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REPORT ON THE

Civil Police Forces
OF THE
UNION OF

BURMA

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OF
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REVIEW BY LAUREN J. GOIN, DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY, AID/W

December 1957

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION

Washington, D.C.

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REPORT ON THE
CIVIL POLICE FORCES
OF THE
UNION OF BURMA

by

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November-December 1957

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION*

A. PHYSICAL FEATURES OF THE COUNTRY

1. General.

Burma occupies one of the most fertile parts of Southeast Asia and has an area of about 261,000 square miles. It is larger than Texas.

Beginning in the far south, within 10 degrees of the equator, Burma stretches to the north for 1,200 miles; from east to west its breadth is half as great. Its coastline includes the whole eastern shore of the Bay of Bengal, and on the east and north rugged mountains and hills separate it from its neighbors. Burma has approximately 1,000 miles of border with Thailand, 150 miles with Laos, 1,000 miles with Communist China, and another 1,000 miles of common frontier with India and Pakistan.

2. Mountains.

On the north are the snowbound mountains of Tibet, where even the passes are thousands of feet high; on the west, the Arakan Hills, the Chin Hills, and the Naga Hills, whose ranges vary from about 3,000 to 8,000 feet above sea level; on the east the plateau of the Shan and Kayah States, averaging some 3,000 feet above sea level; on the southeast are the Tenasserim Hills; and in the heart of Burma, 1,500 to 3,000 feet high, are the Pegu Hills. The whole mountain system of Burma consists of north-south offshoots of the Tibetan mountains in the shape of a horseshoe.

3. Rivers.

Burma comprises a series of river valleys, the Irrawaddy, the Sittang, and the Salween running from north to south and divided from one another by mountain ranges and plateaus. The Irrawaddy, rising in Tibet and navigable for some 900 miles, is Burma's main highway. South of Prome the Irrawaddy, before

* In the preparation of much of the background material of this section of its report, the Survey Team has drawn freely on the "Psychological Warfare Area Handbook for Burma" prepared by the 14th Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Battalion, on the Pacific Command's "Weekly Intelligence Digest" of July 27, 1956, on official material furnished by the Burmese Government, and on valuable material furnished informally by the Economic and Political Sections of the American Embassy in Rangoon.

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entering the sea, branches into creeks and rivulets and forms the Delta, which is one of the great rice granaries of the world, covering an area of some 10,000 square miles. There are eight main distributaries; the westernmost, on which the port of Bassein stands, is the most important. Rangoon, the capital, is not on the Irrawaddy but stands some 20 miles from the sea on the Hlaing River and is connected with the Delta by tidal creeks. The main tributary of the Irrawaddy, the Chindwin, is navigable for about 300 miles and joins it near the town of Pakokku. The Sittang, rising east of Yamathin, drains the Toungoo, passes through Pegu District and, after running for about 350 miles, opens into a wide estuary noted for its tidal bores and empties into the Gulf of Martaban halfway between Rangoon and Moulmein.

The third important river of Burma, the Salween, rises in Tibet, flows through part of the Shan and Kayah States, and for some considerable distance forms the boundary line between Burma and Thailand. Its falls and the deep chasms and crags which mark its banks render it unnavigable for most of its distance.

4. Climate.

Burma, lying between 93 and 103 degrees east longitude and between 10 and 28 degrees north latitude, is mainly within the tropics. There are three seasons. The rainy season occurs during the southwest monsoons from the middle of May to the middle of October, when the coastal regions of Arakan and Tenasserim and the mountains of the extreme north have a rainfall of about 200 inches a year; the Irrawaddy Delta about 100 inches; the hills on the west and east about 80 inches; while central Burma, cut off from the monsoon by the Arakan Hills, receives only 25 to 45 inches of rain. The hot season comes immediately before the rains begin and a shade temperature of 100 degrees is not uncommon in the Delta region while central Burma often registers a temperature of over 100. In the cool season, December and January, the temperature in southern Burma is in the neighborhood of 60 degrees minimum, and in central Burma it drops to less than 60. The Delta and the coastal areas are excessively humid throughout the year.

B. COMMUNICATIONS

1. External.

Burma is not well provided with external land communications. The horseshoe of mountains surrounding the country makes road and rail communications uneconomical in comparison with sea communication. On the west the only alignment for road or rail leads to Manipur, but has never been developed since the area is remote from any large center of supply or population. Overland communication from Arakan to India can be effected, but the route is difficult. The easiest route on the west of Burma is the one leading from Kalewa on the Chindwin River to Tamu and on to Palel and Imphal in Manipur and

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from there to Dimapur. On the east, tracks which are suitable only for pack transport lead from Putao through Konglu across the frontier into Yunnan, and from Myitkyina through Seniku or through Sadon. From Bhamo a track leads through Hkalunga and by the Taping River Valley into Yunnan. The Burma Road to Yunnan leaves the Lashio-Bhamo Road near Muse and south of this road a mule track leads from Lashio into Yunnan by the ferry at Kunlong on the Salween. From Kengtung in the Shan State mule paths northward through Mengyaung lead to Yunnan, and southward a road leads to Tahkilek on the Thai border. A number of tracks lead from other parts of the Shan State into Thailand.

2. Internal.

Internally, Burma is a country of water-ways and is poorly provided with road communications. The two principal roads connecting Lower and Upper Burma are the Rangoon-Prome-Meitkila and the Rangoon-Toungoo-Meitkila-Mandalay roads. The total mileage of surfaced roads has been given as 6,811, of unsurfaced roads as 5,611, of cart tracks 4,704, of mule tracks 8,319, and of village tracks about 47,000.

3. Railways.

The Burma Railways system is of meter gauge and the main lines are from Rangoon to Prome (161 miles) and from Rangoon to Mandalay (386 miles) extending to Myitkyina (723 miles from Rangoon. Branch lines extend from Letpadan to Tharrawaw (24 miles), from Henzada to Bassein (82 miles) and from Henzada to Kyangin (65 miles). In the Tenassarim Division, the lines are from Pegu to Martaban (122 miles) connecting the Moulmein by ferry, and from Moulmein south to Anin (57 miles), and from Nyaunglebin to Madauk (11 miles). Then there are the branch lines from Pyinmana to Taungdwingyi (67 miles), and from Thazi to Myingyan (70 miles), from Mandalay to Madaya (17 miles), and from Ywataugn, near Sagaing, to Ahlon (71 miles). The Northern and Southern Shan States Hill sections are important branches connecting with the main lines at Myohaung (near Mandalay) and Thazi, having respectively 12 and 16 mile sections continuously graded at 1 in 25. The Railways suffered severely as a result of World War II and the present route mileage is 1,777 as compared to 2,059 in 1942.

4. Inland Water Transport.

Burma's great Irrawaddy River is navigable up to Bhamo, 900 miles from the sea, while its main tributary, the Chindwin, is navigable for nearly 400 miles. The Irrawaddy Delta with its numerous creeks provides a seaboard for all types of craft and has nearly 1,700 miles of navigable water. Around Moulmein the Salween, the Attaran and the Gyne also provide about 250 miles of navigable waters. In addition there are 60 miles of navigable canals -- the Pegu-Sittang Canal (38 miles) connecting the Pegu River at Tawa (near Pegu)

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with the Sittang River at Myitkyo and the Twante Canal (22 miles) connecting the port of Rangoon with the China Bakis (or To) River, one of the deltaic branches of the Irrawaddy.

C. THE PEOPLE OF BURMA

1. General.

It is estimated that out of Burma's total population of 18 to 20 million, about 300,000 are Chinese and 800,000 are Indians or Pakistanis. The remainder - Burmans, Shans, Kayahs, Arakans, Mons, Chins, Kachins, Karëns, Karënni, and various other smaller tribes - varying in language, dialect and culture patterns, are Mongoloid stocks who emigrated to Burma proper as late as the 19th century.

Eleven races are generally recognized within the borders of Burma, the largest of these being the Burmans (14,000,000), Karen (2,000,000), and Tai (Shan) (1,500,000).

It has been estimated that 65% of the entire population speak Burmese habitually, and 70% of the remainder have a working knowledge of that language. English is used by some 30% of the urban population. In spite of the growing nationalism, however, at least 100 different dialects are spoken in Burma.

Comments on the characteristics of some of the principal indigenous minority groups are given in the sections that follow to illustrate the cultural, linguistic, and racial diversity of modern Burma.

2. Kachins.

The Kachins are the most numerous and widespread ethnic group in northern Burma. "Kachin" is a generic racial term for several linguistic family groups or divisions and is widely used in the literature of the area, although the term is disliked by the people themselves. (The literal meaning of "Kachin" in Burmese is "savage".) The Kachins are classified as a Tibeto-Burman people. It is believed that their original home was in the eastern part of the Tibetan Plateau. Although the Kachin people are united by common modes of living and broad linguistic similarities, they have never been politically unified.

3. The Burmese Tai (Shan).

The Tai are the most widespread and important ethnic group in South-east Asia. "Tai" is a generic term applied to several peoples united by common cultural characteristics and linguistic similarities, including the Thai, the Lao, several Tai tribes of northern Vietnam, the Shans of Burma, and various

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Tai groups in the Chinese provinces of Yunnan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, and Kwangtung. In all, there are an estimated 25,000,000 Tai-speaking people in Southeast Asia.

There are about 700,000 Shans in the Shan State of Burma. Other Shan-speaking tribes have been partially assimilated, and some Burmese-speaking Shans who are enumerated as Burmans on census rolls consider themselves Shans.

4. Karens.

The Karens are a group of Indo-Chinese tribes living principally in easternmost Burma, mainly along the lower Salween from the south of the Shan State to Tenasserim and the adjacent lowlands.

5. Chins.

The Chins are a Tibeto-Burmese-speaking group with as many as 44 recognized dialects. They probably number close to half a million and are concentrated along the southern half of the western Burma border on the eastern slopes of the Arakan mountains.

6. Nagas.

The Nagas are a primitive Tibeto-Burmese speaking group with considerable differences among the various dialects. Their population probably totals more than 200,000 and for the most part they are located east of the Chindwin River and Hukawng Valley, along the mountainous Assam-Burma frontier.

D. THE PERIOD OF BRITISH RULE

Total annexation of Burma by Great Britain resulted after the three Anglo-Burmese Wars -- the War of 1824 ending with the annexation of Arakan and Tenasserim, the War of 1852 with the occupation by the British of the province of Pegu including Rangoon, and the War of 1885 with the deportation of King Thibaw to India. The whole of Burma was thus annexed to the British Crown, but it took an army of 30,000 men over five years to suppress the sporadic resistance which broke out all over the country and which also spread to the then British occupied Burma.

The system of administration by the British in Burma was patterned after that in use in India. In 1897 Burma was given a legislative Council consisting of "nominated" members and having a few real powers, finance being controlled by the Central Government. A change was made in 1909 when a non-official but nominated majority was provided, but the powers of the Council were no more than that of an advisory body to the Lieutenant-Governor. In 1923, the Indian Constitutional Reforms granted to India, popularly known as Dyarchy, were extended to Burma, not without agitation or struggle on the part of the Burmese. Subsequently, following the Report of the Indian

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Statutory Commission, there was introduced the Government of Burma Act of 1935 which provided for the separation of Burma from India and gave Burma a semblance of responsible Government - the responsibility for Foreign Affairs, Defense, Currency and the administration of the frontier peoples, the Shans, the Chins, the Kachins, etc., being retained in the hands of the Governor.

After the termination of the War in Burma, the British Civil Administration was resumed in October, 1945. In January, 1947, an Agreement was reached in London between the British Government and the Burma Executive Council as to the methods by which the people of Burma may achieve their independence either within or without the Commonwealth, as soon as possible. A Constituent Assembly was elected in April, 1947, in which the Anti-Fascists Peoples Freedom League led by Bogyoke Aung San obtained an overwhelming victory. In February of that year Bogyoke Aung San met the Chiefs and the leaders of the Shans, Kachins, Karennis and Chins at a Conference in Panglong and the leaders agreed to join the Burma Government on condition that their autonomy was respected and that they were adequately represented on the Executive Council.

A Constituent Assembly met for the first time on June 10, 1947, and a resolution moved by Bogyoke Aung San on June 16, 1947, to proclaim Burma as an independent sovereign republic was unanimously adopted. Thakin Nu (U Nu) headed a mission which arrived in London on June 23 and obtained from the Prime Minister of England an assurance that Parliament would introduce legislation to give effect to the transfer of power at the beginning of the Autumn Session. It was also agreed that the interim Government in Burma should become the provisional Government with Bogyoke Aung San as the Premier. On July 19, Bogyoke Aung San and many leading members of his Government were assassinated while holding a meeting of the Executive Council, and on that very night Thakin Nu, who was at that time Speaker of the Constituent Assembly, accepted office as Prime Minister and a new Cabinet was sworn in. The Constituent Assembly met again on July 29 and the draft constitution, after discussion, was approved by all parties in September, 1947. In October there was signed in London between Thakin Nu and Mr. Attlee, a treaty covering the future financial and commercial relations between Burma and Britain and making provisions for the contractual obligations of the two parties and for the defense of Burma. The transfer of power took place in January, 1948.

E. BURMA'S INTERNATIONAL ORIENTATION

The two guidelines to Burmese foreign policy are neutralism and anti-colonialism. These are intertwined and mutually sustaining; they stem from the early doctrinaire convictions of the group which fought for and achieved Burmese independence and have since been reinforced by the fear of a third world war and uneasiness over the presence of a militant and expansionist Communist China on Burma's long and unprotected northern border.

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The Burmese have generally followed the neutralist line on major foreign policy issues, in common with India, Indonesia, and others. Burma was one of the "Bandung Powers" which organized the Bandung Asian-African Conference of the Spring of 1955. Her stand on most of the international issues and questions of recent years follows the familiar neutralist pattern. Thus, Burma maintains diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet Union, Communist China, and others of the Communist bloc, and refuses contact with the Republic of China.

Burma's own view of her neutralist policy was summed up in a recent address by Prime Minister U Nu, who said:

"...I would like to submit that we have succeeded in making all these friends without sacrificing our freedom of action in foreign affairs. Our right to decide each issue on its strict merits, without dictation or pressure from any external source, remains unscathed. It was this which has made it possible for us in the course of one session of the General Assembly of the United Nations to condemn the French for their policy in Algeria, the British, French and Israelis for their attack on Egypt, and the Soviet Union for its armed intervention in Hungary. For a small country in our position, I am convinced there is no better foreign policy, and I can assure the House that it is the policy which will be followed as long as the Government which I have the honour to lead remains in power."

With particular reference to the United States, our relations with Burma have not been close for some years. They deteriorated badly in the early part of the present decade, largely as a result of our identification, in the minds of the Burmese, with the irregular Chinese Nationalist troops which fled from Yunnan into northeastern Burma when the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949, but which refused to submit to Burmese authority. U Nu summed up the Burmese view of this development and its effect on our relations as follows:

"...In 1950 we signed an Economic Cooperation Agreement with the United States Government, and under this agreement received assistance to the approximate value of 19 million dollars. In 1953, developments in connection with the Kuomintang aggression unfortunately compelled us to terminate the aid programme. We found ourselves in the anomalous position of receiving aid from the United States Government on the one hand, and on the other fighting against an army which was controlled and supplied by the Formosan authorities whose continued existence was dependent on large scale American aid..."

Against this background of waning Western influence, the Communists have been quick and adept in exploiting Burma's neutralist position. Burma's leaders have been feted and extolled in the Bloc countries; the Communists have bought large amounts of Burmese rice at a time when it appeared to the Burmese that American surplus rice disposal abroad was destroying traditional Burmese rice markets; the Soviet Union has been prompt and generous in offering ostensibly "stringless" economic and technical aid to Burma; Soviet technicians

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are now in Burma in sizeable numbers and as yet the Burmese have not seen any reason to believe they cannot accept such aid without damage to their political integrity or their cherished neutralism.

Nevertheless, there are good reasons to believe that fundamentally Burma is more in sympathy with the United States and what it stands for than she is with international communism. The difficulty is, as an American Ambassador put it earlier this year upon completion of his tour in Burma, the Communists have been more successful than we have in manipulating the concepts of neutralism and anti-colonialism. The result, he said, has been that while the leaders of Burma are basically convinced that Burma has less to fear from the Free World, they find it easier to agree publicly with the hypocritical generalizations of the Communists about peace, freedom, and democracy than with our more specific pronouncements.

F. THE INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEM

Independent Burma's insurgent problem began almost with the achievement of independence. Various Communist groups, equipped with arms left from World War II, embarked in March 1948 upon a campaign of violence in an effort to seize control of the new Government from the "Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League" (AFPFL) Government led by U Nu. In addition, certain minority racial groups, notably the Karens and the Mons, took up arms in their efforts to establish their own independent states. Finally, in early 1949, the fledgeling Burmese Government was confronted with the additional problem of the Chinese Nationalist irregular troops who crossed into Burma from Yunnan.

The aims of the various insurgent groups are not identical. Some, like the Karens and Mons, as nationalists, are attempting by political and military means to obtain independence for their own areas. Others, as the Burmese Communists, are attempting through political and military operations to gain control of the government. The anti-Communist, former Chinese Nationalist soldiers are attempting to remain in the area of Northeast Burma without giving up their arms. There is little doubt that the insurgent movement in Burma has been seriously curtailed. However, the fire continues to smoulder, although organized military opposition has deteriorated due primarily to the lack of arms, ammunition and military supplies. This does not mean that the insurgent problem has been eliminated, but only that it has deteriorated to the extent that numerous guerrilla bands now roam the country instead of offering conventional military resistance to the Burmese Government. Much of the current lawlessness, including murders, kidnapping and robberies are credited to the insurgents rather than to local dacoits and bandit gangs which exist throughout Burma. For this reason, it is impossible to obtain accurate figures on current insurgent strengths. Burma is far from establishing law and order, although the problem is becoming more one for the police rather than for the Armed Forces. The insurgent groups appear to be widely scattered

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and generally ineffective as conventional military forces. There is little evidence of cooperation between the various dissident groups except for some reports of attempts of liaison on economic and military matters between the KNDO and the BGP, and between the various Communist groups.

G. THE PROBLEM FOR THE POLICE

Recent progress by the Armed Forces of Burma clearly indicates that the backbone of the insurgency is being broken. The Government is slowly winning its military battle against the organized groups and is making headway in its propaganda efforts to persuade large groups to surrender. As the organized armed rebellion disintegrates, however, increasing problems are obviously presented for the police system of Burma. Broadly, they fall into three categories: (1) the establishing, or re-establishing of law and order in areas which have been under martial law or have been totally outside the effective jurisdiction of the central Government; (2) the suppression of crime by the remnants of organized insurgents who retain their arms and turn to banditry; and (3) the intelligence problem of surveillance over the Communists, having failed to attain their ends by insurrection, turn to political subversion.

