aid, West German aid, British aid, U.N. aid, etc. Local expectations of relevance and quality range from basic literacy education to advanced MBA training. The nearby presence of South Africa is evident in locally-available newspapers from Johannesburg. The management and business schools of prestigious liberal open universities such as Witswatersrand advertise training for students throughout Southern Africa -- especially for large-scale business. These neighboring sources of training also impact upon educational role models for Botswana.

Large firms such as Debswana (Anglo-American Corporation) have relatively sophisticated in-house managerial skills training at a technical level of instruction which differs from public-sector efforts. Barclays has developed an innovative computer-assisted system of credit and managerial/technical services which target indigenous small-scale businesses. The Peace Corps and other voluntary agencies are also delivering teacher training and appropriate small-scale entrepreneur technology.

1. USAID/G Contributions

A.I.D. was the first donor to support participant training aimed at the private sector.

From data contained in the UNDP annual country profile, NDP 5/6, and related data sources, A.I.D. has a small part of the donor-assisted training market (excluding OPEX and other non-training contributions). This means that A.I.D.'s available resources should be carefully channeled to have a significant developmental effect.

The GOB has sufficient recurrent budget to choose carefully among donor offers. The democratic and free market position of Botswana serves as a model for Africa and has dramatically increased donor desires to contribute. This situation means that A.I.D., along with many other donors, can grasp real opportunities for expanding assistance to the private sector through targeting of high-quality, cost-effective and distinctive training programs which better link indigenous needs to trade and investment, business expansion, and employment. American management education has played a role in bringing in new technology and training.

2. Other Donors

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the YWCA are providing training in secretarial and advanced courses in business-related subjects for youth and women. The German government is assisting GOB in an ambitious expansion of rural vocational/technical training. The World Bank is supporting a number of organizations which offer degree programs related to managerial and technical training, including the Institute for Development Management, University of Botswana, Polytechnic, Institute of Administration and Commerce, BRIDEC, and Botswana Agricultural College. ILO and UNDP are also working with the GOB to plan more coordinated technical training related to private sector needs. Foreign firms such as Toyota have introduced state-of-the-art technical training related to maintenance, marketing and sales of product lines. Locally-based management firms such as Coopers and Lybrand provide specialized training. GOB has recently compiled a book listing available training opportunities. Although various training programs have not been evaluated, it may be time to move toward a more formal accreditation process in which industry and the private sector participate in review. In this regard the University of Botswana will play a crucial role.

E. Management and Delivery of Training in the Public Sector

1. Achieving Impact Upon Job Creation

Education does not create jobs. A recent study⁵ found that educational planning has been largely driven by manpower needs. Manpower needs in turn have primarily been oriented toward the public and formal sector. Now, due to population pressure, it has become apparent that the public sector will not have the ability to absorb all the projected school-leavers. By 2000, there will be an accumulated shortage of jobs for school-leavers of 59,000, in spite of the jobs expected to be created in all sectors of the economy.

It is increasingly evident that there is a need to consider those Botswana who do not or will not have adequate educational access to urban formal employment. Kaan *et alia* advocate a "work creation approach" in manpower planning especially for the informal and traditional agricultural sectors. This will require better systems for monitoring of income differentials as well as creating public awareness of

⁵U. Kaan *et alia* (1988).

the rapidly changing relationship between education and employment.

2. Improving Delivery Impact

In examining the literature on employment-related education and training it was evident that there has not been a sustained delivery impact at the community level. In part this is due to an apparent retreat from de-centralization, as well as vested interests. In an article by W. Reilly (1984), it was noted that Central Government ministries have not given priority to strong community-based educational and training systems which could be utilized for multiple functions.

The problem in education related to the private sector is not that there are insufficient resources to meet the challenge of unemployed school-leavers, but an absence of linked training plans and opportunities. There are regular donor meetings to coordinate assistance, as well as regular DPSM meetings between all public training institutions; and monthly Training Briefings for training officers, which are also attended by institutions such as IDM, Polytechnic, and others. At the level of training plans for individuals, however, it appears that each donor-assisted Brigade, VTC, etc. does its own thing -- with minimal attention to complementary linkages. Linkages between short-term non-accredited training and long-term academic offerings have yet to be made and delivered where they are needed. There is a need to adopt a coalitional planning approach which examines alternate ways of relating education to job creation. With the gradual replacement of the London Guilds system with the new apprenticeship training there is an opportunity to introduce experiential learning. Rigid academic systems are not capable of quickly responding to specialized needs in the private sector. There are needs for cost-effective, practical, hands-on training, as well as for high-level academic improvement of quality. If formal training produces graduates with credentials for which there are no jobs, education will be regarded by students and their families as a holding tank.

At multiple levels -- for a variety of needs -- a linkage model is required similar to that of the American community college.⁶ Local institutions could be adapted to

⁶Certainly one of the best ways of linking to American trade and investment as well as specialized training could be through community colleges which have small business development units, and can provide on-the-job apprenticeships and internships for both public and private sector needs.

perform some of the functions which an American community college meets. Such functions include: local participation in governance, short-term technical training, academic training for transfer, hands-on learning and linkages with industry and commerce.⁷ Obstacles include a lack of knowledge by many Third World decision-makers about the benefits of such a model for delivering targeted training.

Quasi-community colleges have been partially experimented with in Botswana, e.g., Masheng Community Colleges. American community colleges were tapped in the 1980s for skills related to Brigades training. Short-term and long-term participant training under BWAST II are currently utilizing American community colleges for cost-effective specialized training as well as remediation in math, science, and other areas.

Serious consideration should be given to developing a model whereby existing (or, if necessary, new) Botswana institutions could be linked to fill the functions performed in America by community colleges.

In summary, there are five formal components for human resource development and training for job creation in Botswana whose relevance and utilization could be enhanced by BWAST II. First, the Brigades, as mentioned; second, non-formal education; third, centres of vocational/technical education; fourth, auto trades technical training schools; fifth, Teacher Training Colleges, and Community Service through Tirelo Sechaba. An additional, though unemphasized form which should be mentioned was the establishment of a community college-type of institution in three rural communities. Unfortunately, the experiment was never adequately tested and failed effectively to link with existing Brigades and other local organizations. Although other donors have vested interests in existing segmented training activities, there really is a need for exploring how needed training could be integrated in a new institutional linkages form. An American community college provides functions which could be utilized in linking training to the private sector in Botswana--not the mortar-and-brick institution but the integrated linkage of activities at the community level.

⁷In America, community colleges train persons for repairing Boeing 747s, assembling Caterpillars, and preparing the academic base so that qualified students can transfer to four year and graduate training, if desired.

F. Comparison of BWAST I and II

BWAST II evolved from BWAST I, and previously from SAMDP, but has significant differences in purpose, nature, scope and scale, and desired impacts. SAMDP was essentially a conventional participant training project with all of the shortcomings; i.e., poorly targeted, insufficient linkage between manpower needs and training, difficulties in participant placement, and OPEX recruitment and support, etc. Essentially, SAMDP responded to needs but lacked a cogent project focus, and experienced difficulties in management and support.

BWAST I was initiated in FY 1982 and is scheduled to be completed in FY 1989, at a total USAID cost of \$14,558,000 out of a total of \$19,354,000. BWAST II was started in May of 1986 at a USAID cost of \$27,000,000 out of a total of \$36,034,000.

The stated purposes of BWAST I and II were essentially the same--to assist the GOB to increase the number of trained Batswana in the public and private sectors in skill areas related to employment generation by financing the costs of (a) long- and short-term training in the United States and third countries; (b) in-country training for Batswana in several critical areas, including public administration; and (c) technical assistance, including long- and short-term OPEX personnel and training materials.

Comparisons were made in the following areas:

Design. BWAST I was designed to move towards private sector expansion but also had an equity component, and was essentially tied to SAMDP in making a transition. Many SAMDP OPEXers and participant trainees evolved into BWAST I, slowing the transition to the private-sector emphasis. In 1982, much of the emphasis of GOB and USAID was in response to the Picard Report, which recommended strengthening of the Unified Local Government Service to assist in de-centralization, i.e., strengthening of local government capacity for development and promotion of income generation particularly in rural areas. The advent of NDP6 changed the emphasis away from de-centralization towards an emphasis upon allowing the private sector to expand and create social and economic development.

OPEX. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells found that a primary difference between the BWAST I OPEX mechanism and BWAST II was that before 1986 counterpart training could be in-country, in the U.S., or in an approved third country. Under BWAST II, all counterparts must undergo training in the U.S. or in a third country. Under BWAST I, there was concern that OPEXers were staying too long and that their

contracts under BWAST II should be limited to four years in order to achieve localization objectives. Under BWAST I, some OPEXers continued from SAMDP and were not restricted as they were under BWAST II.

Participant Training. Under BWAST I, 72 participants were placed, whereas 176 participants are projected for BWAST II. There are cost-benefit factors such as the \$7,500 ceiling which did not apply to BWAST I, and may have affected quality. No empirical data was available to determine the relevance and quality of participating institutions. Under BWAST I, only 15 participants were in private sector topics compared with a projected 100 under BWAST II. Third-country training was not an emphasis under BWAST I, but has become a requirement (15 percent) due to audit recommendations. Historically Black Colleges and Universities have continued to receive emphasis. It was reported that undergraduate preparation under BWAST I was "fair," while a majority of current participants have poor academic backgrounds. Indeed, it was reported that some candidates have self-selected some institutions with lower academic requirements. An example given was with respect to the MBA. At present there are four MBA participants at one university which does not require a strong GMAT score (500 minimum).

Short-term in-country training. Under BWAST I, primary responsibility for in-country training had resided with a sub-contractor, Creative Associates, since 1983. In May 3, 1985, the interim evaluation found that training totalling about 500 person-months had been provided, somewhat below projections. Problems included a lack of updated specific training courses at IDM. Under BWAST II, a private sector course has been developed. Communications between training institutions and the DPSM had been poor, but have improved markedly under BWAST II. There were minimal linkages with third country training institutions under BWAST I, whereas IDM staff have attended conferences with regional institutions and created on-going linkages for improved short-term training. Finally, BWAST II has projected training 1,000 participants in-country, and is currently on target.

AED has instituted improved systems for OPEX and participant training, especially with reference to short-term training. Costs were not available.

Appendix 1
Documents

EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORKPDC-0085-I-12-6108-00
Page 2 of 10BACKGROUND

The Botswana Workforce and skills Training project, Phase II (BWAST) provides training and technical assistance to certain key ministries and to the private sector. The training provided consists of long- and short-term external U.S. and third country training and in-country training. BWAST II technical assistance includes long-term personnel who hold line positions (operational experts - opexers) and short-term consultants. BWAST II was preceded by the BWAST project (initiated in 1983 and sometimes referred to as BWAST, Phase I) and the Southern Africa Manpower Development Project (SAMDP - started in 1979).

