


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**A SUPPLEMENTARY SURVEY  
OF THE NATIONAL POLICE FORCES**



**REPUBLIC of the IVORY COAST**

REVIEWED AND DECONTROLLED by Lauren J.  
Goin, Director, OPS; January 29, 1975

**January/February 1966**

**OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY**

**AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

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A SUPPLEMENTARY SURVEY  
OF THE NATIONAL POLICE FORCES  
OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF  
THE IVORY COAST

By

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January/February 1966

Office of Public Safety  
Agency for International Development  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
FOREWORD . . . . .	1
SUMMARY. . . . .	3
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. . . . .	4
INTERNAL SECURITY THREATS AND PROBLEMS . . . . .	9
INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES . . . . .	13
National Army . . . . .	16
National Gendarmerie. . . . .	18
Surete Nationale. . . . .	20
 ANNEXES	
Chart 1 - Estimated Project Costs . . . . .	30
Chart 2 - Surete Nationale Distribution Personnel . . . . .	32
Chart 3 - Surete Nationale Planned Personnel Increase . . . . .	33
Chart 4 - Surete Nationale Distribution Vehicles. . . . .	34
Chart 5 - Surete Nationale Planned New Posts. . . . .	35
 APPENDIX	
Acknowledgements and Persons Interviewed. . . . .	36

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## FOREWORD

In May of 1962 an AID/W public safety team conducted a survey of the civil police forces (Surete Nationale) of the Government of the Ivory Coast. The recommendations of this survey group resulted in the inauguration of a public safety program in the Ivory Coast which consisted of commodity, technician and participant training elements. The FY 1962 and FY 1963 Project Agreements included 36 vehicles, a VHF radio net for Abidjan consisting of one base station, 15 mobile and two walkie-talkie units, a single side band net for the interior which included nine base stations, and 10 mobile units, spare parts for radios and vehicles and small amounts of armament, emergency police, traffic, auto shop, office and training equipment and U.S. participant training for four Ivorian police officers. A Chief Public Safety Advisor, a logistics/supply advisor and a communications advisor were assigned in late 1962 to implement this public safety project. The last U.S. technician left in June of 1964.

As a result of vastly increasing demands upon the limited capability of the Surete, intensified by problems of internal security arising mostly from subversive activities of Ghana, the GOIC made a request for additional commodity assistance for an expanding Surete Nationale. The recent withdrawal of major elements of French military tactical forces in the Ivory Coast has also influenced the GOIC decision to increase and improve its civil police internal security forces.

A joint State/AID message assigned Chief Public Safety Advisor John Manopoli to update the previous survey. Mr. Manopoli arrived in Abidjan on January 26, 1966, and completed his part of the survey on February 4, 1966. The communications section of the survey was conducted by the Public Safety Communications Advisor Rene L. Tetaz, who spent two days (May 6-7) in Abidjan. All activities were conducted under the policy and administrative direction of the United States Ambassador in accordance with the following terms of reference:

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- a. Determine nature of current threat as related to civil law enforcement operation.
- b. Determine GOIC Civil Security Force capabilities, including jurisdiction, mission, size, organization, administration, operations, equipment, training facilities and personnel as an updating of the April/May 1962 survey.
- c. Determine GOIC's ability to provide adequate budget support for police, make recommendations regarding improvement of GOIC civil force capabilities.
- d. Determine extent and nature of other donor country assistance.
- e. List commodities already submitted GOIC not to be regarded as binding on survey recommendations, but as preliminary material to be critically assessed in light of over-all findings of survey.

It is suggested that this report be read in conjunction with the police survey of April/May 1962, which, except for the updating of internal security problems, the changes in internal security force structure (both civil and military), and the commodity requirements of the Surete Nationale, is still valid.

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SUMMARY

The salient points presented in this report are as follows:

1. The pro-western Government of the Ivory Coast and particularly the regime of its anti-Communist President is being confronted with increasing subversive pressures from several Chicom-oriented neighboring West African states.

2. This situation, while not constituting an immediate danger, has a potential for creating a serious internal security and maintenance of order threat against the nation and its institutions.

3. The internal security forces consisting of the National Gendarmerie and the Surete Nationale are not properly led, trained, equipped nor have sufficient numbers to respond to the possible multiplication of internal security problems.

4. GOIC efforts at self-help, in spite of its good economic posture and its budgetary ability to operate needed equipment, has provided insufficient quantities of equipment for its internal security forces.

5. The withdrawal of French military units, the reduction in French police advisory assistance and GOF refusal to provide commodity assistance to the internal security forces of the GOIC has adversely affected the burgeoning requirements for GOIC internal safety.

6. The GOIC has turned to the U.S. for commodity assistance to the Surete Nationale, its only civil police force. The U.S., while continuing to urge French primacy in police assistance, has a political responsibility to support the anti-Chicom efforts of the GOIC.

7. The survey recommends that U.S. commodity, participant training and technician assistance of a modest size, confined to the basic transportation and communications needs of the Surete Nationale, be provided in response to the GOIC request for such assistance.

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

1. There is no immediate discernable internal security threat confronting the GOIC. However, there is a serious latent problem stemming from the GOIC's and President Houphouet Boigny's firm opposition to Chinese Communist activities in this portion of Africa. This opposition to Communist penetration has severely strained relations with neighboring countries more amenable to Communist blandishments. In the case of Ghana's opposition to GOIC policies it has reached more alarming proportions. Further, the removal of President Houphouet from the scene would be welcomed by Ghanaian and Guinean leaders. Any drastic change of GOIC policy vis-a-vis Communist penetration into the Entente area and/or the supplanting of Houphouet would detrimentally affect U.S. political objectives in West Africa.

2. The GOIC internal security forces concerned with civil police functions and the maintenance of law and order now number 2,800 (National Gendarmerie 1,350, Surete Nationale 1,450). This number is insufficient to properly perform the assigned internal security responsibilities in a country of more than 4,000,000 inhabitants, of 124,000 square miles, with 1,400 miles of frontier with five countries. The factors impinging the Surete Nationale, the only constitutional civil police force, from maintaining law and order in the event of serious internal disorders are poor mobility of its forces, a serious gap in communications capability, a difficulty in maintaining vehicle and communications equipment, under-experienced officers and the lack of sufficient educated personnel to pursue courses in police instruction. These limiting factors are also present in the National Gendarmerie, which has law and order responsibilities concurrent with those of the Surete Nationale.

3. With the withdrawal of a substantial number of French military tactical units the GOIC has become more aware of the insufficiency of its present civil police forces to meet the internal security requirements of the country. To answer this problem President Houphouet

Boigny has ordered an increase in personnel of the Surete Nationale and has enlarged its mission. Further, there are strong indications that he considers an enlarged civil police as a counterfoil to a possible threat to his regime by preponderant GOIC military forces. The planning for the disposition of an enlarged Surete extends its patrol and law enforcement activities into rural areas hitherto the domain of the National Gendarmerie and increases emphasis on border control activities and intelligence gathering. While not multiplying the number of internal security forces, this enlargement of the Surete is creating a parallel structure with a Gendarmerie force concurrently charged with civil police responsibilities.

