

MID TERM EVALUATION REPORT

HARVARD TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE POOL PROJECT  
PHASE II

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Executive Summary: Conclusions, Commendations and Recommendations

We conclude that the Technical Assistance Pool, on the whole, has served the Government of Kenya well since its renewal as TAP II in 1981, and that its reinforcement by ATAP has been successful. There has been an improvement in almost all areas of the Pool's activities, and remarkable progress in the Management Systems Unit. Progress in institution building has been slow, but once again improvements are marked, particularly since the 1978 Faaland/Saywell evaluation. The direction is right, and the major obstacle now is quite clearly the inability of the Government to recruit and retain the numbers and quality of staff required. Fundamentally, we conclude that the activities and approach of TAP II and ATAP are sound and are contributing materially to the welfare of the country. (Passim)

2. We recommend, in view of the ambiguity of the contract and the differing perceptions of role and priorities, that a tripartite meeting be held to clarify the responsibility of TAP II and the associated Kenyan officers in the Planning Divisions for explicit institution-building as part of the regular activities of advisors and officers. (Section II)

3. We commend the DPD-MLD for developing work programmes and procedures which are successfully attempting conceptually to accomplish the dual objectives of TAP II to produce quality, timely and relevant output and to develop Kenyan capacity. (Section III.B)

4. We recommend that the development of a long term strategy paper for the MLD proceed as planned and be given high priority. (Section III.B. 11-12)

5. We recommend that the DPD-MoA intensify and give high priority to the current effort to develop comprehensive work plans and mechanisms for improving Kenyan capacity. We further recommend that a Divisional philosophy of a team approach be enunciated and implemented, and that a system for assignment of work plans, reporting and accountability be instituted through such mechanisms as regular divisional meetings. (Section III.C.14-16)

6. We encourage more longer term analysis in the DPD-MoA which can demonstrate the usefulness of the analysis of policy alternatives while building the capacity to do economic analysis. (Section III. C. 17)

7. We recommend that the government give serious consideration to our concern about the presence of bilateral advisors working explicitly as planners in the DPD-MoA, and if in its judgement more advisers are needed than are currently provided by TAP II consideration be given to enlarging the TAP and encouraging would-be bilateral donors to contribute to the Pool.

(Section III, B. 13-14)

8. We recommend that immediate steps be taken to more fully integrate the TAP advisor in MEPD into the work of the section to which he is attached in order that his time and talents may be more effectively utilized. We also recommend that the adviser and the Senior adviser seek consciously to keep the lines of communication open between the MEPD and the Planning Divisions in the two operating ministries.

9. If TAP II should experience resource constraints or new priorities emerge the continuation of the adviser position in MEPD should be carefully reassessed.

10. We recommend that the development of a framework for longer term analysis be accepted as a matter of high priority, and we commend the Senior adviser for his current intentions in this regard.

11. We commend the Senior adviser for his efficient administration of the project. We suggest that as he becomes more involved in DPD-MoA that he keep in mind his important role as a channel of communication and a link between all units to which advisers are attached, and where the work is often complementary.

12. In this connection, we recommend that serious consideration be given to our proposal that another adviser be identified who, in addition to his/her substantive work in a section, could assist in the conscious and continuing identification, organization, and monitoring of appropriate short courses and in-service learning programmes.

13. We commend the advisers in the Management Systems Units and their Kenyan associates for the enormous strides made in the area of financial management and the budget process. We realize that the system has not yet been fully implemented, and that the use of the budget as a method of dealing with the rational allocation of scarce resources is in its infancy. But the direction and the objectives seem set. We also commend the units for their share in devising a ministerial response to the District Focus mandate, and we learn that these two ministries are among the most advanced in responding to this important thrust in national development policy. We also commend the current proposals for a project management system in the MoA and trust that government will be responsive to this necessary mechanism for rational management and control.

14. We applaud the work of the Budget and Finance Task Forces and recommend that they be continued, with ATAP support, until they are fully integrated into the governmental structure.

15. We recommend that, with the approval of the Permanent Secretaries the MSU and the DPD's begin to study appropriate mechanisms for ministerial monitoring of the parastatals and incorporating their activities within the overall planning activities of the ministries, particularly as longer term strategies are developed.
16. We recommend that more radical solutions be examined to the problem of staffing the Planning Divisions, and recruiting and retaining members in the Scheme of Service for Economists and Statisticians.
17. In this connection we have very serious reservations about the capacity of the University of Nairobi to graduate the resources necessary to enable the process of Kenyanization to proceed as rapidly as all would desire.
18. We believe that a more conscious, systematic and continuing process of capacity building be implemented in all areas of TAP II activity, and the possible short-term tradeoff in efficiency be accepted by all in the interests of the long-term development of Kenyan resources. We commend those who accept this concept, and live by it.
19. We urge government to seriously review our observations concerning support services, and take such action as, under the circumstances, seems reasonable.
20. Finally, we recommend in the interests of all parties, that discussions begin no later than the summer of 1984 concerning the future of the TAP-ATAP, and that a decision be reached at last twelve months before the current contract expires.

1. INTRODUCTION

It is unnecessary to provide a lengthy introduction to this mid-term evaluation of TAP II and the associated ATAP. The relevant historical and background documents, particularly the two contracts and the semi-annual reports submitted by the Senior Advisor, are well-known, and our elaborate terms of reference are attached. Our terms of reference (ANNEX C) ask us to evaluate progress made not only since TAP II began in 1981, but also since the 1978 Faaland-Saywell evaluation, and we assume that all parties have that document at hand.

We arrived in Nairobi on August 20, following a briefing at HIID by Richard Cohen, the previous Senior Advisor, and now the back-up at HIID, Jane Edwards, desk officer for recruitment, Richard Paget, administrative officer for the project, and Richard Hook, the first director of the Rural Planning project in the MEPD, which is connected to TAP through a common concern for implementing district focus and decentralized planning.

For over two weeks we interviewed all TAP and many bilateral advisers in the MoA and the MLD, the office of the President and the MEPD; all available Kenyan officers associated with TAP and ATAP in the three ministries, including senior financial and management officers; and the Permanent Secretaries in the three ministries. We also interviewed representatives of UNDP, USAID, and CIDA (A list of those interviewed is attached in Annex A). We appreciated the candor with which everyone responded to our questions and expressed their views. We also read a healthy selection of finished reports, working papers, internal memos and working files of many of the TAP advisers. A list of documents reviewed is contained in Annex B.

As we began to digest our findings and prepare a preliminary report we frequently continued to interrupt work in progress by asking for more information, and the elaboration and clarification of issues that perplexed us.

When we finished our research, we issued a preliminary report to elicit and/or provoke discussion. As we stated in that report:

We hope that the discussion with all parties will enable us to sharpen our focus, clarify the unclear, elaborate the too succinct, correct the errors of facts and judgement, modify hasty assumptions, and when the evidence and logic is overwhelming, even change our minds.

The discussions of the draft were cordial thorough and forthwith and they and a number of thoughtful and lengthy written responses (or rebuttals) vastly improved our report.

Moreover, in our judgement the discussion also enabled officers, and advisers to clarify and modify their views of the issues and problems, and have already led to progress towards some of the remedies we suggest throughout this evaluation.

We have no intention of straying beyond our mandate, and apologize for what might at times be taken as unwarranted presumption. Yet our mandate is so broad that it almost commands us to range from a micro look at the quality of technical advice to an appraisal of government agricultural policy, from a review of the work and development of Kenyan officers working with TAP advisers to comments on the structure of the Kenyan Civil service.

We have no intention, either, of being deliberately hyperbolic, but we hope not to back away from "telling as it is," or at least as it seems to us to be. We are fully aware of the many constraints operating on all concerned (even the donors whose Headquarters may have utopian objectives), and trust we are sufficiently familiar with the Kenyan environment to be able to address the issues within the bounds of reality. But to excuse all real or alleged shortcomings because of these constraints could too easily lead to an acceptance of the status quo or of too limited accomplishment. We may be charged - and have been - with both naivete and arrogance. We believe neither is true.

Rather than take either the statement of objectives in the contract or our Terms of Reference as an organizational framework, we have chosen to look initially at the work of the TAP within the governmental structure. First, we examine the organization and activity of the Management Units, the Planning Divisions, and the sectoral desk, linked to TAP, within the MEPD. Next we address the issue of the development of Kenyan capacity or institution building. Finally in summary or de nouveau, we attempt to identify critical issues for triparite discussion and decision, and offer, as we have implicitly or explicitly throughout, our modest recommendations. Inevitably, there is some overlap and redundancy, but in the interests of reader efficiency we have tried to be as succinct as possible.

## II. Project Objectives: a need for clarification.

We did not include a discussion of project objectives in our preliminary draft because we assumed, too hastily we learned, that there was no significant difference of opinion about the nature of the objectives

and the priorities among them. The critical question, raised by advisers and Kenyan officers and donors, concerns the commitment to the development of Kenyan capacity and what is referred to throughout as "institution building." What is that commitment in the TAP II project? What is or should be the relative emphasis between that objective, once clarified, and the provision of policy and planning analysis and advice?

Initially, although we had read the TAP II contract and the annexed scope of work, we were guided by what were said to be the objectives of TAP II in our Terms of Reference:

"In collaboration with senior ministry officers and planners in these three ministries, the TAP II seeks to achieve five central objectives:

- (1) (1) undertake technical analysis in the areas of strategy formulation, commodity-price analysis, project design and administration and finance;
- (2) develop improved systems and procedures for undertaking technical analysis and for integrating policy, project and budget functions in the ministries;
- (3) improve Kenyan capacity to undertake technical analysis;
- (4) institutionalize improved policy information flow systems in the involved ministries; and
- (5) improve liaison between the Ministries of Agriculture and Livestock Development and the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development."

In addition to evaluating the progress made towards the realization of these objectives, we were specifically asked:

- (6) have advisers worked on involving and training junior Kenyan officers while carrying out their activities?
- (7) how might this counterpart training function be improved?

We began our review believing that the objective of institution building-- particularly the development of Kenyan capacity-- was central to the purposes of the TAP II. However, we found considerable diversity, implicit or explicit, between the donors who attached the highest priority to this objective and some officials in the Kenyan government who attached much higher priority to the provision of high quality, timely analysis and advice as they dealt with the day to day demands placed upon them. This is not to suggest that donors are not interested in analysis and advice or are not aware that most governments operate in ad hoc fashion, whatever the ideal may be; nor is it to suggest that government is not interested in institution building. It is a question of emphasis. HIID, as represented by the Cambridge management and the resident Senior Adviser, is to some extent caught in the middle, committed to institutional

building as a philosophy and an objective but aware of the Kenyan realities. So too are most of the advisers, although most are completely committed to the objective of institution building and willing to work towards that end, while carrying out their on-going tasks of analysis and advice.

We have reviewed the TAP II contract carefully, and find the following:

Article I: Services to be provided by Harvard.

"...the services to be provided by Harvard under this agreement shall include advisory and training services directed at assisting the Ministries to build up their capacity to:

- (a) formulate and revise development strategy for crops and livestock;
- (b) undertake commodity analysis and policy formulation and planning;
- (c) identify, prepare and appraise development projects;
- (d) evaluation and monitor agricultural (crops and livestock) projects; and
- (e) analyze and recommend improvements in the Ministries' management of budget and finance systems, parastatals general administrative services, field implementation activities and the general flow of decision making information."

While there is reference to strengthening capacity in "wheras clause B" and to formal training in the Scope of Work (paragraph 27 subsection (g1), a literal interpretation of the objectives in the contract cited above does not in our judgement spell out with sufficient detail or clarity the commitment to human capacity or institution building apparently intended.

We recommend, therefore, that the Government of Kenya, donors and Harvard meet to agree explicitly what is the relative commitment to capacity and institution building and to formulate plans to accomplish that agreed upon objective.

