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A STUDY OF SOME KEY USAID JOBS

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

PROGRAM OFFICER

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DIVISION CHIEF

AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH
Washington, D.C.

JUNE 1964

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PREFACE

We wish to thank the many people in AID/Washington and in the USAID Missions who participated in this study for their cooperation and assistance. Many interviewees, especially, devoted considerable time and effort to the project. We hope that their candor and confidence will be beneficial to them, to the Agency, and to the peoples with whom they work.

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A STUDY OF SOME KEY USAID JOBS

Purpose

The chief aim of this study has been to determine the detailed functions of four key positions in the overseas missions of the Agency for International Development, and to delineate the difficulties, problems and obstacles involved in carrying out these functions. This knowledge, together with information about requirements normally derivable from it, is basic to all personnel operations which must be accomplished in order to provide the right people in the right place at the right time. While it was recognized from the outset that the functions and problems in any particular position would tend to differ from mission to mission, it was believed that a basic core of functions could be identified, and that analysis of the situational characteristics producing differences among missions could be combined with the core findings to provide a realistic basis for refining the Agency's personnel operations.

A second purpose of the study was to test the feasibility of using questionnaires to obtain valid and reliable job information, by comparing questionnaire data with information derived from the more costly methods of interviews and observation. Because of changed circumstances the Agency requested that this phase of the study not be completed.

Procedures

The four positions studied were chosen by Agency officials. The positions are: a) Deputy Director - chosen because of his central management position, b) Program Officer - representing the key program

position, c) Division Chief[1] - representing development and management of field projects, and d) Executive Officer - chosen because of his impact on efficiency and morale.

The basic data-collection procedure consisted of extensive interviews and observation in selected missions. Interview time for each job averaged approximately 60 hours per mission, including both interviews with the incumbent and his superiors, subordinates, colleagues and other associates. One full day was devoted to observation only, and other observations were made in the course of interviewing.

Original plans called for the use of questionnaires to validate the information derived from interview and observation data. This was to have included the systematic collection of information about frequency of specified functions and problems and the perceived importance of the several job functions. However, the revised scope of work prevented this.

The missions to be visited for interviews were selected by Agency officials. The original plan called for selecting between fifteen and twenty missions judged to be the most effective and approximately the same number judged to be the least effective. These evaluations of missions were not made known to any project personnel. It was intended to correlate such characteristics as mission organization, relative emphasis of the several job functions, modes of accomplishing duties, relationships among mission personnel and types of problems encountered in the mission in the key jobs, with mission effectiveness. Among other

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[1]Originally the job specified was that of Chief Education Advisor; this was later expanded to include other specialties as well.

characteristics to be tested were size, program emphasis, type of leadership, history of mission, culture of the host country, and political factors. However, at the Agency's request, a total of twelve missions was visited, and analysis on the basis of mission effectiveness and mission type was necessarily abandoned.

Interviewers asked informants to describe their responsibilities, the manner in which they discharged these responsibilities in diverse circumstances, and the difficulties and problems they encountered in performing their tasks. Throughout, and particularly with regard to difficulties and problems, incumbents and their associates were asked to provide critical incidents: examples of effective and ineffective behavior associated with the difficult aspects of the tasks or with special problems that had to be solved in order to accomplish a basic goal or a personal intention. This constituted an important element in the interview procedure, since it provided the means for obtaining factual accounts of specific behaviors which promoted or hindered the attainment of individual or mission goals. It is a technique which minimizes personal bias, since it calls for descriptions of actual occurrences rather than general opinions.

In addition to the above topics, an extensive set of questions was asked about personal attributes, skills, talents, knowledges, attitudes, and habits which had been hypothesized beforehand to be important to success in the four key jobs. These hypotheses were derived from prior research on overseas work and from knowledge of AID organization, policies and procedures acquired in the early phase of the study. Incumbents were also asked for information about their past experience, education and training, and for their opinions concerning attributes desirable for their jobs. In short, data were obtained concerning responsibilities, factors which tended to make the jobs difficult, and background information concerning the qualities required to perform effectively.

Before interviewers visited the missions and while the data-collection instruments were still being constructed, informal interviews were held with a number of AID staff members in Washington, and a preliminary interview schedule was tested in one mission in Latin America. Interview teams were given intensive training in the basic concepts of the project, the use of the interview schedule, and in other interview and observation techniques. Interview teams of two (or three) persons as a rule consisted of a psychologist and either a political scientist or an anthropologist.

Interviews were conducted with a total of 49 incumbents and their associates in the twelve missions. It should be recognized that while the results of this study are based on analysis of extensive data concerning virtually every aspect of mission life and work, it was not possible (within the curtailed scope of work) to determine with any degree of confidence how frequently particular situations, problems, duties, or behaviors occur, or to measure their relative importance. Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that USAID missions are so heterogeneous that the twelve in which interviews were conducted probably do not constitute a good sample of the mission population. Therefore, in order to avoid the spurious quantification of information which is not properly quantifiable, the data were subjected to qualitative analysis by experienced analysts who had worked on similar studies in the past. The analysts developed categories of situations, problems, functions, tasks, and behaviors which served as a basis for the report on each job. Regardless of observed frequency, tasks and problems judged to be of fundamental importance were included, as were any issues cited by more than a few people. Seemingly minor issues which were very rarely cited and which could be traced to purely local circumstances were excluded.

Reports on functions and problems appear in Appendices A through D. Also appended are suggestions for training and orientation (Appendix E); tentative indications of personal attributes which should be considered in recruitment, selection, and evaluation (Appendix F); and a discussion of general Agency policies and procedures affecting the key jobs (Appendix G).

General Findings

The results contained in the appended reports must be viewed as tentative until the basic information can be validated. It is our belief, however, that the interviews, which were both lengthy and candid, provided sufficiently comprehensive and detailed information to merit serious consideration.

Similarities and Differences in Job Characteristics

Although each of the four jobs varies considerably from mission to mission, there are major components which are similar in each job. Moreover, there are common elements of significant magnitude among the four different jobs.

In all four jobs, incumbents are heavily engaged in the management of other personnel. They are all involved in documentation tasks such as writing, reviewing, editing, rewriting, and clarifying. In all four jobs, incumbents are engaged in becoming familiar with old and new regulations, interpreting unclear regulations and attempting to reconcile regulations with the practical field situation. All four incumbents are potentially or actually involved in dealing with host nationals in such situations as negotiating, advising, training, persuading or otherwise motivating, and participating in social and ceremonial activities. They are all concerned with financial matters, including budget planning, assignment of priorities and calculation of costs. They are also faced

with the usual environmental factors of overseas life, including the difficulties of living and working in highly circumscribed communities, and the various difficulties inherent in an underdeveloped country such as delays and breakdowns in communications and transportation, equipment problems, and the lack of services of various kinds.

People in all four jobs are more or less deeply involved in shaping or modifying the program and in planning or carrying out projects. All are thus concerned with essentially complex intellectual tasks which require detailed appreciation of a wide variety of phenomena and the interactions among them. These tasks include:

(1) Understanding of the concrete implications of abstract language used in project proposals, plans, agreements, reports, or memoranda. Planners must be able to foresee from the language of such documents the necessary actions by the U. S., the host government and other agencies which may be involved in a proposed project.

(2) Prediction of the probable role of the host government, including a) the support, opposition, or indifference of functionally powerful individuals, based upon the probable gains or losses for these individuals that are implied by support or opposition to a project or its several segments; b) the probable understanding and interpretation of agreements by host officials and others who will be involved in projects; and c) the probable actions by the hosts which affect the availability of competent personnel, necessary funds, required materials and the procedures needed for obtaining them.

(3) Accurate conception of the mission's basic ability to accomplish a project in view of its administrative, personnel, and program resources.

(4) Understanding of political dynamics and the ability to predict probable local, U. S. and international political events which may affect the course of the project.

(5) Knowledge of probable popular response to projects, where relevant, including differences among the various ethnic subgroups and social classes, etc.

(6) Knowledge of specific geographic, economic and social characteristics of the host country which bear directly on project success. This includes specific knowledge of the kinds of problems which can beset particular projects as consequences of: a) the lack of institutions, methods, and procedures which are ordinarily taken for granted in operations in the United States; b) the inadequacy of equipment, the lack of supplies and repair facilities; c) the difficulties in communication and transportation; d) personnel inadequacies; e) information lacks including basic statistical information and information concerning requirements for adapting existing Western methods to underdeveloped conditions.

(7) Knowledge of operative U. S. legislation, policy, rulings, regulations, and procedural directives, and the personal preferences of various U. S. individuals which will probably affect particular projects.

(8) Specific technical and financial methods for carrying out projects; for example, the best ways to construct houses in given localities, the best procedure for funding a school construction program, the best accounting methods for particular enterprises, the best organizational structures for cooperatives.

All of these factors and perhaps others must be considered in program and project decisions; they must be differently weighted; conflicts among them must be resolved; the impact of each on the others and the impact of projects on these factors must be calculated, often in the absence of vital pieces of information.

The four positions also differ sharply. Unique characteristics of each job will be discussed below.

1. Deputy Director

Theoretically, the Deputy Director is the incumbent who is most heavily involved in direct general management of the mission and mission personnel. He tends to be more deeply engaged in mission policy, mission organization, interagency relations, and AID representation, and he has relatively more contact with high-level host officials than the other incumbents. However, there are many variations in the actual role of the Deputy Director. In some missions, the Deputy is closely allied to the Director and acts as his "alter ego", cooperating with or substituting for the Director in dealing with host nationals on major policy issues, formulating mission policy, recruiting, directing, and supervising key mission personnel, shaping the substantive program of the mission, and dealing with major difficulties throughout the mission operation. In other missions, certain of these activities may not be delegated to the Deputy; for example, in at least one mission, the Director reserved to himself most of the contacts with host officials, and made the Deputy responsible for general operation of the mission. In another case, the Deputy and Director were not in sympathy with one another, and the Deputy was largely preoccupied with "pet projects" of his own having little relationship to the basic program. In other instances, Deputies, in addition to having general operational responsibilities, were put in charge of a technical division because of the absence or inability of the Division Chief. In some cases, Deputies were largely occupied by relatively minor organizational, financial, and regulatory matters, taking little part in formulating overall policy, in shaping the program, or in supervising the mission staff. It must be concluded that in most of the missions in the sample, the Deputy Director's job is defined either poorly or not at all, and that in a significant number of cases, the Director and Deputy have not been able to work out a role for the Deputy which is satisfactory to both.

2. Program Officer

The Program Officer's job also varied from mission to mission, but to a lesser extent than that of the Deputy Director. There was generally nominal recognition of a standard group of tasks for this position, whereas no such consensus was found for the Deputy. Theoretically, the Program Officer is involved in analysis of economic and social conditions in the host country, determination of development needs, planning of the substantive program or of changes in an existing program, and integration of the program into host efforts and institutions. The Program Officer, again theoretically, works closely with the Mission Director in shaping the program or modifying it, and with the Division Chiefs and their staffs in planning and setting priorities. He also generally supervises the operation of the program to ensure conformance with goals and budgets. All Program Officers in practice as well as in theory are centrally involved in the preparation of the various basic documents pertaining to program development and implementation. In practice the Program Officers have relatively fewer contacts with host officials than Deputies or Division Chiefs.

The mission variations in this job are chiefly a matter of the degree to which the incumbent is involved in the several functions, rather than in the nature of the functions undertaken. In some missions the Program Officer is almost solely responsible for program planning. More commonly, the Director gives major program guidance and the Program Officer develops the specific plans, usually with the assistance of subordinates who are responsible for the details of plans. In another variant of the job, the Mission Director, the Deputy or others carry out most of the programming functions, leaving only relatively insignificant details to the Program Officer.

3. Division Chief

The Division Chief, in theory, performs roles similar to those of the Mission Director, but within more limited spheres of operation. He or his subordinates plan or modify the program in his technical area, he supervises technicians, he monitors the progress of projects, he deals with host nationals in the development of program ideas and in the implementation of projects, he troubleshoots projects, and participates more or less heavily in overall mission operations and planning. Like the Deputy Director, he has representational and managerial functions; like the Program Officer, he has planning and implementation functions; like the Executive Officer, he has administrative and support functions. In practice, however, few Division Chiefs do all of these things, and most do only a few of them. In the twelve missions visited, the activities of the Division Chiefs ranged from almost total isolation from the mainstream of mission operations to almost full involvement in these functions. Commonly, the Division Chiefs participated more or less extensively in project planning and moderately in supervision of project personnel and progress. Reportedly few interacted to an appreciable extent with host nationals. Very few served as even occasional advisors to host national officials.

4. Executive Officer

The Executive Officer's job varied the least among the twelve missions which were visited. Nearly all Executive Officers were responsible for approximately the same kinds of housekeeping and administrative functions including purchasing, transportation, housing, and supervision of clerical and service personnel. The extent of the incumbent's activity varied with the size of the mission. In small missions the Executive Officers tended to be more directly engaged in each of the various functions, whereas in larger missions subordinates accomplished

the actual work under the incumbent's supervision. The particular areas which Executive Officers reserved for themselves or delegated to others varied considerably, depending on the Executive Officer's preferences, availability and competence of local or American subordinate personnel, and to some extent program emphasis. In general, the Executive Officers' modes of operation were found to range between the following two extremes: a) the Executive Officer was service-oriented, i.e., he attempted to provide the mission staff with the services, equipment or other support that they required to the maximum extent possible, interpreting regulations and constraints to meet the needs of the individuals in the mission, or b) he tended to deny services and support to individuals, making relatively little attempt to obtain or provide them or to overcome obstacles which prevented satisfactory service, and was apt to cite or interpret regulations which served to justify his orientation.

Difficulties and Problems

In all four jobs, incumbents were perturbed by a lack of definition of their actual responsibilities. This problem was most severe for the Deputy Director and least troublesome for the Executive Officer. In all four jobs, the incumbents were troubled by absence or ambiguity of policy information. There were cases in which the Director, the Deputy Director or the Program Officer disagreed about the interpretation of policy concerning major program emphasis. Differences in interpretation of major policy between the Program Officer and one or more Division Chiefs appear to be common. Again, the Executive Officer is apparently least troubled by this problem. In all four jobs, incumbents found it difficult to keep up with regulations. Incumbents were troubled by the poor performance of other Americans, and almost without exception, by difficulties of some sort with host nationals. All incumbents were faced with the

fundamental problem of a lack of objective criteria for determining programs and projects which would be most beneficial in particular circumstances. They found it difficult to assign priorities objectively among various projects. Furthermore, they found it difficult to determine the procedures or methods which would achieve accepted project goals most effectively and efficiently in specific circumstances. Finally, they found it difficult to evaluate project performance in specific circumstances.

Since USAID programs typically cover a wide variety of technical areas, and appropriate technically qualified personnel are frequently not available, all four incumbents necessarily make decisions in technical matters outside their own professional specialties. This gives rise to two further problems. Altercations arise with technical specialists whose judgments are questioned, and obviously, where technical decisions are made in the absence of technical expertise, the likelihood of error increases. The ensuing problems further complicate these jobs.

There is also a general problem in dealing with high officials of host governments. Speaking very broadly, AID personnel, particularly Division Chiefs and Program Officers, are technical functionaries whose competence tends to be limited to particular bodies of technical knowledge. Quite to the contrary, most host officials, particularly those at the upper levels, are basically politicians - men whose expertise lies in the control of individuals and groups, and in a knowledge of the mechanics and dynamics of power and position. The outlooks and intellectual habits of two such disparate groups may differ sharply, and this may explain some of the difficulty which USAID employees report in dealing with host officials. The problem is perhaps further compounded by the possibility that host officials may in fact be more perceptive, quicker to learn and quicker to see implications than some

Americans who are working overseas. Furthermore, Americans, coming from a tradition where objectivity is highly valued, may tend to take a more impersonal view of any particular event or situation than host nationals, many of whom traditionally place high value on personal influence and relationships. In the final analysis, the average incumbent may be ill-matched with the elite of host societies in the political arts which govern aid efforts. The profound effects of such differences on relations between Americans and their hosts and on the success of American efforts overseas cannot be lightly discounted.

A pivotal administrative problem affecting all jobs is the existence of two personnel evaluation systems: the formal and the informal. The informal system, which is apparently preferred by most incumbents, is both a result of the shortcomings of the formal system, and an obstacle to its improvement. For example, almost no one is given an efficiency rating below "4", largely due to the resentment often felt by subordinates who have been given low ratings, and the consequent difficulty in working with them. This means that the formal rating has little effect in eliminating inadequate personnel from the field of candidates available to fill an open position. Thus hiring decisions have come to depend upon the informal system of evaluations by former co-workers. An incumbent therefore must rely heavily on the recommendations of his co-workers in obtaining reassignments. This makes a rater reluctant to rate a subordinate low, because the subordinate's opinion of him may influence the next assignment of the rater. If the rater develops a wide reputation for giving low ratings, he may find it difficult to obtain a desirable reassignment.

The complicated informal system of "connections" and "guardian angels" is viewed by incumbents both favorably and unfavorably. On the one hand, it often provides personnel information not otherwise available

and to some extent it protects people against arbitrary judgments. On the other hand, it makes it possible for inadequate but influential people to continue in their jobs, it diminishes the authority of mission administrators, it leaves people without influence unprotected, and it promotes the tendency to let personal considerations compete with or override substantive requirements.

Both the shortcomings of the formal system and the existence of the informal system stem in part from several other more fundamental difficulties. First is the fact that objective criteria of successful performance in the various jobs have generally not been identified, making it necessary to base evaluations in large part on well- or ill-founded subjective personal opinion, often highly clouded by irrelevant considerations, often lacking in many essential elements. Second is the fact that the upper echelons of any large organization, particularly of an organization which is decentralized, must conduct their personnel evaluations remotely and must rely on the quality of their designated judges. The administrators, managers and all others who are concerned with evaluation of performance at a distance must deal with filtered information, and few checks exist for minimizing subjectivity.

Third, the Agency's historic instability and its inherent need for changes in program emphasis, shifts in fund allocation and geographic concentration, and revisions in implementation methods, all combine to produce a significant degree of job insecurity and a need for administrative freedom of action. Both of these factors tend to strengthen the development of informal channels of influence, since the job incumbent needs protection and the administrator needs latitude in personnel decisions. Fourth, many people overseas feel they are at a serious disadvantage in the job market since they are out of touch with their

normal American job community. If they leave AID voluntarily, or are dismissed, they face the prospect of having to look for a job, possibly in the absence of a current income, in a market where they are often thought to have lost touch with current developments in their professions. For these people, job security and concerns over impending assignments are of particular importance.

Improvement in the evaluation system will depend ultimately on: a) careful identification of the critical elements of performance, b) delineation of the realistic circumstances which may prevent successful performance in each job, c) the establishment of a procedure which forces evaluators to attend to each of these critical elements and mitigating circumstances, and d) the use of procedures whereby the persons who are being evaluated are given the protection of two or more thoroughly independent judgments (rather than the group opinion of an establishment). Perhaps the Agency should explore the possibility of employing those elements of the informal system which can contribute to a more effective evaluation procedure.

Concluding Remarks

In this brief covering report, we have attempted to highlight some of the essential similarities and differences among the jobs studied, and to indicate some salient problems and difficulties which are encountered in all or most of the jobs. A detailed description of activities, problems and obstacles is contained in the individual job reports (Appendices A-D). Although no single individual is beset by all the difficulties cited, most incumbents are confronted with pervasive and fundamental obstacles to job performance. The Executive Officer's job, although sometimes exceedingly difficult, can be accomplished more or less successfully. However, under existing conditions, it must be seriously questioned whether the other three jobs, as conceived by incumbents, can generally be accomplished effectively.

In view of the foregoing, it is apparent that extensive changes are required if performance is to be improved. The structure of the missions and of some of the jobs should be changed. Some of the legislative and policy constraints within which missions must operate should be liberalized. Management in general, and personnel operations in particular, should strive to form and maintain in each mission a team of highly talented and functionally cooperative individuals. The variety, amount, and caliber of supporting talent which each senior officer can command should be increased. Policy coordination between Washington and the field, and Washington's support of the missions at the operating levels, must be improved. The effects of these changes, no matter how extensive, will of course be limited unless the physical, economic, and political conditions of host countries, and the inclinations of host politicians, bureaucrats, and populations are favorable to the efforts of the United States.

In brief, what is needed is an extraordinarily high level of individual talent, operating in an extremely intricate team enterprise, under the best situational circumstances; these teams must be given the highest order of political, financial, material and personnel support, if their talents are not to be wasted.

APPENDIX A

to

A Study of Some Key USAID Jobs

THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

American Institute for Research
Washington, D.C.

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DEPUTY DIRECTOR

Outline of Functions

I. PARTICIPATES IN PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

A. Obtains Information Relevant to Program Development

1. Confers with potentially knowledgeable people
2. Selects and reads documents
3. Observes host country conditions
4. Assigns USAID personnel to obtain information
5. Evaluates information

a. considers reliability of sources
b. deduces or infers errors or inconsistencies
c. verifies data
d. judges relevance of data

B. Participates in Development and Revision of Program

1. Provides guidelines, assistance, and information to others

a. reviews, or revises preliminary project plans
b. recommends priorities
c. suggest project ideas

2. Coordinates with others

a. Embassy, USIS, other U. S. Government groups
b. third country, international, private groups
c. host country officials
d. AID/W

C. Participates in Document Preparation

1. Reviews, edits, and evaluates
2. Prepares documents or rewrites documents prepared by others

II. PARTICIPATES IN PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

A. Reviews and Edits Details of Project Implementation Documents

1. Checks plans for conformance to goals and regulations
2. Revises or suggests changes

B. Conducts Negotiations With Host Country Officials

1. Negotiates details of development grant implementation documents
2. Negotiates details of loan applications

III. PARTICIPATES IN PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

A. Obtains Information on Project Status

1. Confers with U. S. personnel
2. Confers with third country or international agency personnel
3. Confers with host government personnel
4. Reviews project status documents
5. Visits project sites
6. Assigns others to observe field operations

B. Evaluates Projects

C. Corrects Project Deficiences

1. Directs personnel changes
2. Motivates USAID personnel
3. Directs equipment changes
4. Persuades host government to honor commitments
5. Coordinates division activities
6. Coordinates division activities with host country efforts

D. Accomplishes Other Program Management Functions

1. Reads and reviews correspondence
2. Keeps others informed about project status
3. Acts as Division Chief

IV. PARTICIPATES IN MISSION MANAGEMENT

A. Guides and Assists Staff Officers and Division Chiefs

1. Assigns tasks
2. Provides advice concerning mission administrative operations
3. Settles disputes
4. Provides information concerning mission administrative operations
5. Reads, reviews or edits administrative written materials
6. Consults on personnel needs, allocations, and appointments
7. Monitors and evaluates performance
8. Develops skills of subordinates
9. Rewards outstanding performance
10. Reprimands and disciplines
11. Provides advice about, or handles, special behavior problems

B. Serves as Acting Mission Director

C. Deals with Visitors

1. Provides briefings
2. Arranges itineraries and conferences
3. Accompanies visitors on tours

D. Maintains Social Relations with Personnel from Other U. S. Agencies, Other Donor Agencies, and the Diplomatic Corps

V. PARTICIPATES IN MISSION REPRESENTATION

A. Develops "Good" Relations with Host National Personnel

B. Represents Mission at Social Events

1. Attends and gives luncheons, parties, etc.
2. Attends or participates in ceremonies

C. Provides Information, Advice and Assistance to Host National Personnel

1. Provides information on policy or procedural changes
2. Advises host government on their operations

USAID DEPUTY DIRECTOR

I N T R O D U C T I O N

The Deputy Director's job varies considerably, based on the personalities involved, individual capabilities and interests, and local needs. In general, the Deputy Director is responsible to be ready to assume the role of Acting Director, at any time, which means that a principal part of his job is to stay informed about all phases of mission operations. This need to be informed, coupled with the fact that other mission personnel are responsible for substantive production, leaves the Deputy in an ambiguous situation. He must learn without really being involved, without permitting himself to become a bottleneck in the chain of command, and frequently, without an established procedure for doing so.

In some missions Deputy Directors are assigned supplementary duties, usually of an administrative nature. Examples include final clearance of routine correspondence, supervising technical divisions, and entertaining official visitors. Supplementary duties also tend to be ambiguous, resulting from unclear authority. For example, it is difficult to determine what correspondence is nonroutine. Even more frustrating for a Deputy Director, technicians under his supervision have the prerogative, which they tend to successfully use, of making direct appeals to the Mission Director.

Because of the nature of the relationship, the Deputy Mission Director needs to maintain close contact with the Director. Unfortunately, this is not an easy process. Some Deputies reported that technical and administrative personnel have no hesitation to deal directly with the Director, although the Deputy is supposed to be in the chain of

command, or, as a minimum, a participant in mission decisions. This problem is less critical when the entire mission is in one physical location, and more pronounced when the mission has two or more physical facilities, with the Directors in such situations prone to confer with personnel in other buildings without informing the Deputy. In other examples, the Deputies were assigned specific responsibilities for a function, and then learned that the Director was continuing his own involvement in the function. This type of situation not only undercuts the Deputy, but also affects the performance of the subordinate who in effect has two supervisors.

Because the Deputy is seldom directly responsible for substantive mission operations, the terminology used in this job description is qualified by using the phrase "participation in." For example, the Mission Director and the Program Officer shape the program and determine project details, while the Deputy participates by giving advice, revising written documents to conform with policy, procuring information, and coordinating. In addition, the description has been made very general, with the intention of providing an idealized format for the job in an effort to make this incumbent a more useful and more used member of the mission team.

In addition to the problems and obstacles which can be related directly to the specific functions, which will be discussed below, several problems were reported by Deputy Directors which affect all phases of their jobs.

The most frequently cited general problem involves personnel. As a rule Deputy Directors attributed the origins of this problem to the Agency for International Development/Washington (AID/W) personnel office. One Deputy reported that the Washington personnel office was so poorly organized that when appointed he had to "walk his papers

through" for processing because they were lying in in-baskets without receiving action. Another Deputy reported the need to visit Washington several times a year because of the personnel office bottleneck. A third Deputy reported that Washington personnel "has a large pool of people for whom they have no assignment and they are continually trying to peddle them to missions around the world." This procedure created a need for the Deputy to be on the alert to prevent unwanted and unnecessary personnel from being sent to the mission. Other Deputies reported similar problems: the arrival of two people to fill one job, being without a key executive for twenty-four months because of AID/W recruiting failures, the assignment of technicians to Division Chief positions, and the assignment of personnel who were clearly incapable of withstanding the physical strain of overseas life.

A related general problem frequently mentioned by Deputy Directors was that many mission personnel are either incompetent or so poorly selected or trained that they are unable to function properly. Technicians received the most frequent criticism from Deputies, based on their inability to visualize anything other than their own projects, inability to write, inability to cope with subtleties, lack of drive, inability to represent the mission among host nationals, inability to adjust to an overseas environment, inability to train others which is their major function, and possession of a pronounced air of paternalism or superiority. In one example, which is not an isolated case, a mission employee became drunk in the company of host country officials, accused them of being communists, and stated that the entire country could be bought for a small sum and that it would never be able to progress. This employee was quickly sent home, but the damage had already occurred.

Another pervasive problem is that agency operations frequently lack clarity, and that clarifications are difficult to obtain. One Deputy reported that his mission was forced to learn what could not be done by

trying something and then waiting to see if disciplinary action resulted. Another Deputy reported that AID/W was really an agent to supply money, personnel and materials, but that in addition AID/W tried to administer on the local scene, without adequate information. A third Deputy reported constant combat between the mission and AID/W because after submitting ideas based on locally available information, the ideas were disapproved by AID/W based on political news. A fourth Deputy reported that determining Washington's assistance policy was difficult. In this particular case the U.S. Ambassador favored "soft aid" while the mission favored "hard aid," but no one knew the official Washington view.

Difficulties in obtaining clarifications were frequently attributed to poor communications. Unclear messages, delayed replies, and inappropriate replies occur frequently enough to warrant correction. For example, one mission asked permission via cable to purchase some specialized equipment. After three weeks of waiting no answer had been received. In another example, permission to manipulate a Public Law 480 loan was requested, but no reply was received for several days. Other missions reported frequent cases of delays in the sending of travel orders from AID/W, and that many cables concerning such items were sent which AID/W simply failed to answer. In every mission there were reports of communication mismanagement, either extensive delays by AID/W in providing answers, or complete failure to answer.

In addition to incompetent mission personnel, host country personnel are often not effective; they lack training or initiative, or are corrupt. This handicap extends from high level ministry officials to workmen responsible for routine repairs. Obviously, negotiating with a corrupt or uninformed Minister is the more complex end of the scale, but mission work is also difficult to accomplish when typewriters and air conditioners can not be readily repaired.

A frequent complaint was that host country officials try to obtain favors from the AID mission or to pressure it for personal gain. For example, frequent attempts are made to send a relative to the United States under the participant training program. In another reported problem, a mission purchased property, but could not obtain possession because high ranking politicians were maintaining mistresses in the building. In this case, the mission was hesitant to risk the displeasure of the politicians by insisting on immediate possession. Mission Deputies, participating in the effort to solve such problems, are forced to spend countless hours searching for and carrying out solutions, using cautious methods. This not only requires time that could better be spent on development of the country, but also tends to bring the American into conflict with the host country culture, which, because of the necessity to judge negatively, leaves the American in the inherently displeasing role of critic.

Several Deputy Directors reported problems in mission-Embassy relations. It appears that the general feeling among AID personnel is that Embassy employees think of and deal with AID as a second class entity. For example, one Embassy was accused of reserving for itself contacts with Ministers, and leaving lower level contacts to AID. Other Deputies reported that, in general, Embassy-mission relations were "not good." One Deputy remarked that AID has a bigger operating budget while the Embassy had prestige and employee career status, so that a work damaging rivalry was to be expected. Regarding operations, a common complaint was that the Embassy's goal tended to be to win friendships, which in turn created a desire to conduct development programs of any kind so long as cordial relations were maintained. The AID mission, on the other hand, operated under the philosophy of undertaking only those projects which are believed actually to advance development; consequently certain projects proposed by host country officials had to be vetoed.

Such differences widen the gulf between Embassies and missions, and further complicate efforts to provide development assistance. The Deputy often becomes involved in such controversies in attempts to reduce the excess time needed to negotiate AID business with the Embassy.

The following sections contain descriptions of specific functions with descriptions of activities, complications and problems that were found to be associated with them.

F U N C T I O N S

I. PARTICIPATES IN PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

This broad category includes all activities necessary to plan and produce a realistic assistance effort for the Agency's development operations in the host country. The Deputy is seldom a direct producer in this part of the mission's work, but instead "observes," "reviews," "suggests," or "coordinates," work created by other mission personnel.

A. Obtains Information Relevant to Program Development

In order to advise, review, coordinate, suggest, etc., a Deputy Director obviously must have information. Obtaining information occurs continuously, and by a variety of methods; information is utilized, for the most part, during the period of Country Assistance Program production.

1. Confers with potentially knowledgeable people

The Deputy obtains information from others through formal and informal meetings, varying from attendance at a structured conference to conversation over cocktails. Sometimes an incumbent is seeking a specific item of information such as number of teachers being trained, and sometimes he merely learns a bit of interesting information which is mentally stored for possible future use. People from whom he obtains information vary as greatly as the type of information obtained; from the president of a country to a day laborer, and from host country official policy to a day laborer's desire for training.

One of the technical Division Chiefs suggested sending a team of counterparts to the U.S. to study a very specialized course. I asked him to explain his ideas and then I discussed it with the Program Officer who agreed that it was a good suggestion. However, a ranking official of the Ministry was not in favor of the plan. Then the technician went to Washington on consultation and his experience there led him to think that we should forego the idea and instead have a consultant come out, look over the situation, and recommend whether such training would be useful. I called the Program Officer for his opinion and we both agreed that it would be a good idea for the consultant to come. The consultant eventually came and recommended that we not send the group for specialized training, which I agreed to after reading his report.

* * * *

I do not take many notes, which has created problems. For example, at a meeting with a local Minister, the Minister gave me needed information which contained an amount of money to be donated by the Ministry for an AID project. I failed to write down the figure, thinking that I could easily remember it. However, I and the technician who attended with me forgot the exact figure, so the technician had to telephone later to find out what the figure had been.

* * * *

I met a Ford Foundation representative at a cocktail party. He mentioned that he was considering the possibility of establishing an agricultural center in a rural area. Since we are very active in this area, I talked to him about this possibility. We exchanged points of view which allowed us to learn about their plans which would be very complementary to our

work. Not only did I get reliable advance information, but I was also able to give him much encouragement regarding their plans.

* * * *

2. Selects and reads documents

Major sources of information are host country publications, third country and international agency materials, and a great deal of printed matter from the United States, including correspondence to and from AID/W, newspaper articles, and applicable government reports such as those from the Department of State. Because of the frequency of accomplishment and lack of immediate criticality, meaningful examples were not obtained.

The main problem reported for this task was that of time. With a full work day of participating in meetings, reviewing correspondence, coping with personnel problems, etc., there is little time remaining to read and digest a central bank report, or a Ministry publication discussing training needs. Many Deputies partly solve this problem by reading after hours, at home or at the office. A related problem is that some materials are in a foreign language, so that even with some foreign language ability reading is a laborious process for most Deputies.

3. Observes host country conditions

The Deputy Director travels throughout the host country for several reasons, to monitor projects, to represent the mission at ceremonies, to vacation, etc. This task includes the obtaining of useful development information, either for immediate use or for possible future reference, by means of personal observation. For example, while on vacation an incumbent might observe that building maintenance would

be a logical addition to the mission's educational assistance effort, or something more general such as need for a better diet.

Again the major problem is lack of time. Most Deputies reported that day-to-day activities were time consuming, and more necessary than field trips, with the result being that few field visits were made. This failure in turn created a handicap when programs were being considered and planned, i.e., the difficulty of making judgments about unseen facilities or operations.

4. Assigns USAID personnel to obtain information

Information in this instance refers to that which is not readily available by simply asking, but for which an effort must be made. Examples include making a survey, reading a document, or compiling statistics. Because of lack of time, facilities, or expertise, a Deputy Director sometimes assigns the obtaining of such information to a mission employee with the necessary skills or tools.

> I wasn't satisfied with the justification given on a loan application which was submitted to me by the Program Office so I asked the Program Officer to get the details I felt would satisfy AID/W. Since he didn't have them he asked the technician to come and discuss it. When the technician arrived I chaired two meetings involving the Program Officer, the technician and myself. The result was a much better piece of work and it was accepted by AID/W.

* * * *

> I recently received some reports from the host government concerning expansion of educational facilities. I have concluded that there is not much clarity about where they are going in this area. They are proposing buildings, courses of great size, and have made no provisions for

teachers, tuitions, getting students, etc. I brought the reports and my conclusions to the attention of the Director and suggested that I contact our technicians and ask them to do a serious assessment of the preliminary evaluation done by the host government. I proposed a great concentration on re-evaluating the feasibility of undertaking a project such as was described in the reports. The Director accepted my judgment so I assigned several technicians to obtain the needed data.

* * * *

5. Evaluates information

   a. considers reliability of sources

   b. deduces or infers errors or inconsistencies

   c. verifies data

   d. judges relevance of data

After or while obtaining information, a Deputy Director must complete the process of evaluation, with emphasis on applicability and correctness. Descriptive incidents of a mental process are,of course, impossible to obtain, and even a listing of types of information would be difficult because of the range of topics to be considered. However, this is an important part of a Deputy's responsibilities. There is frequently conflicting information, lack of information, and deliberately falsified information. For example, a Ministry of rural affairs might report the existence of a certain number of rural schools, with the Ministry of education reporting an entirely different number. Sometimes sources have reputations for accuracy or good intentions, so that selectivity of data is less of a problem. However, some data are so obviously inaccurate, and the facilities for verification are so limited that the Deputy must pass judgment using the criterion of what he himself thinks is realistic.

B. Participates in Development and Revision of the Program

Normally the Deputy Director applies his knowledge by lending his services to program development to ensure that the policies of the Agency and the Mission Director are followed, and by using his authority, his personal qualifications, his close association with the Mission Director, and the information which he has obtained, to help ensure that the best possible projects are made available to be included in the Country Assistance Program. This section covers the preplanning necessary to decide what kinds or how many projects will be included. Detailed planning of specific projects is covered in a later section.

1. Provides guidelines, assistance, and information to others

There are a multitude of decisions to be made while producing the Country Assistance Program, with the Deputy Director's involvement closely related to the Director's mode of operations. The Director might assume responsibility for all decisions, assign some types of decisions to the Deputy, assign all decisions to the Deputy as a preliminary to his own consideration, or share all decisions with the Deputy. In some of the missions the Director had not made his mode of operations clear, so the Deputy was required to search for a proper degree of involvement in program development decisions. In some missions this problem was never satisfactorily resolved.

a. reviews or revises preliminary project plans

Deputy Directors reported that they participated in most planning discussions and that preliminary written materials such as memoranda were routed to them prior to or simultaneously with consideration by the Director. A typical sequence would be initiated

by a host country official suggesting a meeting to discuss assistance for a specific development effort. The Deputy Director would participate in such a meeting, which might lead to the future inclusion in the CAP of the proposal discussed. In short, such reviews as are accomplished by the Deputy under this heading are for the purpose of determining if a proposed project merits the detailed planning necessary for incorporation into the CAP, and are conducted with host country officials, with mission personnel, or with mission and host country personnel.

A significant problem for the Deputy results from USAID technicians not having a sense of objectivity. In many cases technicians are interested in expanding their own responsibilities, or they think of their technical specialties as being the only type of suitable assistance. Because of this frame of reference the technicians tend to present their plans, ideas, or proposals in emotional and selfish terms, without regard for other technical areas. The Deputy, usually untrained in the technical specialty, is required to make judgments concerning applicability, and at times, veracity. With highly persuasive Division Chiefs, with a natural instinct to stress their own specialty, a Deputy has the problem of assuring that technical areas with less persuasive leadership are not neglected. If one technical area does merit the largest portion of the budget, the Deputy has the problem of persuading technicians in other specialties to accept the unbalance and appreciate the reason for its existence. One particularly sly maneuver used by ambitious technicians is the enlisting of support from host country officials. This is exemplified by the technician who advised his counterpart Ministry official to insist to the AID Mission Director or Deputy Director that unless certain new projects were supported, current projects would be terminated, or that host country cooperation would cease. Therefore,

detection of suppression, distortion, or slanting of information by American technicians becomes a problem for the Deputy Director. Furthermore, the problem is complicated by the fact that host country officials spontaneously make the same kinds of threats, without prompting by American technicians, so that the Deputy may not know whether to trust his technicians or not.

The Deputy Director in such cases must cope with the sometimes subtle problem of what should be versus what has to be. To enable accomplishment of mission goals, and, quite often, to prevent a failure which would stigmatize a career, the Deputy at times is faced with the need to approve or to recommend the approval of an unrealistic project proposal. When a Deputy, with other mission officials, is faced with the choice of approving a specific project or terminating the AID mission, the choice could hardly be other than to approve the project. This, of course, allows the mission to "stay alive" in order to continue appropriate work. This issue is further complicated by the fact that many Deputies believe that their careers would be damaged if their mission programs are curtailed or eliminated at the behest of their hosts.

> I read a preliminary loan application and was able to determine that the company was not viable and that they had no real basis for future profits. I pointed these things out to others present at a meeting to consider the application. By spotting the weakness of the company I saved myself and others involved from wasting time considering the loan.

* * * *

> A local industry was built to produce 100,000 items per year. At present, it is producing only 50,000 items because of equipment limitations. They want to discuss a loan to increase production to total capacity. With this increase the company would

be able to pay off the new debt and make payments on a previous loan. However, they could not produce evidence of being able to sell their total output if production was increased to full capacity. During the discussions I recommended that they obtain more complete data and then approach us a second time with their idea.

* * * *

(From a colleague) When the new Director arrived, the Minister of Economics hauled out his pet project. The Deputy Director avoided involvement in the discussions because he suspected that the Minister would do a "snow job" on the Director, who was new to the job. The proposals included some project details which had previously been disapproved because of exorbitant costs. The Minister successfully convinced the Director, and soon a contract for a feasibility study was let. Suddenly AID/W became critical. They claimed that the consultants were going beyond the requirements of a feasibility study, so naturally gathering facts about this expansion of function slowed down progress of the study. The Minister began to exert strong pressure on the Director, claiming that the United States was not living up to commitments and was wasting time. He threatened to call the newspapers and denounce AID as a fraud. The Director, because of this pressure, was determined to get the project going without delay, and was ready to stake his job on it. Therefore, he returned to Washington and a couple of weeks later the project was approved. This entire controversy would have been avoided if the Deputy, who knew the situation, had rendered advice to the new Director about the original project proposal.

* * * *

The host government requested a grant to send representatives to a U.S. seminar in vocational counseling. The Director and I refused on the grounds that vocational counseling was unrelated to the goals and other programs of AID for this country.

* * * *

A technician in charge of an agricultural project was striving to increase his responsibilities and, of course, to do a good job. He proposed that several new technicians be added to his staff. I vetoed his proposal because: 1) I knew that the technician could not supervise well enough to handle the additional staff, 2) the host government was not cooperating fully with the existing project, thus increasing work would also tend to increase frustrations, 3) there was probably already a satisfactory number of Americans here and new personnel might upset the balance, and 4) even if it were decided that new technicians were needed it might be possible to get TDY people for short periods, thus costing less money. The Director agreed with my reasons and with my decision.

* * * *

A Division Chief submitted a proposal calling for technical staff to be used in an outside advisory capacity to the host government. I favored placing staff directly in Ministry offices. In a program conference I asked questions that led the Division Chief to agree that internal placement of technicians would be more effective in relation to division goals. The proposal was amended to reflect this agreement.

* * * *

b. recommends priorities

Various mission personnel, principally Chiefs of Divisions, the Program Officer, and the Mission Director, are involved in seeking out or creating, or considering ideas to be included in the CAP. The Deputy, as a spokesman for the Director, an informed mission employee, and a senior executive, presents his own views of the various proposals and their comparative value in the overall development effort. Usually the Deputy does not have technical reasons for recommending a certain emphasis, but he may have special information not available to others. For example, he may have learned the development plans of a private foundation from having participated in social discussions and could thus recommend immediate attention to or postponement of a particular AID development goal.

With creative people and a limited budget, it is very easy for conflicts to develop. Technicians, eager for success, eager to provide assistance, and eager for increased responsibility, are prone to ignore the needs of other technicians. Cases were reported in which Division Chiefs demanded an unfair portion of a limited budget for their own projects. In such instances, the Deputy, either on assignment from the Director, or as a member of mission top management, becomes involved in working out compromise solutions.

Pressures also come from AID/W. Technicians write unofficial letters to AID/W asking their backstop offices to put pressure on Desk Officers to approve certain projects. Also, host country officials are able to apply pressure in Washington through their lobbying facilities. In addition, there are very real pressures from Congress. Congressmen who know very little about AID projects or problems, types of commodities involved, etc., sometimes make suggestions based on their own political goals. When such a suggestion is made to

AID/W, the essence of the suggestion often becomes AID policy. One Deputy reported that the Agency had no intention of losing Congressional support just to make a technician happy. Therefore, the Deputy's job was to convince technicians to accept illogical suggestions, without really explaining the real need for compliance. Therefore, recommending priorities means more than merely selecting what projects are most needed.

> A technician recently arrived who wanted to get ahead. He proposed a program calling for expenditures of $_____. The Program Officer had earlier decided that AID should not be stressing the technician's specialty in this country and had made this suggestion to AID and had it approved. Therefore, to approve the technicians proposal would mean rewriting the CAP, and ruling against the Program Officer's decision. The technician thought he wasn't being appreciated, and the Program Officer had to be upheld, so I decided to work out a compromise. The technician had wanted a central demonstration center and several regional demonstration centers, so I said "complete" regional centers were out, but that limited-facility regional centers would be acceptable. The technician was happy and the prestige of Program Officer was preserved.

* * * *

> The Chief of the Education Division was trying to sell a project. The Chief of the Agriculture Division was not enthusiastic about the project and the two Chiefs obviously did not agree. The Agricultural Chief wanted to have a statement in a report to the effect that the U.S. was not interested in the area of development being proposed by the Education Chief. I convinced both Division Chiefs that no statement about the disagreement was necessary.

* * * *

c. suggests project ideas

A Deputy Director has an overall view of the mission, frequently has high-level, well-informed friends, and reads most if not all of the mission's correspondence. He thus can be in a position to know everything that is succeeding, what is failing, what needs revision, stimulation, etc. This special position enables the Deputy to form educated opinions concerning assistance needs and operational abilities and limitations, making him a prime source of ideas and suggestions.

Usually the Deputy has no authority to order that projects be put into effect, therefore he must rely on persuasion. In addition, the Deputy seldom has specific technical knowledge, which hinders efforts to be persuasive to the necessary degree.

> The project called for the host government and the U.S. to divide costs. I was not happy about this project because it called for bringing in U.S. contract personnel so I proposed to the host government that they establish and operate their own division to accomplish this kind of work. The mission would train local national technicians in the use of equipment and give them the necessary equipment. This means that the local nationals could continue the work after U.S. concern with the project had closed out. I circulated a memo to this effect to those in the mission whose divisions were involved. There were some questions raised by several of the divisions as to who was to do what. I revised the memo and finally got acceptance within the mission. We will now move forward to put the project into effect.

* * * *

I recommended a major construction project which would create a lot of interest and be good publicity for the United States because of its impressive size. It would create a need for U.S. workmen and engineers, who would not need to speak the local language since they would be working with other Americans. The idea was accepted by local officials as a "natural." Statutory requirements were such that cost estimates and a feasibility study must be accomplished before the U.S. can be committed to support a capital project such as this one. Events moved slowly so I had to stall the government but finally they insisted on an answer about U.S. intent. I replied that I could not provide an answer until the feasibility study was finished. The consultants arrived and spent several weeks making the study, then left and reviewed their findings for several months. In the meantime the host government was being friendly with other aid donors. AID/W was afraid to touch the project thinking that to do so would provide Congress with ammunition against the Agency because the proposal might be seen as running counter to the policy of stimulating assistance from other nations and other aid donors. AID/W finally sent a cable telling me the U.S. might be willing to go ahead providing that certain conditions were met, and that I could pass this information on to host government officials. My interpreter asked why I was bothering to transmit the information since the issue had already been settled. The host government had grown weary of waiting for the Americans and had signed an agreement with another donor agency. I had the translation completed anyway and took it to the Ministry. The Minister read the information then replied that the matter was already "settled."

* * * *

The Chief Agriculture Advisor wanted to start a program to teach local nationals how to raise poultry. When this proposal came to me I assumed that poultry production was more complex than beef production. Also I remembered that in an earlier program somewhere else there were many fiascos in poultry -- giving a man a few chickens and expecting that he would then be able to feed his family proved a complete failure. With these thoughts in mind I suggested to the Chief Agriculture Advisor that beef, not poultry, should be emphasized. The Advisor agreed, so a beef production specialist was requested.

* * * *

The host national economy was not moving. I thought that if there were tax reductions, there would be incentive to invest, and to expand production, and thus the economy would get moving. The host national government was opposed to tax cuts, so I talked to the _____ Division and learned that there was a very high tax on medicinal drugs. I planned to give P.L. 480 money to the host national government in lieu of their collecting the tax. The money would be given in cash, and for a trial period only. Increases in purchases of drugs could be observed, as well as what decreases there would be in labor losses due to illness. I gathered all data and costs for this plan. The Mission Director agreed with the idea but the Embassy disapproved because the P.L. 480 payments would amount to budget support, which is against United States policy. Therefore, the idea, although it had great potential, had to be abandoned.

* * * *

> I tried to get the division to work up an idea for _____, which they did, but the result was not acceptable to the Program Officer or to me. I felt the idea, as worked out, did not have enough promise to warrant pushing it. There was a lack of enthusiasm all the way around, although _____ was clearly needed. I felt I could have brought about a better program and better coordination if I personally had gotten more involved in it, but I didn't have time to spend motivating apathetic technicians.

* * * *

2. Coordinates with others

This category includes all efforts expended in assuring that proposed AID operations do not duplicate the operations of other assistance agencies, private foundations, or host country offices, and efforts to coordinate with the embassy and with AID/W. Goals for this task include conformance to policy and regulations, and the reception of advice from personnel in the chain of command above the mission. Methods of coordination include meetings, telephone calls, mail communications, and conversations, and are both formal and informal.

The Mission Director carried the brunt of this task by virtue of his contacts with other chiefs of agencies, host country Ministers, and United States officials, but the Deputy, as a frequent "stand in" for the Director, share this burden.

a. Embassy, USIS, other United States Government groups

As the senior American official, the U.S. Ambassador occasionally desires an explanation of project plans, or even detailed justification of proposed assistance. In addition, Embassy officers at times have special expertise, helpful to development, or because

of the political implications of assistance, the Embassy and the AID mission frequently engage in policy coordination. The Deputy Director assists the Director in presenting the AID position either as a participant at a meeting, for example, the Country Team meeting, or, on request or assignment, the Deputy provides a formal briefing.

A common problem reported was that mission and Embassy officials have trouble agreeing about assistance philosophy due to different goals. Another problem is that AID personnel have trouble interacting with Embassy officials because of either not knowing the interests of the Embassy, or being forced to consent to Embassy instructions that AID feels to be unsound. A common complaint in this regard was that the Embassy tended to become involved in areas which should be reserved to AID.

Most of these contacts are with Embassy officials, but the Deputy also occasionally interacts with United States Information Service personnel. Typically, such a contact would be to discuss informational coverage of potential AID assistance projects. AID has infrequent contacts with military personnel, except for Country Team meetings. When these contacts do occur they are generally for a specialized purpose, e.g., to consider joint participation in emergency assistance to the host country. In such instances the Director would normally attend personally, often accompanied by the Deputy, but at times the press of business requires that the Deputy attend the joint meetings alone as the official USAID representative.

> The State Department was "sorry" that negotiations started with the host government on the project without the approval of Washington, D.C. I was not clear as to whether negotiations should be broken off. I work for AID, not State, and I did not know whether or not this was an order for the mission not to negotiate with the host government

on this matter. It so happened that the host government approached me on this matter so I feel we have a right to negotiate. I am waiting for clarification.

* * * *

UNESCO is interested in a project currently being planned. However, the host government doesn't know who will put up how much money. I don't know the Embassy or Washington's position so I have to reach an understanding with the Ambassador about what the mission should recommend to Washington. However, I have to wait for the Ambassador to make up his mind.

* * * *

A project was planned for a remote area which neither the Director nor I felt was an especially worthwhile project. We felt the money could be spent to greater advantage by teaching the local nationals how to do their own construction and improvements, and in purchasing some equipment for them rather than using U.S. contractors. The Director and I talked with the Ambassador who was strongly in favor of doing the project using U.S. personnel. The Director and I finally agreed with the Ambassador in spite of the fact that we felt the money had a better use because we did not want to appear to be "pig-headed."

* * * *

I talked with the Embassy Economic Officer to determine how far we could go in the process of approving or disapproving a certain loan application. I wanted to avoid the error of speaking only for myself or for AID and to remain within the limits of U.S. policy. We talked for a short while and came to an agreement concerning what U.S. policy should be.

* * * *

> The government has been reluctant to give thanks to the U.S. for its aid, but recently a beautiful ceremony was held in which the U.S. turned over an expensive building to the host government. The Ambassador gave a formal speech and received much attention. The Ambassador heretofore was disinterested in aid to this country, but he became enthusiastic and talked to me about how the host government's attitudes had improved. He spoke about recommending increasing amounts of aid to them. I must consider the Ambassador's attitude since my job depends on getting along with him, but my views must also reflect my own professional judgment and be in line with what is best for the Agency. In the present situation, for political reasons, I will not be able to recommend increased aid. At the same time, the Ambassador must be dealt with. I have no solution at this time so I am hoping that the Ambassador will get over his unrealistic enthusiasm.

* * * *

b. third country, international, private groups

This task involves coordination with a variety of agencies and is composed of two general types of activity. As an agent of the AID mission, the Deputy exchanges information and suggestions about proposed projects with other donor agencies. Secondly, he receives requests for assistance from private groups, such as universities, from within the host country. This task requires delicacy inasmuch as some AID information is classified, some is considered sensitive, and some is politically controversial, while at the same time there is a need to coordinate aid efforts. Similarly, care is necessary in coordinating with private groups, especially those from the host country, because of the likelihood of misunderstandings about intentions, procedures, and responsibilities.

This task is made difficult because of the lack of systematic coordination methods. In the last few years there has been a proliferation of assistance agencies, with few or no lines of authority. Thus, coordination tends to be accomplished on a personal basis. Also, the international agencies, in an effort to become involved and justify their existence, become embroiled beyond delivery capability. For example, in one country several international agencies promised skilled personnel to staff a planning board, which was agreeable to the host country. Unfortunately they have been unable to provide the personnel, and because of the agreement AID is powerless to furnish the required assistance. The Deputy in this case, in his role in program development, was helping to search for a solution to the stalemate.

Private groups from the United States, such as foundations, are included in this category as international groups. They are generally well-staffed, well-intentioned, and well-planned organizations, thus present few or no problems for the USAID mission. However, the private groups from within the host country, such as autonomous universities or businesses, do occasionally cause task difficulties. Representatives from these host country private groups are for the most part outside the established assistance system. Therefore, although they may be extremely deserving, they create an administrative burden for the mission, especially for the Deputy because of his role in dealing with visitors.

> I got a call a few days ago from an AID technician explaining that he had been informally approached by a host country official for assistance in a specific specialty. The specialty deserves aid, so I told the technician that I would return his call the following day. I knew this specialty was supported by an international agency so I called my colleague there to ask if they might be interested in something like this. He replied

that they would be interested and that we should encourage the host country official to make a formal request to his agency. On the following day I relayed this information to our technician, who so informed the host country official.

* * * *

A host country university wanted to establish a special institute. On their own they had a consultant team out from the United States to conduct a survey concerning need, location, etc. The report from the consultants caused them to decide in favor of establishing the institute, so they came to us, hoping that AID would provide financing. It would be a worthy project, but it was too costly to add to our existing program. I knew that a private U.S. Foundation did this kind of work, so I got in touch with my contact there, asking him if they would be interested. He replied, "Yes," so I asked him for permission to refer the university officials to him, which was agreeable. Now university and Foundation personnel are working out complete details for this project.

* * * *

One of the universities is establishing a new curriculum and came to us for help. We agreed, but before assistance could be authorized, a number of clearance steps were necessary. We sent them the forms which included a requirements analysis. The form for this analysis was in their hands for months, but they couldn't seem to get it processed. After a long wait I made arrangements to meet with university trustees and the senior adminstrator. I explained in detail what was required and how important it was that it be thoroughly accomplished. At the end of our meeting they said they understood and would implement it immediately. I also sent a letter to the university's senior administrator reiterating the information needed, and enclosing a sample analysis to use as a guide.

In the same letter I told them we would be glad to send out a team of advisors to help them if they had trouble. Apparently they are still having trouble because after over a month we have had no response to my latest letter.

* * * *

A notice from the host government came across my desk the other day. It was a general inquiry about how the problem of the lack of housing available for technicians could be approached. I was somewhat puzzled at the intent of this and I thought it looked like a circular, so I called my U.N. colleague to ask what he thought of it and learned that he had also received the document. Together we came to a general conclusion about its intent and significance, and I formulated an answer accordingly.

* * * *

The problem of classroom facilities became acute so we recently negotiated an agreement with host country officials to make funds available for classroom construction to alleviate the problem. However, before the construction agreements were signed, they began construction on their own. This made all expenditures before signature legally invalid. The problem was what to do about the expenses incurred by the school, since they had put themselves in debt and were depending on funds from us. I recommended to the Director that we try to find some way of helping them in this situation without jeopardizing our position before Congress or the Government Accounting Office. He agreed that it would be advisable to find a solution so I then called the Executive Officer and told him to draft a letter to the host country officials describing the nature of their violation and why we were powerless to help them defray their costs. However, I told him

to propose that we build another classroom to add to theirs in which we would contribute all of our originally estimated funds, and to make an appointment to meet with a school representative to discuss implementation of this alternative. This is much better for our relations than to passively let them take the loss.

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The Dean of a department in the engineering school visited me to make a request for books and for laboratory equipment. Our policy has been to support viable, existing organizations in various education areas rather than to encourage new institutions. Therefore, the request might be considered very appropriate. However, in the interest of coordination the Chief Administrator at the engineering school had asked me to report any of his staff members making requests except through the Administrator's office. Although the Dean had attempted to violate the Administrator's system on several other occasions I had never reported him and didn't intend doing so on this occasion. Instead, I told him what fine reports I had been hearing about his school. Then I asked him if he had visited other mission officials as had been suggested to him on an earlier visit. He had not, so I immediately called in the Assistant Program Officer, who had some experience in obtaining books and equipment, and asked him to assist the visiting Dean. As they departed I made it a point not to invite the Dean back, in order to help enforce the Administrator's system without being harsh.

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My United Nations counterpart called last month and wanted to know the size of one of our proposed projects. I was not at all sure that I could or should provide him with these figures so I had to hesitate. However, in my position

I could not let him think that I had to check this out with somebody before I could say anything, so I gave him an approximation which was somewhat below the actual figure. I told him that this was an approximate figure and could be substantially off since I was stating it from memory. I think I caused enough doubt in his mind to cause him not to consider my figure very valid and, at the same time, put him off.

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A host country official called me to ask help in organizing a provincial sanitation improvement effort. They requested an adviser for a few days and we were considering the request. Then I got a call from an international agency colleague who had heard that what we were going to do would be in competition with their work. I explained in detail what we were going to do and it was determined that he had the wrong impression and that there would be no duplication.

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c. host country officials

During planning it is necessary to determine host country response to potential projects in order to learn such details as intended participation, contributions, and feasibility. Such determinations are made formally and informally depending on circumstances, and are made or attempted by most mission employees. Because of his high-level contacts the Deputy Director has valuable sources of information which should enable him to gain beneficial insights into host national motivations and intentions. To assist in carrying out this task the Deputy should cultivate contacts with host nationals, and encourage other mission personnel to provide assistance and support by interacting with host nationals at every appropriate opportunity.

In the process of carrying out this task the Deputy serves as a supplement to the Director. He occasionally attends meetings with the Director, in order to be informed, and at times substitutes for the Director when the workload is heavy, or if the Director lacks aptitude or interest in this type of activity. These meetings are difficult in that care must be taken to avoid leaving the impression of making commitments, when in actual fact speculation on a proposed project is the intention. Host country officials are prone to take any statement as a commitment, so this danger cannot be overemphasized. Such misunderstandings may occur because of such simple obstructions as language differences, or they may be based on a desire to embarrass the AID mission into giving more or different assistance than that which is planned. One Deputy explained that the only solution to this problem is to explain statements very carefully, and to repeat them for emphasis, hoping that misunderstandings do not occur. Another Deputy reported that he always took an assistant to a meeting not only to help translate, but also to help make points clear, and to provide background if misunderstandings seemed likely.

In addition, even if the Deputy thinks that a project is sound, and is likely to be attempted, he must still use care in discussing it with host country officials. Regardless of need, availability of money, and intended goals, AID/W may refuse to allow specific projects to be initiated because of political implications unknown to the mission staff. Therefore, to avoid embarrassment, the Deputy needs to use extreme caution when giving details, or encouragement, at these discussion stages.

A related problem is that many host country officials agree with everything suggested by mission personnel, perhaps without knowing or caring what is being said, or perhaps with the hope of acquiring additional assistance. A frequent result of such easy agreement

is that after project initiation the host nationals fail to fulfill their commitments. Therefore, the Deputy, in his conversations and meetings, must be able to make realistic appraisals of host national reactions to proposed projects.

Quite often host country officials do not understand or appreciate AID procedures. These procedures, e.g., a feasibility study, often require considerable time, thus creating an appearance of over-cautiousness. A Deputy Director bears much of the responsibility to combat this negative impression by explaining AID procedures to host country officials. One Deputy, although unable to provide a specific illustrative example, indicated that he always emphasized to host country officials that they should be very interested in proper preplanning, including time-consuming feasibility studies, because they are the ones who are mortgaging future budgets to pay for current projects.

The problems outlined above are made more serious because of the speed with which the CAP must be written. Because of deadlines and the amount of work involved, it is often necessary to prepare project plans without coordinating at any level with host national officials. Therefore, AID/W approved projects might prove impossible or difficult to implement.

Varied and frequent contacts at all levels are necessary to ensure proper coordination with host national officials. Such a burden cannot be carried only by administrative staff, because of the sheer volume and because technical materials need to be handled at many meetings. From the Deputy Director's viewpoint, the technical Division Chiefs should do a substantial amount of this type of coordination. Deputies reported, however, that the typical Division Chief does not become involved in this activity. Various reasons were

reported for this failure, including lack of ability or interest, inability to see the need, dislike of host nationals, and a jealous guarding of an "empire." Some technicians do coordinate with host nationals and in an acceptable manner, but the void exists often enough that several Deputies reported that their own workload within this task was unnecessarily, inappropriately, and excessively increased because technicians did not, could not, or would not participate in this type of coordination.

Deputy Directors themselves are not without personal shortcomings with regard to this task. Americans are a notoriously ingrown community when living abroad, and the AID Deputy Director, although perhaps well-intentioned, is not immune from error. The fact that Americans, even Deputy Directors, need schooling in how to interact within a foreign culture is demonstrated in the case of one Deputy who complained of the difficulty of becoming acquainted with host nationals because of their unexplained reluctance to associate with Americans. Host nationals in this same country remarked that "Americans are alright, but they are difficult to know because they are reluctant to mix with us." Another Deputy could not interact with host nationals because he did not know the locally accepted language. A third Deputy had stopped all but token associations because the host nationals continually asked for favors. A fourth Deputy lacked sufficient time to cultivate contacts, and so on.

Other evidence points to a lack of interaction with the hosts. Mission parties and other social events attended by interviewers were conspicuously lacking in host mission employees. Few Deputy Directors were able to list a friend from among the host national population. Yet interacting with local national personnel is generally believed to be crucial to the Deputy Director's job, especially during

program formulation, because it is essential to promote full cooperation with an appreciation for the AID program. The apparent deficiencies in this area should be a cause of grave concern to AID administrators.

> The mission education division had been working with the Ministry of Education to set up a specific education program. The host government was not willing to contribute much, but wanted the program. I was not in on the original negotiations, but the Education Division Chief kept me informed. When I learned that the suggested commitments of AID were to be four times as high as that of the host government, I talked to Ministry of Education officials to learn precisely what they were willing to contribute. Upon finding out how small their contribution would be I recommended to the Mission Director that the program be disapproved. This made our Education Chief and the host country Ministry officials unhappy, but we must avoid approving a program when interest is so low that future success is doubtful. The Mission Director agreed with my recommendation, so I arranged a meeting with a host country education official and told him that they should forget the program if their contribution was to be so small. This official complained to the Minister, who in turn complained to the Mission Director. The Minister also wrote a letter to the Mission Director complaining even further, but in both cases the Director followed my advice. Thus we prevented wasting money on a project likely to fail because of lack of cooperation.

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> The host government was negotiating a loan with a private business which will require excessively burdensome, but legitimate repayments. When they were in the process of negotiating I met the Deputy Minister of Finance at a cocktail party. The atmosphere was cordial and informal so I brought up this matter. We held a friendly

discussion and I indicated that possibly AID could have financed the project at less burdensome terms. I told him how much better off their treasury would be if they had approached us with the proposed project. Then I asked him if he would be willing to consider this, and he replied that he would. He will now, hopefully, discuss the matter with the Minister, citing the advantages of coming to AID. If we are able to do the project we will help the host country and increase our presence here.

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Negotiations for one proposed project had all been with the host country planning board, but there was another group, the Ministry of Finance, which wanted to become involved. The Ministry saw an opportunity to place their men on the liaison team since the head of the planning board had recently resigned. To prevent this I called on an outstanding and respected citizen who was closely allied to the planning board and told him what was going on. He then made arrangements to immediately place planning board personnel on the liaison team, as members, and as chairman. This private citizen was successful, which prevented the project from being controlled by the Ministry. With the planning board in control the proposed project will provide badly needed training for the board and is more likely to succeed since the board is more responsible than the Ministry.

* * * *

After considerable reading of available documents and personal observations, I came to the conclusion that educational development should be a top priority. Searching further, I learned that the previous Director had withdrawn most education projects because the host government failed to meet their commitments. However,

I felt very strongly about the need for educational development, so I invited several host country officials to a meeting to discuss needs, budgets, and priorities. This meeting definitely improved rapport, and there is now a good possibility for initiating a good, well conceived, cooperative program.

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In connection with one proposed project I felt that I should not discuss it openly with the Minister. However, I saw the Minister at a cocktail party and was able to discuss the study informally. I was primarily interested in learning if the Minister really wanted the study and if he would support it after the work began. Unfortunately the Minister would not reveal his thoughts, so we will have to plan the project without knowledge of its acceptance. It is impossible to solve this type of problem because the host nationals are simply not prone to reveal their motivations.

* * * *

I tried for a long time to convince host national officials that a planning board was necessary. When meeting with the President of the Central Bank, or with the Minister of the Treasury, I always mentioned the matter and asked about progress, stressing the need for setting priorities. For a long time I made insignificant progress, and then I indicated that little United States assistance would be possible unless a planning agency was created. Within a short time the planning board was set up. As it turned out, the planning board members were incapable, but at least it was set up.

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> In a discussion at the Ministry I was asked about the likelihood of our helping to establish a series of agricultural experiment stations in rural areas. I said that we would be very much interested in helping in that area subject to AID/W's approval. The Ministry soon sent in a request, and only two weeks later I got a call from the Minister wanting to know why we didn't have a consultant or someone from the Agriculture Division out at the site to begin feasibility studies. He was rather impatient because the machinery was not yet in motion to implement the project. He assumed that my being so optimistic about his informal inquiry meant that I was going to go back to the mission and initiate the project immediately. I had to explain to him in detail the process that we had to follow in such cases before he was satisfied that I was not dragging my feet on the matter.

* * * *

d. AID/W

At the same time that the mission is determining project feasibility it is necessary to communicate with AID/W to procure approvals, provide information or to request assistance. Most material of this type is drafted and received by others, but the Deputy Director clears such correspondence, and perhaps suggests needs to personnel more directly involved.

The major obstacle to accomplishing this task seems to be that AID/W and the mission have different views concerning urgency of substantive matters. Most Deputies expressed appreciation of the fact that AID/W has a broader, overall view of world assistance efforts, but at the same time they tended to be critical of AID/W for not keeping missions informed, e.g., by the simple expedient of acknowledging the receipt of an important piece of correspondence which requires extensive consideration.

I requested that AID/W send an expert to assist us in considering an important project proposal involving a feasibility study. It was necessary for the expert to be present during a specific time of year due to weather conditions. AID/W had earlier informed us that the expert would be readily available, but forty-one days after sending my requesting cable the expert had not arrived, and AID/W had not even acknowledged my cable. Therefore, I sent another cable, which also has not generated an AID/W response. Now the entire project will have to be canceled because of the AID/W delay.

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With one project which is being considered we have an opportunity to really assist the host country. Host country officials are really interested in the project, and it is desperately needed. I communicated complete details to AID/W via airgram several weeks ago, but no answer, or even confirmation of the airgram has been received. As a next step I will send a cable, hoping to prompt a reply of some kind so that planning can continue, or alternatives can be considered. However, I must be cautious in prodding AID/W because I have learned that officials there do not like to be pressured, especially by telephone, no matter how important the questions are.

* * * *

There was to be a conference held to consider a specific capital development project. Since we were invited to attend I recommended to the Director that we ask for a high-level official from AID/W to attend the conference. I have requested this type of Washington representative by airgram. We are unable to predict what will happen at the conference, but we may find opportunities to renew bids to the host government to allow initiation of various development projects. I felt that a representative from AID/W would demonstrate interest,

add prestige, and perhaps facilitate the presentation of our views concerning the capital development project.

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I had been here only six months when it was suggested to me by a host country official that a certain project would be desirable. I agreed and asked the Division Chief to write up an airgram for AID/W approval. AID/W did not approve. Instead, they asked a number of questions. Their questions convinced me that it was a poor idea, so I withdrew the proposal.

* * * *

C. Participates in Document Preparation

This section refers to the work involved in producing the formal Country Assistance Program. Planning is included in the sense that it is necessary to make final determinations about project details, e.g., how many teachers will be trained, or the feasibility of vaccinating the particular number of persons designated in preplanning. The Deputy Director is not usually involved in generating such details, but functions as a critic, reading all or most documents with the intention of improving project details and improving the entire set of project plans in order to provide an effective development program.

1. Reviews, edits, and evaluates

The Deputy reads the various sections of the CAP, including the final version, and attends meetings to consider details of the CAP. His philosophy during this process is to ensure that the CAP conforms to policy, and that project plans are feasible, properly planned, and well presented.

When appropriate the Deputy requests document originators to revise materials, or, if necessary, requests revisions by more competent personnel, or personnel possessing special expertise.

Because of the highly specialized nature of some projects the Deputy Director cannot be expected to posses the knowledge necessary to judge each proposed project included in the CAP. Where expert advice is needed, and available, it is brought into play by the Deputy. For example, the Deputy might request an Education Advisor to review materials prepared to document an agricultural education project.

> I did not read carefully a statement in the CAP prepared by a technician about the number of people to be trained. This statement proposed training a ridiculously large number of host nationals. This amount of training could not possibly be carried out, and if I had noticed the number and thought about it I would have realized it. This situation is not critical, and no drastic consequences will result, but it is embarrassing to have sent something like that to Washington.

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> (From subordinate) AID/W was exerting heavy pressure on the mission to submit the CAP. We did not have a good document and many projects were poorly planned, but the Deputy, worried about the AID/W pressure, insisted that the document be forwarded immediately. Because of document inadequacy much useless work was required, explanatory cables were necessary, and special trips to and from Washington were made. The Deputy had been in the mission for a long time so he should have told AID/W that we needed more time because our document was poorly planned.

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A technical division was suffering from a lack of well-defined goals, and very poor communication among its staff. They were being very slow in their project planning and personal tensions were obvious. In order to ensure successful preparation of their section of the CAP, I began to follow closely the progress of their work. Since no progress was being made I called daily meetings of the technical division staff to evaluate proposed plans. I repeatedly asked for detailed objectives, justifications for the objectives, means of achieving objectives, and justifications for the means. After several reviews of each proposed E-1, there was finally something on paper and there was a notable increase in cooperation among the division staff. My main contribution was in demonstrating that someone was interested in their work, and that someone was ensuring that their work would be properly prepared before it was forwarded to AID/W.

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Last year we had a number of important visitors at the same time that we had to prepare our CAP. The result was that people had to work extremely long hours for several weeks. This naturally created dissatisfaction and was very hard on morale. I took every opportunity during this period to give pep talks to the people concerned. I told them how much their extra effort was appreciated, the importance of AID for the host country and how each of us was responsible for making a success of our program. Of course, it is impossible to measure the effect of my effort, but we did manage to meet all mission commitments.

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An E-1 prepared by a technical Division Chief and the Program Officer was routed to me for approval. I noted that it called for project completion within eight years. On the basis of my past experience here, and my knowledge of the project,

> I thought this was too long. I felt that not much effort would be required to accelerate the project to enable completion within five years. I called a meeting of the Division Chief and the Program Officer and explained my point of view. I asked for a refinement of the E-1 on the basis of an earlier project completion date. They accomplished the refinement after agreeing with me that the work could be completed within five years.

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2. Prepares documents or rewrites documents prepared by others

The Deputy Director, like most executives, does not always have a qualified staff. Therefore, it is occasionally necessary to write or rewrite sections of the CAP personally. This activity, as a rule, is a last resort used only after attempts have been made to stimulate the mission staff to produce adequate documents. Personnel failures to this extent are uncommon, but do occur, and there is always the potential for such failures. The Deputy Director should be ready for such work, should the need arise, by learning as much as possible about details of proposed projects and capabilities of project staff.

> A technical Division Chief is an authoritarian individual who does not communicate with his staff. In addition, the Division Chief's staff is very incompetent. The result of this situation is that I have had to assume leadership of this particular division. In one example, I made repeated efforts to explain how to prepare adequate materials for the CAP. They were unable to produce satisfactory documents so I personally prepared the necessary plans, based on what I knew of the host country situation, documents

from previous years, and technical advice from wherever it could be found. These plans were approved by AID/W, so my work was acceptable, but now it is unknown whether or not current technical personnel will be able to carry out the plans.

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II. PARTICIPATES IN PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

Project implementation refers to the preparation and negotiation of documents to legalize the AID assistance program, specifically, the project agreements, project implementation orders, and related materials. Other mission personnel are directly responsible for implementation, but the Deputy Director is involved as a member of management to ensure smooth performance and conformance to policy; he participates actively in planning or negotiation when the need exists.

The main problem to successful performance here appears to be the need to commit funds by a specific time. Many Deputies reported that such inflexibility was very unrealistic. Setting a specific deadline for implementation, i.e., the end of the fiscal year, is unrealistic because projects may be insufficiently planned, project status may have changed, or, it may be that a new project, although unplanned, could better use the allotted money. Unfortunately, with a deadline to meet, and the possibility of losing funds if the deadline date is not met, the mission tends to be unwilling to shift plans. Also, the missions feel that AID/W has the attitude that a mission is not doing its job if funds are not committed. Some Deputies believe that success for a mission seems to depend on the size of a program, more than on the way a program is conducted. They reported that a Deputy who is mindful of his reputation and career is not likely to return funds, even if a project is no longer necessary.

Another burden preventing smooth implementation stems from the fact that the Implementation Approval Document (IAD) frequently arrives at the mission late in the fiscal year. There are various strategies for alleviating this problem, the "continuing resolution" being the best known example, but still the administrative hardship is great, especially in missions with large programs. Updating plans, typing,

proofreading, discussions, signing ceremonies and the like require considerable blocks of time. Therefore, when the IAD is late in arriving, (this appears to be the rule rather than the exception) the mission is under a strain to accomplish all the necessary tasks by the 30th of June deadline. As a result, in the rush to complete the task, documents are likely to be poorly written, other work is likely to be neglected, and proper clarifications with host country officials are impossible to obtain. The indirect results of such an occurrence are more difficult to ascertain, but no less important. For example, a host country official would be likely to sign a Project Agreement or a Project Implementation Order (PIO) to avoid losing funds, even if he did not have time to fully understand the project. However, after learning project details at a later date, and judging it to be ill conceived, inappropriate, undesirable, etc., there is likelihood of non-cooperation.

A. Reviews and Edits Details of Project Implementation Documents

1. Checks plans for conformance to goals and regulations

2. Revises or suggests changes

The Deputy Director is involved in this stage of implementation to provide a management focal point to facilitate document production. He participates in discussions preparatory to the actual writing of documents, rendering advice concerning agency and mission policy, concerning details of project plans, and concerning document terminology to satisfy host country requirements and to help ensure host country support. The Deputy reviews the various documents and offers advice as appropriate to those mission personnel directly concerned with implementation.

A typical item which I advised about involved a Division Chief on home leave. The Division Chief on leave had left a list of what equipment to include in implementation documents, but no one knew where the list was. It was necessary to obligate the money before June 30, 1963, or it would be lost. The Acting Division Chief informed me of this, and I cabled the Division Chief at his home to learn the location of the list. The return cable said that some things were "probably" already on order, and that "tools" should be bought with the balance of the money. I realized that this information was inadequate, so told the Acting Division Chief to disregard this and to include the items he felt were needed.

* * * *

I observed the Deputy in a meeting with the Program Office staff in which he read a draft PIO, asked some critical questions and noted several areas which should be changed. The Deputy was able to do this because he stays aware of the Director's standards of performance and the details of the program which is to be implemented.

* * * *

I knew from experience that AID/W would soon be asking for a review of the obligation status of program funds. The Director apparently did not realize this, so I suggested to him that it would be a good idea to begin the review prior to receipt of AID/W's request, which would almost surely allow inadequate time. The Director agreed and announced the need at the next staff meeting. We were properly prepared by the time AID/W's request was received.

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AID/W had not specifically authorized the program, so the Program Officer had not prepared implementation documents. The Program Officer was busy on other work, but it was important that he start preparing implementation documents, even before notification from AID/W. I wanted him to begin working on them without directly asking him to, so I called him in and asked him to describe the various implementation documents that were to be accomplished. We discussed each document for a short while, talking of the details that were to be included in each one. The Program Officer took the hint, and began work on document preparation.

* * * *

I asked the Program Officer to see what he could do about speeding up obligation of funds for this year. He reported back that one of the problems was trouble in getting participants to use up the funds assigned for participant training because of host country hesitation to pay the travel costs for participants. This causes many difficulties: for example, the Ministries want to make the decision themselves about who should go for training; also very often participants are required to pay their own travel costs. In order to resolve this difficulty, I called a meeting of the Executive Officer, the Program Officer and the Controller. After discussing the problem, we decided that AID would pay the travel costs of participants. We also discussed new kinds of selection procedures to be instituted in order to protect AID since there is going to be a bigger investment in each participant.

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B. <u>Conducts Negotiations with Host Country Officials</u>

1. <u>Negotiates details of development grant implementation documents</u>

2. Negotiates details of loan applications

These negotiations refer to the discussions of details, explanations, or clarifications made necessary by host national misunderstandings. This process was found to vary considerably. For example, in a few missions the host national officials signed documents without question, relying on the reputation of USAID personnel to prevent irregularities. In other missions the documents were discussed in detail with host national officials, with the Deputy participating either as an on-the-scene adviser to the Director, or as a substitute for the Director.

One problem that occasionally occurs hinges upon the legality of final signatures. In some cases uniformed or misinformed host officials begin project work before documents are finalized. In such cases payment for such work cannot be made, which creates ill feeling, resentment, and criticism of United States' administrative procedures as being hopelessly muddled. See the second example listed below for an illustration of this problem.

The Deputy is less involved with negotiations involving loans than with development grants because of the tendency to use a staff loan expert, or to obtain a loan expert from AID/W. However, the Deputy occasionally gets involved, usually in preliminary stages, in discussions with host country officials to discuss purposes, details, and approval procedures of loan applications.

