



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

USAID BURUNDI WORKSHOP: NOTES OF PROCEEDINGS¹

Fragility, Resilience and Program Priorities in Burundi: A Fragile States Assessment Exercise

*July 27 & 28, 2005, 8:30am –5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility
1429 North Quincy Street
Arlington, VA.*

DAY ONE

WELCOME AND INTRODUCTIONS

Elisabeth Kvitashvili

For the past two years, USAID has been developing the fragile states assessment framework. CMM (Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation), AFR (Africa Bureau), OTI (Office of Transition Initiatives), and D&G (Office of Democracy and Governance) all have their own strategic frameworks. The fragile states assessment framework that we are working with now serves to pull all of these frameworks together.

This workshop marks the second time that it has been used to identify programming priorities. The first was our Guinea Assessment, and the results we got back were mixed. Since then, we have revised the framework and are now conducting another pilot test over the next two days with Burundi.

This framework is a living document, so in addition to programming priorities for Burundi, this workshop also serves as a test of the framework itself. We hope to get a better understanding of the framework from these two days. For instance, we would like to determine if the framework can be used across the agency, or if it needs deepening or refining. We will adjust the framework as we learn and we will adjust it per country.

I. Goals of the Workshop

Ruth Buckley

Looking to the future, we need very integrated approaches. The Africa Bureau is committed to one framework that is multi-sectoral.

Andy Sisson

Burundi is obviously a fragile state, but compared to the region, it is on a positive track. There is progress and it is positive. USAID and its partners can take satisfaction in contributing to this positive result. OTI, OFDA (Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance), and CMM all contributed to improved health and a good electoral process, even with modest resources.

¹ This document is drawn from notes of the presentations, comments, and discussion taken by IRIS staff members during the two-day workshop, July 27-28, 2005.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

However, the types of programs that we had a few years ago may not be appropriate for the next few years. In addition, the US government is resource constrained in the region. Therefore, when it comes to programming now and in the near future, the choices are even more important. We need to make wise choices. We need to focus. The challenges are huge, and determining how to address them is difficult. Over the next two days, we need to determine where USAID can make the biggest difference.

The top priority today is to work on Burundi. I have high hopes for the agency in the African Bureau. There is a lot of interest from the field in Burundi. Personally, I really want to have an impact in Burundi. We have a lot of talent to share.

II. Review of the Fragile States Assessment Framework

Tjip Walker

The FRAME (**FR**agile States **A**ssessment **ME**thodology) is intended to organize thinking, develop a compelling story for USAID, and identify program opportunities. This is still a work in progress, as the Agency is trying to develop various tools to identify sources of fragility, such as the fragility assessment framework, the expert survey, the framing workshop, and the expert's procedure guide.

Our aim at this meeting is to work through the four tasks in the framework. Task One is huge. It consists of two parts: first, to identify patterns in a big-picture sense and second, to identify the context in which interactions occur. When working through Task One, ask yourself: what are the patterns of fragility and resilience? What is the context? These can be patterns of fragility or patterns of resilience. Our goal is to break up patterns of fragility and turn vicious, downward cycles into more virtuous cycles.

When we are talking about patterns, we are talking about state-society relationships. We are looking at the quality and nature of the interaction between citizens and government. There are interlocking patterns of state-society relationships. In stable states, this relationship is productive and supportive; there is accountability and shared views. Not so in fragile states. In fragile states, the relationship between citizens and the government is poor, antagonistic, and clientistic; rules are not followed, people opt out, and they use violence.

Looking at the context, we have to take into consideration structural factors and governance arrangements. For Burundi, structural factors include its demographics, land pressure, the current macro conditions, the "bad neighborhood" that surrounds it, international actors, and the UN presence. Governance arrangements include the new constitution, the new transitional government, and the types and level of expectations held by the populace.

In Task 2, we map the key actors. This is where we start to address the patterns. We need to understand the players. Who are our opponents and who are our own players? What are their motivations? This is where we move from terrain to tactics.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

In Task 3, we try to identify windows of opportunity and vulnerability. It is important to remember that in this task, we need to recognize the importance of timing and sequencing; we want to confront the temporal condition. For Burundi, this would include the post-election honeymoon.

In Task 4, we try to identify programming options to address the sources of fragility. The first thing we do is determine how to mitigate patterns of fragility and increase resilience. We want to support reformers and keep spoilers in check. We need to exploit every entry point by taking advantage of windows of opportunity and managing windows of vulnerability. In this task, we aim to create an “ideal”, US government-wide program. Then, we filter the ideal program through our constraints.

In summation, it is important for us to ask ourselves: What do we want to accomplish? We would like to articulate the conditions in Burundi in a logical way.

Discussion

A country suffering from fragility requires new thinking and risk-taking. We are not using five year plans anymore. Programming for fragile states is not about operating programs as usual. For example, in Nepal, we needed to step back from successful health programs. We realized that in addressing health in a fragile state, it was more important to serve a smaller proportion of the population, but to do so in a way that decreased the fragility of the country.

However, identifying patterns of fragility can be a difficult task. We must determine how to target programming effectively. What we are trying to do now is to make tackling these issues more manageable. We are looking for indicators that can measure effectiveness and legitimacy in four dimensions. At each level, we are thinking in terms of outcomes. What are the impacts on judgments of effectiveness and legitimacy? We need to look in terms of the analytical and organizational. This process is not rigid: it is a way to get at the critical functions of government. In addition, it does not matter what the resource is—it could be democracy and governance, or health.

As we begin our work today, first with Task One, it is critical that we not get caught up with definitions--we should not distract ourselves from the purpose of the workshop today. The concept of fragility covers a variety of situations. We are not trying to look at the point where it is exactly; we are looking at the trajectory that it is on.

In addition, as we work through the Framework, let us not restrict our thinking to money for programming. We need to go back to senior management and say we need x, y, and z programs. We must tell senior management what it will take to arrest decline and do development.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

III. Task 1: Identifying Patterns of Fragility and Resilience: A Broad Stroke Picture

A. STRUCTURAL FACTORS, GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS, AND STATE/SOCIETY INTERACTIONS, WITH EMPHASIS ON THE POLITICAL DIMENSION

Howard Wolpe

No analysis on Burundi can be complete without taking into consideration the importance and impact of the broader Great Lakes region, most notably, of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Burundi has tremendous potential to be a success story. However, there are three fundamental issues that must be addressed in order for success to happen:

First, Burundi suffers from extreme poverty; it is one of the poorest countries in the world. The state is the principle source of economic prosperity, which means that political corruption equals control of the state.

Second, within Burundian society, there is extreme inequality, between not just the Hutus and Tutsis, but also between Tutsis themselves. There is a small Tutsi minority that controls all power and resources; but the rest of Tutsis and Hutus are poor.

Third, the communal violence has created, next to Rwanda, the most traumatized society on earth. The violence had a deep and emotional intimacy to it. Burundi is very different from Rwanda; there, ethnic identities are not as sharp. Tutsis and Hutus mobilized politically in Burundi very late in the game compared to Rwanda.

The past patterns of interaction have produced a highly traumatized society and the creation of a “zero-sum” mentality. There is an intimate and emotional quality to the violence. As a result, very little value is attached to collaboration. Above all, there is a need to restore and build cooperation and interdependence. Another issue is tribunals: there are many unresolved questions with justice given all the past crimes. But people want more reconciliation, not more judicial punishments.