III. ROLE AND NATURE OF TAP ADVISING AND POLICY ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES

A. INTRODUCTION

Our analysis of the various units proceeds in the sequence in which we conducted our interview: the Development Planning Division in Livestock Development and Agriculture, the Ministry of Economic Development and Planning and the Management Systems Unit and ATAP. We move through our discussion of each of the units following this general sequence of analysis in the form of these questions:

- (1) What are the general tasks of the unit and how is it structured to accomplish them? What is the modus operandi of the management?
- (2) How are TAP advisors perceived to fit in to the unit?  
What formal roles were expected of them?
- (3) What are TAP advisors actually doing in terms of the type of activity e.g. very short-term policy advice ("fire-fighting"), intermediate term policy analysis, and longer term planning activities?
- (4) How do they do their work? More specifically how do they interact with Kenyan officers and administrators?
- (5) What is that nature of the work of the unit?  
Where does the output go in terms both of channels and end users?  
and in what form? Is there differential treatment of advisors' and Kenyans' work?
- (6) What is the impact on policy?

What follows is our perception of the answers to these questions following the interviews and research outlined in the introduction. We do not single out the work of particular advisors except as examples nor do we comment on the relevance and quality of an individual's work. We do not hesitate, however, to offer some general comments on relevance and quality as we proceed. Finally it must be emphasized that the pool concept (which we completely accept as a concept) makes evaluation more difficult. As a pool of individual advisors located in the various units and functioning "as Kenyan civil servants" advisors theoretically have their work programs determined by the unit, its manager and higher level officials.

However, we have found considerable diversity in the way in which the advisors' work activities actually occur. On one extreme, a literal interpretation of advisors roles is that they should do what is asked of them by their Kenyan superiors. This responsive role could lead to periods of overwork interspersed with periods of relative inactivity. Almost invariably the activities will be short-term, sporadic and lacking in any sort of temporal coherence. At the other extreme would be the case where advisors design their own activities either because there is no work program or because they convince their supervisors that what they want to do is the best possible use of their time.

While we have not necessarily found either extreme in pure form, there is a considerable range of operating styles between the two poles. Stated another way the relative mix of responsive work to self-initiated activities varies significantly. Perhaps this results from the fact that there is by no means a common philosophy or perception of role among advisors. Further there appears to have been little, if any, attempt to define a TAP philosophy in this regard or in regard to the individual advisors role in on the job training - a subject discussed in more detail latter.

We now turn to our discussion of each unit.

B. DEVELOPMENT PLANNING DIVISION - MINISTRY OF LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT(DPD/LD)

This unit is relatively new and small. It was formed following the separation of the Ministry of Livestock Development from the Ministry of Agriculture in 1979. Two of its senior officers were transferred from Agriculture at the time. The tasks of the unit are generally those listed above relating to strategy, commodity and marketing analysis, policy formulation, planning and projects activities including (in theory) identification, preparation, appraisal, monitoring and evaluation as they relate to the livestock sector.

The unit consists of a head, a deputy head and three sections or activities - commodity and marketing problems, projects, and strategy. The commodity section consists of two Kenyan officers (one as head) and a TAP adviser. The projects section has three Kenyan officers and one

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TAP adviser and is in addition headed by the Deputy Head of the division. In addition there are two planning officers on overseas training under TAP II. A recent doctoral graduate, partially funded by TAP, will join in September, and another officer is expected to leave for training. Strategy is perceived (correctly in our judgement) to cut across the other sections and is reserved to the Director. There are no planning officers in the Strategy section. The TAP adviser relates to the director, but seems to have worked at various times with most of the Kenyan officers. There are no other expatriate advisers attached to the unit, a condition strongly supported by the Head.

The philosophy of the division as explained by the Head is that all members are a team and that the output is divisional output. Requests for analysis, either originating outside the division or from within, are channelled from the Head to the Section Head who then sits with his staff and determines how the work should be done and by whom. Advisers are clearly treated as part of the staff. The Division has a six month work plan aggregated and integrated from individual work plans as modified by Divisional responsibility. Officers are required to prepare one page statements of activities each month and these are submitted to the Head. They are then circulated to all members of the unit to allow full information exchange. Finally the full division staff meets at least once a month to discuss progress and necessary modification of work plans. We also received information about a short-term training programme which is in an advanced stage of development.

We believe that the procedure described above, which appearing somewhat formal, has resulted in a sense of collective and collegial purpose and effort. As a result morale seems high and many express a commitment to the livestock sector. Despite a possible loss of efficiency, the two advisers in post at the time participated as staff members in the development of the approach and all three fully support it.

In this unit the TAP advisers are perceived to be regular members of the sections who participate fully in the development of work plans and in the carrying out of the division work. Two share offices with Kenyan officers with whom they work. The advisers all articulate the philosophy that their role is to assist in analysis and to work with and through Kenyan officers to enhance their capacity to do planning and policy analysis. It is their stated philosophy that all work should be joint and that few items should emerge from the division clearly identified as their own. It is

their stated philosophy that all work should be joint and that few items should emerge from the division clearly identified as their own. It is their judgement that involving Kenyan officers at all stages of analysis, while perhaps slower and producing a less polished product, is crucial to building longer term capacity. In terms of the trade off advisers are faced within all units, of doing it yourself quickly or doing it as a team, the advisers in this unit in theory and in practice support collective work.

The actual work of the advisers varies with the section to which they are attached and is obviously part of the on-going work. The projects group is involved in several types of activities including participation in mid-course project review, the development of a project inventory ( a necessary first step towards project monitoring), the development of criteria for project approval, and work relating to training livestock officers for the implementation of district focus. In this latter project one of the Kenyan officers, trained in statistics, is working with the management group to develop computer capacity both to maintain a project registry and to develop basic district data for the implementation of district focus. In general the project people are focussing on longer term issues and the work seems well integrated and of good quality.

The commodities marketing group is assisting in the analysis of a number of marketing issues including margins and market efficiency, the efficiency of parastatals, the price review and other shorter term issues which arise from time to time. Again the adviser perceives his role as supportive in a team role.

The strategy section naturally has a Division-wide scope and is responsible to the Head of the Planning Division. One TAP adviser is assigned to strategy. The section has two apparent major responsibilities:

- 1) identification of long term policy issues and the development of a coherent strategy, and
- 2) coordination of the preparation of the sector chapter in the 1984/88 National Plan. Documents reviewed and interviews conducted suggest that six major issues have been identified:
  - a) the changing production structure from large holdings to small holdings and the necessary changes in service delivery;
  - b) the role of parastatals and the private sector as they interface with public policy in the marketing system;
  - c) prices and the role of the market;

- d) strategies for drought management;
- e) special credit needs of the livestock sector;
- f) lack of reliable data at the farm, market and national levels.

Each of these topics and others have been the subjects of position papers and memos which are presumably feeding into the evolution of a Ministry strategy paper as well as providing input into the national plan. In general the subjects are thoroughly, though sometimes academically, treated. A firm base for a strategy paper seems to exist. We recommend that the development of a long term strategy paper proceed as planned.

The effort to develop a livestock sector chapter of the National Plan is the first since the creation of the Ministry. Collective efforts, which used inputs from other members of the Division and the Ministry, have resulted in a draft plan which has been coordinated and largely written by the strategy adviser. It is a comprehensive review of past performance, identifies major issues and recommends action.

In general the work of the Division is somewhat more reflective than that in DPD - MoA where much more energy seems to be consumed in responding to short-term policy crises. This reflects a perception by Division leadership that this is the appropriate role for a Planning Division, but is made more realizable, perhaps, by the differing demands on the Division. Thus in MLD it is more difficult to assess how and where the Division's output enters into the national policy process except through channels from DPD leadership to the Permanent Secretary, who in turn participates at higher levels. Expatriates in MEPD and the Office of the President in general judged the output of the Division to be of good quality and that it had helped the Ministry of Livestock Development to respond well. However, none could identify specific outputs associated with particular advisors. This is a healthy sign with respect to the integration of advisor work into the Kenyan process. On the other hand, given the importance of the livestock sector to Kenyan agriculture it is not clear how much high level attention the long term issues receive. This may explain our inability to speculate about the impact of DPD-MLD on national policy decisions.

In sum the unit and the advisers in it, seems to be attempting conceptually to accomplish the dual objectives of TAP II: namely to produce quality, timely and relevant work and to develop Kenyan capacity. Overall we are impressed by the approach being taken and the functioning of the unit

as a team. Some of this no doubt results from the small size and newness of the unit, but it also reflects conscious attempts by the leadership, the Kenyan officers and the TAP advisers to work towards the objectives we believe are espoused in TAP II. It also clearly reflects the philosophy of the Permanent Secretary.

C. DEVELOPMENT PLANNING DIVISION - MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE (DPD/MOA)

This unit has a longer history, is more structured organizationally, and is larger than the DPD/MLD. The formally assigned tasks are similar in terms of functional areas: strategy, commodity policy analysis, marketing, and project review and appraisal. The number of commodities covered is significantly larger than in livestock as is the number of parastatals normally reporting to the Ministry. Given the importance of foodcrops and export commodities to the Kenyan economy, the Government appears to give heavier policy attention to Agriculture than Livestock. All of these variables suggest that the number of immediate policy issues is in fact much higher. Therefore, the DPD/MoA appears to be almost always involved in the most recent policy issue or crisis. We note this because in part it may well influence the way the work is undertaken.

The unit consists of a Head, a Deputy Head and four sections: project evaluation and planning, commodity policy, strategy planning, and marketing. Each section is headed by a Kenyan Officer. The projects section is staffed by the head, six planning officers, (two of whom are abroad for training) one TAP adviser, and at least two other bilateral advisers. The commodities section consists of the head, five planning officers (one on study leave) and two TAP advisers. The strategy section currently consists of one Kenyan officer (the head). The senior TAP adviser spends what time remains after administrative and coordinating duties in this section and soon will join the section physically. The marketing section consists of three Kenyan officers (one as head) and two FAO consultants. This unit is somewhat apart from the rest of the Division having originally been conceived as part of a development project. Care must always be taken to assure that overlaps between work in this section and the commodities section are minimized while enhancing complementarity.

It is our understanding that the FAO project is scheduled to end next year and we would expect that serious consideration will be given to rationalizing the work assignments in DPD. We note, as did Faaland and Saywell in 1978, that the presence of an uncertain number of bilaterally funded expatriates, in addition to four TAP advisers, brings the ratio of Kenyan officers (excluding administrators) to expatriates below the crucial minimum of 1:1.

The presence of additional advisers with bilateral loyalties, while increasing the pool of resources available to DPD/MoA, raises two kinds of issues which may merit attention. First for bilaterally funded planning and analysis activities, mainly operating within the Division, there is an issue of whether their project objectives are the same as those of TAP. If they perceive their role as doing short-term policy analysis only, then TAP advisers, who have the additional responsibility of institutionalizing Kenyan capacity, may be judged as less effective in producing the volume and quality of output. This provides the setting for potential internal conflicts among advisers and may contribute to uncertainty among Kenyan planning officers as to their role and responsibilities. Secondly, other advisers without an institution-building commitment may become directly involved with higher level users of information without involving Kenyan officers at all levels.

In light of these issues we recommend that the GoK consider either encouraging bilateral donors interested in providing planning assistance for DPD to join the pool or at least explicitly build institution-building objectives into all bilateral contracts. Finally we wish to make very clear that we are not referring to bilaterally-funded field projects administered through technical division which have a planning component. Here, continuing to develop the system of full information exchange and coordination being undertaken between the projects section and the Department of Agriculture should be sufficient.

The mode of operation of the DPD/MoA is evolving towards a positive programme of work plans and specific work assignments for individual officers. Several times in the recent past work plans have been proposed and put on paper, but each time they have been overtaken by events. The most recent attempt in June, fostered by TAP advisers, is promising. We have seen plans from two Sections which explicitly assign responsibilities, by commodity or subject matter area, to individual officers. In addition, in the commodities section, the two TAP advisers have also been assigned

larger groups of commodities, making possible collegial interaction on commodity issues if desired. A similar procedure had been previously adopted in the projects section. All of these efforts are commendable and we recommend that work plans be formalized Division-wide and that they be adhered to.

But there is more to making a Planning Division functional than having a written work plan. We note that requests for analysis sometimes go directly to TAP advisers by passing administrative officers. We are not slaves of bureaucratic processes; however, clearly defined and adhered to channels of work requests and analysis flows would enhance morale. Further there should be a clearly stated Division philosophy, endorsed and supported by all TAP advisers, that part of the process involves collaborative work which potentially improves Kenyan capacity. Further we recommend an operating philosophy that assures that all work should be done by team involving Kenyan officers when officers are available.