The Burma Police face these problems in a setting which immeasurably enhances their difficulty. First and foremost are the physical difficulties presented by the geography of Burma with its unmarked borders, its long and difficult coastline, its forbidding mountains, its dense jungles, and its crippling lack of roads and other means of communications. They face these odds with insufficient, inadequate, and obsolescent equipment.

H. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEM

Prime Minister U Nu has stated that the insurrection has cost Burma about the equivalent of one year's national production, probably a conservative estimate. In terms of opportunities lost, discouragement of private investment and initiative, interference with commercial travel, hampering of Government operations, and the diversion of public sector financial and human resources from productive activity, the cost is probably much higher.

Some of the effects may be seen in production statistics. The Gross National Product is only about 90% of what it was in FY 1938-39. Per capita consumption is about 78% of the pre-war figure. Largely as a result of the insurrection and dacoity associated with it, Burma has since the war been pretty much of a one-product economy, with rice representing nearly 80% of the value of Burma's foreign exchange earnings. Rice production, which is not so much affected by internal insecurity as the extractive industries, has recovered to about 86% of the pre-war level, while teak production is only about 50% of pre-war, mineral production is a little over 30% and crude oil production stands at 22% of the pre-war figures.

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The effects of continued internal disorder are dramatically evident in the fact that more than two million acres of once flourishing rice fields have still not come back into production. Fertile alluvial land is overgrown with rank growths of tall, tough kaing grass; irrigation and flood protection works have fallen into decay; villages, pagodas and schools have crumbled into dust and been overgrown by jungle because the people who once worked the land and lived in the villages have fled, crowding the larger towns and cities. The urban centers have been unable to absorb these refugees, and they live in depressing poverty and filth. Others, including many of the young and stalwart, have joined dacoit or insurgent bands, because they see no opportunity to take up productive and lawful pursuits. These youths, trained only in banditry and guerrilla fighting, not only contribute to internal insecurity, but represent as well a drain on one of the underpopulated Burma's most needed economic resources - productive manpower and potential leaders.

The disruption of transportation and communications and the danger of travel about the country choke the flow of commerce and the movement of people. Construction is costly because materials move only with difficulty, labor is difficult or impossible to assemble and protect, payrolls are constantly subject to bandit raids or highway robbery.

Poverty in the towns breeds discontent and rebellious attitudes, poor distribution of goods contributes to scarcity and inflation, which reduce the return to those engaged in productive enterprise and destroy their confidence in the Government's ability to solve their problems. It is a vicious circle which can be broken only by determined and effective action to break up dacoit and insurgent bands and adequately police the country.

Our \$21.7 million PL 480 program for Burma was designed to ease public dissatisfaction and bring down consumer prices by substantially augmenting Burma's imports of cotton textiles. The importation of these PL 480 textiles has now been completed and has had the desired impact in Rangoon and its environs. However, the poor distribution system, which is largely a result of banditry and insurgency, has restricted the flow of the PL 480 textiles to interior towns and villages. The impact is felt much less in the interior than in Rangoon, if at all. Warehouses in Rangoon are overflowing with many types of textiles and merchants carry significant stocks.

Internal insecurity hampers every aspect of the administration of our two ICA loans to Burma. It limits the nature and location of projects which may be regarded as feasible, it renders difficult and frequently dangerous the collection of data needed for the analysis of projects proposed for ICA financing, it increases the costs of construction projects, it minimizes the economic gains to be achieved from all but a few types of projects, and it will ultimately render difficult and complicated the task of carrying out post-audit checks.

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As a matter of fact, most of the projects which the Burmese Government has proposed for ICA financing have derived their character and urgency from the economic consequences of internal disorder. The already approved land reclamation project is part of the Government's drive to bring back into production abandoned rice land. It has been made possible only by the courage and intelligent initiative of officials of the Land and Rural Development Corporation who have been able to inspire confidence in and organize previously demoralized peasants for the building of flood control and irrigation projects. It has been requested by the Army as a means of clearing off kaing grass and jungle growth which has long provided cover for lawless armed bands and as a means of re-establishing villages which will constitute an element of social stability.

The timber extraction project is aimed at restoring Burma's teak production to pre-war levels; but it is confined to areas in which security is sufficiently good to permit operations without undue risk to men and costly equipment.

The town water supply project will provide basic facilities to towns in which public utilities have been neglected partly due to insecurity, partly due to the dissipation of public funds and energy on combating insurgency and dacoity. In many large urban centers, such as Rangoon itself, water supply and sewage disposal systems have been hopelessly overtaxed by the presence of thousands of refugees from the countryside, who have crowded into these centers to live in squalor and filth. In the wet season the clogged drains are inadequate to carry off the water. In the dry season the acres and acres of jumbled bamboo and palm leaf huts are hugh populated tinder boxes that burn every year in hundreds of disastrous fires consuming the little possessions of the poor and taking the lives of many. Hydrants provide no water to fight these fires, and the undermanned and underequipped fire departments are helpless to prevent the repeated destruction.

A major U.S. objective is to encourage the development of private enterprise and to promote private American investment in Burma. The Burmese Government, too, has now come to recognize the desirability and importance of this objective and is seeking to stimulate domestic private enterprise and attract private American investors. Thus far physical insecurity has constituted an effective block to significant domestic private investment in productive enterprise outside of the environs of Rangoon and a few other major cities. It is the principle deterrent to American investors. Foreign concerns are unwilling even to consider any participation in any enterprise which is not located in the immediate vicinity of Rangoon.

The principal attraction to American investors is Burma's unexploited and largely unexplored mineral wealth. Dr. Roy T. Wise, the mining member of the American Trade Mission which visited Burma during February and March of 1957, has told interested American firms that the mineralization of Burma may well be as rich as that of the Katanga region of the Belgian Congo. There are

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possibilities of large and rich nickel, manganese, chrome, titanium, and copper ore deposits. These are minerals for which the United States in future years will have a constantly more pressing need; and American firms today are aware of these things and are interested in Burma. However, as the Chief Geologist of the Union Carbide Corporation put it during a visit to Rangoon, American firms are willing to take risks with their money, but they are not willing to risk having their personnel murdered.

I. ATTITUDE OF THE GOVERNMENT TOWARD THE PROBLEM

Earlier this year the Government of the Union of Burma took full public cognizance of the seriousness of the situation. The Prime Minister, in a major address, declared that his Government would henceforth give top priority to the problem over all other tasks and programs. On September 27, 1957, in speaking before the national legislature, he dwelt at length on the origins and history of the insurgency and on the Government's past efforts to deal with it. He addressed himself to the problem in the following language:

"The establishment of law and order will be from now on the first priority task of this Government. Nothing will be permitted to stand in the way of the achievement of this goal. The Law and Order Committee has recommended more and better guns, ammunition, uniforms, communications equipment, patrol boats, improved staff quarters, better roads, and a variety of other needs, to accomplish this goal. These things may cost a great deal of money - perhaps as much as an additional 20 crores of kyats (ten million kyats: more than two million dollars) a year. But I say without the slightest hesitation that, whatever the increase in expenditures necessary to achieve our aims, that money will be provided. If we can obtain special loans from abroad for this purpose, so much the better. But even if it means a drastic reduction in our cherished plans for economic and social development, the money necessary will be provided.

"But I also want the Parliament, the country, the military, the police, and everyone else concerned to understand this: what is involved in re-establishing law and order is, in the first instance, not money, but determination. We must be determined to stamp out and eradicate this social cancer that is eating away the vitals of our country. The key words must be initiative, intelligence, communications, mobility, imaginative tactics, and, above all, determination. I call upon the military, the police, and the civil administration to mark these words. And I call upon the people throughout the country to cooperate with the authorities and the armed forces in eliminating this scourge."

The Prime Minister then outlined the following fifteen-point program in the new drive for law and order:

"Item (1) - The strength of the Police (including the Special Police) and the UMP will be augmented. The Pyusawhti (a kind of home guard) program will be extended for three more years, including this year.

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"Item (2) - The Police (including the Special Police), the UMP, the Pyusawhti and the Army will be equipped and reinforced with modern arms and ammunition.

"Item (3) - All armed forces will be equipped with land, river and sea craft, armored troop-carriers, wireless sets and such other equipment as will enhance their striking power.

"Item (4) - To enhance the striking power and morale of armed forces all other necessities will be supplied.

"Item (5) - To accommodate armed personnel and add to their living comfort, necessary buildings will be systematically constructed.

"Item (6) - Comprehensive training will be given to armed personnel to enhance their fighting skill and effectiveness.

"Item (7) - The Police machinery will be systematically reorganized to enable the Police to work effectively for internal security.

"Item (8) - To bolster up the morale of Government servants, measures will be taken as far as the economic conditions of the country and the Government's finances permit.

"Item (9) - As courts and prisons are important in the matter of securing law and order they will be reconditioned.

"Item (10) - Laws too are vital in the maintenance of law and order and so they will be reviewed.

"Item (11) - Primarily to secure law and order and generally to enable effective action to be taken for the people's economic and general development, the administrative machinery will be reorganized.

"Item (12) - To enable effective action for the attainment of law and order and for the people's economic and general development, the Administration and the personnel connected with it will be reorganized.

"Item (13) - Roads and communications which will contribute primarily to the attainment of law and order will be repaired or newly constructed.

"Item (14) - Frontier security, immigration and smuggling control, will be stringently and effectively tightened up.

"Item (15) - By means of educative programmes, the people will be awakened to the dangers attendant on the disruption of law and order and to the blessings of peace and security. They will then be systematically organized for participation hand in hand with the Government in its campaign for law and order."

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On lower governmental levels, the Survey Team consistently met with what appeared to be genuine sincerity and determination that effective action at last be taken to end the present state of lawlessness. Bearing in mind that the Home Ministry and police officials with whom we were dealing would naturally be endeavoring to impress us with their earnestness and with their ability to use the equipment they are seeking from the United States, nevertheless the Team was favorably impressed with the attitudes they encountered and believes them to be genuine.

J. RESUME' OF REQUEST FOR AMERICAN ASSISTANCE

The history of U.S. - Burmese aid program relationships was touched upon briefly earlier in this section of the report, when Prime Minister U Nu was quoted as to the termination of American aid in 1953. The period of suspension was cautiously ended early this year when the relationship was revived at Burmese initiative. The Prime Minister has recently described this more recent development in the following terms:

"...Early this year, the Economic Cooperation Agreement was revived, and under it the United States Government has made available to us for development purposes one loan of 25 million dollars in U.S. currency, and another of approximately eight and a half crores (85 million) of kyats out of kyat funds accumulated in Burma by the United States under the PL 480 Program. Under the latter program itself, we have obtained from the United States surplus agricultural commodities which we need to the value of approximately 23 million dollars for which we have paid kyats, thereby saving ourselves much needed foreign currency, and, at the same time, helping to solve the agricultural surplus problem for the United States Government. I need hardly say that all these transactions are completely without strings, as Hon. Members will be able to see when the relevant documents come up to the Parliament for ratification. For the assistance given to us under the original aid program, and for these loans, we are most grateful to the United States. We look upon the revival of the Economic Cooperation Agreement as a new chapter in the development of closer relations between the United States of America and the Union of Burma."

It is important to note that the new loans spoken of by the Prime Minister are, in fact, loans. They are not grants. It may be argued that Burma is more interested in the form than the substance - i.e., that the Burmese very much want substantial American assistance but want it on loan terms that are sufficiently easy as almost to amount to a grant but are politically defensible as being in accord with Burmese neutrality and Burmese rejection of undue foreign influence. Whatever may be the reason for it, two facts emerge which are basic political realities to be taken into consideration in any discussion of an American aid program in Burma: (1) the Burmese want at least to appear to give something in return for foreign aid in order to be able to assert they are not under foreign political obligation, (2) they will welcome foreign technical advisers only on their own terms.

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During the period when our aid program was suspended in Burma, the Burmese Government has hired, on a contractual basis, the services of several American firms as economic and technical advisors. Moreover, on an individual contract basis, Burma has sought the teaching services of several American military officers. This type of relationship has great appeal to the Burmese, since they believe it gives them a freedom of action and an authority of control they would lack if the advisors and technicians were official representatives of a foreign government and supplied by the foreign government.

It was against this background of caution in their relationships with the United States, amounting almost to active distrust, that the Burmese Government approached us more than a year ago for limited military assistance. Subsequently, during a visit to the United States earlier this year for medical treatment, Deputy Prime Minister U Ba Swe cautiously and informally approached us regarding the possibility of active American assistance in the field of police equipment.

Further general discussions of the possibility of American aid in the police field were held in August and September with our Ambassador in Rangoon and the matter was also raised by the Burmese at the highest level when Under Secretary of State Herter visited Rangoon in September.

The U.S. response to the Burmese approach for police aid was that we would be unable to determine our position until we could send a technical survey team to Burma to observe the actual situation and to talk with members of the police organization itself. This half-response, with - to the Burmese - its suggestion of a visit by a snooping team of gratuitous advisors, met with opposition on the part of at least some levels of the Burmese Government, where it was considered that all the U.S. need do was to examine in Washington the Burmese list of equipment desired and indicate those items we were able to supply.

K. BURMESE ATTITUDE ENCOUNTERED BY THE SURVEY TEAM IN BURMA

In view of this demonstrated sensitivity, the awkward and unhappy relationship between the two countries in recent years, and the sensitivity of delving deeply into so delicate a subject as internal security in Burma, the Team was admonished during its briefing sessions in Washington to be ever mindful of these considerations and warned that it might receive a very cool and uncooperative reception in Rangoon. Moreover, the Team was briefed on the reorganization which was taking place in the police establishment and warned that appearances indicated that numbers of competent key police personnel were being summarily dismissed and replaced with politically malleable officers of little competence.

With regard to the first of these considerations, the Team proceeded cautiously at first and, throughout its stay in Burma, maintained the closest

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liaison with Ambassador McConaughy and his staff. However, while our initial sessions with the Burmese were somewhat formal, they were nevertheless cordial from the outset. As the mission progressed, the Team was able to establish an informal, friendly, and personal relationship with the key officers of the Home Ministry and of the police establishment. Gradually, the Team became less and less inhibited in its discussions and in the degree of its curiosity about police matters in Burma. Never at any time during its stay in Burma did the Team encounter the slightest suggestion that its questions were unwelcome, that the Burmese officials resented its presence, or that they wanted to do anything but cooperate with the Team. Reports reached the Embassy and the Team time and again from various sources that the Burmese were pleased with the Team's technical competence and with its informal and direct approach to matters at hand.

With regard to the second consideration, the Team found no evidence that the professional competence of the Burma Police had suffered from the current reorganization. In fact, to the contrary, the Team believes that the reorganization has been salutary.

The Team did not discuss with the Burmese officials with whom it dealt the question of method of financing a possible police program for Burma. Such questions appeared to be clearly beyond the competence of the Team. However, it is noteworthy that the basic question of the Burmese Government's attitude toward loans as distinct from grants was discussed by the American Ambassador with Deputy Prime Minister U Ba Swe during the Team's stay in Burma, and the Team invites attention to Embassy Rangoon's Despatch No. 527 of December 4, 1957, setting forth the details of that conversation.

Similarly, U Ba Swe (as detailed in the same despatch) clarified his Government's attitude toward American technical assistance. The Team's conversations with the Home Ministry and Burma Police working-groups with whom it dealt bear out the impression given by the Deputy Prime Minister that the Burmese will welcome opportunities to send police officials to the United States for training and will welcome American technical advisors, under certain circumstances, who may be sent to Burma.

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CHAPTER II

BURMA POLICE - SUMMARY

Total annexation of Burma by the British was completed in 1885. However, remnants of the Burmese Army scattered into small bands, continued guerrilla operations against the British and subsisted by pillage and robbery. By 1887 the British realized that the employment of military elements to police the country was relatively ineffective and in 1891 established the Burma Police Force and the sepoy who had been used for police duty were formed into a paramilitary body known as the Union Military Police.

When Burma attained independence in 1948 there was little change in the Police System and its organization except that the administration of the police came under the control of the President who delegated this responsibility to the Minister of Home Affairs.

The insurgent problem in Burma began almost with the achievement of independence. Various communist groups equipped with arms left from World War II embarked in March, 1948 upon a campaign of violence in an effort to discredit and seize control of the new government. In addition, certain minority racial groups took up arms in efforts to establish their own independent states. Finally in early 1949 the new government was confronted with the additional problem of Chinese National irregular troops who crossed into Burma from Yunnan.

Today the prevalence of insurgent, dissident and other lawless groups throughout Burma provides a fertile field for infiltration and development of subversive elements and poses a serious threat to internal security, preservation of law and order, stability of government and orderly development of economic programs.

A four-year plan, designed to develop, train and equip a police force large enough to cope with prevailing conditions has been given top priority by the Government of Burma and is in the process of implementation.

All civil police forces of Burma are under the Minister of Home Affairs and comprise the "Burma Police" and the Rangoon Town Police.

The Burma Police, operating under the direction of the Inspector General of Police includes administration, logistics, and training departments; four regional supervisory headquarters known as geographical ranges; a railways and criminal investigation division; a special branch; and the Union Military Police.

The Burma civil police have complete jurisdiction and responsibility in Burma proper except in Rangoon and limited jurisdiction in the Karen, Shan,

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Kayah, and Kachin States for the preservation of law and order, investigation and prevention of crime and all other activities normally performed by civil police relating to maintenance of the internal security of the country.

The Union Military Police is a paramilitary unit designed for mobility, with its own organizational structure patterned along light infantry military lines. This unit has primary responsibility as a striking force for aiding the civil police throughout Burma in phases of internal security activities which the civil police are unable to cope with alone, such as suppressing organized groups of insurgents and dissidents, and controlling civil disturbances. The UMP also has responsibility for guarding frontier posts, government property and convicts, as well as guarding and providing escorts for governmental and other dignitaries.

The Union Military Police do not conduct investigations or have the power of arrest. When the need for such action arises during UMP operations these tasks are turned over to the civil police.

The Rangoon Police operate under the direction of a Commissioner of Police who is directly responsible to the Minister of Home Affairs, and has exclusive responsibility for maintaining law and order within the municipality of Rangoon. It is augmented by one battalion of Union Military Police which is used for various guard and escort duties and in cases of civil disturbances when the Rangoon Police are unable to control the situation.

