


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DECONTROLLED SEPTEMBER 6, 1972  
AUTHORIZED BY LAUREN J. GOIN,  
OPS/A.I.D., Washington, D.C. 20523

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

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POLICE SURVEY MISSION

TO THE CONGO

JUNE, 1963

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION.....	1
SUMMARY.....	3
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	6
STEPS IN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION.....	12
PROPOSED TIMING FOR CONGO POLICE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.....	14
SUGGESTED ORGANIZATION FOREIGN POLICE ADVISORY GROUP.....	16

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## INTRODUCTION

The Republic of the Congo, which was formerly known as the Belgian Congo, became an independent nation on July 1, 1960. It is located in western central Africa and is the largest country in the area covering a total of approximately 906,000 square miles. The Congo is about equal in area to that portion of the United States east of the Mississippi River.

The estimated 1960 population of the country was 14,200,000 with an approximate annual rate of increase of 2.2%. The density is estimated to be 15 persons per square mile. The most densely populated areas are located around the major cities of Leopoldville, Elizabethville, Luluabourg, Stanleyville, Bukavu and Albertville, as well as in the rural areas between Leopoldville and the Atlantic, the diamond mining areas of Tschikapa and Bakwanga; the copper, cobalt, and tin mining areas of Katanga, and in the plantation and agricultural areas of Paulis and Bunia in the northeast.

There are approximately 70 major indigenous ethnic-social groups in the Congo covering slightly more than 200 tribal units and about 400 or more native dialects. The four major native languages spoken in the country are:

- Kikongo - Western Area
- Lingala - Along the Congo River
- Tshiluba - Central and eastern shore
- Kiswahili - Eastern area

Tshiluba is the most widely spoken language nationwide, while French is the official language of the country.

The Congo has tremendous possibilities for future economic growth. It has been a major producer of copper, tin, uranium, industrial diamonds, palm oil and manganese. It could become an important producer of lumber, coffee, rubber, cotton and hydro-electric power. Most of the country is considered to be fertile and could be developed agriculturally. About one third of Congolese.

foreign exchange earnings prior to independence in 1960 stemmed from the export of agricultural products. The bulk of agricultural production and nearly all mineral exploitation is controlled by Europeans. Since 1960, the economic stability of the country has been increasingly threatened by political instability, the inability of the Congolese to establish and maintain reasonable standards of law and order, the use of force (UN troops and the Congolese Army) to put down secessionist activities in Katanga, the disruption of the country's transportation system, the resurgence of tribal conflicts and the attempt to create new provinces along tribal areas of influence, lack of discipline in the army and in the police, inability of the central government to exercise its authority in many provincial areas, uncontrolled migration of totally unskilled labor to the major cities, increasing unemployment, flight of capital, uncontrolled smuggling and resultant loss of foreign exchange earning to the central government, a lack of loyalty to the central government in some areas, and what appears to be an ever increasing inflation. The Congolese franc is officially pegged at 65 to the U.S. dollar, the black market rate is anywhere from 280 to 400 to 1. Although there is undoubtedly sound economic justification for encouraging a devaluation of the Congolese franc, there are those who hold that such action could cause serious reaction in both military and police ranks if salary or pay schedules were not immediately adjusted to compensate for the loss in purchasing power. The current inflationary pressure on the Congolese franc can become a source of considerable difficulty unless some relief is found.

As was noted in the Cleveland Mission report, several favorable factors exist in the Congo:

1. Great natural wealth.
2. Low-population - land ratio.
3. Subsistence agriculture permitting small negative impact resulting from decreased imports.
4. Traditional tribal codes placing responsibility for handling unemployed and refugees by each tribe involved.
5. Basic strength of tribal hierarchy.

## SUMMARY

This is a summarization of the salient points presented in this report.

1. The maintenance of law and order is basic to the development of political stability and economic growth of the Congo.

2. The internal security situation is very volatile in many areas of the country where minor altercations have suddenly escalated into indiscriminate armed assaults, inter-tribal warfare, rioting, etc.

3. The major potential trouble areas are located in the pre-independence provinces of Leopoldville, Katanga, Oriental, Kivu and Kasai.

4. The withdrawal of the United Nations military forces in 1963 could result in increased unrest and lawlessness which could explode into major disturbances leading to serious economic breakdown.

5. Congolese civil police forces and the Congolese Army (ANC) have contributed to disorder in many areas and are only capable of developing and maintaining order where they are properly led and disciplined.

6. A comprehensive civil police assistance program is vitally needed with particular emphasis on improving disciplinary standards, training, operational effectiveness, and riot control capability.

7. Since 1960, uncoordinated and independent efforts to improve the Congolese police forces by the United Nations (UN), Nigeria, and Belgium have had but a minimal impact.

8. The UN could exercise the role of a catalyst in the development of an overall civil police assistance program and in marshalling available resources from interested member nations in the implementation of such a program.

9. Should the UN indicate a lack of interest or capability in handling such a responsibility, consideration should be given to the possibility of the development of a quadri-partite program involving police technicians from the

Congolese Ministry of Interior, Nigeria, Belgium, and other donors.

10. Although the Nigerians have indicated an interest in assuming a major role in training the Congolese police, their capability is limited by a lack of Nigerian police personnel who are fluent in French, Lingala, or Swahili, and by differences between Nigerian and Congolese legal systems.

11. An initial forward step would be the creation of a multinational task force of police technicians, including Congolese, working under the aegis of the UN, for the purpose of preparing short and long range plans for each of the 22 civil police forces in the country.

12. Approximately 100 French-speaking foreign police technicians are required for the various police forces and to staff four regional police schools for at least four years.

13. Maximum Belgian participation should be solicited.

14. Current Belgian experience in introducing Belgian military advisors to the ANC may be useful in guiding the introduction of Belgian police advisors to the civil police forces.

15. U.S. overall participation should be minimized.

16. Present Congolese civil police strength is estimated to be about 22,000 throughout the Congo. A substantial reduction is in order particularly with regard to the large numbers of unfit personnel.

17. Every Congolese policeman and officer requires training.

18. The Congolese are not capable of handling police training responsibilities without foreign assistance.

19. With the exception of the Leopoldville police which is controlled by the Central Government, each provincial government is responsible for the police forces within its jurisdiction. A total of 22 separate police forces exist throughout the country.

20. Although a single federal type police force may be desirable, provincial political considerations mitigate against the creation of such a force at this time.

21. The Surete Nationale is not capable of handling its border patrol responsibilities properly because of lack of personnel and equipment.

22. Close cooperation between foreign military advisors and foreign police advisors could result in similar cooperation developing between the Congolese military and police establishments in approaching internal security problems of mutual interest.

23. No police uniform issue has been made in the Congo for almost three years. New uniforms issued to police school graduates would greatly increase self-respect and esprit de corps within police ranks.

24. The Congolese police forces have an urgent requirement for communications, transportation, riot control equipment and the means of supporting and maintaining such equipment.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The UN and the Government of the Congo should be persuaded as soon as possible to create a working committee of qualified personnel from the GOC, the UN, the Nigerian Embassy, the Belgian Embassy and the American Embassy. The committee should be chaired by the UN and should be charged with the responsibility of identifying the specific requirements of the Congolese civil police forces in terms of Leopoldville and each of the provinces. Both short and long range plans should be drawn up by the committee to include:

- a. Organizational structure
- b. Functions and responsibilities
- c. Strengths
- d. Personnel distribution by unit according to rank
- e. Special needs
- f. Training programs (Congo or elsewhere)
- g. Equipment requirements and distribution
- h. Foreign police technical assistance needs (number of advisors or technicians and period of time)
- i. Police Manuals of Rules and Regulations
- j. Needed legislation
- k. Detailed anticipated Congolese annual police budgets projected over the next five years for Leopoldville and each province.

2. Estimated costs of an overall police assistance program over the next five to ten years. Admittedly, a multinational approach to the problem is not the most desirable in terms of speed and efficiency. Political and financial considerations make it preferable that this approach be tried rather than to have a single country undertaking to provide all the necessary assistance.

3. The United States should not agree to furnish any support until some kind of acceptable program has been worked out. American participation should be limited to those aspects of the overall program in which there is a

certainly that United States technical competence can accomplish the tasks efficiently and where there is a potentially positive impact being made. Where desirable, in terms of United States and/or Congolese interests, active participation should be solicited from other friendly nations for technical, financial, or material support.

4. In the event that American material aid is granted, a sufficient number of American technicians be assigned to the Congo AID Mission for the purpose of maintaining close liaison with the UN and the Government of the Congo to assure that necessary steps are being taken to protect American investment of equipment in terms of trained personnel, maintenance facilities, technical competence, proper installation and use of equipment, warehousing and issue of spare parts, supplies, tools, etc. Although competent technical assistance in this domain may be available in the form of other foreign technicians, American general overseeing of its investment of equipment should be mandatory.

5. Prior to Independence, the civil police forces in the Congo numbered 8927 Congolese policemen and 272 Belgian police officers. The exact number today is unknown. The Ministry of Interior has not been able to establish a firm figure since many of the totals furnished by the provinces are false. A rough estimate would place the total throughout the Congo at around 22,000. A proper training program should be used to eliminate the incompetents and to finally arrive at a figure of between 12,000 - 15,000. The exact final figure should depend upon established requirements province by province according to population totals, tribal tensions, economic conditions, population density, sensitive areas, routes of overland transport, crime rates, border area conditions, climate, etc.

6. The possibility of major disturbances in many areas of the country require that considerable emphasis be placed on developing Congolese police capability in handling riots and in controlling crowds.

7. La Loi Fondamentale, Article 220, stipulates that the police function is the responsibility of each individual province. The Central Government exercises little or no control in provincial police affairs. A centralized single national police force would be desirable in the Congo. However, such a recommendation would doubtlessly be unacceptable by many of the provincial

governments. It was learned that the overabundance of "police" in several provinces actually constituted a form of privately controlled forces (milices). A basic code of rules and regulations for the police in the Congo is badly needed. The Central Government should be prepared to underwrite the annual provincial police budgets as much as 65% to 75% of the total. An office of Police Inspector General should be created within the central Ministry of Interior. It would be the responsibility of the Inspector General of Police and his staff to conduct frequent inspections of the police services throughout the Congo in order to determine whether or not the basic code is being applied. Deficiencies could then result in the withholding of future budgetary support for a given province until corrective action had been taken and verified. A police inspector in each province would be responsible to both the provincial governor as well as to the Inspector General of Police. In this manner, some semblance of centralized control, standardization of operation and relative efficiency could be achieved. To expect 21 different provinces to operate separate police forces effectively within the framework of present Congolese instability and under-development is unrealistic.

8. At the present time, there is no guarantee of adequate budgetary support for the civil police in the Congo. It can also be stated with reasonable certainty that very few, if any, Congolese are aware of the large sums of money required to keep a fleet of police vehicles running. It is recommended that this problem be closely examined because there is nothing to be gained from providing equipment where it will not be operating a few months following its arrival for reasons of improper use, poor preventive maintenance, lack of spare parts, or lack of gasoline or oil. The equipment would be of no use to the Congolese under such conditions.

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9. Although both the UN police training program, the Congo-Nigerian police training agreement and the training being accomplished by the Belgians at Elizabethville are all steps in the right direction, a greater degree of coordination is needed and a greater emphasis on training is recommended. Four or five regional schools are needed to train the required number of officers and specialists as soon as possible. A single school in Leopoldville will not do the job quickly enough. Personnel of intermediate rank should also be trained at regional schools. At the outset, enlisted men could be trained in the provinces

in standardized programs handled by foreign police technicians.

10. With regard to both vehicular and communications equipment, care must be taken to avoid a proliferation of makes and models. Large numbers of varying types and manufacture of equipment greatly increases the problem of spare parts supplies and the necessity for increased competence in terms of using and repairing different models of equipment. Every effort should be made to standardize equipment wherever possible.

11. It may be necessary to provide handguns (revolvers) and a small quantity of ammunition for officer and investigator personnel upon a concrete determination of their number and upon their having been trained in their use. However, it is not contemplated at this time that any weapons, other than the Belgian made 9 mm Mauser bolt action rifles, be procured for the police. It is necessary that Congolese riot squads be trained in the use of tear gas equipment.

12. It is recommended that a central identification bureau be created in the 3rd Directorate (Maintenance of Order) of the Ministry of Interior. A central fingerprint file should be available to all the police units of the country. A central crime laboratory is also needed. A small laboratory and a fingerprint file are operated by a single Belgian technician in Leopoldville. A long range program is needed in the selection of intelligent and interested young people and their future education in mathematics, physics, chemistry, etc. Foreign assistance in these two fields will be needed for several years.

13. Eventually, a central criminal record bureau should also be developed in the Ministry of Interior. The laboratory, the identification bureau and the records bureau would serve as a clearinghouse for information of value to all police units throughout the Congo.

14. It is recommended that the Congolese Police be uniformed as distinctly as possible from the ANC. Police vehicles should also bear a different color. A combination of dark blue trousers and light blue shirts and caps seems desirable. New uniforms should only be issued upon completion of recruit, intermediate or officers courses, as the case may be. Uniforms should not be issued to all those now claiming to be policemen. Only those who have cleared the weeding-out process at the training schools should be issued new uniforms. The present attire of the average Congolese policeman is pitiful. A decent uniform

will add considerably to esprit de corps, the feeling of prestige and respect.

15. The responsibilities of the various law enforcement or security agencies in the Congo must be clearly delimited. The prevention and suppression of criminal activity is the logical responsibility of the civil police forces throughout the country. Civil disturbances and riots are also normally within the jurisdiction of the police. The military should only be called upon when a situation exceeds police capability or where a given police force refuses to act. The Gendarmerie, a unit of the ANC, should not have any law enforcement jurisdiction whatsoever outside of military reservations except where a state of martial law has been proclaimed or when called upon to render assistance on the basis of a valid requisition executed by competent civilian authority.

Violation of banking law and commercial regulations should be handled by representatives of the various ministries dealing with monetary or commercial affairs.

The Surete should not have any control or jurisdiction over civil police forces and should be limited to investigation and control of subversive activities, counterespionage, immigration and deportation matters, and border control. Present Surete border control capability should be greatly increased. The possibility of merging the operations of the Financial Brigade, the Customs Service, and the Surete border control should be explored.

16. It should again be emphasized that a solid police program is essential in the Congo. All of the resources available to the Congo through the UN must be marshalled and concentrated on the problem. The suggested task force and a dedicated spirit of professional cooperation among the technicians are indispensable for the success of such a multi-national undertaking. Belgian police officers, working within the framework of an overall UN police assistance program, are obviously far better qualified in terms of experience in the Congo than anyone else to do the job in the field. Sound advance planning must be done as soon as possible. Once the program has been drawn up and approved by competent authorities, all interested parties will then realize what has to be done and what will be required to see it through. It is recommended that the UN move ahead on the formulation of the committee as soon as possible. The work of the task force is the starting point of a long and arduous program. Continuation

of the present uncoordinated efforts does not lend itself to forseeing encouraging results.

17. Efforts should be made to arrive at standard pay-scales for all police forces in the country and to have these standards applied in each province. Provincial governments should also be influenced to pay their police forces regularly and promptly in order to eliminate a common complaint and a source of trouble.

## STEPS IN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

1. Determine the position of the GOC regarding future of civil police forces and foreign police assistance requirements.
2. Clarify to the GOC the urgent need for a coordinated major effort in upgrading police in a long range program .
3. With GOC and UN agreement, form a multi-national police task force under the UN for the purpose of preparing basic planning documents for each civil police organization in the Congo. Representatives of the GOC, the UN, Nigeria, Belgium, and the U.S. should be included in said task force.
4. Prepare an overall assessment of training requirements in terms of scope, courses, standardized procedures, manuals, facilities, budgets, instructor personnel, standards, and schedules for use at each school.
5. Obtain written agreement of each provincial government to participate fully in overall program.
6. Depending upon GOC and individual provincial approval of program, recruit approximately 70 foreign police technicians to assist 32 Belgian Police technicians now in the Congo. Technicians should be experienced police officers who are fluent in French.
7. Assign all foreign police technicians to the UN program under the leadership of the Chief of Civilian Operations.
8. Prepare an orientation program for incoming foreign technicians.
9. Assign technical personnel on a priority basis in terms of potential trouble areas, population centers, etc.
10. Assign a qualified and experienced American Public Safety Advisor to USAID/Leopoldville to act as the liaison between the UN and the American embassy on police affairs and to assist, along with representatives of other donors, the UN task force leader in the development and implementation of a

comprehensive civil police program.

