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Project Completion Report
Local Resources for Development
(USAID/Yemen 279-0045)

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September, 1986

Project Completion Report of
Local Resources for Development

Table of Contents

	Page
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms.....	1
I. Introduction.....	1
II. Project 045: Local Resources for Development: Findings.....	2
A. The Design Phase.....	2
B. The Research Component.....	7
C. The Logical Framework.....	10
1. Goal.....	11
2. Purpose.....	12
3. End of Project Status.....	15
4. Outputs.....	19
5. Inputs.....	27
III. Implementing Contractor's Scope of Work.....	29
IV. Conclusions.....	32
V. Recommendations.....	35
Footnotes.....	38
 Appendices	
A. Evaluation Scope of Work.....	A-1
B. Logical Framework.....	B-1
C. Description of Methodology.....	C-1
D. Bibliography.....	D-1
E. A.I.D. Evaluation Summary.....	E-1
F. List of 045 Trainees.....	F-1
G. List of 045 Subprojects.....	G-1

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADO	Agricultural Development Officer
AFTE	Training agency*
AID	Agency for International Development
CC	Coordinating Council
CID	Consortium for International Development
CLCCD	Confederation of Local Councils for Cooperative Development
CYDA	Confederation of Yemeni Development Associations
DBS	Development Support Bureau (now Science and Technology)
EOPS	End of Project Status
LCCD	Local Councils for Cooperative Development
LDA	Local Development Association
MAF	Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOH	Ministry of Health
MPW	Ministry of Public Works
NEAC	Near East Advisory Committee
NIPA	National Institute for Public Administration
NOFA	Training agency*
PCV	Peace Corps Volunteer
PP	Project Paper
PVO	Private and voluntary organization
SOW	Scope of Work
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
YAR	Yemen Arab Republic
YARG	Government of the Yemen Arab Republic

*These acronyms could not be determined by the Mission.

Project Completion Report
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(279-0045)
USAID/YEMEN

I. Introduction

This Project Completion Report for Local Resources for Development Project 279-0045 (hereafter referred to as 045 or the Project), was performed by the Program Office Research Coordinator at the request of the Agriculture Development Officer. Several considerations motivated the decision to evaluate 045 in-house. First, there was the lack of response to the March, 1985 advertisement for a consultant to undertake the evaluation; second, 045 had been reviewed and assessed by an institutional development team in the fall of 1985, which provided many insights into the organizational aspects of the Project and the Yemeni agencies involved; third, this type of evaluation provided the Program Office with an opportunity to develop its evaluation capacity further.

While this document is basically a Project Completion Report, it extends beyond the logical framework to include a somewhat broader search for "causal" factors in order to measure goal achievement. To some degree, this report includes findings regarding assumptions, policy related factors, unintended side effects and measures of socio-economic and cost benefits; it does not, however, allow for the breadth of a final evaluation.

II. Project 045: Local Resources for Development

Local Resources for Development is usually described as a complex, integrated rural development project designed to strengthen institutions at the national, regional and local levels by providing a coordinated program of technical and financial assistance and socio-economic research to the existing development system. The Project was authorized in June, 1979, and was originally planned for ten years of implementation. A contract between USAID/Yemen and Chemonics was signed March 27, 1980, and Chemonics had fielded a full team by July of that year. In April, 1983, following the November 1982 Project Evaluation and three years into implementation, a decision was made to terminate the Project on June 30, 1985. The last expatriate contractor departed Yemen in July, 1984.

A. The Design Phase

According to the 045 Project Paper (PP), the Project was closely linked to the Yemen Arab Republic Government's (YARG) strategy for rural development which was "...long on intent and short on implementation". Although the YARG demonstrated interest in rural development by allocating special customs duty proceeds to the Local Development Associations (LDA), there remained the government's inability to support rural development financially and with adequately trained personnel. At the same time, the LDAs were perceived as excellent indigenous media for infrastructure development based on hefty remittances from Yemeni migrant workers in the oil states. In fact, the LDAs had been responsible for impressive road and school construction throughout Yemen. These supposedly grassroots level organizations, then, were the institutional targets of 045. "The project is the cornerstone of the AID rural development program in Yemen and over its life will be the principal contributor to achievement of one of the three major CDSS objectives:

Expansion of our understanding of human needs and of local institutions through research and pilot programs, and development of institutions which can increase the availability of, and access to, needed services."¹

Foreign missions to Yemen generally find it difficult to develop projects; this is due, in part, to the dearth of sufficiently developed institutions and adequately trained counterparts and, in part, to the isolation and heterogeneity of the countryside which preclude the collection of the necessary socio-economic and cultural data on which to develop assistance programs. Relative to many developing nations, the YAR offers an inhospitable atmosphere for development as practiced by most donors. In this context, the promise of LDAs was very attractive. So the focus on LDAs, the notion of grassroots level involvement, and the theoretical perspective suggesting that Yemen was an anomaly within the operating paradigm of rural development all interested USAID/Yemen, AID and Cornell University. From the academicians' view, Yemen was especially interesting because of its capital-surplus, labor-short economy and the vitality of its local organizations which, though apparently taking responsibility for the planning, funding and implementation of rural development infrastructure, still lacked technical and managerial skills.

As an aside, the Chemonics Final Report states that having initially defined the intent of the project, USAID/Yemen looked for institutions with which to work and found the LDAs. A review of the files, however, shows that the Project basically sprang from the attractiveness of the LDAs to USAID and their perceived potential for directing rural development, and not the reverse. It is clear that AID and the academic community had become infatuated with "development from below" and that the information generated by earlier centrally funded cooperative agreements for research served to promote a project which would emphasize grassroots organizations.

By couching 045 in the context of experimentation, however, USAID/Yemen could afford to be overly optimistic. The experimental nature of such a

project in Yemen is understandable and a research focus in a less complex project context could have proven very valuable. The Project, however, was characterized by disconnected, informationally baseless efforts at responding to too many needs at too many levels; the Project's ambition led to its downfall.

Based on the preliminary nature of all the relevant baseline information used in the development of this Project, USAID suffered from many misconceptions regarding Yemen's rural social structure and the absorptive capacity of the national and regional development organizations. The concept paper gives excellent examples of the delusions under which the Mission operated at that time. The author claims that after a working relationship is established with the local organizations and the national level, the Confederation of Yemeni Development Associations (CYDA)*, the Mission could move to larger policy issues:

This would be an opportune time to begin to explore with the Yemen government possibilities of a rural tax reform. We would, presumably, have created a local demand for an expanding and formalized rural tax system and we would have improved the capacity of the LDAs to administer and use such funds.²

The 045 Project Paper had many shortcomings, among them its exaggerated scope and a lack of linkages between its different components. The scatteration of varied efforts at different levels made the project dubious from the start.

*As a result of recent organizational changes, CYDA and LDAs have been renamed Confederation of Local Councils for Cooperative Development (CLCCD) and Local Councils for Cooperative Development, respectively. See Assessment of USAID Institutional Development Strategies, MSI, February, 1986, for an overview of the organization. Throughout this document, though, CYDA will continue to be referred to by its previous name.

Initially, our rural development effort will be concentrated on assisting LDAs establish and construct small scale rural water systems, roads, agricultural infrastructure and to support services such as primary health care systems, basic education and production cooperatives. In doing so, we will be improving simultaneously the planning, management and implementation capacities of LDAs which, in turn, will allow an increase in the already substantial amount of resources that rural people invest in locally initiated development activities. After we have made strides in developing local infrastructure, we visualize a shift in emphasis back to regional and central government in institutions which plan and coordinate broad-based action programs and which supply leadership and technical capacity to local organization. In the implementation of programs in this area, intensive cooperation among AID, Peace Corps and PVOs will be necessary.³

The difficulties inherent in such a far flung design based on negligible information were discussed in the Near East Advisory Committee (NEAC) review of the PP. The committee approved the PP, but apparently against its own better judgment:

...the committee was not comfortable with the fact that the "process" and the "adaptive field testing" language of the PP is not carried through in the details of the design. There is a lack of clarity as to what is being tested, how the information generated by the "process" and "research" components feeds into the broader project purpose, and how the project design actually lays the foundation for more concrete RD interventions as promised in the text.

Additionally, the committee was concerned at the scale of long term TA and the corresponding LOP budget emphasis (approximately \$11 million in TA and \$2 million in rural infrastructure grants).

Under other circumstances the committee would have voted to turn the PP back for additional design work prior to NEAC review. However, in

light of the long delays and painful history of project development, the committee agreed to support bringing an edited version of the PP forward for review (editing was undertaken to reduce the size of the document and clarify the financial elements, no change was made in project components, levels, or design features).⁴

The PP was approved under the condition that ten issues be addressed. The committee considered \$13 million a high level of investment in a "process" project. Phasing of the project was also considered a problem; the lack of specificity in timing of key inputs resulted in the need for an improved implementation plan. There were also doubts about finding a competent contractor for such an undertaking, given the project's technical breadth, the requirement of Arabic fluency and the hardships of rural living in Yemen. Also mentioned were the Mission's expectations for getting a contractor on board in a timely manner. Unfortunately, several of these issues were never adequately addressed and came back repeatedly to haunt the Mission.

Four decision options were proposed, one of which was "...approve the paper as a PRP Type 'Intermediate' Document", which would have called for a new PP in 60 days, but would have assured the mission of NEAC consideration of an RD project that year.⁵ However, the option which the committee finally recommended was approval of a scaled-down version of the PP, extending Phase I to three years, reducing the size of technical assistance and training inputs, with funding at somewhat less than \$5 million. The committee's reservations should have been a signal of the problems which were to surface throughout the project. The difficulties resulting from poor project design suggest an inadequate understanding of design principles on the part of the Project authors. But responsibility for the generally poor outcome of the Local Resources for Development Project rests, at least to some degree, with AID/Washington for not having pursued a more rigorous and critical review of the design. Specific design deficiencies will be discussed in the logical framework section of this report.

15

B. The Research Component

In the 1982 evaluation of 045, little if any attention was paid to Cornell's role in the project. However, given the funding level of Cornell's international "Rural Development Participant Project" and the generally bad feelings exhibited in the Cornell Final Report, this aspect of the project deserves a review.

From a programmatic perspective, a review of the Cornell reports and Project files suggests that Cornell's interest lay not so much in the Project as in the Project's subject as grist for the academic journal mill. Many of the Project's difficulties point to obvious deficiencies or, at the least, misdirection, in the Cornell research. As part of a centrally funded cooperative agreement, Cornell already had researchers in the field who had produced much of the information on which the PP was founded. So untimeliness of field placement was not a valid reason for research shortcomings. This is clear after a review of the contents of Cornell's Working Notes Series. Of the six Working Notes produced from July, 1979, to February, 1981, only two were original and project specific, and these were short and very preliminary in nature. The remaining Working Notes were reprints from professional journal articles, a bibliography of Yemeni literature, and a set of summary translations of newspaper articles.