A Police Training School is operated at Mandalay for training supervisory officers down to the grade of sub-inspector and instructors. Constables and special reserves are trained in the Districts under the supervision of District Commanders.

A Detective Training School is operated at CID Headquarters in Insein, and some special training is provided by the Special Branch for agents assigned to that unit.

The Union Military Police operates a Training School, at Mandalay. The Rangoon Police operate their Training School at Insein.

Many of the higher ranking officers have received special training by the British at Lumpur and some of them in various European countries.

The personnel observed by the Survey Team appear to be reasonably well trained by British colonial standards, with considerable emphasis on military type training. Previously, the Union Military Police received only military training, although at the present time some civil police training is being integrated into the training for officers.

With the exception of a few items of obsolete war surplus radio equipment in the Special Branch, the civil police have no communication

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facilities of their own. They are forced to rely on the few public telephone facilities that are available, use such Union Military Police and Army facilities as may be available at the time, and as a last resort, which is quite frequent, use messengers.

The Union Military Police have a limited amount of obsolete war surplus C/W equipment which provides them with partial coverage.

The Rangoon Police have a limited number of telephones and a small amount of RCA radio equipment which is inadequate.

The police have a nondescript assortment of motor vehicles of various sizes, makes and models, most of which is in bad to unserviceable condition. Spare parts are practically non-existent and many of the vehicles are being cannibalized to obtain spare parts in an attempt to keep others in service.

A large portion of the country is only accessible by water. The police have no boats of their own, but obtain a limited number on loan from the Nautical and Marine Department. They have 3,000 bicycles, 1,500 of which are unserviceable.

The organizational structure follows the British colonial pattern to a great extent and with a few exceptions appears to be reasonably adequate. State officials have considerable control over operations of the police forces within their boundaries, with administrative guidance and training of personnel by the National Police.

Based on limited observation the training appears to be reasonably adequate, although there is apparent need for additional emphasis on public relations, investigation and patrol techniques.

A review of authorized personnel strength and proposed distribution indicates that the present authorized strength is sufficient if properly trained and equipped.

The Survey Team was most favorably impressed with the quality of the ranking officers contacted and with their sincerity and apparent determination to restore law and order, maintain internal security and preserve the independence of the country.

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CHAPTER III

CONCLUSIONS

The Survey Team sought to establish the nature and extent of the civil disturbances in Burma, to ascertain what the Burmese proposed as a solution, and to evaluate the Burmese request for assistance in terms of the problem and in terms of the political relationship between the United States and Burma. In setting about its task the Survey Team sought the advice of Ambassador McConaughy and his staff, particularly the ICA Representative in Burma, and officers of the Embassy's Political and Economic Sections and the Office of the Military Attache; held numerous meetings with senior officers of the Burmese Home Ministry and with the senior officers of the Burma police establishment; and visited police installations in Rangoon, Insein, Maubin, Mandalay, Sagaing, and Maymyo. One of the members of the Team accompanied Ambassador McConaughy on a call on the Deputy Prime Minister during which general policy questions relating to possible American assistance were discussed.

While the Team concedes that its access to the Burma police establishment and its opportunity to observe the problem were limited by the brevity of its stay in Burma, the Team nevertheless unanimously subscribes to the following conclusions:

I. The law-and-order situation is the most urgent and most critical problem facing the Government of Burma.

World War II brought great physical damage to Burma, little of which has actually been repaired. The area encompassed by the present boundaries had never been politically unified before the emergence of the present state. The new government of the Union of Burma faced, almost from the instant of its birth, successive insurrections by political and racial groups and very nearly succumbed to these insurrections in the first months of its existence. Despite shortages of arms, equipment, communications, and trained personnel, the Government managed to survive and slowly to tip the armed balance in its favor without, however, being able to stamp out either the insurrections themselves or the general lawlessness and banditry to which the early disturbed conditions gave rise and which have increased ever since. In spite of some recent success in inducing secondary insurgent leaders to surrender, it is unlikely that the insurrections will cease entirely without a strenuous effort by the Government. Even should the organized insurrections come to an end, the police establishment will be left with an enormous task of controlling the banditry and lawlessness which have come to flourish to an extent which practically nullifies efforts at economic and social improvement. To become a unified, viable, stable country, Burma desperately needs internal order and tranquility. Without these, the situation could revert to economic and political chaos. In any event, without substantial economic improvement and greater political stability, for both of which law and order are prerequisites, the present Government may be defeated at the polls in 1960, be forced in order to survive to use totalitarian methods

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of controlling the voting, make such concessions to the pro-Communist opposition as would destroy the independence of the country. The present orientation of the AFPFL Government, although still neutralist, seems to be evolving slowly in the direction of the free world; the only alternative to it foreseeable at the moment is a Communist or pro-Communist regime. The establishment of law and order inside the country is the prime requirement for the survival of the present government in its existing form.

II. The Government is aware of the gravity of the situation and intends to take forceful action.

The major policy address made to Parliament on September 27, 1957, by the Prime Minister, expresses clearly the seriousness with which the highest levels of the Government view the problem of restoration of law and order. Moreover, for the first time it recognizes that the problem must take priority over all other tasks facing the Government and is a sine qua non to any progress in the field of the Government's cherished economic development program. Similarly, on the professional police level the Survey Team encountered no complacency and was impressed with the determination of law enforcement officers to find a way to restore peace to the country.

III. The Burma Police need material assistance.

The present equipment of the Burma police establishment is woefully inadequate for the task confronting it, particularly in the fields of transport and communications. The Team saw equipment in operation and at first hand. Much of it is totally unserviceable, most of it is obsolete, and the overall picture is one of a hodge-podge of British, American, Russian, Japanese, Czechoslovakian, and what-have-you. The Government's foreign exchange position prevents it from acquiring from its own resources the materials needed by the Police.

IV. The Burmese would prefer to obtain their equipment from the U.S.

The Team formed a general impression from its talks with officials at various levels that American mechanical and technical equipment enjoys a prestige second to none. There were continual references to American equipment they had seen in other places or had read about. They explained in realistic detail, in response to questioning by the Team, the shortcomings of Russian and Czech equipment they were using.

Moreover, the general impressions of the Team bear out the evaluation of other American observers that as a matter of policy the Burmese would much prefer American to Communist association with their law and order program.

V. The Burmese will, however, turn elsewhere if necessary.

It was the definite impression of the Team that the Burmese are determined to take forceful action in pursuance of their four-year program

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for the restoration of law and order. To do so they require external assistance, since they cannot pay for this out of resources presently available for that purpose. While they would prefer to obtain it from the West, they will turn elsewhere if necessary. The Team was told confidentially by a high official of the Home Ministry that one alternative under consideration, should U.S. assistance not be forthcoming, was aid from India. One of the two key Deputy Prime Ministers recently announced, on his departure for a goodwill tour of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China, that while in Czechoslovakia he would discuss the possible acquisition of small arms. Yugoslavia has already supplied some arms to the Burmese Military establishment.

VI. The fact that the Burmese turned to us provides us with a significant opportunity.

Viewed against the background of Burmese neutrality, fundamental to their foreign policy, and against the background of U.S. - Burmese relations over the past six years, the fact that Burma has turned to the U.S. for assistance in the most sensitive field of internal security assumes great significance. The Survey Team met with complete cordiality and apparent candor. We were able early to establish rapport with the principal officers of the police and of the Home Ministry. The Team felt that no useful information was withheld on security grounds. Moreover, early official Burmese sensitivity to the danger of public knowledge of our visit all but disappeared as the Team went about its work. The relationship which has been established provides an opportunity for American entry in an important field, for the achievement of a measure of closer identification of Burma with the West, and for precluding Communist bloc entry into the professional police establishment of Burma.

VII. Burma will welcome American technical assistance in the police field.

Whereas the antipathy of the Burmese Government to anything which smacks of interference in their internal affairs is well known, it became apparent to the Survey Team that the professional police officials would welcome American technical advice and assistance. The point was later clarified in an interview with Deputy Prime Minister U Ba Swe, who (1) reiterated his Government's insistence that the cost of any equipment supplied should figure as a loan, not a grant; (2) said his Government would welcome opportunities to send police officers to the U.S. for training and observation, regarding assistance of this kind as "scholarships" rather than as "grant aid"; (3) said his Government would not want American official advisors to be sent to reside in Burma for a period of several years, preferring instead to make individual contractual arrangements with any such technicians; (4) but added that his Government would welcome technical experts sent to Burma for periods of several months for the purpose of installing American equipment and training Burmese in its use and maintenance.

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VIII. American recommendations for the wholesale reorganization of the Burma Police are neither feasible nor necessary.

While the Survey Team met with frankness and cordiality at all levels, it constantly bore in mind two related considerations: (1) the Burmese had originally requested certain items of American equipment and at least some members of the Burmese Government had regarded our insistence on sending a Survey Team to Burma as an unwarranted intrusion into the operation of their Government; and (2) the Burmese, as a matter of national policy, reject foreign official advisors in any capacity which partakes of telling them how to run and to reorganize their affairs.

Moreover, while there are obvious inefficiencies and a number of readily apparent improvements which could be made in the organization of the Burma police establishment, nevertheless the Team was impressed with the intelligence, competence, and devotion to duty of the officers with whom it came in contact.

IX. The U.S. should respond to the Burmese request for assistance in the police field promptly, generously, and in a fashion which will prove acceptable to the Burmese Government.

It is clearly in our national interest to deny Burma, with all its resources and its strategic location, to the Communist bloc. One way of furthering this end is to establish ourselves in a position of influence in the country's law enforcement agencies. The door has been opened, at least partially, and we have already indicated a positive interest by sending a Survey Team to study the situation. The Team has found a genuine need for help. To furnish this help would strengthen our ties with Burma; to deny it might cause Burma to turn to the Communist bloc as the only other source able to provide it under the requested liberal terms. The Team believes we should not let the opportunity pass through default. For us to exploit the opportunity successfully, however, we must be prompt to supply visible and tangible help and we must do it in a manner sufficiently flexible to demonstrate a sympathetic understanding of the Burmese sensitivities which have their root in Burma's national position of neutralism.

X. The capacity of the economy of the country generally and of the police specifically to absorb American equipment should be borne in mind.

The material needs of the police establishment are so great that to attempt to satisfy them all in a short period of time, even if that were contemplated, would overwhelm the capacity of the police to maintain or operate the equipment thus supplied. This would be counter to our aims. Any program, therefore, must be geared to the Burmese capacity of absorption.

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Nevertheless, the Team believes that a substantial amount of equipment is needed initially, can be absorbed by the Police, and should be furnished them by the U.S. The political impact of prompt delivery of visible goods would be excellent and would serve as an earnest of our intentions. We will forfeit our opportunity if we respond with only a token program or with a long-delayed one.

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CHAPTER IV

RECOMMENDATIONS

The items of equipment requested by the Burmese were reviewed in detail by the Survey Team with the Inspector-General of Police and his top advisors as well as with the Secretary and other officials of the Home Ministry. The Team was informed that the lists had gone through three earlier reviews, and had been accordingly pruned, as part of the normal Burmese Government budgetary process. The lists were further revised somewhat by the Burmese after their reviews with the Survey Team. Proposed distribution, use, and maintenance were discussed with the Team in detail, with particular reference to the problems posed by Burma's mountainous terrain, water barriers, and lack of adequate roads.

A number of the items listed, e.g., band equipment and music, some of the uniform requests, and some of the police laboratory supplies, fall either into the category of luxuries or into that of goods which are perhaps not appropriately supplied by the United States in its general aid programs. Nevertheless, it is the consensus of the Team that in essence the equipment listed constitutes a realistic estimate of the needs of the Burma Police establishment if the police are to cope successfully with the multitude of problems confronting them in maintaining internal security and political stability.

Discussions were held on the professional police level as to the general Burmese attitude toward technical training. The Team understands that the Embassy has also discussed this aspect of a possible U.S. police program with higher levels of the Government of the Union of Burma and has reported the substance of the Burmese views to the Department of State. It is apparent that within certain limitations the Burmese Government would welcome training of its police officers under American auspices in the United States or elsewhere and would welcome the presence in Burma of short-term technical advisors from the United States.

With these considerations in mind the Survey Team recommends:

- I. That the United States enter into an agreement with the Government of the Union of Burma whereby the U.S. would furnish Burma, on either a loan or a grant basis, certain amounts of police equipment over a period of three to four years and in accordance with the ability of the Burmese police establishment effectively to use and maintain the equipment furnished;
- II. That priority should be given to transportation and communications equipment;
- III. That transportation equipment consisting substantially of the kinds of equipment listed should be provided as soon as possible, with priority being given to jeeps, trucks, motorcycles, vans and watercraft. (The Burma

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Civil Police maintain 178 "riverine" stations out of a total of 354 police stations in Burma proper. This means that half of the Civil Police field posts have a responsibility for policing area adjacent to waterways. The UMP is basically a paramilitary force utilized for police support in combatting insurgency and dacoity. It has not the same fixed responsibility for patrolling stretches of Burma's system of internal waterways. The Survey Team, therefore, believes that if distributive priorities are established, the Civil Police request for watercraft should have precedence over that of the UMP although it does not believe that a loan or grant should be made conditional on Burmese acceptance of these priorities);

IV. That communications equipment consisting substantially of the items listed be provided;

V. That, however, before such communications equipment is ordered, a competent telecommunications specialist conduct an appropriate study in Burma, develop plans for a police communications net, and prepare specifications for the items needed;

VI. That the services of a telecommunications specialist be included in any contract for communications equipment for the purpose of supervising its installation and instructing Burmese personnel in its operation and maintenance and that satisfactory arrangements be made for similar assistance in the care of other complex equipment;

VII. That in the field of communications priority similarly be given to the needs of the Civil Police, and the Union Military Police, over those of the Rangoon Police, but that, again, such priorities not be made conditions of the loan or grant;

VIII. That a portion of the requested laboratory equipment be provided;

IX. That a firm offer be made to the Burmese Government, if possible prior to the conclusion of the agreement referred to in Recommendation I, to provide participant training for 10 to 12 selected police officials in the United States and approximately the same number in the Philippine Constabulary School or other suitable guerrilla warfare training establishment;

X. That if the United States Government should approve a police program along the general lines recommended by the Survey Team, the appropriate agencies of the Government bear in mind that the present opportunity for political advantage will be lost unless we can respond to the Burmese request promptly and flexibly with a substantial program and not a token one.

XI. That if a program is approved a Chief Police Technician be assigned to the ICA staff in Burma for an indefinite period of time to assist in effective implementation and operation of the program and as the need

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develops and the Burmese are willing to utilize their specialized assistance, other police specialists be made available for periods of time necessary to accomplish specific objectives.

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CHAPTER V

PROPOSED BURMA PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

Following is an estimate of the cost of a proposed Public Safety Program for the Burma Civil Police phased out over a three-year period. Boats are not included.

This is based on the requirements of the police by priority in maintaining internal security and their ability to assimilate, utilize and maintain the equipment.

Communications and transportation equipment should have first priority. It will be noted that most of the communications equipment is included in FY 58; first, because it should be first priority; second, because it comprises a complete communications net and should all be included in one project; third, the lead time caused by inability of manufacturers to make prompt delivery will be considerable (probably 18 months after a contract is awarded); and fourth, because of the time required to install the equipment and train personnel in its operation and maintenance. Transportation equipment (trucks, jeeps, motor vehicles, motorcycles and bicycles) which is of equal importance is phased out into an equal amount in FY 58 and FY 59 with a smaller amount in FY 60 in accordance with the ability of the Burma Police to assimilate, utilize and maintain it.

This equipment can probably be procured and delivered in a much shorter time than the communications and will provide the police with a degree of mobility which is extremely important in coping with the present chaotic conditions in Burma.

Many parts of the country are accessible only by water transportation and a considerable number of boats (approximately 265) are needed by the police. However, because of the cost involved and the lack of factual knowledge as to the availability of the type of boats needed, it is suggested that a program for other requirements be initiated as soon as possible and that the problem of boats be held in abeyance pending further checking into possibilities of their availability and cost. It should be noted that the possibility that the boats required by the police may be overlapping Navy requirement or function is erroneous. The type of boats required and their utilization is in no way comparable to any naval requirements or operations.

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FY 58

U. S. Technicians.....	\$ 35,000
Participant Training.....	72,000
Commodities:	
Communications Equipment.....	950,000
Transportation Equipment consisting of trucks, jeeps, motorcycles and bicycles.....	1,500,000
Equipment for motor vehicle repair and maintenance.....	100,000
Uniforms and miscellaneous personal equipment such as helmets, mess kits, mosquito nets, blankets, first aid kits, foul weather gear, etc.	<u>260,000</u>
Total FY 58	\$ 2,917,000

FY 59

U.S. Technicians.....	\$ 50,000
Participant Training.....	80,000
Commodities:	
Communications Equipment.....	100,000
Transportation Equipment consisting of trucks, jeeps, motorcycles.....	1,500,000
Equipment for motor vehicle repair and maintenance.....	50,000
Crime Laboratory Equipment.....	15,000
Uniforms and miscellaneous personal equipment such as helmets, mess kits, mosquito nets, blankets, first aid kits, foul weather gear, etc.	<u>260,000</u>
Total FY 59	\$ 2,055,000

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FY 60.

U. S. Technicians.....	\$	50,000
Participant Training.....		80,000
Commodities:		
Communications Equipment.....		50,000
Transportation Equipment - trucks.....		800,000
Laboratory Equipment.....		15,000
Uniforms and miscellaneous personal equipment.....		<u>150,000</u>
Total FY 60		\$ 1,145,000

Total 3 year program exclusive of boats:

FY 58	\$ 2,917,000
FY 59	2,055,000
FY 60	<u>1,145,000</u>
	\$ 6,117,000

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CHAPTER VI

HISTORY OF THE BURMA POLICE

A. THE BRITISH OCCUPATION

The British occupation of Burma was carried out in three stages. In 1824, after the First Anglo-Burmese War, Lower Burma was annexed by Britain. A part of Central Burma was annexed in 1854 following the Second Anglo-Burmese War. Total annexation of Burma was completed in 1885 after the Third Anglo-Burmese War. Although the British had achieved the political subjugation of the country, the remnants of the Burmese Army scattered into small bands, continued guerrilla operations against the British and subsisted by pillage and robbery. The British attempted to restore law and order through the use of Indian troops, but by 1887 had come to realize that the continuing employment of military elements for civil police duty was relatively ineffective. The British began the recruitment of Burmese police and, in 1891, established the Burma Police Force. The sepoys who had been used for police duty were formed into a paramilitary body known as the Burma Military Police.

