

PROJECT APPRAISAL REPORT (PAR)

4390063 (8)

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1. PROJECT NO. 439-11-820-063	2. PAR FOR PERIOD 1/75 TO 6/75	3. COUNTRY Laos	4. PAR SERIAL NO. 75-4
5. PROJECT TITLE Refugee Relief and Resettlement			

XD-AAF-043-A  
4390063001006

6. PROJECT DURATION: Began FY 64 Ends FY 75	7. DATE EST PROP 4/22/76	8. DATE EST PIP 8/13/69	9. DATE PRIOR PAR 1/22/75
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10. U.S. FUNDING	a. Cumulative Obligation Thru Prior FY: \$1,013,000	b. Current FY Estimated Budget: \$1,457,000	c. Estimated Budget to completion After Current FY: \$ 0
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11. KEY ACTION AGENTS (Contractor, Participating Agency or Voluntary Agency)

a. NAME	b. CONTRACT, PASA OR VOL. AG. NO.

I. NEW ACTIONS PROPOSED AND REQUESTED AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION

A. ACTION (X)			B. LIST OF ACTIONS	C. PROPOSED ACTION COMPLETION DATE
USAID	AID/W	HOST		
			<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Lessons Learned</b></p> <p>The Refugee Project, was conceived more than a decade ago. As such it provided food, medical and other basic household necessities required to support and maintain villages caught up in the war, thereby freeing husband-soldiers from the need to work the fields so that full time could be devoted to the war.</p> <p>As the fighting progressed the nature of both the war and the Refugee Project changed. The refugee program while still supporting para-military dependents, came less to directly support the war, and began more and more to focus on the humanitarian task of assisting the growing numbers of displaced people. As it became increasingly clear that many of the refugees could not soon return to their home areas, the focus of the refugee program began to shift toward relocation/resettlement efforts and away from short-term relief. This change of course coincided with, and indeed resulted from, significant changes in the character of the war itself. Following the cease-fire virtually all short-term relief activities were discontinued since few new refugees were generated.</p> <p>Throughout the life of the Project large inputs of assistance, the mix of which varied with the character of the war itself, from other mission Projects such as Public Health, Agriculture, and Education were also used to complement and broaden the overall quantity and quality, as the Project was increasingly focused almost exclusively upon relocation/resettlement, the Project became correspondingly more indistinguishable (cont.)</p>	

D. REPLANNING REQUIRES							E. DATE OF MISSION REVIEW	
REVISED OR NEW	<input type="checkbox"/> PROP	<input type="checkbox"/> PIP	<input type="checkbox"/> PRO AG	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/T	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/C	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/P		

PROJECT MANAGER: TYPED NAME, SIGNED INITIALS AND DATE M Wiseman AISA/Laos	MISSION DIRECTOR: TYPED NAME, SIGNED INITIALS AND DATE
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from traditional Community Development programs.

In reviewing the Project, it is necessary to recognize that it was a very complex, multi-faceted large-scale operation, undertaken under war-time conditions. It was for the most part planned and operated by the USAID with a minimal degree of Lao Government involvement, due both to an acute lack of Lao resources and trained personnel. Much of the Project required sizable control of and access to resources such as aircraft, food supplies, and construction equipment and materials to an extent that discouraged the significant involvement of nearly all other potential donors. Additionally, many donors were increasingly inclined to avoid the portions of the Project having controversial political overtones, such as in MR II.

In reviewing the Project the following points surface as particularly significant in view of the manner events developed in Laos. (1) The personnel and resource component of other mission projects, such as Agriculture, Health and Education, which were directly concerned with refugee assistance, might have been integrated into the Refugee Project thereby assuring centralized direction of activities and maximizing the efficient use of available resources. As it was, the objectives/goals of other projects did not always complement the Refugee Project.

(2) Tolerance of excessively inefficient and corrupt local Lao refugee officials tended to undermine the Project.

(3) The control which the USAID exercised over commodities and the manner of refugee operations, while appropriate and indeed remarkably effective during the war, should not have continued beyond the cease-fire. As it was, the virtually unchanged arrangement provided grist for PL propaganda about U.S. control of Laos and concurrently assaulted the growing sense of nationalism among even the rightists in the postwar period.

(4) The mixing of AID personnel, resources and operations with other elements of the U.S. Mission had the long-term effect of making the USAID suspect in the eyes of many Lao, particularly the PL. Although this mixing did have the short-term advantage of maximizing the efficient use of USG resources such as aircraft, etc., the long-term effect was detrimental.

(5) On the more positive side, the wide use of young, able, language-trained officers in the field was very successful. The energy and language capability of these officers more than compensated for what they might have lacked in age and experience.

(6) Another positive element of the program was the latitude and responsibility given young low level officers. This resulted in a good deal of innovation. The highly successful rice drop program is one example.

**II. PERFORMANCE OF KEY INPUTS AND ACTION AGENTS**

A. INPUT OR ACTION AGENT CONTRACTOR, PARTICIPATING AGENCY OR VOLUNTARY AGENCY	B. PERFORMANCE AGAINST PLAN							C. IMPORTANCE FOR ACHIEVING PROJECT PURPOSE (X)				
	UNSATISFACTORY		SATISFACTORY			OUTSTANDING		LOW		MEDIUM		HIGH
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5
1. None												
2.												
3.												