BWAST II, BWAST I and SAMDP have sought to alleviate the critical shortage of skilled manpower, which is generally accepted as one of the major constraints to economic development in Botswana. A principal difference between BWAST II and the two previous projects is increased focus by BWAST II on identifying and assisting those areas of the public and private sectors which are likely to have the greatest impact on employment generation. For this reason, BWAST II is providing greater assistance to the private sector, an area of potential new job opportunities.

A primary purpose of the evaluation will be to assess the project's performance in identifying and assisting employment generating-related positions. The evaluation team will be assisted in its work by two previous studies, Botswana Workforce and Skills Training Project, (BWAST): Baseline Data Collection Study (Turnoff/Elmer), November 1986, and a report on the impact of opexers for USAID/Botswana (Deloitte, Haskins and Sells - Botswana), December 1987. Both studies provide methodologies, data, and insights upon which the BWAST II mid-term evaluation can build. Additionally, an IG audit was conducted in July 1987 and is available.

In addition to USAID, the implementing agents in the project include the Directorate of Public Service Management (DPSM), the Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs (MLHA), the Botswana Employer's Federation (BEF) (recently renamed the Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower - BOCCIM) and the Academy for Educational Development (AED). DPSM coordinates and prioritizes requests from the target ministries, MLHA approves private sector submission received from the BEF/BOCCIM and AED is USAID's implementing contractor.

91

ARTICLE I - TITLE

Botswana Workforce and Skills Training Project, Phase II
(BWAST II)

(Project No. 633-0241).

ARTICLE II - OBJECTIVE

Complete a Mid-term evaluation of the projects stated above.

ARTICLE III - STATEMENT OF WORK

SCOPE OF EVALUATION

The mid-term evaluation should follow guidelines set forth in the A.I.D. Evaluation Handbook, April 1987.

The following five questions deal with issues (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability) that should be considered in evaluating any type of development assistance, including BWAST II.

Relevance: Are the development constraints the project was initially designed to address remaining major problems that are germane to current Botswana or U.S. interest development strategies?

Effectiveness: Is the project achieving satisfactory progress toward its stated objectives?

Efficiency: Are the effects of the project being produced at an acceptable cost compared to alternative approaches for accomplishing the same objectives?

Impact: What positive and negative effects are resulting from the project?

Sustainability: Are the effects of the project likely to become sustainable developmental impacts - that is, will they continue after A.I.D. funding has stopped?

BWAST II's impact on employment generation is of particular importance in this evaluation. The methodology, however, for measuring such impact is very limited. The evaluation team should make full use of existing studies already performed by

83

A.I.D.'s PPC Bureau, especially A.I.D. evaluation special study no. 53, "A.I.D.'s Experience with Selected Employment Generation Projects", by Donald Bowles. A general question the team should address is whether the project's decision-making process is efficiently and effectively identifying and assisting activities with employment generation impact. The team may use the criteria for employment generation positions developed by USAID and the GOB, but an appraisal of that criteria itself should be useful.

Using background documents and interviews, several other lines of specific analyses should also be assessed. Among these are the following to be assessed:

1. The "Delivery Order" process and various ordering mechanisms under the project.
2. The overall performance of the general contractor, the Academy for Educational Development.
3. The impact of BWAST II on GOB training systems, particularly the impact on the process by which individuals are targeted for training.
4. The role of returned participants.
5. All private sector-focused components.

The evaluation team should consider the following elements as it addresses the issues cited above:

A. Training

1. Description of the training activity:
 - a. by long-term participant
 - b. by specialized course/seminar
 - c. by local series of courses or certificate program
 - d. analysis of relevance
 - e. by institution
2. Work Duties and methodologies:
 - a. tasks and position of participants prior to training
 - b. tasks and position of participants after training
 - c. difference of the above and assessment of the changes

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3. Cost of training activities
 - a. actual cost of participants
 - b. GOB input costs
 - c. AID input costs
 - d. assessment of cost effectiveness
 4. Selection process for participants
 - a. selection criteria for training and for individuals
 - b. logistical arrangements
 - c. problem areas
 5. Overall finds and recommendations
- B. Technical Assistance
1. Description of the technical assistance activity
 - a. by opexer or short-term consultant
 - b. job description and working environment
 - c. observed duties/roles
 - d. relationships with colleagues
 2. Operation system changes made through technical assistance
 - a. description of design and implementation
 - b. net results of changes
 - c. analysis of effectiveness
 3. Training done by T.A. personnel
 - a. on-the-job-type described
 - b. seminar or course work description
 - c. assessment of relevance and effectiveness
 4. Overall assessment of performance
 - a. by supervisor
 - b. by opexer/consultant
 - c. by the ministry and colleagues
 - d. by the study team

C. Recommendations

1. Emphasis in training
 - a. long-term vs. short-term
 - b. U.S., 3rd country and local
 - c. specialized vs. general
 - d. institutional appraisal
 - e. effectiveness by ministry/skill area

2. Emphasis in technical assistance
 - a. short-term vs. long-term
 - b. quality and skill areas
 - c. selection criteria guidelines

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

The team will make use of previous studies and update the data where necessary to draw conclusions about project. The team should review the relevant documents, cited earlier, and hold interviews with AID/W staff (AFR/PD/SAP, PPC/CDIE and AFR/SA) and AED/Washington staff prior to departing for Botswana. The local environment is conducive to the evaluation effort, in terms of the accessibility of individuals and data.

EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION

The evaluation team should consist of a Team Leader/Economist, a Human Resources/Training Specialist, and a Private Sector Specialist. The mission's HRDO - International Development Intern (IDI) will assist the team on a full-time basis. GOB and private sector individuals also will be assigned to assist and contribute to the evaluation.

The three contracted team members will work collaboratively, but the following subject/responsibilities are allocated as indicated below:

Team Leader/Economist

Overall project impact and items 1 and 2, Section IV specific analyses.

Human Resources/Training Specialist

Items 3 and 4, Section IV, Specific Analyses

91

Private Sector Specialist

All private sector components. Since this is a new area of substantial project assistance, a thorough analysis of this component is required.

PROPOSED SCHEDULE

August 8, 9, 10 - Preparation days in Washington, D.C.
August 11, 12 - Travel days to Botswana
August 15 - Meet with USAID/Botswana staff to establish work plan
August 16-24 - Conduct interviews/research/data

COLLECTION

August 19 - Submit detailed outline of report
August 25-29 - Prepare draft report
August 29 - Submit draft report for USAID, GOB and private sector review
August 30-September 2 - Prepare and submit final report
September 3-4 - Return to U.S.

ARTICLE IV - REPORTS

Format of Reports: The evaluation report shall consist of an Executive Summary, Project Identification Data Sheet, Table of Contents, Body of Report and Appendices as set forth in the A.I.D. evaluation handbook. The final Report shall be submitted by the team prior to departure from Botswana.

ARTICLE V - TECHNICAL DIRECTIONS

Technical Directions during the performance of this delivery order will be provided by USAID/Botswana, pursuant to Section F.3 of the contract.

ARTICLE VI - TERM OF PERFORMANCE

- A. The effective date of this delivery order is August 2, 1988, and the estimated completion date is September 10, 1988.

memorandum

DATE: August 8, 1988
REPLY TO: John Hummon *John*
ATTN OF:
SUBJECT: BWAST II Evaluation
TO: John Roberts
Will Elliott ,

The scope of work for BWAST II evaluation is too narrow and I want to make sure that the team that comes here has an opportunity to work on a broader scope of work. We are not talking about BWAST II as related only to employment generation/skills development. We are talking about its impact on the total policy and procedural framework of the country --- in terms of greater emphasis on market forces and a strengthening of the private sector as a means of achieving various employment generation objectives. We have an exciting project here which we have used far beyond its original purpose and with imagination.

The present evaluation scope of work is too narrow and technical in nature. I think if you put it in the context of a broader conceptual approach, we are going to come up with some interesting conclusions which will fortify our program and strengthen us in terms of getting some additional money, and be helpful to the agency. If we set it up in just a very narrow format --- number of participants trained, jobs created, etc., we will be missing the point of what has become an exceptional resource.

In short, while the information that is in the scope of work is not unimportant, and should be covered, it is not the primary focus. I did not really look at this carefully before I left for the States. This memo should be part of the scope of work. Thanks.

Effective employment generation implies a quantifiable and significant increase in the number of jobs for Botswana in the private sector. The government public service simply can not be expected to absorb the 20,000 new people who enter the labor market each year.

The BWAST II project is attempting to increase employment opportunities in the private sector through assistance to both the private and public sectors. The project seeks to assist those activities/positions whose function it is to make the creation of additional jobs more likely.

Various factors influence the expansion of businesses such as the availability of and access to finance, markets, technical production expertise and management skills. The right government policies and incentives can also encourage business expansion. Therefore, as one tries to evaluate the relationship between a certain position for which training or technical assistance is requested and the national goal of employment generation, the following questions could be asked:

- (1) Does the position assist individuals and the private sector in general in gaining access to finance, markets, and technical and management expertise?
- (2) Does the position assist in the development or application of policies, programs and incentives which encourage business expansion?
- (3) Does the position lessen or minimize constraints to the initiation or expansion of private enterprises?

Specific employment creation measures include, for example, such things as:

- . greater emphasis on technical and vocational training,
- . long-term manpower planning and allocation,
- . greater encouragement of small-scale and arable agriculture with an emphasis on diversification beyond the meat industry,
- . greater assistance to citizen and foreign investors in identifying and establishing new enterprises,
- . better business development and training networks,
- . financial assistance to new businesses.

The BWAST II Project is assisting the Government of Botswana to meet this important objective of employment generation as identified in NDP6. Given the finite resources of the BWAST Project, it is attempting to maximize its impact by concentrating in those areas which have the greatest potential for long lasting impact. Assistance to the public sector is given in those areas which most effectively provide incentives and support to the private sector. Examples of such assistance can include:

- Training institution lecturer who trains people from the private sector,
- Agricultural marketing officers who work with the private sector,
- Officers involved with various job creation activities such as tourism, wildlife, trade promotion, mineral exploration,
- Officers involved with government policies which influence the expansion of the private sector such as labour officers and commercial officers.