The Cornell work was described in a Mission letter three years after the contract's completion as having "...provided useful background but has had little programmatic impact...". "Some of the material looks ... to be academic make-work." "There is less here than meets the eye."⁶ According to one of the few remaining American staff members who has firsthand knowledge of 045, Cornell's tasks -- indentifying social or economic blockages to project success and providing baseline information for measuring subsequent project impact -- were inadequately addressed. He added that nothing in all the Cornell documents ever suggested the type or magnitude of problems which were encountered in 045.⁷ In fact, two reports submitted in the last quarter of the Cornell contract discussed the tensions between CYDA, the CCs and LDAs, and the potential for these organizations as rural development

16

media. This, of course, had already become evident to all involved. At about the same time, the Cornell team wrote in a development journal article:

Given the diversity that marks the LDA movement and the lack of research on LDAs, it is likely that CYDA and donor efforts to modernize these indigenous organizations will meet only limited success.⁸

This last bit of wisdom was untimely, as the article was submitted in Cornell's Final Report nearly two years after completion of the contract.

On the Cornell side, there was obvious dissatisfaction with their staff's treatment at the hands of USAID and Chemonics. In the Final Report the co-directors maintained that practically no sort of evaluation or substantive monitoring of its research was ever performed by USAID/Yemen.

"...(this) lack of critical, professional evaluation of the emerging work product made it difficult for the co-directors to know whether the research was useful to the Mission or the Contractor and clearly constituted a constraint on the production of a more applied product for USAID."⁹

The emerging work product, as previously noted, had already been available to USAID. And, in fact, Cornell's performance had been evaluated in the Contractor Performance Evaluation Reports (July, 1981, and August, 1981) in which the Mission gave the team an overall outstanding and satisfactory ratings, with an explanation regarding the difficulties of obtaining travel permits and so on; in addition, the Mission's response to an AID/W cable regarding "USAID/DSB Mid-term Review of Cornell Participation Project" was a brief, though very complimentary, assessment of Cornell's work. However, these "evaluations" apparently did not reflect the Mission's perception of the work quality. In support of Cornell's claims in the Final Report, these were admittedly perfunctory reports on Cornell and were basically of little value to anyone. Any displeasure on USAID's part should have been voiced. But, at

17

the same time, it should have been plain to Cornell that the Mission did not want to pay for reprints of available journal articles that were based on materials already reviewed by USAID for the PP or for Arabic newspaper translations. It seems that both USAID's and Cornell's disappointments stemmed from a misunderstanding of the potential for data collection in such a politically charged study environment and its analysis for the Project's good. Given the PP's lack of linkages between research and implementation, the timeframes of Cornell's and Chemonics' work, the lack of a Cornell agricultural economist and the absence of the Cornell co-directors from Yemen, the inadequacies of the research component of 045 are not surprising.

C. The Logical Framework (See Appendix B)

The Logical Framework (log frame), a required document in all AID assisted projects, should communicate the initial project design. Basically, it provides a simple way of bringing together the analytic and diagnostic perspectives of program management, the basic scientific method, systems analysis and contract law. The correct employment of the log frame produces an evaluable design. That is to say, a good evaluation depends on the existence of previously stated, explicitly phrased development objectives and hypotheses, and the establishment of success indicators at each level of the project hierarchy. Most importantly, these indicators express what the designers are willing to call success. The evaluation process, then, should consist principally of data collection on prime indicators, followed by judgments of the project against predetermined standards for success.

Given the resource limitations USAID always faces, project designers should make every effort to assess the quality of predictions. AID needs confidence that project objectives can be achieved. Confidence depends on the accuracy of assumptions which underlie the goal, purpose, outputs and inputs of the project; their validity is subject to constant monitoring.¹⁰

From our perspective, given the difficulties which 045 experienced at every stage, it is clear that the Project cannot be validly evaluated strictly on the basis of its modified log frame. While the wording of much of the log frame does not allow for quantifiable analysis of End of Project Status (EOPS), there are additional problems. As will become evident, faulty assumptions, the predominant source of Project failure, necessitated very early, very major alterations in both design and implementation, which disrupted the "logic" of the 045 log frame. Nonetheless, the Local Resources for Development log frame will be examined in this section.

1. Goal

Increased production, income and quality of life in rural Yemen.

The special evaluation in November, 1982, determined that the Project's prospects for ever achieving its goals were very small. Following this evaluation, thirty-two months into the Project, the Program Office recommended that the Project be terminated for convenience based on: (1) the lack of significant progress; (2) the inability of the Mission and Chemonics to inculcate in CYDA an appreciation of the institutional-building aspects of the project; (3) the fact that what success had been achieved was the result of abandonment of the original strategy and (4) CYDA's lack of commitment, poor performance and the unlikelihood of a behavioral change in that institution.¹¹ However, the political implications of such an action kept the project alive, but with major revisions.

The "political" costs of termination would probably be considerable vis-à-vis CYDA. CYDA's credibility could also suffer significantly in the eyes of YARG policymakers, not to mention clients and potential beneficiaries in rural areas. ... The political importance of CYDA is underscored by the rank of Deputy Prime Minister held by the working head, the Secretary General, but even more so by the automatic selection of the YAR President as the CYDA President. CYDA's pivotal role of using LDAs as political tools has to be recognized, but also has to be looked at in terms of CYDA's relative success. A conspicuous failure might be the fact that LDAs appear to go their own way politically and economically. I question whether AID should be closely associated with such an obviously political organization in a country like North Yemen.¹²

Given the obstacles facing the Project, the revisions were appropriate and resulted in as much success as could be expected under the circumstances. The failure to reach goal achievements was based on the faulty underlying assumptions. Implicit in these assumptions was cooperation between the

CYDA/CC/LDA system and Project goals of staff development and improved management. Specific difficulties arose regarding the relationship between increased participation and local contributions. Different standards for project development and construction and divergent views of the Project's focus proved too difficult to reconcile; Project goals were never truly aimed for by the Yemeni organizations involved.¹³ This, of course, harks back to their inadequate participation in Project development. One assumption, that regarding the continued Yemeni reliance on local self-help, was correct, but this method must obviously be followed on Yemeni, not donor, terms and involves subtle political and cultural machinations.

The means of verification, too, deserve mention. The Cornell research component did not produce the type or quantity of baseline data against which goal achievements could be measured; by the time that Chemonics was to assume data gathering responsibilities, the atmosphere was so tense as to discourage probing of that sort.

2. Purpose

Establishment, acceptance, and initial implementation of methodologies for (a) increasing the capacity of LDAs to plan, implement, and evaluate locally initiated development projects and (b) increased government and external support for locally initiated development projects.

The purpose of the Local Resources for Development Project was very broadly stated. In Chemonics' estimation, the key words were "methodologies", "capacity" and "locally initiated".¹⁴ That is, the Contractor's interpretation matched USAID's in that the Project was to be a process rather than a product one. However, the purpose was so broad that the Project lacked a central theme on which to mount the implementation. Instead, it sought to be all things to all people.

Some interesting and seemingly accurate criticisms of the Project's vocabulary were found in Chemonics' Final Report. USAID's perception of the existence of a "local development system" was incorrect. The Contractor found the LDA movement and LDA-related entities to be "distinctly unsystematic" and unprepared to make effective use of a multifaceted program of assistance. The term "integrated", too, was criticized by Chemonics. They noted that "integrated" must have referred to the Project's complexity rather than to a comprehensive and cohesive character. That complexity led to confusion, dispersion of effort and even chaos among all parties.¹⁵

In fact, the program was not "coordinated"; instead, severe problems existed regarding both communication and consensus as to Project objectives, problem solving, the amount and mix of resources, and policy-making procedures.¹⁶ Such issues were primarily raised once implementation had begun. Perhaps the largest problem was the disparate objectives of the two camps, i.e., USAID/Chemonics vs. CYDA/CC/LDA, which had not been recognized in the PP's assumptions.

Increased government support was a very basic problem from the Project's inception. First, there was CYDA's low level of institutionalization. It is now evident that CYDA, the CCs and the LDAs did not possess the absorptive capacities necessary for this type of project; in fact, they had objected to this sort of project from the beginning. CYDA not only suffered from inadequately trained Project counterparts and a severe lack of the administrative capability, but it also did not share the spirit of the Project. It wanted visible, tangible achievements with which to win clout at each of the three levels. This lack of consensus between USAID, CYDA, the CCs and the LDAs probably accounts for these groups' inadequate support, coordination and assistance, and eventual hostility, all of which were well documented in the Project files. The Institutional Development Assessment team pointed to the very nature of CYDA as having presented major obstacles to Project success. They contend that CYDA's ambiguous sense of organizational purpose compounded the difficulties that arose from the Project's vague design. An added source of conflict was the Project's strategy of working with three levels, which, it is now clear, exist at cross purposes.¹⁷



The political nature of the LDA movement and the potential for hostility between the different levels and across the LDAs in a region were not appreciated until well into Project implementation. Economic and political limitations involved in working with the "poorest of the poor", became evident quite early as Chemonics realized that the Project's mandate toward these groups was not reflected at the CC or CYDA level; social stratification and resulting prejudices made it difficult, if not impossible, to work with the neediest.

Project sites were chosen based on their relative poverty and, from an experimental viewpoint, as representative of vastly different geophysical and cultural environments. The environmental and economic contrasts of the two regions obviously have consequences for social organization. The highland region exhibits greater social fragmentation and local diversity and there is fierce intracommunal competition for scarce resources. However, the ease of communication and relatively higher productivity in the lowlands encourage greater social homogeneity and political centralization. Differing social stratification in the two regions also affected the Project in that lower status groups, the original Project targets, are systematically excluded from decision-making in the highlands. While Hodeidah's experience with outsiders and its larger economic resources made for comparatively fewer obstacles to the Project, Hajjah's remoteness and inaccessibility, its lack of exposure to foreign influence, its xenophobia and tendency toward political scrapping created gigantic obstacles to Project processes. In retrospect, Hajjah was a very poor site choice.

Early on, all Project parties agreed to postpone the testing of different resource mixes. Instead, attention was focused on limited technical assistance and training. (In fact, stratification of LDAs did occur, but not through pre-selection; this will be discussed later in this report.) When matching funds were introduced approximately six months into the Project, they proved problematical in some locales as their selected application was misconstrued by the target population, leading to charges of fraud and mismanagement on Chemonics' part. Another difficulty in this regard was the

213

meager US\$ 900,000 in a context where hefty funding was available in some locales and where infrastructure project costs due to mountainous terrain, deep aquifers, and so on, were tremendous.

3. End of Project Status (EOPS)

- a. Targeted LDAs demonstrating an increased capacity to identify development problems and constraints, develop adequate plans for activities to overcome problems and constraints, mobilize financial and human resources for these activities, effectively implement them and evaluate their impact.

While selected individuals benefited from the training resources applied to the LDAs and 14 communities have enjoyed some service associated with a Project-supported activity, as collectives, the LDAs felt little impact in this regard. It is extremely doubtful that any LDA increased appreciably its capacity for developing and implementing community projects. A very basic factor involved the unformed status of many LDAs and their inability to absorb technical and administration assistance given the low educational levels of the individuals involved. In addition, the Chemonics team's limited access to LDAs based on political reasons did not allow for the continual and repeated contact necessary to instill planning concepts. In almost all cases of exposure to Project activities, the Western concept of design did not take hold in the targeted organizations and, instead, created rifts between Chemonics/Peace Corps and the local beneficiaries. Ultimately, this lack of achievement is related to the divergent views of a process vs. a product project and the differing cultural perceptions of how infrastructure projects come into being. See Jon Swanson's report, "Some Problems Associated with Design in Project 045" for an excellent discussion of this issue.

- b. Targeted LDA/CCs and CYDA more effectively performing their administrative and technical support functions in the planning and implementation of local development initiatives.

