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# SENEGAL PL 480 TITLE III

## Food for Development

## USAID/Senegal Final Evaluation
## Lessons Learned

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by

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## PROJECT DATA SHEET

1. Country: Senegal

2. Project Title: PL 480 Title III Food for Development

3. Project Number:

4. Project Implementation:
   a. Project authorized -- 5/16/80
   b. Project extended and amended -- 3/84
   c. Final obligation -- N/A
   d. Final input delivery -- N/A

5. Project completion - Final Disbursement: o/a 12/87

6. Project Funding:
   a. U.S. 28 million dollars equivalent of commodities (rice and sorghum)
   b. converted to 8,629,861,046 FCFA

7. Mode of Implementation:
   a. Title III Agreement between US Government and Government of Senegal, Ministry of Finance with six amendments

8. Evaluations:
   a. Periodic evaluations October 1980, September 1981, January 1983, June 1984, and August 1986
   b. US General Accounting Office Review 1984 (Draft incorporated into larger global Title III Report)
   c. USAID Inspector General Audit November 22, 1985
   d. Financial Audits of completed projects (1986 and 1987)

9. Responsible Mission Offices During Life-of-Project:
   a. Mission Directors: David Shear, Sarah Jane Littlefield
   b. Program Officers: Lance Jepson, Norman Rifkin, Vara LaFoy, Arthur Braunstein
   c. Program Managers: David Kingsbury, Donald Rassekh, Cynde Robinson

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# MAP OF SENEGAL




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# I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Senegal's six-year, $28 million Title III Food for Development Program financed over twenty five discrete development projects in the fields of natural resource conservation, infrastructural development, agricultural production, crop protection, and agricultural research. It contributed to the implementation of policy reforms elaborated in the GOS's New Agricultural Policy (1984), reinforced in its most recent five-year development plan. These Title III policy reforms concerned the protection and rejuvenation of the natural resource base, the strengthening of parastatal regional development agencies, enlargement of the role played by agricultural cooperatives in the national economy and the improvement of the agricultural economic knowledge base.

A joint GOS/USAID Management Committee (MC) was responsible for project selection, the programming of Title III funds and the development of program guidelines. The Program was administered by a relatively autonomous "Permanent Secretariat" headed by a high ranking official in the Ministry of Finance but primarily staffed by freelance personnel.

The GOS imported over 60,000 metric tons (MT) of 20 percent broken medium grain rice and 23,000 MT of sorghum. The GOS experienced great difficulty selling the rice; it did not correspond to Senegalese tastes and preferences. High world market prices and a steep appreciation of the dollar obliged the GOS to sell the rice at a substantially higher price. This had an adverse effect on national rice marketing. The Government was forced to sell rice at a significant loss, incurring a shortfall of approximately $7 million which was reimbursed by the GOS Treasury. In contrast, the GOS had no difficulty selling the sorghum.

Slow rice sales resulted in interrupted funding flows to individual project accounts. This delayed implementation of the projects up to two years. No single project, however, was irrevocably crippled by funding delays. Funding flows improved over the course of the Program and, from 1984 on, were no longer a constraint to implementation of any of the projects. The GOS qualified for 100 percent debt repayment offset.

Programming, management and monitoring difficulties hindered achievement of project objectives and impeded the efficient administration of the overall Program. These difficulties manifested themselves in sometimes questionable project selection and an inability of the administrative structure to effectively direct the Program.

These difficulties were caused by uncertainty as to the responsibilities of the Program participants. Questions concerning the appropriate roles of USAID in the programming process, the extent of USAID's obligation to monitor program funds, and the correct role of the joint GOS/USAID MC in Program implementation were never adequately answered. Policy guidelines and requirements concerning the USAID Mission's monitoring responsibilities should have been better elaborated by A.I.D./W. Program specific implementation procedures needed clearer definition by Mission management. These unanswered questions were at the root of all administrative problems. Title III legislation is generally not well understood by Agency personnel or by host country governments. This hindered effective Program implementation.

The joint GOS/USAID MC was unable to exercise effective control over the Permanent Secretariat (PS). The Secretariat lacked the qualified personnel needed for administration. In the absence of restraining regulations, it exercised far too much autonomy. This was to the detriment of overall Program implementation.

Projects which achieved their stated objectives appeared to have the following common factors: the technology chosen was appropriate; beneficiaries clearly perceived that their economic interests were well served by project goals; GOS and NGO project directors had the necessary technical expertise, administrative talent and motivation; projects having multiple activity sites possessed a tight hierarchical structure which permitted project oversight and coordination from Dakar.

Administrative demands made of the GOS were consistent with local capabilities. The GOS had the institutional capacity to administer this Program and the technical expertise to direct the projects. Nevertheless, alternative programming and administrative structures are analyzed to encourage thought about future Title III programs in Senegal and elsewhere.

The implementation of Senegal's Program would have been improved if: commodities had been put on the market well before the beginning of individual project implementation to help assure uninterrupted funding flows; a suitable financial monitoring system for projects had been developed prior to project start-up; roles and responsibilities of Program participants had been clarified by appropriate staffs at Washington and Mission levels.

This lack of clarity is not surprising. Title III legislation and practice is the result of a compromise between four principal actors: USAID, A.I.D., Department of State and Congress. Each actor has different interests and agenda. This results in a legislative package which tries to accommodate everyone but does not totally satisfy anyone. In addition, A.I.D. has only limited experience in implementing Title III programs.

Title III programs have potential advantages over alternative forms of project assistance. They conserve developing countries' scarce foreign exchange reserves. They can be more cost efficient than certain multilateral or bilateral options as expenditures on expatriate technical assistance are generally far less. Because the host country is intimately involved in planning and administration, a Title III program can substantially promote technical and financial management skills of host country personnel.

Title III legislation was enacted in 1977, yet only ten programs have been implemented world wide during that span. Mission directors have been reluctant to include Title III programs in mission strategy because of the administrative headaches and burdens engendered by lack of clear program guidance. In spite of many inherent advantages, the program will be attractive to mission directors only if improved policy guidance from Washington is forthcoming.

## II. INTRODUCTION

Senegal's Title III Program accomplished many of its stated objectives and made a significant contribution to the country's development efforts, particularly in the fields of dune fixation, seed storage, infrastructure and policy studies. Problems were, however, evident in the administration of the Program.

The vast majority of difficulties encountered in the implementation of the Senegal PL-480 Title III Program can be traced to a crucial management question:

<u>What were the appropriate roles and responsibilities of the program participants?</u>

This issue was never resolved. The resulting ambiguities affected all institutional actors, from the President of the Management Committee to the individual project managers at field level, and proved to be at the root of most Program management problems. One cannot determine the roles and responsibilities of the participants without deciding, in a larger sense, what should be the extent of USAID's involvement in a Title III program. Should a USAID be actively involved at all levels of program implementation, assuming the lead in program management, or is its role more passive in nature, i.e. collaborating on programming decisions, and providing administrative guidance to host country entities in this case, the GOS and the Title III Secretariat? On a financial level, what is the extent of a USAID's monitoring responsibilities? Are they limited to verification of deposits into the various project accounts or do they extend down to disbursement at field level?

It is beyond the scope of this evaluation to answer those two interrelated questions but it is important to point out that a consensus was never reached (in the case of the Senegal Program) on these issues, either within the Mission or between GOS, the PS and USAID personnel. This lack of consensus engendered confusion with respect to roles and responsibilities for programming, management, monitoring and reporting of program participants. Within the Mission the confusion manifested itself in conflicting viewpoints regarding: (a) the proper role which the USAID MC representative should play, (b) the extent of the Food for Peace Local Currency (FFP/LC) Unit's responsibilities for implementing an effective implementation and financial monitoring system, and (c) the scope of USAID's financial oversight.

Within the Title III management structure, this confusion was apparent in a lack of clear role definition between USAID and the Management Committee and between the MC and the PS. The resulting repercussions will be examined in the sections treating the specific management entities.

In reading this report, it is essential to distinguish between the Permanent Secretariat and the GOS. The PS is not part of the GOS. It is a semiautonomous structure created to administer the Program. Although the Permanent Secretary as well as the Title III Coordinator were, later in the program, employees of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the PS was not part of that Ministry. This distinction is extremely important because it bears on many of the issues discussed in this report.

Much of the ambiguity surrounding the roles and responsibilities of Program participants stems from A.I.D.'s limited experience with Title III programs. To date, A.I.D. worldwide has implemented only ten such programs. The institutional knowledge base is rather thin. It is hoped that this evaluation will add to that knowledge base and help the Agency improve the programming of future Title III programs.

A. Definition of Terms

To avoid undue confusion, the following terms are defined:

Program - The ensemble of planning and administrative activities involved in the implementation of the Title III Program Agreement.

Project - A discrete development activity funded by the Senegal PL 480 Title III program.

Project Director - The GOS or NGO official responsible for the implementation of a Title III-funded project.

Monitoring - The administrative, financial and technical supervision of the Senegal Title III Program and its individual projects.

Reporting - The physical recording and transmission of facts and opinions garnered from Program and project supervision.

USAID - The local Mission, as opposed to A.I.D., the Agency as a whole or the headquarters (Washington) portion of the organization.

## III. PROGRAM OVERVIEW

The United States and the Senegalese Government signed, in May of 1980, a three year $21 million PL 480 Title III Sales Agreement for the purchase of surplus medium grain American rice. The USG sold the rice to the GOS on concessionary credit terms (ten year grace period, 20-year repayment schedule at 2-3 percent annual interest). Under terms of the Title III Agreement, the GOS was eligible to offset its debt repayment obligation by using the FCFA equivalent of $21 million for approved development purposes, as stipulated in the sales contract (i.e. Agreement). Any portion of the FCFA equivalent of $21 million not spent for approved purposes would remain a GOS debt to be repaid according to the above mentioned repayment schedule. In accordance with the Title III Agreement, the GOS opened a special local currency account in October of 1980 in the name of the USG. FCFA proceeds from the sale of the PL 480 imported rice were to be deposited in the account; all such deposits would automatically be earmarked for financing specific projects.

The Sales Agreement required the GOS to develop, fund, implement and monitor projects aimed at: 1) strengthening the role of the Rural Development Agencies (RDA); 2) strengthening the role of farmer cooperatives; 3) reviewing and revising agricultural pricing and marketing policies; and 4) managing and conserving the country's natural resource base.

USAID/Senegal, in February 1980, submitted a Food for Development Program Proposal (PP) which analyzed constraints to Senegal's economic development, identified GOS and USG Title III Program policy objectives, recommended appropriate commodities for sale, developed project proposals and suggested a programming and administrative framework to implement the Senegal Title III Program. This proposal was approved in Washington by an interagency working group composed of representatives from USDA, A.I.D. and the Department of State.

Six projects were approved:

| Name | Activities | Implementing Agency | Budget (FCFA equiv of $) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Agricultural Policy Studies | Conduct and publish research on risk analysis, pricing and marketing studies | ISRA | $ 900,000 |
| Decentralization of Research | Construction of Regional research stations | ISRA | 4,750,000 |
| Local Cooperative Storage | construction of 50 large multipurpose village warehouses | CSA | 4,000,000 |
| Rural Technical Schools | construction of teaching and dorm facilities for mid-level government officials | Min. of Education | 2,040,000 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reforestation and Dune Fixation | construct coastal wind breaks, stabilize dunes through tree planting, develop tree nurseries | MPN | 6,910,000 |
| Rural Development Fund | finance various small scale development projects | Multiple | 2,000,000 |
| Program Budget | | | 400,000 |
| | | | $21,000,000[1] |

Interrupted finding flows of the six "first tranche" projects encouraged financial rigor. In consequence, monies were available to finance the following projects:

| Name | Activities | Implementing Agency | Budget million FCFA |
|---|---|---|---|
| CRS Multi purpose warehouses | construction of 250 multipurpose village warehouses | CRS | 330 |
| Cooperative Training | administrative and technical training is the use of large multipurpose warehouses | MDR | 45 |
| Institut de Technologie Alimentaire | development of alternative uses for locally produced agricultural goods | ITA | 130 |
| OFADEC | diverse village level agricultural production projects | MDS | 182 |
| SAED | grant to regional development agency to facilitate transition to new role | MDR | 1,907 |

In 1984, the GOS requested and received a one-year extension of the Sales Agreement, buying $7 million of rice and sorghum. A new round of "fourth tranche" project proposals were reviewed and approved. FCFA proceeds from the sale of the fourth tranche rice and sorghum were deposited in the Special Account to fund the following projects:

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[1]Original budgets were denoted in dollars. Beginning with amendment 4, budgets were denoted in FCFA to avoid ambiguities and confusion in exchange rates.

| Name | Activities | Implementing Agency | Budget million FCFA |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kebemer Dune Reforestation | fabrication of wind breaks, dune fixation through tree planting | MPN | 130 |
| Diourbel Village Wood Lots | creation of village-based tree plantations (former bilateral project) | MPN | 85 |
| State Tree Nurseries | creation and protection of 15 large state-owned tree nurseries | MPN | 289 |
| Bandia Forest Maintenance | protect forest planted under a previous bilateral project | MPN | 148 |
| Charcoal Production | fabrication of improved charcoal kilns. Training of artisans in construction techniques (formerly a bilateral project) | MPN | 100 |
| Hydrological Study | topographical survey, well construction | MH | 385 |
| CERER | fabrication of energy efficient cook stoves, training in construction techniques | MPN | 101 |

A. The Administrative Structure of Senegal's Title III Program

Following the terms of the Sales Agreement, the Title III MC was formed to approve project proposals, allocate funds to individual projects and to formulate Program policy guidelines. It was originally composed of a representative from the Ministries of: Plan, Commerce, Finance, Rural Development, Higher Education, as well as, the individual project managers and a representative from USAID. In April, 1984, the size of the MC was reduced to a representative from Plan, Finance and USAID.

