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TO : DIRECTOR, U.S.A.I.D., DAR ES SALAAM  
FROM : D.L. MORIS, WATER DEVELOPMENT SPECIALIST, TAMU *DLM*  
THRU: M.B. INMAN, CHIEF OF PARTY, TAMU PROJECT.  
SUBJECT : TANZANIA LIVESTOCK MARKETING PROJECT EVALUATION REPORT

After briefly reviewing the recent Evaluation Report on the Tanzania Livestock Marketing Project I feel compelled to comment on some of the statements and recommendations which have been made. 170

First I do not believe the evaluation team accomplished what they were commissioned to do and that is to evaluate the project in reference to the existing contract logical frame work and then to provide recommendations and alternatives for improvement. Instead right from the start they attacked the logical framework as unworkable and then set about to evaluate the present projects and individual's performance in light of their own " revised logical framework".

As a consequence in reviewing my own work they chose to criticise me for carrying out my duties as described in the Project Job Description - because I was " too operational" and " not directly related benefiting the small producer". Looking at the job description the Water Development Specialist is assigned as a member of the Project Management Unit responsible for carrying out specific duties i.e. reviewing ranch water plans, determining water requirements, develop water conservation plans, assist in the design and construction of water supplies and training of counterpart staff. Nowhere is the term " advisor" used in my job description. The above duties pertain to assisting the Ujamaa, DDC and MARCO ranches and sub-borrowers participation in the IBRD/IDA Livestock Development Loan Phase II. Are not " Ujamaa" considered as traditional small producers? The Evaluation Report prognosis Page II - 13 states " the Water Development Program is proceeding rapidly inspite of constraints. This program is interrelated to the production and marketing from the MARCO, DDC and Ujamaa ranches and is essential to their ultimate objectives and timely progress". In the very next sentence the prognosis is: " The program of the Water Development Specialist is so designed that his experience, output and ultimate goals benefit only the parastatal ranches and benefits to the traditional small producer of livestock cannot be expected".

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The Evaluation Report is riddled with such inconsistencies and generalizations frequently mentioned but not substantiated by hard facts but rather apparently originating from either hearsay or preconceived notions. After pointing out numerous deficiencies in each member's particular work the evaluation however rates each member's work with the sole exception of the Financial and Management advisor position which was terminated earlier as "highly satisfactory" because work was being carried out under "difficult conditions". However, the point is such an evaluation objective?

I have participated in several evaluations previously having worked 7 years on the Masai Range Development Program but I have never seen one as closed and rushed as this one seemed to be. In the first place team members were neither asked to provide any written report of any kind summarizing their individual work or scope of duties as background orientation for the visiting evaluators nor were we asked to or given the opportunity to do so orally before the group of evaluators where we would have had the chance to put forward our own proposals or to interact on the proposals of the evaluation team prior to submittal of the evaluation report. Perhaps the evaluators felt that the recent AID review of this project was sufficient background material but even that report stated that it was primarily reviewing the TLMC portion of the project with very little said about the assistance to LIDA. Instead individual team members were contacted only very briefly by one or two members of the evaluation team to answer more general questions in regards to achievement of the logical framework goals.

Although I had the opportunity to accompany the evaluation team for several days safari from Mwanza to Dar es Salaam much if not most of the time was taken up in travel to the various TLMC regional offices with very little time to actually review any holding grounds except on a superficial basis and only an hour or two visit to one of the NARCO ranches by only two of the evaluators. Bumping around in the back of a jeep is hardly the most conducive time to show evaluators one's work especially when most of the ranches are skipped by and most of the written record of my work was in the Dar es Salaam office. A visit to the Ujamaa ranches north of Dodoma was deleted because the development probably was not far enough along at this stage and access was difficult but there was the evidence of the assistance directly to the traditional small producer by LIDA equipment to build water surface dams as well as start of construction of infrastructure of fencing and dips, etc.