11. Survey and repair existing police communications equipment.
12. Survey and repair police vehicles in Leopoldville and Elizabethville which lack spare parts.
13. Conduct complete surveys of each proposed urban and provincial police communication's system.
14. Implement training program in Leopoldville while expanding training in Elizabethville.
15. Begin training program at police school in Stanleyville and negotiate the use of public administration school 15 kilometers out of Luluabourg as another regional police school.
16. Prepare commodity procurement documents pursuant to task force recommendations.
17. Provide equipment only to those police forces where foreign police technicians have been assigned and where the Congolese personnel are capable of properly using and maintaining said equipment.

### PROPOSED TIMING FOR CONGO POLICE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

(This table is for planning purposes only and should not be interpreted as being indicative of a planned cause of action contemplated at this time.)

- |  |                   |
|--|-------------------|
| 1. Secure GOC, UNOC, and UNNY agreement to create multi-national police task force in Leopoldville.  | 15 September 1963 |
| 2. Begin required field surveys, negotiations with each Provincial Government, development of overall Police Assistance Program Document, and survey and repair available police communications and transport equipment. | 1 October 1963    |
| 3. Begin recruitment of required foreign police technicians.   | 1 November 1963   |
| 4. Initiate procurement of commodities on priority basis.  | 1 November 1963   |
| 5. Complete preparation of training programs, standard operating procedures, manuals of rules and regulations, orientation for new technicians, etc., by the task force.   | 1 March 1964      |
| 6. Complete draft of overall Police Assistance Program Document.   | 1 March 1964      |
| 7. Submit Police Assistance Program Document to ONUC for approval and distribution.  | 15 March 1964     |
| 8. Arrival of foreign police personnel for school staffs and for assignment to provincial police forces.   | 26 March 1964     |
| 9. Begin orientation program for foreign police technicians.   | 1 April 1964      |

10. Departure of personnel to the field.


23 April 1964

11. Begin field operations and training programs.

1 May 1964

SUGGESTED ORGANIZATION

FOREIGN POLICE ADVISORY GROUP



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
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**ANNEXES TO  
APPROVED REPORT OF  
POLICE SURVEY  
OF THE CONGO**

**JUNE 1963**

REVIEWED AND DECONTROLLED by Lauren J.  
Goin, Director of OPS, January 28, 1975

**AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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**These Annexes of the approved report of the Congo Police Survey are the observations, comments, and suggestions compiled during the Survey by members of the Survey team and do not represent an official view of the United States Government.**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ANNEXES	
ANNEX I - INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS . . . . .	1
ANNEX II - INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES . . . . .	5
Civil Police . . . . .	5
Surete Nationale . . . . .	13
Congolese National Army - ANC . . . . .	15
ANNEX III - FIELD OBSERVATIONS . . . . .	19
Leopoldville . . . . .	19
East Katanga - Elizabethville . . . . .	21
Upper Congo - Stanleyville . . . . .	25
Upper Kasai - Luluabourg . . . . .	27
South Kasai - Bakwanga . . . . .	32
North Katanga - Albertville . . . . .	34
Kivu - Bukavu and Goma . . . . .	35
ANNEX IV - TRAINING . . . . .	39
ANNEX V - COMMUNICATIONS . . . . .	51
Urban Police Systems . . . . .	55
Provincial Police Systems . . . . .	62
ANNEX VI - VEHICLES . . . . .	67
ANNEX VII - APPENDIX . . . . .	73
Map 1 - The Republic of the Congo . . . . .	75
Map 2 - Ethnographic Sketch . . . . .	76
Map 3 - Recommended Regional Police Communications Systems . . . . .	77
Map 4 - Provincial Limits . . . . .	78

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd)

	Page
ANNEX VII - APPENDIX - (continued)	
Chart 1 - Actual Leopoldville Urban Police Organization. . . . .	79
Chart 2 - Recommended Leopoldville Urban Police Organization. . . . .	80
Chart 3 - Recommended Provincial Police Organization. . . . .	81

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ANNEX I

INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS

The major threats to internal security in the Congo are inter-tribal conflict; antagonism between the Katangese and other Congolese; irresponsible agitation of the population for political reasons; poor control of weapons in the ANC, the police forces, and among the civilian population; riots; armed assaults; and general criminal activity. The development and maintenance of order has been a pressing and persistent problem since mid-1960. Economic recovery and future growth will be rendered difficult, if not impossible, unless a climate of security can be restored throughout the nation. The over-riding political problems will require solution before this can be accomplished.

According to Belgians who have lived many years in the Congo, the average Congolese is very peaceful and does not seek conflict or trouble under normal circumstances. However, when encouraged or motivated, a group can explode into a vicious and cruel mob. A minor altercation between members of different tribes can quickly escalate into a murderous battle between the tribes involved and their allies. In many areas of the Congo, smaller tribes often seek protection from larger, more powerful tribes. Systems of mutual protection against enemies have been established. Intermarriages between rival tribes have tended to reduce the volatility of some of these situations to some extent. Disputes involving land have also been the source of tribal warfare. During the Belgian administration, inter-tribal conflict and disorder became a matter of negotiation between the tribes under Belgian supervision. Where mediation and negotiation failed, or where one or the other of the tribes willfully violated established agreements, overpowering force was applied under Belgian command to impose a settlement. With the withdrawal of Belgian control and the subsequent deterioration of the former Force Publique as a stabilizing factor, tribal grievances and hatreds were surfaced. The political and economic dislocations engendered by the sudden attainment of independence led to the fighting and killing which subsequently occurred during the course of

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military movements into Kasai and Katanga. Tribal chiefs regained much of the authority they had enjoyed prior to and during the earlier period of Belgian colonialization. As a consequence, provincial governments today are strongly influenced by the deliberations of tribal councils. In many rural areas, tribal custom, tradition, or law successfully keeps crime to a minimum.

In the former provinces of Kasai and Katanga, internal security is endangered by the fact that the ANC is regarded as an unwanted "foreign" army. Latent secessionist tendencies still exist. Many instances of brutal and outright murder were attributed to the ANC in these areas following independence. Cold blooded murder of Europeans by ANC troops has occurred in Kolwezi, Jadotville, Kindu, Elizabethville, and elsewhere. With the continuing withdrawal of UN troops from these former provinces, Belgian and non-Belgian merchants and technicians are leaving the area in increasing numbers because of a fear of a resumption of large scale hostilities or of a breakdown in law and order. There are those in Elizabethville among the Belgian community who believe that if all the UN troops are withdrawn from South Katanga by December of this year, the area will become a virtual timebomb. These sources feel that the ANC will suddenly find itself all alone, i.e. without UN-forces to back them up, for the first time since it entered Katanga. This could lead to a feeling of uncertainty and fear on the part of ANC officers and men. An attack or two on ANC positions or quarters, unnecessary use of force and brutality by the ANC in patrol activity, the mixture of liquor and weapons on the part of either the ANC or the Katangese, could easily lead to additional loss of life where each side becomes bent on revenge. The reported presence of former members of the Katangese Gendarmerie and a handful of former mercenaries across the border in Angola and in rural areas of South Katanga, if true, could also become a prime source of difficulty. Some UN military officers have expressed the opinion that these people will not constitute a future security problem on the "rusty gun" theory. It is undoubtedly true that a large percentage of the weapons and ammunition of the former Katangese Gendarmerie will become useless because of poor maintenance. However, it is safe to assume that some weapons and ammunition will be well maintained. Not all will be rusty and inoperable.

Another source of difficulty in the South Katanga area is the lack of discipline among ANC troops, particularly insofar as control over the issue and use of weapons is concerned. Off-duty military personnel have been known to leave their encampments or billets fully armed. This has led to unfortunate and unnecessary gun battles between the ANC and local citizens and police. Both the ANC and the Katangese forces have very poor discipline regarding the use of firearms in the face of an altercation or in a tense tribal situation. Obviously, the situation in South Katanga is going to require cool, reflective, and dispassionate handling on all sides. Mature leadership, stern discipline, and a mutual willingness to avoid turmoil and strife are basic to any successful solution of the security problem there.

Given the virtual non-existence of reliable data regarding crime rates, it was necessary to rely on the observations of those in, or familiar with, civil police operations. The major types of violations coming most frequently to the police are:

- Assault with a deadly weapon
- Assault and battery
- Armed robbery
- Breaking and entering
- Larceny
- Auto theft
- Illegal possession of firearms
- Escape from custody
- Smuggling
- Murder
- Rape

According to both Belgian and Congolese sources, most of the above violations occur in urban areas inhabited by Congolese, except for crimes against property which are predominant in areas inhabited by Europeans. The incidence is far greater during hours of darkness. Unemployment, availability of intoxicating beverages, arguments over women, poor crime prevention activity, and inadequate crime repression capability on the part of the police have been cited as causal factors.

Crime in rural areas involves inter-tribal relationships in many instances. Murders, kidnapping and raping of women from rival tribes and theft of livestock are the more general types of crime reported to the police in outlying provinces. The exact incidence of each type of violation is not known since many crimes are never reported because of revenge, and because many are handled according to tribal law without advertising provincial authorities. In many areas, the amount of crime was reportedly almost non-existent for various cultural or traditional reasons.

Smuggling is a major criminal activity which is depriving the Government of the Congo an untold amount in the earning of foreign exchange and in tax revenue. Contraband consists mostly of diamonds, gold, coffee, rubber, cotton and tea. Provincial administrators are often involved in these operations while both police and customs personnel clear the way for actual movement of contraband. The areas where this activity predominates are: Matadi, Leopoldville, South Kasai, Luluabourg, Elizabethville, and along the entire eastern and northeastern frontier. UN sources estimate 80% of Congo's pre-independence import-export revenues and earning of hard foreign exchange outside of the operations of large companies, such as Union Miniere, is currently being lost.

## ANNEX II

### INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

#### Civil Police

The Belgian Parliament on May 18, 1960 voted a "Fundamental Law Relative to the Structures of the Congo." This law is composed of 259 articles and it replaces the Colonial Charter of 1908 until such time as the Congo adopts its own definitive constitution. In the Congo, it is referred to as "La Loi Fondamentale."

A translation from the French language text of Article 220 is as follows:

"Without prejudicing the particular dispositions attributing competence to central authority, or to provincial authority, with the reservation that such authority cannot be in opposition to this article, the subjects enumerated hereinafter are exclusively attributed to provincial authority:

1. Provincial police
2. Judicial police assigned to those courts under provincial jurisdiction.

La Loi Fondamentale is currently being applied in the Congo. All civil police forces in the provinces, except the Surete Nationale, are under provincial control. A federal police force does not exist. The Central Government controls the police of the city Leopoldville only. The only two nation-wide security forces controlled by Leopoldville are the ANC, including the Gendarmerie, and the Surete Nationale. There are a total of 21 provincial police forces in addition to the Leopoldville Urban Police. All of these organizations are independent of one another, and except for Leopoldville, are not directly responsible to the Central Government. There is an office in the Central Ministry of Interior headed by Mr. A. B. Mobhe which is concerned with the maintenance of order in terms of strikes, inter-tribal conflict, and civil police. However, it does not exercise any operational control over the provincial police. The Leopoldville police are responsible to the Ministry of Interior through the Mayor.

According to the Belgian 1958 Annual Report on the Congo, the police were distributed as follows:

Leopoldville (Urban)	1616	
Leopoldville (Provincial)	2921	
Equatour	545	
Oriental	1119	
Kivu	727	
Katanga	1554	
Kasai	<u>445</u>	
	8927	Congolese
	<u>272</u>	Belgians
	9199	Total

For all practical purposes, valid figures for the total strength in the country today are non-existent. After independence, large numbers of people were added to the provincial police payrolls on the basis of nepotism or tribal affiliation. None of these individuals was required to meet normal personnel standards of any kind. Very few have since received training. A considered estimate of maximum current police strength today would be approximately 22,000 to 23,000 of whom almost 17,000 were accounted for during the survey. The vehicular and communications equipment which the police had in 1960 has either been rendered useless through misuse and poor maintenance, or has disappeared by means of illegal sale, conversion to personal use by provincial authorities, military confiscation, or theft. In general, some of the problems peculiar to the police are:

1. Overstaffing with totally incompetent personnel.
2. Uneducated, untrained, and inexperienced leadership.
3. Constant meddling by political leaders.
4. Inadequate budgetary support and irregular salary payments.
5. Serious lack of discipline.
6. Insufficient training capability in terms of facilities, equipment, and competent instructors.
7. Lack of proper uniforms.

8. Lack of standard operating procedures and of manuals of rules and regulations.
9. Poor administrative and criminal records systems.
10. Inadequate office facilities and equipment.
11. Lack of qualified technicians.
12. Poor identification capability.
13. Inadequate crime laboratory facilities and insufficient numbers of laboratory technicians.
14. Lack of transportation equipment and maintenance facilities.
15. Insufficient numbers of trained drivers and qualified mechanics.
16. Shortage of spare parts and maintenance facilities.
17. Lack of provincial and urban police communications nets.
18. Lack of trained radio operator and maintenance personnel.
19. Nonexistence of police operated communications repair facilities.
20. Lack of esprit-de-corps and general loyalty to the Central Government.
21. Lack of discipline and training in the use of firearms.

The codes and laws of the Belgian Congo are still applied pending the adoption of new legislation. This is true of the police. Accordingly, the duties of the civil police are as follows:

1. Maintain constant surveillance of public thoroughfares and markets - and also engage in night patrols.
2. Report to competent authority all which is observed in violation.
3. Maintain public order and, in cases of trouble or riot, participate in the reestablishment of order.
4. To secure all possible information regarding violations and to make them known immediately to competent authority; to search for the violator, and in case the arrest of a violator has been ordered, follow and apprehend said violator.

5. To physically take into custody and to conduct before competent authority all persons caught committing a serious crime (felony) or being followed after by public clamor (hue and cry), as well as those found bearing effects, arms, instruments, or papers which could prove their guilt.

6. To prevent any individual from causing any evidence of a violation to disappear.

7. To arrest all persons under the influence of alcohol, as well as persons deemed to be dangerous, who are found on the street and to place them outside of danger (incarceration) and to inform competent authority immediately.

8. To arrest and to take before competent authority all military deserters, escaped prisoners, those persons who are vagabonds or beggars, those found committing acts of violence against the property of whomsoever, and those found on a public thoroughfare causing disorder by shouting, singing, quarreling, crowding or in any other manner.

9. To advise without delay those interested authorities of all accidents and injuries and to lend assistance thereto; to inform competent authorities of the discovery of bodies outside of houses or habitations.

10. To report to competent authorities, those persons traveling by steamboat or by train who do not have medical passports.

11. To serve as prison guards and to treat the prisoners with firmness, dignity, and humaneness (serve under the orders of the prison director).

12. To guard aerodromes and to enforce airport regulations.

With regard to recruitment, the following regulations were applied prior to Independence. Although still valid, they have been disregarded in almost every respect:

No person may be recruited as a policeman in the corps of territorial police where said person does not meet the following conditions:

1. Be of Belgian nationality or a national of the territory of Ruanda - Urundi;
2. Be of irreproachable conduct.
3. Have but one wife.

4. Be recognized by a doctor of the colony as being physically capable to exercise the duties involved.

During the first year of engagement, the policemen will study the courses of a police school as student-policemen and their special situation is regulated by the particular rules of the school.