A Title III Secretariat (PS) was formed to administer the Program, verifying that project expenditures went for approved uses, assuring that acceptable financial management systems were used by the individual projects and publishing quarterly reports monitoring project implementation progress and financial management. The

MC's representative from the Ministry of Finance also held the position of Permanent Secretary of the Title III PS.

In the case of GOS projects, individual project directors were appointed by concerned ministries to direct project activities. These project directors in turn, hired free lance accountants to keep project books.

B. How the Program Worked (in theory)

The Caisse de Perequation et de Stabilisation des Prix (CPSP) is a division of the Ministry of Finance charged with purchasing and reselling certain imported commodities e.g. rice, wheat, millet, sugar. It buys commodities at market price and resells them to certified wholesalers at a fixed price. The CPSP thus insulates the wholesaler, retailer and consumer from world market price fluctuations and protects Senegalese producers from having their prices undercut by commodity importers.

The CPSP sold the PL 480 rice and sorghum and deposited the proceeds into the Special Account earmarked for financing Title III Program funded projects. The Management Committee, composed of members of the GOS and USAID, received and approved project proposals emanating from the Ministry of Plan, various technical ministries and from local NGOs. They also allocated annual project budgets. If the Management Committee approved a proposal or budget submission, it instructed the Permanent Title III Secretary (who was also the Ministry of Finance representative on the Management Committee) to prepare letters of transfer from the Title III Special Account to the individual project accounts. Project directors drew on their accounts for project related purchases of goods and services. Each project accountant justified project expenditures by submitting monthly receipts to the Secretariat and quarterly financial and technical activity reports to both the Title III Secretariat and the USAID Food for Peace Office. Once the Title III Secretariat verified that at least 60 percent of a project's advance had been spent for approved purposes, under the terms of the sales agreement, that project would be eligible for the next advance from the Special Account.

The Title III Secretariat sent quarterly financial reports to the FFPO which listed the advances and allowable expenditures of all Title III funded projects. Based on the quarterly reports, the FFPO prepared Currency Use Offset Reports which were certified as having been used for approved expenditures and sent to Washington by the Regional Controller's Office. Upon certification, the amount was deducted from the GOS's debt repayment obligation.

## IV. TITLE III LEGISLATION

The Title III legislation outlines provisions of a sales agreement between the USG and the government of the importing country and is not, in any legal sense, a "loan" which reverts to a "grant", as it is so often characterized. This distinction is not simply semantic but is of enormous importance in comprehending A.I.D.'s appropriate role in the implementation of Title III programs.

The Congress passed Title III legislation in 1977 in order to encourage agricultural trade and to aid in the economic growth of developing countries. The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) purchases surplus commodities from U.S. wholesalers for resale on concessionary terms to developing countries who agree to implement certain policy reforms. Furthermore, the importing country agrees to:

> take steps to assure that the exporting country obtains a fair share of any increase in commercial purchases of agricultural commodities by the importing country (Article III Item 2).

Title III legislation is essentially the same as Title I legislation,[a] except that it provides the importing country with an option. Under Title I, the importing country agrees to purchase surplus U.S. commodities on credit and to repay its debt obligation in installments of US dollars at minimal interest rates over a twenty year period, after a grace period of ten years. Title III legislation on the other hand provides the importing country with the option of offsetting its Title I debt repayment obligation by using local currency, at least equivalent to the amount of the debt repayment obligation, for uses approved by the USG. Under terms of the sales agreement, the government of the importing country agrees to deposit proceeds from the sale of the imported commodities into an interest bearing Special Account opened in the name of the USG. Monies disbursed from the Special Account and used for approved purposes as outlined in the agreement, are credited against the importing country's debt repayment obligation.

The distinction between sale/debt obligation and loan/grant is very significant. The use of the words "loan" and "grant" implies that monies deposited in the special account set up under the sales agreement belong to the USG. People under this misconception reason that when the importing country deposits money in the Special Account it is paying back the "loan" extended by the USG. This is incorrect. What the sales agreement actually says is that if the government of the importing country uses its proceeds from the sale of PL 480 commodities for uses specified under the agreement, the recipient government offsets its debt repayment obligation. Therefore, monies deposited into the Special Account belong

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[a]Title III legislation, unlike Title I requires the importing country to open a special account in which proceeds from commodity sales are deposited. Currency use offset requirements are generally more specific in Title III programs.

to the importing country. This fact has important ramifications in defining A.I.D.'s appropriate role in the implementation of Title III programs. If funds held in the Special Account do indeed belong to the importing country, this suggests that A.I.D.'s role should be one of collaboration and guidance rather than one of actively directing the implementation of the program.

In addition to providing collaboration and guidance, A.I.D. has a right and an obligation to assure that disbursements from the Special Account are used for approved purposes. The extent of USAID's monitoring responsibilities in the case of Senegal remains unclear. This subject will be discussed in detail in a following section.

## V. A DISCUSSION OF COMMODITY ISSUES:

Program implementation was retarded and hampered by the inability of the GOS to sell the rice imported under the Title III sales agreement. The Senegalese consumer prefers the less expensive Asian broken rice to the medium and long grain American rice which was available under the sales agrgement. The high world market price for whole grain rice coupled with the appreciation of the dollar against the FCFA made the American rice uncompetitive in market place. The GOS originally agreed to buy $7 million of medium grain American rice annually over a three year period from the Commodity Credit Corporation of the USDA. The amount of rice which the GOS received for each $7 million annual "tranche" fluctuated according to world market prices. When world market prices moved higher (world prices rose some 58% over the course of the program), $7 million bought less rice. The GOS, in order to offset their $7 million annual debt repayment obligation had to deposit the FCFA equivalent into a special account. The more the dollar appreciated (it rose from 210 FCFA to 399 FCFA during the period) the more local currency the GOS had to deposit to offset their debt repayment obligation. At the outset of the program, the GOS bought PL 480 rice at 77 FCFA/kilo, excluding shipping, handling and storage costs.' Three year later, it cost the GOS 125 FCFA/kilo. Over the life of the program, GOS costs rose while their revenues decreased. In order for the GOS to break even on the rice transaction, it was obliged to sell the rice at a far higher price than the preferred Asian varieties. Despite two price cuts in 1982 and 1983, the rice would not move. The GOS was forced to withhold Asian rice off the market. Wholesalers, anticipating the unavailability of the preferred variety, stored up on Asian rice to tide them over. This disrupted normal marketing activity at the CPSP. In response, the CPSP returned Asian rice to the market but required wholesalers to buy PL 480 rice in order to be eligible to purchase Asian varieties. The GOS sold much of the PL 480 rice at a loss and incurred a shortfall in the Special Account of about $7 million on a $23 million sales transaction. This shortfall was offset by deposits made by the GOS treasury to qualify for full debt forgiveness as required by the Title III sales agreement. In addition, the GOS paid out approximately $4.5 million to cover shipping, handling and storage costs. The GOS, in effect, paid $11.5 million for rice valued on the world market at $23 million. This represents a substantial sum of money for the GOS.

The CPSP sells, on average, 25,000 tons of Asian rice per month to government certified wholesalers yet it took almost five years for the Caisse de Perequation et Stabilisations des Prix to sell the 65,000 tons of PL 480 rice imported under the program. In addition, proceeds from the PL 480 rice sales were often not deposited promptly in the special account, opened in the name of the USG, as stipulated in the agreement.

Slow rice sales, coupled with delays in the deposit of sales proceeds into the Special Account, set back implementation of the six original projects[3] eighteen months to two years. These projects received, on average, only 48 percent of their planned budgets over the first two years of the project. Some projects had to forgo necessary vehicle purchases which had a negative effect on project implementation. Projects containing construction components ground to a halt as project directors did not have sufficient funds to pay local contractors. Project directors were unable to program quarterly budget expenditures because neither they, nor the Management Committee, knew how much the CPSP would deposit into the Special Account during the next quarter. Because of sporadic PL 480 rice sales, the CPSP never could project how much rice could sell during the following quarter. Thus, project directors not only had to deal with severely downsized budgets, they could not effectively revise planned allocations because no one knew how much funding would be available for the next quarter. Deposits into the Special Account only began to flow on a regular basis in 1984, when the GOS once again lowered the retail price of PL 480 rice and required that wholesalers buy it. From this point on, there were sufficient funds to finance planned project activities.[4]

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[3]Agricultural Policy Studies, Local Cooperative Storage, Decentralization of Research, Rural Technical School, Reforestation and Dune Fixation, Rural Development Fund.
[4]A short-term difficulty arose in mid 1986 when the CPSP failed to make final deposits. The MC was forced to "borrow" from 4th tranche deposits (kept separate at Citibank) to fund 1 to 3 tranche projects. However, eventually 4th tranche funds became deficit as well because proceeds from the sorghum, used on credit for emergency relief in 1984, had not been deposited.

## VI. AN ANALYSIS BY ADMINISTRATIVE ENTITY

In the following section, the responsibilities and performance of the major institutional players, the Food for Peace/Local Currency Office (FFP/LCO), the Management Committee, the Secretariat, and the management structure at project level, will be analyzed. The repercussions of vague role definition will be traced and discussed. The manner in which each management entity adapted to and functioned within an unclear administrative context will be described and evaluated.

### A. The Local Currency Unit

#### 1. Findings:

a) The Local Currency Unit (FFP/LCO) operated in a very uncertain institutional setting. Crucial questions concerning USAID's appropriate role in programming and financial monitoring were never adequately addressed by A.I.D./W.

b) Title III legislation was generally poorly understood by mission staff.

c) The vast majority of administrative problems encountered in the implementation of the Title III Program were addressed, albeit sometimes tardily, by the LCU. Their recommendations, however, were often not acted upon by the PS.

#### 2. Duties of the LCU

The LCU was responsible for coordinating technical assistance to Title III funded projects, preparing Currency Use Offset Reports and acting as a liaison between mission management and the Title III administrative structure.

The Local Currency Unit (FFP/LCO) was forced to operate in an extremely unclear administrative environment where, even at the Program close out date, crucial questions such as: "Is USAID's appropriate role to actively direct the Title III Program or is it to collaborate and provide guidance to the GOS?", and "What is the extent of the LCU's monitoring responsibilities?" were never adequately answered. These questions should have been answered by A.I.D./W before the Program began in 1980. These unanswered questions left the Local Currency Unit to function without fully knowing the nature of their role and the extent of their responsibilities.

#### 3. Sources of Legal Confusion

After reviewing the Program Agreement, amendments to that agreement and intra-mission correspondence and memoranda, the evaluation team found no document emanating from A.I.D./W which clarified the mission's appropriate overall role in the Title III program. It appears that it was largely left up to the head of the Local Currency Unit to define USAID's role and to administer his office in accordance with that definition. According to information garnered from present LCU staff, the former LC Officer felt that USAID should collaborate in, not dominate, the programming process within the MC and monitor GOS adherence to the terms of the sales agreement. The absence of well understood official guidelines fostered two main areas of confusion in USAID's role; 1) its involvement in the Programming process and 2) the scope of its obligation to monitor Title III funds.

When interviewed, the USAID Regional Legal Advisor (RLA) stated that the Title III Program was generally poorly understood by Mission staff. He cited two specific examples: staff often characterized the income transfer mechanism of the Title III Program as a "loan" which reverted to a "grant" upon fulfillment of certain financial obligations by the GOS. The RLA stated that the Title III Program was a sales agreement, and laws and regulations governing A.I.D.'s administration of loans and grants were not necessarily applicable to the Title III program. On a substantive level, the Regional Inspector Generals' Office (RIG) and the Regional Controller (RCON) had widely differing interpretations concerning the extent of USAID's monitoring responsibility of Title III monies.

