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olice Survey Mission

to the

KINGDOM OF BURUNDI



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1964

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Office of Public Safety
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Washington, D.C.

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FOREWORD

On October 28, 1963 the Government of the Kingdom of Burundi (GKB), in a letter addressed to the American Embassy requested United States assistance to help assure the internal security of Burundi. This request was for the following commodity assistance:

20 Jeeps
15 Trucks
20 Mobile radios of a 50 to 100 kilometer range
3 Fixed radio stations of a 200 to 300 kilometer range, capable of communicating with the mobile units.

On May 21, 1964 a letter, from Pascal Magenge, Secretary of State for the National Gendarmerie to the American Embassy confirmed this request.

A joint STATE/AID proposal for a two man Public Safety survey team to evaluate the GKB request to its civil police forces was made on April 17, 1964 and later accepted. This proposal included the assignment of Public Safety Advisors John Manopoli and Adolphe Bonnefil. The survey team arrived at Bujumbura, Burundi on May 22, 1964. The survey was completed on June 5, 1964.

All operations of the survey team were conducted under the policy and administrative direction of the American Ambassador, and in his absence, the Deputy Chief of Mission. The following STATE/AID terms of reference were indicated for the survey team:

A. The purpose of the survey would be to evaluate the GKB request for U. S. assistance to its civil police forces.

B. The survey would cover those GKB civil police forces responsible for maintaining internal security with a view toward determining the capabilities of all divisions and the activities of these forces, to include inter alia, mission, organization, administration, budget, personnel strength, deployment, records system, training and equipment.

C. Survey team would expect to consult with U. N. and Belgian police advisors presently assisting Burundi.

D. Following a comprehensive survey, the team would prepare a draft report at the post and submit a copy to the Ambassador for comment.

E. The GKB would not be advised of recommendations, and it is imperative that the GKB understand that the U. S. will make no firm commitment concerning any eventual program until the survey findings have been reviewed and approved by AID/W.

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F. Upon review and approval of the report, AID/W would be prepared to provide appropriately sanitized version to the GKB for its information.

A complete survey and analysis was made of the National Gendarmerie. Pursuant to a request of the Deputy Chief of Mission no attempt was made to survey the National Surete and the Judicial Police. Both of these services by the nature of their activities are part of the civil internal security forces. This request stemmed from a delicate diplomatic situation which arose on May 26, 1964. A cultural attache of the Chinese Communist Embassy in Bujumbura sought and was given political asylum at the American Embassy and negotiations are still under way in this matter.

SUMMARY

The following is a summarization of the salient points in the completed survey report:

1. Maintenance of law and order and political stability in Burundi in the face of Chinese Communist influence on Congolese and Rwandan exile groups that are attempting to subvert the Governments of the Congo and Rwanda, as well as influencing the indigenous Burundi population, is essential to the internal security and economic growth of the Royal Government of Burundi (GKB).

2. The population in the rural areas is normally law abiding. Common criminal activity in the capital of Bujumbura, and unorganized smuggling operations into Tanganyika have increased since Independence. This can be primarily attributed to the depressed economic situation and the presence of a more cosmopolitan and floating type population in the Capital.

3. Control of the National Army and the National Gendarmerie, the only two substantial internal security forces in Burundi, is firmly in the hands of the King at this time. His conservative orientation and the influence of the Belgian military and police advisors will probably prevent Chinese Communist penetration into these vital government organizations.

4. Failure to receive needed economic and commodity assistance from non-communist donors will impede the pro-Western elements of this fundamentally friendly country in its struggle against the extension of Chinese Communist influence.

5. There are sixteen Belgian police advisors in Burundi. Thirteen are assigned to the National Gendarmerie mostly in administrative, training and equipment maintenance capacities. Three of these sixteen advisors are assigned to the Judicial Police. There are no advisors to the National Surete.

6. The United Nations police training program, consisting of two advisors, has made very little impact or progress and its discontinuance is planned at the end of this year.

7. The National Gendarmerie has the beginning of a sound organizational and administrative structure. It requires a great deal of improvement in its training and operational functions. It is well uniformed and disciplined and is preparing to launch an intensive training program.

8. The National Gendarmerie does not have a police controlled communications capability, nor training in the operation or maintenance of such equipment.

9. The automotive equipment of the National Gendarmerie is rapidly deteriorating in spite of a maintenance capability above the normal found in comparable underdeveloped countries. It has a clear need for replacement units for this antiquated motor equipment and additional shop equipment to continue its maintenance effort.

10. Adequate communications and transportation equipment is an essential requirement of the National Gendarmerie for the maintenance of internal security and political stability in Burundi.

11. GKB requests for commodity assistance for its civil police forces made to American, British and U. N. officials have been moderate and indicate a certain degree of planning and coordination. No police commodity assistance has yet been received by the National Gendarmerie from any donor country.

12. It would serve a vital U. S. interest to supply communications and transportation equipment to the National Gendarmerie, in an effort to prevent subversive infiltration into this force; and to enable them to adequately counter any future subversively supported incursions into Rwanda by Tutsi refugees which would result in a recurrence of international incidents.

13. United States participation in the training and technical advice areas should not be in conflict with the present Belgian efforts and should be of a coordinating and supplementary nature in developing the required skills for the proper use of the recommended commodity assistance.

14. The National Surete has little intelligence or counter-intelligence capability. It is understaffed and requires intensive training and operational assistance. The GKB officials concerned with this force have refused previous offers by U. N. police advisors for assistance.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

1. The National Gendarmerie which is directly under the King is, to date, western oriented and plays an important part in the maintenance of law and order and political stability in Burundi. A positive response to the GKB request for assistance to the Gendarmerie would advance the important U.S. goal of containing the spread of subversive influence in Burundi, the Congo and Rwanda.

2. The National Gendarmerie, as presently constituted has the basic organizational and administrative structure required for continued growth into a viable national police force. This has been mainly achieved through the efforts of 13 Belgian police advisors. Where these advisors are operational as in the Bujumbura Commissariat and in the Gendarmerie Central Garage, adequate performance standards exist. Inversely, in the territorial commands where Belgian advisors are not present, lower standards of administrative and operational efficiency are evident. The Belgian Ambassador has advised the survey team that his country has no intention of reducing this police advisory assistance in the foreseeable future.

3. No formal training has been given at the Gendarmerie School since early 1963. This has been caused by the organizational and administrative changes required by the transfer of the Gendarmerie out of the Ministry of the Interior in September 1963. Prior to the session in early 1963, accelerated courses were given to recruit, NCO and Officer groups. A new comprehensive syllabus has been drawn up for all grades and ranks by the Belgian instructor staff at the School. Work is now under way on construction of new buildings and the remodeling of existing structures. Gendarmerie officials have programmed the re-opening of this school for mid-July of this year.

4. The majority of the Gendarmerie officers are of a young age and have a higher than average education level for Burundi. The Secretary of State for the Gendarmerie has expressed his pleasure in the progress being made by the Gendarmerie officers now pursuing police training in the United States and expressed the hope that additional scholarships would be offered to the Gendarmerie.

5. The National Gendarmerie is well supplied with uniforms of a distinctive color from that of the military. The major portion of this uniform equipment is purchased in Belgium with Gendarmerie funds.

6. The National Gendarmerie motor fleet now consists of the following vehicles: 14 Willys Jeeps, model 1957 in poor condition, 17 Land Rover Minervas, model 1958 in still poorer condition, 12 heavy trucks of which only 3 are in poor condition, 4 light trucks in good condition and 4 sedans in good condition. Maintenance and repair services are well organized by Belgian and local personnel, but there is a lack of adequate shop and repair equipment. Due to the general poor condition of the vehicles, maintenance and operation costs are extremely high.

7. The Gendarmerie does not have a nation-wide communications network of its own. Adequate long distance and local telephone service is lacking. The Gendarmerie presently depends on the sporadic availability of the Ministry of Interior fixed AM voice network. This network closes down between the hours of 5 PM and 8 AM. Moreover, it is in the process of being physically absorbed into the commercial telecommunications network of the Bureau of Post, Telegraph and Telephone. A small short range FM radio network is in operation in the Commissariat at Bujumbura, using Motorola and Stornophone (Danish) equipment. Due to lack of spare parts and obsolescence of the equipment, this system is unreliable and in large part inoperable.

8. Although not adequately surveyed because of previously mentioned circumstances, it is apparent that the Surete and Judicial Police are poorly equipped and trained, and have a limited capacity for the performance of their internal security functions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

9. It is recommended that this report be read in conjunction with the Rwanda Police Survey Report. The survey of the internal security forces of the Kingdom of Burundi was conducted in accordance with the same terms of reference applied to the survey of the internal security forces of the neighboring Republic of Rwanda.

The feasibility studies were confined to the training, organizational and operational ability of the police services of each country to properly utilize U.S. assistance. The interlocking internal security problems, and especially the refugee Tutsi incursions into Rwanda, which resulted in current political tension between the two countries, dictate that utmost care be exercised in providing U.S. assistance. Any commodity assistance granted should not be of an offensive nature and should not appear to favor one country against the other.

10. It is strongly recommended that the U.S. specifically refrain from supplying arms and ammunition to the internal security forces of Burundi.

