

A S T U D Y

**VIET CONG
USE OF TERROR**

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
UNITED STATES MISSION IN VIETNAM

SAIGON-VIETNAM

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1. INTRODUCTION

In the Spring of 1959, the Communist leaders in North Vietnam were growing increasingly impatient. They had won the Viet Minh war five years before and felt they had been cheated out of what they believed was rightfully theirs: control of all Vietnam. That the government in the South was not party to any agreement delivering Vietnam to the communists, or that the people in the South did not want and would not accept such an arrangement, was beside the point. The Viet Minh leaders had won the war and they meant to have the fruits of victory. For five years they had waited for unification, placing their faith in the Soviet and Chinese communist diplomatic process. For five years their fellow communists -- using the argument that the South was so divided and its government so weak that soon the whole structure would collapse of its own weight -- had dissuaded them from taking direct action to bring all of Vietnam under the red banner.

But finally the waiting game could no longer be endured. Worse, the South steadily was gathering strength and daily its government was becoming more stable. Time was running against the men in Hanoi. And so on March 13, 1959, the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party, meeting in Hanoi, declared that the time had come to begin the task of "liberating the South . . . to struggle heroically and perseveringly to smash the Southern regime."

To smash the Southern regime -- that was the stated objective. The method was to eliminate by force the Southern governmental apparatus, the country's official and natural leaders and establish in each village an apparatus tied to Hanoi. The assault began in the villages and was to work its way up through the district and then provincial governmental levels until at last there would be a direct attack on the central government itself. Along the way, the enemy's instruments of power -- his police and his armed forces -- would be won over by proselyting or nullified by force.

A two-pronged attack was ordered -- a political attack and an armed attack. Underlying both attacks was the rational use of terror. Terror was made an integral part of the planned campaign to achieve the single political objective: unification of Vietnam under the communist banner.

This is a study of the specific uses which the Viet Cong have made of terror during the past eight years. The Viet Cong terror program has become sophisticated and highly developed, shaped by a number of forces: rural Vietnamese climate of opinion, the availability of resources and personnel, the inherent dangers involved in its use, governmental counter-measures, historical lessons, and Viet Cong grand strategy.

The public rationale for use of force was that the enemy had given the Viet Cong no alternative. Said an early indoctrination

booklet:

"During the first years following the reestablishment of peace (Post-1954) the people of South Vietnam engaged in a peaceful political struggle. But the warlike and terrorist policies of the enemy forced them to take up rifles and begin an armed struggle ... The U.S. - Diem clique uses collaborators, villains, spies, Self Defense Corps members, and secret police agents to carry out fascist policies and to terrorize and suppress the people's political struggle. Thus it is necessary to counter-attack the enemy's military units, to destroy collaborators, villains, secret police agents and spies ... (violence) is required:

- (1) because the enemy's political weaknesses have forced him to resort to force of arms to impose his will and this must be countered ...
- (2) because it will enhance the political struggle ...
- (3) and because it prevents the enemy from mingling freely among the village masses ... helps isolate him and thins out his ranks ..."

Justifying the use of terror was never an easy matter for the NLF. The natural abhorrence of rural Vietnamese for systematic slaughter formed a major and continuous problem which the leadership constantly sought to overcome. Among NLF cadres, especially those recruited locally, the use of force seemed both

repugnant and unnecessary. Even among more sophisticated cadres there was the widespread belief that the NLF could win by the political struggle alone and need not use terror. The response by the leadership to these reactions was thoroughly to mix the violence program and the political struggle and insist that the blend was essentially political. It also administered massive doses of indoctrination to cadres to convince them that victory could be achieved only by measured use of force and violence.

"We have learned," said an indoctrination booklet, "that the only correct way to organize revolutionary forces and make preparations in all areas to smash the enemy's machinery of violence is to use the appropriate form of armed struggle ... Therefore from the masses' struggle movement there has emerged a new struggle form, the armed struggle. Emergence of this new struggle form not only meets an urgent demand, but is an inevitable result of the revolutionary movement. It does not contradict the political struggle, but supplements it and paves the way for the political struggle to develop."

At any rate there is no doubt that the historical development of the NLF from 1960 to 1967 (as well as the 1957-60 period) was characterized by the growing use of violence and terror and by

increased efforts to make its use more palatable in and out of the Viet Cong ranks. And whereas the early effort had been essentially the political struggle, the attack against the post-Diem governments was basically the armed struggle.

The primary objective of the violence program was to make the political struggle movement possible. The terror program was central to the violence program -- it was the hardener in the formula, the steel in the superstructure.

Early acts of terrorism, in the 1957 to 1962 period were mainly local and sporadic and consisted largely of assassinations and kidnappings designed to eliminate or nullify local leadership opposition. A more concerted program of terror and violence began in December 1962 when the NLF Central Committee issued orders for increased use of terrorism:

"We should organize attacks against the enemy in his rear areas, to upset him. In the past this activity has been neglected. There has been no adequate preparation or organization. Weapons and facilities were lacking. Now, we should set up specialized units and clandestine forces to attack communication centers, warehouses, airports, and U.S. offices particularly. Public utilities such as electric plants, machines, etc., are not to be sabotaged yet. In carrying out sabotage activities in urban areas, always protect our organization. Clandestine organizations for sabotage in urban

areas should be set up separately and have no connection with political organizations. When using such organizations, in Saigon, in particular, consider carefully all immediate and all future advantages and drawbacks before performing an act. "

2. THE TERRORISTS

The basic unit of all Viet Cong elements, as is common in a communist organization, is the three-man cell. In GVN controlled areas where of course it is covert, it is known as the Secret Guerrilla Cell. All Viet Cong within government controlled areas belong to such a cell. In addition, in the GVN controlled areas, there are other types of cells, two of which, under the bland names of Special Activities Cell and Sapper Cells, have been organized to carry out acts of terror.

Highly motivated, willing to take great risks, operating in either urban or rural areas they know well, members of these cells are able to strike virtually anywhere, at any time. From the rosters of these cells are drawn the assassination teams, the volunteer grenade hurlers and the death or suicide squads. Most of the spectacular acts of terror, sabotage, assassinations throughout Vietnam are the work of these cells. Although highly motivated and possessing good knowledge of local terrain these Cell members usually lack technical skills, such as the ability to manufacture and detonate explosive devices. Those technical skills, and sometimes leadership, is supplied by the Provincial or Zone Headquarters of the National Liberation Front. The frogman who blew a hole in the USS CARD, May 2, 1964, in Saigon harbor, undoubtedly was such a specialist sent in

for the job. The bombing of a major building in Saigon, which requires careful planning, timing, coordination and must be rehearsed until letter perfect, also is supervised by a specialist from Zone Headquarters.

A typical Viet Cong terrorist was Nguyen Anh Tuan, 37, who was captured January 7, 1966 while enroute to the Alabama Hotel, U.S. enlisted men's billet in downtown Saigon. Tuan, and the two other members of his Special Activities Cell were arrested by alert police a few blocks from the hotel and a 264 pound bomb was discovered hidden under the false floor of their three-wheeled cart.

Tuan appeared before the press on January 13, still defiant, and declared he would try again if he ever escaped. A Vietnamese school was adjacent to the Alabama Hotel, and police had estimated that perhaps 100 Vietnamese school children would have been killed or injured had the terrorist act been successful. When an incredulous Vietnamese reporter asked whether he would have felt even slightly remorseful about killing or maiming Vietnamese children, Tuan replied: "No, I wouldn't feel any remorse at all. This we cannot help."

Terrorists quite obviously must be strongly dedicated and highly militant. Most of them are young. Tuan's chief assistant for example was 19. Except for major terror acts, such as the

attempt to destroy the Alabama, daring and risky terror enterprises are assigned to youths in their teens. They are more easily influenced in their thinking, are more willing to take risks, physically are more capable of the tasks assigned them, are less prone to question orders and less likely to be or to become double agents. The optimum age for Viet Cong terrorists appears to be around 18. Some of the city saboteurs, such as grenade throwing boys are 13 or 14, and seldom past 25. The exceptions of course are the specialists.

Thousands of South Vietnamese living in rural areas have shown a high degree of courage and determination in resisting Viet Cong terrorism.

Nguyen Thich, was a poor farmer with a few worldly possessions, but as his neighbors report, he had "moral courage" -- the courage to speak out for what he believed to be right.

He had the courage to stand up at political meetings held by the Viet Cong in his hamlet in Duy Xuyen District of Quang Nam Province -- and to criticize the terror and sabotage committed by the communist guerrillas.

Mr. Thich asked how the Viet Cong could say they were fighting

a war of liberation when they were terrorizing the countryside and destroying the property of the very people they said they were trying to liberate. Moreover, according to his neighbors, Mr. Thich did this not once, but twice.

Shortly afterward Mr. Thich was kidnaped from his home by the Viet Cong and literally beaten to death. The 56-year-old farmer's body was then thrown callously to the ground in the village market place.

Stories such as this one are not news in South Vietnam, for, in 1965 alone, a daily average of more than 35 civilians, including women and children, were murdered or kidnaped by communist terrorists. And, more than 100 other acts of terror were carried out daily against the civilian population. The Viet Cong atrocity total for the year: over 12,000 civilians kidnaped or killed and more than 36,000 other acts of terrorism inflicted on the Vietnamese people.

Equally brutal attacks against government officials and their families have been frequent. In 1964, the average number of local officials murdered or kidnaped each month was 95. By 1965, the monthly average had climbed above 135 a month.

All Viet Cong atrocities are coldly organized for political purposes.

For instance, in February, 1966, Viet Cong mines blew up two buses carrying Vietnamese civilians who were in the midst of the unwarlike task of harvesting rice. The toll: 39 dead and seven wounded. Such acts are never really indiscriminate - there is always a purpose. A warning not to cooperate with or give information to the government - or an effort to spread the prestige of terror to demonstrate power - the victim himself may not be important. He doesn't even have to be guilty of the alleged crime - if his death will get the point across.

When the Viet Cong enter a village, they often try to win the local inhabitants to their cause through persuasion. When they are faced with opposition, however, terror is quickly used to force compliance.

Terrorism also has the important objective of disrupting the normal process of government and causing the villagers to lose faith in the ability of the central government to protect them. Thus, if the village chief, the symbol of the South Vietnamese Government, does not cooperate with the Viet Cong, he is likely to be shot or kidnaped.