One way to address these fundamental issues and to ameliorate relations between the state and society and between the citizens themselves is to strengthen self-interest and self-investment/ accountability in the government through collaboration. The President has made moves to work towards cooperation between political parties and to promote a better integration of the military. However, the political system as it is currently is one in which the government is the source of all revenue. This pattern must be diluted so that the government is not the source of everything related to wealth, both in terms of real access to wealth and people’s mentality that government should have this role. With the new political system, Burundians, for the first time, are able to express themselves. They are requiring the government to keep its promises towards increased agricultural productivity and access to primary education, for example. Nevertheless, the political elite benefit from the current situation and a changeover in regime does not necessary translate into a systemic change.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

There is a receptivity to build cohesion and restore cooperation, especially in the military. This is evident in the September elections.

Discussion

In the short-run, the interim constitution will work and provide some legitimacy to decision-making. The Arusha Accords have helped, by providing a basis for discussion. However, Arusha is a process, not a hard-and-fast law. Burundians still need to talk through issues and develop a framework for doing so. However, more focus should be placed on consensus-building and not executive dominance. There should be mechanisms in the constitution to resolve differences and build consensus.

Promoting consensus from the bottom-up is extremely difficult, or perhaps even impossible. Other factors that are impediments to consensus include poverty of the resource base and youth.

As for the FNL (National Liberation Front), and their participation in the new government, their fighting numbers are small. They claim they will talk with the new government. They could be fragmenting, but it is debatable as to whether or not they still hold a significant spoiler capacity. They can still cause anxiety but they can not derail the political process by themselves. However, the historical context of the FNL leads to the belief that they will not stop fighting until their situation has been addressed.

The Tutsis have the Hima clan in Bururi, an untouchable cartel that consolidated their dynasty; they are the historical elites, and continue to control resources. There were three former presidents from this region that were cousins. They excluded other Tutsi from royalty and weakened them. Interestingly, there can be intermarriage between a Hutu and Tutsi, but never a Tutsi from the Hima clan. They remain a big question mark, as they may be the group most resistance to change.

With the ascendance of the FDD (Forces for the Defense of Democracy) in the recent legislative elections, there has been a significant political shift. Large numbers of people have made the leap. We are definitely seeing a change in how business is being done. However, while no one would deny the problems, hard issues remain to be tackled.

Regional dynamics remain a huge factor. Continuing instability in the DRC (Democratic Republic of the Congo) can provide bases for rebels. We should keep in mind that the FNL operates from the DRC. Now, in Rwanda, a positive result in Burundi could threaten elites in Rwanda. But, as long as Burundi stays on a positive, internal track, the regional dynamics will matter less. Neither Rwanda nor Burundi wants ethnic adversaries in the other country. Burundian leaders are trying to maintain good relations with Rwanda. They do not want the government of Rwanda to see Burundi's government as hostile. Burundi is not a Hutu power state. They want a moderate and broad-based transition.

Regarding war fatigue, Burundians may indeed be tired of fighting and conflict. However, it would not take much for fighting to start again. Not all rebels are demobilized. For the time being, Tutsi armies are still a negative force. Remember, the FNL took up arms and fought an army that all feared.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

B. SOCIAL DIMENSION

John Janzen

During my time in Burundi, from 1994 to 1995, my focus was on the lowest commune level of Burundian society. Most local levels of government were created by the Belgians. This was also the case in other Belgian territories in the region: the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda.

In terms of effectiveness and legitimacy, inclusiveness is perhaps the single most important value of legitimacy in Burundi.

In terms of windows of vulnerability and opportunity, a spasm of violence could occur from any number of provocations. It is not too optimistic. Many underlying social problems have long been neglected, and have not been addressed, such an unequal education system, non-functioning courts, and land tenure.

Ethnicity is known as an effective card to play to increase support. It is an elite strategy for recruitment and a strategy for violence. While some reject ethnic labels as phony, others accept them as de facto legitimate. Some treat ethnicities like races – an essentialist would say that ethnicity means distinct physical features and character traits. As you can imagine, this is kind a confusing set of “beliefs.”

However, this belief in separate “races” so to speak is further confused by the intermingling and cultural similarities between the Hutus and Tutsis. For example, it is quite common for them to intermarry, and all groups in Burundi speak the same language, a rarity indeed for Sub-Saharan Africa.

Discussion

It is very important to affirm the importance of the judiciary machinery in a modern state. After the genocide in Rwanda, there were already judicial mechanisms in place for individuals to take judicial recourse for the murders. However, this is not the case in Burundi, which has still to update and centralize its courts system and legal codes.

At the moment, there is no centralized state mechanism for the judicial system. There was a time in Burundi when local councils could settle disputes and when the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa ethnicities worked together. Now there is no authority that can resolve disputes for all three ethnicities. The lack of an effective judiciary has now reared up and is causing problems. While there are cultural traditions of council of judges, and judicial elders, this tradition is no longer present throughout the country: In some regions, the councils still exist, in others, not. There is still no recourse to an authority that can resolve disputes. The judiciary is sometimes threatened and killed. We need to affirm the significance of the judicial system.

There is a lot of impunity when it comes to the judicial system. Burundi needs better rule of law, and we need to look at community access to justice. The local councils cannot always be trusted since they have committed many crimes. How can they judge themselves? Truth-telling is necessary to achieve reconciliation. The truth and reconciliation committee was built into the negotiation committees, and now Burundi is ready to move forward.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

A few years ago, everyone was focused on judicial accountability. OTI had a pilot project for training local leaders. The result was those trained were envied by others. Traditional decision makers in the government became jealous of new leaders being trained.

In conclusion, when it comes to service delivery, inclusiveness should be a top priority. All interventions should be perceived as being implemented even-handedly. It would be disastrous for a USAID project to be regarded as promoting inequality. Equity is not always a sustainable value, though. For education, equity is sustainable, however it is not so in something such as food production.

C. ECONOMIC DIMENSION

Mevin Ndarusigiye

The economic sector cannot be analyzed in isolation; economics interacts with social, political, and security circumstances. Two critical features of the Burundian economy are food and security. Fighting has always been over food and power. Food production has not kept pace with population growth. The level of food production is the most important indicator of whether people are happy or if the government is effective. In the past, the Tutsi governments have focused on consolidating power; as a result, the government has always been the source of survival.

Another feature of the economy is land. The average land size for a household (which is usually about seven to eight people) is only one hectare. Agricultural inputs are just not there. There is a lack of equitability in land distribution.

An offshoot of land productivity is land tenure, which is a major problem facing Burundi. After 1972, there is a lack of documentation regarding land ownership and distribution. Land tenure was highly corrupted. For example, government officials would just give land to friends, without notice of legal codes or necessary documentation. It is in ways such as this that many refugees, upon their return after the violence of 1972, found their land given away. Land disputes are intimately linked to continued violence in Burundi today. People will fight until land disputes are resolved.

At present, agriculture is the primary employer of the majority of Burundians. It is imperative to create new forms of income generating activities other than agriculture. One option is to focus on small scale enterprises.

You can not run away from poverty; there are high levels of poverty in both rural and urban populations; therefore, there is no place for labor to go, especially unskilled labor. This is linked to the educational system which is both elitist and ethnicized. Ethnic classification is institutionalized and linked to the mentality of looking to the government for all solutions. We must dilute this pattern; government cannot be the source of everything.

There is also a regional bias. For example, Bururi has the highest national income but contributes little to the state. It is a region that has no natural resources but the highest per capita income.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

Corruption is still a major problem in Burundi. High ranking officials may only make between 30 to 100 US dollars per month. Considering that most families in Burundi are extended families, averaging 8 to 10 people, there is an urge for officials to fill their pockets while still possible. Oversight and management of public servant salaries is necessary.

Public resources are highly mismanaged. If not managed well or overseen, there can be no solution to the problem of development. In the last ten years, the budget for the health sector has decreased 30 percent, whereas spending on the military has increased 600 percent. Unfortunately, for all their good intentions, donors facilitate this problem.

When it comes to education, most Burundians cannot attend. School fees take approximately 20 percent of a family's income. Burundi needs free universal education; at least, until 10th grade.