The sales agreement signed by the GOS and USG states:

> On receipt of satisfactory evidence of disbursement from the Special Account for eligible uses by GOS described below for the activities and/or programs described in annex B, the USG will apply such disbursements against the Title I payment obligation incurred under this agreement.
>
> (Annex A, Item 1.B)

Disagreement centered on when disbursement occurred. RIG maintained that disbursement occurred when money was transferred from the Special Account to individual project accounts, and was actually spent for purchases. They believed that the Local Currency Unit's monitoring responsibilities extended down to the project level. Conversely, the regional controller, basing his view on the interpretation of the RLA, maintained that USAID's monitoring responsibilities ended when funds were transferred from the Special Account into individual project accounts. This confusion left the Local Currency Unit to operate without knowing the extent of its official responsibilities.

4. The Role Played by the Local Currency Unit

In the view of present staff, the former head of the LCU considered USAID's role to be one of collaboration, guidance and administrative support. This is borne out in a memo sent by the LCU to the USAID mission director.

> By the end of the fourth tranche, the GOS will have spend $4.73 million for freight, handling and insurance. This is not an insignificant investment for them and the utilization of Special Account funds should reflect Senegalese priorities insofar as they coincide with USAID strategy (Memorandum dated February 15, 1983).

ANALYSIS

Without question, there were serious deficiencies in the administration of Senegal's Title III program, but it is difficult to hold the Local Currency Unit responsible for those deficiencies. Virtually every administrative problem was addressed by the LCU. Unfortunately, the Title III Secretariat often did not act on those suggestions, nor utilize those administrative tools developed by USAID. Three separate financial monitoring systems were proposed by the Local Currency Unit and the Sahel Regional Financial Management Project (SRFMP), none of which were adopted by the PS. The LCU also elaborated a comprehensive description of the roles and tasks of members of the PS, but this personnel management plan was never enacted. The Local Currency Unit created a system to monitor the progress of individual projects toward programmed activity goals, but it did not receive a sufficient number of project implementation reports from the various project managers to effectively implement the system (although project reporting improved dramatically with the appointment of a new Permanent Secretary in 1985). The twenty five projects financed under Title III were monitored and evaluated by the LCU. Annual project budget proposals were examined by the LCU and opinions were presented to the MC by the USAID representative. Financial management assistance was extended to individual project managers to help them in the preparation of quarterly budget justifications.

Many of the management problems addressed by the LCU could have and should have been acted on in the beginning phases of the Title III program. Some of these problems, however, surfaced only later, once operating funds became available on a reliable basis. The clear management insufficiencies in the implementation of the Title III program do not essentially stem from deficiencies in the LCU, but rather from the inability of the PS to fulfill its administrative role.

B. <u>The Management Committee</u>

1. <u>Findings:</u>

a) The MC was unable to exert effective control over the Permanent Secretariat due to the absence of regulations governing the MC/PS relationship.

b) Appropriate roles of MC members were never clarified vis a vis autonomy from their institutions (Ministries, USAID).

c) The MC did not always avail themselves of the technical and economic expertise necessary to rigorously evaluate project proposals nor did they institute a system to improve the information content of proposals.

## ANALYSIS

### 2. Duties of the Management Committee

The Management Committee's basic functions were to: generate and approve project proposals; review and approve annual project and program budget submissions; formulate Program policy guidelines and provide overall coordination of the program.

### 3. Historical Overview

The composition of the MC underwent several changes through the life of the project. At the outset, the Committee was composed of a representative from the Ministry of Plan (president), the Ministry of Finance (secretary), USAID, concerned technical ministries and the project managers of Title III-funded projects. This structure proved to be too cumbersome.

From mid-1984 on, the MC was limited to a representative from the Ministry of Plan, the Ministry of Finance and USAID. During this time, the representative from the Ministry of Finance (who also served as director of the Secretariat) was changed. This improved Program management.

At the beginning of the program, the MC met infrequently as funds were not yet available to finance approved projects. As time progressed and monies became available, the MC began to meet more regularly. During the final years of Program implementation, the MC scheduled more frequent meetings and met, on average, twice a month.

Project proposals were submitted to the MC by the Ministry of Plan, various technical ministries and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Both GOS representatives were of senior management level. The Ministry of Plan official was director of the division responsible for donor coordination. The representative from the Ministry of Finance was deputy director of the Bureau of Debt and Investment, and USAID was usually represented by a direct hire employee who had authority to speak for the Agency during Management Committee meetings.

### 4. Appropriateness of the Management Committee Staffing

The eventual size and composition of the MC was appropriate for its functions. The Ministry of Finance is the conduit through which all donor aid passes and thus exercises financial monitoring control over all development assistance. The Ministry of Plan helps formulate national development priorities, writes the five year development plan and serves as a clearinghouse for project proposals emanating from the GOS. The Ministry of Plan had experience in project selection and had, in theory, a stable of unfunded project proposals. USAID should have been represented because it was the logical representative of the USG which exported the commodities.

There were both advantages and disadvantages to having the MC staffed by senior management. The Senegalese representatives were required to travel in the course of their other duties. Management Committee meetings were, as a consequence, frequently postponed. Both GOS representatives were responsible for many other activities and thus could not always devote as much time to Program management as might have been, at times, required. On the other hand, the Permanent Secretary had to be high ranking in order to exert authority over some twenty project directors who were not employed by the same ministry (e.g. Ministry of Rural Development, Ministry of the Environment or the Ministry of Education).

5. Unclear Role Definition between the Management Committee and the Secretariat

The Sales Agreement, its annexes and amendments, defines the role of the MC in only the most general of terms; "The Program will be implemented by the GOS under the overall coordination of a Senegal Management Commission" (Sales Agreement, Annex B, Item 4). The vagueness of this definition proved to be a source of confusion with respect to the dynamics of decision-making within the MC and had a decidedly negative effect on the administration of the Title III Program.

According to the sales agreement, overall coordination of the Title III Program was confided to the Management Committee; but how much authority did the MC exercise over the Title III Secretariat? This is another way of asking, "what authority does the Management Committee have over the Permanent Secretary?" The Permanent Secretary sat on the MC and was thus able to exercise near total control over the administration of the Title III program, in the absence of official documents delin:ating the roles and duties of these two entities. As long as the Tit. III Secretariat had operating funds, it had enormous autonomy. It was free to allocate its quarterly budget as it saw fit. In 1983, the Permanent Secretary arbitrarily and unnecessarily doubled the size of his staff and rented new office space without prior consultation with the other members of the Management Committee. For reasons of organization, efficiency and politics, the Permanent Secretary should have sat on the MC but his duties and responsibilities towards the Management Committee needed to be clearly spelled out to avoid an over concentration of power by the Permanent Secretary.

The Management Committee could not manage the Program unless the Title III Secretariat functioned, not as an independent entity, but rather as the implementor of MC decisions. (This finally occurred once the GOS replaced the Permanent Secretary). Once the Management Committee gained control over the Title III Secretariat, Program administration greatly improved.

It is important to realize, however, that the MC only gained authority over the Title III Secretariat because the new Permanent Secretary felt that the Secretariat's appropriate role was to implement MC decisions. There were never regulations formulated to institutionalize this relationship. Had there been, the Title III Program could have avoided many of the administrative problems which it faced.

6. Uncertain Role Definition within the Management Committee

The nature of the relationship between the USAID official representative and the GOS representatives on the MC was never clarified. Did the USAID representative's vote carry more weight than those of his counterparts? Did USAID have an unspoken de-facto veto over MC decisions? Was it the role of the MC members to represent officially enunciated ministry/mission policies or were they to adopt a more autonomous position?

The GOS Management Committee representatives stated that they were often hesitant to bring to the table and promote a proposal if they thought that the USAID representative was unenthusiastic about the project. On the other hand, they affirmed that they approved project proposals promoted by the USAID representative, even when they had serious reservations about the appropriateness or viability of the project. They felt that they could exercise more flexibility and independence in the decision process than could the USAID representative, but were hesitant to assert their viewpoints because the power structure within the MC was unclear. In their opinion, it appeared that the USAID representative often defended a predetermined USAID mission stance rather than a more independent view as the GOS representatives felt they were permitted.

The Local Currency Unit had a different interpretation. In interviews conducted with present and former staff, it was felt that the GOS representatives could have been more active in generating, prioritizing and tabling project proposals. It was also believed that the GOS officials could have been more involved in the budgeting process and the technical monitoring of individual projects. It seems clear that the MC would have functioned more efficiently and effectively had the nature of the relationship between the GOS and USG been clearer.

7. Weakness in the Proposal Process

There were some major weaknesses in the project approval process: no standardized format for project proposals, no established economic criteria (e.g. measures of cost effectiveness) with which to evaluate ex-ante project proposals, and little economic analysis of reviewed proposals.

A standardized proposal format could have insured a more complete and better detailed project proposal. The relative merits of different proposals would have been easier to compare and would have facilitated economic analysis. Many project proposals were inadequate in scope and detail; the MC often had to request resubmission of proposals. This was a time consuming process and hindered the efficiency of project approval and implementation.

The Management Committee would have judged competing proposals with a more informed opinion had it disposed of an ex-ante economic evaluation of the various submissions. Unfortunately, the Title III Secretariat's economist had neither the training or experience to perform economic analysis.

C. The Title III Secretariat

1. Findings:

a) The Title Secretariat operated semi-autonomously, to the detriment of Program implementation and exerted far too much control over the functioning of the program.

b) The Secretariat did not have the professional competence to assume its designated role.

2. Activities of the Secretariat

The functions of the Secretariat were to certify that monies disbursed by the individual projects were used for allowable expenditures; to assure that the projects used a valid financial management system; to administer its budget and to prepare scheduled reports; and to monitor the financial management and technical activities of all Title III-funded projects.

3. The Staffing of the Secretariat

At the outset, the Secretariat was composed of the Permanent Secretary, a head accountant, an assistant accountant, a secretary, a chauffeur and an office boy. In 1984, without prior approval from the Management Committee, four additional accountants and one more secretary were added. With the exception of the Permanent Secretary (and after 1985 the Secretariat coordinator), none of the secretariat staff were employees of the GOS.

The Title III Secretariat was the crucial player in the success or failure of Program management. It controlled the purse strings by certifying or rejecting financial justification of monies spent by individual projects. Project directors were required by the MC to provide justification that money spent by the project was used for approved purposes before receiving their next allotment. Although the Title III Secretariat (read Permanent Secretary) did not obligate the funds directly, it was able to turn on and off the financial tap through its certification process.

4. Critical Personnel Deficiencies

All members of the Management Committee, including the current Permanent Secretary, acknowledged that the Title III Secretariat did not have the competence to perform its role. For example, one of the head accountants, who was named Secretariat Coordinator by the former Permanent Secretary, had falsified his accounting diploma. It is unknown if he had any training as an accountant. According to those interviewed, he had little notion of acceptable accounting practices. He was also suspected of misappropriation of funds. Subsequent to an investigation by the Regional Inspector General's Office (RIG) and the GOS, which was initiated at the request of the Local Currency Unit, the head accountant was arrested and is awaiting trial.

It is also unknown if the five other accountants hired by the Permanent Secretary had any formal accounting instruction but, in any case, they proved to be incapable of keeping valid records themselves and thus were unable to advise individual projects on improvements in their own financial management systems.

The six full-time project accountants, (some of whom apparently started as office boys), were each responsible for fewer than four projects. It would appear that the secretariat was over-staffed. The Regional Inspector General's Office maintained that some of the staff were paid with Title III funds for jobs which did not involve the legitimate duties of the Title III Secretariat. The staff economist, also hired by the previous Permanent Secretary, had never held an economist's position prior to his work at the Secretariat. This inexperience, coupled with an apparent lack of motivation, prevented him from making a contribution to either the technical monitoring of Title III funded projects or the evaluation of project proposals submitted before the Management Committee.

5 <u>Deficiencies in Management and Accounting Practices</u>

The four annual evaluations, the last two being joint reviews, stressed that the Secretariat had a disproportionately large staff for the size of its work load. Each evaluation recommended that a comprehensive personnel management plan, outlining the respective duties and responsibilities of the Secretariat staff, be adopted to improve the efficiency of the unit. This was never fully done and the resulting ambiguities allowed the Secretariat to function without controlling oversight by the Management Committee.