The Police Act placed the control of the Burma Police under the Governor and the administration of the police under an Inspector General of Police. The Burma Police Force was comprised of the Civil Police and the Military Police. The Civil Police were composed of:

1. The District Police
2. The Village Police
3. The Railway Police
4. The Criminal Investigation Department
5. The Training Schools

The Burma Military Police, controlled by the DIG/UMP, was organized into Garrison Battalions and Frontier Battalions. The force was essentially a military organization, extremely mobile and reasonably equipped. In matters of training, discipline and internal economy, the systems used by the Army were followed as closely as possible. In 1937, on the administrative separation of India and Burma, the Garrison Battalions were placed under the Inspector General of Police, in the Home Department, while the Frontier Battalions became the Frontier Force under its own Inspector General. The Frontier Force was placed under the administrative control of the Defense Department. This organization remained with few changes until World War II.

B. JAPANESE OCCUPATION

During the Japanese occupation of Burma from 1942 until 1945, the Japanese interfered little with the organization and administration of the police. A Japanese Advisor was placed in the office of the Inspector General

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and some modifications were made in the laws. A majority of the force cooperated with the occupation authorities in maintaining civil order. The Military Police was absorbed into the Army in 1942 and lost its identity, although some members of the UMP and the Civil Police had enlisted in the British Army and formed the backbone of the 7th Burma Rifles.

C. BRITISH MILITARY AND CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

On British reoccupation of Burma in 1945, the Burma Police were placed under the British Military Administration as a branch of the Civil Affairs Service (Burma). There was no alteration in the pre-war organization except that the position of Police Station Officer was upgraded to that of Police Station Inspector. The British Military Administration was terminated in late 1945 and Civil Administration resumed.

The new Police Act of 1945 came into force with the resumption of Civil Government. The responsibility for the preservation of law and order was again vested in the Governor with the administration of the police delegated to the Inspector General of Police. Also in 1945, the British organized the Burma Army Police and the Burma Frontier Constabulary, each under a separate Deputy Inspector General, and which were counterparts, respectively, of the former Burma Military Police and the Burma Frontier Force.

D. UNDER INDEPENDENCE

Burma attained her independence on January 4, 1948. The Police Act of 1945 was amended to provide that the power formerly vested in the Governor now rested with the President of the Union of Burma. In 1948 the Burma Army Police and Burma Frontier Constabulary were merged into the Union Military Police under a Deputy Inspector General. In addition to changes in the basic organization of the police, the amended Act provided for the creation of an organization known as the Public Property Protection Police Bureau of Investigation, under the control of the Public Property Protection Committee, and administered by the Deputy Inspector General, CID. This Bureau was responsible for the investigation of all crimes affecting public property, including foreign exchange violations, bribery, and corruption. In September, 1951, the Bureau was renamed the Bureau of Special Investigation and was placed directly under the control of the Prime Minister.

With the outbreak of insurgency in 1949, it was found that the regular police force was inadequate to cope with the problem and that additional manpower was required. The Special Police Reserves were created by virtue of Section 27 of the 1945 Police Act. These Reserves are trained in guerrilla fighting and are equipped with arms from the police stores. They are under the supervision of the IGP but are attached as striking forces to the District Defense Commands. In December 1955 it became apparent to the Government that yet additional forces were necessary to combat insurgency, and the

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Pyusawhtis were organized to meet the situation. This is a volunteer force formed chiefly through the integration of Village Defense units. Originally, each man was paid K5* for each day of duty; however, somewhat later the rate of pay was established at K90 per month. The Pyusawhtis serve as static defense forces and as striking forces cooperating with the Civil Police, the UMP and the Army.

Traditionally, Burma had been divided into three ranges for the purpose of police administration. The growth of insurgency and crimes of violence in the Northern Range, which encompassed Northern and Central Burma, made effective supervision of police activities by a single man difficult if not impossible. On July 7, 1950, the Central Range was created from the central portion of the Northern Range and was placed under the supervision of a Deputy Inspector General. Although this action was taken as a temporary measure, the continuing high incidence of crime and insurgency has resulted in the retention of the fourth range.

*NOTE: The official rate of exchange is 4.7 Kyats per U.S. \$

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CHAPTER VII

CIVIL POLICE

The Civil Police Forces of Burma, excluding the Union Military Police, are composed of the Burma Civil Police, Special Police Reserves, Pyusawhtis, State Police Forces and Chin Hills, and the Rangoon Police.

Collectively and within their prescribed jurisdictions, they are responsible for preservation of law and order, prevention and investigation of crime, and all other activities relating to enforcement of civil laws and maintenance of internal security normally performed by civil police. The Union Military Police may be called upon for assistance when the civil police are unable to cope with the situation alone.

The organizational structure follows the British Colonial pattern to a great extent, and with a few exceptions appears to be reasonably adequate. The state officials have considerable control over operations of the police forces within their boundaries, with administrative guidance and training of personnel by the National Police.

Based on limited observation of personnel and visits to the Civil Police Training School at Mandalay, Range Headquarters at Maymyo, District Headquarters at Maubin and the Rangoon Police Training School at Insein, the training appeared to be reasonably adequate, although there is apparent need for additional emphasis on public relations, investigation and patrol techniques.

A review of authorized personnel strength and distribution indicates that the present authorized strength is sufficient to cope with the problems if properly trained and equipped. Once adequate equipment is provided and the organized insurgent and dissident groups are pacified the number could probably be reduced to some extent.

Lack of communication and transportation facilities presents a serious handicap to dissemination of information, coordinated operations, reporting and mobility essential to efficient operations.

The Team was favorably impressed with the quality of the ranking officers contacted and their sincerity and apparent determination to restore law and order, maintain internal security and preservation of the independence of the country.

A. POLICE ORGANIZATION

The Burma Police are organized under the Ministry of Home Affairs and consist of the Burma Civil Police, the Union Military Police (UMP), the

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Rangoon Police, the Special Police Reserves and the Pyusawhtis. (See organization chart on Page 36.) In addition, a Kachin State, Karen State, Shan State and the Chin Hills Special Division maintain autonomous forces responsible to the Head of the State and, in the Chin Hills Division, to the Commissioner. There are also small residual Village Defense units which are being integrated into the Pyusawhtis but are now employed in static village defense.

The total authorized strength of these forces is approximately 66,500 men, distributed as follows:


Burma Civil Police.....	14,797 \
Special Police Reserves.....	9,954 \
Union Military Police.....	22,693 ✓
Rangoon Police.....	2,800 \
Pyusawhtis.....	12,500 \
State Police Forces and Chin Hills.....	<u>3,741 \</u>
Total.....	66,485

A complete understanding of the relationship of the police to the central Government, to the civil administration, and to the State Governments, requires a knowledge of the political and administrative structure of the Union of Burma and an appreciation of the factors which motivated the British in creating their colonial administration. Under the British the civil administrator was the fountain-head of authority, responsible for maintaining law and order, for the administration of criminal justice, for the execution of civil magisterial powers, for tax assessment, plus a variety of other administrative duties. The police were responsible to the civil administrator in matters of law enforcement policy and when an area was divided into districts, sub-divisions and townships, administrative convenience dictated that the administrative area be coterminous with the police area and that the administrator at each level have a police counterpart responsible to him for certain aspects of enforcement. Subsequent to final annexation in 1885, Britain managed to impose this system of administration on most of Central Burma (Burma "proper"), but was forced to content herself with a looser form of control in the outlying tribal states, ruled by chieftains who had acknowledged fealty to the British Crown, but who continued to administer their territories under British Colonial supervision. With independence, Burma inherited the British colonial administrative structure and continued to employ the district, sub-divisional, township and village administrative divisions found effective by the British.

The Union of Burma is comprised of a centralized political entity known as Burma "proper" and four autonomous States - Kachin, Karen, Shan, and Kayah. For purposes of administration and national defense, Burma proper is divided into eight Divisions, each under the administrative control of a Commissioner who is appointed by and is an employee of the Government of Burma. One of these eight Divisions is known as the Chin Hills Special Division. It

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ORGANIZATION - BURMA POLICE



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is a part of Burma proper and is administered by a member of the Union Government who is known as the "Minister for Chin Affairs". The Minister is aided and advised by a Chin Affairs Council composed of members of Parliament representing the Chins. This Division is not a state and does not enjoy the autonomy of a State; however, it is expected that it will ultimately attain statehood, and, in anticipation of this, it has been granted certain privileges among which is the right to maintain its own police force.

The responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in Burma proper is vested in the Minister of Home Affairs. His responsibility for Burma proper, exclusive of Rangoon municipality, is delegated to an Inspector General of Police (IGP), who administers two forces - the Burma Civil Police and the Union Military Police. Rangoon is policed by the Rangoon Police, headed by a Commissioner of Police who is directly responsible to the Home Minister in operational matters and to the IGP for personnel. These regular police forces are augmented by the Special Police Reserves and the Pyusawhtis, organized along paramilitary lines and responsible to the IGP for recruitment, training, pay, equipment and logistical support, but to the District Defense Commands for operational deployment.

Each State retains the right to maintain public order within its boundaries and may administer its own police forces and establish machinery for the administration of criminal justice. The administration of State affairs is the responsibility of the Head of the State who is appointed by the President from among the State representatives in Parliament. The Head of the State may authorize the recruitment and training of a state police establishment and may enlist the assistance of the IGP in assigning personnel to the state and in exercising supervision over the personnel until such time as the Head of the State shall believe the State force is competent to handle law enforcement within the State without the assistance of the federal government. At the moment, Karen State, Kachin State, and Shan State have their own police forces, independent of the Burma Civil Police but officered by personnel seconded to the State forces from the Burma Police. The central government has exclusive authority for national defense throughout the Union, and since insurgency, subversion and infiltration are considered aspects of this problem, the UMP and the Special Branch of the Civil Police maintain posts in the States as well as in Burma proper.

The problems of national defense are handled at top government level by a National Defense Council composed of Defense Minister, Home Minister, and chaired by the Prime Minister. Internal security is the responsibility of a subordinate group, the National Defense Executive Committee, composed of the Chief Secretary, Inspector General of Police, the G.S.1 of the Army, the Secretary of Defense and the Parliamentary Secretaries of Defense and Home Affairs, and chaired by the Home Minister. In each of the eight Divisions there is a Divisional Security Committee, chaired by the Civil Commissioner. The Deputy Inspector General of Police for the Range in which the Division lies, the Battalion Commander of the UMP forces and the Commander of any Army units assigned within the Division are the other members of the Committee.

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Subordinate political jurisdictions have Security Committees with the same agency composition but with representation drawn from the appropriate administrative stratum.

For police administrative purposes, Burma has been divided into four Ranges - the Northern, Western, Southern and Central. These are purely artificial administrative divisions with no territorial relationship to Divisional or District boundaries. The Delta, Arakan Divisions and the southern tip of the Chin Hills Special Division form the Western Range. The Southern Range is formed by the area starting with the Frome and Toungoo Districts and stretching south to include the Tenasserim Division. The Central Range is formed from the Thayetmyo and Maitthila Districts. The Northern Range is formed from the Katha and Sagaing Districts, the northern part of the Chin Hills Division, the Shan and Kachin States and the Naga Hills. The disparities in the size of the ranges is due to the relative crime problems and the density of population. The police Range is not an operational territorial unit, but represents a grouping of Districts for administrative purposes. The DIG of the Range has a staff rather than a command relationship to the several DSPs in his area of responsibility. He inspects the District establishments and makes recommendations on operational matters. He is delegated authority by the IGP for the management of non-gazetted personnel in his Range - chiefly, in the fields of transfers, promotions and discipline. The DIG of each Range has under his control a Flying Squad which he may assign to a critical area within the Range for temporary duty to assist in handling a problem too great to be met with the forces regularly assigned to that area.

The basic administrative unit is the District - basic in that the civil administrative district and the police district are coterminous; that at this level there appears to be the closest cooperation between government functionaries; that this unit appears to enjoy the greatest freedom from higher control, yet exercises the greatest control over subordinate political units. There are 33 Districts in Burma proper (excluding the Chin Hills Special Division) and 10 Districts in the four states and the Chin Hills Division. The District Commissioner is the chief administrative officer of the District. He is also District Magistrate and, in this dual capacity, is responsible for law and order within the district. He is chairman of the District Security Committee. However, the Committee chairmanship may devolve upon the Army Commander or UMP Commander, depending upon the district security situation. The police are under the command of a District Superintendent of Police who is responsible for police management within the district. The DSP confers with and takes guidance from the Deputy Commissioner in policy matters and looks to the DIG/Range for supervision in personnel matters and in the maintenance of equipment, however, he is the man who decides how to handle a specific police problem. If the DSP wishes an increase in personnel he looks to the DIG/Range. If he wants repairs made to a station house, he makes the request direct to the IGP. The several DSPs interviewed by the Survey Team during its study conveyed the impression that they received few instructions relative to operations, either from the District Commissioners or the DIGs;

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that they were the ultimate authority for routine operations. Decisions affecting combined operations of police, UMP and Army units will normally be made by the District Defense Committee on which each of the services is represented.

The Districts are divided into two or more Sub-Divisions. In each of these a Sub-divisional Officer is responsible for civil administration and a Sub-divisional Police Officer for law enforcement. The Sub-divisions are divided into two or more Townships. Here again, we find a parallel relationship between the Township Officer who is responsible for civil administration and the Circle Inspector of Police who may have two or more police stations under his command. The administrative parallelism ceases at this point. Although a Township may consist of a number of Village tracts, there is no police official who has responsibility for the village. Within the Township there may be several Police Stations, each under the command of a Police Station Officer.

Village tracts form the smallest administrative unit in Burma. During the period of insurgency the village has lost its historical significance as the center of Burmese cultural and social life. The interests of the village have been subordinated to those of larger political units. The paramount position of the district is the outgrowth of the need for the grouping of resources to meet the insurgent problem. The British, in attempting the pacification of Burma, placed the ultimate responsibility for law and order in the village administration, superimposing the township and district organizations as coordinating tiers between the village and the colonial Governor. One of the objectives of the present Government is to re-establish the village as the focus of the traditional Burmese way of life. A village is administered by a headman appointed by the District Commissioner after his election by the villagers. The Commissioner must appoint the successful candidate unless the election can be shown to have been fraudulent. The headman is responsible for maintaining law and order within the village; for recording births and deaths; for the collection of government revenues; and sitting with a village committee has petty magisterial and judicial powers. In Rangoon a headman is appointed by the Commissioner of Police and acts as the liaison between the people of his ward and the Police and should report to the police the presence of newcomers to the ward. He has none of the traditional duties of the village headman. The Village Headman has the authority under the Village Act to organize a volunteer Village Defense force. He can arm the force with weapons on hand; can raise funds and purchase arms; or may obtain firearms from the District Commissioner from the District stock. The Village Defense Force may be invested with special police power by the District Magistrate if the law and order situation appears to warrant such action. Such a village unit has no prescribed uniform, no organized pre-service training, and is responsible solely to the headman. Most of these Village Defense units have been absorbed into the Pyusawhtis but some still exist in remote areas and are employed for static village defense.

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B. PERSONNEL

From 1885, the date of the final annexation of Burma, until 1937, Burma was administered as a province of India. During this period top civil administration was in the hands of a group of civil servants known as the Indian Civil Service (ICS). Men filling the top police positions were members of the Imperial Police Service (IPS). Most of the higher positions in both services were filled with British nationals, however, stiff competitive examinations were held periodically and a very few highly qualified Burmese were selected for these services. Lower civil service positions were filled principally by native Burmese who were members of the Burma Civil Service (BCS) and the Burma Police Service (BPS).

The Government of Burma Act was enacted in 1935 and became effective in 1937. Burma was separated from India and the civil service structure was revamped. Members of the ICS and the IPS became members of the Burma Civil Service and were converted to BCS and BPS Class I status. Those who had been members of the old Burma Civil Service were designated as BCS or BPS Class II. This system of classification was followed until independence when the class distinctions were abolished.

Today all regular members of the Burma Civil Police are members of the Burma Police Service. All positions within the Service fall into two categories - gazetted and non-gazetted. There are three grades of gazetted personnel - Senior Administrative, Selection Grade, and Senior Branch. All non-gazetted personnel fill Junior Branch posts. The following is a list of grades, positions and salaries:

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>SALARY</u>
Gazetted	Senior Administrative	Inspector General	K1600
		Deputy Inspector General	K1300
Gazetted	Selection Grade	District Superintendent	K800-50-1200
Gazetted	Senior Branch	Deputy Superintendent	K350-25-700
Non-gazetted	Junior Branch	Inspectors	K200-10-300
		Sub-inspectors	K110-10-200
		Station Writers	K70-5-110
		Head Constables	K50-2-60
		Constables	K40-1-50

In addition to their pay, police personnel are given (a) conveyance allowances, (b) compensatory local allowances, (c) housing allowances (in cases where no quarters are provided), (d) uniform allowances (non-gazetted personnel receive free issue uniforms, gazetted officers receive allowances), and (e) travel allowances.

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The educational requirement for appointment to a gazetted post is graduation from a recognized university and for appointment as sub-inspector, graduation certificate from primary school or a matriculation certificate in the secondary schools. The age requirement for gazetted personnel is 21 to 28 years and for non-gazetted personnel 18 to 25 years.

Appointment to command and supervisory positions may be made through outside recruitment or by promotion from the ranks, subject to certain restrictions. The Inspector General of Police must be appointed from the eligible Deputy Inspectors General or District Superintendents of Police. Appointments to these posts are made by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Appointments to the rank of District Superintendent of Police are made by the Inspector General with the concurrence of the Public Service Commission. Deputy Superintendents of Police are appointed from an eligible list or from the Inspectors of Police with the proviso that 50% of all appointments must be made from within the department. Inspectors are appointed by the Inspector General upon recommendation of the District Superintendents and the Deputy Inspectors General. Sixty-seven percent of the appointments must be through promotion. Five percent may be from among department clerks. In the case of Sub-Inspectors of Police, 50% must be appointed through promotion while the other 50% may be acquired through outside recruitment.

Each police employee is entitled to annual leave amounting to 1/11 of his total duty time. Those appointed prior to October 1, 1934, may accumulate leave without limit but those appointed subsequent to that date may accumulate no more than four months of leave.