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I tried my best under the circumstances to put forward the case of developing the ranches as I personally feel that is where the greatest potential lies and where most of the progress has been made. However, seeing is believing and I felt genuinely frustrated in not getting either the Team Leader/Evaluation Specialist or Agricultural Economist to even visit a ranch or see developments on a nearby holding ground (Kwala). Although I pointed out to the evaluators from the start that the LIDA Management thought that development of the ranches was the most important area where the Texas A&M Project could assist in the future. I seriously doubt the evaluators ever gave serious consideration to gathering facts in regard to the economic viability of the ranches for this proposal. Suffice it to say that at the time of the farewell party for evaluators my Tanzanian Supervisor, Mr. Kimati, Director of Technical Division of LIDA personally asked to talk to the evaluators for the first time as he had not had the opportunity to do so previously! The Economist did not participate as he felt he was not concerned with "technical matters" yet Mr. Kimati was the one most immediately knowledgeable concerning the work of both the Range Management and Water Development positions. From the time the evaluators returned from the long safari they were isolated most of the time 20 miles from town busy writing up their findings and the meetings. I hoped the team members would have to discuss proposals never materialized, instead all sessions were "closed" and even the Chief of Party experienced difficulty attending. Seeing that there was no time or room for discussion I finally resorted to giving the evaluators copies of some of my work reports for their reference in hopes that some of the information contained would get through. For some reason the original departure of all but the Team Leader was moved up by a week with the result that individual evaluation members were still busy drafting up the first draft of the report the evening their plane was leaving! Under the rushed circumstances it is not surprising that the evaluation report shows a lack of objectivity in not evaluating performance on the project first hand but rather relying on over generalizations to support only one recommended alternative.

Fully one week after the other evaluation members had left and the report finished I was finally contacted by the Team Leader to find out my views of what my changed job description should be. Quite frankly I felt that if in the evaluations own words my performance was "highly satisfactory with the exception of being too operationally oriented and that the Water Development Program was preceeding rapidly inspite of constraints" then no major changes were called for in regards to my job description or role. At this point I was told that under the present circumstances the "evaluation team" thought it best for me to "reduce" my efforts in working for LIDA for the next year or so until more support was forthcoming and studies could be made to determine what our new role should be!

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At this point I exploded.

First the generalized charge made that the Tanzania Livestock Marketing Project is basically orientated to "institutional building" without any supporting criteria could just as well as be made of almost any project existing. The original documents state specifically that the Livestock Marketing Project purpose and reason for coming into being is in support of the IDA loan, hence the reason the PROP does not make a clear distinction between the USAID Project and IDA goal objectives. Any change in this policy would have to be considered to be a major change in the project. There is every reason to believe that although the evaluation report comments on the recent review of the World Bank IDA loan they did not avail themselves of the opportunity to read the actual IBRD-IDA - APPRAISAL of the Second Livestock Development Project (March, 1973) which very specifically sets forth the projected contribution of the respective NARCO, DDC and Ujamaa Ranches in contributing to fulfillment of many of the same LOGICAL FRAMEWORK goals of the USAID project. Hence the tendency of the evaluation team to totally ignore the contribution and potential of the RANCHES in writing up their report simply because they felt that traditional livestock producers are not benefiting in their view. Hence they naively state that the profitability of the ranches is not our concern!

I would like to point out that benefiting the primarily producer is one of the most important goals of project but it specifically is not the only goal. The IBRD- IDA Appraisal of the Second Livestock Development Project (March, 1973) points out that the development of the ranches is one of the most important means of meeting the total national demand for beef supply (plus increasing export earnings and increasing the nutrition of urban and non-cattle producing families), etc.

For the sake of information I would like to quote some pertinent statements made in the IBRD Appraisal referred to above.

- 1) At full development (year 12) the participating ranches were projected to produce 45,000 cattle for slaughter, equivalent to about 10,000 tons of additional beef, which represents a 22% increase over the current marketed production and about 13,000 breeding heifers and 1,300 breeding bulls. The estimated output of the ranches is summarized below:

NARCO Ranches	-	31,970
DDC Ranches	-	8,590
UJAMAA Ranches	-	<u>4,068</u>
		45,044

2) The addition of the marketing component of the project after deducting for contribution of project ranches was projected to increase the offtake by about 85,000 cattle and beef production by about 11,000 tons (24%). If the project were undertaken without the component of marketing the projected increase in offtake was estimated to be likely to increase by 100,000 animals to a total of 438,000 animals at full project development.

3) FINANCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF \$ 24 Million IDA LOAN MONEY

RANCHES:

NARCO	30%
DDC	10%
UJAMAA	9%
	<u>49% Total</u>
	=====

LIVESTOCK MARKETING

Markets	3%
Stock Routes	4%
Holding Grounds	5%
	<u>12%</u>
	=====

MEAT PROCESSING 21%

TECHNICAL SERVICES 6%

Contingencies 12%

TOTAL 100%

4) The financial rate of return in TLMC was estimated at 18% with the expectancy that it would be financially viable from year 1.

5) The estimated producer benefit and rate of return for the individual ranches varied from 14% to 26% the main incentives for the Ujamaa participants would be primarily the increase in number of cattle owned and secondly improved income levels. Furthermore the rationalization of livestock marketing and the development of meat processing plants in high cattle density areas are expected to have direct and indirect benefits from livestock producers.

- 6) Employment: The project is expected to create an additional 2,500 new jobs in the NARCO/DDC ranches, stock holding grounds and meat plants. In addition the project would create self-employment opportunities for about 1,400 persons in 700 family on Ujamaa ranches.
- 7) At full development (year 12) project incremental beef production was projected to be 21,000 tons, of which half is attributed to the ranches and half to the rationalization of the cattle marketing system and the location of meat processing plants in high cattle density areas. Higher production levels would increase exports by increment of estimated \$ 6 million.

Overall economic rate of return on project was estimated to be 25%.

#### COMMENTS

- 1) It should be obvious from the above that the USAID Tanzania Marketing Project LOGICAL FRAMEWORK goals were derived from the Second Livestock Development Project document.
- 2) However stated goals of an increase of beef from the ranches from 40,000 to 150,000 by 1985 in the Evaluation proposed MODIFIED LOGICAL FRAMEWORK is totally unrealistic given the fact that no increase in level of investment is made. For example, the IRB Projects an increase of 22% overall to 45,000 while the evaluation suggested goal calls for an increase of 375% with no additional investment and a recommended curtailment of technical services rendered to the ranches!
- 3) The loan paper further shows that the individual ranches are not expected to begin producing any tangible net return of income from production until at least the 4th year of operation. With over half the existing ranches embarking on very substantial capital improvements, construction of good roads, firebreaks, dips, ranch facilities, water supplies and infrastructure not to mention purchase of immature stock to start with it is totally unrealistic to expect them to be operating at a profit at this stage. Because the land belongs to the nation no realistic account is made of the tangible improved value of the land to production as would be the case in individual private tennure of ownership. Yet the Evaluation Report implies that LIDA( the overall parastatal organization) is useless simply because its subsidiaries are reportedly operating at a loss at present.

- 4) Since over half the projected increase in beef production is projected to come from the ranches it is totally unrealistic for the Evaluation team even to suggest that support to the NARCO and DDC ranches should be withdrawn and reduced to assisting the traditional livestock producers only while at the same time retaining the goal levels as stated in their suggested modified logical framework.
- 5) It is unrealistic for the Evaluators to claim that the ranches and holding grounds are not assisting the livestock producer. In the first place "Ujamaa ranches" consist of traditional livestock producers. Secondly the newly founded NARCO and DDC ranches buy all their new stocks of cattle to start the ranch directly from the traditional livestock producers contributing substantially to income of the producers while at the same time serving a much more important factor of re-distribution of cattle from over stocked areas to areas of real livestock deficiency thus helping to protect the environment.

Secondly the ranches are specifically a very significant asset to the traditional livestock producer as a source of improved livestock (estimated production of 13,000 breeding heifers and 1,300 breeding bulls from ranches at project end). The producers have no other source of supply in quantity to make any appreciable impact. Breeding of cattle takes time and money cannot buy that.

Furthermore the holding grounds are intended to be used by the primary producers as well as TIMC. In fact TIMC staff have frequently complained of their inability to control the grazing by the primary producers on these holding grounds which are meant to be reserved for the intended use and not continuous grazing.