4. French technician assistance to the internal security forces of the GOIC is primarily in the military sector. There are 185 advisors to the National Army, 36 advisors to the National Gendarmerie and 20 to the Surete Nationale. It has been indicated that French technician assistance to the Surete Nationale will be slowly reduced, except for instructors assigned to the National Police School. There is not now a French auto maintenance advisor and the communications technician's contract, expiring in mid-1966, may not be renewed.

5. French commodity assistance is entirely in the training field. A grant of 60 million CFA (\$240,000) has been made for the construction of a new National Police Training Center. The proper training of Surete personnel since independence has been adversely affected by the limited capacity of its present training center. French technical assistance to the training program and the curricula presented has been adequate. With the construction of a new training center, due to open in October of 1966, there should be an appreciable increase in the number and quality of Surete graduates of all ranks. With the pronounced GOIC policy of Africanization of cadres and the gradual departure of French police advisory personnel continued French endeavors in the training field are of paramount importance. The GOF has turned aside GOIC requests for transportation and communications equipment. It is most certain that continued refusal to requests of this nature will remain a GOF policy.

6. The Surete Nationale has a fleet of 105 vehicles. About 50% of these vehicles are in poor condition or deadlined, among them 50% of the USAID vehicles supplied in 1963. The motor maintenance facilities of the Surete are in a deplorable condition. Although an adequate garage and shop compound is now available, the absence of an auto maintenance technician has seriously affected the auto maintenance capability of the Surete Nationale. The existing fleet due to advanced age, poor maintenance experience and the requirements of an expanding force, is insufficient. Any additional vehicle commodity assistance to the Surete Nationale without the presence of a U.S. auto maintenance technician and additional shop maintenance equipment should not be considered.

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7. The present communications network of the Surete Nationale, consisting primarily of USAID supplied and installed equipment, gives the Surete Nationale a limited contact between the capitol and the interior. It has been well maintained by the present French communications advisor. With the planned expansion of services and installations, a deficiency in proper communications with the interior is inevitable. Additional communications capability is required to assure that the additional personnel and installations in the interior and along the frontiers become viable instruments for internal security improvement. In light of the probable departure of the French communications technician, it is of paramount importance that a U.S. technician assure the installation and maintenance of this equipment, together with conducting a program of training for Ivorian police communications technicians.

8. The planned rate of expansion in personnel and installations for the Surete Nationale over the next five years requires additional transportation and communications equipment. The past and present budgets for the Surete Nationale indicate a financial ability to support additional equipment. However, despite self-help efforts as evidenced by the 1965 purchase of 21 vehicles, the allocation of funds for Surete buildings and for the Training Center, the GOIC has not been able fully to provide equipment necessities.

9. In support of the planned GOIC expansion of the Surete Nationale, future U.S. technical and commodity support should be predicated on continued GOIC budgetary support of the Surete Nationale, self-help toward the procurement of needed equipment and the retention of the French technical advisors, particularly at the National Police School. Based on the meeting of these criteria, and U.S. Government policy/strategy considerations, AID/W should consider the establishment of an on-going public safety project echeloned to meet a portion of the commodity requirements of the expanding Surete Nationale. This would include funding needs for a modest amount of commodities, participant training, and technician support.

10. As the Ivory Coast is the nerve center of both the Entente and OCAM, and in the face of inadequate French commodity support, it is highly important for the U.S. to supply some of the Surete Nationale commodity and technician needs as a tangible demonstration of our political support to one of the leading African moderate states in its efforts to check direct and indirect Communist subversion in this general area of Africa.

Recommendations

1. In view of the consistently pro-western posture of the GOIC, it would serve present U.S. policy objectives and interests in

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West Africa to assist the GOIC in its efforts to improve the capabilities of its civil police forces to respond to any threat to the nation or its institutions. It is recommended that a favorable response be made to the GOIC request for commodity assistance to the Surete Nationale.

2. In addition, oral requests for vehicle and communication commodity assistance to the National Gendarmerie have been made to the Ambassador and the Defense Attache office. Although under the Minister of the Armed Forces, the primary mission of the Gendarmerie is nevertheless in the civil police field. The composition, disposition and training of its personnel make it, for the moment, a substantial force contributing to the maintenance of public law and order in the rural areas of the Ivory Coast. With the GOIC's apparent emphasis on the Surete Nationale as the primary civil police force, no official request for commodity assistance to the Gendarmerie might be forthcoming. However, if such a demand is made, it is recommended that, in the event of a GOIC change of emphasis on improvement of internal security forces, the U.S. should consider commodity support to the National Gendarmerie.

3. It is recommended that, consistent with U.S. policy/strategy consideration, U.S. commodity, participant and technician support to the Surete Nationale be continued through FY 1968. It should be echeloned to accommodate the vehicle and communications needs of the Surete Nationale not met by either the GOIC or the GOF, as the Ivory Coast meets its declared goals of increased personnel and the establishment of commissariats and frontier posts. Indicated planning figures for FY 1967 only are indicated in the attached Estimated Project Costs. It is recommended that the following commodity, participant and technician assistance be implemented by a FY 1966 public safety program.

4. It is recommended that 19 additional vehicles and spare parts equivalent to 10 percent of the value of the vehicles be furnished to the Surete Nationale. Five sedan-type patrol vehicles and one ambulance for the Abidjan city police, six patrol vehicles and six personnel carriers for the additional six commissariats planned for 1966 (Attiekoube, Bouaffle, Lakota, Port Bouet, Sinfra, and Tiassale), and one station wagon-type vehicle for transportation of personnel, equipment and spare parts used in support of the communications network and one personnel carrier vehicle for the transportation of students and other activities of the new National Police Training Center.

5. It is recommended that communications equipment and spare parts equivalent to 10% of the value of the sets be furnished as follows: Ten 20 watt SSB compatible AM transceivers with generators for the Commissariats of Adzope, Sassandra and Port Bouet and the frontier posts of Ayame, Adiake, Assinie, Danane, Toulepleu, Tabou and Quangolodougou; six 20 watt SSB transceivers for police command car use

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at the Commissariats of Bouake, Korhogo and Daloa, including CRS companies and one spare; ten FM-5 base stations, 20 FM-5 mobile units, and four FM-1 transceivers to be located in Abidjan. It is also recommended that replacement parts be provided for communications equipment previously supplied by the U.S.

6. It is recommended that a third echelon group of motor maintenance tools and equipment be provided to insure the maintenance of U.S. furnished transportation commodities and to assist in the repair and maintenance of other vehicles in the Surete Nationale motor fleet.

7. It is recommended that U.S. excess property sources be used to furnish basic furnishings, kitchen equipment and other commodities adaptable to the needs of the Security Companies of the Surete Nationale.

8. It is recommended that participant training be offered to the Surete Nationale on the basis of U.S. training for two participants for the Special Course (riot control), two participants for automotive maintenance (U.S. sponsored in Togo), and two participants for extended courses in radio maintenance.

