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BOLIVIA DROUGHT 1983/1984

FIELD ASSESSMENT OF THE TITLE II

EMERGENCY FOOD PROGRAM IN BOLIVIA

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**SUMMARY OF THE FIELD ASSESMENT OF THE TITLE II
EMERGENCY FOOD PROGRAM IN BOLIVIA**

BACKGROUND

The 1983 drought deprived nearly 1.6 million campesinos of their source of income and food supply. The majority of these people live in the Altiplano in the Departments of La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, Potosí, Chuquisaca and Tarija. Approximately 35% of Bolivia's total land area, or 380,000 square kilometers, was directly affected. A food crop deficit of over 1,000,000 MT, half of which consisted of potatoes, was largely attributed to the drought. Severe livestock losses reaching 40% of some herds of cattle, sheep, and llamas also depleted the meagre resources of the campesinos. The drought was followed by severe flooding in some areas which further exacerbated the problems of the rural population.

In response to the food shortages, the United States Government, in cooperation with Catholic Relief Services (CRS)/Caritas Boliviana, Food for the Hungry International (FHI) and the National Community Development Services (NCDS), imported 28,820 MT of P.L. 480 Title I supplies to be distributed under an Emergency Food for Work and Humanitarian Assistance Program as follows:

CRS/Caritas	8,820 MT
FHI	10,000 MT
NCDS	<u>10,000 MT</u>
	28,820 MT

The 28,820 MT of food supplies was to alleviate serious hunger among drought victims primarily in the Altiplano regions of the country. Food assistance under the Emergency Program was distributed under Food for Work projects or as humanitarian assistance to people who were unable to work. Each family of five were to receive 50 kilos of food for a minimum of 17 days of work per month. Each family was to receive one or two complete monthly rations.

La Oficina Nacional de Alimentación (OFINAAL) was designated by the Government of Bolivia to coordinate distributions, designate geographic areas of concentration and supervise the Emergency program. Departmental Committees composed of food distribution agencies were responsible for coordination at the regional level. USAID provided \$b. 2,066,105,000 to the Cooperating Sponsors to cover food distribution costs.

Purpose and Methodology of Field Assessment

USAID/Bolivia requested the collaboration of all food distributing agencies to assess the effectiveness of the Emergency Food Program and to begin to develop plans for orientating regular programs towards rehabilitation and development strategies in areas still seriously affected by the consequences of the drought. Emergency food distribution ended in the majority of cases in mid-July and a

field assessment of accomplishments and shortcoming was necessary to learn from the experience and to reorient regular programs. OFINAAL declined to participate in the field assessment as an active sponsor, but collaborated in field interviews. Catholic Relief Services, also, declined to participate as a member of the field assessment team, since this agency was conducting its own evaluation of the CRS/Caritas Program. However, CRS and Caritas facilitated the field assessment process by providing information and participating in interviews. The National Community Development Service and Food for the Hungry International participated with USAID personnel in the assessment teams which covered five affected departments, namely, La Paz, Oruro, Cochabamba, Potosí and Sucre. The assessment teams focused on the following aspects of the emergency program:

- 1) Program Impact;
- 2) Organizational capacity of the agencies to allocate resources, implement distribution system and supervise and monitor program.
- 3) Achievement of program objectives;
- 4) Identification of geographical areas that continue to need food assistance to recuperate from consequences of drought.

The field team conducted interviews of food distribution personnel,

rural beneficiaries, and other key informants to obtain information on the topics covered by the assessment.

General Findings

The Emergency Food for Work and Humanitarian Assistance Program implemented by CRS/Caritas, FHI and NCDS reached a total of 1.6 million disaster victims. Beneficiaries report that the food commodities were acceptable and an important complement to scarce locally available food supplies and substantially contributed to the alleviation of hunger. Because of the availability of regular food programs stocks, Caritas was able to be the most responsible agency in terms of alleviating hunger on a timely basis during the months of November and December 1983 and January and February of 1984. Caritas, also, utilized local distribution centers which greatly facilitated distributions to the affected population. Because of its previous experience in distribution, Caritas could have handled larger quantities of food supplies than those programmed.

FHI and NCDS, on the other hand, were overburdened by the 10,000 MT of food supplies programmed for each agency. For FHI, the Emergency Food Program was its first involvement with Title II programs. For NCDS, the emergency program meant an extended geographic coverage since its regular program only encompassed the Department of La

Paz. NCDS was, also, plagued by internal labor problems and political pressures. Both agencies had severe difficulties in administering the program and in adequately handling Title II supplies. They lacked qualified personnel to manage and implement the programs at all levels. FHI and NCDS experienced difficulties in obtaining and maintaining adequate warehouse space for Title II supplies. Despite these shortcomings, losses and pilferage of food was minimal. The late arrival of commodities to Bolivia, especially in the case of FHI and SNDC, delayed distributions and, in some cases, food did not reach the rural communities at the time of greatest need. For example, food was distributed during the 1984 harvest when rural households food stocks were adequate.

All three agencies were inefficient in assigning resources to regional offices on a timely basis because of poor accounting procedures and slow disbursement processes. This deficiency further delayed distributions. Also, USAID Outreach grant funds were not approved for the CRS and FHI program until after the Emergency Program was terminated. Since these agencies counted on these resources to purchase vehicles, they were unable to provide adequate supervision and monitoring of the program.

All agencies experienced logistic problems in transporting food from ports to points of entry because of transportation shortages, strikes, and roadblocks. NCDS's logistic capability was not

sufficient to handle the quantities of food assigned. The programming of five food commodities which did not arrive in Bolivia simultaneously greatly complicated logistical problems.

Although overall coverage of disaster victims was good, the lack of coordination, caused some provinces to be over-targeted while others received negligible assistance. In general, provinces closer to departmental capitals received more food supplies than programmed while remote areas received as little as 10% of the assigned quotas. Efforts by USAID in early February to make distribution more equitable were largely ineffectual. Based upon the inability of the agencies to develop a targeted strategy to assist the neediest victims and the prospects of improved 1984 crops, USAID decided in March to end the emergency program by July 15. By this date, NCDS had distributed 8500 MT of food supplies and FHI 8400 MT to disaster victims. Caritas distributed all of the food commodities (8,820 MT) assigned to its emergency program.

Although the Emergency Food Program reached its humanitarian objective of alleviating hunger among drought and flood victims, its goal of making a significant contribution to rehabilitation objectives through food for work projects was only minimally achieved. Even though most distributions were made under food for work projects, the impact of the projects was limited because they were of short duration and directed at maintaining previously

undertaken community development infrastructure projects. The field interviews indicated that approximately 25% of the projects could be considered as having contributed to mitigating future disasters while 75% had only a humanitarian benefit. The most important factor contributing to the lack of quality in food for work projects was inadequate supervision and technical assistance. In terms of project quality, NCDS/Potosí, NCDS/La Paz and FHI/Sucre achieved substantially greater results than the other regional agencies in sponsoring rehabilitation projects, since these regional offices provided technical assistance and closely monitored project implementation.

Lessons Learned from Emergency Program

The most important lesson learned from the Emergency Food Program in a drought disaster situation is that implementing agencies need periodic information to assess needs and their performance in reaching the most needy victims on a timely basis. Without this type of information and targeting strategy unbalanced and inequitable distribution occur which limit the humanitarian impact of the food distribution system. Secondly, the emphasis on a food

for work strategy for distribution of food relief commodities to disaster victims does not appear to be realistic. The Bolivian experience shows that the food distributing agencies were unable to sponsor meaningful food for work projects in 75% of the cases. What is needed is a well defined targeting strategy clearly delineating areas which require immediate humanitarian assistance and those which could benefit from well-designed food for work projects aimed at recovery. Thirdly, coordination of distribution must be planned from the beginning assigning geographical areas of concentration and food quotas to each agency subject to changes as periodic assessments indicate. Ideally a level of coordination at the regional level should exist which permits a pooling of resources so that allocations are made to the most needy areas avoiding duplicate or inadequate coverage. Fourthly, decentralization of decision making and rapid allocation of resources to the regional level is imperative if timely assistance is to be provided to disaster victims. Fifthly, as agencies shift from distributing food on an humanitarian basis to community projects which alleviate the causes of natural disasters, complementary resources are necessary. Technical assistance and materials are essential components to meaningful rehabilitation projects. Finally, to simplify logistical problems, the rations should consist of not more than two or three products essential to dietary considerations.

Implication for the Immediate Future

The field assessment attempted to identify provinces which were still suffering severe consequences of the drought and flooding with a view towards orientating regular Title II food for work programs toward a rural development strategy to mitigate future disasters and to contribute to agricultural production in the Altiplano. In the Department of La Paz, the provinces of Pacajes and Ingavi were singled out as provinces where the greatest need existed. In Oruro, the province of Saucari was identified. In Cochabamba, Tapacari, and Ayopaya require continuing assistance. In Potosí, Chayanta needs food and material assistance to recover from the effects of the drought.

Based upon the experience of the Emergency Program, Cooperating Sponsors are in a position to make a valuable contribution to disaster prevention and rural development if adequate resources are available to complement Title II food in these areas or in other provinces of similar need. USAID/Bolivia believes that with adequate planning and coordination with other agencies, the Cooperating Sponsors could begin a targeted and well defined rural development strategy which would assist campesino communities engage in essential rural development projects. Based upon the interviews and upon the institutional strengths of the Cooperating Sponsors,

micro-irrigation, potable water, soil conservation, forage improvement, agro forestry, and crop storage facilities were identified as possible areas of concentration. If the Cooperating Sponsors could develop well defined project proposals in these areas, local funds to finance these projects are available from Title III currency generations managed by the P.L. 480 Secretariat. USAID/Bolivia is prepared to assist the Cooperating Sponsors develop project proposals which could be channelled to the P.L. 480 Secretariat for financing.

FIELD ASSESSMENT -DEPARTMENT OF LA PAZ

Introduction

In the department of La Paz the total population affected was 304,572 inhabitants. In order to provide this population with a one month supply of food 3015 MTs of commodities were required. Distributions by province is shown on the attached sheet as of May 30, 1984.

Food distribution in La Paz was carried out by CARITAS/La Paz, CARITAS/Patacamaya, Food For The Hungry and NCDS.

1. Emergency Program Impact and Implementation/La Paz

The Emergency Program in La Paz, which involved 3 agencies using Title II foods, is characterized by a lack of coordination and planning among agencies. This caused the provinces close to La Paz to be overly covered by food aid. Those farthest away and most affected by the drought and flooding only received between 61% and 85% coverage. The provinces most densely attended received coverage of between 248.5% and 6500% and were situated close to La Paz.

Initial designation of areas and beneficiaries was not adhered to by FHI and NCDS. CARITAS maintained their assigned distribution

program within reasonable limits and could have handled the distribution of larger quantities of food.

The main causes of these changes in established distribution patterns were:

- 1) Deficient coordination among agencies.
- 2) Late food arrivals.
- 3) Positive responses to changing disaster conditions.
- 4) Non adherence to original province food quotas.

The administration of the Emergency Program was particularly deficient in the areas of warehousing and supervision. Warehouses with the exception of Caritas were generally badly managed and insecure. Only NCDS managed to supervise the majority of their projects while CARITAS and FHI reached an insignificant proportion.

The late arrival of food at the warehouses was caused by a delayed response to needs by USAID. This meant agencies, also, delayed preparation of staff and infrastructure because of undefined food arrival dates.

The administration of the program by the implementing agencies was severely affected by a lack of training and experience in handling disaster programs. FHI and SNDC poorly allocated resources.

Furthermore, poor accounting procedures limited fund disbursement. Little emphasis was placed on the achievement of program objectives so that goals such as rehabilitation were unattainable. The agencies were unable to direct activities in the fields of staff training, resources allocation and supervision to reach established objectives.

Food distribution by agencies was generally positive, but the lack of coordination caused wide fluctuation in overall distribution patterns. Target populations were covered but in widely varying levels. However, three provinces which did not require food were also attended with 85 MT of food for 8,570 beneficiaries, mainly through NCDS.

With the exception of NCDS the FFW projects did little to contribute to agricultural rehabilitation with the main emphasis on the alleviation of humanitarian suffering.

Duplication of activities was particularly widespread in the provinces of Omasuyos and Los Andes whose populations obviously used the influence they have through agrarian trade unions to obtain food from various sources. This contrasts to the situation in Pacajes, where the villagers are less familiar with the necessary paper work to receive aid and were less attended by the different agencies.

Technical assistance in most projects was non existent with the exception of NCDS who has a well established infrastructure for project supervision. Any technical assistance agreements between institutions were unworkable due to lack of coordination and communication between institutions.

Resource disbursement was particularly deficient for all agencies. This affected operational capabilities in the three agencies.

Supervision (except NCDS) and project monitoring were deficient with less than 10% of projects from FHI and CARITAS receiving supervision.

An inter-agency committee in La Paz was started by the Civil Defense Committee to coordinate food deliveries with the participation of all Title II agencies but, after initial meetings at the beginning of the program, no further progress was made. Any conclusions which were arrived at in initial meetings were not adhered to as the program evolved. OFINAAL, also, attempted to fulfill the role as coordinator but the regional La Paz Office made little impact in this field.

The food aid received full acceptance among the rural population and evidently contributed to alleviate suffering caused by the drought. Most communities also used the sale of sacks to finance communal activities.

USAID was slow to respond to the prevailing conditions involved in the implementation of the Emergency Program and the need for close monitoring. A field inspector was hired only in Mid-March after 6 months of the Emergency Program. This meant that feedback from USAID was limited during the first six months of the program. All the agencies also contributed to this lack of feedback by not reporting on food distribution and reception within the required time periods.