If the Evaluation and USAID still feel that only the traditional producers should be directly assisted by this project an order to obtain stated LOGICAL FRAMEWORK GOALS then they should be also prepared to back that up with funds and equipment for a substantial increase in this field as presently they do not have the means to do so as the provision of funds from the IDA loan for this purpose is minimal. It is no good suggesting in my new job subscription that I should be primarily an advisor to say all the one million traditional livestock producers all over Tanzania when there are no means equipment or funds to implement the advice given or technicians to advise (surely such is the function of the Ministry of Water Development. I am not trying to be absurd but only to point out how absurd the recommendation of the Evaluation team is. Perhaps the traditional livestock producer may in fact benefit more in the long term by the indirect assistance through the ranches (by way of demonstration and source of improved livestock) than would have been the case if the equivalent effort and money was applied directly on his behalf in a scattered effort.

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My services are already stretched beyond reason in assisting the existing ranches all over Tanzania - not to be dissipated any further unless the evaluation team feels that I should restrict my services to only one small area say livestock producers within Dar es Salaam District or a couple Ujamaa ranches in only one given area (the closest present Ujamaa Ranch is some 300 miles from my home base). The Masai Range Development Project already has responsibilities for the Masai Ujamaa Ranches.

In reviewing the Evaluation Report on the existing water development specialist position there are a number of items which need clarification to avoid misunderstandings.

First the statement that " Although the Water Development Specialist appears to work well with survey crew members his philosophy that he " should be completely operational and get the development work done first, then turn it over to the appropriate people to manage does not show progressive attitude for training during the development phase. The results of this operational attitude are presently apparent on the dependency upon the Water Development Specialist to locate sites for dam construction."

I do not deny that I firmly believe in the practicality of an operational role at the initial formation stage especially if there is no existing organization or staff to do the job - one cannot advise in a vacuum. Secondly, contrary to what some of the evaluators and USAID officials might feel on this matter I believe from practical experience that transfer of skills and responsibilities to Tanzanians is quicker accomplished by some operational role of the expert. Being operational does not mean being unnecessarily tied up in administrative duties which could be done by other Tanzanians but rather being responsible for the particular functions of ones job and this also implies that ones advice is followed and those carrying it out are responsible or held accountable in turn. I have often heard the argument given that when an expert is fully operational the project frequently collapses on his leaving; however the counter argument could just as easily be made that when the expert is only an advisor and ones advice is not followed then when leaving there is nothing there to collapse! In an operational role most frequently something tangible is left behind and this does not mean that the element of training is ignored.

Being an advisor on the one hand limits liability and blame if things go wrong, on the other hand it can frequently limit the effectiveness and accomplishment of specific goals by the expert when advice is ignored. The technicians working on this project will attest to that fact. If you are only an advisor it is only human nature that you are likely to be less personally involved and committed than when you are held personally responsible for a job.

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In fact the whole notion of "advisor" and corresponding counterpart is something that is relatively new to USAID policy but has no parallel in the history of development in America by private industry either at home or abroad.

As stated in the Evaluation Report the Tanzania Government prefer to see technicians in an operational role, do not prefer to use the term "advisor" and do not agree that counterparts are essential. Such a setup would involve a doubling of expense for each position for the Tanzania Government while at the same time leave the line of authority unclear. There is no such position as counterpart to an advisor in the Tanzania Civil Service Scheme. It is incorrect to call an operational Tanzanian Officer who is in fact administratively over the advisor a "counterpart". Operationally the counterpart in a real sense would hold the position of in my case Assistant Executive Water Engineer and when I left he would on merit be promoted to fill my position automatically. Qualifications for position would be the same as mine educationally a Bc Degree in Civil Engineering. If such a person was not available then someone should be sent on training for this purpose either in country or on participant training. As a case of point which I was Regional Water Engineer in Arusha for a couple of years a number of recent graduates were posted to Arusha as Assistant Executive Engineers. After a short period of 2 years of learning through work they were promoted and are now very competently serving as Regional Water Engineers in other regions of Tanzania yet at no time were they designated as "counterparts". Frequently the task of an expert is as much that of imparting a degree of confidence in what one is doing which comes from experience rather than just imparting knowledge or knowhow. Thus the expert acts as a catalyst and driving force.

On the other hand I have worked on a development project (Masai Range Project) where most of the experts (with the exception of associated with the water development side) were advisors without any real operational responsibilities and saw their frustrations in getting anything done in the traditional livestock producer sector. I have seen "counterparts" idly wasting away their time as they had no clear responsibilities but were simply following in the steps of the advisor and dependant on his transport. Not until they were shaken loose of this "counterpart" role and given clear responsible operational positions of their own did they really start functioning very effectively examples: J.P. Williams, Former Kiteto District Livestock Officer now Monduli District Planning Officer and Munissi now Arusha TLMC Zonal Marketing Officer. Similarly I have seen a small group of Tanzanian co-workers develop with on the job training doing a credible job on duties for exceeding the responsibilities of their limited educational experience in surveying, calculating and drafting up dam surveys and supervising construction of works.