9. It is recommended that a full tour French-speaking public safety advisor--logistic/supply/auto maintenance--be assigned to this program. He shall actively participate in the training and technical advice required to assure the establishment of proper maintenance, inventory and supply management procedures for the Surete Nationale motor fleet. He shall assess the feasibility of additional equipment and training assistance to the Surete Nationale. He will prepare reports and other documentation required for program implementation.

10. It is recommended that a full tour French-speaking Public Safety Advisor (Communications) be assigned to this program to prepare sites, install equipment, conduct basic operator courses, instruct in administrative and operational control of a police communications network for superior officers, prepare radio operator's manuals and forms required for a communications system, install an inventory system for equipment and spare parts, oversee the continued installation, maintenance and operation of the communications system until such time that Ivorian technicians can assume full responsibility.

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INTERNAL SECURITY THREATS AND PROBLEMS

Because of the staunch anti-Communist stand of the GOIC and its President, the prime internal security threat to the GOIC is subversion of the Government and the possible overthrow of President Houphouet Boigny by the actions of Communist-oriented neighboring countries, particularly Ghana, and to a lesser extent Guinea and Mali.

Ever since the Ivory Coast obtained its independence in 1960, staunchly pro-western anti-Communist President Houphouet Boigny has played a dominant role in its policy direction. He is generally acknowledged as the leader, and personifies whatever national unity exists in the multi-tribal Ivory Coast. He has provided strong and acceptable leadership for internal stability. Thus far, the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast (PDCI) has effectively fused divergent segments of Ivorian society into a semblance of unity. However, he is not now looked upon as infallible on domestic or foreign policies, as demonstrated by his recent unsuccessful efforts to implement dual nationality. An internal opposition of students, labor and disaffected civil servants fanned by anti-Government propaganda, is an ever present possibility in the Ivory Coast.

Houphouet is particularly vulnerable to propaganda attacks from the radical states because of his moderate positions and because he is considered the acknowledged champion of moderate African causes and an instrument and symbol of western policies. Houphouet has also been a leading vocal opponent to Chinese Communist machinations in Africa. He is suspected of having been the prime mover in getting the Government of Dahomey to expel the Chinese Communist mission from Cotonou. Houphouet is strongly disliked by the radicals for his primary role in getting the Congo (Leopoldville) into the OCAM and for building it up into a powerful organization of anti-Communist orientation.

The recent military takeover in Africa, specifically Upper Volta and Nigeria, with which the Ivory Coast had very good relations, prompted Houphouet to appeal to France to reactivate the 4th (RIOM)

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Regiment at Port Bouet until such time as the political situation in West Africa becomes more stable. According to the best information presently available, it appears that the French Army units will be maintained here certainly until 31 March 1966, and probably until July of this year.

Withdrawal of French units will leave a security vacuum which the Ivorians will not be fully able to fill. The absence of French troops could encourage and tempt would-be anti-Houphouet plotters, whether external or internal, to undertake stepped-up political action initiatives and/or a coup.

The French are expected to withdraw some key personnel from the Surete Nationale even though the Ivorians presently lack qualified personnel to fill some of these important posts. Due to increased pressures, Houphouet and others in his Government have felt it necessary to pay more immediate attention to the problem of Africanization. All responsible Ivorian and French officials charged with security matters have felt that the Ivorian security forces need better communication and transportation facilities to monitor and control internal and border security threats in a more professional manner.

The GOIC has forwarded frequent and repeated requests to the French to provide assistance in the communications and transportation sector. These requests have been regularly turned down by the French on the grounds that assistance was being used on other worthwhile endeavors, i.e., police school. The French, however, felt that GOIC's concern for better communication/transportation facilities is well founded and suggested that Ivorians seek assistance elsewhere, preferably from the USA or West Germany.

This French position, coupled with the withdrawal of sizeable French military tactical forces, has reinforced the GOIC desire not to be dependent entirely on the French for assistance.

Although there are no enlarged internal security threats to the GOIC, there are, however, a number of situations with a potential for aggravating the internal security problems of the GOIC.

1. The Ivory Coast's relations with Ghana are extremely poor and there is visible evidence of Ghana's subversive effort against the GOIC. President N'Krumah of Ghana had made territorial claims on portions of the Ivory

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Coast. He is continuing to support the Sanwi tribe, which is anti-Houphouet. There have been a series of Ivory Coast-Ghana border incidents including abductions, imprisonments, and skirmishes resulting in casualties. Tension between the Ivory Coast and Ghana increased considerably following the boycott of Entente countries of the OAU summit meeting held in Accra in October of 1965. There is no indication that these disputes will be settled in the near future. U.S. Embassy/Ghana reports state that Ghana is henceforth concentrating its intelligence collection, subversion activities and political action against the Entente states, particularly the Ivory Coast.

2. Relations with Guinea are also frayed, although the threat of subversion from that quarter is less than that from Ghana. However, Houphouet's disappearance would be a prize coup for Sekou Toure, whose recent diatribes against Houphouet necessitated appeals to calm by the latter to avoid acts of retribution against the Guinean community, which numbers 200,000 in the Ivory Coast.
3. During the past year both Algeria and the UAR have established diplomatic missions in Abidjan. It is known that representatives of these countries have been trying to establish ties with the internal opposition with the ultimate aim of giving comfort to elements favoring the overthrow of Houphouet.
4. At some undetermined time in 1966, the Ivory Coast is expected to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Bloc. The presence of Bloc missions in the Ivory Coast will present a new factor and raises the specter of subversive activities and encouragement to dissident elements to undertake a greater number of anti-regime initiatives. These countries can be expected to encourage internal opposition and give support, even if indirect, to anti-Houphouet policies being pursued by radical African states.
5. The numerous military takeovers in Africa have caused President Houphouet to be seriously concerned with the improvement of this civil police force, particularly the Surete Nationale which has an important internal and external intelligence capability.
6. A danger facing the GOIC is that of a neighboring power coming to the aid of its oppressed "brothers" or "nationals" in the Ivory Coast. Ethnic frontiers do not

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correspond with political frontiers. Various tribes live astride the Ivory Coast/Ghana border and the Ivory Coast/Guinea border. The French would probably come to Houphouët's assistance if he were directly threatened and/or attacked by external forces. The French have sufficiently high political and economic stakes in the Ivory Coast to take action if the country were attacked. It is therefore highly likely that the French would employ force in any clearcut issue where intervention by an unfriendly neighboring African state or group was concerned (i.e., Ghana, Mali, Guinea, etc.). It is not so certain, however, how far the French would be willing to go on a purely internal move against Houphouët.

7. In the past, a principal antidote to internal unrest has been the country's economic prosperity. If the economy should take a turn for the worse, Houphouët can expect trouble and unrest from the people, including non-Ivorians residing in the Ivory Coast.