> On June 30 the mission was busy completing obligation documents for signature before the midnight deadline. While working late I received a telephone call from an official in the host Ministry of Education. The host Minister was upset because the obligating documents for his

signature specified repairs to schools about which he had not been consulted. I indicated that some mistake had been made, and was forced to switch to the host national language as the Minister himself came on the phone. I assured the Minister that his signature on the document would not prevent correction by amendment at a later date. After my repeated assurances the Minister appeared to be satisfied and the conversation terminated. Then I called in the Assistant Program Officer who had prepared this particular obligation document. After the Assistant Program Officer explained the situation, he realized that he had omitted a qualifying phrase, which would have made clear that the names of the schools included were only representative and final decisions would have to be made later. In this case no harm was done because the correction could be made later, and I had convinced the Minister to sign the document.

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A USAID technician had completed some phases of project work without proper authorization for expenditure of funds and without host country consent. When I met with the Minister to get approval of the project the Minister indicated that he would approve the already completed work only if the AID mission undertook a second project in which he was interested. There was nothing that I could do but agree.

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III. PARTICIPATES IN PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

This task refers to that work necessary to assure that projects, once planned, approved, and implemented, are conducted in an orderly, efficient, productive manner. The Deputy Director's role varies from direct responsibility for all or some mission projects to that of coordinating work efforts in the name of the Director. Level of detail also varies, ranging from concern with such details as types and numbers of spare parts to complete delegation of authority to a subordinate. When the Deputy has been assigned direct supervisory control over a project or projects, he is free to determine his own level of involvement, based on his own interests and aptitudes, the abilities of project staff, and the working environment. However, when he is serving the Director as a coordinator, the Deputy's role is very unclear because he must not only be concerned with making projects a success, but also in determining his own role vis-a-vis the Director, e.g., the Deputy must decide what the Director would like to be personally involved in, what information to pass on to the Director, and how to obtain discipline, sometimes without authority.

A. Obtains Information on Project Status

Either as a part of the Director's office or as a direct supervisor, the Deputy Director is vitally concerned with projects. The Deputy needs to be informed about project details in order to be able to interpret information obtained, and to be able to take necessary action or to relay the information and his interpretations to appropriate officials.

Obtaining information is critical and most Deputy Directors learn to use all of the several available sources. Many Deputies develop routines for acquiring information, e.g., a daily reading of all

correspondence, or weekly reviews with project staff. Some Deputies indicated that they must keep as generally informed and alert to information as possible in order to maintain background for specific solutions to problems.

The reliability of information from both American and host sources is a problem. Concealing known personal inadequacies, furthering a career, dishonest conduct, desire to appear better informed than is actually true, and general lack of information are some of the reasons why Deputies get incorrect or falsified information. The Deputy's problems are to determine what situations require special attention to the accuracy of information, to judge the reliability of sources, and, if necessary, to find and follow proper methods for acquiring information. The problems are aggravated by the fact that ordinary cues or bench marks, i.e., those he is familiar with in the U.S., may be misleading.

1. Confers with U.S. personnel

The mission project staffs are a prime source of information. Knowledge is obtained via formal or informal meetings, question sessions, or social conversation, and although project personnel are the principal sources in this category, data are sought from other sources such as American businessmen, other American agency personnel, and private foundation employees.

> I request individual conference when I want to be informed about the work, when I want to give instructions, when I want to raise specific questions about operations, or when I want to provide advice or a solution to a problem. In one case a technician was setting up a ceremony in which equipment was to be turned over to the host government. I called in this employee to give me a briefing

so that I, in turn, would be able to explain to the Ambassador what would occur at the ceremony.

* * * *

A technical Division Chief needed more money for project operations, but wanted a TDY expert to evaluate project operations before submitting a formal request to AID/W. I talked at length with the Division Chief, learning that host country cost estimates had been in error, and that the TDY expert was needed in order to determine precisely how much additional money to ask for. I agreed and cabled a neighboring USAID mission for assistance, which they provided. With the expert's advice, the Division Chief was able to draft a realistic request for additional funding, which I approved. The complete report was submitted to AID/W and the additional money was approved.

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2. Confers with third country or international agency personnel

This task covers the same type of activity as is described immediately above, but with a different set of conferees. This type of conferring is much less frequent, and refers especially to those occasions when the USAID mission is cooperating with another agency in a development project. In such cases, the Deputy would naturally want to inquire about the status of work being performed for the combined effort by the cooperating agency. However, there is a mutual hesitancy to discuss projects with foreigners. For example, one Deputy indicated that "I cannot push them for information or it will only spoil our working relationship and the same thing is true in reverse." No examples of this activity were obtainable, perhaps because of infrequency of occurrence.

3. Confers with host government personnel

This task is similar to the two immediately above, but again the conferees are different. Cooperation with host government agencies, typically Ministries, is more common than with international agencies, but specific examples of conferring for information about project status were impossible to obtain. The task appears to be done relatively infrequently, partly because there appear to be better sources of information available, partly because of language and cultural barriers, and partly because host sources are judged inadequate or undependable.

4. Reviews project status documents

Reviewing project documents is one of the most common methods used by the desk-bound Deputy to obtain information. However, even this method is not without problems because, by virtue of having to read many reports from several mission technicians, the Deputy has insufficient time to enable careful reading. In addition, Deputies claim that technicians in general do not have writing skills, and do not understand the importance of the documents they are writing, so they do a poor job of reporting.

> One technician received some new equipment and supplies, but learned that much of it needed repair, one piece was lost, and one article was inoperable. At first, the technician did not write up the situation, but informed me orally, so I asked the technician for a complete written report so that AID/W could be informed of the situation. The technician wrote the report in a very pedestrian manner, listing only the damage and lost equipment. I asked for more details, but again the report was incomplete. The technician made no recommendations, offered no solution to prevent future occurrences, and made no provision to notify the equipment manufacturer. I finally wrote the report myself to ensure its adequacy.

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5. Visits project sites

Most Deputy Directors expressed the need to obtain personal, first hand information about the status of project work. However, most Deputy Directors also reported that lack of time prevented them from making more than a few, quick field trips, and some were unable to make any visits to project sites because of what was considered to be urgent other business. Poor transportation facilities and distance to project sites also tend to hinder field trips.

All levels of mission personnel commented on the need for members of the Director's office to visit project sites, in order to demonstrate interest, to acquire useful information, and to understand realistically the problems faced by the on-the-scene project workers.

> On a regional field trip, I had drawn a preliminary conclusion that we were overextending in one technical area. This was merely a feeling I had from seeing and hearing about project work and problems in getting supplies from the central office. When I got back I communicated this to the Director who agreed that the matter should be studied in detail and that steps should be taken to correct deficiencies. I called the Program Officer into my office and explained my observations and theory. I asked him to undertake a review of project work and to consult with the Executive Officer and Division Chiefs. The Program Officer completed his review and consultations and reported to me that two jobs should be phased out due to the difficulty of supporting them, and that additional vehicles be obtained to speed up operations. I informed the Director of this recommendation and he issued the order for the change.

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(From Director) I had a "feeling" that a project supervised by the Deputy was not going well, so I asked for a briefing on the status of work. A technician accompanied the Deputy and presented a project briefing explaining how well the project was going, the progress thus far, and adding that everyone concerned with the project was pleased. Within a week, I learned that the actual situation was directly contrary to the information provided in the briefing. Host nationals called me asking what was going on at the project site, so I made a personal visit with the Deputy to see the work. Observation revealed that progress was not being made, that the briefing had been deceptive, and that the Deputy Director had never before been to the project site. I gave the Deputy instructions to provide a solution and to keep me informed of progress which he is currently trying to do. Hopefully, the project will now receive some personal attention.

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(From subordinate) Everyone in the mission feels that morale would be improved if the Director and Deputy Director could visit other offices and project sites more often. It is rare to see either of them anywhere except in their own offices or in the conference room. The Deputy has never been to the warehouse, and does not recognize many local national mission employees.

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On a field trip I did not see any progress being made or knowledge being spread outside the physical environs of our project. I sensed that there was a lack of contact with the people by project personnel. The result of this is that I have asked the Division Chief to initiate a complete evaluation of the project to make sure we are not spending money and wasting time for nothing. I will respond as necessary, based on the details of the Division Chief's report.

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6. Assigns others to observe field operations

Some Deputy Directors try to solve the problem of not being able to make personal visits to project work sites by assigning other personnel to carry out the task. This device is perhaps adequate when specific information is needed, or if a project problem is already obvious, but, because of personal biases, lack of adequate evaluation tools, or improper orientation, it often fails to provide information which would prevent problems.

> A contract group is working with the mission to provide technical assistance to local nationals. Their contract calls for them to concentrate on specific assistance needs instead of the regular operational processes of the country. However, they recently started some assistance efforts unrelated to a specific host country need, so I explained to the contractor that he must follow the terms of his contract. The contract team did not move any closer to conformance to the contract terms so I assigned the Program Officer to study the work of this contract team and to provide a recommendation as to what should be done. He has not yet reported, so a solution is temporarily postponed.

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> I asked a technician to obtain facts for me about a certain road which was being built which seemed to be requiring excessive time. I asked the technician to report back to me so that I could then discuss the matter with the engineer under contract to build the road. The technician never got the facts, but reported to me that he had talked to the engineer himself and that the engineer had agreed to build the road correctly. I was unhappy about this because it was a case of sheer nonperformance and misunderstanding of my request by the technician. Now I have no way of knowing whether or not the technician was able to give proper emphasis to the need for progress in his talk with the engineer. My only action now is to wait, perhaps wasting more time, to see if the engineer begins to make progress.

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B. Evaluates Projects

The key feature of successful program management is the evaluation of projects. Unfortunately there appear to be no tools or guidelines in existence for determining if a project is actually proceeding effectively. It is possible to determine relatively simple issues such as whether or not a planned number of teachers are completing courses on the planned date. However, there appears to be no objective method for determining the status of more complex matters as, for example, whether projects are moving the assisted country forward, whether the people are really receiving benefits, whether project goals and objectives need alteration prior to completion, whether the proper quality of advice or service is being provided, whether changes should be made in project objectives, materials or personnel, whether host nationals support a project, or whether the project is necessary.

Some mission officials lack the overall view of the Deputy Director, and, therefore, could not fully evaluate projects even if adequate tools were available. The Program Officer has an overall view of mission work, but is usually so involved with planning that a realistic evaluation of projects is impossible for him. The Mission Director, with his multitude of responsibilities, may not have time for evaluation. Therefore, the task of serious, unbiased evaluation of projects often falls to Deputy Directors.

Several Deputies recognized that the minimal kinds of evaluation now being done are subjective and unsystematic. Almost all felt that the task was largely neglected. Some proposed that Deputies should have an established procedure for visits, reports, etc., plus the necessary criteria and measuring tools to assist in performing objective evaluation. In the absence of these, there is a tendency to become involved in routinized activities or in other activities which are less

difficult than evaluation. For example, Deputies were observed to attend meetings called to discuss minute project details. They indicated that unless standard evaluative procedures are instituted, the mission will continue operations lacking the knowledge to determine whether or not certain types of projects should be continued, whether assistance efforts should be shifted to other areas, or whether certain preventive measures should be taken to forestall crises and failures.

C. Corrects Project Deficiencies

This task involves decisions about necessary changes, and initiation of changes either through direct action or by stimulating others to enforce the change. This task is much easier than the previously discussed evaluation of projects, which includes the detection of trouble and prevention of project deficiencies, because as a rule concrete events, persons, and materials are involved after a deficiency has become obvious. However, considerable complexity is involved because of the multitude of solution options that are available, and, again, because of inadequate machinery and tools for correcting deficiencies. For example, the procedure for replacing personnel is very burdensome, and excessive time is required to obtain project materials.

Deputy Directors are involved in this task to varying degrees. Some Deputies are explicitly assigned direct supervisory responsibility over all or some of the divisions. In other missions they possess supervisory authority only by virtue of being in the chain of command. Quite often a Deputy will be reluctant to correct deficiencies because of lack of authority, using instead the tactic of gathering facts to provide to the Mission Director who is then expected to make the necessary decision. In other typical operations the Deputy gathers information, makes his decision, and directs a change designed to correct the project deficiency. However, in many such cases the person who receives the direction to initiate a correction has the option of "going over the head" of the Deputy to the Mission Director, which, of course, undermines the Deputy's authority, creates duplication of effort, and further burdens the Director.

There are some matters that cannot be corrected locally, so communication with AID/W is frequently necessary. Every mission reported that AID/W was unreasonably slow in providing answers. The missions often do not know whether AID/W has received the communication, whether AID/W will provide an answer, whether AID/W will provide an answer in time to initiate effective corrective measures, or whether it should act without AID/W concurrence in the interim. In some such cases there reportedly is little or no harm done because of delays, but delays concerning important matters, or an accumulation of delays concerning seemingly unimportant matters, create troublesome situations. Such delays not only prevent mission personnel from acting or from acting confidently, but also create an unfavorable impression among host country personnel who have been led to believe that the United States bureaucracy is efficient.

A frequently heard mission complaint was that "front office" (Director's office) personnel tend to get involved in unnecessary project details, and to bypass skilled advisers. It was felt that because of this Directors and Deputy Directors were second guessing mission experts, and that because they did not solicit advice, they missed information which could prevent future problems. For example, one mission employee remarked that "I would feel much more useful if I were asked for advice within my specialty. However, I can't and don't want to push my services on them." The Directors and Deputies, however, sometimes fail to seek technical advice because they do not respect or trust their advisors.

1. Directs personnel changes

One important factor is ensuring smooth project operations pertaining to project personnel. Ensuring that proper personnel are available, that inadequate personnel are dismissed (or, more usually, transferred), and that personnel shifts within the mission are made is not usually a primary responsibility of the Deputy. However, as a member of the Director's office, and as a link in the chain of command, the Deputy often plays a significant role in project personnel matters. In most matters the Deputy is not free to act decisively, but must obtain approval from the Director. This, of course, hinders effectiveness because mission personnel are aware of the degree of authority possessed by the Deputy, and are able to gauge their own activities accordingly. It is not unusual for a Division Chief to appeal successfully to the Mission Director for changes in instructions given by the Deputy. Other cases varied from alcoholics and racially biased personnel, to people who were, in the judgment of the Directors, Deputies and other senior personnel, obviously unqualified to fill the positions to which they had been assigned. It was reported that often employees with no training experience, or with no inclination to train, were assigned to jobs requiring skill in training others. Not infrequently, technicians are sent to a country although they hate the nationals of that country. One Deputy was forced to cope with the arrival of three employees all expecting to be Chief of the same division. In other instances, technicians reported for duty and had no jobs to do.

One man was sent to this mission without his wife, and within a short time he completely went to pieces. This was perhaps because he missed his family, perhaps because of work pressures, or a combination of several factors. I procured a sufficient statement from a local medical doctor to provide the legal basis, and then sent the employee home as expeditiously as possible. This was an unfortunate case, but the action was necessary in order to remove a man who was unqualified due to personality problems. The Director was in complete agreement with my decision.

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One technician wanted elaborate equipment before he would work. He simply could not understand that in an underdeveloped country working conditions are not as smooth as they are in the United States. At the time this situation began, I went on home leave. Upon returning to the mission about two months later, the man still was refusing to work. After discussing the matter with the Director, and obtaining his approval, I cabled AID/W with a complete explanation and transfer orders for the technician were soon received.

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The Division Chief has not been successful in this mission. He has been rigid about the kind of program he wants, and has lost all the sympathy and confidence of his counterpart Minister. I had to decide whether to move him from this post before the end of his tour because of his ineffectiveness, or to wait until the end of his tour. In this case, I decided to let him complete his tour because he was close to finishing. I now have to deal with the Minister myself, whereas this should normally be performed by the Division Chief.

Also, I get involved with end of tour reports, which I must endorse. The Division Chief recently submitted his with a long description of what he would like to do next. The Division Chief thought he would like to be assigned to a research project, or to an assignment in AID/W. I had to decide whether to recommend that the Division Chief be given one of these assignments, or recommend that he not be given any assignment because he was ineffective here. I decided to recommend him for the research project because I felt that his ineffectiveness in establishing rapport here bore no relation to his qualification for a research job. Hopefully the Division Chief will be valuable to AID in his new position.

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The agricultural division wanted to recruit a livestock advisor to fill a vacancy, but I felt this to be unnecessary. I checked and learned that one of the men in the division knew livestock and had training in this field. Therefore, I suggested that this man serve duty, which the chief of the division agreed to allow. The Director thought the idea sound, so we prevented the need for another technician. So far our operations have not suffered, so our decision appears sound.

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Our largest division has personnel in several different locations. I knew from incoming correspondence and field trips how busy these personnel were and that closer supervisory control was necessary. I concluded that the present organization was inadequate to handle such widespread operations, and that there was a need for on-the-spot supervision. I went to the Division Chief of this project and discussed the matter with him. I told him that I thought we should have a senior technician in each geographic area who would act solely as a field liaison man

between the technicians and the mission and the technicians and their host country counterpart. The Division Chief agreed, so we presented the idea to the Director, who also agreed. The Division Chief is now putting the new system into effect.

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One project involved provision of equipment to the host government. No one on the staff knew how to handle the equipment, so a TDY technician was asked for, and received. This TDY man determined what equipment would be reasonable, and what quantity would be realistic. Then he returned to his own mission. The project was carried forward, but when the equipment arrived, it was realized that someone was needed to teach the local nationals to operate and maintain the equipment. A SPAR was immediately submitted for a direct-hire technician and after a delay, the technician arrived. The technician provided proved to be an excellent maintenance man, but lacked ability in the local language and lacked the ability to teach his skills to others. I discussed this with the Program Officer and we decided that with this technician we were not fulfilling our commitment to the host government. We decided to terminate the technician at the end of his tour and included this in the staffing described in the CAP. The Mission Director approved, but when the CAP reached the Ambassador for approval, this proposed staff deletion was noticed. The Ambassador pointed out that even though the technician was not providing the necessary training, it would be nearly impossible to get a replacement, or there might be a lengthy time lapse before a replacement would come. Without a skilled replacement, the United States-supplied equipment that would deteriorate, thus

embarrassing the United States. Therefore, the Ambassador felt that we should retain this technician. We complied with this view, which was reasonable. However, we are moving extremely slowly toward our real goal of providing training.

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A technician was assigned to a new project in our mission. He was well-trained, his family was friendly and liked the local nationals, and he and his family had already lived and worked in an underdeveloped country. Local nationals liked him and there was no problem of adjustment. However, the technician was shy, and although he knew the local language did not use it. I assigned an interpreter to work with him, but this reduced his effectiveness with the people. Then I sent him to travel throughout the country hoping that this would increase his contact with nationals and force him to use the local language. This did not work. The technician lacked initiative and although an expert would not move unless someone told him what to do. Then I realized that he had been successful in other missions because of working in structured situations, a luxury not available here. Therefore, we sent word to AID/W and a transfer was arranged for the technician to be sent to another post post where his work could be in a definite pattern. The transfer was arranged and the technician is now happier and is performing satisfactorily.

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One project activity was being phased out, which meant that several technicians had to be transferred. However, some of these technicians had home leave due between the time the decision to phase out was made and the time for project termination. According to policy, they would not be allowed to return to the country after home leave for the project termination date, yet their services were needed during the crucial completion step. I solved this problem by calling in each technician and asking him to stay until the end of the project, rather than taking home leave. All the technicians agreed to this so we were able to phase out the project without being short of personnel.

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A technician served one successful tour here, then requested and received permission to stay for a second tour. There were indications that the second tour was prompted by a romance, but after being committed for the second tour the romance ended. In spite of this, the technician continued to perform well. However, unknown to me, someone in the mission sent a letter to AID/W describing indiscretions being committed by this technician. The Ambassador was notified by Washington, who ordered the mission to get the technician out of the country within 24 hours. The Director asked me to handle the problem, so I explained to the Ambassador that the procedure was irregular, since it was not yet proven if the accusations were true. I was unable to convince the Ambassador to investigate, but I did manage to get permission to wait one week before sending the technician home. I told the technician to be ready to leave in a week, then I sent a message to a friend in AID/W asking that authority be arranged to send the technician home under normal orders. This authority was returned to the mission only five hours before the technician would have had to depart using emergency authority. The

technician returned to AID/W and is working there with greater responsibilities than ever. He is performing well -- with an unblemished record.

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Two employees were in line to be named head of the division. The subordinate employee had a higher Foreign Service rating, but was supported by the Ambassador and the Director. The supervising employee has married a host national and wants to stay. The Director instructed me to inform the present superior employee that he will become the subordinate of his present subordinate in the division. The problem involved breaking the news so that effectiveness was maintained and general morale not reduced. I informed the superior that the mission needed a qualified Division Chief and that the background of the subordinate made him best available man. This discreet handling with absolutely no discussion of the affair with others prevented loss of face. The Director's decision was gracefully accepted, and work operations have not been noticeably interrupted.

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2. Motivates U.S. AID personnel

Convincing project personnel to work, and to work effectively, appears to be a major problem. The problem exists for several reasons, including the existence of incompetent personnel, an administrative system which allows incompetent personnel to perpetuate their employment within the agency, a lack of disciplinary controls, a faulty evaluation system, lack of measures to reward truly outstanding personnel, and a personnel system without adequate recruitment, selection, and training procedures. When the Deputy is faced with the

problem of an ineffectively producing subordinate, whatever the cause, he is handicapped further by his own lack of situational clarity. The Mission Director is typically of little assistance in clearing up this ambiguity. The Director, with either a strong desire to assure project success, or a tendency to adopt the least controversial method of operating, tends to ignore the Deputy on these matters. The Deputy in almost all cases must obtain the Director's approval before taking a personnel action, and often faces the possibility that a mission employee will ignore him and appeal to the Director. Without a clearly defined place in the mission's authority structure, the Deputy often resorts to being a troubleshooter, looking for problems to be extinguished. This kind of activity produces the image of a trouble-maker, a block to project work, and reportedly tends to create a climate of tension and distrust.

> AID/W cabled that one of our projects should be turned over to the host nationals and that work plans for the turnover should be submitted to AID/W immediately. The Division Chief in charge wrote an attempt to justify retaining the project and justifying his division's work. Of course, I disapproved this but the Division Chief's second effort was just as bad because he tried to explain why the host government was unqualified to take over the project. The Division Chief was so emotionally involved with the project that I had to ask him to draft a reply to the AID/W a third time, simply stating confirmation of instructions and informing Washington that we were working on a plan for the turnover. The Division Chief had been unwilling to comply with the AID/W request until literally forced to do so.

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A Division Chief was on home leave, and an Acting Chief was left in charge. Unfortunately, the Division Chief had not provided specifications or instructions which were necessary for one of the projects. The Acting Chief came to me to ask what should be done about obtaining the necessary instructions. The details were technical, so I was unable to explain exactly what to do. Instead, I told the Acting Chief to gather facts to ensure that he knew what he was doing, then to continue with the work, considering himself as the employee with authority and responsibility for conducting the project. Work was continuous in spite of the absence of a key Division Chief and lack of information.

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The Director asked all Division Chiefs to submit a list of program priorities, and all replied with one exception. The Director sent follow-up memoranda, which were also unsuccessful. The Director asked me to try to motivate the Division Chief to do the task. I also sent memoranda, but again to no avail. Therefore, I made up my own list of program priorities for this division, and submitted it to the Division Chief for approval or change. The list was returned to me unchanged, so I know that the Division Chief was still not bothering with the task. It had been impossible for me to convince the Division Chief to accomplish the task, but at last we had a workable list of priorities.

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Three technicians, all working on the same project, were in complete disagreement. I had been aware of this, but had been ineffective in not documenting the situation. The situation culminated when a local national complained to the Director that the Americans on the project

did not know what they were doing. The Director assigned me the task of handling the situation. At this same time, one of the three technicians came to me and reported that project work was not being accomplished. Contrary to project schedules and plans, no local nationals were being trained, tests were not being conducted, and the United States worksmanship was obviously poor. I learned that each technician accused the others of sabotage, but I could not determine which technician was really causing the trouble. I could have sent the technicians home, stopped work, or replaced them with TDY or regular personnel, but all of these solutions would have required excessive time. Instead I threatened the technicians with transfers home, unless work was accomplished. I then made the Program Officer responsible to "bird dog" the project and ensure its effective completion, insisting that the Program Officer visit the project every day, observe work progress, and report back. The personality clashes ceased immediately, and work proficiency gradually began to improve. I was able to improve project efficiency to some extent, and routine transfers eventually solved the basic problem.

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A Division Chief was strictly honest, and had a high standard of personal conduct, but was very dogmatic in his beliefs. His host national counterpart was just exactly the opposite, so the two had trouble working together. The Division Chief explained his low opinion of the local to me and the host national Chief also came to me to explain that he was having trouble working with the Division Chief. I did not like the host national either, but I was of the opinion that it was impossible to cease dealing with him. I tried to persuade each of them to try to work together, but they continued their arguments. Finally, as a last resort, I took over all relationships with this host national, thereby preventing contact between the two who could not get along. This solution was the only possible way that work was able to continue.

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3. Directs equipment changes

Another important feature of successful project operations is proper equipment, supplied in a timely manner. A few Deputies complained of delays in equipment arrivals, with the most extreme statement being that equipment from the United States never arrived on time. For the most part other personnel, mainly technicians, are directly responsible for procuring and utilizing equipment. Deputies tended to be involved with equipment as an ancillary matter, as an activity noticed and dealt with when observed, but not of major concern.

> A special truck had been bought for a specific project, but the project was not yet under way so the truck was destined to sit idle for at least two months. I was told about this by a technician at the project site while I was on a field trip. After hearing about the truck, I thought that it would be suitable for another project which was already in process. I checked with the Division Chief, who in turn checked with the project technician on the site. The Division Chief later informed me the technician felt that the truck would be very useful. Therefore, I told him we would transfer it to his project until it was needed on the original project. I was able to manage this transfer without complications, so the truck was utilized to full advantage.
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> On a field trip I noticed a generator rusting. I asked about power to run the generator and learned that it had been promised long ago by the host government, but was still unavailable. I knew that a generator was needed on another near-by project, so I proposed to the Division Chief that this generator be moved to the other project until it could be used for its primary purpose. The Division Chief agreed so I told

him to see the Minister to provide the reason and to promise that it would be returned immediately when it could be made operative, and to get his permission to remove the generator. I also asked him to get in touch with the host government official having jurisdiction over the other project to ask for his permission to move the generator there, giving the reasons and the agreement of the former Minister. The technician agreed to this, and I formalized the request by reiterating the same suggestions in a letter. The technician acknowledged the letter, and carried out the directive, with the action proving to be very successful.

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A Division Chief explained to me that automobiles operated by the division were obsolete and dangerous and were not worth repairing. The Division Chief also displayed the cars to me, and explained that field work was being curtailed because of vehicular breakdowns. Then he submitted a request for more vehicles, which I approved without question because of having first hand evidence of need. I attached my observations to the request so that the Director would have access to the details without having to personally check. The Director approved the request, based on my recommendations and indications of need.

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Our mission staff began to grow rapidly, outstripping the arrival of automobiles. Finally, whoever received a vehicle looked upon it as belonging solely to his project, and tried to restrict usage. Many complaints regarding this situation began to come to me. I called a meeting of all senior mission personnel to put forth the vehicle problem, saying that a system of coordination of vehicles had to be established whereby

everyone could have equal access to vehicles until all required vehicles were on hand. I then turned the meeting over to those present and left, feeling they should arrive at a solution themselves because the problem directly touched all those present. Soon I received a report from those attending the meeting with conclusions and recommendations. Their plans were acceptable, so I drafted a directive embodying these conclusions and sent it to all mission employees, to be effective immediately. The plan was to make available all existing vehicles on an area basis by which everyone would be able to utilize the available vehicles at certain times. Everyone was pleased with solution, and, better, the system proved workable.

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One project involving considerable equipment was beginning to have trouble. For example, on a field trip I saw a considerable amount of undistributed equipment. I decided that distribution would be unmanageable unless a system was designed for receipts, transportation to sites, accounting, assuring proper use, etc. I took the initiative in that I gave this problem a sense of urgency. I explained to the Director that something had to be done immediately, and he agreed that I should handle the situation. I called together a working group composed of myself, the Controller, the Executive Officer, and the Program Officer. We met three or four times to pool our thoughts regarding how to solve the problem. After a few meetings, I drafted a revised order regarding procedures and responsibilities for equipment, which essentially insisted that all responsible employees name a staff member to assume personal responsibility for specific items of equipment. The system proved acceptable to everyone, and is now being put into effect.

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4. Persuades host government to honor commitments

At various times and for various reasons the host government is unable or unwilling to meet commitments. The first determination of this failure is often made by project technicians, but could be made by any mission employee. For example, the Deputy Director could learn of inadequate progress by visiting project sites. A common method of discovering lack of host government compliance is through the Controller's office, which keeps the usual detailed records of receipts and expenditures of joint project funds.

Most Deputies cited the need to ensure that the host government met commitments in order to retain their interest in successful project completion, to help prevent host government bureaucratic and political obstacles, to promote a sense of responsibility, or to satisfy United States legal requirements. Because of the importance of this task, Deputies tend to be willing to become involved in this activity at any necessary moment. The typical procedure is for a technician to become aware of such a problem, to determine that higher level assistance is necessary, and then to inform the Deputy and to ask for his help. The Deputy then either provides advice, refers the problems to the Mission Director, or acts himself to solve the problem. The problems may range from minor misunderstandings through disagreements on interpretation of agreements to serious attempts by the hosts to manipulate host or international political issues.

> The host government was committed to provide a building and related furnishings for an AID-financed project. The building was not completely ready at the time the project was to begin work, but work began anyway, in order to get the project going. Later the Division Chief called me to explain that such things as telephones, furniture,

and janitorial services were not being provided by the host government in accordance with the agreement. The Division Chief requested that action be taken to force the host government to meet commitments. Now I need to work out recommendations for the Director's approval. I know that the host government doesn't have a large budget, so how can they be asked to pay for telephones? Also, the building belongs to the host government, so perhaps it should be allowed to deteriorate so that they will learn how much less expensive proper maintenance is on a routine basis, by learning how costly it will be to put the building in order. I have no solution at the present time, so I recommend that we wait until a new annual host government budget is prepared which will clarify host government financial capabilities. Priorities can then be set up.

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A host government coordinating agency had limited power, and was badly undermanned. We depended on this agency for services and information pertinent to USAID projects, but a history of poor performance had developed. I set up a series of meetings designed to orient the Director of the host government agency to the USAID mission efforts, to educate him concerning mission needs, and to establish a basis for continuing contacts. The meetings proved very effective in that the agency began complying with all of our requests.

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I had been pushing to get the host government to use some of their loan money to _____, but without apparent success. Then, at a cocktail party, I met the host government official responsible for the project. Having this official's support would greatly assist in the proper use of loan money so I got him aside and raised some of the issues. We had a fruitful discussion and arranged a meeting with him for the following day to solidify some of the issues which we discussed.

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A technician told me that his project was having much trouble convincing the host government to release government funds which had been appropriated for financing a joint project. It seemed to me that the trouble was caused by inertia on the part of the host government Ministry. I decided to go to the Ministry myself and talk to the key officials including the Minister. They apparently had not understood the project which was a shortcoming on the part of the AID technicians. I made what I considered clear, detailed explanations of the project and they were apparently satisfied. When I left I told the Ministry I would follow up our meeting with a letter of confirmation. I also told the technician to follow up with the Ministry now that the host government seemed willing to cooperate. Soon the money was released for its purpose.

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The firm submitting the lowest bid on a construction project was partially owned by a host national. Shortly after the firm received the contract, the owner of the company was appointed to a senior official position in one of the Ministries. Legally, there was no barrier, but by our standards such a procedure is highly unethical. We felt that United States bidders, and Congress, might raise objections. I discussed the issue with the Director, who agreed that we should explain to the Minister and ask him to proceed. We were sure that if the problem were clearly stated, the Minister would provide advice. Luckily the problem solved itself. The Division Chief, reviewing project files, found that the men involved had sent a letter to the USAID mission stating that he had been appointed to a Ministry position, and thus felt it would be inadvisable for him to retain the building contract. This was an official letter to USAID so there was legal, binding authority. Shortly thereafter the official reconsidered and officially stated that he

wanted to retain the contract, but the Director and I felt that we should hold the man to his original renouncement of the contract, with an explanation of why this was being done. The host national accepted our decision and thus far there have been no adverse effects.

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The local government had not complied with its commitments for quite some time. AID/W cabled that partial payment was necessary immediately, and that a payment system must be worked out. I told this to the Minister the day the cable arrived. The next day another message came from AID/W stating that all host government commitments had to be met immediately. After clearing with the Director, I immediately set up a second meeting and carefully explained AID/W's position to the Minister. I did this in order that local officials could understand the AID/W position and in order that I might retain their trust for future transactions.

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Two cases occurred in which local nationals were indulging in dishonesty in financial matters. They were not only not meeting their commitments, but were also publicly misusing equipment supplied by the United States. I called a meeting with the local national officials and notified them that future United States assistance would be difficult to obtain unless agreements were constructed to preclude dishonesty, and to ensure their compliance with commitments. They cooperated with amazing rapidity.

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After much success during a pilot phase, the project was begun with full force. Plans called for the host government to construct and staff a building, and the AID mission to pay for supplies and equipment. I obtained a special technician on TDY to provide lists of appropriate supplies and equipment. I would like for the building to be ready and staffed by the time our equipment arrives. To ensure readiness, I made several trips to the project and learned that the host government was not proceeding. However, I will be unable to pressure the host government to expedite it because it is likely that they will complete their work before our equipment arrives since U.S. equipment is always months late in arriving. Therefore, I will wait until the equipment bill of lading arrives and at that time will begin to exert pressure on host government officials. This will delay the project because the time span from bill of lading arrival to equipment arrival does not allow enough time for building construction, but unfortunately this is the only solution possible.

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5. Coordinates division activities

Successful program management implies that the various USAID divisions and offices work well together, that the various projects are not duplicative, and that project work is not prevented, mismanaged, or obstructed by virtue of the operations of other USAID projects. This task includes the coordination of efforts between staff offices and technicians and is considered to be an important part of the Deputy's job.

The Program Office and the Division Chiefs frequently need "coordination." Division Chiefs think that Program Officers "meddle" and require excessive paperwork, while Program Officers think that Division Chiefs and other technicians lack ability to plan, and cannot properly record or document project efforts. These two USAID officials, the Program Officer and the Division Chief, are frequently quite bitter about each other's shortcomings. Disputes often come to the Deputy Director for solution, either as a result of a complaint by one of the parties, or because of his own observation of the need.

Another basic difficulty is the need to keep sufficiently well informed about the mechanics of projects and about new developments to be able to note when two or more projects should or should not be involved with each other or with the same issue.

> A technician arrived hopping mad. He had received a list of participant trainees which specified people he did not want, so he was working with a Ministry official on another list. The technician blamed the Program Officer for interfering. I did not know details of this situation, so I called in the Program Officer to discuss the situation. It turned out that the Program Officer, at the Mission Director's request, had asked the technician for a copy of the list but had not told him what he was going to do with it. The Program Officer and the Director were impatient with the slowness with which participant trainee nominations were going through, and had decided to expedite matters by taking the task out of the technician's hands. They had completely altered the list and the technician refused to approve it, explaining that the list was unsatisfactory. I agreed that the technician should prepare the list and explained my views and the reasons therefore to the Program Officer. The Program Officer was apologetic and agreed to work more closely with the technicians.

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There was disagreement in a technical division concerning training. Two technicians were at odds concerning the relative amount and type of training necessary for certain participants. I brought them together indicating the type of compromise which might be made in the training procedure. I knew the background of both of these technicians, so I was able to get them to agree. Now the training process is proceeding satisfactorily.

* * * *

(From a Division Chief) When the project ended, I wanted to keep my own Administrative Officer rather than have my technicians become dependent upon the USAID Executive Officer. The Deputy Director disapproved, so I appealed to the Director, who finally approved. The Deputy was very nice about it, saying, "O.K., I was overruled."

* * * *

I initiated a conference to bring in technicians from the field to discuss the overall program. Presentations were made by staff members such as the Program Officer, and technicians were asked to discuss their activities related to the overall program. This was an attempt to encourage better coordination, especially in relation to better project management. Hopefully, the projects will now demonstrate more satisfactory progress.

* * * *

A letter by a staff officer indicated that some participants should be investigated. They had gone to the United States for training, but upon returning had not engaged in the activity for which they were trained, and they had also changed jobs. A Division Chief was supposed to clear the letter, but would not do so. He felt that these participants should not be

singled out, and that if an investigation were to be undertaken forty to fifty per cent of the participants would be in the same category as the few to be investigated. I asked the staff officer to elaborate on his reasons for investigating these participants, and when the elaboration was completed the Division Chief was willing to clear the letter requesting the investigation.

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6. Coordinates division activities with host country efforts

After all project plans and project documentation is completed, and project work is underway, there are misunderstandings to be clarified, details to be arranged, and information to be exchanged between the host government and USAID personnel. Much of this occurs at the technician level, without need for formal meetings or Director's office involvement. However, there are some matters of policy, or of substantive involvement which require Deputy or Mission Director involvement. The Director generally leads in such cases, either becoming personally involved or delegating responsibility to the Deputy.

This task generally occurs on a non routine-basis, usually in the context of a problem for which corrective measures must be taken. The usual problems of interacting with host nationals occur in this task. Deputies were reported to become over-sympathetic to host national viewpoints as a consequence of trying very hard to appreciate the hosts' problems. Although infrequent, cases were reported in which Deputy Directors allowed projects to continue for months which should have been phased out, because they were reportedly able to see only the host national point of view.

AID/W approved a sizeable loan to conduct a project. Unfortunately, the project site interfered with a small town. The town officials were opposed to our site selection because it would hurt the economy of their township. To change the site would have doubled the cost. We did not want to alienate the people, but we also could not jeopardize our position with Congress or the GAO by changing the approved plan for political reasons. I suggested to the Director that we take advantage of an AID/W visitor to improve relations, and to personify AID/W views. I suggested that the visitor meet with town officials to point out that Congress and the GAO would never allow us to amend the project. The Director agreed, so I arranged the meeting. It appears that the town officials were satisfied because their objections were dropped.

* * * *

A Division Chief was trying to convince a current graduating class of host nationals to serve in rural areas for the good of the country. He was trying to work through the School Director, but the Director was ill and apathetic and refused to comment on the idea. The students were very much opposed and threatened violence if ordered to rural areas. The Division Chief was thwarted so he brought the problem to me. I had no real solution, and could give no real advice, but I did serve as a sounding-board, talking with him freely about the problem, and helping him consider all the angles involved. For unknown reasons the students suddenly agreed to work in rural areas, so the problem, although not solved by us, was no longer bothersome.

* * * *

One of my subordinates wrote a letter to a host government official explaining a specific procedure. After reading the letter and determining that it was unclear, I called a meeting of this subordinate and two staff personnel to prepare a better reply. We worked together to produce a letter which all approved. Improved procedures were apparent almost immediately after they received the letter.

* * * *

On a field trip to a project I became aware that my host government counterpart did not understand what was going on, and that he had never been to the project. I decided this was probably a main reason for the lack of coordination between our project and the host government. I suggested that he visit the project at least once to get a better understanding of what was being accomplished, and how the project was being conducted, which he agreed to do. I called our technician and told him of my discussions and informed him that the host government official would probably visit. I learned later that my counterpart did visit the site and that good rapport had been established between our technician and the host government ministry. There is now a constant dialogue between project personnel and the host government.

* * * *

We were conducting one project in a rural area which was utilizing several host national personnel. They were storing equipment and supplies, furnished by AID, in town. This delayed work because of the unnecessary transportation time. The Division Chief informed me of the situation, so I asked the host government Minister to allow equipment and supplies to be stored at project sites. The Minister agreed, but apparently a misunderstanding occurred because the equipment and supplies warehouse was locked up. USAID technicians could not get the warehouse opened, and could not learn why it

had been locked. I met with the Minister again and offered the equipment and supplies to the host government as a gift, if they could be stored at the project site. This suggestion was accepted readily and the warehouse was soon opened. We lost control of the equipment and supplies, but work progressed, and host nationals were able to learn how to handle such items.

* * * *

I requested that a Ministry with a secondary interest contribute manual labor to assist us and the Ministry with primary involvement in a USAID project. I thought that this would demonstrate interest and cooperation, and save money. The Ministry with primary involvement disapproved the suggestion, using the reasoning that there would not be many people involved, so it would be better to do the work using the experienced personnel from their Ministry. I concluded that the answer was based on the desire to prevent the other Ministry from becoming involved in the project. I had to agree in order to get the project completed.

* * * *

(Observed incident) The Ambassador requested that the Deputy Director discuss four items with a host government Minister, and that a confirmation letter be obtained if an agreement were reached on a particular issue. When this issue was mentioned by the Deputy, the Minister agreed, remarking that the agreement was customary. The Deputy expressed gratitude and passed over the subject. Later, back in his own office, he explained to the Program Officer that the meeting had gone well, and that the Minister had been favorable to all items. However, he said that he could not tactfully ask the Minister for a confirming letter.

* * * *

The host government undertook an extensive project, on their own, with very little consultation with our technicians. This made me reflect on the necessity of having our people available since the government was not disposed to utilize them. I suggested to the Director that a reduction should be made soon, and that serious consideration should be given to complete phasing out in that area. The Director agreed with my suggestion so I requested that a serious review of this contract be made by the appropriate Division Chief in conjunction with the Program Officer.

* * * *

The host government had promised to provide equipment for some of our technicians. When they began to arrive, the host government realized that equipment was not available, so they proposed to share expenses with us in purchasing equipment on an "as needed" basis. This involved many considerations such as how much we should pay. When the Director and I received this proposal I suggested that we meet with all mission people who would have an interest in hopes of getting a group solution. The Director concurred so I called the group together. At the first meeting, I stated that we had to sort out the roles which each person would have in the area of equipment supply in relation to the host government. I gave my ideas regarding what areas each party should be concerned with. I had already thought about this, and so had it pretty well worked out in my own mind. Each point was discussed and a concensus reached. The roles assigned to each individual were close to what I had wanted and gave us a coordinated effort, well-defined relationships, and responsibilities with which to attack the problem.

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D. Accomplishes Other Program Management Functions

The Deputy Director has other responsibilities in the area of program management which occur infrequently, or which are less important than those discussed immediately above. These tasks are diverse, but are grouped within this miscellaneous category for convenience.

1. Reads and reviews correspondence

The Deputy in all missions reads and reviews project related correspondence, both incoming and outgoing. In many missions the Deputy also is delegated authority to provide final clearance on all or some project communications. Keeping informed about projects by reading incoming and outgoing airgrams and cables is not considered to be complex, although some editing and revision is done. However, the amount of time necessary for this task was reported to be extensive, ranging at times to as much as three hours per day. Consequently, the Deputy has considerably less time to devote to other, sometimes more important, tasks. However, reading cannot be neglected because information is needed to perform other tasks properly. Some Deputies tried to solve this predicament by extensive reading after work hours but found that it interfered with other matters.

> A subordinate prepared a cable which asked for two things, policy clearance and procurement authorization. I knew that cables received by AID/W require extensive coordination, and that by including two requests in a single cable excessive delays would occur. I advised the subordinate to rewrite his requests, putting each one in a different cable. The material was rewritten with the first cable asking for policy clearance, and the second asking for procurement authorization. Using this system I expect to get quicker replies.

* * * *

A Division Chief wrote a letter for the Ambassador's signature which I approved. The Division Chief had included a major error in his letter, which I did not discover. The Ambassador signed the letter and it was mailed. This created a costly, unintended commitment for us. I should have been more careful with this letter, and in the future I will need to be more concerned with communications details.

* * * *

(From Director) I wrote a long cable to AID/W justifying a specific action and included a statement that the mission would also send a lengthy airgram, with more complete details of the situation. I asked the Deputy Director to ensure that an appropriate airgram was prepared at the appropriate time. The Deputy asked the appropriate Division Chief to draft the airgram, and then reviewed and approved the Division Chief's work. When the airgram came to me I found it inadequate and in need of revision. Because time was now short I did the revision myself, and got the airgram out on time, but I should not have needed to become involved.

* * * *

2. Keeps others informed about project status

The Deputy is occasionally called upon to prepare a written report concerning the status of a project, but the more usual occurrence is an oral report. Reports may be given impromptu, at the informal request of an interested individual, or they may be carefully prepared in advance. Structured situations, such as briefing the Ambassador on project status, rarely involve difficulties. However, as a ranking American and a senior USAID official, the Deputy Director is occasionally asked provocative questions in public or private conversation. He must try to be cooperative and yet avoid revealing sensitive or classified information. As a further complication, such exchanges can occur in a foreign language.

The mission was invited to send a representative to a host government meeting to be chaired by a Minister. Upon request by the Mission Director, I agreed to be the USAID representative. During the meeting the Minister asked me several questions about details of mission operations and organization structure. This was a delicate situation because any inaccurate or inappropriate statements would be heard by some of the most influential personnel in the host government. I tried to keep my answers simple, and brief, but with enough detail to demonstrate a cooperative, willing attitude. My answers seemed satisfactory to those present.

* * * *

The Ambassador had to give a speech and wanted information about our total program to use in his speech. He used our CAP as a basic reference document, but many of the projects he did not understand, especially how they fit into our total program. The Director asked me to brief the Ambassador on the projects in terms of dollars spent vis-a-vis realized achievements. I had to give him both the overall picture and the relationship of results to invested capital. The Ambassador called last week and wanted to know what our expenditures and successes were since the beginning of the host country's development plan. I gave him a rough estimate in general terms on the spur of the moment without the figures at hand. I later checked these estimates for accuracy and found them to be satisfactory so I didn't go back to him about it.

* * * *

AID/W asked the mission for specific information about the status of some of our projects. The Director asked me to be responsible for the task, so I asked each Division Chief to provide technical information, and I wrote introductions, and justifications, and reviewed the technical contributions. Our information was reportedly well received in AID/W.

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3. Acts as Division Chief

The Deputy Director is occasionally required to function as a Division Chief. This is necessary when there is no competent technical employee available. For example, if a Division Chief without adequate staff personnel were to leave the mission for emergency reasons, leaving insufficient time to obtain a replacement, the Deputy would be likely to receive an assignment to fill this opening. This task appears to be required infrequently since a Deputy Division Chief or a senior technician is usually appointed to serve as Acting Division Chief. Also, in cases where the Deputy Mission Director does serve as Division Chief, the assignment is always considered to be temporary although it may last many months.

The Deputies who had been required to serve temporarily as Division Chiefs reported no difficulties because of lack of training in the technical specialty. This was true because they were already generally informed about projects. Because of the temporary nature of the assignment, the Deputies reported that they tried to avoid involvement in project details in order to concentrate on overall project management.

The main problem created by this task is the interference with other more "primary" duties. However, there is pressure to become more involved in division work than is thought desirable. The Deputy meets with division technicians, plans division work, and evaluates division progress. To the degree that division involvement is required, exactly that amount of time must be deducted from the Deputy's normal work day.

IV. PARTICIPATES IN MISSION MANAGEMENT

Mission management is that work done to ensure an efficient, well organized, presentable, happy mission, and for the most part is the major responsibility of the Mission Director. In the preceding section, PROGRAM MANAGEMENT, the Mission Director is assisted to a degree by various other people: the Program Officer, the Controller, the Executive Officer, senior technicians and the Deputy Director. However, in certain aspects of mission management the Deputy Director is virtually the only mission employee who is able to help the Director. In extremely busy missions, some mission management work was assigned to the Program Officer and to a lesser extent to other senior mission personnel. Although this was necessary because of the volume of work, it tended generally to create problems.

One obvious reason for such problems is that only the Director and the Deputy Director have sufficient authority to provide effective control. Since Program Officers generally have approximately equal status with other staff personnel and technicians, they find it exceedingly difficult to exercise control. Attempts to do so often result in status and morale problems. Division Chiefs indicated time and again during the course of the study, resentment of Program Officers for interfering in what was considered to be division business, even if the Program Officer was under direct instructions from the Mission Director.

General problems mentioned in the introduction to this position, i.e., unclear authority, incompetent mission personnel, inadequate backstop assistance, inadequate operational guidance, inadequate communications, and mission-Embassy conflicts, are particularly pertinent to this function.

A. Guides and Assists Staff Officers and Division Chiefs

This task covers all efforts necessary to ensure that mission business is properly executed and that personnel are operating efficiently. Mission business as here defined consists of providing goods and services to mission employees and their families, selection, upkeep, and utilization of office facilities and equipment, information

exchange between mission personnel and between the mission and AID/W, mission transportation, non-program reporting and planning, division of work, and other similar activities. Efforts to insure that personnel are operating efficiently include activities such as evaluating performance, providing discipline, recognition, or training, and creating an appropriate atmosphere for work.

To be effective in this task a Deputy must deal effectively with different kinds of people without incurring displeasure. He must stimulate subordinates, make objective judgments about performance, recognize and provide for informational or training needs, and discover and correct organizational malfunctions.

Management problems are magnified in the overseas situation. For example, minor items such as sofas or marketing are elevated to become major sources of difficulty which affect work output. General lacks of facilities, resources, training, and perhaps inclinations to meet United States standards of performance also create management difficulties. The Deputy must cope with many problems stemming from such general environmental paucity which few managers working in the U. S. ever encounter.

Cultural differences also create a need for unique management skills. For example, Executive Officers are generally responsible for providing and supervising recreational facilities, but the Director or Deputy Director generally must determine whether or not facilities are likely to create a bad impression among host nationals.

Management tools provided by the Agency also make this task difficult. Specific inadequacies are discussed below as applicable to specific tasks. Furthermore, there are general factors which hinder mission management and handicap the assistance effort. One frequent complaint in this general category was that missions were losing autonomy

and becoming increasingly under the control of AID/W. No one objected to major, substantive matters being decided in AID/W, but the general contention of Deputies was that decisions should be made locally if at all possible. A few Deputies took the view that the trend should be to greater mission autonomy, with AID/W becoming less involved.

Relations with the Embassies proved to be a controversial general problem; some Deputies held the opinion that the AID mission should be more closely associated with the Embassy. The majority of the Deputies interviewed, however, were of the opinion that the missions should be more independent of Embassy control than they are now. Several types of conflicts were mentioned to justify this viewpoint. Lack of uniform policy or procedure was a common complaint. Another common complaint was that the Embassy could and did dictate policy in matters which were thought to be more appropriately AID's concern.

Many mission personnel expressed concern about the lack of communication between the Director's offices and the mission rank and file. This lack is especially evident in relation to host national employees of the mission. These employees represent a potential wealth of information about host country conditions, attitudes and receptivity. Perhaps even more importantly, they represent a source of information for other host nationals. They are the groups which work most closely with Americans, and in this capacity are spreading their opinions about their employers. Yet, with minor exceptions, these employees have no link with top management. As a rule, they have no means for voicing complaints, opinions or suggestions. In one mission an incident was reported in which a host national employee, engaged in a chance conversation with an American, asked the American what work he did in the mission. The American was the Deputy Mission Director.

American personnel are also concerned with lack of communication between the front office and other echelons of the mission. Personnel felt that there was insufficient association between management and the other employees. For example, one employee said, "We senior staff personnel all feel that we should meet with the Director's office in a sort of senior staff management meeting. However, they don't want to bother with a meeting of this type so we meet without them to solve mission management problems." In another case the Deputy Director asked an American subordinate if he had been on leave, because he had not been seen for a long time. The subordinate had not been away from the mission for eighteen months.

1. Assigns tasks

The responsibilities for most mission staff work are well-defined. Further, most senior personnel can communicate directly with the Director so that the Deputy does not need to become involved heavily in task assignment as a rule. In a few missions the Deputy was explicitly responsible for assigning tasks and insuring their completion; in other missions the Deputy assumed responsibility by thrusting himself into situations permitting control over the work of others; in a third type of mission there was no mission management of this type except that exercised by the (generally overworked) Mission Director.

In many cases, especially in the latter two types, the Deputy's attempts to exercise authority arouse resentment, perhaps because such action places the subordinate one additional step away from the top mission position, perhaps because it adds control where previously none existed, or perhaps because it violates earlier existing authority patterns.

Some comments were made about lack of skills in assigning tasks. For example, one Deputy was criticized for relaying instructions through a third party, which created the need for personal visits to clarify assignments. However, this type of problem is insignificant compared to the basic problem of authority relations.

> Before one subordinate could finish a task, I learned of a new factor and realized that someone else should be doing the work. I took the work from the first employee and assigned it to a second, but, because of the heavy work schedule, there was no opportunity to provide a complete explanation. The employee to whom the task had originally been assigned brooded about it for several days.
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> A new secretary came to work at the mission. I talked with her and found that she was uninspired, quiet, and seemingly with little vim and vigor. Because of this, I avoided giving her lengthy, detailed instructions during our first meeting, assigning her instead to routine work. After learning that she didn't care for social life, that she was diligent, calm, and could do detailed work, I assigned her to a job which required exact work, under pressure, where she excelled.
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> (From subordinate) AID/W sent a circular airgram asking if missions would like copies of certain books. I considered the books acceptable, but not really essential; therefore I did not bother answering the airgram. Soon the Deputy called asking when and what reply was being made. Now, I must stop work, decide what books, if any, are desired and draft a reply. Such incidents lead me to believe that the Deputy has no faith in my judgment, and that he does not believe that I am capable of setting

my own priorities. In addition, the assignment has created a hardship for me because I must stop working on a project of more importance in order to deal with the Deputy's assignment.

* * * *

A technician liked to go on field trips, even though they were non-productive. I felt that I did not have time to listen to the purpose of every field trip this technician proposed making, so I delegated control to the Program Officer. This has worked very well because as technicians report to the Program Officer on any trips taken, the Program Officer keeps informed on project work and activities of technicians. In addition, the Program Officer is able to forbid any field trips he thinks will be non-productive. Thus, I saved valuable time and my span of contacts with subordinates was reduced to a manageable level.

* * * *

A capable employee was transferred to our mission. He was enthusiastic, had good ideas, was liked by locals and Americans, but got nothing done on the job. I did not want to get rid of him because he seemed so well-qualified. From conversations I learned that the man was interested in mechanics and knew about gears and motors, and was able to sell others on his ideas. The Director agreed to my suggestion that the man be transferred to an industrial phase of our operations. Now the man is happy in his work, and is productive, and has maintained his good relations with everyone. He is now a valuable Agency employee.

* * * *

There had been some general griping about the parking situation, so I suggested to the Executive Officer that he make some improvements, telling him one specific item that could be improved. The Executive Officer's reply was that the problem "should take care of itself." However, complaints about mission parking continued, so I then asked the Assistant Executive Officer to improve the situation. Whatever the Assistant Executive Officer did was apparently successful, because the complaints soon stopped.

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(From subordinate) The other day my secretary came in and said the Deputy wanted me right away. I was in the middle of a meeting which I had to drop. I went to his office and waited a few minutes. Finally, the Deputy called me in and asked, "What time does the Pan Am flight arrive tomorrow?" I answered, and then asked what he wanted to see me about. He replied, "That's all." This is not an uncommon occurrence.

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Acoustics and lighting seemed to be inadequate, so I asked the Executive Officer if corrective measures could be taken, and he replied that new lighting assemblies were already on order. At the same time we were getting new office drapes and rugs, so I asked the Executive Officer if anyone was considering the adequacy of the new lighting assemblies in relation to the new drapes and rugs. The Executive Officer was unable to answer, so I suggested that he meet with a staff engineer to determine requirements and cost estimates for proper lighting. I made this assignment because I felt that a complete appraisal of the lighting situation was necessary.

* * * *

(From subordinate) Last week a circular airgram came explaining the importance of getting financial reports in on time. The Deputy told his secretary to tell me to come to his office, which I did. He wanted to know why we were late in submitting these reports. I pointed out to him that this was a circular airgram which went to every mission and didn't specify us. He took up my time and got involved in a trivial matter in this case. It would have taken only a minute if it had been done by phone.

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The Executive Officer brought a contract requiring my signature. I examined the contract and found it incomplete, so asked several questions about contract details, e.g., leave arrangements, commissary privileges, provision of housing, etc. The Executive Officer had no information about these points, so I asked him to analyze past contracts, and examine regulations, and then to write up his recommendations for a consistent contracting policy. This assignment, when completed, will save the mission time in the long run, and will prevent morale problems caused by preferential treatment.

* * * *

Recently we received a request from AID/W to do a review of a certain aspect of our budget. This work normally would be done by the Executive Officer, but it was also pertinent to the Controller's office. Since I knew that the Executive Officer was very busy on a more important task, I assigned the job to the Controller.

* * * *

2. Provides advice concerning mission administrative operations

This category includes all Deputy Director efforts in such areas as setting work schedules, devising or revising mission structure, and establishing work priorities. Advice is rendered either to the Director, or to subordinates. Several Deputies had the time and the skills to become involved in such matters, and were able to produce effective changes by virtue of being ranking mission executives. For example, one Deputy reported being dissatisfied with the mission organization. The Deputy merely reorganized the mission into a more effective pattern, procured the Director's approval, and immediately put the changes into effect.

Other Deputies were more uncertain in their approaches. For example, one Deputy reported that "two technicians have such low morale that they should be removed, but I'm going to let the Director find out for himself." This Deputy added that one of the two technicians had been badly treated by the Agency and would be leaving at the first opportunity, and that the Director disliked the second technician to the point of refusing to see him. The same Deputy reported that although morale in the mission was low, morale in other missions was even lower.

Many mission personnel held the opinion that Deputy Directors were involved in mission operations at too low a level. For example, it was reported that Deputies concerned themselves with the house bidding system, and with transferring secretaries from office to office. The list of examples below contains several incidents of this type. The presence of this problem and its pervasiveness is not surprising when the status of the Deputy Director is considered. The Deputy's authority is often unclear, his responsibilities are often unclear or non-existent, and he is frequently bypassed by his supervisor as well as by subordinates. Thus, over-concern with minor details is understandable.

Our telephone operator had been providing very poor service, with many resulting complaints. I explained the situation to the Executive Officer, who offered to compose a set of instructions for her to follow. After a week we were still getting poor performance from the operator, so I told the Executive Officer that if I had to instruct her myself, we would look for a new telephone operator. With this, her performance improved considerably.

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After hearing many complaints about mission work hours, I wrote a memorandum to the Executive Officer suggesting different hours, or at least a study of the hours. The Executive Officer wrote back immediately with a copy to the Director, indicating that a change of hours would disturb mission operations, for example in the motor pool. I learned that the Director agreed with the Executive Officer, and I realized that the issue was not really important, so I dropped the problem from consideration.

* * * *

An employee was being transferred to another mission, but he was delaying his departure in every conceivable way. Finally, we were able to set a firm date for his departure, and notified AID/W and the receiving mission. However, the receiving mission cabled that the employee was urgently needed, so I tried to locate the employee, who was in the field, to discuss an earlier departure date for him. Since he could not be readily located I personally set his departure date, and told the Executive Officer to notify the employee as soon as he could be found, and to send immediate cables to AID/W and the other mission.

* * * *

One of our staff offices was not being properly utilized. No one knew what this office really did, or how the personnel in the office were to be utilized. I was sure that this office could best be used if certain of its operations were placed within the control of technical divisions. I talked to the head of this office, who agreed with my observations. I also asked him to talk to his staff, after which he informed me that his staff was agreeable to any change thought best. Then I called a meeting of Division Chiefs and the head of the staff office to work out specific plans. We agreed to place some people and some functions within the divisions and the executive office, and to abolish some positions which were unnecessary. The Director approved of our suggested changes, so we put the system into effect. These changes enabled us to utilize our available resources much more effectively, thus was an extremely beneficial reorganization.

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We recently had an investigation concerning one phase of our operations. To correct matters, the Director assigned me responsibility for the operation. I revised procedures, and consolidated offices to enable close coordination and easy control. The operation is now easily maintained, and production is satisfactory.

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I had to feel my way into the job, and it took a lot longer than I had thought it would. I tried to do some of the things that my predecessor had done, but this was not successful because the Director did not support me. Later I decided to try to talk with the Director about the job, in spite of the fact that the Director was very "cold" and hard to warm up to. The Director gave

me some tasks to do, but on the first one, he interfered before it was completed. I finally went to the Executive Officer who suggested that he and I write out a list of things that would be my responsibilities. We did this and I took them to the Director who approved the list.

* * * *

An Acting Division Chief had just taken over responsibility for a division. He came to me to complain that the division was doing a poor job of administering the payroll for host national workers, and some salaries were too high, and some were too low. I told the Acting Division Chief to meet with the Executive Officer to solve this problem. I could easily have solved the problem, but by my action I was able to give the Executive Officer an opportunity to perform a task rightfully his, and saved my own time for more important matters.

* * * *

For some unknown reason the Director was refusing to allow an important staff officer to come to staff meetings. I saw that this was damaging morale and that mission coordination was suffering. Therefore, I successfully convinced the Director that such an omission was very bad policy.

* * * *

I began to get complaints from technicians that they were not being informed regarding communications between the mission and the Ministries. Dissemination of information is very important, so I immediately took action. To boost morale immediately, I wrote that a new directive would be issued to solve this problem. I also announced it at our staff meeting next day, after clearing with the Director. I then wrote a draft memorandum

and sent it to the Executive Officer to circulate as a new memorandum of procedure. It directed that all correspondence to Ministries had to be forwarded through technicians, and that every communication was to provide copies for the technical offices. The complaints have now stopped and the system is working smoothly.

* * * *

During a recent expansion, the Executive Officer was having difficulty keeping up with logistic requirements. For example, technicians were making commitments with Ministries to receive technicians and not informing the Executive Officer of the arrangements. This reduced time available for the Executive Officer to prepare support arrangements. The Executive Officer came to me and complained. I could see that he was disgusted, discouraged and had very low morale. The Executive Office is critical in a mission and has to function efficiently so I therefore had to boost the Executive Officer's morale. I called a meeting with the Executive Officer and technicians and emphasized that the Executive Officer was being pushed into difficult positions by not being kept informed regarding logistic arrangements for new personnel. I said that technical divisions would be more useful to the extent that they cooperated with the Executive Office. I then clarified the responsibilities of the technical divisions in receiving new people.

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At a weekly staff meeting several technicians mentioned dissatisfaction with mission working hours. The Director and I discussed this and decided to let mission personnel decide what hours they wanted to work. At the next staff meeting I proposed new hours including a lunch break and asked technicians to sound out their staffs to see if they would like to adopt that system. At the next meeting the technicians

were all favorable regarding the proposed hours. I asked the Executive Officer to circulate a mission notice informing people of the official change in mission hours. As soon as the notice came out we got a terrific negative reaction. There were complaints to me personally, to the Director and to the Executive Office that we were being arbitrary. I concluded that the technicians collectively didn't do a good job. At the next staff meeting, I pointed this out to them and told them to go back and get a realistic appraisal of the desires of their staffs. This was done, and the new mission hours were dropped on the basis of majority rule.

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There were many requests that we acquire additional vehicles for the mission motor pool. The requests were somewhat disturbing because no one knew the status of our present vehicles, i.e., their use, operating costs, or depreciation. I suggested to the Director that an equipment survey be conducted before any more vehicle requests were considered. The Director agreed and asked the Executive Officer to conduct the survey.

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I was aware that much of the mission's business was being conducted by the Program Officer and the Director without the knowledge of the rest of the staff. I suggested to the Director, privately, that all mission memoranda should be circulated for everyone to read. This was begun at the Director's request, and, although some staff members ignored the memoranda, at least the information was available.

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3. Settles disputes

A wide variety of disputes come to the Deputy Director for solution. These disputes vary in content, in detail, in importance, and in participants.

This task differs from the one immediately above in that advising about administrative operations refers to correcting omissions, mistakes, or inefficient operations, while the present task refers to discord, which may or may not lead to mistakes or inefficient operations. Very real disputes, some quite heated, occur between mission personnel, between mission personnel and employees of other agencies, and between U. S. employees and host national mission employees.

At times the Deputy is sought as an arbitrator, because of his rank, because of management talents, or to prevent the issue from coming to the attention of the Mission Director. At other times, the Deputy learns of situations and exerts his authority, in order to preserve order, dignity and working effectiveness.

> I received a telephone call from a Peace Corps official who complained that the AID Executive Office was mishandling the Peace Corps petty cash fund. This official is strongly supported by the Ambassador, so it was necessary to handle him carefully for more than one reason. First, I apologized for the difficulty and then asked for a description of the petty cash procedure which was causing the problem. I was able to suggest an alternate procedure while on the phone, and arranged a later meeting to work out specific details.

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The Executive Officer came in to discuss a problem he was having with a host national employee. This host national for a long time had been parking in a space reserved for visitors, and continued to do so in spite of polite warnings by the Executive Officer. The Executive Officer agreed with my recommendation to give the host national until noon to cease the illegal parking. Apparently the Executive Officer also talked to the Division Chief who supervised the host national, because the Division Chief called me that afternoon and said that the host national had still not moved the car, and that he would like me to talk personally with the host national to settle the dispute. I agreed to do so, and arranged a meeting. The host national had to be handled carefully because of the public relations implications, and because he had high-level host national political connections. During my meeting with the host national, I simply made a personal request for him to park properly, without making demands. The host national agreed to comply, not because he "had to," but as a personal favor to me. Under the circumstances this was the best solution possible. The prestige of the host national and the Executive Officer was saved, and the illegal parking ceased.

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Watchdogging United States loans is a responsibility assigned to the Program Office, which is the normal arrangement. However, one technician was very concerned about this, wanting his division to have a more active part in negotiating loans. He complained to me several times and was beginning to put some pressure on the Front Office. The technician had high qualifications and was very capable, so I couldn't overlook his point of view. I discussed the problem with the Program Officer, and learned that his views were in harmony with mine. Next, I presented the problem to the Director, including my

recommendations on the matter. He agreed with me that the Program Office should have responsibility for general loan negotiations, but that the technician should be considered as a standby section at all times available for consultation. My problem was to convey these decisions to the technician without blunting his enthusiasm. I simply give him the picture as it was and relied on his reasonableness to accept it. I pointed out to him the variety of non-technical considerations that had to be considered. I pointed out that many technical judgments were made by United States consultants, especially in matters of size, for example, about steel mills, bridges, etc. At the same time I assured him that the initial judgments would always be made by his technical division, and that they would be as important as any of the other factors coming to play in loan negotiations. The technician was reasonable and accepted the fact that the broader implications must take precedence.

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One of our staff officers is very energetic, and very bright. When he first came, and for sometime thereafter, he wanted to expand his responsibilities. He specifically wanted to get in on all matters which came from the Program Office. He began pressing me to give him more authority in program matters. I knew that something would have to be done because I felt that the Program Office was extremely able to handle matters without increased consultation with this staff member. Besides there was personal friction between him and someone in the Program Office. I had already been working on a document discussing mission clearance procedures, encompassing the lines of authority and responsibilities, and I was going to circulate this as a mission order. The problem of the staff member pushing for more program authority gave this a greater sense of urgency, so I decided to get it out sooner.

I sent the draft I had to the Director for clearance and then to the Executive Officer, telling him to circulate it as a mission order. At the same time I told the Executive Officer to put out a mission notice defining the responsibilities and functions of the energetic staff member. The Executive Officer got the fundamental description from the Manual Orders and I drafted a supplementary description which I told him to work in with his. The two notices effectively defined operations and eliminated misunderstandings.

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A Division Chief and a contractor were getting along so poorly that no work was being accomplished. When I learned this, I started bringing the two together in my office every week for consultation and decisions about work efforts. I did this hoping to provide an atmosphere in which they could work together harmoniously. Unfortunately my efforts were unsuccessful because the two would explode again almost immediately after leaving my office. The problem was not really solved until one of the two was transferred.

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A Division Chief complained to me that the Controller had refused to pay host national employees who had already been hired to work in the Division. I asked the Controller to present his views, and he explained that he had refused to pay because the host nationals had been hired and put to work without security clearances, which was a definite violation of regulations. The new employees had to be paid to avoid creating a bad impression among host nationals, but finding a legal way to do so was a problem. The Controller suggested that perhaps the technician who had incorrectly hired the host nationals would need to pay them out of his own pocket. There was animosity

between the Controller and the technician, which did not facilitate solution of the problem. Therefore, I decided to wait for a few days to allow everyone to calm down, with the intention of arranging a rational solution after a more relaxed atmosphere was possible.

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Host nationals are very sensitive about the jobs for which they have been hired. One day I came to work and found workmen arguing about who was to lay brick around the driveway. Each workman thought someone else should do the work. I quietly picked up the tools and started laying the brick. This proved embarrassing to the workmen, so all of them began work.

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4. Provides information concerning mission administrative operations

At times the Deputy is called upon to inform others about mission administration. This type of informing refers to all efforts to disseminate information, without intention to influence change. For example, the Deputy might be asked about the status of an intended move into new office spaces by the Ambassador, or might inform mission subordinates about an administrative policy decision made by the Director.

I obtained information about the legal disposition of certain AID property. Then I wrote a memorandum describing what I had learned and circulated it to the entire staff. This was effective in that the memorandum provided documentary information about legalities and policy. Now, the staff is well informed about this matter, and complaints about improper disposition of property have ceased.

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I conduct an orientation session with all new employees soon after their arrival. At this session I tell them what is expected of AID employees at this post. During the conversation I attempt to make judgments about the new employee's personality, give them a chance to make the same judgment concerning me, and I explain their role in the mission. For example, when a new secretary reported for duty I explained that I expected her to relieve me of the minutiae of running the office, that she was to learn office operations so well that she would be able to find things with only general information, that she would provide grammatical corrections to my paperwork, and produce rough drafts of letters from my notes. I gave her documents and files to run through, and then discussed them with her to learn how well she understood them. This system provides me with information about new employees, and provides them with information about how the mission is operated and what is expected of them.

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The previous Director was a fatherly type who talked nicely to everyone and let each person run his own shop. The new Director loves details, runs a taut ship, and is reorganizing the mission. People on the staff resent the change in personality and in procedure. I was on home leave during the changeover. Upon my return everyone in the mission began inviting me for dinner and cocktails, and pouring out their hearts about their feelings toward the new Director. They wanted me to be a buffer between themselves and the new Director. My response to this was the only realistic reaction possible. I informed everyone that the new Director was my supervisor and that I would support him and his policies fully.

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5. Reads, reviews, or edits administrative written materials

The Deputy in most missions reads all incoming and all outgoing administrative materials such as cables, airgrams, and special reports. Frequently the Deputy serves as an editor of outgoing correspondence, insuring that materials are grammatically correct, that they conform to USAID and mission policy, and that they provide an appropriate response. The Deputy also reads outgoing materials to obtain information, and reads incoming correspondence for the same purpose.

A few Deputies reported that the task of reviewing outgoing correspondence was also utilized as a supervisory tool. By virtue of reading these materials it was possible to judge subordinate performance, to become informed for purposes of later discussions, and to enable unobtrusive criticisms.

The major problem for the Deputy is lack of clarity in the written materials. It was reported that mission personnel were in general incapable of writing effectively, and that incoming materials from AID/W and other missions were often garbled, incomplete, or ambiguously written. This situation has created the need for special care in handling correspondence, in an effort to avoid mistakes and misunderstandings, and many Deputies have assumed the role of correspondence watchdog in an effort to correct this deficiency.

> The mission cooperates with the Embassy in a certain administrative matter. When the Embassy refused to pay its share of the costs for this operation, I wrote AID/W about the situation, and requested guidance. AID/W sent back a reply which was such an enigma that it was impossible to determine the meaning. Then I sent a second airgram seeking clarification and guidance, but after several days, no reply has been received.

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I must read all outgoing correspondence very carefully because subordinates, even with advanced academic degrees and technically competent, are unable to write. Recently I found that a subordinate's airgram to AID/W made little sense. Before clearing the airgram, I summoned the employee, and explained how the airgram could be improved grammatically, and how it could be made more clear. The subordinate made two attempts before he had a clear piece of correspondence for AID/W. This type incident is a frequent occurrence, and constitutes a significant portion of my job.

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In doing my routine morning reading, I came across a memorandum regarding the possible appointment of a mission staff officer to a UN post in another country. I called the staff officer and asked him to drop into my office. When he arrived, I was reading the memorandum regarding the possible appointment, and he volunteered to summarize it for me because he had read it several times. We discussed strategies regarding a reply, and implications of specific approaches and appropriate modifications. When he was leaving, I asked him about the status of a report which he was preparing, which was unrelated to the memorandum we had been discussing. I was not familiar with the report, but asked about it to indicate that I was exercising supervision. The reason I did this was because of my own assignment from the Mission Director. The Director is trying to get rid of this employee, and thus assigned me the task of "riding" him about his work.

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6. Consults on personnel needs, allocations, and appointments

The Deputy Director participates in the procedure for acquiring personnel. He participates in discussions regarding need for new personnel,

and qualifications of personnel needed to fill positions. Next, the Deputy becomes involved in the reviewing and editing of documents, SPARS, cables, etc., which are necessary to initiate recruiting procedures by AID/W. Then, when biographic data are available, the Deputy meets with mission officials to evaluate the data and participates in the final decision concerning whether or not to accept the proposed candidate.

To perform this task, the Deputy utilizes his knowledge of the job to be done and the atmosphere in which it will be accomplished, the biographic data available about the proposed candidate, and his own management judgments. The Deputy will seldom, if ever, have ultimate authority in considering personnel, but his advice is frequently decisive.

It appears that the general procedure frequently breaks down. The personnel recruiting, selecting, and transferring effort is reported to be riddled with inadequacies, inconsistencies, and errors. The method is unbelievably slow. Every mission reported cases in which AID/W required excessive time, not only to recruit, but to deal with correspondence concerning recruiting. Most Deputies reported that they needed to step outside the regular channels of recruiting in order to obtain personnel within a reasonable time.

In addition to recruiting delays, AID/W seems unable to provide qualified candidates. This too has driven missions out of regular channels in attempts to obtain employees with acceptable qualifications. A minor but closely related problem is the amount of data about newly proposed candidates supplied by AID/W. Deputies reported that data were frequently too sparse to be meaningful, and that a frequent occurrence was additional correspondence trying to learn enough information about a candidate to permit meaningful judgments.

Another difficulty arises from the usual procedure of inviting mission staff to give personal opinions concerning any proposed candidate that they have known. This part of the system would perhaps work well if all employees were objective and gifted observers of human performance. Unfortunately, according to Deputy Directors, many mission employees lack these talents, so that jealousies, rivalries, personal dislikes, and vindictive attitudes are likely to be evidenced when opinions are solicited.

The fact that contract personnel must be considered further complicates the task of meeting personnel needs in that the contractor obtains his own personnel, who are scheduled to do work for which the mission will be responsible. One Deputy complained that this was particularly bad because whatever the contractor did badly, or wrong, would be blamed by the hosts on the USAID mission, not the contractor. Yet, the mission had no effective control over contract personnel recruited to work in the host country.

> AID/W detailed a Division Chief position to us, without providing an employee to fill the position. I consider such a person of necessity as an adviser to the host government since one of their major difficulties is the lack of qualified personnel in this area. The Director was aware of my personal and professional interest in this area and asked me for suggestions regarding whom we could bring in for this job. I asked him to let me check with a mission where I had formerly worked to see if a person would be available from there. He agreed, and I wrote to this person. He said his assignment would be up shortly and he would be happy to come here if he were nominated. I conveyed this to the Director and suggested that he ask for this individual. The Director did ask for the recommended person, and we were able to get him assigned to us. He will arrive here after his home leave.

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I am seldom satisfied with candidates provided by AID/W personnel for mission positions. I solve this by going outside the AID personnel system. In one case I wrote to friends and acquaintances for recommendations, and then had the desired candidate contact AID/W. In this case my efforts enabled us to obtain a more qualified, preferred employee, and to get him to the mission much faster than if I had followed the regular system.

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We wanted a specific person to be Deputy Chief of one of our divisions. This man insisted on a certain grade, which we were willing to give, but the AID/W personnel office hesitated, being reluctant to give the desired grade. I sent a strongly worded justification for obtaining this man, but no reply from AID/W was received. I was afraid that we would lose the candidate if AID/W hesitated much longer, so I sent a second cable which was really a ringing criticism of AID/W Personnel. This cable did not endear our mission to AID/W, but it did stimulate them to hire the man we wanted, at the grade we wanted.

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I wrote to AID/W requesting a particular individual that I had known in another mission. I was sure that this person had the necessary qualifications, and that he would do a good job for our mission. AID/W complied with my request and had him transferred to us in a relatively short time.

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A Division Chief was recruiting for technicians, so I recommended a young, bright, imaginative Ph.D. The Division Chief refused my recommendation on the basis that he was making his own list of potential employees.

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A contract team from a United States University was doing an unsatisfactory job. The team did not have vision, and, although not complete failures, were not really achieving anything. The contract team leader was being replaced by a University employee even worse than those already present. Based on the proposed man's vitae, I concluded that he would have trouble gaining admission to a good graduate school. In addition, the contract team's home school did not really have the proper orientation for the program which we desired. We definitely did not want the proposed new contract team member, and wanted to award the contract to a different University. I informed AID/W of our views, but they answered to the effect that the proposed contractor was qualified. Meanwhile, I learned that the proposed contract was perhaps political, so, because of this possibility, and the fact that AID/W insisted on the acceptance, I cabled AID/W again, this time indicating that the proposed contractor would be acceptable. Fortunately, someone from AID/W reviewed the correspondence on this matter with the University officials, and they soon withdrew their bid for the contract.

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7. Monitors and evaluates performance

The Deputy Director prepares efficiency reports, and occasionally serves as a personnel reviewing officer or as a member of a review panel. The system of efficiency reporting is well established within the Agency, so an explanation of task performance is unnecessary. However, there are several problems involved, which do deserve discussion, and which are very much in need of correction.

A common complaint among Deputies was that the efficiency report system did not allow objectivity. First, the Agency atmosphere is such that a rating of "3," or average, has come to mean unsatisfactory. Therefore, few raters assign a "3," even if the subordinate's performance is average, or even below average. This has, in effect, reduced the five point to a two point scale, with employees generally receiving either a "4" or a "5."