11. It is recommended that the United States should retain its freedom to offer advice to the GKB internal security forces, particularly in the fields where commodity assistance requires competent backstopping in training, administrative support and operational ability. The U.S. should encourage the Belgian Government to continue the training and other support they are now making available to the internal security forces of Burundi.

12. A study of the National Gendarmerie capabilities and needs in the fields of transportation and communication indicate that a reasonable amount of commodity assistance in these areas would be fully utilized and integrated into the organizational structure of the force. Present high costs of motor maintenance would be substantially reduced if part of the obsolete motor fleet would be replaced. Technical help of the available PTT radio specialists would insure proper maintenance of communications equipment.

13. It is recommended that the obsolete Land Rovers be replaced by fifteen (15) 4 x 4 six passenger patrol vehicles to be assigned as follows: one each to the three

regional commands, one each to the eight territorial commands, 2 for the Palace Guard, one to the Gendarmerie headquarters and one to the Gendarmerie School. Spare parts based on local experience but not exceeding 10% of the cost of the vehicles should be furnished.

14. It is recommended that tools and garage equipment be provided to insure the proper maintenance of U.S. furnished vehicles.

15. It is recommended that a 12 fixed station (10 actual, 2 reserve) single side band, non-transistorized, 50 watt voice and code (CW) communication network be provided to the National Gendarmerie. Due to the lack of steady electric power supply and its total absence in several provinces, gasoline driven generators should be provided with each station. Spare parts for radio and generators should also be provided. The radio stations should be located as follows: one station at Gendarmerie headquarters, one each at the eight territorial Gendarmerie headquarters, one at the Palace Guard, and two in reserve. The equipment should be as simple and rugged as possible with no deviation from the manufacturers' regularly produced models.

16. It is recommended that a small amount of spare parts for the existing Bujumbura FM short range network be included in the spare parts purchased for the recommended SSB network.

17. It is recommended that communication equipment be delivered by air freight, phased in to arrive two months after the arrival of the full tour communications advisor. The long lead times required for documentation, contract awards and ocean-overland delivery would be counterproductive to the urgent need of this equipment.

18. It is recommended that the required documentation and specifications for this proposed network be performed by a TDY Public Safety Advisor (Communications). Site and wave propagation studies have already been completed by Belgian PTT technicians.

19. It is recommended that one full tour French speaking (S-3) Public Safety Advisor - Communications - be assigned to the Rwanda and Burundi police assistance projects. The small size and proximity of these countries would facilitate such utilization of Public Safety advisory services. Installation of the network can be accomplished by the four Belgian telecommunications technicians of the PTT, with the assistance of such an advisor.

20. This full tour technician would be responsible for the communications portions of these projects, and specifically with the following:

a) Finalize site preparation of the installation of equipment;

b) Assist in and supervise its actual installation;

c) Prepare and conduct basic operators' course at the Gendarmerie School;

d) Prepare and conduct a course in administrative and operational control of a police communications network for Gendarmerie Officers;

e) Prepare a radio operators' manual and operational forms required for a police communications system;

f) Install an inventory system for spare parts and equipment;

g) Assist in the selection, orientation and documentation of participant trainees in radio maintenance;

h) Oversee the continued maintenance of the system by PTT technicians;

i) Make further survey of the possible inclusion of the Surete and Judicial Police into the Gendarmerie communications system.

21. It is recommended that a full tour French speaking (S-3) PSA Generalist be assigned to actively administer Public Safety Projects in both Rwanda and Burundi. His specific duties in both countries would be as follows:

a) Actively supervise the operations of full tour and TDY communications advisors;

b) Prepare all project documentations required for the implementation of the programs;

c) Actively participate with foreign police advisors in the training and technical advice areas required to support recommended U. S. commodity assistance;

d) Select, orient and document all participant trainees;

e) Coordinate U. S. assistance with that offered by other friendly donors;

f) Complete the survey of the National Surete and the Judicial police in Burundi, assess their training and equipment requirements, and develop programs for active assistance to these types of internal security forces in both countries.

22. It is recommended that participant training be offered to the National Gendarmerie on the basis of 12 participants in the criminal investigation and riot control areas, and two participants for extended courses in radio maintenance. The suppliers of the proposed radio equipment should be required to make these courses available in French.

INTRODUCTION

The Kingdom of Burundi, the southern half of the former Belgian administered United Nations Trust Territory of Rwanda-Burundi is located in the East Central African highlands. It is a landlocked country, bordered by Tanganyika to the east and south, the Republic of the Congo on the west and the Republic of Rwanda on the north. About 80 miles of its 120 mile border with the Kivu Province of the Congo is separated by Lake Tanganyika. It is located 1,200 miles from the Atlantic Ocean and 700 miles from the Indian Ocean. It has an area of 10,744 square miles, slightly smaller than the State of Maryland. Burundi consists mainly of grassy uplands and high plateau areas studded with jagged mountain peaks. The country is astride the Congo-Nile crest, which in Burundi attains a height of 8,500 feet. It is located only two degrees south of the Equator. The average 24 hour temperature of 73.4 degrees F. at Bujumbura on Lake Tanganyika (altitude 2,639 feet) drops markedly in the mountainous interior, where night frost occurs. There is a short dry season during January, followed by the major rainy season from February to May. This is characterized by heavy downpours almost daily. The major dry season runs from May to late September. Annual rainfall averages 31.2 inches but is subject to great local variations and is much heavier in the mountain areas.

The population of Burundi is approximately 2.5 million of whom about 4,000 are Europeans. The population density of about 230 per square mile is one of the highest in sub-Sahara Africa. The rate of growth of the population has been estimated to be an average 2.5% in recent years, and if sustained, will double the population in another generation. Despite the density of the population there is no village life outside of the city of Bujumbura and a few provincial seats. Most families live in self-contained compounds on a hillside. Bujumbura, with a population of 50,000 is the Capital, and contains most of the Belgian, Greek, Congolese and other foreign residents of Burundi. The two main ethnic groups are the Hutu (86%) and the Tutsi (13%) and 1% others.

Burundi is a constitutional monarchy under a Mwami (King). The present Chief of State, who is also Commander-in-Chief of the National Army and National Gendarmerie is Mwami Mwambutsa IV. Prime Minister Albin Nyamoya, who is of Tutsi origin, has headed the Government since April 6, 1964. Legislative power is exercised by a 64 member National Assembly elected for a 6 year term by direct universal suffrage. The Judiciary is organized along the lines of the Belgian system. The country is divided into eight provinces administered by Governors. These provinces are in turn subdivided into arrondissements, which in turn are subdivided into Communes. There are a total of 28 arrondissements and 180 Communes. The provinces and arrondissements are administered by Governors and Commissaires, appointed by the King, with the approval of the Assembly and administratively responsible to the Ministry of the Interior. Each Commune has an elected Council, one member of which is selected as Bourgmestre (Mayor) by the Mwami.

For more than four centuries Burundi has been characterized by a stable, feudalistic society with a caste system and a ruling King. This society evolved through relatively peaceful arrangements between the invading Tutsi cattle breeders and the original Hutu farming population. The Hutu mortgaged their services in

order to obtain cattle, for which they assumed a series of commitments relating to cattle, pastures and arable land. In practice, the Burundi King was much less absolute than in Rwanda. He shared his power with a semi-autonomous class of Tutsi nobles. This caste consisted of royal princes belonging to the four Tutsi families from which the Bami (plural for Mwami) are chosen. Traditionally, this caste has held almost all of the executive posts, and non-royal Tutsi, although regarded as aristocrats, have enjoyed far less prestige than in Rwanda. The caste system in Burundi is not as firm as in Rwanda and a racial mixture between Tutsi and Hutu has taken place.

Although Burundi was visited briefly by several European explorers between 1860 and 1880, it was not until the last decade of the 19th century that Burundi along with Rwanda came under European administration as part of German East Africa. Belgian Troops from the Congo occupied both countries in 1916, and after World War I Burundi and Rwanda were mandated to Belgium as the territory of Ruanda-Urundi by the League of Nations. Following World War II, Ruanda-Urundi became a United Nations Trust Territory with Belgium as the administering authority.

Reforms instituted by the Belgian administration began in 1952, and were designed to encourge the growth of democratic political institutions. This coupled with the stabilizing influence of the present Mwami, who ascended the throne in 1915 at the age of two, and the relative absence of Tutsi-Hutu antagonism, combined to save Burundi from a Hutu revolt against traditional system such as occurred in Rwanda in 1959. The semi-autonomous Tutsi ruling class, rather than the Tutsi in general, was the focus point of some social protest on the part of both the Hutu and the less well placed Tutsi.

In the United Nations-supervised elections held in September, 1961, the Tutsi dominated UPRONA (Parti de l'Unite et du Progres National de Burundi) led by Prince Louis Rwagasore, the Mwani's son, won an overwhelming victory. Its success was rooted in Rwagasore's identification of UPRONA with the Mwami. Rwagasore, who became the first Prime Minister, was assassinated in October 1961 by political rivals. His murder left a legacy of fear and suspicion in Burundi politics that has not yet been dissipated.

The new government was granted internal autonomy by Belgium on January 1, 1962. In addition to granting independence, the resolution recognized the right of Burundi to make its own security arrangements. On July 1, 1962, Burundi became independent. In June 1963 a government shakeup placed a Hutu, Pieree Ngendandumwe, in the Prime Ministership for the first time.