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INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

The terms of reference for this survey have limited its analysis to the GOIC civil police forces, as an updating of the May 1962 survey. However, the importance of the armed forces, most particularly its National Gendarmerie units, to the maintenance of internal security requires a brief word on the National Army and National Gendarmerie, which are responsible to the Minister of Armed Forces. There also exists a Ministry of Defense which controls the Presidential Guard and a type of civic action service. The survey made no contact with GOIC military or civilian officials connected with these two organizations. The survey comments are based on discussions with the U.S. Defense Attache office, GOIC and French personnel connected with Surete Nationale, and examination of pertinent files at the U.S. Embassy. Due to time limitation, the only Surete Nationale installations visited were the national headquarters, the police academy, the central garage and the radio communications center, all of which are in Abidjan. The Director of the Surete Nationale and French police advisors openly provided the survey with all available statistics on the Surete Nationale. Informal oral requests for commodity assistance for the National Gendarmerie have been received at the U.S. Embassy, but have never been followed by an official GOIC demand. On October 20, 1965, by letter to the U.S. Embassy, the GOIC Administrator of General Planning requested the following commodity assistance for the Surete Nationale:

Vehicles

5	Special police sedans
20	6-passenger special police station wagons
4	17-passenger carry-alls
2	Paddy wagons
2	Ambulances
4	Small trucks (vans)
4	Canvas-covered pick-ups
2	8-passenger suburban (station wagon)
2	Canvas-covered trucks

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Communications Equipment

1. 17 T/R RCA SSB1 Mark IV

Each equipped with 4 frequencies - 220 V/50 cycles with headset and transmitter.

Antenna equipment for the above-cited radios:

6 automatic tuning systems Type MI 22774 with cables MI 626210 and MI 626175

51 metallic tubes, 6 m. long, 40 mm. diameter, threaded at the ends and with pipe couplings.

5 KM. of steel galvanized cable, 5 mm.

1 KM. of bare copper wire.

400 small model nut type porcelain insulators.

150 1 m. metal poles for guys.

750 m. coaxial cable, 75 MD.

30 male plugs for coaxial, 75 MD.

150 cable stretchers, 5 mm.

500 cable clamps, 5 mm.

Spare parts for Mark IV:

17 sets of lamps

5 sets of spare parts

3 radio headsets and 3 transmitters.

2. Complement for Existing Radios:

10 Feeder blocks 115V/50 cycles for SSB 5 compact.

3 Replacement sets for SSB 5 fixed station.

5 Sets of lamps, diode and fuse replacements for SSB 5.

10 RCA filters 1400 kos for lower lateral band SSB 5.

10 Male plugs for feeder wire.

3. 2 T/R model RF Communications 301 (SSB) using 230 V/50 cycles, and model allowing the use of 12V battery, antenna coupling RF 302, shock-absorber mounting RF 305, set of replacement parts RF 301 and whip antenna equipment.

4. 3 T/R SSB, 5 watts, transistorized

Battery operated receiver - hand operated transmitter - 4 frequencies.

5. 2 portable T/R SSB 10 RCA - 220 V/50 cycles

6. 6RCA T/R VHF fixed station, model LD 40W  
Band of 70 Mcs - 220V/50 cycles with 1000 VA 115/220V transformer, with 6 omnidirectional antennas, cables,

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and masts, and six replacement sets.

7. 5 RCA T/R VHF mobiles, model LD 4OW  
Band of 70 Mcs - using 12 volt battery. Equipment for antenna installation and replacement sets.
8. Sets of crystals for VHF RCA LD (all above radios and complements for existing radios) - 176 crystals.
9. 4 T/R VHF Transistorized, 1 watt (for motorcycles) 4 channels using 6 volt battery, with installation and replacement parts.
10. 7 Collins Receivers 51SL-CW-AM-BLU-220 V/50 cycles with headset and replacement parts.
11. Measuring apparatus and tools.  
1 generator, RF RCA, up to 100 Mcs.  
1 RCA lamp voltmeter.  
Tool kits for radio technician.

A brief analysis of the GOIC national budget indicates the following internal security expenditures: (in 000 CFA)

	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>
Total National Budget	27,496,000	29,353,000	31,875,000
*Total Internal Security	3,332,000	3,767,000	4,448,000
%Total for Internal Security	12%	13%	14%
*Includes National Army, National Gendarmerie, and Surete Nationale.			

Complete figures for FY 1966 are not now available. However, indications of a sizeable increase in the Surete Nationale forces presages a sizeable percentage increase in over-all internal security expenditures. There is not now any firm information as to any planned increased budget allocations for the Ministry of the Armed Forces.

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NATIONAL ARMY

The Ivorian army as of June 1, 1965 was composed of some 3,500 men and 105 officers. There are 1,760 regulars among the enlisted personnel, the remainder being conscripted for two years. The majority of the officers are of low calibre, having for the most part only grade school education. The army is encadred with approximately 185 French military officers and NCO's. The French military advisors, while not in tactical command, occupy key staff, administrative, intelligence, logistics and training positions. The national army is organized as follows:

General Staff of the Armed Forces at Abidjan, which also contains a Headquarters Company, a Supply Company and a Transport Company. The Armed Forces Training School is located at Bouake in the central region of the Ivory Coast.

First Battalion of Infantry stationed at Akouedo (suburb of Abidjan) has attached to it an Armored Squadron, an Engineer Company, and a BOFORS (artillery) Company. A Combat Infantry Company is stationed at Boundoukou near the Ghanaian border.

Second battalion of Infantry stationed at Daloa (west central region) maintains combat companies at Seguela and Gagnoa.

Third Battalion of Infantry at Bouake (central region) has assigned to it a 105 howitzer battery.

In addition, a species of Civic Action Service (Service Civique) exists as a special unit under the Ministry of Defense. It was recently removed from army control, but six "Farm" companies are still assigned to the army for administrative purposes. Training of these "Farm" companies is done by the Israeli Military Mission to the Ivory Coast.

The Ministry of Defense also contains a Presidential Guard Company of approximately 800 persons. This total includes some 400 milice personnel which have been incorporated in the Presidential Guard. Their primary function is to protect the President, but they are also

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assigned to ceremonial duties and guard prisons where political prisoners are detained. After an attempted coup in late 1963, the milice was organized as the military force of the *Partie Democratique de la Cote d'Ivoire* (President Houphouet Boigny's party) and for a short period of time assumed an important internal security role.

The army, although having basic adequate equipment for its territorial defense mission, would have to depend on French military aid to resist external aggression. The present disposition of army units, together with the preponderant internal security mission assigned to its *Gendarmerie* branch, has minimized the maintenance of order responsibilities of this force. It does not have a capability for an external mission.