In particular cases, such as in the case of former soldiers or non-com's of the Force Publique, the provincial governors or their representatives may waive the foregoing training obligation.

"In principle, new recruits enter as policemen 2nd class. However, former corporals or sergeants of the Force Publique are hired as policeman 1st class, with base pay increased at the rate of 1% for each year of service in the Force Publique beginning with the rank of corporal."

For those candidates who were former members of the Force Publique at a rank higher than sergeant, each case shall be handled individually by the province chief or their representatives.

Provincial governors are authorized to terminate the careers of policemen after 30 years service or where the policemen no longer is fit for service. Pension rights are stipulated in the decree of August 7, 1935.

Old Belgian regulations governing the issue and supply of equipment, which are still partially valid today, are as follows:

Policemen and those in the junior NCO category are armed with a pistol. These arms and their ammunition shall always be stored in a secure depot under the responsibility of the European police officer commanding the detachment. The existing policies (rules and regulations) govern the circumstances in which territorial police shall carry arms.

Territorial police detachments can be supplied, upon decision of the provincial governors or their representatives, with equipment such as sub-machine guns, tear gas grenades, gas masks, etc. The use of this equipment is controlled by circumstances under the responsibility of the territorial administrator.

Provincial governors or their delegates decide upon the vehicles each detachment shall have: bicycles, motorcycles, jeeps, autos, and trucks.

The Belgian Government made serious efforts to improve the Congolese police forces during the three or four years immediately prior to Independence. Strengths were increased, additional police advisors were sent to the Congo, modern police schools and barracks were built, and considerable equipment was provided. Unfortunately, attempts to train police command officers in sufficient numbers came too late. Whatever semblance of police effectiveness which may exist in the Congo now, is the result of the efforts of a few enlightened Congolese administrators, assistance rendered by 32 Belgian police technicians, advice offered by interested UN civilian operations personnel, and because of the guidance and on-the-job training being given by the UN Nigerian Police Detachments located in Leopoldville, Stanleyville, Bukavu, Kindu, and Lulua-bourg.

Two relatively small identification bureaus using the Bogerhof Fingerprint Classification System exist in the Congo; one at Leopoldville, and the other at Elizabethville. Both are appendages of the criminal courts in those cities and work very closely with the judicial section or division (detective) of the police. Although the services of these bureaus are available to other provincial police forces, neither is equipped or staffed to handle many outside submissions of fingerprint cards.

A small crime laboratory exists in Leopoldville and is attached to the criminal courts. A single Belgian technician, Mr. Roger Verhaegen, with a few Congolese clerks, conducts all of the analyses of evidence submitted to the laboratory. His reliability as an expert technician is unknown. A detailed inventory of equipment and supplies now on hand, those which have been ordered, and a list of needs based on past and expected numbers of requests for laboratory operations records were not made available. The present laboratory reportedly lacks the necessary equipment, facilities, and staff to properly handle the load in the Leopoldville area alone, much less that of the entire Congo.

No central criminal dossiers and name index files are available anywhere on a nationwide basis. Each police agency maintains its own separate file system ranging from nothing whatsoever to the meager beginning of such systems in Elizabethville and Leopoldville.

The core of any effective police organization is the efficiency of its records, identification, and laboratory capabilities. Without these, the overall impact of excellent personnel, training, leadership, and discipline is reduced. The Congolese police are currently lacking in all of these. A complete overhaul of all the police forces is required. All personnel require training, and all need a thorough dose of strong discipline. Although a national police force would be desirable in terms of efficiency and reduced influence and control over police affairs by local politicians, the creation of such a force may be a long way off for both political and language considerations. The creation of a national police force would require adoption of legislation by the Central Government which would surely meet strong resistance from several provincial governments. The police commanders at Luluabourg polled all of the provinces in April of this year with regard to the possibility of having a conference at Luluabourg to discuss common problems and explore the possibility of forming a national police force. Nearly all responses agreed that a conference should be held, but four strongly opposed the national police proposal and referred to La Loi Fondamentale. The Luluabourg police officers felt stronger opposition would undoubtedly be generated by provincial politicians at the prospect of losing control over the police. The other argument against such a proposal is the question of language. In order to be effective, a policeman must be able to speak and comprehend the language of the people with or among whom he is working. A policeman who cannot do this is virtually useless. Until such time as the number of languages and dialects used in the Congo becomes greatly reduced, policemen speaking a given language will have to work in the same areas in which that language is spoken. This problem is not as great in the ANC since the army is not expected to have the same degree of day-to-day association with the population as do the police.

The greatest single weakness of the police in the Congo is lack of discipline both among officers and men. Those with political protection conduct themselves unethically and often violate the law with impunity. Orders are ignored with little or no subsequent punishment. Proper patrols are not carried out, telephone calls are not answered, stations are often not manned, equipment is misused, and investigations of crimes are often a farce. Mismanagement in the matter of personnel is extremely high. In most areas, the police are seen only during

daylight hours. Very few are seen at night. The crime rates and security in all of the urban areas in the Congo could be quickly controlled with relatively few well selected, trained, led, disciplined, and equipped police working at night. Belgian police advisors agreed that this could be done only if the right degree of discipline could be achieved.

A complete survey of the current inventory and condition of Congolese police firearms and ammunition supplies is required. This should include accurate estimates of actual requirements in terms of quantities, types, ranges, training needs, reloading equipment, and storage facilities. Belgian advisors have indicated that there are sufficient arms and ammunition available in the Congo to equip the police forces. Unfortunately, nearly all are believed to be in the hands of the ANC or the former Katangese Gendarmerie. It is believed that none of the Congolese policemen should be armed until after each has completed a formal firearms training program developed and supervised by foreign police technicians. The Congolese should be influenced to carry weapons only on night patrols or when required in controlling riots, in inter-tribal conflicts, or in arresting people who are armed and dangerous.

Given the insecurity which exists in so many areas of the country, considerable emphasis should be placed in riot tactics and crowd control training programs. It is believed that studies should be made in order to determine those tactics which are most effective in the Congo. Modifications of Nigerian and Belgian systems may be useful. The Belgian police technicians are reportedly teaching riot control methods at the police school in Elizabethville. The tactics being taught there should be examined in an effort to develop a standardized group of tactics for use in other police schools. A high priority should be given to this subject.

Riot squads or intervention units should be created in Leopoldville, Elizabethville, Kolwezi, Jadotville, Stanleyville, Luluabourg, and in selected provincial police forces in those areas. Exact manpower requirements for riot squads should be based on studies made in each area.

The civil police forces in the Congo today are currently not capable of developing and maintaining law and order without the help of foreign technicians. The ANC and Gendarmerie will have to play important roles in assisting civilian

authorities in this, a purely civilian responsibility, until such time as the police develop such a capability. It should be noted that the army is not capable of carrying out this responsibility alone either. Therefore, some sound planning is definitely in order with regard to this problem with particular emphasis on delimiting both civilian police and military authority or jurisdiction. With the exception of martial law or of a national emergency, the civil police should have primary law enforcement jurisdiction in all non-military reservations or areas throughout the Congo. All criminal acts reflected in the Penal Code now in existence in the Congo, and the prevention thereof, with the exception of those occurring on military jurisdictions or involving military personnel or military information or property, should be the sole responsibility of the civil police. This would not include jurisdiction in matters which are now the investigative responsibility of the Customs or Surete agencies. There is no sensible reason why military and police authorities cannot or should not cooperate. Every effort should be made to prevent or stop inter-agency competition, jealousies, etc.. The problems in the Congo will present enough work for everyone involved for many years to come. The country can ill afford the luxury of duplication of effort or the lack of a common cooperative spirit in removing the sources of internal insecurity which plague the Congo today.

#### Surete Nationale

The Surete Nationale is an organization having nationwide jurisdiction and has the functions of a combined Secret Service, FBI, CIA, and Immigration-Naturalization Service of the U. S. It is directed by Mr. Victor Nendaka, whose headquarters are in Leopoldville. This agency is composed of some 200 men who are spread-out across the Congo. An undisclosed number of former provincial surete agents in Katanga and Kasai are still working for their respective provincial governments and have not yet been disbanded or integrated into the national organization. Not having had sufficient opportunity to become familiar with the Surete, any attempt here to evaluate its operation would be grossly unfair. An interview was had with Mr. Nendaka which dealt mostly with broad generalities of Congolese security conditions and with an ambitious program for improving the Surete communications network.

The Surete Nationale is engaged in the following activities:

1. Investigation and documentation regarding immigration, visas, and passports.
2. Expulsion of undesirables.
3. Interpretation of legislation, circulars, etc.
4. Delivering foreign visas and passports to Congolese nationals.
5. Handling of fees, fines, and duties concerning visa documentation.
6. Maintenance of a bureau of general information.
7. Counter-espionage and physical surveillance.
8. Protection of government officials and public services.
9. Investigation of questions of loyalty.
10. Operation of technical surveillances.

The best information which could be developed regarding the effectiveness of the Surete from Belgian and Congolese sources was to the effect that it is under-staffed and that it lacks qualified personnel and experienced leadership. Any large scale operation by the Surete requires it to seek the assistance of either the police or the army. Since the Surete cannot rely on the police in Katanga, arrangements have been made permitting the Surete to requisition the ANC as needed. The length of the Congolese border adjoining a total of nine neighboring nations or states makes it virtually impossible for such a small agency to accomplish very much as a border patrol unit. It is felt that the jurisdiction of Surete as it now stands is proper. The control of civil police forces by the Surete is certainly not desirable and should be avoided. Criminal matters per se should remain the responsibility of civil police forces, while subversion, alien control, and counter-espionage should remain the business of the Surete. At the present time Belgian, Israeli and German technicians are assisting the Surete.

The Surete is not now capable of efficiently discharging its border patrol responsibilities because of a considerable lack of manpower, vehicles, and communications equipment. The GOC should be encouraged to conduct a

thorough survey of its border control problems, in order to enhance the capabilities of Surete. The final estimates of organizational, manpower, and equipment requirements would be dependent upon the results of such a survey and its evaluation.

#### Congolese National Army—ANC.

The National Congolese Army (ANC) is an outgrowth of the Force Publique which the Belgians had created in the Congo prior to 1900 to maintain order. Prior to independence, the Force Publique was regarded as an efficient and loyal establishment. All of its officers were Belgian. No effort had been made to develop Congolese as officers. The mutiny of the ANC garrison at Thysville following independence caused a general panic among the Europeans and led to a mass withdrawal of Belgians from the Congo. Among these were most of the 1,000 Belgian officers who were assisting in the organization of the then new ANC. This left the army without experienced leadership. Non-commissioned officers were promoted to high officer grades and all ranks received an automatic promotion to the next higher rank. As a result, the ANC became top-heavy in terms of rank. It became an army in which there were predominantly officers and non-commissioned officers but no privates. This situation is slowly being corrected as new recruits are being inducted as privates.

The old Force Publique was reported to number about 24,000. The present strength of the ANC is believed to be approximately 30,000 officially. However, it was indicated on several occasions that this figure is low and that it could number in excess of 40,000.

The duties and responsibilities of the ANC are:

1. To defend the territorial integrity of the Congo from external attack.
2. To assist civilian authorities in the maintenance of law and order.
3. To insure proper execution of Central Government decrees, regulations, and laws.

The Gendarmerie is a 6,000 man corps of the ANC. General Mobutu, Commanding General of the ANC, stated that he intends to develop the

Gendarmerie into an elite corps of the army and to increase its strength to about 9,000 officers and men. At present, the six Gendarmerie battalions are spread-out throughout the Congo in small units. One battalion has the mission of assisting in the maintenance of order in Leopoldville until the civil police forces there have been fully reconstituted following the May 3, 1963 mutiny which led to virtual liquidation of the 2,000 man force.

General Mobutu, in answer to a direct question, declared that he does not intend to utilize the Gendarmerie as a national police force. He asserted that it will not be used as is the Gendarmerie in France. He clearly indicated that the Gendarmerie will have two major missions:

1. To carry-out the duties of a military police corps within the ANC.
2. To assist the civilian police forces upon presentation of a duly executed requisition by competent civilian authority.

Obviously, the authority of the police and that of the Gendarmerie in the field of internal security, in terms of enforcement of civilian criminal law, must be clearly defined and delimited. The conditions under which the Gendarmerie would become involved in purely civilian affairs must be specific in order to avoid the difficulties which so frequently occur in situations where two or more agencies have concurrent jurisdiction.

General Mobutu explained that 25 Gendarmerie officers had completed a nine month infantry school in Belgium and that they were currently enrolled in a nine month Gendarmerie School. He asserted that he had obtained assurance from the Belgian Government that an additional 65 Gendarmes would be trained along identical lines. Since the police and the Gendarmerie must closely cooperate in order to overcome the volatile situation which exists in many areas in the Congo, foreign military and police advisors should take the lead in the development of a spirit of cooperation between their respective counterparts. A well organized, trained, and disciplined Gendarmerie could be of great value in restoring order and discipline within the ANC itself and in assisting civilian authorities in doing so throughout the country.

Although the ANC has been a source of disorder in many areas of the country in the past, it has recently been relatively effective in maintaining

order when properly commanded and disciplined. The ANC could well be the sole available agency to "keep the lid on" in the Congo until such time as the civil police forces are reorganized and finally become capable of assuming this responsibility.

## ANNEX III

### FIELD OBSERVATIONS

#### Leopoldville

The city of Leopoldville is the capital of the Republic of the Congo and is located on the left bank of the Congo River, opposite Brazzaville, capital of the former French colony now also known as the Republic of the Congo. Leopoldville is upstream approximately 250 miles from the Atlantic coast and is just above a series of rapids in the Congo River making river traffic to the sea impossible. It is linked to the port of Matadi by rail and an excellent highway. Rail and river shipping is transloaded in the large Congo River dock and rail yard facilities in the city.

The 1958 population of Leopoldville was estimated to be about 370,000. No accurate figures exist concerning today's population, but estimates as high as 1,200,000 have been made. It covers an area of 90 square miles along the river and south some 12 miles to a group of hills reaching about 600 feet above the city. The European sections of the city are located along the river and up on the nearby hills. The Congolese sections consist of a series of communities located farther inland from the River. These are separate entities with their own sub-municipal administrations. In most instances, these communities are separated by fairly large expanses of uninhabited terrain.

Leopoldville is the principal financial center of the Congo. It is also a principal commercial city served by international jet airlines, and an important river shipping line. It has a city telephone system, international telephone and teletype communications, and radio/teletype communication with other areas of the Congo. It has an excellent power supply and has a large network of excellent streets. Tall office buildings and apartments dot its skyline.

Prior to July, 1960, the strength of the Leopoldville Urban Police was approximately 1700 officers and men. The Belgian staff totalled about 70 officers. The Department was equipped with approximately 85 vehicles and

20 motorcycles. The communications system consisted of eight Motorola base stations and about 65 mobile Motorola sets. All but two base stations are now inoperative and all of the mobile sets except two of Dutch manufacture have disappeared. A total of 12 vehicles remain of the original fleet.

Prior to the so-called police mutiny of May 3, 1963, the strength of the Leopoldville Police was reported to be 1,999. Ten Belgian police advisors were working with this organization. The police are responsible to the Mayor of Leopoldville and are organized into one Headquarters, 5 Divisions, 18 subdivisions, 5 police camps, and 5 special service brigades (detectives, traffic, etc.).

Following independence, many of the police were released, while others left to enter the military service. The ranks were filled with totally unfit personnel for political, tribal, or personal reasons. All but two of the Belgian police officers left for Belgium. The result was sheer chaos. Overnight promotions of non-commissioned personnel to officer ranks were made. Policemen untrained for higher ranks became non-commissioned officers. Files, records, vehicles, radio equipment, office supplies and equipment disappeared or were ruined through improper use and lack of adequate maintenance. A single Belgian police officer remained throughout the period of upheaval. He is Police Commissaire Roger C. V. Henrard, who commanded the Urban Security Brigade (intervention unit) of 400 officers and men until the recent mutiny. Commissaire Van Biesbroeck is advisor to Police Inspector General Gabriel Kuma and to the Mayor. Commissaire Pochet is the advisor at Police Headquarters. These men and others, are actually doing the work for the units to which they are assigned. Without their behind-the-scenes efforts in handling the paper work of these units and in advising their Congolese counterparts, the entire police operation in Leopoldville would collapse.