Nguyen Van Tram was a village chief in Kien Phong Province. The Viet Cong kidnaped him and made him pay a ransom of 42,000

piasters. Afterward they chopped off one of his fingers to remind him that they, the Viet Cong, were to be feared and obeyed.

Mr. Tram was comparatively fortunate. One evening the Viet Cong entered the house of Huynh Huu Be, Chief of Phong Dinh Village. They dragged him into the courtyard of his home with the obvious intention of murdering him. His wife, who had been bathing their six-year-old daughter, ran out of the house and threw herself in front of her husband. The Viet Cong shot her. Then they shot her husband.

Meanwhile, their terrified daughter ran out of the back door to hide in the garden. A Viet Cong guerrilla spotted the child and riddled her naked body with bullets from a sub-machine gun. The murder had been coldly planned two weeks earlier and was carried out calmly - without emotion.

Many observers attribute the rise in atrocities to the military set-backs the Viet Cong have suffered and to the rising opposition to them by the people of South Vietnam. Recently captured Viet Cong have admitted that villagers flee into the jungle or government-held areas when the guerrillas enter a village to collect "taxes" in the form of money or rice and other foodstuffs.

There have been other indications that the continuing Viet Cong

terrorist campaigns have begun to meet with increased resistance. In a small village just outside the city of Hue, the Viet Cong were faced with vocal opposition from a number of courageous inhabitants when communist guerrillas arrived to collect "taxes." The Viet Cong selected two of the older members of the community, one 85 years old and the other 65, and shot them.

But instead of yielding to the Viet Cong terrorist pressure, more than 1,000 farmers and their families courageously staged an open demonstration in support of the South Vietnamese Government -- even though it was known that members of the Viet Cong band were still in the area.

3. THE TERROR

In order to provide the reader with a sense of the type of Viet Cong terror activity during the past eight years typical examples have been selected from government files, newspaper morgues and International Control Commission reports. This list is in no way complete, but it does provide a representative picture of the kind of terrorist activity which the Viet Cong have engaged in during the 1960s:

February 2, 1960 -- The Viet Cong sack and burn the Buddhist temple in Phuoc Trach Village, Go Dau Ha District, Tay Ninh Province. They stab to death 17-year-old Phan Van Ngoc who tries to stop them.

April 22, 1960 -- Some 30 armed Viet Cong raid Thoi Long Hamlet, Thoi Binh Village, Thoi Binh District, An Xuyen Province. They attempt to take away villager Cao Van Hanh, 45. Villagers protest en masse, farmer Pham Van Bai, 56, is particularly vehement. The Viet Cong, angered, seize him. This arouses the villagers who swarm toward the Viet Cong and their prisoner. The Viet Cong fire into the crowd. A 16-year-old boy is shot dead.

August 23, 1960 -- Two school teachers, Nguyen Khoa Ngon and Miss Nguyen Thi Thiet, are preparing lessons at home when Viet Cong arrive and force them at gun point to go to their school, Rau Ran, in Phong Dinh Province. There they find two men tied to the

school veranda. The Viet Cong read the death sentence of the two men, named Canh and Van. They are murdered. The Viet Cong stage the murder presumably to intimidate the school teachers.

September 24, 1960 -- A band of armed Viet Cong burn a school in An Lac Village, Tri Tan District, An Giang Province. All that remains are four walls.

September 28, 1960 -- Father Hoang Ngoc Minh, much loved priest of Kontum Parish is riding from Tan Canh to Kondela. A Viet Cong road block halts his car. A bullet smashes into him. The guerrillas drive bamboo spears into Father Minh's body. A Viet Cong fires his sub-machine gun point-blank, killing him. The driver Huynh HUU, his nephew, is seriously wounded.

September 30, 1960 -- A band of ten armed Viet Cong kidnap farmer Truong Van Dang, 67, from Long An Hamlet, Long Tri Village, Binh Phuoc District, Long An Province. They take him before what they call a "people's tribunal." He is condemned to death for purchasing two hectares of rice land and ignoring Viet Cong orders to turn the land over to another farmer. After the "trial" he is shot dead in his rice field.

December 6, 1960 -- The Viet Cong dynamite the kitchen at the Saigon Golf Club, killing a Vietnamese kitchen helper and injuring

two Vietnamese cooks.

December 1960 -- The GVN reports to the ICC that during the year the Viet Cong had destroyed or damaged 284 bridges, burned 60 medical aid stations and, by destroying schools, deprived some 25,000 children of schooling.

March 22, 1961 -- A truck carrying 20 girls is dynamited on the Saigon-Vung Tau road. The girls are returning from Saigon where they have taken part in a Trung Sisters Day celebration. After the explosion the Viet Cong open fire on the passengers. Two of the girls are killed and ten wounded. The girls are unarmed and traveling without escort.

May 15, 1961 -- Twelve Catholic nuns from La Providence Order, are traveling on Highway One toward Saigon. Their bus is stopped by Viet Cong who ransack their luggage. Sister Theophile protests and is shot dead on the spot. The vehicle is sprayed with bullets seriously wounding Sister Phan Thi No. The ambush takes place at Tram Van Hamlet, Thanh Phuoc Village, Go Dau Ha District, Tay Ninh Province.

July 26, 1961 -- Two Vietnamese National Assemblymen, Rmah Pok and Yut Nic Bounrit, both Montagnards, are shot and killed by Viet Cong near Dalat. A school teacher traveling with them on their visit to a Montagnard resettlement village, is also killed.

September 20, 1961 -- One thousand main force Viet Cong soldiers storm the capital of Phuoc Thanh Province, sack and burn the government buildings, behead virtually the entire administrative staff. They hold the capital for 24 hours before withdrawing.

October 1961 -- A U.S. State Department study estimates that the Viet Cong are killing Vietnamese at the rate of 1500 per month.

December 13, 1961 -- Father Bonnet, a French parish priest from Konkala, Kontum, is killed by Viet Cong while he was visiting parishioners at Ngok Rongei.

December 20, 1961 -- S. Fukai, a Japanese engineer working on the Da Nhim dam, a Japanese government war reparations project to supply electric power to Vietnam, is kidnaped after being stopped at a Viet Cong road block. His fate is never learned.

January 1, 1962 -- A Vietnamese labor leader, Le Van Thieu, 63, is hacked to death by Viet Cong wielding machetes near Bien Hoa, in the rubber plantation on which he works.

January 2, 1962 -- Two Vietnamese technicians working in the government's anti-malaria program, Pham Van Hai and Nguyen Van Thach, are killed by Viet Cong with machetes, twelve miles south of Saigon.

February 20, 1962 -- Viet Cong throw four hand grenades into

a crowded village theater near Can Tho, killing 24 women and children. A total of 108 persons are killed or injured.

April 8, 1962 -- The Viet Cong murder two wounded American prisoners of war near the village of An Chau in Central Vietnam. Each, with hands tied, is shot in the face. They could not keep up with their retreating Viet Cong captors.

April 25, 1962 -- Two French civilians are shot and killed by Viet Cong while boating on the Saigon River just outside the city.

May 19, 1962 -- A Viet Cong grenade is hurled into the Aterbea restaurant in Saigon wounding a Berlin circus manager and the Cultural Attache from the German Embassy.

May 20, 1962 -- A bomb explodes in front of the Hung Dao Hotel, Saigon, a billet for American servicemen, injuring eight Vietnamese and three Americans who are in the street at the time.

June 12, 1962 -- The Viet Cong ambush a civilian passenger bus near Le Tri Hamlet in An Giang Province, killing all the passengers, the driver and the driver's helper, a total of five men and women.

October 20, 1962 -- A teen-age Viet Cong hurls a grenade into a holiday crowd in downtown Saigon killing six persons, including two children, and injuring 38 persons.

November 4, 1962 -- A Viet Cong hurls a grenade into an alley

in Can Tho killing one American serviceman and two Vietnamese children. A third Vietnamese child is seriously injured.

January 25, 1963 -- Viet Cong dynamite a passenger-freight train near Qui Nhon killing eight passengers and injuring 15 others. The train is carrying only rice as freight.

March 4, 1963 -- Two Protestant missionaries -- Elwood Forreston, an American, and Gaspart Makil, a Filipino, are shot at a road block between Saigon and Dalat. The Makil twin babies are shot and wounded.

March 16, 1963 -- Viet Cong terrorists hurl a grenade into a home where an American family is having dinner, killing a French businessman and wounding four other persons, one of them a woman.

April 3, 1963 -- Viet Cong terrorists throw two grenades into a private school near Long Xuyen, An Giang Province, killing a teacher and two other adults. Students are performing their annual variety show at the time.

April 4, 1963 -- Viet Cong terrorists throw grenades into an audience attending an outdoor motion picture showing in Cao Lanh Village in the Mekong Delta, killing four persons and wounding 11.

May 23, 1963 -- Viet Cong mine the main northern rail line killing five civilian passengers. Twelve other passengers and crew

are injured.

May 31, 1963 -- Two powerful explosions set off by terrorists on bicycles kill two Vietnamese and wound ten others in Saigon. Police believe the explosive detonated prematurely.

September 12, 1963 -- Miss Vo Thi Lo, 26, a school teacher in An Phuoc Village, Kien Hoa Province is found near the village with her throat cut. She had been kidnaped by the Viet Cong three days earlier.

October 16, 1963 -- Viet Cong terrorists explode mines under two civilian buses in Kien Hoa and Quang Tin Provinces, killing 18 Vietnamese and wounding 23.

October 26, 1963 -- The French Embassy in Saigon reports that four French planters were kidnaped and two others wounded in machine gun attacks on French rubber plantations east of Saigon.

November 9, 1963 -- Three grenades are thrown in Saigon, injuring a total of 16 persons including four children; the first is thrown in a main street; the second along the waterfront and the third in the Chinese residential area.

February 9, 1964 -- A bomb explodes in the Playboy Bar in Saigon killing four Vietnamese and injuring 35 Vietnamese and four Americans.

February 9, 1964 -- Two Americans are killed and 41 wounded

including four women, five children when a Viet Cong bomb is set off in a sports stadium during a softball game. A second portion of the bomb fails to explode. Officials estimate that had it detonated fifty persons would have died.

February 16, 1964 -- Three Americans are killed and 32 injured, most of them U.S. dependents, when the Viet Cong bomb the Kinh Do movie theater in Saigon.

February 21, 1964 -- The Saigon - DaNang train is derailed, with 11 persons killed and 18 seriously injured.

July 14, 1964 -- Pham Thao, chairman of the Catholic Action Committee in Quang Ngai is executed by Viet Cong when he returns to his native village of Pho Loi in Quang Ngai.