In the La Paz the overall effectiveness of the Emergency Program was affected by:

- 1) Poor inter - agency coordination.
- 2) Insufficient planning.
- 3) Limited project supervision.
- 4) Insufficient resource disbursement.
- 5) Inadequate program monitoring by USAID.

Food distribution in La Paz was carried out by Caritas/La Paz, Caritas/Patacamaya, Food for The Hungry and NCDS.

2. Program Implementation; Department of La Paz

2. National Community Development Service.

2.1 Planning

NCDS elaborated a regional program for La Paz as part of a national emergency plan completed in May, 1983. This plan was produced by NCDS, without coordination with other voluntary agencies. The final result was that few elements of the plan were carried out as originally conceived.

In La Paz priority areas such as Pacajes received minimal food aid whereas areas less affected by the drought such as Omasuyos received almost one third of food distributed by NCDS. This situation is clearly illustrated in the attached charts.

The plan did not assign fixed amounts of food by province which caused unequal distribution. Various factors mentioned below have contributed to this unequal distribution.

- 1) Late arrival of food stocks in La Paz.
- 2) Poor inter-institutional coordination.
- 3) Personnel lacked experience in the administration of the emergency program.
- 4) Lack of monitoring of deliveries with checks against the number of beneficiaries.

The program was planned to function between June, 1983 and February, 1984. However, in La Paz the program did not begin until October and was terminated on July 15th, 1984.

2.2 Administration

The administration of the La Paz program was carried out by a national coordination team in close cooperation with the regional offices. It is evident that the initial team made up of 3 people was not sufficient to administrate the emergency program. In February, 1984, an effort was made to reorganize the administrative apparatus which did little to improve program efficiency. Staff lacked training to handle large volumes of food and resources were evidently deficient (see section 1.5). Perhaps the most important factor which contributed to delays in food deliveries was that all requests for food first had to be processed by regional offices in La Paz and then sent to the National Office. The purpose of this national control was to avoid duplication of deliveries. However, there was little feedback to regulate excess deliveries. In addition, loans of food between institutions and to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce also affected the limited administrative and logistics capacity of the NCDS team.

Factors outside the control of NCDS which affected the distribution of food were:

- 1) Late arrivals at port.
- 2) Poor transport from port to points of entry, particularly where food was moved by railroad.

2.3 Warehousing

Large quantities of food from various donor agencies arrived in La Paz at the end of 1983 and the beginning of 1984 giving rise to acute shortages of warehouse space. The warehouse used by NCDS, an aircraft hangar, was unsuitable for food storage, particularly from the point of view of security. In addition the warehouse staff

received little training in warehousing techniques which caused food losses to occur through poor stacking, rodents and pilfering. During the program it was also difficult to ascertain food stocks as warehouse administration was only rudimentary.

2.4 Distribution

Despite the problems mentioned above NCDS covered a total of 16 provinces, and of the 5000 MT originally programmed for La Paz 24% was delivered up till 31 January, 1964 and the total amount delivered by 30th. May reached 3499 MTs. Of this amount, 44% was delivered to two provinces, well in excess of one months ration. In Omasuyos and Camacho the total population affected by the drought was 17,500 where as NCDS distributed 1500 MT of food to a total of 170,000 beneficiaries in these two provinces. Other institutions also were operating in these provinces such as FHI.

NCDS considers that the limited number of food deliveries (average one months ration per community) meant that the FFW projects were not beneficial in mitigating the causes of the drought. However the aid did alleviate human suffering. Some 80-85% of NCDS FFW projects under the emergency program, received supervision and technical assistance was given to a smaller proportion projects. One advantage NCDS had over other food distribution agencies was the availability of technical staff to supervise micro-irrigation projects, road construction and defensive dykes. But despite this advantage the short duration of projects limited any real contribution to agricultural recuperation. Some 70 % of projects involved renovation of previous roads, irrigation canals and watering holes without any improvement on existing facilities.

The input of technical assistance (essential to new initiatives) was also limited by the lack of resources to mobilize technical staff and most supervision was carried out by field promoters. Many

communities received food from various agencies particularly in those areas more accustomed to requesting aid. NCDS limited food aid to more needy areas such as Pacajes and gave preference to the areas close to La Paz causing large distortions in food distribution patterns. NCDS was in a position to direct food aid to specific areas and provide 2-3 months rations but this option was deferred in favour of a blanket coverage in Omasuyos and Camacho.

2.5 Resources

On a National level NCDS was assigned a total operational budget of \$b. 310,192,718 of which only \$b. 190,000,000 was transferred from the Title III Office. The low level of resource allocation together with the negative affects of the devaluation of the Bolivian Peso in April 1984 diminished the weak operational capacity of NCDS in the following aspects:

- 1) Program supervision was limited by a lack of resources.
- 2) It was not possible to obtain adequate staffing levels.
- 3) Villages who should have been paid 50% of transport costs were not reimbursed in over 60% of deliveries.

NCDS sites various factors which affected resource disimbursement such as:

- 1) Strikes affecting the central bank.
- 2) Changing conditions in the budget.
- 3) Lack of agility in USAID over approving advances in funds.
- 4) Poor documentation in accounting reporting procedures.

2.6 Conclusions

The NCDS input to the emergency program was limited by lack of administrative experience, but, given the large volume of food handled by the La Paz office compared to previous programs, it is an

achievement to have distributed this food by July 15th. Adverse factors, both internal and external, affected the program but project quality was superior to other agencies operating in the program mainly due to improved supervision and technical input. However, a lack of respect for food quotas limited the program to palliative measures despite the possible inputs NCDS had available.

The overall effect of the NCDS program can be considered as largely humanitarian aid which some contribution to rehabilitation.

Food For The Hungry/La Paz

Introduction

The office of Food for The Hungry in La Paz is closely linked to the National Office. In some aspects, of the evaluation, it was difficult to differentiate between national and regional activities.

3.1. Planning

FHI did not elaborate a regional plan for distribution but their distribution effort was guided initially by provincial quotas received from the National Civil Defense Committee. Initial provinces selected were Omasuyos, Ingavi, Los Andes and Aroma. Approximately 36000 beneficiaries were to receive 2,160 MTs of food. As of May 30, 1984, FHI/La Paz had distributed food in 13 provinces in La Paz and two in Oruro with a total of 90,191 beneficiaries attended with 1224 MT of food.

FHI suggest that they are not entirely responsible for these changes in targets. It is evident that 79% of food did go to the original areas; however, the selection of these areas which were given heavy coverage by NCDS should have been modified. Ingavi was well attended by CRS/Caritas. As in the case of NCDS, FHI chose to attend areas close to La Paz and not so severely affected by the drought such as the provinces of Omasuyos, Los Andes and reduced attention in other provinces such as Pacajes and Gualberto Villarroel. In the planning of food distribution Los Andes and Omasuyos should have received 44% of the food allocation. They actually received 47% where as Aroma with a quota of 33% only received 10% of food allocated for La Paz.

The program was designed to operate from October to July where as operations only begun in December due to the late arrival of commodities.

3.2. Administration

The FHI program in La Paz was originally run as an offshoot of the national operation with no clear delineation of responsibilities. In May, 1984 a separate administrative apparatus was designated to overcome the difficulties mentioned above.

All the personnel in FHI received training in one short seminar. The lack of staff training showed up not only in the warehouse operations in La Paz, but also in the poor orientation of the emergency program towards declared objectives. For instance 25% of FFW projects were directed towards non-productive activities. FHI had serious difficulties in managing Title III funds to cover the operational costs of the program.

Food reception in La Paz caused a number of problems particularly in the handling of a large number of trucks arriving at one warehouse in a short space of time. The haulage companies were often responsible for these bottlenecks. Food requests were processed rapidly which allowed the affected population to receive aid without much delay. However, as in the case of NCDS food deliveries continued during the main harvest period when there was more likelihood of food being sold or not reaching the target groups because the campesinos had sufficient food stocks in their homes.

3.3. Warehousing

The warehouses used in La Paz by FHI were poorly managed and often lacked sufficient security measures. The shortage of warehousing facilities meant that FHI had to improvise in warehouse facilities, for instance using a church hall without adequate security equipment.

The warehouse staff were poorly trained in accounting methods and warehouse administration which caused difficulty in conducting inventories. Towards the end of the emergency FHI improved warehouse facilities acting on USAID recommendations.

3.4. Distribution

FHI estimates that only 30% of their FFW projects in La Paz contributed to a rehabilitation of agriculture. The rest of the aid must be considered purely humanitarian. This aspect was confirmed by field inspections carried out by USAID.

Of 215 villages attended as of the thirtieth of May 1984, only 2% of the projects received any kind of supervision from FHI. However, FHI did not receive from AID/Washington the Outreach Grant resources needed to be able to provide adequate supervision of the program. Technical assistance was virtually non-existent in La Paz, although in isolated cases the National Road Service provided limited guidance for road construction.

The food distributed in La Paz did not arrive to the areas most affected by the drought due to some factors outside the control of FHI such as;

- 1) Late arrival of commodities in Bolivia
- 2) Lack of resources
- 3) Poor coordination with other institutions
- 4) Poor road conditions.

Reporting of food distribution to USAID was also delayed which limited up to date coordination of food distribution.

3.5. Resources

Resources allocated at a national level were disbursed to a total of \$b. 171,120,736 which was approximately \$b. 10,000,000 short of

total funds allocated under Title III. However, the shortfall was caused by the failure to disburse the outreach grant which should have covered the main capital costs of the operation. This evidently affected operations such as supervision and warehousing.

3.5. Conclusions

As FHI was only accepted last year as a voluntary agency by USAID, the lack of experience in handling commodities contributed to the deficient program management in the La Paz office. Close supervision and monitoring was necessary to help FHI initiate their emergency operations.

The large volume of projects handled by the office together with the lack of trained staff contributed to poor project quality with a low emphasis on agricultural recuperation.

Catholic Relief Services/CARITAS - La Paz

Introduction

The operations of CRS/Caritas in La Paz were carried out by two offices in the department of La Paz, one situated in La Paz which attended the Province of Ingavi and the other situated in Patacamaya which attended the provinces of Gualberto Villarroel and Pacajes. The requests for food were processed by these offices and distributed through supply centers located in the provinces.

4.1. Planning

Caritas/Patacamaya and Caritas/La Paz planned their emergency operations in Pacajes, Gualberto Villarroel and Ingavi respectively. These provinces were attended with limited extension to other areas. The food was distributed in the months of September 1983 to May 1984 while the program was designed to operate from September 1983 to February 1984. Caritas/Patacamaya received and distributed more food than was originally programmed, thereby reducing the amount of food available for Caritas/La Paz.

To assist in the smooth running of the emergency program, Caritas/Patacamaya tried to coordinate with other rural development institutions working in their area of influence although this effort did not prosper beyond initial meetings. Caritas/La Paz was heavily dependent on the input of the local priest in Ingavi for planning and carrying out the emergency food distribution.

4.2. Administration

The administration of the emergency program in both offices was carried out by extra staff hired for the emergency program. This staff was only sufficient to process the food dispatches and did not

permit sufficient project supervision. In both offices it was necessary to utilize staff from the regular program to supplement the emergency employees.

CRS provided limited training for the emergency program employees who assisted in the operation of the program. The system Caritas employed for food distribution through supply centers and local committees organized through the agrarian trade unions greatly facilitated the distribution of food. It was also a more efficient method to pay directly for food transport costs rather than payment to individual truckers as in the case of NCDS and FHI.

4.3. Distribution

The distribution of the food took place through various supply centers with the cooperation of the agrarian trade unions. In the Province of Ingavi an average of two 50 kilo monthly rations were distributed where as in Pacajes and Villarroel an average of two monthly rations were distributed amounting to a total of only 30 kilos for a family of five. Nevertheless, in Pacajes (where NCDS and FHI had only a limited number of projects) Caritas reached a total of 83,391 beneficiaries which is 100% of the affected population.

Ninety percent of the FFW projects were limited to renewing older projects and food was often used to stimulate ploughing and weeding prior to the sowing of potatoes which are tasks that would normally be carried out without Food for Work.

The low ration size in Pacajes and Villarroel contributed to poor project quality. In addition, Caritas/Patacamaya did not receive sufficient resources to carry out an adequate supervision of the projects and generally was only present at the supply centers to supervise distribution to the individual villages.

NCDS was initially to have supported Caritas with technical assistance for the FFW projects; however, NCDS could not provide technical assistance to Caritas because they could not even cover their own projects adequately.

4.4 Resources

Resources for administration and supervision of the emergency were not sufficient to cover activities over and above reception and dispatch of food requests. The area of distribution was adequately attended by the dispatches of food directly from the central warehouse.

The national budget approved from Title III was \$b. 152,640,032 of which 48% was disbursed. Certain operational elements of the emergency program were weakened by the lack of available resources. Caritas was most affected in the field of program administration, supervision and monitoring of projects.

4.5 Conclusions

Caritas was able to distribute the food efficiently but poor project supervision restricted the Food for Work to purely humanitarian aid. A small proportion of projects made a contribution to agricultural rehabilitation. The low ration levels in Pacajes limited recuperation efforts through longer term projects.

The limited financial resources also contributed to reduce the effectiveness of the Caritas emergency program in La Paz and Patacamaya.

Emergency Program
Rural Impact, Dept. of La Paz

Introduction

The evaluation covered 5 provinces and 38 villages with a total of 3,629 families. The total number of people participating in the interviews reached 569. The total population affected by the disaster in these provinces reached 233,880, so the interview reached 0.2% of the affected population and could be considered representative of 7.7% of the affected population.

5.1 Province of Gualberto Villarroel

The disaster in this province was twofold: first, the drought of 1983; second, severe flooding in the first month of 1984.