At the present time, 400 of the former 2,000 policemen are working in the city. All of the others have either been fired or placed on indefinite leave pending review of their individual cases. Security is being maintained by these 400 policemen, 1 battalion of Gendarmerie, UN military police patrols, and by a contingent of Nigerian Police. Frequent meetings have been held to coordinate the activities of all of these agencies.

The reported causes of the so-called police mutiny in Leopoldville were:

1. failure to receive a 25% cost of living increase in pay
2. delay in receiving salaries for April
3. failure of the Government to provide support in terms of uniforms, equipment, etc.

The fact that a mutiny was planned by some 5 or 6 members of the Security Brigade was known in advance by the Chief and by several Commissaires. On the night of May 2, the eve of the mutiny, several command officers spent the night in Brazzaville in order to avoid being involved. Others made themselves unavailable in Leopoldville. At about 7:00 AM the following morning, the mutineers, now numbering a hard-core of 20 or 25 with a following of about 200 arrested the Mayor, the Chief of Police, available senior officers, and Van Biesbroeck. The Gendarmerie, under the personal command of General Mobutu, put down the mutiny and caused the principal personnel involved to be arrested. All police stations and other installations were closed. It soon became apparent that the Gendarmerie could not replace the police with only one battalion. Furthermore, they soon became aware of their incapability of handling investigative matters. Upon recommendation of the Belgian police advisors, a total of 400 selected policemen were returned to duty. A program of reorganizing the police force is now being developed. General Mobutu had agreed that he would continue to make available a Gendarmerie battalion until such time as the police are capable of maintaining order without further military assistance. He acknowledged that this could require two or three years. Training facilities are available in the city, but a complete staff of foreign instructors are needed as soon as possible. At least 15 advisors are needed to work with the police here in order to accomplish the task of rebuilding this police force as expeditiously as possible.

#### East Katanga (Elizabethville)

Elizabethville is the capitol city of the Province of East Katanga situated on a plateau in the south eastern extremity of the Congo. The Province is bordered by Angola to the west, Northern Rhodesia to the south, and Tanganyika to the east. The pre-independence population of the city was about 169,000. Current

estimates of the population place the figure at around 300,000. The increase was reportedly caused by an influx of refugees from rural areas. The city is the focal point of economic activity in the region. The huge industrial complex of Union Miniere is located in and near Elizabethville. It is served by railroad connections to Northern Rhodesia to the south, Angola to the west, Port-Franqui and Luluabourg to the northwest, and to Kindu and Albertville to the north. Two bridges have to be repaired as a result of Katangese Gendarmerie demolition before the rail lines into the Congolese interior are again operational. An airport capable of landing jet transport aircraft is available and now handles scheduled internal and international traffic. The streets and roads in and near Elizabethville are generally in good condition. The main highways north to Jadotville and south to Kipsushi are in excellent shape. The city is sufficiently small that any location can be reached in five minutes or less from the heart of the city, the terrain is fairly flat with a gentle descent south toward the Lumbashi River.

The population is composed of a mixture of tribes. Although Swahili is the principal language, many dialects are found. French is spoken by those who have had a basic education. The overall educational system is weak. Uncontrolled migration of unskilled labor has increased the number of unemployed. This has resulted in increased unrest.

Elizabethville has been the scene of fighting on three occasions since 1960. Its attempt to become an independent country led to a UN and Congolese military movement into the area and to the disintegration of the 15,000 man Katangese Gendarmerie. The power of Moise Tshombe, former President of Katanga, has been virtually emasculated, and the size of the area over which Elizabethville is now the provincial government has been reduced to about one fifth of Katanga of pre-independence days. The past fighting, the unstable political situation, the unsettled economic conditions, and the mutual dislike between Congolese and Katangese all contribute to the general uneasiness which was found to permeate the area. Many Europeans say they are planning to leave when or before the UN troops are withdrawn, because of a conviction that fighting will again break-out once the stabilizing factor of the presence of UN troops no longer exists. All leaders, whether political, military, or police can avoid bloodshed and rioting providing they work together in attempting to control the situation. ANC officers

should be held strictly accountable for the actions of the troops in their respective commands and severe discipline should be meted-out to those who disobey orders. No ANC troops should be allowed to venture about the area with arms and ammunition except when specifically ordered to do so.

Prior to independence, the police forces in the entire former province of Katanga totalled 1,554. There are now a reported 3,992 under orders from Elizabethville in about half of the former province. The police of this area are undoubtedly the best organized and are operating more efficiently than any other police force in the Congo. Eighteen Belgians continue to do the planning, record keeping, training, and the paper work of the organization. The Belgians offer advice in the preparation of cases for trial and handle the necessary documentation. Without this support, the police force would virtually collapse. The Belgian advisors here do not wear uniforms nor do they carry arms as do the Belgian advisors in Leopoldville. The Belgians are respected by the Katangese and the former are very careful in their dealings with the latter. It was pointed out by the Katangese that additional Belgian advisors would be welcome. Unfortunately, the Katangese often ignore the advice given by the Belgians and this becomes a source of irritation.

The police in South Katanga are organized into a single force divided into provincial, communal, and supplemental units. They are all controlled by Provincial Police Inspector General Pius Sapwe who is responsible to the Provincial Minister of Interior. The police in Elizabethville itself are commanded by Commissaire-en-Chief Boniface Mwamba. Neither of these men has had extensive police experience.

The city of Elizabethville now has a reported police strength of 1,335. Under normal circumstances, this figure would be about three times too high. Given the situation in the area today, these men could maintain order in the city providing they receive proper leadership, are adequately trained, and become better disciplined. The application of sound police patrol techniques needs improvement. The curfew from midnight to 6:00 a. m. is enforced by the Ethiopian Troops of the UN. One hundred well trained, well led, and highly mobile policemen could easily establish and maintain order at night throughout the city. The force as a whole, with proper training and equipment, could handle routine

police matters and act as a reserve in case of riots. Belgian proposals to this effect have thus far not been acted upon by their Katangese counterparts.

Transportation and communications matters are treated elsewhere herein.

Only a total of 8 Belgian manufactured 9 mm Mauser bolt action rifles are available to the Elizabethville police. Ammunition supplies are alleged to be adequate. This small number of weapons and the lack of tear-gas equipment and masks greatly reduces the riot control capability of this force.

A fairly sophisticated records section is maintained by the judicial police. A weekly bulletin is prepared dealing with criminal activity, wanted notices, property recoveries, etc. Efforts are being made to improve the efficiency of this unit.

The Belgian advisors are highly aware of the deficiencies of the police in East Katanga. In their opinion, better selection and intense training, in addition to integrity on the parts of police and political leaders, plus sound budgetary support, could permit the upgrading and overall improvement in the effectiveness of the police forces. They agree that the task will be a long range one which must be undertaken in the interest of reestablishing security in that part of the Congo.

#### DISTRIBUTION OF KATANGESE POLICE PERSONNEL

Detachment	Officers	Provincial Police	Communal Police	Supplemental Police	Totals
Inspectorate	12	47	-	-	
Garage	-	38	-	-	
Ministry Guards	-	49	-	-	
Inspector Candidates	-	120	-	-	
School	-	27	-	-	
Police Students	-	63	-	-	
Surete	-	18	-	-	362
Elizabethville	55	1,136	199	-	1,335
Jadotville	16	183	119	-	302
Kambove	1	53	-	27	80
Kolwezi	12	220	-	89	309
Kasaji	1	57	-	-	57
Dilolo	2	41	-	50	91
Kapanga	1	8	-	52	60
Sandoa	1	8	-	25	33

DISTRIBUTION OF KATANGESE POLICE PERSONNEL (cont'd)

Detachment	Officers	Provincial Police	Communal Police	Supplemental Police	Totals
Kipushi	2	52	-	22	74
Kamina-Kabongo	4	39	-	113	152
Luena-Bukama	1	141	-	-	141
Lubudi	1	25	-	82	107
Sakania	2	21	-	13	34
Pweto	1	-	-	89	89
Kasenga	1	47	-	44	91
Mitwaba	1	-	-	32	32
Baudouinville	1	3	-	106	109
Lukuni- C. R.	1	197	-	-	197
Kaniama	1	-	-	84	84
Kongolo	1	36	-	99	135
TOTALS	118	2,629	318	927	3,874

Elizabethville, May 27, 1963

Officers	118
Men	<u>3,874</u>
TOTAL	3,992

Upper Congo (Stanleyville)

The pre-independence province of Orientale covered an area of approximately 302,000 sq. miles with a 1958 estimate of 2,475,000 population. The population density was calculated as being 4.90 per sq. kilometer. The city of Stanleyville was the seat of government for this area at that time and is now the capital city of the province of Haut-Congo (Upper Congo). It is located on the right bank of the Congo River a distance of 750 air miles from Leopoldville. Stanleyville is the political and economic center of this region. It is the trans-shipment point for goods moving up or down the River onto a rail line running south to Ponthier-ville. Rapids in the Congo River between Stanleyville and Ponthierville make it unusable for shipping. Large rubber, tea, coffee, palm nut, and cotton plantations exist in the area. It also has some unexploited mineral deposits. Population density increases from about 3.36 per sq. kilometer to 6.81 around Paulis, the capital of Uele Province, and on up to 10.62 per sq. kilometer around Bunia, the

capital of Ituri Province. Population density appears to be directly related to the agricultural productive capacity of the soil in that region.

It has been estimated that about 1/3 of the population lives on a monetary economy in terms of salaries paid by industry, government, business, and large plantations. Another 1/3 exist on a half monetary-half subsistence economy which includes those small producers of palm nuts, bananas, etc., part of which when sold, becomes a source of money; the balance is consumed by the producers. The final 1/3 exist strictly on a subsistence basis as an outgrowth of living in areas which are not in a normal trade structure. Since independence, Stanleyville has been the scene of considerable fighting, riots, and turmoil. Because of unsettled political conditions, it is still a source of insecurity. Some 40 to 50 tribal groups live in the area with three major tribes around Stanleyville. Lingala and Swahili are the major languages. The greatest potential for tribal conflict exists between the 100,000 Lokele tribe just south of the River at Stanleyville and the Wagenia tribe whose number is not known. The Lokele dominated the civil service system in the area in pre-independence days, just as the Baluba did in Luluabourg. The Lokele are mainly merchants today. The Wagenia are fishermen and are a noted tourist attraction. The Wagenia and other tribes reportedly strongly dislike the Lokele.

The population of pre-independence Stanleyville was about 60,000 including approximately 5,000 Europeans. Today, the foregoing figures are about 100,000 maximum against less than 1,000 Europeans. Approximately 22,000 people reside on the left bank of the Congo River opposite the principal part of the city.

The pre-independence police strength of the entire Oriental Province was about 1180. The total number today is approximately 3,500. Stanleyville was policed by 100 officers and men under the Belgian regime. The city now has a force of 380 with another 460 in the Provincial Police. It is believed that the bulk of the police assigned to the province actually spend most of their time in Stanleyville. The city police has one headquarters and five stations. Six motorola base stations still exist, but none are operational. Of the fifteen police vehicles and the ten mobile radio sets, none are available today except for a 4 1/2 ton truck formerly used by the Belgian Army to draw heavy field artillery. No other police vehicles exist. No police vehicle nor radio repair facilities exist.

Only a few poorly maintained Belgian rifles remain. According to Police Inspector General Maurice Albert, the same general conditions prevail in the other two new provinces as well. Numerous personnel changes have occurred in police ranks since independence. Many men have been recruited who are totally unfit for service. No foreign police advisors are now working with the police of this area. The headquarters building and the stations need repair or replacement. The personnel and their families are inadequately housed. The salary scales were deemed to be sufficient but support is badly needed for uniforms, housing, vehicles, gasoline, and training. Modern administrative, criminal and identification records systems need to be instituted. Obviously, a major overhaul of the police forces in this area will have to be accomplished if these forces are expected to carry-out the mission of maintaining order.

The internal security situation in Stanleyville is being maintained by a Nigerian Police unit, the police under Commissaire-en-chef Leopold Kalume, and by the ANC under Colonel Malemba. The Nigerians are effective in policing the city jointly with the Congolese. Colonel Malemba is reportedly one of the better ANC commanders. Tribal conflict and smuggling in the eastern provinces constitute the major problems. Occasional assaults, the theft of automobiles and their accessories, and a few break-ins are the more frequent crimes. Reports of assaults upon European plantation managers and technical personnel still are received from time to time. It was also reported that a group of Congolese known as "crocodile men" have been responsible for from 35 to 40 deaths. These people are allegedly dressed in crocodile skins and carry knives as they approach their victims. The cadaver is allegedly used as food and also as fish bait. The overall operation is somewhat similar to the so-called "leopard men," whose activity was stamped-out in 1947 by moving and dispersing the villages involved.

#### Upper Kasai (Luluabourg)

Pre-independence Kasai Province had a reported population of 2,158,633 in an area encompassing about 194,000 square miles. The 1958 population density was given as 6.68 per square kilometer. Since no demographic surveys have been conducted in recent years and since shifts in population have occurred as a result of the fighting since independence, no one in Luluabourg, the former

seat of the Kasai provincial government, now has accurate figures on today's over-all population.

Luluabourg is situated in rolling country about 500 air miles south southeast of Leopoldville. It is the economic and financial center in the area. The old Kasai Province was divided into five new provinces supposedly along ethnic lines following independence:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Seat</u>
Haut-Kasai	Luluabourg
Sud-Kasai	Bakwanga
Unite-Kasaienne	Tshikapa
Lumani	Kabinda
Sankuru	Lodja

The population of Luluabourg was estimated to be approximately 200,000, made up primarily of Lulua, Basonge, and Batetela tribes. Whereas the nearby Bakwanga area is inhabited almost entirely by Baluba tribesmen, the Luluabourg area is an ethnic melange. The new provincial divisions of the old Kasai Province did not succeed in completely separating opposing tribes. Minorities are found in each new province. Clashes often result from discrimination against these minority tribal groups or when attempts are made either to move a minority tribe or take away some of its land. Land rights have been a problem between tribes for years and have been a source of considerable turmoil and hatred. Many disturbances are provoked by some tribal chiefs who do not feel it within their interest to accept peaceful coexistence. According to both Congolese and UN sources in Luluabourg, all tribal chiefs are politicians. For political reasons, both the Central Government and the several provincial governments hesitate to neutralize the ambitions of these chiefs. Contested territories currently in contention and pending a referendum are also a cause of tribal conflict. As is the case throughout the Congo, each province has an elected parliament consisting of about 20 or less deputies. Haut-Kasai Province has 17. Each of the members of the so-called provincial cabinet are elected by the parliament or assembly rather than being appointed by the president of the province. No legal machinery exists such as a constitutional court to make decisions regarding the lawful rights, privileges, and duties of the various deputies, etc. There is no senate. These questions are judged by the

provincial president and his close followers according to existing political interests involving the tribal chiefs on one hand, and in terms of the Central Government on the other.

Illicit diamond smuggling is a serious problem in Luluabourg. A few Pakistani merchants are reportedly the big operators in collusion with local politicians. Hundreds of West Africans, mostly Senegalese who handle smaller operations on an individual basis, allegedly handle a business equal to that of the fewer Pakistani. In the middle of May, 1963, approximately 400 West Africans were arrested by the police on orders from provincial authorities on charges of diamond smuggling. These people were herded onto a soccer field in Luluabourg and held until each paid a "fine" of 100,000 Congolese francs. Meanwhile, the homes of several were raided and considerable property was stolen.