Another complaint is that many Agency employees have friends in AID/W or in political positions, and thus are able to exert pressure to keep ratings up, perhaps much higher than is deserved. It is a difficult task indeed for a Deputy Director to objectively rate a mission official who received an appointment based on the intercession of a Senator or Congressman.

Many Deputies thought that the mechanics of the rating scale were inadequate. For example, one Deputy stated that the 5-point scale was too narrow, because more shades of meaning are necessary. Therefore, greater importance is placed on the narrative section, which in turn depends on the writing skill of the rater. A ratee being evaluated by a supervisor with exceptional writing skills has a great advantage over his colleagues. Deputies attempt to solve this problem by being objective, but by doing so they report that it is impossible to know if they are actually aiding or obstructing subordinates, because they do not know the attitudes and performance of other raters.

Some Deputies reported that the task of efficiency reporting was routine, tedious, and time-consuming, and that their time could be better spent. They were especially resentful of having to review reports written by others.

Several Deputies reported that preparing efficiency reports was more difficult overseas than in the United States. This is because many different factors have to be considered that are not normally part of efficiency reporting in the United States. In this category are such factors as health, family, conformance to Agency policy, and adjustment to the environment.

One further point concerning performance evaluation deserves special note. By far the most commonly reported means of getting rid of incompetents, troublemakers, malcontents or otherwise undesirable employees was to have them transferred, from which it can be inferred that the problems are continued. Undesirables are often rated well and their transfers are arranged informally. In the relatively rare cases in which persons are rated low, they can usually only be transferred back to AID/W since most other missions would not accept them.

> A secretary had worked for five different technicians during a reporting period, and the technicians took a cavalier attitude about writing an efficiency report for her. At first each of them said that someone else should write the report. Later, when I began to ask the technicians for the report their general tone was that if it had to be done they would write a poor one for her, to more or less punish her for creating a need to write the report. I could either force them to write the report, or write the report myself. In this case, I selected the latter course of action in order to ensure that a fair efficiency report was written.
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> One technician is kind, pleasant to be with, and gets along well with fellow Americans. This technician's job is to teach his specialty to host nationals. Although this man is a nice guy, he is very poor at his designated job. I recently rated him a "3" overall, which is just short of his being questionable in performance. For the training category of his efficiency report, I rated him "2" which means that it is mandatory that he improve this aspect of his work within six months.

I discussed the efficiency report with the technician, explaining that the ratings being given were not personal, but were comments coming from a supervisor. The technician became very angry because of such low ratings, so I carefully went through all manual order definitions of terms, explaining to the technician the reasons behind each rating. I did this in order for the technician to learn the form of reference used, to calm his extreme anger, and to perhaps educate him sufficiently so that his performance would improve. The technician was not soothed, however, and he continued arguing, insisting that since he had received a "5" at his last post, that he deserved the same rating here. I know that if this technician had received a "5" at his last post, it was because his supervisor did not rate truthfully, but I did not argue with the technician. Instead, I told him that the ratings that I had given were firm, and that it would be wise for him to improve his performance before the next efficiency reporting period.

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A Division Chief was a problem for everyone. He was looking out for his own personal future, and the work of the mission came second. He simply discarded ideas and instructions that were not personally advantageous. He would never admit being wrong, and would continue with his own way in spite of specific orders to the contrary. I tried to persuade him to improve, and to devote his energy to mission work, but was unsuccessful. Therefore, I included all of these factors in the man's next efficiency report. The efficiency report apparently was effective, at least from the mission's point of view, because soon after its submission the Division Chief was transferred.

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I wrote an efficiency report concerning my secretary which I thought was favorable, but she did not think so. We discussed the report and she explained her point, which was sensible. I had obviously used an incorrect word to express a descriptive thought. I changed the wording to present a more accurate version.

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At a meeting to discuss efficiency report review panels, I realized that the review panel members were uninformed on the procedures and instructions. Therefore, I suggested to the chairman of the panel that he convene a meeting of all raters to instruct them carefully on procedures for making out efficiency reports. This was effective in reducing difficulties in preparing efficiency reports.

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8. Develops skills of subordinates

Part of the job of any executive is to develop and upgrade the abilities of subordinates. For the Deputy Director this usually means Division Chiefs and Senior Administrative Personnel, but could apply to any mission employee.

Techniques of developing the skills of others vary according to need, aptitudes, and personalities, but the need to develop skills does not change. In some missions the upgrading of personnel becomes crucial because of the lack of availability of replacements, or the difficulty in replacing incompetent personnel. To the extent that the Deputy and others are successful in this function, the Agency can save the cost of replacements or further poor performance.

A technician works well in one context, but is in danger of losing his job because of incompetence. The technician was hired to be an adviser. He is kind, and spends his own money for books, food, and entertainment of participant trainees in his area. He speaks the local language well, and is well loved by the host national people. He is a friend of the Minister and is able to visit the Minister at any time of the day or night. He plans to visit participants in training in the United States, using his own leave and money. In spite of his extremely good attitude and motivation, his problem is very real. He can't use the language and structure of the AID bureaucracy and he doesn't know how to present information in a form usable to AID/W. Hired as an adviser, he cannot advise. I explained to him that he should develop AID/W contacts, and that to do this he should send cables and airgrams bearing his name so that AID would become familiar with him. The technician cannot bring himself to develop contacts, write properly, or be an adviser. The Ambassador realizes that this technician is not "pulling his weight" and occasionally asks how much longer he will be kept around. I agreed with the Ambassador in thinking that this technician was not as efficient as other technicians, but I have not acted conclusively yet. I have done everything possible to help this technician know where he is failing, but this has been unsuccessful. Unfortunately, it will soon be necessary to send this technician home if I am unable to teach him how to be a good adviser.

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Recently the Agency changed assistance philosophy from a function orientation to a goal orientation. The "old timers" in charge of functions view the change as a threat to their jobs, and as a method of losing prestige. When we began to change our mission structure to reflect this new orientation, the old timers really objected. First they tried to convince me that the new system would be unsatisfactory. When this failed they reduced to a

minimum all concrete efforts to produce the change. One Division Chief was particularly upset about the change. He soon developed the habit of visiting my office every day for a few minutes. He really had nothing significant to say or to report, but merely wanted to talk about the "good old days." In order to prevent him from feeling worse, to keep him productive, and to assist in convincing him to help effect the change, it was necessary to spend time talking with this Division Chief, and bolstering his ego by telling him how important he would be in the new organization.

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A whole new series of manual orders was put out describing program procedures to be followed and the United States legal requirements for documentation. These manual orders were complex and would take time to digest. At the same time, the Program Officer was busy, and seemed disinclined to make the effort to carefully read and digest the new instructions. I felt that it was important to begin learning what the new instructions were, before the time to apply them. However, I did not want to tell the Program Officer bluntly to read them, thinking it would insult him. To solve the problem I asked the Program Officer to present the main points of the new instructions to the rest of the staff, over two or three staff meetings. This would help them understand a difficult set of instructions, and would be a smooth way to get the Program Officer to immediately digest in detail the new instructions.

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A week after the Executive Officer went on leave, his secretary submitted a request for transfer together with a draft of her End-of-Tour report. In the latter she said that she felt that her secretarial capabilities were not being used and she was afraid that this would affect her

opportunities for advancement. She added that she was losing her initiative and her respect for the mission. I knew that she was one of the most effective secretaries on the staff, and I was also afraid that her last comment would do her more harm than good. During a conference with her I learned that she was constantly being left in the middle of difficult situations. For example, the Executive Officer never told her anything, although she was constantly being called for information or services. I offered her a position as my secretary because my current one was ineffective and was transferring. The Executive Officer's secretary declined the position I offered because she felt she could not stay in the mission. I was unable to salvage this extremely good secretary for the mission, but I was able to convince her to revise her End-of-Tour report.

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I decided that part of the reason for the low morale of the secretaries was partly the pressure of work, and partly that many of the officers did not know how to use their secretaries. There had been no attempt to orient them to the work, no explanations about what they were doing or why. This demonstrated a need for "in-service training" for the mission officers as well as the staff. I had not pushed for this before because I thought the Director and the Executive Officer were planning to do something in this area. However, it is increasingly clear that they are not planning anything, so I will decide what needs to be done. In-service training is always valuable, and will be particularly helpful here because of the lack of communication.

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The Executive Office is the most poorly organized and operated part of the mission. It is necessary for me to constantly supervise the Executive Officer in order to insure that minor but crucial tasks are performed. For example, I have had to remind him to set up chairs for a ceremony, to provide transportation from the airport for arriving technicians, and to provide substitute chauffeurs when absences occurred. I have tried providing reminders of job duties, but this does not seem to work. The Executive Office is a real problem in this mission.

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9. Rewards outstanding performance

The Deputy Director participates in providing rewards, either directly or indirectly. He sometimes writes recommendations, or actually provides a reward, as was done in one incident below. At other times the Deputy advises others concerning procedures for providing rewards, and helps judge whether or not rewards are appropriate. For most cases the method of rewarding is thoroughly covered by regulations. However, there are flaws which prevent the system from working properly. These flaws, as the incidents listed below indicate, stem from erroneous or unethical personal judgments.

(From subordinate) A host national mission employee had committed an illegal act. Six months later he was up for promotion, which I refused. The Deputy overruled me, and approved the promotion. The Deputy's decision was unjustified, it made me appear ineffective, and it had a negative effect on my morale.

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(From subordinate) The Deputy recommended me for an award, but asked me to write the justification. I refused, on the basis that this procedure would be unethical, and because my view of myself could not be objective. Since I refused, the recommendation was never made, apparently because the Deputy was unwilling to do the work.

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(From subordinate) While I was in the United States the Deputy recommended one of my subordinates for a well-known award. At this same time I was writing an efficiency report on the same subordinate, but I had not been told of the Deputy's intention. I did not consider the subordinate worthy of the award, and had intended writing an average efficiency rating. With news of the special recommendation, I was forced to write what I considered a dishonest efficiency report because I could not afford to contradict the Deputy. It would have been only reasonable for the Deputy to consult me before recommending my subordinate.

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The Program Officer was just completing a period of difficult, complex work, in an effort to produce the CAP in time to meet the designated deadline. I knew that the Program Officer wanted to make a short trip back to the United States, and that someone should go to AID/W with our CAP presentation. Since I wanted to reward the Program Officer, I suggested that he be allowed to carry the CAP to Washington, and provide consultation as necessary. The Director agreed, so I asked AID/W to send orders for the Program Officer. The Program Officer returned to the mission after his trip feeling refreshed, and eager to return to work.

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A mission staff officer has been creative in non-job activities, producing some ideas with a strong impact potential. These originally brought him favorable attention from the Ambassador and from the Mission Director. Then, on a trip to AID/W, the Director learned that someone from this staff member's office had made embarrassing allegations, which were(probably falsely) attributed directly to the staff member. Now the staff member, with the Ambassador's support, is pushing for promotion. The Director refused to recommend the promotion, so the staff member appealed to me. There was really no substantive action for me to take, but I was able to see that nothing would be gained by denying the recommendation. It was obvious that the staff member's morale would be hurt badly if the recommendation was refused, and that his production would be negative for the rest of his tour. Therefore, I agreed to arrange for the staff member to personally visit with the Director, knowing that it would be harder for the Director to refuse a promotion recommendation if the confrontation was face-to-face. After this meeting, the Director did recommend the promotion, making my prediction correct.

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We tried to obtain a promotion for one of our outstanding technicians, but without success. Finally the Executive Officer found a way to reward him through the incentive award system, but it was small,so I felt that a new effort should be attempted. I sent a new recommendation to AID/W, providing plenty of details, but they asked me for even more details. I sent more details, but to no avail.

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10. Reprimands and disciplines

Imposing disciplinary measures is seldom a direct responsibility of the Deputy Director except in the few cases in which he has control over divisions or staff offices. The more frequent occurrence is for the Deputy to be sought out for advice concerning a disciplinary problem, or for the Deputy to discover a disciplinary problem and consult the Director about what action should be taken.

The manual orders to some extent provide for disciplinary action, but supervisors within the missions are allowed discretion, and are able to interpret regulations. Typically, the Deputy Director is consulted about a disciplinary problem, discusses it with appropriate officials, and recommends a course of action. In serious cases, the Deputy is likely to discuss all appropriate facts with the Director in order to ensure precise reflection of mission policy.

> A staff officer was refusing to work, was griping, was bothering other people who were trying to work, and refused to take responsibility even to the point of not signing off on documents sent to him. This employee had apparently received an insult, real or imagined, and preferred to spend his time complaining and trying to arrange for other people to support his point of view. When I learned of this, I advised the Director that the staff officer should first be given a warning, and if the warning was insufficient, then a recommendation for immediate transfer should follow. The Director agreed, so I summoned the man and gave him a stern warning. However, his behavior continued so I explained his behavior in an efficiency report and recommended that he be transferred. Again, I cleared my intentions with the Director because of the delicacy of the situation. Later we learned that the man had performed in a similar way in his next two (!) assignments, so we were correct in not wasting time with him.

* * * *

A new employee arrived with extremely high qualifications. Soon after arriving, the supervisor of the new employee complained to me that the man was never on the job. The new man disregarded mission discipline and produced no work. It was learned that he had submitted an article full of mission gossip to a prominent magazine. The Director heard of this first and asked me to handle the situation. I called in the employee and told him he was not to discuss mission personnel or mission policy with non-mission people, and that he was to do his work. Otherwise disciplinary action would be taken. The employee again disregarded his job, so I called him in again only to learn that he had numerous personal problems. After hearing of these problems, I decided to give the man a third chance. This did not pay off, because the employee's unsatisfactory behavior continued. Therefore, with the Director's approval, I notified AID/W to transfer the man.

* * * *

(From a subordinate) A contract technician was temporarily placed in an AID apartment normally reserved for direct-hire AID personnel, but when a host government house became available the technician refused to move. Finally, after a long struggle, he moved to the house, which he claimed to be grossly substandard. The technician refused to sleep in the house, using it only for storage, and very untactfully made it clear that the housing was unsatisfactory to him. This, of course, was embarrassing to the mission because the house was supplied by the host government and everything possible had been done to make it habitable. The host government began to wonder what kind of technicians AID was bringing into the country. The situation revolved around a question of control. Every member of the contract group was asking the Deputy when he

would do something about the substandard housing being provided for contractors. They are slowly beating him down to the point where they will dictate to him the kind of housing they want, and what he should say to the host government on the subject. The technician continued to complain very publicly and the other contract personnel continued complaining too, but the Deputy would do nothing because he wanted to avoid hurt feelings. Instead, he is waiting for a contract team leader to arrive, and at that time intends discussing the situation.

* * * *

The Assistant Executive Officer had been acting Executive Officer for an interim period. Upon arrival of the new Executive Officer the Assistant Executive Officer became bitter, no longer wanted to work, and refused to associate with the Executive Officer. The Executive Officer brought this matter to my attention but because the Assistant Executive Officer's tour will be completed within a few weeks, and he will depart, I decided to take no action.

* * * *

A technician was planning to make a field trip which was unnecessary, and at a time when he was needed in the mission. I told him not to go on the trip, and the reasons for not going, but he went anyway. When he returned, I told him that if he repeated such disobedience, disciplinary action would result. Actually I was talking through my hat because I really have no effective method of disciplinary action. Even if I were able to write his efficiency report, I would have little control because of the pressure to rate everyone at the "4" level.

* * * *

11. Provides advice about, or handles, special behavior problems

A group of Americans living abroad must provide services for themselves which are usually taken for granted in the United States. For example, it is occasionally necessary to provide for the safety of the American community. When emergencies do occur, it is often necessary to cope with the problem, and in some cases, to avoid having host nationals become aware of the problem. For example, one Deputy was called upon to contend with a nervous breakdown by a visiting official. The Deputy Director is pressed into service to handle such emergencies, perhaps by chance, perhaps because of his position, perhaps because of his personality, interests or aptitudes.

Each involvement is a problem situation, and such problems vary considerably in scope, detail, and importance. Therefore, solutions must be provided on an individual basis, and there is little opportunity for advance warnings, although not all such emergencies are as serious or as dramatic as the two listed below.

> An administrative employee was an ineffective worker, and was a suspected alcoholic. One day I received a telephone call from the man's wife. She explained that her husband was brandishing a gun, and threatening to kill her and the children. I immediately went to their home and discovered that the husband was very drunk and that he had completely lost control of himself. I quietly asked him for the gun, which he surrendered without argument. We were then able to calm him, and get him to sleep. Later we were able to get him transferred, and he was eventually dropped from AID.

* * * *

An American administrative employee was involved in an accident in which he inadvertently struck a host national with his car. My involvement did not come until the host national had already been hospitalized and was well cared for. In order to be absolutely certain that bad relations did not develop, I visited the host national in the hospital several times. I did this in order to make sure that the host national was being properly cared for, and to help counter any adverse opinion that might be developing. Apparently my efforts were more successful than it had been possible to anticipate because I heard several host nationals remark that Americans certainly had respect for people.

* * * *

B. Serves as Acting Mission Director

The amount of time that Deputies serve as Acting Director varies considerably from almost none to almost a full assignment. There is no accurate method for predicting just when and to what extent a Deputy will need to assume control. Consequently, the task of "staying ready" to assume control is of primary importance.

As a mission secretary expressed it, staying ready consists of "crawling inside the Director's head to learn everything inside." It is significant to note that most Deputies reported that their jobs did not change when they became Acting Directors. Instead, it was reported that they simply changed from being the next to last person to sign or verify, or decide, or review, to the last person to do so. However, it is exceedingly difficult to stay ready to assume responsibility without complete information, without complete access to information, without being in all ways and continuously the "next to last person" to sign, verify, decide, or review.

Several Deputies reported that the Director gave them a daily briefing of what had been done, and current thinking on work in progress. However, other Deputies reported just the reverse. The most severe criticism of this type was that one Director simply did not spend enough time with the Deputy, never sought out the Deputy to relay information, and that 99 per cent of all contacts were at the Deputy's initiative.

Deputies reported that problems also developed when they were serving as Acting Directors. The most usual problem of this type is that cooperation is difficult to obtain. Everyone, host nationals as well as mission staff, is aware that the deputy is in an "acting" capacity. Thus, there is a tendency to wait, or to delay action, until the Director returns to his post.

A similar problem is encountered both by Directors and Deputies acting as Chief of Mission. This problem is that mission authority is not clearly defined. It was reported that no one in AID really knew how much authority was possessed by an Acting Director. The only alternative is for them to try to learn by "feel" what they can and cannot do.

C. Deals with Visitors

As a ranking mission official, the Deputy is pressed into service to care for mission visitors. Highest ranking visitors are entertained by the Mission Director, or by both the Director and the Deputy combined, but there are enough lower ranking visiting officials to keep a Deputy occupied for a significant portion of his time.

Visitors to a mission vary as to rank, nationality, and purpose, and are reported to come in a constant stream. Several Deputies reported this as a real hardship because of the frequency of occurrence, and because even one visitor requires considerable time.

Notification of the arrival of official visitors is almost always received in advance by the mission, so that a measure of preplanning is possible. However, there are also frequent visits by unannounced guests, frequently businessmen, who desire information, advice, or financing. For all visitors, no matter how inappropriate the visit may be, it is necessary for the Deputy to be polite, to provide as much information and advice as possible. All Deputies feel that they need to be concerned about the AID image, both at home and abroad. In the host country, it is necessary to possess a good image in order to create good working relationships, to ensure coordination, and to obtain respect and friendship. Americans from private business and government can, upon returning to the

United States, register complaints regarding real or imagined slights. Therefore, the Deputy tends to be helpful to the maximum limit possible within the framework of mission operations and security requirements.

1. Provides briefings

A main service provided to visitors is to brief them on the AID effort within the host country. This is often a picture of the total effort, but is sometimes a specialized briefing concerning a specific project, or a specific problem situation. Briefings of this type are generally provided for official United States visitors, and are generally done in a formal setting. In addition, either formal or informal briefings are given to businessmen, host country officials, third country nationals, and officials of international agencies.

Some Deputies reported that the necessity to give briefings was disruptive of normal work schedules, but most Deputies welcomed the opportunity to give briefings as a vehicle for "spreading the mission story." Some Deputies reported being handicapped by the volume of businessmen who came asking for information and for AID financing. This creates the necessity for repetitive and time consuming explanations, for example, of the qualifications necessary for a loan, and the procedure for applying for it.

> An American engineer who represents a large construction firm in the host country dropped in without an appointment. I saw him immediately. The visitor indicated that his visit was to obtain information, so I gave him a thumbnail sketch of current and potential AID projects, information regarding project financing, bidding factors, currency conversion problems, and then referred him to a host national mission employee for further information. The visitor commented favorably on the amount of information which he received.

* * * *

A high level Department of State official came through the host country. An AID briefing was part of his itinerary. I gave the briefing concerning our program, giving particular stress to some of our problems, particularly the problem of conducting feasibility studies and the negative impression they create. In this way, I was able to use the briefing to stress an issue which was of concern to me.

* * * *

Several months ago the president of an American firm visited me. He had a contract with a firm having an AID contract here in the host country. The visitor arrived unannounced, seeking guidance. I gave him information, advice, and made appointments for him to see other people. Later he dropped in again, wanting AID financing for some work he wanted to do in the host country. I explained to him why AID could not finance work such as he proposed, and suggested that he deal directly with the host government, and that if he worked for them that he arrange for advance payment. On a third visit to my office, he stated that he had completed his work, and that he would now like to be paid by AID. I repeated that AID could not pay for his work and that he should visit the host government. This American businessman handled his affairs in a very poor way and took up my time needlessly.

* * * *

The day before yesterday the Director got a call from the Peace Corps Representative who asked the Director to give a talk to 30 new PCV's regarding what AID does. The Director was very busy preparing for a field trip so he asked me to give the briefing. He so informed the Peace Corps Representative and I delivered the speech, taking about 45 minutes.

* * * *

2. Arranges itineraries and conferences

For planned visits by officials the Deputy participates with mission personnel in the preparation of detailed schedules. It is frequently necessary to prepare these schedules without advance knowledge of the visiting delegation's interests or time requirements. Thus, the Deputy and his collegues are required to make judgments concerning what they anticipate will be the visitors requirements. At times these judgments are incorrect, creating the need for haste.

> (From subordinate) The Deputy always asks me to construct itineraries for visitors. I always comply with the request, but my work is duplicated because the Deputy constructs his own itinerary for the same visitor, and overrules what I have done. The Deputy does this with every visiting delegation coming to our mission so there is a considerable amount of wasted time.

* * * *

> The Chief of State of the host country was planning a visit to the site of one of our projects. Knowing of the visit in advance, I arranged for the Chief of State's itinerary to include a personal greeting to every member of the project staff. By including this item in the itinerary, I built up the morale of both the host national and American project staff members.

* * * *

> A cable arrived announcing an official United States visitor who wanted to see everything. The Director and I worked together to prepare a schedule for the visitor, including transportation schedules, stopover facilities, and a program of briefings by Division Chiefs. The visit went smoothly, so our careful planning was worthwhile.

* * * *

> While on annual leave I received a telegram asking me to return to work because of the impending visit of a high-ranking Department of State official. I immediately returned to work, and spent long hours planning a program for the visitor. The visitor did not arrive on schedule, and we later learned that the visit to our mission had been canceled. I did not resent interrupting my leave, and working needlessly, but, after learning the facts of the case, it was obvious that a simple cable to us would have prevented the misunderstanding.

* * * *

3. Accompanies visitors on tours

It is occasionally necessary for the Deputy to accompany visitors on tours, especially if the visiting personnel are of high rank. A lengthy field trip removes the Deputy from important mission work and disrupts normal work schedules. Several Deputies complained of this, stating that such tours were non-productive and time-consuming. On the other hand, a few Deputies stated that they needed to make field trips in order to really know and understand what was going on in the field, and that tours with visitors were the only real opportunity to break away from office routine for first-hand observing.

While accompanying visitors on tours the Deputy is required to provide general and specific details of mission work and sometimes to serve as an interpreter.

> I accompanied the visitor to the project site. While traveling, and while inspecting project work, I answered his questions about problems and progress, and explained project details

> such as financing and supervision. A considerable block of my time was used up, but the visitor's requirements were adequately met.

* * * *

D. Maintains Social Relations with Personnel from other U.S. Agencies, other Donor Agencies, and the Diplomatic Corps.

It is necessary to maintain good relationships with other agencies and units operating in the host country. The bulk of non-mission working interactions are with Embassy personnel. Apart from working situations, activities help to ensure reasonable cooperation and coordination with the Embassy and with other units. The Director and Deputy, as ranking executives, participate most heavily in these activities. According to most Deputies, entertaining and being entertained is simply an integral part of the job, although, of course, occurring outside normal work hours.

A main problem with this responsibility is the volume of entertaining. Deputies expressed a taste for social activities except for the time involvement. For example, one Deputy reported that during his first year he attended a function of some type almost every night. During his second year at the post, job demands and time factors forced him to adopt the policy of attending only official functions. This solution permitted him to avoid giving offense by rejecting some while accepting other unofficial invitations. The quantity of invitations made it impossible for him to accept all of them.

> My first meeting with the Ambassador had revealed him to be unpleasant and my relations with him continued to be unpleasant for six months. The Ambassador would not even speak to me for some time. Then the political officer informed me that it was thought in the Embassy that I was the protégé of two high AID officials who pushed the "hard" AID line. This was an important concept

because the Ambassador is an advocate of "soft" aid. I maintained a pleasant aspect and made only complimentary remarks concerning the Ambassador. The situation now is that the Ambassador is also saying complimentary things about me.

* * * *

V. PARTICIPATES IN MISSION REPRESENTATION

The probable importance of this task justified considering it as a separate major function. Amounts of contacts with the hosts vary with differences in jobs and personalities. The USAID Deputy Director's position appears to be at the upper end of the scale, having working and social contacts with important host nationals, practically on a daily basis, and frequently involving important items of business. Since the Deputy Director is the second, and at times the first figure in mission representation, it is believed to be mandatory that he be able to develop and maintain successful relations with his hosts.

Communications difficulties were the most commonly reported obstacles to successful representation. It is, of course, virtually impossible to obtain a Deputy Director completely fluent in certain of the host languages. Even if the Deputy Director has a high degree of proficiency in the host national language, he is likely to be handicapped because of subtleties, colloquial usages, and slang. Further, many underdeveloped countries have several dialects. Even when English is an adopted official language, there are problems because host nationals and Americans often consider the host nationals to be fluent, when in fact, they are not. Most Deputies reported problems of one kind or another with language.

Other communication problems exist because of cultural differences. These difficulties are more subtle, and difficult to recognize. For example, several Deputies reported that it was impossible for them to know what the host nationals meant, or even whether they understood, when they replied "yes" to a question. One Deputy reported that a host national said to him, "you don't understand the system." Another Deputy, articulating what is probably well-known, said of host national-American relations, that "we have communications difficulty because we have no common heritage; we emphasize, observe, and are impressed by different things."

Other examples of obstacles will be listed below under specific tasks.

A. Develops "Good" Relations with Host National Personnel.

It is difficult to define this task and apparently even more difficult to perform it well. However, the need for good relations is unquestioned. "Good" relations in this context is a dynamic or perhaps fluid concept. Based on situations, personalities, and goals, "good" relations has meant anything from being considered a "nice" guy to being considered a hard headed, dictatorial American. The material presented here makes no attempt to define when, how, to what degree, and with whom, an American should attempt to mold an image of himself. However, it is intended to present some of the obstacles to such an effort, and some examples of effective and ineffective behavior.

One of the first obstacles that must be considered is that contacts are not always easy to make. One Deputy remarked that he considered himself lucky to be able to talk with a Minister because the Ministers travel a great deal, either on business or pleasure, and thus are hard to reach. Most Deputies reported that it was necessary to be on constant guard because host nationals are eager to obtain maximum benefits from United States assistance for their own personal advantage as well as for the good of their country. A third problem reported with some frequency was that host nationals with whom the Deputies needed to interact tended to consider themselves above the Deputy in status and were either inaccessible or unfriendly. Deputies also commented on pride or "face" as a factor in preventing good relations. For example, some Deputies felt that many host nationals, while eager to receive maximum benefits, are also sensitive about receiving aid. One Deputy said, "If you insult them about money matters, work is held up."

For some Deputies this task to a considerable extent consists of cultivating friendships. Among Deputies opinion was divided, however, between those who thought it necessary to cultivate and have friends among ranking host national officials, and those who avoided such friendships. One Deputy stated that friendships were very important and that without

them his job could not be accomplished. Other Deputies denied having friends among host national officials, and stated that such a situation would be improper. For example, one Deputy explained that after he had carefully established some friendships that the "friends" began clamoring for special favors. Consequently he began quietly to reduce his social contacts.

Regardless of which school of thought is correct concerning cultivation of friendships, the fact remains that an AID official, particularly at the Deputy Director level, must initiate and pursue contacts and establish and maintain some working rapport with host nationals. One group of host nationals reported to interviewers that "it is a tragedy that Americans won't mix. They are making themselves hated the world over." Another group of host nationals said that relations with Americans were good but that "the Americans have a hard job. They don't understand us, and we don't understand them. The worst thing that is creating this situation is that Americans won't mix." In these same missions, the Deputy, like other mission personnel, considers that the problem exists because the host nationals will not mix.

> (Observed incident) In a meeting of several American AID officials and one local national official the Americans discussed a topic for 40 minutes. Finally, the Deputy called on the host national official. When the host national started to talk the Americans continued to talk among themselves and finally drowned out the host national's voice. The Deputy, who was seated next to the host national, continued to listen to him and finally called the meeting back to order.

* * * *

> We were providing assistance in a specific project, but the project was failing due to lack of trained local national personnel, and insufficient local national interest in the work. After the decision was made to phase out of this project, it was my job to convince the host government to accept the withdrawal. I did this by visiting the appropriate officials and explaining to them in such a way that no feelings were

hurt. I had previously established rapport with several host national officials, so I was able to speak frankly and avoid resentment.

* * * *

Many million dollars were available for loans. A Division Chief received a quarter million dollar loan application for a company in which a host national Minister is a partner. Host national employees of the mission division advised the Division Chief of the situation and indicated fear that there might be pressure to deprive them of their jobs if things did not go well with the application. The Division Chief brought the problem to me so I told him to tell the Minister that the loan application fell under my final jurisdiction. With this the Minister insisted on meeting me. At our meeting the Minister indicated that everything was aboveboard and that other people were getting loans, that he might as well get his share. I indicated that the answer was "No" because the loans were set up for development in an area not appropriate to the Minister. The Minister then threatened to expose past graft, but I replied that the answer still had to be "No." I also explained that several other host nationals would see the loan application and therefore that it would be hard to conceal an improper loan such as the one the Minister was proposing. With this, the Minister calmed down somewhat, and we were able to continue loan negotiations in an acceptable manner.

* * * *

I met with a host national official on my last field trip. He had just spent four weeks in the United States. The only thing he would talk about was the ability of our elevators to go up so many floors, and the height of our buildings. I could not get him off this type of conversation. It was a wasted meeting from my point of view. This example points up the fact that we have to learn their environment and background in order to be able to live and work in this context.

* * * *

B. Represents Mission at Social Events

The number of social events at most missions is very large. The Deputy Director attends social affairs given by host nationals, Embassy staff, international organizations, the diplomatic community and mission personnel. By far the most frequent comment concerning social events was that they were extremely time-consuming, but that they were so necessary a part of mission life that reduction was impractical.

For all contacts with host nationals, Deputies are guided by standard rules of conduct. In addition to rules of etiquette and protocol there are other considerations which govern contacts with host nationals. Deputies reported that they were required to avoid topics of conversation which fall within the realm of Embassy work, and that United States policy, for example, toward dictators, communism, or tariffs, must be kept in mind in order to avoid misunderstandings.

1. Attends and gives luncheons, parties, etc.

Entertaining appropriately, and with results, such as gaining rapport or learning useful information, seldom produces praise for a Deputy Director. However, if he fails or is lax at the same task, he is likely to be criticized. For example, one mission employee reported that "the Deputy Director's lack of entertaining is noted by many people. This failure hurts the mission, especially since the only host nationals who attend the few socials that he does give are already known to him."

This task is an important one for the Deputy Director. The Mission Director is obviously the principal AID person in the host country, but he is frequently occupied with pressing duties in program development, mission and agency policy, and strictly ceremonial affairs. This leaves the Deputy Director as the only USAID official with the time and the necessary rank to adequately

represent the mission socially. Objective judgment concerning successful entertaining is perhaps impossible. However, it was reported that, with one exception, Deputy Directors interacted socially with host nationals either very little or not at all.

> I decided to give a reception to meet host government officials, but when the Ambassador heard of this, he instructed me to cancel the reception and to meet only with host nationals that I already knew, and that any contact would be made in the presence of an Embassy official. I prevailed upon my secretary, a host national who knows many people, to call certain host government officials and move the conversation in such a way that the host government officials would request my presence and in such a way that the callswould come in with insufficient time to arrange for an Embassy official to go along. Therefore, I was able to meet host nationals on their own ground and at their request, and not contradict the orders of the Ambassador.

* * * *

> At a party I was talking to a Deputy Minister. It had been very difficult to see this man since he was very busy. I made a kidding remark. This enraged the Deputy Minister who told the Director that I didn't understand the host nationals. The Deputy Minister also told a visiting United States official that he couldn't get along with me. Now I am persona non grata with the Deputy Minister, especially since I am also held responsible for cancelling certain programs which the Deputy Minister favored.

* * * *

2. Attends or participates in ceremonies

The Deputy often attends ceremonies with the Director, and sometimes attends them by himself. This type of ceremony includes those in which important documents are signed, in which equipment, supplies or buildings are transferred, anniversary ceremonies such as

those held on independence days and other important national holidays, the beginning and/or end of capital projects, such as dam or road construction, and other events which involve publicity. This activity often requires that the Deputy give a speech, either planned or impromptu, propose and replie to toasts, and perhaps participate in ceremonial events such as laying a cornerstone, or cutting a tape to permit traffic to pass.

C. Provides Information, Advice and Assistance to Host National Personnel

Most Agency officials, especially the Deputy because of his rank, encounter the need to provide advice, information and opinions to host nationals. Deputies have found that offering unsolicited advice or opinions is advantageous, even if not directly related to the job. Examples of this activity are given in the specific categories listed below.

1. Provides information on policy or procedural changes

Many host nationals are interested in the Americans who are working in their country, and the procedures under which the Americans operate. Also, more sophisticated host nationals realize that in most cases their country is contributing something, even if the contribution is minor or deferred, to the jobs being done by the Americans. Therefore, there is further interest in learning about the Americans and their effectiveness. For the Deputy Director this curiosity often takes the form of questions asked by host nationals, such as "why are the salaries of Americans so high," "why does the mission have such a large administrative staff," or "why must a feasibility study be accomplished"? From the American's viewpoint, especially the Deputy Director since he is part of the Director's office

and thus has negotiating and ceremonial duties, there is conflict between the desire to get a job done quickly, and the need to take the time to explain matters to host nationals.

> A meeting occurred just prior to a host national election and many comments were being made about the United States not really helping the host government. I understood all of the remarks and in my own speech at the meeting emphasized what the United States had already done for the host country. This silenced some unwarranted criticism and informed some host nationals as to what the United States was doing for their country and therefore hopefully made relations better.

* * * *

> I learned, late one afternoon, that there was to be a conference of a professional group from all parts of the host country the following day. This would afford a good opportunity for someone from AID to speak on the assistance program, to give the host nationals information, and to get publicity that would be spread by the professionals in their own remote areas of the country. The professional group was agreeable and asked that a talk be scheduled for the next day. I changed my mind about speaking because I decided that some of the professionals would be very sophisticated, and that I would have to give a very good speech. This would be tough because our mission is not really clear on several policies, so our attitude toward many issues is hard to define. Therefore, I decided that although the opportunity was a good one, it was necessary to pass it up because of inadequate preparation time.

* * * *

> I received a call from a host national official immediately following an important United States foreign policy statement from Washington. There was to be a mass meeting at the host national's office and I was invited to attend. I found the meeting was really held in an auditorium, so I took a seat in the front row. The host national Ambassador to Washington was also attending. The official presented a fairly good speech to those present. Then he called on the Ambassador to Washington to make comments about the United States foreign policy statement. The Ambassador replied that he would reserve his comments until after hearing from the representative from AID. I was therefore forced into an impromptu speech. I have no idea whether or not I was effective, but I did try very hard to clarify any misunderstandings that might exist because of the foreign policy statement.

* * * *

2. Advises host government on their operations

Deputies reported that they occasionally found opportunities to provide advice over and above their basic job, with no direct benefit to the mission or to the United States except for the cementing of good relations, or the potential benefit of preventing obstacles. Advice of this type is usually unsolicited, and is made possible by the particular skills, training, and interests of a given incumbent.

> I read in the newspaper that a new bridge was to be built by the host government. I realized that the new bridge was parallel to an already existing bridge, and was to be a short distance away from the old bridge. I took my Division Chief to see the old bridge and found it fairly adequate. We worked out comparative cost figures, one set for building the new bridge and one set for extensively repairing

the old bridge. Then I took the data to a meeting with the Ministers involved, and explained that it would be much cheaper to repair the old bridge. Still, they insisted they would go ahead and build the new bridge so I was unsuccessful. I later obtained a property map of the area and learned that some key officials had property in the area in which the bridge was to be built.

* * * *

One of the unreal features of the host national budget is that it does not include any of the grants or loans from AID. This not only eliminates public recognition of the contribution by AID, but makes host government budgetary planning and decisions quite difficult. The Director and I decided to persuade the host government to list AID contributions as income in their annual budget, but we were unsuccessful. I think that we were not familiar enough with host national values to be able to present it in such a way as to convince them.

* * * *

I obtained some information from businessmen about equipment which revealed that considerable money could be saved if ordering was done at a certain time of the year, and in the proper quantities. I knew that the host government was interested in acquiring this type of equipment, so I gave the information to a host national Minister. My information will save them a considerable amount of money.

* * * *

One of the main problems in this country is that there is no horizontal movement on the part of the government officials. For example, in negotiating an agricultural program you may be negotiating with the Minister involved with

agriculture, but to get him to cooperate and work with personnel involved with marketing is a major undertaking. I have been explaining coordination to the various Ministries and have finally gotten a committee appointed which will bring Ministries together. This will help us too because the Director and I will be able to negotiate with the Committee. It has just been formed, so I don't yet know how it will work out.

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APPENDIX B

to

A Study of Some Key USAID Jobs

THE PROGRAM OFFICER

American Institute for Research
Washington, D.C.

JUNE 1964

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to

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PROGRAM OFFICER

Outline of Functions

I. DETERMINES PROGRAM

A. Obtains Information Relevant to Program Development

1. Confers with potentially knowledgeable people
2. Selects and reads documents
3. Observes host country conditions
4. Assigns USAID personnel to obtain information
5. Evaluates information

a. considers reliability of sources
b. deduces or infers errors or inconsistencies
c. verifies data
d. judges relevance of data

6. Generates (new) information

a. conducts or initiates empirical research or surveys
b. makes estimates
c. analyzes data

1) calculates
2) weights data
3) interprets verbal material

B. Develops and Revises Programs

1. Makes decisions concerning program content, costs, and funding methods

a. reviews, and approves project plans
b. establishes priorities
c. integrates plans with host development program
d. anticipates AID/W information when delays occur
e. works out compromises

2. Provides guidelines, assistance, and information to other mission personnel

   a. suggests project ideas
   b. advises others on plans, policies, and procedures
   c. provides assistance of subordinates

3. Coordinates with other agencies

   a. explains USAID position to other agencies

      1) Embassy, USIS, other U. S. agencies
      2) third-country, multilateral, and private groups

   b. participates in developing coordinated plans

      1) confers on joint problems
      2) reviews and edits reports
      3) writes portions of reports

   c. arranges for other-agency assistance to AID and vice versa

4. Obtains approval for new and revised programs

   a. follows routine procedures
   b. expedites approvals
   c. defends and justifies

      1) prepares briefs
      2) gives formal presentations
      3) gives informal presentations
      4) provides routine and requested justifications to AID/W

C. Prepares Documentation

   1. Writes or rewrites portions of CAP, LAS, or other documents
      a. selects or revises relevant portions of previous documents
      b. formulates project descriptions in required terms

2. Prepares numerical charts and tables

a. checks for consistency and accuracy

b. prepares explanatory material

3. Coordinates and supervises the work of others

a. schedules and assigns work to subordinates and technical personnel

1) monitors progress

2) pressures as needed

b. reviews, edits, and evaluates

c. requests revisions

d. rewrites work of others

e. requests review by others

4. Supervises mechanical production documents

5. Directs forwarding procedures for documents

D. Integrates Development Plans with World-Wide Programs (e.g. Food for Peace)

II. PARTICIPATES IN PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

A. Reviews Background Information Relevant to Projects

1. Confers with staff

2. Reviews documents

3. Obtains clarification as necessary

B. Reviews and Approves Details of Project Plans

1. Checks plans for conformance to goals and regulations

a. reviews and edits documentation for grant projects

b. reviews loan applications

2. Institutes revisions of project plans

C. Conducts Negotiations

1. Negotiates with host country officials
2. Negotiates with contractors
3. Negotiates details of loan application
4. Obtains necessary signatures

III. MANAGES PROGRAM

A. Monitors and Guides Projects

1. Obtains information on project status and host contributions

a. confers with U. S. personnel
b. confers with third country or multilateral personnel
c. confers with host government personnel
d. reviews project status documents
e. visits project sites
f. assigns others to observe field operations

2. Evaluates projects

3. Corrects project deficiencies

a. advises on changes

1) in personnel
2) in equipment

b. presses host government to honor commitments if necessary
c. coordinates division activities
d. coordinates division and host agency efforts
e. coordinates division and other U. S. agency efforts
f. presses USAID personnel as required
g. explores solutions with technical staff

4. Advises on routine project administration

   a. reviews staffing and requests for personnel
   b. recommends procurement procedures
   c. assists in planning cost reductions
   d. approves use of local currency
   e. interprets project documents

5. Manages phase-outs

   a. negotiates with host government officials
   b. prepares completion reports

B. Revises Projects and Adjusts Program Budget as Necessary

1. Advises on fund transfer and budget revisions
2. Reviews and approves requests for supplemental funds
3. Explains or justifies project and budget changes

   a. to USAID personnel
   b. to AID/W
   c. to host government personnel

4. Advises on handling contingencies

   a. provides information on relevant regulations
   b. recommends funding procedures

C. Accomplishes Other Program Management Functions

1. Reads, reviews, prepares correspondence
2. Reads, reviews, prepares project reports
3. Keeps others informed about project status
4. Acts as Division Chief as required

IV. CONTRIBUTES TO MISSION MANAGEMENT

A. Directs Program Office

1. Supervises subordinates

a. provides information

b. monitors and evaluates performance

1) prepares Efficiency Reports

2) serves on Efficiency Report review panel

c. develops skills, counsels

d. settles disputes

e. recommends recognition of superior performance

2. Manages Operations

a. assigns and adjusts duties and responsibilities

b. establishes work schedules and priorities

c. requests additional personnel as needed

d. interprets policies, regulations, and Manual Orders

e. reads incoming materials

f. maintains files on host country information, AID/W correspondence, directives, etc.

g. edits written materials

h. insures effective working relations between the Program Office and divisions

B. Participates in Personnel Matters

1. Assists in recruiting staff

a. gathers information

b. prepares documentation as required

c. corresponds with friends or professional associates

d. evaluates and selects personnel

2. Orients new staff members

C. Handles Public Relations

1. Handles publicity

a. advises or develops publicity policies and procedures

b. prepares or approves news releases

c. arranges and conducts press conferences, public ceremonies, etc.

d. arranges for production of information and publicity materials

2. Coordinates efforts with USIS

3. Receives non-official visitors (as assigned)

D. Accomplishes Other Management Activities

1. Consults on organizational matters

a. advises on mission structure

b. advises on staff behavior problems

2. Provides advice and assistance in executive office functions

3. Substitutes for other administrative officers

4. Receives visitors as assigned

a. gives briefings

b. schedules meetings and trips

5. Answers special information requests as required

6. Socializes with other U. S. agencies, other donor agencies, and the diplomatic community

V. MAINTAINS WORKING RELATIONS WITH HOST PERSONNEL

A. Develops "Good" Relations with Host Officials

1. Adapts to local usage in negotiations

2. Cultivates friendships with hosts

3. Uses appropriate means for handling project rejections or curtailment

4. Makes speeches to host groups

B. Represents Mission at Social Events

1. Attends luncheons, parties, etc.
2. Entertains host officials at home -- as appropriate
3. Attends or participates in ceremonies

C. Provides Information, Advice and Assistance to Host Officials

1. Provides information on AID policy and procedure
2. Advises host government on their operations
3. Assists hosts in dealing with other donors

D. Uses Conduct Appropriate to Position

USAID PROGRAM OFFICER

I N T R O D U C T I O N

In broad outline, the Program Officer's job consists of functions and tasks found in many middle-level executive positions. He is responsible for collecting information, analyzing written materials, providing others with information, considering the suitability of plans, deciding between alternative courses of action, reviewing and writing documents, and similar activities. The specific job description describes the major functions in detail, and indicates the essential tasks and subtasks involved in each major function. It also indicates the problems or obstacles commonly reported to impede or complicate the accomplishment of these tasks. There are, however, certain considerations, problems or obstacles which cut across all job functions that are worth discussing before taking up the specific descriptions of each function.

Certain aspects of the Program Officer's job that lead to problems result from the context within which he must work. Some are common to any bureaucratic establishment, such as delays because of requirements for multiple clearances or approvals, slow or faulty communication systems, confusions and ambiguities regarding the chain of command, and conflicts in policy between different operating levels, to cite a few of the more salient difficulties. For the Program Officer working in a foreign country, however, these factors become exaggerated because the mission exists as a minor bureaucratic system operating within and governed by a larger bureaucratic system distantly removed, while at the same time operating in conjunction with several other relatively independent

bureaucracies. The latter include other United States Government agencies, academic institutions, the host government, and sometimes other aid-donating agencies. In addition, the mission functions within a developing nation, with its characteristic deficiencies in resources, manpower, and institutions. All of these aspects of the job situation interact to complicate accomplishing assigned duties and discharging responsibilities, so that ordinary problems frequently balloon to unusual proportions and unusual problems develop. The following discussion describes some of these problem areas which were commonly reported by Program Officers interviewed in the study.

In all of the Program Officer's job functions, he is required to interpret Manual Orders, planning directives, and special instructions from AID/W, explain them to others, and insure that they conform to them. Many difficulties occur because these regulations and directives are conflicting, unclear, too voluminous for easy reference, and are constantly being revised. The time required to keep up to date on Manual Orders is viewed as an obstacle by many of the Program Officers. In addition, they report that changes are forwarded so unsystematically that they can be easily overlooked. Another time problem arises in clarifying directives. Apparently it is not uncommon to spend two or more hours searching for specific items mentioned in cables, airgrams, or other sources. In instances of conflicting or ambiguous directives or instructions, procedures call for requesting clarification from AID/W. Because Washington frequently delays in answering these requests, or occasionally fails to answer them entirely, activities or decisions affecting many aspects of the job may have to be postponed, or undertaken with the risk of incurring official criticism or disapproval.

Further complications develop when the Director, or at times the Ambassador, holds views opposing or conflicting with AID/W's regulations, especially at the policy level. Since any important action requires approval by both local higher officers and Washington, the Program Officer may risk disapproval at either level unless he can phrase requests or plans in terms agreeable to both. In some cases he may be able to convince the local higher officer to modify his views, but in others he may have to act according to an approach which he knows will be rejected by Washington. When the latter occurs, he usually must completely redo significant portions of work.

Most Program Officers report a major obstacle to be the time pressure on all their work, created by workload, as well as by required deadlines. This appears to result from a variety of causes.

In some missions, the Director depends so heavily upon the advice and assistance of the Program Officer that he consults him about nearly all decisions whether or not these are related in any way to program operations or development. As a result, the Program Officer may spend a large portion of each day in the Director's office working on non-program aspects of managing the mission. In addition, some Directors require the Program Officer to accompany them to many meetings, both inside and outside the mission. This requirement, added to other meetings which the Program Officer feels he must attend with Program Office or Division personnel, brings complaints from many incumbents that there are entirely too many meetings and that most of them accomplish nothing useful.

A related problem is the tendency of many Directors to assign miscellaneous tasks to the Program Officer. Again, these matters may have little, if any, relation to the program. In the opinion of most incumbents, this is a complete mis-utilization of their time.

Certain time pressures are created by AID/W. The delays in answering requests for clarification, discussed above, are one set of factors. Another factor, perhaps the most serious, is AID/W's failure to allocate enough time for the mission to complete program documents between the arrival of final instructions or approvals and the deadlines scheduled for submitting required documents. This means that most of the work involved in developing, planning and implementing the program must be performed at a hectic pace. Frequent requests from Washington for information or special reports on a crash basis are a third factor. These requests not only have to be answered hurriedly, but attending to them disrupts the schedules for completing routine work which may, in turn, have to be rushed to meet deadlines.

All of the Program Officers interviewed attributed a certain portion of their problems with time pressure to the fact that they frequently had to rewrite the work prepared by others. Since this tends to occur during the periods of peak workload--the documentation phases of program development and program implementation--they regard it as extremely troublesome.

The result of these factors is that most Program Officers find it necessary to work overtime, if not regularly, then during the documentation phases of program work and for occasional special reports. Most find it necessary to put in an extra hour or two of work every day, or to devote part of each weekend, to catch up with their less urgent routine work or to find time to read and think without interruption. Some incumbents resent having to work overtime so frequently and report that this, added to their work-related social obligations, leaves them insufficient time with their families or for recreation.

Field observations indicate that some incumbents created a portion of the time pressures themselves in one or more ways. Some seemed uncertain about particular tasks to the point that they spend apparently unnecessary time in reviewing and reworking written materials. A few seemed unable to delegate work to subordinates and either did it all themselves or thoroughly reworked everything produced by their subordinates. A very common failing was their lack of control over the flow of people into their offices. They would allow anyone to interrupt at almost any time, no matter how trivial the visitor's question or how important the interrupted task. Similarly, some incumbents did not utilize their secretaries to screen telephone calls, but answered themselves each time the telephone rang. The importance of these observations should not be exaggerated, however. Interviewers generally agreed that there is a great volume of work assigned to Program Officers and in many cases complaints against the requirement that they work extensive overtime to complete their tasks seem completely justified.

Some of the most important job problems for the Program Officer result from the discrepancy between his authority and his responsibilities. In all of his program functions, he schedules and reviews work performed by division personnel. However, in most missions, he possesses no clearly defined authority to insure that his requests or instructions will be carried out correctly and expeditiously.

Mission Directors rarely attempt to correct the situation by explicitly defining the scope and limitations of authority delegated to the Program Officer. Further, the Director frequently takes inconsistent action regarding decisions or recommendations made by the Program Officer. On one occasion the Director may support the Program

Officer's position in a matter concerning a Division Chief, and subsequently, in an ostensibly identical situation he may fail to do so. As a result, the Division Chief realizes that his interests are served by circumventing the Program Officer and dealing with the Director, or by forcing the Program Officer to refer disputed decisions to the Director. Conversely, the Program Officer may be discouraged or resentful of the Director's lack of confidence in his capability.

To some extent the Director may be utilizing the ambiguity of the Program Officer's status in relation to division personnel as a buffer between the front office and the divisions. Whether deliberately or inadvertently, the Program Officer frequently becomes the Director's "hatchet man", charged with informing technicians of plan rejections, fund cuts, and similar unpleasant decisions. As a result, nearly all Program Officers interviewed consider that their jobs are the most unpopular in the mission. Many corroborative comments by other mission officers confirmed this point.

Another source of confusion created by the Director is his tendency to assign miscellaneous non-program tasks to the Program Officer, which was mentioned above. Fellow staff officers often regard these assignments as infringing upon their domains and resent the Program Officer's undertaking them. Accordingly, they fail to cooperate if their assistance is required, making the Program Officer's task more difficult.

The position of the Program Officer in the mission organization is also complicated by the failure of division personnel to understand the reasons for even having a Program Office. They see it as a bottleneck, serving only to create extra work for them and rejections of or delays in their projects. The Program Officer is regarded as a "paperpusher" who obstructs rather than facilitates project activities and infringes

on technical areas in which he has no competence. In conjunction with their failure to recognize the status of the Program Officer, technicians also fail to recognize the status of the Assistant Program Officers or Deputy Program Officers. If they deal with anyone in the Program Office, they insist that it be the Program Officer.

A few comments by interviewers may be illuminating here. The responsibilities of the Program Officer require more information than he can possibly obtain about all aspects of the program. As a result, he constantly seeks out additional sources of information or means of verifying information. The technical personnel see this as an attempt to aggrandize his position and encroach upon their control of their projects. In a few cases, interviewers were inclined to agree with technicians that, consciously or not, the Program Officer was striving for greater authority and control of certain projects. The crux of the conflict is, of course, that the Program Officer must assert his authority and establish his position vis-a-vis the Division Chiefs in order to perform his duties effectively. What is required is that he clothe an aggressive pursuit of his necessary demands upon others in very subtle and diplomatic terms to diminish any feelings of resentment or threats to their status which these demands may generate. He must be aware that Division Chiefs feel that they do not have sufficiently important roles, particularly in the determining and planning phases of programming, and plan his strategies accordingly. Or he may make decisions as he considers appropriate, insuring that the Director will support his stand, and accept disputes and personal enmities as part of his job.

Further complicating the status area is the problem of rank and professional standing. Rarely is the Program Officer of higher rank

than the Division Chiefs. He is usually of an equivalent, or in some cases, lower rank. This contributes to the technician's reluctance to take orders, however subtly phrased, from the Program Officer. In addition, length of service with AID may be involved. This cuts two ways. New personnel tend to ignore channels and procedures, feeling that they have been hired as specialists in particular areas and that they should be left free to operate as they see fit. Conversely, old AID hands frequently feel that they have far more experience and knowledge in AID operations than the Program Officer, especially if he is younger and fairly new to the post. Further, both new and old technical personnel tend to hold higher academic degrees than many Program Officers,[1] which sometimes serves to reinforce their feelings or beliefs that the Program Officer is not qualified to advise or direct them concerning "technical" matters.

One of the most important considerations involved in the Program Officer's performance of his job is his understanding of the views and working premises of the Director.[2] Since sufficient latitude exists within the policies and regulations prescribed by AID/W for each

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1/ Among the 12 Program Officers interviewed, 3 held doctoral degrees, 7 masters, 1 bachelors, 1 non-degree. Eight of the 13 Division Chiefs held doctoral degrees. Of course, the size of the study does not permit firm generalizations from this information because there is no way of knowing whether the sample is representative of the total population of Program Officers and Division Chiefs.

2/ In certain missions the division of responsibilities between the Director and Deputy Director results in many operational matters and decisions being handled by the Deputy. In those cases, many of these remarks pertain to the Deputy.

Director to modify significantly some elements of the program and some operations within the mission, and, in addition, higher control is ordinarily thousands of miles away, the effectiveness of the Program Officer depends in part on the extent to which he and the Director agree on substantive matters and working methods.

Nominally, the Director runs the mission. Actually, this varies considerably from virtually ignoring the Program Officer on policy matters to consulting the Program Officer on almost any decision. Where there is disagreement, the degree to which the Program Officer accommodates to the Director's position or attempts to counter-balance it also varies considerably. (Some Program Officers are apparently not aware of basic disagreements and complain that it is "difficult to work with the Director.") The appropriate adjustments required of the Program Officer in dealing with a Director who habitually or occasionally pursues questionable policies and courses of action is beyond the scope of this study.

A series of problems commonly encountered by Program Officers are credited to the failure of other staff officers, either supervisors or colleagues, to perform their jobs effectively. When the Director, or sometimes the Deputy Director, fails to command and control the activities of mission personnel, serious obstacles in handling program matters result unless the Program Officer is forceful enough himself to push people to meet schedules. Equally disruptive are situations where higher officers become so deeply involved in minor operating decisions that they block program work and fail to attend to broader or longer-range decisions. Similar difficulties occur when the Director (or Deputy) becomes enmeshed in "pet projects". These may be regular portions of the program especially interesting to the Director, or, more frequently, they may be the result of his

or someone else's ideas of areas where AID can be especially helpful. They tend in either case to be relatively minor in relation to the total program and usually have a high potential for favorable publicity. These situations generally have two unfortunate results for the Program Officer. First, it becomes almost impossible to get any other work accomplished by the people involved in the current "pet project". Technicians neglect their regular responsibilities, and higher officers let papers requiring approval or review accumulate on their desks. Secondly, if one of these projects is pushed through and made a part of the program, it usually doesn't fit into any on-going projects and, therefore, has administrative costs greatly out of proportion with its probable results.

When colleagues of roughly equivalent rank with the Program Officer give ineffective job performances, there are also unfortunate results for the Program Officer. Ordinarily he simply takes over and either handles neglected matters personally or delegates them to a subordinate. In view of the discussion of the workload in the Program Office given above, it is to be understood that taking over is not, in fact, a simple matter since considerable interpersonal problems may result. When colleagues resent the Program Officer's actions or develop animosities toward him, they may in turn try to block activities which are important for the Program Office.

The job of the Program Officer can best be summarized by citing the variety of conflicting pressures or demands that an incumbent is required to resolve. The following list indicates some of the types of judgments required; no significance is to be attached to order of presentation.

Types of Conflicting Pressures

U. S. policy A vs. U. S. policy B
U. S. policies vs. Host Government policies
U. S. goals vs. demands of local situation
Host Government request A vs. Host Government request B
Economic vs. social vs. political considerations
Procedure A vs. Procedure B
Division A's views on budget vs. Division B's views on budget
Short-term gains vs. long-term gains
Work demands vs. interpersonal relations
Quality of work vs. time and money considerations
Views of U. S. agency A vs. views of U. S. agency B
Personal and family needs vs. job demands

Judgments such as these must be made with inadequate information in the context of difficult communications and fluid organizational factors, while living and working in an underdeveloped country and dealing with untrained or ineffective personnel. Details follow.

F U N C T I O N S

I. DETERMINES PROGRAM

This major function includes deciding what specific projects or changes in projects will be recommended, "selling" these ideas if necessary, and preparing the formal and informal documentation needed to obtain Agency for International Development/Washington (AID/W) approval. While this function is nominally the crux of the job, relatively few details or examples are available. This may be due to such factors as: a) the fact that most of the yearly programs are basically continuations of projects decided upon and approved in the past, b) the difficulty of verbalizing the process of making complex judgments, and c) the occasional necessity to make program decisions on the basis of sensitive considerations.

The major problem cutting across all of the activities included in this function, and affecting those in other functions as well, is the lack of accurate information pertaining to all aspects of the host country. It is characteristic of assistance-receiving nations that they lack the facilities and personnel to provide such information. When the host government can provide information, it is frequently unreliable and can be used only as an estimate of actual conditions.

A. Obtains Information Relevant to Program Development

Information is gathered throughout the year, although special more systematic efforts tend to be made during the period in which the Country Assistance Plan (CAP) is prepared.

The types of information potentially needed may be categorized as follows:

host country goals, policies, and expectations
host country needs, resources, laws, and traditions
host country politics
U.S. goals, policies, and expectations
U.S. resources, laws, and public opinion
U.S. Congressional views
third country and multilateral programs, resources, and intentions
progress and experience of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other projects
views of USAID and other overseas American personnel
sources of information

1. Confers with potentially knowledgeable people

Many types of people may be consulted for relevant information, including representatives of both the government and private sectors of the U.S., the host country, and third countries. While the data do not permit charting a systematic linkage between the type of source and the type of information obtainable, the evidence indicates that U.S. personnel may at times be the best source for host country information, and that host nationals may at times be the best source for third-country information.

For a number of reasons gaining information from other people is frequently difficult. Representatives of host or other governments sometimes are restrained from speaking freely by political or commercial considerations. U.S. policy may prohibit the exchange of information with representatives of certain "unfriendly" nations; and other U.S. personnel, in the mission or in other agencies, may fail to cooperate because of organizational or personal conflicts. Conferring ranges from a quick meeting or a telephone call to regional conferences and trips to the United States.

When I first got here I learned that the Embassy Economic Officer had been here for quite some time. I felt that he would be able to give me an excellent orientation about the country on the basis of his experience here. I also found I had no time to do outside orientation reading after I got here. So to get as complete and current a picture as possible about the situation here I went to the Embassy and spoke to the Economic Officer at length about host conditions.

* * * *

When I sent some preliminary economic status sheets to AID/W, the Desk Officer requested additional data on the plans of a third country. In order to "tease" the information from the third-country government, I requested permission from AID/W to release some classified data. When I got the permission, I sent the data to the AID Liaison Officer in that country. I have not yet heard from him.

* * * *

While attending a public ceremony I talked with the United Nations representative who explained their budget for the coming year.

* * * *

(From observer) I was with the Program Officer in a hotel cocktail lounge. On the way out he met a staff member of an international bank. The Program Officer spoke to him about a commodity produced and imported by the host country. The Program Officer got information about the volume of the commodity available.

* * * *

Since an international agency is a big donor I have built up a good relationship between myself and their principal representative here. I did this, in part, because it helps me get information as well as for purposes of social contact. In this case, I called him and made an appointment to see him. I told him over the phone I was interested in his projects, especially their implementation rates, growth rates, expenditure rates and status.

When I went to see him the next day, he had this information on his desk. I had a social visit with him first and then asked about this information. He simply gave me the documents and let me read them.

I got the information I wanted and even got some pertinent statistics about a section of the Country Assistance Plan.

At the time I got this information "unofficially" it was due to be published in 3-4 months. However, getting it that much later would make it much less valuable than having it so far in advance of its publication.

* * * *

A staff member of an international organization was leaving the country. I went over and had lunch with him. I wanted to find out what people to contact for certain types of information and what channels of communication were most efficient and reliable in providing information after he left. He had always been extremely helpful but since he was now leaving a new "system" had to be developed for procuring information about host financial matters.

* * * *

I met a third-country representative at a party, and, at his insistence, agreed to introduce him to the AID Director. I arranged the meeting but he did not appear, nor did he notify anyone of the cancellation. Later I met him again and agreed to arrange another meeting. This time the meeting occurred, and I participated. He asked for some information, which I agreed to provide. I tried to reach him via telephone, at the appointed time, but found that he was unavailable. I have now decided to stop contacts with this group in order to determine if they will be more cooperative with a less aggressive AID.
This group tends to be secretive, and that their program is closely allied with commerical interests, so their effort is on a different basis than AID.

* * * *

When the AID/W official was visiting, I arranged appointments for him, and accompanied him to meetings with representatives of other donor agencies.

* * * *

(from interviewer) I was invited to dinner by the Program Officer. Other guests were representatives from a world-wide financial organization who had arrived to have discussions with host officials.

The next morning the Program Officer gave a brief explanation to the Country Team (at the weekly meeting) about the visitors, why they were here, and what they were going to do. Obviously his source of information was his prearranged dinner the preceding evening.

* * * *

> I discussed AID assistance to a local industry with a host national businessman who was concerned about proposed changes in the project. He explained why the proposed changes were potentially harmful to the industry and suggested another approach. I agreed to consider his suggestion.

* * * *

2. Selects and reads documents

Reading for information about AID regulations, orders, and directives, as well as for substantive information is included in this entry. The written sources are as diverse as the human sources, ranging from classified State Department cables to local newspapers.

Several types of problems arise in using documentary sources. One of the commonest problems reported is insufficient time for all kinds of reading, both routine program documents and various background materials. Acquiring source materials is complicated by the lack of a centralized clearing system within AID/W to insure that publications prepared by other donor agencies and economic or financial institutions are forwarded to the field. There may be difficulty in gaining access to classified materials in missions where classified files are maintained by the Embassy which is located at a distance from the mission. Understanding certain types of technical reports written in "jargon almost unintelligible to outsiders" is another problem. By far the major problem reported concerns the inaccuracy and unreliability of information published by host government agencies.

> I also asked to go through his chronological files for the past two years and also the Embassy Economic files. For orientation purposes I wanted to see the types of things he had done, what his sources were and who his contacts were. This gave me a good starting point while I built up my own personal contacts.

* * * *

In going through the Embassy files I found a copy of the agreement between a third country and the host government which set up the relations between them. It gave me basic information on how that country's aid was to be carried out. I felt that this document was extremely valuable, so I classified it in order that its use would be restricted and that it wouldn't leave the Embassy files. It is now a constant source of information.

* * * *

I discovered that the Embassy Economic Officer had received a useful report by the International Development Bank. It contained a great deal of information that should have been made available to the Program Officer. I immediately notified AID/W that the mission should have its own copies of this report, and also requested that a system be set up to send such things to us routinely.

* * * *

The host government published a report about former bank assets of neighboring countries. I skimmed the document lightly, but missed the point of the very significant information it contained. I did not realize it until I received a memorandum from a representative of an international agency calling my attention to the information.

* * * *

3. Observes host country conditions

Although it seems an obvious method for investigating assistance opportunities, few Program Officers perform this function. Program Officers rarely leave the city where the mission is located. This may be partially explained by the demands on their time for completing paper work and attending meetings within the mission. Another partial explanation may be that this method has not been institutionalized, that is to say, it is not recognized as a standard procedure. It is, therefore, given a low priority and rarely accomplished. Still another reason may be that some

Program Officers do not know the systematic procedures which would make such observations most meaningful and therefore don't believe that much useful information can be gotten this way. Finally, it should be recognized that, whereas personal observation can be an excellent source of ideas for needed projects, it rarely can provide the type of data that must be written into the formal AID documents.

4. Assigns USAID personnel to obtain information

This task refers to activities that range from instructing a subordinate to gather some routinely available data to asking the Mission Director to confer with host officials about sensitive matters. A problem arises when the Program Office staff is too small to permit placing personnel within various host agencies on an extended or continuing basis to gather necessary information. Also, the staff time allotted to this task interferes with their completing other duties, and sometimes makes it necessary for the Program Officer to take on some of their work.

> The host asked the Director if we could help them finance the purchase of equipment from a company that had completed a large project. Much of the equipment was available for purchase at low cost because it would be very expensive to transport away. The Director bucked it to me for analysis.
>
> I asked our engineer if the host government needed this equipment, if it could afford the cost and maintenance, and if it had skilled personnel to operate it. The engineer added other data to the answers to my inquiries. Based upon his report, I turned down the request.

* * * *

5. Evaluates information

a. considers the reliability of sources

b. deduces or infers errors or inconsistencies

c. verifies data

d. judges relevance of data

While this task consists of routine steps, it becomes complex in the overseas situation because of the inadequacy and inaccuracy of basic information which was discussed above. In many countries statistics published by the government conflict with those published by the private sector and the Program Officer may have no means of reconciling discrepancies among sources other than his own experience and judgment (which, particularly if he is new, may be pointless).

Other problems concern mission records of past projects. The descriptions of why projects were initiated and the results accomplished are frequently so poor that no useful information can be gained from them. Similarly, current reports may be so slanted to conceal deficiencies in the projects that they are nearly useless. These same difficulties are encountered in using the reports published by other donor agencies.

Another problem arises out of the need to evaluate technical information in specialties in which most Program Officers have no qualifications, and where there is no technical expert on whom to rely for advice, either because no such experts are available or because their qualifications or judgments are questioned by the Program Officer.

> The summary comments prepared by Division Chiefs on host self-help deficiencies were very mild. These reports were typed by host secretaries. The Assistnat Program Officer and I talked to Division Chiefs informally and found that their views were much less mild. I asked for pencil-draft rewrites and arranged for typing by a U.S. secretary.

* * * *

Project analyses and documentation have to be pieced together by us. We have to dig up and evaluate. We get very little help from the host government. There are few experienced government workers who know how to gather and present valid statistics and information. The information we get from various ministries is just a starting point. It has to be qualified in light of all the other data we get.

* * * *

The rate of population growth in Latin America is conservatively calculated to be 3% by U. S. scholars. Data provided by host sources, however, utilized another figure. Many of their other projections were based on this figure. I discussed this difference with a USAID colleague. We decided that the host figure could easily be wrong. He subsequently checked with the source and found they really didn't know if their figure was correct or not. I decided to use the U. S. estimate because I felt it more accurate. I then had to watch carefully other data from the host source. This factor of general unreliability, of course, consumed a good bit of my time.

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6. Generates (new) information

Planning requirements frequently include types of information which are totally lacking in some host countries. To fulfill these requirements, Program Officers have to develop "new" data by some of the following procedures.

a. conducts or initiates empirical research or surveys

AID's research efforts are sometimes the first systematic collections of information about some aspects of the host country. The

task may range from simply assigning a subordinate to analyze some sector of the host economy to systematically collecting opinions from well-informed people. It may also include arranging for extensive surveys by TDY specialists or contract teams. Disagreements with AID/W on the scope and operations of such teams is sometimes a problem. More general problems encountered are poor performance by subordinates and inadequate time to do thorough studies.

> Because the host government lacks adequate staff, it is difficult to learn what types of project they desire. They have formulated a general development plan, but have few plans for specific projects. Therefore, it is difficult to list potential projects in the CAP. To help solve this problem, I sent a letter to provincial officials stating that USAID had money to lend, and would be happy to consider any capital projects which the region might be planning. This is not done as a rule, dealings with the National Ministry are more appropriate, but I made the exception in order to try to build up a shelf of projects. This effort has really provided no concrete response, but it did demonstrate that the U. S. was willing to cooperate, and willing to listen to host government plans. This frame of mind then makes them more receptive to U. S. suggestions.

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> As part of my responsibilities to inform Washington of investment possibilities related to the development program, I participated in an investment feasibility survey of a factory. I accompanied the Mission Director, the Embassy Economic Officer, and the head of the planton a tour of its facilities. I lagged behind the other three men and questioned a plant engineer to get the details of its operating procedures and capabilities, taking copious notes. I had previously

accompanied an AID/W engineer on surveys of two plants in another country and had listened carefully to the detailed and persistent questioning by the engineer. So I knew what to ask about although I was quite aware of my inability to evaluate the information from an engineering standpoint. My memo was dictated from my notes and circulated to the regional capital project officer, the regional chief engineer (both personal friends) the desk officer for the region and the latters' advisor on capital development and private industry.

The project "suggests itself" as an important one and was one of the first ones listed in the first program book. However, I feel that no one in Washington is sufficiently aggressive to buttonhole prospective investors for the project, and I plan to push it at higher levels myself on a trip to Washington which I am planning for the near future.

* * * *

b. makes estimates

Because of the scanty information available about economic, financial, demographic, or resource aspects of the host country, the PO is constantly required to develop estimates in fulfilling many of his functions.

A technician dropped in for assistance in preparing a report which involved describing host plans which were not clear and detailed. I suggested that host plans for applying for outside agency funds would have to include plans for manpower in order to get approved. I suggested that host lack of cost data be reported and U. S. experience-based figures included with a summary description of the on-going project. I suggested supplying bracketed figures for estimates of proposed costs.

* * * *

To tease out data on the contributions of other countries to the host development plan, I prepared some estimates for a speech to be made by the Mission Director. Members of the host planning agency corrected the estimates and I thereby got the data I wanted.

* * * *

c. analyzes data

1) calculates

2) weights data

3) interprets verbal material

Simple arithmetic accounting to sophisticated statistical analyses may be performed in this task. Comprehensive analyses and comparison of documentary materials may also be required. General problems of time and staff performance, as mentioned in 6a, also pertain here. In some missions there are difficulties in allocating personnel to this task because of differences of opinion between the Program Officer and Director regarding the importance of data analysis.

Evaluation or interpretation of some economic data presents difficulties. The host government publishes a number of statistical documents, but their categories are broad and not easily broken down. Some are actually misleading, e.g., the host government budget shows transfers of money from certain treasury funds to the development fund as an expenditure. This

is a substantial amount of money and handling it this way makes the balance sheet look as though the difference between revenue and expenditures is much smaller than it actually is. I discovered this only after very detailed examination of the budget, including a reworking of the figures.

* * * *

B. Develops and Revises Programs

The Program Officer is responsible for directing and coordinating the work of all other line and staff personnel who participate in the planning stages of program development. All aspects of this function are affected to some extent by problems arising from the ambiguity of his authority in relation to these personnel. See the discussion presented in the introduction.

Other problems also affect all aspects of the function. AID/W frequently fails to allow adequate time for planning between the time the mission receives instructions and the deadline date, often creating tremendous time-pressure in getting out the work and requiring much strenuous overtime effort. Instructions and policy may be so unclear that much time is wasted in getting clarification before work can begin. In some missions the Director may disagree with AID/W policy or directives, so that the Program Officer must manipulate plans so that they are acceptable to both the Director and AID/W. Regulations requiring that classified materials be locked in central files create delays in using them and sometimes prohibit working with them after regular office hours.

When an AID/W official visited the mission, he argued that every project should include a particular technical aspect. When he visited a host minister who was responsible for that specialty he told him that he would see that he would have anything that he wanted. The only way to contend with pressures like this is to send messages back to Washington directly quoting the irresponsible statement.

* * * *

1. Makes decisions concerning program content, costs, and funding methods

The freedom accorded the Program Officer in making program decisions varies greatly among missions because the Director defines the task in accordance with his own opinions. It may carry great responsibility for deciding program content or it may consist merely of advising about regulations and expediting paperwork.

> The Director wanted to get a development loan for a project. I argued that AID/W would take too long to process a loan and recommended a direct grant instead. I failed to persuade him at first. But a month or so later I tried again and succeeded.
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> We had arranged with the host government and another donor agency to do a certain type of project in a particular section of the country. It was my task to develop the master plan covering all projects. Fortunately I knew a host national engineer who was qualified to do most of the basic technical planning. He has been hired to assist me in this task.
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> * * * *

a. reviews, and approves project plans

Proposals are weighed in terms of how they conform to AID and mission goals and policies; their suitability to current conditions in the host country or to host government expectations, their value compared to other projects competing for funds, and other relevant factors. Reviewing can consist of a range of actions from a casual conversation to a detailed study of formal project documents and to detailed formal presentations by Technical Divisions.

Determining if specific project activities conform to mission and AID/W goals sometimes is difficult because the statements of these goals are often unclear and disagreements regarding interpretations arise.

Because project funding must be decided long before there is any firm knowledge of the amounts that AID/W will approve, and the action that Congress will take, the whole area of estimating future budgets is regarded as a problem. This also makes it difficult to settle other project details both within the mission and with host government agencies.

Developing an integrated program is difficult for several reasons. One major reason is that most projects continue over fairly long periods of time and are hard to alter once in operation. This reduces the flexibility of the mission in planning to meet changes in external circumstances or in AID policy. Another reason is that Division Chiefs fail to understand the broad aspects of the total mission program and fight to prevent changes or reductions in their projects.

Another set of problems arises because technical personnel either will not or cannot conform to planning directives. Program Officers generally agree that however able he may be in technical operations, the average technician is simply incompetent in presenting adequate program proposals. The Program Officer therefore comes to be regarded as a "bottleneck" or "hatchet man" because he must constantly reject plans or send them back for revision.

> Yesterday a Division proposed a small project. They said the host government could not afford this so we should do it since it would have a far-reaching effect. I disagreed with this and explained that this is not the kind of thing we wanted to do. Because it is such a small amount of money, if it were really that important the host government would either pay for it or pay for part of it. At the very same meeting the proposal was brought up to build institutions which would cost the host government thousands of dollars to run and will turn out technical people whose salaries will have to be paid by the host government . And yet, the Division said the host government could not afford the small project. If a job is worth doing they should put up their share of the costs.

* * * *

An officer of the Embassy interested the Deputy Director in a small project. I disapproved of it because it would not do enough good to justify the time spent on it. AID/W also disapproved. However, later political pressure was exerted on AID/W to approved the project. Now I must find a way to administer it because there is no on-going project into which it can be fitted. This is wasting my time on a not very useful project.

* * * *

An incident involving policy conflict: The host government wanted to use some heavy equipment which it had purchased under a loan on a project sponsored by another donor. The Ambassador and Director approved of the idea for political reasons. The Director drafted a message for Washington, and asked me to review it. I, however, was opposed to the idea since I felt that such a violation of policy would provide Congress with ammunition to attack AID as ineffective in carrying out its programs, and thus would undermine AID's position. I drafted an alternate message, and when I was reviewing it with the Deputy Director, who characteristically took no firm position, the Director walked in, saw my draft and "hit the ceiling." Washington did not agree with the Director and told the mission to keep the equipment off the project. When the Director finally reported this to the Ambassador, he gave full credit for good judgment to me.

* * * *

I had gotten policy information on major program emphasis at a regional meeting. The Director disagreed with me and the plan was written up with the kind of emphasis he wanted. AID/W disapproved it.

* * * *

b. establishes priorities

The fundamental difficulty in this task is the lack of criteria or guidelines with which to judge the various priorities. While broad guidelines may be provided by AID/W, the application of these guidelines in the context of both the specific country situation and the specific projects possible in the various technical areas, represents an intellectual task of considerable magnitude.

Changes in policy at either the mission or AID/W level, or the existence of new factors affecting the host government may necessitate revising priorities from year to year even though the content of the program remains substantially the same.

Complicating the task is the problem of satisfying all of those concerned with the program. Technical personnel frequently feel that they are being deprived of their "fair share" of program funds if their areas are not high on the list of priorities. AID/W desk personnel disagree with mission-established priorities and attempt to have changes made. Visiting dignitaries, AID/W officials, and host personnel concerned with particular specialities all believe that their particular areas are of prime importance and bring pressure on the mission to do more projects in these areas. Pressure may also exist for doing less in certain areas. For example, some incumbents feel that assisting local industry may bring about Congressional pressures because of potential competition with U. S. businesses.

> In the last programming cycle, I substantially cut the funds for a certain segment of the program. One person objected violently and we had to go to the Director to settle the dispute. The Director upheld my decision after I went through the details of funding the entire program and showed that in accordance with directives covering the scheduling of funds committed by the mission, this was the only area where the cut in the funds by AID/W could be taken.

* * * *

c. integrates plans with host development program

Few program officers can perform this function because few host governments have adequate planning capability. In practice, it usually means various attempts to teach planning concepts to host officials and to encourage them in establishing and using planning agencies.