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After a 2 years on the job training many of the good dam sites were being selected and brought to construction completion independantly. One of my successor's first comments on coming on the job was he didn't think he was really needed as the Tanzanian crew already felt they knew what to do. My counterpart had not even returned from the U.S. from training for B.S. degree and the 3 Tanzanian technicians with whom I worked had no formal education past Form II and not received formal training from a technical training institute. By contrast most of the advisors on the project already had a score of counterparts with Diploma Degrees as well as a number of participants returned with B.S. degrees for several years and still there is very little tangible results show for all these years of efforts in these fields as no new viable ranching associations have been found in the last 5 years and the project is now nearing its targeted completion date. Granted there were and still are many contributing factors which make measurement of progress and effort in many fields much less tangible. I was criticized for being too operational in that case. It would seem from actual practice on the Masai Project that the advisor - counterpart approach to the project has had the opposite effect of that intended - i.e. slowed up both accomplishments and transfer of skills, because of the lack of a more direct working relationship between the experts and their Tanzanian co-workers.

The point I am leading up to is that once an operation is set up and functioning with Tanzanians operationally responsible to the expert in carrying out the various functions of his job it is a simple matter for the expert to then become an advisor and then be quickly phased out because the Tanzanians have been already carrying out most of the work and the expert is able to better transfer his skills or knowledge by and being responsible in some way for supervising their work.

Returning to the evaluation statement under level of performance quoted at the start I would say that the assessment was made without even first hand observing the specialist working with his Tanzanian co-workers in the field on surveys. In fact the observation was apparently based on a casual 5 minute discussion between myself and the LIDA Land Surveyor Mr. Mapunda (who is incidentally not my counterpart) to help him locate potential dam sites using existing topographical maps. If they had taken the time and opportunity to come into the field they would have observed that all the survey work is being carried out by the Tanzanians and not solely by the "expert". Furthermore, the matter of choice of location of dam sites is one of the most important areas where the assistance of the Specialist is vitally needed as such requires a greater technical knowledge of hydrology, runoff, soil suitability, and practical judgement.

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This is where the specialist can be of greatest impact and benefit to the country in helping to determine the feasibility of projects to reduce costly mistakes while the technical knowhow is being acquired by Tanzanian in formal technical institutes and university and by on-the-job training of others thru observation of what works best. In this role the technician maximizes the use of his expertise while leaving the operational execution of the project to capable Tanzanians.

The degree to which the Specialist becomes operationally involved is dependant on the existence of any staff to do the job; their level of training and experience in investigation, survey, design and construction work as well as the priorities at hand. For example the amount of direct operational assistance required by TLMC, the DDC or the Ujamaa ranches is much greater because they do not even have any survey staff, etc period while on the other hand the NARCO ranches have a qualified Engineer as their Development Officer who has been responsible for laying out most of the surveys and designs for the existing dams as well as for planning on the NARCO ranches. In this case my job is primarily to assist up grading the technical know-how i.e. project site selection and design and end product thru on-the-job training and preparation of technical guidelines for the Ranch Managers in operational control and to monitor the development. The Evaluation team never met Mr. Mwamakula, Development Officer at NARCO but in a real sense he is my " counterpart" within NARCO. Hence the charge of the evaluation that I do not have a counterpart is not correct in a real sense. My job description specifies that I am to train counterparts in each of the subsidiaries (of which NARCO is largest) although I do not have a direct counterpart at LIDA, the Land Surveyor Mr. Mapunda and his crew also assist in implementing the surveys for dams to what extent they are available from other duties.

By the very nature of the organization of LIDA it is impossible for one to be fully "operational" given the wide scope of responsibilities scattered on ranches all over the country. Hence the very nature of my existing job description naturally limits the operational role.