We note also that there are infrequent Division wide meetings held to discuss Division philosophy, objectives and work plans. Further we were not informed of any formal monthly or semi-annual reporting requirements. Formalization of work plans, reporting and meetings should help in building coherence and morale. Efforts in two of the Sections in this regard are to be commended. The above analysis suggests that the role of TAP advisers in DPD/MoA is perceived differently at various levels of the bureaucracy. In general the higher the level, the greater the emphasis given to timely, quality analysis. There is also some diversity among adviser perceptions of their role, both in terms of short-term reactive work versus longer term analysis and/or the costs of taking the additional time to involve junior Kenyan officers in problem formulation, analysis and reporting. Even TAP advisers who take seriously their role in institution building are often frustrated by the constant turnover of Kenyan staff and the lack of experience and/or the motivation and work habits of some Kenyan officers. In short we have to confess that the long term objective of institution building is not being realized to any significant degree in the Division less because of advisers' willingness and commitment to institution building than because of the capacity and experience of junior officers. It also probably reflects the priorities of Ministerial and Divisional management for product rather than process.

The work of advisers in the three sections is extensive, relevant and recognized to be of high quality. Rather than attempting a full review of specific subject matter (this is clearly outlined in various semi-annual reports) we broadly characterize the work and comment both on its timeliness, relevance and apparent impacts. In doing so we comment also on the way in which advisers have been deployed. We have also reviewed in depth a great deal of the written output of the Division.

The work of the projects section has focussed broadly on agricultural development issues which have included helping design the National Extension Project and the National Home Economics/Nutrition Project. The Section has also worked with the Management Systems Unit to design a project management system. The TAP adviser was also involved in a crash effort to ascertain the actual status of major food crop yields. The TAP adviser was also heavily involved in integrating inputs to and drafting the Agricultural Chapter of the 1984/88 Plan. It is a comprehensive review of past progress, current issues and future plans. Finally we note that the TAP adviser and the Section head have worked together to improve forward planning in the section and have attempted to devise ways of securing greater interaction with planning officers.

The Commodities Section, given its mandate, is necessarily involved in shorter term issues of immediate concern. These have included policy papers on Pyrethrum, Tea, Oilseeds; the possibilities of disposing of surplus food grains; and on relative gazetted prices. These activities are in addition to the one institutionalized task in the DPD - namely the annual price review. This annual effort begins in the commodities section and ultimately ends up in cabinet. There is some evidence that this task is not as well anticipated as it might be. Continuing discussions of methodology and data needs as proposed in recent work plans would improve the process. We note that this section collaborated with the projects section in making projections for the five year plan.

We are impressed by the recognition of the quality of work coming out of this section and others in DPD/MoA by advisers and Kenyan officials in other Ministries. We note with approval that recently there have been specific assignments of commodity responsibilities to both Kenyan officers and TAP advisers. This is part of an effort to develop a section work plan.

The strategy section is understaffed. This may reflect Governmental priority for the present over the longer term. This section, logically the place to take the lead in the five year plan, had a change of leadership about the time that work assignments for plan papers were made. Thus only a coordinating and editing role was expected. However, as noted above, ultimately much of the final drafting was done in the projects section. The absence of a fulltime adviser in this section also constrains possible collaborative and longer term activities.

This is not a criticism of the Senior Adviser. It is, rather, a much more realistic recognition of the time required to be an effective Senior Adviser than the 20 per cent time envisioned in the TAP II Scope of Work (para 34). To his credit the Senior Adviser was a leading participant in a significant and quality analysis of maize marketing, a good example of long-term analysis which we commend and which offers on occasion for some additional thoughts.

The main document, the product of DPD-wide effort, is a well-reasoned and analytically sound presentative of a set of four maize security options. The technical appendices, almost exclusively done by TAP advisers, are more academic and contain relatively sophisticated simulation analysis. We offer two comments; first, the attempts in Annex IV to state clearly the limitations of the analysis is commendable and underlines the necessity of constantly emphasizing to decision-makers the limitations of models when choosing policies; and second, we commend the degree to which Kenyan officers were involved in the conceptualization, analysis and interpretation of the results. This was clearly an ideal opportunity, that was seized, for on the job training. We believe it might also have provided an opportunity for the involvement of the substantial research talent in the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University of Nairobi. We recommend more of this kind of analysis which can demonstrate to Kenyan officers that policy involves choices among alternatives, and that simple elementary economics has much power.

In summary the record in DPD/MoA in producing timely and quality policy analysis is generally good. Given turnover in junior staff and the loss of several more senior officers it is clear that a great deal of the credit for the quality and timeliness rests with TAP and other expatriate advisers. This is a contribution to one important objective of TAP II namely to improve the quality of policy analysis and policy action in Kenya. As noted earlier it is less clear how much it has contributed to institution building in the Ministry of Agriculture.

D. NATURAL RESOURCES DIVISION - MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT (MEPD)

As the Central Planning Ministry, MEPD is charged with coordinating planning activities in the operating ministries. The planning activities of both MoA and MLD are coordinated through the Natural Resources Division. The major role of this division is coordinating and interacting with operating ministries in the preparation of the 5 year plan but it also gets involved in short term issues such as the price review and various other interministerial committees. The division is organized into four sections one of which is agricultural development. The Division head is involved in many of the agricultural activities while delegating responsibilities in other sectors to members of his staff.

The TAP adviser in MEPD is nominally attached to the Division Head, and therefore his work activity should be determined by the activities of the unit. The MEPD has a major role in prescribing to the operating ministries procedures for sector plan development (Sessional Paper No. 4, 1981) and provides a broad macro framework for agriculture and livestock. (Macro targets for detailed sectoral plans are not provided in order to give the ministries flexibility). A large number of inter-ministerial task forces were set up on a sectoral basis. The task force relating to agriculture and livestock met several times. However, it is our impression that the major initiative in sectoral plan development fell to the MoA and MLD. The Division will be involved in the integrative process which takes place at MEPD after sectoral drafts are prepared.

Unlike the DPDs in the operating ministries there is a less clear structure of continuing tasks around which to formulate a work plan. Thus it is most difficult to evaluate the impact of TAP in this area. This position, as all must be aware, was not part of the original TAP programme, but was added later with an incumbent already in place. After the implementation of TAP II a new adviser was appointed. In the absence of a clearly defined role, the adviser had two options. The first, in the spirit of TAP, was to perform those tasks that were asked of him by his superiors in the role of a civil servant. The second would be to create a more or less self-initiated work programme, in addition to responding to shorter term and immediate requests. The current incumbent has followed the first option, which was his perception of the job. Thus most of his activities, with one major exception in sugar policy, have been responses to requests for comments on papers, projects and books emanating to a large

extebt from the Permanent Secretary. In addition he has been asked to draft memos and write speeches. The work load seems sponradic and, by his own admission, not fully demanding of his time or talents. He has not as fully as he might forstered informal contact between Kenyan officers in MEPD and the two DPDs. He also has had limited interaction with the Senior Advisor or other TAP advisors.

We have great difficulty, as a result, in assessing the value of this component of TAP II to the objectives of the project, or to the MEPD. We believe, however, that the relative contribution of this TAP role is sufficiently modest (and to some extent murky) to raise serious questions about its cost effectiveness should there be resource constraints or the identification of new TAP needs in the future. For the moment, we recommend that the advisor should be integrated immediately into any work plans that might exist in his division in order that his time and talents be more fully utilized. We also recommend that his on-going work should not only involve collaboration with Kenyan officers but might also involve more awareness of the work going on in the operating ministries.

E. THE NEED FOR LONGER TERM INTEGRATIVE POLICY ANALYSIS AND STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

In each of the previous three sections we have commented on the apparent priority, given limited resources, for short-term and generally narrowly-focussed requests for work. The strategy sections in each Ministry are the smallest. The MEPD concentrates its attention on the preparation of the national plan at periodic intervals and there seems to be limited progress in linking the annual budget process to longer term strategic planning.

But we also see, and hear articulated, the need for some place in Government, or Government in conjunction with other institutions such as the University, to contemplate longer term goals and the commulative impacts that shorter term policies have on them. There are several ~~dimensions~~ dimensions to this issue. Projects are supposedly long term developmental efforts. But the large (how large is not fully known) array of large and small, specific and general-projects that exist in Agriculture and Livestock could have an aggregate impact quite different from the summing of the individual projected impacts. Where are these issues being addressed?

Clearly the agriculture and livestock sector has and will continue to undergo rapid structural change. These structural changes will be accelerated, decelerated or prevented by ad hoc short term policy decisions made on a commodity by commodity basis. Who is working on a more integrative frame of analysis to anticipate these desired and undesired consequences?

Parastatals have always been significant variables in Kenyan agriculture. The private sector, particularly in the marketing and input areas, could become more important if the Report of the Working Party on Government Expenditures (Ndegwa report) is implemented. Where is the broader agricultural sector, including Government, quasi governmental (parastatals) and private organizations, being analyzed and evaluated in a longer term frame?

The Kenyan Government, as represented by those we interviewed, seems more than satisfied with the nature and quality of the work coming from the advisors and we have no strong evidence to disagree with that judgement. However, we repeat there, with few exceptions, seems to be a void in the area of long term comprehensive strategy analysis. On the whole, the longer term yields to the short and in terms of the Division Heads and the Permanent Secretaries, and it will ever be thus unless some unit is specifically freed from shorter term analysis to concentrate on these major issues. But if the short-term, in reality, is the time frame of the Government of Kenya then continuing to hammer for long-term strategy analysis and the building of the capacity on long-term comprehensive planning may remain forever an elusive, through rhetorically appealing, objective.

Our call is not for a comprehensive sectoral model, but rather a conceptual framework. Since the preliminary draft and discussion of this report we have had lengthy discussions with the Senior Advisor. We are persuaded that he has a firm grasp of what is needed. We cite his memorandum to us at length:

"Strategy work ... is high on the agenda, or should be. I think it can be done in three ways:

1. By developing a strategy conceptual framework(s) that will facilitate definition and guidance of well focussed research carried out by university and other consultants. This framework does not have to be comprehensive. It, in fact, may be more powerful if it

identifies and focuses work on subsets of behavioural linkages and associated policy instruments.

2. By linking the conceptual framework to short and medium term policy choices, so that government decision makers can see the importance of such concepts at their own level of concern.
3. By encouraging the development of decision making structures which integrate policy objectives with resource constraints in the context of the ministry's major functional roles, selecting and administering a public investment portfolio, delivering public services such as research and extension, and advising government on price and other policy issues.

Each of these aspects entails linkages between important components of the TAP project and between the project and resources outside the ministries. I believe the Senior Advisor has major responsibilities in this area. He cannot play this role by simply being a carrier of information from one component of the project to another. He needs, at least, a conceptual framework for determining what sort of information is important to carry and whether to carry it. He also, in this context, must focus on advisers and on-going activities that seem to be oriented toward this more strategic thrust."

Other than quibbling, in good academic fashion, about how a strategy conceptual framework can be other than "comprehensive", we endorse this as a sound statement of worthwhile objectives, and commend the Senior Advisor for his conceptualization of the task. However, to accomplish this in the Kenyan context will be challenging.

#### F. THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS UNIT

The initial agreement establishing TAP I anticipated the creation of a Management Unit with the MoA, but two years later the Faaland-Saywell Report noted that no progress had been made and concluded that "the establishment of such a unit, staffed by Kenyans, within the office of the Permanent Secretary is not presently contemplated." Later in 1979 the Ministry apparently moved formally to create a Management Unit, but the Unit seems not to have materialized. While TAP advisors readily identified a list of priorities for such a unit, the June 1980 semi-

annual report from the Senior Advisor admitted that the effort had met with "little success" and attributed the failure to the total absence of Kenyan staff and little Kenyan interest. "The decline in MSU activities ..... continued into 1981", noted the June 1981 report with modest understatement. At the same time a report by Mr. W.B. Cutter on financial management in the MoA for the World Bank (April 21, 1981) pointed to the need for improved financial management:

The Ministry of Agriculture does not have adequate control over its resource allocation process. A pattern of this kind does not represent a simple failure to expend funds in any one period. Rather, it represents inadequate planning, budgeting, management and information within the Ministry over a period of four fiscal years. Planning has not taken into account the Ministry's performance in the previous year, or the capabilities of the Ministry itself. Budgeting has evaluated insufficiently the potential and the problems of individual projects. Management has apparently failed to follow through with appropriate expenditure plans and appropriate oversight of expenditure patterns. And finally, the Ministry clearly lacks the information regarding expenditures to make adjustments in the course of a fiscal year.