However, the government and UPRONA remained a coalition force of Tutsi and Hutu politicians. In this one party system, the King remains the stabilizing factor between Hutu and Tutsi elements of the party. In January 1964, the government was rushed into establishing diplomatic relations with Communist China by elements of the extreme opposition. However, the King maintains a basically moderate government, and as of the writing of this report, has not officially received either the Chinese Communist or the Soviet Ambassador.

The Rwandan Tutsi refugees resident in Burundi are restless and susceptible to agitators who encourage them to return to Rwanda, or to engage in terrorist

attacks against Rwanda. Burundi finds it difficult to control these refugees with its small, ill-equipped security forces. Although extremist members of the government have voiced a desire to see the present Rwandan Government overthrown, there have been no overt acts on the part of the GKB toward this end. Its tolerance of the Chinese Communist effort to assist these Rwandan exile groups and the Congolese CLN adherents has had an adverse effect on its political relations with Rwanda and the Congo.

Burundi is a poor, overpopulated country, with extremely low living standards and an essentially subsistence economy. The per capita annual income is less than $40 per year and the annual per capita "money" income is only about $20 per year. In the past, famine caused by irregular rainfall resulted in tens of thousands of deaths. In 1952 a Belgian plan was directed toward raising the level of the economy and combat the recurring tragedy of famine. Under this plan there was impressive progress in the introduction of traditional food crops, the cultivation of marsh land, the protection of land from erosion, reforestation, creation of peasant settlements and agricultural research stations. Cash crops were also introduced. Coffee exports for Ruanda-Urundi reached 36,000 tons in 1959. The latest available figures indicate that the Ruanda-Urundi coffee crop was reduced to 22,000 tons in 1961. This resulted from the political turmoil in both countries, adverse climatic conditions and relaxation in the efforts of the people after the lifting of the Belgian control. Cotton, castor-oil plants, tobacco, palm oil and tea are also produced but the importance of these crops is secondary to coffee.

The problems associated with stock raising are an outgrowth of the fact that ownership of a cow in Burundi has greater social than economic significance. The country's known mineral resources, gold, tin, wolfram and columbo-tantalite, are meager and not suitable for large scale development. Industrial activity is still at an extremely low level.

The following are excerpts from the official Burundi national budget as it concerns national defense and the civil police forces:

	000 RBF		
	Actual 1962	Actual 1963	Proposed 1964
National Army	40,843	58,770	50,486
Surete	1,457	1,600	1,600
Gendarmerie	43,000	51,154	*51,350
Total	84,940	111,524	103,436
Total National Budget	523,628	760,000	837,800
% for Security Forces	16%	15%	12%

* The Secretary of State for Gendarmerie states he has submitted a supplementary request for RBF 37,000,000 for the construction of additional buildings.

The financial situation of Burundi is precarious. The economy is dangerously inadequate and the nation's finances utterly dependent upon outside assistance for survival. Belgian direct budgetary support for 1963 amounted to 65 million Royal Burundi francs. A balance of payment deficit of three million dollars has been predicted for Burundi in 1964. A limited economic union with Rwanda broke up in late 1963, and separate banks and services have been established for each country. The Burundi franc has an official rate of 50 = U. S. dollar and a free rate of 95 to 100 = U. S. dollar. This difference in rates has resulted in an upsurge of coffee smuggling into Tanganyika. It is estimated that this unorganized smuggling costs the GKB about one million dollars a year in foreign exchange.

The national language of Burundi is Kirundi, a Bantu tongue. French and Swahili are also spoken. Although elementary education is compulsory and free, the great majority of students do not complete primary school. It is estimated that 90% of the population is illiterate. The University of Bujumbura opened in 1960, and operated by the Catholic Jesuit Order has a student body of about 110. It should be noted that the GKB has taken advantage of all scholarships offered including those of the USSR.

The road network in Burundi totals about 3,600 miles, of which only about 60 miles are paved. About half of this paved portion of the road network is to be found in Bujumbura. This road network continually suffers from landslides and erosion caused by heavy rains. AID is presently considering a development grant for primary road maintenance. Travel by road is time consuming, difficult and during the rainy season, often impossible. There are no railroads in Burundi. Most of the equipment and supplies come into Burundi via rail from the port of Dar-es-Salaam, Tanganyika, and then by boat from Kigona, Tanganyika, to Bujumbura via Lake Tanganyika. A fairly well equipped airport at Bujumbura can receive up to DC-7 size aircraft. There is a small airport at Kitega which can accommodate only small passenger craft.

Electrical power supply in Burundi is limited to the city of Bujumbura, the provincial capital of Kitega and to Cibitoke a small village in the northwest section of the country near the Congo border. Electrical power is 220 volt, 50 cycle. Bujumbura and Cibitoke are normally supplied through Bukavu in the Congo. Each of these locations and Kitega have thermal plants for electricity.

The Ministry of Posts, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) operates and maintains a commercial teleprinter and voice connection between Brussels and Bujumbura. Bujumbura in turn is connected with the provincial capitals and four arondissements. The interior commercial connections are AM voice only. The PTT has begun to remove similar type equipment owned by it and loaned to the Ministry of the Interior, from provincial offices into the PTT locations. It expects to have commercial service in seven additional arondissements when this transfer is completed. The telephone system in Burundi is also controlled by the PTT. There are no long distance telephone connections. Bujumbura has an automatic telephone system with 1200 lines and Kitega has a manual system with 120 lines.

INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS

1. There is no evident external threat to the internal security of Burundi, except for the possible extension of present Chinese Communist influence into the National Army and the Gendarmerie. Chicom influence in the internal security forces does not exist at this time. These two forces are now under the direct command of the King, whose present pro-Western orientation is an effective barrier to any possible Chicom influence on these forces. The other barrier is the heavy Belgian advisory influence in the National Army and National Gendarmerie. This influence continues to be strong and effective. There are no foreign advisors to the National Surete, which appears to have a poor intelligence and counter-intelligence capability.

The Chicom activities in Burundi appear to be limited to the financial and propaganda support of the Congolese Committee for National Liberation, the UNAR-exterior and the Inyenzi, militant Rwandan Tutsi organizations that are attempting to overthrow the current Rwandan government, and to a newly formed trade union in Bujumbura. There are indications that cash payments have been made by the Chinese Communists to a number of Burundi politicians. The strained diplomatic relations between Burundi on one hand and Rwanda and the Congo on the other are in a great degree a result of the outward threats of these Chicom supported activities to the internal security of these two neighboring countries. In retaliation to this increasing threat, the Congolese on May 27, 1964 ordered the shutting down of the electric power supplied to the City of Bujumbura from Bukavu in the Congo.

2. The activities of the Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Burundi, while not constituting a direct internal security threat to Burundi, do pose a major problem for the internal security forces. This problem is to properly contain any violent action on the part of these refugees that might exacerbate the relations between Burundi and Rwanda. While the government of Burundi does not actively support the efforts of these refugees, there is no doubt that most Tutsi elements in the government would more than welcome the overthrow of the present Rwandan regime. Despite this sentiment the GKB has studiously avoided any accidental or actual encounter of its armed or police forces with those of Rwanda.

Inversely a number of prompt and efficient actions by the National Gendarmerie was instrumental in stopping additional bloodshed. In November 1963, four platoons of the National Gendarmerie, under GKB orders disarmed an estimated 1,800 spear carring Tutsi refugees that had congregated near the Rwandan border and escorted them back to their camps. Similar police actions against smaller Tutsi groups occurred in mid-December. There appears to be an honest effort on the part of the National Army and the National Gendarmerie to contain these refugee Tutsi incursions into Rwanda.

3. According to Burundi Gendarmerie sources there is no abnormal crime rate in Burundi, except for the city of Bujumbura and its environs. In the Provinces, the normal law abiding tendencies of the indigenous population do not tax the available Gendarmerie resources. The city of Bujumbura with a police estimated population of 70,000 has a proportionately high crime ratio. This is allegedly caused by the

cosmopolitan nature of its residents and a high percentage of unemployed and floating population. The only attempt to maintain crime statistics in the city of Bujumbura was made in the month of January 1964. This study was made by the United Nations police advisors, but was discontinued after the first monthly report. This survey indicated the following reported crimes, pointing out, however, that many Europeans fail to report thefts because of the cumbersome procedure of such reporting and the failure of the police to successfully complete their investigations:

Armed Robbery	5	
Burglary - nighttime	17	(16 complainants were African)
Burglary - daytime	11	
Other Major Crimes	7	(rape, embezzlement, etc.)
Larceny from the Person	7	
Larceny from vehicles	12	
Simple larceny	21	
Auto theft	1	

Since the turn of the year the commissariat central has increased its activities in the BSR (detective unit) and presently has 9 detectives and a number of "indicateurs", or paid informers.

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

The short history of the National Gendarmerie and the National Army in Burundi has been dominated by the success of the King in removing them from under the control of the political ministries. These two organizations are now considered to be politically oriented toward the King. The Gendarmerie and the National Army are the backbone of the internal security in Burundi. The organization, administrative and training capabilities of the National Gendarmerie are a reflection of the assistance given in these fields by foreign technicians. Any let up in this technical advice would result in a retrogression of the capabilities of this force.

