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EDUCATION AND CRISIS INTERVENTION FRAMEWORK

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Contract Number DFD-I-00-05-00245-00
Task Order No. ICRP-CAI-2007-002

May 2008

This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development.
It was prepared by AMEX and Creative Associates International, Inc.

Acknowledgments

The Education and Crisis Intervention Framework was prepared in 2007-08 by AMEX International, Inc. and its sub-contractor Creative Associates International Inc. under the USAID Indefinite Quantity Contract Instability, Crisis and Recovery Program (ICRP).

Vijitha M. Eyango (Asia) was the Chief Technical Officer. She and Chris Capacci-Carneal (Middle East) coordinated this activity and served as the key resource people. They reviewed seven partial and complete drafts of the framework at progressive stages prior to the Bangkok workshop. After the workshop, they provided written instructions for a revised product and for final revisions.

USAID officials from Washington and missions attended a three-day workshop in Bangkok, Thailand, February 26-28. Two sessions on the second day and another on the third day of the workshop were focused on revising the draft framework.

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Prime Contract # DFD-I-00-05-00245-00
Subcontract # AMEX/ DFD-I-00-05-00245-00/ ICRP 001
Task Order # ICRP CAII-2007-002

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I. Background

Violent conflicts and natural and man-made disasters are critical issues facing countries served by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Asia and the Middle East. The purpose of this Education and Crisis Intervention Framework is to assist those bureaus in programming education activities in countries that face the threat of conflict or disaster. The primary audiences for the framework are the technical and policy officers in country and regional Missions and Washington-based technical and policy advisors.

Much of this framework is concerned with preventing and responding to violent conflict. Conflict is not necessarily a negative force, but can be a natural expression of social differences and people's struggle for power. When resolved without violence, conflict can be a transformative force. Where social capital is strong within a society, there is a greater likelihood of resolving conflict nonviolently.[1] Other forces such as poor governance, corruption, a youth bulge and extractive natural resources can also play a role in violent conflict.

The framework also includes response to disasters, both natural disasters, such as floods, cyclones and earthquakes, or man-made disasters, such as fires and explosions (for example, the Bhopal disaster in India in 1984.) Education programs cannot prevent disasters, but they can help communities prepare for and respond to them.

This background section covers the rationale for this framework, an overview, guidance in its use, and a summary of issues and lessons learned about education in crisis situations.

A. Why this framework is useful for USAID/ Asia and Middle East

The framework is designed specifically for USAID education programs in Asia and the Middle East. First, it responds to the bureaus' education portfolios, which go beyond basic education to address needs in secondary education, higher education, and in non-formal education. The size and volume of these programs are unmatched in other regions. In the Philippines, for example, USAID's program extends to out-of-school youth at the primary level, and in Nepal USAID works in non-formal settings with children and youth. In Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan the agency has given scholarships for graduate study and exchanges, among other forms of support to higher education. Second, the framework is based on the definition of education development objectives used by USAID in Asia and the Middle East: access (including equity), quality (including management) and relevance. Third, unlike many other tools and guidebooks on education and crisis, this one covers the different phases of crisis, including prevention as

[1] Social capital is the networks of relationships among persons and institutions in a society, together with associated norms of behavior, trust, caring, cooperation, and mutual accountability that enables a society to function effectively. It is the "glue" that holds a society together and gives it a common moral identity. Education programs can help build social capital to prevent a violent conflict and to recover from one.

well as response. Finally, the framework has been shaped with input from education officers in the missions and Washington.

B. Overview of the framework

The framework defines how a crisis context is different from a development context and discusses factors to consider when programming in a crisis context. The conceptual basis for our framework is the intersection between the development-oriented objectives of USAID education programs in Asia and the Middle East and the context of crisis.

1. Phases and contexts of a conflict

The key phases in the evolution of a violent conflict are the escalation of conflict, the violent events and the cessation of violence. These are encompassed by periods of stability. The concept of "phases," however, implies a sequence of events or situations. In the evolution of a conflict it is more useful to think in terms of "contexts"—settings or environments that are not necessarily sequential but that correspond roughly to the phases. A conflict has three contexts: prevention, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction. Unlike the humanitarian and reconstruction phases, the prevention phase is ongoing and indefinite, and two or more contexts may overlap in time. Humanitarian assistance is frequently needed well into and sometimes even beyond the reconstruction phase. And the transition from a reconstruction context to a stable development context is often complex and difficult to define; perhaps occurring in some parts of the country earlier than in others. For example, teacher training systems may be renewed, while curricula are still being revised, or accountability may improve at the central level earlier than at the local level.

The main effect of a conflict, as illustrated in Figure I.1, is a severe disruption of development activities and conflict-prevention activities.

Figure I.1. Contexts of a conflict



Though the figure shows sharp lines between phases and between contexts, more often than not these lines are blurred. Transitions are not clear cut. In many cases, violence recurs, so that the move among contexts is fluid and repetitive. [2]

2. Education objectives in a crisis

The objectives on which the framework is based are access (and equity), quality (and management), and relevance. The framework presents what is different between education objectives in a development context and in crisis contexts. It outlines objectives, questions to pose and responses for each context.

C. How to use the framework

The framework is designed to assist education officers in the Asia and Middle East regions frame a strategy for education programs in crisis contexts. It focuses at the programming level. It is *not* a "how to" manual for practitioners to design activities, nor is it a handbook for dealing with an emergency situation. Rather, it is aimed at providing what is known in the development community about adapting the objectives of education programs and projects to *what is different* in a crisis situation and what issues and complexities must be explored in each situation.

Using this framework, education officers and their colleagues at USAID should be able to identify the context for which they need a program and to determine what objectives are appropriate to their situation. Based on these variables, they can prioritize objectives and formulate a strategy by selecting a set of responses in line with the objectives.

The framework has four sections:

1. Background (this section);
2. The framework;
3. Monitoring and evaluation;
4. Public-private partnerships.

The framework is focused on the second step of a four-step process:

1. Assess the crisis situation: to be done prior to using this framework;
2. Develop a program strategy: the framework provides this guidance;

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[2] The Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC) categorizes countries by their relation to fragility and potential for conflict: deterioration, arrested development, post-conflict transition, early reconstruction.

3. Design projects to implement the strategy: tools for implementation are referenced;

4. Monitor and evaluate progress and impact: the framework provides this guidance.

Use of the framework follows the use of tools to assess a crisis situation and precedes the use of tools to design projects for reaching specific objectives. The framework should be treated as one of a host of tools and other resources available to those charged with programming education resources in a crisis environment.

1. Before you use this framework assess the crisis situation.

There are two useful and accessible USAID tools for this carrying out this assessment.

- *Conducting a conflict assessment: A framework for strategy and program development* (2005) issued by USAID's cross-cutting program in the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (USAID/DCHA/CMM). This resource, discusses the causes of conflict and means of assessing them. The CMM office has also published a series of toolkits on conflict in relation to specific sectors (forests, land, livelihoods, and minerals) and people (youth, women). CMM's current analysis of social patterns that lead to conflict are elitism, exclusion, corruption and rent-seeking, chronic capacity deficits, and unmet expectations in transitional moments.

- *Education and fragility: An assessment tool* (2006). This CMM resource focuses on education in particular and is based on a more extensive list of social patterns that includes organized violence and public disengagement in addition to those above. This resource also analyzes education in the economic, social, governance and security domains. For each of these patterns and domains, it proposes a series of questions about education objectives: access, quality, relevance, equity and management.

These tools and other publications of international agencies are available online (see the Reference annex).

2. Use this framework to develop a strategy

A strategy for addressing a crisis is a combination of objectives appropriate to a particular context (phase, or operating environment). The user can determine from the framework what the context is (and there may be more than one at any particular time). The user then studies the categories of objectives (access, quality, relevance) and selects a combination of those that are appropriate, based on the earlier assessment of the situation.

3. After you use this framework design projects to implement the strategy using referenced resources.

With a set of objectives and a strategy in hand, the education officer can turn to other available toolkits and resources for designing and managing projects in a crisis context, a representative selection of which is provided as an annex to the framework.

4. Monitor and evaluate progress and impact of strategy implementation

A monitoring and evaluation plan should be developed and included as an integral part of the management plan. This framework provides guidance on monitoring and evaluation in crisis contexts.

D. Issues and lessons learned

This section presents a summary of issues that arise in all phases or contexts of a crisis and what has been learned from experience about how to address these issues.

- The first three issues relate to all phases and contexts of crisis: trade-offs neglected and strategic populations and sequencing.
- The next three focus primarily on conflict prevention: education and violence, conflict prevention and social cohesion and peace education.
- The following three relate mainly to reconstruction and preparation for violent conflict: government legitimacy, government will and capacity and changing power relationships.
- The final issue is disasters, natural and man-made.

1. Trade-offs

While programmers confront trade-offs even in stable environments, the urgency of a crisis environment makes trade-offs more severe. Trade-offs must be made between

- The urgent need to deliver services directly and the long-term requirement to build capacity of government to manage delivery of services;
- Increasing access to education and improving quality of inputs and services;
- Short-term objectives, such as providing learning materials, and long-term objectives, such as revising curricula and developing materials based on the revised curricula;
- Strengthening central-level and local-level capacity;
- Windows of opportunity to reform policies and practices and the capacity of government and the sector to institute reforms and enforce practices.

Trade-offs must also be made among beneficiary groups, as discussed below.

2. Neglected and strategic populations

In light of the conflict, who is being left out? The conflict analysis that precedes education programming will reveal inequities in the delivery of education and other social services, including the effects of politically-based exclusion and elitism, those responsible for the conflict and those most affected by it. Through the use of the resource *Education and Fragility* programmers will have determined regional and

local disparities in expenditure on education and analyzed these within the context of conflict or disaster. Groups may have been left out on the basis of

- Ethnicity, religion or other social group affiliations;
- Gender, particularly in traditional religious communities;
- Economic status: the poor often cannot afford the costs of schooling;
- Geography: people in less accessible areas are often neglected because of the cost of reaching them;
- Age: access to school and other learning centers diminishes dramatically after the early primary grades.

Frequently these groups overlap. Adolescent girls living in poor communities of minority ethnic groups, for example, are likely to be left out of opportunities for education.

In each phase of a crisis, tough choices must be made about who gets education resources. Equitable access is a long-term objective, but in the face of crisis, neglected and strategic groups—those most central to the conflict—get first priority. Since allocation decisions are very political, a broad array of stakeholders should be engaged in making them. The provision of services should be treated with great attention to avoid misperceptions that one group is favored over another, thereby possibly escalating tensions.

3. Gender

The neglectful treatment of female students and teachers is intensified during a time of crisis. With extra demands on families, girls are more likely than boys to be kept at home to help with younger siblings and chores. If they are in school, the chaos of crisis may lessen protection of girls and attention to their particular needs. Female teachers may also need to stay home to care for their families or risk danger by traveling to school. It is especially important to renew and enforce codes of conduct to ensure that female students and teachers who are able to attend school feel safe and enjoy the same rights and responsibilities as their male counterparts.

The emergence of violent conflict creates additional risks for young men and boys, who are often taken from their homes and forced into militias. Even if not conscripted, young men may have no hope for work in a destroyed economy and, without an outlet or incentive, may find violence an attractive alternative. Expected to maintain certain masculinity roles, boys and men may be taught or pressured to act with aggression or hostility towards women or their peers. Schools and other learning centers can encourage boys and young men to counter aggressive tendencies by learning to listen and to voice emotions. (See the *Toolkit for Working with Men and Boys to Prevent Gender-Based Violence*). Those who have experienced war often need special programs to help them recover and re-enter a more normal social environment.

Girls and young women who are also recruited into militias face the same dangers as young men, and during violent times they are more subject to rape and other gender-based violence or trafficking; they may be pregnant or with young children as a result of rape; and, as very young war widows, they may have responsibility for supporting their family. Learning centers should give high priority to protecting girls and young women from these dangers and helping them cope with horrible experiences.

Women have strong potential to mitigate conflict and promote peace; they have been engaged as politicians and leaders of NGOs who actively campaign for peace. Learning centers should encourage women and girls to participate in public events to promote peace and help them develop their skills of conflict resolution and their knowledge of peace education (see International Committee of the Red Cross, 2004).

4. Sequencing

As suggested in the above list of trade-offs, everything cannot be undertaken at once. Decision makers and planners must take a dual approach: for each aspect of program planning, they must agree upon what to provide immediately and what to develop for the longer term. Immediate services should be delivered with an eye toward what will be delivered in the long term. To illustrate this dual approach, Table I.2 suggests for selected aspects in the delivery of primary education (one element in the overall education system), issues of immediate concern and those for a longer-term enterprise. The longer-term objectives are likely to evolve from reconstruction to development objectives.