By the spring of 1981, however, when TAP II was about to begin there was a remarkable change in the policy environment and, partly as a result of personnel changes, in the receptivity of senior officials to the desirability and necessity of improved financial performance.

The deteriorating fiscal situation, a bleak projection of rising debt service costs and foreign borrowing, the impact of the world recession on exports, and the questionable performance of many parastatals, underlined the need for vastly improved management of the republic's finances. The Report of the Working Party on Government Expenditure (1982) was to emphasize the necessity for action with telling clarity.

The implications for the rural sector, thus agriculture and livestock, were obvious. The thrust towards District Focus simply added another critical dimension, if national policy was to be fulfilled, to the demonstrated urgency of improved performance.

We present this historical background to put in sharper focus the remarkable progress that has been made in two years.\*

With the changed local environment new initiatives were proposed and accepted with speed and purpose. The TAP II contract provided for management advisers in both MoA and MLD; and a TAP - initiated consultancy led to the installation of the first Apple II micro-processor; IBRD funding supported the work of a Task Force on Budget and Financial Management Processes encompassing the two Ministries; and ultimately World Bank funding for the Harvard administered Agriculture Technical Assistance Project (ATAP) was to increase the micro-processor capacity, and support one additional advisor in financial management and organization and one full-time computer consultant to work with both Ministries.

By the summer of 1982 when a new Senior Advisor and these new MSU advisors arrived in Kenya, marked progress had been made in many areas of MSU activities, and the basis laid for the progress that has continued since that time. The work of TAP-ATAP advisers and the availability of the micro-processors has been most impressive, certainly to senior Kenyan officers, in the budgeting and financial management field, where a reliable and efficient system has been put in place for expenditure monitoring, allocation of funds, and budget preparation. The difference between the summer of 1981 and 1983 is like that between night and day.

The following review illustrates the current state of the art: Expenditure Monitoring: All officers with authority to spend government funds submit returns each month on all of their accounts. These 250 reports with details on about 10,000 allocations are entered into the micro-processor and compiled in several ways. At present, four monthly reports are generated for each of the four budgets.

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\* The best study of the shortcomings of financial management in the two ministries and the financial and economic crisis that compelled dramatic reforms is Thomas C. Pinckney, John M. Cohen, and David K. Leonard, "Microcomputers and Financial Management in Development Ministries: Experience from Kenya", Development Discussion Paper No. 137 (Harvard Institute for International Development, August, 1982.)

The reports are:

- 1) a list of the budget by head, sub-head, and item detailing the budget, total payments, total commitments, and balance for each item;
- 2) a list of the spending officers with details on total allocation, total payments, total commitments, and per cent of allocation spent;
- 3) a list of the major budget items (transport operating expenses, purchase of plant and equipment, farm inputs, etc.) including total budget, total payments, total commitments, and per cent of the budget spent;
- 4) a special focus each month, picking a particular item from report 3 and pointing out which budget head(s) and which particular spending officers are the source of the problem.

The expenditure monitoring system is the largest monthly operation for the microprocessors. The same officers who previously produced report 1 by hand enter the data into the machines. The reports are widely used in both ministries. In addition to the normal monthly reports, the files are also used to create special reports from time to time, such as summary reports of allocations and expenditures by district.

Allocation of Funds: The two ministries must divide their budgets into 10,000 allocations to spending officers within a very short time during June. Previously this was done piecemeal with allocations being made well into September or October. Both ministries now use the microprocessors to aid in the allocations. The process is not nearly as well defined as the expenditure monitoring system, but proceeds something like this: In May, the machine produces a list of proposed allocations to spending stations by dividing the preliminary budget figures in the same proportion as allocations (and/or expenditures) in the present fiscal year. The chiefs of the divisions (and/or provincial and district officers) review this document and propose changes. The changes are reviewed and modified by the finance officers, and entered into the machine. The microprocessor checks that the allocations add up to the budget figures. After the printed estimates come out, the allocations are modified to reflect changes from the preliminary budget figures, and the allocations are printed.

In reality the process is much more complex than this when the fiscal situation changes because the Treasury may be forced to review its preliminary budget ceilings requiring the printing of several drafts. Also, division chiefs often revise their submissions from week to week. In any event, the field officers now receive allocation by the middle of July at the latest. During the year, revisions to the allocations are sometimes done by the microprocessors, depending on the number of revisions to be made. In all cases the files in the machines are kept up to date, as the allocation file is also used for expenditure monitoring.

Budgeting: The microprocessors are used in preparing the forward, revised, and printed estimates. They are used:

- 1) to record what has been proposed and what has been accepted,
- 2) to print proposed budgets with no typographical or summation errors,
- 3) to make amendments, projections, and re-typing easy and accurate, and
- 4) to substantiate the arguments made to the Treasury.

The final use is the most important. The expenditures are routinely used to help in deciding on budget figures, and summary reports by head or item are used to argue about proportions within the budget.

TAP advisers have also used the microprocessor for a number of cost-benefit analysis of projects, most notably the Bura Irrigation Scheme and in a few economic studies, such as the Inter-ministerial Maize Marketing Study where they were used for econometric analysis, financial analysis of the NCPB, and for simulation modelling. At the moment a system for vehicle monitoring in the MoA is underway, and should in time enable the ministry to have an updated inventory of all vehicles, including machinery, and a method of monitoring usage, petrol consumption, repair bills etc. Once the system is running it can be easily adapted for

the MLD. The ATAP/ATAP advisors working with MLD are currently working on a system for monitoring some aspects of personnel management and record-keeping in the Ministry.

Equally impressive, though more difficult to measure, is the work of the AT&P-funded Task Force on Budget and Financial Management Processes. Initially, the Task Force was to meet every three months until mid-1983, and to date four meetings have been held, the last in April 1983. The objectives of the Task Force, as outlined in a project document, were:

- 1) to follow the budget process for one full cycle;
- 2) to propose short-term interim improvements to the relevant ministries when such proposals are appropriate, and
- 3) to carry out longer term assessments of the entire budget process.

Each meeting of the Task Force was focussed on such matters of common concern as differing views about resource availability; views of programme strategy or department performance; differing analytical conclusions to budget problems and solutions; approaches to data and information needs; and conceptual issues concerning the budget process.

While there has been close consultation and collaboration with senior personnel in the two ministries, much of the staff work of preparing the agenda, writing the discussion papers, writing the reports of the meetings, and monitoring the follow-up has fallen on TAP/ATAP advisers, for obvious reasons. The two-day meetings have involved as many as 70 Kenyan officers; including Permanent Secretaries; a representative from the Office of the President; officials and advisers, in Finance, MEPD, and the Ministry of Co-operative Development; provincial officers; and representatives of the World Bank. Working papers provide the topics of discussion; the Task Force reviews the recommendations and followup from the previous meeting; and, following a full discussion, recommendations are made for further consideration, decision, and implementation. The minutes of the Fourth Workshop contain 21 pages of concise and lucid reporting, and the recommendations in a sense provide a forward work programme for many sections of the Ministries.

The Task Force process has not only yielded significant results, but it also seems to us to be an invaluable management by objective educational process. Moreover, it serves an equally invaluable vehicle for the sharing of information and the discussion of common problems at a time when there is a real need for coordination among the various sections of the Ministries and between all Ministries represented and the Office of the President, which, we observed, seems to be assuming the role of a central coordinating agency itself. We strongly recommend that financial and human support for the Task Force process be continued until it can safely be said to be irrevocably built-in to the Kenyan system. We also think it is an experiment that might well be replicated in other ministries or groups of ministries.

Progress in other areas is more difficult to measure but seems to us to be heading in the right direction and at a speed that cannot be faulted given the structure of the bureaucracy, the novelty of the approaches, the pressure of the work discussed above (and other assignments of a short-term nature), and jurisdictional (sometimes called "semantic") disputes. We might mention, in particular, the important strides made in elaborating and refining an administrative and financial system in response to the District Focus mandate in the two ministries (which have been accepted in principle) and an equally thorough proposal for a management system for the planning, preparation, implementation and monitoring of district, regional and national level projects and activities. As stated in the last draft of the proposal, the planned system has three related aims:

- a) To subject all proposed projects to a standard appraisal procedure so as to make certain that all meet minimum standards and so that comparisons within a common framework can be made in allocating limited resources;
- b) To follow the financial and physical progress of all development activity so that corrective action can be taken in time, budgets and fund allocations can be adjusted to actual progress and action can be taken if expected results are not being attained;
- c) To integrate project appraisal and planning and project monitoring and evaluation with the funding system so that allocations can be more closely related to development priorities and physical progress.

At the moment the proposal is still under discussion, but expectations are high. We note that there is considerable difference of opinion between the Department of Agriculture and the MSU over relative responsibilities and competence, and also that the Planning Division seem to have little involvement in developing the system. In time, it seems to us, a final decision will rest with the Permanent Secretary if the proposal, in some form or other, is to be firmly implemented as it must if the objectives are to be realized.

Despite the progress in systems building, particularly in the area of financial management, there is cause for some concern. Senior Kenyan administrative and financial officers not only appreciate the improved system, and marvel at the productivity of the microprocessor, but wonder aloud at how they could have functioned for so long without it. At the same time, however, while they appreciate and use the results of the additional human and machine capacity they could not, unassisted, replicate them at this moment. Moreover, officers in the Administrative and Financial cadre change, sometimes with astonishing rapidity, and a continual process of indoctrination and education will be necessary if the system is to be maintained under constantly changing management.

Senior Kenyan officers have been closely involved in the development and operation of the financial management system, but only an unbelievable stretch of the imagination could suggest that "at least one Kenyan is available to work with" each of the advisers in the MSU. On the other hand it is difficult given the bureaucratic structure, where no Management Unit exists, to determine exactly where full-time "counterparts" and ultimate replacements for the advisers could be located in the Ministries or indeed whether they should be. Nevertheless this is a question of crucial importance that must be addressed by government if it wishes to ensure the permanent implementation of a so-far highly successful experiment when the time comes for complete Kenyanization.

It has been argued with considerable logic and in line with textbook management and organizational theory and practice - that the ultimate success will be determined by the extent to which the system itself is built into the institutional framework and no longer depends on individuals but is in fact their master. This certainly is true in the long run, but it seems to us that in the intermediate term success will depend not only

on an acceptance of the philosophy of the management system (and the introduction to Management skills acquired in a six week course), but on the availability of technically and managerially qualified Kenyans to maintain, update, improve, and make full use of the man-created system and the machine-readable data.\*

The advisor responsible for introducing these activities into the ministries has placed special emphasis on developing software which makes minimal demands on user programming skills. He has also devoted considerable effort to training micro-processor users at varying skill levels. In his evaluation report of these activities, Prof. Carl Gotsch has outlined a training strategy which should facilitate Kenyanization.\*\* This strategy involves the explicit recognition that the Ministries, while developing a group of officers capable of operating hardware and making modest changes in software, will have to depend on outside expertise to develop additional software as new areas for application are identified. These training activities must continue to be pursued vigorously if sufficient Kenyan capacity is to develop over the next two years.

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\* We suggest that all officers involved in the Task Forces read the final section in the Pinckney-Cohen-Leonard paper on micro-processor mentioned earlier outlining the dangers and limitations of the use of, and reliance on, the machine without professionally and technically qualified people all along that long line that stretches from the District, through the Ministry, to the Treasury and the Office of the President and back.

\*\* Carl H. Gotsch an evaluation of the present contribution and future potential of micro-computer in the Kenyan Ministries of Agriculture and Livestock Development, August 1983

G. THE ROLE OF THE SENIOR ADVISER

We approach a discussion of the role of the Senior Adviser with considerable difference and hesitation, for any discussion involves:

- 1) personalities and different conceptions of how to maximize the potential effectiveness of the office and the individual;
- 2) the delicate balance between being an adviser or officer "like any other" except for administrative chores;
- 3) the danger of insinuating more of a "team" approach into the "pool" concept;
- 4) implicitly suggesting a somewhat new function that has no counterpart in the Kenyan bureaucracy.