644

TVT ASSOCIATES
503 CAPITOL COURT, N. E.
SUITE 300
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002
(202) 547-4550
TELEX 440730 ITS UI

August, 1988

Dear Sir:


TvT Associates, Inc., a Washington, D.C. consulting firm, has been contracted by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID/Gaborone) to evaluate the Botswana Workforce and Skills Training (BWAST) Project, Phase II, which provides training and technical assistance to certain ministries and to the private sector. TvT's evaluation team consists of:

Dr. Kenneth F. Smith, Team Leader
Dr. Stanley B. Andrews
Dr. Dennis R. Herschbach

The evaluation team will assess the extent to which the project has helped alleviate shortages of skilled manpower. In particular, they will focus on the project's performance in assisting those areas of the public and private sectors most likely to have an impact on employment generation.

We appreciate your taking time to assist the evaluation team with their investigation.

Sincerely yours,


Mary A. Tondreau
President

MAT:pf

ANNEX XIII. D.
PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Life of Project:
From FY 86 to FY 94
Total U.S. Funding: \$27,000,000
Date Prepared 12/31/85

PROJECT TITLE AND NUMBER: Botswana Workforce & Skills Training, PHASE II (IBAST II): 633-0241

<u>Narrative Summary</u>	<u>Objectively Verifiable Indicators</u>	<u>Means of Verification</u>	<u>Important Assumptions</u>
<u>Program or Sector Goal</u>	<u>Measures of Goal Achievements</u>		<u>Assumptions for Achieving Goal Targets</u>
To assist the GOB's efforts in job formation.	Rate of non-Government job creation equals or exceeds NIP6 (1985-1991) projections of 5.61.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. GOB employment statistics and income surveys covering sectors and subsectors targeted by project. 2. Examination of revenues allocated and expended by the Domestic Development Fund. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. That employment generation continues to be a government priority and that this policy is translated into concrete programs. 2. That the GOB continues to use revenues from the domestic mining industry and other resources sufficient to stimulate employment generation. 3. That the economic and political climate in Botswana remains attractive to private investment. 4. That the lack of water resources does not worsen.

PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Life of Project
From FY 86 To FY 93
Total U.S. Funding: \$27,000,000
Date Prepared 12/31/85

PROJECT TITLE AND NUMBER: Botswana Workforce & Skills Training, PHASE II (INAST II): 633-0211

Narrative Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Important Assumptions
<u>Project Purpose</u>	<u>End of Project Status</u>		<u>Assumptions for Achieving Purpose</u>
Increase the number of trained Botswana in positions which foster employment generation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increase of 1100 in number of trained Botswana in GNI and private sector in positions of responsibility with substantive inputs into the planning, design and implementation of employment generating activities. 2. Maintenance of high-level operational efficiency of GNI offices with OPEX staff while Botswana are in training. 3. Vacancy rate in Government not more than 5% of established posts in target ministries. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Directorate of Personnel's annual reports on training accomplishments and reports on the status of localizations; UNF training reports; data collected for longitudinal analysis of participant training. 2. USAID project reports; GON and implementing contractor evaluation of OPEXers. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. That GON applies the selection criteria and places returned participants in positions for which they were trained. 2. That AID through an implementing contractor will be able to provide OPEX technicians with the technical skills and cultural sensitivity required to carry out operational responsibilities under the direction of the GON.

97

PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

PROJECT TITLE AND NUMBER: Botswana Workforce & Skills Training, PHASE II (IHAST II): 633-0241

Life of Project:
From FY 86 to FY 91
Total U.S. Funding: \$27,000,000
Date Prepared 12/31/85

Page 3

<u>Narrative Summary</u>	<u>Objectively Verifiable Indicators</u>	<u>Means of Verification</u>	<u>Important Assumptions</u>
<u>Project Outputs</u>	<u>Magnitude of Outputs</u>		<u>Assumptions for Providing Outputs</u>
1. Botswana trained through in-country training programs	1. 1,000 Botswana receive a cumulative total of 2000 person-months of in-country training in administration/management and technical fields by FY 90.	1. Training records and GOB invoices for in-country training.	1. That local training institutions remain operational.
2. Botswana trained in the U.S. or third countries to replace U.S. funded OPEX personnel	2. 176 Botswana receive a cumulative total of 520 person-years of long-term international training in administration, management, and technical fields by FY 91. 64 Botswana receive a cumulative total of 192 person-months of U.S. and third country short-term training in administration, management, and technical fields by FY 90.	2. Training records for target ministries and ICF; USAID PTO/Ps.	2. That qualified applicants are available for training.
	3. Imbalance between supply and demand for educated and skilled Botswana will be reduced by 7%.	3. Statistics from Manpower Planning Unit (MPUP).	
	4. Selected critical posts in public and private sectors will be localized by 4%.	4. IOP, Central Statistics Office, and Department of Labour records.	4. That localization remains GOM priority.

10

PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Life of Project:
 From FY 86 To FY 93
 Total U.S. Funding: \$27,000,000
 Date Prepared 12/31/85

Page 4

PROJECT TITLE AND NUMBER: Botswana Workforce & Skills Training, PHASE II (IWAST II); 633-0241

Narrative Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Important Assumptions
<u>Project Outputs (Continued)</u>	<u>Magnitude of Outputs (Continued)</u>		<u>Assumptions for Providing Outputs (Continued)</u>
5. A sustained or improved level of organizational efficiency in government departments in which OPIEX technicians serve.	5. Estimated seven ministries and the private sector assisted by 72 person-years of long-term TA and 45 person-months of short-term TA by FY 90.	5. Requests from Directorate of Personnel, ministries and DEX (private sector); USAID PIO/ra; Implementing contractor Delivery Orders; USAID project reports; Implementing contractor evaluation of OPIEXs.	5. That implementing contractor can nominate qualified technicians who are then approved by the GOB.
6. A management of training system that will strengthen Botswana's ability to manage their own manpower development.	6. Institutionalization of a management of training system in seven ministries and among selected private sector firms.	6. Examination of Training Plans as a reflection of organizational priorities, manpower projections, individual needs assessments and training program designs.	6. That ministries and firms in the private sector produce training plans. That ministries and firms recognize the need for, and value of, long-term personnel planning and management.

694

PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Life of Project:
From FY 86 To FY 93
Total U.S. Funding: \$27,000,000
Date Prepared 12/31/85
Page 5

PROJECT TITLE AND NUMBER: Botswana Workforce & Skills Training, PHASE II (HWAST II); 633-0241

<u>Narrative Summary</u>	<u>Objectively Verifiable Indicators</u>	<u>Means of Verification</u>	<u>Important Assumptions</u>
<u>Project Inputs:</u>	<u>Implementation Target (Type and Quantity)</u>		<u>Assumptions for providing inputs:</u>
long-term technical assistance	\$1.35 million/year of long-term technical assistance, FY 86-FY 89	AID financial records/GON records	Funding is available.
Short-term technical assistance, including for the project evaluation	\$90,000/year of short-term technical assistance, FY 86-FY 90		
long-term administrative and technical training	\$2.85 million/year of long-term training, FY 87-FY 90		
Short-term administrative and technical training in US and third countries	\$192,000/year of short term overseas training, FY 87-FY 90		
Short-term administrative and technical training in-country	\$350,000/year of short-term in-country training, FY 87-FY 90		
Contractual assistance for the management of training	\$100,000/year of contractual assistance for management of training, FY86-FY90		
Planning Studies	\$50,000/year for planning studies, FY 86 to FY 89		

100.

Appendix 2
Data Collection Instruments

PARTICIPANT TRAINING FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONNAIRE

TVT Associates has been contracted by AID to evaluate the Botswana Workforce & Skills Training Project. The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect some information about your learning experiences as an AID participant, and after your return to work. Please answer all questions as completely and frankly as possible.

Only overall summary data will be provided to AID, AED and the Government of Botswana. TVT will only use your name to verify with the AID participant list. **NOTE: The identification of the individual supplying the information will be held confidential by TVT.**

Name: _____

1. What was your title and job position before you were selected for participant training?

2. What is your title and job position now?

3. What type of program did you attend, and where?

- | | |
|------------------------------|------------------------|
| a. ___ Short Term | 1. ___ U.S. |
| b. ___ Long Term | 2. ___ Another Country |
| c. ___ Degree (Type, if any) | 3. ___ In Botswana |

4. Where did you receive training? _____

5. How long was your training program? _____ months

6. When did you return?

7. What were your main reasons for enrolling in the course?;

- | |
|--|
| a. ___ My Employer nominated me |
| b. ___ I wanted to improve my job prospects |
| c. ___ I wanted to start my own business |
| d. ___ I wanted to learn a skill |
| e. ___ I was not accepted in my first choice |
| f. ___ Other ... |

8. Did you receive adequate guidance about

- a. The Course of training? ___ Yes ___ No
- b. Job Availability on Return ___ Yes ___ No
- c. Other Possible careers ___ Yes ___ No

9. To what extent do you feel the institution and the education/training it provided was appropriate for your needs at that time?

- a. ___ It met my needs and expectations
- b. ___ I was disappointed
- c. If (b.), which of the following aspects were Unsatisfactory
 - a. ___ Level of Training
 - b. ___ Content of Training
 - c. ___ Quality of Instructors
 - d. ___ Access to learning resources
 - e. ___ Discipline (or lack)
 - f. ___ Facilities - housing, institution
 - g. ___ Other (Specify)

10. How related was the training to your present position?

- a. ___ Very relevant
- b. ___ Somewhat related
- c. ___ Not very related
- d. ___ Very little or no use on the job

11. In your opinion, what were the main reasons for your or other participants' having problems.

- a. ___ Coursework too difficult
- b. ___ American system of education unfamiliar
- c. ___ Difficult to travel to school from residence
- d. ___ Lack of discipline
- e. ___ Poor teacher
- f. ___ Financial Reasons
- g. ___ Family Problems
- h. ___ Other (Specify)

Best Available Document

11. To what extent did your training institution attempt to help you solve your problems or overcome difficulties?

- a. ___ Not much help
- b. ___ Some help
- c. ___ Usually helpful
- d. ___ Provided a lot of assistance

12. To what extent do you feel that AED (or other contractor) provided support during your training activities?

- a. ___ Outstanding
- b. ___ Good
- c. ___ Mediocre
- d. ___ Poor

13. What could be done by USAID or AED or the Training Institutions to improve the training?

14. Since your return, have you been involved in any professional activity related to your training -- such as a seminar or alumni association?