The Chemonics Final Report discussed the assumption underlying this EOPS and concluded that the lack of consensus among CYDA, CCs and LDAs regarding the proper role of the CCs made coordination with and training of CCs very difficult. While the Hodeidah CC already had a technical role when the Project began, the Hajjah CC began technical activities under 045. However, in Hajjah there was tremendous resistance to this idea at all three levels. LDA members generally view the CCs as regulatory bodies and as CYDA's means of controlling the LDAs. According to Chemonics, there apparently is an inherent conflict between the LDA-CC relationship as envisioned in the PP and the role as perceived by CYDA, CCs and the LDAs. While it is evident that CCs can perform a technical support duty, it is by no means clear that CYDA desires this.

In its study of CYDA, the IDA team found that the Project had made small steps toward strengthening CYDA. Seven Yemenis were sent to Jordan for regional training as engineers and they continue to work for CYDA. One of CYDA's Directors of Public Service received a masters degree in international public policy from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Several of the LDAs near Taiz benefitted from administrative short courses arranged through the National Institute of Public Administration. Apple computers were installed in CYDA and several Yemeni staff members were partially trained in their use. Since the end of the Project, CYDA has purchased its own Wang computer and departmental functions such as accounting and payroll are now being performed more efficiently. The present use of the Wang to follow the performance of LDAs suggests increased monitoring and evaluation capabilities within CYDA. In addition, other short term, educational and invitational travel benefitted CYDA and IDA personnel who are still with those organizations.

The IDA team claimed that among the most important, though unintended, institutional accomplishments were a "lesson on the limits of foreign technical assistance in a complex, new, sensitive, political and developmental institution" and CYDA's having learned how to work with a donor. Of interest, however, is the fact that 14 other international donors have worked with CYDA. One wonders if they all learned the same lesson and if CYDA has repeated this lesson as many times. In fact, two donors, the Dutch Volunteers and UNDP, were consulted regarding their project relations with CYDA. Both of

25

their projects were very small (1 to 3 consultants) and both were terminated earlier than scheduled. Spokesmen for each agency stated that there were misunderstandings and a lack of Yemeni commitment which caused cancellation of the projects. Nonetheless, they, along with several donors, have noted that since its reorganization, CYDA is theoretically an attractive organization because of its representative nature and might be reconsidered as a target organization for future projects.

c. CYDA enjoying an improved reputation as a leader and coordinator of the local development process.

The recent reforms in CYDA effectively place CYDA within and under the authority of the Yemeni central government. CYDA, together with its regional and district branches, combines representative, coordinating, and developmental functions. As of December, 1985, eight Deputy Ministers of the YARG held positions on CYDA's National Administration Board; the Secretary General of CYDA holds a rank comparable to that of a Minister and has de facto cabinet status. While this obviously increases the political significance of the organization, it is not clear whether CYDA's national reputation has indeed improved. As a broader extension of central government power, it may be less attractive at the governorate and district levels. Whatever the case, it is unlikely that O45 contributed significantly to CYDA's present national status. However, an earlier termination of the Project, which could have damaged CYDA's reputation, was postponed by the Mission because of the preceived political repercussions for the organization.

d. Increased understanding and implementation on the part of YARG technical ministries of their designated role in support of local development initiatives.

According to Chemonics, this EOPS could not be addressed due to the lack of contact between CYDA and line ministries which precluded CYDA's ever gaining credibility with them or influencing their policies or programs. Therefore, it was impossible, and certainly inappropriate, for Project staff

26

to attempt to coordinate activities between CYDA and ministries which held CYDA in very low esteem. However, Chemonics was able to enlist the training divisions of several ministries to give short courses and seminars; this was the extent of coordination with line ministries. Interestingly, the reorganization of CYDA, giving local representatives more authority, has, for political reasons, encouraged cooperation between CYDA and line ministries. Increasingly, donor projects are required to include a regional LDA representative in some portion of project planning and implementation.

e. Methodologies established and proven as a result of this project being accepted by elements of the LDA system, other donors, and the YARG.

The experimental approach broke down early on. Cultural and political precedents became obstacles to the types of technical assistance and research deemed desirable by the Mission and Chemonics. Attempts at implementing the Project were stymied regularly by CYDA, CC and LDA intransigence and lack of financial commitment and cooperation. At this point, the Mission knows that such complex process projects should not be attempted in highly politicized organizations with broad mandates. For an excellent presentation of predictors of project success, see the Assessment of USAID Institutional Development Strategies, MSI, February, 1986.

f. Beneficiaries

Regarding beneficiaries, the target LDA populations had been vastly overestimated in the PP, so the anticipated cost per beneficiary, ranging from US\$ 13 to US\$ 51, was far off the mark. At present, the lack of LDA-specific data precludes accurate calculations of cost per beneficiary. (As an aside, Project costs were higher in general due to the inability to replicate systems; for example, in the case of the Al Maghrabah hand dug well, economy of scale was lost, given the Project's inability to apply water systems technology to other LDAs. This well actually cost US\$ 1,770 per meter; had nine additional wells been built employing the steel forms for tube casting, the cost would have decreased to US\$ 969 per meter.)

21

Training beneficiary costs were more easily attainable and are discussed in the following section.

4. Outputs

a. Locally Initiated Development Projects

Fourteen subprojects were completed using Project matching grants of US\$ 765,789. An additional subproject, the Hasaniya primary school, was not completed because of substandard performance by the Yemeni subcontractor. (It was later finished using village funds and has been operational for approximately three years.) The 14 completions represent 78% of the minimum 18 envisioned in the PP. Eleven local water systems, usually wells, were constructed, along with two public schools and one Mobile Workshop for the repair and maintenance of heavy equipment. (In Al Jaliya and Al Magrabah, two subprojects were required for each complete water system, i.e., the actual drilling/digging was one subproject and the design and construction of the system another.) Most water systems continue to operate smoothly with minimal recurrent costs involved. However, major difficulties have disrupted the operations of the Al Magrabah water system and the Hajjah Mobile Workshop. Increasing salinity in the wells at Al Jirba and Suq Al Ruboa have forced many villagers to reject the water for drinking and seek other sources for potable water.

A list of the subprojects and information on their present status are included in Appendix G. Also, see the Inputs section of this document for comments regarding the matching grants.

b. Trained Human Resources

It was in the area of training that the Project came closest to realizing the original Project objectives. As accomplishments either met or exceeded PP targets, training is perhaps the salient achievement of 045. The exception to this was in the case of academic training in the United States and Third Countries.

The breakdown of training is as follows:

IN-COUNTRY FORMAL TECHNICAL TRAINING

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number of Recipients</u>	
Water	37	
Heavy equipment operation and maintenance, and road maintenance	38	
Vocational skills	124	
Primary health care	45	
Agricultural machinery operation and maintenance	46	
Veterinary extension	33	
English language	<u>30</u>	
<u>Subtotal</u>	353	
Average number of months/trainee		4
Average cost/trainee/month		US\$ 221
Administrative, marketing and cooperative courses	186	
Average number of months/trainee		1
Average cost/trainee/month	<u> </u>	US\$ 585
<u>Total</u>	539	

29

IN-COUNTRY TECHNICAL ON THE JOB TRAINING WITH PROJECT TECHNICAL STAFF

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number of recipients</u>
Mid-level technical/engineering	11
Contractors, foremen, laborers (water and construction)	130
Heavy equipment repair	3
Computer operations	<u>3</u>
<u>Subtotal</u>	147
Average number of months/trainee	3
Average cost/trainee/month	US\$ 341

Administrative

(rural development, project
management, technical)

	<u>19</u>
<u>Total</u>	166
Average number of months/trainee	8.4
Average cost/trainee/month	US\$ 97

THIRD COUNTRY TRAINING

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number of recipients</u>
Publishing	1
Agricultural and rural development, project preparation and evaluation	2
Civil engineering	7 (5 completions)
Water technology	1
Video production	5
Training reconnaissance	4
Average number of months/trainee	11
Average cost/trainee/month	<u>US\$ 720</u>
<u>Total</u>	20

29

UNITED STATES TRAINING

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number of recipients</u>	
Educational/invitational	7	
Masters degree in public policy	1	
Computers in development and management	1	
Alternative energy technology	1	
Average number of months/trainee		4.25*
Average cost/trainee/month		US\$ 3,125
<u>Total</u>	10	

Over 700 individuals received training for a total of 200 person years. Ninety percent of all Project training time occurred in-country and involved 96% of the trainees. Three-quarters of the trainees received instruction by means of formal courses, while the remainder participated in on the job training. Three-quarters of the in-country trainees received technical training which accounted for 83% of the in-country training time. Training took place in over 70 locations and used the services of 29 diverse training agencies.

While the Project substantially reached its expected outputs regarding training, there were shortfalls in Third Country and United States training for a number of reasons. Constraints to Third Country instruction included: (1) the lack of technically qualified candidates; (2) the reluctance of CYDA to pay travel, cover one-half of the individual's salary and replace that staff person; and (3) CYDA's in-house politics and ambivalence regarding this

*This training was generally very short, with the exception of that of the masters degree candidate who spent three years in the U.S.

type of training. Targets for United States training proved especially difficult to achieve for these same reasons, along with the dearth of candidates with qualifications acceptable to U.S. universities and the lack of English proficiency. The estimated time required for preparing them sufficiently in English was deemed unnecessarily long to make it worth the Project's effort.

On the whole, the actual training component reflected the objectives of the original design and prepared a large number of individuals in a wide range of subjects. Although the limited periods of training for many of the recipients were not ideal, skills have certainly been upgraded and diverse institutional benefits have resulted from this training.

CYDA representatives stated that training was the most successful, productive portion of the Project, contending that the training capacity of their organization has been strengthened considerably. Expanded training efforts are being made at CYDA as a result of the increased appreciation of such instruction. CYDA has expressed an interest in discussing a new training project with USAID.

Appendix F contains available information regarding the 045 participants who received various types of US and Third Country training. The present (8/86) employment of these individuals is provided when possible. For the most part, CYDA officials who were trained by the Project remain with CYDA, and according to other CYDA representatives, they have become better contributors to the organization as a result of their training.

c. Training capacity

The PP envisioned two types of enhanced training capacity: (1) upgrading of existing training facilities and (2) institutionalization of training within CYDA. The Project achieved the first, to some degree, by making extensive use of established training organization. Among those local agencies employed were YARG ministry training divisions (e.g., those of the

MOH, MOE, MAF, CYDA, and MPW), NIPA, AFTE, NOFA, Vocational Training Centers in Sana'a, Hodeidah, Sa'ada, and Marib, and several other facilities.

d. Socio-economic administrative studies

While large volumes of research were produced over the course of the Project, for the most part, few of these were of the depth and programmatic utility anticipated in the PP. Much of the reporting was, indeed, interesting, but the baseline data were too aggregated to serve as a basis for measuring change under the Project. As initial research was too broad to use as a basis for LDA selection, the linkages between baseline studies and implementation were tenuous, at best. The escalating tension between Chemonics and the CYDA/CC/LDA staffs proved to be a serious constraint to implementation studies. From the Yemeni perspective, too much research had already gone on before the Project began; this feeling was demonstrated by the serious problems created for Cornell and Chemonics in obtaining travel permits for data collection. Nonetheless, several management studies of CYDA were completed by Chemonics, along with an evaluation of one of the LDA subprojects in Hodeidah. Ultimately, though, the Project did not achieve its expected targets in the area of socio-economic administrative studies.

e. Tested methodologies for local development initiatives

The PP called for the development and refinement of the following methodologies or procedures: (1) project planning, (2) project design and approval, (3) evaluation, (4) financial management, (5) organization and administration, (6) training and syllabi development, and (7) technical practices. As will become clear in this discussion, results in this area were mixed.