Table I.2 sequencing immediate and longer-term service delivery

	Immediate intervention	Longer-term development intervention
Teacher recruitment	Rebuild a teacher corps that has been decimated by death and emigration	Reform recruitment policies to be equitable, fair and manageable
Teacher training	Rollout basic teacher training workshops	Rebuild a teacher training system
Learning materials	Deliver whatever useful materials are available for teachers and students; remove all offensive matter	Build a relevant curriculum and quality textbook procurement and distribution system
Curriculum	Use what is available, deleting offensive units	Bring together all stakeholders to agree on comprehensive revision

Sequencing decisions are specific to the context: there is no universal formula. In some cases, for example, recruiting barely competent teachers and getting them on the payroll will take priority over any kind of training. In other cases, teachers' ethnicity or gender may be a key issue, and reforming hiring practices will take priority.

5. Education and violence

Education is not always a force for inclusion and social cohesion. A school may succeed in achieving a high ranking on standardized exams but fail to build social cohesion and contribute to the prevention of violent conflict. Reflecting larger social and economic forces, a school can be a force for exclusion, privilege, and oppression. Education is a valued asset, and the differential treatment of social groups in terms of access to education and subsequent positions of influence increases tension and creates a sense of inequality. Schools can become contested terrain by magnifying discrimination and reinforcing intolerance of ethnic, religious or political groups. Conflicts within the education system that are not resolved peacefully destabilize the system to the point of violence or dysfunction.

Evidence that schools can and do perpetuate violence is being documented to show that schools are not inherently benevolent. Table I.3 illustrates what schools can do to perpetuate inequity, conflict and violence and what they can do to build peace.

Table I.3 The "two faces" of education in conflict contexts

Negative: **Peace-destroying and conflict-maintaining face**	Positive: **Peace-building and conflict-limiting face**
• Manipulate history for political purposes • Teach war as routine and expected • Encourage hate • Segregate ethnic or religious groups • Promote stereotypes and allegiances • Inhibit learners from dealing with conflict constructively • Ignore bullying and other forms of violence	• Present alternative historical perspectives • Nurture an ethnically tolerant climate • Promote cooperation between different groups • Respect linguistic and cultural differences • Cultivate inclusive concepts of citizenship • Actively challenge violence • Create forums for dialogue and encounter • Teach conflict resolution skills

Sources: Bush and Saltarelli (2000), p. 34; Davies, *Forced Migration Review*, 22 (July 2006), p. 13.

Schooling is a form of political socialization. It teaches children and youth how to respond to power. What children learn in school comes in part from the curriculum; their learning is also affected by how their time and space are organized, what they see their teachers doing, and how they are encouraged to interact with their peers. Intentionally or inadvertently, schools often teach and promote conflict, by passively conveying that violence is the only option for resolving conflicts. Policies and practices in education systems that perpetuate violence are often deeply entrenched and not easy to reform.

While international agencies cannot often work directly with schools, they can begin to raise awareness by working with educators to develop policies and design programs that shift the balance toward positive peace-building practices at schools. Such awareness-raising activities should engage the broader school community in non-violent alternatives to resolving conflicts. Particularly in communities where there is ethnic or other social tension, school management committees, PTAs and other such organizations can provide opportunities for positive conflict resolution.

6. Conflict prevention and social cohesion

Development objectives guide the transformation of education and other systems so that they function more efficiently and effectively. Conflict-prevention objectives guide their transformation so that they build social cohesion. Building social cohesion in a society prone to violent conflict requires a dramatic transformation of institutional practices and behavioral norms that govern relationships. As a government institution with formal and informal norms and networks of engagement, the ministry of education reaches most citizens. How ministry officials at every level deal with conflict large and small---—concerning policies, practices and incidents—affects processes that can either build peace or maintain tension and conflict. The formal and informal mechanisms that shape communication, interaction, and relationships within the education system must be transformed to promote positive action. This will enable non-violent approaches to conflict resolution to spread to schools and classrooms. (See Davies, 2004; Salmi, 2002; Seitz, 2004; Smith and Vaux, 2003; and Tebbe, 2006.)

Interventions that support conflict prevention need to take place at three levels:

- The administrative system, starting with the minister's office and stretching to district or other local education offices;
- The school, including its administration, extra-curricular activities and community support organizations;
- The learning space and what is taught therein, explicitly and implicitly.

At each level interventions should be designed to:

- Create and maintain visions and policies that support inclusion and tolerance;
- Support open forums for discussion of issues and robust channels of communication;
- Teach and model values of inclusion, tolerance and responsibility.

Interventions aimed at preventing conflict and building social cohesion, including peace education, are long-term and ongoing and should take place before crises occur as well as after conflicts have subsided.

7. Peace education

Peace education is one component of conflict prevention that is often criticized for being ineffectual and not getting at the root economic and power-relations causes of war. Critics note that it suffers from a conceptual confusion and that there are few empirical findings on what is effective (Seitz, 2004, p. 10). With the growing concern for preventing violent conflict, however, comes a new array of approaches to peace education as part of conflict prevention. At one end of the spectrum are modules of peace education that can be inserted into a social studies or life skills curriculum at any level; at the other end are comprehensive programs that reform structures and model peace-building behaviors. In between are a number of initiatives that have been created in specific situations. Modular topics include human rights, citizenship laws and values, cooperation, critical thinking, self-respect and respect for others, problem solving, negotiation, mediation, reconciliation. Teaching methods include experiential approaches, role playing, simulations, values analysis and clarification. A compendium of approaches used in Asian countries shows that some approaches are direct and prescriptive, while others are discussion-based and open-ended (APEID, 2004).

8. Natural and man-made disasters

The role of education in relation to natural and man-made disasters changes in relation to the phase and context of the disaster in the same manner as its role in relation to conflicts. The main difference between education responses to disasters and to conflict is that actual cause of a natural disaster is largely outside the scope of social, political and economic analysis and dynamics; a man-made disaster may be subject to some of this analysis.

The education sector has an important role to play in the face of disasters, especially in Asia and the Middle East, where many countries are extremely vulnerable and susceptible to unplanned calamities. Indonesia, the Philippines, India, Afghanistan, Vietnam, and Pakistan are included on the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction's (UN/ISDR) Top Ten list of countries most affected by natural disasters in 2006. Worldwide 74.6 percent of people killed by natural disasters occurred in Asia. A study in 2001 found that in the past decade, on average, every disaster in low human development countries claimed about 1,062 human lives, compared to middle human development countries which claimed 145 lives, in further contrast to high human development countries, where an average of 22.5 people were killed (Disaster Management in Southeast Asia: An Overview, p. 4)

Schools are a community hub and a cornerstone of daily life. To manage and mitigate disasters, schools can serve a variety of strategies.

- Venue for education and awareness-raising: information on disasters can be integrated into school curricula for students, and outreach to parents and other community members can stem from the school.

- Center for security and shelter: as in situations of violent conflict, a school can be used to protect people from harm.
- Network to organize volunteers: people linked to a school community (students, parents, teachers, and administrators) can be mobilized to help at all phases of a disaster.
- Means to distribute goods and services: goods and services, like relief aid, can be dispersed to a community through a school network.
- Hub for information sharing: schools can be a venue to gather data for needs assessments or program monitoring and evaluation and as a means to share information about current or future efforts.

Education and awareness building is one of the most useful ways to engage communities in local initiatives. After a disaster, there is a window of opportunity to change old ways and cultivate new approaches. Energy should be directed at identifying and incorporating long-term shifts that will result in more sustainable environmental practices to minimize the damage created by farming, construction, and deforestation. These long-term shifts require beginning education and awareness building of the next generation at an early age.

9. Government legitimacy

In pre- and post-violent conflict situations where insurgency is a threat, the government's legitimacy—its ability to establish and maintain its moral right to govern—is considered by counter-insurgency experts its most important means for depriving insurgents of support and maintaining stability and peace.[3] The education sector has a critical role to play in supporting the legitimacy of a government threatened by insurgents. In rural areas, the local school may be one of the few institutions and services provided by government and, as such, can be perceived as a natural target for insurgents who want to undermine government authority. Closure of a school demonstrates that the political institution is weak or has lost control and cannot provide a basic social service communities have come to expect; the perception of illegitimacy of the government as a result of its voluntary or involuntary inability to provide services can drive conflict. The implications are not limited to resource allocation but also include isolation of schools and their communities, lack of civic engagement and passive acceptance of violence and discrimination. For some, joining an armed group rather engaging in school may bring more income and protection.

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[3] See reference to Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century (COIN). Establishing government legitimacy should be a high-level objective as conflict escalates as well as in a post-conflict situation. This point is made in the literature on fragile states—those prone to violent conflict. See USAID's Fragile States Strategy, 2005, and Rose and Greeley, 2006, for example. This assumes that the U.S. government supports the government in power and does not view it as a perpetrator of conflict and illegitimate rule. For operational guidance on the role of civilian agencies and organizations in counterinsurgency, see reference to the U.S. Army field manual on Counterinsurgency (December 2006), Chapter 2.

10. Government will and capacity

A government's willingness and capacity to lead are essential in providing education services. The failure of will and/or capacity is a root cause of violence. There is no blueprint for strengthening will or capacity; interventions will depend on the configuration of many variables along each of these dimensions. Table I.4 offers guidelines for strategies in various combinations of a government's will and capacity, strengths and weaknesses.

Table I.4 Varying interventions responsive to government's will and capacity

	Strong WILL		
Strong CAPACITY	**Strong will and capacity** • Strengthen government systems to be visibly accountable at each level of the system. • Strengthen schools and provide incentives for teachers, leaders and community oversight.	**Strong will but limited capacity** • Provide direct support to government and to NGOs that help communities partner with government. • Help these partners develop and advertise policies and programs that show visible impact of education service delivery.	Weak CAPACITY
	Strong capacity but lack of will • Support a policy-making body that has strong representation of civil society and the international community, as well as government, and look for entry points to support political will when it appears. • Support a strong partnership between willing local ministry officials and community organizations, working with NGOs to strengthen these partnerships in service delivery.	**Limited will and limited capacity** • Support a policy-making body that has strong representation of civil society and the international community, as well as government. • Support delivery of services through NGOs in a manner that engages and strengthens local education offices however possible in partnership with communities. • Build shadow systems at the central level.	
	Weak WILL		

The structure of this table follows that of Berry, et al. (2004)

Where capacity is exceptionally weak, USAID can build scaffolding activities that parallel and support government systems, allowing them to take over as they become capable. In Afghanistan after the defeat of the Taliban, international partners supported a Teacher Education Program (TEP) which operated inside the Ministry of Education but whose funding was largely controlled by the external agencies. Support agencies need to coordinate their support for shadow systems so that resources are

used efficiently and a smooth transition can be made from the shadow system to the state's own system.

11. Changing relationships of authority and responsibility

When a crisis has destabilized the ministry of education, the reconstruction phase offers strategic opportunities to transfer authority within the education sector. This can be done within the state education system, either by centralizing or decentralizing responsibilities and financing. It can also be done within the sector—among non-state actors and institutions as well as government.

Decentralization and centralization**.** Within the state education system, various areas of authority and decision-making can be placed at different levels of the system: central ministry offices, regional offices, district offices, and schools. In a post-crisis situation, decentralizing decision-making has the advantage of giving more autonomy to groups that perceive they have been dominated by opposing ethnic, social, or political groups. On the other hand, decentralization in an unstable environment can be perceived as the government giving up its responsibility to provide education services at a time when it should assume greater responsibility. Because decentralization can also contribute to social fragmentation and local corruption, all of these issues need to be addressed within particular contexts.

State and NGO relationships**.** Between the state and its private-sector partners, there are some who advocate that when the government is so weak that violence threatens, international agencies should abandon support to the government altogether and focus on non-government organization (NGO) service providers. In the long-term, however, this position is difficult to defend. Though community support to schools is critical, its effectiveness depends on ties to "a broader framework of responsive institutions" (Slaymaker, 2005, p. 20). Even in stable situations, experience shows that community schools supported by NGOs must eventually turn to government for resources and accreditation. In unstable situations, community-based NGO schools that operate outside the government system have the potential to de-legitimize the government's role in providing education (see Rose and Greeley, 2006; Dana Burde, 2004). Abandoning a weak government in favor of NGO and community support is shortsighted; rather, local education officials should stay involved in NGO community-based schools and help them interact in a positive manner. NGOs that have been in communities during violent conflict can bring local education officials into the circle and help the ministry establish links with schools and communities.

E. Education objectives in crisis and development contexts: What is different?

Education objectives in a development context overlap considerably with those in a crisis context. In both instances, programs aim to increase access to education, provide good-quality education, and enable the ministry and its partners in the education sector to grow in capacity and leadership.

