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**Democratic Consolidation in Ethiopia
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Democratic Consolidation in Ethiopia
Bibliography

Journal Articles:

Larbi Sadiki, "The Search for Citizenship in Bin Ali's Tunisia: Democracy versus Unity," *Political Studies*, 2002, 50(3): 497-513.

Abstract: Commitment to unity can hinder democracy, rendering the search for pluralism into an exercise in political singularity. I contest the thesis within the theory of democratic transition that national cohesion and ethnic homogeneity are essential preconditions for democracy. Tunisia is an ethnically homogeneous society, but seems to be unable to seize on the opportunity to transcend the threshold of democracy. The Tunisian example suggests that democracy (that is, an ethos of toleration of difference), should be rethought as one essential precondition for cohesion within democratising polities. The analysis unpacks how 'fragmented' politics works in the North African country. Politics becomes 'fragmented' when 'loyalty' to the state's discourse of 'citizenship' and 'identity', becomes the one distinguishing feature by which political community is defined and membership within it is determined. National unity is another word for political uniformity. Thus understood the state's imperative of unity and uniformity contradicts political pluralism and demotes rather than promotes democratic development. [Abstract from author]

Ian S. Spears, "Understanding Inclusive Peace Agreements in Africa: The Problems of Sharing Power," *Third World Quarterly*, 2000, 21(1): 105-118.

Abstract: Power sharing has increasingly been seen as a way out of otherwise intransigent conflicts in multi-ethnic African societies. Yet power sharing has obvious problems: power sharing agreements are difficult to arrive at, even more difficult to implement, and even when implemented, such agreements rarely stand the test of time. Indeed, there are relatively few historical examples of successful, formalised power sharing in Africa which would warrant its advocacy. Drawing primarily on the cases of Angola, Somalia, Ethiopia and Rwanda, this paper seeks to explain why a method of conflict resolution so appealing in theory fails so often in practice. The paper will outline general theoretical approaches to power sharing, examine the practical problems associated with its implementation, and suggest ideas for how some of these problems can be overcome. [Abstract from author]

Ulrich Schneckener, "Making Power-Sharing Work: Lessons from Successes and Failures in Ethnic Conflict Regulations," *Journal of Peace Research*, 2002, 39(2): 203-229.

Not available electronically.

Abstract: Focuses on power-sharing arrangements that may be an appropriate solution for managing and settling ethnic conflicts. Identification of favorable conditions in

power-sharing; Evaluation of the quality of regulations in the arrangements; Concept and elements of power-sharing; Presentation of European cases of power-sharing; Role of political elites in sustaining shared rule. [Abstract from EBSCO]

Raphael Njoku, "Deadly ethnic conflict and the imperative of power sharing: Could a consociational federalism hold in Rwanda?" *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 2005, 43(1): 82-102.

Not available electronically.

Abstract: Principles of consociationalism and federalism have been successfully adopted by the strategic elites in a number of countries, including some in Africa, turning their once volatile politics into a more amicable order. It is proposed that the best hope for a less conflictual politics in Rwanda resides in an elite disposition towards political accommodation and the adoption of the non-majoritarian political arrangements associated with consociational federalism. This agenda is discussed in light of both the structural dimensions of consociationalism and federalism and, more briefly, of relevant African examples of their utilisation. Application of appropriately configured consociational and federal arrangements is presented as an imperative in such a deeply divided polity, where power commands monopolistic access to available resources and where those in power often employ violence and exclusion to safeguard their interests.

John Dryzek, "Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies. Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia," *Political Theory*, 2005, 33(2): 218-242.

Abstract: For contemporary democratic theorists, democracy is largely a matter of deliberation. But the recent rise of deliberative democracy (in practice as well as theory) coincided with ever more prominent identity politics, sometimes in murderous form in deeply divided societies. This essay considers how deliberative democracy can process the toughest issues concerning mutually contradictory assertions of identity. After considering the alternative answers provided by agonists and consociational democrats, the author makes the case for a power-sharing state with attenuated sovereignty and a more engaged deliberative politics in a public sphere that is semidetached from the state and situated transnationally. [Abstract from author]

Shaheen Mozaffar and James R. Scarritt, "The Puzzle of African Party Systems," *Party Politics*, 2005, 11(4): 399-422.

Not available electronically.

Abstract: Two puzzling features characterize African party systems: low fragmentation and high volatility. We present systematic data describing these features and provide a theoretically grounded explanation of them. The explanation emphasizes the role of strategic choice structured by the institutional legacies of authoritarian regimes in the formation and development of political parties. Political restrictions under authoritarian regimes produced severe information deficit concerning electoral mobilization, strategic

coordination and the collective action problems that typically attend party formation and coalition-building. Under these constraints, political actors in Africa's emerging democracies established political parties to preserve their fragmented power bases and relied on presidential elections and ethno-political cleavages as alternative sources of strategic coordination over votes and seats and electoral coalition-building. The result is the entry of large numbers of short-lived political parties, producing high volatility, and the electoral and legislative dominance of a small number of large parties producing low party system fragmentation. [Abstract from authors]

Vicky Randall and Lars Svasand, "Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Africa," *Democratization*, 2002, 9(3): 30-52.

