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SUMMARY REPORT

KENYA NATIONAL POLICE

SPECIAL ASSESSMENT

DECONTROLLED by Lauren J. Goin,  
Director, OPS on January 27, 1975

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## PREFACE

Mr. Byron Engle, Director, Office of Public Safety (OPS), Agency for International Development, and Colonel Mitchell A. Mabardy (USAF), Chief, Africa Operations Branch, OPS, during May 22 to June 4, 1967, performed a short-term special assessment of the Kenya National Police. The assessment was in response to a Government of Kenya request made on the Department of State/AID, U. S., for an examination of the Kenya police in light of current threats.

The Team met with various and distinguished senior governmental officers and conducted conferences at the national and subordinate levels and at major technical and support facilities of the police.

This summary report addresses itself to a number of major sectors of the police organization and its operations. Detailed facts and general information furnished the Team with regard to the police have been omitted from this report because such data are available in Kenya.

In accomplishing its important assignment during the very brief visit, the Team was greatly assisted and its mission highly facilitated through the warm cooperation and complete and full assistance provided by the various governmental representatives, and especially the police, of the Government of Kenya. The Public Safety Team takes this occasion to express its sincere appreciation and gratitude.

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I. GENERAL

A. Police Relationship to Civil Administration and Security Committees

Kenya has 8 provinces, each divided into a number of Districts and administered by Province and District Commissioners. The police, with National Headquarters in Nairobi, are organized by provinces which are made up of Province Headquarters, Division Headquarters, Police Stations, Police Posts, and Police Outposts. Police Province and Division area commands coincide geographically with civil government administration areas at the Province and District levels.

Security Committees are organized at the National, Province, and District government levels. During its visit the Team had the good fortune to attend a meeting of the National Security Committee chaired by Vice President Daniel Arap Moi. The Team considers the Security Committee system as a sound and highly logical government mechanism for the purpose of focusing the attention of responsible officials on the security situation.

B. Police Mission

The Team noted that the Kenya police are charged with the conventional mission of law enforcement, and there appeared to be no overlap or conflict in mission interests with other governmental agencies. The Kenya police include a General Services Unit (GSU) which serves as the primary force for internal security, and its duties include the paramilitary anti-shifta operations. The armed forces who are concerned mainly with the external threat are significantly smaller than the police and at the present time are used to support the police in tactical operations against the shifta. The employment of the GSU as a paramilitary police force for internal security appears operationally sound for the situation in Kenya and, in comparison to the cost of placing an equal force of conventional army troops in the field, is substantially more economical. The role of the police is sound, and its employment as the primary anti-shifta force based on the nature of the threat is most logical.

II. COMMAND AND STAFF

A. Direction and Management

The direction and management of the police are sound and its performance of a high quality. The Commissioner and key command and staff officers interviewed and observed demonstrated outstanding qualities of leadership and a fine degree of professionalism, impressing the Team most favorably. The operations staff at headquarters appeared to be doing a most noteworthy job. Responsibility and authority appeared to be clear and well established at the various staff levels and organizations visited. Supervision of

mission performance stemming from the national headquarters appeared to be well exercised and firmly established at all levels of command; the Team was able to obtain a reasonably close insight to the operational, technical, and support activities and found them to be well disciplined in this regard. The expatriate officers made a most favorable impression; their performance reflected admirable qualities of professionalism.

B. National Headquarters Staff

The headquarters staff, which is generally duplicated on the province level, consists of Directorates for administrative, operational, and technical functions with chiefs reporting directly to the Commissioner whose span of control over staff and operational activities is logical and within practical limits. The administration, personnel, budget, transportation, and communications are examples of activities headed up by civilians under contract; generally, all other activities are headed up by members of the police force. Staff supervision over technical and operational activities of the force gives strong indications of excellent qualities of ingenuity, resourcefulness and industry directed along self-help courses of action for realizing the maximum advantage from limited and inadequate resources.

III. GENERAL AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

A. Intelligence Activity

The Intelligence Directorate, also known as the Special Branch, is charged with the national intelligence and countersubversion operation and impressed the Team as being an effective unit. Its system of organization on the various levels, liaison function, and flow of information appear to be efficient. Although reporting to the appropriate head of the police at its level of assignment, its members attend Security Committee meetings at all levels. Intelligence dossiers are appropriately filed with the Directorate.