October 1964 -- U.S. officials in Saigon report that from January to October of 1964 the Viet Cong killed 429 local Vietnamese officials and kidnaped 482 others.

December 24, 1964 -- A Christmas Eve Viet Cong bomb explosion at the Brink officer billet kills two Americans and injures 50 Americans and 13 Vietnamese.

February 6, 1965 -- Radio Liberation announces that the Viet Cong have shot two American prisoners of war as reprisals against the Vietnamese government which had sentenced two Viet Cong terrorists to death.

February 10, 1965 -- Viet Cong terrorists blow up an enlisted men's barracks in Qui Nhon killing 23 Americans.

March 30, 1965 -- A Viet Cong bomb explodes outside the American Embassy in Saigon killing two Americans, 18 Vietnamese and injuring 100 Vietnamese and 45 Americans.

June 24, 1965 -- Radio Liberation announces the murder of an American prisoner as a reprisal.

June 25, 1965 -- Terrorists dynamite the My Canh restaurant in Saigon killing 27 Vietnamese, 12 Americans, two Filipinos, one Frenchman, one German; more than 80 persons are injured.

June 1965 -- Vietnamese officials report that Viet Cong assassinations and kidnappings of rural officials doubled in June over May and April. A total of 224 officials were either killed or kidnaped.

August 18, 1965 -- A Viet Cong bomb at the Saigon Police Directorate in Saigon kills six and wounds 15 Vietnamese.

October 4, 1965 -- One of two Viet Cong planted bombs explodes at the Cong Hoa National Sports Stadium killing eleven Vietnamese, including four children and wounding 42 other persons.

October 5, 1965 -- A Viet Cong bomb goes off, apparently prematurely, in a taxi on a main street in downtown Saigon killing two Vietnamese and wounding ten others, most of them Vietnamese.

December 4, 1965 -- A Viet Cong terrorist bomb kills eight persons when it explodes in front of a Saigon hotel converted to quarters for U.S. enlisted men, 157 are injured, including 72 Americans, three New Zealanders and 62 Vietnamese.

December 12, 1965 -- Two Viet Cong terrorist platoons kill 23 unarmed Vietnamese canal construction workers asleep in a Buddhist Pagoda in Tan Huong Village, Dinh Tuong Province, and wound seven others.

January 7, 1966 -- A Claymore mine explodes at Tan Son Nhut gate killing two persons and injuring 12.

January 17, 1966 -- Viet Cong in Kien Tuong detonate a mine under a highway bus, killing 26 Vietnamese civilians, seven of them children. Eight other persons are injured and three listed as missing.

January 18, 1966 -- Viet Cong mine a bus in Kien Tuong Province killing 26 civilians.

January 29, 1966 -- Viet Cong terrorists kill a Roman Catholic priest, Father Phan Khac Dau, 74, at Thanh Tri, Kien Tuong Province. Five other civilians, including a church officer, are also killed. The marauders desecrate the church and destroy its statuary and religious artifacts.

February 2, 1966 -- A Viet Cong squad ambush a jeep load

of Vietnamese Information Service personnel, killing six and wounding one in Hau Nghia Province.

February 14, 1966 -- Two Viet Cong mines explode under a bus and a three-wheeled taxi on a road near Tuy Hoa killing 48 farm laborers and injuring seven others.

February 14, 1966 -- Fifty-four Vietnamese civilians, including four children, are killed and 18 wounded by three Viet Cong mines buried in a road in Phu Yen Province.

Mining of the road was in retaliation for an Allied operation guarding the harvesting of the rice crop. The area had had to import 600 tons of rice monthly because the Viet Cong control the major portion of the crop.

The first explosion, which left a three-meter crater in the road and threw the large bus into a canal, killed 27 farmers on their way to work near Tuy Hoa. Eleven others are injured.

A three-wheel bus, loaded with men, women, and children, touches off the second mine which kills 20 and wounds seven. Another three-wheel bus sets off the third mine, which kills seven.

March 18, 1966 -- Fifteen Vietnamese civilians are killed and four injured in the explosion of a homemade Viet Cong mine on a country road eight kilometers west of Tuy Hoa, capital of

Phu Yen Province (380 kilometers or 240 miles northeast of Saigon).

Most of the victims were riding in a Lambretta tricycle which struck the mine. Others were on bicycles. The blast ripped the Lambretta apart, and twisted the bicycle frames.

Authorities said the mine was a pressure-detonated type made of bamboo and contained about 20 pounds of TNT. They added that the mine was probably used to terrorize villagers returning to their homes from refugee camps in the area.

April 7, 1966 -- Twenty-five prisoners of the Viet Cong -- mostly civilians and including three women -- all of them chained and padlocked -- are gunned by their communist captors just minutes before Vietnamese Government troops, accompanied by American advisors, arrive on the scene.

The victims had been prisoners of the Viet Cong for varying lengths of time -- some of them since September, 1965. The survivors told of being shuttled back and forth between two Viet Cong prisons and of months of ill treatment.

The Viet Cong were forcing the prisoners, all chained together, to march to a new site when they were spotted from the air. When friendly troops were closing in the Viet Cong apparently felt their escape was being hampered by their chained captives and according to the survivors they were told they could walk

away. After they had started to do so, the Viet Cong shot them from behind.

May 22, 1966 -- Viet Cong terrorists slaughter 18 men, a woman and four children late at night in attacking a compound of canal workers in the Mekong Delta Province of An Giang.

The defenseless families were shot in their beds.

The Viet Cong boasted that the cold-blooded action was deliberate murder for revenge. Survivors quoted them as saying they were retaliating because the 60 canal workers and other residents of An Giang Province had been supporting the Government of Vietnam by giving information about the Viet Cong.

"We are doing this now to teach you a lesson," one Viet Cong cadre was reported as saying, just before he pulled the trigger.

Most of the 23 victims were shot in the head. At least 12 others in the compound were wounded. The slayings occurred in Vinh Han Village, 160 kilometers west-southwest of Saigon.

October 11, 1966 -- Acting upon information from a 14-year-old-boy, a unit of the U.S. First Air Cavalry uncovers a Viet Cong prison complex with bodies of 12 Vietnamese who were machine-gunned and grenaded by their fleeing guards.

The Vietnamese youth, one of five to escape the slaughter,

said he had been held prisoner by the Viet Cong with 16 other Vietnamese and two North Vietnamese soldiers in a prison complex hidden under woven jungle vines 33 miles north-northwest of Qui Nhon, capital of Binh Dinh Province.

The boy told how the Viet Cong guards threw grenades and shot into the prisoners after they had been herded into a rock crevice. Luckily the boy escaped death when he happened to fall under the bodies of the slain prisoners. Two prisoners were not found.

A 24-year-old former Viet Cong medic, who had also survived the slaughter, led the American Cavalry unit to the camp, where they found the 12 dead Vietnamese prisoners.

October 24, 1966 -- The Hue-Quang Tri bus runs over a Viet Cong mine in Phong Dien District, Thua Thien Province; 15 passengers are injured.

October 22, 1966 -- A village Youth Commissioner in Binh Chanh District of Gia Dinh Province is shot and killed by a Viet Cong sapper team while asleep in his home.

October 27, 1966 -- A grenade is thrown into a home in Ban Me Thuot, Darlac Province, killing a 63-year-old male civilian and a nine-month-old male child; seven other persons, including six females, are wounded.

October 28, 1966 -- An alert policeman arrests a female Viet Cong agent who is about to place a time-bomb under the reviewing stand at a Cambodian festival in Soc Trang, Ba Xuyen Province.

November 1, 1966 -- The Viet Cong kill the son of a Hamlet Chief in Hoa Vang District of Quang Nam Province.

November 2, 1966 -- A grenade is thrown by a terrorist at the front gate of the Phu Tho racetrack in Saigon, located in the 5th Precinct.

Approximately 3,000 Revolutionary Development Cadres were billeted in the racetrack at this time. Two ARVN soldiers were killed in the explosion and eight other persons were wounded. Among the wounded were two children and a Saigon policeman. The terrorist escaped.

November 2, 1966 -- A squad of armed Viet Cong guerrillas ambush a Hamlet in Chau Thanh District; Phong Dinh Province.

The Viet Cong fired machine guns and then withdrew, after having placed a 10 kilogram mine which detonated, destroying one-third of a steel bridge at the Dau Sau Canal and wounding one old woman and two children.

November 4, 1966 -- The Viet Cong launch a mortar attack against Binh Long Hamlet and Trang Lon Airport in Phuoc Ninh District of Tay Ninh Province; 16 civilians are wounded and two are killed.

November 4, 1966 -- The Viet Cong attack a settlement in Darlac Province, wounding two civilians and burning 22 houses.

November 4, 1966 -- The Viet Cong mortar Trang Bang in Hau Nghia Province, killing one civilian and wounding eight others.

November 4, 1966 -- The Viet Cong attack Suoi Cao Regional Force (RF) outpost in Khiem Hanh District of Tay Ninh Province; two Revolutionary Development Cadres are wounded and six civilians are killed.

November 5, 1966 -- A Hamlet Chief is shot and killed, one Deputy Hamlet Chief is wounded and two other GVN employees are kidnaped by terrorists at a New Life Hamlet in Phuoc Ninh District of Tay Ninh Province.

November 7, 1966 -- One Viet Cong squad on Provincial Road 8 in Kien Duc District, Quang Duc Province, abducts a Hamlet Chief and Deputy Chief for having transported an official letter to the Kien Duc District Police Headquarters.

November 8, 1966 -- A Viet Cong terrorist tosses a grenade into a house occupied by a Hamlet Chief in Go Cap District; the occupant is seriously wounded in the explosion.

November 8, 1966 -- In Chau Doc Province, a 53-year-old woman is tortured and shot to death by the Viet Cong in Tinh Bien District.

A note pinned to her body declared that she was a traitor working

for the GVN.

November 9, 1966 -- Three Viet Cong terrorists ambush a Village Administrative Committeeman in Binh Chanh District of Gia Dinh Province.

November 11, 1966 -- The Viet Cong fire 25 rounds of 81 mm mortar at a community in Kien Giang Province, three civilians are killed and 40 are wounded.

November 15, 1966 -- A Viet Cong platoon infiltrate Phu Hai Hamlet in Hoa Da District, they smash and burn furniture in the Hamlet office, burn down a guardpost, disseminate propaganda leaflets and then depart, taking with them an alleged civilian sympathizer.