___ Yes

___ No

15. Since your return, to what extent have you kept in contact with the institution?

- a. ___ Still receive and send messages regularly
- b. ___ Occasionally receive newsletters and other information
- c. ___ No contact

16. Miscellaneous comments that would help us to improve the U.S. participant program.

NY

BWAST II MID-TERM EVALUATION

Appendix 2b

OPEX PROBE QUESTIONNAIRE

1. NAME: _____ POSITION: _____
ORGANIZATION: _____
2. How long have you been associated with SAMPD, BWAST I, or BWAST II, and in what capacities?
3. When will you finish your assignment?
4. When will a counterpart be placed in your position?
5. How long do you expect to work with your counterpart after their return?
6. If you have a counterpart on the job, what are you doing to ensure that he/she will be able to assume your responsibilities?
7. To what extent do you work with the training officer and the training plan in your Ministry?
8. How was the type of training your counterpart received identified and do you feel it was appropriate?
9. What percentage of your time is allocated to:
 - a. Operational Line Responsibility _____
 - b. Other Technical Assistance _____

- c. On Job Training _____
- d. Formal Training _____

10. What difficulties have you or others experienced in project support, such as orientation, health, housing, etc. and to whom do you look for such support - AID or AED?

11. Are you familiar with problems identified with "Report on the Impact of OPEXers for USAID" (1988)? If yes, to what extent have these difficulties been addressed?

12. Do you feel that there has been confusion about your task goals vs. BWAST project goals? How could this be improved?

13. How effective do you feel that AED has been in their performance upon this project?

14. To what extent do you think your contributions are utilized by the Ministry?

15. What do you feel have been the unintended but important spin-offs of your OPEX contribution?

16. How do you think that training could be more effectively linked to employment generation in the private sector?
17. How has your position had an impact upon the expansion of job opportunities in the public or private sector?
18. What bottlenecks in policy and/or procedures do you think could be eliminated which would enhance employment generation?
- ~~19. How do you think that training could be more effectively linked to employment generation in the private sector?~~
20. What is your understanding of an effective approach to on-the-job training for both counterparts and staff?
21. Describe your working environment including commodities, equipment, etc., and how well it supports your job performance?
22. To what extent do you feel that your relationships with colleagues enhance job performance?
- a. A great deal _____
 - b. Somewhat _____
 - c. Not much _____
 - d. Not at all _____

23. To what extent do you feel that your relationship with your supervisor affects your job performance?

- a. A great deal _____
- b. Somewhat _____
- c. Not much _____
- d. Not at all _____

24. What incentives and professional development opportunities would motivate you to stay after this OPEX assignment?



Agency for International Development
U.S.A.I.D. Mission to Botswana

*Embassy of the United States of America
Post Office Box 90
Gaborone, Botswana
Tel: 353382 and 352401. Telex. BD 2336*

*(U.S. mailing address)
USAID/Botswana
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523*

August 18, 1988

Dear Former Participant:

TVT Associates, Inc., a Washington D.C. consulting firm has been contracted by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID/Botswana) to evaluate the Botswana Workforce and Skills Training (BWAST) Project, Phase II, which provides technical and training assistance to ministries and to the private sector. TVT's evaluation team consists of:

Dr. Kenneth F. Smith, Team Leader
Dr. Stanley B. Andrew
Dr. Dennis K. Herschbach

In particular, the evaluation team will assess the extent to which the project has helped to alleviate shortages of skilled human resources. In that regard, we invite you to attend a reception, Tuesday, August 23, 1988 at the President Hotel's Boiketlo Room from 3:00 - 4:30.

Refreshments will be served. We welcome your attendance for the purpose of providing information about your participant training experiences. Enclosed is a questionnaire which we request you to complete and bring with you to the reception.

Thank you for your help in this matter.

Sincerely,

Barbara Belding
Assistant Human Resources
Development Officer

Appendix 3
Overviews

THE REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA

A BRIEF OVERVIEW

Go ikgolega,
go ruluganya ka bothhale,
pelo le tele,
boitlhomu jwu boikaelelo.¹

The Republic of Botswana -- formerly the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland -- is a landlocked country in the center of the Southern African plateau. It about the size of Texas, bounded by the Republic of South Africa on the south and southeast, and Zimbabwe² on the northeast. Namibia³ on the west and north, separates Angola and Zambia⁴ from Botswana by the narrow Caprivi Strip. The Kalahari sand desert and sparse bush covers the major portion of the country, while the Kavango Delta swamp is a dominant feature in the North. Along the eastern border -- roughly following the railroad line and a major highway -- the land rises above 4,000 feet then slopes to the Limpopo Valley. The climate is predominantly arid, and for the past seven years Botswana has experienced a major drought.

The first contact with Europeans was through missionaries in the early 19th century, when the territory was torn by intertribal warfare. In the last quarter of the century, hostilities broke out between the Tswana -- the predominant ethnic groups -- and the Boers from the Transvaal.⁵ Following appeals by the Batswana⁶ for assistance, in 1885 the British Government proclaimed Bechuanaland to be under British protection. As a protectorate rather than a colony the chiefs were

¹The qualities of the people of Botswana as described by Hoyt Alverson -- i.e. "Commitment, planning and cunning, patience, and well-grounded purposive action." See: Mind in the Heart of Darkness. Yale University Press, 1978, p. 135.

²Formerly Southern Rhodesia

³Formerly South West Africa

⁴Formerly Northern Rhodesia

⁵Formerly a separate territory in the Union of South Africa, and now incorporated in the Republic of South Africa.

⁶Botswana is the country, Batswana the people, and Motswana an individual citizen.

protected against Boer encroachment while the British gained access to their colonies to the north via the railroad roughly paralleling the territory's southeastern boundary. Afforded protectorate status, the Tswana (and other indigenous peoples) retained internal control with only a sparse, benign, British presence. When the constitution of the Union (now Republic) of South Africa was drawn up, the African inhabitants of Bechuanaland,⁷ Basutoland,⁸ and Swaziland asked that they be excluded. A steady evolution from local tribal government to national government ensued -- with continued British guidance -- culminating in independence in 1966, and the seat of government established at Gaborone.

With no expatriate settler-focused conflict, the colonial experience for the Tswana was more symbolic than real -- a significant difference to the majority of developing African nations; a difference which is reflected in Botswana's government today. The Republic of Botswana is a stable, democratic,⁹ non-discriminatory society with a high regard for ethics, orderliness and the law.¹⁰ The government practices rational, fiscal conservatism and exercises prudence in dealing with its neighbors. On the international scene, Botswana maintains a non-aligned political stance. In recent years, Botswana has tried to diversify its contacts to include relations with other African nations to the north, East European nations, and Arab countries. Closer to home, Botswana is opposed to South Africa's *apartheid* policy of separate racial development, but because of its proximity, relative economic weakness, and dependence on South Africa for importing and exporting goods, Botswana maintains a working relationship and close economic ties. South Africa is the major source of Botswana's imports -- primarily food and petroleum products, critical for Botswana's survival.

Along with South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland, Botswana is a member of the Southern Africa Customs Union

⁷Now Botswana

⁸Now Lesotho

⁹Democracy in Botswana has its roots in the traditional institution of the *Kgotla* -- the general village assembly where each male villager was expected to attend and participate in decision-making on a wide variety of activities affecting village life.

¹⁰Keeping the law also means following guidelines and adhering to precedents, which leads to a heavy reliance upon seeking advice from "experts".

which permits free trade and common external tariffs among members. Botswana also has a free trade agreement with Zimbabwe. At the same time, to reduce its economic dependence on South Africa, Botswana is a member of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) comprised of Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In addition to promoting trade, SADCC aims to develop joint projects to the members' mutual benefit.

The government of Botswana is committed to creating growth opportunities for its citizens through increased self-reliance, and since independence, a series of six-year national development plans have been undertaken. The current plan -- from April 1985 to March 1991 -- is the Sixth. While currently dependent to a large extent on foreign donor assistance, the four development planning objectives are:

1. Rapid Economic Growth
2. Social Justice
3. Economic Independence, and
4. Sustained Development

with two special themes of employment creation and rural development. To further these aims, a Financial Assistance Policy (FAP) is targeted at generating productive employment opportunities -- particularly in the rural areas -- while promoting arable agriculture to provide income earning opportunities and stimulate food production is another objective.

Overall, Botswana has experienced rapid economic growth since independence, but the key indicator -- per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) -- is misleading as the overall unemployment rate exceeds twenty-five percent and employment opportunities are extremely limited for the majority of the population who are poor, undereducated, rural inhabitants. Fundamental structural changes have occurred in the economy with a heavy concentration in two capital-intensive sectors -- cattle and mining -- and even these have been affected by recent reverses. Furthermore, despite overall growth, the value of exports has plummeted in recent years while agricultural production indices have steadily declined.

The mainstays of Botswana's economy are mining and livestock production. Mining -- for diamonds, nickel

and copper -- is a concentrated, capital-intensive, industry and the biggest foreign exchange earner; while the second largest revenue earner is livestock, representing some 80 percent of agricultural output.¹¹ Reduced world market prices in the mid-1980's and the lessening demand for the minerals Botswana produces, coupled with major drought conditions which resulted in wholesale devastation of cattle herds have served to exacerbate the equity situation. Agricultural crop production is mainly for subsistence, and the majority of Botswana's population depends on rural incomes and lives at or near absolute poverty.

Through careful planning and budgeting, Botswana has effectively used its mineral wealth in the past to provide economic stability and improve its infrastructure and social services development. An extended period of drought has strained the nation's resources to the limit however. Botswana's scope for redistributive policies is constrained by its land-locked geographic position, heavy dependence on exports, and overdependence on South Africa for food and fuel importation. Rapid population growth -- which has an insidious impact on the nation's capacity to educate and absorb into the labor force, and more immediately fosters housing shortages and urbanization -- is an emerging issue which national development plans must also take into consideration.

¹¹Cattle have traditionally played an important part in Batswana society -- the number of head of cattle owned is widely perceived as a leading indicator of status and wealth. While many individuals possess a few cattle, and others aspire to their acquisition, the cattle industry is concentrated in the hands of a few large ranchers.

ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

The Republic of Botswana has made substantial strides in economic growth since independence in 1966. At that time, Botswana was among the poorest nations in the world, with a \$60 per capita annual income. Today, per capita income is approximately \$900.

Between 1981 and 1986 Botswana's annual Gross Domestic Product showed a real growth of 15 percent, coupled with a major increase in foreign exchange reserves. This optimistic picture, however, masks what is actually a sluggish and vulnerable economy. Excluding mining and quarrying, the annual growth was 4.0 percent (largely achieved through government expansion), and in manufacturing there was an annual decline of 0.04 percent. The Gross Domestic Product increased in 1987, with an additional increase projected for 1988.