Abstract: It has been assumed that African political parties should play a key role in democratic consolidation. This article first assesses their performance in terms of particular democratic functional requirements. Second, it seeks to explain apparent shortcoming in their performance by reference to the imbalance of the party systems and 'weakness' of parties, especially opposition parties, and also by reference to certain underlying factors. These include the economic context, weakness of civil society, prevalence of ethnicity as basis for political mobilization, personalism, clientelism and strong presidencies. [Abstract from author]

Matthijs Bogaards, "Electoral Choices for Divided Societies: Multi-Ethnic Parties and Constituency Pooling in Africa," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, November 2003, 41(3): 59-80.

Abstract: The third wave of democratisation has given new impetus to the debate about the choice of electoral system in divided societies. The growing preference for proportional representation has been dented by Horowitz's advocacy of 'vote pooling' through the alternative vote. However, the conditions in most African polities are unfavourable to the working of the alternative vote. This article seeks to reveal the hidden potential in Horowitz's analysis by focusing on 'constituency pooling' as a related but distinct way of promoting cross-cutting cleavages in the party system. The principle is illustrated with the unique Ugandan electoral law for the 1971 parliamentary elections and its possible application is examined with the help of the case of contemporary Nigeria. Constituency pooling may have special relevance for new democracies in Africa, because it is expected to work best under conditions of non-fragmented party systems and geographically concentrated ethnic groups. [Abstract from author]

Jeffrey Haynes, "Democratic Consolidation in Africa: The Problematic Case of Ghana," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, March 2003, 41(1): 48-76.

Abstract: Focuses on the democratic consolidation in Ghana under the government of presidents Jerry Rawlings and John Kufuor and the importance of structure and contingency in the development of democracy among African countries. Explores the relationship between class divisions and state power and discusses Ghana's democratization in post-colonial political history. The article provides details of the

influence of elites in determining political arrangements and focus of democratic consolidation on ethnicity and economy of foreign aid.

Hennie Kotzé and Pierre du Toit, "The State, Civil Society, and Democratic Transition in South Africa," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, March 1995, 39(1): 27-49.

Abstract: The presence of civil society is widely recognized as a crucially important component of the foundation of stable democracy. Divided societies can be expected to be lacking in this attribute. Yet claims have been made for the existence of a civil society in South Africa, which is usually typified as a leading example of a deeply divided society. The importance of this claim for the consolidation of democracy lies in the fact that negotiators were able to converge on a new set of constitutional rules of the game, to hold a founding election, and to establish a Government of National Unity to replace the apartheid state and regime. The question is whether these steps toward securing democracy after apartheid are buttressed by the presence of a civil society or are taken in its absence. If the latter applies, then the immediate task of the new government will have to be both to democratize the state and regime and to civilize society. This article addresses this question by reporting on data that bear on the attitudes of elites to the state and to a wide variety of civic bodies in South Africa. [Abstract from author]

James Hamill, "A Disguised Surrender? South Africa's Negotiated Settlement and the Politics of Conflict Resolution," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, September 2003, 14(3): 1-30.

Abstract: Since the drafting of the interim constitution in November 1993, it has become the fashion to hail South Africa as an inspirational example to other societies divided along racial, ethnic, or religious lines. The conventional wisdom has held the South African settlement to be a model for conflict resolution as former enemies demonstrated a willingness to transcend the bitter enmities of the past in favour of a common shared future. The terms 'miracle' and 'historic compromise' have been routinely attached to South Africa's negotiated settlement, descriptions which imply that the contending parties eschewed a zero-sum game mentality in favour of a positive-sum approach rooted in the politics of inclusiveness and mutual accommodation. This article argues that this 'peace without losers' version of the South African transition is essentially a fiction, albeit a politically convenient one. What the South African transition actually produced was a comprehensive victory for a majoritarian political philosophy at the expense of group-based or consociational models, and thus for one particular political movement, namely the African National Congress, at the expense of the historically white-based parties, principally the National Party. Consequently, although it may be an exaggeration to describe South Africa's transition as *sui generis*, this article concludes that South Africa's experience is certainly of limited relevance to the management and resolution of conflict in other deeply divided societies. [Abstract from author]

Shale Horowitz, "Source of Post-Communist Democratization: Economic Structure, Political Culture, War, and Political Institutions," *Nationalities Papers*, June 2003, 31(2): 119-137.