Where there are host planning agencies, various problems arise. One is the tendency for these agencies to be staffed by poorly qualified personnel who plan very unrealistically. This adds the task of re-orienting their thinking to that of developing workable plans. Another problem arises when host government ministries refuse to co-operate with their government planning agencies. This may mean that the Program Officer has to pay lip-service to the planners, while real planning takes place with ministry personnel. Sometimes the planners could do an adequate job but their programs are so dependent upon AID support that they cannot make long-range decisions without knowing the amounts and conditions regulating future funding. As noted above, AID does not have and therefore cannot provide this information. The organization of host planning pertaining to certain areas may be split among different agencies, so that deciding upon agricultural projects, for example, may involve dealing with several different groups. This can create serious time problems during the final, rushed planning stages. There are also problems because these different groups do not agree with each other, or do not agree with AID about the goals or procedures appropriate for a project.

Still another problem in integrating planning with the host government programs grows out of the instability of economic and political conditions in many aid-receiving nations. It frequently is impossible for anyone to predict to any satisfactory extent what projects will be most useful and what their costs will be.

> I try to build up the power of the host planning group by channeling all requests through them and insisting on their presence during negotiations with the ministries. I doubt if this has been of any great help, but I feel that the situation may improve because of a recent host reorganization.

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I was trying to reach agreement with the host planning group concerning a project. At an earlier meeting, which I had not attended, the Director, the planning group, and other host government officials had not been able to reach an agreement. They could not decide how to set up authority for controlling the project. I asked an engineer, who is a friend of mine and who was present at that meeting, if anyone had ulterior motives for blocking the project. He explained that there were none and suggested that we go on with making preparations which did not depend upon the point at issue. I bought this interpretation and preliminary steps are underway.

* * * *

Different host officials took different positions on the advisability of a feasibility study that had been suggested. In questioning them to get them to state a unified position, I was unable to make them understand that I wasn't pushing for or against the project, only that AID would do it if, and only if, they really wanted it.

* * * *

The political forces opposed to the President of this country have done everything they could to oppose the establishment of a planning body. We are trying to get the religious leadership to rally public support for us and maybe in that way public opinion will have an effect on the opposition.

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(See also the relevant example under 1A6a above.)

d. anticipates AID/W information when delays occur

This task arises because of the frequent delays in communication between AID/W and the mission. In order to meet deadlines set by AID/W on various aspects of programming, work may have to be started before approvals, instructions, or clarification of instructions have been received. Problems of delays appear to be more serious in the distant missions where the Program Officers hesitate to make frequent telephone calls to Washington.

e. works out compromises

Conflicting points of view about program content or priorities frequently arise among mission personnel. In order to prevent these differences from affecting peoples' attitudes toward their work or creating disputes among personnel in various segments of the mission, the Program Officer often has to assume the role of conciliator and attempt to evolve amicable settlements. This task overlaps with advising others on plans, policy, and procedures (discussed below).

2. Provides guidelines, assistance and information to other mission personnel

The steps in this function are closely integrated with those described above under the decision-making function, and in practice the two usually occur concurrently.

a. suggests project ideas

The Program Officer may devote considerable attention and effort to this task or he may do very little depending upon his interpretation of its importance. The ideas may range in form

from a casual remark to a documented project outline. Failure on the part of superiors or technical personnel to accept the Program Officer's ideas is sometimes reported as an irritating aspect of this task. One of the complications of this task arises out of the need to make suggestions about technical matters without having technical qualifications. These suggestions must be made to people who are technical specialists, some of whom may consider the Program Officer not only unqualified technically but also unnecessary to effective mission functioning.

> With new road building programs there has come increased need for transportation. The host government needs a large number of vehicles. If they get them, maintenance becomes a problem. For each project for which vehicles are requested spare parts requests are being made. There is no coordination. The host government does not have the concept of fleet maintenance. I proposed fleet maintenance so that there will not be spare parts requests project by project. If this is set up, there will have to be a project to teach management of stock and inventorying of parts. I suggested this to one of the technical divisions and to the host government. The first step will be to do a formal survey.

* * * *

> The worst mistake in advising the Director to press for expansion of the program occurred last year. I had been considering a new project. I persuaded the Director to request approval in Washington late in the fiscal year. Washington strongly disapproved, asserting that the Director was just trying to use up funds on new projects.

* * * *

b. advises others on plans, policies, and procedures

There are two principal aspects to this task. The first consists of insuring that appropriate information is communicated to the mission staff and line personnel. It requires that the Program Officer be aware of all project plans and the opinions toward these plans of significant policy-making personnel. Frequently division personnel will have biases toward the program which are contrary to mission policy and the Program Officer must make them aware of the correct emphasis and try to persuade them to change their approach.

The second aspect of this task is providing advice and clarification to other personnel about the orders, directives, and regulations that pertain to programming. This requires that the Program Officer be thoroughly familiar with this information and have it easily accessible for reference. Some Program Officers write summaries of these materials and distribute them to the technical divisions. This task has two major problems. The first is interpreting what AID instructions really mean when directives are phrased in unclear terms or frequent changes are made. The second is the questioning of some Program Officers' interpretations by other personnel.

> In meeting the problem of the technicians' inability to plan, I must consider the technicians and evaluate their competency. I have tried a variety of methods of indoctrination and education: holding meetings, hearings, exhortation, and having my subordinates press for good planning. There has been some improvement in some of the technicians, and as new people come in I have been successful in indoctrinating them.

* * * *

An Acting Division Chief dropped in for assistance in the preparation of a report which involved detailing host plans which were neither clear nor detailed. I suggested that host plans for applying for outside agency funds would have to include plans for manpower in order to get approval. I suggested that host lack of cost data be reported and U. S. experience-based figures included with a summary description of the on-going project. I suggested supplying bracketing figures for estimates of proposed costs.

* * * *

A Division Chief wanted to use prior year unobligated funds for a research team In this case I was able to convince him that this was an invalid use of the funds by citing appropriate directives. The project will be covered by current year funds.

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The Director liked the idea of having a special fund for useful projects that come up, but which would be too small for a loan or grant aid. The Director wanted a sort of "large" petty cash fund for this. I listened to the idea, then told the Director that the idea was nice, but that AID/W would never allocate money on such a basis This was effective in that it saved time, saved being turned down by AID/W, and saved the Director from making a foolish request. I knew from my work in AID/W that such a request, however meritorious, would have no chance of approval.

* * * *

An airgram was received from AID/W with a series of questions about a contract technician whose activities were covered by a Project Implementation Order/Technician for this fiscal

year but for whom funds were not included in the next fiscal year CAP. The mission wanted to keep him beyond this fiscal year, but the acting Director had decided that the project on which he was working must be closed out and no funds would be obligated for it for the next fiscal year. The technician was on loan from another government agency, so the Chief of the Division and Acting Director drafted an airgram telling AID/W that the man would still be here at the end of the fiscal year but no funds would be available and asking AID/W to request his agency to pick up his payroll from that point on. A subordinate knew this was wrong, but refused to buck the Acting Director. I refused to concur on the airgram, and sent it back to the Acting Director giving the reasons why I refused to sign it. The Acting Director then called a meeting with the Division Chief and me. In about 14 minutes I convinced them that AID/W would just laugh at this request as the procedure they were suggesting was illegal in a very basic manner and the mission would appear foolish and incompetent. I won my point and the airgram was changed.

* * * *

In another instance, I saw a cable to Washington from the Ambassador reporting a request from a host Minister for assistance to a government ministry. I advised AID/W of the political sensitivity of the matter at the present time. I pointed out that the local press was already misconstruing the Director's suggestions about the host needs in this area. I felt that if the U. S. provided the assistance we would be plunged into the middle of a very thorny political problem involving conflicting factions among the host nationals.

* * * *

In one instance, the instructions ask what the U. S. could do to help the host government politically. In my report, I suggested that the U. S. assist them in getting into an

international organization. I was criticized four months later by the desk officer who said this was absurd, and that the U. S. couldn't interfere in such affairs. I knew this at the time and assumed that the desk knew I knew it. I assumed that the desk wanted some sort of a suggestion no matter how absurd it was. I know now that they are not "serious" about some of their requests.

* * * *

c. provides assistance of subordinates

Preceding sections have described the common failure of technical divisions to provide well-executed plans for future or continuing projects or to respond adequately to special requests from AID/W. In order to meet deadlines, Program Officers frequently assign subordinates from the Program Office to assist division personnel in completing assignments. The assistance provided may range from simply drafting a cable to developing an extensive background analysis for project justification.

A technical division was assigned the task of developing a plan for a costly project. Their plan was poorly done; it was inaccurate and proposed "dream world" facilities. Their planning required a full year, with me occasionally participating in their meetings and encouraging them to be practical, advising about what AID/W would approve, and even making suggestions, e.g., starting with a small facility capable of being expanded. My efforts were to no avail, so I finally asked the Division Chief if a Program Office employee could be assigned to help on the plan. The Division Chief agreed, so I assigned a subordinate to work on the plan who has experience in putting research together, and knowledge of economic matters. Now, an adequate plan is almost ready for presentation.

* * * *

A Division is constantly delaying. This may be a tactic to get their program into the CAP without change, because no one has time to review it. Last year, they were again late, so I tried telephoning them to remind them of the deadline. This didn't work, so I asked if I would assign a Program Office subordinate to the Division temporarily to help produce the paperwork. It worked. The Division accepted the Program Office subordinate and he successfully turned out their documents.

* * * *

There is to be a conference between the mission and the host government on a project that is being planned. AID/W had warned the mission to be careful to limit the scope of assistance to specific target areas and to learn a third government's interest in participating. A technician drafted a reply to AID/W, telling them in effect that the mission was capable of handling the situation. The reply was also inadequate in that it did not describe how the scope was to be limited, or other information required. My subordinate cleared this message routing it to me. The Director read the message and realized its inadequacy so he bounced it back to me. I took the disapproved message to the subordinate who had cleared it, and instructed him to meet with the technician to work out a more appropriate reply.

* * * *

3. Coordinates with other agencies

This function involves maintaining contact and working out coordinated plans with all United States Government agencies and with other assistance groups -- third-country, multilateral, or private -- which are cooperating with the host government.

a. explains USAID position to other agencies

1) Embassy, USIS, other U.S. agencies

2) Third-country, multilateral, and private groups

In order to develop cooperation and coordination with other agencies, it is frequently necessary to define or clarify the general philosophy and purpose underlying the AID program and any particular interpretations developed within the mission from special emphases chosen by the Director. It requires an ability to state explicitly these mission views on various topics and its position vis-a-vis other agencies. The extent of the Program Officer's responsibility varies considerably from mission to mission. In relations with other United States groups, he may have regularly assigned liaison duties or he may function solely as an advisor to other personnel. His contacts with non-United States groups may be tangential and intermittent or they may be close and regularly scheduled.

A problem frequently reported in working with the Embassy concerns the "superior attitude" of its personnel toward AID personnel.

In dealing with other groups, there is a feeling among some Program Officers that the lack of communication between the United States and other donors at higher levels creates a situation of "near-competition" in the field. A problem that may arise in part because

of this is a tendency for representatives of other agencies to be aloof or cool toward mission personnel.

> I am trying to improve Embassy relations by considering the role of the Embassy and trying to put my arguments in their terms. I cannot judge whether I have been effective or not.

* * * *

b. participates in developing coordinated plans

1) Confers on joint problems

2) Reviews and edits reports

3) Writes portions of reports

Coordinating plans usually means working with United States agencies, particularly the Embassy, more than the other types of agencies mentioned above. In some missions, the Program Officer or one of his subordinates constantly consults with counterparts in the Embassy, military groups, or USIS. One of the obstacles in developing mutually acceptable plans is the difference in objectives among the various United States agencies. It particularly affects the progress of work on preparing reports because each agency tries to slant the contents to support its own interests.

Another difficulty is the reluctance of these agencies to consult knowledgeable AID personnel about special information, but to rely upon their own staff members, with the result that Washington receives conflicting reports.

In working out project plans, incumbents report that Embassy officers "try to order AID around and impose political decisions over economic wisdom," or want to expand projects beyond what AID considers to be appropriate levels of operations, content, scope, or goals.

The Embassy sometimes creates difficulties for the mission in negotiating with host officials by supporting the host's views in opposition to AID's.

> Both the Embassy and the mission received a joint message from State/AID urgently requesting certain economic data. I prepared my part immediately and turned it over to the Embassy Economic Officer, who hadn't quite finished his part, and assumed that the Economic Officer would reply with a joint message. Joint messages are credited to both sources, but I learned later that the Economic Officer had sent the reply in the State message series, thus precluding any credit for the USAID contribution. There was nothing I could do about it.

* * * *

> The Long-Range Assistance Strategy was well-coordinated. I sent lots of copies to all of the United States team, gave them plenty of time for perusal, and spent a good bit of time discussing it with each agency. I know they were well-informed and had ample opportunity to object if there was any conflict between AID's position and theirs. In spite of this excellent coordination, one agency filed an objection with Washington, without apprising the mission, after appearing to agree with the Long-Range Assistance Strategy as it had been discussed and revised.

* * * *

Coordination with non-United States agencies depends upon several factors: the size and extent of other assistance programs, the personal rapport between mission personnel and other-agency representatives, and the location of projects or offices. One source of difficulty encountered here is the poor internal coordination of some

host governments. There frequently is no central point where information on assistance programs can be obtained. Also, if a country has multiple teams working within any one area of development it is very difficult to avoid some duplication of programs. The problem of secrecy about program plans for political or commercial reasons discussed in section I A, also applies to this function.

> A third-country Ambassador (who is a personal friend also) came here to find out how our aid program was working out. I gave him a report on the status of our projects. At the same time, I asked him what they were financing for the host and what types of aid they were giving. I specifically wanted to know whether they were considering reducing a certain project because host officials had made unofficial queries to find out whether we would provide some assistance. If this third-country withdrew, we might get a formal request. If this were to come about, it would be best for us to have looked at the situation in detail before a request was made. It would also mean that there would be a potential chance to expand our program and influence.

* * * *

> A private agency is distributing food and goods in this country. They have a very large program of their own and they also have been implementing some of our PL 480 projects. However, they have been getting very little cooperation from the local government and the public and are considering pulling out. The representative for the area came to meet with me yesterday. The meeting was mutually desired. We exchanged policy views. We discussed his problems and alternatives. During our discussion, I was trying to get some background on what they had been doing so that I would have some information on which to anticipate new PL 480 proposals which we most certainly would receive if they pulled

out. At the same time we were discussing possible means of improving the level of cooperation and assistance which they were being given in an effort to possibly save the program. So, in effect, the entire meeting with him served a dual purpose -- I was able to gather information with which I could prepare for one eventuality, and at the same time was exchanging points-of-view and information which I could utilize to recommend possible solutions to the problems at hand.

* * * *

Another important consideration which has to be made here is that of other countries or agencies who are operating in the same area as the proposal under study. For example: The United Nations is also interested in agriculture extension and in agriculture programs in general. In trying to meet our objectives in this area, we try to coordinate our activities with theirs so as not to duplicate or contradict theirs but rather to supplement them. In view of this, we cannot use host country "needs" as our sole criterion for evaluating new proposals.

* * * *

I found out that a third-country was interested in a project. This allowed me to eliminate a proposal that AID should support a similar project.

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It is difficult for the mission to find out what the U.N. is doing here since the nearest U.N. representative is in another country. AID/W has a U.N. coordinating office, but it has never been very effective, probably due to understaffing. When I was in Washington,

one man was responsible for coordinating all U.N. activities for this region. I sent three messages of complaint about the lack of information to AID/W. I feel that this must have been effective as AID/W sent two U.N. project proposals to the mission for comment.

* * * *

c. arranges for other-agency assistance to AID and vice versa

This task usually pertains to arrangements with other U.S. agencies. It includes obtaining permission from the Embassy as required, and arranging for borrowing or lending personnel and equipment. A special instance of this task, arranging assistance from USIS for publicity is discussed below in section IV C.

One obstacle is the reluctance on the part of some agencies to provide personnel when AID requests assistance. This reluctance may result from policy laid down in Washington, from policy made by local officers, or from a shortage of personnel. At times when personnel are loaned to AID, they may want to pursue objectives held by their own agencies rather than those of AID. Bottlenecks sometimes develop because other-agency personnel ignore AID deadlines in completing their tasks.

Arrangements with non-United States agencies are made most frequently in connection with world-wide programs, such as Food for Peace, which are discussed in section I D below. A common problem reported is that the agencies involved tend to be religious organizations who may be in conflict with certain segments of the host population. This creates the risk of engendering anti-AID attitudes among these host groups.

Another problem arises when AID develops joint programs with other agencies and cannot fulfill its obligations because AID/W delays in approving the plan or recruiting personnel.

> I requested permission from the Embassy Administrative Officer to use the Ambassador's diplomatic privilege to import a shipment of goods donated to the children of the country by a private United States group. Use of the Ambassador's privilege would avoid the payment of customs fees for which there were no official funds available. The Administrative Officer got the Ambassador's permission and so informed me.

* * * *

4. Obtains approval for new and revised programs

This function includes obtaining approval for programs at several levels -- mission superiors, the Ambassador, or AID/W. Disagreements between AID/W and the Mission Director regarding program goals or policy create problems for the Program Officer in accomplishing this function. (See the discussion contained in the introduction to Section B.)

a. follows routine procedures

Formal channels for obtaining approvals are specified in the Manual Orders and other regulations, and under usual circumstances approvals are requested through these channels. Failure to answer requests for approval or long delays in forwarding their decisions by AID/W are the major problems reported.

> AID/W sent out a team of experts who met with various Ministers to set up a joint committee and develop a program for reviewing projects. The program was submitted to Washington where it languished. Then AID/W proposed sending out a consultant. I approved of this, but only on the

condition that AID/W approve a commitment to get the project going. AID/W did not reply, but a consultant came out later -- without a commitment. The project died because Washington never got around to it. I believe this is the fault of the Desk Officer, a key man, who should be sensitive to country priorities as well as regional ones. Urgency should be his business.

* * * *

b. expedites approvals

To overcome delays in obtaining program approvals, non-routine procedures are frequently employed. These include seeking the intervention of a "friend" in AID/W to facilitate action, going to Washington personally to "walk a document through channels," bypassing someone in the chain of command, or other similar measures. There are risks involved in some of these actions since they may lead to difficult working relationships in the future.

c. defends and justifies:

1) prepares briefs

2) gives formal presentations

3) gives informal presentations

4) provides routine and requested justification to AID/W

The task refers to both the routine procedures of providing oral or written background summaries to demonstrate the purposes of a program, and the extra efforts required to overcome questioning or disapproval of a program. It also includes the preparation and presentation of visual displays, statistical information, and briefings. It may require traveling to AID/W.

The major problem relating to this task is the amount of detail which AID/W requires to justify projects. Program Officers report that completing the work involved is a serious drain on their time.

There are frequent reports that communicating the rationale of a project to AID/W is a very difficult task, often complicated by a requirement to "justify political aid on economic grounds."

> A technician wanted to send Participants to the United States. The Director was against it. I thought it was a good idea. I went to the Director and pointed out how integral a part of all our projects this area was and thought that the United States should get in on the ground floor before somebody else does. I convinced him to change his mind. It hasn't gotten off the ground yet, however. There is a risk in that, if the program failed and more harm than good were done, the United States' position here would be seriously affected and a great part of it would be my fault for having supported the idea so strongly.

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> I had arranged for a TDY specialist to do a survey to provide justification for a project which AID/W had rejected. The Technical Chief agreed, but the Director objected. Later I learned that a high official from AID/W was planning a tour of the area. As an alternative to the TDY specialist, I suggested that the Technical Chief arrange for the official to come to the mission. The Director agreed to this. During his visit the justification was provided, and AID/W approved the project.

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> AID is interested in certain projects in the host country and has contributed to this type of effort with host national financial support. One host national Minister advised one of our Division Chiefs that they were interested in additional projects of the same type, which would likely be under the auspices of another Ministry. However, as planning progressed, additional host national funds were not available. Since regulations require contributions from both host national and United States sources, I had to develop a justification for United States unilateral contribution. I emphasized the Director's approval of the procedural deviation, the one-shot nature of the request, the high return in terms of benefits to the host economy, and host national commodity contributions. The proposal was approved.

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C. Prepares Documentation

For this function, as for I B, the Program Office is ordinarily the center for directing and coordinating the efforts of all personnel concerned with completing program documentation.

Problems reported are also similar to those described for I B -- inadequate time, unclear instructions, undefined authority, and the need to redo the work of others. Other problems are discussed in connection with the detailed tasks of this function.

1. Writes or rewrites portions of CAP, IAS, or other documents

   a. selects or revises relevant portions of previous documents

   b. formulates project descriptions in required terms

A large proportion of the Program Officer's time is devoted to this function. It is generally his responsibility to

provide some, if not all, of the narrative sections of program documents. Frequently the standard periodic reports required by AID/W can be prepared largely by updating former reports and revising them in accordance with any changes of instructions. However, special reports, and at times standard reports, may require writing extensive narratives.

AID/W requests for special reports tend to disrupt the usual activities of the mission. Also, these reports frequently request information which has already been forwarded in other documents, making the Program Officers feel that they waste their time writing materials which are never read. The necessity for providing irrelevant detail (in the Program Officer's view) in reports also brings comments from Program Officers about wasting their time. In the words of one interviewee, "There are too many curious clerks in Washington."

Problems in deciding upon appropriate materials to be included in reports arise because of the frequent changes in format and content instructions and a general lack of clarity of these instructions. Many Program Officers feel that the writing tasks would be simplified, especially for the CAP, if repetitive presentations of the same materials were eliminated.

> I wrote the first draft of the strategy statement. I looked up the instruction for preparation, former copies of strategy statements, read a summary of the economic situation, political analyses and self-help reports, and sat with my head in my hands. Final writing was done over a period including Saturday afternoon and evening, and Sunday morning. On Monday morning, the Director showed me his version of the statement and then I realized that the Director's version was going to be the official version. I had spent 15 hours on it.

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The Director had told me that he thought the CAP was a silly exercise and that there was not much to be said in it. Director felt that the only significance of the CAP was for cutting up the AID pie, and that claims were already staked out. I felt that I was slaving to do a conscientious job without support from the Director and that the Director didn't care whether it was done well or on time. I also knew that no matter how good my product was it wouldn't be good enough for my backstop at the desk in Washington. In view of all this, I felt compelled to push. I submitted a draft of the CAP to the Director who reviewed it conscientiously. But he rejected one fundamental point. This point was that USAID should seek some modifications (not changes) in the host government's development effort. The Director knocked this out, and told me that the United States posture is to build political relationships and USAID shouldn't rock the boat. I felt the Mission Director showed inadequate concern. He brushed off further discussions of the point with a brusk rebuttal. The upshot of all this was that we compromised and did it his way.

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AID/W is forever asking the mission for additional details, even when the mission is at peak work load, e.g., when CAP is being produced. Last year, during CAP preparation, AID/W asked the mission to submit project work plans to AID/W. I knew that to do so would take much time. Therefore, I sent a single cable to AID/W saying that work plans would not be submitted because they would not be useful to AID/W. AID/W didn't press for the work plans.

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The principal time pressures are those which come from Washington. Last year, when I had understood that the CAP would be due in December, I was informed in September that it would be due in October. Since I was new on the job, had never prepared one before, and the old one was full of errors, I worked day and night for three weeks to get it done. I do not think it would be much of a job to update it this year, and I have been keeping files of materials which will help me do it. In April I learned that the new CAP would be due in June, but this did not bother me.

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While working full time trying to get out the CAP and to meet AID/W deadline, AID/W still continued to send other work with early deadlines. Right in the middle of CAP work, I received a request from AID/W to submit a report on what other countries were doing to aid the host. I solved this problem by letting the non-CAP work pile up. I simply didn't do it until the CAP work was finished.

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2. <u>Prepares numerical charts and tables</u>

   a. checks for consistency and accuracy

   b. prepares explanatory material

The Program Officer's task usually consists of reviewing the work of subordinates (see below). However, in small missions, he may have to calculate the data and compile the charts and tables himself.

Many of the same problems affect this task as were reported above concerning narrative writing, and in section I A concerning evaluating information. The requirement that the same figures

be broken down into numerous categories is considered inappropriate by many Program Officers because of the unreliability of much of their information. It also is very time-consuming.

> For the last volume 1 of the CAP, the Economic Advisor and I disagreed whether summary tables (E-4's) were required by Washington. CAP instructions were not clear. I decided to go ahead and send the CAP without them, figuring Washington would ask for them if they were needed. No word from Washington yet, so I assume it was O.K.

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> The tables for the CAP are not done yet. Deputy Director told me to go to the Program Economist and simply tell him to get it done, now. I hesitate to do that, however, because I have gone to him several times in the past and asked about things he was doing and when he could have them finished. I always get a big reaction from him like "what do you expect me to do, I'm only human and I have no one to help me." Because of his attitude I just don't bother him anymore. I guess he'll finish sooner or later. Perhaps this is very inefficient of me, but I don't know what else to do about him.

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3. Coordinates and supervises the work of others

In many ways this is the most difficult task for a Program Officer because his lack of authority over the technical staff means that he must resort to persuasion or appeal to higher authority to get his "orders" carried out.

Delays in clearing drafts with all of the people involved in document preparation also create problems in accomplishing this task.

a. schedules and assigns work to subordinates and technical personnel

1) monitors progress

2) pressures as needed

The task involves establishing procedural guidelines, interpreting directives from AID/W, and setting internal deadlines. Classification of certain portions of documents produced sometimes slows work progress because it inhibits the free flow of information among staff members who need to work with or review these materials. Another problem frequently reported is that technical divisions ignore memoranda sent to them advising or inquiring about work progress so that the Program Officer (or a subordinate) must spend a great deal of time in visiting their offices to give and get information. At times technicians refuse to conform to mission deadlines and will not turn in reports until shortly before the AID/W deadline, creating great difficulty for the Program Office in its attempt to develop unified presentations.

> We got a directive from AID/W which included a timetable for presenting the various areas of our E-1's and suggestions for their improvement. They were broad guidelines describing targets and goals. I had copies of the directives distributed to the technical divisions. There were no questions; the instructions were very clear. I was very pleased because a couple of weeks earlier I had drafted a directive myself which included many of AID/W's suggestions for improving our E-1's and CAP preparation. I had anticipated Washington very well, I thought.

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> I handle the tight deadlines from AID/W by setting internal deadlines well in advance of the AID/W deadlines. This worked well on the last CAP which was in AID/W early.

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b. reviews, edits and evaluates

Ordinarily, responsibility for developing good program documents is given to the Program Officer. He must examine all document inputs produced by other people for both substance and style to insure that they meet requirements and are clearly written.

The low quality of other people's writing is the major difficulty. According to many Program Officers, most technical personnel and some Program Office subordinates simply don't know how to write, and occasionally competent technical personnel dash off their work hurriedly, knowing that the Program Office will "fix it up." An ancillary problem arises because some technicians resent the Program Officer suggesting or making improvements in their documents. This resentment occasionally develops into permanent interpersonal conflicts.

> During the CAP preparation, I was assisted by a subordinate who had never done a CAP before. I worked with him as closely as I could, but my time was limited by the "hurly-burly." I did not realize that the subordinate wouldn't produce until the last minute, so there was no time for me to review his material which went from rough draft to final copy and then out into the pouch, with the rest of the CAP. Then there was a short period of "let down" and I forgot about that subordinate's contribution. I then prepared to review the strategy section in Washington, but when I got to Washington the first criticism I heard concerned the section of the CAP which the subordinate had prepared. AID/W asked whether it couldn't have been done better.

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c. requests revisions

These actions may range from a suggestion for a few changes given by telephone to an extensive written outline detailing additional substantive materials needed or major stylistic rewrites. Some Program Officers arrange a meeting with the drafter and go over the document point by point. The problems cited regarding the preceding task also pertain to this one. Another problem is that division personnel often regard the Program Office as delaying unnecessarily long in acting upon materials submitted and requiring too many petty changes.

> The specialists in a division wrote a report. These people were the ones who were attaching themselves to a host Ministry and so their report consisted of all the great good that was going to come from one type of aid. When I read this, I called in the Division Chief and discussed the report with him. We agreed to have the technicians rewrite the report. It has been rewritten but they have still not pinned down the exact aim of the project. It was my function here to analyze this report and ask for further data. My background in this area stood me in good stead.

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d. rewrites work of others

Many Program Officers consider this task a problem in itself. It adds an extra burden to their workload during the last and busiest phases of getting out reports, and it creates personal animosities (see above). The task ranges from correcting the grammatical constructions to completely reformulating the content of a report.

A subordinate wrote a section of the CAP. It was oratorical and verbose. He wrote things for which there was little evidence. This was very confusing and I had to cut and revise this considerably.

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When I arrived, a first draft of a document had been written. It contained lots of repetition, rambled. I did not have time to do anything with it, but later AID/W said a revision of it should be prepared. They offered a man to help with it. I accepted, since I thought the man could edit and revise it, but it needed a lot more than just editing, and the man from AID/W was unfamiliar with local conditions. I decided I had to do it, and asked the Director to give me the time, and to let the Assistant Program Officer take over. I worked day and night for six weeks. Then it took more time to clear with the Embassy. AID/W reviewed it and decided that it should include other information which had not been in their original guidelines.

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I consulted the Director about his feeling that a division report contained too much irrelevant data. The Director agreed and sketched an outline of appropriate topics. I took the report home and rewrote it. The next day I showed it to the Division Chief who made a few minor changes and approved it.

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I reviewed a proposal from a Division Chief. I felt that the text of the proposal was not presented in such a way as to get the best possible response from AID/W. The benefits and advantages of the proposal were not spelled out clearly at the beginning. So I rewrote the introduction with the Director's approval, and this was accepted by the Division Chief.

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e. requests review by others

Most documents prepared in the Program Office are regularly reviewed by higher officers. If a technical report has been extensively altered, the Division Chief is usually given an opportunity to "approve" the final draft. Occasionally the Program Officer may call upon various line or staff personnel to read documents to insure that they are accurate and in accordance with mission policy. When all personnel are very busy, it may be difficult to persuade others to devote time to an adequate review.

> I routinely had subordinates check data in reports. They questioned the baseline for data in one report. I advised the originator of the problem and my subordinate and the originator worked out the problem.

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4. Supervises mechanical production of documents

This task involves instructing secretaries in following format directives, providing assistance if drafts are not clear, supervising proof-reading, and monitoring document assembly. It also includes making administrative arrangements for borrowing extra personnel if needed.

The necessity of asking secretaries and subordinates to work overtime, especially common in producing the CAP, is considered a problem by many Program Officers.

> Another problem we have is that we are far away from anything. It takes a long time to send and receive communications with Washington. We got into the last stage of drafting all the pages making up the final form of the CAP, and discovered that we were short of the proper forms

on which to make our drafts. We requested more from Washington. The request was days in getting there. When the actual materials got here they were the wrong kind and they arrived past our deadline. We had to do the final draft without the correct forms, so we simply used what we had.

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(from interviewer) At the morning meeting, the Director indicated that a "working paper" about a program should be prepared to hand-carry to Washington, and a smooth, final document would be mailed to AID/W later. This was to enable them to get something into the mill early, and better thought out ideas would be submitted later. The Program Officer, instead, turned out as smooth and final a document as possible, not only correcting minute typing errors, but also cancelling any reference to a future final document. I have observed other Program Officers having documents typed up smoothly when it appears that they don't need to be. In this case, it meant that both he and his secretary had to work three hours overtime.

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(from interviewer) Getting the CAP typed up properly is a problem. There are many drafts and revisions by Program Officers and Assistant Program Officers. The CAP is thick, running to a few hundred pages with detailed tables, graphs, tabular presentations, etc. The Program Officer's time was consumed merely being available to typists, proofreading, and assisting borrowed secretaries who did not know the procedures. The Program Officer and Assistant Program Officer helped to prolong the typing of the CAP. They would frequently have a typist redo an entire page to change one or two words.

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5. Directs forwarding procedures for documents

This refers to all of the tasks performed in clearing and sending a finished document, obtaining approvals and signatures, writing cover letters, and other routine processes. It also may call for hand-carrying a document to Washington in order to meet a deadline.

> We submitted our first phase (as called for by Washington's schedule) with a request for comments, criticism and suggestions in the event that we should need to revise our second phase. We got no response from AID/W so we got no benefit from any errors we may have made in the first phase. We had to do phase two without any comment or specific guidance from AID/W. The result was that it took us longer to finish the CAP book (waiting for AID/W to respond) and we would have submitted it late if I had not been going to Washington on consultation which allowed me to hand-carry it. If AID/W doesn't respond to our requests for timely guidance there is nothing we can do.

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> The United States Ambassador must approve the CAP, but he was taking a long time to clear it. Therefore, I was forced to wait for the Ambassador to write my transmittal letter. With the deadline for submission at hand, I sent the CAP to AID/W with a notation that the Ambassador's approval and cover letter would be forwarded later.

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D. Integrates Development Plans With World-Wide Programs (e.g., Food for Peace)

The involvement of the Program Officer in accomplishing this function varies considerably from mission to mission. This results partly from differences in mission staffing and partly from differences

in scope of these programs as a consequence of conditions in the host nations or of acceptance by the host governments. In most cases, the Program Officer performs tasks similar to those cited previously, e.g., obtaining information, guiding others, making decisions, and preparing documentation, as well as those to be discussed below in implementation and program management.

This function is cited as a separate "content" area because (a) some programs generate funds which are to be utilized in other sectors of the program, necessitating additional administrative procedures; (b) the integration of a program with other sectors of the mission program may be complicated by the involvement of non-AID administrative agencies located outside the host country; and (c) the actual implementation of a program may be carried out by a non-AID agency over which the mission can exercise little control. These factors create additional and perhaps unusual tasks in coordinating with other groups which may become the responsibility of the Program Officer.

Most of the problems described above and below regarding regular programs also are encountered in these programs -- unclear regulations and directives, undefined authority, policy conflicts, lack of qualified staff, lack of host acceptance, and so forth. A problem peculiar to these special programs is the issue raised by using religious organizations for distributing food. This generates opposition not only among sectors of the host population who are hostile toward certain religious groups but also among people in the United States. The former may extend their negative attitudes to AID, while the latter may contribute to public or Congressional opposition to AID at home.

I obtained approval from the Director and Ambassador to recruit a Food for Peace Officer for the mission. I discussed the matter informally and met several prospects informally. I called AID/W asking if my preferred candidate was available. AID/W approved the candidate on TDY basis. I drafted an acceptance cable after reviewing fiscal data and checking with the Controller to see how to get the candidate's permanent mission to pay as much of his travel expense as possible. I could have submitted a routine request, but in that case I would expect no results due to a shortage of Food for Peace Officers.

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Since AID provides the commodities for the CARE program, I have some responsibilities for the coordination of it. I decided what is to be done and prepared a program for the coming year. Washington was pushing two commodities, but I noted an item in the local newspaper reporting a ban on one of them, apparently to protect the local producers. I thought it would not be right for the United States to export it for the CARE program, so I restricted the CARE imports to the other commodity.

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During a period of serious riots, I was distressed by the "bad press" that the U.S. was getting. I felt that some of the rather large amounts of money that had been accumulating from PL 480 sales could be used for some conspicuous project aimed at the urban, politically conscious segment of the population. (I think the political impact of food gifts is lost in the complex processes of distribution.) I decided to "make a pitch" for a project, and proposed this to AID/W. This gave rise to a flap at AID/W. They said that they could not approve the project for political reasons. However, I argued successfully against their objections.

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The host country has never had a PL 480 program. It would be an inexpensive way to give aid and would facilitate our operations and influence. It would be an entirely new idea here. However, I have not succeeded in creating any interest within the host government. I haven't been able to get them to understand the program and its benefits. I had legislation and other documents translated and sent to an appropriate Minister. I met with several different officials and explained how PL 480 would work here. I finally had a larger meeting with several Ministry representatives, the Director, the Controller, the Assistant Program Officer, and myself to get some ruling or idea about their impressions. We discussed it in full and they said they would study it further. The last I heard, they gave the action to their Minister for decision. I think the principal reason for my lack of success is that I haven't had enough time to personally explain the program to them. As a result, they will not formally propose it. In the future, perhaps, I'll get some time.

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A cultural difference which mades headaches for one of the programs is that the host nationals have no concept of a government welfare program. All of the welfare is usually handled intra-family. This makes it very difficult for the PL 480 program where we are attempting to get across the concept of government welfare. I try to explain this concept to the host government officials.

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I want the host government to propose a PL 480 program. It would be to both our countries' advantage. I have been arranging meetings with a Minister -- whenever I can spare the time -- to explain such a program to him. I'm trying to point out all the advantages to him. I'm doing this in a very concrete manner so that he realizes that I mean what I say and will

take immediate action if and when they make such a proposal. I am in hopes that once I get to spend a little more time with him he will see my point and take the lead himself.

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I assumed that a host Minister knew I didn't have an organization capable of distributing PL 480 commodities and, consequently, I assumed that they would be willing to hire an organization such as CARE to take charge of it. The Minister did not have this attitude and would not sign the agreement in spite of the fact that I and everyone else assumed that there would be no delay in signing. Just why this happened nobody knows.

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A religious agency prepared posters for the program as per regulations. The posters highlighted the agency and free food and mentioned U.S. contributions in small print. I instructed the Communications Media Division to make up another poster without emphasis on free food because I knew that it wasn't going to be free much longer. I tried to increase emphasis on our contribution without making it too prominent due to the publicity restriction. I am going to have the posters printed in the mission and insure that the distribution is monitored by internal auditors.

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II. PARTICIPATES IN PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

The Program Officer usually has responsibility for directing and supervising the processes involved in completing the final arrangements and documentation for all projects. Many of the tasks performed are similar to those described in the preceding section regarding review of plans and documents.

Many of the problems encountered are also similar to those commented upon above: ambiguous directives from AID/W, policy conflicts between the mission and AID/W, and undefined authority.

The greatest problem reported concerns the need to accomplish these tasks under extremely severe time pressure. Ordinarily preparation of project plans occurs after the start of the fiscal year. Once plans have been submitted, only tentative arrangments may be made pending AID/W approval and fund allocation, and AID/W cannot make commitments until Congress acts on AID appropriations. When the cycle is delayed, the implementation of projects on the mission level takes place hurriedly. Many Program Officers attribute the inadequacies of documents to the extreme haste with which they are prepared in order to meet the deadlines for obligating funds.

A less pressing problem, but one that irritates many Program Officers, is Washington's "second-guessing" the mission concerning the details of particular projects. It not only holds up implementation, but also discourages the efforts of field personnel who feel that AID/W lacks confidence in them.

Another problem arises from the practice of encouraging other agencies to take over AID-generated projects. After mission personnel have devoted considerable effort to planning a project, they experience a psychological let-down when another donor steps in and assumes the responsibility for operating it.

Sometimes when the Mission Director or other personnel are new, the Program Officer has a problem in keeping them from starting work on projects before all of the necessary formalities have been completed.

A. Reviews Background Information Relevant to Projects

In order to insure that all requirements have been met, the Program Officer must be familiar with the details of regulations, mission and AID/W policy, and funding procedures, as well as with the substantive aspects of project plans set forth in the CAP. A review of the CAP is almost always required because of the usual time lag between submission of the CAP and the onset of the implementation phase.

1. Confers with staff

As indicated in earlier sections, conferring refers to discussions which may range from short telephone conversations to formal meetings. Conferees may include anyone within the mission or technical divisions who has information pertaining to this function. In general, the persons most frequently consulted will be the Technical Chiefs, Program Office subordinates, the Director and Deputy Director.

> Washington sent approval for a project and an agreement for the host to sign. Although the agreement had been formulated in Washington, certain sections were negotiable. I had to prepare myself to understand everything in the agreement so as to be able to answer questions from host officials. The Director also had to be familiar with the agreement. With the Director I went over the agreement point by point in detail. We checked with the Controller on points we did not understand. The intense preparation was required because the agreement was in English, and few host government officials know English.

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2. Reviews documents

The Program Officer consults a variety of documents in addition to the CAP for information relevant to developing final details of approved projects. These documents include various AID/W directives or special instructions, project reports, or other materials.

We are spending a million dollars in setting up a project. It will be completed shortly. We have a private agency representative here who has been working in this area with the host government. He has apparently impressed the Ambassador with his ideas on what could be done to improve the services. The Director has asked me for my comments about his proposals. I told the Director I couldn't comment until I had evaluated the results of the last project done in this area.

We had a technician here for 2 years who was doing just the type of work that had been suggested. I got the former technician's end-of-tour report and studied it. It was obvious from this report that he received no cooperation from the government here and that their organization in this area was tenuous and loose. To me, it seemed that the steps we should be taking were to assure and assist in establishing a proper organization rather than to concern ourselves, as the representative suggested, with improvement of services at such an early stage.

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I was talking to the AID/W Desk Officer via telephone. The Desk Officer said that there had been a delay in signing a contract for a project. Therefore, the Project Implementation Order/Technician (PIO/T) and Project Agreement had to be amended to change commencement and termination dates to comply with the new dates made necessary by the contract delay in Washington. I didn't think there would be a problem, so I told the Desk Officer that the amendments would be made. However, when I tried to accomplish this, the Controller said that amendments to PIO's and Project Agreements could not extend termination dates beyond 3 years from the original date of the signing of the contract. He was firm about this, even though AID/W had given the order. I then went through manual orders for 1-1/2 to 2 hours in order to find a ruling on the matter. I found a sentence which said

that extensions beyond three years could be made if the PIO/T and Project Agreement were both changed. The Controller then complied. The Controller apparently had not known of this particular rule.

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3. Obtains clarification as necessary

In order to provide guidelines to other personnel, the Program Officer must interpret rules and directives. Since these are frequently ambiguous, he may need to contact AID/W to obtain clarification. He may go through channels or resort to contacting personal friends in Washington to expedite answers to his requests. He may also need to clarify points in various project documents prepared in AID/W. Similarly, he may request advice from AID/W concerning issues which apparently are not covered by existing policy.

I wrote the first draft of a cable to Washington to get clarification on a program loan agreement. I sent the draft to Division Chiefs for clearance and comment. One Chief pointed out an error in the draft agreement which I had not mentioned in my cable. I should have noticed the error but simply did not. I had been present when this matter was discussed and agreed upon by the host government and would have known it was wrong in the agreement if I had paid attention to the wording.

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I wrote a very clear cable to AID/W questioning an approval they had made of the wrong figures. It was not effective, however, since AID/W did not respond to the questions raised by the cable.

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At a meeting with a host Minister, the Director, Controller and I made a point-by-point explanation of a Project Agreement. We could not agree among ourselves about the meaning of one point. We told the host Minister that we would cable AID/W requesting clarification on that point. Since the Project Agreement was written in AID/W, this action could prevent future problems arising from a misinterpretation.

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Five weeks of a 2-month stay by a team of advisors were in the current fiscal year, the rest in the next. AID regulations do not allow saving or carrying over funds from one fiscal year to pay salaries in the next fiscal year. The APO and I spent 2 hours searching for regulations enabling payment of this team totally out of this fiscal year funds. None was found. It happened that the Controller was ill and could not be consulted. We eventually decided to cable AID/W for advice. Payment would have been simple if I had elected to pay the team for their work in funds from both of the fiscal years. However, this would require two separate signatures from the appropriate local national officials. Local signatures were hard to get because of the current election situation which made officials hesitate to put their names on anything. In addition, I felt silly asking an official to sign two papers on the same subject.

* * * *

AID/W authorized loans to the host government to purchase certain types of products. The conditions of this loan, even though agreed upon by Washington and host, may create a problem for importers. They discussed the issue with the Director and me. Since we are not well-enough versed in the legal aspects, we had to forward the substance of our discussion to AID/W for an answer.

* * * *

Importers seeking a loan called the mission and asked to meet with the Controller and me. They pointed out that if their products could be purchased from a neighboring country problems concerning the loan would be solved. The Controller and I both felt that there would be no objections on AID/W's part because the agreement did authorize these arrangements if necessary. We insured that they knew our assurance was contingent upon approval by AID/W. We then drafted a cable stating the facts and relaying our discussion to Washington.

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B. Reviews and Approves Details of Project Plans

The steps involved in accomplishing this task are similar to those described in sections IB3 and IC3. Many of the same problems in working with technical personnel are also encountered, so that frequently the Program Officer and his subordinates have to do the technicians' planning and paperwork. The chief difficulty in this function lies in judging the adequacy of the plan for achieving the approved goals, since all too often the incumbents believe the Division Chiefs' judgments are questionable.

1. Checks plans for conformance to goals and regulations

This task involves insuring that plans fill the goals of the mission and AID/W regarding the host country. Difficulty sometimes arises because these goals are not always explicitly stated and it is hard to determine whether or not specific projects are applicable.

A Division Chief came in with a new proposal from the host government requesting funds for certain equipment. The Director and the Deputy Director thought it a good sound proposal and wanted to do it in the new FY which meant we would have to do the Project Agreement within a week, in addition to getting all the others signed. They gave it to me for analysis and recommendation. It sounded good to me but I couldn't fund it with unobligated funds -- there weren't enough. So I thought that we should write to AID/W requesting the additional funds. From my AID/W experience I thought it was the kind of project and amount they would approve. The Director and Deputy agreed and okayed going to Washington. I then talked to everyone concerned about the proposal to make sure I understood all its aspects. I got information from the host Ministry, the Division Chief, etc., and asked such things as who would use the equipment, were qualified personnel available, was better equipment available, etc. I was satisfied about these ramifications, drafted the request and sent it to Washington. As it turned out I committed a gross error. The equipment was produced only by a firm in another country, a direct violation of our "buy American" policy. It took all kinds of negotiations to "get us off the hook" here. This obviously reflected on my judgment. AID/W is aware of this big mistake. It's embarrassing to me. I felt personally and professionally guilty and sheepish.

* * * *

An approved project which I inherited involved the construction of roads. I approved plans for these roads to meet certain construction standards. AID/W questioned this, By this time, the mission had committed itself, and could not talk the host government into changing the standards to what AID/W considered appropriate. I did not focus soon enough on what was really important in the project.

* * * *

The host proposed a participant to go to the U.S. This nominee was not very qualified to begin with and his English was not very good. He was also rather lazy. However, he had political connections which made the situation more ticklish. I certainly felt that he shouldn't go and so did the Director. Due to his connections I just let it drag without making a decision. I also did not keep in close contact with the nominee to let him know there was some doubt about his approval. Finally it got to the point where I had to make a statement and I had to refuse the applicant. This made a bad impression with the government. I should have taken a firm stand and gotten it over with. I knew that I couldn't justify this participant so I should have taken action immediately.

* * * *

I felt that a particular participant selected was so unqualified that the objectives of the program could not be fulfilled by sending him. I called in the Technical Division Chief and the Training Officer and told them that the Program Office would withdraw approval of that segment of the project unless someone else was selected.

* * * *

I tried to solve the problem of interpreting Manual Orders by hammering at people to produce good documents, and pushing them to find a way to accomplish aims within regulations. This has been fairly successful.

* * * *

A relative of a high host official was going to the U. S. as a participant. We knew this was to be something of a honeymoon for him and we knew unofficially that he did not intend to work in the area of his training when he got back. We therefore wrote a memo to his Ministry saying that if the returned participant was not utilized for his intended purpose when he returned, the host government would have to repay to the U. S. government the cost of his training. The Minister balked but it was finally agreed upon. I talked to several

people about this and came to the conclusion that it was AID policy to get these assurances. The statement of intended use is written into commodity agreements and I proposed writing it into participant agreements to give us more insurance that our projects were achieving their desired ends. I talked to the Controller about it and he said they did have such a written understanding about participants in other posts. So I asked that we include this stipulation in the project agreement for participants for the coming fiscal year. It was adopted and written into the agreement. At first the host Minister refused to sign it, but we got him to agree after a series of negotiations. I think our training program is now much more effective because of this clause.

* * * *

a. reviews and edits documentation for grant projects

b. reviews loan applications

These tasks parallel those described in section IC3, and are affected by similar problems and obstacles. In some missions the Program Officer may act as an advisor to a Loan Officer, rather than having direct responsibility for the task himself.

2. Institutes revisions of project plans

In the event that project plans as presented do not meet the requirements, the Program Officer may advise the originator of appropriate changes to be made, may request a Program Office subordinate to make changes, or may accomplish replanning and rewriting himself. Extensive substantive changes will usually be cleared with the Director or Deputy Director and with the technical division.

A project from technicians planned a large job requiring host nationals. I had visited the area and noticed a dearth of laborers. The job couldn't be done with the available laborers. I cut off the plan which would have forced a later distortion of the program.

* * * *

A division chief requested some equipment. I sent the request back saying that no specific plans were given for using the equipment and there was no planning for training host nationals to operate the equipment.

* * * *

C. Conducts Negotiations

The Program Officer sometimes conducts negotiations himself and at other times acts as an advisor to other personnel. Because of the restrictions on making commitments at the mission level prior to AID/W approvals, considerable skill may be required in developing strategies for preliminary discussions which do not create the impression that binding promises are being made. Misunderstandings of this sort frequently create difficulties in concluding final agreements later.

A problem which can have major repercussions involves insuring that all mission negotiators understand and present unified statements of the mission's position on various matters. Technical Chiefs, because of their tendency to think primarily in terms of their own projects, may require careful instructions on this point. In some countries where there is a tradition of sharp bargaining and a deliberate use of "divide and conquer" tactics, this problem becomes important in all types of negotiations.

1. Negotiates with host country officials

Negotiations are very often time-consuming and may become more so if conferences must be conducted through interpreters. The Program Officer who cannot speak the host language frequently finds that he must call upon other mission personnel to speak for him, with possible loss of respect of the host officials and almost certain loss in communication. In some cases, the Program Officer must perform the negotiations for technical officers because they cannot speak the language, thus increasing his own workload during the rush to complete project implementation documents.

Even in cases where there is no language barrier, communicating with host officials can be difficult. In certain areas of the world, cultural practices involved elaborately circuitous discussions and it is hard to obtain a clear statement of the host's position or opinion. It may occur that mission personnel misinterpret politeness for acceptance of their statements, or the hosts may make the same mistake. A related difficulty pertains to the meaning of terms. For example, one report cites a case in which the term "project" was used by the host to mean "idea", while the U. S. negotiators were thinking of bags of cement, man-hours, and so on.

Other problems relate to the confusion of authority among various agencies of the host government. Conflicts and power struggles between central government agencies and provincial governments, or among central agencies, may necessitate conducting multiple negotiations for the same project, or expending considerable effort to rework plans in developing compromises acceptable to competing factions. There is also a risk that some influential official may be overlooked initially because it is not obvious that he should be involved, and he may be so offended that he scuttles the project entirely. Frequent

changes of personnel in host agencies also require duplication of negotiations while the new incumbent learns about the projects.

Difficulties also arise because many host governments are new and staffed by inexperienced personnel who are not willing to accept responsibility for making decisions. This creates delays while arranging to see higher officials, who frequently are extremely busy and hard to see.

Some of the problems associated with AID's inability to supply full project information to host officials have been mentioned above (see IB1c) and also apply here. Another problem created by this curtailment of information is that hosts may reverse prior commitments upon seeing fuller project details and bring about complicated and prolonged negotiations. Reversals also occur as a result of political changes in the host government.

AID/W's preference for Project Agreements that are not stringently binding upon USAID may raise the suspicions among the host government officials that they are entering into a bargain slanted in AID's favor, and they may become more difficult to negotiate with on these grounds. Similar problems may arise when AID regulations change or a new Program Officer conforms to procedures that his precedessor ignored, resulting in increased costs to the host government in fulfilling its share of a project.

> A project director discovered that the local costs had been underestimated and that additional host funds would be needed. I asked the project director to determine how much the host agency would benefit from the completion of the project. I negotiated with the host government including the budget group, and frankly presented the problem. I persuaded the host government to contribute half the additional funds needed and put up half the funds from counterpart funds. I was successful because I was able to convince the hosts that the problem was serious and that they shared the responsibility for it. /The Assistant Program Officer commented that this was successful because the Program Officer had treated the host officials as full partners and as serious and responsible officials./

* * * *

A plan called for a large joint AID/Local project. AID/W approved one way of carrying out the project. The local government preferred another way, partly for political reasons. I talked with two Ministers and the Chief of State and finally convinced them to pass legislation enabling the project to conform to AID/W's approved method.

* * * *

I have tried to lick the AID/W delays in approvals by trying to anticipate their approval. This year we are preparing Project Agreements and negotiated preliminary agreements with the host government to get some of the work done before the approval comes in. I must make sure the hosts understand that it really is tentative. Whether or not this will work, I don't know.

* * * *

A routine specification in a Project Agreement is that in the case where there are differences in translation between English and the host language versions, the English language version will be the official version. A host official objected strongly to the wording of a project agreement, saying that _____ is the official language of the country and that it was impossible for English to be the "official" language. I amended the document to read...."the English language version will apply."

* * * *

The Director and the host Chief of State agreed on AID support for a local industry. I asked for a later session between myself and the Chief of State alone to discuss details, so that the Director would not disrupt the plan and would not have to devote time to details.

* * * *

In arranging terms for a survey team, the host officials were supposed to collect and supply data to the team before they arrived. They never gathered the data, and USOM people had to collect it after the teams' arrival. This was a failure on my part to realize that they had not been clearly pinned down, and a lack of follow-through on the part of the Technical Division.

* * * *

A host Minister met with me to sound out a project. I told him generally what AID could do. I made a later appointment to discuss details and specific problems. I explained that recruiting _____-speaking instructors would be a problem. I told the Minister that local administrative costs could not be admitted because of the balance of payments problem. I reviewed the whole idea between meetings, also checked CAP, other projects, and priorities, AID/W guidelines, etc. At a third meeting I informed the Minister that the project seemed sound. Specific points were discussed further at several later meetings, some attended by the technical team's chief so that he could provide additional information or suggestions.

The USAID position was clearly and unambiguously presented; the discussions were carried out smoothly and purposefully, and the negotiations did not cover a long period of time.

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A commodity request was prepared for a project for assisting an industry. The host Minister refused to approve it on the grounds that the industry would be competing with existing industries.

Another Minister was angry and said he's tired of the first Minister sticking his nose into this area all the time.

I was in a dilemma. Should I go to defense of the second Minister with whom I agreed, or should I try to mediate since the first Minister is powerful and is AID's best friend here.

My decision was to mediate and substitute different items in place of the controversial commodities.

* * * *

The problem of dual negotiations with the planning agency and the Ministries was acutely exemplified in one project. The Director and I were anxious to expedite approval of the project and obtained a preliminary outline from the USAID Division Chief who had been working on it with members of the host Ministry. I took the outline to the planning agency and after much hassling obtained an approval. When I took this back to the Division Chief he "blew-up" because of the changes made. He was particularly angry because I had taken these steps without his knowledge or approval, and I frankly confessed that it was a mistake. The Division Chief refused to accept the changes and I had to withdraw it while the Division Chief and the host Minister drew up another outline.

When the outline was submitted to the planning agency the latter requested that I be present at the meeting and the Minister asked the Division Chief to come also. The Minister did not attend, but the head of the appropriate Department (within the Ministry) did attend and nearly destroyed the whole thing again. At the beginning of the meeting the planning agency called on the USAID Division Chief to justify the outline. This he did eloquently. Then the host Department head denied ever having approved the matter. When the Division Chief produced paper evidence of their having gone over the details together several times, the Department head said he didn't think they could fulfill their part of the bargain.

The planning agency called a halt at this point and said they would take the matter under consideration. I felt that a letter should be sent to the planning agency explaining the situation and pointing out that the USAID had indeed made prior agreements with the Minister, in spite of what the Department head had said.

But the Director suggested that I simply phone the Secretary of the planning agency. The latter said the members of the committee were well aware of what was going on and what the Department was trying to do.

I agreed with the Division Chief that the details and priorities of the project should be determined by him and the officials of the Ministry and not by the planning agency. I also know that the Division Chief would like to deal only with the Ministry and that their agreements should be sufficient and final. But the planning agency is "a fact of life". The Division Chief should accept the fact that the government is new and its people will ask questions well beyond the scope of their authority. The Division Chief should adjust his program to it, and not fight it so hard.

* * * *

2. Negotiates with contractors

3. Negotiates details of loan applications

Some missions have Contract Officers and Loan Officers who have primary responsibility for these tasks and the Program Officer then acts in an advisory role. Many contracts and loan agreements are prepared in Washington, where the negotiations take place, and the Program Officer need only review the documents. In some cases, however, he may conduct these negotiations and would require knowledge of procedures pertaining to loans and contracts and the relevant AID regulations.

Problems regarding contract and loan negotiations often duplicate those indicated immediately above. Other problems arise for Program Officers who lack knowledge of legal details, especially when there is no Legal Advisor attached to the mission staff. When

documents are prepared in AID/W, the Program Officer may find he has problems understanding the reasoning behind certain details and interpreting these to host officials.

> In the implementation of a construction project, it was not clearly specified whether a host contractor would have to pay a host government business tax. Arguments over this have delayed the project and taken much of my time. I should have negotiated this point before the Project Agreement was signed. /The Deputy Program Officer feels that it was time-pressure which caused the Program Officer and the rest of the Program Office to overlook it./

* * * *

> The host officials had selected a contractor to do some work on an AID project. We objected to the choice, on the basis that the contractor was unqualified, so another was selected. The unsuccessful contractor protested to AID/W, telling them the host specifically wanted his company and insisting on their reverting to the original choice. AID/W sent us a cable instructing that the original contractor be used. I recommended to the Director that I be allowed to discuss the situation with the host government. He agreed. I learned that host government was in agreement with us and had made no statement about reverting to the original contractor, nor had they any desire to do so. I reported this to the Director, presenting him a cable to go out to AID/W containing the facts of the situation. The Director cleared the cable and AID/W upheld the mission.

* * * *

> I recall one incident in which my memory saved trouble. A contractor had submitted a contract for approval which contained a clause referring to a 1954 agreement for its justification. The contract had been approved by all the other offices in the mission, but when it came to me, I remembered that the 1954 agreement had been declared illegal. So the contractor had to change the clause.

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> In order to insure that host government officials thoroughly understand the terms of a project agreement for a loan the Director and I took the Controller to a meeting with us to handle questions on the mechanics of the loan. At the meeting we read the agreement point by point, word for word, in the host's language, and explained each passage to them because few of them are fluent in English. At this first meeting we covered ten pages, and plan to finish the remainder at another meeting tomorrow.

* * * *

4. Obtains necessary signatures

Frequently this task is an easily accomplished routine procedure in concluding formal negotiations. In some instances, however, host ministers delay signing documents that have been fully agreed upon, so that it is difficult to forward them to AID/W by scheduled deadlines. It may also be hard to arrange appointments with high officials. Sometimes host officials will sign agreements without reading them, and this can lead to later misunderstanding of what each side has agreed to do.

> A contract had expired and staff salaries were being paid out of the contractor's own funds. They required a firm financial commitment from AID in order to plan for the next year. The Division Chief concerned was new to the job, couldn't speak the host language. A major new agreement involving host reforms had to be worked out. There was not enough time to work out a complete Project Agreement before the obligating deadline.
>
> I suggested to the Director that efforts be directed to completion and host signature of the necessary PIO/P and other documents rather then the complete Project Agreement. These signed documents become legal dollar-obligating

documents for the U. S. and the host government where the Project Agreement has not been signed.

My suggestion was accepted and the money was successfully obligated two days before the deadline.

* * * *

The Mission needed to sign more Project Agreements, in order to meet obligation deadlines. But a law says the Director cannot sign any agreement for over $100,000 if more or additional money will be needed for which plans are not already spelled out. A huge construction project is involved. My solution was to sign the agreements for segments of the project since no one costs more than $100,000.

* * * *

III. MANAGES PROGRAM

The Program Officer ordinarily serves as a high-level general manager for the total mission program, although in certain missions portions of this work will be handled by the Director or Deputy Director. There are three important aspects to this managerial function: insuring proper and efficient operation of projects, monitoring program budgets, and providing for the distribution of information.

A. Monitors and Guides Projects

1. Obtains information on project status and host contributions

a. confers with U.S. personnel
b. confers with third-country or multilateral personnel
c. confers with host government personnel
d. reviews project status documents
e. visits project sites
f. assigns others to observe field operations

The methods of carrying out the tasks involved in this function have been described in earlier sections. There are some additional comments to be noted, however. It frequently happens that the United States and co-operating host government personnel try to conceal deficiencies in projects, or overstate their effectiveness. In these cases, third-country or multilateral personnel can sometimes provide the most accurate reports about project operations. The consensus of people interviewed in the study is that field observations are the best sources of accurate project information. As reported in section I A 3, the majority of Program Officers maintain that the volume of work within the mission prevents them or their subordinates from making field trips.

Monitoring certain types of technical projects, by whatever method, may be difficult for the Program Officer who has no special knowledge in those areas. Often, the only expert available is the Division Chief whose project is in question. When host national experts are available for consultation, they may be reluctant to criticize U.S. operations or personnel.

> As an example of conflicting information, a Division Chief was informed by his counterpart in another country that a new serious disease was spreading very rapidly through the area and that it was highly contagious. The host government was informed about this and an urgent Ministers' meeting was held to decide to buy the vaccine necessary to fight the disease. Then, when the Mission Director was on a trip, he met the Mission Director of the other country by chance, and the latter told him the situation was really not so urgent. Thus I still do not feel that I really know how urgent the problem is. I think the risk of the disease justified the measures we took, but concluded this primarily from logical rather than technical considerations.

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> The inadequate information problem has not really been solved. I hold meetings and discussions, and feel the problem is getting better because, with experience, I am getting able to analyze the information better.

* * * *

> I am frustrated by repeated defensive action on the part of some of the Division Chiefs. For example, when rumors of the inadequacy of a program reached me, I asked for a report from the Division Chief. After a long interval, I finally got an ambiguous reply. I kept hammering at the Division Chief. I finally called a meeting of the whole division to see if I could get a clear statement. They did not speak up. I kept on gathering evidence of its relative ineffectiveness, until I convinced the Director that I was right.

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The Division Chiefs are not prone to report lack of success if they think a project is a good one. I have to probe, question, and get opinions from host officials to try to determine its worth.

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An outlying provincial project was equipped with radio for contacts to the other branches. When I arrived, I learned that the radio would only contact one other station. The radio had receptacles for five crystals but had only one crystal. I sent the extra crystals.

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When I arrived here I figured that the mission had done without a Program Officer for a long time so they could do without one for 6 weeks more. So I got out and saw the projects we were doing. I gained very much from that experience and I want to do more of it in the near future. There is still one project I haven't seen. It gives a better background for evaluating reports and requests from project personnel, and from getting out to see the projects right away I got a realistic understanding of the program as it is working.

* * * *

One way that I do get out is when I am assigned the task of escorting visitors from Washington. For example, two high-level visitors are expected and I will travel with them for 3 days, visiting the various projects that they select to visit. While on such trips, I am able to make subjective judgments about project operations. I average one field trip every 8 months.

* * * *

A report came in from one province that they planned to do certain work soon. On an earlier field trip, I had noticed certain aspects of the project. By

chance I made a quick calculation of how my observations compared with this report. I found that their report was greatly exaggerated. I was able to save money and to prevent false reporting to Washington.

* * * *

Technicians planned a large job on a project. I had visited the project and noticed the dearth of laborers. The job couldn't be done with the available laborers. I cut off the plan which would have forced a later distortion of the program. If I had time to visit the field, I would probably catch many more errors.

* * * *

We have a project in one of the provinces which is almost finished. The provincial government wants to continue it because they think it is advantageous to them. But we won't do this until we know the effect the program has had in the past so that we have some idea of its desirability in the future. We also want the request for a continued program to come through the central government, not the provincial government, because it has to be important and effective enough to stimulate nation-wide concern. This would indicate to me the amount of success the program has had or not had.

Yesterday I met with a technician in that province. As a result of our discussion I have concluded, that the best way to evaluate the program is to send a certain Division Chief to the province with a representative of the host Minister to inspect the project sites, talk to the people involved, and make a subjective, on-the-spot estimate of the program's worth. When they get back, we will have something concrete, on paper, on which to base our decisions about the continuation or elimination of the program.

* * * *

> In a construction project, a host architectural firm contracted has produced very poor plans, completely unacceptable by U.S. standards. No one was aware that the plans were so bad. I heard that it was a problem, but didn't have enough staff to investigate. The division made no reports of the difficulty. When rumors got stronger, the Director assigned USOM personnel from another division to evaluate the design and they discovered the truth. Painfully difficult negotiations are now being conducted and no one can see a good way out.

* * * *

2. Evaluates projects

Very few Program Officers report that they perform this function in any formal sense. It is done implicitly to a certain extent in the programming function, but because there is little urgency for systematic evaluation, it tends to be ignored under the pressure or more urgent demands on staff time. The tasks of examining and analyzing project operations and results are difficult in that there are no systematic criteria or procedures established. For example, one Program Officer reports that while it is possible to determine the number of secondary teachers being trained, it is impossible to determine if they are being adequately trained, quickly enough, and if they are really needed. In areas where evaluation is possible, a competent, objective, evaluation may be provided best by outside contract teams, but there are usually no funds to hire such teams.

The evaluation questionnaires sent out by AID/W requesting quantitative data are considered by some a waste of time because they ask for information which is frequently irrelevant to project goals.

3. Corrects project deficiencies

Effective operation of mission projects may be prevented by many things. It is the task of the Program Officer to become aware of

any difficulties which arise and to provide advice to technical personnel in correcting them.

There are certain circumstances affecting project operations over which the mission has little control and which may necessitate the devising of stopgap measures to cope with them. For example, political or economic crises in the host country may stop all projects, so that program schedules cannot possible be met. Projects requiring seasonal timing for certain steps, may have to be substantially revised and objectives reduced.

Work stoppages also occur because AID/W fails to take prompt action on requests for commodities or personnel. This may result in the enforced idleness of highly-paid technicians for long periods of time, creating an unnecessary drain on project budgets and a morale program for the personnel.

a. advises on changes

1) In personnel. When personnel fail to perform adequately, from lack of skill, misassignment, or other reasons, the Program Officer may be consulted by the Division Chiefs in deciding whether to admonish, reassign, or terminate them. He may also assist in locating and recruiting permanent or temporary specialists, either locally or from the United States. A problem in doing the latter arises from the obsolescence and lack of clarity of the AID Staffing Pattern.

> "A job title in the Staffing Pattern may reflect what the incumbent is currently doing, but gives no information about his experience or capabilities. Good information would be very valuable for a small mission which could use a lot of technical help on a TDY basis."

There is a processing project which was started some years before I came here. It should have been finished years ago. AID brought in a consultant who was in conflict with the host counterpart. Nothing was getting accomplished. Something should have been done at that time. The consultant's contract ran out and they brought in a new consultant. AID/W sent another man to investigate. At this point I had arrived at the post and accompanied the AID/W man to field. I interrogated the manager who was a host national and determined that the man could not manage. In fact, if the man knew anything about management and the conditions which were to be imposed, he would not have taken the job. The manager had three former Participant Trainees working with him who were good but could do nothing because of the manager. I recommended that a new manager be brought in. This suggestion was adopted but, the way top management is handling this project it is still impossible to do a decent job. The setup is such that a manager takes orders from two sources. I am suggesting this be changed. At least now they are processing some material (after 10 years).

* * * *

I was present at a discussion of a problem concerning an accusation of incompetency of a USOM technician by an outside contractor. I suggested to the Director that the technician be removed from the project. The Director got more information and discovered that the feud between the two parties had already been settled. I believe I gave bad advice because of a lack of information.

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2) In equipment. The Program Officer may have information not available to some of the technical staff about equipment. He may advise about equipment modifications or special devices required to adapt to local electric power, altitude, climate, or other factors.

b. presses host government to honor commitments if necessary

One of the most common complaints of Program Officers all over the world regarding the operation of projects is the failure of host governments to meet their commitments for funds, material, or personnel. Certain of these governments seem to expect AID "to pull their chestnuts out of the fire," if, for any reason, they cannot make the contributions agreed upon. The actions taken by Program Officers range from subtly discussing the situation to threatening to cut off AID funds. It is very difficult, and at times impossible, to develop a genuine understanding among host officials of the reasons why United States personnel salaries and other expenses are high; why the mission cannot solve more of their problems; and why they gain from self-help projects.

> We never can be sure that the host government will finance things that they say they will. It was to provide equipment for a team of contract people coming in. At the last minute we found that they were not taking steps to do this and were not planning to do so. USAID had to start a crash program of equipment procurement.

* * * *

c. coordinates division activities

This task may range from assisting in the allocation of scarce equipment among divisions to insuring that the projects of different divisions are integrated when two or more operate in the same area. For example, if both the Agriculture and Education Divisions were conducting extension projects in training farm workers, the Program

Officers would attempt to coordinate their efforts to avoid the duplication of courses offered. A problem that arises in such circumstances is the deliberate encroachment of one division into areas nominally under the jurisdiction of another in order to increase the size of the division, the scope of its activities, and its importance in relation to other divisions.

Facilitating any required exchanges of services between divisions and the mission staff offices is also included in this task, since the Program Office serves as a communications link between the field and staff personnel. Difficulties most frequently arise because division personnel fail to observe regular procedures, or try to bypass low-level personnel and deal directly with the Chiefs of staff offices. For example, a Division Chief may refuse to provide information requested by an Assistant Program Officer and insist upon talking with the Program Officer. Often when important decisions are an issue they circumvent the Program Office entirely and demand to consult the Director. Other problems occur because the Executive Officer, Controller, or other administrative officer may give only secondary attention to assisting division personnel and ignore or delay fulfilling requests. Then the Program Officer will be called upon either to handle the matter or to insure that it is handled by an appropriate person.

Further difficulties regarding administrative services arise when other staff offices are ineptly directed. The Program Officer may find that the only way to fulfill division needs is to assign the task to a subordinate in the Program Office.

Close friendships between the Program Officer and technical personnel may also create coordinating obstacles. For example, when two divisions are in conflict or competition for some reason, the Program Officer's personal relations with members of one division may arouse suspicions within the other that the Program Office shows favoritism.

The greatest obstacle to fulfilling this task is the failure of Program Office personnel to make field observation, which has been discussed in earlier sections.

> Two divisions are both involved in working on the reorganization of a host Ministry. Independent reports submitted by the divisions did not concur regarding the state of the Ministry. I asked the Assistant Program Officer to see the Chiefs involved and to ask them to get together. If conflicting reports reaching AID/W it could: a) reflect badly on the Director's awareness of Division activities, b) reflect on programing and raise doubts in minds of the program review staff about program needs, and c) lead to Congressional repercussions.

* * * *

d. coordinates division and host agency efforts

The Program Officer's task of insuring that host governments honor their commitments in joint projects with AID has been discussed above (IIIA3b). He is also responsible for renegotiating and approving any changes in project operations which may be necessitated after work begins. It occasionally happens that host officials lose patience when AID is delayed in meeting its commitments, and they sometimes simply order equipment or recruit personnel from other sources without giving any notification. This may mean that the mission has had funds and staff members devoted to plans which subsequently have to be scrapped. It may also mean that the mission loses control over major aspects of the project.

Another coordinating task arises when AID schedules projects which overlap with those of host agencies having no formal agreements

with the mission. It can be difficult to arrange complementary operations because officials have not had earlier contacts with AID and do not understand its procedures, or because they do not want to reveal their plans for political reasons.

Technical personnel who become closely identified with some one host agency also create problems for the Program Officer, especially if that agency has conflicts with other host agencies who are planning development projects in the same general area. This can result in overemphasis of certain factors, when a more generalized approach encompassing a broader range of the whole area would be of greater long-run value.

> A number of problems beset the establishment of a host agency. First, the host officials decided that it could have no directors who were also directors of business concerns. Two men who had been working on the planning committee resigned when they learned of this. Second, the chairman of the board of directors is a political appointee who is held in contempt by the business community. Third, there has been great difficulty in getting the necessary legislation. Although I feel that the establishment of this agency is one of the most important steps for developing the country, I wonder how the people can be motivated to take advantage of the opportunities it offers. Instead of taking real investment risks, they deposit their money in Swiss banks or put it into nonproductive items such as houses or automobiles.
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> An AID contract called for the purchase of special equipment. This, of course, was to be purchased in the U.S. When the time came to buy the articles they were not available in the U.S., but were available locally from a European firm. The local official involved suggested he pay for the equipment, so that the European-made products could be purchased. AID was to spend the money originally obligated for equipment to renovate a building to house the equipment. My subordinate brought this problem to me for a decision. Realizing that the project must be started and that a substantial delay would occur by waiting for U.S. equipment, I authorized the swap.
>
> * * * *

> I wanted to get a host department to work with one of our divisions. I tried to get members of other host departments to arrange the contact. When they failed to do it, I worked with another host agency and they were able to set up a committee. It was effective because I found the people with the desire and power to accomplish what I wanted.

* * * *

e. coordinates division and other United States agency efforts

Many of the same tasks and problems are involved in coordinating project operations as were described in coordinating plans (see section IB3).

Frequently the efforts of other U.S. agencies in fulfilling their part of joint projects will be delayed for the same reasons that the mission's efforts are delayed--lack of funds, insufficient personnel, or bureaucratic tangles. In these situations the Program Officer may find himself subject to conflicting pressures. Mission personnel and some host officials may press him to expedite a project by placing it under the sole management of AID, while personnel from the cooperating agency, and perhaps other host officials, want to maintain the existing arrangement. He has to make a decision, which others may find hard to understand, that weighs possible long-run considerations against the more immediate project goals.

f. presses USAID personnel as required

The major obstacle in this task, as in so many others, is the lack of definition of the Program Officer's authority. His efforts to pressure project personnel to meet their schedules may be construed as interfering in technical areas beyond his competence or jurisdiction, and result in personal conflicts. At other times division personnel may complain to the Director, who may or may not support the Program Officer.

Failure on the part of Division Chiefs to monitor contract teams employed by their divisions appears to be a prevalent problem. The Chiefs feel that they have hired experts and that little supervision is required. However, contract teams usually need guidance in conforming to AID regulations or in dealing with host agencies. In addition, some contractors try to "build empires" to insure that their services will be required by the mission in the future. Work groups from other United States Government agencies tend to be particularly difficult to manage in this respect. The Program Officer frequently has to decide between "hounding" the Division Chief to provide supervision or taking over the job himself and running the risk of offending the Division Chief.

Some Program Officers report that they feel very constrained in developing social contacts because it then becomes difficult to correct or pressure people with whom they have close informal relationships. Others admit that they require less stringent regard for procedures from their friends than from other people, sometimes leading to charges of favoritism.

Many problems are created by the reluctance of Division Chiefs to fulfill the requirements of division administration. The following critical incidents illustrate typical examples of the kinds of situations which arise.

> One of the most difficult feats of persuasion is to impel the technicians to make their own decisions. For example, one Chief insisted upon two participants for his plan. I finally conceded. Then the Chief wanted me to select the participants. I refused. Finally he began to make his own decisions.

* * * *

AID/W sent the mission a cable instructing that they be informed which positions in a division should be cut in order to conform to an economy drive. The Division Chief was supposed to decide which positions were to be deleted, but he not only refused to decide, he also refused to discuss the situation with me. Finally, after much delay, the Division Chief gave me a cable for clearance which informed AID/W that personnel cuts were impossible. I knew that the cuts had to be made, and also that the Division Chief would never make the cuts, so suggested that both he and I meet with the Deputy Director to discuss the situation. As a result of this meeting, under the Deputy Director's influence, the Division Chief not only agreed to the cuts, but also designated which positions. Thus, the message to AID/W was able to go out.

* * * *

One Chief Technician sometimes overlooks some of the political aspects of his projects. He also has been here long enough to be fed up with the host nationals. This presents a problem for me. What seem to be good ideas to people who have been here a short time do not seem so to him. He has worked with these people a very long time and knows them well. He has gotten blunt in his thinking toward them and in his written messages. Because of these things I feel I should check what he does in order to represent our broader interests and because we certainly don't want him to antagonize the Embassy. I would like to let him go on but for the above reasons I shouldn't. The difficulty is, I have to establish a different relationship with him since he is quite old enough to be my father and he has been around here a long time so I can't issue orders to him and hover over his desk when he is working.

* * * *

g. explores solutions with technical staff

While the Program Officer lacks many types of specialized knowledge, he frequently has more experience than technical personnel in meeting problems typically encountered in underdeveloped countries. For example, technicians may not understand that host national counterparts fear loss of face if they ask questions. The Program Officer may be able to assist other United States personnel in developing strategies for insuring that instructions are thoroughly understood and thus avoid the waste of time and material resulting from mistakes. He may also be able to recommend methods for overcoming problems that he has observed to work successfully in past projects.

In large missions with scattered projects, division personnel may be unaware of the total resources in trained personnel or special equipment available to the mission. The Program Officer can frequently arrange interdivision consultations or equipment loans to solve specific problems. In some instances, he may arrange for assistance from TDY specialists, host agencies, or other groups.

> I heard that difficulty was being encountered in a project for training host nationals. I assigned my senior analyst to discuss it with division personnel. They were quite cooperative and interested in investigating. The problems were resolved.

* * * *

4. Advises on routine project administration

As the mission officer with the greatest knowledge of Manual Orders, regulations, and policies pertaining to program matters, the Program Officer provides advice, guidance, and information.

to the technical divisions and staff officers in all aspects of project administration. The problems encountered because of confusing AID/W directives, delayed approvals of requests to AID/W, and unclear authority, previously described, also interfere with the effective performance of the tasks involved here.

Another major problem is the tendency for field personnel to bypass the normal channels for handling the details of project administration. It may occur on any level, from refusing to deal with Program Office subordinates to bypassing mission officers and contacting AID/W directly. It nearly always means extra work for the Program Office staff, and perhaps other staff offices, to find out what has gone on and to take appropriate remedial measures.

At times, there may be difficulties because technical personnel and the Program Officer do not communicate easily with each other. These may range from minor verbal misunderstandings to basic conflicts in interpreting policy and procedural requirements. Conversely, some Program Officers report that technicians impose upon their time by "crying on my shoulder" whenever they get the opportunity.

a. reviews staffing and requests for personnel

This task may range from routine processing of staffing documents to extensive collaboration with Division Chiefs in deciding upon the assignment or recruitment of personnel.