This province was attended by three institutions in the emergency program and OFASA under the regular program. Seventy-five percent of the villages received food aid rations from two agencies and 25% from four institutions. However only 25% of the FFW projects can be considered as rehabilitation with the remainder only involving limited work on existing rural infrastructure. Only 25% of the villages worked the required 17 days.

As well as food aid all the villages received seeds from "Plan Sequía 83" which mitigated to some extent the lack of seeds available for the 83-84 agricultural campaign. The food aid was considered very beneficial by the villagers with a 100% rate acceptance. Seventy-five percent of the villages received two deliveries of food by each institution.

Food was distributed on an equitable basis by most villages and as with other provinces villagers preferred to divide food equally

between workers disregarding family size. This measure was taken to avoid internal conflicts as each villager worked the same number of days.

The province is still suffering from the effects of two disasters and will require assistance for the year 1984 to 1985.

5.2 Province Pacajes

This is the largest province in La Paz and the most severely affected by the drought. Livestock losses reached 80% in many villages and agricultural production is only for subsistence.

Coverage reached 90% of the the affected population with 82% of villages receiving two monthly rations. However, the lack of locally produced food stocks in the villages means the province is still severely affected by the drought.

A large percentage of the villages had distribution problems because of the insistence of CARITAS, which delivered 80% of the food. (and USAID), that rations should be distributed by family size and not solely by number of days worked.

Due to the extensive area (12,000 sq. Km.) the province was very poorly supervised and 80% of the FFW projects can be considered only as humanitarian aid. Many villages dug livestock watering holes without ever reaching the water table.

One aspect which greatly eased distribution was the use of supply centers which allowed the CARITAS supervisor to monitor distributions of food to village committees.

As in the province of Gualberto Villarroel, agricultural production was increased to a limited extent because 60% of the villages

received seed from "Plan Sequía 83". However, the situation remains critical for most of the villagers.

5.3 Province Aroma

This province with mixed agricultural and livestock production was affected by the drought most heavily in the plains west of the mountain chain. Food coverage was 80% of the affected population which received two months rations from NCDS and FHI.

The villagers considered the food aid very beneficial but as in other provinces the aid was mainly humanitarian and only 40% of projects made a contribution to agricultural rehabilitation.

Due to favorable climatic conditions, the province has recuperated quickly from the drought. Although some areas were affected by limited flooding, agricultural production this year was favorable, especially barley.

NCDS had reasonable coverage in the area and managed to supervise some 80% of the projects which resulted in few food distribution problems in the villages.

In this province all the villages had to pay for the transport costs as NCDS and FHI did not have adequate resources to cover these costs.

This province is not a high priority area for future food aid to stimulate agricultural and livestock rehabilitation.

5.4 Province Ingavi

This province, with mixed agricultural and livestock production, was severely affected by the drought and this year large sections along

the banks of the river Desaguadero were affected by flooding.

Food coverage amounted to 72% of the affected population which received two months rations. However, rations delivered by CARITAS were 100 kilos for those families reached, in two deliveries. The distribution was arranged through supply centers which allowed 100% of transport costs to be covered. Nevertheless, the quality of projects was affected by a lack of village supervision. As with other provinces, the aid is considered as humanitarian. Fifty seven percent of FFW projects were for preparation and F30ling of field with very little attention being paid towards irrigation, defensive dykes and roads.

The province did receive a good coverage of seeds from "Plan Sequía 83" which helped to cover certain short falls in this years' harvest. Despite this aid the area will need assistance for 1984-1985 to avoid seed being consumed as food. The barley harvest was favorable which should allow livestock to recuperate.

The presence of a very active parish priest in the province contributed to a well organized food distribution program in the province, with food obtaining full acceptance among villagers.

5.5 Province Loayza

Initially this province was relatively unaffected by the drought, but the heavy rainfall in February and March of this year caused the main rivers to damage areas of crops close to the river banks.

Food aid was employed in FFW projects especially through NCDS to build defensive dykes to avoid further erosion. The area evidently suffered from the heavy rain but production was only lightly affected. The area has a high income compared to other more depressed areas in the Department of La Paz. Sixty percent of

villages only received one monthly ration, supervision of the FFW projects was accomplished through the field promoters of NCDS who covered some 50% of the projects.

The high percentage of distribution problems (50%) were mainly due to the negative attitude that villagers take towards communal activities.

The area receives significant aid from regular programs through Mothers' Clubs and school feeding and should not have been considered a priority for emergency food aid.

The food which was distributed in the area was well received and the villagers found it acceptable.

DEPARTMENT OF URURO

Introduction

In the department of Oruro the total population affected was 132,040 inhabitants. A total of 3,829 MT of food commodities were allocated for distribution by NCDS, FHI and CRS/CARITAS according to the following breakdown.

SNDC	800	MTs
FHI	1,644	MTs
CRS/CARITAS	1,385	MTs

As of May 30, 1984 the distribution by province is shown on the attached schedule.

1. Emergency Program Impact and Implementation/Oruro.

The Title II Emergency Program in Oruro was carried out by three sponsors: NCDS (Government), FHI and CRS/CARITAS. In general, the program was characterized by a lack of coordination at the planning stage, which resulted in an unbalanced coverage. Many provinces were duplicated and others were completely left out. Also, drought affected communities farthest away from access roads were not attended. Those programs were the neediest. The average percentage of coverage for those farthest away provinces was 56%, while those close to the main roads and larger cities received a coverage of about 87%. Duplication to communities attended by more than one sponsor was about 12%. Duplication of beneficiaries that received food more than one time was 20%. Out of this 20%, only five percent were entitled to the second ration because of the size of the project.

The areas chosen by the sponsors were not well coordinated and all three of them violated assigned provinces. For example, the province Alonzo de Ibañez was attended by the agencies from the departments of Oruro, Cochabamba and Potosí. The main causes for these duplications are:

- 1) Non-existent coordination between sponsors.
- 2) Unequal and late food arrivals.
- 3) The desire of each sponsor to be in each area.
- 4) Non adherence to the original planning.

The lack of food management of the SNDC and FHI offices caused late starts in the deliveries. CRS/CARITAS did a good job as far as distributing their allocated amounts at the time when it was most needed.

The projects implemented by NCDS and FHI were of better rehabilitating quality than those of CRS/CARITAS. Also, NCDS was able to attend both drought and flood victims. About 31% of all projects carried out by the three sponsors can be considered as alleviating the causes and effects of the drought. The inability of the sponsors to have a good quality program was hindered mainly because the personnel at NCDS and FHI were not properly trained and briefed by their national offices with regards to the objectives, goals and purposes of the FFW program. The CARITAS/Oruro office is well established and did not have as many administrative problems.

The FFW projects contributed little or nothing to agricultural rehabilitation, the emphasis being on the humanitarian aspect.

Technical assistance was very deficient. NCDS was the only sponsor capable of providing technical support, but the continuous strikes and internal problems of the agencies had a negative impact on their operational capacity. FHI and CRS/CARITAS worked with the Instituto

Boliviano de Tecnología Agropecuaria (IBTA). NCDS also provided them with sporadic technical cooperation.

The degree of supervision varied from sponsor to sponsor. Technical supervision of the projects reached approximately 23% of the NCDS projects while distribution supervision was lower.

FHI rated somewhat higher, around 35% on the technical supervision, most of it being conducted by IBTA. CRS/CARITAS has a well established network of field promoters, constantly monitoring their various programs.

Operational capabilities were negatively affected by faulty resource disbursements. All sponsors depended on their national offices for the disbursement process which was very slow and cumbersome and adversely affected their operational capability. For example, transportation payments and purchases of equipment such as, scales and adding machines, were delayed.

Program Implementation; Department of Oruro.

2) National Community Development Agency

2.1 Planning

An operational plan was developed by the national NCDS office for each regional office. This plan was completed in May, 1983, without the participation of representatives of the regional offices. After completion, the Oruro regional office did not receive a copy, neither was the personnel properly briefed on the FFW program.

The result was that the start of the FFW program was plagued with a series of problems arising from the lack of coordination with the

national office and other institutions. The FFW program was implemented with little or no reference to the original operational plan.

Also, other external factors influenced:

- 1) Late arrival of food commodities to the Oruro office.
- 2) Deficient inter-institutional coordination.
- 3) Internal problems at the national office both a political and organizational nature.
- 4) Lack of accurate data for the affected areas concerning number of affected population.

The Oruro program was scheduled to start in June, 1983, becoming fully operational around the end of January, 1984. Deliveries under the FFW program continued until July 15, 1984.

2.2 Administration

An effort was made by the regional NCDS office manager to develop an operational plan more in keeping with the working conditions of the office. However, this plan was directed towards the administrative aspect of the FFW program and did not contemplate distribution and targeting of the food. Also, because of the very unstable nature of NCDS's top level management, the regional office suffered too, with personnel constantly being replaced by newcomers. Program efficiency/effectiveness was very much affected, the staff were not properly trained thus causing delays and errors in processing food requests.

A major problem developed when the accounting reports were not properly done, causing serious delays in the disbursement of operational funds.

2.3 Warehousing

In general, warehousing was deficient. Oruro is a city that cannot provide proper food storage facilities. Most of the warehouses are small and inadequate.

NCDS rented several small warehouses, which were qualified as appropriate at the time of the drought because they were dry and secure.

The unexpected floods reached some of the warehouses damaging food stored in direct contact with the floor.

Food storage was adequate, but it could have been improved with proper training. Food was not stacked according to Mission recommendations. Kardex cards were kept to keep track of the food movements. Clearing was less than adequate because the size of the warehouses would not permit access to corners and walls.

Food losses were also caused by rodents.

2.4 Distribution

Although NCDS was plagued with continuous strikes and other problems, they managed to distribute until May, 1984, about 325 MTs of the 750 MTs received. They covered 13 provinces from Oruro and five from Potosí. The number of beneficiaries reached was 11,835 inhabitants, which is about 8.96% of the total affected population. This percentage may seem a little low, but Oruro had a very late start in the distribution.

NCDS considers that this food is not enough and they expected their office to have more than one food delivery per community. NCDS carried out limited supervision of the nearest communities or to

those with good access roads. They consider that the food was a complement enough to mitigate the hunger and not a substitute.

Deliveries were usually made at the warehouses, with occasional on the spot deliveries. In 100% of the cases the costs of the transportation from the warehouse to the community was paid by the beneficiary.

2.5 Resources

The regional offices depended 100% per cent on the national office. In the case of Oruro operating funds were received with delays, affecting the operational capacity of NCDS. Also, equipment contemplated in the budget was not purchased on time.

Resource disbursements were the responsibility of the national office, but multiple Central Bank strikes and a money devaluation added to NCDS's poor performance.

Lack of properly trained accountants was one of the reasons that financial reports were inadequate which created further delays in disbursements.

2.6 Conclusions

The NCDS Emergency Program was characterized by delays and administrative problems. Nevertheless, SNDC managed a good program. The technical supervision and quality of their projects was better than FHI's and CRS/CARITAS's. Not all the limiting factors were internal. Some of them were outside NCDS's control.

Given the fact that NCDS did not have a food program in Oruro, the Emergency Program has been a valuable experience which will allow this agency to set up a good regular food program.

3. Food For The Hungry

3.1 Planning

A national distribution plan was elaborated . The lack of communication and coordination within FHI seriously affected FHI's capacity to complement the plan in Oruro. Nevertheless, certain priority areas were designated which were the areas most affected by the disaster related to flooding and drought. This plan was not strictly followed as other affected provinces were included as requests for food came in. There was no inter - institutional coordination to designate areas.

The program was designed to operate from December 1983 to July 1984, but distribution did not begin until February.

3.2 Administration

The administrative capacity of FHI was deficient. Personnel had little training and the orientation given by the FHI National office was not sufficient.

Food was distributed efficiently as requests arrived at the office. However, the late arrival of food to the FHI/Oruro office caused some difficulty. Distribution started with a loan from NCDS/Oruro.

3.3 Warehousing

As with NCDS, the warehouse capacity was affected by the lack of available space and the majority of warehouses available did not fulfill the minimum required conditions for food storage. FHI did not manage warehouse accounting adequately until USAID made recommendations for changes in April 84. The warehouses were not well stacked but cleanliness was adequate.

3.4 Distribution

The distribution of food did not present any problems with

the exception that many areas in the west of the department could not be attended because of the poor state of the roads.

Duplication of deliveries existed in some 20% of the villages due to the lack of coordination. Many food losses occurred in transit from the seaports to Oruro.

3.5 Resources

FHI received funds from Title III and utilized their own resources.

Both the budgets for administration and supervision were insufficient but warehousing and distribution was adequately budgeted. The devaluation and economic adjustment which the program suffered also negatively affected the real value of budgeted funds.

3.6 Conclusions

The development and implementation of the program was a favorable experience as the office overcame obstacles in the program enabling FHI to gradually improve program quality.

4. CRS/CARITAS - Oruro

4.1 Planning

Although CARITAS/Oruro did not elaborate a regional plan they had the experience and organizational capability derived from the regular program. Provincial quotas were generally fulfilled by CARITAS both in Oruro and 4 provinces in the North of Potosí. The office planned to attend 15 provinces but actually attended 21 provinces in total during the months of March, 1983 to February, 1984, by borrowing food from the regular program.

The affected population was 132,000 in Oruro with CARITAS attending 52,237 beneficiaries.

4.2 Administration

CARITAS did not have any problem in distributing the food and administrating the program with a team of 8 experienced and trained employees who also worked for the regular program. The distribution in the north of Potosí was organized with the help of the parish of Sacaca.

The food arrived in October, 1983 with the exception of the flour which arrived in January, 1984.