The following are the budget figures of the Ministry of Armed Forces for the past three years, which include the National Army and the National *Gendarmerie*. The FY 1966 budget figures were not available at the time of this report:

	(in 000 CFA)		
	<u>FY 1963</u>	<u>FY 1964</u>	<u>FY 1965</u>
Salaries - <i>Gendarmerie</i> )		476,000	646,000
Salaries - Army)	1,156,000	618,000	688,000
Equipment - Army and <i>Gendarmerie</i>	301,000	332,000	382,000
Equipment - Special <i>Gendarmerie</i>	80,000	80,000	115,000
Renewal Equipment	191,000	102,000	90,000
Other Costs	<u>624,000</u>	<u>923,000</u>	<u>1,317,000</u>
Total	2,352,000	2,631,000	3,148,000

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NATIONAL GENDARMERIE

The National Gendarmerie is a part of the armed forces of the GOIC. However, its chain of command is directly to the Minister of Armed Forces. The Gendarmerie operates as an autonomous para-military force charged with the maintenance of public order and internal security. In addition, it has all the judicial, civil and investigative police powers accorded to the Surete. Although it cannot be considered a component of the civil police forces, in its mission and functions, it is virtually indistinguishable from an ordinary civil police force. In organization, training and effectiveness, it can be considered the best of the internal security forces having civil police powers. French police advisors admit this, contending that the larger number of French advisory personnel to the military, and previous neglect of the Surete forces by the GOIC, accounts for this superiority.

In June of 1965, the total personnel strength of the Gendarmerie was approximately 1,350 (14 officers, 181 noncommissioned officers and 1,129 gendarmes). All of the personnel are volunteers, usually army veterans who have completed their normal tour of duty and are rated as superior to the army personnel. There are 36 French officers and noncommissioned officers assigned to the Gendarmerie as advisors and technicians. The training facilities of the Gendarmerie graduate about 100 gendarmes each year, and afford training for an additional 45 to 50 NCO's per year. Selected officer candidates are sent to France each year for training. The training facilities and curricula of the Gendarmerie School are considered to be superior to those of the Army and the Surete Nationale.

The Gendarmerie, with headquarters, service units and training school located at Abidjan, is organized into two major operational divisions, each composed of approximately 650 officers and men. These divisions are the Mobile Gendarmerie and the Brigade Gendarmerie. The Mobile Gendarmerie is assigned in company strength in the four key cities of Abidjan, Daloa, Korhogo, and Bouake. While performing routine patrol duties, these mobile groups also act as reserve units in the event of needed intervention for the maintenance of public order.

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The four major cities noted above also act as department headquarters for the Brigade Gendarmerie. Brigades of these departmental groups are assigned to cities, villages and special details in groups varying from one to five, as follows:

Abidjan: 20 territorial brigades, 2 highway patrol brigades, one investigative brigade, one seaport brigade, and one airport brigade.

Daloa: 15 territorial brigades, one highway brigade.

Korhogo: 9 territorial brigades, one highway patrol brigade.

Bouake: 18 territorial brigades, one highway patrol brigade.

The Gendarmerie disposes of 297 pieces of motor equipment (113 light cars, 29 light vans, 48 small trucks, 21 trucks, six sedans, 56 motorcycles, six motor bicycles, 10 water carriers, one trailer and seven dump trucks). A good proportion of these vehicles are in poor condition. To maintain the proper mobility required for its rural constabulary functions additional vehicles, as well as an improved communications capability, are required.

There is no indication at this time that the GOIC (or President Houphouet Boigny) intends to increase the personnel of the National Gendarmerie. It appears that emphasis on civil police internal security responsibilities, with concurrent increases in personnel and financing, is being placed on the Surete Nationale.

CONFIDENTIAL

SURETE NATIONALE

1. History and Background:

During the French colonial regime law enforcement and maintenance of order activities, particularly in the rural and frontier areas, were the principal mission of the Gendarmerie. The Surete Nationale was limited to metropolitan police duties, immigration, judicial and investigative functions. French officer personnel dominated the Surete Nationale. In late 1961, the GOIC, through the Ministry of Interior, assumed command of the structure and personnel of the colonial Surete. However, it was not until May of 1962 that the first Ivorian was appointed to officer rank. In July 1962 an Ivory Coast national became Director of the Surete Nationale. Personnel strength increased from a 1962 level of 890 to the present level of 1,424. In comparison, the Gendarmerie strength from 1962 to date has remained at a constant figure of 1,350. New Surete Nationale posts were established in the interior portions of the country, mobile brigades (judicial and investigative police) were formed for the rural areas; and with the additional responsibility of border control, new posts were opened along the nation's frontiers. The withdrawal of substantial numbers of French military forces from the country, coupled with increasing subversive and anti-Government activities, has prompted the GOIC to augment its internal security forces. The instrument selected for this increase is the Surete Nationale rather than the National Gendarmerie. As a result, the Surete Nationale is undergoing a process of considerable expansion in its personnel strength and in the number of its installations.

2. French Technical Assistance:

The French police advisory assistance to the Surete Nationale has been reduced from a total of 34 technicians in calendar year 1964 to its present strength of 20. These police advisors are assigned as follows: five to the National Police School, four to the Police Judiciaire (Investigations), two to Renseignement Generaux (Intelligence),

CONFIDENTIAL

two to Identification and Records, one radio technician, one to the Bouake Commissariat and five to Surete Nationale Headquarters, principally in administrative capacities. No French police advisors hold command or operational positions in the Surete Nationale.

Georges Nardon, French police advisor to the Director of the Surete Nationale, stated that he expects a continual but gradual reduction in the number of French police advisory personnel. He excepted the police instructors assigned to the National Police Academy. He indicated that this reduction stemmed from both a GOIC Africanization posture and the GOF policy of reducing technical assistance in all but cultural spheres. Fifteen of the 20 French advisors are part of the regular French technical assistance program. The remaining five (all instructors at the National Police School) are members of the French Ministry of Interior's (SCTIP) Service de Cooperation Technique International de Police. The present French communications technician intimated that he would probably not return after home leave in summer of 1966.

French commodity assistance consists of a gift of 60,000,000 CFA (\$245,000) for the construction of a new Surete Nationale Training Center. Thirty million CFA was accorded in FY 1965 and 30,000,000 CFA will be granted in FY 1966. Together with a GOIC contribution of 31,000,000 CFA this gift will comprise the total cost of buildings and furnishings for the center. Construction will commence in mid-March 1966. Details on this Center as well as French participant training efforts are covered in the Training section of this report. GOIC requests to the French Government for vehicle and communications commodity assistance have been refused. The following excerpt is taken from a memorandum of conversation between the U.S. and French Ambassadors on 27, January 1966:

"Toward the end of the conversation, I told Ambassador Raphael-Leygues in general terms about the renewed GOIC request for police equipment and of our survey now beginning. I asked him whether he thought the Ivorians really needed more vehicles and radios for their police. His response was immediate and affirmative. He said the French would of course move in rapidly in case of trouble, but good communications were essential to ensure early warning from the police, e.g. from some remote point on the Ghanaian border."

3. Mission:

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The Surete Nationale, as the National Gendarmerie, is generally charged with the maintenance of law and order, the public peace and enforcement of laws throughout the Ivory Coast. In addition, it is specifically charged with the following responsibilities: Criminal investigation and detection of crime, apprehension of criminals identification of criminals, immigration and border control, internal and external intelligence collection, public morals and vice squad activities, firearms registration, airport control, seaport control, railroad terminal control, traffic control on streets and highways, enforcing prefectural regulations, and the general policing of cities and villages.