The Title III Secretariat never designed and implemented adequate accounting procedures for its own books nor was it able to institute and monitor acceptable accounting practices at the individual project level. Although three financial management systems were developed, at different times, by USAID-Senegal, no standard technical and financial monitoring format was ever adopted and enforced by the Secretariat, either at the project level or within the Secretariat itself. Once money was obligated from the Special Account to the individual project accounts (including the operating account of the Secretariat), there was no way of assuring that budgeted line items were respected. Line items appearing in the approved budget proposals did not necessarily correspond to those in the projects' quarterly financial disbursement reports. There was, moreover, no standard menu of line items common to all projects which would have permitted a comparison of similar expenditures between different projects. There was no standard inventory control system, either at the project or the Secretariat level.

The Secretariat, thus, could not verify that expenditures by the individual projects fulfilled the currency offset requirements. In the absence of an inventory system, one had no way of proving that bills submitted for allowable expenditures to the Secretariat actually corresponded to the purchase of the purported goods or services. Similarly, the MC could not verify that purchases made by the Secretariat under its operating budget actually went for the alleged uses. Without an inventory system, spot checks to verify the physical presence of purportedly purchased goods was difficult at best. In any case, the Secretariat accountants rarely attempted to verify purported expenditures with spot checks at field level. The Secretariat's quarterly financial reports, summarizing technical activities and disbursements by the 25 projects, were often submitted late, delaying the subsequent allocation of project advances, and thus hindering efficient project implementation. This sometimes had a negative impact on meeting project timetables and goals.

6. <u>An Over Concentration of Power within the Secretariat</u>

The original Permanent Secretary, who served during the first four years of the project, believed that "his secretariat" should function independently of oversight control by the MC of which he was a member. According to several knowledgeable sources, he considered the secretariat to have the same relatively autonomous status as the individual projects. In view of the absence of codified regulations governing the relationship between the Management Committee, the Permanent Secretariat, USAID and the GOS, he had virtual autonomy in allocating his quarterly budget and administering the Secretariat as he chose. This, clearly, was an invitation to problems. Because the Secretary was a high ranking official, represented a different ministry than the President of the Management Committee, and sat on the MC himself, it was practically impossible for the Management Committee to exert effective control over the Secretariat.

The original Permanent Secretary at one point hired a chief accountant, who later was named the Title III Coordinator. The chief accountant decided which projects had sufficiently justified their quarterly expenditures to be eligible for further disbursements from the Special Account. This allowed the chief accountant/secretariat coordinator considerable control over the individual project directors, which he attempted to capitalize on, by allegedly soliciting kickbacks from project directors in exchange for rapid disbursement of project operating capital. GOS project directors brought this to the attention of responsible persons within USAID and the GOS. This led to a joint investigation. It was learned that, previous to the investigation, the Permanent Secretary had been advised by project directors that kickbacks were being solicited by the chief accountant. The Permanent Secretary never acted on this information. Subsequent to the investigation, he was replaced.

The original Permanent Secretary and his chief accountant were able to exert undue control over the program, not only through the certification of project disbursements, by also by having authority to hire and dismiss Secretariat staff, by defining the responsibilities of the staff and by allocating the operating budget. The Title III Secretary was under no obligation to require project site visits by his accountants for the purpose of verifying that project disbursements used for offsetting the Title III debt repayment obligation were legitimate. He was able to dictate the agenda of the staff economist by withholding funds needed to undertake economic evaluations of Title III-funded projects.

The arrival of a new Permanent Secretary in 1985 signaled a substantial improvement in Program implementation. There was much more coordination between the Title III Secretariat and the individual project directors. Minutes from MC meetings were sent to the projects; a memorandum was circulated to the individual project accountants, detailing the exact receipts required by the Secretariat and pressure was put on the project directors to submit their quarterly disbursement reports in a timely manner. The relationship between USAID and the Title III Secretariat became far more open and cooperative following the nomination of the new Permanent Secretary.

The Title III Secretariat was able to operate largely beyond the control of either the MC or the Local Currency Unit. This occurred because the relationships between the different administrative entities were not sufficiently defined.

Even had there been no malfeasance or personal friction at the Secretariat level, the Title III Secretariat would still not have been able to effectively administer the Title III Program because of deficiencies in the professional capabilities of the accountants and the economist. One must ask how accountants without certifiable professional backgrounds came to manage the FCFA equivalent of $28 million over a three year period. The answer, of course, is that they were hired by the Title III Secretary, without the prior investigation or approval by the Management Committee. The staff of the Secretariat, with one exception, was composed of contractors who were not GOS employees. Secretariat personnel was accountable only to the Permanent Secretary who, because of poorly defined responsibilities, operated with virtual autonomy. Had the Secretariat been staffed with GOS employees with a proven professional record, or with contractors who were thoroughly screened, the administration of the Title III Program would have functioned more effectively.

## D. The Project Management System

### 1. Findings:

a) Project implementation was hampered by unreliable funding flows due to slow rice sales and an inefficient financial management system.

b) The ability of project directors to formulate budgets was severely constrained because neither they nor the Management Committee could project future available funding.

### 2. History

The PL-480 Title III Program funded 25 projects. Project directors were selected either by the concerned technical ministry or by the NGO which implemented the project. Project directors hired accountants from the private sector to oversee the financial management of the individual projects. Each project had a bank account through which it paid for goods and services purchased on behalf of the project. Project directors were required to submit monthly disbursement justifications and quarterly financial and technical reports to the PS, which reviewed and approved project expenditures and to USAID which also monitored the projects' financial reports and activity status. Project directors were obligated to spend and justify at least 80 percent of their budgetary allotments before receiving their next installment.

Three types of bureaucratic structures implemented Title III funded projects: ministries (e.g. Ministry of the Environment), parastatal organizations (e.g. SODEVA, ITA) and NGOs (e.g. Catholic Relief Services). Ministries traditionally do not possess individual financial management systems or hold bank accounts. The national treasury approves and controls all disbursements by individual ministries. Parastatal organisms have bank accounts and implement a financial management plan, which, in theory, conforms to GOS regulations. NGOs, each, evidently, have different financial management systems.

### 3. Major Management Constraints

As mentioned in a preceding section describing commodity issues, the six original Title III projects, begun in 1980, were hampered by the unavailability of funds, due to slow PL-480 rice sales, delays in the approval of contracts by the CNCA and tardy certification of project expenditures by the Title III Secretariat. Project implementation in the early stages was delayed up to two years and sometimes compromised the attainment of project goals. This was the case with the Kayar Dune Stabilization Project where tree survival rates suffered because money was unavailable to construct protective fences. Many projects were unable to meet their financial obligations on time. This naturally made project management far more difficult.

Both the slow pace of PL-480 rice sales and the tardiness with which the CNCA approved contracts were largely beyond the control of the Title III program; delays in the Secretariat's certification of projects' disbursements, however, were not. Despite the fact that the Secretariat contained six accountants, certification of past expenditures (a prerequisite to subsequent allocation) sometimes took up to two months. These delays occurred for three main reasons: the absence of an efficient financial monitoring system at the Secretariat level, unqualified personnel to track and approve expenditures and the unwillingness of the chief accountants to expedite the approval process. Had the majority of PL 480 Title III projects required punctual funding as a prerequisite to project success, attainment of implementation goals would have been impossible.

The inconsistency of deposits made by the CPSP into the Special Account also affected project directors' ability to program quarterly activities, as they were never sure if funding would be available to finance those activities. This prevented project directors from effective medium-term programming.

Management was sometimes hindered by the geographic dispersion of project activities. One projects had 250 activity sites, thus requiring extensive supervision and logistical support. Uncertain funding flows sometimes impeded the project director from supplying that support.

Original project goals were often overly optimistic and would not have been attained even had funding been available on a consistent basis, given the original Program time frame of three years. Some approved project proposals set goals which were too optimistic from a technical or logistical standpoint (Kayar Dune Stabilization Project) or goal attainment was not feasible in view of the project budget (Actions Populaires). The MC did not have, nor did they always avail themselves of, the technical expertise with which to evaluate the appropriateness of project goals. The appointment of an economist to the Secretariat in 1984 was meant to address this deficiency but, for reasons already stated, he was unable to perform this function.

### 4. Relative Autonomy of Projects

Projects functioned in a semiautonomous manner. Project directors -- once funding was in place -- were largely unhindered by bureaucratic red tape. They were able to administer with only minimal involvement from superiors within their respective ministries. This of course presented both advantages and disadvantages. The freedom accorded individual project directors presented them with the opportunity to administer projects in an efficient and expedient manner but it also made technical supervision by the Permanent Secretary more difficult. Because the Permanent Secretary and the project directors belonged to different ministries, the Permanent Secretary did not exert any direct hierarchical control over the directors. He thus had to rely on his status as a high ranking official and his close monitoring of project activities to exercise technical control over Title III projects. The original Permanent Secretary made infrequent project site visits and was generally uninformed as to the progress of individual projects. This lack of involvement in the implementation process hindered his ability to require on time submission of project activity reports and conformance to financial reporting standards, once those standards were in place. The new Permanent Secretary was more involved in the implementation of the program's portfolio of projects and made site visits more frequently than his predecessor. He was thus able to effect improvement in project reporting.

## VII. COMMON FACTORS IN PROJECT SUCCESS

The final evaluation of Senegal's PL-480 Title III Program focuses on an analysis of the means used to implement the 25 projects funded under the program. The success of the program, however, must ultimately be measured by the accomplishments of the individual projects rather than the efficacity of the program's administrative structure[a]. It was not possible to rigorously evaluate all 25 projects in the Title III portfolio due to time constraints. One can, however, attempt to discern commonalities between the various projects which were responsible for project success. Some of these factors are common to all development projects, be they multilateral, bilateral or host country initiatives while others are specific to this Title III program.

Determinant factors in the success of Title III funded projects which are common to all types of project assistance included: appropriateness of technology, interest of project recipients and efficacity of project planning.

Projects which have largely achieved their objectives (Kayar and Kebemer Dune Reforestation, CRS Warehouses, Decentralization of Agricultural Research, Technical School Construction, Hydrological Study, Princeton Study, and CRS income-generation project) all used technologies or methodologies which had previously been tried and proven. The two dune fixation projects drew on past experience in selecting species, cultivation techniques and implementation procedures. In contrast, the original 50 multi-functional warehouses were constructed under the supervision of the Commissairiat de Securite Alimentaire, which did not have a great deal of experience in village site selection or supervision of construction firms. The warehouses were subsequently poorly managed and utilized by the communities. Projects containing large construction components (ISRA, ENEA, Warehouses) were successful because the contractors were experienced and closely supervised by USAID's engineering office.

Another key determinant in the achievement of project objectives was the interest of recipients in project activities. Vegetable and fruit farmers along Senegal's northern coast clearly perceive the need for dune fixation and realize that their economic interests are best served by respecting the integrity of the plantations. In contrast, villagers who stood to benefit from the Bandia Forestry Maintenance Project did not perceive that their interests were served. Villagers no longer had access to firewood and construction materials and they correctly discerned that future fuelwood supply would not increase because the plantations were not growing. Consequently, there was a constant difficulty in guarding the young seedlings against grazing animals, whose herders saw no benefit in protecting the forest. A similar situation occurred in the CERER Cookstove Project. An improved energy efficient cookstove was

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[a]An indepth analysis of the projects will be undertaken during the end of project report.

successfully developed yet was not widely accepted by target groups. Apparently the economic and environmental benefits of the stove were not sufficiently apparent to foster large scale adoption. The CRS and SODEVA Warehouse Projects achieved their objectives because villagers understood the economic advantages of improved seed storage facilities and provided a financial contribution for construction costs.

### A. Determinant Factors Specific to the Senegal Title III Program

The efficacity of a project manager is a key ingredient in the success of all forms of project assistance yet it appeared to be the decisive factor in projects funded under this program. Projects which achieved stated objectives had project directors who had: the requisite technical expertise to oversee project implementation, the willingness to utilize additional technical resource personnel as needed, the ability to plan and administer project budgets, and the dynamism to bring specific technical and administrative problems to the attention of the Management Committee.

Unlike bilateral projects where the role of the project manager is essentially administrative in nature, Title III project directors were both the administrators and the principal technical experts. Thus, technical competence of the project director was a prerequisite to project success. The Kayar and Kebemer Reforestation Projects both had directors who not only had sound technical backgrounds but also showed a willingness to avail themselves of complementary technical input from appropriate mission personnel. In the instance of the CRS-constructed cereal/seedstores, the experience of the SODEVA seedstores greatly facilitated the planning, implementation and village management component of the project.