4.3 Warehousing

The warehousing capacity was sufficient but problems occurred due to interference with the regular program. The security of the warehouse was helped by the presence of porters and watchmen with the warehouses kept in an adequate state of cleanliness and organization.

4.4 Distribution

CARITAS reached some 40% of the affected population, but the projects only contributed to mitigate the effects of the drought in 30% of the villages with the installation of micro irrigation projects.

Problems in distribution of food did not occur, although some delays did exist because of the bad state of the roads, few trucks and continual road blockades. The villages paid for 100% of the transport.

Duplication of deliveries with other agencies existed in 20% of the villages attended.

4.5 Resources

The resources were not sufficient to cover supervision costs. Nevertheless, it was possible to cover distribution costs.

4.6 Conclusions

Due to the experience gained on the regular program, CARITAS/Oruro was able to implement satisfactorily the emergency program and could have distributed much more food.

RURAL IMPACT - DEPARTMENT OF ORURO

According to the institutional evaluation schedule of the emergency program, The Oruro evaluation team, composed of personnel belonging to USAID, NCDS, and FHI evaluated the following provinces: Carangas, Sajama, Atahualpa, Saucari, Cercado, in the department of Oruro, and Alonzo de Ibañez in the northern part of the department of Potosi. The figures show us that the food quotas assigned to this department were enough to cover more beneficiaries than the population affected by natural disasters. This situation originated because of the lack of inter-institutional coordination.

The data tabulated from the evaluation shows that reactivation of agricultural production through FFW projects was not accomplished. The sponsors were not able to provide the individual communities with technical assistance. The majority of projects were carried out for the purpose of mitigating hunger.

Twenty-three percent of all projects were for irrigation, 8.5% for the construction of wells and reservoirs, 34% were for road rehabilitation and construction and the remaining 34% were for communal infrastructure. This demonstrates that the program was more directed toward the relief of hunger than for the reactivation of agricultural production.

Coordination was poor since duplicity of assistance reached 12.5% for the department. Only 47% of all communities attended received technical assistance (NCDS only) and 26.5% received assistance in the form of potato seeds. Nevertheless, all the affected population was covered with food deliveries. Another point worth mentioning is that 20% of the affected population received two deliveries of food. NCDS supervised 23.3% of its projects, FHI supervised 35% and CRS/Caritas 40%. Communal participation in projects was 90%. Villages found the food acceptable and generally they wished to continue with FFW.

To achieve a broader vision of the impact of the program, the general characteristics of two provinces are described below:

SAUCARI

This province has been affected by both drought and floods. This area is mainly dependent on livestock raising and suffered large losses, especially in sheep which reached 60% due to the drought and the remaining 40% is menaced by the floods. The variety of projects implemented with FFW in the province shows that an effective rehabilitation effort did not exist;

Irrigation Projects	20%
Wells and Reservoirs	20%
Roads	20%
Communal Projects	40%

The construction of irrigation projects wells and reservoirs reached 40%. The rest of the projects may be considered as not mitigating the causes of the drought.

ATAHUALLPA

This province was affected by drought which caused a loss of 80% in livestock. In some cases the loss of alpacas was total. The heavy rainfall did not allow the potato and forage crops to grow. Apart from natural disasters this province did not receive adequate technical assistance due to the lack of roads for access. Projects which contributed to the mitigation of the effects of the drought were minimal.

DEPARTMENT OF COCHABAMBA AND CHUQUISACA

Introduction

One evaluation team covered these two departments of Cochabamba and Chuquisaca. As a result the conclusions are included together in one section.

In Cochabamba, the total affected population by the drought was 403,086 in 15 provinces. A similar picture existed in Chuquisaca with 205,139 affected inhabitants in 10 provinces. Food was distributed by Food for the Hungry, Catholic Relief Services/Cáritas and the National Community Development Service.

Evaluation Process and Participants

Cochabamba

The evaluation process in the Department of Cochabamba took two weeks from July 9 to July 20. The evaluation team consisted of the USAID inspector, Hernan Arce of NCDS/Cochabamba and Alfredo Pardo and Omar Fernandez of Food for the Hungry. Lucio Morales, Director of CARITAS, was helpful in agreeing to an interview and providing the team with information.

The evaluation team visited communities in the provinces of Capinota, Esteban Arce, Arani, Mizque, Campero and Jordan. Time and road conditions prohibited greater coverage of the department. During the two week evaluation period three institutions (OFINAAL excluded) and 30 communities were interviewed.

Chuquisaca

In the Department of Chuquisaca, the evaluation process took a little less than two weeks. The team consisted of the USAID Inspector, Johnny Miranda of NCDS and Hugo Bustillos and Basilio Sanchez of Food for the Hungry. Jose Ayo of CARITAS was also cooperative.

The evaluation team visited communities in the provinces of Oropeza, Yamparaez, Zudañez and Tomina. During the evaluation period four institutions were interviewed and 25 communities were evaluated.

Program Impact and Implementation, Chuquisaca and Cochabamba

There are many indicators that demonstrate a lack of sound planning for the Emergency Program. For example, statistics of affected population were prepared by the Civil Defense (CD) and embraced by USAID and the Volags. Unfortunately, there were no other statistics available and the CD data was generally incorrect.

Of the many fallacies in the CD statistics, the most glaring was the failure to identify zones of greatest need. In addition, poor planning at the regional level resulted in two to three Volags distributing food in the same province.

The original planning did not take into account the extent of the disaster in some areas and magnified the disaster in others. The distribution figures show an uneven coverage with one province in Cochabamba, Arque, receiving attention for 190% of the population. The other provinces received coverage range from 20% to 90%.

In Chuquisaca one province which did not require assistance was attended. Two provinces received more coverage than was required. The rest were attended with a coverage ranging from 0% to 72%.

Although drought victims were to have received "one to two deliveries" (operational guidelines) of food to each village, in practice only one delivery was made. The attached figures show however with the exceptions mentioned above deliveries did not even cover the needs of one ration. As in other departments this definitely affected the effectiveness of initiatives in the field of agricultural rehabilitation and alleviation of the causes of the disaster. Only FHI/Sucre managed to make a significant impact in this area.

The Volags maintained in their interviews that they did utilize a regional plan for distribution. Unfortunately, the plan was strictly distribution oriented. As a result, the Volags did not have a clear sense of their own program objectives. Implementation was haphazard and without focus. Food was distributed on a general basis with little contribution made towards development or use of food as a developmental tool.

Volag administration of the Emergency Program suffered on all levels. NCDS and FHI had great difficulty maintaining their operations at the regional level due to poor management and support from their national offices. NCDS and to a lesser degree FHI were hampered at every step of the process by national offices that appeared to be slow to respond to the needs at the regional level.

The disbursement of funds from national to regional offices was a slow process particularly for NCDS and CARITAS.

All the agencies were affected by both a lack of staff and resources.

Because of the emergency nature of the program there was little time to plan and secure needed resources. USAID intended for established organizations like CARITAS and National Community Development Service NCDS to utilize their working resources including staff, together with extra financial support for the emergency program. This was not realistic as both organizations suffer from a lack of funding support. In the case of Food for the Hungry virtually no organizational infrastructure existed.

To further burden the operations, FHI and to a lesser degree NCDS waited for months for food to arrive. The result is that distribution was often postponed till after the most pressing need for food had passed.

The agencies were not prepared to launch a full scale distribution program which required office support, transportation, warehouses, not to mention promotion, inspection and evaluation in the field. A successful implementation of this program requires basic resources readily available right from the beginning of the

program together with sufficient experience in program personnel. The only office to show sufficient capacity in the two departments was FHI/Sucre. CARITAS was more than able to distribute the food and could have handled significantly more food, but they did orientate the program towards rehabilitation.

Most of the Volags were not satisfied with their warehouse space. This was particularly true in Sucre where large warehouses are non-existent. CARITAS-Sucre maintains seven or eight different warehouse facilities. Warehousing should be a primary concern for any food program. The construction of adequate warehouse space may be the best alternative in the long run and certainly more cost effective.

The distribution of food was hampered by the inability of Volagas to enter certain sectors. The heavy rains made many areas inaccessible and food delivery was delayed or never arrived.

The loss of food through falsification of papers, theft and illegal sales is difficult to document but it did occur. The following examples help substantiate this contention.

- 1) In early June a community in the Province of Arani was investigated for an alleged misappropriation of food. As it turned out, the community did not exist, nor did some of the people listed as workers. The village leader had used the name of his cooperative, for a community. We asked him to substantiate the documentation and when he could not, we took all the food that had not been distributed.

The incident is significant in that FHI had never visited or supervised the project and it was by chance that the evaluation team could document this case.

- 2) During the evaluation process, we visited the community of Aguada in the province of Mizque. Aguada was listed in the FHI report as having received food March 21. According to the residents interviewed Aguada never received food from FHI, especially when there is no supervision.

3) The market in Sucre was visited several times and lentils from the U.S. were being sold. Those who sold the lentils openly admit that they come from the U.S. These are obviously lentils that were distributed to communities during the Emergency Program and then sold to vendors in the market. The lentils are currently sold for as much as \$b.2,000 a pound. The open sales of lentils in the market lend credence to the allegation that communities are not consuming all the food they receive and may be profiting by the sales.

However, in villages that have received various deliveries of food the sale of certain commodities seems to be a form of recapitalization of the family economy. This especially occurs when food is distributed at harvest time as occurred during the emergency program.

4) Theft of a different nature occurs within the institutions themselves. On two different occasions NCDS Cochabamba Emergency Program employees stole Title II food - one directly from the warehouse and the other time the program director falsified documentation for a non-existent community. Both times the culprits were apprehended and the food recovered. This sort of theft may occur more frequently than is easily detectable particularly on a small scale. Most functionaries of the agencies are grossly underpaid and there is a temptation to steal a bag of rice or a can of cooking oil.

Without a doubt, the agencies complained most of the lack of resources needed to carry out their jobs. The lack of resources effects an entire operation from office administration to field supervision. Those organizations that had resources or coordinated with other institutions generally offered a more complete, higher quality program. Those without resources suffered, complained and generally ran very poor programs.

In both, Chuquisaca and Cochabamba, the regional committees functioned effectively. This occurred in spite of the non-participation of the Oficina Nacional de Asistencia Alimentaria (OFINAAL). Meetings were held every week in Cochabamba for the first six months and every two weeks thereafter. The inter-institutional committee in Cochabamba continues to meet every two weeks and has expanded membership to include other development organizations that do not necessarily work with food but are interested in coordinating activities.

2. Program Implementation

NCDS - Cochabamba

2.1. Planning

NCDS did formulate one operational plan at the national level but those at the regional level were not included in the development of the plan. The operational plan was never given to the regional offices. What planning that did occur at the regional level came out of the inter institutional committee (CIPERDA). NCDS/CBB was assigned the provinces of Campero, Quillacollo, Canasco, Chapare and Ayopaya with equal shares of 120 T/M going to each. It should be noted that the planning done by the committees in Cochabamba and Chuquisaca were strictly distribution oriented with little consideration of the basic program rehabilitation objectives.

2.2. Administration

Initially the administration of the NCDS/Cochabamba Office was wholly inadequate. The Director who was sent to Cochabamba to head up the program was not qualified.

NCDS also received very little support from their national office. For example:

- 1) No funds - regional offices waited months to be reimbursed for transportation costs and basic operating needs.
- 2) No salaries - Emergency Plan staff commonly waited 2-3 months for low salaries.
- 3) Employee strikes by the non-Emergency Plan staff hampered operations although to their credit the Emergency Plan personnel continued to work.
- 4) No furniture, no equipment, no transportation and poor working conditions.
- 5) No support of any kind from the NCDS regular office operations.

The situation in Cochabamba did improve when the new director took over in February. He was competent and experienced but still suffered from a lack of support.

2.3 Warehousing

The warehouse used by NCDS/Cochabamba was adequate physically and was generally maintained. Prior to February, the NCDS warehousemen were not trained in arranging and managing a warehouse. The entire warehouse operation improved tremendously after February when an honest, competent person took over.

2.4 Distribution

According to plan, NCDS/Cochabamba did distribute food in all five of the provinces previously mentioned. Most of the distribution was of a humanitarian nature as very little development assistance was offered. According to the NCDS Director less than 40% of the projects were supervised and less than 10% received technical assistance.

Due to mismanagement on the part of the first director, some provinces not assigned NCDS were given food as well. This happened in four provinces.

2.5 Resources.

The NCDS office in Cochabamba was poor in resources. Transport, office equipment, materials were not available and often salaries were not payed on time. To their credit, they did carry out a program and continued to work in spite of repeated strikes and few resources.

2.6 Conclusions

The NCDS/Cochabamba office suffered from a lack of initial planning and directions from the NCDS national office. The operation was poorly administrated until directors and warehousemen were changed in February. The warehouse was adequate but most resources were lacking. The latter hampered the entire operation. There was little project supervision and the distribution of food was primarily humanitarian aid.

Food for the Hungry - Cochabamba

3.1 Planning

FHI offered had a faulty planning process for its regional offices. For an organization that was engaging in an emergency development program for the first time in Bolivia, the lack of planning was very evident. In Cochabamba, the FHI office was assigned the provinces of Cercado, Arani, Capinota, Tapacarí, Mizque and Punata by the regional committee and received over 1,100 T/M to distribute to the 6 provinces. FHI staff were well aware of the Emergency Program objectives from the inception of the program.

3.2 Administration

The program in Cochabamba was poorly administrated for a variety of reasons. The director had experience working in the rural areas but no experience in organizing and running an office. In addition, the office was assigned too large of an area and too much food to distribute. North American volunteers were intended to bolster the administrative capacity of the office but instead they were limited because they did not speak Spanish, had no experience with food, and no experience in Latin cultures.