On the other hand without some form of operational role the very existence and purpose of the Livestock Development Authority would be impractical. Without an operational role one cannot hire a survey crew or technical assistants if none presently exists. Hence either the advisor has no-one to advise and no work gets done or else he has plows in and tries to do all the work himself limiting the potential productivity of the specialists expertise and end accomplishments.

Asking an "advisor" to train counterparts is analogous to asking a teacher to effect a rapid exchange of knowledge to students who may not even exist, who are not required to attend classes, who cannot be given assignments on the job or be graded on their performance! If one is operational the question of counterparts can be solved directly without delay. Being operational does not mean the whole job is going to be done solely by the specialist but rather if the goals set out in the Project are to be realized it will only be rationally possible if most of the work is actually accomplished by the Tanzanians themselves - working together with the technician. If a technician's "advice" is worth its salt it is worth giving substance to such advice so that it is carried out. I think that both the evaluators and USAID in general fail to appreciate that aside from regarding the whole position of "advisors" as being non-productive and a waste of resources many third world countries participants may also believe that the "advisory role" connotes or implies a feeling of inferiority on the reciprocant. The transfer of knowledge could be much cheaper be effected by sending the Tanzanians for training even to similar 3rd World situations elsewhere then hire Americans at much greater cost to simply be "advisors" with no responsibilities.

Getting back to the evaluation report of the Water Development position the causality section states that money initially received by the ranches is utilized on offices and similar human needs rather than livestock oriented needs is way off base and inaccurate. In fact the ranches have emphasized the construction of infrastructure, i.e. roads, firebreaks, water supply dams, dips and left the construction of headquarters and staff houses to the last is apparent on most of the new ranches in fact I do not know of a single example where this has been the case.

Question: Then how could such a statement get into print?

Answer: The Evaluation team were told by Water Development Specialist on the field trip visits to the TLMC holding grounds that such was the case with TLMC and the Evaluation team apparently must have assumed wrongly that the same applied to the ranches although they certainly saw no evidence of such themselves, other points made in the evaluation need further clarification.

Section II - 42 5. States: "Tanzanian staff able to plan and monitor necessary range management and water development work without foreign technical assistance". Level of performance - "Tanzanian staff shows ability to plan range and water development work without foreign assistance, to a large degree".

The above statements need some scrutiny - the evaluators do not seem to realize that TLMC has no water development technical staff whatsoever for survey, design or construction of surface water dams or pipelines but relies entirely on other Government Departments (where available MAJI) and LIDA or the Range Development and Water Development technicians.

The NARCO ranches are in a somewhat better situation but again are very much understaffed with only one Development Officer engineer relying on one small LIDA survey team to effect developments on 20 some ranches. Some previous support was received by FAO teams and from MAJI in the past, so the evaluators apparent assumption that the Tanzanian staff within TIMC, NARCO ranches and LIDA have the capable operational staff existing to carry out water development work is false and hence their advice to limit the TAMU technician to an advisory role only. The assumption is made because apparently "the job is somehow getting done". Such rational ignores the fact that no substantial water development work has been taking place on any TIMC holding grounds except for Kwala for lack of equipment and personnel. Most of the supplies are carry over facilities and a very large water development program proposed is now behind schedule. (Note - Although there are limited numbers of capable Tanzanians carrying out water developments the first civil engineering graduates from the Dar es Salaam Engineering Faculty was this last year and the supply of technicians from the MAJI technical institute is limited with the demands for the institutions as well as villages for exceeding the supply on the short term).

Next the statement made in Section II - 26 that "LIDA's philosophy, at present, is to complete development of the existing ranches and holding grounds before developing new ones giving first priority to those located nearest to Dar es Salam and the present centers of high livestock density". While such statement of fact might apply to the TIMC holding grounds it certainly cannot be said of the NARCO, DAFCO ranches. If the evaluators had looked at the map provided to them showing the location of the new ranches and listened to the statements made to them they would have clearly seen that development of the new ranches is being concentrated in the areas of "least livestock density to lessen the competition to available grazing and not highest as stated and that much of that new development has been scattered far inland i.e. Bukoba area, Kigoma (Uvinza), Mbeya (Usangu) and not only the Morogoro area.