November 16, 1966 -- A terrorist parks a plastic-laden bicycle on Nguyen Van Thoai Street in Saigon; the device explodes and two ARVN soldiers and a Vietnamese civilian are wounded.

November 16, 1966 -- The Hamlet Chief of Hai Xuan, Binh Phuoc District, Long An Province, is assassinated by Viet Cong with carbine fire while he is returning to the Hamlet on foot.

November 19, 1966 -- The Viet Cong drop eight mortar rounds on Can Giuoc, Long An Province. Two children are killed and 12 civilians are wounded during this attack. At approximately the same time, 20 mortar rounds are dopped on Can Duoc, one

policeman, four civilians were wounded.

November 20, 1966 -- Two policemen are wounded when they attempted to move several Viet Cong banners which are booby trapped.

November 25, 1966 -- Three Viet Cong dressed in ARVN uniforms shoot and kill a policeman guarding a bridge in Soc Trang, Ba Xuyen Province. While escaping the terrorists threw two grenades, wound seven civilians and two soldiers.

November 26, 1966 -- A Claymore-type mine is set off by the Viet Cong in the playground of the Trinh Hoai Duc Boys' School in An Thanh Village, Binh Duong Province. Korean troops are using the area as a judo training site. Three Koreans are killed and one Vietnamese student wounded.

November 27, 1966 -- A squad of Viet Cong enter a Hamlet in Thanh An District, Pleiku Province, and abduct the Hamlet Chief and two Montagnards.

November 30, 1966 -- The Viet Cong shell the Tan Uyen market area in Bien Hoa Province, killing three civilians and wounding seven others.

December 4, 1966 -- A Village Chief in Gia Dinh Province is abducted from his home in Phu Lam by four unidentified men and killed with seven shots in the chest.

December 5, 1966 -- In Nam Hoa District, Thua Thien Province, the mother of a Hamlet Chief is shot by the Viet Cong.

December 5, 1966 -- A woman civilian is wounded by a Viet Cong mine in Kien Phong Province; another civilian is seriously hurt when the Viet Cong throw a hand grenade into a restaurant in Kien Hoa Province.

December 6, 1966 -- In Tuy Phuoc District, Binh Dinh Province, a former Village Chief and his wife are killed by the Viet Cong.

December 7, 1966 -- In the heart of Saigon, Deputy Tran Van Van of the National Constituent Assembly, Government of South Vietnam, is assassinated by the Viet Cong.

Van was going from his home to the Assembly building in his automobile when, at the intersection of Phan Dinh Phung and Phan Ke Binh Streets, the car is suddenly blocked by two men riding a Honda motor-bike. One dismounts and, at point blank range, mortally wounds Deputy Van who died on the way to the hospital.

December 10, 1966 -- A terrorist throws a grenade into the Chieu Hoi district playground in Binh Duong City.

Three young civilians were seriously hurt.

December 10, 1966 -- A tri-Lambretta taxi traveling along

National Highway #29 in Phong Dinh Province, is mined by the Viet Cong. Five of the passengers, all women, are killed and the driver is badly wounded.

December 11, 1966 -- A company of Viet Cong infiltrate the Xoc Xoai New Life Hamlet in Vinh Binh Province and assassinate two Hamlet Chiefs.

December 13, 1966: While more than 100 Revolutionary Development Cadre are attending a course at the Ca Mau School, An Xuyen Province, a mine explodes in the classroom, killing three and wounding nine.

December 14, 1966 -- The Viet Cong mine and destroy 95% of the My Long School.

In the ensuing confusion, they kidnap three civilians.

December 18, 1966 -- In Binh Dinh Province, four Viet Cong infiltrate a Hamlet in Phu My District, and assassinate three women accused of being informants for the Government of Vietnam.

December 20, 1966 -- A Viet Cong platoon infiltrates a Hamlet in Quang Tin Province, kidnap a hoi chanh (a returnee under the Chieu Hoi Program), carry him to another Hamlet of the village and summarily shoot him as an example.

December 27, 1966 -- An assassination attempt is made on another National Constituent Assemblyman, Dr. Phan Quang Dan.

Dr. Dan narrowly escaped death when his car exploded near Gia

Dinh Province Headquarters. The explosion was attributed to a Viet Cong plastic mine which had been planted beneath the vehicle and detonated as Dr. Dan opened the front door of the car. Although he suffered only minor leg wounds, a female passerby was killed and five other civilians wounded.

December 30, 1966 -- In Lac Duong District an undetermined number of Viet Cong infiltrate Thas Phien Hamlet and shoot to death a former Hamlet Chief.

January 4, 1967 -- In the village of An Hoa, Bien Hoa Province, the Viet Cong shoot to death a Hamlet Chief.

January 6, 1967 -- A National Police Constable assigned to Vinh Binh Provincial Police Headquarters is visiting his family in Tan Chu Hamlet, Cao Lanh District, Dien Phong Province, when a squad of Viet Cong enter the Hamlet, forcibly remove the Constable from his house and then shoot him while members of his family are forced to look on.

January 7, 1967 -- A Viet Cong detonated mine destroys a school and health station in Hong Ngu District, Kien Phong Province.

January 8, 1967 -- In An Xuyen Province the Viet Cong throw a grenade into the house of a Hamlet Chief in Tai Van District, kill one of his children and injured three other civilians.

January 9, 1967 -- The house of the Tan Thanh Village Chief, Kien Phong Province, is destroyed by a Viet Cong mine. In the explosion, one of the village civilians is badly wounded.

January 10, 1967 -- A Viet Cong platoon forces its way into the Ly Tra Refugee Camp in Quang Tin Province and shoot to death two of the refugees.

January 12, 1967 -- Three civilians are killed and three ARVN soldiers are wounded when the Viet Cong ambush a civilian truck traveling on National Highway 14, two kilometers south of Tan Canh Village, Kontum Province.

January 15, 1967 -- In Thanh Tho Hamlet, Tam Ky District, the Viet Cong summarily shoot a merchant because he refuses to give them two of his oxen.

January 17, 1967 -- In the Hamlet of An Chanh, Binh Khe District, Binh Dinh Province, the Viet Cong shoot to death the Hamlet Chief and afterwards burn his house.

January 21, 1967 -- An estimated platoon of Viet Cong forces its way into a Hamlet in Buon Ho, Darlac Province, gathers the people together for a propaganda lecture and then kidnaps six of the young men.

January 22, 1967 -- A group of Viet Cong enters a Hamlet of

Hoai An District, Binh Dinh Province, and assassinates the Chief.

February 1, 1967 -- One squad of Viet Cong fire sub-machine guns and automatic rifles at the 7th Precinct Headquarters in Saigon; the Viet Cong also fired 10 mortar rounds at the installation but these did not reach the target. Seven civilians are wounded, including three children.

February 6, 1967 -- The Viet Cong came into Lieu Tri Hamlet, Binh Nguyen Village, Thang Binh District of Quang Tin Province and abduct a school teacher and an Inter-Family Chief. The school teacher is killed.

February 6, 1967 -- A grenade is thrown onto the porch of the building where the Kontum Deputy Province Chief is giving a party for about 30 Vietnamese officials. The Chief of Education is killed instantly; the Chief of Montagnard Affairs and the Chief of the Political Detention Camp die of wounds the next day. Eight others are seriously wounded.

Harassing villages has probably been the most common form of terror used by the Viet Cong. The most common form of harassment has been small arms fire. It seldom receives much attention in the press or in official reporting because of its apparent inconsequential results. Pro-GVN hamlets serve as primary targets. Periodically guerrillas will approach a village and fire into it a half a dozen random rifle shots. This alerts the defenders who can never be sure that a full scale attack is not underway. Word is radioed to the nearby military headquarters whose commander is then obliged to decide whether the action is harassing fire or an attack, and if an attack, whether an ambush is its real purpose or whether it is a feint designed to draw his unit away from the scene of an actual attack elsewhere. Any guess he makes is apt to be the wrong one. The correct military decision, usually, is for the moment to do nothing and await developments. This causes villagers to doubt that the unit will aid the village if it actually is attacked. This increases the anxiety in the village, precisely as the Viet Cong hoped it would, and adds to the sense of insecurity which villagers naturally feel when a rifle bullet whizzes by them.

The harassing fire often continues sporadically for weeks, generally accompanied by nocturnal megaphone taunts, threats, and appeals; sometimes after a few weeks of softening up, a full scale attack is launched. Harassing fire is cheap and can be done by even inexperienced guerrillas. It creates a great sense of anxiety within the village, keeps villagers awake at night, impairing their farming and normal daytime activities. And it builds confidence within guerrillas ranks.

Psychological objectives dominate Viet Cong sabotage and subversion efforts. In the early years the guerrillas were under strict orders not to destroy or interfere with permanent fixed economic installations such as power stations or port facilities. But beginning in 1965 these became targets of sabotage efforts.

In the cities there has been no end to the ingenuity employed in terroristic sabotage. The grenade is the most common instrument, often rolled into a cafe by a young boy who escapes on a bicycle. Sometimes the bicycle itself is the instrument of death. Its hollow tubular frame is packed with plastic explosive and a timing device is located under the saddle. Terrorists ride the bicycle into the area, lean it against the building to be destroyed, set the fuse, and walk off. Two such explosive devices were employed in

Saigon in May 1963, using a motor bicycle and a motorcycle to blow huge holes in the side of a U.S. military warehouse. The Brink officer's billet in Saigon was dynamited by an explosive-packed vehicle which had been driven into the parking lot on Christmas Eve, 1964. The Pershing Sports Field explosion in Saigon was caused by explosives packed into a length of soil pipe under the grandstand with a calendar watch detonator. The Kinh Do Theater explosion in Saigon was the work of Viet Cong terrorists who shot their way into the lobby carrying a pail of explosive, set it down, and dashed out.

Grenades lobbed into vehicles stopped for traffic lights; poison injected into bottles of wine with hypodermic needles; poisoned darts; doors, drawers, or automobile engines booby-trapped - all are used. Often merely the threat of violence is enough. In November 1964, a young Vietnamese girl typist in a U.S. aid program office in Saigon was caught with program plans in her purse. She told security officials a man came to her apartment and told her that unless she stole the documents, her family, living in rural Quang Tri Province, would be harmed.

Sometimes Viet Cong actions are inexplicable. Visitors to An Lac Village in An Giang Province in late 1960 were shown an example of sabotage that had taken place the night before: Viet

Cong had entered the village school, piled all the benches and tables together and set fire to them. Only the four bare walls remained. The villagers, and the teacher, maintained they had no idea why it was done.