The police of the city of Luluabourg total 240 officers and men. Another 170 officers and men are assigned to the provincial police and are distributed over 6 districts. Of the 65 officers in the city and province, only 21 attended a special 4 months school in 1961 taught by 8 Belgian police officers. The other 44 officers are uneducated political appointees. A few officers are honest and are trying to do the best they can under the circumstances. Most of the policemen are illiterate. Each time the provincial government is overturned, the entire police force is fired. No system of tenure is now in effect. Inadequate administrative or criminal records are being maintained.

Prior to independence, the Luluabourg Police Department consisted of 280 policemen of which 18 were officers. The force had a communications system including 4 Motorola base stations and three mobile sets in the fleet of 24 vehicles. All men were armed. Today, none of the communications equipment or weapons are available. This equipment was either stolen or destroyed during the fighting between Belgians and the former Force Publique or as a result of the tribal conflict between the Lulus and the Balubas. A telephone system exists in the city only. Communication with Leopoldville is through the public telegraph system. There is no means of communicating with rural areas. The police do not have any vehicle or radio maintenance capability.

No police budget has been voted by the provincial administration in over two years. A total of 38 police officers, who are recognized as such by Leopoldville, are paid out of funds provided the province by the Central Government. The remainder have been paid from provincial funds on a very irregular basis. Often no salaries are paid these people for as much as three months. Fines collected by the police are frequently used to pay salaries. Where this device does not provide necessary funds, many policemen are believed to become involved in stealing in order to support themselves and their families.

Police Inspector General, Anaclet Muamba and Police Commissaire-en-Chef, Anaclet Ndibu, bitterly complained about the predicament in which the police find themselves in Luluabourg. They have appealed to the Central Government to take control of the police force in order to avoid continued interference by local politicians who often arbitrarily order the police to arrest certain individuals for purely personal or political reasons without attempting to seek a duly executed warrant from a confining magistrate. Neither of these men is sure of his job and could easily be removed at the whim of the provincial President.

Two Belgian technicians, Mr. Delcour and Mr. Omer De Voss, are trying to assist the police leaders in straightening out the law enforcement mess. Both the Surete Nationale head and the commanding officer of the ANC unit in Luluabourg are also reported to be highly disenchanted with the situation. None of these individuals was available for interview.

A Nigerian Police unit of 60 officers and men commanded by Superintendent Boniface Ihekuna is greatly responsible for stabilizing a situation which could become completely chaotic. Two Congolese police officers and 20 men are assigned to work with the Nigerians. Superintendent Ihekuna is trying hard to influence the Congolese to adopt proper tactics and to assume a semblance of becoming a police organization. Mr. Ihekuna should be commended for the efforts he is making in this direction.

The relationships between the police leaders, the ANC, the Surete Nationale, and the Nigerian police were described as being excellent.

DISTRIBUTION OF POLICE PERSONNEL IN HAUT-KASAI PROVINCE

Luluabourg Urban Police

Headquarters	7
Inspection	7
Patrol	42
Nigerian Police Detachment	22
Traffic Control	24
Investigations	15
Juvenile Section	6
Prison Detail	10
Police Camp	10
Airport Detail	6
<u>Communes:</u>	
Kananga (Downtown)	34
Desha	30
Nganza	21
Katoka	<u>15</u>
	240

Haut-Kasai Provincial Police

Lulua District:

Demba	25
Dibaya	25
Kazumba	20

Luepo District:

Luepo	35
Tshikapa	50
Kabemba	<u>15</u>
	170

### South Kasai (Bakwanga)

The 1958 records for the Bakwanga district of the former province of Kasai show a population figure of 141,000 in an area approximately 4,458 sq. miles. Minister of Interior Trudens Mbuyi and Provincial Police Inspector General Jean Kadima agreed that the figure now reaches over 1 million inhabitants with 150,000 living in and around Bakwanga itself. They declared that the large increase was the result of migration of Baluba refugees from nearby areas during the fighting. Nearly all members of the Baluba tribe living in the Luluabourg area were driven out. Many others came into South Kasai from Katanga to avoid the fighting there. However, it is doubtful that there has actually been such a large increase in population. Tribal tensions still exist as an aftermath of the tribal wars which occurred in this area.

Bakwanga is the producer of 4/5 of the world's industrial diamonds. The MIBA Company operates the diamond mines and has been successful in maintaining pre-independence production in spite of the sporadic fighting which has occurred during the past two years. Provincial officials claim that 30% of total provincial revenues go to the Congo National Treasury and that only about 1% is allocated to South Kasai Province. A strong secessionist feeling continues to exist and there are indications that Kalondji, the temporarily exiled leader of the Kasai secessionist movement, still has many followers in the area. Meanwhile, Joseph Ngalula, President of the Province, is reportedly very effective as a leader and as an administrator.

Total police strength in the former pre-independence province of Kasai, of which Balwanga was a district, was about 700 officers and men. Today, there are a reported 1450 officers and men on the payroll. Another 1,000 are carried as student police and are allegedly in training 87 miles away at Kalenda. Larcenies and burglaries are the major crimes around Bakwanga. Unemployment among the refugees was reported as being the primary cause.

The city of Bakwanga has a European section which now is inhabited by Congolese as well as Europeans. It also has Congolese communities around the outskirts. Most of the houses in these sectors are little more than hovels. The European sector consists of a neatly arranged residential district with paved streets, reliable electrical power, a telephone system, and a nearby airport

capable of handling a DC-3 (C-47) aircraft in both dry and rainy seasons. The city has an area of about 25 sq. miles. The province is divided into 11 districts (territories). The greatest distance from Bakwanga to the most remote part of the province is 120 miles and requires 6 hours of travel time by road.

The police are divided into a Headquarters and 7 police districts. Where they reportedly had about 20 vehicles before independence, they have none now. They have no radio equipment, no weapons, and no riot control equipment. The pre-independence base station and the 10 mobile sets disappeared during the fighting along with the weapons they had been issued. The policemen observed around headquarters appeared to be poorly dressed. No uniforms have been issued since independence. It is obvious that the organization is next to worthless as an effective police force. Of the 190 officers, none have had any formal police training. A complete retraining and reorganization operation must be undertaken to correct the deficiencies which prevent the force from properly discharging its duties and responsibilities. The police forces in South Kasai are totally incapable of maintaining order in that area today.

Security in the province is being maintained by 5 ANC battalions garrisoned in the area. One of these battalions is a gendarmerie unit. A Surete Provinciale of some 300 men is still reportedly operating. It has not as yet been integrated into the Surete Nationale.

The old Police Miniere Nationale has been abolished. The MIBA Company has established its own private force of 200 men to police the diamond mines and other company property.

Provincial officials reported that they had frequently requested the return of Belgian police officers, but that Leopoldville had consistently ignored these requests. Lack of time and the unavailability of transportation made it impossible to go to Kalenda and verify the presence of the alleged 1,000 police trainees there and also to evaluate the quality of training being offered. It is possible that this is either a case of payroll padding or, if these trainees actually do exist, a case of discreet development of a private force under the guise of police training.

## North Katanga (Albertville)

The Province of North Katanga covers over half of the northern portion of the former province of Katanga. It is situated on the east shore of Lake Tanganyika. The population of the new province is estimated at 500,000 while that of Albertville, the seat of government, is thought to be about 40,000. Most of the population is now Baluba since the Batawa tribe was pushed south toward Baudoenville.

Prior to independence, the police force in Albertville numbered about 3 officers and 60 men. Today, there are 20 officers and about 600 men. The force is about as inept as any in the Congo. Very few patrols were seen. The police are untrained, undisciplined, poorly led, illiterate, sadly dressed, poorly equipped, and totally incapable. They have no records, no communications equipment, 7 dilapidated vehicles representing four makes, no foreign advisors, poor office facilities, and a barracks facility which was flooded by the unusually high water level of Lake Tanganyika. The police have no boat for patrol of the lake and are equipped with a few poorly maintained 9 mm Belgian Vigneron sub-machine guns. Communication into the province is by telegraph. A message to and from Manono sometimes requires 8 days. Travel through the province is fairly safe although very difficult because of poor roads and the fact that about 150 bridges were destroyed during the fighting between the Katangese and the ANC. A total of about 25 qualified drivers are available in the police. A small police garage exists, but all of the tools have disappeared.

Tribal differences, political and economic instability are the main problems in the area. Crime rates are very low. The UN and its Indonesian Army troops have managed to control the situation. ~~Withdrawal of the Indonesians~~ could lead to wholesale trouble. The ANC and the Surete Nationale are thoroughly disliked by the indigenous populations. Much of the province is still policed by forces controlled and paid by Elizabethville. The political leadership in Albertville is immature, irresponsible, and dishonest. The police of North Katanga require a complete reorganization, training, and reequipment program.

Distribution of Police Personnel

North Katanga Province

Albertville	590
Manono	137
Kabalo	142
Congolo	152
Nyunzu	130
Malemba	197
Kobongo	150
Bukama	140
Baudoinville	50*
Kaniema	0*
Kamina	0*
Mitwaba	0*
Lubudi	0*
	<hr/>
	1688 Men
	<hr/>
	58 Officers
	<hr/>
	1746 Total

\* Policed by South Katanga Provincial Police

Kivu (Bukavu and Gama)

The pre-independence Province of Kivu had a population of approximately 2,300,000 made up primarily of Barolsa, Bashi, and Walegos tribes. It extends from west of the Congo River east to the Ruanda Urundi frontier, a distance of about 300 miles. The area encompasses approximately 36,000 sq. miles between North Katanga to the south and the provinces of Upper Congo and Ituri to the north. The eastern areas are rich in agricultural production and

livestock. It is also a highly regarded tourist attraction with its lakes, mountains, and national parks. Prior to independence, wealthy Europeans spent their winter vacations in Bukavu.

The total police strength in the area prior to independence was about 750 police officers and men. No exact figures exist at the present time. However, Commissaire-en-Chef Bisherelli at Bukavu estimated the total to be about 4,000 today. The Province of Central Kivu, of which Bukavu is the seat, has a total of 1540 police officers and men. This figure is about twice the pre-independence number for the entire former Kivu Province. The police then had thirty vehicles. Of these, Bukavu now has just one small truck still in operation. The former communications system of one base station and five mobile sets is no longer operational. All need repair. Of three portable sets, only one is functioning. The police no longer have the records formerly maintained by the Belgians. Commissaire Bisherelli declared that the same general situation exists in Kindu, Maniema Province, and at Goma, North Kivu Province. The police strengths in these two areas was believed to be about 2,000 and 450 in each of those provinces respectively.

In addition to the police, the security in the Bukavu area is maintained by 300 Gendarmes, about 10 Surete Nationale agents, and by a Nigerian Police unit. The cooperation between the Surete and the police is not good. The police, Gendarmes, and the Nigerians reportedly worked well together. Communication between police headquarters and each of the five stations in Bukavu is by telephone. Communication to Leopoldville and elsewhere in the Congo is via telegraph. Messages to Leopoldville sometime require five or six days to be received. The Nigerian Police patrol the city with Congolese policemen. They ~~also are attempting to instill some measure of operational efficiency.~~ Unfortunately, continual political interference and frequent changes in police leadership have made progress very difficult. The influx of about 60,000 refugees from nearby Ruanda-Urundi after independence, plus a decrease in commercial activity, has led to an increased unemployment problem. The U.N. is attempting to solve the problem through a road building and dam construction program.

North Kivu has an estimated population of 700,000. Although Kirotshe is the seat of government, Goma, a city of 30,000, is the largest city of the Province. Goma is located due north across Lake Kivu a distance of about 70

miles. The entire area is at an altitude of close to 5,000 feet with volcanic cones reaching over 14,000 feet nearby. Goma is a disputed area between North and Central Kivu. It is policed by some 90 untrained and unfit policemen. In terms of records and equipment, the force has next to nothing.

North Kivu is divided into 5 districts or territories. Four tribes predominate in the area. Watutsi refugees from nearby Ruanda are becoming a source of difficulty in the Masisi area northwest of Goma. Their attempts to enslave the local population as they did the Bantu in Ruanda have caused fighting to break-out. Disputes over land rights have caused trouble. Smuggling is undoubtedly the largest problem in the area. The three major customs and immigration trouble spots are Kisoro, Ishasha, and Kasindi. The Kasindi area alone has over 18 separate smuggling routes into Uganda over which tea, coffee, and gold are transported. According to Mr. Knust, a German national who is the UN customs advisor in the area, less than 25% of the production of the foregoing items is shipped into Uganda legally. A truck load of about 4 tons of coffee can be transported into Uganda at only a cost of 3000 Congolese francs (\$7.50 U.S. at black market rate of 400 to 1). In many cases, provincial authorities are reportedly involved in smuggling operations. Police are often used as guards for an entire convoy of trucks. The contraband is sold for sterling in Uganda, where either Congolese francs or spare parts are bought for smuggling back into the Congo. The operators are hence able to earn a large profit in both directions.

Tribal fighting, village murders, and thefts also constitute a major problem. Security for Europeans is generally fair throughout the area. Police communications in the area is virtually nonexistent. Their ability to patrol the area and to move large numbers of men to trouble spots is nil.

The province of Maniema was not visited. However, it was determined that a major rebuilding task must be undertaken for all the police forces in the region. At present, they are incapable of providing the law and order required in the development of the area's agricultural and mineral production.

REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO  
PROVINCE DU KIVU  
COMMISSARIAT DE POLICE :  
B U K A V U

Distribution of Police Personnel  
City of Bukavu and Central Kivu Province

<u>DETACHEMENTS:</u>	Ville de Bukavu	=	32.-
	Ibanda	=	732.-
	Nguba P. A.	=	125.-
	Nguba A. Q.	=	129.-
	Kadutu	=	157.-
	Bagira	=	105.-
Territoire Mwenga:	Mwenga	=	97.-
	Kamituga	=	32.-
Territoire d'Uvira:	Uvira	=	32.-
Territorie	Kalehe	=	12.-
Police School		=	66.-
	Total		<u>1.539</u>

Fait a Bukavu, le      mai 1963.-

## ANNEX IV

### TRAINING

One of the weakest factors in the Congolese police picture is the lack of adequately trained personnel. Nearly all of the officers and most of the intermediate and enlisted personnel have not had the training needed for the positions they hold. Prior to independence, a fairly comprehensive training program existed with schools in operation at Leopoldville, Elizabethville, Stanleyville, and Bukavu. Training was also given by officers on an on-the-job training basis in many areas. With the upheavals of 1960 and 1961, this virtually collapsed. Belgian police advisors have managed to do an excellent piece of work in reorganizing and maintaining the school of Elizabethville. With the exception of Congolese attempts at training at Stanleyville, Bakavu, Albertville, and Leopoldville little has been done in three years.

The task of transforming the today's Congolese police into an efficient organization is based primarily upon proper personnel selection and training. The problem in the Congo is a huge one since almost all personnel require training.

A well prepared program, addressing itself to both the short range and long range aspects of the overall problem, is indispensable. Such a program has not been formulated by the Government of the Congo, the U.N., or any of its member nations. As was clearly indicated in the June 6, 1963 meeting in Mr. D'Orsinville's office at UN Congo Headquarters in Leopoldville, uncoordinated bilateral agreements have been made to provide certain training and equipment assistance to the Congolese civil police. Unfortunately, insufficient preliminary work has been done in identifying the scope, breadth, and depth of the problem involved. It is indeed difficult to comprehend how a serious program of assistance can be implemented without first having complete and accurate knowledge of what must be done. For example, sound development of a training program implies having a reasonable conception of numbers and types of personnel to be trained. This information permits the establishment

of schedules, courses, instructor requirements, administrative support, training aid needs, required classrooms and of necessary financing over a period of years. This kind of planning has not been done with regard to training.

The police school at Leopoldville (MATETE) consists of an administration building, seven classrooms, accommodations for 250 students, a modern kitchen, adequate laundry facilities, a recreation room, a mess hall, telephones, electricity, hot water boiler, a public address system, and an outside recreational area. The facilities were new at the time of independence. Some work would be required to return them to the same condition. Between 250 and 300 students could be handled here at one time. A small inadequate training program has been operated intermittently by the Congolese since mid-1961.