4. Organization and Administration:

The basic organization chart included in the May 1962 survey is still valid. The Director of the Surete Nationale is responsible to, and reports to, the Minister of the Interior. Due to the shuffling of ministerial posts in late 1964, the Surete for calendar year 1965 reported directly to the Presidency through a Secretary of State for the Interior. However, early in January of 1966 a Minister of the Interior was appointed, and the Surete is once again responsible to its constitutional head.

Directly responsible to the Director General through Service and Bureau Chiefs are the Central Bureaus and Special Services, such as: Inspection Service, National Police School, Communications, Central Files, Central Garage, Personnel, Materiel, Criminal Investigation, Identification and Records, Immigration, Central Intelligence (internal and external), and the Central Service for border control. In addition, there is a uniformed main Central Service for Public Security and the Mobile Companies of Security. Under this broad category fall the commissariat of Abidjan and all commissariats and posts in the interior. The Central Service for Public Security has six departmental headquarters which correspond to the political departments (or prefectures) of the Ivory Coast: the north (Korhogo), the west (Man), the west central (Daloa), the central (Bouake), the east (Abengourou), and the south (Abidjan).

The services, bureaus and special units are an exact replica of the French Direction Nationale de la Surete. All major internal administrative posts at National Surete headquarters are occupied by French police advisors.

The accomplished (1965) extension of Surete Nationale installations and posts into the interior of the Ivory Coast and the

CONFIDENTIAL

projections for further expansion until 1970 are indicated in the attached chart. It is to be noted that these new installations parallel those of the National Gendarmerie.

The following budget figures for the Surete Nationale were made available: (in 000 CFA)

	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>
Salaries	430,000	506,000	555,000	*
Equipment	60,000	62,000	100,000	135,700
Total	490,000	568,000	655,000	---

\*Salary computations have not yet been completed for FY 1966.

In addition to its regular FY 1965 budget, the Surete Nationale has been allotted special funds as follows:

115,000,000	For a new Commissariat Central in Abidjan
31,000,000	Additional to the French contribution for a new National Police School
60,000,000	Headquarters buildings, Mobile Security Company - Bouake

5. Personnel:

By the end of 1965 the personnel strength of the Surete Nationale had risen to 1,424, an increase of 152 over the 1964 strength. The attached charts show personnel distribution by post assignment and the yearly planned personnel increase by rank until a maximum strength of 3,925 is reached by 1970. It is to be noted that the authorized strength for 1965 is 1,798. French advisors and the Director of the Surete have indicated that recruitment difficulties and a slowdown in the accordance of approved credits have impeded efforts to arrive at full recruitment.

The following salary ranges apply to the personnel of the Surete Nationale: (CFA - 245: \$1.00)

Commissaire of Police	63,855 to 158,777
Officer of Police	54,364 to 116,494

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Officer of the Peace	40,257 to 82,840
Inspectors (Detective)	31,065 to 54,364
Noncomm. Officers	19,847 to 39,694
Agents	13,807 to 28,477

6. Training:

The present National Police Training School has been located in provisional quarters since the opening of the school in 1962. The school facilities consist of a long wood building, divided into five classrooms and three offices for the School Director (an Ivorian), and offices for staff and instructors. Adjacent to the building is a large dirt combination drill ground and athletic field. Both furnishings and training equipment are in short supply. Courses are conducted by five French police instructors. There are four Ivorian commissioned police officers detailed to the school as instructors. One is a qualified instructor in police subjects, two act as moniteurs (assistant instructors), and one is the drill and physical education instructor. Now in session are classes for 60 noncommissioned officers, 20 inspectors of police (detectives), four officers of the peace (lowest commissioned officer grade), and seven officers of police (middle commissioned officer grade).

Since its inception in 1962, the school has graduated the following number of policemen:

27	Officers of Police
8	Officers of the Peace
165	Inspectors of Police
320	Agents and Noncommissioned Officers

French participant training during this period has consisted of specialized training in France as follows:

- 5 Commissaires - National Surete School at St. Cyr au Mont
- 17 Officier de Police, as above (includes one now en-training)
- 31 Inspectors (investigators) completed course at Sens (includes one now in training)
- 8 Radio maintenance, includes four now in training

U.S. participant training to date has provided an eight week

CONFIDENTIAL

observation and study visit (1962) to U.S. federal, state, and city police organizations to four Ivorian police officers.

French technical assistance has granted the equivalent of \$240,000 for the construction of a new Training Center for the National Police. Plans have been already approved and construction is due to start in March of 1966. To this French contribution, the GOIC has added an additional equivalent of \$120,000. Plans for this Training Center indicate that it will accommodate 150 students per session. It contains student, officer and staff sleeping quarters, classrooms, kitchen, dining facilities, staff offices, sports field, gymnasium and firing range. The GOF and GOIC credits will also completely furnish and equip the Training Center.

7. Transportation:

The attached chart indicates the assigned locations for the Surete Nationale motor fleet which totals 105 vehicles and 29 motorcycles. Except for two USAID supplied trucks, all motor equipment indicated for the Central Garage is inoperable. These deadlined vehicles include 16 of 20 U.S. furnished trucks, and two of 16 USAID furnished patrol vehicles, all of 1963 vintage.

The following breakdown is by type and year of manufacture of the Surete motor vehicles:

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>Total</u>
Patrol vehicles	9		19	14	3	7	14	66
Light trucks	12			2		1	2	19
Trucks & utility								
US supplied			20					20
Motorcycles	20							29
Total vehicles	21		39	16	3	8	16	105
Total m.c.	20				9			29

In 1962 the Surete Nationale had a total fleet of 70 vehicles and 40 motorcycles. The 36 USAID supplied vehicles were added to this fleet in 1963, and an additional 29 were purchased by the GOIC together with 20 motorcycles. Between 1963 and the date of this survey, the Surete Nationale has disposed of 22 vehicles and 31 motorcycles.

CONFIDENTIAL

In early 1965, the Surete Nationale secured the location and buildings that are now serving as a central garage and automotive and radio repair center. It consists of a large quadrangle (about 400 X 400 feet) enclosed on three sides by suitable offices, spare parts room, radio repair shop, two grease pits, gasoline pumps, mechanics' working area, and garaging facilities for about 35 vehicles. There are no non-Ivorian auto maintenance personnel attached to this garage. The staff consists of the Chief of Garage and ten police officers. Five of these have received minimum on-the-job training in auto mechanics, and the other five can be classified as garage attendants.

Deadlined at this garage are 16 of the 1963 USAID supplied trucks and utility vehicles, and two USAID supplied jeeps. The majority of these vehicles are still in good condition, but no effort has been made by the garage personnel to secure the needed small amount of spare parts to make these vehicles operational. The size and nature of the Surete motor fleet requires as a minimum third-echelon shop repair tools and equipment and the services of an automotive maintenance technician.

The age category of the present motor fleet is indicative of a continued rapid deterioration of the transport capabilities of the Surete Nationale. This obsolescence, aggravated by the increasing transport requirements of a growing service, will result in a poor mobility for the Surete Nationale.