The Evaluation team failed to note that the development of the Ujamaa ranches does not even fall under LIDA's administrative responsibility, hence the evaluations recommended new scope of duties of the Water Development Advisor would in effect mean that all assistance to LIDA be terminated. On the other hand the Evaluation Report talks of dividing the Water Development Advisor's time between the two companies of LIDA and TIMC shows an apparent lack of understanding of the relationship between the two - (i.e. that LIDA is the overall parastatal under which subsidiaries such as TIMC exist) and ignores the practical admonition that "one cannot serve two masters". As was frequently pointed out to the evaluators during their visit the scope of work of the Water Development Specialist, Range Development Officer and Range Management Specialist is already too big when working with only one company and cannot afford to be further dissipated or diluted.

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The existing job descriptions leave the development of water supplies on the TIMC holding grounds to the Range Development Officer although it is understood the Water Development Specialist will provide technical guidance assistance to all IBRD Livestock Development Phase II participants.

In the Evaluation Report (Page II - 11) under causality the team finds that " sincere appreciation for the inputs and accomplishments of the Range Development Officer are apparent at all levels of the parastatal staff. Reasonable co-operation between TIMC has been received". In the very next paragraph the Evaluation contradicts itself by stating " the Range Development Officer is not free to make scheduled or routine inspections of all facilities. Zonal officials often do not request his help or advice when needed".

As stated previously the Evaluation Report contains a number of such glaring contradictions. In the PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY the statement is made that " The Parastatals have not sought advice from advisors" (page X) is an over generalization not supported by facts. The evaluators chose to ignore the account of LIDA's Technical Manager concerning the inputs of the TAMU technicians, as well as clear written evidence contrary to the statement made. My own observations given to the Evaluation team was that I was swamped by specific requests for assistance far in excess of my work capacity and at the same time I was very favorably impressed by the degree to which the participants took these recommendations seriously and implemented them.

The Evaluation Report brings to light many known deficiencies which overall project a very negative gloomy picture and the other hand the Evaluation Report has a tendency to omit positive accomplishments. For example, " the TAMU advisors have made inputs into the IDA supported construction/renovation in varying degrees. Water Development as a project input has only recently recommenced as the Water Development Specialist, position had been vacant for more than a year." Such a statement was excusable in the recent USAID review in February, 1976 but not excusable 5 months after the position was filled and functioning. Such a statement also implies or infers by omission that nothing had been accomplished.

While recommending that in the future technicians on this project receive sufficient Kiswahili language training in the U.S. (which implies that none of the existing technicians knew any Kiswahili. The recommendation is naturally a sound one but no credit is given to TAMU for going to great lengths to obtain technicians with long term East African experience to minimize such problems of adjustments in the past.

The Evaluation goes on to state " the contribution of the TAMU advisors input in terms of achieving the IDA objectives is not clear. The advisors have helped to improve the quality of work but appear to have had only a limited impact on the overall success (or lack thereof) of the IDA project. The leader of the IDA's mid - 1977 review team, when asked about the dependence of the loan project on USAID support, replied that termination of the USAID Project would not substantially affect performance of the Loan Project". Surely such a statement based on "hearsay" should not be admissible in a Evaluation Report supposed to be an objective and independent review not relying on other sources to make their conclusions for them.

It is not my business or purpose to try to tell the Evaluation Team what they should or shouldn't have reported or recommended but rather to insist that they be objective and fair in their approach and not omit observations which might not support their particular recommendations. I believe that just as the review team criticized the Sub-sector report they should similarly expect that their own findings be scrutinized with the same degree of objectivity.

The comments made above are not comprehensive but cover only some of the statements made concerning my own position and that of the team as a whole. The purpose of this exercise has not been to discredit the EVALUATION REPORT as a whole but to rebut some of the statements made and in hopes that in the future the development of Project not be limited to the recommendations made in this Evaluation but be OPEN to explore other options.

I believe that many of the apparent discrepancies were not deliberate but simply the inevitable result of haste. On the other hand I firmly believe the report bears primarily the evaluations and recommendations of the Team Leader. This is a foregone conclusion when the rest of the team depart long before even the first draft is ready. However, more seriously the Team Leader openly questioned and discounted the abilities of his co-evaluators before the write-up had even begun saying the one obviously didn't have a clue as what was going on, the other was qualified but unexperienced and the third although well qualified and experienced only required a little time to come to the right conclusion! If the Team Leader did not wish to be quoted on the above he had no business stating the same in my presence. During the latter stages of the review two members of the evaluation also commented informally to members of the TAMU team that they really didn't know if their recommendations would carry any weight.