At Elizabethville, recruit, intermediate, and officer courses of 6 months duration are being taught by four Belgian and five Katangese instructors. The Katangese instructors are selected from those who graduate from officers' school with highest grades and who show high interest in self-improvement and in police work.

The school consists of 5 classrooms, an administrative building, quarters for instructor personnel, barracks for trainees, a 400 meter track, a soccer field, and a very long and difficult obstacle course. All the buildings are relatively new. The entire grounds cover about one square mile and are located about 5 miles northwest of Elizabethville. Courses taught to officer candidates include:

Police regulations and discipline

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Penal code

Criminal procedure

Motor vehicle code

Accident investigation

Police organization

Police jurisdiction

Investigative techniques

Complaints

Scientific investigative aids

Physical education  
Defensive tactics  
Drill  
Riot control

Annual training output is now about 290 per year and is limited to trainees from the urban police of Elizabethville or the South Katanga Provincial Police. Existing facilities and instructor personnel would permit increasing annual enrollment to 600 provided added funding could be allocated to support the increased load. All teaching is done in French. Only about 60% pass the recruit school examinations.

A visit to the school showed that a sincere effort is being made. The Katangese were obviously proud of the installation and they clearly indicated their appreciation of current Belgian assistance. The Belgian instructors are applying major emphasis on discipline and on the development of esprit de corps. The trainees apparently respect the stern discipline being meted-out by the Belgian instructors. Katangese-Belgian relationships appeared to be excellent. This school is fully capable of handling the training needs of the area. Additional classrooms and staff would be needed to handle trainees from outside. Political obstacles would have to be solved since local authorities regard the school as being solely for the use of South Katangese police.

The needs of this school also include: 2 buses or 2-1/2 ton trucks, 2 new typewriters, 1 jeep, training aids, and classroom supplies.

This school should be considered in the overall training planning so badly needed. Mr. Soete, the senior Belgian instructor, would be an excellent choice to handle the nationwide training program.

The police school at Stanleyville requires a complete overhaul in terms of facilities and staff. It is now in a run-down condition. The facilities consist of 2 classrooms, 6 buildings for married students, 2 barracks for bachelors, and a small office. A total of 150 students can be handled here at one time. A total of about 160 acres are included in the school grounds and are located about 3 miles west of the city. An additional 2 classrooms and added housing facilities would permit increasing the capacity of the school to 300. By limiting the instruction to courses of 6 months in length, an annual enrollment of

600 could be handled. This school should also be considered for use in an overall police training program in the Congo.

Another excellent possibility for a regional police school is a group of buildings approximately 15 kilometers (9 miles) outside of Luluabourg. These were originally constructed for use as a school of public administration by the Belgian administration prior to independence. It is believed that the facilities are not now being used. The unavailability of time made it impossible for the Survey Mission to visit this site.

A UN project entitled "Police Training," number 80-01, dated March 25, 1963, divides the 1963 program into four parts:

Part I - National Police Training School

Part II - Provincial Officers

Part III - Wireless equipment, vehicles and instructors

Part IV - Police experts, South Katanga

This project was prepared and submitted by Dep. Commissioner O. Bello, former commander of the Nigerian Police Contingent in the Congo. Mr. Bello has since returned to Nigeria.

Part I of Mr. Bello's program reads as follows:

"A National Police Training School will be established in Leopoldville making use of buildings already used for police training. Courses of 12 months will be designed to train students to become police officers. Classes will consist of about 65 pupils, divided into 2 or 3 squads. It is planned to start the first course on July 1, 1963 and start a new course every 6 months thereafter. The Central Government will invite the Provincial Governments to nominate students, approximately 3 from each of the 20 provinces, and a selection board will be set up to review all applications. This process will start forthwith. The staff will consist of a commandant, deputy commandant, and 9 instructors. Recruitment will start immediately. It is planned that the commandant should be recruited by May 1, 1963 and the instructors by June 1, 1963. Contracts will be for a 3 year period. By 1966, it is expected that selected members of the class graduated in 1964 will be able to return to the

school as instructors, after experience in the provinces, and the school will then be handed over to entirely Congolese direction. "

Comments:

Assuming that subject school was to begin operations on July 1, 1963 as planned, in the first 2-1/2 year period ending December of 1965, a total of 240 candidates would have been enrolled at the school. A drop-out and failure rate of between 20% to 30% would reduce the total output in that period to between 168 and 192. If the required number of police officers and specialists in a force of 12,000 men is roughly 800 to 1,000, the impact of developing only 168 to 192 in 2-1/2 years will be negligible. An output of 4 to 5 times greater will be required to meet the problem in the shortest time possible.

It is doubtful that the school will begin training officer candidates on July 1, 1963. The detailed curriculum has yet to be completed, class schedules have yet to be worked out, a manual of rules and regulations has to be prepared and approved by the Ministry of Interior, copies of the various codes (criminal, penal, traffic) have to be obtained, classroom supplies must be provided for, administrative support must yet be guaranteed.

In addition, it should be noted that the Minister of Interior has not yet signed the letters to each provincial minister of interior explaining the program and inviting the selection of three candidates for the first school session. It will may prove difficult for all of the provinces to locate three qualified candidates, not to mention the fact that some of the provinces are likely to shun participation in the program. South Katanga already has a school of the type envisaged in the UN plan and is fully capable of handling police training needs in that area. It was obvious during the field trips throughout the country that the UN Program had been developed without first identifying and taking into consideration the desires and opinions of provincial administrators.

The development of adequate numbers of qualified advanced police instructors will require several years. It is not believed that the Congolese will be able to handle the responsibilities effectively by 1966 as proposed by the U.N. The commandants of both police colleges in Nigeria are English officers which tends to indicate that perhaps long range foreign technical assistance may also be required in the Congo.

Part II of the UN plan reads as follows:

"Until such time as Congolese police officers have been trained at the training school, a staff of 60 international police officers will be assigned to the provinces. In each of the 20 provinces, there will be an expert in criminal investigation, a police training officer and a police administrator. Their contracts will run for 15 months in order to allow time for the first officers graduated from the training school to replace them. It is planned to recruit the first 20 experts by May 1, 1963, the second 20 by June 1, and the third by July 1, 1963."

Comments:

Mr. Ahmed, Chief, UN Civilian Operations, advised at a meeting, held on June 6, 1963, in Mr. D'Orsinville's office, that 25 foreign police officers had been hired in connection with overall U.N. police training program. These 25 people represent 14 countries. The criteria used by the UN Headquarters in New York in hiring the instructors for the Training School in Leopoldville and for the provincial officers are that: They meet certain police backgrounds; and that they be fluent in French with a working knowledge of English. Obviously, with such a mosaic in terms of backgrounds and nationalities as will undoubtedly constitute the general make-up of the provincial officers staff, a standardized manual of rules and regulations and operating procedures will be required in order to achieve a semblance of similarity in police operations and training in the provinces. This has not been done. In addition, it will be necessary to provide copies of the existing code of criminal procedure, the penal code and the traffic or motor vehicle law of each officer. An orientation program will be necessary for the purpose of familiarizing these officers with recent Congolese History, geographical considerations, current affairs, program goals and policies, etc.: Such planning has not been accomplished to date.

One of the three provincial advisors should be concerned with the operations of the uniform division rather than with criminal investigations. In sophisticated police organizations, over 50% of the force is assigned to the crime repression (patrol) units, while approximately 15% are assigned to detective or investigative units. Under existing conditions in the Congo, about 80% of the

total force should be in the uniform or patrol units. Hence, it would seem logical to assign the foreign technicians accordingly.

A 15 month assignment of international police officers to each province is believed to be too brief a period to permit the Congolese to reach sufficient professional maturity to carry on alone and unaided. One must take into account the relatively low educational level of the average Congolese policeman. This opinion is based upon completely unscientific data.

The Mission was unable to find any evidence of advance planning by the UN with regard to the training of intermediate or "enlisted" ranks. The scope of this task and its attendant fiscal and administrative support are not clear. The availability of classroom space for the provincial schools has not been determined. It is doubtful whether anyone has made an effort to learn whether or not suitable housing is available for the international advisors and their families.

Part III reads:

"Prior to 1960, the police forces in the Congo had no widespread wireless network of their own. Control and mobile sub-stations were in operation in some of the larger towns, but in all inter-provincial, inter-district or inter-territorial communications passed through the P. T. T. or the administration wireless. The Administration network was all radiophony. Reports have been received that in most provinces the wireless equipment used prior to 1960 is still in quite good condition. This information should be confirmed by a physical check by qualified technicians. It is proposed that each provincial headquarters should have a police wireless/telegraphy and teleprinter link with a national control at Leopoldville. Below this national wireless net the pre-1960 communications network could be adapted to the new provincial organization by establishing 20 provincial controls with sub-stations on their respective nets using the R. T. apparatus already available. In the larger towns an urban control room with Motorola mobile sets and static sub-stations should be established. In Leopoldville, a control room and 6 static sub-stations are already available and it would reasonably be assumed that in other larger towns some equipment is available.

The services of 3 technical officers will be required to train Congolèse staff in the use of the equipment, as well as to inspect equipment in the provinces. No new equipment will be delivered until trained staff are available to use it."

Comments:

The foregoing quote is entitled "Wireless equipment, vehicles and instructors." Nothing whatsoever is mentioned about vehicles and the implication relative to radio equipment is that most of the pre-1960 equipment is still available. This is not true except for a few base stations in Leopoldville, Elizabethville and Jadotville. Virtually all of the mobile sets have disappeared along with the vehicles. No mention is made of the required numbers of maintenance and operations personnel who would have to be trained.

The revised UN 1963 budget estimates for Part III calls for:

Trucks, motorcycles, cars and an ambulance	\$1,043,000.00
Radio equipment	292,000.00
Repair parts	100,000.00
Operational costs	150,000.00

The work sheets which were used in arriving at the foregoing figures are not available. The UN plan provides for 320 vehicles and 60 motorcycles.

The cost estimate for communications equipment is about 55% of what is required.

The UN estimate of \$2,500,000.00 for CY-1963 will provide the necessary foreign technician support, and it will provide 320 vehicles. However, it is understood that the UN does not now have the funds for this project.

Part IV of the UN plan provides:

"Three police officials, expert in criminal investigation, are required in South Katanga to assist the Surete Nationale."

Comments:

This requirement is a mystery inasmuch as the Surete Nationale is not charged with investigations of criminal matters in the Congo.

At the present time, approximately 400 Nigerian policemen are assisting in the maintenance of order in Leopoldville, Stanleyville, Bukavu and in Luluabourg. A total of 18 Belgian technicians are working with the civil police forces in South Katanga. An additional 14 more are assisting the Leopoldville urban police, the criminal courts and the Surete (Immigration). The UN has begun to implement a training program for Congolese police officers at Leopoldville and has also begun to recruit international police officers for each of the provinces. In addition, the Congolese Government and the Nigerian Government have reportedly entered into a yet unclarified agreement pertaining to providing assistance to the Congolese civil police. It was learned that this program only involves training an unspecified number of Congolese policemen in Nigeria. This is another example of entering into an agreement to do certain things without first having a definite overall program of which the agreement would be an integral part. The two police colleges in Nigeria are commanded by English officers and the instruction is based upon English concepts. If the training to be given there is not in French and does not encompass Congolese law, traditions and conditions, the total impact will be lessened. The instruction in Nigeria should heavily emphasize discipline, patrol techniques and riot control. Other subjects should be left for the training schools in the Congo. It is not known whether the Nigerian assistance program includes any hardware.

With the highly volatile security conditions which exist in many areas of the Congo, with the imminent withdrawal of U.N. military forces, and given anticipated future political and economic instability, it becomes imperative that immediate positive steps be taken to begin upgrading Congolese civil police capability. To rely on the Army (ANC) as the sole or major instrument in maintaining order would be questionable. The Army is not trained for this type of work and is highly feared in many areas because of its lack of qualitative leadership and discipline.

One of the major responsibilities of the multi-national police task force recommended herein would be to analyze the overall training needs for each civil police agency in the Congo, once proper tables of organization have been developed. Training needs for each force could then be determined. A basic training program for each police force must be prepared and implemented on an established priority basis. The larger urban centers in the more troublesome

regions should be given the greatest initial attention. Consequently, police officers from Leopoldville, Elizabethville, Jadotville, Kolwezi, and Stanleyville should constitute the majority of the first few classes.

It is not believed that a lone police school at Leopoldville can handle the problem of training officers and intermediate ranks. Schools should be considered as part of an overall training program at Leopoldville, Elizabethville, Stanleyville, and Luluabourg. Based on regional requirements, programs could be worked out for each region. An identical course for each school should be prepared for each rank category and for certain specialties such as drivers, radio operators, etc. Said police task force would prepare course outlines, class schedules, selection standards for candidates, examinations, manuals of rules and regulations, standard operating procedures, develop training aids, determine classroom and barracks requirements, anticipate the number of instructors needed, predict required administrative and logistical support, and prepare detailed budgets for each school over the next four or five years. This is certainly not an easy task, and it will require considerable effort. However, this kind of planning is absolutely necessary in order to make the strongest impact possible in shaping the future of the police as a major contributor to Congolese internal security.

The UN project of assigning three foreign police advisors to each of the provinces is well taken. These men would be of considerable value in restoring some semblance of order in police ranks throughout the country. They would also be useful in the introduction of standard operational procedures, common records systems, supervising the use and maintenance of equipment, improving patrol techniques and riot control tactics, etc. Each provincial government ~~will have to be approached separately regarding the assignment of foreign~~ police advisors. The Belgian Government should furnish the large percentage of these people. Belgian capability in this particular undertaking in the Congo exceeds that of any other nation. An orientation program for these advisors would have to be developed in Leopoldville. Considerable planning should be done before these men are sent out to the field. They will have to be thoroughly familiar with Congolese law and criminal procedure. They will also have to clearly understand the purpose of their participation in the program. The

Congolese will accept discipline providing it is handled in the right manner. Provincial advisors, urban advisors, and school staffs should total about 100 men. They should all be on initial two year tours of duty.

A long range program of developing future command officers, instructors, and specialists will also have to be developed. The police school should prove to be useful in ridding the ranks of unfit personnel and identifying future leaders.

ANNEX V  
COMMUNICATIONS

The police communications systems which previously existed in the Congo were limited to the major urban areas. Leopoldville, Luluabourg, Bakwanga, Elizabethville, Jadotville, Kolwezi, Bukavu, Stanleyville and possibly one or two other cities had operating systems. The survey of these radio networks was hampered by lack of available information or records. No intra-provincial or nationwide police radio nets have ever existed in the country. Messages from one province to another were sent via public telephone or telegraph systems. Nearly all of the base stations of the former urban systems are still available, but most are not in operating condition because of lack of maintenance during the past three years. Of an estimated 200 mobile sets, all have disappeared during the upheaval following the gaining of independence. Over 95% of this equipment was purchased from the Motorola Corp. of Chicago, Ill. The reestablishment of the former urban police communications networks and the creation of intra-provincial systems should have a high priority in the overall program of upgrading the Congolese police forces. A nationwide police radio system is not deemed necessary at this time. A rapid and high quality communications capability is a cardinal requirement of a modern police organization. The effectiveness of security and investigation forces is greatly reduced where it is not possible to have immediate operational control of the units in the field. This is particularly true of the Congo where relatively peaceful situations can suddenly become the scene of fighting and bloodshed. With proper training, discipline, leadership, and a transportation capability, an adequate communications system would greatly enhance the ability of the police to overcome or control threats against life and property in the Congo.