A sense of the Viet Cong approach to sabotage can be gained from this criticism report by the Chau Phu District NLF Committee to the Chau Doc Province NLF Central Committee, dated October 25, 1965 on sabotage efforts from September 15 to October 15, 1965:

"The sabotage of the enemy's communication axis was not regular nor well coordinated. Sabotage activities in enemy hamlets this month was very weak. Only seven or eight out of 73 hamlets in the province were destroyed, all in Chau Thanh, Can Long and Can Ngang areas and these were not destroyed totally. After destructions we usually withdrew without enlisting personnel or motivating the people to destroy their own hamlets...

"During the month continuous sabotage activities were conducted... The result was that 85 road cuts were made and a total of 396 meters of macadam road removed... 183 mounds were built on macadam roads... 341 meters of cuts made on dirt roads, 150 obstacles erected on dirt roads, 28 mounds built on dirt roads, a concrete bridge serverely damaged and ten wooden bridges destroyed...

"In the hamlets...we destroyed ten kilometers of bamboo fence, 1250 meters of barbed wire, 220 meters of ramparts, three gates...burned two administration buildings, two information halls, and seized 73 meters of telephone wire..."

It is violence against the individual villager, in his own village -- an assassination, execution or kidnaping -- that strikes home hardest. Turgid accounts of the "struggle movement" led by the Viet Cong or endless claims of military victories by agitprop teams mean little to the peasant. But when death strikes in his village, against someone he knows, a scar of fear is formed on his mind.

The individual targets of Viet Cong terrorism are Vietnamese government officials, social or natural leaders in the villages and Americans, in that order.

A US survey of terror against GVN officials in the January to October 1964 period indicated that in almost every case the 429 village and hamlet officials assassinated and the 1482 officials kidnaped were people native to the village in which they served and were not Saigon appointees coming in from the outside. Civil servants, village officials, civilians holding some form of authority -- these are the chief targets of the Viet Cong. The assassination pattern appears to be directed toward the very best and the very worst officials, against

the highly popular and effective government civil servant and against the most corrupt and oppressive local official. Such a policy obviously stimulates mediocrity among civil servants.

A document captured in Zone D in January 1966, apparently written about a month earlier, explained in some detail the secondary purposes of this kind of terror:

"During the month... (we) attacked policemen who were searching people in the streets (of Saigon) and also attacked police station. The... National Police Headquarters was attacked by our Liberation Army. These attacks caused confusion in the enemy ranks and aroused enthusiasm among the people...

"Enemy officials dare not oppose us. Policemen dare not stay in slums at night. Those guarding remote areas (of the city) are withdrawn... Policemen enter the slums now only in groups...

"Targets: In addition to attacks launched against personnel in the enemy's lowest echelons we must deal heavy blows against high ranking enemy personnel. Only blows like the attack on the... National Police Headquarters and on Americans can have the proper repercussions, hurt enemy prestige and exert sufficient pressure on the low echelon personnel. Therefore our attacks must be essentially aimed at wicked enemy ringleaders..."

The second major target is the natural village leaders, those individuals who do not hold office but who, because of age, sagacity or strength of character, are the ones to whom people turn for advice and look to for leadership. They may be religious figures, school teachers or simply people of integrity and honor. Because they are superior individuals these people are more likely to have the courage to stand up to the Viet Cong when they come to their villages and thus most likely to be the first victims of Viet Cong terror. Potential opposition leadership is the Viet Cong's most deadly enemy. Steadily, quietly and with a systematic ruthlessness, the Viet Cong in six years have wiped out virtually a whole class of Vietnamese villagers. Many villages today are virtually depopulated of their natural leaders. Natural leaders are perhaps the single most important element in any society. They represent a human resource of incalculable value. This loss to Vietnam is inestimable and it will take a generation or more to replace. By any definition, this is genocide.

Captured Viet Cong documents outline this process in clear and coldblooded terms. The Zone D document cited above declared:

"The plan for eliminating tyrants must be very carefully worked out. Investigation of those to be eliminated must be meticulously

conducted. Leaflets must be disseminated to make the people clearly understand the crimes of the tyrants to be executed and our motives in executing them and to warn other tyrants. The plan for eliminating tyrants must be very detailed so that our personnel can withdraw safely after accomplishing their mission...

"Then take advantage of the deaths of tyrants to terrorize the enemy generally and cause the lowest echelons of his organization to disintegrate..."

The Viet Cong attempt to place an aura of legalism around their assassinations. A kangaroo court meets and the villager, not present, is condemned to death. His death warrant is sent him through the mails or left at his front gate. It declares that he has been "tried" and has been "found guilty" and is to be "punished," which always means execution "in accordance with the instructions of the people's court." Then the villager is assassinated.

Such activity is freely recounted in Viet Cong mass media, where it takes on a moralistic tone. A typical assassination, told in typical communist terms, was described by Australian communist Wilfred Burchett, quoting a broadcast by Radio Hanoi (July 2, 1964):

"In Mo Duc District, Quang Ngai Province, was one Chau, a main

Diemist agent responsible for the deaths of hundreds of former resistance members. We sent a group of guerrillas disguised as Diemist officers to his house on the night of May 18, 1960. Our men persuaded him that the next day was President Ho Chi Minh's birthday and that the Viet Cong would certainly make trouble, so action must be taken that very night... Eventually he agreed and we set out with some of his agents. About one kilometer from his house he was executed and his agents arrested..."

The guerrilla interviewed by Burchett added: "In each village... we compiled a detailed dossier of the various local despots. If someone merited the death penalty we sent a group to deal with him. Afterwards we used loudhailers to explain the crimes committed... we posted names of other tyrants who would be dealt with if they did not cease their activities ... the executions... and the warnings... played a major role in breaking the grip of the enemy throughout the country... and created conditions under which we could move back into the villages, either permanently or on organizational visits..."

A typical example of Viet Cong terror against an individual involves Dang Van Gung, Editor-in-Chief, and Tu Chung, Editor of Chinh Luan (Political Discussions), one of the most respected Saigon newspapers. They are the Vietnamese natural leaders whom the Viet Cong seek to silence.

Chinh Luan is an anti-communist newspaper. But it does not hesitate to criticize the Government of Vietnam or the United States, and has done so when it disagreed with GVN or US policies. Dr. Sung has said of his newspaper: "Our main object is to inform. The second is to provide enlightened opinion. I want to give my readers a digest of everything about Vietnam both here and abroad with no false news. I want to help my people bury the past, to give an impact for new political organizations, to stand on the people's side vis a vis the government -- to tell the people what the government is thinking and tell the government what the people are thinking. "

In this task he succeeded. He and Tu Chung also succeeded in being placed on the Viet Cong assassination list. In June of 1965 a warning letter arrived at the Chinh Luan offices accusing Dr. Sung, Tu Chung and the paper of "serving American bosses" and threatening the pair with assassination. It was signed by Vo Cong Minh, "Commander of Detachment 628, Liberation Armed Forces of Saigon-Gia Dinh area." The letter was turned over to the police.

The in mid-December the Viet Cong sent their "last warning" to Dr. Sung and Tu Chung. It said that the Viet Cong planned to dispose of the two "scabby sheep. "

4. DOCTRINE AND TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Viet Cong have five reasons for employing terror:^{1.}

1. Morale building within the Viet Cong ranks. A successful terrorist act does much to create an aura of invulnerability within a guerrilla band and helps bolster spirits throughout the insurgent organization. The Zone D document cited earlier declared, for example, that terrorist acts in Saigon had "aroused enthusiasm among the people." Radio Liberation, after a terrorist act in Saigon, was quick to take credit for it in the name of the NLF, usually in boastful terms. Obviously the broadcasts were aimed as much at the faithful as at the enemy.

2. Advertising the Viet Cong movement. Kropotkin called terror, "the propaganda of the deed." Undoubtedly there is no cheaper nor easier way for an insurgent band or dissident group to single itself out from other opposition than by use of terror. In the early period Viet Cong terror acts quite obviously had advertising the movement as one of its objectives. For example a civilian might be shot down in a market place after which his killer would remain on the scene long enough to pin a note to his shirt even though it increased his chances of apprehension. The

1. This chapter owes much to "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation" by Thomas Perry Thornton in Internal War, Harry Eckstein, ed. The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.

leadership wanted no ambiguity, no unexplained killings. In some cases it would go so far as to issue leaflets denying the killing of individuals, asserting that they were killed by bandits. But of course this sort of activity cuts both ways -- it advertises but it also horrifies, especially abroad. Thus on January 12, 1966, Yugoslavia, the United Arab Republic and Algeria jointly urged North Vietnam and the NLF to cease their terror activities, quite obviously because terror was hurting the North Vietnamese and NLF image in their countries. Apparently there was never any reply to this appeal.

3. Disorientation and psychological isolation of the individual.

This is done by destroying the structure of authority which previously was a source of security. The particular target is the Vietnamese villager. The response which the Viet Cong seek by using terror is fright, anxiety and despair. Terror removes the underpinnings of the orderly system in which the villager lives out his life.

It disorients the villager by demonstrating to him that his government cannot give him the safety and order he normally expects from it.

On a much deeper level, the Viet Cong seek to isolate the villager from his social context. Terror isolates. A villager can no longer draw strength from customary social supports. He can rely only on himself. He may be physically undisturbed but he is terribly

alone in his anguish. Villagers then become impotent and of no threat to the Viet Cong.

4. Elimination of opposing forces. This of course is the chief utility of Viet Cong terror. By means of terror the Viet Cong have sought to eliminate the entire leader class of Vietnamese villagers. Terror is also used to immobilize the GVN officials remaining between the Viet Cong and their domination of the rural area. For this reason there has been relatively little terrorism in Saigon and virtually none directed at top level governmental officials.

5. Provocation of the GVN. In the early years Viet Cong terror acts were committed with the express purpose of provoking reprisals, but the practice was not as widespread as in other insurgencies. Any government faced with terrorism must attempt to suppress the terrorists. Ideally, that suppression is by an orthodox use of law enforcement. But if the terrorist is effective and if the government sees itself in a crisis, it will almost inevitably use extra-ordinary repressive measures.