Despite these dangers, however, we feel that the question must be faced in the interests of all concerned and the overall long term impact of TAP II. We do this without questioning the pool approach, and without intending any criticism of the TAP II Senior Advisers whose work we find commendable.

TAP advisers work in five different units: DPD MoA, DPD MLD, MSU/MLD, MSU/MoA, and MEPD. Their work brings them into frequent contact with the Office of the President, the Department of Agriculture, the Treasury, the University, and, hopefully, other agricultural research institutes in Kenya, IDS, and transient HIID consultants. The tasks of the various units overlap, and work in one is often relevant to , and is sometimes similar to, that in another. Two advisers, indeed, work in two ministries. The Task Force on Budget and Financial Management includes members from five Ministries and the Office of the President.

Somewhere in the system we believe that there should be an engine to keep information flowing through the many pipelines, and ideally an informal coordinating centre. Since TAP and ATAP advisers are at work in all or most relevant units, it seems to us arguable that the Senior Adviser is, unofficially at least, ideally positioned to fill that role. He has already access to all Planning Divisions and to senior Kenyan administrative officers in all relevant ministries. He is in touch with TAP donors, who ultimately will decide on the future of the Project as least as far as their support is concerned. Through his responsibility for overseas and local training he is ultimately involved in the crucial area of human resource development, including Kenyan staffing and upgrading, adviser recruitment, and short-term consultants. He has no counterpart in the Government of Kenya.

Functionally we could describe part of the role as that of broker, intermediary, or trouble-shooter. The task is one of facilitating and ensuring a quick and easy flow of information, of encouraging dialogue common to all, of anticipating common issues and duplication of effort, and, in general, promoting the overall collective effort to the benefit of all. Combined with his administrative and reporting responsibilities this is an enormously challenging responsibility.

We realize that individuals and Governments have their own order of priorities, and we are not audacious enough to suggest that ours are necessarily wiser or more objective than others. In the present situation we have been told, forcefully at times by both Kenyans and advisers, that the present Senior Adviser's potential value in the Strategy Section of the MoA is of a higher priority than the linkage role that has been performed, and that we feel might be enhanced. On the other hand, we have listened to the argument, from both Kenyans and advisers, that a better information flow and improved linkages between and among the various units in which advisers work would improve the quality and quantity of the overall performance, improve morale among advisers and lead in the long run to more substantial benefits for the Government of Kenya. Obviously there is no consensus. If there were, there would be no issue that we would dare to address. But we believe that the issue must be raised and discussed, and that at least the relative weights of the Senior Adviser's activities be agreed on and the inevitable costs and benefits realized and accepted.

At the same time, as we have noted elsewhere, the development of the strategy section and the formulation of long-term strategies for the agricultural sector is of critical importance to Kenya. It may, indeed, be of much greater priority, even considering the limited impact the Senior adviser might have. Indeed, in Section III- E. above, we did present, with our endorsement, the current Senior Adviser's approach to the development of an overall conceptual framework. It is our judgement that working within the context of DPD/MoA it would be possible both to contribute to the development of long-term strategy for agricultural planning and policy integration and to evolve a conceptual approach which could have much broader applicability. In this effort he should also be able to link with strategy activities in MLD.

However, we do not see under the present structure how one man can satisfactorily fulfil both roles without draining his energy or impairing

his health. Therefore, we suggest that some consideration should be given to the selection of an adviser who, in addition to working in one of the MoA sections, could work with all members of TAP in taking part of the burden of devising, implementing and monitoring much of the in-service and short-term training programmes off the shoulders of the Senior Adviser.

#### H. THE DPDs AND THE PARASTATALS

The agreement between the GoK and HIID does include the parastatals in the statement of objectives (i.e.) and the scope of work (Annex A.6) states: "It is considered that, given the need to fully integrate the parastatals into the process of agricultural planning, this role could best be performed by a Monitoring and Evaluation element with the DPD working in collaboration with a Management Systems Unit attached to the office of the Permanent Secretaries."

Again we have not had time to examine the inter-action between the Ministries and their theoretically subordinate parastatals. We understand that, in Agriculture at least, one attempt made to nominate a senior officer - a form of unit we suppose - to monitor the parastatals did not prove either workable or successful; and at the moment a number of such officers each try to keep in touch with the activities of a number of the two dozen parastatals. As far as we could determine, however, no Monitoring and Evaluation element has been created in either DPD's or the MSU, and for all practical day-to-day purposes the parastatals remain outside the routine purview of the Planning Process in both ministries.

Our review of the work of the DPD's did reveal occasions when particular issues with respect to individual parastatals - usually when some critical issue arose - did involve the DPD's. However, there does not yet seem to be a mechanism for integrating the monitoring and evaluation of the parastatals within the normal work programme of the Planning Divisions, or indeed the ministries.

The whole issue of the parastatals is, of course, before government at the highest levels, and we feel it appropriate, while reporting our observations not to make any recommendation.

I. REPORTING

In the last few years there has been a significant improvement in the semi-annual reporting, although on occasion the reports have been somewhat delayed. Donors feel that the reports do provide them with sufficient descriptive information about the activities of the TAP and on the whole they are content to remain at arms length, which of course is fundamental to the donor pool concept.

However, they do feel that it would be helpful and appropriate for the Senior adviser, when submitting his report, to include a summary statement outlining the progress made in the various units, and the problems and constraints encountered. We endorse that suggestion. We also recommend that copies of the reports be sent to all the advisers and relevant Kenyan officers.

J. RECRUITMENT OF TAP ADVISERS

We have been very impressed by the overall quality and dedication of the TAP advisers. Clearly the recruitment process is working (or else TAP has been incredibly lucky). The current set of TAP advisers are all well trained and widely experienced mostly in developing countries. None are academics interrupting a research career and who function with an eye to academic recognition back home. Rather, by and large, they seem dedicated to doing quality policy analysis at a level of sophistication generally appropriate to the users of the analysis.

The following elements therefore seem appropriate for the future recruitment and orientation process:

- 1) Advisers should be recruited who have the necessary technical competence coupled with a good policy sense and a sensitivity to the form and sophistication of analysis appropriate for Kenyan policy makers.
- 2) Advisers should be recruited who have a commitment to undertake effective and continuous in-service training of the sort discussed earlier in this evaluation. People who believe their only role is to do quick policy pieces should be deliberately excluded.

- 3) Recruitment for particularly sensitive linking positions, e.g., senior adviser, and MEPD should be carefully selected for their broad macro economic competence and experience and for their capacity to initiate, synthesize and reach out to build links.
- 4) Advisers should be carefully screened for those who have the temperament and the necessary dedication to work within the governmental system under local conditions rather than seeking special advantage.
- 5) In the interview process a careful laying out of the philosophy and objectives of TAP particularly as it relates to in-service training should be underlined.
- 6) Once selected there should be a formal orientation programme both at HIID and upon arrival in Kenya. The Kenya orientation, already mandated but apparently not seriously undertaken, should involve not only an introduction to Kenya, Kenyan agriculture and the Kenyan Government, but also a restatement of TAP objectives and philosophy in clear and certain terms. Also every effort should be made to minimize the lost time in wheel spinning in getting to know people, particularly TAP advisers already in place.

We list these recommendations not to criticize current advisers or the process. Rather we include them to emphasize the importance of this part of TAP. Finally, we conclude unequivocally that Kenyan involvement in the interview process and final decision authority is in large part responsible for the appropriateness of the current advisers. A return to the earlier system of unilateral Cambridge recruitment would be a very retrogressive step.

IV RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION: KENYAN STAFF

We are not so obsessively masochistic or perverse to begin a discussion of recruitment and retention in the Scheme of Service for Economists without extreme reluctance. But our terms of reference leave us no choice, despite the fact that Government, Donors and HIID are only too well aware of the problem.

The contract between the Government of Kenya and HIID make explicit the undertakings of Government which was to:

- 2.1(b) ensure that at least one Kenyan officer is available to work with every TAP advisor.
- (d) undertake revisions in the terms and conditions in the Scheme of Service for Economists and Technicians with a view to improving the chances of retaining good Kenyan Officers in the service.
- (e) provide professional and administrative leadership needed to attract and retain good Kenyan staff officers.

There is little point in backing away from a more or less categorical assertion that on the whole Government has not succeeded in staffing the Planning Divisions with the quantity and quality of Kenyan staff necessary to foresee an early end to expatriate advisers in some role or other. The Kenyan staff in the two planning divisions as of June 1983 according to the June 30, 1983 semi-annual report was as follows:

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Filled</u>	<u>Vacant</u>	<u>Training</u>	<u>MAs</u>
MoA DPD	21	16	9	3	7
MLD DPD	18	9	9	3	4

(The arithmetic discrepancy in the Ministry of Agriculture is explained by the fact that four members seconded from the Department are not included in the establishment and the posts apparently are therefore classed as vacant).

The total establishment of 39 in 1983 is to reach 44 by June, 1986 when TAP II expires. Quantitatively the situation is less than satisfactory, as all admit. Qualitatively, at least in terms of length of service or job group, the situation is much less than satisfactory.

<u>Job Group</u>		<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Filed</u>
H	MoA	9	4
	MLD	9	4
JK	MoA	9	4
	MLD	6	3

Only five members of the two planning divisions are in job group L or above, and these, we understand, all hold positions as heads of sections or divisions. Of the total establishment who are members of the Scheme of Service 8 of the 11 in Agriculture and 7 of the 9 in MLD are in job group J or below, and in both divisions 8 are in Job group H. Excluding section heads we would be surprised if in MoA the average experience in post was more than 18 months, and a hasty and rough calculation in one section suggested that the average experience was about one year.

From material prepared by the Senior Adviser it would appear that of the 17 Kenya staff present in 1979, 6 are currently in post, all in administrative positions. Of the nine MAs present in 1979 only three remain. And of the six TAP-trained MAs between 1979 and 1983 only two remain.

Clearly the retention rate is worst in Agriculture, where we found the morale much lower among the Kenyan staff than in Livestock Development. But without exception Kenyan officers to whom we spoke, including section heads, expressed the view that unless the conditions of service were improved they would have no hesitation in pursuing attractive job offers in parastatals or the private sector.

However, on the whole the retention rate appears to be worse, certainly in Agriculture, than for the Scheme of Service as a whole. Paul Haddow's 1982 report indicates that for Government-sponsored trainees in the Scheme the retention rate is about 60 per cent\*. Follow-up data on those who pursued post-graduate training under the York University programme revealed that 73% of the MAs and 38% of the MBAs were still in the Scheme of Service. Clearly the retention of MAs in the Ministry of Agriculture seems much worse than for the Scheme as a whole. Haddow also concluded from a detailed questionnaire that if other positions were

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\* Paul Haddow, The post Graduate Training and Utilization of Professional Planners and Economists in the Government of Kenya.

(A report prepared for the Government of Kenya and CIDA).

available the overall retention rate in the Scheme would be somewhere between 20 and 33%. Our cursory discussion in Agriculture revealed that under such circumstances the retention rate would be close to zero, but somewhat higher in MLD.

The tripartite agreement calls generally for the Government of Kenya to take such actions as are necessary to ensure adequate staffing for the Planning Divisions and the Management Unit to enable the project to fulfill its institutional building obligations and to look forward to ultimate Kenyanization. The Permanent Secretary (MEPD) has made recommendations to upgrade the divisions to departments, thus making possible upward mobility for Kenyan officers, and to facilitate more automatic promotion to job group L. If recommendations are accepted and implemented they would presumably help the retention of some officers at least. He has also secured approval for what we understand is the recruitment of 30 officers, largely educated abroad, and 35 recent graduates from the University of Nairobi.\*\* However, as he sorrowfully admits, by the time PSC/DPM has finished its lengthy screening and recruitment procedure it is possible that the best candidates will have found other employment.