One problem concerns differences in opinion between the Program Officer and Division Chiefs regarding the best allocation of the project staff. Program Officers frequently feel that the technician has a short-range view, narrowly restricted to the goals of his particular specialty or project, which dictates emphasis upon aspects other than those relevant to the longer-ranged, total-program goals.

The problems reported above in section I C 3 regarding report writing also pertain to getting technicians to conform to the requirements and to meet the deadlines for documenting personnel requests.

> The host government has a short training program. The Division Chief did not want to invest much in assisting this training program, but wanted to invest the majority of his staff and funds in a program giving longer training. With the help of the Deputy Director I convinced the Division Chief to put more technicians into the short training program. They finally assigned____to the long program and ____to the short program.

* * * *

> I disagreed with the Chief of a Division on a PIO for a research team. The Division Chief had written looser specifications than I wanted and had omitted some points. We discussed these differences but could not come to any agreement due to differing ideas of what the Director wanted. Therefore, we took this conflict to the Deputy Director who made a decision.

* * * *

b. recommends procurement procedures

The "buy American" policy creates some of the greatest difficulties in this task. Technicians frequently argue strongly for foreign-made equipment or commodities which they like or are accustomed to using when the Program Office requests that they substitute American-made items.

Problems also arise in missions where the Executive Office does not fulfill its part in providing administrative services to the divisions. The Program Office then has an additional task

in researching and advising on methods for handling transport or storage of commodities of equipment.

A technician wanted a new office building. We said no. He knew the host President who forced us to approve. The technician picked and paid for his building but now he can't get occupancy because it is an apartment house occupied by mistresses of the party officials. We can't solve this problem.

* * * *

In the past there has been no policy of describing what commodities were ordered. There never were records as to the specific items purchased. The Director and I were both horrified when we found out, so I issued a directive from the Director stating that commodity purchases had to be specified and justified.

* * * *

Crisis developed in an assisted industry. Expensive new equipment was needed to avoid a shutdown and strike. I was Acting Director. I loaned money to buy the equipment. It was European equipment and the money should have been used only to "buy American." I got away with it.

* * * *

The Executive Officer told me that a technician in a division was requesting a European tape recorder for one of his projects. The Executive Officer asked me what I thought about this. I knew that this was the third request for foreign-made commodities which came from the technicians in a very short time. I wrote a memo to the technician telling him if he wanted a tape recorder it would have to be American-made.

This violation of AID policy should not be this prevalent so when the mission Director gets back I will recommend to him that we explained to the technicians the reasons why we are so adamant on this "buy American" policy. We will cite our balance of payments problems, gold outflow problems, offshore procurement problems, etc., so they can see the rationale of the policy and know that it can't be waived unless it is in the interest of our overall U.S. policy.

* * * *

The host government requested food-processing equipment producing higher quality products, therefore, higher prices. The request was for a project which we sponsor. The machine only costs $__,so the Division Chief and Director thought that the fact that it cost so little should override the fact that it was a local product, not American. The goodwill and efficiency which it would bring would make it justifiable. I argued against it, my point being that since it is not a U.S. product and since it does cost so little, the host government should buy it. We asked AID/W for advice. They refused the request, so I felt justified in my judgment.

* * * *

There was a crash program to buy equipment for a training project. No one paid much attention to what type of electrical equipment was being bought, and whether it would run on 220 volts! Further, no provisions were made for taking inventory of the equipment. A technician was put in charge of this, and I do not blame him for these deficiencies since it was all done in a hurry. However, after hearing reports from men in the Program Office, I am recommending to Director that he talk to another U.S. agency who, in turn, will talk to a host agency to set up an appropriate procedure for handling this phase of the program.

* * * *

A Division Chief wanted some equipment and proposed this to the Director. They didn't mention it to me. I happened to be in the Director's office when it was brought up. As Program Officer, I wanted to know why the host Minister should be given this equipment. It seemed to me that the equipment would not be entirely adequate for their purposes. I came to the conclusion that I was not informed of this proposal, and, as a result, it might have been approved by the Director, which would have been a mistake. If we can't be advised of what is going on we can't be of any help to the program.

* * * *

When I first came here, I was very critical of some details of one division's projects. Some equipment was wanted for a project which I felt was not justified. At least the justification for it was not specific. I disagreed with the request until I came to learn that it was time to present the host Minister with a little "sugar." And it was done through this particular project. It was a political consideration which was operating here--not economic. Our program changed in nature. We are interested in promoting the self-help concept and in order to stimulate it, we sometimes have to give something in return.

* * * *

A letter of credit expired before some commodities had arrived because I had applied incorrectly to AID/W, not realizing these particular orders had been superseded.

* * * *

c. assists in planning cost reductions

In fulfilling this task the Program Officer must be fully informed on cost factors in all aspects of the program, from the price of making mud bricks to international shipping charges. He frequently works very closely with the Executive Officer in working out cost reduction strategies.

Many technicians may lack experience in handling large-scale procurement. For this reason the Program Officer has to be alert in detecting deficiencies in orders submitted and to educating the technicians in economical purchasing methods.

> A Division submitted commodity purchase estimates based on local small-lot purchases. I encouraged thinking through general requirements and submitting bulk purchase orders in the U.S. This was effective in insuring observance of balance of payments directives.
>
> * * * *
>
> I picked up a paper at a conference. It contained information about equipment which could be used for AID projects and which was stored in procurement depots in U. S. I suggested that a Division Chief visit depots while on home leave. A message was received from him that he had been refused permission to go to depots. I sent an airgram to Transportation and Equipment and Procurement Offices telling them this mission's needs were far in excess of supply so that it was important to get maximum mileage out ofevery dollar. The program would suffer if the Chief was denied permission. Permission was granted.
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> * * * *

The Executive Officer was advised by cable that equipment was available at reduced cost. He mentioned it to the Director who mentioned it to me. I encouraged the Director to authorize purchase of the equipment after checking available funds and finding that they would cover these costs.

* * * *

d. approves the use of local currency

In many missions, the Program Officer is responsible for administering local currencies generated by P L 480 programs or other sources. The task involves knowledge of regulations and restrictions on the use of these funds. When it is necessary to reject a request for local currency, the Program Officer may find it difficult to make technical personnel understand why these limitations apply to their projects.

A Division Chief had requested a large amount of local currency for a project. He made a mistake (he needed 4 times as much) which he did not discover until funds were needed. It was too late, there was no way to help; people had to be laid off. Closer attention to what was planned and how little was asked for the job might have allowed me to catch the error myself during the planning stage.

* * * *

e. interprets project documents

After a project has been started, differences in opinion may arise regarding the meaning of some points in the project plans. It may be the responsibility of the Program Officer to interpret these documents and settle any disputes.

> My problems with contractors are largely concerned with interpretation of questions of management. For example, the one contractor needed an extension of time because the host government was moving so slowly. The contract, however, did not permit an extension without AID/W approval. I cabled Washingtion three or four times with no result. The problem was finally resolved by the Mission Director during his visit to Washington, and the contract was extended.

* * * *

> A Division Chief and the Controller were arguing over the interpretation of a Project Agreement for paying host staff on a project. The Division Chief came to me to gain program support. I asked to be allowed to bow out of the argument. (I had not been in on drawing up the Project Agreement). The Division Chief phoned the Director for an appointment to arbitrate the dispute. [Interviewer's note: the Division Chief felt that the Program Officer should have handled it.]

5. Manages phase-outs

Many of the same types of information gathering, conferring, planning, and advising described in project planning occur during project

phase-outs. Problems arise when AID technicians or contract personnel do not fully agree with the mission's view and refuse to cooperate in phase-out procedures.

Another difficulty may occur in determining appropriate administrative responsibility for a small portion of a project retained after the phase-out of the major part of it. Failure to place definite control of such projects under a technical division may result in their being seriously mismanaged.

> (From subordinate) A memorandum came around yesterday concerning the phasing out of Americans on a project. The way it was written it just did not make sense to me. Phasing in and out is very pertinent to training and this is an area of concern for me so I called the Division Chief. He gave me some answers which still did not completely satisfy me. And then he told me that the phase-out was gone into in detail the day before by the Director, Deputy Director, Program Officer, and himself. The Program Officer should have called me in on the meeting since it was so pertinent to training. Now, if I cannot get this thing straight in my own mind, it will take another meeting between the Program Officer and me which could and should have been avoided. Since I was not informed about the meeting, the Program Officer should at least have told me the substance of what went on by a memo or phone call or even a personal visit.

* * * *

> Due to Congressional pressure we are due to phase-out a project as soon as possible. We were getting nowhere with the project personnel in working out a sensible phase-out program. Because of this, the Director suggested to me

that we should tell them we are going to arbitrarily reduce their budget. This would force a phase-out. I said I strongly disagreed. I said we are all Americans and if we cannot come to a sensible solution, there is something wrong with us. I was called to Washington on TDY to discuss this. Washington was completely against an arbitrary budget reduction. They thought serious damage would be done to our whole program if we did this. They wanted us to continue these negotiations and to supply them concurrently with all developing facts and issues. I felt my stand was supported. We are in the process of negotiating a phase-out now.

* * * *

a. negotiates with host government officials

Much of the discussion of negotiations in section II C 1 applies to this task also. Frequently the Program Officer must "sell" the host officials on accepting a phase-out and must reassure them about their own capabilities to carry on in the area and of AID's future assistance in other areas.

b. prepare completion reports

This task includes the same types of writing, editing, and revising tasks described in preceding sections.

B. Revises Projects and Adjusts Program Budget as Necessary

Project or budget revisions may be necessitated for a variety of reasons: changes in AID or mission policy or funding, similar changes by the host government, unpredicated extra expenses or savings in a project, or natural disasters.

It is commonly agreed among Program Officers that project requirements are always different than had been anticipated. Therefore it is necessary to know the status of all funds and the availability of excesses to transfer as needed. Aside from the basic difficulties in deciding what changes to make, the main problem in revising projects or funds is keeping people happy. Technical chiefs fight to avoid any decreases in project activities or funds, and frequently insist that project needs are already being served at minimum levels.

> I observed that an on-going project was employing a number of technicians scattered all over the country. Its goals were not clearly defined, its accomplishments were not particularly impressive and the host officials were not excited about it. The division proposed expanding the program and encouraging the hosts to expand their effort in this direction. I did not believe that the project would help the hosts. I reviewed the project, questioned the division and recipients, and established a low priority for it. It is being phased out. With the money which would have been spent, the mission was able to finance a contract team survey to determine what the priorities are for development plans. This was effective because I was able to reshape the project to host needs.

* * * *

1. Advises on fund transfers and budget revisions

This task may become of major importance in the Program Office toward the end of the fiscal year in order to avoid the loss of

uncommitted funds. It may range from routinely reviewing a budget revision prepared by someone else, to developing a detailed analysis of the program budget and re-allocating substantial proportions of available funds.

> During the Deputy Program Officer's absence it was necessary to readjust the budget downward. I thought the Assistant Program Officer could handle this, but after looking at the start he had made, I realized that I would have to do it myself. Working with Division Chiefs, division by division, I set up a table indicating where the cuts could be made. In these individual negotiations I worked out the data to meet the requirements of the new budget.

* * * *

> A division had a request for $_____for a project which was being proposed by the host government. The Project Agreement was taking much time to be discussed. The host officials were dragging their feet for some reason. They also did not want to provide the same services and counterpart funds which they originally had said they would. The result was no signed Project Agreement, but $_____tied up which could not be utilized and which could not even be returned to the United States Treasury. It was just "frozen" because of the host government delays. I told the Division Chief to inform the host officials that we were going to release the funds back to Washington. But he did not want to do it. He said that it was money earmarked for this division and they would use it somewhere else if they could not get the host government to cooperate. Negotiations dragged on further and again I asked him to sign a release for this money, but he wanted to keep it in the division for other things. With this, I asked the Assistant Program Officer to find out why the division signature was required at all on such a release. I found out that it was not required. It was preferred that authorization be given by the

Division Chief, but not necessary. So I simply de-obligated the funds and notified the division and host government that the move was taken. In this case I felt as though I had to take action. I do not like to write these kinds of letters summarily, but in this case I thought it was necessary.

* * * *

2. Reviews and approves requests for supplemental funds

Supplemental funds are occasionally required when projects exceed budgets. Ordinarily the Program Officer attempts to fill these requests by reallocating existing funds before applying to AID/W, unless he feels quite sure that they are for purposes that AID/W will readily approve. The task also includes advising how to phase the justification for funds in terms most likely to be accepted in Washington.

The difficulties of getting adequate justifications for funds from Division Chiefs create problems similar to those discussed with reference to other paperwork.

Two other major problems exist regarding this task. One is the reluctance and often resentment of Division Chiefs to accept the Program Officer's rejection of their requests because he foresees rejection by AID/W which is in keeping with the unwritten rule in all missions never to make requests to AID/W that are likely to be turned down.

The second problem is, of course, delay by AID/W in acting upon such requests. Projects sometimes have to stop completely in these circumstances.

A division was allowed $_____ for a construction project. Some of these funds were diverted for purchasing equipment, covering a host pay raise that could not have been anticipated, and repairing storm damage to facilities. Remaining funds were inadequate to cover the construction planned. The Division Chief wanted to submit a supplemental fund request. I persuaded him that AID/W would not grant supplemental funds. I am always in continuing discussion with the Director about division needs and available funds. Memos kept coming in from the Division Chief about the need for more money over a period of months. Finally I authorized additional funds supplied by drawing from the Director's reserve, reducing other aspects of the project, using funds available because of unexpected delay in the arrival of a technician, and savings on equipment purchased.

* * * *

A construction program was approved by AID/W on a two-year basis. Construction proceeded ahead of the funding pattern. Money was obligated, but next year's money was actually needed in this year in order to keep construction going. I asked AID/W if some contingency money was available for immediate use and chargeable against next year's money when it becomes available. AID/W replied that the mission must have changed plans. I accounted for changes in rate of expenditure, e.g., bricks made in rural areas of poor facility, good bricks had to be hauled from city, etc., need to complete the project before next year. The request was disapproved. Construction was curtailed.

* * * *

3. <u>Explains or justifies project and budget changes</u>

a. to USAID personnel

The task of convincing other mission personnel that the changes he proposes are appropriate is one of the most difficult in

the Program Officer's job. As described above, the technicians fight to protect or expand their projects. In addition, officers superior to the Program Officer may have "pet projects" or favored technicians that they try to defend. It is much easier to obtain agreement if the Program Officer has the confidence of the Director and can announce changes in his name, but, even if this is the case, unpleasant reactions may be encountered that can develop into long-term feuds.

> A Division Chief told me and the Director that another United States agency was going to assign personnel to host facilities. He thought this would give us an opportunity to increase American staff in these facilities and proposed the establishment of an administrative office, with a top specialist to direct. It would be of primary importance because it would create the machinery for the host government to take over providing these services. The Director did not like the proposal because he would have to bring in and budget for more high-salaried people. I disagreed and argued that we could phase out an earlier project and phase in this one (because I considered it a good proposal in the long run). The Director changed his mind, we sent it to Washington, and they approved it. I think this will pay off for us in the future. We have a big stake in this country, and this work will be an important social reform. On the other hand, _____ is very ticklish. It has to be brought along very carefully. It is dangerous for us to move too quickly, and just as dangerous to move too slowly. If the timing proves to be a mistake, I have a great responsibility for it. We cannot afford mistakes in this area, even more so because host resources will be involved as much as United States dollars.

* * * *

b. to AID/W

Ordinarily routine procedures are followed in preparing notifications of changes for AID/W. It may be necessary to answer several requests for additional information or to send repeated follow-up messages before Washington takes any action.

> AID/W has ordered termination of certain projects and specified an effective date. Planning for an orderly transition to host operation has not been done. Effective administration of a significant contract is based on continuing operation of these projects until transition arrangements are completed. The specific problem is the method for paying United States staff if these projects are transferred to the host government. The Director, the Division Chief, and I sent a special appeal to AID/W to gain permission to operate the projects for a short time. Permission was granted.

* * * *

c. to host government personnel.

See the discussion of negotiations above in section II C 1.

> Support for a host industry has kept a large proportion of AID's available local currency for country development tied up. I persuaded the host Minister to accept lower support amounts by reasoning that in the long run it would help the country by putting pressure on the industry to try to sell their products at home and abroad. In exchange the Director and I agreed to support import restrictions if they could be worked out in general terms.

* * * *

4. Advises on handling contingencies

The term contingencies means all types of unpredictable emergencies or events which may call for extraordinary procedures or additional funds.

a. provides information on relevant regulations

b. recommends funding procedures

These tasks involve advising higher mission officers or host government officials upon what courses of action the mission is permitted to follow in assisting the host government to recover from natural disasters, or in handling emergencies within the mission. In the latter case, the Program Officer would usually cooperate with the Executive Officer. The Program Officer needs to know what funds can be devoted to these ends and how much may be spent without AID/W approval.

> A recent natural disaster destroyed virtually an entire town. The United States Ambassador felt obligated to aid the town and was asked to do so by host officials. He consulted the Mission Director regarding what could be done and how. The Director consulted me. I had previously worked during an epidemic at another post so I knew that a United States Ambassador is allowed to spend up to $10,000 on emergency or humanitarian relief without reference to Washington. I also knew where to find the authority for this and did so. The Ambassador was thus able to provide the immediately needed relief for the stricken area. If a delay had resulted because of seeking Washington permission, the aid would not have been as effective.

* * * *

C. Accomplishes Other Program Management Functions

1. Reads, reviews, prepares correspondence

The amount of attention given to this task by the Program Officer usually depends upon the size of the mission. In the larger, a subordinate usually handles routine correspondence. In all missions, the Program Officer tends to be called upon to prepare or edit important cables or letters. Many of the activities and problems described in discussing reports also apply to this task.

The greatest difficulties pertain to the brevity of messages required in writing cables or airgrams. They are often so cryptic that they cannot be fully understood and disagreements arise over interpreting them. It may result in delaying some crucial action until clarification can be obtained from the sender. Since this happens at both ends of the system--in the mission and in Washington--it is not an insignificant problem.

> We received AID/W approval of a host government loan application. Our copies were all in English. It is my understanding that it is permissible to transmit such documents to the host government in English with an explanation that we would be available for clarification if they wished. I thought the transmittal letter should be in both _____ and English so host officials would know what the document was and not be confused in any way about what it meant. The Director would not go along with me and sent only an English transmittal letter. I'm sure they'll have trouble reading it and may misunderstand some things.
>
> * * * *
>
> Interpersonal problems among Americans in the mission--yes, this is a definite problem, especially between

Division Chiefs and me. The reason for this is that I am not superior in the mission organization to Division Chiefs, but everyone realizes that I have the most influence with the Director. This creates the situation of Division Chiefs' having to win the approval of someone on the same level. The result is friction. For example, a Division Chief once drafted a cable to AID/W asking for several new personnel. My subordinate was clearing the cable and mentioned the contents to me. The subordinate informed me that he intended to try to obtain additional details about the need for these new personnel. When meeting with the Division Chief, my subordinate found the technician absolutely non-communicative so he gave up. Moments later the Division Chief called me and asked why I was questioning the cable. I replied that I was merely interested in what the additional personnel were to do. The Division Chief's response was to say in an angry tone, "O.K., then we will not ask for anyone," and he hung up.

* * * *

(from subordinate) We are building facilities for a host agency. We have known all along that there would be certain problems. The host officials have made known that they now want a specific building configuration. I drafted a memo telling them that the building desired is impractical because of the problems. The Program Officer changed the word impractical and told me he thought it would be better to say expensive. As a result they are going to have their type of building, but they are going to do it at their own expense. I think the change of wording also changed the substance of the letter.

* * * *

2. <u>Reads, reviews, prepares project reports</u>

See section I C 3 for discussions of the tasks and problems applying to reports.

I have had cases where technicians have not responded to requests from AID/W and in one case from myself for specific information concerning a project. These happened at about the same time so I went to the Director and gave him the circumstances. He stated that it was my job to get them to do their jobs. I then drew up a memo to each one which stated, "Will you please submit by (date) the report requested from you to (the Program Officer or AID/W). Refer to the memorandum to you from the Program Officer dated _____ which requested this information earlier."

* * * *

A division submitted a report required by AID/W on the past activities of the division. The report stressed accomplishments made by certain projects. I returned the report to the Division Chief and suggested that stress be laid on the United States' investment in the projects and upon the projects to be implemented in future in order to try to insure continuation of these projects. The report was rewritten. The man who wrote the original report did not speak to me for three months. I took it as part of the job.

* * * *

"Crummy reports" are a big problem, for example, a Division Chief sent in incomplete reports. I sent the Assistant Program Officer to see him and to get information to fill in gaps. It gave the Division Chief a chance to sound off about reports and for us to get the necessary data.

* * * *

I took a report to the Director, saying that it was too bad to do anything with. The Director passed it back to the Division Chief, which is the procedure he prefers to follow. The Division Chief passed it on to the technician who wrote it with a word

regarding who had criticized it. The technician was offended and would not speak to me for some time.

* * * *

The mission has been dissatisfied with a contract, and wants to terminate it. A problem is created by pressures for contract continuation. The Division Chief submitted a routine division report to be sent to AID/W, and it came to me for routine clearance. I noted this report was inconsistent with mission policy because, while it stressed the undesirable aspects of the contract, it also referred to contract continuation. I brought the matter to the attention of the Director, who issued instructions for modifying the report. I carried the Director's instructions to the Chief and the report was changed.

* * * *

Technicians, being more technically oriented naturally, do not see the necessity for regular and specific reporting. They always seem to find some excuse to get out of reporting (too much work, too much time required). The requirements for technicians' reporting are spelled out in the Manual Orders so there should be no need to oversee this part of their jobs. The Manual Orders spell out work plans that they should periodically submit with a check list of items, factors and topics which should be covered by them. These Manual Orders call for monthly reports regarding their work progress. Since these reports were not forthcoming, I issued a directive referring all technicians to the appropriate Manual Orders and [illegible] describing the supplementary reports which were expected of them with deadlines assigned to each report to be submitted.

* * * *

3. Keeps others informed about project status

This task is a continuous activity for the Program Officer. He usually presents regular reports on projects at staff meetings and may be called upon at any time for information about specific facts about any project. In some cases he maintains personal files in order to be able to answer quickly any questions which arise. The Director frequently relies almost solely upon the Program Officer for project information. Host officials may also maintain regular contacts with the Program Officer as their source of information.

Difficulty in obtaining accurate reports from the field (discussed in III A 1) creates the greatest obstacle in performing this task.

> As an example of United States' delays which are embarrassing: A Project Agreement was signed with the host government along with the appropriate PIO/T to provide for the training of local technicians by a United States firm. AID/W did not get out an invitation for bids from United States contractors until seven months later. The contractor was not selected for five more months. The contractor then decided that he needed some special clauses in his contract because it would otherwise jeopardize other contracts which he had with the host government. These additional negotiations lasted for months and at one time were actually broken off. The contract was finally signed by all parties two years after the original Project Agreement was signed. It would still be several weeks, if not months, before the people actually arrive at the post. I had to explain to the host officials that the United States Government and the contractor "were all fouled up."

* * * *

I have mentioned all the difficulties with the Division Chief and with his division. I think one cause of all these difficulties is that he simply has too much to do. He does not have confidence in his assistant so he tries to do it all himself. I am sure that this is one reason why a contract team has been left to itself, why the evaluation regarding their projects is so hard to do, i.e., to get information on, etc. A list of all the responsibilities he has would generate some genuine sympathy for the man. It is just too much to ask of one man. I'm very aware of this and I have proposed to the Director that this Division Chief be relieved of certain projects. This would give him time to keep on top of things. It is really his job to go to the Director and tell him he has too much work to do, but he has not, so I have, and the Director is coming around to my point of view.

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4. Acts as Division Chief as required

The Program Officer may be required to take on the tasks and responsibilities of a Division Chief when the mission cannot recruit a qualified technical person to fill the job or when a proposed project cannot be readily handled by one of the existing technical divisions. Under these circumstances, the Program Officer may be required to direct technical operations, as well as to perform the administrative work. Some of these duties may be shared with an Assistant Program Officer or Deputy Program Officer. The main problem is that attending to these tasks interferes with accomplishing Program Office work.

IV. CONTRIBUTES TO MISSION MANAGEMENT

Ordinarily the Program Officer's superiors consult him about many aspects of managing the mission. These management tasks fall into three categories.

The first category contains the tasks involved in directing the Program Office. These tasks are directly interwoven with the functions of determining, implementing, and managing the program.

The second category consists of tasks such as handling publicity and assisting in recruiting personnel -- tasks which entail decisions based upon knowledge of many aspects of the program. While primary responsibility for performing tasks like these may be delegated to other officers, the Program Officer generally contributes a great deal of time and effort to them.

The third category tends to vary more from mission to mission than the other two. It includes tasks delegated to the Program Officer either routinely or sporadically by higher officers for which almost no program knowledge is necessary. Examples appear among the incidents cited in section IV D 2, below. At times, being brought into non-program matters creates difficulties for the Program Officer in his relationships with colleagues because they may feel they have been bypassed and resent his infringing upon their jobs. They may also disagree with the Program Officer regarding the appropriate course of action for deciding something within their jurisdictions, and interpret his opinion as implying doubt of their competence.

A. Directs Program Office

Directing the Program Office is the major management function of the Program Officer. There is considerable variability in how this task is accomplished. In some missions, particularly the smaller, the Program Officer may deal personally with very minor tasks; in

other missions he may delegate substantial responsibilities to subordinates and be concerned with the details of only the most important matters.

1. Supervises subordinates

While the duties involved in this task -- informing, monitoring, and counselling subordinates -- are fairly consistent from mission to mission, the amount of emphasis for any one of them will depend upon the size and capabilities of the Program Office staff. For example, with a large, well-trained group of subordinates, the Program Officer may spend only little time in developing skills, but perhaps a great deal in insuring that information reaches appropriate personnel, and in monitoring and evaluating their performance. If the same staff consists of relatively new personnel, he may be required to spend extensive amounts of time training them in correct procedures.

a. provides information

Usually the Program Officer holds staff meetings to keep his subordinates informed of any relevant information regarding policy, project plans, operations, or decisions made at higher levels in the mission. For especially important and detailed matters, he may also write and distribute memoranda or directives. In addition, he insures that documents of various types coming into the Program Office are routed to appropriate subordinates.

> The only problem I have, which is not actually a problem, but it does take time and effort, is keeping the Assistant Program Officer and all other Program Office staff advised in general about what is going on. It takes a bit more time with the Assistant Program Officer because I am trying to teach him more substantive things about the Program Office.

* * * *

A subordinate was writing a letter in response to a request for information on host development activities. I read the draft and it was apparent that the letter would lead one to the wrong conclusions concerning certain sectors. I knew enough about this from having read the Embassy report on these matters. I gave the Embassy airgram to the subordinate to read and asked him to revise his letter.

* * * *

b. monitors and evaluates performance

This task involves both day-to-day observation and guidance of subordinates' work and completion of formal evaluation procedures. In accomplishing the former, difficulties sometimes arise because there is a lack of rapport between the Program Officer and a subordinate. This may be the result of differences in background, of different interpretations of what a task requires, or of personal relations involving other members of the mission staff, as illustrated in the first of the following incidents.

One of my subordinates is on especially friendly terms with the Mission Director, which creates problems for me. This subordinate feels free to ignore instructions and generally does inadequate work. In one case, he wrote a very unsatisfactory airgram to AID/W which was routed through me. I sent it back to him for correction, noting its deficiencies. The subordinate, however, came into my office and told me harshly that I had missed the entire point of the message. Because of the personal relationship involved, it was necessary to use diplomacy in handling the situation. Although angry, I forced myself to remain calm and agreed to re-read the message. Frequently I have to redo this subordinate's work, which is an additional burden on my time.

* * * *

I have a very independent-minded secretary who has her own ways of doing things. At times she doesn't correspond to our ways. One subordinate did his work in a very disjointed manner. He would ask her for little things and give her last minute typing -- both of which she refused to do. I find that by giving her a great deal of lattitude she does her best work so I don't tell her how to do things -- I let her go about her job with a minimum of supervision.

* * * *

I occasionally discuss work progress with my subordinate to insure that implementation work is going forward. When work first begins, immediately after receipt of the Implementation Approval Document, I check with him weekly to learn of progress. Then, as work progresses, and the end of the FY approaches, I check with him daily.

* * * *

A research team had gathered data concerning a specific type of program and had made some recommendations concerning smoother operations. Since these recommendations were not fully appropriate for this mission's program, I assigned a subordinate the task of modifying the material in order to meet local needs. He objected to the assignment on the basis that he had no time, but I suspect that the real reason for his reluctance was that he didn't know how to modify and use the materials. I wanted him to try in order to gain experience, perhaps to improve the program, and to provide a basis for judging his ability. I occasionally ask him what has been accomplished, but the answer is always negative. I prefer not to force him to do this task, and there is insufficient time to persuade or to explain in detail what is to be done. Also, his work is satisfactory in other respects, so I decided not to push this issue.

* * * *

Some tables for a report are not done yet. The Deputy Director told me to go to the subordinate and simply tell him to "get it done, now." I hesitate to do that, however, because when I have asked him about things he was doing in the past I always got a big reaction from him like "what do you expect me to do, I'm only human and I have no one to help me." Because of his attitude I just don't bother him anymore. I guess he'll finish sooner or later. Perhaps this is very inefficient of me but I don't know what else to do about him.

* * * *

With regard to the Training Office, I feel it is very effective not to stick my nose into the Training Officer's job. The Training Officer is very effective. If I tried to assert my authority I might upset a smooth operation.

* * * *

I had a local assistant who spent most of his time chatting with other locals in the mission. He was the highest paid local, and the others were distressed by this. However, no amount of assignment would get this man to work. I finally told him that "things would have to change," but it didn't work, and I finally dismissed him. The man already had a part-time job, and simply went to it full-time. I think the job itself is a mistake, and I have not tried to refill the position.

* * * *

1) Prepares efficiency reports. Many Program Officers regard the task of completing efficiency reports as a difficult and rather meaningless chore. They consider that some of the judgments called for about subordinates cannot be made realistically, and that the five-point rating scale, because any rating below a four has come to be considered as unsatisfactory, cannot be used meaningfully.

The requirement to review ratings with subordinates and, if necessary, justify them, is often viewed as unpleasant. Subordinates sometimes feel that low ratings reflect personal biases against them rather than objective evaluations of their work. On occasion, the work of the Program Office may be disrupted because these subordinates feel that their efforts are not appreciated and therefore perform their tasks negligently. This, in turn, may distract or demoralize their fellow workers.

2) Serves on Efficiency Report review panel. Serving on review panels can also be an unpleasant task. Disputes sometimes arise among panel members regarding the fairness of ratings and the advisability of requesting that these ratings be sent back for revision. The panel meetings may require an extensive amount of time and are therefore considered an interference with the more important, major work of the Program Office.

c. develops skills, counsels

Some Program Officers regard training their subordinates and helping them to develop the skills necessary for promotion as an important aspect of the job. Others regard training as a waste of their time and report that they sometimes do work themselves rather than take the time to explain tasks to a subordinate and check his work.

The counselling function is most often reported in relation to actual job performance. It includes encouraging subordinates to take on more varied or more difficult tasks if they seem to lack the confidence to do so, as well as instructing them in how to avoid difficulties of various types in dealing with division or other mission personnel. Most incumbents tend to avoid counselling staff members with regard to personal problems, preferring to pass this type of task to the Executive Officer.

As part of my effort to train subordinates I give them a minimum of instructions. I usually just toss them a job and tell them to go ahead and do it, but let them know that I am available for advice and consultation if they feel that they need it. I prefer to have them follow their own style and develop their own position and discuss it with me later.

* * * *

I sometimes have to consider personalities in dealing with my staff and division personnel. Where I do know about a personal animosity however I do not make any changes in normal procedure. Trying to revise assignments to adjust to personality differences will only cause more problems. What I do is to counsel my subordinates, for example, telling them to be careful not to let their personal feelings interfere with a discussion coming up with such and such a technician.

* * * *

One young man's drive and enthusiasm were irritating the division he worked with. He was going too fast for them. When I learned of this from the Division Chief, I had a chat with the young man and told him to take it easy. He has improved greatly and his relations with the division are better.

* * * *

I have started a long-range activity which should alleviate the problem of one subordinate's slowness in completing his work. I have asked the Assistant Program Officer to take a hand in these tasks. I want him to learn more about this work. This way he can take up the slack left by the other subordinate. However I personally don't think he is capable of this. In certain respects he is really a genius. He does a great deal of work, but I don't think he will do well in this other work. But, I'll give him a try.

* * * *

> I was never able to supervise an older man I inherited. I found him crotchety and staid. I could never work up enough sympathy for the man so that he felt close enough to bring me his problems. I was glad when he retired.
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> * * * *
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> Correcting host national subordinates is an extremely delicate matter as they are very sensitive to any kind of criticism. In a situation where I would simply give an American employee hell and really chew him out, I would very delicately hint to a host national employee that I was not entirely satisfied with his performance.
>
> * * * *

d. settles disputes

Disputes may arise among Program Office personnel because someone feels that work is inequitably apportioned, because personal conflicts develop, or for other reasons. The Program Officer may be required to investigate and adjudicate these differences so that the work of the office will not be disrupted. For example, he may have to justify assigning a particular task to one subordinate, if someone else ordinarily does this task, by pointing out the time considerations, or the special skills involved in his decision regarding the work.

e. recommends recognition of superior performance

The Program Officer may feel that certain subordinates deserve special recognition for their superior job performance. In some missions there are incentive award programs, and he may nominate them for this type of recognition. In other cases, he may try to assist a subordinate in gaining a promotion or a pay increase when he feels that these may be warranted.

> A subordinate took the job at too low a level. I have been trying to do something about this, but once you get classified you have to move along through the ranks. There is no court of equity, which I think there should be.

* * * *

2. Manages operations

Like the preceding tasks of supervising subordinates, the Program Officer's managing activities depend to some extent upon the size and capabilities of his staff. With adequately trained and experienced personnel, many of the tasks described here fall into smooth routines that are quickly accomplished.

Personal preferences will also influence managing operations. Because they bear the responsibility for the work of the Program Office, some Program Officers find it extremely difficult to delegate tasks and overburden themselves checking the details of subordinates' work. When the staff happens to be large, a Program Officer of this type becomes a bottleneck, holding up the work of his staff and frequently that of project personnel dependent upon his office for information or approvals. Occasionally some higher mission officer obstructs work in this way by insisting upon unnecessary involvement in Program Office procedures.

a. assigns and adjusts duties and responsibilities

Problems related to this task result from two major factors. The first is the chronic shortage of trained personnel. Lacking professional assistants with AID experience means that the Program Officer is often required to take over fairly routine, but time-consuming tasks. The shortage of U.S. secretaries results in delays

and inconveniences in handling classified materials. In countries where there are few trained host national secretaries, it may also mean trying to accomplish a large volume of paper work with inadequate stenographic, typing, and filing service.

The second factor is the attitude of subordinates toward their assignments. Some highly trained professionals who find their duties uninteresting or trivial may express their resentment by doing negligent work. In a few cases they may simply substitute something they prefer for the assigned task. In either event, the Program Officer may have to do the work himself in order to meet a deadline.

> I have tried to share the load of training with the Program Office staff. However, now one replacement has not been made and another subordinate is leaving at the end of this month. His replacement will have to do either training or economic work. One or the other will suffer. In the ___ months I have been here the Program Office staff has been complete for only one third of the time.

* * * *

> My primary motivation problem is with the host national employees. They have little enthusiasm for group cohesiveness and cooperation as a means of achieving a goal, but rather tend to develop intense personal loyalties. Every American who has been here for more than a few months has at least one host national subordinate who will blindly and devotedly do anything for him but not for any one else. As a result if a host national employee is asked to do some work for another section, even if it is another section within the Program Office, he will not be highly motivated to do it and will probably try to get out of it or do a poor job.

* * * *

On one occasion when the Assistant Program Officer was not here I had to assign work which was properly his to another subordinate. He said it wasn't his responsibility and that it would take up a lot of his time. He said he would do it only if I ordered him to by putting it in writing. Since the work had to be done I did write an official memo to him requesting that he do the assignment. Nothing more was said, and he did it.

* * * *

When I arrived, the Program Office was divided into two sections -- planning and operations. I did not believe this was efficient since there was limited communication between the two sections, and a project might be planned in such a way that it was difficult to implement, or the implementation might not carry out the true objectives of the planning. I reorganized it on the present sector responsibility system, and so far it has worked quite well.

* * * *

A host national employee told his host national supervisor about a health problem, and then I heard about it indirectly through the supervisor. I arranged to lighten the employee's work load until the health problem cleared up.

* * * *

In one instance I wanted a chart showing the names of people and how long their contracts run. I told the Assistant Program Officer this and he gave the job to a secretary. When I got the chart from the secretary, all of the bars indicating contract duration ended at the same place. It was neat but useless. Obviously I did not explain what I wanted clearly enough to the Assistant Program Officer, or the Assistant Program Officer didn't explain it to the secretary.

* * * *

b. establishes work schedules and priorities

The chief problem in scheduling work in the Program Office is created by the great number of requests from AID/W for various information and reports. Very frequently these requests have to be clarified by checking back with AID/W before work can actually begin. This, coupled with the short time ordinarily given for submitting the information, usually results in a complete disruption of routine work while the whole staff cooperates in the special task. In the meantime, other deadlines crop up, so that most work has to be accomplished under crash conditions.

> I told a subordinate what I wanted him to do, and gave him 6 weeks. At the end of this time he submitted a memo showing the sluggish growth rate of the agricultural sector instead of a general draft of the economic situation and development progress -- essentially an updating of about 6 months from the last CAP. I told him that I knew he had some other things to do, but that he had not even taken advantage of the contacts that I had provided. A month later the material was still not ready, and I had to tell the Director that it was not. Then I had to "jump in" and do it myself. I think he should have taken his deadlines more seriously, working overtime if necessary. I will simply have to supervise his work more diligently.

* * * *

c. requests additional personnel as needed

Decisions to increase the Program Office staff are subject to the limitations of staffing and budget allowances. The most frequent problem, once approval of the Director and AID/W have been obtained, is the delay in recruiting qualified personnel by AID/W. This is discussed more fully in section IV B 1, below.

I have just "ordered" a new secretary who will be a pool secretary. However, she won't stay there long. She will be snatched up by someone who has very much to do and be tied up there all the time. I think in order to solve the problem of the request for a private secretary, I will move one Division Chief into this building and give him the use of any of the pool secretaries. As for the constant shorthandedness, I think we should always keep "ordering" one more secretary than we need so that we will alleviate the problem of her being needed very badly in some division by the time she gets here. This way maybe we can have some kind of a secretary pool.

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I am too heavily loaded with office tasks to get out to field projects more than about once in ___ months. To do something about evaluation, I recommended to the Director that a new employee be added to the Program Office staff. He agreed, and I found a man who appeared qualified working in the _____office. The man had good technical and personal qualifications and was happy to leave the office. The transfer was arranged.

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d. interprets policies, regulations and Manual Orders

This task frequently occupies a great amount of the Program Officer's attention, especially when his staff has had little prior AID experience. The various problems encountered because AID/W directives, policies, etc., are unclear or confusing have been described in earlier sections.

(See the relevant incident in section III A 3 d.)

e. reads incoming materials

Since the Program Office is the central clearing point for all program matters, a great volume of documents, directives, and other materials must be read and acted upon. A major problem is the time required for reading all of these materials. This task also includes insuring that materials are routed to appropriate people within the office or in the field. Certain documents may be abstracted and circulated for general information.

f. maintains files on host country information, AID/W correspondence, directives, etc.

The shortage of trained secretarial personnel, discussed above, sometimes makes it necessary for the Program Officer to set up and maintain his own files. This takes valuable time away from his more important responsibilities, but frequently it is the only way to avoid delays in referring to information needed for writing reports, answering questions, or other purposes.

> I have set up and maintained my own limited "official use" locked files in my office. I did all the work myself because there is no available staff with the necessary security clearance and free time.

* * * *

> I arrived after the mission had been without a Program Officer for several months. Program files were quite inadequate and out of date. I arranged to have the secretary bring the files up to date by obtaining copies of messages and having messages reproduced when no extra copies were available.

* * * *

My host secretary is responsible for maintaining project files. She lacks a "feel for papers" so that I am not able to find documents while I am working on weekends and have to telephone her to find out where to find things.

* * * *

g. edits written materials

The written materials considered here are prepared by subordinates within the Program Office. With this difference, the same types of problems arise that were discussed in section I C 3 in the descriptions of reviewing and editing program documents.

(From observer) The Program Officer stressed the Assistant Program Officer's poor writing and lack of formal education in economics. Consequently all of his work must be edited carefully and at times returned to him for rewriting. The Assistant Program Officer seems to resent the Program Officer, expresses a lack of respect for the Program Officer's intelligence, and says that he has no ideas. The Program Officer suspects that the Assistant Program Officer may resent corrections.

* * * *

The Assistant Program Officer is tactless and offends people. The job depends on good relations within AID, so I must edit everything that the Assistant Program Officer sends out.

* * * *

I am waging a campaign to reduce documents by asking subordinates to justify documents given to me for signature. In several cases they have been unable to do so. This is primarily a cultural problem. Locals keep several sets of books and document everything.

> I suspect that part of this is due to the high rate of unemployment here, since they tend to create work to maintain their job security.

* * * *

> I got several reports from a subordinate, all of which used an incorrect format. This just isn't the way we do things here. I asked him in a very jokingly way about the deviation from standard format. That's all I had to say. He got very indignant and said it was better his way. I didn't know what to say at the time because I never expected that kind of reaction. All I could do since there was no reasoning with him was to tell the secretary not to type his reports like that but to follow the usual format.

* * * *

h. insures effective working relations between the Program Office and divisions

Most Program Officers consider that careful maintenance of good relations between the Program Office and the divisions is a prerequisite to accomplishing their work effectively. Therefore, they take great care to instruct subordinates in appropriate methods for contacting and making requests of division personnel.

> The Assistant Program Officer must be managed carefully in his personal relations because his personality "rubs" people the wrong way. I can't risk offending people because our job success depends upon people working well together.

* * * *

This incident started with an accusation by the Deputy Chief of a division against the Assistant Program Officer. He accused the Assistant Program Officer of altering a report. I checked the report with the Assistant and found that there was no basis for the accusation. I told the Deputy this, but he would not give up and continued to misinterpret other data reported by the Assistant Program Officer. I finally told the Chief of the division and asked him to get his Deputy to apologize to the Assistant Program Officer. The Chief explained that his Deputy was under an emotional strain and to take this into consideration. I agreed but still thought the Deputy should apologize to the Assistant Program Officer. The Deputy finally did come up to the Program Office and they straightened the thing out. I may have been too stern with the Deputy, but it all worked out, so I feel my sternness was justified.

* * * *

For the Deputy Program Officer and Assistant Program Officer, the greatest problem is working with Division Chiefs and having to say no. This is difficult to do without seeming negative toward a particular program. I check to see that memos sent out by these people are tactful and that division people's feelings aren't needlessly hurt.

* * * *

Relations between the Program Office and technical divisions are generally good, except with one Division Chief. For example, after a subordinate and I decided how, what, when, and why concerning briefings and trips for visiting Congressional investigators, he called some people in the _____ Division and asked them to provide briefing materials about their projects. Within about two days the Division Chief called my subordinate and told him to stop telling his people what to do. Therefore, my subordinate had to explain this to me. I, in turn, explained to the Division Chief, asking him to assure that his division personnel provided the appropriate briefing materials.

* * * *

(From a colleague). When the Deputy Director held his weekly meeting with the Division Chief a minor point of disagreement arose about the way the Chief made his reports to the Program Officer (who was also present in the meeting). The Program Officer responded in anger saying "This is what I want!" The Deputy Director had to change the subject to keep the peace.

* * * *

During my first 6 weeks I had meetings with all the technical people, but I went to their offices. That was a very good thing to do. It prompted cooperation and I got some good insights about their abilities, dedication, etc. by meeting them on their home grounds.

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B. Participates in Personnel Matters

In addition to handling the personnel needs for his own office, the Program Officer may be called upon to assist in personnel matters pertaining to field projects or other administrative offices. In most cases, his role would be to advise other personnel or assist in completing paperwork. For example, he might explain Agency leave policy.

1. Assists in recruiting staff

The Program Officer may be consulted about any aspect of recruiting new personnel: to advise in specifying qualifications, to handle paperwork, or to evaluate candidates. The greatest problem encountered is the slowness with which AID/W personnel takes action. It is not uncommon for a year or more to elapse between the filing of a request and the arrival of a new man on the job. To circumvent these delays, the Program Officer may suggest contacting people in business, government, or academic circles to obtain recommendations for job candidates, particularly when technical people are being sought.

Major problems also occur in recruiting personnel among host nationals. The mission may lack dependable sources for referring job applicants to them, in some countries being forced to rely on the advice of present employees who may try to obtain jobs for friends or relatives with poor skills or little training. At times, when the pool of trained personnel is limited, the mission may be competing with host companies, the host government, and international corporations who have higher pay scales or other benefits which the mission cannot meet.

> Some problems stem from the newness of the mission. For example, there are no precedents for the salaries of locals, or for the cost of any other operation. This makes budgeting very difficult. Nor are there any well known sources of employment. The mission has had to rely on the Embassy and word-of-mouth.
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> * * * *
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> We have an opportunity to employ one of our contract employees as a direct hire. The contractor is willing, and he is one of the best men in the mission. But AID/W personnel can't cope with the problem. They don't even answer correspondence, despite pressure.
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> * * * *
>
> Another problem is that the mission has not been able to recruit some people we need for our program. We want to get more Loan Officers and a management consultant team, for instance, but Washington says they are unable to recruit them. I feel that good people are available but that Washington is doing a poor job of recruiting.
>
> * * * *

(from a technical chief). I am being phased out and AID can't find contractors to replace me. I have ____ projects in progress right now. They have been running (or in preparation) for approximately a year on the average. No inexperienced team can take my place now, especially in the field of building human resources.

* * * *

a. gathers information

The actions employed in gathering information for personnel purposes are similar to those described for gathering other types of information: conferring with other persons -- staff members, AID/W, or host nationals -- reviewing documents, requesting clarifications from AID/W, and so forth.

The problem mentioned earlier concerning the ambiguity and obsolescence of AID staffing documents and biographic information also applies here. It may also be difficult for someone who is not himself an expert in a specialized field to interpret descriptions of the qualifications of technical personnel.

AID/W advised that a nominee was available to fill a request for a technical chief. I knew of the AID/W nominee and heard that he had served in another country. I sent a message to a technician I knew in that post asking him to send information about the nominee. My original information about the nominee being difficult to work with was verified. I informed the Director, who rejected the nominee.

* * * *

b. prepares documentation as required

The Program Officer may write or review job descriptions, SPARS, or other personnel documents. The same types of procedures and problems are involved as in preparing program documents.

c. corresponds with friends or professional associates

Frequently when AID/W delays are lengthy or it is known that persons in certain special fields are hard to recruit, the Program Officer may correspond with friends or professional associates who can do a better job of recruiting for him than AID/W. The Program Officer may also correspond with friends in Washington or in other missions if he knows of appropriate personnel who are nearing the end of a tour and may be interested in coming to the mission.

d. evaluates and selects personnel

The Program Officer considers all of the information he has available and decides or advises others upon the acceptability of a potential recruit. This may involve conferring with other staff members or writing AID/W or other sources for additional information with which to make a decision. He tries to judge the suitability of a nominee's training for the position open, the likelihood of personality or emotional problems serious enough to affect work performance, and other relevant factors. In some missions, the Program Officer may help determine salaries for certain classes of personnel, and he may also handle salary negotiations with job applicants.

> I feel that the host government needs some assistance and they had initially requested a _____ before I arrived. The first nominee provided by Washington was too inexperienced and the host government declined to accept him.

Washington nominated a second one whom the host had accepted, but the man felt that the assignment was too short and dropped out. Washington nominated a third man whom the Mission Director hastily approved when he was in Washington on business, but I was disturbed about his qualifications. The candidate was an expert in _____, and I felt that the requirements called for a different type of specialist. I passed the candidate on to the host government, as I had to do, but I tried not to convey any personal judgments to them. I was relieved that the host government did not feel he was qualified either. Washington delayed several months before finding another candidate, but this man has certain problems that made him unacceptable, because the Embassy will not assume responsibility for him. This means that another candidate must be found, and if he is, it will probably have been a year from the initial request before he can be assigned.

* * * *

The Director persuaded a technician to come to work for AID. They started to discuss pay. I stopped the discussion so that the technician and I could discuss the details later. I feared the Director would throw the pay scale off for the mission and upset or demoralize other technicians.

* * * *

2. Orients new staff members

The Program Officer is frequently assigned the task of briefing new personnel in AID regulations, program matters, or the host country. It is sometimes difficult to communicate the operations of the mission -- relationships between offices, responsibilities, duties, or lines of authority -- to new personnel who are unfamiliar with bureaucratic

agencies in general and AID in particular. These briefing sessions may involve arranging meetings, providing reading materials, or arranging field trips.

> In meeting the problem of the technicians' inability to plan, I must consider the technicians and evaluate their competency. I have tried a variety of methods of indoctrination and education: holding meetings, hearings, exhortation, having my subordinates press for good planning. There has been some improvement in some of the technicians' work, and as new people come in, I have been successful in indoctrinating them.
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> I am strongly recommending to the Deputy Director (who is relatively new) to drop everything he is doing and go out to visit the field projects. It would stand him in good stead.
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> * * * *

C. Handles Public Relations

In many missions the Program Officer is assigned responsibility for the mission's public relations. This may involve developing publicity policies and procedures, holding press conferences, receiving non-official visitors, and arranging public ceremonies.

1. Handles publicity

a. advises or develops publicity policies and procedures

The Program Officer may be charged with determining how much publicity the mission should attempt, and what methods and media are most suitable for these purposes. This is another area where confusing AID/W policy directives may make it difficult to decide whether

or not certain actions are appropriate. Another source of problems is the tendency of technical people to criticize the mission or aid projects to host nationals or other non-AID persons. Technicians may not be aware of the sensitive nature of their remarks or the difficulties they may create in the mission's relationships with the host government. The Program Officer must warn people of the ramifications of their remarks and try to convince them to be more cautious in the future.

> An important Project Agreement was signed with the hosts during a "cool" period in host-U.S. relations when the Ambassador forbade local publicity. The contractor involved wanted publicity in the United States. I learned informally that the contract chief intended to release news in the United States through private channels. AID/W regulations require that releases be sent through AID/W, which is a slow procedure. I called the contract chief for more information, checked with other personnel, took the problem to the Director and pointed out the need for local orders on news releases. I also checked with USIS and found that they cannot operate outside the host country. The contract chief released the news to the United States via private channels. He was not subject to AID regulations. I suggested that the mission release the news via AID channels and send an airgram to AID/W detailing the action of the contract chief.

* * * *

b. prepares or approves news releases

The preparation of news releases may be accomplished by a subordinate rather than the Program Officer himself, but he ordinarily carefully checks the work of others to insure that it conforms to the policies and restrictions established by AID/W or the mission, and that it will not offend host officials, the United States public or Congress.

The clearance of news releases may require consulting the higher mission officers, the Ambassador, the host government, or AID/W, and can be very time-consuming.

> A subordinate wrote a news release which was not shown to me. I resented being bypassed although there were no adverse consequences. I think that bypassing me might have been accidental because there were several people involved who each may have thought that someone else had cleared the matter.

* * * *

c. arranges and conducts press conferences, public ceremonies, etc.

The Program Officer may hold press conferences himself or arrange them for other members of the mission staff. He may also arrange various types of public ceremonies for publicity purposes. The major problem with this task, as with the whole publicity function, is the amount of time taken from major Program Office duties in attending to details and obtaining necessary approvals.

> One problem concerning publicity is the United States Ambassador. When he is involved, he annoys me by checking and rechecking details. This creates more work for me because when the Ambassador is worrying, I must stop what I am doing and provide clarification.

* * * *

d. arrange for production of information and publicity materials

> I decided that an illustrated pamphlet describing AID work in this country would be useful to inform the host nationals at all levels about AID and its efforts to help the country. I told a subordinate what I wanted and he produced a booklet which I reviewed for technical correctness, taste, appropriateness, etc. Then the booklet was given to USIS to reproduce and distribute. I plan to have this booklet updated periodically.

* * * *

(See also the relevant example in section I.D.)

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2. Coordinates efforts with USIS

While USIS is nominally responsible for assisting the mission with publicity, many missions cannot depend upon their support. In many cases requests for assistance or materials forwarded to USIS for publication are ignored, or answered with excuses explaining why no action can be taken on the mission's work at present. Some Program Officers report that it is easier in the long run to handle the work within the mission rather than to spar for a while with USIS and get no results.

> USIS is supposed to handle AID publicity, and at one time they promised to assign one man, full-time, to AID work. However, once their staff was increased by the one man, they failed to allow him to work with AID. When asked about this, the USIS reply was that AID would benefit more by having a whole team of USIS specialists

available and each USIS person would work a small amount of time on AID work. Now, when I ask for USIS assistance, they don't refuse, but they just won't do what is asked. For example, I asked for a photographer, and the reply was that the photographer was sick. Or they don't appear at a function which they have been requested to cover. Or they might reply that there is no USIS money to allow participation in a certain activity. Rather than waste time and energy trying to get USIS to act; I assumed responsibility for publicity. I get involved with publicity "when the spirit moves me." Earlier I worked out a program for publicity, compiling a checklist of events that were to occur, e.g., a building completed, a school to be opened, a loan agreement signed, etc., and decided on a logical type of publicity to be used, i.e., a news story, a speech, etc. I assigned a subordinate the task of performing the details of this task. This subordinate at one time turned out three or four news stories per week which I reviewed. He sent them to the appropriate host government Ministry for approval, then the articles would be given to USIS to arrange for publication in the local newspapers.

* * * *

The USIS made a documentary film based on USCM contributions in this country. I knew nothing about it until it was in the final stages. I should have been in on the planning of the film.

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3. Receives non-official visitors (as assigned)

Despite his heavy workload, the Program Officer in many missions is assigned the responsibility of receiving non-official visitors. These may be host nationals, United States citizens, or

third-country nationals who may drop into the mission at any time seeking information. The Program Officer presents briefings on USAID and the host country, as appropriate, or distributes publications explaining AID's policy and work in the host country. This task is difficult because these visitors may arrive without warning and the Program Officer has to drop his work and talk with them.

D. Accomplishes Other Management Activites

Most of the tasks described under this topic fall into the third category described in the introduction to this section. While the Program Officer generally takes some part in nearly all of them, whether he becomes deeply involved depends to a large extent upon the capabilities of other mission officers and the type of working relationships that exist among them. Broad problems affecting these tasks are the uncertainty of AID/W policy, the difficulty of keeping informed of activities within the mission, and the lack of time for attending to these matters.

1. Consults on organizational matters

a. advises on mission structure

As it is used here, the term mission structure refers to both formal organizational matters and informal operating practices. Regarding the former, the Program Officer may be consulted to assist in carrying out reorganizations either on a major level as directed by AID/W, or on a minor level in areas left to the Director's discretion. Considerations pertaining to the latter are usually necessitated by conflicts between staff members or between sections of the organization, or by the failure of someone to carry out his work effectively. In dealing with either type of situation, the Program Officer may take the initiative and present solutions he has developed to the Director and other staff members for evaluation, or he may become involved only as requested.

(from interviewer) The Program Officer explained that in view of the morale and personnel problems in the mission, he felt that the position of Personnel Officer should be filled again. Presently, a secretary is doing much of the work of a Personnel Officer but there is much more that should and must be done which requires a full-time Personnel Officer. The Program Officer had brought this up at a staff meeting, but the Director dismissed the idea saying that a decision was made several months ago to abolish the position and that the issue was closed. The Program Officer stated that the need was great and the issue was not closed with him. He had, therefore, invited the secretary to provide her opinions on the subject. When she arrived, they discussed the needs, advantages, and problems of having or not having a Personnel Officer. The secretary felt the needs were very great. When she left, the Program Officer explained that he was trying to get tangible evidence so that he could speak intelligently and in an informed manner the next time he brought up the problem. He felt this to be the only way to sway the Director's opinion on the matter.

* * * *

An earlier problem was the multitude of people giving advice to the Director. There was a question as to who had prime responsibility to render advice, the Chiefs of Technical Divisions, or me. Because of the confusion, the Director was considering a reorganization that would require a new high-level officer. I advised against this, using the reasoning that it would take a few months for any new person at this level to learn enough of the local situation to be effective, and that it would add another staff member, which, because of economy drives, was against AID policy. As an alternative, I suggested that I be given clear status over the Chiefs of the Technical Divisions. The Mission Director agreed to this,

and the system was effected. This has strengthened my role, erased the confusion, and has freed me from detail so that I may now concentrate on broad policy and thus be a more effective adviser to the Director.

* * * *

(from a Division Chief) Since the present Program Officer came, the Program Office has changed for the better. Before he came project agreements were made, drafted, and signed by the Program Office. We, the Technical Divisions, were then told to implement them. We had no say about feasibility, cost estimates, needs, etc. In addition, we often got mixed up in things that were no concern of ours, such as PL 480 projects. We found ourselves doing projects that we thought were unsound and unfeasible and in which we didn't believe. It created many problems for the Technical Divisions. A further result of this policy was that many government Ministers and financial organizations had built direct pipelines to Washington. They could practically tell Washington what they wanted and the direction would come from AID/W. We would not have anything to say about it. All these requests should go to Washington, but through the mission first. The present Program Officer realized this and changed this policy. He knew it was causing problems for us. He sent Washington a strict telegram telling them that this procedure was making our positions (Technical Advisors) untenable. Now it is much better since he has given us our proper voice in matters concerning our technical fields of specialization.

* * * *

b. advises on staff behavior problems

From time to time, incidents occur as the result of unusual or disturbed behavior on the part of some mission staff member. Sometimes it is immediately obvious upon their arrival that they will

create problems. At other times, circumstances of their work or family situation put stresses on individuals with which they are unable to cope. In either case, they may act in ways that impede the fulfillment of their work or that threaten to damage the mission's standing in the eyes of the host government or private citizens. The Executive Officer generally acts as a counsellor to mission personnel and handles problems caused by behavorial difficulties. However, because in serious cases a career officer's future may be in the balance, it is not unusual for conferences to be called, including the Program Officer, to consider alternative courses of action to deal with these problems.

2. Provides advice and assistance in Executive Office functions

The Executive Officer manages the administrative services for the mission and provides many services affecting the living conditions for American personnel. The Program Officer may become involved in advising or assisting in these functions if he and the Executive Officer happen to find each other congenial working associates and consult each other informally about problems or decisions between alternative courses of action. The Program Officer may also become involved if the Executive Officer handles his work so inefficiently that many problems arise or requests for services go unanswered. He may step in on his own initiative or at the request of the Director. The areas dealt with may include morale problems, provision of project or personal services, coping with environmental difficulties, and so on. The chief problems encountered are the personal frictions which sometimes result between the Program Officer and the Executive Officer, and the imposition which these extra responsibilities make on the Program Officer's time.

> I wrote a memorandum to the Director concerning a suggestion for a subordinate of the Executive Officer to do something, without clearing the memorandum with the subordinate or the Executive Officer. The subordinate was very angry. I did not see that it was necessary or desirable to clear the message with anyone.

* * * *

The Director asked me to prepare a report on mission housing. I asked the Executive Officer for the basic data, i.e., number of houses, their locations, houses to be leased, etc., and used the data to write my report to the Director.

* * * *

I have had considerable experience in setting up and managing filing systems, and was annoyed with the way the Communications and Records office was set up. I found the files set up to accommodate a file retirement system rather than a subject matter system oriented to users' needs. I also found classified and unclassified materials on the same subject filed separately in spite of the fact that there were no locals handling the files. I argued with the Communications and Records clerk about this and she got quite upset. I did not realize how sensitive she was, and have since used a much more friendly approach.

* * * *

The Executive Office should be more precise and organized. I had an argument with the Executive Officer yesterday because he called and told me he had to be informed about everyone coming here and their purpose before they arrived. He stated it was in the Mission orders, but I can't find anything like that. He says they have to be officially registered somehow. I think any USAID policy order like this should be drafted by the Executive Officer and circulated for our clearance. Then if there are any disagreements we can get together and straighten them out. This area is a definite irritant to me.

* * * *

At one of our review meetings, a Division Chief said that he would maintain his office in the host Ministry and therefore only use his office here for picking up his mail and dictating letters. The Program Office was very crowded so I asked the Division Chief whether he would mind if someone else were given the space he would not use and he said it would not matter to him. I immediately moved another Division Chief who was in our cramped offices into the unoccupied one because he wanted an office alone. I brought our other secretary into the Program Office so that the two secretaries could work together. Everyone was happy with this change, and I'm sure it increased everyone's efficiency and added to their morale.

* * * *

I am contracting officer for a certain project. As such I have to serve as an intermediary between the Executive Officer and the team chief because they don't get along. The Executive Officer should be the contracting officer but under these circumstances I have to be the officer. But if it has to be done this way, there is nothing to do because someone has to take care of it.

* * * *

The workload in the mission is not fairly distributed among the secretaries. This is a morale factor. Some girls are always overworked, others are usually not given anything to do. I asked the Executive Officer to help alleviate this situation once and he was all for my idea; which was for all secretaries with too much work to do to give their excess work to their supervisors, who in turn would give it to the Executive Officer. He would parcel it out to the secretaries who were not busy. In this way no resentment would be caused by secretaries giving work to other secretaries.

* * * *

> I went to the Director in April and told him of the secretary problems. (This particular post is particularly hard on them for many reasons--there is no social life for them, the climate makes it difficult for them, living conditions are not the best, there are not many recreational facilities available, etc.). I suggested that we have them all meet with him and ask them to discuss their problems openly. I thought this way they would get a lot of these things off their minds. Also under these circumstances, they could present their problems in a less emotional and more realistic manner than otherwise. The Director said it was a good idea and would do it, but he never did. I feel that if he did we would not have had all these requests for transfers now and their morale would be higher.

* * * *

3. Substitutes for other Administrative Officers

When other staff officers take leave or delays occur in the arrival of new incumbents, the Program Officer frequently assumes the role of Acting Deputy Director or Acting Director. He may occasionally substitute for other officers, but not usually. In order to perform the functions involved in these positions, the Program Officer must be familiar with the details of the job and with relevant policy and regulations. In circumstances where the regular incumbent is to return, the Program Officer has to be sufficiently familiar with that officer's working premises and procedures so that any decisions or arrangements he may be called upon to make will not disrupt normal operations. When he is filling in during a period of transition between two incumbents, he may have to be very cautious to avoid committing the mission to agreements which conceivably will not be acceptable to the new incumbent.

4. Receives visitors as assigned

a. gives briefings

b. schedules meetings and trips

In addition to receiving unofficial visitors, discussed above in section C 3, the Program Officer may also be responsible for receiving official visitors. They may include high AID or other government officials, non-government people traveling with AID's approval for special purposes, or high-ranking non-government host nationals. The Program Officer may be called upon to prepare and give briefings about specific projects or the total mission program, to arrange meetings with appropriate mission technicians, host nationals, or other persons, and to plan appropriate field trips. AID/W, or occasionally other missions, create problems in accomplishing this task when they either do not give sufficient advance notice of a visitor's arrival or do not give adequate information about his purpose in visiting the mission. Since traveling and communications in many underdeveloped nations are slow, the Program Officer may not be able to make the best arrangements to fill the visitor's purposes without adequate advance information. This task is viewed by many Program Officers as a problem because the "constant stream of visitors" disrupts their routine work.

> A private United States professional organization had proposed sending some of its members to donate their services to the host government. Two representatives of the organization visited to learn how their colleagues could best contribute to the host development program. I was assigned the task of caring for them. When I first learned of the assignment, I cabled AID/W and asked to be informed of the visitors' arrival in sufficient time to plan a schedule for them. Nevertheless, they arrived one day without

AID/W warning. I solved the problem by introducing them to a staff member of another United States agency who has local contacts and experience in their special field. He was a logical person to help these visitors. My substantive involvement was slight, but my time was consumed in reading and answering cables, contacting the other United States agency, and making introductions. Also, the task was not one which could be evaded, because if I had left them to shift for themselves, they would have gone back to AID/W and complained of the poor treatment given them by the mission.

* * * *

5. Answers special information requests as required

Occasionally special requests for information of various types are received by the mission. The Program Officer may be called upon to write or edit answers to these requests. The problems of unclear instructions, of editing and revising other people's work, and of obtaining appropriate information discussed in preceding sections would also apply to this task.

Special reports, e.g., a request from Congress for reports on help to religious institutions, take precedence over routine reports. No solution is available.

* * * *

6. Socializes with other U.S. agencies, other donor agencies, the diplomatic community

The extent to which the Program Officer is formally required to attend social activities appears to vary from mission to mission. However, in most missions there will be some requirements of this type. Some Program Officers entertain or attend parties, dinners, etc., beyond those required. They view such activities as efforts to establish rapport

with non-mission personnel who can assist them by providing information or by arranging coordinated project plans.

> I have a friend who is with a multi-lateral delegation here. He informed me that some people from the International Bank were coming to town. I knew that they would want to learn the details of the host government's financial situation -- something that we also want to know more about. I asked my friend to invite them to dinner at my home on the night of their arrival. When they came he did invite them and they readily accepted. Since I speak fluent _____ there was no communication problem. After dinner we sat and talked about the host country. It was a very rewarding evening because the conversation naturally swung to their job here and what they were trying to learn. We traded information and I got some new and valuable information about the country's financial situation. When they complete their study here, I will try to have them over again and perhaps I can learn something about their findings.

* * * *

(See also the relevant examples in section IA1.)

V. MAINTAINS WORKING RELATIONS WITH HOST PERSONNEL

Specific types of interactions with host officials have been mentioned in preceding sections as they influence the accomplishment of various functions, e.g., negotiating, obtaining information, and so on. Here, the discussion concerns interacting with host officials as a goal in itself, because so many other aspects of successful work depend upon cordial relationships and the free flow of information and opinions between the mission and the host government. In other words, it appears that other functions can be more effectively performed if a groundwork of pleasant working relations has been developed.

A. Develops "Good" Relations with Host Officials

The specific definitions of "good" relations vary considerably from one country to another. In general, host definitions of appropriate relations with their American counterparts tend toward a greater degree of formality than is usual in the United States. Therefore, an important part of this function consists of understanding and conforming to these definitions. Reportedly, another important aspect is determining with whom, among host government officials, it is expedient to develop "good" relations. The power structures of the host government and the interrelationships of various significant persons within it can be difficult to discern in countries where titles are proliferated or elected or appointed officials serve as ceremonial leaders while real decisions are made by less obvious government personnel. Such considerations are necessary for various reasons, e.g., to avoid becoming a pawn in an internal power struggle; and to avoid offending a person with the power to assist or block AID's efforts.

1. Adapts to local usage in negotiations

The officials of many countries may expect AID personnel to conform to local usage in conducting negotiations, or at least they appear to react more positively to those who do so. This may mean that the Program Officer has to accept a certain amount of seemingly time-wasting formality or trivial conversation before reaching the point under discussion. He may also have to adjust to very subtle and indirect use of language, dictated by host concepts of politeness.

> The hosts will not ask questions if they don't understand something which I have presented to them. If I suspect a lack of comprehension on their part, I repeat what I said later in the conversation in different and simple terms. I have also adopted a policy of forthrightly asking for clarification from them when I don't understand something which they are trying to tell me, thus trying in this way to let them know that it is acceptable to ask questions in their dealings with me.

* * * *

2. Cultivates friendships with hosts

Few Program Officers report success in making friends with host officials and most admit that they give up after a few attempts. Many report that local nationals, in general, are "cold," "aloof," or "indifferent" to overtures of friendship. Since the concepts of friendship tend to vary among different cultures, it would appear that an important aspect of this task is learning what reactions to expect from the host officials. With this knowledge Program Officers might find that they had accomplished more than they realized, and be less discouraged about the matter.

In at least one mission, higher officers refused to recognize the necessity for the Program Officer to associate with host officials, and obstructed his efforts to meet appropriate people. In other missions, the departure of a predecessor before the arrival of a new incumbent may mean that introductions to helpful contacts become difficult to arrange.

Another difficulty sometimes arises in countries where the official government policy discourages host personnel from developing close contacts with foreign-government representatives.

Of course, some Program Officers are simply disinclined to be friendly with the hosts and make little or no effort to establish friendships.

> I find some lower-level government sources more candid and revealing than upper-level types who are more cagey, e.g., a third-country had offered a loan to start a project. The Mission Director and I tried to learn from the Minister and another official how much money was involved and what the terms were. They were reluctant to say, but a subordinate, who is a good friend of mine, gave me the hard figures. These were confirmed later at a confrontation with the Minister.

* * * *

3. Uses appropriate means for handling project rejections or curtailment

This refers to the necessity to provide host officials with an opportunity to "save face." For example, it may be useful to develop a technique of saying no indirectly and subtly, or to provide informal advance notification of rejection or curtailment of projects before formal procedures are followed. Some Program Officers have found it helpful to phrase discussions in terms which provide the host officials with ready-made explanations to their superiors or colleagues.

> I was at a luncheon with a host government official who had just come from a meeting in which a major new project had been proposed. The host government official mentioned it to me, asking if AID would be willing to provide aid for such a project. I knew that other projects were more necessary, but I didn't want to be unresponsive. Therefore, I replied that AID might be interested, but that many details would be necessary, including need for the project. This type of response was better than saying "no," and tends to smoke out bad features, i.e., once the local national learns that it is hard to justify another project of this type in view of other needs, he will simply not submit details to AID. Ninety-nine per cent (99%) of project "turn downs" are at the informal stage, such as this one, so no ill-will is created, but it is necessary to be tactful.

* * * *

4. Makes speeches to host groups

This task may range from saying a few words of greeting to spelling out in detail the position of the mission, a proposal for a project, or other kinds of information. The Program Officer may make speeches himself or be called upon to prepare them for other mission personnel. In either case it is advantageous to be aware of and employ, as appropriate, the customary phrases and techniques of the host country.

B. Represents Mission at Social Events

1. Attends luncheons, parties, etc.

The extent to which the Program Officer may be obligated to attend mission functions varies from mission to mission, partly as a result of mission size and partly as a result of his relationship with the Director. Ordinarily there are certain formal occasions when he is required to attend social events, and he may also be required to

assist in making arrangements for them. This entry also includes instances of arranging and attending informal luncheons, or parties.

> An Embassy Officer and I were at a luncheon with a group of host government officials. All conversation was in the host language. This wears you down after about an hour but we were doing all right. Then toward time for dessert, an important subject came up. It created a near riot of interest. The hosts talked more rapidly as the conversation progressed. We couldn't keep up. Thus we missed a good opportunity to learn what these people were really thinking on this matter.

* * * *

2. Entertains host officials at home -- as appropriate

In some missions it is agreed that the Director will entertain top host government officials and the Program Officer will entertain those in positions comparable to his own. In other missions there may be no definite requirement for the Program Officer to fulfill this function and some do not take it upon themselves to do so. Others may feel that it is an important aspect of their jobs. At times it may be unrewarding because host personnel will accept invitations to parties or dinners and then fail to appear.

3. Attends or participates in ceremonies

Ceremonies of various types are frequently held to mark the beginning or significant accomplishments of a project. The Program Officer may be involved in arranging for these ceremonies and occasionally is required to attend.

C. Provides Information, Advice and Assistance to Host Officials

This entry pertains to a wide variety of situations in which the Program Officer may be of assistance to host officials regarding matters that are not connected with specific AID projects. It includes both instances where the host may request specific information, and where the Program Officer may volunteer information or advice he thinks may be useful. However, it appears that Program Officers do not provide such advice frequently.

1. Provides information on AID policy and procedure

This refers to keeping communication channels open to host officials and giving them an opportunity to learn informally of changes in policy or procedures which will have an effect upon their dealings with the mission. The task includes the range of activities from a casual chat to a formal conference.

In some cases it may be difficult to communicate to host officials that, while AID wants to help in their development efforts, it is not simply going to do whatever they ask, and that there may be some broader considerations reflected in rejecting some of their proposals.

Explaining AID's policy to the host country may be a problem in itself when that policy is ambiguously defined, or in transition. Under these circumstances, the Program Officer may be able to make only vague statements to avoid having to explain conflicting policy at some later date.

> Another problem is that I must be continuously alert to host government criticism and misunderstandings. For example, in a speech a Minister discussed the high cost of United States technicians and alluded to monetary

figures which were incorrect. When I learned this, I prepared a paper, describing realistic figures, supported by details of costs that tend to raise the total price, e.g., international travel and the high degree of professional experience of the American technicians. I submitted the paper to the Mission Director, who in turn discussed the topic, based on my presentation, with the Minister at a luncheon.

* * * *

AID/W informed the mission, via cable, what AID policy would be about financing a major joint host-AID project. I was responsible for action on the AID/W message. I attempted to discuss the matter with the Director, but failed because he was not available. I discussed the issue with the Embassy Economic Officer, his subordinate in charge of capital projects, and the Deputy Mission Director. After collecting their views, I visited officials of the host Ministry explaining the United States position, but without mentioning the maximum United States commitment. At this meeting the project was discussed at length, and I encouraged the official to solicit other aid. I even provided advice about what kinds of data to have available for other potential donors (cost in detail, materials, time scheduling, use after completion, etc.) Upon returning to my own office, I wrote a memorandum of the conversation to send to the Mission Director and sent a cable to AID/W to report what had transpired.

* * * *

2. Advises host government on their operations

In most aid-receiving nations, the government procedures and practices warrant improvement. The Program Officer may volunteer advice or be asked for it. It may range from dropping a hint to spelling out systems for solving organizational or procedural problems.

> One problem is that the host government Ministries do not have competent personnel, thus their planning is slow and frequently inadequate. All Ministries are feebly staffed, but the two most important for economic development seem to be the worst of all. I have tried hinting to various people, e.g., at a dinner party I expressed concern over weak staffs to a high host official, but so far I have achieved no results.

* * * *

> One problem is that host government officials are not informed on events in their own country. They do not have the necessary staff, and because of work being dispersed around the country, their coordination and news exchange is poor. AID, on the other hand, knows what is going on all over the country in specialized fields. At a party I learned that the government was planning to sponsor some work in an area where AID was active. The government was probably aware that some work was being done, but they were probably not aware of specific work efforts. Therefore, I wrote a letter to a host national official in the appropriate Ministry explaining precisely what was being done.

* * * *

> The host wanted some equipment. Three firms sent in bids. The host would ignore low bids and order some of each kind of item. The concept of minimizing cost did not enter into decisions. I pushed the idea of the advantage of standardization and of taking low bids. As bidders realized that the game had changed, all the bids became lower.

* * * *

3. Assists hosts in dealing with other donors

Host governments frequently do not avail themselves of assistance from other donors because they lack information on what help is available or how to apply for it. The Program Officer may advise host officials on which organizations to approach and the kinds of information to append to applications to facilitate their being approved.

> The host government recently announced that they were applying for membership in the International Monetary Fund. I know that many people who should, don't know much about IMF. The same is true of people within the mission. I remember having a lecture on IMF during a course at a university before I came out. Tonight I'll pull it out and bring it tomorrow, have it reproduced and sent to the appropriate host officials and to all the officers in the mission.

* * * *

D. Uses Conduct Appropriate to Position

As an officer in an agency of the United States Government stationed in another country, the Program Officer must maintain conduct appropriate to his position. It includes both working and non-working situations and extends to the guidance of his family in fulfilling their obligations as representatives of the United States.

> I think it is very undesirable for a Program Officer or any American in the mission to dress in such a way as to present a poor appearance of United States personnel, i.e., during non-working hours such as weekends, evenings, etc. Whenever I go to town I always wear coat and tie. I do so any time I leave the house because I think it is expected of Americans to dress well at all times. I feel that, abroad, it is expected that

Americans are always well-dressed. I learned this in my first overseas post. The general American tendency is to get into awful clothes when the working day is over. I don't think this is a good policy for Americans to follow. I am convinced that people who already know you won't think any less of you because of your dress, but those who don't will think less of you.

* * * *

APPENDIX C

to

A Study of Some Key USAID Jobs

THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER

American Institute for Research
Washington, D.C.

JUNE 1964

APPENDIX C

to

A Study of Some Key USAID Jobs

THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER

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JUNE 1964

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Outline of Functions

I. MANAGES MISSION ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS

A. Directs Executive Office

1. Assigns and reviews work
2. Provides and receives information
3. Develops skills

B. Supervises Operations of Motor Pool

1. Determines need for vehicles and personnel
2. Provides transportation
3. Monitors and corrects operations

a. insures conformance to regulations
b. corrects operating deficiencies

C. Supervises Operations of the General Services Office

1. Procures supplies and equipment

a. reviews purchase orders
b. determines requirements
c. insures conformance to procurement regulations
d. selects procurement procedure

2. Stores supplies and equipment

a. arranges for storage space
b. supervises warehouse personnel
c. conducts inventories

3. Distributes supplies and equipment

   a. reviews requests
   b. explains allocation policies
   c. corrects deficiencies

4. Provides for repair services

   a. establishes procedures
   b. corrects procedural deficiencies

D. Supervises Operations of Communications and Records Office

1. Maintains central files
2. Monitors flow of communications
3. Ensures conformance to regulations
4. Facilitates communications

E. Supervises Operations of the Travel Office

1. Ensures conformance to regulations
2. Reviews requests
3. Greets and assists new arrivals

F. Supervises the Communications Media Section

G. Supervises the Training Office

H. Provides Housing for U. S. Personnel

1. Selects houses
2. Negotiates leases
3. Assigns houses
4. Protects and maintains houses
5. Disseminates information on housing policies and procedures

I. Provides Office Facilities and Related Services

1. Determines need
2. Selects office space
3. Negotiates leases
4. Arranges for utilities and other services
5. Assigns office space
6. Protects and maintains office space
7. Monitors utilization
8. Reviews Expenditures

J. Performs Other Management Functions

1. Insures conformance to security regulations
2. Coordinates administrative activities with other United States agencies
3. Participates in public relations
   a. handles publicity materials
   b. participates in mission representation
4. Handles contingencies
   a. emergencies
   b. legal involvements
5. Acts for other administrative personnel

II. MANAGES MISSION PERSONNEL OPERATIONS

A. Supervises Operations of the Personnel Office

1. Assigns tasks and monitors performance
2. Prepares or reviews documentation
3. Maintains personnel records
4. Assists in determining U. S. allowances
5. Disseminates information

B. Develops and Implements Personnel Policies for Local Nationals

1. Recruits and assigns local nationals
2. Determines pay scales
3. Terminates local nationals
4. Implements procedures for recognizing superior performance

C. Directs Efficiency Rating System

1. Assists in selecting review panel
2. Ensures conformance to regulations
3. Evaluates Executive Office personnel
4. Serves as review officer

D. Provides Orientation for New Employees

E. Advises on Personnel Matters

1. Assists in recruiting staff

a. reviews staffing needs
b. advises on recruiting methods
c. recommends specific personnel

2. Assists in handling special behavior problems

a. ascertains facts
b. counsels individuals
c. advises on personnel actions

F. Attends to Morale Matters

III. PARTICIPATES IN MISSION PLANNING

A. Develops and Monitors Budgets

1. Develops and adjusts the administrative budget
2. Assists in formulating technical support budget
3. Reviews the administrative support agreement

B. Considers Organizational Structure

1. Obtains information
2. Evaluates need for and recommends change
3. Implements changes
4. Insures conformance in organizational matters

USAID EXECUTIVE OFFICER

I N T R O D U C T I O N

The job of the USAID Executive Officer is relatively simple in conception but extremely difficult to carry out successfully. While each task is fairly straight-forward, their diversity, frequency, and content make for a job characterized by excessive workload, time pressure, personal pressures, interruptions, attention to detail, and other characteristics which make the job a "frantic" one.