The ability to effectively plan and administer project budgets was also a crucial factor in project success. Because disbursement to project accounts was contingent on timely justification of project expenditures, directors of successful projects generally submitted justification and reports to the Secretariat in conformance with reporting requirements. In addition, project directors were often obliged to modify project activity in accordance with the availability of funds in the Special Account. The Dune fixation, hydrology study, and construction projects all experienced interruptions in funding flows yet the project directors were able to reprogram and prioritize activities to minimize the impact of interrupted funding on project implementation.

The Title III Secretariat often erected barriers impeding smooth administration of individual projects. Disbursement justification submitted by project directors were sometimes rejected arbitrarily. The Secretariat frequently was slow to effect transfers which had been approved by the Management Committee. During certain periods in the course of the Title III Program, the PS also downsized approved allocations for no apparent reason. Project directors were thus faced with numerous unnecessary obstacles which could hinder project implementation. If projects were to achieve stated objectives, they required directors who were sufficiently dynamic and motivated to bring problems generated by the Secretariat to the attention of the Management Committee. Technical expertise and sound administration were alone not sufficient to insure project success.

## III. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING FUTURE TITLE III PROGRAMS

As illustrated in the analysis, the major deficiencies in the implementation of Senegal's Title III Food for Development Program centered around poor definition of roles and responsibilities and insufficiencies in the professional competence of contracted administrative staff. In addition, weaknesses were noted in programming and administrative practices.

Needed improvements cannot be guaranteed simply through the implementation of valid recommendations. One cannot legislate interest, dedication, or integrity. One can, however, implement reforms or a system of checks and balances which can minimize the negative impact of circumstances beyond USAID's control.

Some of the problems encountered in the implementation of this Food for Development Program are not unique to Senegal, but rather have manifested themselves in other Title III programs. In a 1985 GAO study of Title III programs in Senegal, Bolivia and Bangladesh, a certain number of commonalities were evident. Each country experienced difficulties in selling PL 480 commodities and eventually sold those commodities at a loss; long term programming of resources was made difficult by widely fluctuating exchange rates; geographic dispersion of activities made monitoring difficult; reporting requirements were unclear; and USAID's certification was based on inadequate documentation. Thus, the following recommendations may be applicable to other future Title III programs.

### A. Recommendations for Defining Roles and Responsibilities of Participants

1) Clarify the LCU's responsibility for monitoring the use of program funds by the host country government.

In order to avoid the confusion which surfaced in Senegal's Title III program, A.I.D./W should define the exact extent of the LCO's monitoring duties by clarifying the Agency's interpretation of when "disbursement" of Title III funds actually occurs. It should also develop general policy guidelines indicating A.I.D.'s appropriate role in Title III programs.

2) Clarify the role which the mission should play in the programming of Title III funded projects.

Because the specificity of currency offset requirements varies considerably among programs and the programming and administrative environment of each program is different, decisions regarding the appropriate role of the mission in the programming of Title III funded projects must be made locally, on a country by country basis. The mission director, in conjunction with the program, legal, and local currency officers, should develop implementation guidelines and enumerate responsibilities of the local currency officer with respect to program management and project selection.

3) Make certain that the bilateral entity, responsible for overall management of the program, exercises effective control over the bureaucratic structure charged with program administration.

This can only be accomplished by establishing regulations outlining the duties, responsibilities and perogatives of the administrative arm of the Title III program. These regulations should insure that the administrative structure acts as the implementor of management structure's decisions, and not as an independent entity.

B. Recommendations for Improving Programming

4) The sale of commodities imported under the Title III program should precede the implementation of individual projects.

In order to avoid problems engendered by unavailability of funds and to allow for better long term programming, sufficient funds should be held in the Title III Special Account to assure that project implementation will not be interrupted by lack of funds. The Title III Special Account should contain at least the equivalent of first year budget requirements before individual project implementation begins. By assuring adequate lead time before project implementation, projects which require punctual activities (i.e. rainfed agricultural production projects, forestry projects) could be better implemented under the Title III program.

5) Establish life of project budgets denominated in the local currency.

Budgets denominated in U.S. dollars inhibit effective long term programming.

In the case of Senegal, the dollar/FCFA exchange rate fluctuated (approximately 70 percent during the six years of Title III Program activity). This fact, compounded with unreliable financing, clearly injected an avoidable element of instability into the programming process. At the outset of the program, project directors did not know what their project's global budget was, thus, they were not able to plan activities over the life of the project. Project budgets could be denominated in the local currency, using a three to five year exchange rate average to estimate the program budget. This estimation should be conservative in order to avoid budgeting beyond available resources. Monies unbudgeted at the program close out date could be programmed for other non-project assistance.

6) Develop an approved standard project proposal format and a set of economic, and technical criteria to be used in the evaluation of Title III project proposals.

A standard project format could help assure that sufficient information was obtained to permit a rigorous technical and economic analysis and would facilitate cross-project comparisons.

7) Require that the Title III management structure subject project proposals to economic and technical analysis, availing themselves of expertise both within the mission and in appropriate host country agencies.

Projects funded under the Title III program are generally smaller than the typical bilateral project in the A.I.D. portfolio, but that is no reason to forgo technical and economic ex-ante evaluations.

C. <u>Recommendations for Improving Program Administration</u>

8) Develop, in conjunction with the chief host county administrator of the Title III program, a financial management plan containing standard line items and an inventory control system, before project implementation begins.

9) Require that the management committee, on which an A.I.D. representative sits, has input into the selection of Title III administrative personnel.

This would to help assure that local program accountants have the requisite background to administer Title III funds.

10) Title III administrative personnel should be chosen among regular host government employees, detached from their posts for the length of the program.

Title III programs not only finance discrete development projects but also help develop administrative skills. The host country government should benefit from this "by-product". This would also reduce program management costs if salaries are supported by host country.

11) Local Title III accounting staff both at the Secretariat and project levels should undergo A.I.D. sponsored training in the implementation of an appropriate financial management plan before project start up.

## IX. AN APPROPRIATE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXT FOR TIITLE III PROGRAMS

There is no single appropriate administrative structure for all Title III programs. The administrative system must be defined by program goals, as well as, the USG's and host country's institutional capacity to administer the agreement.

Although many Title III programs have encountered the same difficulties in implementation, Title III programs have varied widely, both in size and goal. The two programs implemented in 1978 and 1982 in Bangladesh were, in dollar terms, over thirteen times as large as Senegal's Title III program. The first Bangladesh Program emphasized development through policy reform. Bangladesh used all of its Title III proceeds to finance a fertilizer procurement and distribution project. The Agreement's currency use offset requirements were much less specific than those in the Senegal's sales agreement. The Program resembled more a generalized economic support initiative than a series of discrete projects.

The Bangladesh Program experienced acute implementation difficulties yet these difficulties were common to all forms of development assistance within the country. Senegal, in contrast, has relatively well developed institutions with which to administer donor assistance. Title III programs can differ so widely that the appropriate administrative structure must be adapted to the individual program and country.

### A. The Senegal Experience

The administrative structure used in Senegal's Title III Program was essentially well adapted to both Program goals and institutional capabilities. The problems which the Program encountered on an administrative level were due to poor role definition rather than to some inherent flaw in the administrative structure. The Program channeled monies into discrete development projects. With few exceptions, Title III monies were not intermingled with other donor funds but rather were the sole source of financing of implemented projects. The structure of the MC and the availability of technical support within the GOS and USAID permitted the structure to, in theory, effectively allocate Program funds. The GOS unquestionably had the administrative capacity to administer Program funds and the technical expertise to direct a wide scope of projects. Administrative difficulties stemmed not from an innate institutional deficiency but from the Management Committee's inability to direct Program implementation due to a lack of role definition. Nevertheless, the program imposed a considerable burden on mission staff. Food for Peace personnel oversaw a large Title II program as well as other non-project assistance initiatives. There was not enough mission personnel to permit one person to devote full time to Program supervision.

### B. Some Possible Administrative Alternatives for a Future Title III Program in Senegal (and elsewhere)

Although Senegal's Title III administrative structure was theoretically well adapted to Program needs, it, in practice, imposed too heavy an administrative burden on mission staff. Possible administrative alternatives should seek to minimize the administrative obligations while, at the same time, assuring that Title III monies are monitored effectively. The following alternatives can only be treated here in superficial terms. An indepth analysis is dealt with more appropriately in the context of a program proposal. It is essential to remember, however, that the ultimate success of any development effort must be measured by what is accomplished and not by the ease with which a program is administered. A perfectly administered project serves little purpose if project objectives are not translated into constructive action.

Option: Fewer but larger and more complex development projects using a Management Committee/Permanent Secretariat Structure.

This option would probably result in a decreased administrative burden but would require a higher level of technical direction and monitoring by mission staff. Administrative responsibilities are arithmetically increased as a function of the number of projects financed under the program. The programming and monitoring burden for the USG and GOS of ten $1 million projects is basically ten times greater than for one $10 million project. The PS, thus, would theoretically have an easier administrative task. The Management Committee---and by extension USAID---would need to spend far less time programming budgets but larger, more complex projects would require a more rigorous technical and economic analysis of project proposals. Complex projects would also unfortunately minimize the possible technical and administrative involvement of GOS project directors. There is not sufficient GOS technical and administrative expertise available to devote full time to the implementation of a large complex project without considerable donor assistance. Furthermore, the Title III legislation's additionalit, requirement:

> The project described herein would not be implemented without the resources provided under this agreement.
> Annex B, Item III 2)

circumscribes the choice of potential large projects. The additionality clause in a certain sense impedes Title III funds from being used for top host country priorities. If a project was a top host country priority the GOS would more than likely be able to find a donor who would fund at least a portion of project activities. The additionality clause in effect says that if no other donors are available to fund the project, the Title III program will do so. For the reasons sighted above, this does not appear to be a viable option.

Option: Title III funds allocated to less projectized activities, containing more liberal currency use offset requirements

This option would take the form of essentially a program grant to a ministry or other host country institution. Title III legislation does require that proceeds from the sale of PL 480 commodities be deposited in a special earmarked account (this requirement can, however, be waived by the U.S. president) but there is great latitude as to the specificity of currency use offset requirements (per Bangladesh). This alternative would certainly minimize mission administrative responsibilities but the monitoring of program funds would probably be more difficult, particularly if Title III funds were intermingled with other funding sources. The Title III Working Group, composed of members of A.I.D./W, USDA and Department of State, has not yet clarified the extent of A.I.D.'s monitoring responsibilities. Until this is clarified, individual missions would be inviting trouble from the GAO and A.I.D.'s Inspector General by extending a "grant" to a host country institution. Furthermore, the Working Group has shown a reluctance to approve non-projectized program proposals because of financial monitoring difficulties.

Option: Confide the administration of a projectized program to a reputable private accounting firm.

This option has the advantage of probable strict oversight of funds without significant involvement in monitoring duties by USAID staff and thus would be attractive to both Washington and local mission management. There are, however, disadvantages. This is a very expensive option which would most likely have to be financed from Title III proceeds. In view of the fact that Title III legislation requires the host country government to pay shipping (50 percent of which must be transported on more costly American owned ships),* handling and storage costs, less program monies would actually go for development purposes. Moreover, countries who are most eligible for Title III programs are those least likely to have established accounting firms operating locally, though this is not the case in Senegal. It should be pointed out that the use of a private accounting firm is no guarantee that program monies will be used for approved purposes. Finally, confiding the administration of the program to a private firm does not contribute to the host country's institutional capacity to manage their development program.

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*This requirement can, however, be waived.

Option: Title III funds programmed, administered and monitored by one or several NGOs.

This alternative would also ease the administrative burden on mission staff and, if Senegal's post experience is indicative, result in close technical and financial monitoring of program activities. The chief disadvantages would appear to be: a lack of technical expertise of NGO staffs to direct complex development projects, insufficient NGO staffing to administer a multi-million dollar program, few institution building advantages for the GOS and, finally, an understandable reluctance on the part of the host country to finance NGO projects with government funds.

The options explored above clearly do not pretend to be exhaustive or comprehensive but are rather intended to stimulate thought and discussion for future Title III programs both in Senegal and elsewhere.

# X. CONCLUSION

## A. Title III: an Underused Development Option

Only ten Title III programs have been undertaken worldwide in ten years. This indicates that the program has not been a popular development option among A.I.D. mission directors. One must ask why.

Title III programs have often been seen by senior mission management as administrative headaches, which place substantial demands on mission staff time. Missions need clearer guidance from A.I.D./W concerning USAID's appropriate role in programming and monitoring. This lack of clarity is understandable. The Title III Program has many institutional players: A.I.D., USDA and Department of State. Each player has a different agenda thus legislation reflects a compromise. The USDA views the Program as both a price support mechanism for the American farmer and a marketing tool to promote commercial exports. A.I.D. sees it as a Program to promote agricultural and economic development. The Department of State may view it as a vehicle to affect policy reform.