INDICATIONS OF BOTSWANA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1967-87
(prices in current Pulas)

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>Growth Factor</u>
Total population	600,000	1.2 million	2
Urban population	48,000 (6%)	245,000 (20%)	5
Gaborone	18,000	100,000 +	6
GDP	P30 million	P2.5 billion	8
GDP per capita	P50	P2,100	42
Mining output	P3.5 million (12%)	P1.6 billion (64%)	457
Agricultural output	P12 million (37%)	P100 million (25%)	8
Imports	P20 million	P1.5 billion	75
Exports	P13 million	P2.5 billion	192
Recurrent budget	P35 million	P1.3 billion	39

Source: Smith, et al, *Evaluation of the Financial Assistance Policy (FAP) and its Role in Botswana Business Development, 1988.*

115

At the same time, the unemployment rate is 25 percent, and the annual birth rate is between 3.4 and 3.7, among the highest in the world. The cash economy is small, with somewhere between 115,000 and 230,000 individuals participating out of a total population of 1,200,000. Botswana, moreover, imports over 90 percent of its food, and there is evidence that land quality is deteriorating from overgrazing and further development is restricted by limited water resources.

A drop in the world price of diamonds, a change in the relative strength of the dollar and rand, further political uncertainty in the region, or a renewal of drought conditions could have an immediate adverse impact on the economy.

The private formal sector in Botswana, nevertheless, is expanding, with a potential for modest, sustained growth well into the 1990's. Projections are for annual growth in the range of five percent between now and 1990. The government of Botswana also has cash reserves to last another five years at the current expenditure rate. Moreover, the GOB is implementing policies to use these large surpluses to stimulate development.

Investment Climate

In many ways, Botswana has a positive investment climate. The country is politically stable, and the GOB has a pragmatic policy toward private sector development. There are liberal rules and regulations pertaining to foreign trade and the movement of capital. There are investment incentives for manufacturing, agriculture, and small mining. Botswana is a member of the South African Customs Union (SACU), and has various trade agreements with South Africa, Zimbabwe and other countries in the region, in addition to agreements with the United States and the EC, thus offering investors potential access to markets throughout the world.

There is a plentiful supply of inexpensive labor, and considerable recent investment has been made in the educational system. Banking and accounting services are available. There is a reasonably good infrastructure in major population centers, and, in general, most goods and services are available.

There are large foreign-exchange reserves with no constraints in funding and the import of raw materials and supplies; and there is a liberal profit remittance. The financial system has high liquidity, resulting in low real cost of local capital and generous leverage limits to credit-worthy firms.

There are a number of investment constraints, however-- a major one being the small size of the domestic market. Export markets will have to be developed in order to achieve economies of scale. There is also strong competition from imported goods, especially those from South Africa. Most raw materials have to be imported. Skilled workers are in short supply--especially craftsmen, technicians and managers. Expatriate staff are needed; this entails high maintenance cost. There is a shortage of international housing and limited schooling opportunity for expatriates. The regulatory and bureaucratic framework surrounding business licenses, work permits, land use, and investment incentives constitutes a major barrier. The tax environment is high for a country in Botswana's state of development. Utility rates are high, and there are unnecessary restrictions on the use of land.

An estimated 20,000 individuals will have to be absorbed into the labor market annually. Government public services cannot be expected to continue to expand, meaning that the private sector will have to significantly increase the number of jobs opened each year for Botswana. Present formal private sector employment stands at around 96,000, with an average increase estimated at six percent annually.

ESTIMATED TOTAL NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES BY SECTOR, 1985-1986

<u>Formal Sector</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent of Employment</u>
Private/Parastatal		
Commerce	20,800	7
Construction	13,700	4
Manufacturing	11,700	4
Mining and Quarrying	7,600	2
Finance and Business Services	7,400	2
Other	17,700	6
Subtotal	<u>78,900</u>	<u>61</u>
Government		
Central, non-education	30,200	10
Central, education	11,100	4
Local	9,400	3
Subtotal	<u>50,700</u>	<u>16</u>
Informal Sector		
Traditional agriculture	142,900	45
Rural non-farm	30,700	10
Urban	13,000	4
Subtotal	<u>186,600</u>	<u>59</u>
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT	<u>316,200</u>	<u>100</u>

Source: Smith and Laport, *USAID Botswana Private Sector Strategy Study*, 1987.


Employment is growing fastest in commerce and manufacturing, with most of the growth occurring in firms with 100 or fewer employees.

Over 82 percent of the population in Botswana live in rural areas; 35 percent of these are cattle posts. Agriculture, however, cannot continue to absorb large numbers of new job entrants, and agriculture production is actually declining. At 14 percent of the labor force, the rural and urban non-agriculture informal economic sector is small compared with other countries. Either the estimate is wrong or else there is considerable potential for expansion.

Population and Education

Botswana's social structure reflects an acute shortage of educated Batswana and a large surplus of individuals with a primary education or less. The former are needed to meet the increasing demands of the country's expanding economy and to replace the non-Batswana workforce throughout the country. The latter require jobs. At the present time their numbers far exceed the requirements of the economy for unskilled labor.

The growth in education has been phenomenal. There were 251 primary schools in 1966 at the time of independence. There are now 528 schools serving 231,397 pupils. At the same time, secondary schools have grown from nine to 68, with a total of 39,484 pupils enrolled. Just in the last three years 29 new schools were built. Formal adult education is addressed at non-vocational, artisan, technical and university levels.



The establishment of schools has been in response to the rapid increase in population. If the birth rate remains constant, Botswana's population will increase to 2 million by the year 2001--13 years from now. If there were a rapid

decline in population growth, which is highly unlikely, the population will still exceed 2.4 million within 25 years. The ratio of adults to children is ten to nine in Botswana, in contrast to a typical ratio of ten to four in most developed countries. Just to provide basic services will strain the resources of the GOB in the near future. Employment generation is rapidly becoming a crucial priority.

Appendix 4
USAID Strategy
and Predecessor Projects

USAID STRATEGY -- AND PREDECESSOR PROJECTS

Botswana has long welcomed (and indeed relied upon) numerous expatriates (predominantly British ones) to fill upper and middle-level positions in all areas of their Civil Service. At the behest of the Government, these seconded civil servants have been engaged in a wide variety of tasks -- from formulating public policy; through maintaining and enhancing government continuity by performing administrative and technical functions; to providing primary education in the nation's school system. These "technocrats" have supplied the means (and some of the impetus) for implementing development initiatives. In the private sector, "Expats" have performed a similar role in establishing and administering key industrial and business activities.

With their emergence from Protectorate status to Independence in 1966, "indigenization" -- or localizing such positions -- has been one of the continuing goals of Botswana's National Development Plans. Although considerable numbers of foreigners are still employed in the Public, Parastatal and Private Sectors, and their numbers continue to grow, they are a rapidly diminishing percentage of the total labor force, and generally of the total managerial and technical labor force.¹

From Botswana's perspective, the first priority has been to get the public management job done well, followed by selective education and training of its citizens to assimilate then subsequently assume the responsibilities of government and development. To this end, over the past fifteen years, USAID/G has provided technical assistance in the form of Operational Experts (OPEXers)

¹As of September 1987 -- the latest official figures published -- expatriates held 1,303 of the 25,967 established (i.e. permanent and pensionable) positions, or some five percent. This represents an increase of 314 expatriate-held positions (or 32%) over 1983. In addition, some 120 long-term expatriate experts, advisors and consultants occupy fully-funded government project posts outside of the central government establishment. However, it should be noted that the number of Public Servants has more than doubled over the past ten years. Thus, there has been a relative decline in expatriates in the government, by some 7%. In the Parastatal and Private Sectors, the number of expatriates increased 43% -- from 2,600 in 1976 to 3,708 in 1985, while the overall labor force grew 78%; thus the net decline was only 1.3% -- considerably less than in the public sector i.e. from 6.3% to 5%. In manufacturing, however, the increase in expatriate managers was phenomenal -- almost an eight-fold increase. See: The Presidential Commission on Localisation and Training in the Botswana Public Service 1987/88. Gaborone, Botswana: Republic of Botswana, undated, pages 3-5.

122

and trained hundreds of Batswana in academic, technical and vocational fields.

In 1986, Phase II of the USAID/G Botswana Workforce & Skills Training Project made a significant shift from prior training assistance efforts by requiring that OPEX positions in the Public Sector and government participants be justified in terms of their employment generation potential in the private sector. Furthermore, the project -- which had primarily only set its sights on public sector localization -- added private sector participants. A brief review of four principal USAID/G human resource development projects which preceded BWAST II -- i.e. SADPT, SAAST, SAMDP and BWAST I -- is provided below.

1. Southern Africa Development Personnel and Training Project (SADPT)

The Southern Africa Development Personnel and Training Project was a five year, \$5.4 million² regional project initiated in 1973. SADPT was designed to respond to a joint request for assistance in human resource development from the governments of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. The request was made to the AID Assistant Administrator for Africa during a visit in the Fall of 1971. Up to that time, the U.S. AID program in the three countries had been insignificant.

Although a policy decision to enlarge the program in the three countries had already been made by the United States Government, nevertheless considerable difficulty was experienced within AID in attempting to formulate a specific operational project that could satisfy AID design requirements while simultaneously offering both flexibility and speed to meet the U.S. commitment.

The assistance proposed herein is not a project in the current sense of the term in AID. It might more appropriately be looked at as a mechanism for providing technical assistance on a program or ³sector basis rather than on a project basis.

As an interim measure, while the appropriate documentation was being refined, several American advisers -- designated as operational experts, or "OPEX"

²U.S. contribution.

³See: Southern Africa Manpower Development Project Paper (633-0069), 7 July 1978, page 10.

advisers -- were requested to occupy vacant civil service positions in the respective governments, and to work on programs aimed at key development problems. Low agricultural productivity, inefficient management of resources, inadequate educational facilities, and manpower programs were specifically identified as target areas for concentration. It was assumed at the time that more intensive and direct institution-building in a given sector or area would be handled under separate government or foreign assistance programs.

When formulated, the project reaffirmed the OPEX concept, but additionally refined the focus to link such U.S. advisory assistance to nationals of the countries assisted. The process envisaged was that a national "Counterpart" would be identified for each such position. The counterpart was to be provided training, and would ultimately return to replace their "stand-in" advisers [i.e. "localization"]. In this manner, the assisted government would get short term help while a citizen was being trained for the long term benefit.