1. Objectives in a development context

The objectives of access, quality and relevance pertain to education as one component of a broader set of economic and social development objectives.

- "Access" pertains to providing equitable access to education for all people. Most often this would mean universal access to primary education, equitable access to post-primary education, special attention to gender-related barriers to access, and adequate financing from public and private sources.

- "Quality" is the objective of high-quality teaching and learning. It includes a competent and well managed teaching force, a comprehensive pre- and in-service teacher training system, high-quality textbooks and other learning materials, and assessment systems with continuous, reliable and valid measures of learning achievement. As defined for this framework, quality includes effective and efficient management of education services. This would entail effective and legitimate governance and decision-making, and management systems that ensure accountability for resources and results.

- "Relevance" has to do with providing education content that responds to the needs of learners through channels appropriate to their learning style and situation. It would include curricula at each level and in each school that meet individual, social and economic needs; and community engagement in and support for education.

2. Objectives in a crisis context

In a crisis context—before, during and immediately after violent conflict or disaster, the objectives for education programs change. Access objectives need to emphasize equity. Quality objectives must stress transparent governance. Relevance objectives must encompass immediate needs for skills and knowledge and focus on social cohesion and peace building.

- Stable and pre-crisis contexts: In countries with potential for violent conflict or disaster, long-term development objectives should be accompanied by a long-term crisis-prevention objective. In a stable environment, the development objectives of education emphasize the improvement of learning outcomes: the ideal school is one with high test scores on standardized tests and other indicators of academic achievement. Yet stability requires an absence of violence, which gives rise to an education objective in addition to development: conflict prevention. In a conflict-prevention frame, the ideal school is one that promotes social cohesion. It helps students, teachers, families and communities use non-violent options to resolve conflict. It promotes inclusiveness and tolerance, actively challenges inequities, and teaches and models non-violent conflict management skills.

- Crisis context: When violence or disaster occurs, development stops and schools shut down. The objective of international humanitarian relief agencies is to protect children, teachers, families and communities from life threats. The role of schools and other learning centers is to provide safe places for children and families and to teach them skills of self protection.

- Post-crisis context: After violence or disaster ends, the education sector, as part of the whole political, social and economic fabric, must reform policies that incited violence and rebuild capacity to lead and provide services. The failure to prevent violence indicates that different populations have not had equitable access to education services and that policy-making has excluded some. The

overall objectives in this context are to reform bad policies and provide services to those who have been neglected—services that are relevant to their particular social and economic needs.

II. The Framework

This section is the framework for programming education interventions in crisis contexts. It begins with a summary of education objectives in crisis contexts. It then presents a matrix for each crisis context—conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and disaster. Each matrix is preceded by a description of the context and prevailing conditions. The matrix summarizes education objectives in that context, questions to address in planning programs, and proposed responses. Each matrix is followed by illustrative examples of programs in that context; programs are included only if they are more fully described online. The descriptions of context, matrix and illustrative programs for each context comprise a "component" of the framework.

Table II.1 summarizes objectives in each context of a crisis. The following matrices of the framework elaborate on this summary.

Table II.1 Summary of objectives in crisis contexts

1. Responses to conflict

Development objectives	Conflict prevention	Humanitarian relief	Reconstruction
Access **(+ equity)**	• Priority given to neglected and strategic populations	• Schools are safe and accessible places for children and families	• Priority given to neglected and strategic populations
Quality **(+ management)**	• Policy-making and implementation managed in a manner that is transparent, inclusive and participatory • Shift in support from national to local government	• Teachers are safe and supported	• Policy-making and implementation managed in a manner that is transparent, inclusive and participatory • Opportunities seized to improve pedagogy and management systems
Relevance	• Direct guidance and instruction in peace-building practices	• Families with skills and knowledge needed to survive the conflict (land	• Curricula that meet the needs of prioritized and strategic populations,

	• Social cohesion strengthened through school-community organizations	mines, anti-trafficking, gang engagement or fighting forces) • Students and teachers receiving psycho-social support	such as livelihood skills and income-generating activities

2. Responses to disaster

Development objectives	Preparation for disaster	Humanitarian relief	Reconstruction
Access **(+ equity)**	• Schools prepared as shelters, community emergency centers	• Normalcy restored to community life through schooling	• Priority given to populations affected by the disaster
Quality **(+ management)**	• Schools built and repaired in accordance with safety standards	• Quality standards in place that can be maintained after international agencies depart	• Schools rebuilt according to safety standards • Opportunities seized to improve pedagogy and management systems
Relevance	• Direct guidance and instruction in preparedness for earthquakes, floods, other predictable natural disasters	• Families with skills and knowledge needed to survive the disaster • Students and teachers receiving psycho-social support, as needed	• Curricula that meet the needs of those whose economy has been affected by the disaster, such as livelihood skills and income-generating activities

In working with the framework, the user should keep in mind the following:

- In addition to the context-specific questions posed in the matrix, the user should ask questions about stakeholders: Who are they? What role do they play in the crisis? Why? What is their potential to contribute to change? How can they be engaged in reforms and repairs? To expand on

these questions, the user is referred to USAID's *Education and fragility: An assessment tool*, cited in the background section above.

- The program options presented are generic; the best actual response must be determined by answers to the questions, assumptions based on these answers, and the nature of the particular context.
- The matrix is followed by illustrative programs. These illustrations are not intended as models to be replicated but as sources of additional information and experience.

What follows are the four components of the framework.

A. Conflict prevention

The education sector can play a direct role in preventing conflict and building peace. The government education system, which encompasses children, youth, parents, teachers, administrators and leaders in most communities, can institute processes and articulate visions that are inclusive, tolerant and just.

1. Context

Conflict prevention is long-term and ongoing. It can take place in a variety of contexts, which might be roughly categorized as stability, pre-violence, and post-violence.

Stability: The most conducive context for conflict-prevention responses, like that for development activities, is political stability. Like development activities, conflict prevention activities should begin long before an environment becomes violent; they have little effect if they are introduced only when violence is on the horizon. This environment is characterized by peace and relative stability; government is perceived by its citizens as legitimate; insurgencies, if any, are limited and contained. In this environment, the state, with support from international agencies, should put into practice a long-term strategy for preventing conflict.

Pre-violent conflict: This being said, conflict prevention is most likely to become a concern when suppressed conflicts move toward violence. Yet as violence approaches, conflict prevention becomes less tenable. A *conflict-prevention strategy* must change to a *conflict-preparation strategy*. A situation of escalating violence is one of fragility: government is losing its effectiveness and perceived legitimacy. The economy is likely to be weak, if not disintegrating. Corruption is widespread. As the conflict escalates, government becomes part of the problem. Many people are not receiving services, including education: systems break down; teachers are not paid, facilities are not maintained; communities must take over support of schools. Government failure to provide services opens the door for other providers, including insurgents, to move in and lure communities to their own political agenda.

Post-violent conflict: This is the context for reconstruction, which is described later in the framework.

Violence-prone conditions: In any context where violent conflict is a threat, the root causes of the conflict are almost certain to appear in schools, their communities, and their administrative support

structure. Ethnic conflicts are manifested within schools or, when schools are segregated along social lines, between schools. School management structures are weak or absent. Students, teachers and parents are unaware of their rights and responsibilities to prevent and resolve conflicts.

2. Objectives, questions to pose, and responsive interventions

The overall objective of conflict prevention is to reform institutions so that differences and conflicts can be addressed in a non-violent and constructive manner. Education has a critical role in creating and maintaining a secure social environment conducive to development and the maintenance of peace.

- Institute peace-building practices throughout the *education system*;
- Transform *schools* into peace-building organizations;
- Teach peace-building skills and values in the *classroom*;
- Help reconcile conflicting groups in school *communities*.

Each of these objectives introduces conflict prevention and peace building into one dimension of the education system: the school community, the government system, the school, and the classroom. Table II.2 presents the objectives in the framework of access, quality and relevance; proposes questions to ask about the situation (see USAID *Education and Fragility* assessment tool for much greater detail) and suggests responses to be considered.

As conflict escalates and preparation becomes an issue, international agencies need to balance programming support to government and civil society carefully. They should consider transferring support from a failing national government to local government offices, which can support communities forced to take more direct responsibility for education.

Table II.2 Conflict prevention

Objectives	Questions	Responses
Access and equity		
• Priority given to neglected and strategic populations	• Which populations have been neglected as a result of elitism or other forms of exclusion? • Which populations are central to the escalating conflict (strategic)?	• Redistribute resources to meet the needs of particular communities and cohorts that have been underserved. • Reform policies and practices that inhibit equitable access.
Quality and management		
• Policy-making and implementation managed in the classroom, the school and at each level of the system in a manner that is inclusive and participatory	• How are schools governed and managed in relation to inclusiveness and participation and to prevention and resolution of conflicts? • What kind of relationships do communities have to their schools? • Where is corruption evident?	• Train school managers and teachers in participatory governance and support them in managing schools in a manner that is inclusive and participatory. • Support the ministry's use of decision-making processes that are inclusive and participatory. • Convene leaders in the school and community to construct a vision for the education system with sufficient common ground to satisfy all parties.
• Where national government is deteriorating, local education offices are capable of supporting schools.	• What are the strengths and weaknesses of the government's will and capacity to provide equitable education services?	• Shift international support from national to local education offices. • Collaboratively develop roles for local officials in NGO-supported community schools. • Develop mutually supportive relationships between community-based schools and local ministry staff.
Relevance		
• Social cohesion strengthened through school-community organizations	• How can schools and other learning centers and the communities they serve be used to rebuild social cohesion?	• At the international level, support international forums to improve classroom-based peace education. • At the national level, create a variety of forums for students, teachers, administrators and school communities to address differences and conflicts and to reconcile.

Table II.2 Conflict prevention

Objectives	Questions	Responses

		• At the school and community level:
		  • Initiate student councils as forums for addressing conflicts
		  • Involve parents in resolving school-related issues
		  • Use school grants to encourage reconciliation
		  • Engage members of conflicting groups in school improvement activities.
		  • Use inter-school activities such as sports to bring children and youth in divided communities to play and work together.

• Direct guidance and instruction in peace-building practices	• How can students, teachers, parents and community members be taught to examine and eliminate biased media and curricula?	• Engage all stakeholders in developing curricula that are respectful of all ethnic, religious and age groups and of both males and females and that represent historical events fairly and accurately. • Use school-community organizations such as PTAs and literacy groups to teach adults principles and practices of human rights, tolerance and conflict resolution. • Help school leaders and teachers become aware of and cease intolerance, revenge and other negative conflict behaviors. • Offer teachers alternatives to corporeal punishment. • Help schools develop policies and practices that do away with bullying and other violent practices outside the classroom.

3. Illustrative examples

Convening leaders to construct a vision

- After the defeat of the Idi Amin regime in Uganda in the mid-1980s, the new government formed an Education Policy Review Committee to write a white paper. Though it took five years to formalize the paper, the writing process allowed for political reconciliation and provided guidance for reforms that all approved (Creative Associates, p. 67).

- In El Salvador, following a decade of civil war ending in the early 1990s, the ministry of education organized a series of stakeholder meetings that led to the "Year of Consultation" for educational reform in 1995. At the end of 1995, the government presented guidelines for a 10-year educational reform plan. The extensive consultations, fundamental to the process, meant that the guidelines represented a national vision for education reform (Tebbe, p. 16).

Reconciling members of school communities in conflict

- After a violent conflict, activities may be needed to bring about reconciliation among teachers on opposite sides. Project Diacom helped Bosnian teachers of Albanian, Croatian and Serbian ethnicities reconcile and work together to repatriate families in their communities (Miller & Affolter, p. 77-89).

- When tensions rose across western Macedonia in November 2002 and threatened to derail the peace process following a move to rename several public schools after Albanian political and military figures, the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) re-engaged communities where it had previously worked. Within weeks, many local conflict mitigation efforts were underway, including an "Educators' Dialogue" among ethnic Albanian and Macedonian teachers, a multicultural project involving over 200 youths, media reports on positive interethnic collaboration in schools in affected areas, and public statements against ethnic segregation by respected leaders in both communities. OTI's rapid response helped to prevent the conflict from reigniting (USAID/Office of Transition Initiatives, 2004).

Peace education programs and models

- The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (**UNHCR**) Peace Education Program was piloted in 1997 in Kenya, starting with extensive participatory research into the needs of populations around the country in refugee camps, particularly Somalis and Ugandans. The program has been described as a course for "constructive living skills" to enable discussion of issues about tolerance, diversity, bias, stereotyping, and cooperation. It has several inter-linked components:

    - Peace education in schools;

    - Community workshops in peace education;

    - Public awareness for the community;

- Peace education in non-formal education;
- Peace education workshops for agency staff.