The Viet Cong has before it the Viet Minh experience. It saw the provoking of suppressive or enforcement terror as a holding action pending the buildup of Viet Minh strength among rural Vietnamese. As the Viet Minh's strength increased its use of

this form of terror diminished. Its use of disruptive terror, as pointed out by Brian Crozier in his book, The Rebels, was to make repression by the French so costly that the French government would prefer to withdraw rather than to continue the struggle. In general, the experiences of the Viet Minh did not particularly recommend wide use of disruptive terror.

The Viet Cong leadership has experienced at least one major failure in the use of terror. This came in the Highlands in the summer of 1962 and involved the Montagnards. After years of patiently cultivating the Montagnards, the Viet Cong leadership apparently came to the conclusion that the policy had not paid off and that a harder line was in order. It was true that despite concentrated efforts, the Montagnards remained hostile to the Viet Cong. The GVN's resources control program in the Highlands (where it is possible to starve to death) and the organizational work among the Montagnards, chiefly by the American Special Forces teams, combined to create an inhospitable climate in the Highlands for Viet Cong Cadres. When food became short, these Cadres under the new policy did not hesitate to take the food of the Montagnard and allow him to go hungry. This Viet Cong program was designed to coerce them into supporting, feeding, and generally assisting the

guerrilla bands operating in the mountains. The Montagnards response to this was traditional: The people of a whole village would vanish in a single night and go as refugees to a GVN military or civilian center. Total Montagnard exodus may have reached as high as 300,000 persons, more than a third of the total Montagnard population in South Vietnam. Eventually most of these people were relocated and a number of them were recruited into anti-guerrilla Civilian Irregular Defense Groups.

Beginning in February 1964, the NLF began a terror campaign against Americans in Vietnam. It probably did build morale among the terrorists; the bombing of the American Embassy on March 30, 1965, most certainly was for morale building purposes. The killing of American civilians obviously advertised the Viet Cong in the United States. The terror also served to disorient Americans in Vietnam and create within them a sense of psychological isolation. Terror, however, was not used to the extent it might have been in eliminating American opposition. The American death rate, for example, could have been much higher in the 1960-1965 period than it was. The initial burst of intensified violence in February and March of 1964 stopped almost as suddenly as it began. Within a ten day period there were about two dozen major and minor terror attacks on Americans but the campaign suddenly ceased for reasons that were never clear.

By studying captured Viet Cong documents and questioning Viet Cong prisoners it is possible to assemble a fairly complete statement of the Viet Cong doctrinal approach to terror. Viet Cong Cadres consider the proper use of terror as terror applied judiciously, selectively, and sparingly. They have found that terror, turned on and off, paradoxically produces both pro-and anti-guerrilla feelings among villagers. On the one hand, of course, it engenders fear and hatred, with the first usually predominating over the second. But when relaxed after an area-wide terror campaign, an exaggerated sense of relief spreads through the villagers and villagers tend to regard the guerrillas as being not nearly as inhumane as they are capable of being.

Terror, the Viet Cong hold, is virtually useless against a dedicated opponent. In general, Viet Cong theoreticians consider terror to be the weapon and hold that as guerrilla control increases it should be used less. They hold that from terror a guerrilla band gets rapid but quickly diminishing returns. And to judge from their terror acts, they believe that terror works better on friends than on enemies. They believe that terror is most effective when the general population is sympathetic to the cause and least effective when it is against it.

5- CAPTURED DOCUMENT REVEALS VIET CONG TERROR PLAN

A Top Secret Viet Cong document, captured on February 6, 1967, reveals again the stress placed on the need for meticulous care in planning for terror. Excerpts from the translation follow:

" After a few years of operation, the Urban Sapper Movement has demonstrated a number of deficiencies in the following main areas:

Direction of activity.

Organization and preparations for combat (i. e. terror, ed.)

Technique, tactics, and equipment...

There exist significant targets which have not yet been attacked, namely: Division Tactical Area and Corps Tactical Zone Headquarters, high-level military schools, middle and high-level administrative schools.

We still have not been able to blow up a single major bridge that equals in size the bridges of Bon Luc, Da Nang, Phu Lang Thuong (which we destroyed) in the course of the nine years anti-French resistance.

There has been a lack of emphasis on continuing guerrilla -type attacks on minor and/or isolated targets and local tyrants, Chieu Hoi and Rural Pacification Teams. These targets can be engaged by village, district and local guerrillas. These small unit actions, added up together every month, will constitute a major factor

in boosting the local (revolutionary) movement and main force operations.

We have not embodied the spirit of "positively and courageously" conducting deep thrusts (into enemy lines).

To date, hundreds of enemy bases and rear area installations remain unattacked. A number of cities, such as Hue, Dalat, etc., scores of province capitals, district seats, strategic hamlets, and arteries of communication remain safe or relatively safe to the enemy.

In some places, on account of the concept of "long term agents", our agents, inserted among the population for civilian proselyting, dared not engage actively in the armed struggle for fear that, in so doing, the enemy might take countermeasures which would eventually hamper the movement.

Absence of guiding plans made it impossible to concentrate on the most important targets which had a bearing on the concept of operations.

For instance, when reconnoitering in the cities, we should place emphasis on selecting the enemy's shortcomings which can be exploited, the avenues of approach, and emplacements (for laying demolitions, directional mines, etc...).

Minor points which are closely connected with the attack procedures cannot be overlooked. For instance, during the bombing attack on the Brink BOQ, Comrade No. 1 lost his composure and became confused from the very start when he could not locate the receptionist (this was due to inaccurate reports).

During the attack on the US Embassy, we failed to assess the situation and the enemy who was posted along our avenue of withdrawal. After the demolition charges had been set off, all attention was focused on the direction of the explosion, and we were conspicuously noticed. This was the reason why Comrade Le Van H was chased, shot in the abdomen and captured.

Little attention was paid to the enemy after the attack had been conducted.

Generally speaking, when conducting attacks in urban areas, we hold the view that after the explosion has been set off our mission is accomplished and we withdraw.

Selection of enemy and puppet targets located in urban areas and rear areas (is considered important).

Little emphasis has been placed on eliminating enemy high-ranking officials, rural pacification tyrants, defectors and traitors who sycophantically and actively offer their services to their American masters.

For a long time in Saigon, we concentrated on attacking Americans while overlooking the (GVN) police and security agents (the latter are tracking down our agents) and the reactionary ringleaders (reactionary parties, disguised religious groups, spies, etc...) who carry on their activities unpunished. If we destroy the Americans, they are capable of bringing in replacements; but if we succeed in destroying the (GVN) suppressive government machinery, pacification apparatus, local tyrants, and reactionary ringleaders, we will have accomplished splendid achievements in favor of the revolution.

The US imperialists will have a difficult time finding replacements for the experienced "old foxes" who have serviced the Americans for years and who are familiar with the local situation.

Since we do not attack the security and police agents, many families have greased the palms of the authorities so their children could be recruited into security and police activities in order to dodge military service...

In the attack on the USS CARD, we did not anticipate its earlier-than-scheduled arrival. As a result, we were confused and could not sink it prior to the unloading of the cargo.

In the attack on the US Embassy, we failed to take into consideration the possibility of additional security and police reinforcement after the day Comrade Tran Van Dang, riding a Vespa scooter carrying 30 kilograms of TNT, was arrested on his way to the Embassy.

Upon entering the area of operation during the My Canh battle (25 June 1965), seeing that the enemy had increased his defense and dispatched tanks to Block 4, a number of cell members became confused and wanted to withdraw.

The lack of elaborate coordination, failure to memorize the passwords caused the enemy to uncover comrade Dien Ngoc's plan to motivate the local inhabitants to destroy strategic hamlets. As a result Comrade A was caught in the encirclement. After this action, only three of the 10-man unit survived...

The first attack on the My Canh Restaurant, supposed to be conducted on 25 May 1967, was delayed because the timing device of the mine was damaged in a rehearsal.

The mine in the Australian Embassy failed to go off at 2130 hours on 24 August 1964 at the moment when it had a full muster of personnel. According to the report of MR4 the timing device (watch) stopped after

a few minutes. The sapper concerned might have forgotten to wind it...

Recapitulation of activities, dissemination of information and learning from past experience are not done in time. As a result, the enemy is given sufficient time to take counter-measures and cause us losses.

Our cadre fail to fully understand combat tactics and techniques.

The main mission of sappers is to attack different types of targets in urban and rural areas, on land and in water both day and night. The targets on land and in water are numerous and quite different. No cadre knows all types of targets. Usually they know one or two types only. Without a good knowledge of targets, the cadre cannot successfully train sappers. Usually they know one or two types only. Without a good knowledge of targets, the cadre cannot successfully train sappers.

Sometimes we need an explosion to create commotion to facilitate our withdrawal. If the weapons fail to function properly and our comrades are detected by the enemy, escape from the spot is very difficult.

In the attack on the Brink, the bomb exploded 10 minutes before the set time (shortly after the explosion, the cars of Bob

Hope's entertainment group arrived). If the bomb exploded at the scheduled time, it might have killed an additional number of guests who came to see the entertainment.

The bomb planted at the Pershing Field exploded five minutes late.

We must ensure that the bombs explode right at the scheduled time, since many types of targets require accurate timing.

We have lacked appropriate equipment for operating in the enemy's rear in the capital, such as, smoke grenades, poisons, and weapons equipped with silencers for assassinations.

To facilitate a daylight withdrawal in the capital, it is desirable to use shaped-charge grenades as fragmentation grenades which sometimes kill friendly civilians. Capital action cells need in addition, smoke grenades, and tear-gas grenades...

The use of incendiary grenades and something like a flame thrower against certain types of targets may prove practical and successful. But efforts have not been made to study the use of these weapons. In the capital, there are sufficient materials to manufacture flame throwers (gasoline, rubber, chemical products)....

6- WE BOMB THE KINH-DO THEATER

The following is a translation of a captured Viet Cong report on the bombing of the Kinh Do Theater in Saigon, February 16, 1964. It was apparently written for training and indoctrination use. It provides a graphic and accurate picture of the world of the Viet Cong terrorist.

Purpose and Significance. After studying the Party Central Committee Resolution of November 11, (1963) the (Interzone) Party Committee decided to deal a heavy blow to the enemy in the capital city. We sought to begin the year with a spectacular achievement that would have an intense political impact.... We also sought to widen the rift in the enemy ranks, which is already marked by mutual suspicion and distrust as a result of repeated coups and counter coups. And we sought to strengthen and enhance the combat spirit of our forces and improve their tactical and technical knowledge.