USDA would prefer to sell its commodities on commercial terms, but participates in the program for its price support and promotional functions. Individual A.I.D. missions would prefer to choose the commodities to be sold locally in order to adapt commodities to local tastes and preferences, instead of picking from a list of available US surplus goods. The State Department might seek more specific policy reforms but will settle for looser policy modifications by the importing country.

Title III program proposals must be reviewed by a technical review committee, chaired by A.I.D. and then by an interagency group led by USDA. Each group seeks something different from the Program and this has resulted in a lack of clear policy direction from Washington. This is compounded by the USG's lack of experience with the program. If the Title III Program is to be made a more attractive development option for mission directors, key points such as A.I.D.'s appropriate role in programming and monitoring must be clarified.

Despite a lack of clear direction from Washington, the administrative problems which Senegal's Title III Program faced were largely avoidable. Interrupted funding flows to the Special Account could have been avoided had the commodities been sold prior to individual project start up. Financial monitoring of Program proceeds would have been much improved had a monitoring system been in place, staffed by trained accountants and accounting clerks before project implementation began. The professional competence of the Title III Secretariat staff would have been better had the Management Committee had approval over staff hiring. Despite administrative impediments, much was accomplished with Senegal's Title III program: the GOS saved $28 million in foreign exchange; needed infrastructure was built; important policy studies were undertaken; the natural resource base was conserved; pilot projects were launched and policy reforms were reinforced.

B. The Merits of a Title III Program

A Title III program can have a positive impact on both the macro and micro economy of the importing country. It can ease chronic balance of payment deficits and help conserve foreign exchange reserves. This is particularly important for those countries which have non-convertible currencies.

The program can fund projects more cost efficiently than some bilateral options. Expenditures for technical assistance are either greatly reduced or nonexistent. Typically, a bilateral project spends between one quarter and one third of its budget on technical assistance; whereas Title III projects are staffed by host country personnel, reinforced by technical and financial expertise from the USAID mission. In Title III funded projects, more money goes for development and less for administration than in bilateral projects.

Title III funded activities can fill a niche for medium sized development projects. Often multilateral and bilateral donor agencies shy away from smaller development projects because the administrative requirements are not significantly less than those associated with larger development initiatives. Often the choice of projects appropriate for implementation by NGOs is limited by staff size and technical expertise. In addition to addressing basic human needs, the Title III program can fund pilot projects whose results are sufficiently significant to evaluate the potential for larger follow-up development efforts.

The program can promote technical and financial management skills of host country personnel. Title III projects are managed by host country officials thus the host country participates to a greater extent in the development process. Programming and implementation procedures are less encumbered by bureaucratic red tape than in many alternative development mechanisms and the system is therefore potentially more efficient. The program's collaborative framework fosters a partnership between donor and recipient in development efforts.

The difficulties which have surfaced in past Title III programs--difficulties in selling commodities and monitoring funds, administrative burdens and incomplete policy guidance - need not be inherent to the Title III program. These problems can be overcome by better policy direction from Washington and improved planning at the mission level. If lessons from past experiences are applied, the Title III program can become both more effective in promoting desired development objectives and more attractive to mission directors.

# POLICY REFORM AND CASE STUDIES

## XI. POLICY REFORM

### A. Issue

Amendment No. 4 of March 22, 1984 (a revised annex B program description of the project agreement) provided for the government of Senegal to consider the following policy reforms :

--A. Selling tree seedlings raised in forest service nurseries;
--B. formulating a clear statement regarding tree ownership and care for these trees.
The GOS was to furnish recommendations no later than one year from the date of the signature of Amendment 4 of the PL 480 Title III Agreement.

### B. History

The genesis for Amendment No.4 covenants flows from USAID/W guidance to the mission in negotiating the extension of the Title III program. In 1983 the Africa Bureau technical review committee recommended that policies regarding tree ownership were an appropriate area for policy reform.

In discussing village woodlots, the technical review committee said:

> "policy with respect to sale of trees is needed. An appropriate benchmark might be specification of legislative or regulatory action on the part of GOS which would not allow the government to provide trees on terms which would undercut tree sales by the private sector". (cable 83 State 203408)

The final form of the May 16, 1980 memorandum did not discuss self-help measures. The covenants of Amendment No.4 appeared to supplement and not substitute for the self-help measures identified in amendment No. 2 of July 14, 1982. The Title III evaluation reports of September, 1981; January,1983; and June, 1984 report on GOS progress on addressing self-help measures previously identified.

It was beyond the terms of reference of the evaluation team to address government progress in addressing policy reform issues identified in agreements earlier than Amendment No.4. The team would like to note, however,that the GOS has already made substantial progress towards fulfilling the covenants of the Title III agreements. Causality is always hard to determine but it is clear the Title III program influenced the GOS in the evolution of its agriculture and natural resources policy, recognized as one of the most progressive in all of Africa.

### C. Assessment

A revision of the 1974 Forestry Code has been completed and is expected to be approved shortly. The development of the new code is responsive to the intent of the covenants in Amendment 4 but, as far as can be determined, independent of those covenants.

The evaluation team could not verify that the covenants cited were transmitted from the Ministry of Finance, which signed for the government, or the Title III Management Committee to the Ministry for the Protection of Nature (MPN). The MPN would have been the responsible government agency for addressing these policy issues. Furthermore, neither USAID nor the Title III Management Committee asked for the GOS to report on specific policy recommendations when the one year deadline expired in March, 1985.

The current Rangelands Code, the Forestry Code and the National Land Law all contain disincentives and even legal obstacles to good land and tree management by farmers, herders and government services.

The Forestry Code is Law No. 74-46 of 18 July 1974. During the course of the Title III program life, a new forestry code has been written. The proposed code has been approved by the Ministry for the Protection of Nature, and the office of the President. It is now before the Supreme Court and will be submitted to the parliament in May, 1987. After debate and possible modification, it is expected to be approved. There are several weaknesses in the new proposed code. Users rights are not clearly defined. There is a lack of clarity regarding the appropriate time and location for harvesting dead wood and the quantity permitted is not specified. The new Forestry Code assigns tree ownership to the person who planted the tree. The code does require, however, that the owner secure permission from the Forestry and Water Service to harvest. This particular regulation has been poorly received by the rural population. In the Sahel and in Senegal, as tree planting moves from a government to a private practice, it is increasingly recognized that national forestry laws must be rewritten to correspond to public perceptions of what is right.

National legislation is only one of the many factors that influence things such as tree tenure and tree seedling sale. Other factors include family, village, tribal and local government policy, procedures, and practices, much of which is unwritten and responsive to personal and political pressures. The new Forestry Code will be adhered to only if it is cognizant of and complimentary to these factors.

D. Recommendations

USAID can promote the process of policy evolution in several ways:

1) USAID can remind GOS of its consistent and continuing interest in equitable tree ownership principles and tree seedling pricing policies that serve as incentives for increased tree planting.

2) USAID should encourage discussion within the forestry community of the new Forestry Code. While a preliminary May, 1986 version is available, the present version is "for eyes only" until parliament acts.

3) USAID should include the issues of tree pricing, land tenure, and other tree planting incentives, when appropriate, in the larger USG-GOS policy dialogue.

4) As part of the Senegal Reforestation Project, the planned one month observation tour to the US by several senior forestry officials to "provide MPN officials with alternative ideas to consider as they take up revision of the forest code and related policies" should be accelerated.

5) The MPN's request for a short term advisor experienced with forestry codes and laws requested by the Minister (Reforestation PP p. 9) to assist in the revision of the forest code should be satisfied. USAID has allocated necessary funds.

6) The baseline surveys programmed during the first months of the Senegal Reforestation Project (Reforestation PP p. 51) should be conducted as planned. These surveys will provide guidance in policy elaboration.

## XII. ACTION POPULAIRES DE REBOISEMENT (APR)

### A. Background and Objectives

The national program goal of the Action Populaires de Reboisement is to promote public participation (rural communities, village groups and individuals) in reforestation activities. Title III supported this goal by providing funds to improve and upgrade the present national tree seedling nursery network and assure its functioning so that it might produce sufficient seedlings to meet the public demand. The two year project objective was to increase production in target nurseries to a level of 500,000 to 1,000,000 plants per year of which 20 to 30 percent would be fruit trees. Reported tree distribution during the period 1977 to 1982 was 2.5 million plants with a planting survival of 70 percent.

### B. Implementation

The APR project began on an unstable footing under Title III. An original proposal was submitted in July 1983, but it was not until a year later that it was finally approved. The implementation and financial plans did not include adequate detail to assure proper management was possible. Reservations were expressed (Management Committee minutes Sept. 19, 1984) to the Eaux et Forets representative about 1) the high cost of materials (30% of budget), including vehicles, 2) the need for coordination with the Bandia and Diourbel project nurseries, and 3) the size of budget allocations for infrastructure. The Committee also asked the project to consider sale of tree seedlings and fruit trees. No apparent action ever occurred on this last point.

The APR first trimester 1985 technical and financial report of the first five months of activity noted, in addition to delays in project approval and funding, the Ministry of Finance's rejection of the project's request for customs and local tax exonerations. It was further noted that allocations for the trimester were late. This resulted in curtailed activities. The Title III Secretariat claimed the delay was due to slow and inadequate justification of expenses. Nonetheless, one hundred and twenty eight permanent workers were in place at the fifteen nurseries, and most nursery material had been purchased.

The second trimester report (July 23, 1985) informed the MC that physical objectives could not be achieved in 1985 due to several problems including funding delays. Second trimester allocations were 25,000,000 FCFA against 70,000,000 FCFA budgeted and arrived three months late. Nine nurseries were reported completely fenced. Total seedling production was estimated to be 1,500,000 plants.

Upon the request of the MC, a revised budget was submitted in July, 1985 to better reflect the correct financial situation and revised activity plan. Against planned expenditures of 185,000,000 FCFA only 85,000,000 FCFA (46%) had been received. Project programming was difficult as allocations were received at the end instead of the beginning of the trimester.

The third trimester report noted that total seedling production had reached 2,000,000 plants. All nurseries but Bambey had been fenced. Six nurseries improved water sources by cleaning and deepening existing wells. The number of nursery workers (128) was thought to be insufficient.

In a report to the Management Committee on December 4, 1985, the APR project director affirmed the project goal was to produce forest and fruit tree seedling for free distribution, that two million seedling had been produced in 1985 and that there was strong local demand for the plants.

Based on concern by the MC as to actual accomplishments of APR, USAID proposed to send a Senegalese USAID economist to do a report on the evolution of the project. A few centers were visited but unfortunately no report was written.

The fourth trimester (Dec. 26, 1985) report had a 1986 total planting target of three million plants. Water problems were noted at Keur Ibra Fall, Bambey, Hann and Mbao nurseries. Nursery workers numbered 139. As the Management Committee had not yet reacted to the July budget revisions proposed, the project director reported he would again redo his budget for the 1986 season.

At the February 26, 1986 meeting of the Management Committee, in response to a report by APR that lack of water at nursery sites would make attaining a 1986 production of even a million plants difficult, USAID suggested the MPN sell the fruit trees produced under the project (20% of the proposed production).

A subsequent letter was sent to the Minister of MPN suggesting certain modifications to overall Eaux et Forets projects which would better distribute remaining project funds. It was further recommended that he consider alternative financing mechanisms. At the March 29, 1986 meeting of the Management Committee the budget of APR was cut at the request of the MPN by 50,000,000 FCFA to cover unauthorized and excess expenditures of 40,000,000 FCFA of the Bandia Forest Project and redistribute funds to other projects.

C. Technology Assessment

The evaluation team's forestry advisor visited five of the fifteen targeted nurseries (Hann, Mbao, Keur Ibra Fall, Bambey and Ndouka) finding production had not significantly increased from preproject levels. Annual total production prior to the project was about 600,000 plants per year from the fifteen nursery sites. Peak production occurred in 1985 when two million seedlings were reported produced. Production in 1986 may have been less than one million plants. Labor costs were far higher than anticipated and eventually represented over 50 percent of the project budget. From calculations of nursery surfaces, it is estimated that each individual nursery is capable of producing 1 million seedlings.

Fencing of nurseries was a major structural improvement in APR. Wire perimeter fencing was installed at all nursery sites and generally remains in good condition. In some instances however, previously existing fence appeared robust enough to control grazing animals without the new fence. Thus fencing appeared in excess of need and seems to have been a central office decision which was not based on an appreciation of nursery site needs.

Water source improvement was limited to maintenance of existing systems and generally did not involve large expenditures for borehole wells or pumps. Cheap and ample water at most nurseries is still not available.