Lastly, the Burundian economy is marked by a reliance on coffee. However, the people have always resisted this crop because it was imposed on them by colonial rulers. Food crops are accepted by the people and can lead to agro industries and thereby increase national income.

Discussion

Agriculture:

While coffee makes up a significant part of the national income, the distribution of the coffee revenues is what is truly important at the individual, micro level. If people receive no direct benefit from coffee, they do not value it as a crop. Any hope for Burundi's economy is based on diversification. Coffee is a short term solution, as it is only a niche market. We need longer-term solutions.

One major impediment to agricultural productivity and income generation is the sub marginal size of individual land plots. As a consequence of this, merely promoting food crops will not necessarily bring food security, so we must be innovative when it comes to agriculture. Intense agriculture is needed. We can promote food crops through ecological zones. There are regional competitive advantages to exploit that can help build agribusiness and can increase household income and improve nutrition. For example, the banana plant can be used for wine, food, and building homes. That can be one industry. There is also sorghum; a grain that can be used to make cereals for malnourished children. Or cassava; there are entire plains of cassava plants. Fish is also a commodity that has been underexploited.

In the early 1970's, Burundi was food sufficient, but it was still a poor country with minimal economic growth. According to one World Bank statistic, the GNP (Gross National Product) of Burundi is approximately equal to the economy of a town of 50,000 people in the United States. Burundi can not supply food for itself now, and future prospects look dim. While the restoration of the agricultural sector to a level of self-sufficiency is easy, achieving economic growth is difficult.

Burundi's economy is too small, even in the best of times. At present, there is no model for the kind of rapid economic growth needed for entry into the global economy. Opportunities for economic growth must come from outside of Burundi's borders. However, such regional economic interdependence depends, naturally, on regional factors. Most notably, we need stability in the Congo.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

Concerning the issue of land, food security, and poverty: subsistence is fine, but there is no growth, no cash stashed away in Burundi. On a small scale, regional trade is an option. But there is no surplus to offer or regional product diversification. However, with manufactured goods, Burundi could easily trade with parts of the DRC. To do so, we would need to encourage farmers because they still have a socialist style of behavior.

The productive potential of Burundi is much greater than current levels suggest. One problem is that agricultural organization and the organizational capacity of farmers is constrained. We need to build marketing networks, cooperative structures, and things such as that.

Inputs, better organizations, and better regulations that do not exploit farmers' work are needed. We need to increase the value of farm activities, or create new opportunities off the farm. One exciting, recent development has been the Coffee Growers Association. Cooperatives used to exist but were managed corruptly. There used to be a dynamic farmers association but this has changed since the conflict. Now these associations are linked with violence and people have given up on them. People need assurance that there is no threat to them.

Another factor contributing to Burundi's inability to provide for itself or experience any substantive economic growth is that land pressure is intense. There are just too many people and not enough land. Since 1993, population has exploded. When the refugees, currently in Tanzania, return, there will only be increased pressure on land. Burundi suffers a "demographic time bomb." This needs to be a cross-cutting issue. Plot sizes are very small and there is extreme land erosion.

Even if agricultural productivity increases through more cassava or banana crops, thereby improving food security, nutritional security is not improved. Burundi needs both food security and nutritional security at the same time. This same problem exists in Rwanda. One solution to this may be exporting population, with excess labor migrating to areas in the DRC that lack labor.

Lastly, Burundi suffers greatly from erosion of land. For example, when you fly over Burundi, crossing from Rwanda, you see that the hills are washing away, whereas in Rwanda, one sees numerous terraced hills. As we discuss programming options further along in the conference, we should consider terracing as a method to improve agricultural productivity and employ excess labor.

Public Finances:

With a huge deficit of over US\$1 billion, it is good question, indeed, where public revenue comes from. There are numerous state-owned enterprises that are notorious for being mismanaged cash cows, contributing little in terms of productive value. One positive development is that the population of Burundi is now more mature and now they have a say in government affairs. They have already warned the government to keep its promise of increased access to primary school. Hopefully, this demand for government accountability will extend as well to public finances.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

A sudden influx of donor money can really affect the economy and government in a negative way. Those who receive the resources get the power and then control access to wealth. Without state-provided security for all, some hire their own militias, which only contributes more to general problems and security fragility. Speaking of militias, there is new one since April or May called RADDAEU. Someone must be financing them.

D. SECURITY DIMENSION

Suliman Baldo

The most significant development in terms of Burundi's security has been the recent political changes, and the political changes that will take place in the very near future as a result of national elections. Most notably, the CNDD-FDD (National Council for the Defense of Democracy- Forces for the Defense of Democracy) won a clear majority in the last elections. This group joined the negotiation process late, and at present, we do not know how they will conduct themselves. We do not know if they will promote exclusion or inclusion.

There is no international community mechanism to assist with the political transition, as there is in the DRC. We need to help the process beyond just the formation of the political process and new government. This is key for general security and for the army in particular.

The military is a lingering source of political power and the entire security sector must be addressed carefully. Essentially, the military has served a limited, though very significant and powerful role, as protection for the elite. The number one concern is whether the new government will use the army as it has historically been used, or will take action to build a more inclusive army.

The FNL (National Liberation Front) has a legitimacy problem. It is already operating as a private militia. This group has the capacity to devolve into organized banditry. This could lead to the delegitimization of the new government. The history of demilitarization and legitimacy of security forces has been completely negative.

Lastly, we need to be mindful of the relationship with neighboring countries. The issue of the security sector in Burundi is dependant on regional events. For example, quite recently, Rwanda ejected Hutus, who fled to Burundi. Thus, the question facing Burundi is should they return the Hutus to Rwanda? And if they did, could this induce some sort of conflict between the two countries that could incite cross-border violence?

Even during the Congo war, the Ugandan army was in the north-east Congo. Congo is now pressuring Rwanda's FDLR (Rwandan Democratic Forces of Liberation) to return to Rwanda, but this group is factionalizing and going to Burundi. Congo is still a major problem for Burundi, and events in the DRC greatly affect Burundi. For the military, economic problems drive potential destabilization and Burundian forces have been abusing their power.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

Discussion

The test for the Burundian peace process was its response to the Gatumba massacre, in which members of the FNL killed 160 Congolese Tutsi refugees at a refugee camp in August, 2004. This was clearly an attempt to resurrect a Tutsi genocide but, instead, the massacre did not distract from the peace process. Burundians rejected any effort to ethnicize this event.

Currently, Burundi is in the process of a complete demobilization. Within demobilization, there is always danger. In addition, there is a tension between helping soldiers rather than other people affected by violence. Thus, the problem is, how can we promote building reconciliation when certain groups, such as the military in the case of demobilization, are being favored rather than others? Other than restructuring the army and the police force, what other procedures exist to standardize human rights violations?

The police and army are now separate but there was no police before; just a gendarmerie. The new high command of police is drawn from the army so now the army and police are institutionally linked. Demobilization must be dealt with as part of the entire framework. For example, the economy must grow or else favoritism will be too stark.

Since 1965, the army has essentially been a Tutsi protection force. Now, with the integration of other forces, Burundi is developing a new, national army. This process is fragile by definition. Look at the process in the DRC: militias are still intact and nothing is happening. In contrast, quite a number of demobilized soldiers have been absorbed into the new army in a short time in Burundi. This is good progress. However, it does not address the root causes of conflict.

For UN missions, the tendency is to leave after elections. But the time immediately after an election is precisely the key moment for interventions, as it is the riskiest time. It is at this moment that assistance should be implemented in digestible and manageable installments so that Burundi can absorb it better. The UN mission will stay around in Burundi for the foreseeable future, absent a direct government of Burundi or US decision for them to leave.