3.2 Warehousing

Before the food started arriving the FHI warehouse was clearly inadequate. There was a problem with water leaks, rates, and security. In spite of repeated recommendations and demands, the warehouse was utilized throughout the program. As more food came in another smaller but adequate werehouse was rented. FHI did employ a competent, honest warehousemen who maintained accurate records and kept weekly inventories.

3.3 Distribution

FHI did distribute to all six provinces it was assigned. Unfortunately only 15% of the projects were inspected. In other words, it was a general distribution of a humanitarian nature with no relation to development. The late arrival of food did retard deliveries and again communities received food three to four months later.

3.4 Resources

As in the case of NCDS, FHI had no transportation. It did receive support from the national office to acquire office machines, equipment and needed money. FHI - Cochabamba was short of personnel as well as overwhelmed with food and areas to distribute to. For better or for worse this office has been closed permanently.

...

3.5 Conclusion

The CBBA office was poorly administered throughout the program mainly due to an inexperienced director. While the national office provided little direction, FHI did receive some planning assistance from the regional committee. Warehousing was inadequate throughout and distribution suffered from the late arrival of food, poor administration, no inspection or technical assistance, and a lack of transportation.

CRS/CARITAS COCHABAMBA

4.1 Planning

CARITAS Cochabamba was instrumental in planning at the regional level. The director served as president of the inter-institutional committee and successfully included other development organizations in the planning process. This planning was distribution oriented and had little to do with development assistance. CARITAS also had a national operational plan but it had little utility on the regional level.

4.2 Administration

The CARITAS Cochabamba director had previous experience and he had no trouble gearing up his operation for immediate distribution. The director gave the program continuity and had a positive influence over the other institutions. The strength of the CARITAS operation in Cochabamba raises the question of why an experienced organization received less food to distribute than the less experienced FHI and NCDS organizations.

Administratively CARITAS took no time in waiting for food to arrive. The director immediately borrowed food from the Regular Plan programs and begin distribution in September while NCDS and FHI had to wait till December and January.

4.3 Warehousing

CARITAS has adequate warehouse space that is generally well organized and maintained. The institution does some distribution out of the small warehouse next to the offices. This facility was not always clean nor was the food properly stacked.

4.4 Distribution

As mentioned above, distribution began in September and terminated in January. This is significant in that the CARITAS food did reach communities at the time of greatest need. This is the period that was intended for the first phase of distribution.

CARITAS concentrated on two of the hardest hit provinces in the department, Arque and Esteban Arce. The difference in promotion, inspection and evaluation in the 2 provinces can be linked to the quality of personnel working in each. Arque is a province that has been left unattended for years by development organizations mainly due to its inaccessibility. Esteban Arce, on the other hand, has benefited from a six year alliance with a Catholic organization - Jesús María.

Distribution in Arque was an operation in which three organizations from Cochabamba and Oruro flooded the zone with food with little regard for quality of programming. CARITAS-Cochabamba at least initiated sound projects but was hampered by the rainy season and has just recently completed project evaluation.

Esteban Arce was covered by Jesús María an organization that knows the province and is trusted by the campesinos. The projects were regularly inspected and evaluated

4.5 Resources

CARITAS/Cochabamba was able to rely on existent resources such as office equipment, jeeps and personnel. This is another reason for the rapid mobilization of Emergency Program distribution. In addition, CARITAS has a vast network of programs throughout the department and is able to facilitate promotion by tapping into the network. Initially, internal resources were the intention for both CARITAS and NDCS at least till other resources could be acquired. CARITAS Cochabamba was one of the few offices that had these resources available.

4.6 Conclusion

CARITAS Cochabamba was a strong force in planning food distribution for the department and maintaining an organized regional committee. CARITAS was adept at promoting the program and distributing food. The director also made good use of existing resources. The food deliveries in the Province of Arque were humanitarian aid while in the Province of Esteban Arce there was more of an emphasis on development. CARITAS delivered food between September and January, the period of greatest need for the campesino

CARITAS/Aiquile

5.1 Planning

There was absolutely no planning either locally or through the national office. The priests who operate the programs were not capable of elaborating an operational plan. The area of distribution consisted in the provinces of Campero, Mizque and Carrasco.

5.2 Administration

This was wholly inadequate. No documentation of food deliveries has even been submitted. There was no promotion, inspection or evaluation in the field. The priests appear incapable of managing a food program. They made no effort to improve the program even after CRS threatened them with a year's suspension of food. The office does not have full time personnel to run the operation.

5.3 Warehousing

The warehouse facilities are old buildings that are inadequate for food storage. The building was dirty, the food was poorly arranged, and pests entered and damaged the food.

5.4. Distribution

It is impossible to analyze this area because no documentation has been submitted on food deliveries. The evaluation team visited various zones within the three provinces and campesinos did report that the food arrived at a time of need. On the other hand, the team encountered a number of campesino complaints

regarding the paternal and arbitrary attitudes of the priests. Because no inspection is carried out, the priests confide in the community leaders. This created alleged problems of theft, illegal sales and inequitable distribution within the communities.

5.5 Resources

Adequate resources exist in terms of transportation, office space and materials. What was obviously lacking was trained personnel and the effective utilization of existing resources.

5.6 Conclusion

This program was a failure in all aspects and did not fulfill minimum standards for the emergency.

NCDS/Chuquisaca

6.1 Planning

This office received no operational plan as in the case of NCDS - Cochabamba. In Sucre, the inter-institutional committee was less specific about provincial assignments for each institution. The result is that NCDS was assigned the provinces of Oropeza, Yamparaez and Zudañez, but distribution took place in those three provinces and Tormina, Azurduy, Hernando Siles, and two provinces in Potosí.

6.2 Administration

The administration of the Sucre office was somewhat haphazard as personnel move in and out of Emergency Program positions. Thus, gave the program had little continuity although the regional office director did play an integral role throughout. Administration suffered from a lack of support from the national office.

6.3 Warehousing

This aspect of the operation was adequate both in physical space, organization, security and cleanliness.

6.4 Distribution

As mentioned above, NCDS distribution did not follow the original planning by the regional committee. This is not necessarily a negative aspect because NCDS attended some non-assigned provinces that received little attention from other organizations. NCDS inspected or offered technical assistance to a

majority of the projects. NCDS also was present when the food arrived and was distributed in the communities. This is a sound idea as it insures equitable distribution and solidifies the relationship between community and institution.

It should be noted that distribution in both Cochabamba and Chuquisaca was disrupted by the late arrival of food. Some provinces waited for three months for their food and in some cases the food arrived long after the need had passed.

Most of the NCDS food distribution was humanitarian aid. When the institution does not have the ability to work directly with communities to solve their problems it is impossible to offer development assistance.

6.5 Resources

NCDS/Chuquisaca was resource poor primarily as a result of the non-cooperation of the national office. At the same time no effort was made to seek out other resources even when it was evident that the NCDS national office was not being supportive.

6.6 Conclusion

Resources were lacking and every aspect of the operation was affected negatively by this shortcoming. The director of the regional office did lend some continuity to the program but administration suffered from the frequent changes in Emergency Program personnel. Again, the lack of supervision and technical assistance meant the aid was purely humanitarian and not developmental.

FHI/Chuquisaca

7.1 Planning

This was the only office in Chuquisaca that did its own initial planning. The director realized that he would be unable to operate a viable program with the limited resources available to him. Therefore he developed a distribution and development plan with IBTA under a formal agreement. The agreement called for IBTA to offer:

- regular transportation to the rural areas.
- technical assistance to projects.
- field supervision
- use of seeds other than vegetables
- free warehouse storage

7.2 Administration

The FHI director has developed other agreements with Servicio Nacional de Caminos, Plan de Padrinos and others. Administration has been adequate and FHI has successfully utilized inputs from other agencies.

7.3 Warehousing

Initially IBTA offered free warehouse space and security arrangements. When the food started arriving in January, a larger, more adequate space was secured. This warehouse was found to be well organized, clean and secure..

7.4 Distribution

FHI-Sucre took more of a Regular Plan approach to working with the communities in Chuquisaca. Seeds were used to introduce vegetable gardening to communities that were unfamiliar with legumes. Food rations were programmed for three months to give the project continuity. IBTA became an integral part of the operation.

Distribution took place in the Provinces of Oropeza, Azurduy, Zudañez, Tomina and Yamparaez. Ninety five percent of the projects received supervision and ninety percent received regular technical assistance from IBTA. This food represented both humanitarian aid and development assistance. The food was used as an incentive to development efforts. The relationships established with these communities will continue into the Regular Plan and FHI recently signed a new contract with IBTA.

7.5 Resources

As previously mentioned the resources were not available at the beginning of the program and in the case of transportation still do not exist. The FHI Sucre Director managed to obtain resources and has established one of the most successful operations in the country as a result.

7.6 Conclusion

This is a model office both in terms of planning, administration and distribution. The office developed its own operational plan in conjunction with IBTA. The operation was well administered and this is reflected in the quality of programming and distribution. The food deliveries by FHI qualify as development assistance first and humanitarian aid second.

CARITAS/Sucre

8.1 Planning

What little planning that did occur happened at the regional level within the regional committee and by the CARITAS Sucre staff. CARITAS - Sucre was programmed to distribute food in the provinces of Yamparaez, Tomino, Zudañez, Azurduy and Nor Cinti. Both FHI and NCDS distributed food in these provinces as well but the regional committee designated zones within each province for each institution to cover. Assigning 3 or 4 institutions to different zones in the same province was poor planning. It created duplication of services and confusion for the institutions and the campesinos.

8.2 Administration

The administration of the CARITAS office was poor. Either too little (less than 1/2 ration) or too much (2-3 rations) food was distributed. This was done in spite of the repeated requests to normalize the ration levels. In addition, CARITAS - Sucre sold food bags throughout the Emergency Program. By their own admission the administrative staff was not enthusiastic about the Emergency Program because of lack of transportation, the wholesale nature of the program, lack of support from the national level and time taken away the regular operations.

8.3 Warehousing

Sucre does not have large warehouse space. As a result, an institution like CARITAS that handles sizeable quantities of food each year must utilize 7 different warehouse facilities. This is obviously a burden logistically and it has been suggested that

the institution construct an adequate facility. The various warehouses are secure and were organized and maintained throughout the Emergency Program.

8.4 Distribution

CARITAS distributed food in the provinces of Azurduy, Zudañez, Tomino, Yamparaez, Nor Cinti and Sud Cinti. More than half the food was distributed in the Province of Zudañez which also received coverage from FHI and NCDS. The staff claimed to have supervised 40% of the projects and offered no technical assistance. More alarming was that the staff reported 60% duplication of food deliveries because of the unwillingness of OFINAAL and Plan Sequía to coordinate distribution. Distribution was also hampered by the inaccessibility of some of the provinces south of Sucre due to excessive rain fall.

The lack of attention given CARITAS projects confirms that the food served as humanitarian aid only.

8.5 Resources

CARITAS - Sucre complained throughout the program of being resource poor. The lack of transportation prevented field supervision and any quality programming. As mentioned before, CARITAS could benefit from a new warehouse facility. The office did have adequate personnel and equipment although the complaint was lodged that use of these resources diluted the quality of other programs.

8.6 Conclusions

The CARITAS - Sucre office was poorly administered and planning was only done to pinpoint areas of distribution. Food was distributed according to different formulas and food bags were sold to the communities. The lack of resources affected distribution and the quality of programming.

A Rural Impact
Department of Cochabamba and Chuquisaca

In reviewing the projects carried out by communities in Cochabamba and Chuquisaca, it is clear that the majority did not follow the Emergency Program objectives. Nevertheless, most communities stated that their projects were beneficial. A distinction must be made though between development assistance and humanitarian aid. According to the program objectives, most of the communities received humanitarian aid but little or no development assistance.

In the type of cooperation received by the communities, one can note a major difference between Cochabamba and Chuquisaca. Almost without exception, the communities in Cochabamba received food only. In Chuquisaca, over 50% of the communities evaluated received seeds, technical assistance or money in addition to food. This means that more institutions and resources were at work during this period in Chuquisaca. It also follows, as the statistics reveal, that Cochabamba communities received one food delivery only while 75% of the communities in Chuquisaca received 2 or more deliveries.

Virtually every community in both departments felt that the food was adequate. The only shortage of rations we found were communities that received food from CARITAS - Sucre. In many cases they received less than half the established ration. The communities overwhelmingly said the food was a help, in most cases arriving at a time of great need. Over 80% of all the communities paid for the transportation of food from the regional warehouse to the community. This was a program shortcoming as the intent was for the community to pay 50% of the cost of transport.

The number of projects supervised varied from institution to institution. In Chuquisaca 72% of the communities evaluated received supervision as opposed to 63% in Cochabamba. In addition, the Chuquisaca communities were inspected an average of 2 times

each while the Cochabamba communities received an average of 1 visit per institution.

With few exceptions, the communities evaluated worked at least the required 17 days. Those that worked more usually received more than one delivery of food. Until January, 22 days of work were required by the implementing agencies.

The issue of migration from rural communities should not be overplayed. On the face of our findings, the number of communities that experienced migration is significant (87% in Cochabamba; 44% in Chuquisaca). The majority went to the Chapare, Santa Cruz or Argentina migrating on a temporary basis. It is important to point out that most of these communities experience migration every year whether there is a drought or high agricultural production. Certainly the proximity of the Chapare to Cochabamba and the money to be made there has a strong influence over temporary migration but it is not a new phenomenon.