The National Surete was removed from the Ministry of the Interior and placed under a new Ministry of Information and Surete. The Judicial Police remained under the Ministry of Justice. The diplomatic incident referred to in the foreward of this survey denied the survey team access to contact with GKB officials in the National Surete and the Judicial Police. The brief analyses of these two organizations were made from information received from United Nations and Belgian police advisors, government statutes and Embassy sources. From the past experience of both Belgian and United Nation advisors it is doubtful whether the information required in the terms of reference would have been forthcoming from GKB Surete officials. They have so far resisted any foreign advisory inquiry into the organizational and administrative structure of what they consider sensitive areas of intelligence. Late in 1963 a United Nations police advisor was requested by the Prime Minister (a Hutu) to conduct a survey of the Surete and to recommend organizational administrative and operational changes where required. The Minister of Information flatly turned down this endeavor, giving as a reason the classified nature of the Surete operation.

The following analysis of the internal security forces is based upon numerous meetings and discussions with National Gendarmerie officials, Belgian police advisors, United Nation police advisors, Belgian Communications technicians, copies of confidential United Nations reports, members of the American, British and Belgian Embassies and field survey trips. The locations visited in these field survey trips included the National Gendarmerie headquarters, Training School, Central Garage, regional commands at Bujumbura and Kitega; territorial commands at Bujumbura, Kitega, Ruyigi, Muramvya, Muhinga and Ngozi and Brigade commands at all the above locations in addition to Canguzo, Karuzi and Kirondo.

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

NATIONAL GENDARMERIE

1. History and Background:

During the period of Belgian trusteeship of the territory of Ruanda-Urundi, maintenance of law and order was the responsibility of a "Force Publique" composed of Congolese troops with Belgian officers. On February 12, 1949, Ordinance No. 21/22 created a "Police Teritoriale" which was given police jurisdiction over urban centers. In the territory of Urundi, detachments of this force were stationed in Bujumbura and Kitega. When trouble broke out in the Belgian Congo in September 1960, the Congolese soldiers of the Force Publique stationed in Urundi were disarmed and repatriated to the Congo. The Police Teritoriale was then increased to about 500 men with jurisdiction over the entire territory of Urundi.

On January 27, 1962, Ministerial decree No. 5 renamed the Territorial Police as the National Gendarmerie and placed it under the authority of the Minister of the Interior. A set of new rules and regulations was also adopted at this time. These rules provided for conditions of recruitment, educational requirements, uniforms, pay scale, leave time and training. The grade system of the Police Teritoriale was retained. On September 21, 1963, a Royal decree transferred the Gendarmerie from the Ministry of the Interior and placed it under the authority of a Secretary of State for the Gendarmerie. This official is directly responsible to the King. The language of this law followed generally that of the Ministerial decree No. 5. However, the para-military character of the Gendarmerie was emphasized and the police rank system converted as follows:

Premier Commissaire Chef	Lieut. Colonel
" "	Major
Commissaire Principal	Captain Commandant
Commissaire	Captain
Sous Commissaire Principal	Lieutenant
Sous Commissaire	2nd Lieutenant
Sous Commissaire Adjoint	2nd Lieutenant (Officer Candidates)
Premier Brigadier Chef	Chief Warrant Officer
Brigadier Chef	Warrant Officer
Brigadier 1st Class	Master Sergeant
Brigadier	Sergeant
Sous Brigadier 1st Class	Corporal
Gendarme 1st Class	Same Rank
Gendarme	Same Rank

Another decree issued by the Mwami on September 21, 1963 authorized foreigners then serving in the Gendarmerie to remain in the force until otherwise directed. Of the 50 Congolese and 150 Rwandans who were in the Territorial Police, a total of approximately 70 remained in the Gendarmerie. They are older men who will probably remain with the force until retirement.

2. Belgian Assistance:

Belgian technical assistance to the National Gendarmerie consists almost entirely of police advisory services. They have given no direct commodity support to this organization. The Belgian Ambassador Col. Edward Henniquiau informed the survey team that the only commodity assistance given to the Gendarmerie was the armament and vehicles left behind by the former Force Publique. The Ambassador cited that the Belgian Government is directly supporting the Burundi budget with a grant of approximately 65,000,000 RBF. The Ambassador indicated that the Belgian Government had received no requests for additional technician aid to the police services of Burundi, and that he was doubtful whether such a request if received would be entertained. He foresaw no Belgian reduction of the amount of police technicians presently assigned to Burundi. The following are the Belgian police advisors assigned to the National Gendarmerie, and all assigned to Bujumbura:

Name	Belgian Gendarmerie Rank	Assignment
DeWilde, Gilbert	Captain	Senior Belgian Advisor and Instructor at Gendarmerie School
Blairon, Michel	None	Former Belgian metropolitan police, has no rank in Belgium, Advisor to Commandant Bujumbura Region
Mascaux, Andre	Adjutant Chef	Advisor to Director of Gendarmerie School and Instructor
Melard, Simon	N. C. O.	Administrative Advisor to Secretary of State for Gendarmerie and Instructor at Gendarmerie School
Nivelle, Henri	N. C. O.	Advisor to Captain-Commandant
Joine, Gabriel	N. C. O.	Armament and Firearm Advisor

Name	Belgian Gendarmerie Rank	Assignment
Flahaut, Hubert	N. C. O.	Advisor to Finance Office Headquarters
Royer, Roland	N. C. O.	Instructor at Gendarmerie School
Mailleu, Raymond	N. C. O.	Advisor at Central Garage
Hobe, Fernand	N. C. O.	Advisor to Riot Company and Instructor at Gendarmerie School
Moulin, Leo	N. C. O.	Instructor at Gendarmerie School
Van Hoolandt, Andre	N.C. O.	Advisor to the Palace Guard
Waxweiller, Roger	None	Advisor for Judicial Police functions of the Gendarmerie. Former metropolitan police officer in Belgium.

To the knowledge of Captain DeWilde, no Chinese Communist assistance has been offered to the National Gendarmerie.

3. United Nations Assistance:

United Nations assistance program for the Gendarmerie started with the assignment of one technician in March 1963. This police advisor, assigned as technical consultant to the Captain of the Bujumbura territorial group is Mr. D. Golder, a former British colonial police official in Kenya. Mr. Golder has resigned and is leaving Burundi at the end of June 1964. In July 1963, the United Nations recruited Mr. B. Mitackis, who is presently on leave from the Metropolitan London Police Force. Mr. Mitackis, whose tour expires in December 1964, has been assigned as advisor to the Gendarmerie Police Training School. The substance of their work in the police advisory field has been the submission of several reports recommending the reorganization of the school curriculum and the construction of new buildings for the school. Both of these police advisors stated that none of their recommendations have been acted on to date, although their efforts were cordially received by the GKB and the Belgian advisors attached to the Gendarmerie. Catherine Mathers, Assistant Representative at the United Nations Technical Assistance Group in Burundi stated that the UN is planning to discontinue the police technical assistance program in Burundi at the expiration of Mr. Mitackis' tour. Both Mr. Golder and Mr. Mitackis feel that they have achieved no progress, taught no classes nor had their

recommendations acted upon. The GKB had requested the following equipment assistance from the United Nations during FY 1964: 10 Jeeps, five trucks, five station wagon type vehicles, four mobile radio sets, 400 rifles with ammunition, 1,000 tear gas grenades and 1,000 hand grenades. This request was formally turned down as not falling within the training and technical assistance concept of the United Nations. The only training aids furnished by the United Nations have been fifteen Belgian produced French language sound films on police subjects. These include criminal investigation, crime scene search, Judicial Police functions, traffice control, crowd control and physical training.

4. Mission:

The Gendarmerie is generally described by the Public Law of September 21, 1963 as a para-military organization charged with the maintenance of law and order and with law enforcement responsibilities throughout the country. Specifically, the Gendarmerie is charged under law with the following functions:

a. Continuous surveillance of streets and roads by means of day and night patrol;

b. Reports all violations of laws, decrees and regulations;

c. Collects all pertinent information on violations; detects and apprehends all violators;

d. Protects the scenes of crimes;

e. Detects and apprehends army deserters and fugitive prisoners;

f. Controls traffic on streets and highways;

g. Controls demonstrations and riots;

h. *Investigates all crimes and violations;

i. Assists and protects the Ministry of Justice Investigators, and when requested, prisons under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice;

j. Provides a Royal bodyguard to the Mwami and furnished other ceremonial guards.

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*This function is performed only by the Gendarmerie commissioned personnel who are also empowered as Officers of Judiciary Police. As such they come under the supervision and regulations of the Ministry of Justice to which they forward the findings of their Investigations (called Proces Verbal).

5. Organization and Administration:

The annex attached to this report gives the organizational structure of the Gendarmerie. The force is well organized and the thirteen Belgian advisors assigned

to it work hard at maintaining a high standard of organizational and administrative control. Even in the smallest units visited in the field, there exists a clear understanding of the structure of the force.

Essentially, the Gendarmerie is divided into one Headquarters unit, and three regions. The Headquarters staff also directly supervises the Gendarmerie School, the Riot Company, the Palace Guard and the Central Garage. Each region is subdivided into territorial commands, each co-terminal with a Province. Each territorial group is further subdivided into Brigades. The first territorial group of the Bujumbura region policies the city of Bujumbura. It functions as a traditional European urban police unit. In fact, it is still referred to under the former police terminology as the "Commissariat Central". It comprises an investigation section, a patrol section and a traffic squad. The Commissariat also houses and supervises the Bujumbura Fire Department. The Central Garage although physically located within the confines of the Commissariat is actually under Headquarters Control. There is no section in the Gendarmerie that is specifically concerned with intelligence matters.