We are now in the process of building cohesion. For example, in regard to the training for police, there is a litany of issues to deal with such as corruption and standards of professionalism.

For the time being, it is difficult to have civilian oversight, although we need to know how the military is working. This process needs to be operational – civilian oversight is not very effective right now.

Regarding a reoccurrence of violence like in 1993, there is still a sense of threat, but we have already passed the point of a potential return to that type of violence. Before 1972, the army was multi-ethnic. While the FDD (Forces for the Defense of Democracy, Hutu) is now represented in the army, there is still a fear of a potential massacre in the army again. The FDD still wants a safety net. The FNL may be the safety net because it is a potential catalyst with implicit support of Hutus. The Bururi Hima will no longer control, because with the strength of the FDD, there is more of a balance of power. However, the situation in Burundi may get confused again, but in a new way.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

Security is a very serious issue. Without it, there can be no development. Perhaps we should be talking about arms reduction and control as opposed to disarmament. Arms reduction and control is better because it is easier to do and more palatable to the people.

IV. Task 2: Key Actors and Patterns of Fragility and Resilience

Overview of Key Actors and their involvement in patterns of fragility and resilience

A. POLITICAL KEY ACTORS

Howard Wolpe

When it comes to political parties, including recently formed ones, it is not clear who will do what yet in terms of patterns of fragility and resilience. Political actors are divided in terms of ethnicity: most parties are either predominantly Hutu or Tutsi, although it should be mentioned that this is not a hard-and-fast division, as there is a certain degree of ethnic cross-over in some cases.

As for majority Hutu political actors, the FNL (Forces for National Liberation) was the most impacted by the 1972 genocide. It merged with a radical ethnic group and only wanted to talk to Tutsi leaders. Key players in the party include Nkurunziza, who will soon take on the presidency. It should be mentioned that he is of Christian faith. Another actor is Hussein Rajabu, the Secretary General of the party. He is thought to be the major source of power in the party and a manipulator. He has recently grown in power and gained voice. Rajabu is of Muslim faith.² Ngendahayo, is a foreign minister who was forced into exile in 1995, but maintained constant contact with leaders in Burundi. Upon his return to Burundi from exile, he was appointed Chief of Staff for Nkurunziza. He comes from the royal clan, and has also identified with FRODEBU (Front for Democracy in Burundi). Lastly, there is Agathon Rwaswa, the leader of the FNL.

Another Hutu majority group is FRODEBU (Front for Democracy in Burundi). Key political actors within this party include Minani, who is the Speaker of National Assembly and the leader of FRODEBU. He is a doctor by profession, and a favorite of Tanzania. He has claimed unfair elections and has threatened to return to arms. His character can be classified as impetuous, emotional, and volatile. The current president, Ndayizeye, is also from FRODEBU. A conflict between Minani and Ndayizeye (which occurred when Minani decided to run for elections), is said to have been one cause of FRODEBU's failure in the recent elections. Lastly, there is Ndikumana, one of the three key players that made the Arusha Agreement possible. He is highly competent. In regards to FRODEBU's recent election failure, he faulted its government partnership with UPRONA (Union of National Progress), stating that FRODEBU was spread too thin and did not have enough men on the ground.

Finally, there is the CNDD (National Council for the Defense of Democracy). Leonard Nyangoma is the main player within this party, and was the original symbolic figure of the Hutu resistance before the CNDD split with the FDD (Forces for the Defense of Democracy, which represented the military arm of the group). Although he won both local and regional elections, he certainly did not play his cards right, as

² Muslims in Burundi comprise approximately ten percent of the population. The Muslim population has essentially been unaffected by conflict.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

he could have easily been elected president, rather than Ndayizeye. Nyangoma participated in the Arusha negotiations. He was squeezed out and stunned about how open the media was.

As for the Tutsi side of political parties, the family structure has broken up. Main Tutsi political parties include UPRONA (Union of National Progress). The leadership is composed of half hardliners and half moderates. The hardliners made the Arusha negotiations difficult and Kadege was blamed. These hardliners for UPRONA are scared of Hutu reprisals against Tutsi. Hardliners include Terena Dindedaya, who was disposed of by Domitien Ndayizeye, without any sort of backlash. Currently, he is the Foreign Minister. There is also Mwanagari, Libere, and Kadege. Kadege has the potential to become one of the two future Vice-Presidents. Moderate players within UPRONA include Mukasi, who is the voice of UPRONA. However, he is a distasteful and untrustworthy figure who only surfaces to talk during times of problems and disappears when everything is going smoothly.

Other Tutsi political parties include the MRC (Movement for the Rehabilitation of the Citizen) and PARENA (The Party for National Redress). Epitace Bayaganakandi is the key player within the MRC; he is a former military colonel and opponent to Buyoya, the former president. Within PARENA, there is Bagaza, the leader and a former president, who is the cousin of Buyoya and swears to kill him. His support base is composed of former military people, suspected of being too marginalized in the army to be effective. He was also present during the Arusha negotiations.

For the Tutsi side, the test of the negotiations was that it was a new deal not controlled by the Tutsis. They allowed international intervention in Burundi.

B. SECURITY SECTOR KEY ACTORS

The security sector has been making progress with reform but still has a long way to go. Security structures are building respect among the population in cooperation with civil society; however, this process is not yet complete. It must first be sanctioned and authorized by political leadership.

Much of the reason for success in the security sector can be attributed to the Army Chief of Staff, Germain Niyoyankana. He is a former field commander and is supported by the troops. He actively participated in integrating rebel groups into the army. He also participated in training officers of the new army. He has been very cooperative and does not possess apparent political pretension or ego. Most recently, he participated in a wide-ranging workshop for integration and cohesion along with representatives from rebel groups and the army. However, the current Minister of Defense, from UPRONA, is decidedly less helpful than Niyoyankana.

Other security actors include Adolphe Nshimirimana, who is former Chief of Staff of the CNDD-FDD, and is currently the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. He maintains good relations with Niyoyankana, who became Nshimirimana's mentor. He has numerous insecurities and tries not to expose himself.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

General Celestin Ilunga was on the list of the six worst actors in Burundi. However, since that time, he has partnered with Germain Niyoyankana and seeks to improve Burundian conditions. Colonel Bikomagu, although retired, is still an actor, and questions remain as to whether he was involved in the assassination of the Prime Minister. There is also Alain Guillaume, Chairman of the Police Commission. Currently, he helps train police and is trying to organize a new police force. Guillaume has formed a partnership with Salvatore, a Tutsi and a top official in gendarmerie. Hermenegilde is a former gendarme. And lastly, there is Colonel Mamert Sinarinzi, the Executive Secretariat of the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) process. He is viewed as a progressive agent, although he is not popular among the Tutsi.

Currently, the security apparatus is building respect among the population and cooperation with civil society. However, the government is not ready to assume control of the military, although progress toward instating civilian control over security structures is being made.

C. CIVIL SOCIETY

Burundian civil society is very different than other civil societies in other countries. Ninety percent of the population is active in agriculture. Little social capital exists. However, the process of organizational development and training has created leaders with skills and good political abilities. This training has reached a wide range of groups active at the local and national levels, such as church groups, women's organizations, and human rights groups. Women's participation is strong and significant in Burundian society today.

In regards to churches in Burundi, Catholic, Pentecostal, and Anglican leaders are all key players in Burundi but none have reached their full potential, despite the fact that 70 percent of the population is Christian. These groups are not fragmented and they were not so much a part of the killings; but they have not done much. For example, there was a Catholic Peace and Justice Conference but beyond that there has been little to illustrate true potential. USAID has given money to churches in the past, but has experienced trouble in getting programs started.