B. Criminal Investigation Activity

The Criminal Investigation Directorate (CID) is organized at national, provincial, and division levels and is responsible for all administrative, technical, and operational matters pertaining to criminal investigation. It maintains all criminal files. Its organization, functions, and flow of information appear sound. One of the particularly noteworthy operations of the CID is the police dog program. The police have experienced remarkable success in the use of dogs and the ability to have the dogs respond to more than two handlers. All dogs are Alsatians, and a significant problem at this time is the need for new bloodlines because of the undesirable effects due to

excessive inbreeding. The situation could be alleviated through the acquisition of a proven stud. Overall, the Team was favorably impressed with the various activities of the CID.

C. Motor Vehicle Activity

The motor vehicle transportation activity is well organized and soundly administered. A chief in charge of transportation is on the staff at National and each of the Province and District Headquarters. The location of repair and maintenance facilities throughout major elements of the command provides an essential capability distributed on a sound basis. The motor vehicle fleet is standardized using as few makes as possible which contributes to efficiency and economy of operation. The fleet averages 14,000,000 miles per year. There is a regular program with appropriations for replacement of obsolete and uneconomical transportation; however, funds have been insufficient for full implementation, and vehicle life span is being continually extended through maintenance and care. Life span is generally 100,000 miles or 4 years for Landrovers, and 6 years for trucks, with many vehicles well beyond these ages and some heavy trucks in their 10th year. The transportation activity provides the force with a complete overhaul and maintenance capability, and its main depot workshop located on the outskirts of Nairobi was most impressive, particularly with respect to its internal organization and businesslike manner of operation.

The procedures, standards and systems established for the training and upgrading of drivers and mechanics are well conceived and provide a highly efficient mechanism for developing technicians and replacements from within the force.

Based on an analysis of motor vehicle capitalization and operational and maintenance cost averages, the Team concludes that the overall transportation activity is efficiently managed and highly economical.

Difficulty is being acutely felt in the area of sufficiency of operational-type vehicles due to shifta attacks. At the time of the Team's visit, 50 vehicles of the tactical fleet having an acquisition cost of nearly \$350,000 had been lost because of land mines planted by shifta. The added burden placed on the existing motor vehicle fleet and the repair and maintenance capability as they are stretched to make up for the loss are causing a serious strain on the system and will require correction.

D. Communications Activity

The communications activity appears well organized. In addition to the Chief Signal Officer being on the Commissioner's staff at force

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headquarters, there are signal officers at the Province and District levels. The exercise of technical supervision throughout the police communications system by the Chief Signal Officer constitutes a practical and constructive placement of authority and responsibility.

The communications system, as constituted, along with plans for its projection appears sound and provides a good network of coverage for the force. The system is constructively moving toward standardization which will eventually result in major equipment of two manufacturers.

Workshops appear to be logically deployed at Province and Division levels with a heavy base type workshop facility located in Nairobi. The Nairobi workshop appeared well organized and possessed a broad capability. An effort is made at maintaining 10% replacement parts which is a good management principle and should add to operational effectiveness.

The procedures and standards for training are sound. They permit selection, assessment, and assignment of individuals based on development as they progress through the various stages of on-the-job and polytechnic school training. The training system has much merit and constitutes a valuable tool for the production of operators and technical engineer-type personnel.

## E. Personnel and Emolument Matters

During the visits to the various police installations, the Team noted that the men were neat and well dressed, conducted themselves smartly, and made a very fine personal appearance, giving indications of good discipline and high morale. Personnel practices appeared sound and favorable for a career system.

### 1. Personnel

Police strength is at 12,000. The force employs about one-third of its personnel in the performance of its own technical services and support activities. This high level self-sustaining technological/service effort is probably the most efficient and effective method for performing the tasks in Kenya. However, it leaves about 8,000 personnel who are greatly stretched to provide the bare coverage for essential law enforcement and other internal security tasks.

The force has an annual turnover of 500 police and although this is a loss to the force, overall it is a gain for the economic structure of the nation. Traditionally, the security forces of a nation in an expanding economy have, in most instances, served as a training ground for industry. In this regard the Kenya police are no exception, and it appears that as the Kenya national economy continues to expand the annual police turnover

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will increase. This most probable development must be taken into consideration and appropriate personnel plans and policies formulated to minimize its adverse influence on the force. Attrition of skilled members of the force such as communications and vehicle maintenance personnel and others normally is crippling in a society with a lack of blue-collar technicians. The police must compete for these skills with industry and generally lose because of the salaries offered by the police unless special provisions are established for compensation of those with higher skills.