Little was achieved in the area of project planning due to several aforementioned institutional and cultural constraints at each LDA level. The LDAs themselves were too unformed to profit from a systematic presentation of project development; in addition, Chemonics' contact with these groups was too circumscribed by CYDA for technical assistance to reach fruition there. The

17

passive role of the CCs, especially in Hajja, and their lack of sufficient resource control made them unlikely targets for successful transfer of planning techniques. At the CYDA level, planning is a political rather than technical endeavor, so despite some training and institutional impact made there, few opportunities existed to influence seriously CYDA's approach to planning.

Project design and approval procedures were repeatedly taught during on the job training and coordination, though it appears that this approach was internalized only in Hodeidah. The underdeveloped nature of the LDAs and CC in Hajjah made it difficult for such techniques to take root there. On the whole, there was no interest at either of the three levels in developing evaluation capacity, so Chemonics could not easily push this sort of instruction. The collection of data and the use of the computer at CYDA do demonstrate at least the potential for low level evaluation, should CYDA choose to pursue it.

Financial management procedures were difficult to present to the LDAs for many of the reasons already discussed. But also, the concepts of counterpart funds, timeframes for collection of local funds, record maintenance and documentation were previously unknown to these groups and such a structured approach usually proved overwhelming to the individuals involved. The hypersensitivity of CCs in both governorates made it inappropriate for Chemonics to broach this subject at that level. However, at CYDA, three specific methodologies were developed and installed: (1) a definition of procedures for handling matching funds from USAID and LDAs and accounting for related expenditures, (2) procedures for handling USAID training funds, and (3) a revamping of CYDA's overall financial management system as a result of a management study by Chemonics.

Regarding organizational and administrative procedures, it appears that strides were made at the Hodeidah CC in that filing systems were developed, technical units were set up and written communications increased. At the LDA level, some training in this area occurred, though the unstructured conditions

of most LDAs made its impact negligible. However, at CYDA, these methodologies were more fully presented and accepted. Arabic manuals produced by the Project concerning procurement and inventory procedures have significantly improved CYDA's internal workings. Syllabi were developed for each training course and are still available. After a slow start, training proceeded with considerable success, making it in many ways the most outstanding Project achievement.

Improved technical practices were encouraged in a number of matching grant subproject sites. These included increased employment of architectural designs and development of standard designs, the formulation and use of performance contracts for construction work, solar-driven pumps, a solar school design, and a well lined with rings for stabilization. A number of these technologies were laid out in manuals developed by Chemonics and by PCVs employed on the Project.

f. Phase II Project Initiated

Following the 1982 special evaluation of U45, the Mission began to look for ways to disengage itself from the Project without damaging CYDA's reputation. By that time it was quite clear that: (1) there had been little if any significant progress toward Project goals; (2) USAID and Chemonics had been unable to develop an appreciation of the institutional-building facets of the Project in CYDA; (3) the successes of the Project to date had been as a result of abandonment of the original strategy; and (4) CYDA exhibited an almost complete lack of commitment to the Project and there was little hope of a dramatic about-face on CYDA's part.

When the time came to begin the design of Phase II, the Mission was thoroughly convinced of the unworthiness of the Project. By this point, however, CYDA's behavior changed considerably and Chemonics and CYDA began discussions of a second phase. CYDA, though, made ridiculous demands for a US\$ 50 million project. This undoubtedly reflects the lack of communication between all parties, as pointed out by the IDA team recently. By early 1984, it should have been clear to Chemonics and CYDA that the Mission did not want

35

to continue the relationship with CYDA in the context of this Project. For CYDA to demand such tremendous funding was ludicrous, given their general rejection of the first phase and their nearly complete lack of support and cooperation in most regards. Chemonics, too, pointing to the Project's experimental character and relative success at training and matching grant subprojects, pushed for a phase II. This, too, was unreasonable, given the torture they had experienced in return for very few Project achievements.

5. Inputs

Most of the inputs have been covered elsewhere in this document, but several merit additional comment here.

Chemonics met its requirement for staffing as established in the PP, although it appears that the firm found it difficult to recruit and retain appropriately qualified personnel. Personnel for the 52 months of the Chemonics contract included 14 long term field staff and 13 short term personnel, along with 4 support personnel hired locally. While over half of the Chemonics staff had had experience with overseas rural development projects and half of the staff had functional levels of Arabic fluency, only one-third of the entire staff had both the development experience and the ability to communicate. The importance of these two qualifications, along with adequate academic preparation, cannot be overstated in a project as unstructured and ambitious as U45 in an environment as complex as Yemen. At the same time, the Mission is aware of the difficulties in finding personnel with the proper combination of expertise, language and cultural sensitivity to work well in Yemen.

As an aside, the volume of reporting that Chemonics maintained seemed excessive, but this may have been a reaction to the general difficulties in Project achievements. In many cases, reporting was used as a means of explaining the reasons for lack of Project achievements.

Training funds were readily available and were used appropriately, although an inability to identify qualified candidates for U.S. and Third

Country training left these training levels below those anticipated in the PP. Commodities presented no problems in the Project's implementation. DSB/RAD support had been forthcoming early in the design stage, providing much of the information on which the concept paper had been based.

Matching grants were available in the amount of US\$ 900,000. However, in order to accelerate subproject development and include poorer LDA areas, arrangements were made to allow a different "matching" system. For example, in 10 of these 14 subprojects, Project grants far surpassed the local contributions. The hand dug well in Hajjah was funded solely by the Project; LDA/CYDA funding for Al Knowfan water subproject was 11% of Project funding, and in the experimental combination well, Project funding was 300% of that provided by the LDA/CYDA. Overall, however, LDA system funding contributions equalled 75% of the USAID-funded total.

In only one case, the Wadi Sharis water subproject in Hajjah, did LDA/CYDA contributions exceed Project grants (US\$ 137,564 (Yemeni rial equivalent) vs. US\$ 88,1066). In this instance, the entire community-based fund emanated from one wealthy individual, the village sheik. According to this gentleman, Ahmad Ali al-Mahdali, although some promise had been made to him for reimbursement by the local residents, he has never been paid and now sells water at profit to the rest of the villagers. The Wadi Sharis Final Report, February, 1984, did not explain the extent to which the sheik, "the key LDA representative", was involved, and referred, instead, to LDA/CYDA funding and "laudable village cooperative effort in terms of financing... .

Peace Corps Volunteer input was approximately one-half of the person/months projected in the PP, as the health and nutrition PCVs never materialized and several PCVs terminated earlier than scheduled. The original plan to have PCVs work at the LDA level in development of subprojects was unrealistic, given the language and community development skills required. Instead, the de facto PCV role became one of providing technical assistance when such assignments were made by Chemonics. The files show considerable dissatisfaction among the PCVs regarding their association with Chemonics; severe communications problems existed between the Volunteers and Chemonics'

staff. While some of the difficulties may have stemmed from their inexperience, idealism, and perception of the inappropriateness of PCV involvement with a profit making contractor, the nature of the Project and the ubiquitous political conflicts made the PCVs' circumstances all the more untenable.

III. Implementing Contractor's Scope of Work

Through the contract between USAID and Chemonics, the firm was assigned the following tasks:

(1) Train and assist local level officials in project planning, financing, management, implementation and evaluation.

Although Chemonics claims to have fulfilled this task adequately, the previous discussion of findings suggests that cultural and political conditions did not allow the full realization of this task, at least not in the sense intended in the PP. Training obviously had some impact on many individuals, and at the CC level in Hodeidah; matching grant subprojects brought benefits to a number of villagers. But these accomplishments came at considerable cost to all parties and at the expense of the Project's original spirit. However, given the constraints discussed at length in this report, adjustments in the Project's design and foci were appropriate and were responsible for the Project's achievements.

(2) Create technical capabilities at the local level to carry out and maintain development activities.

By Chemonics' own admission, the upgrading of construction skills and standards was the sole achievement in this area. The scatteration of training did not contribute to a concentrated strengthening of human resources, but it did reflect the objectives set in the PP, so it should be perceived as having matched original training requirements. At any rate, there was increased

38

sensitization among training recipients as to the complexity of technical design, implementation and inspection in development projects. However, engineering techniques proved too sophisticated to be transferred to the target groups for reasons of low educational attainment and differing cultural standards of project design and implementation.

(3) Increase the organization and technical capabilities of line ministries to support and supervise local development initiatives.

Chemonics focused considerable attention on CYDA in hopes of fulfilling this requirement. Their negligible achievements, however, have been discussed earlier in this document. As mentioned, CYDA's lack of standing among YARG ministries precluded the formation of a relationship between Chemonics and line ministries.

(4) Creation of a Rural Development Information Program which can be replicated.

A very costly and time consuming attempt was made by Chemonics' subcontractors to develop an Arabic version of the Interactive Statistical Inquiry System computer program for use in CYDA. This is a disk-based generalized system for data entry, editing and analysis which operates on the Apple II microcomputer and had been adapted for French in the early 1980s. Unforeseen technical difficulties made it impossible to translate the system into Arabic, despite long extensions of the subcontract for this purpose. A very rudimentary means of collecting data and working with rural development information was established at CYDA, however, and some analyses were carried out using CYDA files and census data. But Chemonics' statement of its development of a useful information system is exaggerated; CYDA's present capabilities in this area do not constitute a true program as required in the SOW.

(5) Submission of Annual workplans.

Although Chemonics stated that the firm submitted annual workplans as

required, the files show that these were usually received very late. As a matter of fact, the first annual workplan was completed and submitted for approval one year after the due date, at about the time the second workplan should have been submitted.

(6) Pre-implementation Visit.

Again, Chemonics claims that this visit occurred. In fact, due to delays in signing a contract with Chemonics and the threat from CYDA to pull out of the Project if implementation did not begin soon, the Chemonics Chief of Party arrived two days after the contract signing and began to assemble a team. This was clearly not a pre-implementation visit in the strictest sense, but merely a necessarily hurried action to placate the Yemeni officials.

Chemonics' performance as Project implementing contractor must necessarily be judged in the context of the realism of the Project's aims and assumptions. While one of the responsibilities of a technical assistance contractor is to mitigate the effects of design flaws, in this case, the combination of design problems, the absence of a consensus between the Mission and CYDA/CCs/LDAs, the culturally heterogeneous and politically volatile nature of the target regions, and the general difficulties in finding suitable staff for projects in rural Yemen all constituted tremendous obstacles toward successful Project implementation by Chemonics. Under the circumstances, the firm did reasonably well and has some Project achievements to its credit.

40

IV. Conclusions

1. Local Resources for Development was a product of the times, a period piece, if you will. Grassroots organization was a catchphrase in development during the mid- to late 70s, and AID and USAID Missions were seeking to encourage local participation. USAID/Yemen put much faith in LDAs as media for development without having an adequate understanding of the structure of the local organizations and the cultural milieus in which they operated. An informational base on which to develop such a broad, multi-faceted project did not exist.

2. An overly ambitious design, lacking in linkages between various components, made achievements of Project goals impossible.