Malnourishment was something the men grudgingly admitted to and the women readily admitted to. The perception of incidence of the malnourishment in both children and lactating mothers was high (66% Cochabamba 80% Chuquisaca). A number of these communities receive USAID food both for the Mother Clubs and the school feeding program in addition to the Food for Work program. The community members were asked why there is malnourishment among children if the family is receiving food from other programs. The answer was that the food is a small ration for a month and generally it is shared with the entire family.

In both departments, 85% of the communities felt that the food did not create a dependency and 100% naturally expressed a desire to continue with food for work programs. Those that felt the food creates a dependency explained that the community becomes accustomed to receiving something for every project - from the priest, from USAID or from another institution. Without the food or some other stimulus there is no work.

A number of agencies and state organizations were instrumental in working with CARITAS, FHI, NDCS and OFINAAL in making the Emergency Program work. The following is an overview of their comments.

- 1) The food arrived too late for the areas in greatest need.
- 2) More emphasis should be placed on supervision and technical assistance in future programs.
- 3) The problem of water and water systems is the number one priority in most areas.
- 4) There is a need for increased inter-institutional coordination, pooling of resources and cooperative training for personnel.
- 5) State organizations should play a secondary not a primary role in future programs.
- 6) Future programs should concentrate on the hardest hit areas with loan programs in seeds, money and materials. Loans are preferable to donations.
- 7) A need to decentralize the operations of the Volags to give the regional offices more autonomy.

1. Program Impact and Implementation - Department of Potosí

The Emergency Program in the Department of Potosí, involved three sponsors: FHI, NCDS, CARITAS, and OFINNAL.

The implementation was characterized by a lack of inter institutional coordination. This deficiency caused provinces closer to the town of Potosí to be heavily covered, for example Linares received 474 MT with a coverage of affected population of 152%, Sponsors from Oruro also assisted provinces in the North of Potosí as did the sponsors in Potosí causing an over coverage of the provinces of Bustillos to 411%, Alberto Ibañez 270%, Daniel Campos 205%. Other provinces in the north also severely affected by draught received little assistance, for example Bilbao 8%, Charcas 12% and Chayanta 37%. None of the sponsors involved kept records of food quotas assigned per province, nor did they check their distribution figures against the estimates of population affected. All the sponsors attempted to assist the more depressed areas, causing duplication of attention in various areas.

The administration of the Emergency Program was deficient in warehousing and supervision in NCDS and CRS/CARITAS. FHI managed to supervise 90% of their projects. Accounting was bad in general causing long delays in the presentation of accounts and fund disbursement.

The delays in the arrival of food caused numerous problems such as changes in targeting, training and allocation of personnel.

The lack of experience in handling disaster relief programs was evident in all the sponsors. Established objectives were not reached due to limited experience and the lack of resources did not permit an efficient direction of activities in the field.

CRS/CARITAS felt that the assistance given was more a relief from hunger than rehabilitation of agricultural production while FHI and NCDS felt that the projects had helped rehabilitation.

Technical assistance was weak in general. NCDS, who has technicians available, only gave assistance to an estimated 10% of all projects. This was due mainly to the lack of communication and cooperation between institutions.

The food aid received wide acceptance among the villagers, and obviously helped alleviate suffering and hunger.

Inadequate program monitoring and feedback by USAID was also to blame for the unequal distribution figures.

Sponsors did not deliver distribution information requested within time periods required, causing problems in the reprogramming of distributions.

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION DEPARTMENT OF POTOSI

The population of the department of Potosí affected was 450,112 with 4,452.11 MT required per month. Distribution figures for the department of Potosí as of May 30th are shown in the attached charts.

2. National Community Development Service Planning

2.1 Planning

NCDS Potosí elaborated a regional plan for Potosí in April 83. This plan was produced by NCDS, without coordination with other voluntary agencies. The plan was based on information supplied by MACA and IBTA as well as by the Confederación Nacional de Campesinos de Potosí. With this information they made up a list of communities to be attended during the Emergency Program, which was scheduled to start in October 1983 but food did not arrive until November 1983 and the program began operations January 1984. NCDS found that a

large percentage of the communities programmed for attention had already been assisted by CRS-Cáritas, so attention was to those unattended villages.

After receiving applications for FFW programs from communities in the Department, NCDS decided to attend projects in coordination with OFINAAL, CRS-Cáritas and FHI with the result that few of the elements of the plan were carried out as originally conceived.

Quotas of food per province were not assigned which further aggravated the unequal distribution of food.

Provinces close to the city of Potosí received large amounts of food causing over-coverage. Inter-institutional coordination was weak, and carried out half way through the program. Many provinces received duplicate attention, while provinces more affected by drought but distant from the city of Potosí received little attention.

Other factors that contributed to this unequal distribution of food were:

- 1) Late arrival of food to Potosí.
- 2) Lack of experienced personnel to administer the Emergency Program.
- 3) Lack of monitoring of deliveries against the number of beneficiaries served.

2.2 Administration

The administration of the Potosí program was carried out in close coordination with the National Office. Unfortunately delays and problems occurred within the National NCDS Office, which was plagued with strikes in the latter part of the program. The major factor which contributed to this situation was that NCDS Potosí is completely dependent on the NCDS National Office for funds and approval of operational activities.

The NCDS Potosí Office was given autonomy of operation and decision making over which communities to assist once it became

obvious that the original plan would not cover enough beneficiaries. Of the communities planned to receive assistance, many had already been served by other institutions. The personnel lacked training and experience in handling large volumes of food, and lacked the necessary resources to make the program more effective. The internal strife between the NCDS Potosí workers Union and the Emergency Program personnel affected program performance.

The loans of flour to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce also affected the administrative and food distribution capacity of the NCDS Emergency Program staff due to excessive workloads.

2.3 Warehousing

The large amount of food that arrived in Potosí for the Emergency Program encountered a serious shortage of warehousing space. Some of the other negative factors caused by the deficient warehouses were a loss of food due to roof leaks, pilfering and in one case the floor of the warehouse collapsed due to excessive weight. The warehouseman was inexperienced and the kardex and bookkeeping control was inadequate.

Security was poor but no losses occurred. The one warehouse with poor security had a permanent watchman to prevent losses.

Stacking was good in general except in one warehouse where milk and flour bags were staked 70 bags high.

2.4 Distribution

Notwithstanding the problems faced by NCDS Potosí they managed to cover 7 of the 15 provinces in the Department of Potosí. NCDS covered 20% of the affected population in the department.

The lack of personnel meant that only 10% of the project received supervision. An estimated 10% of all projects also received technical assistance from NCDS and IBTA technicians.

NCDS Potosí distributed close to 860 MT as of May 30th. Of this quantity 313 MT went to the province of C. Saavedra providing an estimated 70% coverage of the affected population. The province of Bustillos, which was more severely affected, received only 6% coverage and Quijarro, also severely affected received only 1.5% coverage. (474 beneficiaries of 31,485 affected.)

The factors that contributed to this situation include the lack of resources, poor coordination with other institutions and limited experience on the part of the NCDS personnel.

NCDS considers that the projects have helped the communities in a positive manner, since they have increased the infrastructure available in the communities assisted.

2.5 Resources

The lack of resources caused NCDS problems in distribution. Only one community had 50% of the transportation costs paid. All other communities paid 100% of their transportation costs (out of the sampled evaluated).

The lack of vehicles for supervision meant that only 10% of all communities attended received supervision from NCDS/Potosí.

Fund distribution from the National NCDS Office to the Regional offices was slow and in many cases the delays were caused by strikes or due to changes in NCDS National Office staffing. Slow disbursement of funds from Title III also affected the availability of resources.

NCDS/Potosí, by the time funds arrived, was usually in such debt that the funds were used up in a matter of weeks.

Salaries for emergency personnel were low, so that the quality of the personnel were was correspondingly affected.

The slow disbursement of resources meant that essential equipment such as, scales which were needed in the warehouses, did not arrive in Potosí until July 84 when the program was drawing to a close.

2.6 Conclusions

Despite the problems faced by NCDS/Potosí with reference to resources, internal conflicts and lack of trained personnel, they managed to reach certain target areas even though quotas were unequally distributed over the whole department.

The NCDS personnel attached to the Emergency Program had a good working knowledge of the communities, areas and specific needs, so that the projects implemented were of some use to the communities involved and the program was in general better handled than that of the other agencies.

The distribution of food commodities carried out by NCDS/Potosí did not only alleviate hunger but also increased the infrastructure available in many of the communities attended.

It is evident that duplication of deliveries existed, mainly due to the lack of coordination at the beginning of the program.

Although NCDS/Potosí had no experience in the handling of food commodities, they managed to distribute most of their food by July 15th, 1984.

3. Food for the Hungry

This Voluntary Agency started out with no previous experience in Bolivia. The personnel hired had some experience and received a short training seminar in their National Office.

3.1 Planning

FHI had originally elaborated a distribution plan by provinces. This plan was not put into effect because access to some of these provinces was impossible due to excessive rains and the absence of vehicles. Quotas per province were not considered. The plan contemplated attention in the most affected areas of Bustillos, Chayanta and Nor Lipez. However, the first two provinces were being

assisted from Oruro since logisticly this area is more accessible from this province. FHI, therefore, assisted other provinces closer to Potosí as well as the North of Potosí and Nor Lipez (See attached chart).

Distribution was planned to begin in September 83 but food did not arrive until February 84. The program began in January 84 with borrowed commodities and attention was given to more affected areas with an emphasis on rehabilitation because the worst effects of the drought were declining.

Despite this emphasis the difficulty of access to certain areas caused unequal food distribution with over coverage occurring in those provinces closer to Potosí and little coverage given to those further away but in more need. FHI attempted from the start of their program to coordinate with other institutions and achieved only limited success.

Some of the factors that contributed to unequal food distribution are:

- 1) Late arrival of food stocks in Potosí
- 2) Lack of experienced personnel to administrate the program and coordinate deliveries.
- 3) Inadequate monitoring food deliveries against affected population and beneficiaries served.
- 4) No vehicles to inspect the areas covered.

3.2 Administration

The FHI team was shorthanded at the start of the program due to insufficient funding. FHI had to acquire the help of voluntary inspectors to assist in distribution.

The accounting system was weak causing delays in the disbursement of funds and accounting for money used. The limited experience in handling the large amounts of food caused problems.

All accounting and major decision-making was handled in their La Paz office which also caused delays in the distribution of food to the affected areas.

The movement of food from port to Potosí was uncoordinated and in one case CRS-CARITAS received food designated for FHI.

FHI received 2,728 MT of which they distributed close to 1,100 MT in the 7 months the program was operational.

3.3 Warehousing

The arrival of large amounts of food taxed the almost non-existent warehousing infrastructure of Potosí. FHI was able, through its good relations with the "Prefectura" and the "Federación de Campesinos", to obtain on a loan basis storage space from these institution. They also obtained another two smaller warehouses which were considered adequate.

CRS-CARITAS trained the FHI warehouse Personnel so that these warehouses were well managed, food was stacked properly and the warehouses were kept clean. The warehouses were secure and no loss of food due to pilfering or spoilage occurred.

The cold climate in Potosí also favoured the non-proliferation of rice weevils and other insects.

3.4 Distribution

FHI estimates that the FFW projects have helped all the communities assisted, since these projects increased the available

infrastructure (reservoirs, irrigation canals and road infrastructure as well as river defenses). However, project quality limited the real usefulness of the FFW projects.

Food was in general distributed to those provinces closer to Potosí and less severely affected by the natural disasters.

FHI estimated duplication of deliveries existed in 20-30% of all communities attended by their office. This duplication existed with OFINAAL and CARITAS due to the lack of an effective inter-institutional coordination. FHI circulated among the other agencies a non-duplication form which was made up for every community attended and signed by the other voluntary agencies and OFINAAL to certify that the community had not been attended. In some cases, communities attended by OFINAAL were assisted again by FHI because the OFINAAL ration was deficient.

FHI attended 20% of all communities twice and 80% once, with a few communities receiving 3 quotas due to the magnitude of the projects or extreme need for food. 90% of the communities attended received supervision at least twice. Technical assistance was given to 30% of the communities attended through MACA, IBTA and CIAC technicians.

Areas for exclusive attention by the agencies were agreed upon in May 84. However, by this time the CRS-CARITAS program had been in operation for almost a year.

Considering the lack of experience, and administrative capacity, FHI managed to distribute a sufficient amount of food with good project control and their assistance was effective not only as a means to alleviate hunger but also benefited a proportion of communities with their FFW projects.

3.5 Resources

FHI, because of the poor accounting system initially set-up, had problems rendering accounts for funds disbursed. This in turn caused serious delays in the disbursement of new funds. At the National level delays in disbursement to the regional office also occurred.

The outreach grant did not arrive during the Emergency Program. This meant that the Potosí regional office did not have vehicles available for inspection work and a general lack of resources. The Bolivian peso resources were also affected by the devaluation.

Funds were administered and sent to the regional office from the FHI office in La Paz on a monthly basis and were too small to allow a more effective distribution of food.

3.6 Conclusions

Seriously affected by lack of resources, slow fund movement, inexperienced and too few personnel, FHI has managed to reach certain target areas where the effects of the drought and other natural disasters were severe, bringing relief from hunger and projects that did benefit the affected communities. The need for the food to alleviate hunger was evident in the field evaluation since communities were glad to receive any food due to two consecutive bad harvests.

4. CRS - CARITAS - Potosí

Introduction

CRS-CARITAS in Potosí started assistance in the earliest possible moment by borrowing food from their regular programs.

The food for the emergency program started to arrive in September 83 but their Emergency Program was operating from May 83. This means CRS-CARITAS gave out food when the hunger situation was at its peak, right after the 83 crop was lost due to the drought. In this manner their assistance came at the moment of most need and greatest hardship of the rural population in the department.