However, the recruitment at the bottom and the loss at the middle will not produce an intermediate term answer to the development of Kenyan resources in the Scheme, even if the republic becomes "saturated" with Economists and Planners. As long as the scheme cannot provide competitive terms of service, the most promising young officers may go to the parastatals and the private sector. Moreover while this cannot be proven we believe it to be true Government (and donors) have come to expect a quality of data collection, analysis and advice, as well as a time-frame for delivery, that is beyond the capacity of all but a few of the more experienced Kenyan officers. After all, it is unreasonable and unfair to expect that an officer with an MA and a few years experience can match the output, in quality and quantity, of older, better educated, and far more experienced advisors. As we have noted elsewhere senior Kenyan officials lean on expatriate advisors, and themselves seem to do little to encourage, other than rhetorically, the effort to develop Kenyan resources. The trade-off between quality and

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\*\* There is some uncertainty about these figures, but in the time available we have not been able to recheck our information.

speed on the one hand and institutional building on the other, in the real bureaucratic world, seems always to rest with the former.

We hesitate to offer any solutions to a problem that is Government wide, not only because it might be deemed presumptuous but because in-baskets at DPM are filled with similar donor and Government recommendations. The 1982 Ndegwa Report aptly summarized the problem:

"Foremost among the reasons behind the decision of many young professionals to leave Government are insufficient job satisfaction, inadequate promotion prospects and relatively low levels of remuneration."

About all that might be said on the other side is that the current recession has seemed to make job security and fringe benefits, particularly for more senior staff, a countervailing benefit.

Nevertheless, we do offer some suggestions that might improve the quality of staff and the morale of young officers, all the while believing that only radical reforms and, in the long run, adjusting the terms of service in the Scheme to conform more closely to market conditions, will provide a permanent solution:

- a) broadening the pool from which members of the Scheme or Planners generally can be drawn. We note that several planners in MLD have come from the field and then have gone further education in economics. They seem to us to have the ideal combination of applied and academic experience, and we detect a higher level of motivation and commitment. We note also that, for whatever reason, the DPD MoA have seconded officers from the Department. We suggest that greater attention be paid to this resource pool.
- b) a conscious acceptance by senior Kenyan officials of the inevitable short-term loss of productivity in the interests of long term capacity and Kenyanization by insisting that all output be collective.
- c) the acceptance of an improved management system at the divisional level, enforced by the Permanent Secretary, that not only encourages but compels hands-on in-service training between advisers and Kenyans, as discussed in Section V.
- d) the conscious and systematic survey of the pool of Kenyan resources in the Universities, research institutes, and the private sector, and the deliberate employment of such resources rather than the use of outside consultants, and donor agreement that external aid can be used for such purposes.

- e) the selection, on merit, of high-quality candidates for post-MA education abroad, and the development of a system whereby such officers can rise in job group and salary scale without having to assume administrative jobs, much as a University Professor can be promoted and paid on merit without becoming a department head or a dean.
- f) the recruitment of advisers in all appropriate projects who accept the role of institutional building, whatever the constraints. On this point we believe, as noted elsewhere, that on the whole the recruitment procedures for TAP II have satisfied this requirement.

However, having said this, we must wonder whether the pool of resources graduating currently from the Department of Economic and Agricultural Economics in the University of Nairobi is large and deep enough to satisfy the overall national need for planners, managers, and economists.

V: TRAINING KENYAN OFFICERS

In the previous section we have touched on improved training opportunities and programmes as a possible means of recruiting, retaining, and generally improving the morale and quality of the Kenyan officers. Here we discuss the role and performance of TAP and HIID in long-term overseas training and short-courses, and what, for lack of a better word, we call in-service or on-the-job training.

The TAP II contract provides for 25 years of long and short-term overseas training, most at the Masters' level, and the Annex to the contract reveals that government intended to provide another 25 years of MA training at the University of Nairobi, the intention being to have 33 of the 44 positions in 1986 filled by officers with a Masters' degree. As our comments under Recruitment and Retention suggest this goal seems to be utopian. As far as we can determine no masters have been graduated to date from the University of Nairobi.

By the end of the 1983/84 academic year, six officers will have completed 12 years of post-graduate overseas training. One student returned in the fall of 1983 from doctoral training, and five are expected

to complete their Masters in 1984 and one in 1985. Two candidates began their programme in the fall of 1983, and will be expected to return in 1984 and 1985. At the moment there seems to be only one or two in the pipeline for next year. Quite clearly the pool of possible candidates is limited, and unless the training programme reaches out to take officers from parastatals, the Department or other Ministries, the resources available may exceed the qualified candidates on hand.

Given the above quantitative and qualitative constraints, we feel that TAP advisers and Harvard have fulfilled their contractual requirements to develop and manage the overseas training programme. The Senior Adviser and the heads of the DPDs or their deputy review the situation semi-annually, and seek the advice of TAP advisers who have worked with possible candidates, to discuss aptitude and attitude. In consultation with HIID an appropriate institution is selected, very wisely we feel usually American land grant institutions, where the MA degree is taken seriously and not more or less disregarded given the preoccupation with doctoral studies. As far as we can tell HIID monitors the students progress satisfactorily, and handles the administrative and financial chores efficiently.

The Senior Adviser and his colleagues, Kenyan and expatriate, are also involved in the selection of available short courses in Nairobi and abroad, appropriate for selected officers both under the TAP II and the ATAP contract. The ATAP contract, in particular, focusses the training programme on short courses - from six weeks to six months - in Kenya and abroad. Three officers have been sent, and more at the DPS, Under-secretary, and PF & EO level are contemplated. We believe that it is essential that as many as possible in the administrative and financial accounting cadres be introduced to the more systematic financial management and organizational principles and procedures now being implemented if the long-term system-building objective is to be achieved. At the moment reorganization of the government accounting system as a result of District Focus has stalled plans to organize a training programme for ministerial accountants.

Under the ATAP contract one officer is currently abroad for a two year MA in Public Administration and on his return will presumably be attached to the Management Unit; although as far as we can tell no such unit has been established within the bureaucracy. If such a Unit is

established we recommend, as we have elsewhere, that more officers be trained in Economics, and Management to staff such a Unit.

In short, we find that Harvard has fulfilled and is fulfilling the requirements of the formal training programme as well as might be expected given the options open to it, and we expect that in the future the shortcomings may well be attributed to the lack of qualified Kenyan personnel. It is for this reason that we urge not only the continued concern for short-term courses but also the elaboration of a more systematic approach to a variety of informal and formal in-service training activities.

The existence of a formal work programme plan in DPD/MLD and current attempts to implement work plans in the DPD/MoA offer a number of opportunities for a more systematic and continuous approach to collaborative training while accomplishing on-going tasks. We use as an example the approach being fostered by the TAP advisers in the DPD/MoA. There are two continuing functions in both Divisions namely the annual price review and plan development and monitoring. If, as proposed, specific work assignments, both in terms of commodities and subject matter areas, are made to all officers (Kenya and TAP) then the following possibilities seem to us as promising.

First, the formal identification of responsibilities makes it possible to implement a policy that all work should, as far as possible given staffing problems, be conducted by a team consisting of Kenyan officers and an appropriate TAP adviser. These teams should be involved throughout the process from problem identification, selection of analytical approach, collection of data, and analysis and reporting of results. The final product should be clearly a joint effort.

We recognize that the complete adoption of a team approach may extend the time required to complete the task. We also recognize, as has been forcefully pointed out to us, that the talent and experience, and regrettably at times the work habits and motivation of some junior Kenyan officers and the absence of others more experienced, may make the collaborative approach difficult, and at times impossible. However, if anticipatory planning takes place, assignments can be undertaken in a timely and on-going manner. For example, both Divisions know the Price Review is coming. The prior adoption of a procedure for the maintenance of the necessary data and analysis would allow more thorough analysis, while including Kenyan officers to learn while doing.

Similarly, the proposal to publish in the Economic Review of Agriculture, for example, the projection methodology used in plan development would formally record for future use procedures currently done on a more or less ad hoc basis. It would also provide material for workshops and seminars addressed to plan development. Done in the context of an actual task, such seminars, possibly led initially by TAP advisers, would not be pure academic exercises.

Additional possibilities present themselves for informal yet planned efforts to enhance capacity while accomplishing policy analysis and planning tasks. As proposed, the regular publication of the Economic Review with a rolling six month set of assignments from all sections would be useful. Also the building of a long-term strategy paper for each Ministry, which included attention to parastatals and the private sector, could be an on-going activity which had both substantive and training objectives.

Finally as identified in paragraph No. 45 of the Scope of Work, linkages with the University of Nairobi need to be substantially strengthened to use the significant talent pool, particularly in the Department of Agricultural Economics, for both participation in longer term policy and strategy analysis and in both formal and informal on the job training. In addition the presence in Nairobi of a number of International Institutes offers a rich menu of possible speakers, seminar leaders and on the job trainers. We conclude that while these activities may be viewed by some as time consuming and while they would detract from delivering timely (i.e. immediate) policy advice, they are absolutely essential if what we believe to be obligations of TAP are to be fully met. We commend these thoughts to the Senior Adviser and Kenyan leadership so that they may develop a more formal programme which in our judgement would improve both capacity and morale among Kenyan Planning officers.

During the last two years, in particular, the TAP has moved deliberately to attempt, with varying degrees of success as is apparent from our review of the four components, to approach institution building through institutionalizing systematic approaches to problems and issues

and the elaboration and refinement of repetitive processes and procedures. TAP advisers admit that they came:

"... to this point because of the realization that training itself - formal, counterpart, or whatever - has far less than its potential impact unless the system demands that the skills acquired be used. An old saw in the technical assistance business... holds that economic talents wither when returnees from training face bosses who have no appreciation of how the newly acquired skills can be used. Add to this the lack of performance evaluation and discipline, and the outcome is even more dreary. The establishment of a process which moves the correct demands helps to establish a work programme and calls for the use of skills once learned."

We agree completely with this analysis of the problem and certainly one of the solutions. At the same time we must observe that the history of this country and others - both developed and developing - has too many examples of systems put in place - procedures and processes established and working, manuals and recipe books written, training programmes passed - which have withered on the vine when management is disinterested or the technical and professional skills of those required to maintain them either deteriorate or disappear.

#### VI. SUPPORT SERVICES

The provision of support services is another ticklish subject, for it once again arouses the spectre of the "team" as opposed to the "pool" and special treatment of expatriate advisors compared to their Kenyan colleagues. However, we have not hesitated to walk through mine fields before and do not do so now.

The contract between the Government of Kenya and HIID, and the annexed scope of work, make clear the undertakings of government. The Government was to:

- 2.1 (f) provide Harvard personnel free of charge with such offices, secretaries and administrative assistance, equipment and facilities and local transportation as are necessary for performing their professional service. The ministries will provide as additional staff to the project one secretary for the Senior Adviser, four shorthand typists, one clerk, five drivers and two messengers.

The contract envisaged that five motor vehicles would be purchased with project funds which were to be "placed in control of the Planning Units, except one will be reserved for exclusive use by the Senior Adviser."(6.2).

Once again we find performance less than the promise. TAP advisers, almost without exception, believe that their output is diminished by the absence of qualified shorthand typists. They rely on their own calculators and personal computers, for none are provided, and often find they work most efficiently at home as a result. The absence of readily available photocopying equipment delays research and the flow of documents and information.

The most serious deficiency, however, is in the area of transportation. As was the case with TAP I, the motor vehicles provided appear to have been unilaterally removed from control of the Planning Units <sup>while we</sup> /were assured by one senior Kenyan official that vehicles were always available other information suggested that not only were two hors de combat but that TAP advisers, through the Planning Units, lined up like any other officers to secure access to them. In addition, planned and effective work in the field in association with Kenyan officers was severely constrained and sometimes made impossible by the inability of the Units to secure living and travel allowances for advisers, Kenyan officers and drivers.

In their review of TAP I in July 27, 1978 Messrs. Faaland and Saywell made some observations and recommendations which we endorse and cite:

The experience of working under constraints may be salutary for the advisor, a little like taking castor oil because it may be good for one. But clearly the Government needs to make maximum use of members of the TAP. Their output in previous positions and assignments has been based not only on their own efforts, but also on the effectiveness of the support services in carrying out their work and in handling their output. There have been - and will undoubtedly be - times when the individual or collective output has exceeded the capacity of the supporting services, whether personal or technological. Since downtime is not only enormously expensive but also frustrating and even destructive we recommend that it be kept to a minimum by accepting the doctrine that extraordinary needs be satisfied by extraordinary support as occasion demands.