The following Special Units exist in the Gendarmerie:

Riot Company

A Riot Company of 213 officers and men is now stationed at the Gendarmerie School in Bujumbura. It is made up of seven platoons, one of which is formed by men called in from the field on a six week rotation basis. These men are given a basic refresher course while they are in Bujumbura. The remaining six platoons of the company are made up of selected personnel ready to respond to any emergency call. One platoon is kept on ready night alert at the Commissariat Central. Two platoons guard the Central Prison on a 24 hour basis. The Commandant of the Gendarmerie School is also the commanding officer of the Riot Company.

The equipment of this company is no different from that of the rest of the Gendarmerie. However, some composition board shields and a small supply of defensive explosive grenades are available at the Commissariate Central. A Ford 1951 water gun truck with two turret nozzles and a 3,000 litre water tank is deadlined at the Central Garage. Both the water pump and the motor are beyond repair.

Central Garage

The motor transport personnel does maintenance and repair work for all the Gendarmerie units. Due to the poor conditions of the vehicles it has been found necessary to maintain a constant night shift at the garage. The personnel consist of a supervising Belgian technician and 26 Gendarmes and contract personnel as follows: Lieutenant, chief of section, one chief mechanic, nine mechanics, nine mechanics' helpers, two welders, two painters and three electricians.

Palace Guard

The Palace Guard is made up of 4 N.C.O.s and thirty-six men, under the supervision of a Belgian police advisor. These men are especially selected for these positions on the basis of their loyalty to the Mwami and their political orientation. Surprisingly enough, they are mostly of Hutu ethnical stock.

Investigative Section

The nine officers who compose this section are specialized in Judiciary Police operations. They investigate all crimes and violations brought to their attention. They report their findings directly to the office of the King's Prosecutor. They are assisted by ten contract "dectectives" who perform primarily as informers. These officers are empowered by law to negotiate the settlement of cases involving small amounts of fines. They work around the clock on the basis of eight hour shifts.

Patrol Section

This section numbers 185 in personnel and performs the regular duties of an urban police force, including street patrols and ceremonial guard duties. These men work on 12 hour shifts from 0600 to 1800 and 1800 to 0600.

Traffic Squad

The sixteen men assigned to this squad have jurisdiction over all the highways and streets of the country. In effect their traffic enforcement and control activities are centered in and around Bujumbura. They wear a distinctive Belgian style white pith helmet in place of the usual overseas cap.

Fire Department

The Fire Department consists of 28 men who man two fire engines. This fire fighting equipment consists of one 1952 Ford with a 3,000 litre water tank and one Jeep without tank. The firemen have their own quarters at the rear of the Central Garage and work on 24-hour shifts. When a fire is reported they respond along with the Central Hospital, which dispatches medical help and supplies. The firemen are not trained either in firemanics or first aid.

Detailed budget figures with line item breakdowns were not available. Gross budget figures for the National Gendarmerie secured through official government publications are as follows:

Year	Amount in 000 RBF
1962	43,000
1963	51,154 (5,000 for equipment and supplies)
*1964	51,350 (7,000 for equipment and supplies)

*Proposed for FY 1964

The Secretary of State for the Gendarmerie stated that in addition to the 1964 budget request he has submitted a supplementary request of RBF 37,000,000 for the construction of additional buildings for the riot company and new barracks and offices for the Gendarmerie in the provinces. He stated, however, that he did not expect to receive but a small portion of this request.

6. Personnel:

The number of Gendarmerie personnel by rank and location is shown in an Annex to this report. There are now 927 officers and men in the Gendarmerie, plus 21 civilian employees. It is expected that the number of officers and men will reach 1,100 by the end of 1964. The rules and regulations pertaining to officers and N.C.O.s were revised by a Royal decree dated March 6, 1964 and is as follows:

Officers

Officers must enter the Gendarmerie with the temporary rank of Second Lieutenant. Applicants must comply with the following requirements:

a. Citizen of Burundi;

b. Not less than 19 years of age;

c. Physically fit for duty;

d. At least 12 years of formal education;

e. Of good moral character;

f. Obtain required passing grade for training course given at Gendarmerie School or equivalent foreign school.

After completion of his training course, the officer candidate serves nine months in the Gendarmerie with the temporary rank of 2nd Lieutenant. If after this probationary period he obtains an above average rating, he is confirmed in his rank. To be promoted to the next higher grade officers must have served three years in rank with a satisfactory rating and pass a promotion test. In the case of Senior Officers, a list of candidates for promotion is submitted to the Mwami who selects the officers to be promoted.

Pay scales for all grades are shown in an attached Annex. A yearly step increase is allowed to officers according to their efficiency ratings, as follows: outstanding 3 1/2%, very good 3%, good 2%, fair and below average ratings receive no step increase. A random inspection of Headquarters personnel files revealed that efficiency reports are handled carefully and seriously. Ratings are given by unit commanding officers with pertinent comments. The Gendarmerie Commander upholds or modifies the rating and states the reason for his action. The Secretary of State reviews each report and gives the final rating. Until this last step the rated officer is given every opportunity to appeal. Age limits for commissioned ranks are: Lieut. Colonel 54 years, Major 54 years, all other officer grades 50 years. When an officer reaches the age limit for his rank, he is retired. Officers are allowed 30 working days annual leave, but cannot take more than 15 days at one time. In addition, officers may be allowed emergency leaves of from two to four days in cases of death in family, birth of a child and weddings of himself or a dependent child. The Gendarmerie furnishes housing to officers and their dependents or pays them a housing allowance. Medical care is furnished free.

Causes for separation from service are retirement, physical disability, resignation or dismissal. The Court of Inquiry which passes on the dismissal of an officer is composed of a senior officer as president and two junior officers.

Non-Commissioned Officers

The same regulations apply to N. C. O. s as to officers with the following exceptions: Minimum recruitment age 18, minimum education 6 years elementary school, maximum annual leave 15 working days, emergency leaves not to exceed 8 days a year, and compulsory retirement age limits as follows: Chief Warrant Officer 50, Warrant Officer 49, Master Sergeant 45 and Sergeant 45.

Gendarmes

Revised rules and regulations for the rank and file are now being prepared. The statute of January 27, 1962 included these regulations which are substantially those for the N. C. O ranks in the present statute. It was found to be impossible to fill the ranks employing these regulations. The conditions for engagement as a Gendarme will be reduced to a realistic compatability with existing educational levels.

7. Training:

The main training center of the Gendarmerie is located at Kamenge, about six miles from the center of Bujumbura. It is a large compound of 15' x 25' stone and masonry units which house one office, one conference-projection room, 4 class rooms, 1 canteen, 1 dispensary and dormitories for 150 students. Two new offices are under construction and the kitchen is being remodeled. The shower room and sanitary facilities are in poor shape and it is hoped that they will be improved when funds are made available.

The United Nations police advisors have submitted a lengthy report on this school, which criticized particularly the crowded conditions at the school. The dispensary for example, serves not only the students but all the members of the force in Bujumbura and their families. For lack of other facilities, the personnel of the Riot Company are quartered at this school. There are no immediate plans to solve this problem of overcrowding and it is felt that the School will labor under this adverse situation at the time of its planned reopening in mid-July. The school has not officially functioned since early 1963. The upcoming session is the second since Independence, and it is planned to present courses to the following groups: eighty recruits, 25 officer candidates and 20 in yet undecided specialist courses.

In the interim three Belgian advisors at the School have been supervising the instructions to the riot company platoon and the new construction and repairing of existing buildings. An additional Belgian advisor has been assigned to this school in the past three weeks. With the assistance of Captain DeWilde, senior Belgian advisor, these instructors have prepared a comprehensive syllabus for all grades. This program is rather ambitious in its scope when it is considered that only five instructors are assigned to the school. Captain DeWilde stated that he and other advisors located in Bujumbura would be assigned courses in this school, to supplement the five permanently assigned instructors. All courses are to be given in the

French language, and it is not intended to utilize the United Nations instructors because of their lack of fluency in French. The Secretary of State for the Gendarmerie has advised that the Gendarmerie is in the process of recruiting 100 men for the coming school session. The courses are as follows:

Course for recruits		52 weeks
Course for Officer Candidates		64 weeks
In Service Courses for Promotion		
Brigadier (Corporal)		12 weeks
Sergeant		16 weeks
Warrant Officer		16 weeks
Captain		16 weeks
Major		16 weeks
Specialist Courses		
Instructors	No Finalized Syllabus	———
Traffic	No Finalized Syllabus	4 weeks
Drivers	No Finalized Syllabus	6 weeks
Radio Operators	No Finalized Syllabus	8 weeks

Refresher Course - Enlisted Men

Some training is being given in the field at the territorial group level. In each camp visited, the canteen doubles as a classroom, or in larger camps as the projection room. A very rudimentary type of instruction is given at these locations by commissioned officers. Three training films supplied by the United Nations and a Gendarmerie owned 16 mm projector make the rounds from camp to camp. At most camps there is a sports field with a small amount of gymnastic equipment. The men are drilled regularly in these fields.

There is a dire need for firing range practice and firearms instruction. Some Gendarmes have never fired a shot and some officers have reported that in their entire career they have not fired more than five rounds. The new training program includes firearms practice for all students in all categories.