In 2005 **UNHCR**'s Peace Education program was active in nine countries in Africa, Pakistan and Kosovo. In these countries implementing partners, including Save the Children/UK in Pakistan and World Vision in Kosovo, adapt **UNHCR** materials to the local environment. The program is run through refugee schools. (For more information see **UNHCR** et al., 2005; Sommers, 2001; Sinclair in Miller and Affolter, 2003; Dana Burde, 2005.)

- **UNESCO**: In cooperation with **UNHCR** and INEE, funded by the Norwegian government, and based partly on the Kenya experience, UNESCO developed a peace education manual for use with refugee children, youth and the wider community. *The Interagency peace education program: Skills for constructive living* provides guidance in teaching life skills aimed at peace education and "conflict minimalization" (**UNHCR** et al., 2005). When the manual was published in 2005, the program was being implemented in 11 countries in Africa, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Kosovo. UNESCO is also in the midst of the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World, a collaborative program of many UN agencies designed to promote peace (see the June 28, 2007 report to the UN General Assembly on activities).
- In **UNICEF**, peace education is defined as "the process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values needed to bring about behavior change that will enable children, youth and adults to prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural; to resolve conflict peacefully; and to create the conditions conducive to peace, whether at an interpersonal, intergroup, national or international level" (Fountain, 2003). UNICEF treats peace education as fundamental to a basic education (life skills) program. UNICEF projects reach many thousands of children; the content and approach of the program are specific to each country. UNICEF's current list of countries in which it supports peace education projects includes Indonesia, Pakistan and Timor Leste. There do not seem to be any readily available assessments of the programs' depth or impact (Fountain, 1999; Bush and Saltarelli, 2000).

B. Humanitarian assistance

Humanitarian assistance begins with the outbreak of violence and continues until communities are safe and under the protection of the state. The purpose of education activities during a humanitarian crisis is to provide a safe place for children and youth to learn, work and play together, recover from traumatic events and begin to return to normalcy.

1. Context

In the context of violent conflict, families flee their homes, sometimes crossing international borders. Violent deaths and injuries, separation of family members, loss of homes and belongings may be pervasive. Communities may be destroyed and community leaders deprived of their authority until

peaceful conditions return and camps are vacated. In some cases camps are established for internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees.

When emergency is declared, international relief agencies are called upon to provide shelter, food, water and sanitation. The governments of the United States and other countries, along with the United Nations, send trained teams of relief workers, often including the military. Depending on the extent of damage to communities and the capacity of the state to recover, international agencies may stay only a short time or, in some cases, may remain for years.

The extreme disruption caused by violent conflicts usually results in a severe setback to education and other development programs. The need for immediate assistance is high, yet the state is often unable to provide any services. After the violence ends, and when the state can recuperate and take responsibility for education and other services, reconstruction begins and international agencies direct their support to the state. Where the state cannot meet the needs of IDPs and refugees, international agencies may play a longer-term role in providing education services. Over time, and when conditions do not permit families to return to their communities, schools in camps may remain. With continuing, prolonged international support, standards of quality may rise, as international agencies can provide teacher training and learning materials.

2. Objectives, questions to pose, and responsive interventions

Objectives of building capacity to provide services are replaced by objectives of meeting basic needs. Schools may be first used to provide shelter and other basic services, after which, they can offer places for children and youth to gather and to resume normal routines under the guidance of caring, capable teachers and other adults. Questions and responses center on identifying the populations in urgent need of assistance and then organizing schools and other learning centers to provide that assistance.

In the longer term, international organizations in camps must find a balance between the quality of services that their own resources allow and standards that state schools will be able to maintain once families return to their communities. This means that in the humanitarian phase, for example, teachers should be paid at least a living wage and at a rate comparable to other civil servants: not so little that they cannot afford to do the job but not so much that they are unwilling to adjust to a government salary once the crisis has ended and foreign funds diminish.

Table II.3 Humanitarian assistance

Objectives	Questions	Responses
Access and equity		
• Schools are safe and accessible places for children and families	• Which populations need protection? • Who can provide learning centers where schools are not accessible? • How can schools and other learning centers provide safety and security to communities? • How can schools and other learning centers provide basic services of food, clean water and sanitation to communities?	• Create safe environments for children and youth in or around schools to prevent kidnapping, abduction, rape and gender-based violence • Facilitate community survival by providing basic necessities in school environments and reuniting children and youth with parents and extended family members
Quality and management		
• Teachers are safe and supported	• What level of support and standards can international agencies provide that will allow the state to resume services after the violence has subsided?	• Retain teachers by ensuring their safety and providing physical care and security in a safe space • Ensure teachers are paid, using international sources if necessary • Provide psycho-social support to teachers • Ensure that available learning materials are not offensive or incendiary.
Relevance		
• Families with skills and knowledge needed to survive the conflict	• What skills, knowledge and support do learners and teachers need to survive the conflict (land mines, anti-trafficking, gang engagement or fighting forces)	• Teach survival skills (land mines, anti-trafficking, gang engagement or fighting forces) • Provide psycho-social support to children and youth in school • Support longer-term non-formal programs for victims of conflict

3. Illustrative examples

Refugee and IDP camps

- Southern Sudan education emergency, by Tim Brown in *Forced Migration Review*, Supplement, July 2006. http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/EducationSupplement/full.pdf
- Emergency education in Iraq, by Anita Malley and Carl Triplehorn. *Forced Migration Review,* 22, January 2005. http://www.fmreview.org/text/FMR/22/08.htm
- Sommers, Marc (2001), Peace Education and Refugee Youth, in: Jeff Crisp, Christopher Talbot and Daiana B. Cipollone (eds.), Learning for a Future: Refugee Education in Developing Countries. Geneva: UNHCR, 163-216. http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/research/opendoc.pdf?tbl=RESEARCH&id=3b8a1bd84

Psycho-social support

- The Butterfly Garden. In the city of Batticaloa, Sri Lanka, there is a garden dedicated to creative play for war-affected children. The Butterfly Garden nurtures healing through creative expression and trusting relationships with mentors. In *Helping Children outgrow war* by Vachel Miller and Freidrich Affolter, 2002.
- Child Soldiers. The exploitation of children as participants in violent conflict can result in deep psychological wounds and alienation from home communities. In countries in Africa, demobilization projects attempt to help former child soldiers return to their communities and begin their lives anew. In *Helping children outgrow war*, work cited.
- Teacher development and student well being, by Rebecca Winthrop and Jackie Kirk. *Forced Migration Review,* 22, January 2005.
- Emergency education and psychosocial adjustment: displaced Chechen youth in Ingushetia, by Theresa Stichick Betancourt, Rebecca Winthrop, Wendy Smith and Gillian Dunn. *Forced Migration Review,* 15, October 2002.

Schools as shelter and return to normalcy

- Teacher Emergency Packages. These kits, also known as “school in a box,” provide recreational equipment and basic materials to enable teachers to begin instructional activities in a war-ravaged context. They are an initial step toward educational reconstruction. In *Helping children outgrow war*, work cited.
- Getting education out of the box, by Lyndsay Bird in *Forced Migration Review,* 22, January 2005.
- What should children learn? A discussion of learning content during crisis, by Susan Nicolai. *Forced migration review,* 15, October 2002.

C. Reconstruction

Reconstruction usually signifies the transfer of authority from international agencies to the state, whether to a new government or to the government that was in power before the violent conflict. In either case, the government's highest priority is to establish its legitimacy in the eyes of citizens and its effectiveness in providing security and services. The education ministry has a critical role in supporting this priority. It must deal with the urgent need to get children and youth back into school. At the same time, it must set priorities and develop a strategy for the return to long-term development objectives.

1. Context

The context of reconstruction varies significantly from one country to another and usually from one area to another within the country. In every case the reconstruction context is characterized first by the fragility of relationships and structures and the urgency of achieving political stability; second, by the necessity of recognizing what led to the conflict and how to extract the roots of conflict; and, third, by opportunities for reform. It is a time to re-examine the roles and responsibilities within the public and private sectors for delivering education services and, within the state structure, the roles and responsibilities at each level of authority. In particular, it is an opportunity to identify corruption and to establish systems of accountability.

Security is an overriding concern for those in and near the zone of crisis. International staff work under more difficult conditions which—often—necessitate extreme measures taken for their physical protection. Such security measures, however, can inhibit movement of international staff to places where help is needed.

Resources are scarce: domestic revenues are likely to be reduced, and international funds that have paid for humanitarian relief begin to disappear; qualified teachers may have fled or been killed; competent managers and administrators are attracted by higher salaries of international agencies than those of government. As a result, the most qualified educators are often hired by international agencies, leaving the government with a diminished pool of human resources. Civil society, which in good times contributes an immeasurable wealth of resources to communities, is likely to be weak. At the same time, international agencies are likely to prepare large loans and grants, overwhelming state structures with funds they cannot absorb.

For people who experience their political environment as anarchy, the primary motivation is self-protection: each individual must take care of his/her own survival and that of his/her family. The level of trust among government cadres falls below the point at which the institution can function. Jobs are insecure, and they do not expect collaboration or teamwork designed to put the institution before the individual. They remain cautious and—understandably—reluctant to commit to action. As a consequence of weak structures and mistrust, corrupt practices increase.

2. Objectives, questions to pose, and responsive interventions

It is most difficult in the reconstruction context to define what is different about education objectives in a conflict situation from those in a development context. Some of the objectives set during reconstruction are long-term and lead uninterrupted into the development context; on the other hand,

some objectives are short- term, in anticipation of immediate change. The same is true for a transition from reconstruction objectives to conflict-prevention objectives. In view of the high likelihood of a return to violence, the ministry and its partners must begin immediately to address the needs and concerns of neglected and strategic populations—those communities and groups of people whose demands require urgent attention.

During the reconstruction phase there is a narrow window of opportunity for making critical decisions about priorities for recovering from loss and rebuilding. At the same time, the state's capacity is limited making it unable to manage a broad range of reforms. Thus, government officials, other local stakeholders, and international agencies must cooperate and set priorities that address the structural and proximate causes of the conflict and minimize the resurgence of violence.

Objectives, analyses and responses in the reconstruction context should focus on the following:

- Enabling the ministry to take strong and correct leadership in setting priorities that address the roots of the conflict as well as development needs;
- Making choices about whom to serve first;
- Re-examining responsibilities, roles and relationships among the public and private sectors for providing education services;
- Keeping close track of international resources so that they are used effectively and in view of long-term objectives;
- Exposing and controlling corruption.

Finally, objectives in the reconstruction phase should include those of peace building, which are described in the "relevance" section of the conflict-prevention matrix (Table II.2).

Table II.4 Reconstruction

Objectives	Questions	Responses
Access and equity		
• Access restored • Priority given to neglected and strategic populations	• Which populations have been neglected as a result of elitism or other forms of exclusion? • What trade-offs are required between building state capacity and providing immediate service through non-state mechanisms?	• Public and/or NGO basic education services to neglected communities • Accelerated learning for out-of-school youth • Bridging programs for out-of-school youth • Special programs for returning soldiers • Distance education in neglected remote communities • Subsidies for higher education for those from neglected and strategic populations • Policies and practices that promote equitable access to education
Quality and management		
• Policy-making and implementation managed in a manner that is inclusive and participatory	• How are schools governed and managed in relation to inclusiveness and participation and to prevention and resolution of conflicts? • What are the strengths and weaknesses of the government's will and capacity to provide equitable education services?	• Set clear priorities for the transition back to a development context • Support ministry of education to take lead in donor coordination • Decentralize authority where local autonomy is appropriate, or centralize authority where it will address inequities in resources • Re-examine role of NGOs and the private sector in delivering education and exploit public-private partnerships • Improve resource flows, management and accountability systems so as to avoid past mistakes • Provide leadership development and managerial capacity-building for education leaders • Establish capacity-building protocols

Table II.4 Reconstruction		
Objectives	**Questions**	**Responses**
• Opportunities seized to set sound development objectives and improve pedagogy and management systems	• Where is corruption evident? • What kind of relationships do communities have to their schools? • What changes should take priority?	• Attract new teachers with regular compensation and support • Train teachers in sound pedagogy • Reform authority relationships • Introduce anti-corruption measures to ensure salaries and other resources reach intended receivers • Institute deployment policies sensitive to women's needs • Provide in-service training, counseling and support • Strengthen community participation and management in schooling
Relevance		
• Curricula that meet the needs of prioritized and strategic populations, such as livelihood skills and income-generating activities	• What skills and knowledge do learners need to survive the conflict (land mines, anti-trafficking, gang engagement or fighting forces)? • What psycho-social support to teachers and students need?	• Workforce skills for youth • Life skills training for children and youth • Vocational skills training for youth • Early childhood education • Link curriculum to income generating activities; to livelihood skills and opportunities; strengthen inter-sectoral programs • Psycho-social support for students and teachers

3. Illustrative examples

Comprehensive cases of reconstruction

Long-term reform that begins with reconstruction comprises a complex set of development-related objectives. The following sources are recently published descriptions of reforms that began in a reconstruction context.