Mr. Katembwe, Deputy Director of the Postal Telephone and Telegraph Ministry (PTT), declared that the existing public telecommunications system is working in most parts of the Congo. At present, the telecommunications system is in operation only from 6:30 AM to 7:00 PM daily. It is expected that it

will be operating on a 24-hour basis by October 1963. The West German government has agreed to furnish approximately \$1 million worth of new equipment to improve the capacity and variety of service of the PTT. German technicians are already on hand, as is about 50% of the new equipment. It is expected that the police would have access to one or more channels of this system on a gratuitous basis.

In addition to the PTT, the Army (ANC) and Surete Nationale have their own separate nationwide radio systems. The UN also has a radio-teletype system installed and operated by the Canadian Army Signal Corps. The West German Government is reportedly providing the Surete with single side-band radio equipment for a total of 30 stations to be located throughout the Congo. German technicians will install and maintain this equipment. It is highly unlikely that either the ANC or the Surete Nationale would agree to handle police traffic. However, until such time as police traffic becomes too heavy for the PTT to handle, or where a National Police Force is created, a separate nationwide police telecommunications system is not necessary.

#### TELEPHONE DISTRIBUTION

Leopoldville	300,000
Elizabethville	100,000
Stanleyville	20,000
Coquilhatville	15,000
Luluabourg	15,000
Boma	2,000
Matadi	3,000
Kamina	5,000
Kolwezi	5,000
Jadotville	10,000
Manano	600
Albertville	1,000
Kindu	1,500
Goma	1,000
Buta	200
Paulis	500
Bunia	1,000
Lisala	500
Boende	50
Gemina	50
Kikwit	1,000

PTT TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

<u>POINTS</u>	<u>PHONE</u>	<u>TELEGRAPH</u>	<u>TELETYPE</u>
Leopoldville - Matadi	X	X	X
Leopoldville - Boma	X	X	X
" - Elizabethville .	X	X	X
" - Luluabourg	X	X	
" - Stanleyville	X	X	X
" - Coquilhatville	X	X	
" - Bukavu	X	X	
" - Albertville	X	X	
" - Kikwit	X	X	X
" - Bakwanga		X	
Stanleyville - Bukavu	X	X	

In the field of radio and telecommunications, the following points should be given close attention:

1. The analysis of the specific needs of each piece of equipment now available to the civil police throughout the Congo.
2. The ordering of those spare parts with which to render the aforementioned equipment operational as soon as possible.
3. The completion of a comprehensive communications survey and evaluation.
4. The drafting of detailed plans for the creation of a police radio operator school.
5. The development and subsequent implementation of a long range program for the training of Congolese Police radio technicians. This would include the preparation of appropriate personnel standards, mathematics and electronics curricula.

6. The ordering of required training equipment and needed audio-visual requirements.

7. The negotiating with the necessary Congolese officials for the securing or the building of required facilities at Camp Lufungula, Leopoldville.

These facilities should include the following:

- a. Classrooms
- b. A communications center (air conditioned)
- c. A repair shop (air conditioned)
- d. A spare-parts warehouse (air conditioned)
- e. Necessary offices (air conditioned)

8. The preparation and negotiation of a suitable Project Agreement with either the Government of the Congo (GOC) or the United Nations (ONUC) or both.

9. The preparation of a highly itemized budget over the fiscal years as needed.

10. The preparation of required procurement documentation leading to the delivery of equipment according to predetermined phasing.

11. The inspection of all equipment upon arrival in the Congo and the immediate entry of each separate item received in a previously prepared inventory control system. (Cardex)

12. The installation of base stations and required antennas.

13. The creation of an adequate police communications organization within each police agency having radio equipment.

14. The formulation of required rules and regulations governing the use, preventative maintenance and repair of all radio and maintenance equipment. These should provide for stern discipline. The officer charged with the communications responsibility should be a senior officer directly responsible to the chief.

Radio repair shops supply centers should be located in Leopoldville and Elizabethville where the greater numbers of equipment would be located. These could also handle major repair work for those provinces who do not have available police, PTT, or private maintenance facilities.

Each base station should be equipped with an emergency diesel electric power unit of either 5 KW or 1.5 KW for use in the event of sabotage or power failure.

## Urban Police Systems

### Leopoldville

During the 5 years prior to independence, the Leopoldville Police Department was equipped with a total of 8 base stations and an estimated 65 mobile sets. Nearly all of this equipment was manufactured by the Motorola Corporation of Chicago, Illinois. Today, only two base stations are operational and only two 24-volt DC Danish made mobile units are functional in two vehicles which are not in running condition. All of the remaining mobile units disappeared following independence. The whereabouts of this equipment is unknown. As a consequence, the telephone is the principal means of communication in the city. Most of the telephone system consists of multi-party dial circuits which are frequently overloaded. A total of approximately 300,000 telephones exist in Leopoldville, according to Mr. Katembwe of the Postal Telephone and Telegraph Ministry. Waiting periods of five to ten minutes are common in attempting to reach another party. The basic impedance of existing telephone units is 600 ohms.

Radio frequencies assigned to the Leopoldville Police by the Postal and Telegraphic Ministry (PTT) are 160.000 megacycles and 160.240 megacycles. The operational efficiency of the equipment could not be determined because of the locales of Louvanium University which are situated on rolling hills approximately 600 feet above the city at a distance of eight to ten miles south of the center of the business district. Complete coverage of the city proper and its environs can be obtained by the use of the frequencies presently assigned. Natural and man-made interference appear to be relatively low in the city.

Electrical power for Leopoldville is centrally generated and extends from the city proper into the outlying areas. It is considered generally reliable. However, it should be noted that proper maintenance levels have not been maintained for nearly three years by virtue of a lack of experienced personnel, maintenance discipline and sufficient spare parts. Electrical power is 220 volts AC at 50 cycles.

It is strongly recommended that the type of radio equipment now available to the Leopoldville Police Department be utilized in the future. This will avoid requiring additional training in the use and maintenance of several makes of equipment; the variety of needed spare parts can be held to a minimum; overall costs can be reduced, and interchangeability of equipment will permit greater flexibility. The Lufugula Police Camp offers interesting possibilities as the center of Leopoldville Police Communications system. The control room, offices, repair shop and warehouse should be situated there.

The use of high band frequencies 150 megacycles to 165 megacycles, should be continued. Channel spacing should not exceed 200 kilocycles in order to guarantee alignment compatibility. Dual frequencies should be assigned to allow duplex operation of all equipment. Detailed equipment considerations are as follows:

1. All circuits now operating simplex should be changed to permit duplex operation.
2. All base units should have antennas at maximum height.
3. The main transmitter and appropriate antenna should be located on the top floor or on the roof of one of the two Sabena Buildings on Albert I Boulevard. These are the tallest buildings in Leopoldville.
4. The use of high gain antennas wherever applicable.
5. The use of self-supporting towers for all base stations since guy wires cannot be used at several locations.
6. The installations of separate base units of relatively small power between headquarters (Commissaire-en-Chief) and each division. In the event of

sabotage of the headquarters equipment, command of the police could be handled at a selected division headquarters. These base units need not exceed 100 watts except where added power is needed.

7. It is suggested that a base station be placed in each of the police camps, so that in case of an emergency, the police camp through their radio communications can dispatch men who are available at that time.

8. It is recommended that all vehicles purchased be equipped with complete mobile units before shipping. This will avoid installation in the field and will help eliminate separate shipping costs. In the event that individual units are not immediately needed, the transmitter and receiver units can be stored in the parts warehouse. In an emergency, non-radio equipped vehicles could be so equipped by merely placing the transmitter and receiver units back into the vehicle. All control cables, control head wiring and antenna would remain on the vehicle at all times.

9. Although it is recommended that the future system use the available frequencies, the mobile units and control base station should transmit on one frequency and receive on another. All of the base stations at the divisions and camps should transmit and receive on a different frequency, preferably separated by a minimum of 3 megacycles to prevent intermodulation. Two frequencies are desirable in each group of frequencies to permit two frequency operation of transmitters and receivers. With such a frequency allocation arrangement, there would be approximately six practically interference free channels and an equal number having only moderate interference problems. If in the future, traffic should increase to a point of confusion, it is suggested that the city be divided into two sections.

10. It is suggested that a request for frequency allocations be initiated before any plans are formulated for the initial system or for future changes such as dividing into two sections, the only additional equipment needed would be proper crystals for all units involved and another complete base station. The use of the small base stations to be located at the divisions and camps is to provide protection in case of an emergency.

11. In the event that the Public Power system is sabotaged, the Police base stations would be rendered inoperative. Therefore, in order to guarantee a complete emergency Police radio communications capability, a 5 kilowatt diesel driven generator should be installed at each base station site. It is recommended that a weekly operational check should be made of each base station emergency power supply.

The equipment now available to the City Police of Leopoldville is as follows:

1. One 60 watt dual frequency base station with antenna located at Police Headquarters, Motorola desk type-operational.
2. One 30 watt dual frequency base station with antenna located at Camp Lufungula, Motorola #43GGB-being repaired.
3. One 30 watt dual frequency base station with antenna located at the first division, Motorola #43GGB-non-operational.
4. One 30 watt dual frequency base station with antenna located at second division, Motorola #43GGB-operational.
5. One 30 watt dual frequency base station with antenna located at the third division, Motorola #43GGB-being repaired.
6. One 30 watt single frequency base station with antenna located at the fourth division Motorola, #43GGB-being repaired.
7. One 30 watt single frequency base station with antenna located at the fifth division, Motorola #43GGB-being repaired.
8. One 30 watt single frequency base station with antenna located at the Urban Security Brigade, Motorola #43GGB-being repaired.
9. One RCA mobile unit rewired for 220 volts AC and converted to the police frequency; however this unit has missing parts. This is located at the Police training Camp. Non-operational.
10. Two 24 volt DC mobile units of Danish Manufacture are the only mobile units which are still in working condition. However, neither vehicle in which the sets are installed is actually in running condition.

## Elizabethville

This department formerly had a very efficient communications system. However, it has since deteriorated. The nucleus still exists and would suffice for the time being providing a technician with spare parts would be available to place this equipment back into operating condition. The present equipment consists of:

1. Headquarters - one 60 watt dual frequency base station with antenna and two remote controls, motorola equipment, operational.
2. 1st Division - one 60 watt dual frequency base station with antenna, motorola equipment, non-operational.
3. 2nd Division - one 60 watt dual frequency base station with antenna, motorola equipment, operational.
4. 3rd Division - one 60 watt dual frequency base station with antenna, motorola equipment, non-operational.
5. 4th Division - one 60 watt dual frequency base station with antenna, motorola equipment, operational.
6. 5th Division - one 60 watt dual frequency base station with antenna, motorola equipment, non-operational.
7. 2 each handie talkies, motorola equipment, battery powered, non-operational.
8. 20 each 30 watt mobile units, 6/12 volts DC, model T41GGV, motorola equipment, 2 operational.
9. Police camp - one single frequency 60 watt base station with antenna, motorola equipment, non-operational.

The frequencies assigned to the urban police radio communications network by the ministry of Posts and Telegraph are 37.940 megacycles and 38.000 megacycles. The city of Jadotville had electrical power of 220 volts AC 50 Cycles and extends into the surrounding areas. It is considered very reliable. Again, the present electrical generating equipment is operating at one third of its capacity.

It is recommended that a qualified technician repair and place all units back into operating condition. Informative sources contend that all equipment is repairable. It is well to note that since this area is considered a trouble area, the urban police communications system should be one of the first to be placed back into service. With a minimum of parts, a qualified technician could restore service in a matter of hours.

The telephone system exists in most of the city and the surrounding areas and is considered reliable. Again, it is to be noted that little or no maintenance has been accomplished for about 2 or 3 years. The impedance of the telephone lines is 600 ohms.

### Jadotville

Jadotville is a mining town located within the jurisdiction of Elizabethville. It has been the scene of serious trouble in the past. The same situation regarding radio equipment exists here as in Elizabethville. Any future equipment needs could be added to the present system. The terrain surrounding Jadotville is one of rolling hills; few, if any, terrain problems should be encountered. The present equipment consists of:

1. Headquarters - one 60 watt dual frequency base station with antenna and one remote control, motorola equipment, operational.
2. 1st Division - one 60 watt dual frequency base station with antenna, motorola equipment, non-operational.
3. 2nd Division - one 60 watt dual frequency base station with antenna, motorola equipment, non-operational.
4. 3rd Division - one 60 watt dual frequency base station with antenna, motorola equipment, non-operational.
5. 4th Division - one 60 watt dual frequency base station with antenna, motorola equipment, operational.
6. 5th Division - one watt dual frequency base station with antenna, motorola equipment, non-operational.
7. 7 each-30 watt mobile dual frequency units motorola model #T4IGGV, 6/112 volt DC; 2 are operational.

## Kolwezi

The city of Kolwezi is located west of Jadotville. It also is a trouble area. It is the smaller of the two cities. The same conditions exist here as in Jadotville: Some equipment remains, but it is not operational. No foreseeable terrain problems exist. The present equipment consists of:

1. Headquarters - one 60 watt dual frequency base station with antenna, motorola equipment, operational.
2. 1st Division - one 60 watt dual frequency base station with antenna, motorola equipment, non-operational.
3. 2nd Division - one 60 watt dual frequency base station with antenna, non-operational.
4. 3rd Division - one 60 watt dual frequency base station with antenna, motorola equipment, non-operational.
5. 4th Division - one 60 watt dual frequency base station with antenna, motorola equipment, non-operational.
6. 5th Division - one 60 watt dual frequency base station with antenna, motorola equipment, non-operational.
7. 2 each - 30 watt mobile units, 6/12 volts DC, motorola model #T41GGV, non-operational.

The city of Kolwezi has electrical power of 220 volts AC 50 cycles which is available within the city and in the surrounding areas. It is considered very reliable. The present generating equipment is operating at one third of its capacity.

It is recommended that a qualified technician repair all units. The equipment is sufficient for an initial system. Future needs can be determined at a later date and can be added to the existing equipment. Informative sources contend that all equipment is repairable. The telephone system exists in most of the city and in some of the surrounding areas. It is not considered reliable.

If the proposed recommendations are implemented, the present high frequency equipment could be used in other localities using such equipment, as in

Leopoldville. In any event, parts could be salvaged and used at the communications repair center.

### Stanleyville

The uneasy political situation in this city and the continuing possibility of riots require that priority be given to the reestablishment of a communications system here. Competent communications technicians should conduct the necessary tests and inspections to place the available Motorola base stations in operating condition as soon as possible. Specifications for compatible mobile units could also be determined and procurement could be undertaken subsequently. A complete study should be made of the Stanleyville police communications needs in terms of equipment, personnel, training, facilities, records, procedures, control, maintenance, etc.

Adequate 220 Volt AC, 50 cycle electricity is available. The terrain is flat and should not constitute a problem.

### Luluabourg

Unless security conditions seriously worsen in Luluabourg, the establishment of an urban police radio network here should receive low priority. When it is determined that such an installation is required, a detailed technical study will be necessary to establish the types and numbers of units to be ordered, best operating frequencies, base station locations, and all other facets of developing an efficient system. A series of tests may be desirable because of the rolling terrain and ridge lines in the area. The use of space in the City Hall as a communications center should be explored, inasmuch as police headquarters are located there and because the building is centrally located.

Luluabourg reportedly has reliable power of 220 volts AC, 50 cycles.

### Provincial Police Systems

The provincial police forces are in dire need of a radio communications capability within their respective provinces and with the police of neighboring provinces. Intra-provincial means of communications are virtually non-existent. A highly sophisticated system is not required at the present time.

In view of the fact that sufficient frequencies are not believed to be available to permit the assignment of a separate frequency to each province, where it is politically feasible, a regional system could be based upon the 6 pre-independence provincial limits. Each provincial seat of government and other selected cities could be included in the network of each region. All base stations in a single network would operate on a given frequency, while the mobile units would be on another frequency. Initially, no regional network would include more than 8 base stations and 30 mobile units. Total radio traffic is not expected to become a problem for several years.

The procurement of 4 channel single side band base stations will permit communication between the provinces in each region and possible expansion into a nationwide network by adding teletype equipment to one or more of the unused channels. The use of single side band mobile units will permit vehicles to remain in communication with at least one of the regional base stations.