Eugene Nindorera, a Hutu, is the former Human Rights Minister. He is respected by Hutu and Tutsi alike. Although he is moving on to the UN and the DRC, he still has considerable influence on civil society. Another individual actor is Fabien, a Tutsi. His father was assassinated in 1993, but he wants to move on. He was recruited by Nindorera.

As for other civil society actors, unions used to be used merely to extend the Tutsi power structure. Today, they focus on workers' rights. Teacher's unions are emerging as more militant. The press has been emerging in a good way. And finally, the media has come a long way. Many small, independent radio stations have emerged. However, the government sometimes intervenes in press and media business, and it should not be understood that there is absolutely freedom of press.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

Discussion

It is unclear which actors will do what yet; their responsibilities have yet to be determined. Currently, we are trying to build with what is emerging. For example, the judicial system is not strong yet. There is a desire to gain rule of law so it is important to train judges. However, building capacity must extend beyond technical skills to impulsing a collaborative effort between the executive, legislative, and judicial sectors. More ministries need to be involved. Common administrations handle local disputes and may have to be elected. We must build capacity to build local government.

Thirty nine percent of Burundi's GDP (Gross Domestic Product) comes from aid. It is hard to get aid coordination and we certainly need to condition aid. But we need aid quickly now, or progress will falter. The aid that is now being given exacerbates the Hutu/Tutsi divide because there is geographic favoritism based on prior Tutsi domination. It is easier to administer aid in good zones and not operate in neglected zones.

Donor coordination is lacking because donors do not like to be, or appear to be coordinated by others. Perhaps it is best to have an outside coordinator, such as the UN. There are some international players who can help with international coordination. For example, the Catholic order in Rome is working on track II diplomacy.

In regard to donor mapping, in Sudan, there were different sectoral activities against tribal distribution of oil reserves. It is a nice tool to ask the right questions about implementation, but we can not ask anyone in the government to give USAID a map. Part of the fragility assessment should be a map. Mapping donor strategy is especially important in region where there is still violence, rather than more pacific regions. However, mapping is a north-south equation. There is a distorted pattern. Second, we need mapping of where the training centers are located. These are primarily located in Tutsi regions.

As for the private sector, it does exist, but is very small. Now there is a real interest in the private sector as a means to wealth and economic benefit.

There are of course marginal social actors, such as criminal gangs who were not mentioned above. Certainly, if their activity continues, foreign direct investment is not possible. One result of the sanctions was that it created a smuggling arrangement. There are few economic incentives for international players; there is just too little in Burundi.

In the DRC, it is very profitable to hold on to power – more so than in Burundi. The leadership in the DRC is disconnected from the violence it caused, but this is not the case in Burundi.

We need more key actors, divided into spoilers and allies, such as clans. Wealth and nepotism still works, so clans are still important. There are also demobilized soldiers, rank and file officers, traditional elders, the internally displaced and refugees, youth, the unemployed, local development councils, business people, militia, US government actors and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The COMESA (The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), is a growing positive player in the region as well. Demobilized people are very important; they cause a lot of problems so this issue needs a lot of focus.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

The OTI strategy is a broad approach to demobilization. It does not have a narrow focus on getting resources to those demobilized. As for clans, they are implicit in political parties and politics. The Diaspora is especially relevant at times because they finance the insurgency. The Diaspora can remain a concern. Those defeated now could consolidate power and come back later and then draw on the Diaspora for money.

The most specific issue is how to accommodate Burundians who have or will come home. The biggest group will come home sixth months after all political issues have been settled. In addition, there are over 130,000 internally displaced people, many who will remain where they are. Belgium is not doing well at addressing these issues.

The economic stability in the region is crucial to Burundi and Rwanda because both countries would benefit greatly. The long term economic future for both countries depends on regional events.

V. Task 3: Windows of Vulnerability and Opportunity and Regional Implications

WINDOWS OF VULNERABILITY AND WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY, INCLUDING REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Glenn Slocum

There are four predicates to this discussion. First, there is a total divide between the political elite and the population. Second, there is a low-level of national solidarity. Historically, Burundians are not considered to be good collaborators. Third, the balance of power is shifting among political parties and ethnic groups. And lastly, there is a weak level of social capital.

The bulk of Burundi's problems are internal. Potential fissures include economic deprivation, ethnic rivalries, post-election uncertainty, and a predatory state. The state is not a supporter of the private sector.

Windows of vulnerability include a "winner takes all" mentality. In addition, the economy has been devastated by over a decade of political turmoil. As a result, domestic investment has dried up and massive amounts of food aid are still needed, which means that Burundi is not able to create jobs or feed its population. In part, this is due to a weak government. The government is not able to spark the economy. If it is unable to do so, the government will be considered illegitimate. The government is under heavy pressure to deliver services and economic prosperity. If insecurity continues, the provinces will be cut off from all goods and services.

Windows of opportunity include, most recently, the elections. The first two were very successful and can be considered harbingers of stability. Another window of opportunity is the United Nations involvement. It could serve as the main coordinator for all donors working in Burundi. Burundi could become a model of effective donor organization. However, it is difficult for the UN to remain objective since it must stay in good favor with the government. The jobs provided by the UN usually go to elites, that is to say, the favored groups. The weakness of the government is also an opportunity. Perhaps we can focus funds toward local government entities and communities. The Diaspora can help with capacity building. The



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

youth are also another source of opportunity; their adaptability to change is an asset. Another opportunity is the reintegration of security forces, especially the police.

Looking toward the future, there are three things that must happen. First, a truth and reconciliation commission must be established. Burundi is already on the international agenda for such an activity. Bringing to justice those responsible for past crimes may be important for future development. Second, there needs to be a new communal law. And third, within the next month, peace guardians need to be demobilized.

Discussion

USAID could help with getting the rural economy operating again. Donors can help with this by creating rural or community cooperatives. Burundi's reliance on donor aid is an opportunity. We can use NGOs to do things that are balanced by ethnic groups. Currently, some NGOs are meeting some of the service delivery needs. The decisions that the government makes will determine the timeframe. The better the donor-government relationship, the long the time frame. Good service delivery takes approximately two years. We should try and do something sooner.

As for government activities in the next 24 months, the new president may not know how to govern. A change in government is time to clean house and reform it. This is the only time that this can be done.

The PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper), although not an entirely solid base for going forward, will ensure that aid flows into Burundi once it is approved. We need to change the way we do business and Burundi needs to change the way it does business. Fiscal decentralization is very important. Another opportunity is the Eagle Report.

In terms of practical opportunities, the country is very small. There are also good primary roads. There are also over 55 organizations there, represented in each province. The UN peacekeeping presence is also an opportunity. Another opportunity is the reintegration of security forces. Transitional justice is a two-tiered approach. Finally, there is a change from prior ways of doing things. We can make investments and extend our planning horizons. One vulnerability, however, is that Burundians may have unrealistic expectations.

Peace dividends offer opportunities to involve citizens in their own government. We need to work with parliamentarians to be more responsive to the people. This will require a change in laws and procedures.

In any post-conflict situation, there are four things that must be done. First, a change in paradigm is necessary; this is not a zero-sum game. People need to regain a sense of interdependence and collaboration. Second, trust must be rebuilt in relationships. The key is how to deal with this to create a process to bring people together. This is the social dimension of our own relationship. Third, we must focus on the rules of the game. How should power be organized for the future and how should decisions be made? Fourth, we need to improve communication skills. This is an opportunity for collaboration.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

The leaders that were identified above were at the national level. If we want our programs to be community based, there are options to work with or align with outside of the government, for example, Global Rights, Search for Common Ground, and urban unions. In addition, the communal council that is locally elected can be used to channel money.

We need to structure programs according to an issues-based structure. There needs to be a platform to address those involved (the stakeholders). When it comes to anti-corruption programs, we need to build in transparency and accountability but not punishment.