- **Afghanistan**: Delivering education services in fragile states: Lessons from four case studies, by Creative Associates, 2006.
- **Kosovo**: Parallel Worlds: Rebuilding the education system in Kosovo, by Peter Buckland and Mark Sommers. Paris: UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning, 2004.
- **Palestine**: Fragmented foundations: Education and chronic crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, by Susan Nicolai. Paris: UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning, 2007.
- **Sri Lanka**: Respect for Diversity in Educational Publication - The Sri Lankan Experience, by Ariya Wickrema and Peter Colenso. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2003.
- **Timor Leste**: Learning independence: Education in emergency and transition Timor Leste since 1999, by Susan Nicolai. Paris: UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning, 2004.
- **Uganda**: Delivering education services in fragile states: Lessons from four case studies, by Creative Associates, 2006.

Activities to reach neglected and strategic populations

There are numerous examples of NGO activities in reconstruction contexts. Selected examples are summarized here. Many others are documented in the *Global Survey on Education in Emergencies* by the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children (Feb 2004).

- **Communities without access to public primary school:** In 2003, following the violent conflict in Iraq, Save the Children assessed needs of children in the Basrah Governorate. It identified as priorities certain rural areas and opened summer camps for children who had missed school. The following fall Save the Children identified 20 primary schools and began to initiate activities in partnership with communities. Local people contributed towards school maintenance and security and mobilized volunteers to lead landmine awareness and recreational activities. Save the Children assumed responsibility for the rehabilitation or repair of the school and the provision of school furniture, sport and leisure materials and teaching aids and stationery. In collaboration with the Basrah Teacher Training Institute, Save the Children developed and piloted a teacher training curriculum. It opened schools to children of all religions and as time went on began taking in refugees returning to the community.

  See Malley, Anita and Carl Triplehorn. Emergency education in Iraq. *Forced Migration Review*, 22, January 2005.

- **Accelerated learning for youth**

  Catholic Relief Services (CRS) started an AL program in Afghanistan's north-eastern Kapisa and Parwan provinces in 2002. It offered basic educational opportunities to rural youth and women who had missed out on schooling due to war, poverty or cultural constraints. The program enabled participants to compress one grade into six months or less. Once they had caught up, younger participants entered Afghanistan's formal education system. Because conflict has disrupted education for so long, it is common to find women in their thirties or older alongside ten year-old children in AL classes.

  See Anne Ullman McLaughlin and Christine Capacci-Carneal, Accelerated learning in Afghanistan. *Forced Migration Review* 22, January 2005.

- **Vocational skills training for youth**

  In 2007 the International Rescue Committee (IRC) organized a vocational training program to help 400 young people find work in Russia's conflict-prone North Caucasus region. The program, called *Vperyed* or Go For It!, helped young people from the Republics of Dagestan and Chechnya get a variety of in-demand jobs such as manicurist, bookkeeper and office equipment repair technician. The courses were organized with two local youth groups and designed to impart practical skills rather than theoretical knowledge as is the norm for such training in Russia.

  See http://www.theirc.org/news/the-irc-helps-young-people1018.html.

- **Early childhood education**

  In 1999 when communities were destroyed by violence in Timor Leste, the Christian Children's Fund (CCF) in partnership with UNICEF opened a Child Friendly Space in Dili, to help children return to normal activities and heal from the emotional wounds of the violence they experienced. In 15 project locations in eight districts, CCF-Timor Leste assisted communities in organizing Children's Activities Centers. The Centers serve as a focal point providing critical Early Childhood Development activities for children from birth to five, as well as places for educating parents and caregivers about the needs of young children in conflict situations and about basic children's health issues.

  See http://www.christianchildrensfund.org/content.aspx?id=208

- **Higher education**

  Though support to higher education in a reconstruction period is rare, USAID has provided substantial support for higher education programs in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan, including scholarships for graduate study and exchanges as well as university partnerships, all aimed at strengthening overall capacity of host-country institutions.

  See Eyango, Vijitha. USAID, education and conflict in Asia and the Near East. Force Migration Review, 26, 2005.

- **Distance education**

The "Changing Our World" project of Equal Access, with support from UNIFEM, combines broadcast and narrowcast communication methodologies and trains local women to be rural reporters. It aims to create the space for women to speak out against violence, both personal and communal, via radio and community discussion groups - a combination that has the power and impact of reach and depth. Radio is an ideal medium to reach women as lack of education or literacy does not prevent listening and even the most under-served have access to radio in public places.

See http://www.equalaccess.org/programs/nepal/index.htm

D. Response to disasters

Disasters can be caused by nature, but they also can be man-made; they can transcend national borders. Often disasters are unpredictable and sudden, so education activities should include preparedness and early warning initiatives, in addition to immediate response, reconstruction, and resettlement strategies.

1. Context

The humanitarian context related to disasters is similar to that of the context related to violence. Families may suffer deaths, injuries, separation of family members, and loss of homes and belongings. Communities may be destroyed and community leaders deprived of their authority until the physical environment has been repaired so that it is habitable. The trauma experienced during the disaster may linger long after the event has passed.

International relief agencies take over to provide shelter, food, water and sanitation. Depending on the extent of damage to communities and the capacity of the state to recover, people may not be able to return to their homes for an indefinite time. The effects of the 2004 tsunami, for example, varied from one Asian country to another, as did the corresponding need for international humanitarian assistance. Thailand, for example, was able to rely more than others on its own government, private sector and civil society. Where governments do not have the capacity to provide alternative or temporary homes, international agencies may stay as long as needed to provide shelter and food.

2. Objectives, questions to post, and responsive mechanisms

Disaster-related objectives span humanitarian and reconstruction contexts in response to the disaster's immediate aftermath and long-term rebuilding requirements. They are also relevant to the preparation phase, as the likelihood of floods, cyclones, fires and even earthquakes taking place is usually predictable, even though timing is not.

In each phase, effective educational interventions must be developed around specific community needs and interests. Incorporating education as a dimension of relief programming can help stabilize the environment and create a secure, safe space for children.

Affected communities are keen to help and they must be viewed as valuable resources rather than passive recipients of donor aid. Surrounding communities not necessarily affected by the disaster may also want to help, and space should be created for them. To foster a sense of ownership of any program,

local community members should be at the forefront of program design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. Collaboration and consultation are essential to correctly identifying needs and gaps, to learning about the communities' preferred learning styles, and to developing ongoing support. Understanding social, economic, and political dynamics through inclusive participatory consultation will make the interventions more effective. Sensitivity is required to develop innovative approaches that can build on local culture and religion; otherwise programming implementation may face insurmountable obstacles.

Disaster preparedness and early warning systems are extremely important, and education interventions are particularly relevant in this case. Because schools provide a community hub and a cornerstone of daily life, they are ideally positioned to act as venues for education and awareness-raising and thus can be center points for disaster preparation.

Table II.5 Disaster response

Objectives	Questions	Responses
Access and equity		
• Schools prepared as shelters, community emergency centers • Normalcy restored to community life through schooling • Priority given to populations affected by the disaster	• Who is not receiving basic services? • How can schools and other learning centers provide basic services of food, clean water and sanitation to communities?	• Facilitate community recovery by providing basic necessities in school environments and reuniting children and youth with parents and extended family members • Constantly assess distribution to ensure it reaches appropriate populations
Quality and management		
• Schools built and repaired in accordance with safety standards • Quality standards in place that can be maintained after international agencies depart • Opportunities seized to improve pedagogy and management systems	• How can construction of existing schools be improved? • How can future school construction meet standards? • How can safety standards be enforced?	• Ensure standards are shared and enforced • Create assessment unit to evaluate existing and future construction
Relevance		
• Guidance and instruction in preparedness for earthquakes, floods, other predictable natural disasters • Families with skills and knowledge needed to survive the disaster • Students and teachers receiving psycho-social support, as needed • Curricula that meet the needs of those whose economy has been affected by the disaster, such as livelihood skills and income-generating activities	• What skills, knowledge and support do learners and teachers need to survive the conflict (land mines, anti-trafficking, gang engagement or fighting forces)? • How can schools play a role in disaster preparation, management, and recovery? • How can intervention be culturally sensitive and relevant?	• Use schools as community outreach mechanism, consulting and involving various stakeholders • Integrate disaster preparation into mainstream school curricula • Train teachers and organize communities to prepare for disaster management

3. Illustrative examples

Disaster-awareness training

- The Institute of Technology at Bandung, with support from the Asia Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) and USAID/OFDA, offers a three-day training session in earthquake mitigation for school staff. Those who attended the training returned to their districts and schools to train others. The effort resulted in a training course of 11 modules, a 200-page student handbook, a teacher manual of about the same length, and a supplementary binder of background materials. Short training modules in the curriculum included first aid, safety procedures and use of aid equipment, and practice in emergency drills, so teachers and pupils know how to evaluate the premises, seek shelter and administer roll call to identify missing persons.

- In municipalities adjoining Dhaka, CARE, with support from ADPC and USAID/OFDA raised awareness among members of civil society of flood damage prevention and mitigation measures. In 2002 CARE and its local partner NGOs conducted a series of one-day awareness-raising sessions among religious leaders, teachers, scouts, journalists, and other influential people. CARE and its partners also visited secondary schools and colleges to present two-hour sessions on "dos and don'ts during an urban flood." Longer courses also included health education about the dangers of water-borne diseases and contaminated water, as well as environmental education on conservation and sustainable development.

Humanitarian response

- On 15 November, 2007 Cyclone Sidr devastated the coast and inland areas of southern Bangladesh, killing over 3,000 people, injuring 40,000 and leaving two million people in need of urgent life-saving assistance. As an immediate response, World Vision opened nine Child Friendly Spaces in affected areas. A typical day there includes games, singing, painting and other creative activities, as well as storytelling, health and life skills education. The spaces also act as transition schools, where children prepare for their return to formal education. (http://www.worldvision.com.au/emergency/bangladeshCyclone_stories.asp#story3)

- Following the 2004 Tsunami, UNICEF was among the first to respond, shipping life-saving supplies into the region. In Indonesia, central to reopening schools was the delivery of textbooks and school supplies. Temporary learning centers were established for internally displaced persons and salaries were provided for substitute primary school teachers for six months.

Reconstruction

- The devastating earthquake of October 2005 took the lives of more than 18,000 students and over 850 teachers in northern Pakistan and Kashmir. Because the disaster damaged or destroyed 95 per cent of all school buildings, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) has worked closely with UNICEF to provide 100 government schools in the Mansehra District in northern Pakistan with tents, blackboards, notebooks, stationery and recreational materials to make them operational again. IRC trained more than 800 teachers in the latest methodologies and child-centered approaches to create

"healing classrooms" where children can learn, play, and build a future for themselves. (http://www.theirc.org/resources/healing-classrooms-help.html)

- Refugees International solicited donations for small-scale rehabilitation projects for tsunami-damaged schools. They identified two local Sri Lankan organizations to receive the funding: the Office for Eelam Refugee Rehabilitation and Sewa Lanka. Since cultural revival is critical to establishing a sense of normalcy after a disaster of the magnitude of the tsunami, children at some of the schools were given musical instruments, after which the school organized performances for the community and international visitors. (http://www.refintl.org/content/report/detail/6897/?photo=2)

III. Monitoring and evaluation in crisis contexts

This chapter begins with a discussion of monitoring and evaluation in conflict contexts, including definitions of M&E, a discussion of steps in the process, and some sample indicators. The challenges of conducting M&E in conflict contexts are then discussed, and considerations are proposed to ensure that M&E remains context-sensitive, viable and effective in spite of local constraints.

A. Definitions

While both monitoring and evaluation aim to measure program success, their aims are slightly different. Monitoring seeks to identify progress and problems during program[4] implementation in order to provide timely information that can lead to program adjustments and improvements. Evaluation, on the other hand, seeks to demonstrate achievements, measure impact, and provide reasons for program success or failure. Formative evaluation measures are taken during the program, and summative evaluation measures are taken after the program has ended.[5]

In stable countries M&E designs are based on a number of assumptions: that the design of the intervention will remain more or less the same throughout; that members of different ethnic, religious, and regional groups will be able to work together in relative harmony, and even collaborate, during program implementation; and, that progress should be measured on the basis of a variety of types of performance indicators, including some that are outcome and results based. The following table illustrates five types of performance indicators that can be used.