The filling of vacancies by recruitment of qualified candidates from the various tribes of Kenya in order to maintain a proportionate tribal representation in the force impressed the Team as being a sound policy. Additionally, it was noted that the men are generally assigned to posts without discrimination as to tribal origin, which is an interesting and constructive practice.

The anti-shifta operation, in addition to employing a large portion of the GSU and the army, has placed a considerable burden on the regular police. Force strength has not been increased to meet the expanded requirement. In view of the fact that the anti-shifta operation is not short term but one that may extend into at least the next few years, an increase in police strength is essential. It is estimated that the force should be increased by at least 1,000 men. The increase should be provided with various support including appropriate armament.

Officer vacancies are normally filled by the advancement of promising and qualified men from the ranks, which in the long run is one of the strong foundations for meaningful development of the force as a whole. At the time of the Team's visit, the potential from within the force was being exhausted. Plans which were being implemented for selection and recruitment of candidates possessing essential qualifications from outside the force to fill gazetted officer authorized positions appeared sound and in keeping with accepted practices of police in most areas of the world. The Kenya police recognize that this is a desirable procedure for the introduction of new blood and material of a promising caliber.

The Team noted with interest that the 187 gazetted officers of the force are of African, European and Asiatic ethnic origin. It appears the mix and blending of people of various ethnic origin is compatible with the makeup of the national population structure and should continue to have a beneficial long range impact on operations and development of the force.

## 2. Pay

The Kenya police are operating under pay conditions which could in the long run have a demoralizing impact unless meaningful corrective action is taken in the near future. Police pay is significantly below that

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of the Army and there are several inequities, such as the pay and allowances of Sub-Inspectors. Under the present circumstances, it will become more difficult to attract the quality of recruit required to maintain and further improve the standards of the force and could eventually lead to a reduction of standards. The solution of this difficult and aggravating problem is of significant concern and we understand it is currently under study by the Government of Kenya.

One problem noted was that certain GSU members serve six months at a forward operational post without family and six months in garrison at Nairobi where they can be with their families. This operational condition has caused housing difficulties and a review of emoluments for GSU personnel to resolve any unusual hardship caused by the service should be conducted. If justified the solution to this may be a special allowance to assist in the procurement of quarters on the civilian economy.

### 3. Buildings and Housing

Buildings and facilities for operational and support activities and family quarters used to house and shelter the force, varied in quality to a wide degree, which is understandable.

The border checkpoint at Taveta at the time of the Team's visit had new buildings under construction which appeared quite modern in design and adequate for the intended purpose.

The national police college at Nyeri had some fine modern and attractive buildings for administration and training and also others such as the library and student barracks where some modification and improvement would be beneficial. The Kenya Police College grounds and buildings as a whole were in an immaculately clean and orderly condition reflecting a top quality of care and attention. The facility seemed to generate an atmosphere highly conducive to learning.

The anti-stock theft unit at Gilgil, except for the matter of animal grazing acreage, appeared to have sufficient space for housing its operations and police families. At this installation the Team was impressed by all that was being done by the personnel to make the most of what they had and to improve existing facilities. *Live-stock recovery ca. 70-75%.*

The general and communications support depot in Nairobi appeared clean, however, the area was overcrowded and badly in need of more space particularly for the family housing section which was completely inadequate.

Headquarters in Nairobi is located in a most impressive building. Other operational and support buildings visited appeared adequate in general.

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The GSU facility in Nairobi appeared to be having a serious problem because of the lack of family quarters. Additionally, some rehabilitation and decoration of the GSU buildings were indicated. Some of the GSU main buildings were not as neat as others.

Generally all buildings, facilities and housing visited showed much evidence of the police making the most of their resources through self-help. It appeared that the matter of real estate and buildings may be at a point in the overall development of the police and the national economy to warrant special attention. The problems that were evident to the Team during its brief examination of this matter tend to indicate that possibly the functional and planning responsibility in this area may benefit through increased emphasis by being brought closer to the Commissioner's span of control.