The Burma Police Service has a retirement system which is wholly supported by the Government. Retirement is mandatory at age 55 except that in certain circumstances a waiver may be obtained permitting an employee to work an additional two years. The pension is based on the number of years of service divided by 70 provided that the employee has at least 25 years of service. The formula is modified if he has worked fewer than 25 years. The pension is based on his average salary for the last three years of service. In addition an employee receives a lump sum bonus equal to his salary for the last fifteen months of service. There is a provision that a man may be forced to retire for the good of the service. If he has had more than ten years of service at the time of retirement he will receive some pension.

See Page 42 for a listing of authorized strength and distribution of Civil Police and Special Police Reserves.

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AUTHORIZED STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF CIVIL POLICE AND
SPECIAL POLICE RESERVES

Head Constables	<u>Civil Police</u>	<u>Spec. Police Reserves</u>
Inspector General	1	-
Deputy Inspector General	9	-
District Superintendent	43	-
Deputy Superintendent	131	-
Inspectors	334	6
Sub-Inspector	1,815	350
Station Writers	478	-
Head Constables	1,918	528
Police Constables	10,036	9,070
Mochis (Police Constables)	32	-
Total.....	<u>14,797</u>	<u>9,954</u>

Kachin States:

District Superintendent	2	-
Deputy Superintendent	3	-
Inspector	8	-
Sub-Inspector	40	10
Station Writers	18	-
Head Constables	63	13
Police Constables	<u>402</u>	<u>242</u>
Total.....	<u>536</u>	<u>265</u>

Karen States:

District Superintendent	1	-
Deputy Superintendent	3	-
Inspector	6	-
Sub-Inspector	24	5
Station Writers	6	-
Head Constables	19	15
Police Constables	<u>214</u>	<u>206</u>
Total.....	<u>273</u>	<u>226</u>

Shan States:

District Superintendent	3	-
Deputy Superintendent	4	-
Inspector	18	-
Sub-Inspector	80	3
Station Writers	20	-
Head Constables	168	6
Police Constables	1,477	96
Mochis (Police Constables)	2	-
Total.....	<u>1,772</u>	<u>105</u>
Sub-total to be carried forward.....	<u>17,378</u>	<u>10,550</u>

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Civil Police

Spec. Police Reserves

Sub-total brought forward..... 17,378 10,550

Chin Hills-Special Division:

Deputy Superintendent.....	2	
Inspector.....	4	
Sub-Inspector.....	10	10
Station Writers.....	6	-
Head Constables.....	23	20
Police Constables.....	235	254
Total.....	280	284

GRAND TOTAL..... 17,658 10,834

Civil Police..... 17,658

Special Police Reserves..... 10,834

Total..... 28,492

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C. FUNCTIONS OF SENIOR POLICE OFFICERS

The Inspector General of Police is in command of the Police (both Civil and Military) with the exception of the Rangoon City Police. The responsibility for the command of the force, its recruitment, discipline, internal economy and administration is vested in the Inspector General of Police. He is responsible for its direction and control, for its efficiency in the investigation and prevention of crime, and the preservation of law and order, and for advising the Government in all matters connected with it.

The Deputy Inspector General of Police (Administration) acts as the second in command to the IGP. Usually the most senior officer among the DIGs is appointed as the DIG (Admin). Although the post is shown under that of Functional, the DIG (Admin) also has territorial duties of supervision.

The Assistant Inspector General of Police holds the rank of a District Superintendent of Police. He acts as an assistant to the DIG (Admin).

The Personal Assistant to the IGP holds the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police. This post is generally reserved for promotion from the clerical staff of the Office of the IGP.

The Principal of the Police Training College holds the rank of DIG. He is responsible for the training of cadet Superintendents of Police, cadet Inspectors of Police, cadet Sub-Inspectors of Police and Recruit Police Constables. He is also responsible for the recurrent training of Sub-Inspectors of Police. With the Four Year Plan the Principal of the Police Training College has been given additional duties of training Special Police Reserves and Administrative courses for Head Constables and Station Writers. As such the Principal of the Training College is called the DIG (Training).

D. EQUIPMENT

1. Statement of Equipment In Use/In Hand by the Civil Police.

<u>Motor Vehicles:</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Serviceable</u>	<u>Non-Serviceable</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Jeep, 3/4 ton	55	19	36	Out of 19 serviceable, 9 were procured in 1952 and are therefore likely to become unserviceable in a year or two.
Pick-up Van	30	30	0	-----

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	<u>Total</u>	<u>Serviceable</u>	<u>Non-Serviceable</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
2 ton Truck	15	-	15	---
3 ton Truck	60	60	-	These 60 were procured in 1953 and likely to be un-serviceable in 1-2 years.
3 ton Prison Van.	14	12	2	These 12 were procured in 1953 and likely to be un-serviceable in 1-2 years.
15 Cwt. Truck	65	-	65	---
Motorcycles, 350 cc	65	65	-	---
Bicycles	3000	1500	1500	1500 serviceable purchased and issued in 1956. Due to continuous use will probably become un-serviceable in another year.
<u>Water Craft:</u>				
U. B. Type	11	11	-	
B. Type	2	2	-	
E. Type	2	2	-	
F. Type	5	5	-	
L. Type	11	11	-	
D. Type	1	1	-	
Out-Board Motors	8	8	-	Police own.
Country Boats	3	3	-	Police own.

NOTE: These Water Craft, with the exception of 8 out-board motors and 3 country boats belong to the Nautical and Marine Department, Government of the Union of Burma, Rangoon and were allotted to Police Force.

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2. Statement of Equipment to be Procured Under Four Year Law and Order Plan
By Civil Police.

<u>Wireless Sets and Equipment:</u>	<u>Total Required</u>
Transmitter, complete with receiver - 200 to 250 watts	12
Transmitter, complete with receiver - 25 to 50 watts	86
Army wireless set, complete station, 10 to 20 watts	110
Battery, 6 volts, high type, 19 plates	784
Battery charging engine, 500 watts, D.C., patrol driven	153

NOTE: Spare parts to be purchased at 10% of the total value of above wireless sets and equipment.

Wireless saloon cars, complete (very high frequency)	10
Control Stations for above wireless cars	3

Motor Vehicles:

Trucks, 3/4 ton Weapons Carrier, 4 X 4	266
(Spare parts for above trucks to be worked out at 25% of the total value of trucks.)	
Jeeps, 4 X 4 (Cross Country cars)	45

Tear Gas Equipment:

Respirators	48
Gas Gun	24
1 1/2" Cal. Spedeheat Projectile (CN)	48
1 1/2" Cal. Spedeheat Projectile (DM)	36
1 1/2" Cal. Fliterite Projectile (CN)	48
1 1/2" Cal. Fliterite Projectile (DM)	36
Instantaneous Grenades (CN)	72
Instantaneous Grenades (DM)	48
Triple Chaser Grenades (CN)	72
Triple Chaser Grenades (DM)	48

Armored car, complete with arms and accessories (Scout car class) (Manuverable in narrow street, armed with Bren Gun), sufficient armor plating to prevent small arms fire	29
---	----

Water Craft:

Launches (troop carriers), to carry about 20 personnel, excluding crew. Twin screw, Diesel engine; cruising speed about 10 knots; shallow draft, about 2'9" to 3' - Steel Hull	120
Launches, to carry about 15 personnel excluding crew and with cabin for officers. Same as above.	59

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Total
Required

Launches, Estuary type, sea-going Patrol Boats with cabin for officers, twin screw, Diesel Engine, cruising speed about 10 to 12 knots. Steel Hull.

15

Uniforms and miscellaneous personal equipment such as helmets, mess kits, mosquito nets, blankets, first aid kits, foul weather gear, etc.

E. THE CID

The Criminal Investigation Department is commanded by a Deputy Inspector General of Police. It is located at Insein, about ten miles north-west of Rangoon. The quarters of the CID are of better construction and are better maintained than any other police quarters visited by the Survey Team.

The organization chart on Page 48 depicts the structure of the CID, which is divided into four bureaus - Administration (See Page 49), Railway Police (See Page 50), Crime (See Page 51), and Scientific (See Page 52). The total authorized strength of the CID is 1,133 of all ranks. Two-hundred and thirty-seven men are attached to the CID proper; 863 to the Railway Police; and 33 to the Detective School.

The CID is a centralized force with no personnel regularly attached to the Districts. It handles the investigation of major crime on the request of the police district or when ordered by the Government.

The following is a summary of the responsibilities of each of the four bureaus of the CID.

1. Administration Bureau.

This Bureau handles the appointment and transfer of personnel; pay and allowances; issue of clothing; and other support activities. It is under the command of a Deputy Superintendent of Police who is assisted by a staff of Inspectors, Sub-Inspectors and Station Writers.

2. Railway Police Bureau.

The Railway Police are responsible for guarding trains and rights-of-way and for the investigation of crimes occurring on moving trains or on railway property.


3. Crime Bureau.

This Bureau is responsible for the investigation of the following crimes:

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CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT
(Insein, Burma)




NOTE: For details of Crime Section, Railway Police, Scientific Section and Administration see organizations Charts on Pages 49, 50, 51 and 52.

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
ORGANIZATION CHART - CRIME SECTION



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
ORGANIZATION CHART - RAILWAY POLICE



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
ORGANIZATION CHART - SCIENTIFIC SECTION



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ORGANIZATION CHART - ADMINISTRATION SECTION



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- (a) Murder and other major crimes.
- (b) Forgery of Government currency or notes.
- (c) Counterfeiting of coins.
- (d) Theft of Government arms and ammunition and illicit arms trade.
- (e) White slave trade.
- (f) Arson for insurance.
- (g) Fraudulent civil suits.
- (h) Theft or loss of registered mail.
- (i) Important cases with political ramifications and cases involving the integrity of the District Police.

The Crime Bureau maintains the following records:

- (a) Case records of CID investigations.
- (b) Statistics for the whole of Burma on the nine major crimes.
- (c) Crime maps based on statistics.

The Crime Bureau publishes the fortnightly Police Crime Gazette and exchanges information with the International Criminal Police Organization.

4. Scientific Bureau.

This Bureau is responsible for the scientific examination and identification of evidence; for police photography and sound recording; for the maintenance of criminal records and fingerprint files; and for the administration of the Detective Training School.

5. The Major Fingerprint Files.

The CID uses a locally developed modification of the Henry System. It has approximately 100,000 prints on file. The number is not increasing due to the practice of destroying the prints of a one-time offender if he has not been re-arrested within seven years and those of a repeated offender if he has not been re-arrested within 10 years. The Bureau has a second file containing the prints of 90,000 Government employees. Burma has begun the fingerprinting of all Government employees and to date has processed less than half the total number. Ultimately, there are expected to be 200,000 prints on file in this category, unless the Armed Forces are included, in which case the number will

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be greater yet. The Bureau has a small file of single prints using the Battley System of classification. In Burma an offender is not fingerprinted on arrest. If he is convicted he is printed by a fingerprint officer attached to the Office of the Magistrate and the prints are sent to the CID for classification and filing.

b. Criminal Records.

The CID maintains a file of the criminal records for the whole of Burma. The file is indexed alphabetically. CID investigations are kept in a separate file, are logged chronologically, and are neither indexed nor referenced in the master index. Records of CID investigations are maintained for a year, after which they are transferred to dead storage.

c. Detective School.

The Scientific Bureau serves as a center for advanced training in police work. The Detective School conducts two courses simultaneously. One course is in modern methods of criminal investigation; the other is a fingerprint course. Each course is of three months' duration and at the conclusion of one course another is begun.

F. CID-EQUIPMENT

1. Forensic Science Laboratory - Equipment Now in Use.

<u>Amount</u>	<u>Item and Remarks</u>
1	Microscopes; Vernier, Correct to .02 m/m; serviceable
1	Microscope; Comparison; for very small objects only; serviceable
1	Microscope; Monocular and binocular interchangeable; transmitted incident and polarized light and dark field, 100 (10X); serviceable
1	Microscopes; Stereo; 2X, 4X and 6X; serviceable
1	Microscope; Binocular; wide field=59mm (10X); serviceable
1	Projector; Box type; to view fingerprints and documents; serviceable
1	Microscope accessories; Spot lights; 6 volts, 5 amps., A.C.; unserviceable
1	Ultra-violet lamp; Hanovia; portable; 150 watts; serviceable
1	Ultra-violet lamp; Hanovia; standard; 300 watts; serviceable
2	Balance; analytical; serviceable
1	Balance; physical; serviceable
2	Recorder; tape; for recording and conversations only; models out of date, spares not available for repair
	Chemical laboratory equipment; glass and porcelain wares; assorted; limited quantity
1	Duplicating machine, electric; Offset Photo typing and drawing; to print 14" x 20"; serviceable; acquired recently
1	Cine Projector; 16mm; sound and silent with interchangeable lens; serviceable; can be used for another year

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2. Forensic Science Laboratory - Equipment Requirements.

<u>Amount</u>	<u>Item and Remarks</u>
1	Microscope; Comparison; for bullets and cartridges
1	Microscope; Universal
1	Microscope; Metallurgical; for ore dressing and analysis
1	Microscope; low-power binocular; general purpose
1	Microscope; Stereo binocular; general purpose
1	Microscope; Special Document; table large enough to accommodate large documents
1	Microscope; Comparison; Tintometer type to compare ink colors, w/full
1	Microtome; Base and Sledge Rotary, 1 each, standard w/freezing attachment
1	Microtome; Base sledge; Standard with freezing attachment
1	Microtome; Rotary; Standard with freezing attachment
1	Camera; Micrographic and Macrographic; to take 5"x4" plate
1	Refractometer; for solids; for stones Refractive Index ranging from 1.3 to 1.75
1	Refractometer; for liquids; Microscope and thin film type
1	X-Ray apparatus; medium size
1	Fluoroscope, portable; to examine document closely
1	Introscope, standard; to view gun barrels and insides of closed vessels
4	Recorder, tape; for ordinary as well as telephone conversations
1	Ultra-violet Units, portable; to operate on 230 volt A.C.
1	Ultra-violet Unit, double wave length; to operate on 230 volt A. C.
1	Constant deviation spectroscope; for qualitative and quantitative work
2	Laboratory Van; King size, fully equipped
1	Analytical and Standard Research Chemical Laboratory equipment; large enough for six persons working simultaneously
2	Cinema Projector, portable; 16mm, sound and silent

3. Pathological Laboratory - Equipment Requirements.

1	Microtome; Rotary; standard with peering attachment
1	Microtome; Base sledge; standard with peering attachment
1	Incubator
2	Sterilizers
1	Microscope; research
1	Microscope; comparison
1	Microscope; Stereo binocular
1	Micro photo unit
1	Absorption meter
2	Balance, analytical
	Glassware, general laboratory
1	Frigidaire
1	X-Ray Equipment

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4. Serology Laboratory - Equipment Requirements.

<u>Amount</u>	<u>Item and Remarks</u>
1	Frigidaire
2	Microscope; Stereo-binocular
1	Centrifuge Machine; to extract serum
1	Mechanical Rocker; laboratory type
1	Glass Washing Machine; laboratory type

5. Technological Laboratory - Equipment Requirements.

- 1 General Laboratory Equipment and Chemicals

6. Photographic Section - Equipment Now in Use.

- 1 Copying camera fitted with all standard movements and including focusing screen and dark slide (Hunter and Penrose, England) and 18" Cooler Process Lens; 15"x12" size negative to Qr. Size. Vc. Carrier; serviceable
- 2 Field camera with tripod stands; 12"x10" size camera; serviceable for full size, as 12" size is not serviceable
- 3 Field camera with tripod for D.T.S. training; half-size camera; old; serviceable for another year
- 1 Double extension camera with 4.5 lens with shutter; quarter-size camera serviceable for another year; old and obsolete
- 1 Elmoflex camera (Japan); serviceable
- 1 "Copy-Cat" Document copying machine; can copy 16"x20" size documents; serviceable
- 1 Fingerprint camera; for quarter size film; serviceable
- 2 Enlarger made by Johnson, England, with quarter size camera with 4.5 lens; serviceable.
- 1 Gnom Brownie size carrier; camera with 4.5 lens; serviceable
- 1 Cine 16mm; w/wide angle and telephoto lens; serviceable

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7. Photographic Section - Equipment Requirements.

<u>Amount</u>	<u>Item and Remarks</u>
4	Camera; stand; to take photographs of criminals
1	Camera; microfilm; 35mm with viewer
1	Camera; photostat; to take 24"x20" originals with automatic processing appliances attached
40	Camera; press; 5"x4" with wide angle lens and flash attachment; for distribution to all District Headquarters
6	Camera; fingerprint 4 1/4" x 3 1/4"; photographs to be taken at the scene of crime
2	Camera; movie; 16mm with wide angle lens and telephoto lens
1	Camera; process; 15" x 12"; with Arc Lamp attachment and document board
4	Enlarger; vertical; 8" x 6"
12	Glazing machine; drum type; electric operation Dark Room equipment; standard
3	Film drying cabinets; steel, electric operated; to accommodate drying 20 strips of roll film at a time Color filters; full range; to cover lens 3 1/2" in diameter

8. Fingerprint Section - Equipment Now in Use.

General fingerprint appliances used are mostly local made which do not come to required standards and are likely to fall to pieces at any moment.

No latest innovations as Episcopes and magnifier with light, though essential, are used yet.

9. Fingerprint Section - Equipment Requirements.

4 dozen	Utility Fingerprint Magnifier without Reticle
4 "	Battley System Reticle
4 "	Henry System Reticle
6 "	Latent Print Brushes
1 "	Iodine Fuming pipe and silver transfer set
1 "	Fingerprint Powder Blower
1 gross	Latent Print Lifting Tape (roll)
6	Fingerprint camera
4 doz.	Magnifier with light source
6	All purpose Fingerprint kit
1 doz.	Episcopes (comparison)

10. Motor Transport Now in Use in CID and Railways.

4	Jeep, 1/4 ton; war surplus; fit to be scrapped
2	Pick-up, 1/4 ton; in use only one year
3	Trucks, 3 ton; 2 serviceable, 1 unserviceable
1	Jeep, 3/4 ton; unserviceable

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11. Motor Transport Requirements - CID, Crime, Scientific Bureaus and Railways.

<u>Amount</u>	<u>Item and Remarks</u>
2	Bus; to seat 35 persons; for Detective School students
5	Pick-up Vans; 3/4 ton; fitted with two-way radio

12. Other Equipment Requirements.

Teletypewriter set; to work with IGP's Office at Rangoon
Inter-communication system; telephone type; to work between offices
in CID
Investigating Officer's equipment boxes (portable); 50 pieces for
field officers
2 Electric Duplicating Machine; standard; to operate with wax paper
2 Contourmeter; small

G. SPECIAL BRANCH

The Special Branch was established in 1948 shortly after Burma had attained independence. It assumed the duties and responsibilities of the Intelligence Branch of the CID and those of the Burma Defense Bureau, an organization which had been created at the beginning of the Second World War for the purpose of intelligence collection concerned with the security of the country. In October 1953 the responsibilities of the Special Branch were enlarged to include the collection, collation and dissemination of external intelligence. It was asserted that the Special Branch has no personnel posted outside Burma, and that this responsibility is discharged only through debriefing legal travelers and the interrogation of illegal border crossers.