Admittedly, some difficulty may well be encountered in securing the approval of all provincial governments to participate in regional networks. Intense animosities which exist between some of the provinces could necessitate alteration of proposed regional systems. A complete survey should be made in each province by qualified communications technicians.

#### REGION I (Ex - Leopoldville Province)

Although Leopoldville is no longer part of a province, since it is the center of so much activity in the area, it should be included in this regional network. No police communications now exist between the four provinces in the area nor with Leopoldville. Base stations should be installed in the following locations:

1. A single side band master base station of 100 watts PEP, 4 channel, frequency range of 2 to 15 megacycles to be installed at Leopoldville with the following additional stations:

- a. A single side band base station of 100 watts PEP, 4 channel, frequency range of 2 to 15 megacycles be installed at Boma or Songololo.

- b. A single side band base station of 100 watts PEP, 4 channel, frequency range of 2 to 15 megacycles be installed at Matadi.

c. A single side band base station of 100 watts PEP, 4 channel, frequency range of 2 to 15 megacycles be installed at Thysville.

d. A single side band base station of 100 watts PEP, 4 channel, frequency range of 2 to 15 megacycles be installed at Kikwit.

e. A single side band station of 100 watts PEP, 4 channel, frequency range of 2 to 15 megacycles be installed at Kenge.

f. A single side band base station of 100 watts PEP, 4 channel, frequency range of 2 to 15 megacycles be installed at Inongo.

g. A single side band mobile unit of 100 watts PEP, 4 channel, frequency range of 2 to 15 megacycles be installed in each of the vehicles assigned to these areas.

By the use of 100 watt PEP units, compatibility exists throughout the entire system. This will facilitate the ease of training and the stocking of parts. It is realized that in some instances, 100 watts will be too powerful. However, this power can be reduced, thereby maintaining equipment interchangeability.

The topography of the entire region is one of rolling terrain with some high hills. However, few if any problems should be encountered by use of single side band equipment. Electrical power exists in all of the cities of this point to point system. A total of 30 single side band mobile units, 4 channels, with a frequency range of 2 to 15 megacycles, 100 watts PEP, will adequately cover the region.

#### REGION II (Ex - Equateur Province)

The installation of the following equipment at the indicated locations will amply handle the police communications needs in this region: a single side band master base station of 100 watts PEP, 4 channel, frequency range 2 to 15 megacycles be installed at Coquilhatville.

a. A single side band base station of 100 watts PEP, 4 channel, frequency range of 2 to 15 megacycles be installed at Gemena.

b. A single side band base station of 100 watts PEP, 4 channel, frequency range of 2 to 15 megacycles to be installed at Lisala.

c. A single side band base station of 100 watts PEP, 4 channel, frequency range of 2 to 15 megacycles be installed at Boende.

d. A single side band mobile unit of 100 watts PEP, 4 channel, frequency range of 2 to 15 megacycles.

Only a total of 9 single side band mobile units of the same description recommended by Region I are initially needed in this area.

#### REGION III (Ex - Oriental Province)

The installation of the following equipment at the indicated locations will be sufficient for this region:

A single side band master station of 100 watts, 4 channel, frequency range of 2 to 15 megacycles at Stanleyville, Ponthierville, Buta, Paulis, and Bunia. Single side band mobile units of 100 watts, 4 channel, 2 to 15 megacycles should be assigned to all provincial police patrol vehicles. Final selection of frequencies should be made on the basis of tests made in the area.

#### REGION IV (Ex - Kivu Province)

Identical equipment to that cited for Region III should be installed at Bukavu, Goma, Beni and Kindu. All vehicles assigned to the provincial police should have single side band mobile units compatible with the base stations. This will permit all vehicles and base stations in the area to remain in constant communication. Because of the rugged terrain features in this region, final frequency selection and location of each base station should be made following adequate tests made by competent technicians in the area.

#### REGION V (Ex - Katanga Province)

This former province is now reportedly divided into three separate provinces with seats of government located at Elizabethville, Albertville, and Kolwezi. If politically possible, a single provincial system should be developed for the entire area to include all three provinces. Single side band base stations of 100 watts, 4 channels, frequency range of 2 to 16 megacycles should be installed at:

Elizabethville  
Jadotville  
Kolwezi  
Kasenga  
Manono

Dilolo  
Albertville  
Kamina  
Kongolo  
Baudoinville

All patrol vehicles assigned to the provincial police should be equipped with single side band mobile units which are compatible with the base station equipment. Because of the size of this area and its varying terrain features, actual testing will be required for antenna locations, station installation points, frequency selection, etc.

REGION VI (Ex - Kasai Province)

This region now covers a total of 5 provinces. Equipment identical to that recommended for the other regions should be installed at:

Luluabourg  
Luebo  
Tshikapa  
Lodja

Lusambo  
Bakwanga  
Port-Francqui  
Kabinda

Provincial police patrol vehicles will require compatible single side band mobile units.

## ANNEX VI

### VEHICLES

One of the principal reasons for the incapability of the Congolese civil police forces to function efficiently is their almost total lack of transportation. Only an estimated 50 to 60 police vehicles exist in the entire country. With the exception of 6 new Peugeot station-wagons at Elizabethville, all other vehicles seen by the Mission were in various states of disrepair. Prior to independence, the police forces in the Congo had an overall fleet of about 500 vehicles. Over 100 were assigned to the Leopoldville Urban Police, while about 270 existed in Katanga. Nearly all of these were either stolen, requisitioned by various military units, converted illegally to personal use, destroyed in the fighting following independence, or were ruined by improper use or complete lack of maintenance.

Obviously, in order to successfully carry-out its mission in maintaining law and order, efforts will have to be made to rebuild police transportation capability. Order cannot be established if the police are not able to respond when needed. Frequent instances have occurred in Leopoldville where the police have told the complainant on the telephone to drive his own privately owned vehicle to the station to pick-up some policemen and to take them to the scene involved. The same situation was reported to exist in other cities as well.

Several factors must be dealt with in determining the types and numbers of vehicles to be recommended for a given police organization. Among these are: mission, operational requirements, street and road networks, number of qualified drivers, maintenance capability, budget support in terms of POL, funds for future vehicle replacement, and disciplined control of the use of said vehicles. The primary missions of the Congolese police at the present time are to maintain order and to control the incidence of crime. In order to carry out these missions, the police will need patrol vehicles and trucks to transport large numbers of men and equipment to the scene of a possible or actual

disturbance as quickly as possible. The more heavily populated areas such as Leopoldville, Stanleyville, Luluabourg, Bukavu, Central Congo and South Katanga Province should be more heavily equipped than other areas. The principal potential trouble zones are Leopoldville, Stanleyville, and the area including Kolwezi, Jadotville, and Elizabethville. This is not to say that rioting or fighting could not break-out elsewhere. Since accurate figures are not available as to actual population distribution, crime index from place to place, street or road situations in each of the cities and provinces, precise determination of transportation needs cannot be made for each police force in the country. However, under normal circumstances, a total force of 12 to 15,000 policemen would require about 750 vehicles. The Congolese police are incapable of assimilating such a fleet of vehicles today. Lack of qualified drivers, inadequate maintenance capability, questionable budget support, and a limited road network eliminates the requirement for so many vehicles.

The present condition of the Congolese road system is a concrete illustration of the near complete dislocation of public facilities following independence. As a result of political disturbance, scarcity of funds, and lack of qualified technicians, all road maintenance has virtually ceased since mid-1960. To make matters worse, the devastating rainy season of 1961 increased the deterioration of the road system to the extent that a substantial mileage has become totally impassable.

On the basis of a normal deterioration of laterite road beds of 3 to 7 cm. annually, for roads averaging 5 meters in width, it has been calculated that approximately 16 million cubic meters of laterite would be required just to resurface the main roads. According to available information, no plans have been formalized for the accomplishment of such a gigantic undertaking. Instead, it has been reported that the GOC is considering the construction of a series of so-called strategic roads which would require unusually heavy financing.

An additional complication to the overall road situation is the fact that hundreds of bridge and ferry installations were demolished during the fighting which occurred in many areas. The actual extent of this destruction has not yet been fully determined in each case. However, according to informed UN sources, the reconstruction of damaged and destroyed bridges will require many years and considerable funding.

In light of this situation, any requests for automotive equipment for provincial police forces should receive careful scrutiny. At the outset of the implementation of an assistance program for the Congolese police, provincial as well as urban, an inventory of qualified drivers will have to be made in each instance. Only that number of vehicles should be assigned to each force which can be properly handled by its personnel and which will be adequately supported in terms of gasoline, oil and grease. The introduction of automotive equipment is usually the most costly item in a police assistance program in an under-developed country. Without proper control, vehicles can quickly be rendered useless. The lack of discipline and proper leadership has led to the use of police vehicles for many purposes other than official business. Unless every possible step is taken to protect whatever investment is made as completely as possible, the introduction of highly expensive vehicles into the Congolese police forces would amount to sheer irresponsibility. Once it has been decided that a given number of vehicles are required and if the American Government agrees to furnish said equipment, two qualified automotive technicians should be sent to Leopoldville as soon as possible. Both would establish liaison with either the GOC, the UN police task force, and/or the Belgian police advisors, depending upon the situation at that time. One technician could begin preparing procurement documentation and could establish working relationships with his Congolese and Belgian counterparts in terms of driver training programs, the selection and training of mechanics, and the development of adequate maintenance and supply facilities in Leopoldville and Elizabethville. The other technician could assist in this work and in working with Congolese and Belgian counterparts in making a complete inspection of all available police vehicles in the country in an effort to determine which could be put back into operation at relatively little expense.

Until the May 3, 1963, police "mutiny" in Leopoldville, this police force of 1,999 officers and men had a total of 12 vehicles in running condition. Several more were inoperative for lack of one or two spare parts, brake fluid, a battery, a generator, or of tires. The actual situation in Leopoldville today is unknown. The number of police drivers still on the payroll also is not known. A relatively small garage facility exists at Camp Lufungula. Six mechanics of unknown ability are usually loaned to the police by the Ministry of Public Works.

Their tool kits are highly inadequate. The garage has one building which would have to be renovated and enlarged to include adequate space for spare parts, a tool crib, a locker-room, a small machine shop, a welding shop, engine repair area, electrical shop, a paint shop, and an office. The system of using mechanics from another ministry or of contracting vehicle maintenance to an outside establishment is not usually satisfactory in newly emerged nations. A complete inventory of needs would have to be made on the spot by a qualified automotive technician. He should logically be a national of the country which actually furnishes the equipment involved. The actual control of the day-to-day operation of the garage could be assigned to a qualified Belgian garage foreman working under the orders of the senior Belgian police advisor at Camp Lufungula. Until the "mutiny", Commissaire Pfolens was the Belgian advisor there. The garage facility could handle the maintenance problems for the Leopoldville Police Department and for the new provinces in the old Leopoldville Province. No favorable consideration should be given for the establishment of police garages in each province. Where an individual province has only a few vehicles, and where either the Ministry of Public Works or a private garage facility are capable and willing to do minor maintenance work on the police vehicles, contractual arrangements should be arranged accordingly.

Approximately 190 to 200 vehicles would be operating in former Leopoldville Province if the recommendations herein are implemented. In South Katanga, about 50 vehicles would be operating. Some 12 police vehicles are the only ones remaining of a fleet of 270 which existed there. The present fleet consists of 6 new Peugeot station-wagons, one Volkswagon truck, one 5 ton Bedford truck, two jeeps, and two Landrovers. Three BSA motorcycles also exist. Except for the new Peugeots, all other equipment is in relatively poor condition. Several Bedford trucks and a few other vehicles at the police garage could be restored to running condition at low cost. Some only require a few spare parts or tires. An experienced mechanic should be assigned to work with the Katangese and Belgian personnel at the garage to determine the precise needs of each available vehicle. The repair of these vehicles would provide a minimum transportation capability for the time being.

The repair facilities for police vehicles in Elizabethville appear to be adequate for handling a sizeable fleet. Two new electrically operated hoists and a pneumatic

grease unit were noted. The building area would have to be enlarged and additional equipment would have to be obtained in the form of a 3rd or 4th echelon maintenance kit. The country which agrees to furnish the Congolese police with vehicles should supply the services of a qualified automotive equipment maintenance technician to do a detailed survey of the needs of the Elizabethville police garage in terms of equipment, facilities, and personnel. Present office space is adequate. A cardex file still exists although nearly all former records have been destroyed. The garage is situated on the north-east outskirts of the city some two miles from headquarters. The space available is adequate. One Belgian and six Katangese mechanics of unknown ability are assigned by the Ministry of Public Works.

Every effort should be made to have only two major police automotive repair centers in the Congo: one at Leopoldville and the other at Elizabethville. Leopoldville could supply parts and do major overhaul and repair for the eastern, northern and north-eastern regions. The Congo River shipping complex could be used for transporting vehicles and parts. Elizabethville could handle the needs of the southern and south-eastern regions once the railroad system has been repaired. The facilities at Camp Lufungula in Leopoldville could become the central supply outlet for all the police forces in the Congo. To allow or to recommend that each individual province fend for itself in maintaining separate repair and supply facilities will only lead to a certain deterioration of whatever automotive equipment is provided them. Requisitions for spare parts could be forwarded to Leopoldville, as well as requests for the services of a mechanic should none be available in a given province. All services supplied could be on a reimbursable basis. It can be expected that several of the provincial administrations will object to such a proposal. However, no vehicles should be provided except where conditions as to use and maintenance are clearly met.

Procurement of vehicles should take the matter of standardization of vehicles into account. The variety of equipment should be held to a minimum in order to permit easier driver and mechanic familiarization, and to avoid the necessity of having to stock an unusually large variety of spare parts.

Detailed inventory should be established as the equipment and parts arrive in the Congo. All cases and packages should be opened and their contents verified against existing bills of lading and then picked up on an inventory.

No cases should be allowed to remain unopened and unaccounted for. All foreign technicians and Congolese police personnel should work together in this kind of operation. Strict property accountability should be enforced. Requisitions for equipment, tools, parts, or supplies should be countersigned by a European or American technician involved. Several years of training and discipline will be required before the Congolese become capable of handling an inventory control operation capably. No equipment whatever should be furnished unless firm conditions are fully agreed upon by GOC and each provincial government covering the use of said equipment, the training of drivers and mechanics, the development of a proper maintenance program, and the provision of sufficient funds to operate the equipment. No vehicles should be assigned to any police force which does not have qualified foreign police advisors assigned to it.


Although about 750 vehicles are required to properly support all the Congolese police forces, only about 410 should be considered during the first two years of an assistant program. Deliveries should be phased according to Congolese absorption capability and adequate introduction of foreign police advisors into each police agency.

The cost of operating a fleet of police vehicles will have to be clearly impressed upon the GOC. It is estimated that 12,000 to 18,000 liters of gasoline will be required to operate each police patrol vehicle annually. At 10 francs per liter, the cost per vehicle would be between 120,000 and 180,000 Congolese francs each year. A fleet of 400 vehicles would cost from 48,000,000 to 72,000,000 Congolese francs depending upon the extent of both urban and rural patrol operations. The annual expense in dollars at the legal rate would be between \$740,000.00 and \$1,110,000.00. Obviously, such total costs would not be incurred until a full fleet of vehicles is in operation and until such time as a certain sophistication in patrol activity is reached.


ANNEX VII

APPENDIX


Map 1 - The Republic of the Congo



Map 2 - Ethnographic Sketch



Map 3 - Recommended Regional Police Communications Systems



Map 4 - Provincial Limits




Chart 1

ACTUAL LEOPOLDVILLE URBAN POLICE ORGANIZATION

June 1963




Chart 2

RECOMMENDED LEOPOLDVILLE URBAN POLICE ORGANIZATION





Chart 3

RECOMMENDED PROVINCIAL POLICE ORGANIZATION



LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

# LIMITED GENERAL LIFE

1954



1954