The Executive Officer will almost never find the same issues coming to his attention on two succeeding days. He may comfort a distraught secretary one morning, negotiate a lease with a dishonest landlord in the afternoon, try to repair a carburetor while his dinner is getting cold, and the next morning arrange to keep an employee's food from spoiling while trying to straighten out a security violation and answer an urgent request from AID/W for information on an employee's transfer. Thus, it is impossible to construct a "typical" work day for an Executive Officer or to write a job description that will be sufficiently comprehensive to cover all the unique situations and novel problems an Executive Officer may face at some time.

Another source of difficulty, in addition to the factors of diversity and urgency, is the fact that the Executive Officer deals primarily with the area of personal services: the support functions which usually affect employees' feelings and attitudes more readily than do substantive considerations. Ineffectiveness in the Executive Office would probably result in a generally ineffective mission more readily than would incompetence in any other single job. Thus, maintaining a high level of

maintaining staff morale is most impt. function

staff morale (by providing efficient services, and by maintaining a sincere interest in attempting to solve individual problems) is perhaps the Executive Officer's most important single function.

The Executive Officer's job is the most structured of the four jobs studied. It is to a far greater extent guided by Manual Orders and other policy and procedural directives from Washington. Paradoxically, perhaps, it is also the job which most depends upon the personal "style" and interests of the individual incumbent. Regulations, for example can be used to block action, or to expedite action, and the day-to-day activities of the incumbent will vary widely depending upon whether he views himself primarily as an arm of Washington, an assistant to the Director, a servant of the staff, or as some combination of these or other roles.

The Executive Officer's activities also depend to a great extent on his ability to delegate work, frequently of a very detailed nature, and supervise it inoffensively. Personal characteristics, as well as general management skills, play a large part in this area, since a continuous flow of communication is necessary, and staff motivational factors will affect both communication and the quality of work done. Further complicating the picture is the fact that his staff consists primarily of local nationals.

The following job description encompasses tasks which an Executive Officer will have to do himself either frequently or occasionally, and tasks for which he is usually responsible but which he might never be called upon to carry out personally because of mission size or availability of subordinate personnel. In short, the tasks are relatively standard in all missions, but the degree of personal involvement, the basic orientation, and the general effectiveness of the office were found to vary widely. Unlike the Program Officer, who tends to be disliked because of the job he needs to do, the Executive Officer tends to be liked or disliked because of the way he does his job.

F U N C T I O N S

I. MANAGES MISSION ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS

This function requires that the Executive Officer provide for the day-to-day physical needs of the mission and its personnel. The Executive Officer's tasks in this function are very diverse and may range from locating temporary office space to providing suitable draperies for an American secretary. His effectiveness influences not only the operations of a mission but also the morale and efficiency of its employees.

The Executive Officer cannot personally manage all the various service operations for which he is responsible. He must, therefore, establish effective communications between himself and the persons to whom he has delegated the task of monitoring or executing the day-to-day operations of the various sub-units under his cognizance.

The Executive Officer's managerial responsibilities are to establish and maintain effective machinery allowing for timely, efficient response to the physical needs of the operating mission and its staff. However, he does not normally seek merely to establish workable machinery and then maintain a status quo. He retains the responsibility for continuing to make appropriate innovations which contribute to increasingly more efficient administration.

A. Directs Executive Office

This general task concerns the direct management of his immediate staff by the Executive Officer. Normally this staff consists of a secretary and an Assistant Executive Officer. He assigns and reviews the work done by this staff and provides advice and direction as needed.

An essential segment of this task is to establish a working relationship with the Assistant Executive Officer. Many Executive Officers attempt to prepare their Assistant Executive Officers to undertake all functions should the need to do so arise. Generally, however, it appears that Assistants are assigned certain functions as major areas of responsibility and Executive Officers retain primary interest in others for themselves. Another task which is often undertaken as part of the general direction of the Executive Office is the cross training of sub-unit staffs with the intention of preparing members of one section in the skills required to fill in for members of another should the need arise.

1. Assigns and reviews work

The Executive Officer regularly assigns tasks to his secretary and to the Assistant Executive Officer. He normally assigns only clerical work to his secretary, but may delegate any of the operations for which he is responsible to the Assistant Executive Officer.

He reviews the assigned work done by his staff and, if possible, monitors its progress. He revises or gives appropriate direction for the revision of assigned tasks which are not carried out to his satisfaction.

> My assistant had a local employee write a report. It was a routine report, and he signed it without revising it. I didn't know that the local employee had actually written the report, and I passed it on without review. It was in very garbled English.

* * * *

2. Provides and receives information

This is the Executive Officer's major task in directing the Executive Office operations. In order for the Assistant Executive Officer to function effectively, he must serve as the Executive Officer's "alter ego." There must, therefore, be a continuous flow of information between the two, whereby each receives the benefit of the other's experience in and observations concerning Executive Office operations and any existing or potential problems affecting them. This is usually accomplished by daily, scheduled meetings and by consultations concerning specific issues on an as-needed basis. The chief difficulty encountered in this element resulted from poor personal relations between the Executive and his Assistant which caused a breakdown in communications.

3. Develops skills

Training is necessary to increase Executive Office efficiency by providing competent replacements for ill, vacationing or departing personnel. This task will not be covered in individual sections below since it is ordinarily undertaken for all sub-units of the Executive Office. This training is usually done by the assignment of new tasks to a sub-unit, and may include informal instruction in procedures by the Executive Officer or someone he designates. In addition to cross training, the Executive Officer may be required to train local secretaries in appropriate work habits and procedures, since there is usually a scarcity of local clerical help who are above marginal ability. If he has an American secretary, there is little involved in this task since she is generally delegated the responsibility to train relief personnel for herself.

I wanted to switch a bright young man from one sub-unit to another in order to give him broader experience and make him more useful. AID/W Personnel disagreed. The man was a specialist, and if I put him in a different job, they would then find it difficult to place him in a different mission. I argued that a variety of experiences would be in the man's favor for a new assignment. Finally, I was able to prevail upon them to allow the transfer.

* * * *

The only real problem in the sub-units is continuity. When a supervisor goes on leave, or takes a day off, there is no one to fill in for him. I have solved this by having the supervisors give one of the locals appropriate instructions. The same local always relieves the supervisor, and thus they are building up a store of knowledge and should soon be reasonably competent.

* * * *

I thought we could do without a sub-unit supervisor. To do this I took an operation from one sub-unit and transferred it to the Assistant Executive Office. This freed the other supervisor somewhat and allowed him to have enough time to handle the duties of the eliminated supervisor. Whether it will work or not we simply won't know until we try it for a while. If it does, we will save much money each year. In addition, both the Assistant Executive Officer and the supervisor are gaining valuable experience in other functions of the Executive Office. They will be able to fill in for others or take on additional duties since they are becoming involved in more operations.

* * * *

(From an Executive Office subordinate) An American supervisor has a clerk who cannot work properly. As a result, typing is not accomplished, filing is not being done, and records are being misplaced, etc. He has explained the situation to the Executive Officer four times, but the Executive Officer refuses to agree to replace the unqualified local national or to train another. The supervisor does not want to be responsible for the ill effects of non-performance, so he is writing a memo for the record, in an effort to absolve himself of the responsibility. He explained that the Executive Officer was reluctant to accept suggestions from others, and would not act unless the initiative came from himself. Thus the supervisor's suggestion for a replacement clerk was unlikely ever to be accepted.

* * * *

B. Supervises Operations of Motor Pool

The Executive Officer provides the transportation needed to conduct the daily business of the mission. This includes meeting the needs of field technicians for vehicles. He must monitor the entire transportation situation so that he is able to maintain on hand sufficient numbers of operating vehicles and competent staff to meet all usual demands for transportation, and he must do this without waste of equipment or personnel. In addition, he usually provides transportation as desired for unofficial travel.

1. Determines need for vehicles and personnel

In determining the number of vehicles to be maintained by the mission, the Executive Officer weighs the cost factors of increasing or decreasing the fleet against the requirements for transportation of mission and field personnel for business and, as appropriate, for

recreation. He may either initiate or approve suggestions for purchasing new vehicles or disposing of surplus vehicles as circumstances dictate.

He is also concerned with providing and maintaining a staff, i.e., mechanics, drivers, dispatchers, etc., of sufficient size and quality to ensure an efficient motor pool. Establishing and maintaining a pool of competent, dependable drivers is frequently difficult in an underdeveloped country. It may be necessary, if experienced drivers are not readily available, to hire poorly qualified people and give them training in safe driving. Training may also include instruction in appropriate conduct or dress, as well as in the procedures established by the Executive Officer for keeping records of trips, requesting repairs, or other requirements.

> I have a training program for the drivers we hire. I have also developed a driver's test for them on which they are graded. No one is hired unless he passes the driving test. I originated the test and now other United States agencies use it too. The driving test is also used to promote from within, i.e., if a motor pool mechanic wants to become a driver, he can qualify by passing the test.

* * * *

> We have certain minimum requirements for drivers. When we find drivers who meet these qualifications, we provide them with uniforms, caps, etc., and tell them what is expected of them. They are taught safe driving procedures. After all this they make pretty good representatives of USAID. But they have certain personal habits that make them offensive to Americans. These habits I cannot change. This type of thing is a chronic problem. I have to accept as a condition of this job that I can never entirely achieve my objectives.

* * * *

> I have been trying to determine Motor Pool needs. If I were to ask mission personnel how they feel about reducing the number of cars, I would get resistance. However, I have taken five cars out of service, unknown to the staff. If I get beefs, I will put back as many as are needed. If there are no beefs or problems, I will get rid of them.

* * * *

2. Provides transportation

An orderly system for providing vehicles on request must be maintained. Vehicles may be assigned on an organized "first come, first served" basis; however, the task becomes critical when there is a shortage of vehicles in the mission. A complicating factor sometimes arises when the local transportation facilities are considered unsafe or unreliable, and personnel thus frequently request vehicles for unofficial use.

In providing for unofficial use of mission vehicles, the Executive Officer may institute a rental system, so that American personnel can visit recreational areas or points of interest. Very often, mission vehicles provide the only means of traveling to these areas for the lower-ranking American personnel, who have not been able to bring private automobiles with them. In some countries where driving is considered particularly hazardous, many staff members prefer traveling in mission cars with a driver to driving themselves.

> Technical divisions have their own vehicles and vehicle maintenance. One day a technician asked me for an AID vehicle to make an out-of-town trip. I told him to use his own division vehicle, but he replied that theirs was deadlined. I then told him to take it up with the division person responsible for maintenance, because I could not allow the use of an AID vehicle when the division had its own. The technician took the division vehicle even though it was not in good repair.

* * * *

Very often a person uses a car for official business, but soon starts to use it for personal business. When I learn of this, I always send a bill. In one case, the man I billed failed to pay, and I withheld the money from his paycheck. The man was, and still is, a personal friend of mine. But now he doesn't abuse the Motor Pool services.

* * * *

Another U.S. agency recently was planning to make a field trip and needed a carry-all. I had no free vehicles that day. I called a division which has its own vehicles. They happened to have the exact type needed, and they agreed to lend the vehicle if I would provide gas and a driver. I agreed to this, so the agency got their vehicle.

* * * *

An officer's wife was using a mission driver to drive her around when she was furnishing her home. This went on for some time, and I informed her husband that I wanted requests for vehicles in writing. This slowed things down a little, but soon the wife was telephoning for drivers again. I repeated that I would be glad to provide whatever was requested in writing, and, finally, her requests fell off. I have used this technique before and find it very effective.

* * * *

The Director had to go to an important meeting. He personally told me of the importance of the meeting and that his car was not running well. He warned me that if there was any possibility that the car would not run, other arrangements should be ready. It happened that his car would not start, which we discovered just as he was preparing to leave for the meeting. He started walking, hoping to catch a taxi. Luckily, a host government official came by and offered the use

of his car, or the Director would have been late for a critical meeting. I had just forgotten to provide for the emergency.

* * * *

People complain loudly about transportation, but I feel that this is sometimes unjustified. When I arrived, I reduced transportation for unofficial purposes, because I felt regulations were being violated. Although I have published explicit instructions delineating the circumstances under which cars may be requested, there are still many unreasonable complaints. I feel that much of this reaction stems from a lack of full support from the Director.

* * * *

3. Monitors and corrects operations

The Executive Officer must establish procedures which keep him informed about Motor Pool effectiveness and allow him to take appropriate action when operating deficiencies occur. He is concerned with both procedural and personnel deficiencies.

a. insures conformance to regulations

The Executive Officer insures that mission vehicles and Motor Pool procedures conform to AID and host country laws and regulations. To do so he must keep abreast of all laws, amendments, etc. which pertain to mission vehicles. He usually establishes or modifies a records system for documenting vehicle usage and maintenance costs, in order to monitor the efficiency of the Motor Pool.

(From Motor Pool Supervisor) Operation of the Motor Pool is a day-to-day function of my office. There is little contact with the Executive Officer

unless there is an accident. Periodically, I submit reports to the Executive Officer about the miles driven, gasoline consumption, etc. For some unknown reason, he called a meeting of all chauffeurs and refused to include the dispatcher, who is the immediate supervisor of the drivers. He also refused to consult or include me, although I am the Motor Pool Supervisor and directly supervise the dispatcher. Now all the drivers will go directly to the Executive Officer with their complaints or questions when they should be going to the dispatcher. I have been working hard to get the drivers to respect the dispatcher and take orders from him--now my efforts are wasted.

* * * *

The Motor Pool was being operated ineffectively. I called in the General Services Officer and explained why I was dissatisfied. I read Manual Orders on Motor Pools to him, and gave him an order to get the Motor Pool into shape. I felt I was effective in laying the situation on the line, giving a proper warning, telling the General Services Officer exactly what I wanted, and in planning for a follow-up after a reasonable period.

* * * *

There had been no system for establishing cost figures. No one knew how much it cost to run the Motor Pool. I hired a full-time local just to maintain Motor Pool records. Before he started, I developed a work order form for listing parts used and the labor cost involved. To estimate the normal cost of these services, I surveyed other garages and saw what they charged for various types of work. I used salary and time estimates of our employees in the Motor Pool, and the cost of the parts we bought. I also utilized a form showing where a vehicle went, when, who drove, time in and out, and purpose of the trip. As a result, we now know the cost of running the Motor Pool, including the cost of vehicle maintenance.

* * * *

A routine audit revealed incomplete records of maintenance operations. I was notified, and had the garage temporarily padlocked. I also confiscated all garage records and determined that they had been falsified. I questioned everyone, hoping to obtain evidence. An inspection trip through the garage revealed suspicious circumstances, but I could gather no concrete evidence. However, I felt so strongly that something illegal was going on that I fired the local supervisors and placed other employees in charge.

* * * *

I learned from hearing gossip that local employees were being bribed to work on private vehicles. On a routine trip to the garage, I observed two mechanics working on a privately owned car. I gave strict orders that only official vehicles would be handled in the mission garage, and if the mechanics wanted to work on private cars, it would have to be away from the garage and after duty hours. I don't have time for regular checking of the garage, so I can only hope that my order is being carried out.

* * * *

I must determine which regulations apply to mission vehicles and assure, usually through the Motor Pool Supervisor, that vehicles conform to the regulations, e.g., licenses, driver permits, registration, etc.

* * * *

b. corrects operating deficiencies

The Executive Officer investigates all complaints about Motor Pool services, since these constitute one of his best means of monitoring the system. Many of the complaints he receives must be tempered by his knowledge of the mission staff, since some people may have unreasonable expectations regarding vehicle service. In addition,

he takes action on deficiencies which he observes on routine inspections or by chance. Included in this task is the disciplining of personnel who violate regulations, or who are inefficient or uncooperative.

> The General Services Officer informed me that a Motor Pool local was not working well. He recommended five days leave without pay for punishment. I explained that to do so would be contrary to regulations, so instead I told the General Services Officer to write a reprimand, clearly describing the offenses, and warning that if it occurred a second time, the employee would be dismissed.

* * * *

> The Director's driver refused to do some of the odd jobs the other drivers were expected to do, and failed to cooperate in other ways. The other drivers complained. I listened, but I told them that there was nothing I could do, because it was the Director's driver.

* * * *

> Recently drivers for technicians have been involved in several accidents. To curb accidents, I wrote a memorandum for complete distribution, reminding all Americans that when traveling as passengers they were responsible for vehicles and drivers. Therefore, they should make sure that vehicles in which they were riding were safely driven.

* * * *

> One group of officers was to be transported to a meeting with host country officials. The transportation was arranged, but the driver did not arrive. The visitors walked to their meeting in order to be on time, but later informed me of the error. I reprimanded the driver, but could do little else because he claimed that he had misunderstood my instructions. I also apologized

to the officers. I feel that they were not overly upset because they had been in underdeveloped countries before; therefore, they had considerable appreciation of the local situation with which I had to contend.

* * * *

I had noticed that our vehicles were sometimes carrying locals. I also had received complaints at staff meetings that vehicles could not be obtained on a last-minute basis if it became necessary. I knew that we had enough vehicles to assure transport for anyone at almost any time, so I decided to look into the problem. I asked the General Services Officer if he thought the vehicles were being misused. His reply was, "No more than would be expected." At the same time, I asked for a check of the car mileages against the mileage record which the drivers are supposed to keep. The next day the check showed that the drivers were obviously not keeping accurate records of their trips, and, in some cases, kept no records at all. This meant that they could go out joy-riding for an afternoon without anyone noticing, as long as there were some drivers available for call. I called the responsible officer in and told him that the records system had to be enforced. (He had previously told me that some mission personnel had officially requested transport to a ministry but had then told the driver to go elsewhere on personal business.) I told him we had to enforce a two-way check on the use of cars and instructed him on how to go about this. The new system has worked out very well, and we have accurate records regarding where cars have gone, why, and when. I then sent a directive around the mission, instructing everyone about the new system and encouraging them to cooperate. The mileage record forms were in existence before, but were never properly utilized. However, my new system was a good innovation.

* * * *

The mission had been providing transportation to and from work for everyone who wanted it. I eliminated this service. As a result of my stopping this kind of transportation for our people, we are now saving a lot of money annually. I justify this by the fact that it doesn't hamper our operations at all and I think it is a minimum inconvenience. In view of these facts, I think it is in the best interests of the United States government to do away with such services. However, there has been a great deal of negative reaction as a result.

* * * *

Someone complained to the Director that a mission car did not show up on time. The Director wrote me a note to study the transportation set-up and submit a report. I did so, writing up the number of vehicles, their model years, need for replacement, number of drivers, and for whom transportation was provided. A lot of my time was consumed merely because one person complained.

* * * *

I was in the motor pool area one day and noticed that several cars had come in from one area of the field. The dispatcher told me that each car brought only one man. I immediately called the divisions involved and asked why they couldn't coordinate traveling, in view of the distances involved. I worked out a system for coordinating this transportation, and sent a circular around announcing and explaining the system. It was the only authorized means of travel from then on and it has worked out very well.

* * * *

Over half of the mission vehicles are deadlined. One mission technician, who is a recognized expert in auto repairs, has volunteered to repair the vehicles. I plan to refuse the offer because the same situation has occurred before, and the

Director objected to the technician repairing vehicles during work hours. I am not going to bring this up to the Director because of possible repercussions from him even though the vehicles are badly needed.

* * * *

When we started delivering small items, the locals used to take the waste. One day I was at the Motor Pool and noticed that they had two men working all day just finding waste they could take home, so I talked to them about it. According to them, they were gathering "waste," but usable things were being included in the process, and they didn't consider the time they were investing in this, either. I told them this would have to stop, and I alerted their supervisor. It did stop.

* * * *

One day a driver did not appear to take the Director to a meeting. A delay was created because another driver had to be found. When I learned of this, I wrote a deficiency report to go into the absent driver's record, so that the offense would be properly documented. I warned him that this behavior would not be tolerated. Now, if a second incident occurs, the driver knows he will be separated.

* * * *

The people in this country are very sensitive. The drivers often get into squabbles, and then come to me to complain about other drivers. I tell them that our purpose here is to help their country develop and that they are part of that assistance just as much as the rest of us. I explain why they should not bring little things into my office, always adding that they should feel free to come in with major problems. I emphasize that it isn't fair either to the United States or to their own government to spend time each day discussing these personal problems. So far, they've responded.

* * * *

C. Supervises Operations of the General Services Office

This function includes the procurement, distribution, storage, and repair of supplies and equipment for the mission and for the mission staff. Usually the Executive Officer delegates these operations to subordinates, but retains responsibility for them. In small missions a single General Services Officer, who reports directly to the Executive Officer, will be immediately in charge of most of these tasks. In larger missions, the General Services Officer may report through the Assistant Executive Officer and will have a staff of several subordinates who are directly involved in performance of these tasks. The operation of General Services and the types of problems and obstacles encountered, therefore, vary with the size and organization of the section. However, a general problem occasionally mentioned by Executive Officers is indecision on the part of sub-unit supervisors, resulting in the practice of bringing all problems to the Executive Officer for resolution. This delays the sub-unit's operations and takes up much of the Executive Officer's time. One Executive Officer said, "I would estimate that fewer than 10% of General Services Officers have any administrative competence or administrative skills. This makes them problems unto themselves. They tend to be inflexible and afraid of their own shadows." Some Executive Officers considered this to be a problem in all sub-units, not just General Services.

1. Procures supplies and equipment

a. reviews purchase orders

The Executive Officer reviews purchase orders in the procurement of supplies and equipment. Many factors are considered in approving or disapproving these orders, i.e., the appropriateness of the

item for its intended use; its adaptability to conditions created by the local climate, power supply, altitude, or other relevant factors; the acceptability of the supplier under AID regulations.

In this task, it may be difficult for the Executive Officer to convince the person initiating a purchase order that some other item might be more suitable for his purposes, or that a preferred supplier cannot be used because of AID purchase regulations. Similarly, technicians may become disturbed when urgently needed materials cannot be quickly purchased on the local market, but must instead be ordered from the U. S. at considerable delay. Rejecting purchase orders because the terms outlined or the quantities ordered are not suitable also may result in friction with other personnel. Other difficulties occur when the Executive Officer has inexperienced subordinates whose work must be carefully checked. This is not only a drain upon the Executive Officer's time, but may also create the impression among subordinates that he lacks confidence in them. The following incidents illustrate some of these problems.

> A purchase order came to my desk yesterday. It was a small order for material which a technician had already procured. I almost signed off automatically because of the size of the item. But, if I had, I would have been in trouble with AID/W because the regulations specifically say that under no circumstances can any amount of this material be purchased outside the U. S.
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> * * * *
>
> (From Program Officer) The method of procurement, which is clearly within the Executive Officer's jurisdiction, has not been spelled out by him. Currently, technicians unskilled in procurement do their own ordering. Because of unfamiliarity, they waste time and are never sure that their methods correspond to regulations.
>
> * * * *

When several office machines recently broke down, a request was submitted to purchase new machines. Procurement wanted to replace, not repair, the broken-down machines. I approved the request for only a few of the new machines, and arranged to have the others repaired and re-issued.

* * * *

I told the Procurement Officer the type and amount of an item to order. He prepared a purchase request ordering it from a private firm. I noticed this and returned the purchase order with a note telling him that this item must be ordered from the General Services Administration. He rewrote the order correctly.

* * * *

A technician recently requested that calling cards for social use be prepared for himself and his wife. A purchase order was made out and sent to me for approval. I knew from experience that the United States Government did not buy this type of thing, so I checked with the Controller to make sure. The Controller agreed, so I disapproved the purchase order.

* * * *

By regulation, only certain types of household equipment are purchased for AID use overseas. However, some time ago non-standard equipment was purchased. Recently I sent an order to AID/W asking for the same type of equipment as replacements. AID/W caught the infraction of regulations and cabled back, asking if there was justification for this order. I prepared a long cable explaining. AID/W is now deciding the case.

* * * *

b. determines requirements

The Executive Officer determines the needs of the mission and staff for supplies and equipment. In cases where he is informed or observes that a shortage exists, he evaluates the need and takes appropriate measures to procure additional supplies or to provide alternative solutions to shortage problems.

> An officer's wife wanted an appliance not usually supplied by the mission. When I discussed it with the Director, he suggested that one of these appliances be supplied free to all homes. However, practically all of the mission people had already bought these appliances themselves. As soon as the news got out that there was a possibility of the appliances being furnished, some of the mission people wanted to sell theirs. In order to sell any equipment, it must be cleared through me according to regulations. This might have caused headaches since it would mean almost wholesale black marketing if all the people who owned these appliances sold them at once. I had to convince the Director that these appliances should not be furnished by the mission. While I was not loved for this, I felt that I was fair.

* * * *

> I ordered a survey to check on what procurement was really needed and what could be eliminated. There was going to be a reduction of program procurement. One of my subordinates did a preliminary survey and went directly to the Program Officer, telling him that procurement for the program was going to be cut down. The subordinate jumped the gun. He should have taken preliminary findings to me and let me discuss them with the Program Officer. As it was, it was either a misunderstanding or a lack of judgment. The Program Officer got unduly upset.

* * * *

c. insures conformance to procurement regulations

The Executive Officer insures that equipment and supplies for projects are purchased in accordance with the terms of Project Agreements and other regulations, and that local employees buying from local suppliers are not colluding to defraud the mission. In certain countries, practices which are viewed in the U. S. as illegal or unethical are not regarded as improper in any way. This may make it necessary for the Executive Officer to develop special procedures for checking on purchases made by local employees, in addition to his usual monitoring procedures.

> A clerk who is responsible for local procurement lends money to local mission employees at a high rate of interest. This is illegal, but I can't prove it because no one will testify against him. He has never gotten a discount for USAID on an official purchase, although such discounts are available. Without proof, I have no effective solution. I plan to send a letter to all known or potential local suppliers, telling them that a discount for USAID is unnecessary, and hoping that they will then refuse the clerk a percentage of the discount. I will also continue a close watch on him, and sooner or later maybe I will find some evidence.

* * * *

d. selects procurement procedure

In many cases, the Executive Officer finds that an effective procurement system has been established by his predecessor. In others, he may have to initiate new methods for handling requisitions. This may require designing forms, developing or clarifying lines of authority, instituting mission-level regulations, establishing follow-up procedures, and similar activities.

The amount of detail required in procurement procedures is sometimes cited by the Executive Officer as a problem. Another problem mentioned is the long pipeline between AID/W and the mission for items which must be procured from government sources. Frequently there are long delays in receiving supplies and equipment through these channels.

> (From General Services Officer) Under the normal system for purchasing supplies and equipment in AID, the individual requesting the material will complete a purchase requisition for the Executive Officer to approve. After obtaining his signature, I then order the item (s). Here the system is different. The Executive Officer refuses to use a purchase request system, instead insisting that I "just order items" without any written requisition. Under this system, it would be easy for someone to pressure me to order unnecessary or illegal items. Then if an investigation should occur later, I would have no written evidence in my defense, and could be left "holding the bag." I strongly recommended the initiation of a purchase request system, but the Executive Officer refuses to take my suggestion.

* * * *

> Every time we turned around somebody wanted paper. We always seemed to be running out. One section was always complaining that General Services never had paper; General Services always complained that they continuously had to buy paper; Procurement was angry because of the odd orders for certain types of paper they were given. This got to be a personal issue between some of the personnel involved. I therefore told the sections involved to keep records of how much they used, who was using it, etc., so that we could order realistically and not be caught short-handed.
>
> At the end of the fiscal year quarter we knew what our needs had been and would be, so that this area ceased to be a problem. It also provided a good statistic for reporting the work being done by that section to AID/W.

* * * *

A technician sent a procurement order to me for clearance. The items were to be purchased for a specific project. I held up the request because I thought that the items concerned should be bought by the host government. I got the Project Agreement and read it. I was convinced that it implied that this type of commodity was the responsibility of the host government. So I took the request and the Project Agreement to the Director and explained what I thought. He agreed and sent for the Program Officer to get his interpretation. The Program Officer was also in agreement with me, so the Director sent the request back to the technician with appropriate remarks.

* * * *

(From Procurement Officer) The Executive Officer consults AID regulations and the Controller to determine how an item which has been approved for purchase will be funded. Usually there is little question on the funding for standard items. However, there are occasions when it is difficult to decide what budget should be charged for specific supplies or equipment, either because the item involved is unusual or because regulations are ambiguous about certain types of purchases.

* * * *

2. Stores supplies and equipment

The Executive Officer insures that all supplies and equipment are properly stored and maintained in warehouses.

a. arranges for storage space

This task may involve locating and leasing appropriate warehousing facilities, deciding upon the allocation of space during shortages, or simply approving the arrangements made by subordinates.

While walking around the mission, I noticed that one technician had boxes stacked in three locations. I arranged for proper storage in one location.

* * * *

An order of special perishable supplies was due to arrive. I explained the situation to the General Services Officer several days in advance, warning him that these supplies required special handling. On the day the supplies arrived, no arrangements had been made for them. Storage space had not been provided, and special containers had not been set up. Then the General Services Officer went home for lunch without properly stowing the supplies. I had to give up my lunch hour to assure that the supplies were put into storage immediately.

* * * *

Our mission had excess equipment that was to be shipped to other missions. There was a strike at the time so the equipment could not be loaded. I arranged with packers to keep the equipment in a warehouse without storage charges until it could be loaded.

* * * *

b. supervises warehouse personnel

Ordinarily, this task will be delegated to the General Services Officer or some other subordinate, and the Executive Officer will be directly involved only when a problem arises that cannot be handled at a lower level, or when subordinates are not accomplishing their assigned duties properly. In some small missions, however, the Executive Officer may be required to supervise the warehouse personnel directly if inefficiency or irregularities are observed (as in the incident below). Opportunities for graft and stealing are common among warehouse personnel so the Executive Officer must establish a system for detecting and investigating such procedures.

A local national is in charge of the warehouse. The warehouse at one time was dirty, and materials were being stored in a haphazard, disorderly way. I observed this during a routine inspection, so I instructed the warehouseman to clean and organize the warehouse. He tried, but made no progress. I instructed him again, this time demonstrating that similar items should be stacked together, loading and unloading zones should be kept free, etc. He understood after the demonstration, and he is now keeping a well-organized warehouse.

* * * *

A local warehouse employee was taking things. A refrigerator was found in his home. He was also involved in other irregularities. As the case broadened, a regional AID inspector was requested. I was unaware of the activities of the employee, and backed him, at first, in spite of the early evidence. However, it became obvious that the man was guilty, and he resigned. I was ineffective in not being aware of what the local was doing.

* * * *

c. conducts inventories

The Executive Officer makes periodic inspection tours of warehouses or assigns this task to subordinates who report back to him. Whenever irregular or inefficient procedures are observed, he insures that appropriate remedial measures are applied. These may include providing instruction sessions for local employees in better methods of arranging materials, keeping records, or maintaining warehouse security. This task also involves conducting periodic inventories of materials on hand, as well as special investigations to determine the causes of unexpected shortages or deterioration of stored materials.

3. Distributes supplies and equipment

The Executive Officer assures that all mission and field personnel receive the supplies needed in their day-to-day operations. In order to provide required items on an impartial basis, he needs to maintain a regular system of requests and distribution, and to inform personnel of proper procedures for making requests. He also establishes policy for allocating supplies and equipment.

a. reviews requests

The Executive Officer is responsible for determining which of the household needs of mission personnel shall be provided by General Services. He is guided by the AID regulations and by established mission policies in assuring that appropriate and equitable allotments of furniture and other articles are made.

The Executive Officer may delegate the task of allotting items to the General Services Officer, ensuring that he understands the distribution policies and regulations. The Executive Officer becomes involved directly, in this case, only when the General Services Officer reports difficulties to him or when individuals register specific complaints. It is against this background of guidelines that the Executive Officer or his delegate reviews and decides upon requests for supplies or equipment.

> A sub-unit supervisor was asked for a new appliance by a staff member to replace the one he had, because it was a danger to his young children. The supervisor refused the request because there were no such appliances in the warehouse, and we have to buy American, which means we couldn't get one quickly. The staff member wasn't satisfied, and wrote me a long memo. I could sympathize with his case, so I wrote him a letter of refusal on the same grounds

> as the supervisor, but also told him we would contact the landlord and ask him to procure one at the occupant's expense, if he was willing. This was agreeable to him, and it solved the problem.

* * * *

b. explains allocation policies

Frequently, staff members or their families feel that they have not been allocated sufficient supplies for their needs or that other persons are favored with newer or better items. Complaints of this type, as well as those caused by shortages of desirable items, may be reduced or eliminated if the Executive Officer ensures that the policies governing these matters are known and understood by all staff members. This may be accomplished by periodic or timely circulation of appropriate regulations with explanatory notations, or the explanation of pertinent policies to dissatisfied staff members.

> Whenever someone leaves, others inevitably want some of his furniture. If I permitted this, there would soon be a very inequitable distribution of furnishings. Furthermore, furnishings need repairs or refinishing frequently, so I have them returned to the warehouse for repair and storage. In spite of this policy, which I have tried to make clear to everyone, an officer promised someone that he would get him a certain piece of furniture for his new house. I reminded the officer that this sort of special treatment would lead to lots of trouble if it were continued, but I permitted him to keep his promise this time to save face.

* * * *

> In cases where a wife is visiting in the home of another and notices what she thinks is something extra that she doesn't have, she can complain to the wife of her husband's boss. The mission wives meet regularly, and my wife relays the complaints anonymously to me. I investigate the situation and feed the facts back to the grapevine via by wife. The system works quite well. For example, one woman was in the commissary and noticed another one getting an unusual item. She was very put out when she found that the commissary would not sell her any. When I investigated, I found that several people had jointly ordered the items earlier and it was just being distributed to them. The woman was pacified when she learned of this.

* * * *

c. corrects deficiencies

When defective distribution policies or procedures are observed or brought to his attention, the Executive Officer takes the necessary corrective action. This may range from changing a policy, e.g., allocating more or less furniture of a certain type to staff families, to responding to justified complaints on an ad hoc basis, e.g., replacing a new but defective refrigerator.

It is sometimes difficult for effective action to be taken to remedy deficient operations. A common complaint is the delay in supplying technicians in the field with necessary supplies and equipment. This delay is often a result of poor transportation to remote areas, delay in customs clearance, and natural hazards such as washed out roads.

> Many homes do not have adequate furniture. Acting on my instructions, the General Services Officer let a contract with a local to build some furniture. It was supposed to be done by a certain date, but a month later it still was

not ready. Mission employees were complaining because of the delay. The furniture was badly needed, so to prevent continuing delays, I visited the local myself. The furniture was then provided within a very short time, because he merely needed someone with force to prod him to complete the work.

* * * *

A technician put a sign on some mission-owned equipment stating that no one else was allowed to use it. When I learned of this from complaints by other employees, I informed the technician that the equipment was for the use of everyone, and took down the sign.

* * * *

4. Provides for repair services

The Executive Officer supervises the repair and maintenance services for all mission-owned and -leased facilities and equipment. In addition, most missions provide certain home repair services for personnel, whether the houses are leased by the mission or by the individual staff members. In most missions, the General Services Officer, or a subordinate under his direction, is delegated the operational duties of this task.

There are two types of problems generally encountered in accomplishing this task. These occur because the repair crews are usually composed entirely of local national workers. First, local crews frequently misunderstand the instructions given by the Executive Officer or his subordinate. They may only pretend to understand instructions with the result that they fail to accomplish the assigned work properly. This gives rise to criticism of the Executive Office as well as morale problems for the American personnel who have requested the service.

The second type of difficulty arises because American staff members fail to appreciate the difference in standards of work quality in the host country as compared to those in the United States. American personnel often lodge complaints with the Executive Officer about the quality of repairs or delays in completing them. He must take the time to listen to these complaints sympathetically, and to attempt to get staff members to understand and accept less efficient services than they would at home.

a. establishes procedures

The availability of facilities and personnel are usually the basis upon which the Executive Officer establishes operating procedures for repair services. He will usually establish a priority system for filling requests which he communicates to mission personnel. Order of receipt, urgency of the need, and repair capabilities are the foundations of a priority system. Included in this operation is the establishment of a regulated system for requesting services. This system defines the types of services which can be provided and the procedure for requesting them. The Executive Officer reviews, either directly or through the General Service Officer, requests for services made by mission staff. If the request is valid and properly lodged, servicing is scheduled according to the system of priority. The establishment of procedures includes delineations of the responsibilities of mission personnel for alloted supplies. The degree of employee responsibility is a factor which is considered in determining the type of servicing which will be rendered.

> A technician had a damaged piece of household equipment. Repair charges were substantial, but the man refused to pay them because his houseboy had done the damage. A mission committee took the case at my request. They lowered the charge,

but he still refused to pay. The committee was delayed while considering this, and in the meantime the technician was transferred. Finally, the committee ruled that the charge they established must be paid. I first got the concurrence of the Director and then had the Controller deduct the money from the man's pay record before the pay record was transferred to the new post.

* * * *

An American staff member recruited the mission electrician to go to his home to make electrical repairs. When I learned of this, I told the American forcefully that this procedure was against regulations, and that the regulations provided for submission of work requests when home repairs were necessary. I felt that I was effective and that the American would never again "grab" a mission worker without following the proper routine.

* * * *

I set up a system so that a team goes around to all AID housing once a month, making minor repairs and reporting on major repair needs.

* * * *

b. corrects procedural deficiencies

Remedial action is taken by the Executive Officer in individual instances of service deficiencies or in procedural or policy matters as they are observed or brought to his attention.

A staff member asked the General Services Officer to make some repairs at his home. The General Services Officer agreed to do it that day. After a week, the man asked the General Services Officer why the repairs had not been made. The General Services Officer said that he thought they had been completed. Knowing that no one made the repairs, the staff member wrote a note to me explaining the situation. I told the General Services Officer to have the repairs done immediately, and they were.

* * * *

A technician recently moved into a new house. This house wasn't secure. He requested General Services to make an immediate repair. All the repairmen were busy elsewhere, so my subordinate came in and asked me what should be done. I called a non-USAID repairman and arranged for him to do the work immediately.

* * * *

I ordered the repair of several houses in preparation for new residents. I told a supervisor to stay with the local workers to insure that no mistakes were made. Because of a "don't care" attitude, the supervisor left. Only two houses were repaired and then the workers moved on to another assignment. Unfortunately, they also did the work poorly, so now it must be redone.

* * * *

Since I have to deal with so many locals I have to do much guidance and watchdog them all the time because of their unwillingness to say they don't understand instructions.

* * * *

D. Supervises Operations of Communications and Records Office

The Executive Officer supervises the work of the Communications and Records Clerk and the operations of the Communications and Records Office. The procedures involved in this task are closely specified by regulations, so that the Executive Officer rarely takes action in this area other than to handle complaints, e.g., about slow service, and to ensure that security regulations are followed. Occasionally, he advises the Clerk on methods of providing more efficient communications service or improving the filing system. The most frequent problem reported is the difficulty in finding temporary replacements who are familiar with the routines and procedures of the Office when the Clerk is ill or on leave.

1. Maintains central files

> Communications and Records is a fairly static kind of function which doesn't require too much supervision, providing you have a good supervisor, which we do. The only checks I have on her are the complaints made by mission officers about not getting files, improper routing, etc. When this happens I go to her and discuss the matter. I can usually solve it then and there. One thing that I always do with her is take her aside whenever we get new Manual Orders which pertain to Communications and Records and make sure she understands them properly. If she doesn't, I explain them to her.

* * * *

> At one time I noticed that cables and airgrams discussing personnel matters were appearing in the reading file, when only the Director and I were supposed to get copies. I called the Communications and Records Clerk and informed her of the proper routing. This solved the problem.

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* * * *

> I have instituted a retirement program for old records since there were things in the files which did not really belong to the mission anyway. I feel this is an area which has been neglected by AID/W.

* * * *

2. Monitors flow of communications

Ordinarily, many of the duties involved in this task are delegated to the Communications and Records Clerk. These include routing incoming correspondence to appropriate personnel, maintaining a reminder file and sending notices when replies to correspondence are due, and ensuring that other routine details are attended to. In some missions, the Executive Officer has the Clerk assemble reading files, which are sent to appropriate staff members to keep them informed of important communications. In addition, the Executive Officer clears communications leaving the mission. The volume and types of communications he clears depends upon the Mission Director. The Director may delegate to him the task of receiving and signing either all correspondence or only certain types.

The most common problems in this task stem from delays on the part of staff members in reading or replying to correspondence. At times, the Executive Officer finds it more effective to notify staff people personally about particularly important or interesting messages than to circulate reading files.

> AID/W personnel sent an airgram asking a specific mission secretary to write a short account of her overseas experiences and to have two photographs taken of herself in the local environment. These were to be used by AID/W recruiters. I assigned the General Services Officer the task of making sure that the

secretary wrote something and actually had the photographs taken by the deadline set. I selected the General Services Officer because it seemed inappropriate for me to assign my own secretary to check on another secretary. I did not have the time to do this myself, but I had to make sure that the materials were submitted as requested.

* * * *

The problem of getting materials to AID/W on time was discussed at a staff meeting. Someone complained that when a document was being routed just before mailing, there was never enough time to read it, and therefore it had to be signed without the signer really knowing what it contained. I have suggested that a draft be circulated before the finished product is to be signed. This will allow most people to study the document at length, thus preventing errors. Everyone has agreed to follow the suggestion.

* * * *

I became aware of the problem of not having satisfactory catalogs for procurement, so I suggested to the Director that we start a library. He agreed, and thought that part of the library should also be for general use. He gave me permission to proceed. The Personnel Officer hired a librarian and turned over to her all existing procurement catalogs, plus available books and pamphlets. The librarian is now organizing the library and placing orders for new materials.

* * * *

To help assure that reports go out on time, I continued the practice of having the Communications and Records Clerk put out a memo periodically, listing the reports that are due within a certain time.

* * * *

A technician was sending a cable to an engineer in the U. S. offering him a job here. I clear all cables and noticed that this cable said that the engineer's salary would not be subject to income tax. This is not true, so I pointed this out to the technician, telling him that there was no reason to pass on bad information, and that the engineer would be very angry if he came and found out he had been misled. The technician revised the cable accordingly.

* * * *

3. Ensures conformance to regulations

The Executive Officer must keep informed of any procedural changes made by AID/W regarding communications or records, and make appropriate operational changes in the mission. Because of the volume of changes in regulations and orders, there is not always time to become familiar with each change as it is received. Some Executive Officers consider supervising communications to be difficult sometimes because of the amount of detail involved in these regulations.

Another U. S. agency has a cable system different from that of AID, but many AID cables must go via their network. AID/W sent out instructions to change our method so that the system would be more standardized. I received and incorporated the information into our mission's communications system by explaining the change to the Communications and Records Clerk.

* * * *

AID/W sent instructions that when the mission sent information to only one AID/W office, such information should be sent by letter, not by airgram. Thus, the multiple reproduction of airgrams in AID/W could be reduced. To

> disseminate this information, I announced AID/W's request at the mission's weekly staff meeting, and then to ensure compliance, I wrote and distributed a memo explaining the instructions to all mission offices.

* * * *

4. Facilitates communications

The Executive Officer provides an internal system of distribution whereby information of general interest will be made available to the staff. In some cases, he uses the Communications and Records section to implement this distribution.

He is also interested in field communications. This area is not usually the concern of the Communications and Records section, but for purposes of uniformity it will be discussed here. The Executive Officer monitors the systems of communication between the mission and the field in order to facilitate and improve them as needed.

> Many letters from AID/W were coming to the mission as personal letters addressed to individuals here. These letters sometimes contained information regarding Washington policies which were important to the mission as a whole, but they were outside of the normal system of official correspondence, so that only one person saw them. I fought a battle to have all such letters opened and routed by the communications section. There was much initial opposition to this, but I was able to persuade the Director to agree by giving examples of information losses. He is now trying to get AID/W to send all mail to the Director, so that the routing will be decided here at the mission level.

* * * *

I could use a Director's reading file, as other missions do, so that anyone who is cleared in the mission could read all of the incoming and outgoing cables and airgrams. But I feel that is cumbersome, awkward, hard to control, and always out of date, so I prefer notifying people individually of something they should know. I have found this system far more effective.

* * * *

We always had a great deal of trouble reaching our field technicians by phone. When connections were made they were usually bad. I decided to do something about it. My decision to take action was not so much from crisis but from forward planning, since I knew the problem would become serious as the staff increased. I went to the Director and suggested several changes. He was aware of the communications problem and told me to go ahead. I then called the General Services Officer into my office and asked him to try to find a new electrical system which would give us better and quicker connections. I described the kind I thought we should have and the price restrictions involved. I knew these things from my past experience as an Executive Officer in buying this type of equipment. He found a system which was acceptable within the specified price range, of a type which would be relatively easy to service and maintain. The system is a definite improvement.

* * * *

People in the field were not happy with communications. I convinced the Director that improvements should be made. He agreed to consider my radio contact concept. This would eliminate the need for telephone contact between field teams and the mission. It would also be a great intra-area communications improvement. I

> talked to field technicians to determine the locations at which radio communications should be set up. I then went to the host government to get authorization to do this on a trial basis. Then I arranged for professional communications people to set the system up. They are now putting the system into operation in the field, and in a short time we will be able to start using it.

* * * *

E. Supervises Operations of the Travel Office

In almost all missions, travel arrangements are delegated to a Travel Clerk. The Executive Officer is not involved in the day-to-day operations of the Travel Office. He ensures, through his supervision of the Clerk, that travel procedures conform to existing policies and regulations, usually by periodically reviewing travel requests and procedures. In addition, the Executive Officer keeps mission personnel informed about travel policy.

Included in this task is assistance and service which the Executive Officer provides for new arrivals.

1. Ensures conformance to regulations

The Executive Officer is responsible for setting up, and informing other staff members of, the regulations and procedures regarding travel for both business and pleasure. In order to accomplish this task, he must be familiar with current AID regulations and restrictions, and with the laws, customs regulations, and immigration rules of the host government. There may be occasions when he will have to negotiate with the host government to modify travel restrictions that create difficulties or inconveniences for AID personnel.

He is often required to interpret and apply regulations in individual cases involving difficulties that cannot be handled by the Travel Clerk. Such problems may arise when AID/W communications concerning travel are not clear, and delays in implementation may result.

> (From Assistant Executive Officer) The Executive Officer ensures that USAID travelers have all the documents required for travel prior to their departure. Usually, this task is delegated to a subordinate who clears arrangements with the appropriate host Ministry.
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> * * * *
>
> When USAID employees went out of town on official trips, they took mission vehicles. On long trips they needed to buy extra gas, which required that they pay from personal funds and that they be reimbursed later. The reimbursement took a long time. Remembering a procedure from another post, I got a gasoline distributor to sell tickets to USAID which could be exchanged for gas. The gas tickets are ordered in fairly large quantities and paid for by the Controller, and people who are to travel take the tickets to buy gas on the road. This makes the use of personal funds unnecessary. In addition, I convinced the gasoline distributor to pay for the printing of the tickets, using the reason that this procedure would increase purchases from his company.
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> * * * *
>
> A mission employee was being transferred, but had elected to travel via an indirect route. This was the first time the Travel Clerk had been required to handle such a case. I dictated a memo to the mission Controller, the airline, and the traveler, indicating that the traveler was required to pay all costs involved in indirect travel. Also, the traveler was give a blank, signed, itinerary on which he was to write at each terminal point of his travels just what portion

the U. S. Government must pay. This system worked well; it prevented much paperwork which would have been required had the traveler paid everything and then tried to be reimbursed later.

* * * *

The Travel Clerk sent participants to the United States, but purchased tickets for one-way travel only. AID policy is to buy round-trip tickets to save money, so when AID/W learned of the error, a cable was sent to me asking about the one-way tickets. The Travel Clerk had made the original error and I had approved her work, so both of us had made the mistake. When the AID/W cable arrived, I merely sent the Clerk to the airline with the original travel orders to purchase return tickets.

* * * *

The host government sometimes issues very short visas to people even when they are coming for a two-year tour. This means that if they leave the country for a few days, they cannot return again. Sometimes it takes a long time to get such situations straightened out with the government. I've had discussions with several host officials about this. I have even offered local mission positions for top local officials to fill. These politicians love to have patronage to hand out, so they have to have positions they can award to their friends. This has mellowed one of them toward us. I have to maintain this type of relationship with host officials in order to get anything done.

* * * *

Communications from AID/W are sometimes unclear. AID/W recently sent word that employees would have to pay certain travel charges formerly paid by AID. No effective date was given. People

were due to leave on trips and more information was needed. I drafted an airgram to AID/W requesting additional information so that the directive could be properly implemented.

* * * *

A technician was leaving the post and was breaking several regulations by his exit procedures. I let him know indirectly what he was doing wrong. He came to me and told me it was not my business. I then sent a terse memo with the regulations cited and told him to stop. He took offense and claimed that I had told him the mission would pay for various expenses he had incurred. He protested when I didn't confirm this. It went all the way to the Embassy and the employee's Congressman, but I won. He left mad, but I was right. He just wanted to say that he hadn't been told about the proper procedures.

* * * *

A man in the mission was being reassigned, but he had no final travel orders from Washington. He went ahead and made reservations to go, but was held up in sending his baggage. The regulation stated that when traveling as he was, all baggage must accompany the person, and baggage other than hand baggage should be shipped by surface freight. When the authorization for travel finally came from Washington, it was too late to send the baggage by surface freight. The man came to me and asked if there was any regulation which expressly prohibited a quicker way of shipping his baggage. I couldn't find a prohibitive regulation, so I authorized the man to send his baggage by air freight. He was very happy that this could be done, and very appreciative.

* * * *

A technician was being transferred to another post. On the day he was to depart, he came to me and asked how he could get something done quickly. It wasn't covered in the Manual Orders, and I didn't know, so I called in my assistant who explained the system to the man. His request was facilitated and he left very happy.

* * * *

2. Reviews requests

The Executive Officer signs all travel requests for mission personnel. He reviews these requests for conformance to AID, mission, host country, or other relevant regulations. On occasions when arrangements must be made on very short notice, the Executive Officer may make them himself instead of assigning the task to a subordinate.

A technician wanted to send some participants for training by bus instead of by airplane as usual. I was informed the trip would be 48 hours over rough roads. I called the technician and convinced him that money saved by sending participants in a bus instead of by plane would not be worthwhile because of the hardship to them.

* * * *

A secretary recently came in and wanted to resign. She said it was for personal reasons. She wanted to be re-employed by AID in the U. S. I told her to draft a resignation. When she had done so, and brought it to me, I sent a copy of it to AID/W, writing an airgram of my own requesting that AID/W agree and give authorization to issue her travel orders. When the authority came back, I notified the Personnel Officer to type the travel orders, and to have the secretary's household effects shipped. The girl has now departed.

* * * *

A technician got orders to go to another country. He wanted to go indirectly and to take leave while traveling. The Manual Orders prohibit this. I felt another route would be more economical, but I think the technician went to the airlines and got them to say that it was cheaper to go the way he desired. I suspected that the man offered a bribe, so I sent my secretary to get comparision prices. The secretary made the mistake of using the transferee's name, so the airline again said that his preferred route was the least expensive. I had no alternative but to send the man indirectly which, I am sure, is more expensive. To correct this, I suggested to the Director that the Manual Orders be amended to say that the Executive Officer has the final authority to select travel routes.

* * * *

An AID person left one mission to go on leave and then to be assigned to this mission. He was going by way of another country. He wanted to buy furniture there and have it shipped at AID expense to this mission. While it is okay to ship household goods from the U. S. to a new assignment or from one mission to the next, I recalled that the particular thing this person wanted was against regulations. I tracked it down in the regulations and saved the man a good deal of money.

* * * *

A contractor was reported by a local national as being an undesirable person. The Director notified the Ambassador, who had the charge investigated. The charge was proven, and the man was ordered home right away. I arranged travel and tried to call the man, but he was in the field. I sent a letter with a chauffeur, asking the man to report immediately to me. When he returned, I gave him his tickets and told him that he had to leave on a designated flight. He did not object. I then sent a cable to AID/W confirming that the man was returning.

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A staff member on home leave insisted that freight be sent to her home instead of to a dispatch agent who would have cleared it through customs. She hoped to save time. The General Services Officer explained the problems which might be encountered, but she insisted. Therefore, he got her signature on the request. Later, she had problems and complained to me of the General Services Officer's error. He explained and produced the secretary's signature on the request, but I still blamed him because he should have convinced her to follow the proper procedure.

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3. Greets and assists new arrivals

The Executive Officer ensures that appropriate arrangements are made for visitors, temporary duty personnel, and incoming permanent staff. This includes providing transportation from the airport to the mission or a hotel, obtaining suitable accommodations, clearing through customs, and any other necessary services. While these matters are usually delegated to a subordinate, the Executive Officer himself may take over when high-ranking visitors or staff members are arriving.

(From a mission visitor) The Executive Officer had been notified of our arrival time. He had a man there to meet us, and took us to the hotel where he had made reservations for us, despite the fact that we had not requested them. He had arrangements made for us at one of the nicest hotels in town. He had been at the airport to meet us, but the plane was late, so he left a driver for us and returned to work. Soon after we arrived at the hotel, the Executive Officer called to check on our plans. We needed to sleep, which he said he had anticipated, so he had arranged a meeting for us the next morning. He also sent a car to take us to the meeting.

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F. Supervises the Communications Media Section

In some missions, there is a Communications Media Section which the Executive Officer supervises. The Executive Officer generally delegates operational duties to a subordinate, limiting his own involvement to administrative control. Two basic facts make this limitation necessary. The Executive Officer has a wide range of responsibilities and thus little time to become involved in minute details, and communications media work is of the type that requires a technically knowledgeable person to direct operations. The Executive Officer's administrative participation includes such activities as approving work requests, approving requests for equipment and supplies, and clearing correspondence.

> I recently received a letter from an official in a host government Ministry requesting that some equipment be loaned to them for one of their projects. We had done this type of work for the host government before. However, the Ministry personnel involved were doing some contract work on their own, outside of official Ministry work, and wanted the use of free equipment. I learned this merely by chance. A local employee had told my subordinate in charge of Communications Media about the matter. When I called him he relayed the local's information. Therefore, I wrote a letter to the Ministry personnel explaining that the equipment could not be loaned. I also informed the Mission Director of the matter, because he was scheduled to have a conference with the Minister, and I felt that the issue might be discussed at their meeting.
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> Prices for equipment and supplies are high here because of import taxes. My subordinate in charge of Communications Media had a plan to open a bank account in the United States in order to permit

purchasing supplies there at cheaper prices. I agreed that the idea was sound, and suggested that he prepare an amendment to the Project Agreement to explain the reasons for the account. He followed through with my suggestions, got the amendment signed by the proper persons, and put the bank account into effect.

* * * *

G. Supervises the Training Office

In some missions, there is conflict involving the Training Office. The conflict arises when the Executive Officer and the Program Officer both feel that they should control the training function or when the Training Officer would prefer to be independent of both offices. Both the Executive Officer and the Program Officer have logical reasons for desiring control, which is the major reason why responsibility for the Training Office varies among missions.

When the Training Office is under his jurisdiction, the Executive Office usually allows it semi-autonomous status. The most frequent procedure is for technical personnel to recruit, select, and evaluate nominees for a Participant Training Program, with the Training Office completing the routine paperwork. The Executive Officer becomes involved by ensuring that his subordinate, the Training Officer, completes the paperwork on time and in conformance to regulations. This monitoring consists of reviewing incoming and outgoing correspondence, advising the Training Officer concerning regulations, settling conflicts that might arise between the technical divisions and the Training Office, and reviewing training reports.

The problems that exist in supervising the Training Office are numerous and frequent. A particularly vexing problem is that host

participant training program

national officials sometimes attempt to make the USAID Participant Training Program into a patronage system. The Executive Officer must constantly be alert to attempts to send a friend or relative of a ranking official, or even a Minister, to the United States for training which in actual fact might be a lengthy free vacation. On occasion, poorly qualified participants have been approved because of the mission's need to gain host national support for goals which are considered more important than the anticipated utility of training individual participants.

The volume of paperwork involved in this function creates problems. First, a large segment of time is required for the Executive Officer to read and sign Training Office correspondence. Second, the volume tends to induce mistakes, which further increase the volume. Even if the Training Office staff is of adequate size to produce the necessary work, the large number of incoming and outgoing items prevents the Executive Officer from providing adequate controls, in that he is forced to be satisfied with a cursory reading, or, frequently with no examination of the material at all.

Another problem involves the individual participants. Host nationals selected for training are frequently unsophisticated. As a result, they get lost, leave airplanes at the wrong terminals, lose their money etc. In other cases, headstrong participants have refused to return to their own country after receiving training, preferring instead to "disappear." Such problems come to the Training Officer and the Executive Officer for solution. For example, the Executive Officer might need to decide if regulations and circumstances were such that he could instruct the Training Officer to wire an advance per diem payment to a participant who had lost his money.

A fourth problem area is the requirement to conduct follow-up surveys of former participants to determine the efficacy of training

and trainee utilization. Data were obtained concerning mission efforts in this area which indicated that present follow-up systems are inadequate. There was evidence of unclear authority, in that technical divisions, and the Training Office each though that the other should be and was conducting follow-ups. There was also evidence that if information of this type was collected, it was often filed away, unused except in reports to AID/W.

In some missions, language training for Americans is provided through the Training Office. In most cases, this training program is actually operated by the Embassy, with USAID Training Office simply processing the necessary papers. This operation also creates problems for the Executive Officer. The most frequently reported problem concerned attendance. Some missions reported that Americans enrolled for language instruction and that funds were transferred to the Embassy to pay for the training. Then the Americans either failed to attend, or attended so infrequently that benefits were questionable. Other missions reported that Americans enrolled in a series of language classes and then attempted to attend more classes than they were allowed, to persuade teachers to provide extra instruction, or to monopolize class time.

> (From a subordinate) For political reasons and "friendship," the close relative of a Minister was slipped into the Participant Training Program. The Program Officer and the Training Officer agreed to this, although the participant was unqualified. The Division Chief was also aware of the situation, but did not object because of his own political involvement. If the Executive Officer had exercised proper control, this type of injustice would not have occurred.

It was decided that successful participants should be given public recognition, even if they had been trained several years ago. I recommended that awards be given in a public ceremony to all participants, and that the awards be distributed by the sponsoring division because of the problem in assembling everyone at the same time in one city. I felt that each sponsoring division should present the award when a representative of the division was in an area where former participants were working. Everyone agreed, so the system was initiated.

* * * *

H. Provides Housing for U. S. Personnel

In some missions, the Executive Officer leases a complex of houses and apartments for use by mission personnel, whereas in other missions, personnel receive housing allowances and locate their own residences. In every mission visited, the Executive Officer was required to negotiate at least a few leases -- for example, residences for the Director and Deputy Director. This function is generally under the Personnel Office, General Services, or another sub-unit; it is being considered separately here because of its importance. Housing is a crucial item in most posts, because inferior or ill-kept quarters, or delays in providing quarters create many complaints. In no mission was there consensus that housing was adequate -- if the houses were generally acceptable, then the method of allocation was thought to be unsatisfactory. Soon after opening a new mission, houses are leased and occupied, and mission procedures are developed. Since most AID missions have been in existence for a considerable length of time, this function usually involves occasionally leasing additional property, changing leasing arrangements, and maintenance.

1. Selects houses

The Executive Officer's responsibilities may range from instructing a subordinate to keep a list of suitable rentals to searching the city himself for vacant housing. Where appropriate accommodations are very scarce, he may arrange long-term leases between the mission and the owner so that houses will be available as needed. Where there is a fairly good housing supply, the mission may lease some housing to use as temporary quarters for new personnel, people on temporary duty, or short term contractors.

I had to lease many houses. I simply walked around the better residential areas, and whenever I came upon a building in the construction stage, I either got the owner's name and telephone number of asked the contractor to have the owner contact me. (This eliminated the middle man and the "finders" fee which had to come out of our pockets.) At the time, there were no houses available other than those which would soon be completed. When I contacted an owner or he contacted me, I arranged a meeting with him in my office. Usually it took four to five meetings to negotiate a lease to our mutual satisfaction. I got half of our houses this way.

* * * *

One way houses were located was through the landlords I had already talked with. They would spread the word (at my encouragement) among their landowning colleagues, and I got many calls from people who were referred to me in this way. Sometimes I didn't even leave my office, except to inspect the house.

* * * *

In one area housing was simply not available. I proposed to the appropriate official in the host government that we would build houses as required, provided his government would assume complete responsibility for maintenance. Several days later he replied by letter, saying that this was acceptable to his government, if we would build a certain type of house. This was agreeable, so we put the system in effect, solving our housing problem to a considerable extent.

* * * *

AID/W sent a notice explaining that excellent prefabricated housing was available to be purchased as needed by each individual mission. I knew that mission housing was difficult to arrange and that

locally available housing was usually limited to one or two bedrooms, while new mission employees would need larger dwellings. I presented these facts to the Director, who agreed with me and gave permission to order the prefabricated houses.

* * * *

When I first arrived here, the Embassy performed the service of locating and leasing houses for us. Of course, the best places went to Embassy personnel, so I started going out on my own to see if I could get better houses. After the first year I told the Embassy's Administrative Officer that there was no need for us to pay them for something I was doing anyway.

* * * *

2. Negotiates leases

The Executive Officer may negotiate leases himself, delegate the task to a subordinate, or assist mission personnel who are making their own arrangements. The Executive Officer must be aware of host government rental laws, appropriate rental fees, and methods of providing utilities.

A major problem is the cost of leasing a residence. In some countries, landlords automatically raise their prices when renting to Americans or when initiating a new lease. The only defense for this ploy is refusal to rent which is impractical in many cases because of the scarcity of housing. Once terms are agreed upon, there are few problems because arrangements tend to be standardized. An Executive Officer with mechanical aptitudes will have an advantage in this task because he may need to make judgments concerning the adequacy of plumbing, utilities, and carpentry.

mechanical aptitudes

Breaking leases is seldom an issue, but does occur occasionally. When it is necessary for the mission to break a lease, the Executive Officer must be familiar with regulations and host government laws, and be tactful in order to avoid creating a bad impression.

> A landlord is coming to see me today. At home, in this circumstance, he would come in, state his business, get an answer, and be out in five minutes. Here, he will take ten minutes to say hello properly; we must have coffee or tea or we can't do business; he will finally get around to what he wants and usually a decision can't be made on the spot. He will then make abject apologies for upsetting my routine and take five more minutes to say goodbye properly. In effect, the only thing that we will accomplish is to set up another meeting to go through the same process.

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> The Director found a house himself and informed me. I met with the landlord and the landlord's lawyer to agree on rent, date of occupancy, a minor repair to the house. I then put this information into lease form, had it typed, and we both signed it.

* * * *

> I wanted to meet people purposely so I could learn what to expect when negotiating leases. Gradually I've turned this function over to the General Services Officer and Assistant Executive Officer. Now all I do is the actual signing of the lease, except in a few cases where social amenities dictate that I must negotiate the leases also.

* * * *

> We are breaking our lease for a house which is no longer required. I discussed this at length many times with host government officials. In our last discussion, they assured me I would soon have a letter from them stating their position in the matter. It still hasn't come. In this particular case, there is nothing I can do about it and nothing I plan to do. I have been very cordial in my negotiations with the host government officials, giving them every reason why we are stopping our lease. They have indicated that they understand and agree. If this delay means they want to renegotiate, I will just have to take a firm stand and point out our international rights in the matter. I want to avoid a conflict, but I will be firm if necessary.

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3. Assigns houses

In situations where the mission provides housing, the Executive Officer is responsible for allocation. This is usually accomplished on the basis of a bid system, whereby points are given for rank, seniority, the number of dependents, and other factors. The final dicision is made by allotting a specific house to the bidder who has the greatest number of points. In a few cases the Executive Officer was found to be relying upon his own judgment regarding the appropriateness of a certain dwelling for a family. Regardless of the system used, the Executive Officer will fail to please everyone.

The most frequent difficulty, and the one about which the Executive Officer can do least, is dissatisfaction among American personnel about their quarters. This may occur whether they are renting mission-leased housing or have made their own arrangements. In most cases, the Executive Officer is unable to make other arrangements for them, and can only listen sympathetically and try to point out that their complaints are shared by everyone in the mission.

In this post, there are several locations for housing, but the Americans all settled in certain areas and shunned others. I was firm about housing people in the other areas when housing was scarce. There was considerable resistance at first, but I lived in one of these "objectionable" areas and found it quite pleasant. Now that I have insisted that people accept housing in these areas, they are considered just as desirable as the others, and people are beginning to notice their positive qualities. I think I was instrumental in making the areas acceptable, especially by my own example.

* * * *

A certain house, paid for by the U. S. Government, was going to be vacant, but the plan was for a newly-arriving family to take the house. Nevertheless, an AID technician tried to rent the house, although he was well aware of our housing policy. Various people heard of this and complained to the Embassy. I was called and asked to inform the technician of the consequences should he persist in trying to rent the house, so I explained to him the policy and the possibility of punitive action. He was indignant and claimed he would go ahead and sign a lease if he could.

* * * *

An American representative of another government agency was in town on business. This man asked me for permission to use vacant mission housing, offering to pay for the housing with a percentage of his per diem. Since this gave the U. S. Treasury a monetary return on otherwise unused property, I readily agreed.

* * * *

4. Protects and maintains houses

In most countries, providing housing includes upkeep, such as occasional painting, repairs, and renovations. This task is most frequently accomplished by the General Services section. It is included here to provide a complete picture of mission housing, and to illustrate that while the Executive Office's job is largely routine, it is tremendously diverse. He is required to coordinate work from several sources in order to provide adequate services for mission personnel.

Leases may specify that maintenance is to be accomplished by the landlord. However, such terms are infrequent and do not create significant problems. Usually the mission assumes responsibility, and, under the Executive Officer's supervision, General Services provides maintenance for houses. This is frequently a problem inasmuch as facilities may be antiquated or host national repairmen unskilled. In addition, American personnel sometimes display considerable impatience when they need repairs to their quarters and the slightest delay occurs in instituting the work. In such circumstances, the Executive Officer is besieged with complaints.

This task includes protection of property, which is a formidable task in many missions. Watchmen are recruited, either by the mission or by residents. Without a watchman, theft would be rampant in some posts, but even with a watchman houses are not always safe from burglary. Many mission employees have experienced property losses. Problems for the Executive Officer include attempting to hire trustworthy watchmen, and mollifying mission personnel when the thefts occur.

A related problem is the services and utilities provided by host national companies for American-occupied houses. Because of ineptness or dishonesty, administration of these services is not smooth, as is demonstrated in the examples below involving billing. Since an overriding issue for the Executive Officer is to build and maintain an acceptable image for the mission, these problems, though seemingly petty, may become major considerations.

> A technician is stationed several hundred miles from the mission and lives in a mission house. He went on TDY to another country and took his family. He notified me, and I decided the house couldn't be left alone, so I arranged for a 24-hour guard around the house.

* * * *

> Local collectors would very often not deliver bills to mission people. The bill would increase and so would the collector's percentage when he finally collected. If the collector held the bill too long, the company would stop service and no one would know why. I went to the company and discussed this with their credit department. I asked them to mail bills directly to mission people. They agreed, and now this problem is eliminated.

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> We try to close all accounts for departing personnel so the mission doesn't have to pay outstanding bills and then try to find them to collect. Mission people get utility coupons for which they are billed by the company. I got a call from the company some time ago wanting payment for some overdue bills. I had to check our backlist of personnel. I found that these people had left

two years ago and that the bills had never been sent out to them. I had to write to AID/W to locate and collect from them so I could pay their bills and thus prevent the mission from being discredited. This wasted a great deal of time and effort, and it could very easily have been prevented by more efficient operating procedures by the company.

* * * *

5. Disseminates information on housing policies and procedures

Included in all of the Executive Officer's tasks is the need to keep mission personnel informed about the latest developments in specialized areas. To accomplish this, the Executive Officer disseminates such information as lists of available housing, allocation systems, changes in allocation systems, housing allowances, housing regulations, etc.

I. Provides Office Facilities and Related Services

Only in a new mission will this function take on real importance. Since the mission, even if it has only been in existence for a short while, already will have quarters and on-going maintenance systems, the task consists for the most part of coping with an occasional need for additional space, or of monitoring or revising maintenance systems. Typically, this entire function evolves in a manner similar to a comparable effort in the United States, with complications arising from language difficulties, differences in methods of negotiating, and differences in real estate regulations.

1. Determines need

Usually the requirements for office space are determined by consulting with other mission officers, the final decision being subject to the Director's approval. The Executive Officer considers the amount of space needed to accommodate staff changes as, for example, in budgeting space for a predicted expansion.

2. Selects office space

When office requirements have been determined, the Executive Officer searches for appropriate mission quarters. He must consider such factors as the acceptability of various locations, the adequacy of the water supply and utilities, and the availability of parking areas. In countries where commercial buildings are very scarce, it is sometimes impossible to find quarters with sufficient space to house the entire mission, so that it may be necessary to choose between two sets of problems -- cramped offices in one building vs. difficulties in communications and duplicating services for quarters divided among two or more buildings.

Few Executive Officers have formal procedures for locating space, depending instead on leads supplied by others, observation of available buildings, or personal contacts with landlords.

3. Negotiates leases

The Executive Officer uses the same techniques in negotiating leases for office space as those employed in negotiating leases for residential property. He must provide for such items as rent, duration of the lease, maintenance, and utilities. In almost all cases, these terms are set in accordance with community circumstances, requiring that the Executive Officer be aware of current community practices, such as the going rate per square foot of office space.

4. Arranges for utilities and other services

When new office space is obtained, services such as electricity, water, and parking must be secured. Such items become part of the lease if they are to be provided by the landlord, which is the generally accepted practice; otherwise, the Executive Officer must take steps to ensure their provision by contacting appropriate companies. It may be necessary to negotiate separately for parking space if these facilities are not a part of the mission property.

5. Assigns office space

The Executive Officer, in consultation with other mission officials, allocates space within newly acquired quarters, or redistributes space if the acquisition consists only of an addition. Usually acquisitions are to satisfy purposes clearly delineated in advance, such as room for an expanded division, or more suitable office space for the entire mission, meaning that several people are usually involved in planning for the change. This division of responsibility limits the importance of this task.

> A new Division Chief is due to arrive soon. We do not have much space, so I investigated and learned that another Division Chief often goes to the field for considerable lengths of time. I decided that a reasonable solution would be to place the two Division Chiefs in the same office. Everyone agreed to this, so I am having the office arranged according to my plan.

* * * *

6. Protects and maintains office space

The Executive Officer arranges with the Embassy for Marine guards, or hires and supervises watchmen in order to provide security protection. Office maintenance is a more complicated task, since it involves arranging for cleaning services, keeping equipment such as elevators in operating order, and ensuring that equipment and furnishings are properly distributed and kept in good repair.

> An officer's secretary, on her own and without authority, called in a carpenter and ordered two cabinets made for the office. They were very ugly and the officer didn't like them. I had them taken out, altered to a usable form, painted, and put back in the office. In their present form, he likes them.

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7. Monitors utilization

The Executive Officer ascertains whether office space and related services are being utilized properly.

> I discovered that the mission snack bar was using inappropriate and unclean facilities. I had another room prepared and had the snack bar moved to the new location. I gave orders that it was to remain clean or it would be closed. It is now reasonably clean, and no one gets sick from the food.

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8. Reviews Expenditures

Executive Officers must monitor expenditures continuously. Expenditure records are provided to the Executive Officer by the Controller's office. By comparing expenditures with budgeted funds, the Executive Officer makes judgments about the validity of charges, reasonable consumption rates, e.g. in electricity, and whether full value is being obtained for the money spent.

As with tasks discussed above, reviewing expenditures tends to be similar to comparable tasks in the United States. One variation is that some host national firms have antiquated billing and operating techniques, which create errors and/or tardy billing, and delays in making repairs or equipment installations.

J. Performs Other Management Functions

This function is composed of miscellaneous tasks commonly delegated to or assumed by the Executive Officer.

1. Insures conformance to security regulations

Normally the Executive Officer ensures that proper security procedures are followed within the mission, that facilities meet security regulations, that personnel have proper clearances, and that staff members know and understand security procedures and regulations. The Executive Officer performs this task under the authority of an appointment as mission Security Officer.

The Executive Officer determines whether modifications are necessary to ensure that the mission building and filing facilities conform to AID security regulations. This may include arranging for special doors, constructing a vault for classified materials, or providing appropriate locks for files. He may request guidance from AID/W or the regional Security Officer in carrying out this task. Periodically, the Executive Officer tours the mission building to ensure that security safeguards are intact, taking action to correct any deficiencies he observes.

The Executive Officer determines that all prospective mission employees, both American and local, have been properly cleared before coming to the mission. This task also requires that the Executive Officer conduct briefings for all new personnel in security matters or that he provide them with directives specifying procedures and regulations. He also ensures that all staff members are kept informed of any changes in regulations by giving briefings or circulating memoranda.

When the necessity arises, the Executive Officer establishes procedures to enable staff members to work with classified materials after regular working hours. He provides identity cards so that officers can

receive classified messages from the Embassy, and signs building passes so that they can enter the mission after working hours.

Responsibility for investigating security violations is also included in this task. When the Executive Officer observes or is notified of some infraction of the rules, he must investigate immediately. He must judge the seriousness of the offense and determine what official action is indicated.

> A Division Chief hired two local nationals without getting security clearances for them. When their first pay period arrived, the Controller refused to pay them because they had not been cleared. The Division Chief came to me to complain. He reported that he was new and had not realized that everyone had to be cleared. In the meantime, the locals had already worked, he said, and therefore they must be paid to avoid creating a bad impression among host nationals. I will consult the Director about the matter of payment and in the meantime, I have written a notice for distribution outlining all procedures for hiring local nationals.

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> A contract came to me for a contractor on a division's project. The man, on instructions from the chief of the division, was already on his way to the mission. I discovered from reading the contract that the man had not been cleared, and immediately sent a wire to AID/W to delay him until the clearance was completed. A delay resulted which could have been prevented if the Division Chief had performed properly.

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> Once the central safe broke down. It was locked open. The chief of central files came to me and asked what should be done. I immediately called the Marine guard and had one of them stand security watch on the safe until it could be repaired. I then called a local repairman and had it fixed.

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> We did not have good arrangements for physical security. Rather than try to figure out ways to promote a more secure operation, I sent an airgram asking the Regional Security Officer to come and look at the situation and offer suggestions. In the meantime, our interim methods were unsatisfactory. All classified documents were placed in the central file room during non-working hours which was very inconvenient for all of us. While waiting for the Regional Security Officer, I tried to get everyone to avoid compromising U.S. security, without impairing mission efficiency by being especially careful under the circumstances.

2. Coordinates administrative activities with other United States agencies

This task refers to coordination on the operating level, e.g., decisions to share the use of vehicles, or to provide short-term secretarial assistance. The planning necessary for coordination, such as the Administrative Support Agreement with the Embassy or provision of USAID services for the Peace Corps, is covered in section III A below.

This task includes operational coordination with contractors, which can be time-consuming. The Executive Officer interprets contracts written by the mission or by AID/W and administers services based on the contract terms. Contract terms call for various services, such as office space, clerical assistance, housing, transportation, and commissary privileges, but these specifications are ambiguous at times. For example, some contracts state that the mission will provide "necessary" administrative services. A few Executive Officers seemed to dislike providing services for non-AID personnel. A frequent complaint was that contractors take up too much time and that they demand services beyond the limits of their contracts.

Services similar to those listed above are sometimes provided to other United States Government agencies, principally the Peace Corps. In addition, the Executive Officer coordinates certain policies with those of other agencies, for example, cost-of-living expenditures and rules governing the employment of host nationals.

> A major problem with contractors is the question of providing fringe benefits such as commissary privileges. There were no Manual Orders covering this point, and no mission policies. Therefore, when confronted with the problem, I went to the Deputy Director to ask for guidance. The Deputy Director instructed me to confer with the Embassy Administrative Officer and that whatever was decided would become mission policy. The Administrative Officer and I decided the reasonable limits for providing various services based on the type of contract involved and its duration. The Deputy agreed with our decisions.
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> The host national government was required by a contract to provide administrative support for a group of contract personnel. However, they claimed to have no available office space, and insisted that the mission provide this accommodation. I talked to the Mission Director about this, and he decided not to press the host government. Therefore I have to provide some of the services that should have been provided by the host government.
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> One contractor was preparing a journal article based on his overseas experience in this country. The Division Chief heard of this and asked me what should be done. I replied that the contractor must be immediately informed that his contract prohibited such articles, and that if he insisted on continuing, AID/W would be notified. I also

asked the Division Chief to keep me informed, especially if the contractor seemed unwilling to comply. The Division Chief has not reported back, so apparently the contractor has realized his mistake and is complying with government regulations.