3. An inadequately strong relationship existed between USAID and CYDA on which to build such a project. The design phase had not included sufficient dialogue and interaction to ensure understanding of and commitment by CYDA, CCs and LDAs. Additionally, there was no consensus among Project parties as to assistance needs, the forms and amounts such assistance should take, and the approximate funding levels necessary. A very basic difficulty was the lack of consensus between USAID and CYDA as to the CYDA mandate which the Project was to address; thus, severe difficulties existed between these groups regarding Project aims. The largest dispute centered on whether U45 was to have a process or a product focus.

4. Many of the assumptions underlying the Project were either incomplete or incorrect. For example, the structure and political nature of the LDA system were not fully appreciated by the Mission, leading to significant misunderstandings at all levels. LDAs existed at various stages of development; most could not absorb the technical assistance offered by the Project. Relations among the LDAs, CCs and CYDA were much more political and potentially hostile than perceived by the Mission and Chemonics. The general economic power at the village levels, based on remittances, gave the LDAs an independence which they valued; this freedom was threatened by the central

41

government through CYDA and, by association, through the Project. The matching grants did not encourage local contributions as had been expected; instead, the meagerness of these funds relative to the total Project worth created resentment among CYDA staff; US\$ 900,000 was insufficient, considering the capital intensive subprojects envisioned in the PP. The "matching" character of these funds generated suspicions and charges of fraud directed at Chemonics.

5. It was the YARG's general perception that too much funding went to expatriate personnel, while CYDA wanted funding for tangible, visible outputs. Had such products been forthcoming earlier, they may have given the Americans credibility and, consequently, more influence in developing within the Yemeni organizations the Project's process components.

6. Communication was limited among all parties and necessary dialogue between major parties did not occur regularly.

7. In several instances, PCVs were not sufficiently integrated into Project implementation, especially in Hajjah. The Peace Corps person months input was approximately one half of that envisioned in the PP, as some volunteers never arrived in Yemen and others terminated early for a number of reasons. Language skills among PCVs were insufficient to allow them to work as community development planners, as originally anticipated. While most volunteers were highly skilled professionally, they were not always given responsibilities corresponding to their expertise. However, PCV contributions in Hodeidah were significant, once the Volunteers were situated. Nonetheless, relations between PCVs and Chemonics were strained during much of the Project and PCV resentment regarding their assignment to a profit-making firm was common.

8. The quality of workmanship and materials across all subprojects was high.

9. Training was the most salient Project achievement, despite the shortfalls in U.S. and Third Country training. Constraints to these efforts related to CYDA's internal operations and could not be overcome by Chemonics.

10. Language skills among expatriates were inadequate to meet the demands of a project such as U45 which, because of its ambiguity, required much discussion and negotiation.

11. Regarding the research component, several factors influenced Cornell's generally inadequate output. The Cornell research design was too broad, resulting in highly aggregated, qualitative data. The inability to convince CYDA/CCs/LDAs of the importance and utility of research activities resulted in travel restrictions which detracted from Cornell's work. The inability to recruit an agricultural economist and the co-directors' voluntary absence limited the focus required to support overall Project objectives. The lack of Mission direction allowed Cornell to remain at the periphery of Project research aims; more supervision and monitoring may have resulted in a higher quality product by Cornell.

12. The outcome of this Project reminds USAID of the serendipitous nature of overseas development planning. A good fit between a project and an opportune economic and political moment is a constant challenge to all donors. For example, before and during the Project, considerable economic strength resided at the village level. CYDA, CCs and the Project attempted to harness this strength. However, the LDAs apparently resented such efforts and felt threatened by the perceived (and accurate) threat of widening central government power. At present, the situation appears to be very different in that remittances have declined and a restructuring of the local development movement has served to make the LDAs (now LCCDs) more representative and to bring them under the central government umbrella formally. This is apparently welcomed by the villagers, as they see the need to tap into an increasingly wealthier central government (based on oil discovery) at a time when their personal incomes (based on remittances) are decreasing. So the balance has shifted from a wealthy citizen/poor government to the reverse, making for an entirely different climate in which to approach development. Given that the potential for hostilities among the parties seems to have declined somewhat and the local level no longer has the economic independence it once had, it is likely that a sparser project of this sort would meet with considerable success.

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V. Recommendations

1. The success of USAID's analytical processes depends on the perception, competence and cultural sensitivity of its officers. Every effort should be made to train staff in project design and to assist them in internalizing AID's philosophy on development projects. In the design and approval stages of project development, officers should be strictly held to AID Handbook standards.
2. Goals, purposes and objectives of USAID projects should be limited to a few issues which can be reasonably addressed; ambition in a project should be tempered by realistic expectations.
3. USAID should create a stronger, more sophisticated facilitation function to keep projects like U45 on track. A more stringent and exploratory semi-annual review involving key Mission personnel might be a logical means for more effective monitoring and redirection of projects, should they go astray.
4. Research efforts should be conducted in close cooperation with Program and Project Officers with an eye toward basic programmatic concerns and the requirements of project data for adequate evaluation of project impact. In the Yemeni context, minimal, focused research is most useful and obtainable.
5. Research and process-oriented projects must be carefully designed; research and training must be legitimized with visible, tangible outputs which give credibility to both the project and the host country organization.
6. USAID needs to move carefully in choosing agencies of the YARG with which to work. It must understand as clearly as possible their strengths and weaknesses and, importantly, their real, as opposed to stated, agendas. Project design must accommodate any perceived weaknesses as realistically as possible. Consultations with other donors who have worked with prospective organizations would be helpful in this regard.

7. Project designs should be carried out in close cooperation with Yemeni ministries, agencies or departments.
8. An organization such as CYDA might be a good place to begin small, carefully designed pilot activities, but not highly scattered activities with few discernable outputs.
9. Institutional development is perhaps the best hope for national development here. However, in this setting it is a long, difficult process with many obstacles in its way. USAID must recognize, acknowledge and internalize the limits that exist on their ability to initiate change in Yemeni organizations. Rather than push for institutions identical to those in the U.S., USAID and its technical assistance contractors should temper their expectations and settle for an amalgamation of Western and Yemeni institutional operations, cognizant that this is the most realistic approach. The time and effort necessary for institutionalization should not be underestimated.
10. Institutional development of organizations such as CYDA or LDAs is complex, very politicized and is compounded by the vagaries of personality. Americans working in the Middle East are often at a disadvantage because of America's image and foreign policy actions in the region. This should be realized and every effort should be made to foster understanding between American staff and YARG personnel.
11. Selection of implementing contractor firms should be based, to a high degree, on the combination of overseas development experience and Arabic language skills in proposed personnel. When Arabic skills are unavailable, arrangements must be made to assign adjunct staff with requisite interpreting capabilities to contractors without Arabic fluency.
12. Good personal relations may not guarantee that a technical assistance team will be able to effect institutional change, but bad relations will destroy all chances of doing so.

13. Before attempting major projects, the Mission should conduct field testing of the methodologies, outputs, and strategies in a low-key fashion.
14. A large measure of administrative and programmatic flexibility is required for American projects working in Yemeni organizations; it is the responsibility of the expatriate project staff to adjust to the relative weakness of Yemeni institutions with which a project is associated. There should be constant testing of the logframe assumptions and, where necessary, a reorientation of tactics so as to validate the assumptions.
15. Regional training represents a good option for the training of Yemeni candidates and, in many cases, may be preferable to U.S. training. Whenever feasible, use of existing Yemeni training agencies should be considered.
16. Every effort should be made to match PCVs with jobs commensurate with their abilities and educations. Peace Corps should be frank in its recruitment of volunteers for assignments alongside highly paid contractors. Recognizing the current policy of integrating PCVs with USAID and the fact that in some countries the best chances for Peace Corps lie in cooperation with USAID, it is still necessary to realize that such an approach does not jibe with the American public's general perception of Peace Corps and may disappoint some novice volunteers.

16

Footnotes

1. Project Paper. Local Resources for Development (279-0045). January, 1979. (Approved February, 1979.) p. 11.
2. Concept Paper. Local Resources for Development. Date unknown.
3. Project Paper. p. 10.
4. Near East Advisory Committee (NEAC) Decision Memo. October 26, 1978.
5. Ibid.
6. Letter from C. F. Weden, Jr., USAID Director, to Charles W. Johnson, Director, Office of Development Planning, Near East Bureau, A.I.D. June 16, 1984.
7. Conversation with Tracy Atwood, ADU, USAID. March, 1986.
8. "Development from below", World Development, 9:11/12, 1981. Pp. 1039-1061.
9. Cornell Final Report: Yemen Research Program. J. M. Cohen and D. B. Lewis. March, 1983.
10. Program Evaluation Workshop. A.I.D. Prepared by The Pragma Corporation and Management Systems International, September, 1985.
11. Project Evaluation Summary (PES) 83-02, Local Resources for Development. February 16, 1983.
12. USAID Office Memo From Theodore Bratrud, Jr., to Charles Ward, Director, USAID, Subject Local Resources for Development. December 15, 1982.
13. Ibid.

47

14. Chemonics Final Report: Local Resources for Development. May, 1985.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Assessment of USAID Institutional Development Strategies. Management Systems International. February, 1986.

85

APPENDIX A
SCOPE OF WORK

USAID MISSION TO THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

Office of Agriculture

LOCAL RESOURCES FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK

I. ACTIVITY TO BE EVALUATED:

Local Resources for Development Project No.279-0045. The project began June 1979. The PACD is June 30, 1986. The project was authorized for \$8,720,000.

II. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION:

A final evaluation is required of the completed Local Resources for Development Project in accordance with the Project Paper evaluation plan and current Asia Near East Bureau evaluation guidelines. The evaluative information will be used to (1) assess the impact of contractor activities on local development agencies and a select number of project beneficiaries; and (2) specify how local development and cooperative institutions may be utilized in on-going or future USAID rural development projects in Yemen.

III. BACKGROUND:

The Local Resources for Development Project was authorized in June 1979 and originally planned for ten years of implementation. The purpose of the project as stated in the Project Paper is "The establishment, acceptance and initial implementation of methodologies for (a) increasing the capacity of Local Development Authorities (LDAs) to plan, implement and evaluate locally initiated development projects; and (b) increasing Government and external support for locally initiated development projects."

The project goal was to contribute to increased production, income and quality of life in rural Yemen. Goal achievement was directly related to purpose achievement. During an external evaluation conducted in December, 1982 it was discovered that progress towards purpose achievement had been limited, partly as a result of faulty assumptions made about implementation in rural and isolated areas in Yemen and partly as a result of delays caused by local and regional political decision making processes.

As a result, in April 1983, a decision was made to terminate the project on June 30, 1985 taking into consideration prior commitments to the Confederation of the Yemeni Development Associations (CYDA) and the LDAs.

Evaluation Scope of Work

2.

The contractor, Chemonics International Consulting Corporation, completed the contract July 31, 1984. The contract with Chemonics was signed on 27 March 1980, and a total of approximately \$6,440,000 was spent by Chemonics. Under this contract, the following accomplishments were completed:

1. Under the matching grant and technical assistance:
 - a) One Mobil Workshop established in Hajja
 - b) 12 potable water projects completed
 - c) One primary school established
2. Under the training program:
 - a) 221 participants were trained in vocational short-term courses in-country
 - b) 9 participants were trained in short courses in third countries and 7 long-term participants returned from Jordan in May 1985.