In mid April 1964, six National Gendarmerie officers left for the United States for a six week course. This course is in Riot Control, given in the French language under the auspices of the Office of Public Safety.

8. Transportation

The number, assignment and condition of the Gendarmerie motor vehicle equipment is shown in the motor vehicle inspection and distribution charts as Annexes to this report. The Central Garage located in the back of the Commissariat Central is uniquely the handiwork of the Belgian technician. Through his personal initiative and contacts he managed, with the aid of police mechanics, to keep a few vehicles on the road with odds and ends. Cannibalizing of older deadlined vehicles is the rule. Spare parts have to be modified in most cases, and tools are either borrowed or improvised. There is an adequate inventory system of recovered spare parts. The garage personnel are worked around the clock in an effort to keep motor equipment in working condition. The few new vehicles receive the best of care. They are serviced regularly each month, and after every trip into the interior. One driver is assigned the responsibility of each vehicle. Adequate inspection and service records are maintained for each vehicle. The Belgian advisor states that the age of the motor equipment has increased the maintenance and operation costs to the government, and that if replacement equipment were available, this cost would be considerably reduced.

9. Communications

Neither the Gendarmerie nor the National Surete has a national police radio network of its own. A national government network of fixed stations does exist, and with the exception of stations located at Gendarmerie headquarters and Surete headquarters in Bujumbura the radio stations are operated by special secretariats of the particular province or arrondissement in which the station is located. The Gendarmerie and Surete use this equipment with the permission of the provincial officials. This radio network is actually owned by the Bureau of Post, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) and was installed by them as an administrative aid to the Ministry of the Interior. This radio network, consisting of fixed stations and generators is now gradually being physically transferred from the various provincial locations and installed as either back-up equipment to existing PTT locations and eventually for the opening of new locations. It is contemplated that when this absorption is completed, the various governmental agencies now using the system would conduct all their radio traffic by way of the commercial system.

This radio network was installed in 1958, and all maintenance and repair work is done by four Belgian radio technicians assigned to the PTT. The system is AM-voice, (M.B.L.E. - Belgian manufacture) and given the scarcity of spare parts has been maintained in good operational condition. Because of the scarcity of electric power, and voltage fluctuation in areas where it exists, all of these instruments are provided with generators. This governmental network consists of the 20 stations, located as follows:

Location	Wattage	Condition	Existing Commercial PTT
Bujumbura (Province at Gendarmerie)	50	Working	Yes
Bujumbura (Surete)	50	Working	Yes

Location	Wattage	Condition	Existing Commercial PTT
Bujumbura (Radio Rwanda)	50	Working	-
Gitega (Province)	15	Working	Yes
Ngozi (Province)	15	Working	Yes
Bubanza (Province)	15	Working	Yes
Ruyigi (Province)	15	Working	Yes
Bururi (Province)	15	Working	Yes
Muyinga (Province)	15	Not working and removed to PTT	Yes
Muramvya (Province)	15	Working	Yes
Kirondo (Arondissement)	15	Working	No
Kayanzi (Arondissement)	15	Working and removed to PTT	Yes
Rumonge "	15	Working	Yes
Rutana "	15	Working	Yes
Bukirasazi "	15	Working	No
Mwisale	15	Not working	No
Cibiyoke "	15	Working	No
Cyankuzo "	15	Working	No
Makamba "	15	Working	No
Nyanza Lac "	15	Working	No

The Belgian technicians of the PTT are presently conducting a course in Morse Code for 17 operators in the PTT commercial system and 2 members of the Gendarmerie. This course is of nine months duration. According to the Belgian technicians they can train as many Morse Code operators as are needed in the country. Classes are also conducted in the theory of radio operation. These theoretical courses are preparatory ones for Burundians who will eventually receive radio maintenance and repair training. There are now eleven such radio maintenance trainees in Belgium and three in West Germany. The Chief Belgian radio technician states that wave and propagation studies have already been made in conjunction with the recent GKB purchase and installation of Single Side Band radio equipment for the National Army.

The Gendarmerie commissariat in Bujumbura is equipped with an FM radio network. This network consists of one Motorola base station, 50 watt, located at the commissariat central and is in operating condition. In addition there are six motorola non-transistorized 25 watt mobile units and thirteen stornophone (Danish Manufacture) 12 watt. Four of these mobile units are in operating condition, three in vehicles assigned to the commissariat and one located at the Royal Palace. The remaining 15 mobile sets are not operable. Of these fifteen inoperable sets, one is located at the National Army headquarters and the other at the Gendarmerie headquarters. The Belgian radio technicians stated that although his service was prepared to repair these radios with whatever spare parts they had available, the Gendarmerie has failed to present these vehicles for such repair.

10. Armament:

The Secretary of State for the Gendarmerie is reluctant to give any information on the arms and ammunition held by the Gendarmerie. He advised that the force is well provided for and that he does not intend to ask for any U. S. assistance in this field of equipment. He stated that some weapons and ammunition were purchased with 1963 Gendarmerie budget funds.

However, the survey team has been able to inspect the arms in the possession of six Gendarmerie posts. This armament consists essentially of old Mauser rifles model 1935-36 mostly in poor condition, 9 m/m automatic pistols and 9 m/m Sten submachine guns. Ammunition in the field is old and in short supply. Armament inspected in the field is as follows:

Post	No. Personnel	Mauser Rifles	Rds Ammo	Pistols	Sub. M. G.	Rds Ammo
Muranvya	18	8	98	1		10
Kitega	122	79	800	3	2	128
Ruyigi	11	10	30	2		20
Muhinga	14	11	200	1		10
Kirundo	13	9	900	2		20
Canguzo	11	6	25			

11. Buildings:

The Gendarmerie Headquarters, and the Bujumbura regional headquarters are well housed in substantial buildings and well furnished with office equipment. The Gendarmerie School buildings are also well constructed, but the crowded condition will necessitate more construction. All Gendarmerie buildings are usually of substantial brick and stone construction. Brick and stone are plentiful throughout the country. There is a constant demand for more buildings because traditionally, a Gendarme lives with his family in Government supplied camp facilities. Gendarmerie

building construction has not kept pace with the increases in the force since Independence. More often than not, office and police facilities are restricted to make room for personnel housing. The territorial group in Muranvya for example displays an impressive number of stone buildings capable of housing forty families, yet the office is restricted to an overcrowded 12' x 14' room.

Regional headquarters like Kitega form a complete village. In some instances like Ruyigi, Canguzo and Kirundo, the Gendarmerie camp is used solely for housing, while separate office space is maintained at the local provincial or arrondissement building. These provincial offices are located in the immediate vicinity of the Gendarmerie Camp. Certain brigade headquarters like Karuzi consist of round brick buildings about 10' in diameter covered with thatch roofs. In general, sanitary conditions in these camps and buildings are extremely poor. Offices are quite shabby and there is a marked absence of proper office equipment for personnel or for the storage of records.

12. Records:

The Gendarmerie headquarters records consist mainly of personnel and general correspondence files. The record bureau is well administered and all information is of a current nature. No criminal or other police records are kept at Headquarters. Accident reports, personnel reports and general administrative correspondence files are also kept by the field units. Original copies of investigation and arrest reports (Procés Verbaux) are submitted to the Judicial Police for review and presentation to the appropriate criminal court. Copies of these reports are maintained only in the unit where the investigation and/or arrest originated. No fingerprint or identification files are maintained by the Gendarmerie. Pursuant to their duties as Officers of Judicial Police, commissioned officers are required to have fingerprints taken of all arrested persons and forward such fingerprints together with the investigation and arrest report to the Judicial Police.

NATIONAL SURETE

Prior to Independence, the Surêté was actually an arm of the Belgian Surêté entirely composed of Belgian agents, who had jurisdiction within the entire territory of Ruanda-Urundi. With independence, the Surete was placed in the Ministry of Interior and its personnel became totally indigenous. In late 1963 the Surêté was removed from the Ministry of the Interior and placed in a newly organized Ministry of Information and Surêté. From January 1963 to April 1964 the Surêté was headed by Germain Bimpenda. It is now under the direction of Melenu Mbugubugu. There is no indication of any technical or training experience having been afforded to any of the agents of the Surêté. Belgian advisors to the National Gendarmerie state that there is little or no cooperation between the Surêté and the police and that from their observation there is a marked lack of experienced leadership and qualified personnel.

The total personnel strength of the Surêté is about 24, sixteen of which are assigned to the Immigration Bureau. The Surêté branch proper, consisting of about eight agents, is responsible for the investigation of subversive activities and espionage and intelligence gathering. In addition to these agents the Surêté employs a number

of paid informants throughout the country. It appears that the Sûreté primarily devotes itself to checking the political activities of the government opposition.

From all information available the Sûreté has a very low capability in the fields of subversive investigation and intelligence gathering. It suffers from the usual maladies of insufficient personnel, incompetence of leadership and existing personnel and lack of funds or equipment. There are no Belgian or other foreign advisors to the Sûreté. There is an evident antipathy on the part of Sûreté officials to the presence or advice of non-Burundi personnel. All efforts by Belgian and United Nations advisors to survey and make recommendations to this organization have been rebuffed. There is no record of any request for commodity assistance by the Sûreté.