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Recently the Embassy Administrative Officer called on all United States agencies to compile information for submission to Washington. It was my responsibility to gather the information for USAID, so I began by telephoning the other agencies to find out their approaches and how much of the work had already been accomplished. I found the other personnel responsible for this work to be lethargic and uninterested. I felt obligated to produce results quickly, because otherwise the task could have gone on for months. I gathered my data immediately, and circulated it to the other agencies. Soon afterwards, following my example, the responsible people in the other groups prepared their reports and our combined data were forwarded to Washington.

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A contract team was to be here for only a few days. Their contract stated that the mission would provide secretarial assistance. When they arrived, they brought a copy of their contract, which had not previously been available to me. Since they were to be here for only a few days, there was not time to hire someone, and it would have been difficult to recruit for a short-term job anyway. Therefore, I assigned one of the regular mission secretaries to work for the contract team.

* * * *

3. Participates in public relations

Public relations in this context refers to all efforts by the Executive Officer to ensure that the mission presents a favorable impression.

a. handles publicity materials

In some missions the Executive Officer is delegated responsibility to screen or monitor official publicity materials. These materials include news releases, informational films, identifying insignia on mission vehicles, building identification, etc.

The major concern in the performance of this task is the extreme care that must be exercised to prevent the release of inappropriate materials, because a minor mistake or a condescending statement can undo benefits produced by months of hard work on a project.

> A mission news release was all set to go, but it referred to the host government inaccurately, and it was in bad taste. I reviewed the document and, fortunately, caught the errors. Host nationals here are sensitive, and had the release gone out, it would have created resentment. I corrected it and sent out a memorandum indicating the proper terms to be used in referring to the host government.

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> A film had been prepared on an AID project. Official mission policy was to decrease or at least not to enlarge this particular project. In view of this, I decided not to release the film, because to do so might create interest that would result in undesirable pressure to expand project work.

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> I felt that getting adequate publicity for AID should have been my responsibility. It had been my experience that good publicity was not being obtained. I proposed to Washington that we hire some locals and an American and assign them to produce publicity for AID in cooperation with USIS. Washington accepted the idea and it has worked out very well, because these information people are actually working in the mission under my direction.

USIS function 7

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b. participates in mission representation

This task refers to all informal efforts by the Executive Officer to ensure that the mission presents a favorable impression.

In some missions, the Executive Office is the contact point for visitors--local, United States, or third-country businessmen, host government officials, touring Americans, and others. As one Executive Officer stated, "In this job, you have to be able to get along with people. You have to be a real public relations man."

Since the manner in which the Executive Officer receives visitors, and the care with which he attends to their needs or answers their questions, influences their opinion of the mission, it is important that he try to present as favorable an image of the mission as possible. When visitors drop in unexpectedly, it may mean that he has to drop urgent tasks and maintain a courteous, interested attitude toward their questions or problems.

This task also includes social activities. Like all Americans serving abroad, especially senior personnel, the Executive Officer has the task of entertaining and being entertained by host national personnel. Because of the nature of his job, the Executive Officer is generally less involved with this responsibility than the other three positions studied. However, the Executive Officer cannot ignore the responsibility. Some incumbents reported that social activities were directly beneficial, either in obtaining specific items of information, or in building rapport as, for example, with landlords with whom a lease was to be negotiated.

> I had been trying to get some information concerning vehicle requirements, but couldn't contact appropriate local officials. One night there was a party to which

locals were invited, so I went, hoping that I could make a contact. As it turned out, an official did turn up who knew of the situation. I discussed the problem briefly with him, and scheduled a meeting. It probably would have taken longer to get an appointment under other circumstances. Under these informal circumstances, it is easier to get locals to agree to official meetings and conferences.

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I was talking to an American visitor about foreign aid. He was complaining about the amount of waste in the government program so I asked him if he could plan and operate a business without making allowances for waste and inefficiency. He said that he couldn't, so I continued by asking him how he could expect the United States Government to operate its vast programs without the same factor of waste and inefficiency. He said that he had never looked at it that way and that it sounded quite logical. He left with a less critical attitude toward AID.

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A host national community leader came in to discuss a problem. A member of his community who worked for AID had been shifted to a lower position. The community leader wanted to know the reason for the shift. I explained that the employee had been unsatisfactory in his first position, so he had been shifted to a new job instead of being fired outright. My pleasant, but direct manner, and the facts of the case, satisfied the community leader that my action had been proper.

* * * *

At their request, I met with host national officials to explain our assistance program. They were especially interested in why United States employees were paid such high salaries. I had to explain American work methods, and the standards necessary

for Americans to work effectively, including the point that they should be able to live at about the same level that they do in the United States. This explanation took a long time because I had to be careful to satisfy their desire for information, and to be sure that appropriate data were available.

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4. Handles contingencies

This task covers the work accomplished by the Executive Officer which is not part of his established routine. Types of activity to be included are emergency efforts of various kinds, such as that made necessary by natural disasters or political disorders, and work that is accomplished very infrequently, such as arranging for regional conferences. Legal involvements are included here because of their rarity, and because they are generally unexpected.

a. emergencies

Several Executive Officers reported that they had to be able to cope with unexpected incidents. These incidents varied from minor adjustments in mission operations to decisions bearing on life or death.

During recent political demonstrations it was dangerous to be in the streets. I sent the AID drivers to the school with instructions to drive home all the children, including those were not children of mission employees. Later, when other mission personnel were confined to their homes, I had mission drivers deliver commissary orders.

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> We had a conference a few months ago. Weeks ahead of time, I began to go to the Front Office to discuss preparations. However, they didn't seem to care and took no interest in the arrangements. Their attitude permeated the whole mission, with no one being very worried about the conference. I had been through this sort of arrangement before and realized the necessity for advance preparations. While I failed to generate the Director's enthusiasm, I did stimulate my staff into action two months in advance. It was not until ten days before the conference that the Director came to me to discuss preparations. The result was that then everyone had to work overtime and we barely had arrangements made at the proper time.

b. legal involvements

The Executive Officer must be concerned with host national laws which apply to USAID personnel, disseminating information concerning these laws, and assisting personnel or intervening with host national authorities when legal difficulties are encountered. His primary concern is to prevent incidents involving Americans which may prove embarrassing or injurious to the mission or to the individual.

Americans have been involved in legal problems including such topics as customs, immigration, servants, and traffic violations, as well as other offenses resulting in detention by police. Executive Officers have been required to post bond and to deal with attempts to serve court summonses. Tort claims were extremely infrequent, perhaps because Executive Officers have been able to prevent incidents leading to them by proper dissemination of information.

> A USAID vehicle was involved in an accident and the other party decided to sue AID. I warned everyone in the mission to refuse to accept any papers from outsiders and to send them instead to my office. When the process server arrived, I saw him and told

him firmly that the summons would not be accepted. I sent him to a host Ministry because I knew they would work through the Embassy which is the accepted legal practice. Had anyone in the mission accepted the summons, a lot of unnecessary work would have been required to get the summons back into proper channels.

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I initiated a new procedure for use in cases of automobile accidents. It is a card which employees can carry in their wallets. This should eliminate confusion, because the card supplies appropriate identification and lists our insurance agent.

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A mission employee reported that a local real estate company was threatening to seize his furniture because his landlord had failed to make mortgage payments. I went to see the landlord's lawyer to explain that the furniture was United States Government property, and the threat would have to be retracted. The lawyer agreed and contacted the landlord, who arranged an adjustment with the real estate company.

* * * *

The Ministry had failed to provide license plates, with the result that mission employees were being arrested. To solve this problem I went to a local official and asked if we could provide letters for our personnel to carry explaining the situation. He agreed, so the letters were distributed in the host language and in English.

* * * *

Whenever there is an accident, I go to the police station or the hospital to make sure people have

proper care and legal assistance. If someone gets detained here by the police, it is a serious issue. When this happens, I go to the police station and get them out immediately. I am contacted first, and I know now, depending on the nature of the accident, which host national official to contact. I usually take our best host national employee as an interpreter. Also, I have become acquainted with one influential official who will directly help me, or at least intercede.

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5. Acts for other administrative personnel

The Executive Officer may be called upon to assume the position of Acting Deputy Director, or even Acting Director. Such roles are very infrequent for an Executive Officer, especially the latter. The Executive Officer is prepared, to some extent, for such a role because he is often minutely aware of mission administrative operations, and knows the current state of mission affairs as a consequence of having attended many mission meetings, and having exchanged information with other mission officials. However, an Executive Officer would be particularly handicapped if it became necessary for him to make decisions in the program area.

II. MANAGES MISSION PERSONNEL OPERATIONS

In performing this function, the Executive Officer is responsible for advising about and implementing all aspects of personnel management, i.e., hiring and firing, promoting, record-keeping, determining pay scales and allowances, directing the Efficiency Report system, orienting new staff members, counseling, and handling special behavior problems. The degree of his direct involvement in routine tasks depends upon the size of the mission and upon the competence of his subordinates. Usually the Personnel Officer handles most of the routine matters, with the Executive Officer being called upon only in instances where special difficulties arise. The degree of the Executive Officer's participation in substantive vs. procedural tasks depends to a large extent upon the attitudes of other mission officers toward the area of personnel and the extent to which these interests are translated into action. His role in giving advice and decision-making on policy matters also depends upon his own forcefulness and creativity in dealing with these broader issues.

Dealing with the diversity and complexity of human personality and behavior is an essential part of this job. The Executive Officer must be prepared to mediate disputes, accept complaints, or provide advice in instances where American or local personnel may be under considerable emotional stress. He may be called upon to make decisions which directly affect the happiness and well-being of his close associates and acquaintances. On the one hand, he may be required to apply regulations or to transmit decisions which are extremely distasteful to the individuals involved, as in cases of reduction in force. On the other hand, he can be of service in a great many satisfying ways, ranging from minor amenities to fundamental assistance in career development and family welfare.

A. Supervises Operations of the Personnel Office

Although there may be no Personnel Office in a small mission, the Executive Officer supervises the tasks described here whether they are performed by his Assistant, a secretary, or any other delegate. For convenience, the function will be discussed as if a Personnel Officer were part of the mission staff. A Personnel Officer normally has direct responsibility for supervising the routine procedures of the office, such as recording home or sick leave, publishing standard informational notices, and preparing personnel forms. These are brought to the Executive Officer's attention only when his signature or approval is required or a problem arises.

1. Assigns tasks and monitors performance

The Executive Officer is responsible for assigning tasks and reviewing work completed by the Personnel Officer and his staff. Reviews are necessary to ensure that operations conform to appropriate rules and regulations. In addition, most Executive Officers hold staff meetings at regular intervals to advise of any changes in AID/W or mission regulations, to discuss work problems, or to exchange information. Some Executive Officers find that periodically observing work in progress is a useful way to monitor subordinates' performance. In this way, instructions or corrections can be provided on an informal basis.

2. Prepares or reviews documentation

Documentation for personnel action is processed by the Personnel Office. The Executive Officer may prepare documents himself, supervise their preparation by a subordinate, or review those prepared in another office. They may include job descriptions, SPARs, Efficiency Reports (discussed in detail below), leave applications, termination

reports, and other standard personnel forms. The Executive Officer also administers the incentive awards program and prepares the forms requested by other mission officers for employees who are being considered for special recognition.

Lack of response from AID/W is a major problem in this task. It necessitates additional work in drafting follow-up inquiries on cases where there has been no action, and in reassuring staff members involved that action is forthcoming. At times, difficulties arise because other sections of the mission fail to prepare documents correctly, as the following incidents illustrate.

> My biggest problem is with abolished positions. After we propose that a certain job be abolished, AID/W approves. Then we have to wait for AID/W instructions regarding what to do with the man who was holding the job. Sooner or later, AID/W sends orders to transfer the man to a new post. However, they are very slow about doing so. This places the employee and his family in a tough spot, since they don't know what will happen, where they will go next, or even if a job is available. In most cases, the wife gets jumpy first. She either contacts me constantly for information, or pesters her husband to try to find out something. The jumpiness carries over to the employee; his work efficiency drops drastically, and he begins coming to me daily to ask about word from AID/W and for advice about how to seek out a job in AID, about jobs that are available, about what his next move should be, whether I can cable AID/W for information, etc. This takes up my time, since I have to listen patiently and try to encourage the employee by explaining to him that AID/W eventually finds jobs for people. Then I have to follow this up with AID/W.

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Problems concerning transfers are very numerous. The most common problem is that AID/W doesn't reply. If an employee requests home leave and return to post, an approval comes quickly. However, if home leave and transfer is requested, AID/W apparently falls asleep and doesn't reply for weeks. This means that I must continually cable AID/W, hoping to find out what has happened, or will happen, to the orders. As another sidelight to the same problem, when an employee requests "home leave and transfer," he can never be assured of a job. AID/W is prone to cable back, after a long time, that no jobs are available. AID/W's reply may be to send the employee on home leave and perhaps a job or post will be found in the meantime. This leaves the employee in doubt, he can't have a good time on home leave, he is afraid to spend money, he doesn't know what type of new clothing to buy, etc. Thus, his morale and performance go down, and I have to spend time assuring him that he will eventually have a post to go to. As a result, people are afraid to request a transfer; instead, they request return to post.

* * * *

A team of American contractors who are working with the host government need American secretaries, because their required work cannot be handled by local secretaries. I have submitted two SPARs, but so far there has been no response. I took the opportunity of telling a visiting team from AID/W about the problem and I expect them to try to expedite matters when they return to Washington.

* * * *

A new position was recently created in a division. The job description written for this position does not correctly describe the work involved. When AID/W learned of this, they asked for a corrected job description. The Division Chief was responsible for doing this, but instead of fulfilling the request, he merely inserted a new job title. I was ineffective in this because I let this slip by unnoticed.

* * * *

3. Maintains personnel records

In addition to preparing and reviewing personnel documents, the Executive Officer supervises the maintenance of personnel files. He ensures that records of salaries, leave accrued or taken, job classifications, citations for merit, adverse comments, and all other entries are kept up to date. He also ensures that these files are restricted to specifically designated persons who honor the confidential nature of their contents. When staff members terminate or transfer, the Executive Officer is responsible for ensuring that personnel records are closed out and forwarded properly.

4. Assists in determining U.S. allowances

The Executive Officer meets periodically with members of the Embassy Administrative Office to decide whether adjustments in post allowances are required. Part of this task may consist of cooperating with the Embassy or other U.S. agencies in studies to document allowance adjustments. Factors considered may include import taxes, customs duties, local rental charges, expenses created by local environmental conditions, etc. He may request additional allowances whenever mission personnel generally agree that local conditions require an adjustment.

5. Disseminates information

In addition to providing work-related information to his own staff and to other mission personnel, the Executive Officer also ensures that they receive personnel information. Memoranda are prepared for general distribution concerning changes in AID personnel policies, allowances, restrictions on travel within the country, currency exchange, etc. Frequently, brochures or booklets detailing this information are prepared and given to new personnel during orientation sessions

(discussed below). The Executive Officer may discuss particularly important information of this type at staff meetings, following up his discussion by circulating a summary of the discussion so that staff members and their families have details available for reference.

In order to fulfill this task, the Executive Officer must collect the information to be disseminated, e.g., Manual Orders and correspondence to and from AID/W which clarify pertinent changes. It may also be necessary for him to confer with host officials or knowledgeable Embassy personnel to obtain accurate information about host laws, exemptions permitted members of official United States Government agencies, etc. He may contact the local police agency, customs bureau, immigration office, currency-regulating agency, or various types of licensing bureaus for clarification. On occasion, he may negotiate with such agencies to modify regulations pertaining to USAID personnel which adversely affect working or living conditions.

> I attempt to keep owners informed about regulations which apply to privately owned automobiles. I encourage their conformance to local regulations so legal entanglements and mission embarrassment may be avoided. For example, host laws require periodic inspection of automobiles. I have a local national look through the newspaper for pertinent notices of inspection dates and places. Then I circulate this information in a mission-wide memorandum.

* * * *

B. Develops and Implements Personnel Policies for Local Nationals

In most missions, a substantial proportion of the mission staff consists of local national employees. The Executive Officer arranges for hiring, assigning, promoting, and discharging these employees and administers all the personnel details of their employment in the mission. The routine procedures involved are usually delegated to subordinates, but decisions and problems are often brought to the Executive Officer for action.

1. Recruits and assigns local nationals

This task may be delegated almost entirely to a subordinate, or it may be retained by the Executive Officer, depending upon the magnitude of the mission's need for local employees, the capabilities of subordinates in the Executive Office, the importance of the positions to be filled, and the difficulty encountered in recruiting qualified host nationals. The Executive Officer may depend upon the Embassy Administrative Office for assistance in finding suitable local employees, or he may develop his own sources for referring job applicants. Some incumbents maintain files of host national job applicants so that openings may be quickly filled with qualified personnel. Usually local employees requested by divisions or contractors are also recruited through the Executive Office.

In addition to locating job applicants, the Executive Officer ensures that they are tested for technical qualifications, obtains security clearances in cooperation with the Embassy or local officials, and provides orientation. Local employees are briefed on American working methods and, perhaps, cultural factors.

Since there are sometimes shortages of people trained in certain skills, such as typing, chauffeuring, and accounting, the Executive Officer may be forced to hire applicants with low-level qualifications and to provide on-the-job training in specific skills.

In many countries, the mission may be competing for a small pool of trained workers. Host government agencies, international organizations, and private industries may be able to offer salaries or fringe benefits that the mission cannot equal. This may make it difficult to recruit adequately trained people, or it may result in a high turn-over rate among people who have acquired or improved their skills while working with AID.

The Executive Officer assigns local nationals, either newly hired or long-term employees, in terms of the needs and requests of all sections of the mission. When there are severe shortages of capable employees, he may establish a system for allocating competent people equitably, or, with the assistance of other officers, set up a system to determine priorities among competing demands. He also arranges transfers from one section to another to accommodate changing workloads, or to solve problems of personal conflict.

> A local applied for a position in the mission. I explained to her that there were no positions available at the present time. I said that I would be glad to take her application and give her a test. I called in an American secretary, introduced them, and asked the secretary if she would give the girl a test. After the test, I told the applicant that she could expect to hear from me in about two weeks regarding her application. I repeated that here were no jobs available at the present time, and that she should continue to look for other jobs in the area. I was effective in treating her cordially and with respect. I didn't promise her a job, but I got a name and reference for our file.

* * * *

I must try to fit personalities. I recently hired a local secretary to work with an American secretary who gets along with no one, including most American personnel. I picked the local applicant who I felt would be the most tolerant and adaptable in addition to having the technical qualifications for the job.

* * * *

A former American supervisor was very rough. His secretary was competent, but very timid. She complained to one of my subordinates who told me of the problem. I told the Personnel Officer to transfer the timid girl to the main AID offices and hire another, braver girl for the American. This has worked out much better.

* * * *

One officer here is very emotional and hates local nationals. His office has a local national employee with a lot of experience, who ran the office temporarily during the absence of the prior officer. This current officer claimed that the local was inadequate and that he wanted to get rid of him. I asked him to write up a report on the man, explaining why he was inadequate. He refused, but insisted the local be dismissed. To keep peace, I transferred the man to another office and asked a local secretary to take over the work. The local secretary refused, saying that she would not work for anyone who openly said that locals were no good. I found a second local secretary who was willing to "try" working for this officer.

* * * *

A local supervisor was from another country. The native employees were disobedient, refusing to follow his orders and instructions because

they considered him an inferior foreigner. I solved the problem by selecting a leading local to be the supervisor and promoted the prior supervisor to a different job, which utilized his talents just as well.

* * * *

Everyone wants a bi-lingual secretary who can take dictation. I spend time and effort finding secretaries who meet these qualifications. Then, after being on the job, the girls come to me and complain that they never have to take dictation and so are losing their ability. They even inquire about other jobs where they might be able to use this skill.

* * * *

One office had a higher percentage of top-grade local clerical personnel than the others. I asked the Division Chief to allow us to do an audit, warning him that some of his employees would probably be transferred. He refused, and the Director said to wait awhile. That Division Chief has left, so the audit can now be undertaken. I was ineffective because we could have compromised in the first place, i.e., I might have agreed not to transfer any current employees but to make cut-backs as present employees leave.

* * * *

2. Determines pay scales

Pay scales for host national employees are set by the Embassy under regulations provided by the Department of State. Within these limitations, the Executive Officer, or one of his subordinates, determines salaries appropriate for the positions filled by local nationals in the mission, and classifies new employees according to the level of

their skills. Periodically, the salary scale and the ratings of individual employees will be reviewed and adjusted to conform with changes in job requirements, improvements in employees' skills, or increases in the salary rates paid by other organizations. Ordinarily, any major changes in the mission salary scale are made in coordination with the Embassy.

> Locals complained about low AID pay scales. I told them I would do something about the low salaries. First, I called the personnel office in a local company and learned what salaries were being paid to their employees. I had my secretary gather the same data from another local company and from the host government. On the basis of these findings, I recommended to the Director that immediate action should be taken to raise salaries of personnel in the lower grades because they were so far out of line with salaries other organizations were paying. I also recommended that a commission be formed, composed of myself and other appropriate officers, to study wages of the higher-level local employees.

* * * *

> Hiring a local national for a special short-term job was a problem because no one knew what he should be paid. I had no standards to go by. Therefore, I considered other jobs in the mission and compared their level of difficulty to that of the temporary job, and decided, by "rule of thumb," what we would offer him.

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3. Terminates local nationals

The Executive Officer implements and frequently initiates the discharge of local employees. Termination may be required by mission of AID/W cut-backs, project phase-outs, or incompetent performance on the part of an individual.

In termination procedures, the Executive Officer assures that AID regulations are conformed to, that host government laws and restrictions are honored, and that the employee has the reasons for his termination clearly explained and documented. In some countries, a determination of appropriate severance pay may be required.

> Locals here are likely to deal with other locals on a power and influence basis. One local who worked in an AID office at a relatively high level insisted that other locals give him or lend him money or he would "blackball" them. I relieved him of his duties as soon as I learned of this.

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> I was hesitant about cutting back our local staff because of the emotional feeling generated in this culture by such action, but I had to, due to an AID/W order. I waited as long as I could and finally fired the least competent local. He hung around the office behaving very emotionally. This is what I was trying to avoid. I could do nothing but tolerate his presence and ask him to leave again and again. I had already explained to him why we had to let him go. Finally he left. I would not have fired him if I didn't have to, just to avoid this kind of mess.

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4. <u>Implements procedures for recognizing superior performance</u>

The Executive Officer develops and administers appropriate systems of promotion and retirement in accordance with Manual Order guidelines, existing mission policy, Embassy policy, and pertinent labor laws in the host country. The decision to promote a host employee is usually made by the Executive Officer's section supervisor who requests approval from him, or the Executive Officer may make it on the basis of

the ratings earned in standard employee evaluating reports. In addition to recognizing job competence by giving promotions, host national employees may be nominated to receive awards established in accordance with regulations. Ordinarily, supervisors nominate candidates to receive awards by completing appropriate forms and forwarding them to the Executive Officer. In turn, the Executive Officer calls sessions of the awards committee, which consists of both American and local national staff members. The committee considers the nominations and decides whether the candidates merit the awards. When the nominee is approved, the Executive Officer implements the scheduling of awards ceremonies.

C. Directs Efficiency Rating System

The Executive Officer establishes and implements procedures to ensure that Efficiency Ratings are completed fairly and in accordance with regulations. In most missions, a subordinate handles the routine aspects of the task, such as notifying personnel that ratings are due and ensuring that they are submitted on time.

Several general problems relating to this task are widely reported. The first is that many people dislike the system and others do not use it appropriately. Secondly, some AID employees describe the rating system as a "mutual protection society," within which known incompetents continue to be given satisfactory ratings. After a man has been rated as satisfactory for years, rating him unsatisfactory puts the burden of proof on the current rater. In addition, other mission personnel who have complained about the ratee's performance may fail to support the rater who finally turns in an honest report. Therefore, giving a rating that really reflects a man's performance can leave the rater open to question and criticism.

Finally, it is possible for the rater to include in the Efficiency Report comments pertaining to dependents' health, environmental adjustment, or special personal problems which the rater feels have influenced the employees' competence as it is reflected in the numerical rating. However, no effective method of systematically evaluating these factors in relation to performance has been devised.

1. Assists in selecting review panel

Regulations stipulate that all Efficiency Reports be reviewed by a panel of mission officers to ensure that ratings are fair and accurate. In most missions, the Executive Officer recommends a list of potential panel members to the Director, who makes the final selection. The Executive Officer tries to ensure that the panel will include people

who are impartial and objective. He instructs the panel members, as necessary, in the regulations governing their duties, and the restrictions upon their decisions or recommendations.

Various problems arise in performing this task. Because the panel members are usually high-level mission officers and are very busy, and because the reviewing procedures are time-consuming, it may be difficult to schedule meetings which all members are able to attend. In addition, some officers may view this task as an imposition and attempt to avoid serving on the panel. In very small missions, it may be necessary to select a panel which includes one of the raters whose reports are to be reviewed.

The frequent requirement that the Executive Officer be a member of all panels, except those reviewing his own ratings, is viewed by some incumbents as an obstacle to performing their other work. This is especially true in large missions where there are many reports to review.

> When I became chairman of the review panel, I observed that two close friends were members of the panel. I felt that they would probably vote together, so I sounded out the Mission Director about a new panel. When the Director agreed, I formed an entirely new panel and picked a variety of members, none of whom were close friends.

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2. Ensures conformance to regulations

The Executive Officer instructs all mission personnel to write Efficiency Reports that conform to regulations. A problem frequently cited, to which the Executive Officer must be alert, is the refusal of raters to give low numerical ratings. One cause is the feeling among mission officers that a "3" is an unsatisfactory rating. Therefore, they

tend to give a "4" to everyone except the most extremely unqualified or uncooperative subordinates. Another factor is the feeling among supervisors that they will have trouble working with any low-rated subordinates in the future. And finally, mission personnel want to avoid being considered "hard to work with." Such a reputation spreads quickly and may prevent their being accepted at some desirable post in the future.

The Executive Officer is also concerned that ratings conform to the spirit as well as to the letter of the regulations. As illustrated in the last three incidents given below, he may advise raters or review officers to provide the details of any extenuating circumstances when a low rating must be given to an obviously good employee who has for some reason not been able to work effectively. This sometimes results in conflicts between the Executive Officer and the raters when the latter have strong feelings about the ratee.

> An officer wrote a memorandum claiming that a subordinate, to whom he had given a low efficiency rating, needed psychiatric help. The Director showed this to me and I advised him to have the officer remove the memorandum from the records because it left him open to a libel suit. This was done with the Director's endorsement.

* * * *

> A new supervisor wanted to see the ratings on his subordinates written by his predecessor. I said he couldn't. I don't feel it's fair to the employees. The supervisor argued that he simply wanted to be fair and would appreciate another's appraisal of his staff. I still refused.

* * * *

Efficiency reports cover an employee's family to some extent. A ratee had a foreign-born wife whose English was poor. The rater commented upon her ungrammatical English, but did not mention that she was foreign-born or that she had many other acceptable qualities. I noticed this, brought it up with the rater, and convinced him to tone down his comments in the light of the of circumstances.

* * * *

A supervisor felt that a subordinate was shirking his job, and gave him a low efficiency rating. It happened that there were circumstances which the rater had not considered. The subordinate came to me and explained his side of the case. I spoke to the Director, and he called in the supervisor to discuss the matter. The supervisor refused to raise the efficiency rating, and the report was sent to AID/W as written, but the Director added comments explaining the situation more fully.

* * * *

We had an open position in a division. AID/W sent a man who loved this region and wanted to come here. There was an awful misunderstanding. He had requested operational, not planning work. He simply could not handle his assignment. The problem was what to do with him. We could not give him a good efficiency rating because his work was unsatisfactory, but it was not his fault. He would have been very good in the right job. But we needed someone in the position he was holding, so we had to abolish the "body," not the position. I discussed the problem with the Director, the Deputy Director, and the Division Chief. My suggestion was to give him his proper (marginal) rating, but to give AID/W a full explanation of the reasons for his marginal effectiveness. The Director agreed that this was the best solution.

* * * *

One staff member had been an acting officer during the interval between the departure of his former supervisor and the arrival of a replacement. He had hoped to be promoted to be Chief Officer and was very displeased when the new supervisor was appointed. He has never forgiven his supervisor, and avoids all contact with him. At first, we had all hoped things would work out, but all of our efforts failed. If his supervisor assigns a task to him, he will agree to do it, but no one ever sees any results. Because of deadlines, the supervisor has to do the task himself. I discussed the problem with the supervisor and suggested that he talk with the Deputy Director. The Deputy told him to "make" the subordinate work. However, that would require a continual exchange of official memoranda spelling out every detail in depth, and would take up all of the supervisor's time. The odds are that he would still have to do the task himself. The supervisor didn't see how he could give the subordinate a low efficiency rating. If he did so, the subordinate would simply write a rebuttal accusing him of bias. That would not only nullify the rating, but it would give the supervisor a reputation in AID/W as a biased rater. Since he could not honestly give a satisfactory report, I advised him to have the Deputy Director do the rating. The situation did not seem too bad until recently because the subordinate was due to end his tour at this mission. However, when he applied for home leave with transfer, Washington replied that there was no other opening and that he would be returned to this post. On a recent trip to Washington, the Director discussed the problem with the personnel section in AID/W and found out that an important member of Congress had insisted that AID provide a job for this man. With no other job available, they had to return him to this post. Currently, we don't know what will happen. He went on home leave and since he did not know that there were no other jobs available, he told us that he would not be returning to this post.

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3. Evaluates Executive Office personnel

The Executive Officer evaluates the performance of subordinates under his direct supervision. Like other mission officers, many Executive Officers dislike the task, particularly the requirement to discuss the Efficiency Reports with ratees. It is difficult to impress upon subordinates that the ratings are not personal criticism, but an attempt to objectively judge their work.

> A subordinate's Efficiency Report was due 5 months after he came to this post. A man at his level should be a well-qualified person and able to work autonomously, but he was so poor that I prefaced his efficiency report with a statement to the effect that it was impossible to rate him on the tasks which were relevant to his job since he was unable to perform them, and so he was being rated as an on-the-job trainee. What annoys me is that this negative report will have little, if any, effect. There is a lag of one and a half years from the time write a report until we get some feedback from Washington. In any event, Washington will take no action based on just one report.

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4. Serves as review officer

In the larger missions, subordinates in the Executive Office may rate American personnel under their supervision. In smaller missions, the Executive Officer may be called upon to review the reports prepared on the subordinates of other mission officers. In either case, it is sometimes difficult for the Executive Officer to determine how accurate the rating is when he has no real knowledge of the ratee's work.

Another difficulty arises when the Executive Officer feels that a rating is unfair and suggests to the rater that it be changed. The rater may respond that the Executive Officer is biased, or that he is criticising the rater's competence. Since many people dislike the rating procedure as a whole, these matters could become charged with a great deal of emotion and difficult to handle, even among people who are ordinarily in agreement. Such conflicts are sometimes avoided by approving personnel ratings which are better than deserved, with little or no criticism of them.

D. Provides Orientation for New Employees

Some Executive Officers ensure that all incoming American employees are adequately oriented to mission operations and procedures and to the living and working conditions of the post. The extent of the orientation interview depends partly upon the previous AID experience arriving personnel have had; e.g., if an arrival has been a field technician for years, the interview will be merely a briefing about conditions peculiar to the mission and country, whereas if it is his first duty tour with AID, he will need detailed information on general AID procedures and policies in order to prevent problems and misunderstandings from occurring later on. It also appears to depend on the amount of time the Executive Officer can or will devote to this task. In most cases, the Executive Officer presents a summary of the benefits, privileges, policies, and regulations peculiar to the mission.

Some Executive Officers have considered poor orientation by AID/W to be a problem since new arrivals often have unrealistic ideas concerning the conditions under which they will work and live, or an improper notion of what their jobs will actually entail. Another problem is that the mission is sometimes not given sufficient warning about the arrival dates of new personnel. This decreases the Executive Officer's preparation time and makes his orientation less effective.

The Executive Officer may follow up his orientation by providing a kit which is adapted to the post and country containing detailed information concerning mission and country conditions, e.g., language, culture, climate, clothing needs, travel facilities, etc. The kit then serves as a handy reference for information about the post and country. There is some indication that the completeness and currency of these kits varies among missions, and it is necessary to update the materials they contain periodically in order that they may

optimally serve their purposes. The following incident, for example, might have been avoided had the importance of observing travel restrictions been emphasized in an orientation kit.

> The host government has a regulation that prohibits travel outside a given area unless by permit. I explained the regulation to a new American staff member. Nevertheless, within a few days he went into a restricted area, and was seen by local soldiers. The soldiers asked for travel clearances which he did not have. They helped him return to the city, but they also reported the situation to the host government which lodged a formal complaint with the Embassy. The result was that I got "chewed out" by the Director. If the man had realized the seriousness of the regulation and the attitude of the host government, he would have followed my instructions.

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It is also important that new arrivals understand AID procedures. The data indicate that "old field hands" are more readily assimilated into a new post due to their past experience and familiarity with the standard communication and documentation systems. If a new incumbent is not aware of these, it often falls to the Executive Officer to provide the information as it is needed, if it was not covered in the first orientation sessions.

> A technician who knew little of funding came to me for information soon after he arrived. I started from the very beginning and explained the system to him in simple terms. He was able to understand the entire procedure in spite of knowing little of this operation at first.

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This task requires that the Executive Officer himself be thoroughly familiar with these procedures and able to explain them in an understandable manner.

The Executive Officer provides, either during the initial orientation, or soon thereafter, explanations of the important aspects of mission-host relations. He also explains security regulations and procedures, and the individual's responsibilities in maintaining mission security. Finally, he instructs the arrival concerning the post's hazards and dangers, e.g., animal and weather perils, special health hazards and procedures appropriate for reducing or eliminating them. He may introduce the new man to others with whom he will be associated during his stay in the mission.

E. Advises on Personnel Matters

In addition to the more or less routine personnel procedures handled by the Executive Officer or his Personnel Officer, the Executive Officer has a responsibility to remain aware of the over-all personnel pattern within the mission, including such aspects as individual job effectiveness (related to his usual task as Review Officer), anticipated staffing requirements, and both personal and interpersonal problems with import for performance and morale. The sources of this information are the Personnel Officer and the material in personnel files, the Executive Officer's interaction with staff members and the information thus obtained, and his own day-to-day observation. In some cases, a complaint may be informally lodged with the Executive Officer by the supervisor of an errant employee.

The Executive Officer may advise the Director or AID/W on any aspect of mission operation which might be improved through personnel action. When he has complete authority to take action, as with certain national employees, he may initiate required changes at his own discretion.

1. Assists in recruiting staff

The Executive Officer, or his Personnel Officer, act as the mission expeditors for recruiting of new staff members. The Executive Officer also serves as a consultant to staff officers regarding their personnel needs. He often serves as the coordinator of personnel for the entire mission, making sure that the current staffing pattern is justifiable in terms of the division workload, that requests for new people reflect a genuine need for additional full-time personnel, and that the new people are equitably distributed among the various staff and line functions. Since he is also responsible for providing much of the support required by new personnel, this function takes on additional importance in that it provides the basis for an estimate of the housing, furniture, and other support services which will be required in the near future. The Executive Officer provides information about staff needs and changes as the occasion demands or in reply to queries concerning staffing.

a. reviews staffing needs

The purpose of this task is to obtain a realistic estimate of future staffing by consulting with mission supervisors. The Executive Officer also periodically reviews the current staffing pattern to assure that on-hand personnel are justified. He must guard against "over-staffing," in addition to assuring that personnel on hand are adequate to carry out existing programs and administrative duties effectively.

Some Executive Officers find it difficult to get realistic appraisals of future needs and justifications for current staffing because Division Chiefs often have natural biases toward their own projects and, in many cases, are not objective in estimating the staff required to put them into action. At times, other management

personnel lack an understanding of the importance of maintaining a clear and up-to-date picture of the staffing pattern for both American and local personnel. Finally, manpower studies are time-consuming and, since they have less visible end-products than many of the other functions for which the Executive Officer is responsible, it is easy to put them off in favor of more substantive activity, particularly if there is a staff shortage in the Executive Office itself.

> It was obvious that a manpower study should be done. I wanted to find an accurate means of forecasting the future size of mission staff. This was a necessity because I would have to provide the support for all new arrivals. I started by visiting each Division Chief with the intention of getting a realistic appraisal of the numbers and types of people he would be needing and where they would be placed. When I asked where, they were'nt sure; when I asked when, they didn't know; when I asked order of arrival, they couldn't tell me. I came to realize that all they knew for sure was the condition of the staff at the present time. I found that the more particulars I asked for, the fuzzier the answers got. I met individually again with each Division Chief and brought this problem out. They tried to justify their positions by saying that they didn't get detailed information from the field. I explained carefully to each of them individually that Division Chiefs should be held accountable for all the details of future programs. I alerted them that this would be expected from now on. I told them they would have to keep better work plans, enabling us to get a proper picture of what the future staff would look like. This new emphasis sifted down to the field where work plans were originated. The Division Chiefs passed this directive on to their staff which made it even more effective.

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I occasionally do analyses for the Director; e.g., I recently did an analysis of the mission personnel position, explaining what changes would occur in the next two months. I got all the necessary information from technicians and the Personnel Officer. The Director, in response to this, called me and expressed his thanks.

* * * *

I issued an instruction to all divisions that no SPARs will be signed unless the position and person requested have been reflected in the program documents which have already gone to AID/W. This forces people to think ahead or they simply won't get any new people. It causes everyone from field technicians up to Division Chiefs to take a good look at what their future needs will be. This has developed into an airtight operation. Now, at a moment's notice, we can tell how many people will be where, when, and why by referring to current program documents. This has been very effective.

* * * *

I have been unsuccessful in trying to set up a procedure for reviewing local positions. I tried to get the Director to include this as part of the program review of U.S. personnel. The Director would not buy it and told me to review the situation myself. I had time for only a very cursory review; that is, I discussed the local personnel situation and satisfied myself that it was not completely out of line. The only way to do this kind of review properly is to have each position put up for discussion and challenge by the staff, as is done in the program review sessions for U.S. positions. I have no plans for future attempts to set up a review system for local national positions.

* * * *

AID/W sent us a directive to develop a ceiling on local personnel. In the past we had always hired locals as the need arose. I issued the directive that all mission supervisors sit down and give serious thought to the number of locals they would need in the future, and asked that they report these personnel estimates to one of my subordinates. I told this subordinate to make sure the supervisors were aware that they were to provide ceilings, not estimates concerning their requirements. I wanted to know the number of additional local staff which would be required in the next fiscal year, and how they would fit into the program then. The collection of the estimates from the mission and the field was done by my assistant. When the estimates were all collected, I sat down with him and reviewed them to see if they were reasonable. My judgment regarding requests made by the offices here was based on my experience and knowledge of the degree to which the mission would expand. For any estimate which I didn't clearly understand, I asked my assistant to get a detailed justification from the supervisor concerned which would satisfy us both.

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b. advises on recruiting methods

When the need for a new staff member has been established, the individual originating the request will prepare a job description listing the qualifications which will be required to fill the position. This sometimes gives rise to the first problem encountered in the recruiting process, for the originator may not prepare an adequate description, requiring that it be returned for rewrite or that the Executive Officer or Personnel Officer take the time to revise it. Often at this stage the Executive Officer will give advice to the originator regarding the qualifications submitted for similar jobs in the past, AID or mission regulations dealing with such positions, etc.

It is after the completed SPAR has been submitted to AID/W, however, that the most difficult problems occur.

> The big handicap everywhere is delay by AID/W. It is a fairly frequent occurrence for AID/W not to acknowledge SPARs and, when they do, it is usually a long time before the position is filled.
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> I have the responsibility for preparing SPARs for new positions, but Personnel handles most of the actual work. New SPARs are not difficult. They involve determining what the Division Chief wants and extracting the proper materials from the Manual Orders. The principal problem here is getting results from Washington. I have to follow up my requests with repeated queries to AID/W regarding progress in order to get anything done.
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> I nearly always have to follow up SPARs with airgrams to AID/W requesting action. I have no other alternatives to expedite my requests.
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> A Division Chief had requested a specific technician from Washington, and the nomination was accepted by the host government. The acceptance was reported to AID/W and they replied that the technician's expected time of arrival would be in two months. The technician finally arrived in six months. This was about par for the course.
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> * * * *

Such recruiting delays may lead to the rather common practice, particularly among Program Officers and Division Chiefs, of attempting to locate individuals who meet the qualifications outside the usual channels. While the Executive Officer himself will seldom be in a position to make such contacts, he attempts to keep the originator informed of progress within AID. He also may provide advice regarding the best means of expediting the request, as well as on the legality of procedures for such expedition that are suggested by others who may feel the effects of the delay. At this stage, the Executive Officer is likely to become the object upon which the frustration caused by project delays is vented by division personnel.

When the processing of the new employee is begun, other problems may arise which necessitate action on the part of the Executive Officer. Due to delay, the situation in the mission may have changed before action on a SPAR has been completed; or communication between Washington and the mission may be faulty, leading to misunderstanding regarding the status of the request on either or both ends.

> A division recently determined it needed a new man. I went through the routine of getting a man here. While he was being recruited, the project was terminated, thus abolishing the need for him. I realized another office needed a man with the same qualifications, so I cabled this information to AID/W, and they sent the man on anyway. He got along well in the other office, and there was no recruiting delay.

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> We requested a person for a management position. Our request was acknowledged in Washington and they cabled that they had found a qualified applicant and we would get him in a very short time. Not long after that we received another communication saying a different person for

that position was leaving from the U.S. immediately. This shook us up because apparently they were sending us two people. We hurriedly wrote AID/W and requested clarification. When we received a reply we found that they simply had neglected to tell us that the first candidate (in Washington) has been dropped.

* * * *

c. recommends specific personnel

The mission is not always totally dependent upon the AID/W personnel division in locating potential candidates for an open position. In cases where a qualified individual has come to the attention of the mission staff, it is usually the Executive Officer who informs AID/W of the possibility.

At times we know of a specific man who is available to fill an approved position. For example, one of our Division Chiefs was recently in a neighboring country. He heard of a man in another post who qualified for a position here which had been established in a previous SPAR, but which AID/W had not yet filled. The Chief, on returning, informed me, and I sent an airgram to AID/W explaining the availability of the man. It is now up to AID/W to take action.

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In other cases, the Executive Officer may have no personal contact with a nominee or anyone who knows him, the sole source of information being the data provided by the AID/W recruiting section. When AID/W responds to a staffing request, the Executive Officer consults the Biographic Register to compare the nominee's experience with the requirements for the position. He also utilizes any available additional sources, e.g., knowledgeable mission staff, friends elsewhere, to determine the desirability of the proposed recruit.

A complaint often entered at this point is that the information provided is not always adequate to determine how well the candidate will fit into the mission team. It was pointed out, for example, that the job titles of individuals as given in the AID Staffing Pattern did not always reflect a man's past experience, but only his present position, giving little background on his all-around capabilities. It was further pointed out that AID may have a backlog of personnel in certain specialties and will sometimes attempt to place these people in somewhat inappropriate positions in order to find assignments for them. Finally, the most serious problem in accepting or rejecting a nominee is the lack of personal contact. The personality factor is one of the most important in determining the potential effectiveness of a recruit, particularly if he is to be working closely with others; yet most frequently realistic information about personal qualities and behavior is absent when making the hiring decision. The Executive Officer may be able to act upon the opinions of others who know or know of the candidate; more frequently he is called upon to act with no personal information at all.

> A proposed new employee was considered qualified on the basis of the Biographic Register data. However, a technician told the Director that he had served with the proposed employee and that he was not desirable. I had worked with this technician and knew that his judgment could not always be trusted. Since another of our employees was being sent to the nominee's post, I asked this man to discreetly inquire about the nominee. The man learned that the nominee was technically competent but of a bad temperament. Therefore, the clearance for the nominee was held up. In the meantime, the mission was reorganized, the need for the nominee was eliminated, and so was the problem of whether or not to accept him.

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2. Assists in handling special behavior problems

The problems subsumed under this heading relate not to the many support services which the Executive Officer is responsible for providing, but to difficulties of a personal nature encountered in the normal course of mission business. In some cases these disruptions are due to the idiosyncracies of the individuals involved. It is to be expected that in an operation with a staff as large as that of AID, a few people will have qualifications, expectations, or personalities which are inappropriate to accomplishing the job they have been assigned or to accommodating to the living conditions in a foreign country. Unless the problem individual is a member of the Executive Office staff, the Executive Officer's role is largely that of an advisor. He must be aware of the facts of the case or, if the problem is brought to his attention by another staff member, take steps to determine what the facts are.

Often he finds himself in the role of counselor and personal advisor, in attempts to handle the difficulty without resorting to official measures. In other cases, however, it is necessary to take action through regular channels, in which case the Executive Officer both advises as to the appropriate procedure and implements the action with the approval of his superiors.

a. ascertains facts

Except in cases where a full-scale investigation is required, the facts may be obtained from the complaint entered by one or more parties to the dispute, from systematic interviewing of the individual(s) involved, or from the Executive Officer's own observation. It is important that the Executive Officer be alert, open-minded, and objective in the process of fact-gathering, in order that he may base his final judgment upon the evidence rather than upon his personal feelings toward the people involved. The conditions of working overseas may make such objectivity difficult.

One problem I have is the result of community life in foreign service. There is a pool of Americans, both subordinates and superiors, with whom you both socialize and work. In the case of subordinates, this means it is difficult to make cool, able decisions regardless of the feelings of the people involved. You're always aware of the personal facets of the action you take.

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Complaints were received from the host government regarding financial irregularities. An AID employee was handling the finances concerned, and the Director requested that I investigate. I questioned the employee and wasn't satisfied with his answers, so I assigned an auditor to check the appropriate accounts. The report indicated that the employee had been taking money for himself, but it would be difficult to prove since his excuses were plausible. However, I also learned of other dubious activities of his, for which he had also given apparently good reasons. I felt sure then that he was involved in some kind of illicit operation, so I strongly recommended to the Director that the man be immediately returned to the U.S. and discharged. The Director agreed after I gave him the story.

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b. counsels individuals

In this task, the Executive Officer deals with personal and interpersonal difficulties wherein a "word to the wise" is sometimes sufficient to overcome the problem. He handles matters both inside and outside the Executive Office involving both American and local personnel. Many Executive Officers maintain an "open door policy" for all employees who wish to discuss problems. While many of these relate to services provided by the Executive Officer, others are of a

more personal nature. It is often very important for personnel to feel that there is someone to whom they can turn in times of stress. The Executive Officer may be in the best position to serve in this role, if he is personally inclined to do so with a genuine concern for the well-being of the people involved. It should be noted that the Executive Officer in this regard is sometimes involved in activities which, in the U.S., are normally undertaken by professional counsellors.

> I will not involve myself in family matters with local employees. My local subordinate had been engaged to a local girl and absconded with part of her dowry. The family appeared at the mission noisly upset and demanded that I help find the employee. I turned to an assistant and told him to calm the family down and tell them that the mission would not get involved in the problem. This was the end of it.

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> An American came here without his family. The separation upset him both mentally and physically. One day he called me explaining that he was very upset and begged me to come and see him. I went immediately and found him very disturbed, perhaps on the verge of a nervous breakdown. The man simply was lonely and missed his family, but these things really affected him. I talked to him for two hours and calmed him down. That day I began the implementation for his return to the States. I soothed him so that he was effective and relatively happy until his orders came.

* * * *

A local national refused to follow a regulation. I told the local's supervisor to warn him about this. The supervisor was afraid to do anything because the local has a lot of influential relatives in the host government. I wrote a memo to the local, explaining the regulation and requesting that he observe it. This did no good. I then called the Deputy Director and explained the situation. The Deputy Director promised to get the supervisor to correct the problem. I knew this would not work. The following morning, the local broke the rule again. I got very angry at this. The Deputy Director saw how I felt and told me that he would take whatever action was necessary. So he called the local to his office and explained quietly why everyone had to observe the regulation. The local agreed to comply. He continued to break the regulation for another day and a half (perhaps to save face), but thereafter he observed it faithfully.

* * * *

There was one person here who was always complaining. He was a real thorn in my side. He gave me more trouble than any 10 other people. A group of mission people were together one day. I happened to be standing behind this person, who was talking to someone else. He was vehemently complaining about life at home, saying that that was the big reason why he came overseas. He named many things he hated about the U.S., such as having to take streetcars in traffic jams, having to work so hard to make ends meet, etc. I didn't say anything then. I just listened, but the next time he complained about something, I really let him have it. I told him people couldn't expect to live better here than they do at home, and I pointed out all the advantages here that don't exist in the U.S. (without telling him I had overheard his conversation). When I finished, he was dumbfounded. I haven't gotten any trouble from him since.

* * * *

I noticed that employees were not punctual. I wrote a note to the Director explaining this and suggesting that an announcement be made concerning work hours. The Director approved, thinking the idea was good. The sign has just been posted and it is too early to note the results. The problem may end if people know we are aware of it.

* * * *

An AID officer recently called and said he was displeased with a local employee. I called the Personnel Officer, but she knew of no available openings elsewhere. Since there is no place for locals to work around here, I intend to call in the local and explain the situation to him. I'll try getting him to promise to work better, and then I'll call his supervisor to tell him the local has promised to do a better job.

* * * *

I noticed that one of the offices was sometimes totally empty in the afternoon. Even the secretaries were gone. I knew that the supervisor was habitually leaving work early, so I spoke to him about it. I also told his secretary to deduct nonbusiness leave from his leave record. In this way, everyone realized that I knew what was going on, and that any unauthorized absence would be charged against their leave.

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One local national was so filthy, unclean, and smelly that other local employees didn't like him. His supervisor recommended to me that the man be fired. I decided to talk to the employee before firing him, so I explained the situation to him. This worked, and the man now reports to work clean and without odor.

* * * *

Some days most of the local employees won't show up. This has to be taken with a grain of salt -- it's usually because they are adhering to some local ritual and are obligated to perform some religious activity. However, I've stopped this kind of absenteeism. I've explained to them, through our chief local, that we can't stop the whole operation every time there is a religious occasion. I told them to appoint representatives to appear for them when the need arose. Since then, this has not been a problem. They know that I will investigate and take measures if they don't observe this procedure.

* * * *

I learned of a personality problem between a local and one of my American subordinates. The problem was the American's manner which was abrupt and demanding. One of the locals was especially bothered by him, and it resulted in very bad relations between the two. It got so they wouldn't even communicate with one another. The result, of course, was a service breakdown. I went to the American and told him he would have to make a conscious effort to temper his manner toward the local. He agreed to try. I also went to the local and explained that the American did not do this deliberately and that it was a personality factor. I think he understood to some extent. At any rate, they both tried and their relationship improved very much.

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Problems of this nature between local employees and the American staff occur more frequently in some countries than in others. They can be serious, however. The following comment was made by an Executive Officer from a mission in a country where the problem was severe:

> I am very unhappy at the superior attitude that many Americans have toward locals. I have been ashamed of my fellow Americans many times since I've been here. I have felt like crawling into a hole. The treatment that some of the local employees are given by Americans is sometimes atrocious. This applies both to locals working in the mission, and others with whom Americans come into contact. Some Americans just don't realize how they look to the locals when they act the way they do.

* * * *

c. advises on personnel actions

In some cases, behavior problems cannot be solved through counseling. These difficulties involve the inability or unwillingness of individuals to conform to the conditions and requirements of the mission and often require official action. The Executive Officer must, at times, use his own discretion as to when AID regulations may be bent to accomodate the situation. He may, in some cases, manipulate the regulations without breaking them, and, when he feels it would be beneficial to the mission and AID, he may request that AID/W make exceptions in specific cases involving policy or procedure.

> AID/W sent an employee who thought his assigned rating was too low, and he was very vehement in expressing dissatisfaction with such a menial job. He was extremely critical of the lack of contact between Americans and locals, he talked a great deal about prejeudice in the U.S., and he was a general troublemaker with American and local staff members. Yet he did nothing which would allow us to separate him legally. I transferred him to another office where he was an even greater troublemaker. This caused an acute need to get rid of him. I got in touch with a staff member to ask for advice about how to get him out. I wrote to AID/W after this consultation, giving a full explanation of the problem. This initiated action which ultimately led to his separation.

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A transferred employee wanted to delay his departure as long as possible. I called his supervisor and learned that he had no pending work. Still, the man wanted to stay longer. I explained all this to the Director, who told me to get the man out soon. I selected a departure date and had his travel orders typed. Thus, the man was sent on to his new post with little delay. He objected, but when I told him that the Director had authorized the procedure there was nothing he could do. I was effective in getting the information needed and in consulting the person with the authority to facilitate the action, thus cutting down on wasted time.

* * * *

An officer here is competent, but overly ambitious and constantly striving for recognition. He did a report on his own which was not needed and poorly done. Nevertheless, I read the material and sent it to the Director. He wrote a letter of praise to be inserted into the report before its distribution among the mission staff. I then referred the report to AID/W, and had a copy of the Director's letter put into the officer's personnel file. Unfortunately, these efforts were insufficient. The officer has continually pressed me for further recognition. Almost daily, he approaches me with requests to send additional comments to AID/W. I have tried to explain, without success, that only so much recognition is possible out of a single action. If I praise this report to AID/W, the mission would appear to be run by idiots. My failure to convince the officer of this led him to complain in his Completion of Assignment Report that the mission refused to recognize his talents, and was not properly using him. So he requested a transfer.

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reorganization

Some officers were refusing to cooperate with the Director in his efforts to reorganize the mission. They resented part of his plan which reduced their authority. The Director asked me what could be done to speed up the reorganization efforts and get more cooperation. I knew that these officers probably had connections in AID/W, that they couldn't be fired, and that getting tough with them would only make them more antagonistic. Therefore, I advised the Director to transfer them when opportunities arose, and definitely to replace them when their tours were completed with people who could conform. The Director accepted this as the only logical solution.

* * * *

A technician was on the verge of a nervous breakdown. I talked to the Embassy doctor, who recommended home leave and evacuation. I didn't want to request medical evacuation because this would make it difficult for the technician to return here. I knew that each employee had to be in the country for two years before home leave could be requested, but that regulations do allow waivers. I got the Director's permission and then asked for a waiver for this technician. The technician was able to go on home leave, and to recover with his family's care. Now he is returning here, so I feel that I have to my credit a good technician saved.

* * * *

A contractor seemed to have a serious illness. He called me one night and told me about it. The next day I had a doctor examine the man, and the doctor recommended home leave. To approve such a recommendation (before the man was due for home leave) would require a great deal of time by AID/W. I therefore wrote to a personal friend in AID/W and explained the case. Almost

immediately, AID/W sent orders to send the man home. The man was very happy and grateful for this. I felt that I was very effective. If I had depended on regulations, the man might still be here or might have become critically ill.

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Illnesses occured in a technician's family. The doctor said they should leave the post, and the technician came to me to get evacuation orders. I wired AID/W immediately, but they replied that they wanted a doctor's certificate. The technician, tired of the delay, left without orders, and took his family back to a U.S. hospital. I immediately informed AID/W of this and requested that they contact the man, put him on home leave, and keep him in the Agency.

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F. Attends to Morale Matters

This function pervades nearly all of the Executive Officer's other responsibilities, particularly those of personnel administration and support services. Since he is in a position to deal individually with each staff member as well as to affect both organizational patterns and the physical conditions under which the staff will live and work, his influence upon morale is potentially greater than that of any other individual, with the possible exception of the Mission Director.

The degree to which Executive Officers respond to this potential, however, varies substantially. Some Executive Officers apparently see their jobs as involving primarily mechanical, routine duties such as procurement, personnel requests, the negotiation of leases, and the provision of vehicles. They deal with regulations followed to the letter, forms properly filled out, and fiscal records and filing systems systematically operated. Others feel the power inherent in controlling vital goods and services, some becoming almost proprietary in their attitudes toward physical facilities and commodities. They may discourage complaints regarding the adequacy of the goods and services provided from lower-level mission employees, while responding quickly to requests from higher-level staff, perhaps demonstrating favoritism in allocating their choicest homes, furnishings, and vehicles. Finally, some Executive Officers feel that their job goes far beyond either the mechanics of paperwork or the control of commodities; that it involves serving others and making physical and psychological surroundings as pleasant and harmonious as possible. As one man expressed it: "I feel it is my job to help them do their jobs." These Executive Officers deal primarily with people as important individuals regardless of their Foreign Service ratings or their connections in Washington.

The incidents which follow illustrate some of the many ways in which the Executive Officer's activities in other functions affect morale, both positively and negatively. In the first two cases, the Executive Officer was concerned with improving services to mission personnel in response to legitimate complaints he had received.

> A problem arose out of the fact that a memo from somewhere arrived indicating that the charge for a certain service would be raised substantially. Much negative reaction ensued. I had to check with AID/W to find out the source and see what could be done. I also checked with other American agencies here. Finally, I got the order remanded and the charge reverted to its original level. I was also able to get the money back in those cases where the higher rate had been charged.

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> I got many complaints about a particular service provided by a local firm. Not only did people have to wait a long time to have their orders filled, but the delivery vehicles were cutting up yards, scraping houses, etc. I knew these were legitimate complaints because so many people said the same thing. There were also complaints about the drivers' attitudes. I decided to create a service by the mission to replace it, so I got the necessary equipment and drivers and started it. Now people get better service and it costs them nothing. There have been no more complaints.

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In the area of providing the goods and services needed for a comfortable life abroad, which appears to be a major factor in the maintenance of good morale, the attitudes of staff members toward the Executive Office's service functions can cause many problems for the Executive Officer.

I think that when people come overseas, they are amazed at first at the services provided by the mission, but very soon they come to expect them, and then to demand them to excess. I am often requested to send someone to do things like change the light bulbs in a man's house. I find this extraordinary for Americans who usually take great pride in working around their homes themselves.

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Relations between the mission and other American organizations present some problems, but it boils down to personalities. Some people just aren't mature enough to realize that there is an intrinsic difference between organizations and that the privileges they are accorded is usually by statute. Some organizations get things that others don't, but it pretty well balances out. It's very hard for me to get people to understand and appreciate this.

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There is a problem which cuts across the whole service function. It is the problem of basic conceptual differences. The regulations tell you what people can and can't have. They outline the maximum services which I can provide, but I feel that just because the regulations say you can have something doesn't mean you should have something.

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The demands which are made on the Executive Officer by the staff are sometimes excessive and he must refuse to provide certain goods and services, either due to regulations or for reasons having to do with equitable treatment for all personnel. There is a tendency on the part of some people not to accept such refusals graciously, and the perceived shortcomings in mission services are a major conversational topic at

social gatherings, particularly among the wives of staff members. This can place the Executive Officer's wife in an awkward situation socially, as well as affecting general mission morale.

> Mission wives tend to discuss the mission's shortcomings at parties, even when local nationals or third country nationals are present. This is demoralizing to the mission. My wife hates to attend women's gatherings because of the gossiping and we both hesitate to attend parties because of this.

* * * *

> The fact that I must approve or disapprove moves, furnishing, etc., puts me in an unpopular position. This job was not designed to endear one to the rest of the group if it is done properly. When my wife has other AID wives to our home, she feels that they are mentally counting the furniture and checking the house generally to insure that I'm not getting more than their husbands. For this reason my wife and I frequently take less than is normally provided.

* * * *

In other cases, complaints are not taken to the Executive Officer, but are discussed informally instead. In one instance, described in an incident in the section on General Services, the Executive Officer used his wife as a source of information about misunderstandings regarding services performed by the Executive Office, and proceeded to take action to correct these misperceptions either through her or through formal channels. In the following incident, another tactic was employed to cut down the amount of griping about services.

> I have almost daily contact with my sub-unit supervisors, even though they are working in other locations. Most of the complaints of the mission personnel lie in a certain area. People should take these complaints to a specific subordinate, but rarely do. They usually complain to me. I have been striving to get people to register these complaints rather than sitting around complaining publicly at cocktail parties. I have had some success, and complaints now are frequently registered. I convey these to the appropriate supervisor, try to find out if it is a legitimate complaint, and what can be done about it. I also hold periodic meetings on the quality of the services being provided by that sub-unit. I ask, "Are we doing everything we can within the guidelines of Manual Orders?" In addition, I have the supervisor report to me periodically about his progress, problems, etc.

* * * *

The following incidents illustrate attitudes on the part of the Executive Officer which are detrimental to the morale of both his subordinates and the rest of the staff. The first incident illustrates the way in which an Executive Officer tried to justify the inequitable distribution of commodities. Under such circumstances, the lower-level staff members are likely to be quite aware of the situation and to resent it strongly.

> I utilize the principle that in the Executive Office you are dealing with people in a service capacity, in which the concept of equity must be applied. Certainly, in regard to material things everyone should be given the same attention. Of course, this concept must be modified in accordance with the various positions involved, i.e., the rank of the mission people. A secretary should be given the same kind of table that the Director is given, as closely as possible. However, the people in substantive work do different and more important jobs, so they do deserve something a little better than those on lower Mission levels.

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(From General Services Officer) A technician's personal effects were delayed in arrival. He complained to the Executive Officer, trying to get action, but the Executive Officer delayed. The technician complained to the Executive Officer's supervisor, who consulted the Executive Officer. His excuse was that he was waiting for a bill of lading. His supervisor indicated that a cable could be sent asking for the bill of lading. The Executive Officer finally did this, but by the time the effects arrived it was too late for the technician to use them, and he requested that they be shipped to the U. S., since his tour was almost over. They are still sitting in the mission. It will now be necessary to prod the Executive Officer to forward the effects.

* * * *

An opposite attitude is shown in the following incidents, where the Executive Officer went out of his way to be helpful or to arrange matters to satisfy mission personnel.

There was no employee's club when I arrived. I initiated one, set up a snack bar, and built up an employees' loan fund. Everyone now enjoyed the club.

* * * *

Most counseling is done by personnel, but I do some. When there are irregularities in employees' behavior, I talk to them to try to keep it from getting official. People consult me about a variety of things, often seeking guidance on matters other than personnel, such as interpretation of regulations, how to get funds when they have officially run out, rules for classification of dependents, etc. Most of these are handled casually, but some require formal memos on the subject. I like to be able to get information for people when they ask, and will seldom refuse a request.

* * * *

> I told the Division Chiefs to reshuffle, wherever there was a possibility of so doing, their incoming technicians who were destined for isolated areas. I asked them to try to place people in remote areas together, rather than a few miles apart. This would make logistical support easier for us and it would be a positive morale factor for them. It would build up a community spirit among the people out there.

* * * *

Sometimes conditions within the mission are such that the maintenance of high morale is temporarily almost impossible. Under such conditions, the sensitive Executive Officer makes the best of it and takes such steps as he can to minimize the effects of disruptions on mission operations. This attitude is illustrated in the action taken by the Executive Officer in the first incident below, at some cost to his personal image in the mission.

> Cutting down on staff, as this mission has been doing, and will continue to do, is always bothersome. The Director requires me to make nasty decisions and pass along bad news. I feel that Division Chiefs are more effective if I shoulder all the responsibility for letting people go and take all the blame for unpopular decisions.

* * * *

The following incidents illustrate other conditions under which the maintenance of morale is difficult. Such factors as the pressure of workload, social conditions and customs in the host country, and the climate and geographic conditions under which personnel must work are clearly beyond the control of the Executive Officer, and he can only understand and take whatever action is possible to mitigate the negative effects of these factors on morale.

> These secretaries lead a miserable life here. They can't go out alone, or even with another girl because of existing dangers. There usually are not enough suitable single males around. Because of this stifled social life, they get jumpy and frequently argue with their supervisors, and performance goes down. American secretaries are hard to get so sending them home is not a good solution.

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> It is extremely difficult to get technicians' supplies, commodities, personal mail, packages, etc., out to them after it has arrived here. There is no delivery service to most of the project areas which means most of it has to be driven from here to the field. The delivery distances are great and over bad roads in most cases. Many barriers such as accidents, breakdowns, washed-out roads, etc., are encountered. This cuts off their supply lines and makes it hard for them to get the job done. This has a definite negative effect on morale.

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The Executive Officer must also be concerned with the morale of local personnel. This can be made more difficult if, as noted previously, nationals are treated badly by American personnel. Another problem arises in connection with AID personnel policies for local people, which often are congruent neither with American personnel policies nor with employment practices in the host country. The Executive Officer must concern himself with these matters in order to obtain cooperation from local employees.

AID/W does not allow severance benefits for host nationals. I have been fighting this with AID/W because it could lead to very hard feelings here. In order to save face and maintain good relations, I arranged for nationals to be taken off the payroll and be paid severance pay from a special, regional account. This was following the letter of the law but actually I bypassed the spirit. I felt justified in terms of good will and in view of potentially serious incidents which could result.

* * * *

AID is the only agency here which doesn't transport its local employees. I feel that USAID is losing a lot of good will because of this -- our local employees are angry because everyone else is transported but them. I intend to send a cable to AID/W explaining the situation and requesting permission to transport locals to and from work.

* * * *

I told an AID/W official of local employees' lack of security, such as no tenure or benefits. He said he would have someone to survey the problem throughout the region. I later got a message from him that a man was coming out on a certain date to survey the problem, but the date passed without any further word, so I plan to take the matter up with AID/W again.

* * * *

Some Executive Officers go beyond policy matters in making an effort to demonstrate to local personnel that they are a part of the mission team by instituting special functions for them.

> Each year we give a party for the mission locals. This time of the year brings on very complicated social procedures for them which we Americans don't understand, so every year I check with responsible locals to see that our plans for the party are not offensive to them.

* * * *

Maintaining local employees' morale is especially difficult in some countries due to cultural differences regarding social interaction.

> The locals have difficulty communicating with me because of the deference to elders or superiors which they manifest. It's hard to get to know them on a friendly basis because of this. It's hard to explain. There's just no free, fluid interchange. An easy relationship with them is impossible -- you can just feel the underlying reticence.

* * * *

> I have not made a conscious effort to be close to any locals, but I do know that their natural reserve and shyness would make it hard to become friendly with them on a personal basis. They just don't give much emotional reaction to anybody. This gives them a cold demeanor.

* * * *

Sometimes an occasion will arise where the exertion of a bit of extra effort by an Executive Officer can mean a great deal to local and/or American personnel. In the following incident, another staff member exerted this effort to give morale a boost when the Executive Officer ignored the opportunity.

> (from a colleague) A famous visitor was coming to the Embassy. The Director called a meeting of all staff and explained that he was going to try

to make it possible for everyone in the mission to meet him also. He described the protocol for doing so to everyone and explained the procedure which would be followed. The Executive Officer was present at this meeting and made no suggestions or contributions concerning the proposed plan. The next day the Director introduced each staff member to the visitor. The Executive Officer was present, but took no interest in the proceedings. He made no significant effort to guide the visitor into a situation where all employees were allowed to see and meet him, and he didn't make one comment about how happy the staff was for the chance to meet the visitor. I know that if left to the Executive Officer, the introductions would not have been arranged.

* * * *

III. PARTICIPATES IN MISSION PLANNING

The degree to which Executive Officers are actually involved in mission planning is especially difficult to determine. The requirement that he formulate the administrative and technical support budgets implies that, at a minimum, he must be aware of projected changes in program and organization that have fiscal implications. Similarly, he must, at a minimum, be aware of developments in mission staffing. But whether such data are presented to him as given or whether he participates in generating them varies considerably.

The degree to which he needs to go beyond these minimum requirements is dependent upon a variety of factors, most of which appear to operate to minimize his role in substantive planning. Chief among these is the weight of responsibility which he bears in dealing with the minutiae of mission operations. Depending on the capability of his subordinates, and the willingness of other mission personnel to deal with them, he may spend a substantial part of his time handling the complaints of housewives with broken-down washing machines or technicians whose doors will not shut properly. Inoperable mimeograph machines, recalcitrant secretaries, outraged families of host national employees, jailed staff members, mentally disturbed American visitors, sticky desk drawers--all fall within his scope. It is easy to become totally absorbed with the concrete in such a position, particularly because a good deal of emotion is likely to be exhibited by the person with the problem, often quite justifiably, requiring that personal attention be given in order to maintain morale.

Another factor is the volume of routine paperwork which must pass through the Executive Officer's hands. Purchase requests, personnel documents, leases, requests for repairs, budget and other fiscal documents, Efficiency Reports, SPARs and many others are among his primary responsibilities. If he were to participate heavily in substantive

planning, he would need to be thoroughly familiar with both the regular communications flow and the details of documents prepared in the Program Office and the technical divisions, in addition to his already heavy load. This is virtually impossible.

Finally, his colleagues in substantive areas tend to take a dim view of the suggestions made by one in such a thoroughly "staff" position, particularly if the advice threatens the dimensions of their own operation. The common response in this situation appears to be for the incumbent to agree tacitly that indeed, it is the function of an Executive Officer to execute, not to interfere in substantive matters.

These factors tend to limit the Executive Officer's involvement in planning.

A. Develops and Monitors Budgets

A major portion of this task consists of gathering appropriate information upon which to base budget formulations. This is done on a day-to-day basis by the Executive Office staff. Expenditure figures are then entered on appropriate standard forms which are reviewed by the Executive Officer. He evaluates the accuracy of the figures obtained by his subordinates and the relationship of proposed expenditures for the coming fiscal year to those of former budgets, in the light of plans for administrative and program changes.

After the budget has been approved by AID/W, the Executive Officer, with the Controller, monitors expenditures to keep them within the limitations specified in the approved document. If a shortage occurs in a particular area, it is usually compensated by drawing upon funds alloted to another area of the same budget where expenditures have been lower than was originally anticipated. Some incumbents complained of chronic shortages in the amount approved for administrative expenses.

1. Develops and adjusts the administrative budget

The administrative budget includes funding for the salaries and allowances of all administrative personnel, services, and equipment. Preparation of this budget requires analyzing expenses from the preceding year and developing expense projections for the coming year. This task is usually delegated to a subordinate. The necessary data are recorded on a regular basis by both the Controller and an Executive Office staff member. Any discrepancy in the results of these independent calculations is resolved in consultation before the resulting document is submitted to the Executive Officer for review. Budget development is to a large extent a mechanical process for many Executive Officers, since past experience may enable them to make fairly accurate judgments of a budget projection based on expenditures during the current year. Particular attention is usually paid only to those areas of expenditure in which special instructions are given by AID/W guidelines.

One major problem results from the period of uncertainty between the end of the current fiscal year (July 1) and approval of the new budget by AID/W, which in turn, has to wait upon Congressional action. Although expenditures can be made during this period on the basis of the Continuing Resolution, the Executive Officer hesitates to commit the mission to large financial outlays for services and equipment which may be needed, because of the possibility of budget cuts.

The Executive Officer monitors funds by reviewing monthly disbursement statements prepared by the Controller, purchase requests, travel requests, and other items authorizing expenditures. He tries to prevent outlays in excess of the amounts planned. When disbursements do exceed the allotted amount, he arranges for the Controller to transfer funds, and, if the situation warrants it, he notifies mission personnel that certain service expenditures must be cut back or deferred in favor of higher priority items.

I am currently expecting to spend administrative money on house repairs. Because the budget has not yet been approved and the mission is operating on the basis of the Continuing Resolution, I hesitate to spend money on this. Once the budget is approved, it will be necessary to concentrate this work into the last few months of the year, because of the rush to finish before the fiscal year ends. This will cause mistakes in judgment and poor workmanship. This comes about because Congress is late in appropriating money for AID.

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If administrative funds were overdrawn, I would review our shared and administrative funds program with the Assistant Executive Officer to make sure we are paying a minimum amount. I would ask him to look at each individual item of expense which we share with program funds and see if there is a way that we can reduce the percentage of our costs. He may find that by eliminating a certain type of procurement or restricting local travel for a period of time, we can meet our estimate. If this can't be done, I have no choice but to write to AID/W for additional funds. If the funds are not forthcoming, I have to do without low-priority commodities until we get back into line with our estimated expenditure rate.

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A Controller's delegate draws the budget up with the Assistant Executive Officer because the Controller's office also keeps his own record of administrative expenditures. He gets together with the Assistant Executive Officer when we have our budget done, and compares his figures with those obtained by the Assistant Executive Officer. They find discrepancies and work out agreements wherever these figures are not identical. Then they formulate the complete budget by rechecking and ironing out any disagreements.

I review it with them, and when I am satisfied that it is sound, I sign off on it and present it to the Director. I answer his questions the same way my subordinates did for me. If he approves it on the basis of my answers and explanations, he signs off on it and it goes to Washington.

* * * *

Formulating the administrative budget is a fairly clear-cut, easy job because I get ceilings and guidelines from AID/W well in advance of the budget deadline. Basically, all that has to be done is to follow these directives. When I get the order and guidelines from AID/W, I sit down and look at each item to make sure I fully understand what is wanted. This is not difficult since I have had past experience in it. I then call in the Personnel Officer and explain the task to her. Once she fully understands what is required, I completely delegate the legwork to her, e.g., she procures the answers to queries from AID/W from her files, past budgets and correspondence from the field. I have no more to do with it until she submits her figures to me in draft form. By looking at past budgets, considering the changes in personnel, salaries, allowances, etc., and utilizing my past experience, I can tell with some study whether the budget is realistic. I then look to see whether all of AID/W's queries have been dealt with. If they have, I sign off on the budget. On some occasions, I amend it because I am aware of a position that will be filled shortly, or of a new position coming into being, which the Personnel Officer does not yet know about. Once the figures are approved by me and required changes are made, the draft is submitted to the Director for his approval. Then an airgram is drafted for AID/W, giving our needs and justification.

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Every year, AID/W informs me to submit this budget by a certain date. The document, usually an airgram, explains what data are required, so I merely follow the suggested format. There are basic items in the budget, e.g., education allowances and salaries, which are kept on file by my secretary. Other items are less easily estimated, e.g., cost of electricity for a year. For this type of data, I take the previous year's figures and decide if they are adequate. For example, an additional house will raise electricity costs, so I estimate the increase and then use this figure in the new budget.

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I justify the budget by being able to answer any questions the Director asks when I submit it to him for signature. If I have "done my homework," that is, kept up with the formulation of the budget with the Assistant Executive Officer and fully reviewed it upon completion, then I should be able to answer and explain any point that is brought up.

* * * *

2. Assists in formulating technical support budget

The Executive Officer assists the Program Officer in developing the technical support budget. This consists largely of up-dating the budget for the preceding year, including estimated costs for additions to the program or staff. Making these estimates is considered more difficult by many Executive Officers than arriving at similar estimates in the administrative area, because the prices of equipment and field support services vary from one year to the next in an unpredictable manner.

During the year, the Executive Officer periodically reviews the technical support disbursements to assure that they conform generally to those budgeted. If expenditures become excessive, the

Executive Officer implements a priority system calling for reduced spending, requests additional funds from AID/W, or collaborates with the Program Officer to transfer funds within the budget to critical areas.

> During the last six months of the fiscal year, I might discover that actual expenses are exceeding planned expenses. This might occur because of unexpected medical evacuations, unplanned trips by the Division Chiefs to AID/W, unexpected workload requiring overtime payments to employees, etc. If expenses for one item are running over that which was planned, I merely tell the Controller to shift funds. I might say, "We won't put screens on the houses this year, so use that money to pay for the Division Chief's trip." As a rule, payments for fixed items, i.e., salaries, rent on leased houses, etc., are paid first, and if cutbacks are necessary, optional items like furniture replacements are stopped on a priority basis.

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> We just got an increase in an allowance which will affect the entire budget. Whenever something like this happens, it calls for a budget review in order to determine (1) how significant the change is (how much more money is needed in which area), and (2) whether the additional funds can be absorbed by existing funds or whether additional funds will have to be requested from AID/W to cover the cost increase.

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> Throughout the year, I authorize expenditures by signing purchase requests. After I approve an expenditure, the Controller makes the payment and records the transaction. Every month the Controller sends me a report which is a cumulative record of disbursements. I don't concern myself with these reports until the last six months of the fiscal year, during which time I monitor very carefully to ensure that the budget will not be exceeded.

* * * *

One thing I watch closely in keeping up with the day-to-day changes in our budget is to look at every purchase order which comes across my desk, since this is not a fixed sum and is subject to change. We have already budgeted for commodity purchases, but I still want to be able to justify each order. If it isn't essential, I can cut it back and save that much money.

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One major problem in this function is Congressional cuts. We have an estimated amount of money "to live on." So I assign priorities to designate in advance the things we will do without, in the event that our expected budget is cut or seriously delayed.

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I am never sure when AID/W will send people to us. If I knew that Washington would send us personnel within a certain period of time, I could easily budget for them in the appropriate fiscal year. However, I never know how long it will take before someone we request will arrive. If I budget for him but he doesn't come until the next fiscal year, then all that money which could have been used somewhere else is frozen; on the other hand, if someone arrives "unexpectedly," we are put at a deficit for his travel, salary, etc. Normally in such cases even a hectic shifting of funds can't make up the differences, so I have to request additional funds from AID/W.

* * * *

Since this budget is concerned with equipment which technicians need, I have to know how large our staff will be during the next fiscal year, where they will be located, what they will require, etc. I get the projected figures by calling the Personnel Officer and asking for

a memorandum with the appropriate information. She gets the figures from the staff projection file we maintain. From these figures, we can calculate the amount of office space required, costs of household furnishings, repair costs, office supply requirements, travel expenses, etc. The actual calculation is provided by the General Services Officer from his files. Each item has been assigned on a per-man basis. For example, we know that the average cost for a certain utility is so much; we know that a certain service costs so much per family; we know the cost of furnishings for a family dependent upon the number of children they have, etc. After he has made the estimates, I look at the figures to see if there is a basic consistency with the last technical support budget in proportion to the different numbers of people concerned. If the budget seems out of line, I will either ask him to do another check on it or do it myself. Then I refer back to him, and he enters each figure into an appropriate itemized form and totals the figures to arrive at the technical support budget. He gives the form to me; I sign off on it after checking it again, and send it on to the Program Officer for approval. If he approves it, he forwards it to the Director who sends it to AID/W.