1. Duties and Responsibilities.

a. Political Intelligence.

(1) Collecting, collating and disseminating information relative to the political activities of all persons, parties and sects throughout the Union of Burma.

(2) Collecting, collating and disseminating information relative to the views, objectives and plans of foreign governments or of groups or individuals abroad as they may affect the welfare of Burma.

b. Security.

(1) Taking appropriate measures to prevent or suppress all illegal anti-governmental activity within Burma.

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(2) Taking measures, as required, to prevent the entry into Burma of persons whose presence might prove detrimental to the best interests of the state. This involves the screening of all aliens before their entry into Burma.

(3) Protective security involving a study of all defense installations and establishments vulnerable to sabotage; the formulation of plans for their protection, including the establishment of measures to deny unauthorized persons access to classified information; and continuing supervision of these protective measures.

(4) Protection of VIPs and foreign notables.

c. Espionage and Counterespionage. (The meaning of this phrase is not clear since the Chief of the Special Branch denies engaging in "espionage".)

d. Anti-sabotage.

e. Countersubversion.

f. Suppression of Smuggling of Drugs, Narcotics and Arms.

g. Loyalty Investigation of Government Employees.

2. Organization.


The Special Branch has an authorized strength of 650 in all ranks. Its actual strength is about 600. The Special Branch maintains a headquarters in Rangoon, in the Secretariat of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Approximately half its staff is assigned to the Rangoon area. A Sub-headquarters is located in Mandalay to which some 60 men are assigned. In addition, the Special Branch maintains ten posts and a number of outposts in critical border areas. The number of outposts varies with the internal security situation in an area. At present there are 33 outposts. The distribution of outposts, particularly in North Burma, coincides with the concentration of UMP forces. The 10th, 11th and 12th UMP Battalions are stationed at Myitkyina, Bhamo and Lashio, respectively. The Burma-China border, from a point adjacent to Myitkyina to a point near Kunlong, is covered by ten UMP section outposts. This is the area of Communist Chinese incursion and is the only stretch of border so thoroughly patrolled. Akyan, in Southwestern Burma, is the center of the Pakistani Moslem insurgency. This accounts for five Special Branch outposts in this area.

The Special Branch has four major organizational components. These are the Administration Section, the Legal Section, Special Branch I and Special Branch II. (See Organization Chart on Page 60.)

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ORGANIZATION - SPECIAL BRANCH



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3. Personnel.

The Special Branch enjoys a preferred position in the Burma Civil Police as regards the selection of personnel. It is permitted to choose its personnel from other elements of the police and, in addition, may resort to outside recruitment. Because of its responsibility for working among the ethnic minorities and among the tribes in the border areas, it is essential that a proportion of Special Branch personnel possess special language qualifications. The technical nature of much of its work requires certain special skills. These special qualifications make recruitment difficult with the result that the Special Branch is habitually below authorized strength. It was asserted that this inability to obtain qualified personnel is responsible for the fact that Special Branch plans no expansion under the Four Year Plan.

The personnel of the Special Branch enjoy no special benefits and receive no compensation in excess of that received by a policeman of the same rank assigned to another element of the Civil Police. Purely from a financial standpoint, there is some disability attached to working in Special Branch. It is a plain clothes detail and, as there is no clothing allowance for this type of work, the individual's outlay for clothing is greater than if he were working in uniform.

4. Records.

The Special Branch maintains its own files. The Record Unit of the Administrative Division is responsible for keeping a central index, a general correspondence file, a subject file, and a dossier on each individual known to the Special Branch.

5. Reporting.

The Special Branch has the responsibility for accumulating and collating all information relative to insurgent activity. It receives reports from the Army, UMP and Civil Police concerning engagements with the insurgents, losses sustained by both sides, numbers captured, arms and ammunition captured or lost, etc. This information constitutes the first part of "Situation" report prepared by Special Branch. The second section deals with political intelligence. The report is written in Burmese and is classified "Secret". It has limited distribution going only to key members of the Government.

The Special Branch prepares a weekly report which has wider dissemination. This report is essentially a summary of the most significant items in the daily situation reports. It also is classified "Secret" but is sent not only to the Ministries concerned with the problem of internal security, but to all DSP's and UMP Battalion commanders.

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6. Communications.

The Special Branch maintains its own radio communications system which links Rangoon Headquarters with the Mandalay sub-headquarters and with Special Branch posts at Bhamo, Myitkyina, Lashio and Akyab. All transmission is C/W. Radio communication is supplemented by use of the mails. The DIG, Special Branch, said that about half the messages transmitted by radio or post were in code; that everything of a routine character was sent in clear text.

7. Training.

The Special Branch conducts its own courses of training for newly acquired personnel and conduct periodic retraining courses. Members of the force have been sent to Kuala Lumpur and Singapore for Special Branch training by the British and upon their return, have been used as instructors in the training of other members of the service.

The training is patterned after that given by the British. The length of training varies from six weeks to two months. It is believed that the training consists of a combination of classroom instruction with "on-the-job" training.

H. SPECIAL BRANCH - EQUIPMENT

1. Wireless and Monitoring - Equipment in Use.

<u>Amount</u>	<u>Item and Remarks</u>
2	Transmitter, CW/RT combined VFO/Xtal control AC working, 350 watts; 1 serviceable; 1 unserviceable - war surplus and obsolete.
2	Transmitter, CW/RT Xtal control AC working; 100 watts; serviceable
1	Transceivers; CW/RT VFO AC working; 40 watts, serviceable; obsolete
4	Transceivers; CW Xtal control AC/Bty working; 20 watts; serviceable; obsolete
5	Receivers; communication AC working; 4 serviceable, 1 unserviceable

2. Wireless and Monitoring - Equipment Requirements.

- 5 Radio receivers; communication, AC working
- 1 Direction finders; H.F. Fixed station, AC working
- 2 Direction finders; H.F. Mobile use, 6 or 12 volt vibrator or genemotor powered
- 1 Transmitter; H.F. AC working, VFO preferred, CW & RT, 250 watts output
- 5 Transceivers; H.F. 6 or 12 volt, battery powered, mobile
- 3 Radio receivers; communication type, AC working; for wireless communications

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<u>Amount</u>	<u>Item and Remarks</u>
1	Wireless V.H.F.; Control station for radio cars; 50 watts output; 100-156 mc range
1	Maintenance equipment for above sets.

3. Technical Aid to Investigation - Equipment in Use.

5	Recorder, tape 3 3/4" speed, AC working; serviceable
2	Recorder, wire (miniature), battery working; serviceable
2	Amplifiers (Speak-o-phone), battery working; serviceable
1	Epidia Scope, AC working; serviceable
2	Handie Talkies, battery working; serviceable
2	Lie Detectors, H & W; not successfully used

4. Technical Aid to Investigation - Equipment Requirements.

1	Recorder, tape, cabinet type, AC powered; for use in headquarters, complete with accessories
4	Recorder, tape, reporter type, vibrator powered with spring winding, speed 1 7/8 inch per second; mobile use
1	Speech Amplifier, H.F., AC working, 10 watt output
1	Pre-amplifier, AC working
1	Snooper-scope, vibrator powered, portable
1	X-ray, AC powered, portable
4	Microphone, small concealed type, Dynamic

NOTE: Only tropicalized equipment can be used in Burma.

5. Photographic - Equipment in Use.

3	Reflex camera, f3.5, 120; 2 serviceable, 1 unserviceable (in use since 1948)
3	Miniature camera, f3.5, 35mm; 2 serviceable, 1 unserviceable (in use since 1948)
2	Movie camera, f4.5, 16mm; serviceable - NOTE: not used for want of equipment for processing
1	Field camera, f6.3, 12"x10"; serviceable; used for copying photographic prints
1	Enlarger, f4.5, 12"x10"; serviceable
1	Enlarger, 35mm; serviceable
1	Microfilm camera with reader, 35mm; serviceable
2	Document Dupliphot, 18"x14"; serviceable
3	Document Dupliphot, 13"x8"; serviceable
1	Sub-miniature Camera, f4.5, 8mm; serviceable

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6. Photographic - Equipment Requirements.

<u>Amount</u>	<u>Item and Remarks</u>
2	Visual Surveillance devices (High speed motion picture cameras together with equipment for developing, printing and projecting) 16mm
2	Microfilm Unit complete with projector, 35mm
2	Document copying machine (which produces direct positive copies), 40"x30"
2	Infra-red lens and infra-red filter Photographic Cameras with complete unit, 4"x5"
1	Vertical Professional Enlarger for negatives carrier up to 8 1/2" x 6 1/2"

7. Transport - Equipment in Use.

10 Jeep, H.P. 15.63, 4-passenger; 4 serviceable, 6 unserviceable

2 Country jeep, 8-passenger or 2 passenger and 3/4 ton load; serviceable

8. Transport - Equipment Requirements.

2 Saloon with 10 watt VHF radio equipment, 100-156 mc range; 5 passenger

1 Van with 10 watt VHF radio equipment, 100-156 mc range; 1 1/2 ton

9. Miscellaneous - Equipment Requirements.

3 Combination lock steel cabinet (flame resistant)

1 Incinerator, electric

I. RANGOON POLICE

1. Authority and Jurisdiction.

The Rangoon Police force was established under the Rangoon Police Act of 1899. Until that date Rangoon had been policed under a Police Act which extended to the whole of Burma. The Act of 1899 was amended in 1945, and today the Rangoon Police are operating under the authority of the amended Act.

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The Rangoon Police have an exclusive responsibility for maintaining law and order within Rangoon Municipality. This is an area of some 32 square miles with a population of approximately 800,000. Thingangyun Police Station, normally attached to the Insein District, has been added at least temporarily to the Rangoon Police jurisdiction. This administrative realignment adds approximately 120 square miles and about 75,000 people to the Rangoon Police area.

2. Strength and Distribution.

The personnel of the Rangoon Police is interchangeable with that of the Burma Civil Police; however, in practice only the officers are transferred from one organization to the other, while the non-gazetted ranks remain with their parent organization and are transferred only upon the application of the member who wishes to transfer.

The authorized strength of the Rangoon Police is 2,800 officers and men. The force maintains 17 stations and 6 "outposts" or sub-stations. In addition, it has a training center, supply depot, automotive repair shop and stable which are located within the City of Rangoon.

Except for clerical personnel employed in the Office of the Commissioner and the Motor Vehicle Department, all members of the force have police status. Tailors, grooms, stable boys and auto mechanics are police constables and receive the same pay and allowances as the man assigned to point duty or patrol.

The Rangoon Police force is augmented by the attachment to it of one Battalion of the Union Military Police. The Battalion is under the command of a Commandant who is responsible to the Commissioner of Police for operational matters, but derives its administrative support from the UMP. This Battalion is used to guard the Union Bank and the Police stores; to escort government treasure, VIPs, and persons convicted of crime; to guard the President's and Premier's homes and the compound which houses the residences of the members of the Cabinet. It is used in cases of civil disturbance where the civil police are incapable of controlling the situation.

3. Duties and Responsibilities.

The Rangoon Police are responsible for the preservation of law and order and the prevention of crime. Their duties consist of the collection of intelligence for the preservation of the public peace; the apprehension of persons suspected of the commission of a crime; the regulation of processions and public assemblages; the policing of places of public resort; the recovery and protection of lost or stolen property; the protection of public property; maintenance of order in the criminal courts; escorting and guarding prisoners; the execution of warrants of arrest and the serving of summonses.

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The Rangoon Police are further responsible for the registration of all motor vehicles in Burma; the registration of all hackney carriages in Rangoon; motor vehicle inspection in Rangoon; issuance of driver's licenses and the registration of aliens. The registration of aliens is to be transferred to the Immigration Department on 1 January 1958.

4. Organization.

The Rangoon Police are under the command of a Commissioner of Police who is responsible administratively to the Minister of Home Affairs. Because of the interchangeability of gazetted personnel between the Rangoon Police and the Burma Civil Police, the Commissioner is responsible to the Inspector General of Police in matters affecting the assignment, transfer or discipline of gazetted personnel. The title "commissioner" is used only in the Rangoon Police. The position is equal in rank and emoluments to that of a Deputy Inspector General of Police.

The Commissioner of Police has the following responsibilities and duties:

- a. He has the powers of a Magistrate for preserving the peace, preventing and detecting crime, and apprehending and detaining offenders.
- b. He exercises and performs the duties of a Deputy District Commissioner under the Towns Act. He may appoint Headmen, license entertainment, cinemas, etc.
- c. He is granted power under the Arms Act to issue, cancel or suspend licenses.
- d. He has powers comparable to those of a District Magistrate permitting him to sanction prosecutions under the Arms Act.
- e. He performs the duties required of a Magistrate under the Lunacy Act.
- f. He is responsible for the appointment, promotion and assignment of all non-gazetted personnel. He has authority to suspend, reduce or remove such personnel for cause.
- g. He is ex-officio Chairman of the Board of Film Censors; is a Municipal Councillor and a member of the Construction of Buildings and Roads Committee of the Corporation of Rangoon.

A Deputy Commissioner of Police is immediately subordinate to the Commissioner. He is responsible to the Commissioner for departmental operations. Four Assistant Commissioners, as well as the UMP Commandant, report to the Deputy Commissioner. One Assistant Commissioner is responsible for Administration; one for Port Police and Traffic; one for Crime; and one for Intelligence.

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The Assistant Commissioner of Police (Administration) is assisted by the Headquarters Superintendent of Police, who heads the Clerical Establishment, and a Superintendent of Police who commands the Stores and Transport Branch. The Assistant Commissioner's principal tasks lie in the field of appointments, promotions, transfers, leaves, pensions, salaries, allowances, service records, training, stores, motor transport, licensing of firearms, public entertainments, public meetings and processions, office records, Police Band, Mounted Police and Police Reserve Unit.

The Assistant Commissioner of Police (Port Police and Traffic) is paid by the Commissioners of the Port of Rangoon. He is responsible for directing the police employed in maintaining order within the Port Area, and, in addition, supervises the Traffic Department. The Port Police are an integral part of the Rangoon Police and constitute the River Division of the force. Personnel are appointed and directed by the Commissioner of Police. Seven-eighths of the total costs of the operation of the Port Police are met by the Rangoon Port Commission; however, the Port Commissioners do not interfere in the administration of the force. In addition to policing the Rangoon Port Area, this force is responsible for policing the lower reaches of the Rangoon River from the City of Rangoon to the 12 mile limit in Gulf of Martaban - a distance of some 40 miles. For this purpose, 14 small craft of various sizes are employed. The Port Police operate the Port Police Station and two stations located on the West bank of the Rangoon River opposite Rangoon City proper. The Traffic Department is divided into a Motor Vehicle Registrations Branch and a Traffic Branch which has sub-units responsible for traffic investigation, traffic control and hackney coach regulation.

The Assistant Commissioner of Police (Crime) is responsible for handling all reported criminal cases within Rangoon City. For the purpose of administration the city is divided into four areas - the Northern, Eastern, Western and Central Divisions. A Superintendent of Police is in charge of each of the four Divisions. Fourteen of the 17 Police Stations in Rangoon are under the control of the Assistant Commissioner (Crime). Three stations are in the Northern Division; four in the Western; four in the Central; and three in the Eastern. Six "outposts" are subordinate to the Police Stations to which they are attached. Each sub-station is manned with about a dozen police who are empowered to prevent crime and make arrests but who may not initiate investigations. Any matter requiring investigation must be referred to a Police Station for action.

The Rangoon Police Radio Communications Branch is attached to the Crime Bureau and is commanded by a Superintendent of Police. Radio patrol is a responsibility of this Branch. Four radio equipped patrol cars are operated throughout three eight-hour watches. It is not clear whether any of the cars has a definite area responsibility or how much emphasis is placed on patrol. At the time that the Team visited the Radio Branch only one car was in active service. The Rangoon Police have been plagued with transmission problems and have had difficulty in maintaining mobile unit to station communication. The

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system is simplex. It is RCA/FM operating on 152 megacycles. For a time signals could be received to a distance of 20 miles. The system deteriorated rapidly and it became impossible to receive messages at a distance greater than three or four miles with any consistency. An RCA engineer checked on the equipment but failed to remedy the trouble.

All functional units have been grouped and have been placed under the command of a Superintendent of Police. He is in charge of court prosecutions, the police detention facility, the records unit, the photographic unit and a small detective unit which assists the Police Stations in investigations of a serious nature and which handles personnel investigations.

The Crime Bureau maintains a bicycle patrol, divided into two sections. One patrols the western part of the city, the other the eastern part.

The Assistant Commissioner of Police (Intelligence) is responsible for the collection of intelligence which will assist in the maintenance of law and order in Rangoon. Intelligence concerned with the security of the state is the responsibility of the Special Branch, Burma Civil Police. The Intelligence Bureau is responsible for alien registration, but will not handle this work after the first of the year. This Bureau also handles press and public relations.

5. Equipment.

A partial inventory of equipment possessed by the Rangoon Police is appended to this report. The Survey Team understood that a complete list of equipment would be prepared by the police, however, the list received is restricted to the categories of equipment requested by the police in the Four Year Plan. (See Appendix I.)

The Survey Team was given an opportunity to inspect the training site, the storerooms, the stables and the shops. It was impressed by the lack of adequate automotive equipment, the poor condition of existing equipment and the lack of facilities for repair and maintenance.

There is no program of preventive maintenance. Equipment is repaired only when it has broken down and then only those repairs are made which are necessary to put it in running condition.

The acquisition of replacement parts appears to be a major problem with the Rangoon Police. Cars are kept in running order through the cannibalization of parts from other cars of the same make and model.

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The Rangoon Police bought a dozen Ford Sedans in 1951 and three Chevrolets in 1953. Several of the Fords have been junked but a few are still serviceable. Most of the automotive equipment recently acquired has been obtained through rice barter agreements with Russia and Czechoslovakia. The Russian Pobeda is said by the police to be a sturdy vehicle, underpowered and with a tendency to burn out valves. The Czech motorbikes are underpowered but appear to be adequate mechanically.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE UNION MILITARY POLICE

The Union Military Police of Burma is a paramilitary organization under the civil control and designed to augment the national civil police when required to suppress outbreaks of insurgency or banditry.