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

JUDICIARY POLICE

1. History and Background

The National Gendarmerie has an investigative function in addition to its main responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. The Sureté also has certain criminal investigative responsibilities in addition to its primary intelligence and counter-intelligence activity. The Judicial Police has as its main function the original investigation of major crimes and the continuance of preliminary investigations made by other agencies. These Inspectors of Judicial Police although civilian are classified as Officers of the Police Judiciare, a term applied to all government officials, who by statute are deemed competent to conduct investigations of a criminal nature. Prior to Independence all Inspectors of the Judiciary Police were Belgians. All investigations reports and proceedings of a criminal nature must be forwarded to the Judicial Police for a review and transmittal to the King's Prosecutor for submission to a court of jurisdiction.

2. Belgian and other Assistance

There are three Belgian advisors assigned to the Judicial Police. Two of these are police technicians and one is a civilian administrative advisor. The two police advisors are active in the technical and investigative field. The Belgian government has provided no commodity assistance to this service.

The British Embassy advised that on March 14, 1964 they had received an unofficial request from the Kings's Prosecutor for commodity assistance to the Judicial Police. A request for an official confirmation of this desired assistance has never been answered by the GKB. If and when it is received, the British Embassy will forward it to their Foreign Office. The British Ambassador does not hold much hope that his request will be honored. This unofficial list requested the following commodities: 2 jeeps, 2 sedans, 1 prisoners' van, 20 revolvers, 35 black-jacks, 50 pairs handcuffs, 100 gas grenades, 10 typewriters, 1 base radio station, 5 mobile sets, 4 walkie-talkies, 3 restraining jackets, complete equipment for a photograph laboratory, fingerprint cameras and kits, film projector, assorted scientific laboratory instruments, tape recorders and duplicating machines.

3. Mission and Organization

The Judicial Police are directly responsible to the King's Prosecutor in the Ministry of Justice. In addition to their criminal investigation duties they are empowered to subpoena suspects and witnesses necessary to the conduct of an investigation. In some cases they may also act as prosecutors in the lower courts. This service is entirely independent of the National Gendarmerie or the Surete. According to statute the Judicial Police have the following responsibilities:

a. Investigation of all serious crimes;

b. Review of all criminal cases presented for prosecution;

c. Maintain and operate a laboratory for the adequate examination of physical evidence in criminal cases;

d. Maintain a central fingerprint file and identification system;

e. Maintain a central criminal record system.

4. Administration and Personnel

The headquarters of the Judicial Police is located in Bujumbura and a small office is maintained at Kitega. Total personnel in addition to three Belgian advisors consists of a Chief Inspector and 16 Inspectors, 2 of whom are detached to Kitega. There are three in the clerical staff at headquarters. The Judicial Police also employ 13 "detectives", who are in actuality paid informers, with no investigative authority.

5. Training

Information indicates that the members of the Judicial Police have received no formal training in criminal investigation. Their only exposure to this type of police work has been on a working level with the Belgian advisors. Officials of the National Gendarmerie advise that no requests have been received to enroll Judicial Police officers in the officers' courses at the training school. These courses offer instructions in the police sciences and legal background pertinent to the duties of Judiciary Police.

6. Records, Identification and Equipment

All records of the Judicial Police are kept at headquarters in Bujumbura. There is no information available on the quantity or quality of the records and identification system of this organization. It is the only repository of criminal records and fingerprint and identification records in Burundi. It is understood that all fingerprint classification and filing is done by a Belgian technician. There is no information available on the equipment held by this service. The crime laboratory has been closed allegedly due to lack of funds for the purchase of equipment. It is evident that the list of equipment needs for the Judicial Police as submitted to the British Embassy was drawn up by the Belgian advisors.

COMMUNAL POLICE

There are 180 communes in Burundi, governed by a Bourgmestre (communal mayor) and an elected communal council. The Bourgmestre is appointed by the King from among the elected members of this council. The various common councils have the authority to appoint members to a force known as the Communal police. Upon appointment they are under the authority of the Bourgmestre. Their number varies from five to ten, according to the size and population of the commune. There are no qualifications for this position, which is usually filled on the basis of nepotism.

The members of this force are not uniformed, have no equipment or training, and it is estimated that they are 90% illiterate. Their main duties consist in guarding the communal buildings, overseeing the public markets and presumably to maintain public order in the communes.

There has been no attempt on the part of the Belgian advisors or of the National Gendarmerie officials to organize or train these so-called police organizations, and they are totally disregarded by the established internal security forces.

Legislation governing the Gendarmerie states that members of the Gendarmerie can be placed at the disposition of the communal authorities by the Secretary of State for the Gendarmerie if the circumstances warrant such action.

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

NATIONAL ARMY

Although the National Army is not included in the terms of reference for the survey team there are certain occasions under which it can be employed as an adjunct to the civil police authorities in the maintenance of internal security. The Constitution of the GKB vaguely states that the National Army shall assist in the maintenance of internal security. The Royal decree of September 21, 1963, which established the National Gendarmerie under a Secretary of State also stipulated under what conditions the National Army could be used in internal security matters. The Secretary of State for the Gendarmerie, with the approval of the King can request the assistance of the National Army in cases where he feels that the means at his disposal are not capable of maintaining or re-establishing law and order. In case of such need and requisition, the King would designate the responsible commander of the joint operation. If no direct choice is made, the command falls automatically to the superior officer present, whether Army or Gendarmerie. An example of this command function occurred in November 1963 when a joint operation of the National Army and Gendarmerie for the disarming of Rwandan Tutsi refugees fell under the command of the Secretary of State for the Gendarmerie who was the ranking officer at the scene. No contacts were made or conversations held with either National Army officials or their Belgian advisors and the following information is a condensation of USARMA report dated February 15, 1964.

The military force of Burundi prior to Independence (July 1, 1964) consisted of that portion of the Force Publique assigned to the territory of Urundi. It consisted mainly of Congolese soldiers, officered by Belgians. At the time of the turnover of military authority to the GKB, there were about 40 Belgian military advisors. The Congolese troops of the Force Publique were let out and a force of about 600 GKB citizens were enlisted into the National Army. The Army was organized under a Minister of National Defense, with a Burundian Commandant. In September of 1963 by Royal decree, the Ministry of Defense was abolished and the National Army placed under a Secretary of State for the National Army, directly responsible to the King. The then Commandant of the National Army was elevated to the rank of Secretary of State and his second in command became Commandant of the Army. There are presently 31 Belgian military advisors, who range from the rank of Lieut. Colonel to Adjutant Chef. The Belgian military advisors are assigned to all levels of command and line companies, acting as "shadow" commanders to their Burundian counterparts. A number of these advisors are also assigned to the officers school and the instruction company. There are 14 officers and six NCO's of the National Army attending training courses in Belgium.

The Constitution of the GKB stipulates that all male citizens having completed their studies in humanities or their secondary schooling must do one year of military service. Service in the military takes precedence over all other governmental services. After one year of duty these militiamen are placed on a 20 year reserve basis, subject to recall for a maximum of 75 days.

ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH

Bujumbura	Headquarters	35	Officers and men
Bujumbura	Officers School	38	Officers and men
Bujumbura	Base Unit	102	Officers and men
Bujumbura	Line Company	122	Officers and men
Bujumbura	Military Police Co.	72	Officers and men
Kitega	Line Company	122	Officers and men
	This company is categorized as a Commando Company.		
Ngozi	Line Company	122	Officers and men
	This company rotates at platoon strength at Kirondo on the Rwandan border.		
Bururi	Instruction Company	237	Officers and men
	This company varies in size.		

The total estimated strength of the National Army in February 1964 was 927 Officers and men, plus 31 Belgian Military Advisors.

EQUIPMENT

The National Army possesses 83 pieces of transportation equipment, inherited from the former Belgian military force. These include Jeeps and trucks. The Army has just purchased a 150 watt TKT (French manufacture) base station and four 40 watt stations. This equipment was recently installed by Belgian radio technicians of the PTT. Two more 40 watt stations are on order. Previous to this acquisition the Army had six Motorola FM stations.

ARMAMENT

The following armament in the possession of the National Army was left behind by the former Belgian military forces: 98 9mm pistols, 122 sub-machine guns, 1,006 Lee Enfield rifles, 144 Mauser rifles, 177 FAL rifles, 60 FALO automatic rifles, 14 grenade launchers (fitted to FAL rifles), and four 2 inch mortars. There is no ammunition for the mortars, but ammunition for the other weapons is in ample supply.

The National Army has an S/2-S/3 operation, which mainly concerns itself with administrative matters. Intelligence and counter-intelligence activities are practically non-existent.

TIMING OF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Chart No. 1

	1st Month	2nd Month	3rd Month	4th Month	5th Month	6th Month	7th Month	8th Month	9th Month to End of Project
Transportation Equipment	Program Approval AID/W	Pro/Ag Signed PIO/C Prepared	Procurement, Priority C - Arrival - Equipment						
Communication Equipment	Program Approval AID/W	Pro/Ag Signed PIO/C Prepared	Procurement Process Priority A-Air Freight			Arrival & Installation. Equipment Completed.			
Technician		Arrival full tour technician - supervise operations full tour and TDY Communications.							
Generalist		Advisors, prepare all documentations for implementation of program, participate with foreign police advisors in training and technical advice supporting U.S. equipment, select, orient and document participant trainees, complete survey National Surete and Judicial Police, develope programs for active assistance to these internal security forces.							
Communication Technician	Arrival TDY Technician	Depart TDY Technician	Arrival full-tour technician, finalize site, preparation and installation plans with PTT, supervise installation of system, prepare and conduct basic courses for police school and operators; prepare radio operating manual and administrative and operational forms for use of system, install inventory system for equipment and spare parts, assist in selection, orientation and documentation of participant trainees, supervise continued maintenance by PTT.						
Participants					Selected, and given orientation training in programmed communications equipment and documented for one-year radio maintenance course. Selected and given orientation for participant training in criminal investigation and riot control.				