Botswana's share of the OPEX advisory assistance was fifteen technicians in a wide variety of skills -- from Curriculum Development Specialist to Ophthalmologist -- but predominantly agriculturally-oriented, such as⁴

Agricultural Economics Planning Officer

Crop Screening Officer

Rural Sociologist

Cooperatives Management

Professor of Range Management

In 1978, other advisers -- who had completed their OPEX assignments between 1973 and 1975 -- were continuing to work within the region under separate "spin-off" projects.⁵

⁴The OPEX specialties enumerated here were those active at the time the BOTSWANA Southern Africa Manpower Development Project Paper was being developed. See: Southern Africa Manpower Development Project Paper (633-0069), 7 July 1978, page 11.

⁵Data on the complete listing of skills, countries and "spin-offs" is not readily retrievable (even if available), and time constraints do not permit further research on this point.

Participant training was not limited to the 15 OPEX-linked counterparts, as 43 participants received out-of-country training under the SADPT project -- presumably in the United States.⁶

The mid-project evaluation of SADPT in 1976 concluded that the project had indeed made an appreciable difference in both the capacity and quality of operations in the organizational units where OPEX advisers had been (or were still) functioning. The evaluation also noted that the participant training aspect of the project in conjunction with the OPEX concept appeared to be accomplishing more in training personnel and upgrading organizational capability than most other donor-assisted programs and projects. Furthermore -- in contrast to the initial difficulty AID had had in formulating an assistance project -- a fortuitous side-benefit was that the presence of OPEXers in the day-to-day government administration of Botswana enhanced the identification of other AID-supported project possibilities. One significantly weak area noted in the project was the difficulty Botswana experienced in being able to identify suitable national candidates for training.

Recommendations of the SADPT mid-project evaluation included:

1. Continue the OPEX concept to meet the assisted country's serious personnel, and institutional development needs
2. Make a clear commitment (i.e. the assisted country) to eventually localize the functions in which OPEXers are provided
3. Develop specific criteria to determine priorities in supplying OPEX advisers
4. Increase emphasis on in-country training for larger groups of participants
5. Use the SADPT to generate new projects
6. Utilize women's resources, and women's participation in training programs at all levels

⁶The available documentation -- Southern Africa Manpower Development Project Paper (633-0069), 7 July 1978, page 11 -- does not break out the respective participating country allocations.

2. Southern Africa Manpower Development Project (SAMDP)

The Southern Africa Manpower Development Project was developed as a five year, \$10 million dollar follow-on project to SADPT in 1978. Originally drafted as another regional project, a legal determination that SAMDP activities were essentially bilateral resulted in a separate project design for each country.

SAMDP was intended to alleviate the constraints to development imposed by extreme shortages of trained professionals in the public sector. It was anticipated that the project would increase the Government of Botswana's capability and efficiency to plan, design and implement national economic and social development programs. The project goal was

purposely not limited to impact on only one or two development sectors, such as education or agriculture . . . [as Botswana's] manpower shortages are so serious in all sectors [emphasis TvT Evaluation Team] as to pose a serious constraint to any degree of economic and social development.

Nevertheless, the government's Directorate of Personnel⁷ was charged with coordinating all requests for OPEX advisers to verify and to indicate priority government objectives "implicitly if not explicitly"⁸ [emphasis TvT Evaluation Team].

The purpose of the project was to reduce critical manpower constraints to development mainly in the fields selected by the U.S. Congressional mandate⁹ while simultaneously strengthening the public sector's institutional capability to meet the development needs of the country. There were concerns in AID that the government might attempt to retain OPEXers for an indefinite period -- as a quality addition to government personnel rolls, practically cost-free. To alleviate these concerns, AID imposed an additional certification procedure to the effect OPEXers were not just to fill vacancies *per se*, but that counterpart personnel were

⁷Now the Directorate of Public Service Management (DPSM).

⁸Southern Africa Manpower Development Project Paper (633-0069), 7 July 1978, page 14.

⁹I.e. the "poorest of the poor" in the rural areas an attempt to address and redress social equity considerations.

actually available and would replace the OPEX technician after a "reasonable" training period.

Reflecting the recommendations from the SADPT evaluation, the outputs targetted for SAMDP were:

1. 48 Batswana trained in the U.S. and Africa to replace U.S. funded OPEX personnel
2. 420 Batswana trained in 18 in-country training programs and courses
3. Six "spin-off" donor-supported projects, and
4. A sustained or improved level of operational efficiency in government departments in which OPEX technicians serve.

OPEXers

Approximately 18 person-years of long-term advisory assistance were to be provided each year of the SAMDP project, but in order to retain flexibility, the length of assignment was to be determined on a case-by-case basis -- i.e. nine OPEXers for two years each, or alternately several for one year only, or perhaps extending some individuals into third, or even fourth years of service. An additional need for short-term advisory consultation -- as opposed to "stand-in" operational expertise -- was also envisaged.

One of the more important criteria for measuring the suitability of an OPEX activity, based on a government request, was whether the activity addressed an area of the 'new directions' of U.S. foreign assistance legislation. Other criteria were that the position be:

1. Clearly within AID's development mandate and Botswana's development priorities
2. Strategically placed in a key development-oriented institution -- so as to play significant roles in improving its performance
3. Precisely defined as to purpose and duration
4. Within an established government post.

5. Associated with available, qualified
Batswana prepared to participate.

Provision was also made in the project budget for special support funds so OPEXers could access occasional services, permitting them to function more effectively. Such services include photocopying and typing. Also, these funds were available to purchase supplies and equipment locally -- such as pocket-type calculators -- when dependence on Botswanan government services or purchases of such items would unduly handicap or delay the OPEX technicians' work. In addition, funds were provided to construct ten residential housing units.¹⁰

For the first year of the SAMDP project, the Directorate of Personnel proposed seven OPEX positions in the following areas:

Principal Planning Officer, Macro Economic
Unit, Ministry of Finance and Development
Planning (MFDP)

Planning Officer, Alternative Energy, MFDP

Statistical Officer, Central Statistics Office,
MFDP

Principal, Rural Training Center under the
Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)

Agricultural Engineer, MOA

Research Officer, Legumes, MOA

Technical Officer, Crop Screening, MOA

¹⁰Southern Africa Manpower Development Project Paper (633-0069), 7 July 1978, page 23.

Training

With respect to Botswana SAMDP participant trainees, training was to be provided for them to acquire

necessary degree, diploma or certificate qualifications to satisfy the standards for established positions in functions supported by the technical assistance component of the project.¹¹

The following reasons were given for a project preference to utilize third-country African institutions for long-term training:

1. Training was likely to be more African-oriented in content and approach
2. Costs were likely to be less than for a comparable program in the U.S.
3. Exposure to other African countries and the commonality of development problems was likely to be more pertinent than exposure to high-technology and complex systems, with little likelihood of replication in the short term, and
4. Third-country institutions offering quality training programs in a particular sector or discipline are likely to have received institution-building and staff development assistance from external donors. Use of these facilities was seen as a further multiplier effect, and greater use of foreign technical assistance funds.

Furthermore, SAMDP-funded training was available for other personnel working in the same office as the OPEX adviser as well as for OPEX counterparts.

It was noted that the quality of primary and secondary school education in Botswana at that time was weak, resulting in graduates with a generally inadequate mathematics and science preparation. Therefore, to improve the success rate for degree program participants in technical and scientific disciplines, preliminary training and course work in mathematics and science was provided for, if needed.

¹¹*Ibid.*, page 21.

In 1978, the SAMDP project paper strongly asserted that virtually all ministries and departments suffered from inadequate administrative, financial and general management capabilities of support staff within organizational units.¹²

Although these positions have largely been localized, many Batswana have been promoted without working experience at the lower level of operation. As a result, implementation processes are deficient to the point that major programs are floundering.¹³

To remedy this situation, the project proposed large scale local training programs. Locally-produced textbooks and teaching materials were programmed, as well as a limited amount of teaching supplies in support of in-country training programs; or to conduct on-the-job training.

While the SAMDP project was much more comprehensive than its predecessor SADPT in addressing training needs of the government of Botswana, more than three quarters of the cost of the project was for OPEXers and their support.

3. Southern Africa Academic and Skills Training Project (SAAST)

The Southern Africa Academic Skills Training Project was a concurrent regional project to SAMDP, to finance graduate, undergraduate and specialized non-degree training in the U.S. and Africa, for nationals of Botswana (and other countries). SAAST's objective was to assist in meeting development-related managerial and skilled technical needs. SAAST was more of a "catch-all" than SAMDP as training included pre- and post-project training, sector-related non-project activities; training-of-trainers, and training of practitioners to upgrade their skills, or otherwise qualify individuals fill specific development positions.

It is significant that in training practitioners, no provision was made to encumber such positions or link the participants with OPEXers. Instead, a relatively large number of individuals were simply targetted for training in order to provide a broad upgrading of the public

¹²*Ibid.*, page 23.

¹³*Ibid.*

service's human resources, without their positions being designated "key" ones.

4. Botswana Workforce and Skills Training Project (BWAST)

The Botswana Workforce and Skills Training Project was approved in May 1982 as a seven year, \$14.6 million project to increase the number of trained Batswana in both the public and the private sectors in skills areas related to employment generation. Five Ministries -- Agriculture, Education, Local Government & Lands, Commerce & Industry, Unified Local Government Service, related institutions, and the private sector were targeted to receive the assistance. One of the important target objectives of BWAST was to localize positions in both the public and private sector by replacing expatriates with trained Batswana.

Under BWAST,¹⁴ the following training activities were programmed:

Administration & Management

- a. 36 participants in long-term training -- in the U.S. and third countries
- b. 15 participants in short-term training -- in the U.S. and third countries
- c. 595 participants in short-term in-country training

Technical Training

- a. 36 participants in long-term training -- in the U.S. and third countries
- b. 22 participants in short-term training -- in the U.S. and third countries
- c. 405 participants in short-term in-country training

¹⁴BWAST I as it is now known, in order to distinguish it from BWAST II.

Technical Assistance

- a. 52 person-years of long-term OPEX technical assistance
- b. 48 person-months of short-term OPEX technical assistance
- c. 4 person-years of non-OPEX technical assistance in the office of the Director of Personnel to coordinate in-country training programs for key ministries.

A mid-term evaluation of BWAST I completed in April 1985 raised concerns about

- a. Lack of linkage between OPEXers providing technical assistance, and training
- b. Inadequate criteria for identifying and selecting candidates for training
- c. Placement of participants after completing training and return to their respective institutions.

The evaluation commended the project managers in general for selecting highly qualified individuals for training and for developing extensive placement opportunities. The evaluation concluded that the success of the project was evident in that all trainees returned to Botswana and resumed employment¹⁵ with increased levels of authority and responsibility.