IV. STATEMENT OF

A. Review and integrate into a Final Report the Chemonics Final Report, the December 1982 evaluation report, the recent institutional analysis (Case Study of Project 045, pp 58 - 71), and other relevant literature and documents including, but not limited to, the Cornell University reports.

B. Visit representative project sites to determine the impact of the project. Project site visits may include the Hajja Mobile Workshop and/or matching grant projects, such as potable water systems and schools. Special attention should be paid to the levels of personnel, recurrent costs and local involvement at each site visited.

C. Determine the effect of project-funded training on CYDA and LDA staff. The training evaluation should list the persons trained, details of their training, current job positions held and contributions being made to project related activities.

D. Determine the accomplishment of the project purpose and attainment of the outputs and inputs, with attention paid to the quantifiable end-of-project-status benchmarks.

The Final Report should be written in accordance with the latest ANE Bureau guidelines. The USAID Program Office will provide the formats, guidelines and instructions. Particular emphasis must be paid to three sections: (1) findings; (2) conclusions; and (3) recommendations.

V. METHODS AND PROCEDURES:

The evaluation will take place over a three week period, including a 3-day field trip to selected sites. The evaluation will begin as soon as this scope of work is approved. A two person team will be responsible for completion of the Final Report. The field trip and the draft reports must be performed in cooperation with relevant USAID/AGR and CYDA staff.

VI. COMPOSITION OF EVALUATION TEAM:

This final or ex-post evaluation should be conducted by persons external to the implementation of the project or Agricultural Program. The team should be composed of one USAID staff member, preferably from the Program Office, and one external person. At least one of the team members should be fluent in Arabic and at least one should have demonstrated writing abilities in English and an advanced degree in a social science or public administration.

VII. FUNDING

Costs required for the evaluation, including transportation and per diem, will be charged against remaining funds in the Project 279-0045 account. Approval of the Office of Agriculture is required for reimbursement. Per diem for CYDA representatives who may accompany the team on the field trip is authorized.

Estimated Budget

To be charged to remaining funds in the 279-0045 Account:

Field Trip-Per Diem, 2 persons for 3 days each	\$438
Final Report - English Typing	\$300
Final Report - Arabic Translation and Typing	\$582
TOTAL	<u>\$1,320</u>

VIII. REPORT REQUIREMENTS

A. Format of the Report:

The Final Report should consist of:

1. The Basic Project Identification Data Sheet
2. Executive Summary (Limited to 3 single-spaced sheets)
3. Body of the Report (with emphasis on findings, conclusions and recommendations)
4. Appendices - consisting of the Scope of Work, the relevant logical framework (with a summary of the attainment of the purpose, outputs and inputs) description of the evaluation methodology used, a bibliography of documents consulted, and an evaluation abstract (limited to a half page, single spaced).

52

B. Submission Report:

A draft report is required two weeks after initiation of the evaluation in English and an Arabic summary. The English version will be submitted to USAID's Agriculture Office and the Arabic summary to the CYDA representative of this project evaluation. The Final Report is due upon completion of the evaluation and should be given to the Agriculture Office, with an English and Arabic summary. The Arabic summary of the Final Report will later be presented to CYDA and other Yemen Government organizations as appropriate.

Attachments: Basic Project Identification Data
Executive Summary Outline

RR
Drafter: R. Renfro/ac: 3.16.86
Clearance: T Atwood DRAFT
H Vaitaitis DRAFT
J Winn ✓
K Manler. DRAFT

57

APPENDIX B
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

LOCAL RESOURCES FOR DEVELOPMENT
(279-0045)
PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOAL

Increased production, income, and quality of life in rural Yemen.

Measure of Goal Achievement

1. 20% increase in local resource mobilization of affected LDAs.
2. Improved maintenance performance on public works.
3. Increased local participation by 25% in resource allocation and supply of public services.
4. 20% increase in new private investment in area.
5. Increased capability of YARG to support local development initiatives.

Means of Verification

To be determined, but will rely principally on initial baseline data, survey, questionnaires obtained prior to project implementation by PSC researcher, local budgets for development, and subsequent refinement and analyses of data by Cornell research contract.

Important Assumptions

1. Increased local participation in development decision-making process will encourage indigenous contribution in cash, labor, and kind.

2. Participation will be equitable and, therefore, increased earnings derived from the above investments will be spread to all socio-economic levels.
3. The YAR will continue to make LDA reliance on local self-help and management the major mode for executing rural works.
4. The current gap in YAR organizational capacity to service villages will continue unless LDAs find ways to bridge it and its capacity is increased over time through staff development and improved management.

PURPOSE

Establishment, acceptance, and initial implementation of methodologies for (a) increasing the capacity of LDAs to plan, implement, and evaluate locally initiated development projects and (b) increased government and external support for locally initiated development projects.

End of Project Status

1. Targeted LDAs demonstrating an increased capacity to identify development problems and constraints, develop adequate plans for activities to overcome problems and constraints, mobilize financial and human resources for these activities, effectively implement them and evaluate their impact.
2. Targeted LDA/CCs and CYDA more effectively performing their administrative and technical support functions in the planning and implementation of local development initiatives.
3. CYDA enjoying an improved reputation as a leader and coordinator of the local development process.
4. Increased understanding and implementation on the part of YARG technical ministries of their designated role in support of local development initiatives.

5. Methodologies established and proven as a result of this project being accepted by elements of the LDA system, other donors, and the YARG.

Means of Verification

On-site observation by USAID and contractors, YAR organization charts, RD plans and budgets, survey of villages--by research program as part of project evaluation.

Assumptions

1. Local resources for development, both financial and human, are not currently being fully utilized and more can be made available.
2. LDAs are viable instruments for local development
3. Capacities of LDAs to marshal and effectively utilize local resources for development can be improved through the creation of technical skills and introduction of planning and management principles and techniques.
4. External support is required to maximize utilization of local resources.
5. AID resources can be effectively applied to the local development process.

OUTPUTS

1. Locally initiated development projects.
2. Trained human resources.
3. Training capacity.
4. Socio-economic administrative studies.

5. Tested methodologies for local development initiatives.
6. Refinement of rural development strategy and recommendations for support of local development initiative.
7. Design of Phase II AID-supported project.

Objectively Verifiable Indicators

1. Minimum of 18 subprojects completed.
2. Unspecified number of OJT recipients.
3. 70 technicians trained in-country.
4. 20 technicians trained in third countries.
5. 4 professionals trained in United States.
6. Training capacity in NIPA and other organizations.
7. Unspecified number of training manuals, guidelines, and syllabi.
8. Phase II project initiated.

Means of Verification

USAID, YARG, contractor reports, records, on-site observations. Evaluation of contractor's work plans, subprojects.

Assumptions

1. Officials available and trainable.
2. Principal contractors design appropriate program which is effectively implemented by qualified contractor personnel.

3. YARG will provide requisite facilities/instructors.
4. Cornell will provide a qualified researcher and other experts, CYDA/target areas responsive to effort.

INPUTS

United States

1. 28 person-years long-term technicians
2. 60 person-month short-term technicians
3. Training funds
4. Matching grant funding
5. Commodities for project technicians
6. 52 person-years Peace Corps volunteers
7. DSB-RAD support

Host Country

1. Personnel
2. Housing for U.S. technicians
3. Funds for development projects

Means of Verification

Contractor's reports, on-site monitoring, external evaluation

APPENDIX C
DESCRIPTION OF METHODOLOGY

Description of Methodology

Due to Mission exigencies, this Project Completion Report was written in a staggered fashion during the months of March, July and September, 1986, by the Program Office Research Coordinator and was largely a review of relevant literature. The most important documents considered were the Chemonics Final Report, the 1982 Project Special Evaluation, the 045 Case Study from the 1985 Institutional Development Assessment Report, and the Cornell University Final Report. These were augmented by all relevant 045 files, planning documents, contractor reports and interviews with USAID/Yemen and CYDA personnel knowledgeable about the project.

This review of literature was followed by two field trips to 8 sites in the Hajjah and Hodeidah governorates where 10 subprojects were examined. During the first field trip, the author was accompanied by the FSN Agriculture Assistant and a CYDA representative who had been employed by Chemonics. The second trip was made by the author and the Program Office Final Evaluation Officer. Findings from the site visits were integrated with the working draft forming a first draft document which was submitted to USAID/Program for review. Resulting recommendation for further investigation and additional emphases were followed and are reflected in this final document.

It should be noted that this document does not conform to all the requirements set out in the Evaluation SOW, as the SOW was received well into the writing of this Project Completion Report. In addition, the "team" mentioned in the Scope of Work (Appendix A) was never formed. Thus, observations and information collection were based on informal instructions from the ADU prior to the trip which were not entirely reflected in the late SOW. Discussion followed the Asia/Near East Procedural Guidelines for Evaluation (9/85).

APPENDIX D
BIBLIOGRAPHY

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APPENDIX E
A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY

A Project Completion Report for Local Resources for Development was prepared by the Program Office Research Coordinator and was based on a thorough review of files, selected interviews and two field trips. **The purpose of U45 was: Establishment, acceptance and initial implementation of methodologies for increasing the capacity of LDAs (local development associations) to plan, implement and evaluate locally initiated development projects and (b) increased government and external support for locally initiated development projects. Findings: **An overly ambitious design, lacking in linkages between various components, made achievements of Project goals impossible. An informational base on which to develop such a broad, multi-faceted project did not exist. **An inadequately strong relationship existed between USAID and CYDA on which to build such a project. **Many of the assumptions underlying the Project were either incomplete or incorrect. The structure and political nature of the LDA system were not fully appreciated by the Mission; most LDAs could not absorb the technical assistance offered by the Project. Relations among the LDAs, CCs and CYDA were much more political and potentially hostile than perceived by the Mission. **It was the YARG's general perception that too much funding went to expatriate personnel, while CYDA wanted funding for tangible, visible outputs. **The matching grants did not encourage local contributions as had been expected. **Language skills among expatriates were inadequate to meet the demands of a project requiring much discussion and negotiation. **Training goals were exceeded in some regards; over 700 individuals received training for a total of over 200 person years. **Fourteen (78%) of the minimum of 18 subprojects were completed; the quality of workmanship and materials across all subprojects was nign. **Most PCVs were insufficiently integrated into Project implementation. **Cornell's research design was too broad, resulting in a generally inadequate output. Recommendations: **Ambition in a project should be tempered by realistic expectations. **Research efforts should be conducted in close cooperation with Program and Project Officers. **Research and training must be legitimized with visible, tangible outputs which give credibility to both the project and the host country organization. **USAID must examine the strengtns and weaknesses of grantees and their real, as opposed to stated, agendas. **There should be constant testing of the logframe assumptions and, where necessary, a reorientation of tactics so as to validate the assumptions. **Selection of implementing contractor firms should be based, to a high degree, on the combination of overseas development experience and Arabic language skills in proposed personnel. **Every effort should be made to match PCVs with jobs commensurate with their abilities and educations. Lessons learned: **A strong, cooperative relationship with a grantee organization is essential for adequate project design and implementation. **In a context such as Yemen, projects must be relatively simple in design and must provide tangible outputs which contribute positively to the grantee's reputation. **Projects which require negotiation at every turn stand little chance for success, as the Arabic language skills of most USAID staff and contractors are inadequate for such discussions. **The 'level of technology' transfer in a project should depend on the absorptive capacity of a grantee which must be determined early in project development. ~~**Confidence in a project's potential for success depends on the accuracy of assumptions which underlie the logical framework. Thus, the context in which a project is to be developed should be studied carefully and understood before a project design is finalized.~~

1. Evaluation Team

Name	Affiliation	Contract Number OR TDY Person Days	Contract Cost OR TDY Cost (US\$)	Source of Funds
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2. Mission/Office Professional Staff Person Days (estimate) 40

3. Borrower/Grantee Professional Staff Person-Days (estimate) 3

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)

Address the following items:

- o Name of mission or office
- o Purpose of activity (ies) evaluated
- o Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used
- o Findings and Conclusions
- o Recommendations
- o Lessons learned

USAID/Yemen

Purpose of activity evaluated: Establishment, acceptance and initial implementation of methodologies for increasing the capacity of LDAs (local development associations) to plan, implement and evaluate locally initiated development projects and (b) increased government and external support for locally initiated development projects.