Comment on key factors determining rating

4. PARTICIPANT TRAINING	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5
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Comment on key factors determining rating

None

5. COMMODITIES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5
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Comment on key factors determining rating Commodities, especially in the earlier years of the Project, were almost totally controlled by the U.S. Near the end some degree of control had been relinquished to the PGNU. Commodities were essential to the successful implementation of the Project, particularly in the relief and relocation phases and to an increasingly lesser extent in the Resettlement phase. Commodities, especially food, were nearly always available in a timely manner and in adequate quantities. The success on the commodity. (Cont.-

6. COOPERATING COUNTRY	a. PERSONNEL	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5
	b. OTHER												

Comment on key factors determining rating The planning and implementation of the Project was done so completely by the U.S. that little opportunity, nor Project emphasis for that matter, was afforded for the development of Lao Government capabilities. Consequently, Lao capabilities remained underdeveloped and poorly utilized. This coupled with low pay; low levels of motivation, and very centralized decision making within the MSW, resulted in the MSW functioning at a low level of efficiency. In the sense that assisting refugees was the project goal, the goal was very satisfactorily realized. However, the Project purpose, which was to assist the Lao Government to address refugee problems, was not satisfactorily achieved to the extent that this entailed building a strong and competent MSW.

7. OTHER DONORS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5
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(See Next Page for Comments on Other Donors)

portion of the Project was quite satisfactory in the sense that procurement, storage and distribution were well handled. However the dearth of Lao Government resources coupled with the reluctance of the U.S. to relinquish control over U.S. procured commodities retarded the development of the MSW as well as prolonging its extensive dependence and/or subservience to U.S. direction.

7. Continued: Comment on key factors determining rating of Other Donors Although sizable quantities of relief goods were given to Laos by various private and Government donors, the donations were generally uncoordinated, intermittent or unpredictable in nature and although useful, generally not of a magnitude which seriously addressed the problem (albeit with some significant exceptions such as Japanese rice). Several international and VolAg teams worked on refugee relief and resettlement but again in all cases they were small, lacked significant resources and confined their activities to limited locations and specific types of assistance such as medical assistance. In many cases other donor activities depended to varying extents on the US for support to carry out their activities. Transportation of commodities and personnel is one such example.

### III. KEY OUTPUT INDICATORS AND TARGETS

A. QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS FOR MAJOR OUTPUTS		TARGETS (Percentage/Rate/Amount)					END OF PROJECT
		CUMULATIVE PRIOR FY	CURRENT FY		FY ____	FY ____	
			TO DATE	TO END			
Not Available	PLANNED	Output indicators were refugees					
	ACTUAL PERFORMANCE	resettled/relocated; including wells dug, houses,					
	REPLANNED	roads, classrooms and villages constructed, and					
	PLANNED	land cleared. By late 1974 and early					
	ACTUAL PERFORMANCE	1975 the combination of a bumper					
	REPLANNED	rice harvest, increasing numbers of					
	PLANNED	refugees returning to original home					
	ACTUAL PERFORMANCE	areas, the USAID/MSE revising					
	REPLANNED	somewhat outdated criteria for determining					
	PLANNED	refugees requiring support and the changing					
	ACTUAL PERFORMANCE	political situation had virtually					
	REPLANNED	eliminated the refugee problem.					
B. QUALITATIVE INDICATORS FOR MAJOR OUTPUTS	COMMENT: The decline in refugee numbers was relatively rapid. The corresponding level of USAID support hence declined rather abruptly with little long-term opportunity or need, within the last year, for the MSW to function at the level or in the manner that USAID had functioned. Nevertheless, although all refugees were adequately serviced						
1. Adequate servicing of refugees	COMMENT: up to the time AID departed, most observers believe that the MSW was not able or prepared to effectively provide SW services without substantial AID or other outside assistance. This is due to both a lack of qualified and motivated personnel, cumbersome internal administrative procedures and a significant lack of resources.						
2. Adequately functioning MSW.	COMMENT:						
3. Attainment of economic self-sufficiency by refugees.							

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IV. PROJECT PURPOSE

A. 1. Statement of purpose as currently envisaged.

2. Same as in PROP?  YES  NO

To develop and assist the MSW in providing the basic human needs of food, clothing, shelter and health care to refugees; and to assist all responsible PGNU agencies in helping refugees attain economic and social levels equal to those non-refugees in the area.

B. 1. Conditions which will exist when above purpose is achieved.

2. Evidence to date of progress toward these conditions.

Functioning MSW

Economic self-sufficiency of former refugees.

Adequate community services provided

At the time AID left Laos virtually all refugees had achieved a degree of physical well-being and economic self-sufficiency which had allowed them to be dropped from the refugee rolls. In all relocation/resettlement efforts within the 'Vientiane side' AID satisfied relatively high self-imposed standards of community services. The MSW was functioning more effectively than a decade earlier due in large part to the efforts of AID. However, in the view of most AID officials, the MSW was still some way from being able to effectively and efficiently satisfy actual and potential requirements for its services.

V. PROGRAMMING GOAL

A. Statement of Programming Goal

To alleviate war-caused suffering and disruptions, and in so doing promote the economic and social development of Laos.

B. Will the achievement of the project purpose make a significant contribution to the programming goal, given the magnitude of the national problem? Cite evidence.

Although AID is now out of Laos, the project provided emergency relief, relocation and resettlement assistance to a cumulative total of up to 1/3 of the population of Laos over the last decade. In so doing a measure of stability was injected into an otherwise chaotic situation. The Government continued to function in a relatively normal manner, and economic and social activities and structures continued to function, and in some cases, even managed to develop and expand. Problems resulting from war-related suffering and dislocation were addressed in a way that minimized their impact and even in many cases started the very victims on the road to a life better than that from which they had fled, as a result of their introduction to better education, medical facilities, agricultural training, etc.