Because the UMP battalions are widely spread throughout Burma the Survey Team was afforded only limited opportunity to observe UMP units and then only in large population centers (Rangoon, Mandalay and Maymyo) where the insurgency problem is not as great as in other areas. Thus there can be no authoritative evaluation made on the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the UMP.

Based on limited observation and outward appearances of UMP personnel contacted, the Survey Team believes the basic organization of the UMP is sound and the personnel presently in control are professionally competent, loyal to the cause, and aggressive in their desires to get on with the business of freeing Burma from the grip of internal insurrection and lawlessness.

The nature of the fluidity of the insurgent operations, coupled with the lack of transportation and communications, places the UMP in a position of distinct disadvantage. It is believed that with limited amounts of selected communications and transportation equipment the UMP would be able to accomplish its role in the law and order campaign in Burma. It must be understood that much must be done in the way of training of personnel in maintenance (preventive and remedial) and operation of complex equipment before the full potential of the UMP could be realized.

Specifically, training observed at the UMP Training Depot, Mandalay, included bayonet drill, close order drill and instructor preparation for nomenclature, care and maintenance of small arms and physical training. Training methods employed were similar to techniques employed by the U.S. Army.

The attestation ceremony of a battalion having just completed five months of basic training was observed. The manual of arms was executed with precision; however, when the troops passed in review, once in platoon column and again in platoon front, the lines were generally wavy or bowed. The troops presented a smart appearance and gave evidence of attention to care and maintenance of individual equipment.

The Headquarters of the Signal Battalion was visited and the operations of the communications set-up were observed. Radio operators appeared to be competent and were transmitting and receiving messages with the apparent ease of one who has been well trained in his job. Also observed was what appeared to be an attempt to show communications training on a "school solution" basis. However, it is doubtful that the training was effective since there were three

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different subjects (CW Code, wiring diagrams and maintenance) being taught in a single room with inadequate partitions to seal off the sound of one group from the others.

A. MISSION

The Union Military Police (UMP) has the two-fold mission of frontier watch and internal security in support of the Civil Police. In time of peace the UMP is under a civil department (Home Ministry) and operates under the Inspector General of Police, who also commands the Civil Police. In time of war, the UMP would be placed under the Defense Department.

B. ORGANIZATION

(See Organization Charts on Pages 72-78)

Headed by a Deputy Inspector General, the UMP organization down to and including companies, follows closely conventional military lines with combat units organized essentially at standard infantry strength but lightly equipped. There are currently in being 22 battalions divided between a Northern Command and a Southern Command, each under an Assistant Deputy Inspector General. A 23rd Battalion will be raised within the next year. One battalion, named the Rangoon Battalion, has been placed under the operational control of the Commissioner of Police, Rangoon, for special duties in the nation's capital. There is no artillery or armor in the UMP. Limited engineer support is provided by a pioneer platoon in each battalion. Communications are provided by a Signal Battalion which furnishes communications personnel down to and including the infantry companies. Logistics support, except for arms and ammunition, is obtained from the Deputy Inspector General (Supply) and is distributed by the Quartermaster General, who is also Commandant of the Transport Battalion. Arms and ammunition are procured from the Army. Training for the UMP is centralized in the Mandalay Training Center and is directly under the control of Headquarters UMP.


C. OPERATIONS

Although technically available for employment anywhere in the Union of Burma, UMP battalions are operating from essentially fixed installations spread throughout the Union. From the battalion headquarters locations, outposts are established in critical areas. The UMP is not normally involved in civil law and order matters. However, when the Civil Police are unable to handle the situation Army units are then called in. In either case, upon restoration of order the Civil Police again take over. For the most part, UMP field operations employ anti-guerrilla tactics as compared to more conventional ground army operations.

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
ORGANIZATION OF UNION MILITARY POLICE



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ORGANIZATION CHART - UMP HEADQUARTERS




* The Chief Signal Officer (a Major) is also Battalion Commander of the Signal Battalion.

** The Quartermaster General Branch is in charge of a Major who is also Battalion Commander of the Transport Battalion.

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ORGANIZATION - UMP AREA HEADQUARTERS



NOTE: The officers in charge of the three branches hold the rank of Captain.


The officers in charge of the sections under the three branches hold the rank of Lieutenant.

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ORGANIZATION CHART - UMP TRAINING BATTALION

Battalion Headquarters




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ORGANIZATION CHART - UMP SIGNAL BATTALION

Battalion Headquarters



Signal Companies




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ORGANIZATION CHART - UMP TRANSPORT BATTALION

Battalion Headquarters




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ORGANIZATION CHART - UMP INFANTRY BATTALION

Battalion Headquarters



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D. COMMUNICATIONS
(See Net Diagram on Page 81)

Radio is the normal means of communication between headquarters, although in isolated cases telephone is available. Primary radio stations of 200-250 watts, operating on a continuous watch, are located at Rangoon, Mandalay and Maymyo. The stations at Rangoon provide communications for the Southern Command Headquarters and to all the battalions located in the southern half of the country. The station at Mandalay serves the battalions in western and northwestern Burma while the station at Maymyo serves the Northern Command Headquarters and the battalions in the northeastern and eastern sectors. Radio stations at the battalion level are of 50-100 watts and the stations at the company level are 10-15 watts. Both battalion and company level stations operate only on a pre-arranged schedule. At present there is no radio equipment available below the company headquarters level. Radio communications is supplemented by messenger, mail and where available and functioning, the Government telephone system.

E. LOGISTICS

Procurement of supplies and equipment, except for arms and ammunition, is done by the Deputy Inspector General for Police Supplies. Bulk issues are made to the Quartermaster General, UMP, who is responsible for distribution to the battalions. Arms and ammunition are obtained from the Army on a reimbursable basis.

Arms for the most part are of British origin and include rifles, Bren and Sten guns and mortars. Some American machine pistols also are being used. There appeared to be no serious shortage of small weapons except for mortars. It was explained that the Burmese Army could take care of the UMP needs in this respect. Limited quantities of Sten guns and Sten gun and rifle ammunition are produced in the Government Arsenal in Rangoon.


Radio communications equipment is primarily of British and American origin and for the most part is relatively old and rapidly wearing out. Spare parts supply is limited and cannibalizing of unoperable equipment and improvising are resorted to in order to maintain operating schedules. Wire communications below battalion headquarters level does not exist.

Motor transportation equipment is inadequate at best. There are only 176 trucks ranging from 1/4 ton to 3 tons (about half are 3 ton class) on hand to service an authorized strength of 22,693 spread throughout Burma. Of the 176 only 81 are reported to be serviceable with an additional 36 unserviceable but repairable. Thus there are approximately 125 trucks which can be considered as available for transportation requirements for the entire UMP. All currently available transportation is expected to become unserviceable in the next two years.

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UMP COMMUNICATIONS-W/T DIAGRAM (MOBILE STATIONS EXCLUSIVE)



See Key on Page 81.

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KEY FOR W/T DIAGRAM ON PAGE 80.



Master Control Station.
(230 Volt AC; 200-250 Watts)



Battalion Headquarters Control Station.
(230 Volt AC or 12 Volt DC; 50-100 Watts)



Outstations. (6/12 Volt DC; 10-15 Watts)



Main Control Link (continuous watch).



Area Control Link (scheduled watch).



Outstation Link (Scheduled watch).



Emergency Link (for intercommunication in operation areas only).

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Water transportation equipment is not organic to the UMP. UMP units stationed along waterways can rent small to medium size water craft from the Office of the Nautical Advisor. This arrangement is costly and boats are not always available when needed. Some sort of organic water transportation appears to be warranted for UMP units stationed in areas where few passable roads exist and where river craft is the principle mode of travel.

F. TRAINING

The UMP Training Depot is located at Mandalay and is responsible primarily for the training of riflemen and junior enlisted leaders. (See Charts on Page 83 and Page 84.) The Depot has a capacity of 600 personnel per course and normally conducts two courses per year producing a total of 1,200 trainees. The Depot could possibly handle 1,500 trainees if the situation demands. In order to provide training for the four new battalions organized recently, training teams from the Depot were attached to each battalion at its camp area.

The curriculum includes basic infantry and weapons training, limited instruction in Civil Police authority and riot control procedures. Since the Training Depot has no maneuver area there is little or no tactical training conducted. Tactical training and musketry training are done at a camp area approximately 20 miles from Mandalay Training Depot.

Limited numbers of communications and motor maintenance personnel are trained by the Signal and Transport Battalions respectively.

G. PERSONNEL

The current authorized strength of the UMP is 22,693. Current actual strength is approximately 20,500. (See personnel breakdown on Pages 85 and 86.)

Minimum age for enlistment is 18 years. Normal enlistment is for three years with specialists being required to serve five years. According to available information, the re-enlistment rate is satisfactory.

Pay scales range from 103 Kyats (\$22.00) per month for a new recruit to 1,505 Kyats (\$320.00) for the Deputy Inspector General, UMP, including subsistence and quarters allowances. Following on Page 87 is the pay scale for the UMP based on the official rate of 4.7 Kyats per U.S. \$. (The black market rate is approximately 9 - 10 Kyats per U.S. \$.)

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UNION MILITARY POLICE TRAINING DEPOT ESTABLISHMENT - PERSONNEL


	<u>OFFICERS</u>								<u>OTHER RANKS</u>					
	A*	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N
Depot Headquarters	-	1	-	2	-	3	3	2	8	2	2	20	37	40
Administration	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	2	7	12	12	127	160	161
<u>Training Wing:</u>														
Wing Headquarters	-	-	1	1	1	3	1	5	7	-	2	19	34	37
Junior Leader Training	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	1	2	3	6	-	14	15
Weapons Training	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	1	2	3	6	-	14	15
Physical Training	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	3	6	-	12	12
Administrative Training	-	-	-	-	1	1	3	2	5	1	-	-	11	12
Six Recruits Training	-	-	-	-	6	6	12	6	6	24	72	600	720	726
Total Training Depot	-	1	2	3	10	16	24	19	39	48	106	766	1002	1018

- * A - Deputy Inspector General
- B - Asst. Dep. Inspector General
- C - Battalion Commander
- D - Senior Grade Officer
- E - Junior Grade Officer
- F - Total Officers
- G - Warrant Officer (I)
- H - Warrant Officer (II)
- I - Sergeant
- J - Corporal
- K - Lance Corporal
- L - Riflemen
- M - Total Other Ranks
- N - Total All Ranks

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ORGANIZATION CHART - UMP TRAINING DEPOT



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AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF UNION MILITARY POLICE - NON-TECHNICIANS

TROOP/Bn.	OFFICERS							OTHER RANKS							
	A	B	C	D	E	F	PERMANENT		G	H	I	J	K	L	M
Hq. UMP	1	-	2	3	10	16	5	11	35	13	15	95	174	190	
South Burma Area	-	1	-	2	9	12	6	6	18	11	10	73	124	136	
North Burma Area	-	1	-	2	9	12	6	6	18	11	10	73	124	136	
Training Depôt	-	1	2	3	10	16	24	20	39	48	106	766	1003	1019	
UMP Signal Bn.	-	-	1	2	4	7	20	15	12	3	6	128	184	191	
UMP Transport Bn	-	-	1	2	2	5	10	10	18	74	46	707	865	870	
UMP Rangoon Bn.	-	-	1	3	6	10	22	10	36	66	89	630	853	863	
1st Bn. UMP	-	-	1	3	6	10	22	10	36	66	89	630	853	863	
2nd Bn. UMP	-	-	1	3	6	10	22	10	36	66	89	630	853	863	
3rd Bn. UMP	-	-	1	3	6	10	22	10	36	66	89	630	853	863	
4th Bn. UMP	-	-	1	3	6	10	22	10	36	66	89	630	853	863	
5th Bn. UMP	-	-	1	3	6	10	22	10	36	66	89	630	853	863	
6th Bn. UMP	-	-	1	3	6	10	22	10	36	66	89	630	853	863	
7th Bn. UMP	-	-	1	3	6	10	22	10	36	66	89	630	853	863	
8th Bn. UMP	-	-	1	3	6	10	22	10	36	66	89	630	853	863	
9th Bn. UMP	-	-	1	3	6	10	22	10	36	66	89	630	853	863	
10th Bn. UMP	-	-	1	3	6	10	22	10	36	66	89	630	853	863	
11th Bn. UMP	-	-	1	3	6	10	22	10	36	66	89	630	853	863	
12th Bn. UMP	-	-	1	3	6	10	22	10	36	66	89	630	853	863	
13th Bn. UMP	-	-	1	3	6	10	22	10	36	66	89	630	853	863	
14th Bn. UMP	-	-	1	3	6	10	22	10	36	66	89	630	853	863	
15th Bn. UMP	-	-	1	3	6	10	22	10	36	66	89	630	853	863	
16th Bn. UMP	-	-	1	3	6	10	22	10	36	66	89	630	853	863	
17th Bn. UMP	-	-	1	3	6	10	22	10	36	66	89	630	853	863	
Total Permanent	1	3	24	68	152	248	467	248	788	1348	1795	13182	17828	18076	

TEMPORARY															
18th Bn. UMP	-	-	1	3	6	10	22	10	36	66	89	630	853	863	
19th Bn. UMP	-	-	1	3	6	10	22	10	36	66	89	630	853	863	
20th Bn. UMP	-	-	1	3	6	10	22	10	36	66	89	630	853	863	
21st Bn. UMP	-	-	1	3	6	10	22	10	36	66	89	630	853	863	
Signal Group	-	-	-	-	2	2	15	8	4	-	-	36	63	65	
Transport Group	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	17	12	166	201	201	
Total Temporary	-	-	4	12	26	42	105	50	150	281	368	2722	3676	3718	

GRAND TOTAL 1 3 28 80 178 290 572 298 938 1629 2163 15904 21504 21794

- * A - Deputy Inspector General H - Warrant Officer (II)
 B - Asst. Dep. Insp. General I - Sergeants
 C - Battalion Commanders J - Corporal
 D - Senior Grade Officers K - Lance Corporal
 E - Junior Grade Officers L - Riflemen
 F - Total Officers M - Total Other Ranks
 G - Warrant Officer (I) N - Total All Ranks - Non-Technician

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AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF UNION MILITARY POLICE-TECHNICIANS - AND TOTALS

	A*	PERMANENT			RADIO				I	J
		W/T OPERATORS			MECHANIC		FITTER			
		B	C	D	E	F	G	H		
Hq. UMP	190	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	190
South Burma Area	136	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	136
North Burma Area	136	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	136
Training Depot	1019	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1019
UMP Signal Bn.	191	135	171	95	5	15	5	15	441	632
UMP Transport Bn.	870	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	870
UMP Rangoon Bn.	863	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	863
1st Bn. UMP	863	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	863
2nd Bn. UMP	863	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	863
3rd Bn. UMP	863	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	863
4th Bn. UMP	863	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	863
5th Bn. UMP	863	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	863
6th Bn. UMP	863	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	863
7th Bn. UMP	863	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	863
8th Bn. UMP	863	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	863
9th Bn. UMP	863	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	863
10th Bn. UMP	863	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	863
11th Bn. UMP	863	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	863
12th Bn. UMP	863	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	863
13th Bn. UMP	863	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	863
14th Bn. UMP	863	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	863
15th Bn. UMP	863	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	863
16th Bn. UMP	863	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	863
17th Bn. UMP	863	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	863
Total Permanent	18076	135	171	95	5	15	5	15	441	18517

TEMPORARY										
18th Bn. UMP	863	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	863
19th Bn. UMP	863	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	863
20th Bn. UMP	863	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	863
21st Bn. UMP	863	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	863
Signal Group	65	150	180	90	4	15	4	15	458	523
Transport Group	201	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	201
Total Temporary	3718	150	180	90	4	15	4	15	458	4176

GRAND TOTAL	21794	285	351	185	9	30	9	30	899	22693
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- * A - Total All Ranks - Non-Technician (Carried forward from Page 85.)
 B - Grade I
 C - Grade II
 D - Grade III
 E - Grade I
 F - Grade II
 G - Grade I
 H - Grade II
 I - Total Technicians
 J - Total All Ranks

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UMP - MONTHLY PAY AND ALLOWANCES

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Pay</u>	<u>Family Living Allowance</u>	<u>Basic Ration</u>	<u>Fresh Ration</u>	<u>Quarters</u>	<u>Total</u>
Deputy Inspector General (Colonel)	1300/-	---	19/50	23/40	162/50	1505/40
Asst. Dep. Inspector General (Lt. Col.)	1100/-	---	19/50	23/40	110/--	1252/90
Major	800/-	---	19/50	23/40	80/--	922/90
Captain	350/-	44/50	19/50	23/40	35/--	472/40
Lieutenant	200/-	48/88	19/50	23/40	20/--	311/78
Warrant Officer (I)	140/-	42/88	19/50	23/40	18/--	243/78
Warrant Officer (II)	110/-	37/50	19/50	23/40	18/--	208/40
Sergeant	55/-	24/63	19/50	23/40	15/--	137/53
Corporal	40/-	21/--	19/50	23/40	10/--	113/90
Lance Corporal	35/-	20/50	19/50	23/40	10/--	108/40
Rifleman	30/-	20/--	19/50	23/40	10/--	102/90

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Many of the personnel have come from the pre-independence police forces (Burma Armed Police, Frontier Constabulary and Burma Armed Police Striking Force). Although it is normally possible to interchange personnel between the UMP and the Civil Police at all levels, practical difficulties arising out of the difference in training of these elements results in little use of this arrangement, except in case of DIG level.

The morale of the personnel contacted (mainly officers) appeared to be good. However, there were indications that poor living conditions caused by unavailability of adequate housing, low pay scales, and the inflation in Burma are having some adverse effect upon the morale of the lower ranks.

H. FUTURE PLANS

Under the Burmese Government Four Year Plan for speedy restoration of law and order the UMP is preparing plans to:

1. Increase its strength to about 25,000 including an additional infantry battalion.
2. Create several austere staffed brigade headquarters in order to provide closer control over and effect better coordination among the battalions than can be exercised directly by the Assistant Deputy Inspector Generals, Northern and Southern Commands.
3. Increase transportation and communications at the company level.
4. Improve medical support by construction of two base hospitals, one in Mandalay and one in Rangoon.
5. Furnish special items of clothing for troops in areas of extreme weather changes.