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Chart No. 2

ESTIMATED PROJECT COSTS

12	Single Side Band fixed stations, 50 watt, voice and CW, 4 channel 220 volt AC 50 cycle with antenna and 10% spare parts, including lot of FM radio spare parts. each at $1,600	$ 19,200
12	1 1/2 KW gasoline driven generators at $500 each	6,000
1	Complete set of testing equipment	2,000
	Air freight and insurance	8,000
15	Four x four; 3/4 ton patrol vehicles, six passenger, 10% spare parts, plus freight and insurance, each at 3,000	45,000
	Shop equipment, including freight and insurance	2,800
	Total Equipment	$ 83,000

Total Project Cost

Commodities	$ 83,000
TDY Technicians	5,000
Full tour technician - two years	40,000
Participants 12 at $3,000 each 2 at $5,000 each (radio maintenance)	46,000
TOTAL	$ 174,000

KINGDOM OF BURUNDI

Chart No. 3

ORGANIZATION OF THE GENDARMERIE



Chart No. 4

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL NATIONAL GENDARMERIE

	Officers	NCOs	Gend.	Civilians	Total
Office of The Secretary of State	3		2	2	7
Headquarters - Gendarmerie	7		41	8	56
Riot Company	2	4	202	5	213
North Region Headquarters Kitega	1	4	35		40
Kitega Territorial Command	3		6		9
Kitega Brigade	1	3	64		68
Karuzi Brigade			10		10
Ngozi Territorial Command	1		1		2
§ Ngozi Brigade	1		17		18
Kayanza Brigade	1		17		18
Muninga Territorial Command	1		1		2
Muhinga Brigade			11		11
Kirundo Brigade	2		11		13
South Region Headquarters Nyanza Lac	2	1	21	3	27
Bururi Territorial Command	1		1		2
Bururi Brigade		1	7		8
Makamba Brigade		1	7		8
Rumonge Brigade	1		18		19
Nyanza Lac Brigade		1	11		12
Muramvya Territorial Command	1		1		2
Muramvya Brigade			10		10
Mwaro Brigade			5		5
Ruyigi Territorial Command	1		1		2
Ruyigi Brigade	1		10		11
Rutana Brigade	1		9		10
Canguzo Brigade			11		11
Bujumbura Region Headquarters	1	1	2	3	7
Fire Department		1	27		28
Bujumbura Territorial Command	2		22		24
Traffic Squard			16		16
Investigative Section	9				9
Patrol Section		4	181		185
Bubanza Territorial Command	1		1		2
Bubanza Brigade			10		10
Cibitoke Brigade			10		10
Mwisale Brigade			7		7
Butara Brigade	1		11		12
Royal Bodyguard		4	36		40
Gendarmerie School	1	2	1		4
TOTAL	46	27	854	21	948

PRESENT DISTRIBUTION VEHICLES - NATIONAL GENDARMERIE

Chart No. 5

	1957 Jeep Willys Poor Condition	1958 Jeep Minerva Poor Condition	Cars Other Good Condition	Lt. Trucks Good Condition	Heavy Trucks	Other
Bujumbura Headquarters	1	1	2	1		*1 truck water call
Bujumbura Mobile Group					4	
Bujumbura School	1			1		
Bujumbura Palace Guard		5				
Bujumbura Garage			1		*1	*1 Tow Truck
Bujumbura Fire Dept.	1				*1	*2 Fire Trucks
Bujumbura Region Hdqtrs.	9		1	1	2	
Bujumbura Bubanza		1				
Bujumbura Butara		1				
North Region - Gitega		2			2	
North Region - Ngozi		1				
North Region - Kayanza	1					
North Region - Muhinga		1				
North Region - Kirondo		1				
South Region Nyanza Lac	1	1				
South Region Bururi		1				
South Region Murumvya		1				
South Region Ruyigi		1				

*Poor Condition

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VEHICLE INSPECTION CHART - NATIONAL GENDARMERIE

Chart No. 6

VEHICLE #	YEAR & MAKE	MILEAGE Kms.	VEHICLE #	YEAR & MAKE	MILEAGE Kms.	VEHICLE #	YEAR & MAKE	MILEAGE Kms.
G-005	1957 Willys Jeep	110905	G-053	1958 Minerva	77967	G-105	1959 Magirus Truck	63880
006		160058	054		85986	106		56203
007		90651	055		111913	107	1957 Chev. Truck	76252
008		91621	057		89144	159	1958 Bedford Truck	61429
009		110000	058		92023	161	1952 Ford Truck	54937
010		86121	059		85986	163	1963 Int. Truck	4650
012		96125	060		116635	164		4345
015		98766	061		96854	165		3506
017		94628	062		73032	166		3332
019		98999	064		89041	209	1963 Peugeot Truck	6453
020		74122	065		98110	210		6800
022		98010	067		82958	211		5720
024		87299	068		73991	212		4275
025		62176	069		78126	250	1960 Volkswagon	53895
026		102136	102	1959 Magirus Truck	57808	252		53556
050	1958 Minerva	98074	103		51672	254		47173
051		119144	104		46170	256	1963 Peugeot	27010
052		107935						

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PAY SCALE NATIONAL GENDARMERIE in RBF

Chart No. 7

RANK	Annual Salary	Monthly Allow. Wife	(each) Monthly Allow. Child 0-5 years	Child 5-10 years	Child over 10	Allowance Housing
Lieutenant Colonel	185,000	328	142	220	298	120
Major	180,000	328	142	220	298	120
Captain Commandant	150,000	328	142	220	298	120
Captain	125,000	328	142	220	298	120
Lieutenant	96,000	328	142	220	298	120
Second Lieutenant	84,000	328	142	220	298	120
Second Lieutenant (Temporary)	79,840	328	142	220	298	120
Chief Warrant Officer	58,692	75	32	50	68	120
Warrant Officer	48,684	75	32	50	68	120
Master Sergeant	43,692	75	32	50	68	120
Sergeant	37,440	75	32	50	68	120
Corporal	31,836	75	32	50	68	120
L/Corporal	23,604	75	32	50	68	120
Gendarme 1st class	21,204	75	32	50	68	120
Gendarme	18,804	75	32	50	68	120

* All members of the Gendarmerie receive a bonus of 500 RFB on the birth of a child, who lives for at least 6 months.

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MAP-1



GEOGRAPHICAL AND MAIN ROADS

GENDARMERIE AND MILITARY DETACHMENT LOCATIONS MAP-2



REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS
TERRITORIAL GROUP HEADQUARTERS
BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY DETACHMENT

RECOMMENDED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM MAP-3



Bujumbura	(1)	Gendarmerie Headquarters
	(1)	Territorial Command
	(1)	Palace Guard
Provinces	(7)	Territorial Commands

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND PERSONS INTERVIEWED

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Representatives of the National Gendarmerie, the United Nations, Belgian and British Embassies and Belgian technical advisors to the National Gendarmerie, Bureaus of Post, Telegraph and Telephone cooperated fully with the survey team and were the principal sources of information. The following persons were interviewed during the course of this survey:

UNITED STATES EMBASSY

Ambassador Donald Dumont, Bujumbura

Mr. Ernest Stanger, DCM

Col. Arnold Alexander, ARMA, Rwanda and Burundi

Mr. Martin Bergin, Political Officer, Burundi (also covers Rwanda)

Mr. Jay Katzen, Third Secretary

Mr. Joel Ticknor, Third Secretary

Mr. Jacob Gillespie, Asst. PAO, USIS

BELGIAN

Ambassador Edward Henniquiau

Captain Gilbert DeWilde, senior police advisor, National Gendarmerie

Captain Michel Blairon, police advisor, National Gendarmerie

Lieut. Henri Nivelle, police advisor, National Gendarmerie

Lieut. Roland Royer, police advisor, National Gendarmerie

Lieut. Raymond Mailleu, police advisor, National Gendarmerie, Central Garage

Mr. Odilon Deschrijvery, Chief technician, PTT

Mr. Franz Dillen, technician, PTT

Mr. Alain Thys, technician at Regideso (public utilities)

BRITISH

Ambassador John Bennett

UNITED NATIONS

Miss Katherine Mathers, Asst. to Representative of United Nations Technical Assistance Bureau

Mr. D. Golder, Police Advisor

Mr. B. Mitackis, Police Advisor

ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF BURUNDI

Mr. Pascal Magenge, Secretary of State for the Gendarmerie

Captain-Commandant Antoine Serukwavu, Commandant National Gendarmerie

Lieut. Andre Rurajuragiza, Aide to Secretary of State for the Gendarmerie

Lieut. Mathias Bahamiyakawme, Territorial Commander, Muramvya Gendarmerie

Lieut. Joseph Nzibarage, Territorial Commander, Muyinga Gendarmerie