Therefore, we recommend that if government funds are not available that all parties agree, by contractual amendment or otherwise, that the discretionary budget of the Senior Advisor shall include sufficient funds to provide additional secretarial services when necessary, to acquire necessary calculators and photocopying equipment for use by all officers in the Planning Divisions and Management Units, and to secure other research support and facilities as required. We also recommend that, when necessary and urgent, the Senior Advisor, with the approval of the heads of the Planning Divisions, be allowed to use discretionary funds to cover travel and living allowances for advisors, Kenyan officers, and drivers. We also recommend that the vehicles acquired for project purposes be returned to the Planning Units, and the vehicle contractually reserved for the Senior Advisor be placed under his control exclusively. Further, we recommend that the discretionary funds be used to maintain the vehicles and pay for petrol when government funds are unavailable. Naturally, the use of these augmented discretionary funds must be detailed in the financial reports to government and HIID.

We have frequently referred to the onerous and challenging role of the Senior Advisor. Given the complexities of his task and the urgent need underlined elsewhere to maintain close and constant contact with officers in the many Ministries with which TAP personnel are involved, we strongly recommend - almost to the point of insistence - that he be given a direct outside telephone line. If this cannot be provided by Government, we recommend that the project budget cover the costs of installation and maintenance. We understand, following our discussion of the preliminary draft report, that this question should be easily and quickly settled - we trust favourably.

#### VII. THE FUTURE

Our terms of reference do not include a mandate to make recommendations about the appropriateness of a renewal of the Technical Assistance Pool. Nevertheless, the question is clearly in the minds of Government, Donors, and HIID. As a result we have chosen to anticipate such questions, and make the following observations which may prove useful as a basis for discussion by all parties.

1. Substantial progress has been made towards fulfilling the long-term objectives in some areas, less in others, and almost none in some as the lengthy descriptive and evaluative report makes clear. Yet nowhere do we see a situation by 1986 when advisors, in one role or other, will not be needed, and certainly requested in the Planning Divisions and the Management Unit. We need not specify the areas of greatest need, for they will be obvious to any astute reader of this report.

2. If advisors are necessary beyond 1986, even in the DPD-MLD in our judgement the furthest advanced in terms of work programmes and the quality of the Kenyan staff, the question is: how best can they be provided? In our judgement technical assistance can best be provided by a continuation of a TAP pool. We also see no reason, particularly if some of the changes suggested in the work programmes in the divisions and the more systematic use of TAP advisors as trainers are implemented, for government and donors to consider changing the contractor. Harvard has made the mistakes, acquired the experience, has on-site and back-up personnel familiar with the local environment. It seems to us that much would be lost by selecting another contractor who would have to go through a lengthy educational experience and, in reinventing their own wheel would probably make many of the same mistakes HIID did in the formative years of the project.

3. Of course, HIID may conclude, after ten years experience, that the long-term chances of effective institutional building are so slim that time and energy should be devoted elsewhere.

4. The greatest danger, as we see it, is that if the Harvard-managed TAP pool was not continued government would simply reach out and acquire a group or groups of bilateral advisors. Certainly there are donors in the wings. We think this would be counterproductive and would inevitably set back the process of institutional building.

5. Indeed, we feel strongly, as we have indicated in the report and as Faaland and Saywell recommended five years ago, that the TAP should provide all the explicit planning and management advisory personnel and services in the two ministries.

6. We do not propose to offer any suggestions as to the size or form of a possible TAP III. Much will depend on the success over the next three years of institution building and the development of human resources. In particular, significant progress will have to be made in the recruitment, upgrading and retention of Kenyan staff in the DPD-MoA. But we do see the

necessity for the continued presence of advisors in both Planning Divisions and the Management Unit, perhaps in smaller numbers and the occasional use of short-term consultants from Kenya and abroad.

7. If there is to be a continuation of the TAP we would suggest that discussions begin as soon as possible among donors, GoK and HIID. Long-term plans for institution building are in process, individuals have future employment and families to consider, government does not want an interruption in the planning and management development process. It is in the interests of all concerned that the transition to whatever may occur beyond 1986 be "planned" and "managed".

ANNEX A

PEOPLE INTERVIEWED BY TAP II - EVALUATION

TEAM (SAYWELL AND McCALLA), NAIROBI

AUGUST 19 TO SEPTEMBER 16, 1983

A. MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE (MoA)

I. ADMINISTRATION

J. Ilako, Deputy Secretary (acting Chief Accounting Officer)

Mr. Nasieku, Deputy Secretary (Finance)

S.M.G. Mitheki, Sr. Assistant Secretary (Finance) P.F. & E.O.

J. Mithama, Director, Department of Agriculture

II. DEVELOPMENT PLANNING DIVISION

R. Odipoy, Acting Head

J. Karanja, Deputy Head

a. Projects Evaluation and planning Section

B. Nzioki, Head of Section

A. Bereki

Ms. Nykol

Mr. Njoroge

Mr. Shehemi

M. Hall - TAP Adviser

E. Wiess - German Agricultural Team

I. Osman - (ASAL)

b. Commodities Section

Mr. Moka

Mr. Mwangi

Mrs. Mutura

C. Jabara, TAP Adviser

M. Westlake - TAP Adviser

c. Strategy Section

G. Gichuhi, Head

F. Goldman, Sr. TAP Adviser

d. Marketing Section

J. Kesa  
S. Okongi  
P. Newhouse (FAO)  
C. Hansen (FAO)

B. MINISTRY OF LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT (MLD)

I. ADMINISTRATION

L. Ngutter, Head  
J. Mwangi, Deputy Head

a. Projects Section - (J. Mwangi - Head)

Mr. Kinyungi  
Mr. Karengi  
Mr. Theora  
C. Zulberti, TAP Adviser

b. Commodities Section

C. Kimani, Head of Section  
Mr. Mhina  
I. McDonald, TAP Adviser

c. Strategy Section (L. Ngutter, Head)

J. Wyche - TAP Adviser

C. MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS UNITS AND ATAP - MoA, MLD

L. Gordon, TAP Adviser  
N. Isaksson, TAP Adviser  
T. C. Pinckney, ATAP Adviser  
S. Pamakrishnan, ATAP Adviser

D. MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

F. Masakharia, Permanent Secretary  
J. Otieno, Director - Natural Resources Division  
W. Gregory, TAP Adviser  
E. Edwards, Adviser

E. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

R. Campbell - Adviser

A. Tench, Adviser

F. DONORS

USAID - A. Herrick, Mission Director

E. Lundberg

J. Stepanek

CIA - A. L. Breque

H. Janssen

UNEP - P. Metcalf

M. Wilkens

4. OTHER RELATED INSTITUTIONS

I. University of Nairobi, Department of Agriculture

Economics

Dr. O.L.E. Mbatia, Acting

Dr. A.W. M. Makhebi

Dr. C. Akello-Ogutu

II. International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA)

Solomon Bekure, Team leader, Kenyan Livestock Productivity Programme

Yves Wissocq, Coordinator, Trypanotolerance Network

PARTICIPANTS MEETING TO DISCUSS DRAFT REPORT SEPT. 12, 13 + 14

A. Government of Kenya

I. Ministry of Economic Planning and Development

Mr. F. Y.O. Masakhalia, Permanent Secretary

Mr. Mutuku, Deputy Secretary

II. II. Ministry of Agriculture  
Mr. J. Ilako, Acting Permanent Permanent Secretary  
Mr. Nasiaku, Deputy Secretary (Finance)  
Mr. R. Odupoy, Acting Head Development Planning Division  
Mr. J. Karanja, Deputy Head Development Planning Division

III. Ministry of Livestock Development  
Mr. D. Namu, Permanent Secretary  
Mr. Kirui, Deputy Secretary  
Mr. L. Ngutter, Head, Development Planning Division  
Mr. J. Mwangi, Deputy Head, Development Planning Division

B. Donors

Mr. G.L. Pennacchio, Resident Representative, U.N.D.P.  
Ms. M. Wilkens, Assistant, Resident Representative, U.N.D.P.  
Mr. A. Labrecque, Canadian High Commission (CIDA)  
Ms. H. Janssen, Canadian High Commission (CIDA)  
Mr. D. Walker, Agricultural Officer, USAID  
Mr. J.F. Stepanek, Programme Officer, USAID  
Mr. J. Jonsson, Programme Officer, SIDA (Sweden)  
Mr. A.J. Blackwood, RMEA, World Bank

C. TAP Advisers

Senior Adviser plus all TAP advisers except one unable to attend because of illness.

ANNEX - B

Documents and Files Recorded.

1. TAP - II - Contract
2. ATAP - Contract
3. Semi-Annual Report - 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982.
4. Curriculum Vitae - All TAP advisers
5. J. Faaland and J. Saywell "Review of the Progress of the Technical Assistance Pool in the Ministry of Agriculture, July 27, 1978.
6. Carl H. Gotsch, "An Evaluation of the Present Contribution and Future Potential of Micro Computers in the Kenyan Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development "July 27, 1983
7. Material on TAP Training Programme.
8. T.C. Pinckney, J.M. Cohen and D.K. Leonard "Microcomputers and Financial Management in Development Ministries: Experience from Kenya.," Development Discussion Paper No. 137, HIID, August, 1982.
9. Ministry of Agriculture, GoK Facts and Figures About Kenya's Agriculture, May, 1983.
10. Wayne Schutjer, "A Review of the Activities of the Technical Assistance Pool: A consultancy Report" (for USAID) December 1982.
11. Background Papers - Task Force on Budget and Financial Management Process
12. Minutes of Budget and Financial Management Process Workshops No.3 & 4.
13. Report of the Working Party on Government Expenditure (Ndegwa Report) GoK, 1982
14. W.R. Cutter - Report to World Bank on Assistance for Financial Management in the MoA, April 20, 1981
15. Paul Haddow, "The Post Graduate Training and Utilization of Professional Planners and Economists in the Government of Kenya. (A report prepared for GoK and CIDA)
16. MLD-DPD- Work Plan for Period Jan. - June, 1983.
17. MLD-DPD- List of Agro-Industry Possible Projects, 1983
18. MLD-DPD- 1984/88 Draft Development Plan
19. MoA-DPD- 1984/88 Development Plan; Agricultural Sector
20. MLD-DPD - Draft -"Kenya National Livestock Development Programme Preparation of the District Annual Livestock Plans Project Proposal" July, 1983.
21. MLD-DPD- Draft- "Criteria for Project Selection 1983
22. MoA-DPD- Memo re Importance of Relative Prices
23. Exchange of Memos regarding methodology for Price Review

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ANNEX - B

24. Draft Cabinet Memo - "ReDisposal of Surplus Agricultural Products."
25. "Report of Interministerial Committee to study National Irrigation Board Services, Charges and Related Issues"
26. Kenya's Strategy Towards An International Tea Agreement.
27. "Report of Interministerial Working Group on Maize Marketing Policy" - Main Report and Annexes I-V and exchange between MEPD and MoA-DPD re methodology.
28. "Feature of Kenyas Food System and the Role of Food Policy" 1981.
29. MoA-DPD Cabinet Memorandum, "The Crisis in the Pyrethrum Industry."
30. "Strategy for Oilseed Crops Development"
31. "Oilseeds Policy Paper"
32. Memo Re: Wheat Transportation Costs
33. Proposal "National Agricultural Extension Project."
34. "Report of the Committee Appointed to Review the National Food Crop Situation" Jan. 1983.
35. Republic of Kenya, Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1981 on National Food Policy 1981.
36. Working Files of TAP Advisers:
  - a. Fullfiles L. Gordon
    - W. Gregory
    - M. Hall
    - N. Isaksson
    - S. Ramakrishnan
    - J. Wyckoff
    - C. Zulberti
  - b. Selected Documents R. Goldman
    - R. Goldman
    - C. Jabara
    - C. Pinckney
    - M. Westlake
37. MoA-DPD Draft work plans for Commodities and Projects Section (untitled and undated).

TERMS OF REFERENCE  
FOR THE MID-TERM REVIEW OF PROGRESS  
OF THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE POOL II

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, MINISTRY OF LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT  
AND MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT  
NAIROBI, KENYA

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1. Contract, Donors and Requirement for Evaluation

On June 9, 1981, Harvard and the Government of Kenya (GOK) entered into a contractual agreement for a five-year extension of the Technical Assistance Pool project (TAP). The first five-year phase ran from July 1, 1975 to June 30, 1981, with the assistance of a six-month extension. The second phase of the TAP is currently funded by UNDP, CIDA, IBRD and USAID/GOK through commodity reflow funds. It is anticipated that USAID and SIDA will join the donor group in mid-1983.