The net result of this is that only one line of approach or option was fully explored. The Range Management Specialist had in his notes commented that it is likely that an emphasis on production would have a greater impact in accomplishing the goals of the project than the present TAMU emphasis on the marketing side which coincided with LIDA's expressed opinion but this option was not breached. The basic assumption taken by the evaluation team that the traditional livestock producer is not selling his cattle is unfounded hence the recommendations that studies be made to find out why he isn't selling more. The offtake of animals as measured by actual hides produced in Tanzania is presently 1.5 million (not counting an additional 1.5 million small skins of calves, goats and sheep and the small percentage of skins used domestically) per year and this level has not fluctuated widely. According to 1972 FAO cattle census the total cattle population estimate was 9.27 million head; thus the 1.5 million hides would indicate an actual offtake on the order of 16%. (Current estimates by TPL approximate 9.7 million cattle at present). Even if the highest projected figure of 13 million cattle from 1970 is used this would still represent at least a minimum 11.5% offtake. This high level of offtake is further supported by the fact that the average weight of animals slaughtered has been dropping sharply in the last few years for example - TPL stock has decreased from an average of 220 kilos per animal to a present of 160 kilos over the last 10 years. Thus immatures are being sold for slaughter and the present rate of offtake may actually be decreasing future production potential. Thus it is totally unreasonable to expect the producer to be selling more under the present situation simply because TPL, consumers national goals, etc want more. Present emphasis on marketing which tends to measure its success primarily on the number of animals sold without a corresponding emphasis on production is not sound and the facts would support the need for more emphasis on production and animal husbandry - overall if the stated objectives are to be realized.

*see notes* → The consumption of 1.5 million cattle per year by 13 million Tanzanian residents represents a total average yearly consumption rate of only 10.4 kilos per person using the current average useable carcass weight of 90 kilos beef. Current figures show urban residents (Dar es Salaam, Moshi, Arusha) to be actually using 15 - 20 kilo meat per capita while the overall figure in the rural areas is 7 kilos per son. Indications are that the low usage in the poorer rural areas is not a reflection of true demand or need but rather simply a reflection of scarcity of money to meet their needs. If a more realistic figure of demand of 15 kilos meat per person annually were to be met the required production would be 2.16 million livestock based on current average weights or 97,300 tons beef. The Evaluation Report states no nutritional goals only that the supply be sufficient for national domestic demand.

Instead the recommendations are ~~that many of the same activities~~ (assistance to the ranches) acknowledged in the report to be effective and satisfactory be curtailed and more studies be made.

**Director**

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When I suggested to the evaluation team leader that I felt the option of emphasising production had not been adequately explored I was told we need more studies first because this project started on the assumption that there were too many cattle and now the facts seem to indicate the opposite that there may be a deficit.

(Note - that increased production was one of the major goals of this project and not just increased offtake).

I replied that if that is the case then to emphasize production on the ranches as a means to speed distribution of cattle from the overgrazed high cattle density areas to the areas of high grazing potential but low existing cattle population seemed a logical answer. Besides the ranches are the present time the only source to provide the sharply rising demand for quality beef.

By coincidence the required new specialists happen to be specialities which the Team Leaders own company can provide. Clearly this present dangerous precedents of conflict of interest.

The new " Rural Development Specialists" should do a 12 month in-depth investigation " relying in the Evaluation own words" on strong backup support from the TAMU advisors. What the report fails conspicuously to note is that 4 and soon 5 of these TAMU technicians with experience have already left and the Evaluation team does not recommend that most of them be replaced and those that are will be in place will be new with little more experience than those arriving. Understandibly the Tanzania Government, as noted in the Post Evaluation Review, rejected such a proposal outright.

In conclusion the above comments are my own personal opinions but I firmly believe that many of the proposals recommended by the Evaluation Report are impractical and would impair the effectiveness of my work both within the TAMU team and for the Tanzania Government."

c.c: Chief of Party - TAMU/Tanzania

c.c: Project Manager, USAID/TAMU or Acting Agricultural Officer, USAID

c.c: Director, E. Paul Creech, International Programs.

DLM/pfc