Seedlings remained in nurseries which should have been distributed during the previous rainy season. Some were too large to be planted; they had burst their pots and were growing into the nursery beds but nonetheless continued to be watered. Large numbers of bare root neem trees were growing in the nurseries. This is an easy way to make production targets. Seed is widely available and is sown directly on to the seedling beds. Little additional watering is needed. This technique is easily repeatable at the village level.

While nursery visits by the evaluation team were unscheduled and January is a nonactive nursery period, records for such things as germination rates, seedling inventory by species, labor distribution by task and identities of seedling recipients, including numbers of trees distributed to them, were generally inadequate at either the nursery itself or at the local forest service level.

The strategy of large scale regional tree seedling nurseries to incite tree planting is now seen by many foresters as an inadequate strategy. Its deficiency is to a degree recognized in the 1973 Action Populaire de Reboisement national plan which considers free tree seedling supply as transitory to collective and individual tree planting efforts including tree production and purchase.

Labor needs in a Sahelian nursery producing 500,000 to 1,000,000 plants annually can be a constraint to production. Major tasks include collection and mixing of soil, bed preparation, filling of potting sacks, transplanting of germinated seedlings, watering, thinning and pruning. At planting time the plants must be lifted, often loaded into trucks, and distributed. Labor needs are highly seasonal and vary from periods of near inactivity to intense, concentrated work. A smaller permanent work force can satisfy labor requirements, but this requires precise planning and organization. A problem with seasonal labor demands is that requirements often coincide with peak labor needs in the agricultural calendar.

Large nurseries can provide an economy of scale that is appropriate in instances where a large number of species are planted in a concentrated area. Even in this case, however, temporary nurseries have some advantages over permanent nurseries.

When the seedlings are distributed over a large area, logistical problems can occur. One million seedlings distributed in one thousand seedling units requires one thousand contacts in at most a ten day tree distribution period. The transport of seedlings from a central nursery to scattered villages is an arduous task. Furthermore, road conditions generally deteriorate in the rainy season which coincides with the tree planting period.

## ACTION POPULAIRES

The soil needs for a million seedling nursery are enormous. Good local soil is quickly exhausted. A good potting mixture is equal qualities of sand, top soil and composted manure. An inadequate soil mixture can compromise seedling vigor and growth. Instances have occurred where soil is moved in to the nurseries from great distances. This entails a substantial labor requirement and increases significantly the cost of production.

Water quality and quantity in large nurseries can also be a constraint. The period of heaviest watering need is the driest and hottest period of the year, that is, just before the rains.

Tree seedlings desired by private individuals are generally different species from those used in reforestation schemes and of a far greater variety. Seed collection for large volume production of these species can be difficult.

Finally, tree growing is not an arcane science. It is a skill easily learned by farmers. To treat it as an activity only to be conducted by trained foresters, moves the activity unnecessarily from the ultimate beneficiaries who, with the proper support and technical assistance, are perfectly capable of doing it themselves. In fact, on a limited scale, most farmers already have some experience in tree raising and transplanting.

AID/W, and some individuals within the GOS have recently turned their attention from large centralized nurseries toward local nurseries. There is nothing in the experience of APR that indicates this is the wrong course.

Table 1 APR Budget Plans and Accomplishment

| | 1984 Plan | | 1986 June Report | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ITEM | FCFA(000) | % | FCFA(000) | % |
| Construction | 101,700 | 31 | 24,349 | 14 |
| Material | 93,700 | 29 | N/A | |
| Labor | 84,750 | 26 | 127,77 | 70 |
| Consumable | 31,900 | 10 | 17,627 | 10 |
| Overhead | 11,950 | 4 | 9,789 | 5 |
| | 324,000 | | 179,543 | |

## XIII. KAYAR DUNE STABILIZATION

### A. Background and Objectives

The Kayar Dune Stabilization Project is one of the original six projects approved for the PL 480 Title III Program. It represents one third of the original budget and remains the largest single project of the program. It may be the most successful. It is estimated that 25,000 hectares of highly productive agricultural land was protected as a result of dune stabilization. A substantial portion of Senegal's vegetable and fruit production is grown in fertile depression which run parallel to the coast from the outskirts of Dakar to Leonia, 175 kms to the north. La Nouvelle Politique Agricole (NPA), promulgated in 1984, seeks to triple national fruit and vegetable production by the year 2000, in order to respond to increasing national demand and to expand fruit and vegetable exports. To accomplish this ambitious goal, shifting dunes which threaten these coastal depressions must be fixed.

This three year $ 6.9 million project involved planting of approximately 3700 ha of trees to prevent the movement of sand dunes from covering any additional fertile land along Senegal's northern coast and to protect villages from shifting sands. Actions involved stabilization of 73 kms of coastal dunes, tree planting at the windward edge of highly productive vegetable growing basins and planting windbreaks around villages.

The GOS has had over thirty years of experience in this activity. At the time this project was initiated, the GOS was working with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to stabilize a 22 kms coastal strip from Gandole to Lompoul and with UNDP/UNSO to fix 6 kms of dunes near Lompoul. The area planted at the end of 1980 totaled less than 4000 ha. In general, the techniques were well defined due to experience in dune fixation most notably at Malika (1948), Lompoul (since 1975) and Gandiol (since 1973).

The Title III project envisioned three teams operating from Kayar, Mboro and Diander. Kayar would serve as headquarters. A 73 km band of trees 250 meters wide, running parallel to the beach and 60 meters from the high tide line was planned. A similar strip comprising 1400 ha was to be established on live secondary dunes running parallel to the coast and 3 kms inland. Approximately 500 ha of windbreaks would be placed around villages and market gardens. Nurseries would be established in various locations in the area of work for each year's tree planting campaign. As aforementioned, experience elsewhere allowed development of a detailed financial and activity implementation plan.

### B. Implementation

Construction activity of offices in Kayar started in late 1980, however, as the buildings would not be ready for the 1981 season, it was decided that the staff in the interim would commute from Dakar. For the first year, 550 ha of planting was programmed. All funds for vehicles and equipment were allocated the first year as planned.

KAYAR

The September 1981 Joint USG/GOS Annual Evaluation summarized, "The project is being implemented effectively, close to schedule and faces no major problems". The first year planting target was achieved-400 ha primary dune stabilization and 150 ha semi-fixed dune plantings around Lake Tama. A delay in the delivery of essential four-wheel drive trucks forced the project to plant some trees before wind screens could be positioned As a consequence, a lower survival rate was expected.

FY 81 expenditures were only 230,735,000 FCFA versus 425,273,000 FCFA programmed. Under-expenditure was due to 1) the decision to buy project vehicles over a three year period, rather than all in the first year, 2) the construction component was delayed until the second year (and eventually cancelled), and 3) extension activities were slower than planned because of start up delays. Project staff were apparently experienced, competent and effective. For example, at planting time and other peak periods, temporary day labor was hired. In August 1981, some 130 laborers planted 25 kms (500 Ha) of primary dunes in 13 days of nonstop work after the rains made the dunes ready for planting. This could only have been possible with a cadre of dedicated and organized staff managing the operation.

The FY 82 joint GOS/USG Evaluation Report of January 1983 noted that the project had received only 49 percent to date of its planned funding. This resulted in an inability of the project to meet its planting targets as well as prevented it from purchasing its all required vehicles. Apparently this delay in funding was not a result of poor project management, but stemmed from slow commodity sales and consequently a lack of program funds for the projects.

The June 1984 joint GOS/USG Evaluation Report stated that only 650 ha (345 ha of maritime dunes, 280 ha of continental dunes and 25 ha of village woodlots) had been planted against a target of 1350 ha. Total area planted to date was 2200 ha or 59 percent of the total target objective. This again was the result of a lack of funds due to slow sales of Title III rice. Not only did delayed funds hinder planting, in 1983, workers went on strike twice because they had not been paid. The project director reported it was difficult to set planting objectives without an idea of actual budget allocations. As a tribute to the projects' efforts, the evaluation noted "project personnel have proven themselves quite adept at minimizing costs and getting work done despite funding problems". Against a three year budget of 1,400,000,000 FCFA, only 687,200,000 FCFA (49%) had been received. Due to the impressive record of the project, and at last in mid 1984 adequate funds in the Special Account, it was decided that project activities would be financed through 1985.

The original goals for 1984 had been to stabilize 100 ha of maritime dunes, 550 ha of continental dunes, and 400 ha of replanting where 1983 survival had been only 65-70 percent. This poor survival was related to low rainfall, delayed protection, and the use of small seedlings. Thus, in 1985, plans were to plant 850 ha of continental dunes.

Furthermore, as most construction activity had not yet occurred and with only eighteen months remaining in the project, it was recommended that the construction activities be scaled down in the 1985 activity plan to support a maintenance rather than a plantation program.

## KAYAR

Project activity moved along at a much brisker pace in the 1984 planting campaign. The joint GOS/US Evaluation for the period June 1984 to December 1985 reported that 730 ha had been planted against a target of 850 ha. Again poor rainfall thwarted the project from completely attaining its objectives.

Due to encouraging results, USAID responded in two particular instances to provide short term technical assistance to the projects. In the Spring of 1985, it was observed that a significant quantity of filao (casuarina equisetifolia) was dying back in some of the older parcels. A A.I.D./W team was sent to study the area to determine the problem. It was found that no disease was affecting the trees, but that trees in the older stands were too closely clustered due to lack of systematic cutting and thinning. A thinning program was recommended.

Also a supplementary aerial survey of the zone was conducted in December 1985 to better define the problem parcels and to identify those areas which most urgently required intervention. The Geography Department at the University of Dakar, in collaboration with the USAID bilateral National Plan for Land-use and Development Project, produced a report and maps which assisted the DCSR in identifying specific problems areas. Though utility of the photography was somewhat limited as the imagery was low oblique rather than stereoscopic, it did assist the project in identifying primary areas of intervention for its 1986 campaign. Project goals for 1986 were 630 ha of planting of which 420 ha would be new plantations and 20 kms of windbreaks.

At the end of the 1986 planting campaign, 39,000 ha of plantation had been established over the life of the project. Despite these accomplishments, however, the 1986 plantation effort was compromised by late and spotty rains requiring an early August stop in activities for 15 days in Notto and 21 days in Mboro because of inadequate soil moisture. Luckily good rains in September allowed completion of the year on an optimistic note.

Other difficulties noted in the 1986 campaign included low quality seedling bags which led to higher than usual seedling loss and increased handling problems, the declining condition of equipment and vehicles, and prolonged vehicle replacement time. The vehicle problem was solved temporarily by the rental of two trucks from PRONAT. Lack of vehicles and poor state of the existing vehicles delayed adequate protection of some plantings which might have been a factor in the higher than acceptable mortality rate. Three long delayed UNIMOG trucks arrived in the fourth trimester of 1986. In addition to seedling produced for dune stabilization, species produced for local distribution included filao, eucalyptus, prosopis, cashew, badamier, fruit trees, neem and niaouli (melalenca leucadron).

An important lesson learned over the six-year life of the project was that, given the logistical difficulty of the activity zone, staff considered it would have been nearly impossible to have exceeded 1000 ha of planting annually even if financial resources had been available on a regular basis.

Table 2. Area Accomplishments by Year for

Kayar Dune Stabilization Project

| YEAR | COASTAL DUNES | INTERIOR DUNES | STABILIZED DUNES | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1981 | 400 | - | 150 | 550 |
| 1982 | 1 000 | - | - | 1 000 |
| 1983 | 345 | - | 260 | 605 |
| 1984 | 100 | 210 | 120 | 330 |
| 1985 | 425 | 447.5 | - | 872.5 |
| 1986 | 220 | 200 | - | 420 |
| TOTAL: | 2 485 | 857,5 | 550 | 3 892,5 |

C. Technology Assessment

As previously mentioned, the dune fixation techniques for Senegal have been refined over time. The species mix, planting and protection methods, logistics, and even reporting were generally known from previous GOS experience. The PL 480 project continued to test and improve upon previous methods.

A number of papers have already described in detail the practices used (Maheut, J. et Y. Dommerques (1959); Andeke-Lengui, M.A. (1981); FAO, 1981 Andeke-Lengui: M.A. et Y. Dommerques (c.1982); FAO (1983); and LAI, C. (1984).

Briefly, to describe the techniques used in marine dune stabilization in Senegal, the first step is to install the "contre-dune" 60 to 70 meters interior and parallel to the high tide mark. The "contre-dune" is constructed of large panels (one by three meters) of interwoven nguer (Guiera senegalensis) branches; the panels are attached with wire to pickets of <u>Euphorbia balsamifera</u> spaced at 1.5-meter intervals. The "contre-dune" is the first check against wind-blown sand. The 200-meter wide band starts about 20 meters interior to the "contre-dune". Rows of trees are planted at a spacing of three by two meters (2 meters between rows and rows parallel to the "contre-dune").