After careful consideration of three proposed targets we selected the Kinh Do Theater. Reasons: at this theater gather large numbers of important persons such as general and field grade officers. In attacking this target we will destroy a great amount of the enemy potential. This target is in the center of the city, near the Presidential Palace. Attacking it will

create a strong impression at home and abroad and will greatly affect the morale of the Americans, both in Vietnam and in the United States.

Preliminary Preparations. Le Van Duyet Street runs past the Theater. On the left is Bui Thi Xuan Street and on the right, Ngo Tung Chau Street. Bui Thi Xuan and Ngo Tung Chau Streets intersect behind the Theater. Traffic is heavy on these streets, especially on Le Van Duyet Street. Traffic will be heavier on the day of the attack, which will fall on the third day of the Tet holidays (Lunar New Year).

Across Le Van Duyet Street, directly opposite the Theater, is the Headquarters of the General Labor Union and behind it, the Botanical Gardens and a riding club. In front of the General Labor Union is a parking lot for about 40 vehicles, reserved for US moviegoers.

Approximately 100 meters in front of the Theater is the US Dispensary, the US Special Forces Headquarters and the house of a US general, all located on Nguyen Du Street. Next door to the Kinh Do Theater to the left is the office of the Farmers' Association and to the right is the house of an American. Behind the Theater are a network of alleys and houses of GVN civil servants and the city bourgeois. The people in this area are indifferent to politics and during Tet they gather in groups in the alleys to gamble.

About one kilometer in rear of the objective to the southwest is the Headquarters of the National Police. The 2nd Police Precinct is located southeast of and approximately two kilometers from the objective. The 3rd Police Precinct is located 1200 meters from the objective and down Le Van Duyet Street.

The objective, the Kinh Do Theater, is known to the Americans as the Capitol American Theater. This Theater is reserved strictly for the American community. Estimated dimensions: length, 40 meters; width, 25 meters; thickness of wall, 20 centimeters. Capacity: 600 seats. However, our investigation revealed that there usually are only 300 people in the Theater. Sometimes there are VIPs and high-ranking officers.

A one-meter high wooden fence is erected on the sidewalk 0.40 meters from the street curb. No pedestrian is allowed to loiter on the sidewalk and vehicles are forbidden to park in the area right in front of the Theater. One meter inside this fence is another fence which looks exactly like the first one. Entrances to these fences are wide open before the show. Inside the inner fence is a yard, of about five to seven square meters.

The Theater has a large facade with the following sign on it: "Rap Chieu Bong Kinh Do" (The Kinh Do Movie Theater). Below the sign is an accordion gate, with an opening about two meters wide when half closed. Inside the gate, is an open space of about

four meters in width and five meters in length, with two booking offices. Two steel sheets are used to guard the staircases. Between the staircases is a velvet curtain about two meters wide. Inside the Theater running along side the wall are two narrow aisles leading to the latrines separated from the auditorium. Behind the screen is a small room for storing movie equipment. The Americans sit both on the ground floor and the balcony.

Early defenses: there are two policemen standing guard in front of the Theater and, at one time, no US MPs. One policeman stood guard at the corner of Bui Thi Xuan Street and another in front of the US dispensary. One white Chevrolet usually is parked in front of the Theater. On this section of Le Van Duyet Street there always is one cell of plain clothes police patrolling. At each intersection leading to the Kinh Do Theater there is a traffic policeman.

The Theater was first attacked on September 19, 1963 by a Special Activities Cell from the Interzone Headquarters. At that time the attack was directed at the rear of the theater. (A low-grade bomb was exploded in back of the theater inflicting no serious injuries and doing little damage). These experiences were gained from this attack:

-Five minutes after the attack, policemen and security agents flocked down every alley.

-Le Van Duyet Street and all alleys leading to it were blocked so no one could leave or enter...

After the attack the enemy improved his security measures. Two policemen were stationed in front of the Kinh Do Theater. The white Chevrolet remained at the same place. A jeep, bearing the license number NBD 448, was parked at the filling station near Nga Sau intersection. Two or three security agents were ordered to circulate in the alleys back of the Theater. Two US MPs and one security agent were stationed in front of the Theater. Two guards were stationed inside.

The movie schedules: shows begin at 2000 hours and end at 2230 hours. On Sundays there are two or three shows. Before the show the moviegoers gather in groups in front of the Theater. At show time they all go inside. As the last man goes into the auditorium the doors are closed. When the show is finished they come out in groups of 30 under the supervision of the two US MPs.

Taking the Decision. ...Investigation and study indicated that the target would be easy to attack. The Theater was well protected in front but neglected in the rear. Although the routes of approach were long and closely watched by security agents, it was determined

that this could be overcome by secretly infiltrating necessary supplies and conducting the raid lightning-fast. Though police and security forces were deployed in the area no reaction by them was anticipated during the first three minutes after the explosion. This slow reaction is attributable to their lack of aggressiveness and courage. Possible reinforcements from adjacent enemy installations had to be anticipated.

-National Police Headquarters:	10 minutes
-3rd Police Precinct:	10 minutes
2nd Police Precinct:	15 minutes
-Police stationed at Nga Sau intersection:	5 minutes

From the previous attack we know that five minutes after the attack, police and security agents appeared at all alleys, and that within ten minutes, the enemy was capable of blocking off Le Van Duyet, Ngo Tung Chau and Bui Thi Xuan Streets. We knew accordingly that the attack, including the time for entering and accomplishing the mission, should be completed in one minute and attackers should withdraw from the area within three minutes.

Based on this assumption and on the situation stated above, this decision was taken initially:

- 1) Use one cell (three men) to attack the main objective.
- 2) Use one Bazookine, ten kilograms with a time fuse set at 15 seconds (apparently an explosive device involving use of a mortar, rocket launcher or bazooka round).
- 3) Penetrate the objective area via the alley located behind the Theater, place the bomb on a stool, three meters high, located near the left hand wall to slant toward the right hand wall.

The attack was scheduled for the night of February 15, 1964, just after the movie had started.

Plan of the attack. At 2000 hours the vehicle would leave the assembly area, follow Ngo Tung Chau Street and stop in the alley behind the Theater. Number One would pick up the stool, place it in the predesignated position and take up a position from which he could protect Number Two. Number Two would then swiftly run to the stool with the bomb, place it on the stool and pull the safety pin. Then both men would run back to join Number Three and all would withdraw along predesignated routes.

Of the three men selected for the mission, Number One, was the cadre and cell leader. He had received basic political indoctrination and had been thoroughly briefed on the attack. He was qualified as a pistol marksman, knew judo, had combat

experience and was a good leader. Number Two had no combat experience, but was ideologically sound. He had received political indoctrination and had received training in pistol marksmanship. He was enthusiastic and accepted the mission without fear. Number Three had received political indoctrination, but was not as good as pistol shot as Number Two or Number Three. He had no combat experience. The key personnel were Number One and Number Two. They were repeatedly briefed on the mission, and were indoctrinated thoroughly on the purposes and importance of the mission. The training continued before the attack, strengthened ideology and improved their skill with mines, pistols and grenades. They were given the benefit of experience from previous operations and were taught ways to use initiative in such attacks. Training and indoctrination continued after the attack as well.

Equipment and materials issued: one Bazoomine of ten kilograms; two fuses; two safety firing pins; a 15-second detonation cord; one 12-mm Colt pistol; five fragmentation grenades; one smoke grenade; two knives; one basket; one three meter stool (apparently this was a ladder type arrangement nearly ten feet tall with a basket for the explosive on top); two suits of clothing and two pair of shoes to be used as disguises in case of an emergency.

Number One was equipped with the Colt pistol, one smoke grenade and a knife. He was the leader and responsible for the entire operation. His specific mission, in addition to leadership, was to protect Number Two during his part of the mission.

Number Two was equipped with a ten kilograms Bazoomine; two grenades and a knife. His specific mission was to explode the bomb.

Number Three was equipped with two grenades and the vehicle. His specific mission was to provide overall cover, stand by the vehicle, and pick up Number One and Number Two after they had completed their mission.

The Attack - Saturday, February 15. Number Three informed of the date, lied to his wife and told her he was going to the country. This gave him more freedom of action and improved security. Information about the target was not given to Number Three but nevertheless he remained enthusiastic about the task.

Number One and Number Three were to meet at 1200 hours, with weapons and equipment, at a predesignated location. However it was not specified whether the meeting time was to be Saigon time or Hanoi time (Hanoi is one hour behind Saigon). Number Three went

to the meeting place at 1200 hours Saigon time, failed to meet Number One and so went to a pre-designated rendezvous. Before leaving he passed word to a liaison man on the scene (who did not know anything of the operation). Number One arrived at 1200 hours Hanoi time. Failing to meet Number Three, he continued to study the scene of the operation.

Number Two meantime studied the area of the operation from 1500 until dark. In accordance with the plan Number Two, at dusk, carried the three meter stool to a house under construction in the alley. Failing to contact Number One on the scene he returned to where he had started and there met Number One. Number One informed him of the error over time and of not being able to meet Number Three. He suggested that Number Two return to Headquarters the following morning and report that the plan had to be aborted but that the cell was determined to carry out the mission when the opportunity arose.

Number Three meanwhile had contacted the liaison man and learned that Number One had arrived late. He went searching for him and found him at 2400 hours.

The attack had not materialized that day. It was decided to make the attack the following day.

The Attack - Sunday, February 16. At 1300 hours Number Two met Number One at a predesignated rendezvous with the specific message from Interzone: "Destroy the Theater at all costs." Number Two said Interzone authorized the cell to use its initiative in deciding the best means of attack. Number One informed Number Two that he had contacted Number Three and that everything was ready. He asked Number Two to remain calm and to continue his surveillance work, which he did. At 1440 hours Number One and Number Three went to the rendezvous point. Number Three parked the vehicle in a secure area. Number One went to meet Number Two. After exchanging information, Number One decided the attack would be launched at the evening show.

At 1830 hours Number One and Number Two went to the alley back of the Theater by way of Ngo Tung Chau Street. There they noticed the presence of three or four strangers who acted suspiciously. At the alley entrance there were three parked automobiles. Many gamblers were playing dice.

Faced by this unexpected development, Number One and Number Two returned to the rendezvous area to discuss the situation with Number Three. The discussion brought out these difficulties:

it was possible the attackers could be trapped in the alley. There were a large number of people in the alley and an explosion would kill them all. (It was at this point that Number Three realized that the objective was the Kinh Do Theater).