Table III.1 Five types of performance indicators

Type	Inputs	Processes	Outputs	Outcomes	Results (impact)
Definition	What is provided by program	What is done (activities) with program inputs	What is produced (people or things) as a result of program inputs and processes	Changes in behaviors, relationships, activities, or actions of people, groups, organizations	Long-term effects or effects vis-à-vis ultimate program objectives

[4] In this chapter, the word program is used to refer both to programs and to projects.

[5] For a more detailed definition of the terms monitoring and evaluation and related concepts, see OECD (2007), pp. 56 ff. See also op cit, p. 65 for a comparison of monitoring and evaluation. This reference also provides much useful information on how to conduct M&E in conflict situations.

Type	Inputs	Processes	Outputs	Outcomes	Results (impact)
Example	Funds Staffing Books Furniture Equipment Vehicles Technical assistance	Workshops provided Media/ sensitization campaigns Donation/ funding drives Enrollment campaigns	Persons trained Schools repaired School desks provided Textbooks provided Students enrolled	Improved teaching Improved teacher-pupil relations Increased community participation Reduced conflict	Improved student test scores Consistently successful schools New attitudes adopted

Note that to transform these types of indicators into operational indicators, specific targets and time frames must be added. For example, "workshops provided" becomes "x number of workshops provided in y period of time."

B. Contextual challenges and M&E difficulties in conflict and post-conflict settings

M&E in conflict or post-conflict settings differs from M&E in transformational settings in the following ways:

- **A "moving system":** As a result of conflict or instability, ministries can be changed, key personnel or counterparts can be replaced, or the entire public sector can be reorganized. In such a context, public mandates, policies and even laws can be in flux, changing the rules by which all organizations must operate in that country, resulting in restricted information flows, slowed or stalled decision making, decreased collaboration and stymied program implementation.

- **Breakdown of trust**: Societies in conflict are often characterized by suspicion amongst individuals, groups or entire sectors of society, thus jeopardizing cooperation and support originally envisaged in program designs. Suspicion often leads to violence which further divides people, and hardens positions. The convergence of these factors can lead to more violence, making cooperation increasingly difficult.

- **Limited program capacity**: Programs in unstable contexts can be staffed by personnel with limited research skills or ability to engage in data-driven decision making. Constant low level stress, intermittent outbreaks of violence and staff trauma – e.g., direct experiences with violence, disease, or family issues tragedies – can also lead to high and costly turnover.

- **Weak governmental institutions**: Countries in conflict or just recovering from conflict are often characterized by weak ministries of education, an absence of systems of procurement and/or lack of regulations for financing.

- **Institutional complexity**: Countries in conflict are usually home to a large number of US and international agencies, creating a greater need to coordinate across multiple types of implementing partners. Moreover, institutions working within countries in conflict often face special problems of managing a big program with a small staff due to resource constraints and the difficulty of recruiting qualified staff in the face of significant security risks.

- **Difficulties in gathering data**: As the old saying goes, the first casualty of war is truth. This fact is particularly problematic for M&E implementers for a variety of reasons. In situations with heightened security concerns, information is often not available, or is distorted by some to gain advantage over others. Members of competing groups are often not willing to share information for fear that they will sacrifice power once information is released. Allegiance, or perceived allegiance, to the government in power or its proxies, including USAID and its partners, can be a reason for persecution and, therefore, a reason to withhold or distort information. Staff brought in from the outside usually cannot speak local languages, further limiting or distorting information. M&E data-gathering activities can also suffer from logistical difficulties resulting from heightened security measures, such as road or district closures, or state-enforced controls (see Box III.1, previous page). To make matters more difficult, relevant data often does not exist for a variety of reasons. Baselines may not have been conducted or previous records may have been destroyed. Standard media outlets such as television, radio, and newspapers, if they do exist, often present partial or "spun" information. Ministries and development partners often lack centralized or accessible data, or data that is disaggregated by region or group, thus masking group disparities (World Bank, *Reshaping the Future*, 4). And data are often inconsistent – for example, providing different versions of place names or descriptors (spatial data), rendering data use more difficult.

As a result of these challenges, M&E programs in conflict situations, sometimes called "conflict-sensitive M&E," are often required to make running starts, use short results cycles, or rapidly shift their strategy and tactics. Activity targets must often shift in degree or orientation, necessitating renegotiation with donors and other stakeholders. Changing objectives can render baselines and M&E designs obsolete, requiring design overhauls which result in higher costs while raising questions about the continued appropriateness of previous M&E designs. In the

M&E and security issues in Iraq

The M&E program of the Local Governance Project (LGP) in Iraq sought to measure project impact by conducting a series of Quality of Life (QoL) surveys with Iraqi citizens and local government leaders. Questions focused on beneficiaries' attitudes concerning service delivery form 2003-2005. Several challenges arose, including:

- Numerous checkpoints and searches extending travel times and periods of exposure to risk, as well as increasing costs and stress of data collection
- Unstable and unreliable interregional administrative barriers - e.g., the necessity of obtaining special permits to work in certain areas
- Challenges to officially-issued permits
- Heightened sensitivity of respondents with respect to personal questions in the survey
- Heightened suspicions of respondents about enumerator motivations and allegiances, and
- Detentions, beatings, and death threats for one survey team, along with confiscation of their completed questionnaires.
- Source: Elkins 2006

meantime, programs incur higher costs as they adapt to shifting contexts or constraints, often while being asked to provide new information on an urgent basis. In the end, objectives can become confused or conflated, and objectives can change from provision of quality education to creation of stability or optimism.

C. Conflict-sensitive M&E

Just as the choice of interventions should be based on the conditions that prevail, so too should the M&E design be adapted to that country's degree of stability. Based on lessons learned from M&E programs conducted in conflict contexts around the world, four strategies are proposed. Each is discussed in light of the four phases presented in this paper.

1. Establish a clear and viable M&E plan from the outset.

In conflict settings, the lack of clarity in the M&E plan poses additional difficulties. A USAID review of M&E in post-conflict settings (USAID, 2006) found that:

- The failure to establish clear programmatic objectives is the biggest single obstacle to effective M&E in post-conflict settings. There is almost always tension (and sometimes confusion) in post-conflict programs between pressures for immediate impact and reconstruction and the need for longer-term capacity building and structural reform.

- If objectives are not clear from the outset, the tension between immediate and long-term objectives can become a source of confusion that eventually weakens or sabotages the entire M&E effort. Objectives should stem from the results of the initial assessment conducted at the beginning of the strategy cycle in accordance with the objectives and sub-objectives identified with each phase in previous chapters of this document.

Crucially, the 2006 review noted the importance of high-level leadership in the establishment of a clear and viable M&E plan, for few people would be willing to endorse such a significant undertaking without institutional backing.

2. Adopt a gradualist, evolving, "good enough" perspective

A viable M&E design typically includes a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods, the latter usually consisting of some kind of baseline and follow-up measures that draw from representative, randomly sampled populations. Typically, these designs seek to obtain a confidence level of around 95% and a margin of error of 3-5%, in order to produce findings that can be generalized. Of course, in conflict situations, this is not always possible. Participants may be too difficult to reach, or they may not feel safe participating in data gathering exercise. Adequate databases may not exist in order to reliably sample the population. Or qualified staff may not be available in sufficient numbers to carry out these programs.

Under such conditions, baselines are often foregone in the interest of time and expedience, and measures are taken as and when possible. Such, of course, is life, and in such situations, it is important

to remember that something is better than nothing, and that the use of "a good enough" approach can still lead to program success. If an entire sample may not be reachable, responses from *half* the intended audience may still provide program personnel with enough information about conditions, perceptions, and needs to make critical program judgments. If a random sample cannot be used, purposive sampling (applying predetermined criteria to a subset of the population) can be used to select participants, with simple totals and averages providing important comparative information. And qualitative methods (e.g., open-ended interview questions, focus groups, journals) can be employed whenever possible to provide additional, valuable information.

Typically in the humanitarian or reconstruction phases, conditions can still be too uncertain for a robust M&E design. As the situation stabilizes and moves toward the development/long-term phase, designs requiring larger populations and more randomized samples can be considered. Such designs, in turn, make more complex analytical techniques possible. Of course, the reverse direction is also possible; situations can move from more to less stable, requiring a return to more basic M&E methods. The following table illustrates this two-way continuum:

Table III.2 A continuum of M&E designs and methods

Phase	M&E design	Data collection	Data analysis
Humanitarian	• Purposive sampling with a limited number of cases • Occasional measures taken as and when possible • Qualitative methods	• Interviews • Focus groups • Activity records (e.g., participation lists) • Observations • Anecdotal information	• Inductive analysis (identification of patterns and themes) • Totals • Averages
Reconstruction	⇕	⇕	⇕
Conflict prevention/ disaster preparation	All of the above plus: • Rigorous baseline • Regular measures taken (e.g., quarterly) • Pre-test/post-test • Experimental (random) designs • Quasi-experimental designs (some random and some purposive sampling)	All of the above plus: • Surveys • Student achievement testing	All of the above plus: • Descriptive statistics • Regression analyses • Other inferential statistical procedures

3. Adapt indicators to specific contexts

USAID partners have identified three types of conflict-sensitive M&E indicators: 1) indicators to monitor the progression of conflict factors against an appropriate baseline and against which to set contingency planning; 2) indicators to monitor the program's efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability; and 3) indicators to measure how contexts affect programs and the programs affect conflicts (AED, 2004). The type of indicator is also important. Of the five types – input, process, output, outcome, and impact – the last two are often not possible to measure in humanitarian or reconstruction contexts because reliable information cannot be obtained. In such cases, "output indicators are often effective and legitimate monitoring measures during early efforts at stabilization" (USAID, 2006) for four reasons.

First, in unstable contexts, output indicators demonstrate the viability of the institution providing the product or service. Evidence of improved infrastructure, provision of food, and "jump-start activities" like emergency training, contribute in important ways to restore confidence in government or ministry entities, thereby enabling the population to return to a state of peace and stability. Reestablishing confidence in the school system is also of paramount importance in the early post-conflict period, so school enrollment is a good indicator of confidence. Second, educational output indicators serve as an important sign, or proxy, to indicate that life has returned to normal (see box at right).

Third, output indicators are easier to monitor because they can usually be counted easily (compared to, say, test scores or parents' attitudes), and they usually occur on a recurring basis over short time spans, so they can be counted frequently.

Finally and most importantly for our discussion here, counting elements built, delivered or organized does not require the larger sample designs that are so difficult to organize in "moving systems."

Schools and a return to normalcy

Perhaps more than any other, the education sector has emphasized its role in addressing fragility. It provides a clear example of output measures used to indicate or proxy the accomplishment of higher-level, extra-educational results. Measuring a constellation of related outputs—schools fixed, school desks provided, textbooks provided, students enrolled, and so forth—can provide a strong indication that schools are up and running to a certain standard. This signals at least one dimension of a return to normalcy that is quickly felt in almost every family and community. In post-conflict settings ranging from sparsely populated, rural African locales to dense, urban environments in the Middle East, schools provide a general sense of wellbeing and a safe haven. In post-conflict situations with large movements of displaced persons, studies have shown that people will settle in locations where there are functioning schools and move on from locations where there are none. For example, border surveys of refugees repatriating to Liberia revealed that health and education services were two key requirements that determined where and when they resettled.

Source: USAID 2006

The following table is an adaptation of Table III.3 presented earlier in this chapter. This table aims to illustrate the kinds of indicators to be used in each of the phases. Note that M&E programs in humanitarian and reconstruction phase countries include inputs, process, and outcome indicators. Also, depending on the specific conditions, M&E programs in countries in the reconstruction phase might also be able to accommodate outcome indicators as well. Examples are provided in each box for illustrative purposes:

Table III.3 A continuum of indicators

Phase	Inputs	Processes	Outputs	Outcomes	Results (impact)
Humanitarian	Amount of technical assistance provided	Number of workshops provided	Number of teachers trained	Number of schools operating	Communities returning to normalcy
Reconstruction				Number of schools operating	School reforms in place
Conflict prevention				Number of schools teaching prevention	Conflicts resolved without violence

These guidelines are not absolute; some organizations have used outcome indicators such as behavioral and attitudinal measures to provide important information about the progress of stabilization. In Sudan, for example, CARE has used the willingness to talk about and plan for the future as an indicator because it indicates feelings of security. Unobtrusive indicators can also be used to measure change. In Sudan, DFID is using the number of weddings as an indicator of stability: people are willing to plan an event without fearing an outbreak of violence on the wedding day.