F. Airlift Needs and Air Wing

The Team noted an intense interest in helicopters to meet requirements for remote area accessibility, medical air evacuation, and vertical airlift for the President during emergency. An operational statistical analysis reflects that the aircraft in the Police Air Wing are being utilized to a satisfactory degree and additional airlift capability is required to meet urgent needs. Based on operational requirements, the Team believes that the present demand can be met far more economically and effectively by two STOL type aircraft (rather than helicopters) and one DC-3.

At the time of the Team's visit, pilots for the Police Air Wing had dropped to a low of 9 including 3 recently trained African pilots. Action must be taken toward increasing the number of pilots and developing mechanics for the Police Air Wing. In view of the fact that this is a long range type development action, the target for the ten presently assigned aircraft should be a minimum of 14 pilots.

The Police Air Wing with its proper complement of pilots is considered by reliable authorities as the best in East Africa. Additionally, it constitutes a lifeline of the Kenya security force and civil administration insofar as it is also used by governmental officials as well as police. ✓

G. The Bunker

The Bunker in essence constitutes a national operations and communications center and has some feasibility based on its intended purpose. It would serve as a backup for the police national communications net in the event the police headquarters and communications system in Nairobi are knocked out. Additionally, it would serve as a safe and secure hardened site at which the President and key governmental officers may operate and broadcast from in case of emergency. ↓

The Bunker is still in the process of construction, the rough concrete structural portion is nearly finished with much remaining to be accomplished to complete construction and install the communications and certain essential survival facilities, equipment and furnishings. With a suitable physical security system and security force appropriately equipped and armed, it should withstand attack by small hostile elements not utilizing high velocity artillery or heavy bombs.

H. General Service Unit (GSU)

The mission, organization and self-contained concept of the GSU are sound and appropriate to its paramilitary role. The policy for recruitment, length of service and opportunities for entry into regular police has merit in that it provides the individual with a clear understanding of the terms of his service, permits career opportunity with the regular police and assures a young force.

The GSU armament consists of pistols, rifles, Bren guns and light mortars which appear to be an appropriate mix based on current activities.

The Team visited the tactical site of a GSU company deployed near the Somali border at Kiunga. The position was very clean, orderly and well organized. Field tentage and equipment were well cared for although showing some signs of wear. There was much evidence of improvisation to good advantage. The troops appeared healthy, physically alert and rugged. The whole facility with regard to support, tentage shelter, and living and working conditions demonstrated efficient use of limited amounts of allocated equipment.

The Team gained the impression that the GSU is a competent and effective paramilitary police force.

I. Kenya Police College - Nyeri

The school as a whole gives the impression of being a high quality institution. In addition to training the police, the school provides a valuable service to other Kenya governmental agencies, such as: the training given Kenya Air Force personnel, national youth service personnel and game scouts; also, there are plans to train the administrative police. The school campus of 116 acres, the maximum student capacity of 886 and the staff of 160 appear appropriate for the mission. Its organization into three training wings concerned with lower, middle and upper level training programs respectively is logical. The buildings, old and new, and the grounds were immaculately maintained. Students' morale appeared high, the high standards of discipline and Spartan-like garrison life tend to mold them into the desired quality of police. The school library is well stocked with books and reference materials, the building is old and shows signs of marked deterioration and replacement in the near future must be anticipated.

J. Anti-Stock Theft Unit - Gilgil

The leadership, organization, equipment, operational techniques, planning and direction capability of the anti-stock theft unit impressed the Team very favorably. The unit appears to be doing a remarkable job, livestock recovery was running at 70% with losses being steadily reduced. Much progress of a self-help nature was evidenced in rehabilitation of buildings and facilities for operational and housing purposes at the Gilgil station.

K. Villagization Program

The villagization program presents many difficulties. The cultural shock to the nomad stemming from the radical change to village life from nomadic living is profound. His entire way of life including social and economic practices and customs must be reoriented and village life must provide the necessary attraction which would motivate the nomad in this regard.

The scheme with its livestock marketing, small trading shops, schools, sanitation, health facilities and water holes in conjunction with designated and police protected grazing areas has merit. It appears that qualified administrative and technical personnel in adequate numbers and appropriate facilities to effectively staff and implement the program at village level are essential. General education and orientation with respect to village life must be carried out among the tribes. These tools and program attractions must be well established on a going concern basis and offered the nomad before any realistic hope of success may be entertained.