Finally, there are many master trainers in Burundi and lots of them are ready to help. They can provide implementation with facilitation and networking.

Potential program recommendations are threefold: to develop the rural sector, emphasize donor coordination, and push decentralization. In regards to the rural sector, over the next 24 months, the government should develop this sector. Its focus should be on the creation of cooperatives and NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations), and to strengthen civil society organization. Second, donor coordination is critical for public policies to effect change at the grassroots level. International NGOs have had a significant, cumulative impact in Burundi, especially in the area of reconciliation. Burundians who have participated in trainings with these NGOs are in a position to create positive developments and change. Lastly, at the local, rural community level, voter turnout has been high, with over 70 percent casting ballots in commune elections. This is a sign of the capacity for decentralization. Local, smaller communities which, for the most part, do not understand the dynamics of the urban sector, have developed their own capacity for change.

In sum, for the first time in a long time, there is hope for Burundi. The question is what to change and what things to address. Thus, our next steps are crucial in order to take advantage of this opportunity.



DAY TWO:

VI. Overview of the African Bureau's Strategy

Ruth Buckley

The new strategy of the African Bureau allows each mission to decide how they need to operationalize. Each mission chooses from a mix of seven strategic objectives. The strategic objectives are for three years, while the strategy statements can be amended annually.

Africa has the majority of fragile states. Our vision in the African Bureau is to enhance democratic practices. The most important aspect of this is equity. The Africa Bureau has two large goals. The first is to avert and resolve conflict. The second is to manage crisis, promote stability, and promote democratic practices. Within these two large goals are seven broad objectives. Underlying all of these objectives is the concept of "do no harm."

The first objective is to advance any peace processes. The second is to reinforce African conflict management and mitigation capacity. Goal three is to enhance the protection of individuals from physical violence. This represents a new focus on the treatment of people measured in terms of psycho-social indicators. Fourth is the reintegration of persons affected by conflict. Our fifth goal is to increase access to essential services provided by local and national institutions. Within this objective, USAID will try to promote reform and security. The sixth goal is to advance inclusive governance. And our last goal is to restore and maintain basic economic activity. This objective is in effect a stabilization objective.

The most important feature of this new strategy is that it addresses the causes and sources, rather than the consequences of, fragility.

VII. Key Patterns of Fragility and Resilience

Tjip Walker

When looking at Burundi, we must take some structural factors, such as poverty, size, and land and treat them as "givens."

Our first step for today is to identify key patterns of fragility in Burundi and develop consensus. When attempting to identify key patterns, what we are really doing is describing the relationship between the government and the governed. During this activity, we ask ourselves questions like: what can we point to and measure, such as crime rates or nutrition statistics. If we are to look at this as a game, who are the players and who are the winners and losers? Essentially, we are looking for patterns that are central to affecting the state-society relationship.

As an example of one pattern of fragility, I offer the pattern of "rural neglect" because there is a divorce between the large percentage of people in rural areas and the small, political elite in the capital. The result is a lack of investment in agriculture, which is also manifested in lack of services to rural areas and an imbalance in service distribution throughout the country.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

Below is a copy of the template for identifying patterns of fragility, which illustrates that with each pattern of fragility, we are able to identify the nature and types of interactions, measure the outcomes and observe the impact on legitimacy and effectiveness.

Pattern Name	Nature/ Types of Interactions	Outcomes	Impact on Legitimacy and Effectiveness
(Example)	(Example)	(Example)	(Example)
- Rural Neglect	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Divorce” between Bujumbura-focused elites and 90% of population living in rural areas - Elite focus on capturing the state - Limited policy attention and public investments - Inattention to land issue 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Weak service delivery in rural areas - Regional disparities in services - Low agricultural productivity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Low effectiveness - Sustains low levels of legitimacy
Other Example	Other Example	Other Example	Other Example
Other Example	Other Example	Other Example	Other Example

VIII. Task 4: Identifying Program Priorities

A. GROUP SUGGESTIONS OF POTENTIAL PATTERNS OF FRAGILITY

Group 1

We actually identified six patterns of fragility. The first we call **exclusion**. Burundi has distinct “in” and “out” groups, manifested in inequality of health, service provision, and violence. This pattern is connected to the second, which is **capture and control of state resources**. Here, the state is the object of the “in” group’s efforts to use the state for private gain. It is seen in the corruption, predation, and failure of the state to use its resources fully and to create economic opportunities for its people. The third pattern is the **manipulation of ethnicity**, which the state uses as its primary means of exclusion and as a tool of control. It is expressed at both the individual and group levels and is evident in the general mistrust people have in society toward each other and toward those who committed violence. The fourth pattern is **insecurity**. This is a lingering insecurity and is evident in the partial or flawed DDR process and the availability of arms. The fifth pattern is what we call **“enabling”** on the part of donors. This destructive behavior is almost addictive for the Burundian government given USAID’s large contribution to the state. NGOs have also hollowed out the state’s ability to provide services. Lastly, we think that there is a **weak culture and tradition of rights and accountability**. This is evident in a lack of mindset to demand accountability from officials within the state.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

Group 2

The first pattern of fragility is that there is **no government for the people**. This could also be seen as rural neglect. The state is predatory. It provides no services and the result is that there is no consultation of the government with the people. NGOs and other donors fill the void. One symptom of this pattern is that there is no policy reform and, since there are few public goods, Burundi lacks basic infrastructure. The second pattern is **insecurity and violence**, evident in targeted killings and conflicts over scarce resources. One outcome of this is that people have short-term horizons. The third pattern is **regional problems**. For example, the FNL is supported by groups in the Eastern Congo; there is a huge Burundi population in Tanzania; and Rwandans fleeing to Burundi were chased across the Burundian border by the Rwandan army. These regional problems place a huge constraint on Burundi's options. The last pattern of fragility we offer is **politicized ethnicity**. Ethnicity was formalized in the Arusha Agreement with control of the government, military, and assets designated to ethnic groups. This has been a major element in the conflict.

Group 3

We had difficulty narrowing our discussion to only five patterns of fragility. However, we finally chose five, but notice that each pattern combines numerous factors because they are all interrelated. The first is **environment, land, and population crunch**, which has a major impact on food security due to low productivity. The second are **cultural, historical, and psychological elements** that reinforce patterns of violence. The third are **governance, power, regional, and participation factors**. Change needs to be both top-down and bottom-up. Fourth, there are **economic liabilities**, such as the lack of export capabilities. Lastly, there are **social considerations** such as HIV, exclusion of services and eroded trust. In addition, there is a "zero-sum" mentality that has been engrained in the people, whereby the winner takes all.

Group 4

We can actually sum up all five patterns with one overarching pattern which is "Entropic Atrophy." First, Burundi suffers from **lack of participation**. Second, the **government is predatory, patronistic, and oligarchic**. Despite this, there have been positive developments, such as increased power sharing, elections, and a more open media. Third, there is a **lack of institutions and infrastructure to support human development**. Fourth, there is **fear and insecurity**, which results in a short-term benefit paradigm. The last pattern that we identified is **food insecurity**, which feeds in to short-term thinking, asset depletion and poor nutrition. The government is unable to respond to shocks. Here, we see a distinct lack of coordination or cooperation at the community level.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

B. FIVE AGREED-UPON PATTERNS OF FRAGILITY

Now we need to agree on the five key patterns. What stands out?

In reference to the “no government for the people/ of the people”, who are the people? There is little nationalism beyond one’s hill and family. As a result there is no sense of community. Where is the sense of citizenship? What form should it take in the future?

As for “exclusion” and “lack of participation,” is this the same as, or different from, the “no government for the people” and “capture and control of the government?” There is no resource base because the state is the only game in town. This forestalls any economic development. We want to separate the private and public spheres to get a vibrant political economy. We should put “exclusion” with the “no government for the people” and consider this to be a social or economic factor.