4. Explore more contextual approaches to M&E

In 2004, USAID sponsored a workshop in Ghana under the Capable Partners (CAP) Program in which considerations for "conflict-sensitive M&E" were defined (Academy for Educational Development, 2004). The workshop concluded with 5 key principles for practitioners:

1. Identify and involve stakeholders in monitoring, evaluation and resulting changes.
2. Distribute M&E responsibility among project implementers.
3. Carry out conflict analysis prior to program design and throughout the project.
4. Allow flexibility in activity timing to respond to conflict dynamics.
5. Keep a broad view and examine the project in the larger political context.

In Guinea in the early 1990s, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) was implementing education programs for Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees throughout the forest region of Guinea. Field staff collected data (in Excel) on numbers of schools, teachers, and students on a monthly basis in order to report to IRC for funding purposes. The program shared its data with the UNHCR as well as the Ministries of Education in Liberia and Sierra Leone, which intended to use the information to award credit and scholarships to students, and to place teachers based on years of performance, after the wars ended (based on interview with IRC staff).

4. Other considerations

Finally, the following are offered as points to consider when designing and implementing conflict-sensitive M&E programs:

- **Multiple data sources**: As in all research, M&E researchers should always seek to triangulate data, sources and methods in order to ensure accuracy. For example, data gathered by programs from beneficiaries, key informants and program personnel should be cross-checked with information available in surveys, opinion polls, media, and local civil society institutions as well as independent watchdog organizations, public relations reporting of USAID, its implementing partners. Procedures also need to be developed for dealing with erroneous or bogus data in effective, yet sensitive, ways.

- **Develop unified data bases**: The collection and archival of reliable data is difficult and costly under the best of circumstances, and even more so in conflict situations. To address this issue, conflict-sensitive M&E programs should seek ways to collaborate with government officials, agencies and partners within and across sectors to develop and share unified, accessible and easy-to-use data bases. This allows partners to rationalize labor and cut costs, and it legitimizes governments in need of making data-based decisions (see Box 6). In the humanitarian phase, data sets are often kept in the most basic and available programs Excel and Access. In later phases, specialized or purpose-built programs are used.

- **Confidence building**: In response to heightened insecurity, various measures can be taken to build confidence with informants and program partners. While local people are usually more comfortable talking with local staff, higher level officials often prefer to share information with expatriates. Yet even this is delicate: discussions with officials can alienate researchers from many program participants. To defuse potential tensions, instead of asking direct questions, researchers often ask more indirect or hypothetical ones such as: “How would you react to this scenario?” CMM found that a combination of different types of staff worked best: program staff focused on getting the office started and programs underway, external personnel were recruited for their technical skills, and local staff conducted surveys in a community-sensitive way.

- **Perceptions about M&E**: If beneficiaries are not involved in M&E design and implementation, they can view it as intrusive, or worse, spying, thereby endangering the researcher and the researched. Such realities serve to remind M&E designers that program staff and beneficiaries must constantly be sensitized about the importance of M&E and their role in it – an act that is most successful when all are involved in designing M&E programs, interpreting M&E-generated data, and making decisions about how to improve program implementation.

IV. Public-private partnerships for education in crisis

A public-private partnership, as conceived by development agencies, is a collaborative effort between a government, an international agency and private-sector organization to meet a particular development objective. The private-sector partner may be a for-profit business or a civil society organization. Forming a partnership is a means of strengthening the role of civil society in development and its cooperation with government in projects that benefit citizens.

This annex describes a range of partnerships in the education sector that are relevant to crisis contexts. It covers each type of partner's investments in the partnership and the kind of return it expects on its investment. This discussion of public-private partnerships is largely one of possibilities, there are few accessible examples of such partnerships, since the popularity of the notion is fairly recent and time has not allowed for much experience.

A. Categories of partnerships

Public-private partnerships can be categorized in a number of ways. Four categories seem suitable to USAID's goals and experience: corporate social responsibility units, marketing units, humanitarian organizations (charities), and local organizations with a stake in the community's welfare.

- **Corporate social responsibility** units of private enterprises are semi-autonomous units, usually found in large corporations but exist in smaller organizations as well. They serve altruistic goals of the company and as tax write-offs. Some organizations may not have distinguishable CSR units but set aside funds or line items in their accounts that allow them to make charitable donations.
- **Marketing and related business** units of private corporations seek to extend the market for products and services and develop products that open new markets. These units do not treat their investments as charity; they expect measurable financial returns on the bottom line. These investments are usually medium- or long-term.
- **Humanitarian organizations**, such as CARE, Save the Children and Oxfam, raise funding from public campaigns, donations and government grants.
- **Community-based organizations** take some responsibility for the social welfare of members of the community. They include, for example, PTAs, churches, mosques and other religious organizations, and local business organizations such as the chamber of commerce, scouts, and Kiwanis clubs.

This framework focus on partnerships with businesses and their CSR units, as the other types of partnerships are well documented elsewhere. Partnerships may bring together private organizations in one or more of these categories in various combinations. In every public-private partnership

encompassed by USAID's notion of partnership, private partners are part of a triad, along with the state and the international agency.

1. International and local

Private partners that are businesses can be international or local. Partnerships with large multinational firms have received a lot of attention in the past five years and have become *de rigueur* in the development field as agencies try to amplify the impact of aid by leveraging private resources. Since 2001 USAID has endorsed a model of collaboration with the private sector through the Global Development Alliance (GDA) and a multitude of experimental efforts that engage the private sector partners in different ways, with different objectives, and through different types of agreements and instruments. Much has been written about this "private revolution in global development" from the USG perspective and about the many alternative forms that PPPs might take in different contexts.[6] Other bilateral donors too, as well as the United Nations, have been drafting new policies on how to harness the resources of the private sector for international development. All major donors have heeded the evolution of PPPs in development, including the United States, UK, Germany, Sweden, France, Canada, UNDP and the World Bank. Yet, many partnerships in education are only beginning to bear fruit.

While highly-visible partnerships in education have been forged with multinational corporations, those with small or local businesses are equally valuable. Their resources may be more finite, but small, local businesses may also be more committed to the community and have more of a stake in the project's success. There are myriad examples of such local PPPs, though they are poorly documented. In a rare survey of local partnerships, Tietjen (2000, pp. 223-257) provides a list of hundreds of such small and medium-size partnerships. The survey is outdated and has no value for current projects, but it serves as a good indication of the number and types of local business partners that can be found.

2. Partnerships in crisis contexts

Just as the goals of development agencies in the education sector are different in crisis context than in stable development contexts, the nature of partnerships varies across crisis situations. Business risks are greater in a crisis-affected country. This may be a disincentive for the private sector to invest or commit resources to a development project. On the other hand, and equally true, crisis usually leads to human suffering and a company with a philanthropic or CSR mandate may well be drawn to focus its beneficence to where it is needed – and publicly appreciated – the most.

Private sector businesses may have other reasons to look closely at contributing their resources to projects in crisis situations. First and foremost, crisis is generally bad for business. While weapons

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[6] More comprehensive information on PPAs from the USG perspective is available, e.g. USAID, *The Global Development Alliance" Public Private Alliances for Transformational Development*, 2006; USAID and the Committee for Economic Development, Public-Private Partnerships for Development: A Handbook for Doing Business (2006); USAID/PPC, *An Assessment of USAID's Global Development* Alliances (2004); USAID/DIS, *USAID's Experience with Multisectoral Partnerships and Strategic Alliances: An Analysis of Best Practices and Lessons Learned* (2001)

makers, arms traders and security companies might profit from war and catastrophe, most businesses suffer. Conflict and disaster disrupt production, reduce worker productivity, destroy transport routes and market facilities, and undermine consumer demand and investor interest. Peace and stability is good for business and good for attracting domestic or foreign investment to the region.

B. Investments in and returns to each type of partner

As with any effective partnership, each partner brings a different set of core competencies and comparative advantages as well as a different set of expectations and interests. Table IV.1 provides a conceptual summary of resources and expectations of public and private sector, respectively. The table includes the development project as a partner, because USAID is mainly interested in public-private partnerships in which it plays a role.

Table IV.1 Investment in and returns to partners

	Public sector	Development project	Private sector
Investments	Moral authority and mandate Policy and regulatory authority Public financial resources Public infrastructure and equipment	Financial resources Technical expertise Links to international experience	Financial resources Corporate infrastructure and equipment Technology Expertise Marketing channels Job market and links
Returns	Effective delivery of services Legitimacy and credit for services Local ownership and sustainability of the intervention Political support or alliance	Leveraging of public (tax) funds Complementary expertise Support for achieving objectives	Access to new markets Access to public infrastructure Access to leaders Stronger labor force and economy Achievement of altruistic goals Good public relations (locally, nationally, internationally) Political alliances

The items in each cell do not always apply to every partner. As discussed above, some private sector partners are motivated by altruism while others have basically a commercial interest. Similarly, different private partners offer different kinds of contributions. The key to each successful partnership is to find

the right complement of investments and returns and of advantages and risks such that each partner benefits and each partner is committed to the successful outcome of the partnership.

The table illustrates that partnerships should not be conceived solely in terms of leveraging funds. While that is certainly a valid aim in some instances, simplistic ratios (e.g. 1:1) that measure financial contributions will undervalue other kinds of non-cash resources, such as technology, infrastructure, distribution networks, technical expertise, and intellectual property, that the private sector may be able to offer a project besides cash.

In some cases, elements within the private sector may be implicated in a regional conflict or crisis. For example, some firms may support, or benefit from, or be related to, a dictatorial regime that is causing civil conflict; such firms may not be trusted by the general public. Corporations may have exploited communities through extractive industry, environmental pollution, child labor, or oppressive employment practices. Even if the economic reality of the situation is more complex or nuanced, it may do more harm than good for a development project to ally itself with a corporation that is perceived as controversial. On the other hand, precisely those corporations whose reputations have been damaged for whatever reason will often be the ones that want to repair their PR by collaborating with a foreign donor or development project. Development projects should be sensitive to the implications or connotations of corporate partnership.

Some of the most visible PPPs in recent years have involved large, global corporations such as Cisco, Microsoft, Chevron, Unilever and other multinational firms in agribusiness, petroleum, and pharmaceutical industries. Progress has been made in negotiating PPP mechanisms, and donors have leveraged significant private sector resources in support of development projects (especially in the agriculture, health and economic growth sectors) in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. USAID has pioneered successful PPPs in education in diverse countries and contexts such as Afghanistan, India, Jordan and Sri Lanka.

Some of the most tangible and high-profile partnerships have emerged when IT companies provide computer hardware, software and training to schools. Some of the largest IT companies in the world such as Intel, Microsoft, Sun and Cisco, have transformed isolated classrooms into wired, learning centers linked to virtually unlimited amounts of data and multimedia information via the internet. Such companies have acted both philanthropically--assisting those in need of better education—and strategically— introducing their hardware, software and branded IT products to millions of potential consumers. Another PPP in the education sector with great potential is businesses' contributions of technical expertise to vocational education programs. The reciprocal nature of the partnership is clear in this case–students receive vocational training that is current and relevant, improving their chances for employment and income; businesses (employers) help build the skills and competencies of their future employees.

Incentives for the private sector, especially in the form of a skilled workforce, represent a long-term return on investment. For this reason, companies that are looking for a quicker return, and a more measurable one in standard business terms, may look elsewhere to invest their CSR resources. When

agribusiness firms provide free or subsidized agricultural inputs to needy farmers it often leads to measurable increases in sales in the short- or medium-term; similarly with the distribution of medicines by pharmaceutical companies. Conversely private sector support of the education system may take a long time to produce recognizable returns, and those returns may be difficult or impossible to quantify. This is one important constraint for education PPPs.

C. Current partnerships in the education sector

Table IV.2 presents the results of an extensive search for cases of recent (since 2000) public-private partnerships in education that are related—however tenuously—to countries in crisis. The search covered the publically available databases of USAID projects, a thorough search of the Internet, and contributions made by participants at the Bangkok meeting in February 2008.

The table has 16 cases. Each case meets the following criteria for inclusion in the table:

- The project was in a country in one of the regions served by USAID (ANE, Africa, E&E, LA).
- The project is in the education sector.
- At least one public and one private partner are engaged.
- The project was active in 2000 or later.
- The project has potential for support by USAID as a contributor or facilitator (we will not include CSR or other corporate or civil society partnerships with national governments that have no involvement of USAID or other international public donors).