Abstract: The article focuses on statistical evidence to assess the impact of four factors commonly thought to affect democratization: (1) variation in economic structure and the strength of likely economic losers from democratization; (2) differences in political culture, defined in terms of religious traditions and national identities; (3) involvement in large-scale military conflict; and (4) following any initial transition to democracy, variation in strength of presidential powers and in party system cohesion. The varying economic structures of the former authoritarian regimes give rise to different kinds of economic policy cleavages following democratic transitions. Economically threatened interest groups are more likely both to oppose democratization and to try to overthrow new democracies. Economic structures that create larger coalitions of threatened interest groups are more likely to block or undermine transitions to democracy. Political cultures may incorporate values and traditions of rule that are more compatible with democratic institutions. Two more readily quantifiable aspects of political culture are examined here. In the post-communist context, the more obvious hypothesis is that Orthodox Christianity and especially Islam are less compatible with democracy than are either Protestant or Catholic Christianity. Directly, there must be elections in which all parties can compete equally, in which votes are accurately counted, and in which the victors take political power. [Abstract from EBSCO host]

Daniel P. Sullivan, "The missing pillars: a look at the failure of peace in Burundi through the lens of Arend Lijphart's theory of consociational democracy," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 2005, 43(1): 75-96.

Abstract: Looks at the arrangement in terms of Arend Lijphart's main pillars for successful consociationalism in deeply divided states; Assessment of the extent to which Lijphart's recommendations were implemented; Discussion of the lessons and further questions which are of particular importance as Burundi heads into its latest attempt at a stable and peaceful society; Insight into why the effort at peace failed and how future efforts could be improved. [Abstract from EBSCO host]

Sammy Smootha, "Types of Democracy and Modes of Conflict Management in Ethnically Divided Societies," *Nations and Nationalism*, 2002, 8(4): 423-431.

Abstract: The Western democratic nation–state is a model state in the world state system. It appears in two variants: individual–liberal and republican–liberal. Both are grounded on individual rights only. In the West there are also several cases of consociational democracy in which separate national communities and their collective rights are recognised. Since World War II the liberal nation–state has been under global and internal pressures to change. It has kept its basic character but partially decoupled nation and state and recognised group differences. Along with individual–liberal democracy, republican–liberal democracy and consociational democracy, multicultural democracy and ethnic democracy are taking shape as alternative types of democracy. This fivefold typology can contribute to the fields of comparative politics and comparative ethnicity. It serves as a broad framework for the analysis of five states in this special issue: Northern Ireland, Estonia, Israel, Poland and Turkey. [Abstract from author]

Daniel Brumberg, "The trap of liberalized autocracy," *Journal of Democracy*, October 2002,13(4): 56-68.

Abstract: The article explores the transition of the Middle Eastern countries away from and back toward authoritarianism. In order to understand why the political systems differ in the region, and to grasp why some partial autocracies are better than others at sustaining survival strategies, the author asks how the rulers perceive the threats they face by looking at the institutional, social, political, and ideological conditions that tend to intensify or reduce such threats. He argues that "the importance of threat perception lies in the very logic of partial autocracies: in order to endure, they must implicitly or explicitly allow some opposition forces certain kinds of social, political, or ideological power—but things must never reach a point where the regime feels deterred from using force when it deems fit. If a regime can keep up this balancing act, reformists within the government will find it easier to convince hard-liners that the benefits of accommodation outweigh the costs. Conversely, where it is hard to make this case, rulers will prefer total autocracy. As to the conditions that encourage a choice in favor of one or the other, these can be summarized as follows: States that promote competitive or *dissonant* politics will tend to feel surer that Islamist ambitions can be limited and so will be more willing to consider accommodating opposition, while states that promote hegemonic or *harmonic* politics will tend to invite more radical 'counterhegemonic' Islamist opposition movements whose presence increases the expected cost of political liberalization".

[Adapted from author]

Lucan Way, "Pluralism by default in Moldova," *Journal of Democracy*, October 2002,13(4): 127-141. Abstract not available.

"In the 1990s, Moldova, a small country sandwiched between Romania and Ukraine and bereft of a strong civil society, an established rule of law, and any previous democratic experience, nevertheless boasted remarkably competitive and democratic politics. In order to understand the persistence and intensity of pluralism in Moldova, as well as in other post-Soviet countries such as Russia and Ukraine through the mid-1990s, we need to move beyond the usual focus on democratic institution-building. Moldova should be seen less as a struggling democracy, where leaders strive to build more pluralistic institutions, and much more as a case of failed authoritarianism or what I call *pluralism by default*, a form of political competition specific to weak states.

Pluralism by default describes countries in which institutionalized political competition survives not because leaders are especially democratic or because societal actors are particularly strong, but because the government is too fragmented and the state too weak to impose authoritarian rule in a democratic international context. In such cases, leaders lack the authority and coordination to prevent today's allies from becoming tomorrow's challengers, control the legislature, impose censorship, manipulate elections successfully, or use force against political opponents. Such countries are caught in a paradox: The same state weakness and governmental fragmentation that promotes pluralism also

undermines effective governance and may ultimately threaten long-term democratic consolidation.”