To protect the filao seedlings, lines of small panels of woven brush (one-half by three meters, unit cost of 100 FCFA) are staked out in a southwest-northeast orientation, perpendicular to the winds. On relatively flat terrain (slopes of five percent or less), the brush "sandbreaks" can be placed every 20 to 25 meters. On slopes exceeding 10 percent, a crisscross system of sandbreak lines is used with the spacing between lines reduced according to the severity of the slope. The young seedlings require this protection from shifting sand for a initial six month period.

An important treatment that favors the rapid growth of filao seedlings is the inoculation of the plants with actinomycete bacteria that can fix atmospheric nitrogen. These bacteria are obtained from root nodules of older filao trees. The common technique utilized is to crush the nodules and soak them in water for four to five days. This mixture is used in watering the seedlings when they are 8 to 10 centimeters tall. After two weeks, small nodules should appear on the secondary roots of the plants.

Whereas filao planting indirectly protect the "niayes" by stabilizing coastal dune movements, the second component of the project aims to provide direct protection to this valuable area through the establishment of planted windbreaks. In addition, blocks of plantations have been established in some areas, such as the Australian acacias and eucalyptus planted on the yellow intermediate dunes.

Although the Kayar Dune Reforestation Project will no longer receive Title III funding, sufficient revenue could be generated by the sale of trees obtained by the required thinning of planted dunes to continue maintenance activity and expand the area planted. The growth rate of trees planted on the coastal dunes of northern Senegal may exceed that of all other plantations north of the Gambia River. This protective forest may also be one of the country's most productive forests. If Senegal is to maintain (let alone increase) its fruit and vegetable production, dune fixation activities along the country's northern coast must continue to be a priority.

D. <u>Recommendations</u>

Technical observations for consideration by MPN/DCSR follow:

1) in place of government-run mobile nurseries, the GOS should consider contracting for tree seedling delivery from vegetable gardeners in the area who already have established wells and gardening skills. Technical assistance and potting sack supply (sale) may be necessary.

2) panel construction or barriers could be fabricated from filao branches made available from thinning operations. This is already being done to some degree in the Kebemer Dune Stabilization Project.

3) with reduced budgets, use of World Food Program commodities could be used as partial salary to seasonal workers and nursery laborers. Some monetization of commodities may be also appropriate.

4) as foreseen, but not occurring, harvesting of products (mostly from thinnings) from coastal dune plantations should start at year six. Harvesting should be by bid and supervised, but not implemented, by government workers.

5) cashews and other fruit trees should be more available in the project area as they are considered of value by villagers because of their revenue potential.

6) firewood needs for the local population should be met with production from the plantations rather than from the natural forest on the semi-fixed dunes.

7) better management of grazing animals in the project zone will keep naturally fixed dunes from deteriorating. This would be successful if it comes with villager participation and availability of alternative fodder, but should not be a recommendation for increased police activities.

8) dune fixation and better agroforestry practices need to be linked to larger development activities in the project area such as improvement of agronomic and livestock potential, water development, better road access, commercialization of vegetable growing, basic education and health improvement.

# ANNEX

Annex A

## LIST OF MAJOR PERSONS INTERVIEWED

**USAID Officials:**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Arthur | Braunstein, | FFP |
| Daby | Diallo, | ADO |
| Edward | Dragon, | RLA |
| SaraJane | Littlefield, | DIR |
| Campbell | McClusky, | PRM |
| Norman | Rifkin | AID/W |
| Cynde | Robinson, | FFP/LC |
| Phillip | Rodokanakis, | RIG |
| Joel | Schlesinger, | PDO |
| Mamadou | Traore, | FFP/LC |

**USG Officials:**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Tim | Donahue, | Peace Corps Volunteer |
| Peter | Linehan, | Cereals II Agroforestry Project technical advisor |
| Donald | Rassekh, | ISTI |
| Jack | Shea, | Peace Corps, Associate Peace Corps Director |

**GOS Officials:**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Mansour | Diop, | Agent technique des Eaux et Forets, Thies |
| Koymil | Fall, | Ministry of Finance (Title III Permanent Secretary) |
| Mbaye | Khouma, | Project Director, Kayar Dune Stabilization |
| Youssou | Lo, | Agent technique des Eaux et Forets, Diourbel |
| Mademba | Ndiaye, | Ministry of Plan (Title III Management Committee President) |
| Mansour | Ndiaye, | Project Director, Kebemer Dune Stabilization |
| Makhtar | Niang, | Director, Division de la Conservation des Sols et de la Reboisement (Project Director APR) |

Annex A

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Others: | Ms. I Bourges, | World Food Program |
| | Frank Conlon, | Lutheran World Relief Regional representative |
| | Samba Fall, | Catholic Relief Services Seed Storage Project Coordinator |
| | Peter Gallagher, | Catholic Relief Services, Deputy Director |
| | Alistaire Greeves, | Price WaterHouse |
| | Rolande Mignolet, | BIT/ACOPAM |
| | Mayoro Wade, | Price WaterHouse |

Annex B

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Annex C

# TERMS OF REFERENCE
# TITLE III FINAL EVALUATION

## I. BACKGROUND:

A $21 million PL-480 Title III Food for Development Program agreement was signed with Senegal on May 16, 1980 to import $7 million of rice a year for three years. Subsequently, the program was amended to extend it an additional year and increase the program budget to $28 million. The fourth year commodities consisted of 50 percent rice and 50 percent sorghum. The proceeds from these grain sales are used for development projects which are supplementary to GOS budgeted activities.

The overall goal of the Title III program in Senegal is to increase agricultural production and strengthen the position of the rural poor through activities which 1) decentralize the development process by strengthening the role of Rural Development Agencies (RDAs); 2) enhance the role of cooperatives; 3) conserve and manage the natural resource base; and 4) review Senegalese agricultural marketing and pricing policies. Projects which satisfy one of these conditions were selected by a joint GOS/USAID Management Committee for finance. The Committee has supported projects managed by GOS Ministries and PVOs as well as local currency costs for some USAID bilateral projects.

Over the life of the Title III program, four interim evaluations have been conducted as well as a GAO audit and individual financial audits of selected projects. Rather than reviewing issues which have been covered in previous reports, this final evaluation proposes to examine one particular aspect of the Title III program, the administrative structure, and its impact on Title III assisted projects, its perception of benefits derived from Title III, and its influence in promoting policy reform.

## II. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The Title III program, as implemented in Senegal, is a complex entity composed of commodity imports, project-izing of the commodity proceeds, and ongoing monitoring of supported projects. A key element in defining the character and results of the Title III program, has been its administrative structure. The success of the individual Title III assisted projects is heavily dependent on the effectiveness of this decision-making mechanism, composed of the joint GOS/USAID Management Committee and the Permanent Secretariat. Over 20 small-scale projects were financed by Title III, involving intensive managerial oversight. Th

Title III program utilized an approach in which the GOS has played a very active role in programming, policy making, and project management. Thus, the intent of the findings and recommendations of this final evaluation are to weigh the merits of this type of GOS/USAID collaborative approach in the hope that some significant lessons can be learned for use in future PL-480 programs and applied to other donor supported design efforts.

KEY ISSUE: WHAT WAS THE IMPACT OF THE TITLE III ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE ON PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS?

The following questions are recommended to be addressed by the evaluation team in order to determine the impact of the Title III administrative structure on program accomplishments:

1. Was the Management Committee effective in its role as a decision-making body? Did modifications effectuated during the program improve its effectiveness?

2. Was the Permanent Secretariat able to effectively monitor, financially and programmatically, the Title III assisted projects? (use 2 case studies).

3. Was the LC Office's monitoring mechanism effective and appropriate to the task?

4. How does the GOS view the benefits/constraints of the Title III mechanism/commodities vis a vis alternative US-assistance mechanisms/commodities?

5. To what extent were the covenants in Amendment 4 honored by the GOS? What difficulties were encountered in trying to achieve them? How could the Title III administration have better promoted adoption of the covenants?

6. Can Title III supported projects, which were activities additional to the GOS budget, be sustained by the GOS or other local entities without further donor support? A cost-effectiveness study will be conducted of 2 forestry projects. Are the technologies used sustainable and replicable in terms of available human, ecological and financial resources? Were expenditures excessive considering project objectives?

7. In the implementation of Title III supported projects, how did the administrative structure influence the attainment of project objectives? What were the circumstances responsible for project implementation delays? (Use 2 case studies).

## III. COMPOSITION OF EVALUATION TEAM AND TIMING

The evaluation team for Title III will be composed of a Management specialist, who will also serve as team leader, and a Forestry specialist. The GOS will be invited to nominate an evaluator(s) to complement the team. The team will be expected to submit a single collaborative document which integrates all components.

An estimated 5 weeks will be required to complete the evaluation. The evaluation should commence o/a November 15, 1986 and be completed o/a December 20, 1986. The team will work a six day week.

## IV. SCOPE OF WORK

A. The Management Specialist, functioning in a dual capacity as Team Leader, shall perform the following activities:

1. Appraise the effectiveness of the Management Committee in its role as a decision-making body. Review the evolution of the Management Committee over the life of the program and how modifications affected administrative oversight.

2. Appraise the effectiveness of the Permanent Secretariat in monitoring the financial and programmatic aspects of the Title III assisted projects. Two projects will be jointly selected by the evaluation team, USAID/Senegal, and the GOS to use as case studies. It is recommended that one project be in the forestry sector and one a rural development project.

3. Assess the adequacy and appropriateness of the USAID Local Currency's project monitoring mechanism.

4. Review the benefits/constraints of the Title III structure/commodities vis a vis alternative US-assistance structures/commodities.

5. Assure the coordination of work among the team members.

6. Coordinate the writing of the evaluation and write the Executive Summary for the evaluation document.

B. The Forestry Specialist shall perform the following activities:

1. Determine the extent to which the GOS honored the covenants stated in Amendment 4 of the Title III Agreement. Assess the difficulties encountered by the GOS in trying to achieve them. Make recommendations for a procedure in order to achieve the covenant conditions. The covenants refer to 1) tree ownership and 2) sale of trees by the GOS.

2. Perform a cost-effectiveness study of 2 forestry projects to be selected jointly by the evaluation team, USAID, and the GOS. Based on the case studies, assess whether the technologies (e.g. plant availability, planting techniques, care, survival) used are sustainable and replicable in terms of available human, ecological and financial resources. Determine if expenditures were excessive considering the project objectives. Assess the feasibility (possibility) of the GOS being able to sustain the 2 projects given that Title III projects were additional to the GOS budget. Comment on the applicability of technology for future projects.

3. Appraise the impact of the administrative structure on the implementation of Title III supported projects. For example, review the Management Committee's policy on project exonerations and the effect of delayed financial support to the projects in attaining their objectives. The same 2 case studies will be used as in A.2.

C. USAID/Senegal will provide the team members with pertinent documents for their review, if possible, prior to the commencement of the evaluation.

The USAID staff will be available to provide assistance to the contractors on a periodic basis, however it is expected that the evaluation team will be able to work independently. The USAID/Senegal Evaluation Officer will be available to provide guidance on the format of the evaluation.

## V. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

### A. Format of the report

The report will contain the following sections:

1. FES Facesheet
2. Executive Summary (2 - 3 single-spaced pages) using the followin[g] format:
   - Project title and number;
   - Project description and development problem;
   - Purpose of evaluation;
   - Evaluation methodology;
   - Findings;
   - Lessons learned; and
   - Recommendations

The summary should be no more than 2-3 single-spaced pages.

3. Body of report, and
4. Appendices as necessary (including at least the evaluation's sco[pe] of work).

B. Submission of report

A preliminary draft of the evaluation report and executive summary in English should be submitted to USAID for its review at the end of the third week. A final version of the evaluation report will be submitted to USAID in English as well as the Executive Summary in French by the end of the fifth week. USAID/Senegal will arrange to have the body of the evaluation translated and typed in French.

## VI. QUALIFICATIONS

### A. Management Specialist

- -MS or MBA in management administration or training or related field
- -Prior work experience in management administration or training in developing countries, preferably in Senegal
- -Prior service as a member (preferably team leader) of USAID or international agency evaluation team
- -French language capability, FSI S-3, R-3.

### B. Forestry Specialist

- -MS in forestry
- -Prior work experience as a forestry advisor in developing countries, preferably in Senegal. Experience in forestry economics recommended.
- -Prior service as a member of USAID or international agency evaluation team desirable.
- -French language capability FSI S-3, R-3.

# Title III

## Present Administrative Structure




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