Purpose of evaluation and methodology used: The purpose of this report was to evaluate specifically the training component and provide a final review of the Project by means of a Project Completion Report. This decision was based on several factors: (1) a 1982 special evaluation had been very thorough and had contributed to the Mission's decision to terminate the Project before an originally planned phase two; (2) the Mission had already learned invaluable lessons on project development from its experience with 045; (3) the institutional impact of the Project on its YARG grantee had been assessed in an extensive institutional development report in November, 1985; (4) the Mission chose to evaluate in-house so as to increase the evaluation capacity of the Program Office and to avoid using scarce Mission financial resources on a project already well understood by the Mission.

Due to Mission exigencies, the Project Completion Report was written in a staggered fashion during the months of March, July and September, 1986, by the Program Office Research Coordinator, a rural sociologist, and was largely a review of relevant literature followed by field trips and selected interviews. The most important documents considered were the Chemonics Final Report, the 1982 special evaluation, the 045 case study from the 1985 institutional development assessment report, and the Cornell University Final Report. These were augmented by all relevant 045 files, planning documents, contractor reports and interviews with USAID/Yemen and CYDA personnel and local beneficiaries. This exercise was followed by two field visits to 8 sites where 10 subprojects were examined. The first field trip included the author, the FSN Agriculture Assistant and a CYDA representative, and the second the author and the Program Office FSN Evaluation Officer.

Findings and conclusions: **An overly ambitious design, lacking in linkages between various components, made achievements of Project goals impossible. USAID/Yemen put much faith in LDAs, yet an informational base on which to develop such a broad, multi-faceted project did not exist. **An inadequately strong relationship existed between USAID and CYDA on which to build such a project. A very basic difficulty was the lack of consensus between USAID and CYDA as to the CYDA mandate which the Project was to address; the largest dispute centered on whether 045 was to have a process or a product focus. **Many of the assumptions underlying the Project were either incomplete or incorrect. For example, the structure and political nature of the LDA system were not fully appreciated by the Mission; LDAs existed at various stages of development and most could not absorb the technical assistance offered by the Project. Relations among the LDAs, CCs and CYDA were much more political and potentially hostile than perceived by the Mission and Chemonics. **It was the YARG's general perception that too much funding went to expatriate personnel, while CYDA wanted funding for tangible, visible

Date this summary prepared: 9/20/86

outputs. Had such products been forthcoming earlier, they may have given the Project credibility and, consequently, more influence in developing within the Yemeni organizations the Project's process components. **The matching grants did not encourage local contributions as had been expected; instead, the meagerness of these funds relative to the total Project worth created resentment among CYDA staff; US\$ 900,000 was insufficient, considering the capital intensive subprojects envisioned in the PP. **Language skills among expatriates were inadequate to meet the demands of a project such as 045 which, because of its ambiguity, required much discussion and negotiation. **Training was the most salient Project achievement, despite the shortfalls in U.S. and Third Country training. The Project substantially reached its expected outputs with over 700 individuals receiving training for a total of over 200 person years. Constraints to training efforts related to CYDA's internal operations and could not be overcome by Cnemonics. **Fourteen (78%) of the minimum of 18 subprojects were completed; the quality of workmanship and materials across all subprojects was high. **Most PCVs were insufficiently integrated into Project implementation. Their language skills were insufficient to allow them to work as community development planners, as originally anticipated. Ultimately, many PCVs were not given responsibilities corresponding to their expertise. However, PCV contributions in Hodeidah were significant, once the Volunteers were situated. Relations between PCVs and Cnemonics, however, were strained during much of the Project and PCV resentment regarding their assignment to a profit-making firm was common. **Several factors influenced Cornell's generally inadequate research output. The research design was too broad, resulting in highly aggregated, qualitative data. The inability to convince CYDA/CCs/LDAs of the importance and utility of research activities resulted in travel restrictions which detracted from Cornell's work. The inability to recruit an agricultural economist and the co-directors' voluntary absence limited the focus required to support overall Project objectives. The lack of Mission direction allowed Cornell to remain at the periphery of Project research aims.

Recommendations: **Ambition in a project should be tempered by realistic expectations; goals, purposes and objectives of USAID projects should be limited to a few issues which can be reasonably addressed. **USAID should create a stronger, more sophisticated facilitation function to keep projects like 045 on track. A more stringent and exploratory semi-annual review involving key Mission personnel might be a logical means for more effective monitoring and redirection. **Research efforts should be conducted in close cooperation with Program and Project Officers with an eye toward basic programmatic concerns and the requirements of project data for adequate evaluation of project impact. In the Yemeni context, minimal, focused research is most useful and obtainable. **Research and process-oriented projects must be carefully designed; research and training must be legitimized with visible, tangible outputs which give credibility to both the project and the host country organization. Project designs should be carried out in close cooperation with Yemeni ministries, agencies or departments. **USAID needs to move carefully in choosing agencies of the YARG with which to work. It must understand as clearly as possible their strengths and weaknesses and, importantly, their real, as opposed to stated, agendas. Project design must accommodate any perceived weaknesses as realistically as possible. **Institutional development is perhaps the best hope for national development here. However, in this setting it is a long, difficult process with many obstacles in its way. USAID must recognize, acknowledge and internalize the limits that exist on their ability to initiate change in Yemeni organizations. **A large measure of administrative and programmatic flexibility is required in working with Yemeni organizations; it is the responsibility of the expatriate project staff to adjust to the relative weakness of Yemeni institutions with which a project is associated. There should be constant testing of the logframe assumptions and, where necessary, a reorientation of tactics so as to validate the assumptions. **Institutional development of organizations such as CYDA or LDAs is complex, very politicized and is compounded by the vagaries of personality. Americans working in the Middle East are often at a disadvantage because of America's image and foreign policy actions in the

region. This should be realized and every effort should be made to foster understanding between American staff and YARG personnel. **Selection of implementing contractor firms should be based, to a high degree, on the combination of overseas development experience and Arabic language skills in proposed personnel. When Arabic skills are unavailable, arrangements must be made to assign adjunct staff with requisite interpreting capabilities to contractors without Arabic fluency. **Regional training represents a good option for the training of Yemeni candidates and, in many cases, may be preferable to U.S. training. Whenever feasible, use of existing Yemeni training agencies should be considered. **Every effort should be made to match PCVs with jobs commensurate with their abilities and educations.

Lessons learned: **A strong, cooperative relationship with a grantee organization is essential for adequate project design and implementation. **In a context such as Yemen, projects must be relatively simple in design and must provide tangible outputs which contribute positively to the grantee's reputation. **Projects which require negotiation at every turn stand little chance for success, as the Arabic language skills of most USAID staff and contractors are inadequate for such discussions. **The level of technology transfer in a project should depend on the absorptive capacity of a grantee which must be determined early in project development. **Confidence in a project's potential for success depends on the accuracy of assumptions which underlie the logical framework. Thus, the context in which a project is to be developed should be studied carefully and understood before a project design is finalized.

Comment: The outcome of this Project reminds USAID of the serendipitous nature of overseas development planning. A good fit between a project and an opportune economic and political moment is a constant challenge to all donors. For example, before and during the Project, considerable economic strength resided at the village level. CYDA, CCs and the Project attempted to harness this strength. However, the LDAs apparently resented such efforts and felt threatened by the perceived (and accurate) threat of widening central government power. At present, the situation appears to be very different in that remittances have declined and a restructuring of the local development movement has served to make the LDAs (now LCCDs) more representative and to bring them under the central government umbrella formally. This is apparently welcomed by the villagers, as they see the need to tap into an increasingly wealthier central government (based on oil discovery) at a time when their personal incomes (based on remittances) are decreasing. So the balance has shifted from a wealthy citizen/poor government to the reverse, making for an entirely different climate in which to approach development. Given that the potential for hostilities among the parties seems to have declined somewhat and the local level no longer has the economic independence it once had, it is likely that a sparser project of this sort would meet with considerable success.

ATTACHMENTS (List attachments submitted with this Evaluation Summary; always attach copy of full evaluation report, even if one was submitted earlier)

Project Completion Report: Local Resources for Development, (USAID/Yemen 279-0045). Elmira Gilbert, Research Coordinator, USAID/PRM, September, 1986.

COMMENTS BY MISSION, AID/W OFFICE AND BORROWER/GRANTEE

APPENDIX F
LIST OF 045 TRAINEES

The following is a compilation of available information regarding the 045 participants who received various types of Third Country and U.S. training. The present (4/86) employment of these individuals is provided when possible. For the most part, CYDA officials who were trained by the Project remain with CYDA and, according to other CYDA representatives, are better contributors to the organization as a result of their training. In fact, CYDA has expressed an interest in discussing a new training project with USAID.

Hamoud Mohammed al-Salahi received a Masters Degree in International Public Policy from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC. He is now one of the three Directors of Public Services at CYDA and is responsible for water drilling projects throughout the country.

Dirar A. al-Daim, also a Director of Public Services at CYDA, attended short courses in water technology and alternative energy technologies in Dubai and Gainesville, Florida, respectively.

Mohammed Ahmed al-Miqdad, Director of Information, CYDA Office of Culture and Information

Tawfiq Ali al-Bagash, Official Photographer, CYDA Office of Culture and Information

Salah Yahya al-Abad, Rural Programs Dept., YARG Radio and Television

Ali Yuzif al-Amir, Rural Programs Dept., YARG Radio and Television

These individuals each received three months of training in video

informational and documentary programming at the Radio and Television Institute in Cairo during 1984. Ibrahim Ali al-Abyad, a YARG television producer, was trained at this facility for one month.

Dael Ahmed Ubayd al-Karar

Mohammed Abdallah al-Mutawakkil

Abdallah Kassim Azwa

Abdul Karim Abdallah al-Akhali

Khalid Mogbal al-Asbahi

Mohammed Awad Ali al-Moujahid

Mohammed Ismail al-Abarah

Five of these individuals received Project-financed associate degrees in civil engineering from the Arab Community College of Amman, Jordan, where they studied for a total of 19 months. The other two students failed the courses under Project financing but finally graduated under CYDA financing. All seven of these men are still employed by CYDA in its Technical Office.

Murshid Mohammed Wais, Director of Planning, CYDA

Mohammed Mohammed al-Haddad, Director, Yemen Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Hajjah

Ahmed Mohammed al-Zuhayri, Director of the Office of Secretary General, CYDA

Faisal Ahmed Ghalab, Director of LCCD Affairs, CYDA

These gentlemen toured training institutions and development centers in Sudan, Egypt, Jordan and Kuwait for a period of 20 days. The purpose of this travel was to broaden CYDA officials' awareness of structure, operating principles, activities and resources of fellow Arab cooperative organizations.