Some of these are examples of projects taking place in more than one country. The Cisco Academy, for example, operates in many countries. Charitable donations to disaster relief and projects funded by such contributions are not included here, as they are better characterized as gifts, not partnerships. Some projects supported by the CSR units of corporations are included, if there seems to be a partnership with the government or a donor agency, beyond donations of funding or resources such as computers. The table does not list among partners those organizations that are implementing contractors or grantees of USAID or other donor agencies.[7]

The table presents this information for each case and gives a website reference for further information.

[7] We have not included USAID's EQuALLS in the Philippines, for example, because the private partners, in this case, are grantees with cost-sharing arrangements. The nature of partnerships is sometimes described ambiguously, and whether a "partner" is a contractor or grantee to UN organizations, for example, is not always easy to determine.

Table IV.2 Recent education partnerships related to crises

Country	Project	Purpose	Crisis phase	Level	Public partner(s)	Private partner(s)	Dates	Website
Afghanistan[8]	Cisco Networking Academy Program	To teach students how to design, build and maintain computer networks; in Afghanistan women are recruited as learners.	Recon-struction	Higher	USAID, UNDP, UN Volunteers	Cisco	2002-present	http://www.cisco.com/edu/emea/government/case_studies/index.shtml
Afghanistan	American University of Afghanistan	To offer internationally-supported degree programs and education for the professions.	Recon-struction	Higher	Government of Afghanistan, USAID	Private families and foundations in Afghanistan and the U.S.	2006-present	http://www.auaf.edu.af/index.php
Angola[9]	Junior Achievement	To help youth to acquire the skills and confidence that will enable them to live their lives productively.	Recon-struction	Post-primary	Government of Angola, USAID	Esso, Coca-Cola	2006-present	http://www.usaid.gov/ao/business_junior.html
Bangladesh	Nike CSR	To run a social communications campaign to request community learning centers to increase access to education for out-of-school girls and boys.	Preven-tion	Primary	Government of Bangladesh, World Bank	Nike Foundation[10]		http://www.csrwire.com/News/4418.html

[8] Afghanistan is one of many countries in which the Cisco program operates.

[9] Angola is one of many countries in which Junior Achievement operates.

[10] Nike Foundation has other projects in the education sector but none so directly connected to public schools.

Country	Project	Purpose related to crisis	Crisis phase	Level	Public partner(s)	Private partner(s)	Dates	Website
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Piloting Solutions for Alleviating Brain Drain in South Eastern Europe[11]	To offer modern technological and financial facilities to young scientists from the region to co-operate - within the framework of joint research projects - with their fellow-nationals living abroad.	Recon-struction	Higher	UNESCO	Hewlett Packard	2003-present	http://portal.unesco.org/es/ev.php-URL_ID=19337&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html
Brazil	Ayron Senna Institute: Accelerate Brazil and Connect Yourself	To help Brazilian children and young people fully develop their potential as persons, citizens and future professionals.	Preven-tion	Primary, post-primary	Municipal governments and public schools; UNESCO	International corporations, including Audi AG, Compaq, Mattel; Brazilian corporations and foundations		http://senna.globo.com/institutoayrtonsenna/
Colombia	Support for Escuela Nueva	To improve the education of poor children in coffee-growing areas	Preven-tion	Primary, post-primary	USAID, Government of Colombia	Colombian Coffee Federation	2007	http://ies.edc.org/news/articles.php?id=254
Côte d'Ivoire	Resource centers at teacher-training institutes	To promote sustainable educational reform in cocoa farming communities	Preven-tion	Primary, post-primary	USAID, governments of Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana	World Cocoa Foundation, Hershey, IFESH, Teachers for Africa	May 2005-August 2007	http://www.worldcocoafoundation.org/difference/IFESH_Summary.asp

[11] The project also has activities in Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Macedonian and Albania. In 2006 the project began work in Africa, in universities in Algeria, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zimbabwe.

Country	Project	Purpose related to crisis	Crisis phase	Level	Public partner(s)	Private partner(s)	Dates	Website
India	QUEST Alliance	Improve the quality of basic education	Preven-tion	Primary, post-primary	USAID	Microsoft, WIPRO Technologies, Lucent Technologies, Pratham	2004-present	http://www.usaid.gov/in/our_work/ppp/ppp_quest.htm
Indonesia (Aceh)	Vocational Youth Training	To provide vocational training to youth in the area struck by the tsunami.	Recon-struction	Post-primary	USAID	Chevron	2004-2006	http://indonesia.usaid.gov/en/Article.128.aspx
Iraq	Cisco Networking Academy Program	To give Iraqis ICT skills that will allow them to play an active part in post-war reconstruction.	Recon-struction	Higher	Min of Higher Ed, UN Econ and Social Commission for Western Asia	Cisco	2002-present	http://www.cisco.com/edu/emea/government/case_studies/index.shtml
Jordan	Jordan Education Initiative[12]	To improve education through the use of ICT in schools	Preven-tion	Primary, post-primary	Ministry of Education, USAID	Microsoft, Intel, Cisco, other IT companies; World Education Forum		
Pakistan	Quality Education for All (Punjab)[13]	To improve public education by contracting with private-sector organizations to manage 2400 government schools	Preven-tion	Primary	Government of Punjab	National Rural Support Network; Punjab Rural Support Program	1998-present	http://www.rspn.org/files/mo/nrsp.htm

[12] Egypt has an Egypt Education Initiative with the same or similar partners.

[13] This is one variation of partnerships between Pakistan governments and private organizations to deliver education to neglected communities.

Country	Project	Purpose related to crisis	Crisis phase	Level	Public partner(s)	Private partner(s)	Dates	Website
Peru	Centers of Excellence for Teacher Training (CETT)	To improve reading in early primary grades	Preven-tion	Primary	Government of Peru, USAID	Antamina, Pluspetrol, Aguaytía Energy, Lima Tours	2002-	http://www.readingforallchildren.org/2.6.1.php
Sri Lanka	Accelerated Skills Acquisition Program (ASAP)	To prepare school leavers for the workplace.	Preven-tion	Post-primary (youth, 15-25)	USAID	Chambers of Commerce, blue chips companies in Colombo and small to mid-sized companies around the country in manufacturing, agriculture, plantation, trade, insurance, and banking and construction	2006-2008	http://www.caii.com/CAIIStaff/Dashboard_GIROAdminCAIIStaff/Dashboard_CAIIAdminDatabase/CAIIAdminProjectDetails.aspx?PageName=Sri_Lanka/Accelerated_Skills_Acquisition_Program_(ASAP)&PDDSurveyID=1200
Tunisia	MANFORME	To unify objectives and strategies for TVET development both among public and private stakeholders	Preven-tion	Post-primary	Ministry of Education	Private sector unions and enterprise federations		http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/230122/ReformingintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.pdf

Most cases uncovered by our search began after 2002. Their newness, together with the small number of cases, makes it difficult to draw many conclusions about the impact of the partnership—as distinguished from the impact of the project—on improving access, quality or relevance of education. Yet there are some striking observations to be drawn from these cases.

Table IV.3 summarizes the partnerships working at different levels of the education system (primary, post-primary[14] and higher education) during different phases of crisis.

Table IV.3 Partnerships by level of education and phase of crisis

	Conflict prevention and development	Humanitarian	Reconstruction
Primary	Bangladesh Nike Brazil Senna Colombia Escuela Nueva Cote d'Ivoire resource centers India QUEST Pakistan Quality EFA Peru SETT		
Post primary	Jordan Education Initiative Sri Lanka ASAP Tunisia MANFORME		Angola Junior Achievement Indonesia-Ache Chevron
Higher			Afghanistan CISCO Afghanistan AUA Bosnia Hewlett Packard Iraq CISCO

Interpreting Table 3, it is difficult to categorize partnerships according to the phase of crisis in which they operate. At best, some partnerships have an explicit post-crisis reconstruction objective (the Cisco Academy in Iraq; the Chevron-USAID partnership in Aceh, and the USAID project in Sri Lanka), but these projects could (and do) also fit into a conflict-prevention environment. Other partnerships are in post-crisis countries but not explicit about the connection (projects in post-war Afghanistan and Angola). While some partnerships might be labeled preventive, because they work with vulnerable populations, their link to crisis prevention is only implicit (Bangladesh, Bosnia, Brazil, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, India, Pakistan, Peru).

Table 3 shows that there are at least four at each level of the system.

[14] Including secondary and programs for out-of-school youth.

- At the primary level and among those that include post-primary as well as primary, partnerships work with NGOs to provide services to government schools and non-government learning centers (Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, India, Pakistan and Peru). Some partners are international, while others are national. Some create their own NGOs; some collaborate in supporting an independent NGO.
- At the post-primary level, each of the projects aims to improve workforce-related skills and/or life skills of youth. Three of the four projects (in Angola, Jordan and Indonesia) have global companies as partners; the other two (Sri Lanka and Tunisia) have local partners.
- At the higher level, three of the four partnerships are with ICT companies (in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Iraq); the other is the unique partnership at the American University of Afghanistan.

Let us look finally at the education partnerships without a "crisis lens." There seem to be a variety of motivations or forces encouraging private-sector organizations to join partnerships. Here we separate global corporations from local companies and other organizations, though in some ways their motivations overlap.

- Among global corporations, some enter into partnerships as investments that help grow their markets, particularly the ICT companies. These tend to be in more stable, less crisis-prone environments (India, Jordan, Egypt). Cisco and Hewlett Packard have developed more intricate partnerships, in which they form training institutions that lead to outcomes beyond—though including—their own markets. Cisco works in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as in other less fragile countries. Nike and Chevron appear to be at least partially motivated to mitigate an unfavorable corporate image.
- Local business organizations appear to join partnerships for a range of motives. In Sri Lanka and Tunisia, businesses partner with vocational education providers because they can enhance the relevance of training to their direct needs. Local agricultural producers in Colombia and Cote d'Ivoire support education in the communities where they produce, helping to build resources and to promote a good image. In Brazil, Peru, India and Pakistan, where the economy is more polarized, with relative wealth in the modern sector, private companies support NGOs (some even form their own), which provide education services to poor communities. In Afghanistan, private philanthropists are partnering with the U.S. government in founding a new university—a bi-national public-private partnership.

In conclusion, the notion of public-private partnership in education seems to have taken hold, and the numbers are growing as new models are designed and implemented. From the available literature, however, not much can be gleaned yet about the pros and cons of various models, even in stable countries.

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Peace education networks and centers

Peace education is undergoing change, and USAID can learn from collaboration with peace education networks and centers that are in place throughout Europe and North America.

Centers based in **North America** include

- Columbia University Teachers College Peace Education Center http://www.tc.columbia.edu/PeaceEd/
- Center for Civic Education, Civitas International, which operates civic education programs in many countries, including Lebanon and Pakistan. http://www.civiced.org/
- Cultivating peace in the 21st century, Classroom Connections, a Canadian resource for teachers of peace education http://www.cultivatingpeace.ca/cpmaterials/

- Peace Games, a US-based NGO that operates peace education programs throughout the country and has applied curricula in some, albeit limited international settings http://www.peacegames.org/Resources.shtml

- Reading and Writing for Critical Thinking, Open Society Institute and International Reading Association. The program, which teaches "democratic pedagogy," operates throughout Eastern Europe and some countries in Asia to help schools develop democratic structures and interactive teaching methods that encourage youth to become active citizens. (siteresources.worldbank.org/EDUCATION/Resources/278200-1121703274255/1439264-1126807073059/Developing_Critical_Thinking_Skills.pdf)

UN-based networks include

- UN Peace University in San José, http://www.upeace.org/academic/training/

- RelatED at the International Bureau of Education (IBE) in Geneva, http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-URL_ID=30436&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

Europe-based networks include

- Education for Europe as Peace Education (EURED), Klagenfurt, Austria, http://www.uni-klu.ac.at/frieden/BROSCHURE_EURED2007.pdf

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Asian Disaster Reduction and Response Network promotes coordination, information sharing and collaboration among NGOs and other stakeholders for effective and efficient disaster reduction and response in the Asia-Pacific region (http://www.adrrn.net/index.asp).

Asia/Pacific Cultural Centre for UNESCO is a non-profit organization for Asia and the Pacific regional activities in line with the principles of UNESCO, working for the promotion of mutual understanding and cultural cooperation among peoples in the region, including education on environmental sustainability and natural disasters. (http://www.accu.or.jp/en/education/index.shtml).

International Strategy for Asia and Pacific Disaster Reduction does awareness-raising activities in disaster risk reduction, advocacy through policy formulation, dissemination of guidelines to assist in the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action, promote the establishment of national platforms for disaster risk reduction, enhance networking and partnership-building to contribute to an effective culture of safety and protection of all communities in the Asia and Pacific Islands region. (http://www.unisdr.org/asiapacific/ap-partners/partners-ap-drr.htm).

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