4.1 Planning

CRS-CARITAS in Potosí elaborated a distribution plan in February 83. This plan contemplated coverage to the areas that were more severely affected by the drought. Quotas were assigned per province but were not maintained because communities from the provinces closer to Potosí came more frequently and with greater ease than those communities in the more distant provinces causing unequal coverage.

CRS-CARITAS attended more than 50% of the affected population in the department with Emergency FFW.

4.2 Administration

CRS-CARITAS had a small but efficient team to cope with the Emergency Program who had experience in the field of assisting the communities and handling the arrival and distribution of the food commodities. Personnel hired for the emergency were effectively trained by the regular program staff. Accounting was slow and inadequate because the CRS-CARITAS executive secretary simultaneously handled the CARITAS Regular and Emergency program accounting systems.

The delay in the receipt of food for the emergency program caused problems with the communities who had been promised the food. As a response to this situation, CRS-CARITAS started assisting drought victims with food borrowed from their regular programs.

824.3 Warehousing

CRS-CARITAS Potosí had insufficient space to stock the large amount of food received for the Emergency Program so additional warehouse space was rented. The warehouses were inadequate with dirt floors, rodent infested and security was generally weak.

A kardex was maintained and food stacking was excellent. Inventories were taken every month. Warehousing, while inadequate, was well controlled and no fault could be found with the documentation concerning the movement of food commodities from and to the warehouses.

4.4 Distribution

Food distribution was seriously hampered by the late arrival of emergency food stocks, insufficient staff and lack of funding.

Other factors were an inadequate control of beneficiaries served against population affected per province, which in turn meant that assigned food quotas were not maintained. Overcoverage by CRS-CARITAS of the provinces closest to Potosí is evident. For example Nor Chichas received 113% coverage, Quijarro 147% coverage and C. Campos 177% coverage, while Bilbao received only 3% coverage, Saavedra 2% and Tomas Frias 1%.

While overcoverage did occur, in some cases this happened in provinces that had been severely affected such as Quijarro and Sud Lipez 170% coverage (Sud Lipez is an inaccessible province due to an extremely deficient road infrastructure).

The impression at CRS/Caritas-Potosí is that the program was only effective to alleviate hunger and the projects did not contribute to a rehabilitation of agricultural production.

CRS/Caritas estimated that 35% of all projects received supervision from CRS/Caritas personnel as well as from personnel in the different "parishes" which were food distribution centers. It is estimated that 10% of the communities attended received technical assistance from Belgian Voluntary Engineers belonging to CEANCOS. MACA and IBTA also cooperated in carrying out evaluations of affected areas and loss of crops. Duplication occurred once other agencies began operations.

This agency concentrated in giving as wide a coverage as possible and as fast as possible to the affected population. Control of projects was therefore weak and inefficient. Figures show that they covered 50% of the affected population.

4.5 Resources

Fortunately, CRS/Caritas did not have to rely entirely on emergency program funds, which were slow in arriving.

CRS/Caritas paid for 100% of transportation costs to the communities in 80% of all projects. In some cases they paid for transportation to distribution centers or took the food there in their own trucks. Funds donated in Belgium were used to pay for transportation (approx. \$us. 12,000).

Again the lack of a vehicle for supervision and monitoring of the areas was a major negative factor. While CRS/Caritas has vehicles, the two jeeps available belong to the church and could only be used occasionally.

CRS/Caritas as well as EHI and NCDS sold the containers and bags to the communities to try to alleviate the lack of resources.

4.6 Conclusions

Caritas considers that the program only helped to alleviate hunger and was not effective in rehabilitating agricultural production. They used their own funds to implement the program since program funding from their La Paz offices was slow and insufficient. Projects lacked proper supervision since their main concern was to get the food out to the communities as fast as possible. Caritas managed to cover close to 50% of the affected population. Food was dispatched to the rural population in the moments when the effects of the loss of the 83 harvest was at their strongest.

5. Program Impact Rural Area

Nor Lípez

In the evaluation a total of 4 of the 48 communities assisted were visited in Nor Lípez. These results are representative for the whole of the province, since the regional geography does not vary widely.

Most FFW projects were irrigation canals and reservoirs. The population in this area was severely affected by the drought because they depend on ground water levels to plant. This is to say that they plant quinoa and potatoes if the ground moisture is adequate.

In 1983 as the ground humidity was present, crops were planted, however, the lack of rain caused the ground to dry up and crops were lost leaving only 20% that was usable.

In 1984, there was no ground humidity present so planting did not occur on a large scale with the result that the harvest was

low. This year only 30% of the ground water is available.

This area is mainly dedicated to agricultural production with some livestock, mainly llamas, sheep and a few goats.

The first community visited has a large IBTA experimental station (for the study and production of Quinoa). However, most of the communities visited received no help from IBTA (which depends on Oruro rather than Potosí). These communities were within 10 to 15 Km. from the MACA agricultural station.

The Lutheran Church is active in this area and has supplied some of the communities in the area with small amounts of cement which were used for the irrigation canals and reservoirs. No other assistance was given to this area as far as the team was able to ascertain. (35% of the communities in this province received assistance from the Lutheran Church).

The figures tabulated show a loss of close to 80% of their livestock in 1983-1984. Even if this figure is inflated, the livestock loss is considerable. This, coupled with the crop loss puts this area in a situation of extreme need for assistance.

Migration was 40% but only temporary between harvest and the next planting with 10% of those who travelled coming back to the village.

Food distribution problems are present in the sense that those who receive 1/2 a ration because they are single, or are married but have no children, complained that they worked the same amount and should receive equal pay for equal work. However, no other distribution problems were evident. Undernutrition was present in children and adults.

This area also received assistance with FFW from FHI and from OFINAAL. An estimated 25% of the communities in this province received assistance from OFINAAL. The communities paid 100% of transportation costs.

The food received was found acceptable and was needed due to the loss of the 83 and 84 crops. A serious shortage of food stocks is general in this area.

This province was targeted for assistance by FHI, NCDS and CRS/Caritas since the area was severely affected by drought; however, the only agency that gave coverage to this province was FHI and at the end of their program with only one delivery of food per community.

All the FHI projects received at least two inspection visits from FHI personnel.

QUIJARRO

This province lies between Potosí and Uyuni and has two ecological zones, a puna in the high plateau area, and a highland valley area. The needs of these two areas vary somewhat as do their agricultural production patterns. The high plateau is a livestock raising area having both llamas and sheep. The loss of livestock was close to 85%. Even if these figures were inflated, livestock losses were nevertheless excessive.

The sanitary post information shows under nutrition and a fair amount of diarrhea present in the children. However, they are using Oral Rehydration mixes and some powdered milk from Holland to alleviate this problem among children in the community.

Most of the communities in this area received assistance from CARITAS, FFW, and from FHI FFW.

Two deliveries of food per community were usual in this area. (CARITAS over-covered this provinces with close to 147% of the affected population assisted by them).

This province was targeted for assistance by CARITAS and later by NCDS. Eighty percent of the communities in the province received two deliveries.

Transportation costs were paid 100% by CARITAS and the communities paid all transportation costs for NCDS assistance.

With FHI the communities received at least two inspection visits. Communities assisted by NCDS (2% approximately) received one or two inspection visits. CARITAS supervised 30% of the communities receiving assistance.

The high plateau area produces livestock with some cultivation of potato and grain crops (small pieces of land next to the rivers.)

The second ecological area is the highland valley region. A few of the members of the community's work for a large hidroelectrical station which supplies power for the mines. The instalation belongs to COMIBOL.

Since these people depend mostly on rainfall for crops, they were hard hit by the 1983 drought, however, this area does not need prioritary assistance with food. This area has a predominantly mixed agricultural and livestock production basis. Crop loss for 1983 was close to 70% and livestock loss close to 40%.

In general they need more material assistance than food assistance in order to recover agricultural production. Since the 1984 crops were not up to the usual quantities (loss of 35% of their crops), 5% migration was present for a temporary period.

BUSTILLOS

Most of the communities visited were in the immediate area of Uncía and the mining district. The main activities are agriculture and mining with no migration registered. This area was hard hit by the drought and the crop loss for '84 was close to 60%. However, the community people supplement their income with mining and have received food assistance from FHI and OFINAAL (Oruro). Their main crops are potato, wheat and barley. Loss of livestock was about 30%.

Though hard hit by the drought, assistance has been given and this area should not be considered for food assistance though poverty and malnutrition are present. They seem to have enough food to hold out until the next crop.

Other areas not visited in northern Potosí were harder hit by drought and frosts.

This province received assistance from sponsors in Potosí, and Oruro causing a fair amount of duplication in assistance over the whole province. Exact data on the percentage of communities who received duplicate assistance is not available because the communities visited did not declare having received other assistance. NCDS/Uncía (Department of Oruro) has assisted this area extensively, as did CRS/Caritas - Potosí with 46% of affected population covered. NCDS/Potosí assisted an estimated six percent and FHI/Potosí assisted an estimated 25% of the affected population.

CHAYANTA

This area received assistance from NCDS/Potosí and NCDS/Uncía, FHI and OFINAAL. Migration (temporary) was registered at 23% with 100% coming back for the planting season. There is an increase in the number of people who migrate for the off planting and harvest season. The distribution problems are the same as for other provinces. The problem with those "earning" a 1/2 ration must have been felt in all the villages visited.

Like the others this area suffered considerably due to the drought of 83 and lost a large amount of their 84 crop; about 60% loss in crops and 70% loss in livestock for 84.

This area is a predominantly dedicated to agriculture (60%) and livestock (40%) production. The team estimated that they would have only 50% of the needed potato seed for this year. The villages should have enough food to last them till the next harvest.

This area is a priority region for food assistance and materials to avoid seeds being eaten as food.

The projects were in general irrigation canals, reservoirs,

roads and river defenses.

The people in this area have a need for food assistance at least until the next harvest, as undernutrition is present and could become worse. With food assistance, undernutrition levels could be kept at a minimum and regular school feeding programs should be implemented.

Of the communities assisted in this province, an estimated 20% received one food delivery, 10% received two food deliveries and an estimated 70% received no assistance from the sponsors. An estimated 15% of these communities received assistance from OFINAAL. Assistance to this area by OFINAAL was poor and the rations distributed in most cases incomplete, (Only 1/2 rations or less).

The food distributed was found acceptable but was consumed within two weeks after delivery. The need for food in this area is critical.

All FHI projects received at least two supervision visits. However, these visits were not of a technical nature since the supervision merely made sure that the project was being executed and the food was distributed to the community.

The only sponsors in the area were FHI, NCDS and OFINAAL. No other assistance from any other institution was evident in the area.

NOR CHICHAS

This area was severely affected by the drought of 83 since the area is arid. There are also a large number of vineyards and fruit producing trees which were damaged by the drought and the frosts.

This area receives assistance from IBTA which has an office in Cotagaita with an agronomist who is the only person working and giving technical assistance in agricultural production to the Nor Chichas and part of the Sud Chichas area.

All the communities interviewed received assistance from this

IBTA agronomist who also takes care of vaccinating the livestock.

This agronomist estimated the 83 crop loss at close to 70% and the livestock loss at close to 37%. He also estimated the loss in agricultural production in the last harvest at close to 40%. He indicated that the communities in the area would have 70% of maiz seed they need for this years planting season but that the lack of potato seed is almost complete as well as seeds for vegetables. Seven percent migration with 85% returning was registered.

Undernutrition was again evident in children and adults but the community should have enough maiz to trade for other food stuffs.

This area is predominantly agricultural but with a lot of livestock.

The province of Nor Chichas received an overcoverage of affected population of 176% by NCDS, FHI and CRS/Caritas.

All communities interviewed had received food at least twice and in some cases three times. These deliveries were made by NCDS, CRS/Caritas and FHI. OFINAAL was also active in this area.

Food received was found acceptable. FHI supervised all projects at least twice. NCDS supervised an estimated 30% of it's projects in this area. CRS/Caritas supervised an estimated 20% of the communities assisted in this province with one visit per project.

SUD CHICHAS

This area can be divided into two distinct ecological areas:

The first is 800 meters lower down, the second is very arid and similar to the Nor Chichas area except there are no vineyards and few fruit trees. Their main occupation is the raising of sheep and goats. Agriculture takes second place consisting mainly of maiz

with some potato and other small crops.

Poverty was evident as was undernutrition. The area is very arid and was hard hit by the drought with a loss of 65% of livestock and 80% of crops during 83. The communities in this area receive minimal assistance from IBTA agronomists in Cotagaita.

Only OFINAAL gave out food in this area.

This area is a priority region for food and material assistance, with a total of 15 communities in serious need.

The area of Sud Chichas from Tupiza to the south is not considered for food assistance and was not hard hit by the 83 drought since it consists of wide river valleys. There may be "pockets" where assistance with food may be required, but in general the crops this year were good since the area is lower down and was not so severely affected by frost

CRS/Caritas was active in this area with 11% coverage of affected population. OFINAAL assisted communities in the area and covered an additional 12% of the affected population between September 83 and January 84. This would mean 23% coverage in all.

Supervision by CRS/Caritas was minimal and mostly carried out by the CEANCOS Church group. Technical assistance is limited since the IBTA technician for Nor chichas also attends this area.

Some duplication existed between CRS/Caritas and OFINAAL; however, assistance to this area has been minimal. The coverage figures of this province are for the whole province and the more severely affected area in the province seems to have received the least attention.

MODESTO OMISTE

This province is in the extreme south of the department of Potosí and borders with Argentina in Villazón. The communities visited were on or close to the Tupiza-Villazón road and rail line. The projects were mostly irrigation canals (old), some reservoirs (new) and river defenses (new).

The only institution involved in the area is OFINAAL. There is no technical assistance from MACA or IBTA.