An audit completed in September 1987 gave some rare praise to the BWAST I project¹⁶ in reporting its finding that, with one exception

¹⁵Surely a first in the history of AID and predecessor organizations training programs.

¹⁶The objective of an AID audit of a project -- as opposed to an evaluation -- is to ascertain the extent to which the project complied with the law, rules, regulations and objectives of the Foreign Assistance Act, and identify the extent to which it accomplished what its designers had planned to accomplish. Areas of Fraud, Waste, Abuse and Mismanagement are noted, for corrective action. Consequently, usually the nicest thing that an audit report can say is that it "could find no evidence of wrong-doing"!

the project successfully selected, placed and monitored students. . . . significant progress was made toward the project's primary aim of overcoming the economy's skilled labor constraint. Good project administrative control contributed to this outcome.¹⁷

The high quality of BWAST management is reinforced by contrast to the findings of a prior audit of a number of participant programs in various African countries which

showed that missions were not adequately assessing training requirements during the design and planning phase of projects; and effective follow-up and evaluation procedures had not been established for returned participants. As a result, effective implementation of¹⁸ many projects had been severely hampered.

The auditors faulted the BWAST project on economic grounds -- for not using less expensive third-country training for students -- and recommended that a specific third-country placement objective be included in the placement contractor's (i.e. the Academy for Educational Development) contract.

Despite several reservations on substantive technical grounds,¹⁹ the USAID Mission nevertheless complied with the audit recommendation and established a minimum 15 percent target for participants to attend training in other countries in Africa. BWAST I is still on-going and separately managed, concurrent with BWAST II.

¹⁷Audit of Botswana Workforce and Skills Training Project No. 633-0231, Audit Report No. 3-613-87-18, The Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development. Nairobi, Regional Inspector General for Audit, 28 September 1987, page 3.

¹⁸See: Audit of Long-Term Participant Training Program in Africa, Audit Report No. 87-05, The Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development. Nairobi, Regional Inspector General for Audit, 9 December 1986, page 5.

¹⁹Matching Botswana's requirements and gaining admission to institutions in other African countries is not easy. Appropriate training is not always available -- particularly competency-based interactive teaching methodology. Physical facilities are often poor; the socio-ethnic/cultural/religious/political climate is often not acceptable, and the degree, certificate and/or diploma is often not perceived by the recipient, as well as the Government of Botswana as being of equivalent quality to a U.S. degree, or an education received within the British system.

This concludes the review of predecessors to BWAST
II -- the subject of this evaluation.

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Appendix 5
OPEX/Counterpart Linkages

OPEX/COUNTERPART LINKAGE


Background

With the exception of SAAST, ever since the inception of USAID Participant Training programs in Botswana in 1973, an OPEX/Counterpart overlap and linkage "model" has been a cornerstone of participant training for the Public Sector in order to support the GOB objective of localization.

In this model, an expatriate operational expert (OPEXer) is recruited to fill a key establishment position while a Motswana is matched with the OPEXer for prior training on-the-job, and targeted to assume the position after formal education and further on-the-job training with the OPEXer. During the two to three year period that the Motswana "counterpart" is away on training, the OPEXer serves in his/her stead. In theory, the OPEXer has two three-month periods to directly work with his/her counterpart, one before departure and one after the trainee returns. The "training objective" is accomplished when the position has been localized. Graphically, this model is depicted as follows:-

Figure 1

THE OPEX/COUNTERPART OVERLAP/LINKAGE MODEL



In some variants of this model, when both the counterpart and OPEXer are in Botswana at the same time, one fills the actual establishment post, while the other occupies a "Shadow" position.

Findings and Conclusions

In practice -- despite constant reiteration of the OPEX/Counterpart linkage model as a basic tenet of the participant program, and despite numerous earnest efforts to apply it as "USAID/G policy" over a fifteen year period -- the evaluation team noted that these times are highly variable and schedules have slipped a lot. For a variety of reasons, the three month "before and after" OJT periods rarely occur as planned, necessitating an inordinate amount of compromise and adjustment by all involved. The slippage is almost inevitable, since both OPEX recruitment and participant training consist of a lot of separate activities, none of which can occur earlier than scheduled, but all of which may slip.

When a policy is observed more in the breach than in the keeping, either the policy or the system (or both) warrants closer scrutiny and modification. In this instance, the evaluation team concludes that "front-end" linkage (i.e. before formal training) is the most problematic aspect, administratively; while "back-end" linkage (i.e. after the counterpart returns) is the most significant substantively, in terms of turning over the position to the newly qualified counterpart.

The model can be strengthened even further by sending several individuals for training at the outset rather than preprogramming a particular individual to fill a position some three years hence. The likelihood that one individual will return and work in tandem with the OPEXer is increased significantly by this approach. Counterparts could be selected from the pool of returned participants -- or even other available individuals. In Botswana where critical shortages of certain skills exist, "overtraining" is not wasteful as the individuals can be readily absorbed in other positions.

Therefore, the evaluation team concludes that localization would be better served by BFAST II concentrating on having the OPEXer available to conduct OJT when the counterpart gets back, and adjusting the recruiting schedule accordingly.

MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS**OPEXERS & CONSULTANTS**

- Hire Policy Makers, and Trainers of Trainers
- Sharpen Job Descriptions
- Identify Salary Range
- Informal Advertising -- nominating single candidate is OK if "good business practice" observed -- [caution easily abused]
- Advertise in Commerce Business Daily, and Washington Post, rather than Wall Street Journal
- Extend recruitment period to 90 days
- Extend contract length to 3 or 4 years
- Provide OPEXers support equipment
- Provide Technical Assistance for IDM administrative management

PUBLIC SECTOR

- Open BWAST II Program to all Ministries
- Improve Counterpart/OPEX Linkage on "Back-End"
- Begin Long Term Selection Process in February rather than July/August, for 18 month processing cycle
- Minimize third country training
- Maintain Emphasis on Employment Generation Criteria and Private Sector Focus
- USAID provide more guidance on EGC
- Establish Formal Selection Review Board System to apply EGC
- Take TOEFL, SAT, GRE, GMAT testing in Fall
- Provide Feedback to unsuccessful applicants

- Provide Pre-departure orientation on
 - Objective (i.e. Multiple Choice) Testing
 - SAT Coaching
 - Math & Science
 - Computer Literacy
 - American English - spelling and speaking
 - Personal Financial Management/Budgeting

PRIVATE SECTOR

- Focus more on short-term and in-country management and technical skills training, instead of long term degree programs
- Open competition to unemployed
- Include areas outside of Gaborone
- Equity, Women's development opportunities
- Include informal sector - to extent possible
- Establish BOCCIM training/accreditation standards
- Develop linkages with a Community-centered training and business assistance organization

ADMINISTRATION

- AID provide more support to BOCCIM
- AID delegate more responsibility to BOCCIM for participant mix and course selection
- AID delegate more responsibility to AED for project administration
- AED improve financial management analysis of project
- AED improve monitoring system and reporting of key indicators to AID

E. Recommendations

1. Participant training

a. Selection. The evaluation team recommends that nomination criteria for the private sector be broadened to include individuals who are employed by other organizations; those who have appropriate backgrounds but are not yet employed; and individuals who are willing to break their links with employment.

To the extent that currently-identified training priority areas do not highlight particular technical and service skills (such as maintenance of computers or electronic equipment, or diagnosis and repair of automobile electronics, for example), the evaluation team recommends that the selection process include these critical training needs. If these data are not readily available, the evaluation team further recommends that a short-term special study be conducted as a high priority, in order to provide a basis for selecting the next batch of private-sector participants.

b. Training. The evaluation team recommends that private sector participant training be refocused on mid-level fields which require less than a baccalaureate degree; that the use of community colleges for training sites be expanded; and that institutional-based training be combined with work placement.

2. OPEXers

The evaluation team recommends that BWAST II use OPEXers in some selected Private Sector organizations.

The evaluation team recommends that AED's private sector specialist be co-located with BOCCIM.

The evaluation team recommends that additional OPEXers be provided to BOCCIM, and other non-profit private enterprise coordinating organizations to stimulate private sector initiatives through direct operational, training and consultancy services.

3. In-country training

The evaluation team recommends that continued -- if not increased -- use be made of in-country training.

The evaluation team recommends that, to the extent feasible, training be tailored to the requirements of specific employers, rather than generic courses.

The evaluation team recommends that USAID/G, through BOCCIM, support the development of intermediary resource providers who can assist firms in Botswana.

4. BOCCIM

The evaluation team recommends that USAID/G support the development of BOCCIM as a referral center to mobilize and coordinate indigenous services to private sector firms.

The evaluation team recommends that BOCCIM establish a Subject Matter Standards Committee to assess training quality.

The evaluation team recommends that some direct financial support be given to BOCCIM to cover some of the the capital outlay and service expenses for the activities anticipated to be extended to BWAST II.

Recommendations

1. The evaluation team recommends that A.I.D. RETHINK its current policy which attempts to link OPEXers and GOB Counterparts, to focus on improving the "back-link", i.e. after the counterpart returns.

2. The evaluation team also suggests that A.I.D. may occasionally wish to allow exceptions to the policy that OPEXers not continue more than four years in the same job.

3. The evaluation team further recommends that OPEXers IDENTIFY TRAINING NEEDS for both the specific position they occupy, as well as the immediate office to which assigned, and DEVELOP A TRAINING PLAN to upgrade the personnel assigned; assume specific responsibility for targeting competency-based skills for counterparts when they are assigned, and deadlines for completion. OPEXers should identify specific milestone training objectives, and allocate specific periods of time to improve counterparts awareness, knowledge, skills and practice -- through formal training and on-the-job, as appropriate.

Appendix 6
Focus Group Meeting Notes

FOCUS GROUP MEETING WITH
BOTSWANA FORMER USAID PARTICIPANTS

23 AUGUST 1988

NOTES

The TVT evaluation team held a meeting of former USAID participants at the President Hotel Gaborone, Botswana on 23 August 1988, from 3 p.m. to 4.30 p.m. Sixteen participants attended, all of whom were BWAST I participants; therefore, the material developed from this meeting must be regarded as informational with regard to BWAST II. Attending in addition to Ken Smith and Stanley Andrews of TVT, were: Ms. Barbara Belding, IDI; Ms. Dorothy Dambe, Training Officer, USAID/G; Ray Kelley, Project Manager, AED Washington; and Dave Benedetti, Field Coordinator, AED Gaborone.