Should we divide the discussion into political, economic, social, and security sectors? No, all of these patterns of fragility are inter-related. We should resist putting patterns together and rather look at one unique thing that each group identified. Then, we can build on that.

Maybe we should call one pattern of fragility “resource and livelihood insecurity and unsustainable population growth.” Is there value in separating the economic sector from physical security? This shapes why the government is a government for the government. The “game” is about land and access to land.

Maybe we should just have one pattern of fragility be “physical insecurity and violence.” This shapes the quality of life for average Burundians. Physical insecurity is shaped by resource insecurity but we can also look at generic physical security. This is especially important in a post-conflict environment as many people have unrealistic expectations and become discouraged when their expectations are unmet.

We can lump together all the ethnicity/identity issues and call it something like “exclusion, mistrust, and manipulation of identity.”

Lastly, we can not forget regional circumstances. We should call the last pattern of fragility “bad neighborhood/external dynamics.” Regional factors affect investment decisions and contribute to the government dependence on the military. Regional factors also greatly constrain choices for Burundi.

Why are people so susceptible to manipulation? This is really a question of governance arrangements, resource constraints, and history. USAID needs to change this mentality and behavior. In all of our programming, we need to consider the psychological aspects. It is not so much a question of identity but how people act. We need to move this mentality.

In Burundi, people are poor and they suffer from lack of land and from lack of economic opportunity off the land. As a result, people have adopted a migratory livelihood strategy. Under resource insecurity, we should add the lack of access to and degradation of land. Up to 75 percent of court battles are over land. Resource insecurity is separate from access to credit market or access to non-agricultural resources.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

Youth is neglected and there remains the possibility for further radicalization. When talking about the post-conflict situation, there a number of classic triggers such as a youth bulge, proliferation of arms, and urbanization. A lot of this can be addressed under physical insecurity.

In summation, the five agreed upon patterns of fragility include:

- 1. No government of/ for/ by the people**
- 2. Exhausted/ failing economic opportunity**
- 3. Physical insecurity and violence**
- 4. Exclusion/ manipulation of ethnicity**
- 5. Bad neighborhood**

C. PROGRAMMATIC RESPONSES TO KEY PATTERNS OF FRAGILITY

Pattern 1: No government of/for/by the people

Objective:

The primary program objective of this pattern is to demonstrate the benefit of government to people.

Achieving the objective:

To achieve this, USAID's focus should be issue-based (e.g., economic policy, service delivery, security issues). The new government, not international partners, would choose the issues to tackle.

Many members of Burundi's society should be engaged simultaneously, to promote inclusion and full participation. At the national level, this would include civil society and government bodies. Locally, partners would be encouraged to exchange information, communicate frequently, and create collaborative arrangements. This also includes media support, especially radio.

Overall, USAID should pursue a consultative approach to build transparency and accountability among existing partners. We should ensure partners work with client groups to develop activities together.

Program parameters:

The parameters of the program would be to promote donor coordination and encourage other donors to use the same approach to create a productive connection between the government and the people. Much of this would be done by USAID piggybacking on other donors' capacity building.

Equity is the underlying theme for USAID implementation. Focusing on equity would ensure balance. We should also focus on involving youth, powerbrokers, and women.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

USAID would implement the DAC (Development Assistance Committee) principles of engagement in fragile states and leave the option open of trying the TRM (Transitional Results Matrix) rather than the PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper).

In terms of pacing, the primary partner is in procurement now. The first programming consultation will take place soon after this gets off the ground.

Pattern 2: Exhausted/Failing economic opportunity

Objective:

The primary program objective is to provide economically viable and environmentally sustainable livelihoods.

Achieving the objective:

This objective can be achieved by addressing food security as physical security. This can be done both on and off the farm through collaborative development groups to work on community approaches.

This can be done through changing land tenure rules, offering pro-poor financial services, and investing in infrastructure.

Potential entry points for developing associations are in production, storage, marketing, and workforce health. Underlying USAID activities should be promoting consensus on ways to do things so as to overcome division. Existing donor programs should be mapped.

Program parameters:

Program parameters include local market development (physical) and high-impact policy development. USAID should provide job training for regional and overseas markets to develop skills to use off-farm.

To promote investment, the Burundian Diaspora can be engaged, as they may be the best group to invest. Food aid programming can be used in support of rural infrastructure, for example farm-to-market roads.

Pattern 3: Physical insecurity and violence

Objective:

The primary program objective is to enhance security as the sine qua non for short-term and long-term development.

Achieving the objective:

To achieve this objective, USAID can continue what is already going on at the community level, such as OTI mediation, Search for Common Ground training, vocational training and media projects. USAID can



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

provide incentives for groups to work together. We should support community policing activities and promote land reform.

At the individual level, USAID can begin to treat gender-based violence as weapon of war, and address the individual health of survivors, community attitudes about gender-based violence, and go after impunity.

At the national level, USAID can promote dialogue, accountability and best practices through collaborative capacity building. USAID should actively monitor the UN operation in Burundi to ensure continued physical security in Burundi. The US can open dialogue with our partners, meet with the UN on field trips and raise issues with them through the Embassy.

Program parameters:

Program parameters are limited by 508 sanctions. As soon they are lifted and elections have finished, the US should act with urgency. IMET (International Military Education and Training) can assist the army. So far, donor coordination is lacking. It is imperative to improve this quickly. Broad coordination is not usually bilateral, and this will require work.

At the community level, intervention can be coordinated by USAID if UN coordination is incomplete. USAID can co-fund vocational and mediation efforts.

Pattern 4: Exclusion/Manipulation of ethnicity

Objective:

The primary program objectives are to change attitudes and behavior; promote equal access and equal opportunity; mitigate opportunists.

Achieving the objective:

To achieve the objective of changing attitudes and behavior, USAID should first leverage the quality and nature of existing and successful programs, and also strengthen and expand media and community integration programs with those existing programs. Local-level activities should focus on economic prosperity and multiculturalism, and enhance learning environments that develop “soft skills.” We also need to address women and youth in various programs, using women as a “bridge” to peace by strengthening their leadership roles.

To achieve the objective of equal access and equal opportunity, USAID needs to support “education for all” (universal primary education) and expand water and sanitation infrastructure to reach more people. Training and affirmation action should be included in good governance programs. USAID should promote skills for poorer and less educated people.

To mitigate opportunistic ethnic manipulation, USAID should start youth leadership programs, which are less racist and more amenable to cohesion and less amenable to manipulation. USAID can strengthen churches and progressive community organizations’ capacity to mitigate or preempt ethnic manipulation.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

Churches have a huge presence and they are currently being underused. We need to engage local, regional, continental and global actors to develop Burundi's ability to neutralize conflict and bring things back together.

Pattern 5: Bad neighborhood

Objective:

The primary program objective for REDSO is to build a good neighborhood for Burundi.

Achieving the objective:

To achieve the objective, USAID should take a region-wide response, by promoting transparency and control of conflict resources (such as extractive industries) throughout the Great Lakes region. In addition, USAID should act to marginalize and disincentivize domestic terrorism throughout the Great Lakes. Due to the lack of judicial impartiality and/or competency, it is best to promote truth and reconciliation through human rights networks and the media to reduce impunity in the Great Lakes. We can do so through a bilateral justice program.

Program parameters:

Underlying all program parameters for USAID is the concept of "do no harm." Over the next three years, we must work to build effective, active partnerships with Great Lakes partners (the DRC, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda) through the government, civil society and the private sector at both the national and international levels. The model for behavior should be transparency, participation, accountability and donor coordination. Undermining issues such as HIV, cassava, banana wilt are important, but should be addressed after the others. USAID will work with other donors on these issues.