Their crops are potato, maiz, beans and vegetables with potato and maiz as the two main crops. They also have livestock mostly sheep, goats and cattle.

Livestock loss was about 40% for sheep and goats and no loss in cattle of which they have the native variety (criollo) and some holstein.

The loss of crops for the drought was about 70% in 1983 and this year about 30%.

This area should not be considered for priority assistance with food or materials.

The railroads and the proximity to the Argentinian border allows this area to supplement its income with smuggling and regular trade.

Migration was present, with 3% of the population going to Argentina and Bermejo although half the people who went returned for the planting and harvest season.

As the population density in this area is relatively low and the area was not too hard hit by the drought, it is felt they have enough food to get by until the next harvest.

A small area of the province was visited and it is possible that other areas may need more help, but as the general geography of the area is similar the information obtained should be true for the province as a whole.

The area has predominantly mixed agricultural and livestock production.

LINARES

Only one community was visited in this province. CARE is active, as well as CARITAS and CORDEPO. In general, even though the area suffered from the 83 drought, livestock loss was only 35% and crop loss was close to 60% for 83 and 40% for 84. This province has three distinct ecological areas. The area we took data

from is rather low lying compared with the Puna type area. There is also a wide valley area which due to its microclimate is again different.

Migration in this community, one of the largest in the low lying area was estimated at 10% with 80% returning for the planting and harvest seasons.

CARE just finished putting in a potable water system which will benefit all of the community.

This area should not have priority assistance with food.

ANNEX I.

DEPARTMENT OF LA PAZ
TITLE II FOOD DISTRIBUTION BY AGENCY
SEPTEMBER 83-MAY 84

PROVINCE	TOTAL POPULATION AFFECTED	FHI M/T	FHI BENEFICIARIES	CARITAS M/T	CARITAS BENEFICIARIES	SNDC M/T	SNDC BENEFICIARIES	CRS, SNDC AND FHI TOTAL M/T	CRS, SNDC AND FHI TOTAL BENEFICIARIES	TITLE II X POP.AFFECTED COVERED BY TWO DELIVERIE
F. Tamayo	5,400	-	-	-	-	9	918	9	918	8.5
Muñecas	3,200	-	-	-	-	20	2,468	19	2,488	38
Iturralde	1,200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	No coverage
Canacho	612	-	-	-	-	650	79,746	650	79,746	6.500
Pacajes	83,194	82	5,852	1115	78,711	117	9,789	1314	94,352	56
Ingavi	89,696	181	15,238	639	45,746	460	47,997	1280	109,071	61
G. Villarroel	30,470	20	2,114	271	7,887	15	2,547	306	12,548	20.5
Loayza	1,140	6	123	-	-	130	13,917	136	14,040	600
Murillo	19,244	27	2,572	-	-	132	12,745	159	15,317	38.5
Inquisivi	1,200	9	124	4	382	21	3,048	34	3,554	16.5
Los Andes	19,250	312	25,906	-	-	382	40,105	694	66,011	170
Aroma	29,380	220	17,886	-	-	248	32,788	448	50,674	86
Larecaja	550	11	629	2	203	119	12,144	132	12,976	1,150
Ormasuyos	16,836	266	16,060	-	-	913	89,108	1179	105,168	312
Manco Kapac	3,200	33	2,253	5	200	165	13,455	203	15,908	248.5
Sud Yungas	-	3	135	11	635	47	6,106	61	6,876	ANR
Saavedra	-	2	125	-	-	18	2,463	20	2,588	ANR
Nor Yungas	-	-	-	-	-	19	1,541	19	1,541	ANR
TOTAL	304,572	1172	90,191	2047	133,764	3465	370,105	6685	594,860	97

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ANNEX II.

DEPARTMENT OF URURO
TITLE II FOOD DISTRIBUTION BY AGENCY
SEPTEMBER 83 - MAY 84

PROVINCE	TOTAL POPULATION AFFECTED	FHI M/T	FHI BENEFICIARIES	CARITAS M/T	CARITAS BENEFICIARIES	SNDC M/T	SNDC BENEFICIARIES	TOTAL NCDS, CRS, FHI M/T	TOTAL NCDS, CRS, FHI BENEFICIARIES	TITLE II & POP. AFFECTED COVERED BY ONE DELIVERY
Poopo	19,000	-	-	54	8,275	14	925	68	9,200	48
Sajama	13,420	3	353	46	7,865	9	339	58	8,557	62
Dalence	9,250	38	3,307	37	5,305	44	1,342	119	9,954	108
Arahualipa	4,585	19	1,395	16	3,260	8	357	43	5,012	108
Litoral	2,885	-	-	17	3,065	4	170	21	3,235	112
Totora	-	-	-	25	4,505	6	156	31	4,661	ANR
Saucari	7,310	62	4,337	41	7,025	25	1,000	128	12,362	169
Carangas	14,910	109	6,652	167	24,515	116	538	392	31,705	212
Avaroa	26,845	71	3,995	114	18,280	45	1,540	230	23,815	90
Cercado	23,475	158	12,451	134	23,090	78	2,377	370	37,918	160
Tomás Barrón	-	-	-	7	1,560	61	2,732	68	4,292	ANR
L. Cabrera	10,360	11	549	69	10,765	12	359	92	11,673	88
TOTAL	132,040	471	33,099	727	117,510	422	11,835	1620	162,444	122

ANNEX III.

DEPARTMENT OF COCHABAMBA
 TITLE II FOOD DISTRIBUTION BY AGENCY
 SEPTEMBER 83-MAY 84

PROVINCE	TOTAL POPULATION AFFECTED	FHI M/T	FHI- BENEFICIARIES	CARITAS M/T	CARITAS BENEFICIARIES	SNDC M/T	SNDC BENEFICIARIES	SNDC CRS, FHI TOTAL M/T	SNDC CRS, FHI TOTAL BENEFICIARIES	TITLE IIX POP. AFFECTED COVERED BY ONE DELIVERY
Cercado	19,273	13	886	34	3,207	-	-	47	4,093	20
Campero	26,000	-	-	135	13,500	52	7,992	187	21,492	82
Ayopaya	48,000	-	-	-	-	159	17,088	159	17,088	34
E. Arce	22,000	-	-	179	20,105	-	-	179	20,105	90
Arani	37,000	183	20,411	-	-	11	1,054	194	21,465	58
Arque	26,000	21	1,804	383	47,293	79	2,539	483	51,636	196
Capinota	19,000	137	15,211	-	-	-	-	137	15,211	80
Jordán	20,500	-	-	-	-	14	1,936	14	1,936	93
Quillacollo	48,000	-	-	-	-	71	8,938	71	8,938	18
Chapare	25,800	-	-	-	-	70	7,635	70	7,635	29
Tapacari	2,000	25	1,799	71	5,950	-	-	76	7,749	38
Carrasco	36,100	-	-	58	4,800	81	8,757	139	13,566	67
Mizque	26,000	137	13,404	-	-	1	472	138	13,876	53
Porata	29,313	146	1,644	-	-	5	752	151	2,396	8
TOTAL	403,086	662	55,159	840.0	94,855	542.67	57,172	2045	207,186	51

Note: The Province of Arque was attended by SNDC/Oruro (78 T/M)
 CARITAS/Oruro (126 T/M) and FHI / Oruro (33 T/M)

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ANNEX IV.

DEPARTMENT OF CHUQUISACA
TITLE II FOOD DISTRIBUTION BY AGENCY
SEPTEMBER 83 - MAY 84

PROVINCE	TOTAL POPULATION AFFECTED	FHI M/T	FHI BENEFICIARIES	CARITAS M/T	CARITAS BENEFICIARIES	SNDC M/T	SNDC BENEFICIARIES	SNDC, CRS, FHI TOTAL M/T	SNDC, CRS, FHI TOTAL BENEFICIARIES	TITLE II % POP. AFFECTI COVERED BY DELIVERY
Oropeza	38,040	227	8,507	-	-	154	18,958	381	27,465	72
Azurduy	15,031	16	2,392	38	6,664	8	880	62	9,936	65
Zudañez	17,283	150	8,341	601	8,110	39	4,918	790	21,369	123
Tomina	29,445	21	830	136	11,725	73	8,203	230	20,758	73
H. Siles	-	-	-	-	-	47	5,170	47	5,170	ANR
Yamparaez	25,911	187	8,025	244	25,505	42	3,323	473	36,863	142
Nor Cinti	46,772	-	-	136	16,295	21.1	3,189	157.1	19,484	41
B. Boeto	9,261	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Sud Cinti	13,663	3.6	285	17	350	-	-	20.6	635	4.6
Luis Calvo	9,733	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
TOTAL	205,139	604.6	28,380	1172	68,649	384.1	44,641	2160.7	141,670	69

NOTE: The Province of Sud Cinti was solely attended by FHI/Tarija

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ANNEX V

DEPARTMENT OF POTOSI
TITLE II FOOD DISTRIBUTION BY AGENCY
SEPTEMBER 83-MAY 84

PROVINCE	TOTAL POPULATION AFFECTED	FHI M/T	FHI BENEFICIARIES	CARITAS M/T	CARITAS BENEFICIARIES	NCDS M/T	NCDS BENEFICIARIES	NCDS, CRS, FHI TOTAL M/T	NCDS, CRS, FHI TOTAL BENEFICIARIES	TITLE II % POP. AFFECTE COVERED BY ONE DELIVERY
Bilbao	8,668	5	455	2	240	-	-	7	695	8
Ibañez	15,112	176	12,027	200	26,580	15	2,160	391	40,767	270
Charcas	24,784	14	1,237	14	1,545	-	-	28	2,782	12
Bustillos	27,109	120	76,227	89	15,140	122	19,777	331	111,194	411
Chayanta	99,270	115	10,645	20	2,763	186	23,327	321	36,735	37
Tomás Frías	46,448	92	10,626	5	695	156	14,606	253	25,927	56
D. Campos	7,119	-	-	92	12,570	9	2,015	101	14,585	205
C. Saavedra	53,116	24	2,406	8	1,265	313	35,465	345	39,136	74
Quijarro	31,485	-	-	191	46,232	16	2,529	207	48,761	155
Linares	54,712	93	8,217	338	40,442	43	4,439	474	3,098	152
Nor López	11,716	-	-	26	4,097	-	1,705	33	5,802	50
Sud López	5,306	-	-	61	9,020	-	-	61	9,020	170
Nor Chichas	31,340	39	4,052	205	35,217	172	15,953	416	55,222	177
Sud Chichas	26,690	-	-	19	2,935	488	42,000	507	44,935	168
f. Omiste	7,237	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	450,112	678	125,942	1,270	228,741	1,527	163,976	3,475	518,569	1.15

OTE: SNDC/Oruro attended the Provinces of D. Campos (9 M/T), Bustillos (117 M/T), Ibañez (15 M/T), Quijarro (11 M/T), Chayanta (20 M/T) and López (7 M/T). Caritas/Oruro distributed 8 M/T to the Province of Bustillos. SNDC/Chuquisaca attended the Provinces of Chayanta (53 M/T) and Saavedra (26 M/T) Caritas/Cochabamba distributed 7.5 M/T in the Province of Charcas.

ANNEX VI.

DEPARTMENT OF TARIJA
TITLE II FOOD DISTRIBUTION BY AGENCY
SEPTEMBER 83 - MAY 84

TITLE II X
OF POP. AFFECTE
COVERED BY
ONE DELIVERY

PROVINCE	TOTAL POPULATION AFFECTED	FHI M/T	FHI BENEFICIARIES	CARITAS M/T	CARITAS BENEFICIARIES	NCDS M/T	SNDC BENEFICIARIES	TOTAL M/T	TOTAL BENEFICIARIES	TITLE II X OF POP. AFFECTE COVERED BY ONE DELIVERY
Cercado	14,000	20.5	3,139	183	18,000	17.5	1,864	221	23,503	167
Aviléz	15,000	12.2	1,081	117	13,155	33	3,626	162.2	17,862	116
Arce	23,450	19.7	1,917	18.5	2,420	33	3,789	71.20	8,176	35
Hendez	20,650	16.2	1,970	310	31,385	131	15,418	457.2	48,773	236
O'Connor	-	41	405	-	-	-	-	41	405	ANR
Gran Chaco	-	21.9	4,400	-	-	-	-	21.9	4,400	ANR
TOTAL	73,100	98.20	13,197	628.5	65,460	214.5	24,697	941.20	103,354	141

DEPARTMENT OF SANTA CRUZ
TITLE II FOOD DISTRIBUTION BY AGENCY
SEPTEMBER 83-MAY 84

PROVINCE	TOTAL POPULATION AFFECTED	CARITAS M/T	CARITAS BENEFICIARIES	SNDC M/T	SNDC BENEFICIARIES	TOTAL M/T	TOTAL BENEFICIARIES	TITLE IIX OF POPULATION - AFFECTED BY - ONE - DELIVERY
Ibañez	-	29	8,224	83	9,956	112	18,180	ANR
Vallegrande	-	24	3,540	21	1,956	48	5,496	ANR
Florida	-	6.0	1,400	7	761	13	2,161	ANR
San Carlos	-	-	-	1.0	90	1	90	ANR
Runflo Chávez	-	1.0	180	20	1,919	21	2,099	ANR
Sarah	-	6.0	465	11.00	1,091	17	1,556	ANR
Ichilo	-	43	4,200	56	6,469	99	10,669	ANR
S. Esteban	-	151	15,170	2	189	153	15,354	ANR
Chiquitos	-	-	-	13	1,192	13	1,192	ANR
M. Caballero	-	-	-	18	1,117	18	1,117	ANR
Cordillera	15,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
TOTAL	15,000	260	33,179	232	24,735	492	57,914	386

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