I. UNION MILITARY POLICE - EQUIPMENT

1. Union Military Police - Equipment in Use.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Serviceable</u>	<u>Unserviceable</u>	<u>Repairable</u>
Truck - 3 ton	81	50	31	10
Truck - 15 Cwt	35	10	25	10
Jeep - 1/4 ton	57	16	41	16
Station Wagon - 1/4 ton	3	3	--	
Ambulance - 1 ton	2	2	--	
Wrecker - 3 ton	3	-	3	1
Armored car	8	-	8	4
Total.....	189	81	108	

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<u>Item</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Serviceable</u>	<u>Unserviceable</u>	<u>Repairable</u>
Motorcycle, 5HP, 500 c.c.	25	19	6	6
Motorcycle, BSA, 5HP, 500 c.c.	20	8	12	3
Motorcycle, Norton, 5HP, 500 c.c.	3	1	2	2
Bicycle, Hercules	30	30	-	-
Bicycle, Stadion	<u>175</u>	<u>173</u>	<u>2</u>	1
Total.....	253	231	22	

2. Union Military Police - Equipment to be Procured Under the Four Year Law and Order Plan.

<u>Number Required</u>	<u>Item and Remarks</u>
15	H.F. Wireless Transmitter, voice and C.W.; variable frequency/ Crystal control 2-20 Mc/s. Power Output 200-250 watts; for operation on 200-240 volt 50-60 cycles AC Main.
15	Wireless receiver; frequency coverage 550 Kc/s-30Mc/s.
7	H.F. Wireless Transmitter, voice and C.W.; variable frequency/ Crystal control 3-12 Mc/s. Power output 25-50 watts.
7	Wireless receiver; frequency coverage 550 Kc/s-30 Mc/s.
97	Portable H.F. Wireless Transmitter/Receiver, voice and C.W.; Variable frequency/Crystal control frequency coverage 3-12 Mc/s. Power output 10-20 watts; 6 volt or 12 volt D.C. operation
300	Portable Pack Set Transmitter/Receiver, voice and C.W.; frequency coverage 2-8 Mc/s. Power output 2-3 watts minimum; hand generator
122	Battery charging engine; 25-30 Amps. 12-24 volt D.C.
602	Storage batteries; 6 volt, 19 or 21 plates.
26	Telephone switchboard, Magneto exchange; 10 line subscriber unit.
208	Field telephone; E.E. 8 B.
416	Field cable; D.3 Mk.VI (twisted); Per 1/2 mile drum.
4	AVO Multi-range Tester Measuring instrument; large.
8	AVO Multi-Range Tester; medium.
4	AVO Characteristic Meter A.C. Main operation.
4	Portable Frequency Meter.
4	Standard Signal Generator.
4	Portable Receiver Tester.
4	Cathode Ray Oscillograph.
92	Truck, 2 1/2 ton, canvas hood.
254	Truck, 1 ton, canvas hood.
55	Jeep, 1/4 ton, canvas hood.
9	Jeep station wagon.
4	Ambulance.
12	Browsers Water Trailer; 250 gallon capacity.
3	Wrecker, 5 ton.
19	Motorcycle, 5HP, 500 c.c.

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Number
Required

Item and Remarks

- 7 Water-craft, Type UB, twin engine; crew of 5, 30 to 40 passengers; speed 12 knots (maximum); Diesel engine; (A) type for officers and (B) type for troops.
- 10 Water-craft, Type L, twin engine; crew of 4; 30 to 40 passengers; speed 12 knots (maximum); Diesel engine.
- 2 Water-craft, Type ML, twin engine; crew of 10; 60 to 80 passengers; speed 15 knots; Diesel engine (D) type - sea-going.
- 10 Water-craft, speedboat; single engine; crew of 1; 2 to 3 passengers; Outboard 35 HP.
- Uniforms and miscellaneous personal equipment such as helmets, mess kits, mosquito nets, blankets, first aid kits, foul weather gear, etc.

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APPENDIX I

STATEMENT OF EQUIPMENT TO BE PROCURED UNDER FOUR YEAR LAW AND ORDER PLAN BY
RANGOON POLICE

Garage Equipment:

Lubrication battery; British "Tacalemit Majestic" type complete with overhead swinging arms for grease hose and fittings as well as Power Guns and all accessories.....	1
Hydraulic car lifts; "T" type with ramps; 5 ton.....	2
Air compressor; "Tacalemit" two-stage type, electrically operated, Model No. 218; 200 lbs. per square inch.....	1
Car washing pressure pump; "Tacalemit Niagara" type with full accessories; 300 lbs. per square inch.....	1
Engine re-boring machine; electrically operated, 230 AC Mains 50 cycle; Bore 2-4 inch.....	1
Engine polishing machine; electrically operated, 230 AC Mains 50 cycle; Bore 2-4 inch.....	1
Emery wheel for grinding tools; electrically operated; 230 AC Mains 50 cycle with detachable brushes, emery wheels and buffers, bench type; 6-8 inch diameter.....	1
Welding plant; oxygen-acetylene gas type complete with full set of nozzles, hose pipes, blow pipe and regulators; 200 cubic feet.....	1
Vulcanizing machine; electrically operated 230 AC Mains 50 cycle.....	1
Micrometer; precision measuring type, instruments inside and outside, depth 0-4 inches.....	1
Measuring tools; precision tools, e.g. clippers, dividers, screw gauges, feeler gauges - set	4
Spark plug tester; Champion type with rubber adapters, nozzle jets and abrasives.....	1
Wheel alignment gauge; checking up of camber and toe-ins of the front wheels.....	1
Battery charging plant; electrically operated 230 AC Mains with 3 channel circuits, each charging 24 x 6 volt cells maximum.....	1

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Tool kits; large tool chest "Hazel" 100/101 chrome vanadium type.....	4
Bench vice; bench type 2" to 4" and 6" and anvils; 1 set each.....	1
Electric drill press; electrically operated 230 AC Mains 50 cycle with associated parts.....	1
Electric hand drill; 230AC 50 cycle, 1" drill.....	1
Chain Block; pull type by hand, 1 ton.....	1
Chain Block; pull type by hand, 3 ton.....	1
Taps and dies; major sets - American; various sizes.....	1
Valve refacing machine; "Valve Master" type, electrically operated 230 AC Mains.....	1
Hydraulic press; to be used for extraction and fixing of sleeves, collars, ball-bearings and oil-seals, etc. of cars, with accompanying accoutrements; 3-5 tons.....	1
Hydraulic jack; hand lever type; 5 ton.....	1
Brake testing meter; large model with cards showing brake efficiency.....	1
Brake testing meter; portable model to be attached to car when testing...	4
Compression tester; to test compression of engine.....	2
Head lamp alignment gauge.....	1

Motor Vehicles:

Motor car, for wireless patrolling; Saloon car, right hand drive, 4-door, heavy duty shock absorber and stabilizer bar, heavy duty front and rear springs, heavy duty front and rear springs, heavy duty fan, 60 ampere alternator type generator with high output, 2-way radio cable conduit, heavy duty floor mats, heavy duty seat arms, heavy duty seat cushion springs, waterproof material upholstery interior trim, heavy duty backrest springs, heavy duty 70 ampere hour battery, 12 volt electrification, direction indicator, 2 search lights, Police sign on roof, siren, 6 cylinder low compression engine, revolving red beacon on roof.....	15
Jeep, 1/2 ton; if possible right hand drive, dark blue color, not necessarily 4-wheel drive, traffic indicator.....	12
Bus; 6 cylinder, right hand drive, dark blue color, traffic indicator; 2 or 2 1/2 ton for 20-24 persons.....	7

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Truck; 6 or 8 cylinder, right hand drive, dark blue color, traffic indicator; 2 1/2 ton.....	5
Anti-riot van; police van for anti-riot duties protected with iron grids or expanded metal, right hand drive, 6 cylinder, dark blue color, Police sign, siren, electric fan, direction indicator; approximately 1 1/2 ton.....	4
Utility Van; 6 cylinder, right hand drive, dark blue color with seats, direction indicator; 1/2 ton.....	2
Prison Van; 6 or 8 cylinder, right hand drive, dark blue color, direction indicator, diesel or petrol engine; 3 tons, seating capacity for 30-35 prisoners and 5 officers.....	2
Motorcycle; police type, 500 cc, twin cylinder, rear shock absorber, Police siren, wind screen, crash guards, pillion seat, 500 cc.....	30
Ambulance car; right hand drive, 6 cylinder, Police siren and lights, dark blue color with white top or full white, direction indicator; for 2 stretcher cases, 1 sitting case and 1 attendant.....	1
Spares for items 1 to 9; 20% of parts liable to damage and replacement..	
Sidecars for motorcycle; sidecars for use with motorcycles in item 8, Police type; for 1 officer.....	4
<u>Photographic Equipment:</u>	
Camera; movie camers with 16mm, 25mm and 75mm lens and filters; Paillard Bolex type with carrying case.....	1
Flash unit; electronic flash unit about 750 joules, wet cell.....	1
Spares for Flash Unit; flash tubes for above.....	4
Flash Unit battery, wet, for above.....	4
Vibrator, for above.....	3
Enlarger; Omega D-2 type; for 35mm to 4x5 negatives.....	1
Camera, Leica H-3 complete with exposure meter, filters, telephoto lens, 35mm.....	1
Roll film; very fast type (i.e. Tri-X or HF3); size 120	600
Printing paper; glossy soft and normal type; 12 x 10; 500 packets of 10 sheets.	

Sheet film; film pack, fast type (e.g. Super XX), 3 1/4 x 4 1/4; packets of 25 sheets each.....	24
Movie film; direct positive type, very fast; 16mm, 100 feet roll.....	100
Camera; field type with stand, triple extension f4.5 lens, complete with accessories; 6 x 4 plate size.....	1
Camera; Speed-graphic or Linhof camera with 3 lens. Flash gun, roll film adapter; tripod, carrying case; 6 x 9 cm, 2 1/4 x 3 1/4 for Linhof, 3 1/4 x 4 1/4 size or 120 size for Speed-graphic.....	1

River Craft:

Speedboat; police use, diesel or petrol engine; approximately 8 passengers.....	2
Speedboat; police use, diesel or petrol engine; approximately 4 passengers.....	1
Spares; for above; 20% of parts liable to damage and replacement.....	20%

Wireless Equipment:

Central control switch (to be located at Hq.); 15 watt FM Transmitter/Receiver for AC Mains 220-250 volt 60 cycle. Frequency range VHF 152-174 Mc/s complete with switching facilities for selection up to 6 adjacent channel frequency and crystals for 2 channel operation. (Frequency desired 152-153 at 100 Kc/s spacing); Complete with Yagi beam aerials	
Transmitter - Channel 1; Channel 2	4
Receiver - Channel 1.....	4
Emergency power supply for automatic change-over in case of Mains failure, voltage for above requirement.....	1
Suitable remote control desk with stand microphone and switching arrangement to stand-by equipment.....	2
Master station (to be located on high elevation; 75 watt FM for each channel. Transmitter/Receiver for reverse frequency trigger operation with facility for remote switch-over to stand-by equipment. Channel for working with control on permanent talk-through basis.....	4
A stand-by diesel generator for automatic change-over in case of Mains failure.....	1

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Antenna - Yagi and Dipoles etc. cables and other accessories

Mobile sets; 10 to 15 watt FM for 6 channel working equipped with crystals for 2 channel operation. Power supply 12 volt DC. Whip aerial, cables, etc. and control unit. Provision for public address system..... 45

Portable wireless set (voice); FM system, wet cell power supply; hand set model; frequency range to operate on same wave length as the control station (152-153 Mc/s range); 5 watt output..... 2

Walkie Talkie set; for wet cell operation preferably same frequency as others above and FM; 1 to 2 watt output..... 6

Wireless set for motorcycle (voice); type for 6 volts, FM; same frequency as above, loud-speaker, microphone which can be worn around head or attached to Police cap, simplex; about 10 watt output..... 6

Tape recorder; 220 volt AC 50 cycle, 2 for Police Control Room to record reports and information (i.e. studio model) and 2 portable model on same voltage, speed of tape suitable for Police work; Studio model with 1200' tape or 2 hours capacity, portable model with 600' tape or for one hour operation..... 4

Wireless test equipment; necessary test equipment for above wireless sets and their maintenance such as:

R.F. power meter; VHF range; 0.5 watt to 25 watt..... 1

Output power meter; frequency range 20 c/s to 35 Kc/s power range 20mW to 10W..... 1

Wave meter; frequency range 20 to 300 Mc/s (absorption type)..... 1

FM Deviation meter range up to 500 Mc/s (direct measurement of deviation up to 75 Kc/s)..... 1

Vacuum Tube volt meter to measure AC 50mV to 300V, 20 c/s to 700 Mc/s input capacitance less than 2 Micro-micro-farad; measures DC smV to 1KV; measures resistance 0.2 OHM to 500 M OHM..... 1

Volt OHM - milliammeter with ranges..... 2

Miscellaneous:

Speech amplifier; complete with super-sensitive dynamic microphone with adjustable boom stand, each with one reflex horn type loud-speaker, with adjustable stands, 50 ft. cable for each -

For 6 volt operation, 40 watt..... 3

For 220 volt AC 50 cycle operation, 60 watt..... 2

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Tires for motor vehicles; thread grip, 6 ply - 600 x 16..... 80
650 x 16..... 70
700 x 16..... 80
750 x 16..... 50
900 x 16..... 50
650 x 15..... 55
700 x 20..... 10
1100 x 20..... 5

Inner tubes, for motor vehicle tires - - - - - 600 x 16..... 75
650 x 16..... 80
700 x 16..... 80
750 x 16..... 50
900 x 16..... 50
650 x 15..... 50
700 x 20..... 10
1100 x 20..... 5

Motorcycle tires; thread grip, non-skid - - - - - 3.25 x 16..... 20
3.25 x 19..... 60

Inner tubes for motorcycle tires - - - - - 3.25 x 16..... 20
3.25 x 19..... 60

Traffic equipment - Cat's eye for traffic markings on streets and signs:
White...5000
Red....5000

Reflector material, Scotchlite Brand: Reflective sheeting; Yellow and red, size 50 yds x 24" - 24 and 12 rolls respectively; feltsqueeze, 24 rolls; Pan, for A-2 activator, 12 each; A-2 activator, 36 tins; 2" rubber hand roller, 36 each; Scotchlite Reflective fabric, 1 roll 50' yds x 24".

Pedestrian marking discs; Dur-O-Line - 100,000 discs.

Flashing Amber lights - for pedestrian refuge islands and dangerous crossings:
(a) Four-way suspended type..... 40
(b) Globe type for islands..... 100
(c) 4-sided flasher for pedestrian refuge guards..... 200

Road-Marking Machine.....
(a) Motor driven Line Marker - with compressor, patent heater unit, spray gun, 3 gal. pressure feed container, self-cleaning stencil discs..... 1
(b) Spray gun..... 1
(c) One pint container complete with cover & clamps..... 1
(d) 20' length air-hose with couplings..... 1
(e) 20' length No. 38 fluid hose with couplings..... 1
(f) Centerlite reflective compound, white color, 1 gal. tins-1000

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Traffic lights: (a) Vehicle actuated type with provision for operation on fixed time cycle and manual, 3 aspects (red, amber and green), 2 way i.e. facing both ways at 180 degrees, top of post type, 4 posts for each unit, for operation on 220 volt AC 50 cycle, 60 watt screw type bulbs. For "T" junctions, one one-way, one two-way and one three-way lamps are required. Each lamp to be provided with 4 spare bulbs; height of posts 7 or 8 feet from ground level to lowest lamp (green); 9 for intersection and 6 for "T" junction..... 15

(b) Portable type, 4 way, with self-contained adjustable timing device, equipped with standard red, amber, blue-green lens, with wet cell, 12 volt operation; 4 way, 3 aspect..... 4

Batteries for above, 12 volt, 200 amp. 4

Pneumatic tire, 2 wheel trailer..... 2

Lamps, 12 volt, 25 watt..... 192

Standard lens, 4 of each color..... 12

Lens neoprene seal molding..... 12

Automatic controllers..... 2

Batteries/accumulator; 17 plates, high type, 6 volt, 75/80 amp. hr. 100

Batteries/accumulator; 9 plates, high type; 80 amp. hr. 100

Spray painting unit; 3/4 HP electrically operated 220/230 volt AC with air compressor, portable with spare parts and accessories..... 1

Spray painting unit; spray guns, size No. 3, complete with air lines, connections, spare nozzles and pins..... 2

Police sirens; police model, heavy duty, 12 volt operation combined with revolving red beacon for roof mounting..... 6

Bicycles; 22" frame, 28" x 1 3/4" wheels, with dry cell lamps, black, w/bell..... 200

Tires for bicycles, 28" x 1 3/4"..... 300

Inner tubes for bicycles, 28" x 1 3/4"..... 400

Flashlight, police type, 3 dry cells..... 200

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Torches, police type, 5 dry cells.....	50
Dry cells for torches, 1.5 volt battery.....	2000
Battery charging equipment; with full output of 100 amperes for 6 volt and 50 amperes for 12 volt charging with features for Automatic charging time control. Thermostat battery safety control, adjustable charging rates and automatic overload protection.....	2
Spares; for all wireless equipment reckoned at 20% of parts liable to deterioration and replacement.	
Dictaphone; with speech operation - control and associated transcriber..	1
Office furniture; card index cabinet with drawers; 8" x 6" cards, on suspension slides, maximum drawers each cabinet = 8-10; each drawer to hold 1500 cards of medium weight.....	10
Tool set, complete, armoury.....	2
Tool set, complete, carpentry.....	20
Disinfectant sprayers; pneumatic, knapsack, complete with fittings and accessories; 4 imperial gallons.....	6
Laundry: (a) Washing machine, 50 lbs. dry.....	1
(b) Centrifugal extractor, 50 lbs. dry.....	1
(c) Drying Tumblers, 50 lbs. dry.....	1
(d) Boiler, packaged type, 50 lbs. dry.....	1
(e) Pressing equipment and compressor; 50 lbs. dry.....	1
Electric sewing machines:	
(a) 69-5 class Button stitching, head only.....	1
(b) 71-31 class Button holing, head only.....	1
(c) 96 K 49 class, head only.....	22
(d) Three sets of power benches each section.....	24
(e) Machine to stitch leather, canvas, etc., bed type.....	1
(f) Machine to stitch leather, canvas, etc., cylinder type...	1
Ferrier's tools and accessories, complete set.....	4
Blacksmith tools and accessories, complete set.....	3
Electric clipper for horse hair; tools and accessories, complete set....	3
Clippers for horse hair, hand operated, tools and accessories.....	3
Uniforms and miscellaneous personal equipment.	

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