The participants had been mailed questionnaires to complete and bring with them. An initial half-hour social time was set aside for people to arrive, get acquainted, and complete the questionnaire, if necessary. (Several completed their questionnaires after they arrived.) Three separate focus groups were then organized for the remaining hour. A different topic or issue was reviewed and discussed by each group, to identify problems and possible solutions, as follows:-

1. Orientation & Placement, and U.S. Program
2. Reentry into Ministry Position in Botswana
3. Linkages with Training Institutions, and with other former USAID Participants in Botswana (on-going)

The participants self-selected a discussion group, and then -- with TVT, USAID & AED acting as observers and facilitators -- noted the following perceptions, concerns and recommendations:-

1. ORIENTATION & PLACEMENT, AND U.S. PROGRAM

1. Participants wanted more information on the program course of study, and the school to help them make an appropriate choice. However, they did not get to choose, but were assigned without any choice. In some cases their placements turned out to be unsuitable.

RECOMMENDATION: AED could provide counselling on this before placement is sought, and stay in contact with participant during the selection phase.

2. Per Diem/allowances were insufficient for their personal expenses. A major difficulty encountered was that most Batswana were unfamiliar with budgeting. In Botswana, they are used to room and board being provided for them. The need to manage funds was a new experience and took time to adjust.

RECOMMENDATION: AED could provide some guidance before participants leave.

3. U.S. accents are difficult to understand. Most Americans do not speak distinctly -- they don't speak English! They slur T's into D's and word endings. Batswana are accustomed to British English which is much clearer.

RECOMMENDATION: AED could provide some tapes of different American conversational accents for people to listen to -- particularly Texan, Southern, New England, and New York.

4. American spelling, and many word meanings are, different from Botswana English spelling, and word usage -- i.e. color, tire, and globe (lightbulb), lift, boot, bonnet, hooter, pavement, etc.

RECOMMENDATION: AED forewarn participants of some typical differences; prepare a reference list.

5. Multiple-choice test questions are difficult for Batswana to understand and use for the first few times. (They are brought up on essay questions, and problem solving)

RECOMMENDATION: AED provide some practice sessions to familiarize participants and explain how to take multiple-choice tests

6. TOEFL and GRE are culturally biased. They are difficult for non-U.S. participants to comprehend and take, particularly in the unfamiliar multiple-choice mode.

RECOMMENDATION 1: AED seek a waiver of this requirement for Batswana who speak and understand English adequately.

RECOMMENDATION 2: AED provide some tutoring practice sessions to familiarize participants and explain how to take multiple-choice tests.

7. Botswana's rigorous, critical grading system is not understood by U.S. institutions. i.e. Average ("C") is good.

RECOMMENDATION: AED provide a cover letter that discusses this cultural difference.

8. Botswana's/British Academic Levels -- Cambridge, 0 level, Grade 8, Certificate, City & Guilds A, B, C; Diploma, BSc, etc. are not understood by U.S. institutions.

RECOMMENDATION: AED provide a cover memo that outlines the Botswana/British system and U.S. equivalencies.

9. The U.S. Course Registration system is very confusing.

RECOMMENDATION: AED provide some generic orientation on registration before participants leave.

10. The U.S. course elective system for a degree is very confusing.

RECOMMENDATION: AED provide some generic orientation on U.S. college elective practices before participants leave.

11. An individual must have a BSc degree before being admitted to an MSc program. If individuals skip a degree or level, when they return the higher degree will not be accepted by Botswana institutions, but will only be equated with the lower level.

12. The period of study in the U.S. -- 2 to 5 years -- is a long time without being able to come home to Botswana. Participants lose contact with their Ministry, job, family, friends and business interests. Individuals can only come home at their own expense, which most cannot afford.

RECOMMENDATION: Programs should pay individuals to return during the summer to work in their Ministry jobs, or do academic research.

13. Many individuals would like to do the academic research -- thesis, dissertation -- portion of their degree program in Botswana on appropriate job-related topics. If they do this now, it has to be at their own expense. USAID also cuts off academic funding allowances when the assistance is critically needed.

RECOMMENDATION: AED should include the possibility of research in Botswana as a part of the placement program, and USAID should provide funding for in-country research expenses.

14. Government Participants get full salary for first year, and half salary thereafter. The participant's family has continuing expenses to meet all the time in Botswana. Participant cannot work in U.S. to make up the difference, and cannot afford to come back, so it is very difficult to understand this policy. The participant is penalized for studying for potential advancement. This adds to the other pressures from being away.

RECOMMENDATION: Request change in policy to provide full salary to participants for the entire period of their course of study.

15. Participant's supervisor (or department) is not often involved in the participant's training placement or kept aware of his/her on-going program.

RECOMMENDATION: Better communication is needed between AED and Ministry regarding individuals' training programs and progress.

2. REENTRY INTO MINISTRY POSITION IN BOTSWANA

Five main topics were discussed:

Topic 1: Were you expected back in the Ministry and how were you received?

All participants in the group encountered housing difficulties.

Three were well oriented by their Ministry, but one received no orientation at all. Participants uniformly expressed the need for more information on major changes/shifts, etc. in the Ministry during their absences.

Several participants were denied accumulated leave.

Several were getting information both formally and informally from their colleagues and counterparts while they were away, and therefore the need for orientation was diminished.

Topic 2: Was the position ready when you returned?

There was a gap between the expectations of the returnees and the positions that were available. "You don't always get the position you expected, but there were positions."

The job evaluation scheme had been executed in their absence, and therefore there were no salary increases.

Topic 3: Was your work assignment in recognition of the overseas preparation?

Remuneration didn't change, but responsibility was increased.

No assistance or incentives from Ministry (e.g. housing, transportation).

"Government doesn't plan ahead"

Our counterparts (i.e. the Expatriate OPEXers) were always guaranteed housing.

This topic engendered the liveliest discussion and could be summed up by describing it as one of heightened expectations that led to disappointment.

Topic 4: Was the training you received appropriate for your assignment?

Technology participant was trained to use is not in place in Botswana. (e.g. videos for micro-teaching).

Participant trained as an economist but working as an administrator.

"Ministry doesn't plan ahead."

Three participants in the group were trained in technical areas but a major part of their assignment is administrative.

No plan for growth of the individual.

Topic 5: Were the participants promoted upon return?

"Promotion is not based on efficiency but upon whether the supervisor likes you."

Other topics:

1. The participants felt that AID does its part by providing training and the Government of Botswana should do its part by putting counterparts in appropriate positions on return.

2. Orientation: Two participants were not part of any group because they were "off-season" May entries into the U.S. One was given 1/2 day pre-departure orientation in Botswana. Both situations were far from ideal.

3. LINKAGES WITH TRAINING INSTITUTIONS AND OTHER PARTICIPANTS

Few participants maintained linkages with their U.S. training institutions, or with other USAID/G participants from Botswana on a continuing basis. Most persons reported being part of professional associations related to their job in their Ministry, and felt that there were ample opportunities to maintain continuing professional development by attending international and local conferences, workshops, etc.

Professional journals, magazines, and other literature were available, and former participants frequently worked with expatriate experts in their respective positions. The majority of participants reported difficulties in maintaining active participation in University of Botswana or USAID/G alumni association programs because they had little time to devote to such activity after meeting the demands of family, work, and their social situation upon their time. For example, one participant said that many government employees went to the cattle-post on weekends, and that maintaining linkages between their jobs in Gaborone, associations in their respective villages where they also maintained households and families, and checking on cattle in remote locations took most of their time -- they did not have time for professional development, nor did it pay off.

It was concluded that Botswana is different from many other African nations, where participants return to unemployment and a lack of opportunities for continuing professional development. It appears that there may be

more incentives for maintaining traditional linkages than
for tying one's loyalty to organizational development.

Appendix 7
Responses to Evaluation Questions

BWAST II

BOTSWANA

INTERIM EVALUATION

RESPONSES TO EVALUATION QUESTIONS

August/September 1988

153

FINDINGS

- In General:** -- Imaginative use of Traditional Participant Training Program
- AED Providing Outstanding Service

RELEVANCE [Are the development constraints the project was initially designed to address still current?]

1. LOCALIZATION - YES
2. UNEMPLOYMENT/UNDER-EMPLOYMENT - YES
3. MANAGERIAL & TECHNICAL SKILLS CRITICALLY SHORT - YES

EFFECTIVENESS [Is the project achieving satisfactory progress toward its stated objectives?]

1. OPEXERS - YES
2. PUBLIC SECTOR - YES
3. PRIVATE SECTOR - YES, but . . .

EFFICIENCY [Are the effects of the project being produced at an acceptable cost compared to alternative approaches for accomplishing the same objectives?]

1. OPEXERS - YES, but . . .
2. PUBLIC SECTOR - YES
3. PRIVATE SECTOR - NO

IMPACT [Positive and negative effects of the project?]

POSITIVE

- Government & Private Sector closer together in Key Areas
- New initiatives in assisting Small Business Development
- Increased capabilities of individual Batswana for Botswana

NEGATIVE

- Administrative Mgt Burden for GOB/AID BOCCIM and AED

SUSTAINABILITY [Will the effects of the project continue after AID funding has stopped?]

Public Sector - YES, for positions that are localized

Private Sector - NOT YET -- not enough resources, need sharper focus

LESSONS LEARNED [Findings/conclusions of general interest to other projects; and unique factors in Botswana.]

General Application

1. Flexibility Mission Management should be able to respond quickly to changing conditions and needs
2. Participant Training Programs can be adapted to accomplish targeted policy objectives -- in this case, Employment Generation in the Private Sector
3. Institution Building Institutional Linkages are important for sustainability

BWAST II - Botswana

Replicability: Botswana situation very unique. Model should be adapted -- not adopted -- to fit other situations.

Accelerators: Stable democratic government; good data base; expatriates accepted in policy, operational and training roles; attractive investment climate.

Constraints: Narrow and fragile economic base -- cattle ranching and mining (major drought conditions prevail and depressed world market for raw materials); land-locked; rapid population growth; widespread poverty, unemployment & underemployment; and largely untrained labor force.

108

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT**TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (OPEXERS)**

Target Assignments better
-- Emphasize Policy, & Training roles

TRAINING**Public Sector**

Improve Counterpart OJT Linkage with OPEXers
after formal training

Private Sector

Target Training better
Provide Management Assistance to Small
Entrepreneurs

General

Develop Linkages with other business
Organizations and Training Institutions

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION & MANAGEMENT

- USAID Monitoring vs Micro-Mgt
- AED OPEXer Recruitment
- OPEX/Counterpart Training on the job
- BOCCIM Participant Selection for Private Sector
- AED/USAID/GOB/BOCCIM Participant Processing
- AED Accounting, Analysis and Reporting

Appendix 8
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Appendix 9
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