At 1920 hours Number One and Number Two once more approached the objective, along Ngo Tung Chau Street. They found the situation there unchanged. They then drove along Bui Thi Xuan Street and past the front of the Theater on Le Van Duyet Street. Observation revealed the following: the police were at their usual posts; a plain clothes agent was standing at the entrance of the outer fence talking to a US MP who was standing at the entrance of the inner fence. The other US MP was standing at the left side of the entrance of the inner fence. American aggressors, buying theater tickets, were in a short line.

The cell held a quick meeting and the new situation was discussed. A new plan was then developed and adopted. The concensus was this: although the enemy had many men in front of the Theater they were nevertheless negligent and tired as a result of too much celebrating during the Tet holidays. Moreover, based on experiences in the past, it was believed the police and plain clothesmen were cowardly, unaggressive and, on hearing the first shots, surely would run away. It was essential

that the two US MPs be killed at the outset. We decided we had the superiority of weapons and of morale. The route of approach to be used was short and direct, providing best chances for quick penetration and withdrawal.

The three or four men in the alley and the two or three cars parked in the alley were believed to be part of the enemy's security apparatus. An attack in the rear of the Theater could easily be detected; even approaching it would be difficult; distances were relatively long. If the enemy detected us in time they could block off the alley and corner us. An attack in the rear would produce less results since the capability of our weapons could not be exploited to the utmost.

An attack at the front of the Theater would be more difficult but it had a number of advantages: a good avenue of approach permitting quick penetration and withdrawal. The enemy had many guards but they were not vigilant. We had the capability of (momentarily) overwhelming the enemy. We could effectively use our weapons.

Based on these considerations, a frontal attack was decided upon. H-hour would be immediately before showtime, after all the Americans had gone into the Theater and before the accordion gates were closed. We also decided that all three cell members must be calm and courageous and act with precision.

The new plan was this: the vehicle will stop in front of the Theater. Number One quickly will jump out and kill the two MPs with his pistol. At the same time he will call to the security agents to run away. If they resist he will kill them all. It is vital that he get rid of the policemen and security agent. After the two MPs have been killed Number Two will run into the Theater with the bomb. The farther he runs into the Theater the better. Number Three will be outside the vehicle with two grenades in his hands ready to throw them at the police on guard in front of the Farmers' Association or in the parking lot. After Number Two has penetrated the Theater and the policemen and the security agents have been killed or run away, Number Three will return to the vehicle, pick up Number One and then Number Two and they will drive away.

The Bombing. At 1955 hours Number Two went to study the objective for the final time before the attack. He noted that the velvet curtain had been drawn and that the accordion gate was open just enough to let in one person at a time. The show was about to start. Noting that there was no change in the enemy set up, except that a few late comers loitered in front of the Theater, Number Two went back to report the situation to the other two men.

All three got into the vehicle and crossed the line of departure. Number Three, armed with two grenades, drove the vehicle. Number One armed with a pistol and a smoke grenade sat in the back seat of the vehicle on the left. Number Two sat in back on the right, armed with two bazoomines and two grenades. Everyone was tense.

The vehicle drove up to the Theater. It stopped quickly. Number One jumped out. He shot and killed the MP with two shots. At the same time he shouted: "We attack the Americans. Run away brother policemen and agents." One policeman ran away. But the security agent remained. Two American moviegoers outside the Theater, panic stricken pushed their way into the Theater.

Seeing that the enemy in his path has been killed, Number Two took the bomb and dashed into the Theater just behind the two American moviegoers. Fearing that the two Americans would block the door, Number One shot at them. But his pistol misfired.

Then one security agent seized Number One and swung his fist at his face. Number One dodged and the blow landed on his right shoulder. Number One hit the security agent with his pistol and his fist sending the man sprawling. But he got up and rushed at Number One and they traded many blows in the street.

Number Three rushed back to the vehicle, got in and tried to run over the security agent but instead almost ran over Number One. Then he drove to the rendezvous point in the alley.

Number One broke loose from the security agent, recovered his pistol, pointed it at the security agent and once more pulled the trigger. This time it worked and the shot killed the security agent.

Meantime Number Two, in the Theater lobby, approached the staircase leading to the balcony and was only one meter away from the velvet curtain. An American came down the staircase. The American moved to seize Number Two. Unwilling to wrestle with the American, Number Two put down the bomb and pulled the cord to detonate the bomb.

There was a snapping sound. The American aggressors fell back panic stricken. One ran into the Theater shouting something.

Number Two ran out of the Theater calling to Number One, "Withdraw immediately." Number One hurled his smoke grenade. He turned to run. There was a terrific explosion. Number One was thrown to the ground. Stunned by the explosion he got to his feet and leaned against an electric light post for a moment before he staggered to the alley where Number Two was waiting. They walked to the vehicle. Number One led the way, followed by Number

Two with a grenade in each hand. People came up the alley and asked what happened. "We attacked the Americans" Number One said as they got into the car and drove away.

According to the enemy radio two Americans and one security agent were killed among the five hundred people in the Theater at the time. But our reconnaissance agents reported that only about ten Americans came out of the Theater alive, while all others were killed. The bodies were taken to Tan Son Nhut in ten ambulances and trucks. Ten-wheeled cranes were used to lift the collapsed stairs and two walls. Most of the seats in the Theater were smashed; the wall behind the screen and the roof collapsed.

(Note: Actually killed in the attack were: the US MP, Corporal Peter M. Feiersbend; Marine Corps Captain Donald E. Koepler, whom Number Two met in the lobby and who had run into the Theater with the warning was buried alive under the debris when part of the balcony collapsed; and SP/5 William Reed sitting in the last row of the auditorium. Injured and requiring treatment were: 23 American servicemen, six American male civilians, three American women, two American children and one British civilian. All recovered. The security policeman shot by Number One was not killed and later recovered).

As they withdrew, Number One drove and watched the front; Number Two protected the left flank; Number Three protected the right flank. When they reached a certain point all three went their separate ways, agreeing to meet again in three days time. They crossed Hong Thap Tu Street just three minutes before it was blocked by security police.

Enemy Reaction. Five minutes later enemy security agents and policemen in the area began to react. Ten to fifteen minutes later fire engines arrived, along with policemen from the 2nd Precinct who blocked off the area. The enemy arrested a taxi driver, four policemen who had been on duty, and ten civilians. Twenty minutes later Vietnamese Marines and Military Police arrived and surrounded the area, from Hong Thap Tu to Ngo Tung Chau to Nga Sau to Nguyen Du Streets.

The Effect. All of the inhabitants in Saigon were very enthusiastic. They came that night and the next day to look at the scene of the attack. The people said: "Once they have succeeded in attacking this objective, they will easily succeed elsewhere." Another effect was that US and Vietnamese Army troop morale was badly shaken. After that the Vietnamese Marines and the US troops set up barbed wire fences and mounted guards everywhere. They always went armed. Over 20 Americans

demanded to return to the US. (Press reports so stated; however, of the 1800 American dependents living in Saigon at the time, only three families accepted the US Mission offer the following day of immediate return to the US for dependents).

Observations and Lessons Learned. The strong points were these: there was a thorough understanding of the meaning, purpose and importance of the attack. There was high resolution by the cell. Their calmness, courage, ability to overcome all difficulties ensured the successful accomplishment of the attack. Success was due to: secrecy, suddenness, quick penetration. Maintaining the initiative and keeping flexible increased the injury to the enemy and helped achieve greater success. Most importantly, precisely evaluating the enemy's situation and adopting an alternate attack plan enabled our agents to find the enemy's weak points and seize opportunities. The attack also involved coordination of troop proselyting with combat (i. e. calling on the police to flee).

The weak points were these: failure to understand clearly the time for meeting on the night of February 15. It was dangerous to carry the explosives around in the vehicle. There were too many trips past the Theater by our agents for observation purposes; they could have been noticed. There was the failure to make a false license plate for the car to prevent it being traced.

There was failure to anticipate all possible developments in the situation.

During the attack on the Kinh Do Theater, even after encountering many difficulties, our agents always kept in mind the importance of the attack, and they were determined to carry it out. Within a short time after the first abortive mission, the three agents made an accurate assessment of the enemy's situation, and devised and discussed an alternate plan. This stresses the importance of flexibility to cope immediately with any situation. In any attack it is necessary to devise a primary plan and one or two contingent plans. In the Kinh Do attack our agents were confused when their first plan was upset, although they successfully accomplished our mission by applying another plan.

However, we must recognize the active enemy defense. Because of money and pressure from the wicked leaders, there are stubborn security agents and policemen such as the policeman who fought with Number One during the attack on Kinh Do Theater and two security agents and policeman who ran after and fired at Number One during the attack on the US Embassy.

For the first time our agents did enemy troop proselyting during combat. In the city, the security agents and policemen are apparently escapist and negative but they still have a spirit of nationalism

(this means that they do not like the Americans). We have to take advantage of their spirit during our attack to isolate the Americans. This limits enemy resistance, reduces our difficulties and creates a situation favorable to successfully accomplishing the combat mission. Prior to appealing to them, we must punish them to make our appeal effective. Our experience in the Kinh Do Theater attack was that our appeal was only effective after we had killed two US MPs...

7- STATISTICS OF VIET CONG TERROR AGAINST CIVILIANS

	<u>ASSASSINATIONS</u>	<u>KIDNAPED</u>
1958	200	250
1959	200	350
1960	1,500	700
1961	500	1,000
1962	1,700	9,500
1963	2,000	7,000
1964	1,800	9,500
1965	1,800	8,500
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1966	1,618	3,507
1967 (through 25 March)	480	870
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TOTAL	11,798	41,177

Total includes 1,000 assassinated and 1,500 kidnaped civil officials.

***Prior to 1 August 1966, figures are not entirely accurate since in many cases no count was kept by local authorities. It is believed, however, that any error is on the low side.

Dr. Sung and Tu Chung published the Viet Cong letter and also replied to it, declaring that the paper sought to serve only one master, truth, and that proof it had done so could be found in the fact that it had been criticized by all. But only the communists, declared the editorial, go beyond criticism to threaten terror and death. It declared that, while the paper could fight the communists ideologically or politically, it of course had no defense against terror. It concluded: "We love the life that God has breathed into our bodies, as all men love life. But we will look straight into the gun barrel held by the murderer who comes against us and will say: You can kill us but our spirit will live on."

On December 30, Viet Cong terrorists fired four bullets into Editor Tu Chung as he stepped from his car in front of his home, killing him instantly. The two terrorists escaped on a motorbike.