In addition to the present concepts which embrace villagization, it may prove of value to establish one model village and give it sufficient impetus and time for a reasonable trial period to demonstrate the practicality of the overall villagization scheme.

The Team was told that the wives among the nomadic people were the best supporters for village living, mainly because of getting away from the hardship of a continuous nomadic existence. It appears there may be some merit to developing the village idea so that it provides for some type of inexpensive yet permanent-type family shelter. This along with all the other features may serve to increase the tangible incentives.

L. Shifra

There is a significant internal security problem resulting from shifra activity which constitutes a continual major drain on the economy, absorbing funds urgently needed for economic and social development.

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For the most part the shiftas appear to be part-time participants, not ideologically motivated but interested in personal gain. There are a few hard-core irredentist leaders who supply the leadership and direction for politically motivated guerrilla action against selected targets and terrorism against individuals.

The area in which the shifta operate is huge. Apprehensions by the police are difficult because of time and space and slow reporting; shiftas are difficult to locate before they disperse or disappear into the bush or cross the border. Banditry has long been endemic within the area, and at this time, it exists in unmanageable proportions. It appears that shifta activity will continue as a problem for some time and it will take a long time for the security forces to get the situation in hand.

The Team believes that the fundamental solution to the shifta problem must come through diplomatic and political effort combined with social and economic developmental and support action programs.

## IV. CONCLUSIONS

A. The police mission is sound and their para-military role in the anti-shifta operation is appropriate, as the Kenya police is the most logical force for dealing with this problem based on the nature of the threat. The Security Committee concept, a system functioning under civilian control and direction, provides an excellent mechanism for coordination and focus of security forces and civil government activities on security problems.

B. Police direction, management and operational planning are excellent. Organization is good, particularly the integration of functional supervision of staff services in such areas of technical support as communications; automotive maintenance, transportation and air wing.

C. Operational, logistical, technical and support functions were being carried on in a business-like manner but although capabilities may have been fairly adequate for normal security operations, they are now stretched to the maximum because of heavy burdens imposed by the shifta and other problems. All activities evidenced much self-help effort and good cost consciousness resulting in the most efficient use of inadequate resources.

D. Although the force is well managed and effective when considered in terms of its size and resources, the Team identified some major areas of weakness that need corrective action. These are:

1. Pay is inadequate and unless corrected may cause deterioration, inability to attract suitable material for recruitment and a breakdown of standards.

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2. Building and family housing needs of the police should receive more emphasis because of its importance. Family housing is insufficient and some of the present facilities are in need of rehabilitation. GSU is particularly concerned because of its 6-month rotation program from garrison to the field and the inadequacy of garrison family quarters to accommodate the force.

3. Inadequate police strength to cope successfully with the security situation over the long run.

4. Insufficient weapons and motor vehicle transportation.

5. Inadequate airlift capability to support minimal operational needs.

E. The Bunker has some feasibility for its intended purpose. Much additional effort and resources are needed to complete the project.

## V. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. That the following action be taken as budgetary resources permit:

1. Increase pay commensurate with police duties and at a level to eliminate the inequity that exists between the police and the army.

2. Focus increased attention within the force headquarters staff on the functional area of buildings and family housing, this could be accomplished by placing it more directly under the Commissioner's span of control. Study GSU family housing question of insufficient quarters to accommodate troops rotating each six months and if justified consider (a) building more quarters or (b) providing a rental allowance for rental of quarters on the civilian economy.

3. Increase the force by about 1,000 men to satisfy requirement stemming from the anti-shifita situation and general police needs based on a manpower survey and study.

4. Provide additional motor vehicle transportation and weapons to meet needs based on an expanded effort in the field, increased force strength, the projected Bunker requirement and vehicle losses due to shifita operations.

B. To relieve the serious shortage of airlift, the following should be provided immediately:

1. A second DC-3. This aircraft will cost in the vicinity of \$100,000 compared to \$800,000 for a Caribou. It has greater versatility and will be cheaper to operate and maintain.

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2. Two STOL-type aircraft rather than helicopters which should satisfy nearly all of the operational demands that could be met by helicopters. It would provide aircraft that can be economically purchased and maintained and assure greater periods of in-service time as contrasted to the low in-service time of helicopters.

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