In year three, we should add regional programming to address economic collaboration and expand reconciliation act to include legal professionals and mediators.

D. DISCUSSION REGARDING THE FIVE PATTERNS OF FRAGILITY

We need to address service delivery. How can we get the program off early? Can we do any short-term work? Are there any service systems that we can tap into now?

Agriculture is the area to act first and the agricultural group so stated in their presentation. USAID is already working in this sector and this is a sector where USAID holds significant comparative advantage. How can we make inroads to change the government?

Basic education is good to see in programming priorities. It is usually seen as a long-term goal. It is a good investment now to deal with fragility because you can address the youth through education and thereby promote cohesion. It also promotes attitudinal changes, increases hope, and increases the chance of reunification. There is also a connection between education and low birth rates as well as a decrease in



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

HIV. However, to get these effects you really need equitable education. Looking at it in terms of donor partnership, FFP (USAID Office of Food for Peace) and WFP's (World Food Program) commitment to education shows an increase impact on girls.

However, for education to work, you need a high level of commitment on the part of the parents. Programming for education needs to be neutral and equity-based in order to build cooperation. Do we know if there is an up-to-date curriculum for basic education? We need to look into whether or not there is UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund) program that is doing this.

While we are all concerned about education, one problem in many fragile states is that the teachers who are already trained often times do not represent the ethnic composition of their students. Therefore, teacher training should be addressed as well. The question is: how quick is the impact? Do we have enough money in education for accelerated education for ex-combatants and for skills-training for employment?

In regards to promoting a good neighborhood, we really need to determine the size of the problem and the options available to USAID. There are already some initiatives to build on such as the Tripartite Commission. We need to stop ducking the principle instability issues. What are the conflict resources at play between rebel groups? What is in it for these players? This must be addressed because it is linked to economic growth and other benefits.

We have programs that address agriculture but there are no programs that address land issues such as land tenure and land access. So we are acknowledging food security as an issue but not land. Is that just the way the patterns worked out or have we over-looked something? Many patterns dealt with land indirectly; it is a cross-cutting issue. Security in all its forms involved land. It is battleground issue that can be addressed in every pattern.

We have not mentioned HIV in our patterns of fragility and programming options. The infection rates in Burundi are the same as in Kenya and Tanzania. But Burundi is not a PEPFAR (the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) country. Should we be looking at HIV as a source of fragility? HIV may be an undermining source of crisis. However, money realities are very important. It is an issue of supply and demand. As we have mentioned previously, there is a surplus of labor in Burundi. Perhaps we can set up a training program to address HIV and use the people trained as a vehicle to export skill as well. After all of the refugees return from Tanzania, Burundi will witness a huge jump in prevalence rates.

Implicit in our discussion of equitable access to health is HIV programming. We must explore this issue more on the ground. Where does the government stand with health services and HIV? USAID needs to discuss this with the government. Epidemics can create scares and a plethora of problems for fragile states. HIV in the entire region needs a response now.

What are some other fragility factors? Does the government of Burundi concern itself with service delivery? What should be our highest priority here? Obviously, USAID cannot do everything and therefore we must be strategic in addressing the most critical fragility problems.



E. OPERATING PRINCIPLES

The situation in Burundi is unique: the fragile states methodology is new and Burundi is hopeful. How USAID does business is therefore especially important. There is a lot to learn, so let us take this opportunity to learn.

We need to discuss principles for engaging Burundians, principles for how we can encourage Burundians to engage each other and principles to build relationships with other donors.

The core principles of the USAID strategy in Burundi are to encourage collaboration and accept ownership for our successes and problems.

One pet peeve is when we attempt to create livelihood options and partners tailor their programs to those impact numbers easiest to obtain. For example, training 52 tailors in a village of 150 people is ineffective. We need to change our approach and redirect it to opportunities and services, always keeping in mind the principle of equity. We also need to be aware of quality control. In addition, messages, perspectives, etc. differ according to the CTO (Cognizant Technical Officer). We need to pay attention to absorptive capacity. Above all, we need to work closely with partner NGOs to harmonize our objectives to achieve common results. Lastly, one of our goals should be building local capacity for takeover.

USAID needs to promote the private sector across what we do, by not relying so much on NGOs, as NGOs are often unsustainable. We need to foster the local private sector rather than the non-profit sector.

If one of USAID's and the US government's overarching themes is security, then we need to look at capacity, skills, etc.

USAID should not be afraid of self criticism. We need to have some mechanism to systematically check ourselves. We need to be adaptive and acknowledge failure. Too often, USAID staff is not rewarded for taking risks and we are terrible on monitoring progress. We need to abandon this culture and be smart about taking risks. USAID needs to be able to adjust, or at minimum recognize failure and not do it again.

To address fragile states, we need to take a "whole of government" approach. The donor countries need all agencies to be involved- the State Department, the Department of Defense, Trade, and the military. However, their roles are unclear, as this is a new element of the fragile states strategy.

We need to set up a Country Team that meets once a week. USAID is the core element of the broader US government's national security strategy.

Recognizing linkages across the portfolio are important to demobilization and livelihood. Currently, we do not do this well. If we need to address all five patterns of fragility at the same time, we need to change our communication behavior; there may be other programs that conflict with our goals.

This is the first cross-USAID workshop on a fragile state. Burundi is in a unique place and time. This is a special opportunity for USAID, and as such, we have a special responsibility. If we do a good job in Burundi, we can have a big impact. We need to be smart and agile. To impact significantly, we must hold



Notes of Proceedings
USAID Burundi Workshop
July 27-28, 2005; 8:30-5:00pm
OFDA Training Facility, 1429 N. Quincy St
Arlington, VA

to our principles. An opportunity like this does not happen often in our careers. Burundi's current transition is a big opportunity. We always say we will take opportunities, but never do. We need to change.

F. NEXT STEPS AND SUMMARY

The current situation in Burundi offers an amazing and rare opportunity. Thus, our first next step is acting differently for Burundi. We must act with urgency, we need to take smart risks, and we need to approach Burundi cross-sectorally through a Country Team and other donors. We must break the mold of USAID and make structural changes. This involves budget allocations and how we relate to one another. Individually and collectively, we need to take the responsibility to change USAID. Each of us needs to allocate time to Burundi and put it high on our list.

To do this, we should design a strategy statement and increase program development. We must work together as a team, press urgency and take risks. We should be aware of cross-sectoral issues, such as gender violence.

How should we do this? Weekly meetings? Teleconferencing?

We should immediately set up a group email mailbox to facilitate communication and serve as an information sharing mechanism. If any of us hears something about grant proposals, other donor activities, or any information that may be of interest to Burundi, we should send it to each other. If any of us experiences roadblocks, we can always turn to the Agency Fragile States Task Force to remove them. When we talk to other people, we should send out joint memos. We need good collaboration. One preliminary step can be a short document. The Africa Bureau will take the lead. Andy Karas should pull together a team to work on the strategy.

We need the guidance of both the Africa Bureau and PPC. We need to talk about Burundi at the DAA (Deputy Assistant Administrator) and Office of the Director level as well. We need to determine how we can all work together and get into synch.

We have made a lot of progress in the last two days. This is not a stove pipe approach. Our programming priorities have not conformed to traditional things. We should not backslide into stovepipes.

Regarding donor coordination, we need a much clearer idea of what other donors are doing. A piloting exercise can be led in the DAC process.

OTI is still needed in Burundi. We can help longer. Of primary concern is setting up a mission in Burundi. We need as much help as we can get to get this done.

This is only the beginning of the collaborative process. If any of you have more ideas, about land tenure, for example, then send it to the Great Lakes desk, to Andy Karas, to Ron Bloom and to Laura Pavlovich.