The contract between Harvard and the GOK specifically requires a mid-term evaluation. It states:

Article 3. Evaluation of Performance

3.1. The Government and Harvard agree to carry out an evaluation of the project, beginning the third quarter of 1983. The evaluation team shall consist of at least two independent evaluators who will be selected by the Government in consultation with the Donors and Harvard.

3.2. The terms of reference for the evaluation mission will focus on the objectives set out in this agreement and shall be worked out by the ministries in consultation with the Donors and Harvard. The evaluation report will be made available to the Government, the Donors and Harvard.

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3.3. Within 30 days of the issuance of the evaluation report, the Government and Harvard will discuss the issues raised in the report and outline effective action responses to problems or constraints identified by the evaluators.

3.4. Within an additional 15 days the Government and Harvard will forward to the Donors their reaction to the evaluation report. The Government and Harvard will meet with the Donors to discuss these reports.

## 2. Background to Technical Assistance Pool Project

The Government of Kenya in the mid-1970s moved to give increased priority to agricultural development and the needs of the small farmer. In order to analyze and restructure this area, the Ministries of Finance and Planning and Agriculture undertook a joint study of the planning and management capacities of the Ministry of Agriculture. As a result, re-organization of technical assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) in those areas was proposed.

HIID was selected by the Government in 1976 to manage the TAP in the Ministry of Agriculture, by assisting the Government in strengthening the Development Planning Division and establishing a Management Systems Unit in the ministry's administrative wing. By 1978, an adviser was added to the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (MEP & D) and was charged with serving the Natural Resources Division in its efforts to promote overall coordination of agricultural and livestock development planning. Then in 1979, the Ministry of Livestock Development (MLD) was created out of the MOA. A Development Planning Division and a management unit were formed in the new Ministry and additional TAP-funded advisers assigned to them. Economic advisers in all three ministries continue to perform activities similar to those of earlier project years: analysis of strategy issues, review of price policies, design of development projects, and assistance with management tasks.

After a review in 1978 and extensive government and donor discussion of the project's successes and problems, a second five-year phase began in June 1981. The dollar expenditures of TAP II are currently funded by IBRD, UNDP and CIDA. USAID commodity reflow funds have provided the project's

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shilling expenditures. It is anticipated that SIDA and USAID will soon join the other donors in providing dollar financing for the project.

In June of 1982, the World Bank began providing additional funding to the TAP. This was done under an amendment to the TAP II contract providing an additional adviser and a separate contract for a project known as the Agricultural Technical Assistance (ATAP). Both the amendment and the separate project will run for three years and provide funding for a task force on budget and finance, an adviser on financial and budget management, an adviser on microprocessors for finance and budget management, microprocessor equipment and training of Kenyan officers in finance and budget management techniques. Since these additional activities are closely interconnected with TAP II and rely on TAP advisers for implementation, they are generally considered as part of the same project and should be reviewed as such.

Currently, there are twelve advisers serving on a counterpart basis with government officers to develop planning and management systems and to help improve the analytical capacity of younger officers. The Senior Advisor (Chief of Party) for HIID is Richard Goldman. He works with the government and donors to see that the project is moving toward its objectives and administers program activities in Kenya. In addition, he serves as adviser in the Strategy Section of the Ministry of Agriculture's Development Planning Division. Aside from Goldman, there are three advisers in the Ministry's Development Planning Division and one in its Management Systems Unit. Three advisers serve in the Ministry of Livestock Development's Development Planning Division and one adviser in its Management Systems Unit. In addition, a budget and finance adviser and a computer processing adviser serve the Management Systems Units of both ministries. Finally, one adviser serves the Natural Resources Section of the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development. The project is backstopped at Harvard by a former Senior Adviser and a part-time staff assistant. This mechanism provides a wide range of recruiting, training and support services to the project.

Institution building is being addressed through the use of Kenyan consultants, counterpart interaction and graduate school training. In addition, institution building is promoted through efforts to help the government institute systems of planning, commodity price analysis, project design and financial management. Promising young ministry officials are also identified for overseas masters-level and short-term training. As of early 1983, there were five Kenyans abroad doing long-term Master's degree training. They will be joined by at least two more Kenyan officers in the summer of 1983.

### 3. Scope of Work

The review should be comprehensive. Central topics to be considered are set out below. However, the reviewers, as independent professionals, should be free to expand or focus their examination so as to advise the Kenya Government, Harvard and the donors how best to achieve the objective of strengthening development and management planning.

In evaluating TAP II, consultants should give systematic attention to three aspects of the project:

- (1) objectives of the project;
- (2) activities of Harvard, the project's advisers and the government; and,

(3) performance by Harvard, project advisers and the government. By "Harvard" is meant the activities of HIID's Cambridge office and the TAP's Senior Adviser in implementing the project, including relationships with government and donors, general administration recruitment and adviser personnel services, financial management, project support services, and general reporting functions. In reviewing these three aspects of the project, the consultants should carefully distinguish between TAP activities in three separate ministries:

- (1) Ministry of Agriculture: Development Planning Division and the Management Systems Unit;
- (2) Ministry of Livestock Development: Development Planning Division and Management Systems Unit;

(3) Ministry of Economic Planning and Development: Natural Resources Section.

In collaboration with senior Ministry officers and planners in these three ministries, the TAP II seeks to achieve five central objectives:

- (1) undertake technical analysis in the areas of strategy formulation, commodity-price analysis, project design and administration and finance;
- (2) develop improved systems and procedures for undertaking technical analyses and for integrating policy, project and budget functions in the ministries;
- (3) improve Kenyan capacity to undertake technical analysis;
- (4) institutionalize improved policy information flow systems in the involved ministries; and
- (5) improve liaison between the Ministries of Agriculture and Livestock Development and the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development.

In regard to these objectives, the consultants should consider:

- (1) Do the objectives of the program need clarification or alteration in light of the experience gained so far?
- (2) Given the baseline or starting point for the program in mid-1981, has satisfactory progress been made? Progress must be judged both in terms of the objectives of the pool and in terms of alternative means of providing technical assistance.
- (3) Reviewing the comments and recommendations of the July 1978 mid-term review of TAP I by Just Faaland and John Saywell, has satisfactory progress been made? Again, progress must be judged both in terms of the objectives of the pool and in terms of alternative means of providing technical assistance.
- (4) Are there ways in which either the ministries or the TAP could more effectively promote progress toward these objectives?

The activities undertaken by Harvard to reach these objectives are:

- (1) formulating and revising development strategy for crops and livestock;
- (2) undertaking commodity analysis and policy formulation and planning;
- (3) identifying, preparing and appraising development projects;
- (4) analyzing and recommending improvements in the ministries' management of budget and finance systems, parastatals, general administrative services, field implementation activities and the general flow of decision making information; and
- (5) formulating staff development plans, identifying promising young Kenyan officers for short- and long-term training, and organizing and administering such training programs.

A wide range of memoranda, reports, studies and other documents have been produced by TAP advisers in the performance of these activities. In addition, TAP advisers carry out these activities through informal conversations, counterpart exchanges, discussions with individual officers and statements at meetings and workshops. In order to ascertain the quantity and quality of such performance, it is necessary to:

- (1) review all Semi-Annual TAP II reports;
- (2) review major documents to which TAP advisers contributed;
- (3) discuss work products and other activities with each adviser; and,
- (4) interview Kenyan officers who direct advisers and draw upon their varied work products.

In evaluating the activities and performance of advisers, particular attention should be given to:

- (1) What has been produced by advisers and how has it been used?
- (2) What is the quality of work by advisers?

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- (3) How might the quality of adviser work be improved and its utility to the Government enhanced?
- (4) Are there substantive areas where present efforts should be expanded?
- (5) Have advisers worked on involving and training junior Kenyan officers while carrying out their activities?
- (6) How might this counterpart training function be improved?

Finally, the activities and performance of the project and advisers are affected by the direction and support given it by the Government. In this regard, it should be noted that TAP advisers work as a pool of resources provided the Government, not as a separate team within the Ministry. There is no formal mechanism to coordinate their work outside the Head of the division in which they work. However, the task of the Senior Adviser is to work with the Division Heads, senior Kenyan Ministry Officers and the donors to promote progress toward the TAP II objectives and to ensure that the required activities are carried out at acceptable performance levels.

The activity and performance of TAP advisers depends in part on the Government. Specifically, it is to:

- (1) provide Harvard personnel with such offices, secretaries and administrative assistance, equipment and facilities, and local transportation as are necessary for performing their professional services;
- (2) set work priorities and direct adviser activities through Heads of divisions and units to which advisers are assigned;
- (3) establish a recruitment program that facilitates the entry of sufficient numbers of qualified university graduates into the Scheme of Service for Economists and Statisticians;
- (4) undertake revisions in terms and conditions of the Scheme of Service for Economists and Statisticians with a view to improving the chances of retaining good Kenyan officers in the service;

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- (5) provide professional and administrative leadership needed to attract and retain good Kenyan staff officers;
- (6) ensure that at least one Kenyan is available to work with every TAP adviser;
- (7) work with Harvard to establish staff development programs that:
  - (a) make effective use of study opportunities, both short and long term, at the University of Nairobi or other local institutions, such as the Kenya Institute of Administration;
  - (b) send staff for short and long-term external training programs;
  - (c) include workshops and seminars that will attract a broad range of staff in agriculture; and,
  - (d) ensure that staff and advisers have adequate exposure, through field trips, to rural areas, institutions and businesses involved in Kenyan agriculture.

Consultants should evaluate the progress of the government in regard to these activities. In addition, they should address the following issues:

- (1) Is the concept of a "pool of advisers" still an appropriate mode for providing technical assistance aimed at strengthening the ministries? Or should it function more as a team, with more specific group objectives? Or are there alternatives to both "pool" and "team" which might be more appropriate?
- (2) Have institutional modifications proposed by the TAP agreement with the Government of Kenya been carried out as anticipated? If not, do circumstances warrant their still being implemented?
- (3) Is Kenyan staff available in the numbers and of the quality that enables the Government to make adequate use

of the technical assistance provided and to progress toward self sufficiency as rapidly as anticipated?

- (4) Has the training program served to identify and effectively train promising Kenyan officers?
- (5) Is the training program being adequately managed and how might it be enhanced, if needed?
- (6) Have the Government encountered serious difficulties or delays in carrying out the program?
- (7) Is the system for reporting and communicating with donors adequate?

4. Personnel and Specialization

The review will be undertaken by two experienced professionals in the development field. The reviewers selected are:

- a. Dr. John Saywell  
York University
- b. Alex McCalla  
University of California

Dr. Saywell is a former director of the York University project in Kenya. He will focus on the management activities of the TAP. Dr. McCalla is former dean of the College of Agriculture at the University of California, Davis. He is a professor of agricultural economics and will focus on the economic planning and policy aspects of the project. Their c.v.'s are attached.

interviewing and reviewing relevant documents. The third week should be

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##### 5. Approach and Timing

The reviewers will depend primarily on interviews with key people who have knowledge of the Pool's operations. These will include primarily Kenya Government officers, members of the Pool, and will include aid agency staff, other advisers and any relevant individuals outside of government. The review should also examine records of staffing in the ministries, the Planning Division's staff development and training programs. In addition, key documents produced by advisers will be relevant to the review.

It is anticipated that the reviewers will spend their first two weeks interviewing and reviewing relevant documents. The third week should be spent preparing a draft report. It is essential that all interested parties have the opportunity to see the draft report and to discuss it with the reviewers while they are in Kenya. On the basis of these discussions and comments on the draft, the final report can be prepared either while reviewers are in Kenya or shortly after their departure. It is expected that the review and drafting of the report will take three to four weeks.

The review is scheduled to begin the ~~second~~<sup>fourth</sup> week in August with the final report being completed and available for distribution on September, 1983.

##### 6. Financing

Funds to cover the cost of the review will be drawn from the consulting budget of the TAP II. Administration of financial payment will be done by Harvard.