Ali al-Imadd, Director, LCCD, Ibb

Abdallah Hasan Khiraat, Director, LCCD, Hodeidah

Mohammed Ahmed al-Mahturi

Al-Qadi Yahia Raasa

Mohammed Husayn al-Farh

These individuals were all elected officials at the LDA level who were sent on six weeks of invitational travel to the United States in order to familiarize themselves with the cooperative movement there. They received exposure to solar energy technology, rural highway construction, dry land agriculture, and community/public works and services. Since the LDA elections last year, only two of these men remain in office. There is no information regarding the employment of the other three.

APPENDIX G
LIST OF 045 SUBPROJECTS

The following includes the Chemonics descriptions of the 045 subprojects and information on their current status as determined during site visits during March and September, 1986. Subprojects were constructed in seven nahiya, or provinces; six of these nahiya were visited by Mission personnel during March and September, with a total of nine subprojects observed. Thus, a more than adequate sampling of subprojects took place. The other five subprojects not surveyed, all in Hodeidah Governorate, were omitted because of time constraints and their remoteness. The cost of each subproject, i.e., LDA/CYDA and USAID contributions, is included below; all amounts are shown in US Dollars at YR 4.54/US\$. See the Inputs section of the main body of this document for comments on the matching grant proportions.

Hodeidah

1. Al Jirba

PPA Signature: May, 1982 Project Completion: November, 1983
LDA/CYDA: \$34,141 USAID: \$58,889

"Joint effort to establish a potable water system in Al Jirba, Nahiya Al Durayhimi. Provided technical assistance in system design, water tower and pump house construction, and installation of pipeline distribution system to individual households."

This system is in generally good condition; however, the pump belt is badly worn and there is slight water tank leakage. The system serves 90 homes; each resident family pays a monthly charge of YR 25. Because of low pressure, the system operates seven hours per day; it is managed by a villager whose salary is YR 800 per month. According to the caretaker, the system requires approximately 440 liters of diesel and 60 liters of oil per month. Fewer residents are drinking this water because of its increasing salinity. However, the water continues to be used for other household purposes and for domesticated animals kept in the village. Drinking water is brought to homes on donkeyback from a nearby well.

78

2. Al Shuggan

PPA Signature: November, 1983 Project Completion: March, 1984
LDA/CYDA: \$30,176 USAID: \$43,106

"Joint effort to establish a potable water system in Al Shuggan, Naniya Al Durayhimi. Provided technical assistance in system design, installation of pumping unit, construction of an elevated water tower and a pump house, and distribution system to service each household."

The water tank at this subproject exhibits what appears to be minor superficial cracking and is badly weathered. At one time, there was a pump malfunction which was repaired at a cost of YR 250. The system serves 113 homes, operating 5 hours a day. Some of the residents resent the YR 20 monthly fee, claiming that it is too high considering their low incomes. It is interesting, however, that the system manager, a very young man, reportedly earns YR 1000 monthly; this is an extremely high salary if there are few sources of cash income in this village, so it may well be that YR 20 is a reasonable fee. Nearby villagers in Al Jirba who pay more, YR 25/month, considered their fees fair.

3. Combination Well

PPA Signature: November, 1982 Project Completion: August, 1983
LDA/CYDA: \$5,947 USAID: \$24,423

"Joint effort to establish a potable water system based on the installation of experimental wells in Al Jaliya in Nahiya Al Munira. Technical assistance provided in system design, supervision of drilling of test wells to locate potable water and subsequent deepening and lining of one well using experimental precast caisson protective rings to maintain water quality."

4. Al Jaliya

PPA Signature: November, 1983 Project Completion: March, 1984
LDA/CYDA: \$46,118 USAID: \$46,118

"Joint effort to establish a potable water system in Al Jaliya, Nahiya Al Munira. Provided technical assistance in system design, installation of appropriate pump and motor for existing well, construction of elevated water tank of reinforced concrete, laying of pipelines, etc. for water distribution system to service each village compound."

These are two combined subprojects, the second an improvement on the basic well constructed in the first. The system appears to be in excellent condition and has not experienced breakdown since its completion. Villagers do not pay a separate monthly fee, but their cash contributions to the community cover recurrent costs.

5. Al Hamadia

PPA Signature: November, 1983 Project Completion: July, 1984
LDA/CYDA: \$26,084 USAID: \$26,084

"Joint effort to establish a solar-related potable water system in Al Hamadia, Nahiya Al Munira. Technical assistance provided in system design, procurement, and installation of solar array and accompanying water pump and construction of fence enclosure."

This water system is the source of much pride for Al Hamadia residents. It serves a village of approximately 125 homes with community distribution points. There have been no difficulties with the solar unit to date. A villager manages the daily operation as a service to the community.

40

6. Al Khowfan

PPA Signature: August, 1981 Project Completion: March, 1982
LDA/CYDA: \$4,511 USAID: \$37,875

"Joint effort to construct a basic gravity fed, pumped storage potable water system serving the village of Al Khowfan in Nahiya Al Munira. Provided technical assistance in system design, installation of a concrete well head, pump and engine, water tower, and gridiron distribution system to service private standpipes and taps in village compounds as well as village mosque and a public fountain."

This system serves a community of approximately 750 residents who pay YR 30 per dwelling in monthly fees. A young man manages the system at a salary of YR 500 per month. No other information is available.

7. Medinat Mawr

PPA Signature: February, 1983 Project Completion: December, 1983
LDA/CYDA: \$80,066 USAID: \$82,860

"Joint effort to establish a potable water system in Medinat Mawr, Nahiya Al Luhayyah. Provided technical assistance in system design, installation of a pump and motor, construction of a pump house and an elevated concrete water tank, and the laying of a pipe distribution system for an existing well."

Approximately 2000 residents in 270 dwellings are serviced in this project. No other information is available.

81

8. Mowshig

PPA Signature: October, 1983 Project Completion: March, 1984
LDA/CYDA: \$67,297 USAID: \$67,297

"Joint effort to construct a primary school in Mowshig, Nahiya Al Khowkha. Technical assistance provided in architectural design and supervision for construction of five-classroom primary school."

This was a very interesting project, as it provided for a solar designed school in a zone with extreme summer temperatures. This environmentally appropriate construction was built by a very qualified local subcontractor, and can be considered one of the finest of 045 achievements in subprojects.

9. Al Qormiya

PPA Signature: November, 1983 Project Completion: May, 1984
LDA/CYDA: \$40,917 USAID: \$43,120

"Joint effort to establish a potable water system in AL Qormiya, Nahiya Al Durayhimi. Provided technical assistance in system design, provision of a pump and motor for an existing well, construction of an elevated water tank of reinforced concrete, installation of water distribution system to service each village compound and laying of pipe to service nearby village of As Salliya where ground level tank placed."

No information is available on this system.

82

10. Al Hasaniyah

PPA Signature: November, 1982 Project Completion: Unfinished
LDA/CYDA: \$22,063 USAID: \$34,035

"Joint effort to establish a primary school in Al Hasaniya Nahliya Al Munira. Technical assistance provided in architectural design and supervision for construction of six-classroom primary school to serve surrounding villages."

The Project withdrew from this subproject based on the inferiority of workmanship on the part of the subcontractor and an inability to negotiate with him regarding construction standards. Nonetheless, this school was later completed by the villagers using their own funds. The shoddy construction is very evident, but the school operates normally and is a source of pride for local residents.

11. Suq Al Ruboa

PPA Signature: August, 1981 Project Completion: July, 1983
LDA/CYDA: \$27,962 USAID: \$27,962

"Joint effort to establish a potable water system in the village of Suq al Ruboa, Nahliya Al Luhayya. Provided technical assistance in system design, installation of pumps, and construction of pump storage room and water storage tower with distribution to individual household taps and five fire hydrants."

No information is available for this subproject.

Hajjah

12. Wadi Sharis

PPA Signature: August, 1982 Project Completion: November, 1983
LDA: \$137,564 USAID: \$ 88,106

"Joint effort to establish a potable water system in the Wadi Sharis district. Technical assistance provided in system design; improvements to water pump platform, collection chamber, and protective wall; installation of pump; construction of storage tanks and distribution system to service the Saris Suq, the village of Al Sudan and a nearby primary school."

This construction had begun approximately three years earlier as a private venture by the village sheik. While the Chemonics Subproject Final Report congratulates the villagers on their cooperative efforts, the sheik, in our interview with him, claims that he contributed the entire local funding, is the rightful owner of the system and now sells water to local residents. Apparently, he was to have been repaid by the villagers for the sum advanced, but has never been reimbursed. According to Chemonics, the figures above do not indicate the true cost of this subproject, as many materials had been purchased by the sheik, and much labor had gone into the project before U45 involvement. The system is in excellent condition and is managed by a villager employed by the sheik. The sheik would not disclose the monthly fees charged to residents, but stated that they are very small. It is quite difficult to determine the exact truth in a case such as this. It does, however, suggest the kinds of "adjustments" which were made in the matching grants subprojects and gives some of the flavor of the Project context.

13. Hand Dug Well

RPA Signature: March 1982 Project Completion: June, 1984

LDA/CYDA: \$ 00 USAID: \$ 10,700

"Effort to develop improved sources of potable water in Hajja Province. Technical assistance provided in introduction of piped water systems using shallow hand-dug wells; construction involved the sinking of series of reinforced concrete rings."

14. Al Magrabah

RPA Signature: March, 1982 Project Completion: May, 1984

LDA/CYDA: \$ 48,480 USAID: \$ 88,106

"Joint effort to establish a potable water system for Al Magrabah in the Nahiya Al Magrabah. Technical assistance provided in the system design and supervision of construction of well in Wadi Nishan and pumping and storage system in Central Al Magrabah. Distribution system to service public taps in village."

These, too, were combined. However, the hand-dug well was the first of four proposed wells. The Hajjah CC's lack of enthusiasm for this type of simple project as an interim water source until more costly systems could be developed caused this to be the only hand dug well initiated.

The water table has dropped far below the pipe which draws water, effectively cutting the village water supply for the last four months. According to village officials, sometime ago CYDA staff were informed of this condition and they promised to assist in the extension of deeper tubing; however, no action had been taken in this regard as of March of this year.

15. Mobile Workshop

PP. Signature: August, 1982 Project Completion: April, 1984
LDA/CYDA: \$ 35,800 USAID: \$ 87,108 (plus U45 training budget support for
chief technical trainer's salary of \$ 39,648)

"Effort to establish a mobile workshop for the mechanical repair and maintenance of heavy equipment in Hajja province as an income-generating project for the Hajja Coordinating Council. Technical assistance in staffing, procuring necessary vehicle and tools and operation and maintenance of workshop services provided."

The Mobile Workshop has been out of operation for approximately two years. A CYDA representative said this facility closed once the chief mechanic left for a higher paying job; since then, CYDA has not attempted to replace him. This type of problem had been anticipated by Project staff who lobbied vigorously to convince CYDA of the importance of competitive salaries for Workshop personnel. (There is some dispute regarding the status of this Workshop. The chief mechanic, who now works for CID, claims that the Workshop is still operating on a low level with two assistants. However, we must assume that the CYDA representative is better informed.) It is reported that all the tools, equipment, and so on are stored in the base facility in Hajjah. During the field trip we visited this building but were unable to attest to the actual presence or condition of the equipment, as no officials were available to open the facility.

86