8. Communications:

The present communications network of the Surete Nationale consists of both VHF and single side band equipment. The VHF portion is 40 watt and is confined to the city of Abidjan police, as follows:

Fixed posts	1 Commissariat Central (USAID supplied)
Mobile units	13 In Patrol Service (USAID supplied)
Portable units	2 In Service (USAID supplied)
Fixed posts	3 Direction Generale Surete, Airport Police, Liaison with Fire Department (French equipment)

Of the five French model mobile stations in service at the time of the 1962 survey none are operable, and of the five compatible fixed posts, only three are still in operation.

CONFIDENTIAL

The operating Surete Nationale 100 watt SSB system is comprised of U.S. equipment furnished by the former USAID Public Safety Program. It is located as follows:

- |              |    |  |
|--------------|----|--|
| Fixed posts  | 8  | Direction Generale and Commissariats of Aboisso, Abengourou, Bouake, Korhogo, Odienne and Daloa, with one in reserve at Abidjan.   |
| Mobile posts | 10 | Of the 10 furnished mobile units, only two have been installed and are being employed as mobile transceivers (the escort vehicle for President Houphouet Boigny and the service vehicle of the Director General of the Surete. The remaining eight have been installed and are being used as base stations as follows: Commissariats of Man, Gagnoa, Dimbokro, Boundoukou, Agnibelikrou and Agboville, the frontier post of Frambo, and one in reserve at Abidjan. |

The French communications technician (Charles Bion) has performed creditably in maintaining and repairing the U.S. furnished equipment. He has established an adequate spare parts and repair shop at the site of the new Surete Central Garage, and is assisted by three Ivorian members of the Surete assigned to radio repair and maintenance duties. While not profuse in his praise for their ability, he indicated that they were competent assistants for a qualified technician. He categorized the radio maintenance course given in France as all theory and no practice. Mr. Bion stated that the work requirements for repair and maintenance have not afforded him the opportunity to properly train operators for the system. The spare parts have been depleted and there is urgent need for replacement spare parts for both VHF and SSB equipment. A meager indoctrination is given, and on-the-job operating instructions are continued when he is present at a network site for repairs.

Except as modified below, the GOIC request for communications equipment for the additional Surete commissariats and posts and the Abidjan police is not excessive for the service's communications requirements.

The request for VHF equipment for Abidjan to supplement the existing system is inappropriate. The equipment previously supplied by USAID is in the 70 mc band, which makes it incompatible with newly OPS/W

CONFIDENTIAL

developed FM-5 equipment. In discussions with the PTT, which controls all frequency assignments, an agreement was readily reached to earmark a frequency in the high band for the police network in the capital city of Abidjan. The assigned frequency is 162.50 mcs. It is further proposed to salvage as many as possible of the 70 mc units and reinstall them in the town of Bouake where three base stations and five vehicles for local patrol are planned. Abidjan would be supplied with 10 FM-5 units with AC power supplies and ground plane antennas to be used as fixed base stations in Commissariats, 20 FM-5 mobile units and four FM-1 handcarried transceivers.

The existing SSB network operates on the following frequencies: Channel One, 3275 kc; Channel Two, 5745 kc; Channel Three, 9370 kc; and Channel Four, 10839 kc. The first two channels are the only ones used and, according to the Surete, are ample to handle the traffic. It is recommended to supply SSB 20 watt PEP equipment, four channels, with crystals for two channels only and dipole antennas for these frequencies, thus eliminating antenna tuners. A total of 16 such sets would supply: (1) The ten fixed stations for the Commissariats of Adzope, Sassandra and Port Bouet and the frontier posts of Ayame, Adiake, Assinie, Danane, Toulepleu, Tabou, and Quangolodougou; (2) Three mobiles for border posts; (3) One spare; and (4) Two back pack units planned for CRS (Compagnies de Securite). A total of ten generators and ten sets of 12 volt batteries for the fixed installations would be required. The three mobile units would operate on car batteries while the two back-pack units would operate on Ni-cad batteries.

The existing SSB network is badly in need of spares. The Surete has placed a large order with the local RCA representative for such common parts as resistors, capacitors and transformers. However, the Surete has requested that AID supply replacement tubes, LSB filters, ten sets of power supplies for the existing SSB-5, and miscellaneous small parts, such as: telegraph keys, headsets, tool sets, and test equipment.

The Surete has also requested three general coverage receivers for the purpose of monitoring traffic in neighboring countries. It is proposed that these three units be supplied and be of Hammarlund, National or other equal make.

The French technician in charge of telecommunications for the GOIC, Mr. Bion, was unfortunately on home leave at the time this survey was made. The principal French advisor to the Surete, Mr. Nardon, who was present during Advisor Tetaz conversations with the Ivorians, strongly recommended that contact be maintained with the French

CONFIDENTIAL

technical advisor on this matter, in order to preclude development of technical problems. The survey team concurs that close and continuing cooperation must be effected with the French communications advisors if a program develops.

The October 20, 1965 request for commodity assistance by the GOIC was accompanied by a map which indicated locations where the requested communications equipment would be installed. The Surete advised the survey that recent changes in Commissariat and frontier post planning has made this map no longer valid.

9. Uniforms:

The Surete Nationale provides the following items of equipment to the uniformed members of the Force on an average two-year replacement schedule: One cap w/cover, four trousers, two short sleeve and two long sleeve shirts, two ties, one complete set of dress uniform, three pairs of socks, two pairs of low shoes, one trouser belt, one pair of gloves, one raincoat, one gun belt w/holster, one rubber baton, one helmet liner, complete sets of rank insignia and cap badges. In addition the special services such as the Mobile Security Companies and Traffic Details are furnished with correspondingly appropriate equipment.

10. Other:

The time limitation placed on this survey did not permit an updating of information or an analysis of the Central Service or Special Bureaus of the Surete Nationale such as Identification and Records, Immigration, Criminal Investigation or Crime Laboratory facilities. It is also believed that with the pre-eminence of French technical assistance in these sectors of the Surete Nationale, equipment and commodity needs for these Bureaus should be supplied by the GOF.

## CONFIDENTIAL

CHART No. 1

<u>ESTIMATED PROJECT COSTS</u> (Includes Cost Freight)		<u>FY 1966</u>	<u>FY 1967</u>
<u>Transportation Equipment</u>		<u>\$79,000</u>	<u>\$64,000</u>
5	Patrol sedans (Abidjan) at 2,500	12,500	
6	Patrol Jeeps - CJ-6 (interior) at 3,000	18,000	
6	Personnel carrier (interior) at 4,000	24,000	
1	Heavy duty station wagon (radio repair) at 4,000	4,000	
1	Personnel carrier (school) at 4,000	4,000	
1	Ambulance (Abidjan) at 3,500	3,500	
1	Third echelon shop equipment	6,000	
	10% spare parts vehicles	7,000	
<u>Communications Equipment</u>		<u>45,000</u>	<u>36,000</u>
10	Base Stations, FM-5 with accessories	3,500	
20	FM-5, Mobile with accessories	6,000	
4	FM-1 hand-carried transceivers	600	
16	SSB 20 watt PEP Transceivers with accessories	16,000	
10	Generators and sets of 12 volt batteries	8,000	
	10% spare parts on above	3,500	
	Replacement parts (Previous USAID Furnished radio equipment)	2,575	
3	General coverage receivers	3,525	
	Test equipment and misc items	1,300	
<u>Other Commodities</u>		<u>5,000</u>	<u>5,000</u>
	Purchase U.S. owned excess property to support CMS companies.		
<u>Participants</u>		<u>19,000</u>	<u>19,000</u>
2	Special course at 3,000	6,000	
2	Auto maintenance - Togo at 1,500	3,000	
2	Radio maintenance long course at 5,000	10,000	
<u>Technicians</u>		<u>50,000</u>	<u>50,000</u>
1	Full tour Log/Supply-Auto Maintenance	25,000	
1	Full tour Communications	25,000	
<u>Other Costs</u>		<u>17,000</u>	<u>17,000</u>
	Housing, TDY, local travel two technicians	14,000	
	Contingency for commodities to support program development	3,000	

CONFIDENTIAL

CHART No. 1

-2-

<u>Total Costs</u>	<u>215,000</u>	<u>191,000</u>
Commodities	129,000	105,000
Participants	19,000	19,000
Technicians	50,000	50,000
Other Costs	17,000	17,000

CONFIDENTIAL

31

SURETE NATIONALE

DISTRIBUTION PERSONNEL		1 February 1966
Direction General	Includes administrative - judicial, immigration intelligence - records, identification, garage, communications, etc. . . . .	230
	Mobile Security Company - Abidjan. . . . .	67
	Seaport Police - Port Abidjan. . . . .	11
	Airport Police . . . . .	8
	Abidjan-Niger Railroad Police. . . . .	15
	Detached Duty. . . . .	32
	National Police School . . . . .	98
	National School Administration . . . . .	3
Commissariat	Abidjan - Uniform Force. . . . .	458
	- Detective Division . . . . .	24
	Abengourou . . . . .	30
	Aboisso. . . . .	19
	Adzope . . . . .	13
	Agboville. . . . .	23
	Agnibelekrou . . . . .	11
	Bassam . . . . .	31
	Boudoukou. . . . .	10
	Bouake . . . . .	93
	Daloa. . . . .	35
	Dimbokro . . . . .	20
	Gagnoa . . . . .	27
	Korhogo. . . . .	30
	Man. . . . .	28
	Odienne. . . . .	15
	Sassandra. . . . .	14
	Seguela. . . . .	6
Frontier Posts	Adiake . . . . .	2
	Toulepleu. . . . .	5
	Ayama. . . . .	6
	Danane . . . . .	9
	Divo . . . . .	16
	Frambo . . . . .	6
Sick	. . . . .	4
Suspended	. . . . .	2
TOTAL PERSONNEL		1,424

SURETE NATIONALEPRESENT AND PLANNED PERSONNEL

RANK	(PROGRESSIVE INCREASE)					TOTAL
	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
Commissaire	44	60	75	89	103	115
Officier de Police	71	97	121	143	165	185
Inspecteur de Police (Detective- Intelligence Immigration)	205	265	325	385	445	500
Officier de Paix	20	26	32	38	44	50
Non/Com.	20	46	71	94	117	140
Agent	1150	1425	1700	1970	2240	2510
Contractual (Civil)	11	12	13	13	13	13
Temporary Agents	<u>277</u>	<u>307</u>	<u>345</u>	<u>368</u>	<u>389</u>	<u>412</u>
TOTAL	*1709	2238	2662	3100	2516	3925

\*Actual total is 1,424. The Director General has stated that the failure to achieve full strength is due to a combination of recruitment difficulties and the slow advancement of credits by the Ministry of Finance.

DISTRIBUTION SURETE VEHICLES

	Patrol Sedans	Light Truck	Heavy Truck	U.S. Jeeps or Sedans	U.S. Trucks & Utility	Motorcycle	Total Vehicles
Direction General	10	1		3			14
Police Headquarters - Abidjan	7	5				29	12
Mobile Security Company - Abidjan		3		3			6
1st Precinct - Abidjan	2	1					3
2nd Precinct - Abidjan	1						1
3rd Precinct - Abidjan	1						1
4th Precinct - Abidjan	1						1
5th Precinct - Abidjan				1			1
6th Precinct - Abidjan	1						1
7th Precinct - Abidjan	1						1
8th Precinct - Abidjan	1						1
9th Precinct - Abidjan	1						1
Port Police	1						1
Aeroport Police	1						1
Commissariat - Adiake				1			1
Commissariat - Divo	1						1
Commissariat - Aboisso	1						1
Commissariat - Bondoukou	2						2
Commissariat - Bassam	1	1					2
Commissariat - Adzope				1			1
Commissariat - Bouaka	3	2			2		7
Commissariat - Korhogo	1			1			2
Commissariat - Man	1						1
Commissariat - Odienne	1						1
Commissariat - Seguela				1			1
Commissariat - Sassandra	1						1
Commissariat - Daloa		2					2
Commissariat - Dimbokro	1	1					2
Commissariat - Frambo				1			1
Commissariat - Gagnoa	1	1					2
Commissariat - Agnibileko	1						1
Commissariat - Agboville				1			1
Commissariat - Ayame				1			1
Central Garage - Abidjan	7	2		2	18		29
	50	19		16	20	29	105

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SURETE NATIONALEPRESENT AND PLANNED COMMISSARIATS AND POSTS

	EXISTING			PLANNED		
	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
Commissariats	Abengourou Abidjan " Airport "Railroad " Seaport Aboisso Adzope Agboville Agnibilekrou Bassam Bimbokro Bouake Boundoukou Daloa Gagnoa Korhogo Man Odienne Sassandra Seguela	Attiekoube Bouafle Lakota Port Bouet Sinfra Tiassale	Ferkessedougou Oume Ticbissou Yamoussoukro	Beomi Boudiali Guiglo Soubre	Bayakro Katiola Podogournu Zuenoula	Bangolo Bokanda Duekove Vavoua
Mobile Security Companies	Abidjan	Bouake	Daloa	Abengourou	Korhogo	Man
Frontier Post	Adiake Assinie Ayame Danane Divo Frambo Issia Niabile Quangolodougou Tabou Toulepleu	Grand Lahou Sassandra	Asueferi Touba	Tingrela		

CONFIDENTIAL

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The following persons were interviewed and were the principal sources of information:

United States Embassy

Ambassador George A. Morgan  
Mr. Alfred T. Wellborn, DCM  
Mr. Robert Whittinghill, Political Officer  
Mr. Robert M. Fouche, Political Officer  
Mr. J. David Gelsanliter, Economic Officer  
Lt. Colonel Shirley R. Trumps, Defense Attache office  
Mr. Michael Codi, AID Operations Officer

Government of the Ivory Coast

Mr. Pierre Goba, Director General, Surete Nationale

French

Mr. George Nardon, Chief French Police Advisor, Surete Nationale  
Mr. Rene Lamborelle, Director, National Police School  
Mr. Charles Bion, Police Communications Technician, Surete Nationale  
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