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3. Reviews the administrative support agreement

Because the Embassy provides services to the mission, part of the Executive Officer's budgeting task consists of conferring about these service charges with an Embassy representative. He must also keep track of charges owed to AID for the support it provides to other agencies, notably the Peace Corps. The Executive Officer ensures that services charged for have been received by the mission, and that other agencies pay for services provided by the mission. A problem commonly

reported by Executive Officers is the tendency for the Embassy to overcharge the mission for services provided, or to charge for services which the mission actually must provide for itself.

> The charges for personnel consular services seemed way out of line last year. (This is an estimate of costs based on last year's services and this year's estimate of staff size.) I asked them to refigure it, and when they did, they found it was wrong. I questioned it on the basis of former charges for the same service and my experience in knowing about what these costs should be. This particular figure just seemed too high.

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> It is an aggravating situation. We are much larger in personnel, money, size, etc., and yet the Embassy, in theory, give us support. However, when we need something done, we have to do it ourselves. The Embassy could never fulfill all our requests for certain services. We have locals working on contract for many things in order to keep pace. We do all of our own work, yet we pay them a large amount of money each year for support.

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> The Embassy tried to overcharge AID in an effort to decrease its own operating costs. The last administrative support agreement, as prepared by the Embassy Administration Office, listed an item called "special equipment" which AID was supposed to pay for. I noticed this item and inquired about it. The reply was that the equipment was to be used by the Embassy and available at any time for AID use. I explained that AID, if it was felt to be necessary, could buy its own. The item was deleted from the agreement.

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B. Considers Organizational Structure

A few Executive Officers indicated that they were both monitor and advisor in matters having to do with procedure and lines of authority, as they are specified in the Manual Orders and in mission policy, and reflected in the organizational structure. This includes such matters as individual responsibility and authority, procedures for document clearance and correspondence, and the interrelationships within and between offices, divisions and sub-units, and management as they relate to the mission development program. However, most Executive Officers found it difficult or impossible to provide examples of concrete behavior in this area.

1. Obtains information

The Executive Officer seeks information which will enable him to make recommendations concerning organizational matters. This is sometimes done by conversing informally with others on a problem or more rarely by conducting a systematic survey (usually at the request of the Director).

> I decided to have the Division Chiefs write a "think" paper, to be discussed with the Director. The paper was supposed to be on the question of the changes in staffing that were needed to better implement the country program. First, the Chiefs tended to write papers designed to justify keeping things exactly the same, showing how the new plan could be implemented using the old organization. Further, the Director was departing and so was unable to find time to moderate the discussion and I had to do it myself. It was not productive. The Director's prestige was badly needed.

* * * *

Someone complained about the working hours in the mission to the Director. He sent a note to me suggesting that perhaps work hours could be improved and asking me to study the problem and give him a complete report. I was aware of the logical reasons for the working hours. They were very desirable for various reasons, and, in addition, they allowed employees to come to work during the pleasant hours of the day. I talked to employees at random and found that everyone favored the existing hours. I made my report accordingly and the issue was dropped.

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2. Evaluates need for and recommends change

Changes in this area may be based on considerations of efficiency, cost, redefinitions of purpose, staff preferences, observations of working relations between people, etc. Executive Officers appear to rely heavily on their prior experience in similar circumstances. They usually advise on substantive changes at the request of the Director or Deputy.

When the Director was planning a trip to visit a project and talk with the host government staff, I suggested that he take along a certain technician for "back-up" when talking to the host staff. I said I thought this might help to improve the weak relations that existed between the Director and the Officer. The Director agreed, and it seems to have been effective.

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There were many reasons given by the Director for his attitude toward his Deputy, but his principal gripe was the Deputy's lack of initiative. I suggested that a series of responsibilities for the Deputy Director be listed and that these then be considered his major field of operations.

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AID/W sent a cable disapproving the mission's proposed reorganization. It arrived the very day on which the Director had scheduled a meeting to explain the reorganization to the staff. The Director asked me what to do about it. I felt that he could convince AID/W to change their disapproval to approval, and that, therefore, he should avoid mentioning the newly arrived cable during the meeting. He took my advice.

* * * *

When the Director asked for advice on what to do with a greatly reduced division, I studied the situation and decided that they logically belonged in my office, since they actually performed services for the entire mission. I wrote a reorganization plan, and this former division has been successfully absorbed into my office.

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Another problem is getting a technician to accept my administrative advice. Many technicians feel that to accept such advice is an infringement on their responsibilities, especially since it is from a staff man to a field man.

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3. Implements changes

When recommendations have been approved by his superiors, the Executive Officer is often responsible for seeing that they are put into effect. In addition, he must implement organizational changes which take place within the Executive Office as well as those which are handed down from AID/W.

There is sometimes a problem in translating AID/W changes into changes in mission operation. For important matters, I must often decide what changes must be made to the existing mission, delegate the responsibility for writing the change, and then follow it through editing and publication. For example, a whole new set of procedures was recently issued from Washington. I had to look at these and see what changes needed to be made in the corresponding mission regulation. Then I discussed these changes with the Program Officer and followed through to see that they were actually made. It is definitely my responsibility to be sure that existing mission directives are congruent with existing directives issued from AID/W covering the same subject matter.

* * * *

The Acting Executive Officer decided to give more authority to a senior man in a sub-unit. The senior man was new and did not understand the various types of funding. Not only was he new and inexperienced, but his personality was inappropriate for the job. A junior man in the unit was senior in service. Everything got fouled up and the junior man did nothing to help since he was not in charge. When I returned and found this situation, I reorganized the unit and gave each man different responsibilities. Each man was competent in his own field of training and I was aware of this. With this division of labor (both reporting to me directly) things are better.

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4. Insures conformance in organizational matters

The Executive Officer generally has the responsibility of keeping personnel appropriately informed on mission procedures and policy. He usually does this by distribution of pertinent memoranda, notices, etc. He may initiate this action himself or in response to a request by the Director. He relies on Manual Orders to formulate an accurate definition of staff responsibilities.

The Executive Officer also may draw up organizational charts as needed for the Director. He may establish one to assist in defining staff responsibilities or may include it in an arrival kit to orient new personnel to the mission organization. The chart incorporates both AID/W regulations and mission policies.

A problem encountered here is that many people fail to read and take heed of mission notices. Some Executive Officers feel that circulated memoranda regarding staff responsibilities are ignored. Thus people are not always aware of pertinent organizational factors, and irregularities may occur.

> Another officer recently rented a warehouse without checking with me. Such tasks are my responsibility and it is possible that I would have known of a better or a cheaper place. He had no authority to do that.

* * * *

The need for the Executive Officer to act arises when the responsibilities of one officer appear to be overlapped by another, or when an officer feels a specific task is not within the area of responsibility normally assigned to him. This often happens among technicians. One of the Executive Officer's problems here is that technicians are often not cognizant of the administrative aspects of their jobs. They are usually occupied with the operational considerations pertaining to their own projects. The result is that they sometimes fail to assume and carry out the administrative duties required of them. They also may fail to observe established lines of authority. If this is not effectively handled by the individuals involved, the Executive Officer may be required to step in.

APPENDIX D

to

A Study of Some Key USAID Jobs

THE DIVISION CHIEF

American Institute for Research
Washington, D.C.

JUNE 1964

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to

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DIVISION CHIEF

Outline of Functions

I. PARTICIPATES IN PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

A. Obtains Information

1. Confers with potentially knowledgeable people
2. Selects and reads documents
3. Assigns subordinates to obtain information
4. Evaluates information
5. Observes host country conditions

B. Develops Project Plans and Revisions

1. Reviews proposals
2. Formulates and justifies project ideas
3. Explores feasibility of project plans and details

C. Manages Document Preparation

1. Develops and guides working arrangements
2. Reviews, edits and evaluates documents prepared by subordinates
3. Writes or rewrites documents in required terms and format

II. PREPARES PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS

A. Reviews Background Information Relevant to Projects

1. Confers with staff
2. Reviews documents
3. Obtains clarifications

B. Directs Document Preparation

1. Writes, revises, edits development grant implementation documents
2. Reviews loan applications
3. Confers with program office concerning details of documents

C. Conducts Negotiations With Host Government Officials

1. Negotiates details of development grant implementation documents
2. Negotiates details of loan applications

III. MANAGES PROGRAM

A. Monitors and Guides Projects

1. Obtains information on project status

a. confers with project staff, other American personnel, and host country personnel
b. reviews project reports and correspondence
c. visits project sites
d. solicits appraisals from others

2. Prevents or corrects project deficiencies

a. assigns, adjusts, and advises on duties and responsibilities
b. procures needed equipment
c. advises subordinates on plans, and procedures
d. persuades host government to honor commitments
e. deals with host conditions and complications
f. coordinates U. S. activities
g. motivates project personnel
h. provides training

3. Evaluates projects

4. Guides project phase-outs

a. advises mission personnel
b. arranges details of disposition of equipment and personnel

5. Manages division participant training

a. advises on selection and administrative procedures
b. evaluates participant training efforts

B. Provides Information Concerning Project Progress

1. Prepares or reviews progress reports and correspondence
2. Gives formal and informal briefings

IV. CONTRIBUTES TO MISSION MANAGEMENT

A. Directs the Technical Division

1. Supervises subordinates

a. provides orientation and information
b. evaluates performance
c. develops skills; counsels
d. settles disputes
e. handles special behavior problems

2. Manages operations

a. interprets policies, regulations, and manual orders
b. assists in recruiting and selecting personnel

B. Assists in Other Mission Activities

1. Receives visitors

a. provides briefings
b. develops itineraries and schedules conferences
c. accompanies visitors on field trips

2. Socializes with personnel from other U. S. agencies, other donor agencies and the diplomatic community

V. WORKING RELATIONS WITH HOSTS

A. Develops and Maintains Relations with Host Government Officials

1. Participates in social activities
2. Cultivates friendships

B. Acts as Consultant or Advisor to Host Nationals

USAID DIVISION CHIEF

I N T R O D U C T I O N

The functions outlined for this position are necessarily idealized: the number of them carried out by any one man, and the extent of his efforts in any one function, obviously depends upon such factors as the size and nature of the mission's program in the specific technical area, the relative importance of the area to overall program and host country objectives, and the particular capabilities, interests, and work habits of other mission personnel, host government personnel, and the incumbent himself. The variations observed range from a position in which the incumbent was extremely busy with both USAID affairs and voluntary activities concerning his professional field, to a position in which the incumbent was almost literally jobless because the program in his specialty was relatively small and he was continually by-passed by both host government personnel and his superiors in the mission. On a hypothetical scale of "busy-ness," most Division Chiefs by far were closer to the idle end. 1/

Similar observations are valid for specific segments of the job. For example, the extent and nature of interactions with host government officials

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1/ A supplementary part of the data-collection effort in this study consisted of one full day of observation of each incumbent. On these days almost all incumbents were observed to have "light" activities. This finding is consistent with observations made during extensive interviewing and information provided by other mission personnel.

covered a wide range, with the bulk of the incumbents having minimal interactions of any kind. A majority of these men indicated that contacts were relatively few because of resistance on the part of the host government officials.

The Division Chief's job can be broadly viewed as consisting of planning and carrying out specific development projects, together with the administrative and social tasks required in support of these two substantive functions. Of the four positions studied, it is through this one that most of the Agency's practical successes and failures are realized. Although direct changes could be achieved by Deputies and Program Officers, their impacts can legitimately be indirect as well. The Division Chief must produce change directly. It is through him and his staff that the Agency's policies, procedures, organizational units, its entire overhead in the missions and in Washington, meet the realities of concrete project events, and things in concrete situations. It is these people who must produce palpable results in the face of real problems. The predominant complexities and difficulties encountered in carrying out these functions stem chiefly from the milieu in which the job is conducted, i.e., as part of a highly organized U. S. government agency attempting, in conjunction with other U. S. government agencies, to assist in the progress of underdeveloped, and in some instances newly independent countries, which are receiving assistance from other sources as well. It is these environmental considerations that engender various specific problems to be cited in the discussions of specific functions, such as coordination difficulties, personnel inadequacies, conflicting objectives, vested interests, contradictory policies, and information gaps, to name but a few. Several difficulties and observations which pertain to many specific functions will be discussed below.

A fundamental question about any job is "who is the man's boss?" Even this question cannot be answered unequivocably. In some missions it

is the Director, in others it is the Deputy Director or a chief of several divisions. In many missions it is sometimes one person, and sometimes another. In all the missions visited the Program Officer had responsibility for some aspects of the Division Chief's job; in only some missions did he have authority as well. Incumbents are unclear on these matters, and will often view the Director as their immediate superior in an effort to avoid the confusion of conflicting authorities. Even when he is clearly not their immediate superior, incumbents turn to the Director in an effort to cut corners or to obtain a reversal of a decision made by the designated supervisor.

What is the Division Chief's role with regard to the host government? If he views himself as an "advisor," and as a means of stimulating self-help efforts, both of which seem to imply to incumbents a relatively passive role, he feels that "nothing will get done." He thus finds himself confronted by two seemingly contradictory considerations: to get things moving, and to assist the host government to carry out what it chooses to initiate. In actual fact, while the conflict is reported, the predominant procedure is for the incumbent to inform the host government about the project plans decided upon by the mission, rather than to guide or advise on the initiation of plans by the host government.

What is the nature of the planning function? It is, or should be, a complex task based upon needs, resources, policies, past experience, host government wishes, and consideration of broad elements such as the planned activities of other divisions and other donor agencies. The task is complicated by such factors as lack of information, lack of experience or skill in planning, conflicting pressures, budget uncertainties, and seemingly unrealistic requirements imposed by the hosts and/or AID/W and/or Program Office. While several of the incumbents indicated awareness of these complexities, planning efforts appear to be directed more toward

avoiding the complications than toward meeting and perhaps overcoming them. For example, coordination is attempted infrequently, procedures for obtaining useful information are not instituted, etc. In some instances, incumbents have expressed a "defeatist" attitude, i.e., they feel it is futile to do a thorough job when Washington can cut or eliminate the project with little or no knowledge of local needs or events.

With whom does the incumbent work? The number and quality of both Division personnel and the counterparts involved in project work are among the key sources of difficulty. These factors are also complicated by the fact that the Division Chief has little or no choice, ordinarily, in who is assigned, and there is little or no corrective action he can take about incompetence, other than to provide counseling or informal training. The problem of lack of control applies to both U.S. personnel and their counterparts. In some instances it is easier to correct U.S. personnel problems; in other instances it seems to be easier to correct problems involving host national counterparts. Of the two types of problems, the latter is a more important consideration from a long-term point of view since the Division Chief is concerned with pointing toward ultimate phase-out of U.S. efforts and take-over by host nationals. From a shorter point of view, problems involving U.S. personnel are paramount since they more directly involve specific project "success" and the image of the U.S. Both types of problems not only involve the Division Chief in a supervisory or administrative role; they also require him to spend a significant portion of his time in the substantive work itself.

Other factors which cut across several functions include the uncertainties of program development, the necessary changes in both planned and on-going projects, the influence of both U.S. and host country political considerations, and differences in views and requirements between the mission and AID/W. In addition, there is the problem of job insecurity

which engenders the attitude: "don't rock the boat." This is a particular problem for Division Chiefs because of the possibility of changes in program emphasis and the shift in policy from direct hire to contract personnel in technical fields.

Each of these, as well as each of the considerations cited above, can itself disrupt or preclude effective job performance. When they occur in combination, and are further complicated by the more specific problems to be cited below; it should not be surprising that so many Division Chiefs are often idle or are engaged in relatively inconsequential work such as supervising vehicles or ordering supplies.

FUNCTIONS

I. PARTICIPATES IN PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

The Division Chief contributes to the development of a program within his specialty by identifying host needs, formulating and reviewing project ideas, creating the necessary conditions for acceptance of the ideas, and managing the preparation of necessary documents. The extent to which he is involved in these functions varies from mission to mission. The degree of involvement appears to depend upon several factors such as the size of the mission, the role of the mission administrators, the emphasis placed by the Agency for International Development/Washington (AID/W) and the mission on his specialty, and finally, his own inclinations and capabilities. For example, a small mission, headed by a strong director, may require little assistance from the Division Chief while a large and active mission would almost necessarily require delegation of responsibility to the technical divisions and particularly to those divisions concerned with the key development projects. However, many of the incumbents interviewed reported that their particular roles in their missions were more or less unclear to them.

Difficulties in carrying out the functions pertaining to program development are found both within and outside the mission. Within the mission, decisions and commitments in a technical area may be made by administrative personnel, such as the Director, the Deputy Director, or the Program Officer, without consulting the Division Chief--at times without informing him even after the fact--leading to poor morale, frustration, and embarrassment in dealing with host government officials.

Outside the mission, problems center around the host government officials and other donor agencies. The officials are often political appointees who have varying degrees of competence in the specialty area and suggested projects are apt to be based on self-interest or political expediency. At times problems are hidden rather than disclosed so that they can be solved. There also tends to be fairly rapid turnover and little regard for the wishes or commitments of one's predecessor. Co-ordination or integration of the division Chief's or the mission's proposals with the plans of other agencies is a formidable task involving political and economic rivalries (with their attendant secrecies and ambiguities) and subtle political wishes and actions on the part of the host government officials. It may also involve planning skills of a high order since there may be a likelihood of potential overcommitment by the host government to a diversity of aid sources.

A. Obtains Information

To effectively contribute to program development, the Division Chief is required to obtain information from a wide range of sources about a variety of topics, including such subjects as demographic, geographic, political, economic and cultural conditions of the country, and policies and wishes of the United States government.

1. Confers with potentially knowledgeable people

To obtain these types of information he confers with Ministry officials to determine what statistical information they can provide, such as population figures, breakdowns on trained vs. non-trained persons within special technical fields, or geographical information on terrain, climate, and soil of the host country. He also tries to obtain their views on development priorities. A major difficulty

in performing this activity is in contacting the officials. They are busy, sometimes disinterested, or prefer to deal with the Director. Information flow is poor. To supplement information obtained from the host officials, the Division Chief may call in other U. S. advisors, consultants, technicians from other missions and request that surveys be made to observe and report on existing conditions in the host country. These survey reports are used as a basis for determining the scope, immediacy, and value of development within a specific area.

Third country groups are another source of information. Although the host Ministry sometimes requests all groups to cooperate, they do not force them to do so. Third country groups may refuse to inform anyone of what they are doing, as illustrated in one of the incidents below.

Host nationals are another source of information. Informal conversations on education, agriculture, etc., and problems encountered in these fields provide the technicians with the views and observations of private citizens to supplement those of the government officials.

Consulting representatives of host institutions and research groups also provides information. If the information is furnished by the host to the Mission, but not made available to the Division Chief due to poor administration, then the Division Chief is faced with the embarrassing situation of obtaining the information directly from the host group.

* * * *

> In order to formulate plans for training, I needed information on the levels of competence, existing training programs, and the total number of people involved. I was able to talk to a ministry official about these matters on the basis of our

personal friendship. Otherwise I would have had to work through many people on his staff to provide the information.

* * * *

There are times when I can't get the information I need so I simply put my cards on the table. When theproject first got under way I went to see the Minister to get some idea of what type of personnel training would be most beneficial. The Minister was very uncooperative and would not discuss the area. When I recognized this resistance I told the Minister very frankly, "if we are going to provide assistance for you I have to get certain information in order to establish a program which will be of value. I have to know what problems you are having. Some of your problems we won't be able to help you with by training, but if you can't be honest and frank, I can't help you at all." The Minister saw the plain common sense of this. We discussed this workable approach and from then on I encountered little resistance in getting the Minister to tell me about personnel training problems.

* * * *

It is a problem to try to find out what is really going on within the Ministry. I should have a go-between to contact people in the Ministry. In this country the third channel for communication is indirection. Some agencies have men on a double payroll; that is, they have men on their payroll who are also on the Ministry payroll. Thus they have an inside track as to what is going on. I put in a request for such a liaison man but it was turned down by the Deputy Director.

* * * *

A group which is trying to aid the host country refuses to inform anyone as to what they are doing. I tried to gain their cooperation by inviting them to committee meetings, to social affairs, and

asking their advice. So far, I have not been successful. For example, the group constructed a building next door to an AID center and didn't consult with anyone about what they were planning to do. The Ministry has formally asked all groups to cooperate and follow standard plans, but no one is forced to do so. This particular group continues to act independently.

* * * *

An official of a research institute was trying to get a contract with the host government to conduct some experimental work in my specialty. He called me and asked to discuss the project and asked if I had seen the plan. I had not, and was not aware of such a plan. The representative said this was strange because he had given a copy of the plan to my boss 2-3 weeks ago. We decided to hold the discussion anyway, and the representative brought a copy of the plan to the meeting for me to see.

* * * *

One project called for a trial of a specific equipment utilization procedure in two institutions. I was to check with these two universities to see if the equipment was really needed, and if anyone objected to the procedure. I went to one institution and gathered some facts. I needed more data. I have done nothing to get more data, have not informed anyone of my results thus far. My supervisors have probably dropped the idea because nothing more has been said to me.

* * * *

2. Selects and reads documents

To contribute to his overall understanding of host needs, the Division Chief will read various documents. He may have at his disposal reports prepared by other groups which will provide factual

information as well as information on their activities and intentions in a given area. Statistical records are checked, previous program documents are reviewed, reports from the Embassy, technicians, and Division Chiefs are read when available, and the Division Chief reviews host publications in order to prepare cost estimates and to determine quantity and variety of host needs. As in most technical work, a major problem is to be able to distinguish between the relatively large amounts of useless matter and the usually less abundant relevant materials, before time and effort have been wastefully committed. Furthermore, there is often a scarcity of known, available, directly germane material upon which to base hypotheses, from which to draw conclusions, etc.

> The Minister requested that the AID mission provide certain English language materials. I turned the problem over to my subordinate and asked him to check the catalogs and find out how much they would cost. He did this, and sent it to the Minister and the Deputy Director. The Minister questioned his figures by telephone, and the subordinate checked again. He discovered that the document from which he had been working was printed by a foreign firm and the prices quoted had been in foreign currency, which he had read as dollars and cents. We recalled the memos and destroyed them.

* * * *

3. Assigns subordinates to obtain information

When information is not readily available from personal or documentary sources, the Division Chief may assign subordinates to obtain it by visiting sites or gathering data. A frequent difficulty is the need to use inexperienced personnel who provide erroneous evaluation of information.

The man who came to analyze and evaluate requests for loans had never been overseas before and had been "oriented" in Washington by people who had no first-hand knowledge of the host country. I had to make all his contacts for him and the man never quite "adjusted" to the host's problems. I felt that his lack of experience left him unequipped to interpret the local data. For example, he took production figures at face value, and I had to insist that he check on them. His report was "naive" and I had to edit it section by section.

* * * *

I wanted to use a technician to visit other sites around the country and make preliminary studies of potential development projects. I was overruled by the Program Officer. He thought it was not a good idea because the host government might interpret this as a commitment.

* * * *

4. Evaluates information

Evaluation of information may reach very complex levels. For quantitative data, errors or inconsistencies must be inferred and somehow corrected. For all types of data, the reliability of the sources must be considered and judgments must be made of the potential relevance of diverse material. In addition, the Division Chief may be called upon to evaluate information which is ordinarily outside of his nominal area of competence.

The host government's classification of certain products is misleading. Wool production was placed under "food", but wine is not found in that category. Situations like this made it necessary to seek more detailed information and revise figures accordingly.

* * * *

> I was trying to analyze some of the construction phases of the loan application. Realizing that as a _____ I was not competent to pass such judgments, I called my boss and explained the difficulty. I explained that I needed the assistance of a specialist to check some phases of the plans. When he evaded the issue, I gave up and went back trying to do the analysis myself.

* * * *

> After working out my estimates of their needs I decided to ask the host government how many items they felt were needed. The officials worked out a set of figures and I found them to be closely similar to my own figures so I accepted them.

* * * *

> In spite of my best efforts, all cost estimates for the initial sector of school construction are grossly in error. One factor contributing to the error was the incompetency of consultants sent out on Temporary Duty (TDY) by AID/W. One man stayed for 5 days and was shipped out of the country, the second stayed for three months but his figures were not accurate.

* * * *

5. Observes host country conditions

Direct observations of host country conditions is another step in obtaining information, particularly with regard to conditions that present opportunities for development. The overriding problem in carrying out this function is reported to be lack of time or opportunity for leaving the office or the capital city. The function is rarely accomplished, and no specific occurrences are available for citation. However, surveys might be instituted to learn details of conditions and resources, as in the following example:

> To support my ideas I have had regional AID advisors come for two weeks and report on

the possibilities for development. Their reports were positive and I made them known to my superiors.

* * * *

B. Develops Project Plans and Revisions

This function represents the distillation of information about what is needed, what is desired, and what is possible. The Division Chief recommends projects based upon his own views, the views of the host government, and the views of other mission personnel. One of the chief problems is the inability to determine objectively which of many possible projects in a particular specialty would be optimally valuable ones; it is even more difficult for Technical Division Chiefs to determine objectively the potential value of projects in their specialties as compared with projects in any or all other specialties. In addition to the substantive factors entering into the recommendations, the Division Chief must consider various non-technical factors such as the overall aid policies of the mission. For example, one incumbent pointed out that it was difficult to "sell" education projects such as curriculum development to "the front office" because the benefits would be long-range and intangible.

1. Reviews proposals

Suggestions for projects or for project revisions come from host government officials, mission personnel, AID/W, and other U. S. agencies on the scene (particularly the Embassy). The Division Chief reviews these proposals for practicality, need, and conformance to AID/W and mission policies and regulations. Ideally, perhaps, the bulk of the suggestions would emanate from the host government. Actually, this appears to be more the exception than the rule. As one incumbent put it, "if the U. S. waited for them to develop proposals, nothing would ever be done." The Division Chief often needs to "educate" the officials about AID's purposes and possibilities and to advise on the most appropriate proposals within his technical field. A complicating consideration is that proposals from the host government are apt to represent departures from on-going projects because of changes

in host personnel and reviews of such proposals involve considerable attention to "non-substantive" considerations. Another problem in this function is the bypassing previously cited, i.e., proposals are approved at a higher level with no review opportunity given to the Division Chief. When this occurs, he can only defer to the judgment of his superiors or write a paper outlining his position. A related problem occurs when the Division Chief turns down a request from the host government, on the basis of clear regulations or policy, and then "the Director or AID/W pulls the rug out from under him" by approving the proposal. This apparently does not occur often.

> I received an information copy of an airgram from the mission to AID/W explaining that my division supported the plan and was gathering facts on how to implement the project. The airgram listed me as having drafted it, but I had not. Furthermore, I did not support the plan because the facts so far did not indicate such a plan to be feasible. Further, no additional facts were being gathered. I had not been consulted at all about the airgram. My first knowledge of it was when I received the information copy. If I had been consulted I would have advised against the project until more facts could be gathered.

* * * *

> A plan came from Washington to provide free assistance of _____ to every child. I objected to the "free" nature of the assistance. I felt that a fee should be charged and the funds thus gained could be used to purchase replacements in the future. I expressed this thought to a representative from _____, but was rebuffed with a statement about the political nature of giving free things to host children.

* * * *

One of the current proposals called for aid to a normal school, where the teacher training project is being carried out. The Minister asked for a meeting about this. He explained that since some students and teachers were being shifted around at the school because of the plan, then more money was needed. I tried to find out just how the suggested extra money would be spent. The Minister hedged, refusing to give a direct answer. I decided that what was really wanted was "palm money" either for the Ministry officials or for the teachers in the normal school.

* * * *

During the course of a rare meeting with the Minister, the Deputy Director committed us to providing a particular type of training aid for local schools. After the meeting, I was charged with seeing what could be done about getting those items. I was very negative about the whole plan. I leaned toward another method but realized that we would have to carry out the Deputy Director's commitment. But I know that AID is going to blanket this country with the other method in the next few years. We are investing heavily in a complete backup system for it. Why can't we wait? What to do with them...the schools don't have the facilities for them...I felt we were overextending ourselves.

* * * *

2. Formulates and justifies project ideas

The specific ideas are generally written up and submitted for review to the Division Chief's superiors; and then are submitted through them to AID/W. There is usually informal conversation about them beforehand. The ideas and papers may be worked on independently or with other interested parties. Problems encountered include lack of clear guidelines from the Director and the Program Officer, delays in obtaining

the necessary or desired reviews, and the inaccessibility of knowledgeable people with whom the Division Chief needs to discuss his ideas. Several examples illustrate the problem of "selling" one's activities in the face of an opposing "front office" viewpoint. There is often fundamental disagreement between the Division Chief and the Program Officer or Director as to the rôle of a given specialty area in furthering the general goals of the mission.

> I had an idea about utilizing the Peace Corps Volunteers in my work and I outlined my idea to the Peace Corps country representative. He thought the idea was feasible, so we had other meetings to work out details. I discussed the proposed project with the Mission Director and received his approval. The Peace Corps representative did likewise with the Peace Corps Headquarters. With this approval, we drew up a formal proposal. The proposal was submitted to the Minister who readily approved.
>
> * * * *
>
> When I began to formulate a concrete program for _____ I wanted to establish a participant training program. Training in the states would provide us with qualified people to take over when we phase out. I explained why and how I wanted to utilize this training to the Director and got his approval.
>
> * * * *
>
> An advisor and I prepared a draft proposal on establishing a _____ college. The Director reviewed the draft and found it lacking in specifics: number of students to be trained, coordination with other divisions, tie-in with host development goals. It was not accepted and required further work.
>
> * * * *

I recommended to the Program Officer that a special public health evaluation project be established. The man serving as Program Officer at this time felt that health had no economic impact, so was reluctant to consider the project. To combat this, I wrote a lengthy paper on the economic impact of public health, stressing facts such as work days lost because of sickness.

* * * *

One of my first tasks assigned by AID/W was to comment on the host country's most immediate need in the field of education. My reply was that the biggest need was for an increase in training for school teachers because of the booming population. Washington fired right back for me to draw up a plan for this. A realistic plan for this was worked and sent to AID/W. They loved the plan so much that they added money. This caused a revision upward of the plan. Then Congress cut funds to a point less than called for in the original realistic plan. This caused a downward revision. Then some money was restored, causing another revision of education plans. Eventually, the final amount of funds available was fixed, and the Program Agreement was written.

* * * *

The Director and I rarely "communicate" with each other--we do not seem to speak the same "language". The Director was driving for an integrated program that would have a real impact on the local economy without having the capability to integrate it himself. On the other hand, I constantly referred to the need to go slow, establish rapport and good relationships in order to have the advice acted on.

* * * *

> I don't really know how far I should go in arguing my position that my specialty is an essential part of development. I don't know whether the front office wants to hear this kind of argument in favor of a technical specialty or whether they think that I am simply being rigid and narrow when I make this kind of argument. My problem lies in finding ways to justify my program in terms that the Program Office and the front office will understand. I must be able to tie in each project with the basic objectives of the mission. One problem here is that the basic objectives change from year to year.

* * * *

3. Explores feasibility of project plans and details

A prerequisite for successful planning is obtaining the approval and support of host government officials. It is sometimes necessary to approach the officials directly with respect to funding details and staffing or equipment projections. Meetings with host personnel are frequently attended by the Mission Director, Deputy Director, or Program Officer, and the project idea is clarified and reviewed for the host to obtain his support and consent. A major problem in doing so is to avoid premature commitment, since final approval is a long way off at this stage, and USAID policy changes may force major shifts in the plans. Knowledge of the local language is particularly helpful here since delicate explorations and tentative negotiations are involved and misinterpretations would create serious problems later. Another fairly frequent problem is lack of information on developments concerning the project which have previously been carried out by other U.S. personnel or within the host government itself.

In several missions the exploration and coordination of tentative plans is carried out chiefly by USAID personnel other than the Division Chief.

Lack of information is also a major difficulty where it is necessary to integrate plans with the host government's development program or with the plans of other agencies.

Delays in planning occur when the host government officials will not provide the necessary information required to outline final steps in planning. This is sometimes due to an official's desire to work with higher level people, or due to their inability to come to decisions.

> University officials and the Chief of another USAID division worked out an arrangement without my knowledge. Then, with the mission committed, I was brought in to help work out details. Since the situation was so obviously wrong, I was determined to try to salvage the situation if at all possible. I insisted on a meeting with the Minister and university officials and told them that AID would help, but with qualifications. They agreed to them.

* * * *

> AID/W requested a manpower survey of the country. At the same time, an international group had its own idea of a manpower study and was going to invite two teams in to do it. I tried to convince the other group to combine efforts. The head of the group would not deal directly with me but felt he should deal with the Director. I talked to a representative of the group and got him to get the Director and the head of the group together. They agreed to try to work together. I got the other team and our team together at a cocktail party and they discussed their mutual interests and common problems. At any major reporting to the host government, I made sure that there was representation from both groups.

* * * *

I met with the head of the local international delegation to apportion segments of an overall program. They agreed that their group would sponsor a research institute within the Ministry, but independent of the host department. The operating program, sponsored by USAID would then apply the information developed by the research institute. However, this agreement was being sabotaged by the head of the international group who was "pirating" people from the program for the institute. I objected to his practices and suggested he be declared "persona non grata."

* * * *

One of the major problems was getting the Ministry officials to act. For example, they were supposed to provide a list of places where construction was to begin. My subordinate and I asked for the list several times. At last, long after the due date the list was submitted. This delay, in turn, caused a short delay in getting construction underway. The locals frequently just won't act unless they are dealing with an important person. Thus, they just ignored my subordinate, even though they held up construction of their own buildings.

* * * *

One of the lending institutions was planning to lend the host money for educational purposes, but they required a census of school students, buildings, teachers, etc., before they would release the money. I notified the Minister of this requirement and indicated that nothing could be done about the loan until the census was accomplished. The Minister insisted that no census was needed. Later the Director was called to a meeting with the Minister and

the Ambassador. The Director took me along. At this meeting the Minister again insisted on the loan without bothering with the census. The Director pointed out to those present that the census was a necessity for processing the loan. The Minister accepted this.

* * * *

I had not previously mentioned the evaluation project to host government officials, in spite of having it in mind for over a year. I waited to be sure of having AID's approval, and to enable building up friendly relations first.

* * * *

A subordinate got data together on a five-year plan with the financial prediction based on the continuation of joint support of the project by AID and the Ministry. Figures based on a contribution of 50% by the USAID were submitted, but shortly thereafter the mission had decided not to contribute to local costs. A subordinate brought the problem to me, and I handled it. Instead of confronting the Minister, I worked through the other advisors who worked in the Ministry. These people were my friends and professional colleagues. I got them to change the figures in the U.S. presentation and made it clear that the plan involved no commitment by the U.S. for local cost.

* * * *

A host official sent a letter to the Minister requesting answers to technical questions about one of our possible projects. He wanted clarification concerning financing, overall scheduling, and material to be used. They both assumed I had been sent a copy of

the letter for my information and comment. I should have been asked by the Minister to help draft a reply and I should have been sent a copy by the host official. Neither was done. It wasn't until the host government official called a meeting, a couple of months later, to discuss these points, that I learned of the letter. This embarrassed everyone because this pointed out the haphazard way in which the Ministries were handling our project.

* * * *

I thought my ideas about a project could be promoted by a movie which I had sent from AID/W. It was a film on self-help housing from all over the world. It showed that this was not solely a local program, and it included explanations and examples of the effectiveness of participant training which I wanted to begin.

* * * *

C. Manages Document Preparation

The Division Chief prepares documents which outline each project's objectives, estimates costs, and suggest personnel and equipment needs. If there is a sufficient and competent staff, the Chief will delegate document writing tasks to his subordinates. He will call meetings, assign duties, review the content and format of the document, and has on occasion hand-drafted the document to facilitate the process. Often considerable rewriting is required because of the quality of the subordinate's work or because of the comments and requests of the Program Office. The documents require specific and accurate facts and figures, attention to procedural detail, and to an extent depending on the quality of the Program Office, interpretation of guide-line materials. Coordination with other divisions may also be a problem.

1. Develops and guides working arrangements

Because of budget arrangements, this project is paid for out of another division's funds. However, my division plans the work, staffing arrangements, and course content. For a long while it was unclear as to which division should prepare the E-1. At first, a joint preparation was attempted. This required excessive time because so many people were involved. Aware of this problem, I suggested a solution. I asked the Mission Director and the Chief of the other division to allow my division to prepare the E-1 and then submit it to the other division for approval. Both agreed to my suggestion.

* * * *

2. Reviews, edits, and evaluates documents prepared by subordinates

One subordinate had excellent technical knowledge, but very poor writing skills. I wanted a good E-1 for his project without pushing him aside. Therefore I used a technique used by many college-level teachers, i.e., discussing the document, suggesting that a paragraph be rewritten, asking a question requiring an explanation, and keeping the papers flowing back to the subordinate for revisions.

* * * *

3. Writes or rewrites documents in required terms and format

My local employees have little general and technical education. They can't prepare program documents. Therefore, I must do them myself. Their drafting skills and knowledge of construction are also far below U.S. standards.

* * * *

II. PREPARES PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS

This function includes the preparation of Project Implementation Orders, preparation and review of project agreement documents, and negotiating the specific terms of such documents. (For present purposes, loan applications are included in the general category of project implementation documents since they represent an implementation phase relative to a more basic development planning document such as the Country Assistance Plan.) A distinguishing characteristic of this function is that it is heavily governed by constraints. These include such considerations as: a) conformance with the approved CAP or Long-range Assistance Strategy, b) the interpretations of the Division Chief's superiors and the Program Officer concerning the specific application of general policy guidelines, c) the particular interests of the cognizant host government officials, d) the legal implications of the agreements, e) format and procedural requirements, and f) the necessity to meet fairly strict calendar deadlines.

These constraints will frequently conflict with the requirement that the implementation plan be the one most likely to achieve the relevant goals of the CAP, and the Division Chief (and his superiors) must use considerable judgment in developing and negotiating the optimal plans under the prevailing circumstances.

A. Reviews Background Information Relevant to Projects

In order to be informed about the format, content, schedule, and processing of the documents, the Chief carries out all or some of the following steps:

1. Confers with staff

In conferring with his staff, the Division Chief decides upon estimates with respect to equipment, personnel, and time. He relies

on his staff for accurate information and sound advice. Where the project represents a continuation or modification of previous work, estimates will be based in part on past experience. When he is given incomplete information or inaccurate estimates, the Division Chief is responsible for discovering the inaccuracies and correcting them.

2. Reviews documents

The Division Chief uses previous documents as a source of information on those items to be included and the manner in which they are included. He also consults the approved CAP for review of specific goals if, as is generally the case, considerable time has elapsed between CAP submission and implementation.

3. Obtains clarifications

The Division Chief consults the Program Officer and others for interpretations of policies, procedures, and plans, since the specific application of generally-worded material is frequently a matter of judgment.

> Washington allocated money for the training project. This was much below my estimate (as made with Program Officer and Controller) of what the project required. Since funds had to be gotten by the end of the fiscal year, I had to find some right away. By having a broad knowledge of where money is I knew where to go to get the extra money. I consulted with the Controller to see whether I was right about the amounts available and then got the Program Officer's approval to put the funds in my project. From various areas, I brought the total up to the needed amount. I got some funds from one project's funds which were to be reallocated to make my total minimum. This is a matter of advising Program Officer where money can be gotten and telling him where it should be.

* * * *

> I pointed out that the Director's instructions violated procedural requirements. The Director insisted. I refused to sign the documents and advised the Director to consult the Controller to verify the accuracy of the procedure outlined.

* * * *

B. Directs Document Preparation

The preparation of the documents may involve many persons, or a few. Without suitable assistance, the Division Chief may initially prepare all documents himself. Missions vary in terms of the specific people involved in review of the documents; with more people involved, the likelihood of delays, disagreements, conferences, and revisions all increase.

1. Writes, revises, edits development grant implementation documents

2. Reviews loan applications

At times the Division Chief needs to assess plans in an area outside of his specialty, as was illustrated in an example in Function I. B 4. - Evaluates information.

3. Confers with program office concerning details of documents

One problem occurring here is the frequent changing of rules governing format for Project Agreements. Often the document must be rewritten to conform to the new regulations. The function is facilitated or made difficult depending upon the clarity of information provided by the Program office.

C. Conducts Negotiations With Host Government Officials

Since some of the documents produced represent the legally binding agreement between two governments, there is a necessity for considerable negotiation over very specific details. In most instances

the final negotiations are handled by the Director, the Deputy Director, or Embassy personnel, with the Division Chief playing a relatively minor role during the meetings. The nature and extent of his involvement is highly variable from mission to mission. Generally, he will have laid the groundwork for the agreements in the course of his own meetings with Ministry officials. Problems include uncertainty about AID/W actions, the reluctance of host government officials to commit themselves, the danger of committing AID prematurely, the personal relations between USAID and host government personnel, and language ability on the part of both USAID and host government personnel.

1. Negotiates details of development grant implementation documents

> We have a deadline for receiving participant nominees from the government. If they aren't in by then we can't complete implementation in time to include them in this year's budget, and we certainly can't write them off on next year's program. This year it was late and we were supposed to get ___ participants for just one project from the Minister; we had only three nominations. The government is just plain slow in getting around to nominating participants. They don't want to go through all the difficulty of nominating an individual until they are sure he will be approved, so they don't send us the necessary information on which we can make our judgments. And naturally, we don't want to approve a nominee until we have the data. It is a vicious circle. In this particular case, I called the Minister and told him that tomorrow was the last day for nominations and that if they were not in tomorrow all the funds for that project would be deobligated and the program would be scrapped. The next day the entire group of official nominations came in. The effect of this is that by nominating every one

at the last minute this office is jammed with people and paper work for 6 weeks to 2 months. Everybody works overtime at the close of the FY. The rest of the year the work is easily handled and comes in a smooth flow. I really don't know how to alleviate this delay problem so I learn to live with it.

* * * *

All my negotiations with the host government concerning the host contribution to projects must be done with no knowledge of the American contribution to be made. I may indicate to the host what U.S. funds have been requested and try to find out what the host would be able to give if the U.S. gave a given amount. However, the host does not know with certainty what they may contribute. Any Ministry commitment must be approved by the Ministry of Finance. Thus, uncertainty for both groups makes negotiation a very time consuming process.

* * * *

I had to go to Ministry with the Chief. I felt that the fact that I had to interpret for the Chief seemed to weaken his position with the host. The Chief knew every detail of the program, but couldn't speak the language. The Minister was free and open with me and my subordinate, but formal with the Chief. I feel that an understanding of the language leads to an understanding of attitudes.

* * * *

Since there were such high priorities attached to this training it was established immediately and included in FY 63. I had to compose, approve and transmit to AID/W the PIO/Ps for all the proposed programs in a

very short time. This meant that I had to have very detailed information for AID/W concerning each project. There were 20 projects altogether. I had to give them the types of training for each project and for each participant. Out of all the projects AID/W had only one question, which I think is pretty good. I got my estimates from the information that I had accumulated in many conversations with government and city officials who were interested in training, and when the request for training came to me I had no official means of assessing the Minister's judgment regarding the training programs (time estimates, etc.). I accepted his evaluations which were close to my own, but I made sure that he gave me detailed information from which he made his estimates so I could satisfy all of AID/W's information requirements.

* * * *

2. Negotiates details of loan applications

(No examples available.)

III. MANAGES PROGRAM

This function provides the Division Chief with his greatest degree of autonomy. In contrast with the two preceding functions, the extent of the responsibilities in this function depends relatively little on the predilections of the front office; the Division Chief's role in this function is fairly standardized and will vary primarily with the size of the division staff and the nature of the program, e.g., the extent to which contracts are involved. In this function, the plans are put into operation, and the ideas, words, and papers involved in other functions are confronted by the realities of people, environment, and resources. The tasks may be summarized simply with the terms "observes operations," "corrects deficiencies," and "keeps others informed." Problems abound, however, and decisions and adjustments must be made on one's own, since review by one's superiors occurs long after the fact and is likely to concern broad accomplishments rather than day-to-day operations.

A. Monitors and Guides Projects

The task involves recognizing and correcting errors made in the development and implementation phases and recognizing and overcoming obstacles which were not anticipated beforehand. It also involves considerable interaction with host nationals, ranging from personnel on high government levels to those on the "working level," such as teachers, construction workers, or villagers, depending on the particular project involved. The Division Chief's role in these interactions is more like that of a supervisor or coordinator than a "negotiator", and unique problems are likely to arise because of this relationship. These will be indicated in appropriate sections below.

1. Obtains information on project status

Sources of information are other people, written material, and observation. As with other information tasks, the Division Chief is required to interpret and evaluate the "facts" received. He must also on occasion persist in his efforts to obtain the information, particularly if the information must come from the field, from other divisions, AID/W, or the host government. A major problem lies in the fact that the "natural evolution" of projects may differ from similar projects in the United States. The Chief cannot assume that certain future events are probable because certain others have taken place. Thus, he must develop a different and often more detailed set of cues which indicate progress or the lack of it. Delayed or misleading information prevents timely or appropriate action and may lead to costly or embarrassing errors.

a. confers with project staff, other American personnel, and host country personnel

Both formal and informal meetings are held, usually on an irregular basis. The Division Chief must be alert to any hint of current or potential difficulty and may even need to infer trouble from the very absence of negative information.

> When the head of a project group came to town I invited him to lunch, and had a pleasant informative conversation. From the luncheon discussion, I was able to learn that he had "shaken down," how he was getting along with his staff, the Ministry, and with other local persons. I felt this to be a good professional visit, made smoother because it was personal and informal.

* * * *

Project work is to be accomplished by a university team. The contract has not yet been signed although it has been in process for several months. I frequently asked my supervisor the status of the contract and was told each time that it was almost signed, that only a tiny technicality was in the way and that it would be worked out at any moment. The Director just returned from AID/W and reported that not even a draft copy of the contract had been worked out. I was very upset by this information. I couldn't figure out why my boss had misled me.

* * * *

Shortly after my arrival and after my first few meetings with the Ministers, I felt as though there was a strong antipathy between them. I reported this to the Director and the Ambassador. When a delay arose over our project due to their internal lack of cooperation, we readily knew what the reason was and what the origin of the delay was. We didn't have to make many embarrassing inquiries as to why there was such an administrative breakdown concerning our project. In view of our being alerted to this situation we could more realistically evaluate what we had accomplished under the circumstances.

* * * *

> Flow of communication is from a villager, to village political leaders, to us. I was sure the villagers were bringing their problems to us. I also assumed that if they didn't they would go to the political leaders -- so they would get to us through them. The local political leaders promised to keep us informed about the villagers' feelings and this is the assumption I went under. Since no negative information was reaching me, I felt all was going smoothly. However, there were many feelings of discontent by the villagers which the political leaders didn't transmit to me.
>
> * * * *

b. reviews project reports and correspondence

As with conferring, the Division Chief must be alert to any and all cues that things are not going smoothly or that developments are underway which might affect the on-going work. The written material involved in this function emanates from subordinates, contractors, people in other divisions, and from AID/W. Subject matter includes policies, funding, personnel, equipment procurement and utilization, and operating procedures.

> When a certain phase of the operation was begun I relied on the oral and written reports given me by the supervisors we were training and my technicians at the site. As far as I could tell there were no problems developing. One morning there was an accident at the site. I immediately went out to see what had happened. A certain step in the operation had not been done. The technician had told the local supervisors to check something but hadn't followed up to see if they did. Locals had not bothered to find out if certain material was on site, and the laborers who brought in the material hadn't bothered telling anyone it was there. This showed a serious breakdown in coordination and supervision, which was my ultimate responsibility.
>
> * * * *

c. visits project sites

For most technical specialties, neither conference nor written report can substitute for personal observation. Incumbents clearly recognize the importance of such visits, but indicate that they are unable to make visits as often as they would like because of lack of time or lack of transportation.

> When I needed to be at the site,often there was no transportation available. I went to the Minister and asked for a vehicle which he placed at our disposal. AID provided the gasoline for the jeep. He gave us this support after I told him how essential it was and that there was no available transportation for us until we received our requested vehicles. I requested two vehicles in the next FY commodity request. When the vehicles get here, I will have no more difficulties of this kind. Until then I will continue to use the host government car.

* * * *

> Observations made during field trips allow me to make better judgments on how far to lead or push a subordinate, and on the prospects for recommending the subordinate for another tour. I spent a full day and an evening with one subordinate visiting project classrooms, classrooms where uncertified teachers were instructing, and observing project technicians tutoring the uncertified teachers. This trip enabled me to verify that project work was effective, and it gave a morale boost to the U. S. technicians, and to the subordinate, to know that someone was interested enough in their project to leave a comfortable city to come for a visit.

* * * *

I sat in on classes and got ideas about the teaching abilities of my employees, the teacher training team. I looked for oral presentation, ability to demonstrate, how they conducted the class, their knowledge of subject matter, methods, punctuality, and other necessary teacher skills. One teacher was so poor, coming in late and unprepared, that I dropped him from the team.

* * * *

While a technician was on vacation for two weeks, I had more work in the office than usual; this kept me from on-site inspection. During this time they put another man in charge. I had little time and only supervised his work on amoral discussion basis. He made so many demoralizing blunders in doing what he wanted rather than what our approved plan called for that I should have taken the time to go out to the village at least once a week.

* * * *

d. solicits appraisals from others

On occasion the Division Chief may request that a specialist be utilized to survey a project or to recommend alternative courses of action. If his relations with host personnel permit, he may ask for an informal appraisal of both U. S. and host government efforts.

A specialist was passing through host country en route to the U. S. He visited the college and noticed several weaknesses in the training program. It was pointed out that the director of the program was stressing the wrong topics, and that he taught on a level too advanced for his students. I met with the director, discussed these remarks, and he agreed to revise his course and methods of teaching.

* * * *

The host has not followed up on its part of the village project. I have had regional AID specialists come to the village for two weeks, observe and report on the possibilities for development in their areas. Their reports were positive and I made them known to all the host officials involved.

* * * *

A specialist was supposed to be helping the Ministry organize a department. The Minister remarked to me that nothing was being done to form the department and that the Ministry was not in favor of having Americans in the country who were not doing their jobs. At about this time the specialist went on home leave, so immediate action was impossible. (When the man returns, I will try to inspire him to work and if unsuccessful will see that the man is transferred.)

* * * *

2. Prevents or corrects project deficiencies

Since the Division Chief is not usually in direct charge of a project, this function is generally carried out by advising others or by changing the work assignments. Both methods entail the risk of offending or demoralizing people, both nationals and U.S. Where projects are handled by contractors, the Division Chief would usually have to work through his superiors rather than take direct action himself. Several incumbents were uncertain about just what their roles should be with respect to contract projects.

a. assigns, adjusts, and advises on duties and responsibilities

Preventing or correcting improper assignment and adjusting the responsibilities of project personnel is frequently a major concern. The task requires an understanding of personnel capabilities, host customs, work attitudes, and staffing needs. Very often the Chief requests a subordinate to substitute for other staff who are on leave, or to perform the duties of personnel being terminated or phased out. This creates a hardship for everyone. The substitute is sometimes performing duties new to him or he is handling twice his normal workload. The Chief temporarily relies on an overworked staff and both morale and performance are affected.

> The local nationals have a very distinct feeling about ages and working relations. There are a couple of bright young boys who are working with an older man whom I consider very valuable. They consider him an "old fogey" and don't like him to tell them anything. I called the group together; didn't mention the conflict, and told them I wanted to assign their responsibilities. I gave them the same duties in different words but I made the

old man the overseer of the group. This worked very well since it is customary to have the oldest be leader.

* * * *

Plans for construction were given to a local architectural firm. They were late in submitting a report, and when I called on them to learn the status of work, I found that what little work had been done was inadequate. I assigned the task to my subordinate, who completely redesigned the entire structure. The result of his work was satisfactory and construction was begun.

* * * *

I assigned a subordinate the simple task of finding out how many _____ were available. He telephoned a local national in another division for an estimate. He presented this to me. I said this wouldn't do. I needed more exact, more reliable information. I then told the subordinate to check with the U. S. chief of the section. The subordinate then reassigned this task to a local national to do. I had to take the subordinate aside and tell him this wouldn't do, that he himself should go, because the local national would probably confuse things. At this point, the subordinate finally got the message and did the task himself.

* * * *

The position of project coordinator could not be filled from Washington. I knew that filling such a post would be most difficult. The technician agreed to reclassification. The slot thus left vacant was then filled by a _____ with the necessary qualifications.

* * * *

A project calls for developing a new type of institution. Thus, a strong leader is needed. The man assigned to the job has marked time, done nothing for the first 6 months. He could not produce a work plan. My subordinate became aware of the static nature of the project and informed me. I tried to save the situation by urging my subordinate to spend extra time with the man developing the work plan and other project documents.

* * * *

Two employees were angry and at loggerheads. Each would let paper work sit on his desk, just to spite the other. This slowed down their own work and the work of others. When I learned of this, I fired one man immediately. Later the second man was fired also, and a third man was given both jobs.

* * * *

At one of our remote projects, the personnel became irritable, perhaps because of the isolation, perhaps because of the rough — living conditions. Some refused to work with the others. The project director wrote to me about these conditions. I left immediately for the project. I met with the people, told them what an important job they were doing, rearranged work schedules, made arrangements for one really distressed person to go home, and told them I would visit them more often. I felt that their main complaint was not enough recognition for the work being done, so I stressed my appreciation. Apparently, my efforts were successful because they settled down and are now working harmoniously.

* * * *

The head of a school which is financed by AID recently resigned. The Ministry did not inform AID of this resignation and did not plan to consult AID regarding the appointment of a new head for the school. I was very concerned about this because there is one AID technician assigned full time to the school and a lot of money has been put into the school. I went to see the official in the Ministry and let him know that I was concerned that a well qualified man be appointed director and that it not be a political appointment. This is the kind of situation where a talent for public relations and a great deal of diplomacy is needed.

* * * *

A subordinate didn't cooperate and was not very competent. The first assignment I gave him was a very important problem to solve. His solution was not satisfactory. I asked him to try again. He always found excuses--too busy. The result of his attitude was that nothing was done for weeks. Finally I simply told him to forget it and contracted the problem out to the Ministry. It was finished in ten days and we had formulated a satisfactory solution.

* * * *

b. procures needed equipment

The Division Chief is often responsible for determining specifications for equipment and supplies, and approving requests of subordinates. In some instances, he is also responsible for distributing and transferring equipment and supplies to selected locations and appropriate persons, for checking on installation of equipment, and transportation of both equipment and personnel. In certain de-centralized projects he is also required to schedule the use of vehicles and keep the vehicles in repair.

The Division Chief ensures that personnel conform to policy and procedures when exchange or transfer of equipment is considered, or when equipment and supplies are being ordered. Failure to follow proper channels when ordering may result in payment difficulties.

Common problems in this task are delays in arrival of equipment, loss of equipment in transit, arrival of defective or inappropriate materials, and problems of transferring materials once they have arrived. Considerations to be made when ordering equipment include the effect of the environment, its relevance to the project, the level of competence of those who will use it, and the availability of parts or repair facilities. Procurement policies, such as "Buy American", are a frequently cited problem.

> Generators were ordered. The specifications explained how the generators operated at sea level. I overlooked the fact that the generator would be in use at 8,000 feet in the mountains. When the generators arrived it was quickly learned that they were inadequate for operating in the altitude. A local official learned of this error and loaned his own generators for use. A more appropriate generator has since been ordered, but not yet received.

* * * *

> The U.S. regulation that requires purchases in the U.S. places a burden on the program. The host landscape is very rugged and I have projects in progress in the most rugged and isolated areas. Transportation for personnel in these areas should be by a rugged vehicle with four-wheel drive. The Land Rover is heavy, spare parts are easy to obtain, and most villages have a mechanic capable of making repairs. But I must purchase vehicles made in the U.S. These frequently break down.

Spare parts are hard to obtain and since they are new in the area, local mechanics have a hard time repairing them. Thus, the project cannot be kept going at full speed because of the breakdowns.

* * * *

There is always the risk that materials ordered will be imperfect. Refrigerators were ordered for hospitals. Upon arrival, it was learned that most of them were inoperable. They were eventually replaced, but in the meantime, hospital operations were hindered.

* * * *

A subordinate ordered oil stoves. I approved this request, thinking erroneously that the stoves would be appropriate. When the stoves arrived and were set up, it was learned how improper they were. They each had an electric motor, which meant that in addition to oil, reliable electricity was required for operation. Also, to be economical, it was necessary to buy large quantities of oil. The budget had no provision for this big initial outlay. In addition, there was insufficient electricity. The stoves had to be taken out and replaced by wood burning stoves. The project was delayed.

* * * *

A testing machine was ordered by a subordinate but it was not suitable to the kind of project we should be concerned with here. I decided the machine was overly sophisticated, although the machine is valuable, and could be used for certain purposes. I recognized this, and explained to the subordinate that AID money could be spent more effectively on other items.

* * * *

Recently the Minister sent a letter asking for transportation for 5 officials of an international agency in order that they might make an inspection trip. I knew from past experience that these people begged everything they could get, even when they had money of their own. Also, I was already providing two vehicles to the Ministry for other purposes. In addition, I was somewhat short of drivers and cars. Thus, I disapproved of the request.

* * * *

Maintenance men were attempting to install two large oil heaters purchased for the service building. They pretended to be installing them for days, but did not know how. Noticing their lack of progress, I talked with them and learned of the real difficulty. I called a local store selling such heaters and hired their workmen to come and install the heaters.

* * * *

A contract group moved into houses without window screens. AID was obligated to supply the screening. As time passed the lack of screens created a morale problem because the technicians couldn't open windows as they would be flooded with mosquitoes, and with windows closed, their homes were unbearably hot. Their leader complained to me and I wrote a memo to the Executive Officer requesting screens. Several days passed without action, so again the leader complained to me and I spent five hours making personal visits to the Executive Officer and General Services explaining the need. Screens were installed within 10 days and morale was restored.

* * * *

In accordance with the Project Agreement, several hundred dollars worth of books were ordered for donation to the library of a university. The books were late in arriving. When I discovered that the books had not been received I wrote many letters to the book publisher to discover their location. No answers to my letters were ever received. Finally, after a year and a half, the books arrived.

* * * *

One of my subordinates is here on his first tour with AID and for a while had not learned to cope with government bureacracy. Thus, when a contractor submitted a list of reference books for order, he went through the list deleting titles he thought inappropriate and then returned the edited list to the contractor. The contractor got the impression that he was exerting a censorship authority, and he complained to me about this. I promised to work out a solution. My problem was to preserve the freedom of the contractors, to avoid making the subordinate feel worthless, and to insure that books ordered were appropriate. I asked each contractor to construct a list of criteria against which all materials would be screened. The contractor would then certify that a list of books requested had been verified against the criteria. This system was accepted and works well.

* * * *

One of our centers sent an order for critically needed items. They sent their order by diplomatic pouch, but it never arrived. A technician made a personal visit to me to learn what had happened to the order. I explained to the technician and to other subordinates to never

again send orders through the pouch, as the system was unreliable. Instead, the local mail facilities should be used, because it was considered more reliable. (Note: in some other countries, the reverse is generally believed to be true).

* * * *

I needed some serum to be able to conduct some lab tests. I wrote directly to the U.S. supplier and did receive the necessary serum. I later learned that my requests should have gone through the AID supply officer for approval and for the record. Now, the bill had been received and the supply officer is reluctant to pay it. In addition to slighting the supply officer I may be forced to pay for the serum from my own personal funds.

* * * *

One year a contractor ordered 6 sets of textbooks and they were provided. The following year, the contractor placed a new order for texts and by chance I observed that the order duplicated the previous year's request. I arranged to see the contract Chief of Party and at the meeting asked if texts were being ordered to give to students. The contractor replied, 'yes' that he had hoped to help the students develop a sense of ownership. I explained that this was against regulations because the U.S. does not have a textbook program here. To supply all students with books, which would become necessary if some were provided -- would cost a prohibitive sum of money. The man accepted the explanation, and spread the information to other contractors with the result that textbook orders are now realistic, i.e. orders for a few of each type to use for development purposes.

* * * *

Four hundred sewing machines were to be distributed through union organizations, etc. They were being paid for by the mission. My predecessor had agreed to distribute the sewing machines. Since he had left it was necessary for me to follow through and distribute them. I uncrated, assembled, and distributed them. Some didn't have the required parts. Roads were so bad that many machines had to be sent by air. I had to organize and supervise this operation, in spite of it being well out of my own field (Education).

* * * *

When visiting a project, I learned that the technician not only had unneeded equipment,but also that additional unnecessary equipment was on order. The technician indicated to me that although the equipment was not needed, the host government officials would be highly insulted if the equipment order was cancelled. Upon returning to my office, I checked with the Division and learned that they had a real need for the equipment and that it would be used by host nationals in the Division so I had it transferred to the Division. I therefore directed the technician to explain this transfer to his host counterparts and they agreed because their government would not be losing the equipment. The Division was happy to receive the machines. To make the transfer more palatable, I used the term "loan" in my discussions.

* * * *

A minor problem has been mechanical. A project team uses 3 tape recorders in their data collection. These recorders were made in the U.S., and no adequate repair facilities are available locally. Two of the machines are out of order. In an attempt to get them repaired, one was shipped to the U.S. I will hand carry another to the U.S., hoping to get it repaired there while I am visiting the U.S.

* * * *

c. advises subordinates on plans, and procedures

This function involves both the application of technical knowledge and awareness of AID goals and country resources. The principal difficulty is learning about the plans and procedures before they are actually carried out.

The substantive difficulties of the technical problems which a chief may be called upon to solve are often highly varied and may be either relatively easy or extremely difficult depending on the nature of the individual projects. Division Chiefs are sometimes not called upon to assist in solving substantive problems because subordinates lack respect for their abilities or knowledge, because subordinates do not know their own limitations or wish to hide them, and sometimes because the Chief and the technician may be geographically quite remote from each other.

When I arrived at this post, my subordinate in charge of the training project wanted to start a course for _____. I explained that such a course would be impractical due to the existence of a school for this purpose. Recently, the head of the training project was replaced. On a routine field trip, I learned that the new project head was planning to start the same kind of course. He had even procured approval from the local authorities. I explained the existence of the other school and that it would be foolhardy to create an unnecessary training course.

* * * *

> I visited our survey team and learned that the team leader had planned to survey everyone in the area. I advised that only a sample needed to be taken to determine the percentage. In addition, I briefly explained the reasoning behind sampling. Because I learned of the problem in time and was able to correct it, several weeks of work were saved.

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d. persuades host government to honor commitments

Often the host government fails to contribute its share of time, interest, personnel, or funds to a given project. This may be due to lack of understanding of the terms of a signed agreement, unawareness of the depth of the commitments, changing conditions within the host government, or other factors. How deeply the government will actually become involved in a project may be difficult to define in the early stages of planning and implementation. The Division Chief may assume the host understands its obligations and will honor its commitments, when in fact it does not. The role of the Division Chief in this function is somewhat variable from mission to mission, depending upon the wishes of the front office and the capabilities of the incumbent.

> I relied on the Minister to implement the host government's share of the project on schedule, as soon as we were ready. The result was we got farther and farther behind schedule. This meant that for all our efforts we had nothing tangible to show. This in turn caused the Ambassador to press us to get something done.

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Host has not followed up properly on its part of the project. Without the host fulfilling their implied promises, all we will end up with is a group of buildings. I have suggested to the host officials in various departments that ultimate success in this field requires contribution by almost all departments -- health, education, commerce, youth groups, forestry and fisheries. I have suggested that representatives of each of those areas study the problem for a couple of weeks to see how they could fit into the project as a whole.

* * * *

The Minister had promised space for the seminar to be assigned later. I pointed out that the promise could not be depended on, that when the time came, the Minister just might say no space was available.

* * * *

One of the schools was built on the property of a national. The Minister was supposed to provide the compensation in such cases, and handle all such deals for negotiation of property. In this case the Minister apparently did not provide compensation, and gave no satisfaction to the property owner. She called me and complained. I called the Minister and explained the situation and asked him to act on the case. He wrote the lady a letter and explained what he had done.

* * * *

My biggest problem is getting the Ministry to provide funds which they have agreed to provide. One program is a joint U. S. host undertaking. The Ministry was supposed to provide trucks for project workers. For a long time the Ministry wouldn't release the money to buy the trucks, so the project

could not get underway. I waited a reasonable time, then visited the Minister and convinced him that the trucks were needed immediately. I was successful.

e. deals with host conditions and complications

The Division Chief spends much of his time acting as a diplomat. It is often necessary for him to encourage the host to concentrate on the developmental goals of the projects, and to understand the underlying reasons for host actions or inaction so that he can successfully redirect their efforts. He must be fully attuned to practical local politics and bureaucratic procedures and customs. In this function the Division Chief is concerned with difficulties arising from host government planning, personnel, intra-governmental disputes, host government organization, and information flow. Any or all of these similar factors could significantly affect on-going projects. The quality extent and variety of his personal relationships with host individuals can greatly affect the course of his projects.

* * * *

I had to find a building to use for a project. We began the project using facilities which had been built with American aid money. When it came time to expand the project the Minister told me that the nationals didn't want Americans to "take" their building. I looked elsewhere. One official was willing to help in certain ways as long as I provided my own space. I hired a contractor to build a new building to take care of their needs and my group used their older buildings.

* * * *

Due to existing personal antagonism between two Ministers and the power struggle between them -

both trying to get sole control of the project in order to use its budget to bolster the budgets of their respective Ministries -- there had been a severe breakdown in communication (for example, questions about overall goals, financing, social problems, inter-department cooperation were not answered). One Minister would want us to do one thing, another something different. This made it impossible for me to get clearance for anything. There was no final authority. The project came to a standstill for three months.

* * * *

I feel that the Ministry should have construction location plans based on population growth and location trends. The host has no such plans. The host tends to put up schools on the basis of immediate need and political consideration. An example of this occurred before a recent election. The party in power was looking for "mileage" in the construction program. The mission was having difficulty in getting release of funds for construction. The host Minister became angry at the delay and refused to make contribution payments to the project and used the construction funds for political purposes.

* * * *

Two ministers were openly at odds. One told me not to go to meetings until the calls came through him. I couldn't get the mission involved in this internal dispute so I had to completely withdraw from both of them and accept a halt to our project until the conflict was resolved. Not only did I not go to meetings, but I tried to avoid contact with them that was unnecessary. This kind of antipathy, causing much ambiguity for me in my relations with the host, went on for almost one and a half years.

* * * *

Counterparts at a sufficiently high level have not been found for training and eventual phasing-in for U. S. technicians. The reason is simply

that there are so few available with this level of education and these few are earmarked for government administrative work. There is nothing I can do about the available numbers of people at this level, but I have tried to get some of them assigned to this project. I have tried to gradually impress upon the government how much they are needed. I have had several talks with the Minister and explained how these people are necessary in order for nationals to take up or continue the program after we leave. The Minister agreed and found two persons, one of whom is already assigned.

* * * *

The Minister appointed an unqualified local to head a semi-autonomous unit. This man appointed his relatives as subordinates, also unqualified. No work was accomplished for a long time. My subordinates became very discouraged. I first tried to convince the Minister that a new local national employee was needed, but the Minister stuck by his appointee. Next, I convinced the Mission Director and Training Officer to give me a participant training leadership grant. With this grant I took the Minister on a short trip to see how a successful program was being run. Well qualified technicians were in the program and unqualified people were released or moved to other jobs. The program was a success. The Minister returned convinced that some changes in personnel were necessary. He appointed a well qualified man to head the program.

* * * *

The counterpart organization of a division was a suborganization of the local Ministry. Since the staff on the project was composed of locals during the first year, this gave the Ministry complete authority over the conduct of the program (in the sense of having to clear all orders, decisions, etc., through the normal Ministry chain of command).

The project was time phased, that is, certain critical steps had to be done before certain others and on a very strict schedule. Therefore it needed to be free of administrative control and red tape. When the project first started, the counterpart organization was not autonomous, thus work was delayed, and preliminary work was wasted. I convinced the Minister to form a separate unit to prevent such delays.

* * * *

It is my responsibility to be sure that the right people get involved in the planning of a program. For example, it is possible that the Ministry may develop a program for a school without bothering to tell the school what they are doing. This has actually happened once where a program was developed for teacher training and the AID technicians found they were not at all welcome at the school to which they were assigned. The school had never been notified they were coming to train the teachers.

* * * *

The project needed trained personnel in certain areas. The Minister of _____ and a USAID division had employees trained in these areas. I learned of this and went to see the other Division Chief. I convinced him that it would be impossible to proceed with his program unless my project was started first. He agreed and invited me to talk with the Minister. I also convinced the Minister, adding that my project would be a temporary effort and therefore the borrowed employees would more than likely return to him. The Minister was convinced.

* * * *

I met with local officials to negotiate for land to be used for a project. I was sure I

had their agreement. However, when the construction company tried to move onto the site some weeks later, the local officials refused them permission. When I was notified of this, I made a revisit to the local officials. They claimed that they were not sure this project was needed. I convinced them that such a project would be very beneficial in their area, that people would be better off and that some local people would be trained to work on the project. At this the local officials agreed, and this time I got their signature on a contract prepared by the Ministry. The construction team was thus able to move in and begin. I was ineffective in not having the matter absolutely clear from the beginning, but effective in meeting with and convincing the local officials once the problem did arise.

* * * *

The contractor doing the building was very late in completing the work. Since the construction contract was between the Ministry and the contractor I had several meetings with Ministry officials, trying to determine how to speed up work progress. From these meetings I learned that there was little to be done. The contractor was close to bankruptcy, so invoking contract penalties would not be effective. I was successful in convincing Ministry officials to warn the contractor that he must soon finish. As a final result, the contractor required two years over the stipulated contract time to complete the building.

* * * *

They were not interested in developing the country. Thus, they are very hard to work with. They ask for meetings with me at every opportunity, even when there is really nothing to discuss. This takes up considerable time and gives them many opportunities to ask for favors or special aid --which they frequently do.

* * * *

> One of my USAID experts recently went on leave. As soon as he left, a Ministry official came to see me. He asked for an immediate meeting about the expert's project. I insisted that the meeting be held up until our man returned from leave. The official who wanted an immediate meeting was probably trying to get in on the work. If he were allowed to do all or part of the work, he might not do anything and would draw the money for his work; he might do sloppy work and be outside of our control, or he might even slant the project along political lines. I realized these dangers, insisted that the meeting be postponed until the return of our expert. If I had allowed the demanded meeting to take place, the other Ministry officials would have tried to embarrass or maneuver me into allowing the local to work on the project in the absence of the expert.

f. coordinates U. S. activities

Maintaining a timely flow of communication within and among the divisions is a frequently cited problem of considerable importance. Some Division Chiefs find it imperative to meet with other Division Chiefs to learn about their projects and to be alert to possible conflicts and problems with respect to goals, personnel, equipment, or funds. The Chief also conducts staff meetings to inform his staff of other divisions' activities and requests and to insure communication within his own division. In missions where there is a division of responsibility between a central Division Chief and regional or provincial chiefs there is a particular problem of failing to take responsibility because it is assumed that another person will.

One project technician failed to keep a colleague informed about work progress and, as a result, the latter was uninformed when a Ministry official asked what was happening within the project. The colleague complained to me and I suggested to the project technician that by keeping the other men informed the project would be strengthened. The two men began to work together and prepared joint briefings for the Director.

* * * *

The Program Officer asked for a report on the status of all work plans. When I announced this requirement at a staff meeting, one of the staff became very irritated, complaining that the Program Officer was always asking for something, and the Program Officer had already read all the work plans. I smoothed over the situation by indicating that the staff member's work plan was adequate, but that the reports would clear up any misunderstanding on the part of the Program Officer concerning which work plans were complete, and which were incomplete. Then I assigned the task of gathering the necessary facts and writing the report to my deputy, who has the ability to ask questions about work plan progress without creating irritation.

* * * *

I think there are not enough meetings within my own division. I circulate material but there is not enough fact-to-face communication. Few know what is going on especially within my division since they don't know enough about the other programs. The people out in the field away from the mission are not kept informed. There is also not enough interdivisional information exchange. Without knowing what is going on I can't advise the Director. The USOM weekly meeting is not enough. The extroverts talk and the rest say nothing. There is no real central place to meet. I feel that there are people here I don't really know. If you don't know the people and don't know what is going on it is difficult to know if a program might be acceptable.

* * * *

Co-ordination with _____ is a little more difficult here than in other missions, since other missions have such a division within the mission and this one does not. I must contact an outside agency with an AID employee on its governing board to coordinate activities in this area.

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There is not enough time to coordinate my program with other divisions. The mission is not geared for coordination of this and other programs. In general my function is administration. I delegate the actual coordination which does occur.

* * * *

g. motivates project personnel

The Division Chief must be alert to difficulties that hinder the performance of his subordinates. Personal jealousies, incompetence, and disinterest can delay progress or prevent successful completion of projects. The function appears to involve local-nationals to a greater extent than U. S. personnel.

There was some jealousy between two subordinates as soon as they began working. One wanted to do work the other should be doing. Instead of doing things that were assigned to him, he did the things he wanted to do. I talked to him several times, trying to get him to cooperate, but I didn't succeed. He was having some serious personal problems with his family at the time and I didn't want to press too hard. He maintained the same attitude so he was useless to our project.

* * * *

A project had gone badly due to failures in supervision by locals. This showed a lack of interest on the part of these people, who were eventually to phase-in for us. I took them aside a day later and told them this. I explained that they owed their country and the local area better work than they did. I also told them that the government depended upon people like them to help develop the country. I told them that much more was expected of them than they had given. They seemed a bit remorseful and guilty about it, and agreed they were careless and would do better.

* * * *

On one occasion there was a load of material delivered. Everyone else was busy so I began to carry the material. At first the staff would not do it but just stood there. Soon they were embarrassed and began helping me.

* * * *

Other considerations I have to make include keeping up the morale of my staff of nationals. I always try to keep them busy so they will feel as though they are contributing something. I try to keep their interests up. I do this by meeting with them almost every day. At this meeting I can discuss with them any problem which has come up, assign their work for the afternoon and next day, and also find out what they have accomplished during the day.

* * * *

In my supervision of the local nationals being trained to phase into the administration of the project, I encourage them to criticize me constructively (or criticize the project). I let them do this regularly at meetings I call with them.

* * * *

h. provides training

Since there is frequently a critical lack of trained nationals, providing training represents an effective way to minimize many of the project deficiencies cited previously. The Division Chief may institute informal training given by himself, or arrange for special training by contacting others or by assigning subordinates for special courses. The training involved in this function is generally less formal than the participant training program, but more formal than the training implied in advising on procedures or correcting other forms of error.

> One of the overall objectives I had for the project was the training of local supervisors. The subordinate in charge of the project was the one who was supposed to do the training. After several weeks, I discovered that none of the persons had learned how to do the prescribed work. I also learned that the subordinate did not know how to do it himself, much less teach others. This put us far behind schedule.

* * * *

> As the staff began arriving, I had to teach them how to do an evaluation project. None of them had ever before participated in such a study. To do this, I had them read the notes, working papers, and final material resulting from a similar project done elsewhere. Then, I had meetings in which I laid out broad details of how the project was to be conducted. The staff then began the work, handling the details under my general supervision.

* * * *

> The contract group for a project was conducting a seminar prior to coming to the host country for field work and had arranged for project members to attend. I decided that it would be valuable

for an AID local employee to attend the seminar also, so I picked a subordinate who knew the country and who could come back after the seminar and be influential in project work. The seminar provided an opportunity to broaden the subordinate's talents by placing him among Americans who had been successful in the specialty. After the seminar the subordinate returned to the mission to become one of the directors of the project.

* * * *

My three trainees had to take an examination. During the period of their training, I was very busy so I took advantage of their services by giving them operational work to do to get some of the load off my shoulders. The result was they got no theoretical training in the administration of this type of program. The test they had to take was theoretically oriented. They did not pass the examination. I tried to think how I could help them pass the next examination. They agreed that they needed and wanted additional training. I found that a professional training team had courses in the kind of theory the trainees lacked so I enrolled them in those courses. I was trying to compensate for what they did not have. However, they soon lost interest and began missing classes.

* * * *

3. Evaluates projects

While evaluation occurs in other functions dealing with monitoring and guiding projects, this function is identified explicitly to cover the more formal or "overall" type of evaluation. The Division Chief is required to judge the general effectiveness of projects and to decide whether each is a "worthwhile" effort. Many incumbents indicated a need for guidance as to the criteria to be used in making such judgments. No specific details are available for this function, not because it is not done, but because the Division Chiefs who were interviewed were unable to indicate how they do it. It was readily admitted that a large element of subjectivity entered into the judgments. Final evaluation perhaps depends on the long-range effects of the project efforts.

4. Guides project phase-outs

This function is singled out because it involves some unique problems. The principal considerations are that accumulated equipment and funds must be disposed of in a proper manner, and personnel matters, such as transfers and terminations, must be handled judiciously. Policies, procedural regulations, formal agreements, individual interests and public relations must somehow be balanced. The Division Chief may advise other mission personnel on specific steps to be taken and point out the implications of various aspects of the phase-out, such as possible loss of U. S. prestige or waste of funds or equipment. He may work closely with host nationals to insure communication, compliance with regulations and policies, and the maintenance of good relations.

a. advises mission personnel

> AID/W should avoid abrupt changes. Abrupt changes cost the United States money. The phase-out of the _____ project is a prime example. I have had to keep considerable dollar reserves on hand to meet emergencies. With the phase-out, the Ministry of Education is entitled to all of this money. An audit is being allowed by AID to be sure the money is spent for appropriate purposes. However, some money will be lost. I have no choice but to go ahead, but I believe I am throwing away United States money. I feel that if I were given flexibility in the phase-out, I could either bargain, or simply continue operations until the money is used up in a useful way.

* * * *

> A special project is being closed out. Everything legally goes to the Ministry. It is a widely held opinion that the Ministry will not put these materials to good use. USIS asked my subordinate for some of the materials, and he said they could have them. When I learned of this, I told my subordinate and USIS that the exchange was impossible because everything legally went to the Ministry. I knew the legal points in the basic document, and thus avoided a corruption charge.

* * * *

b. arranges details of disposition of equipment and personnel

> To clear out the warehouse, I visited several institutions which were possible recipients of

unneeded materials from the warehouse. I went personally to determine what plans for expansion these institutions had. My philosophy in such cases was that "we'll give you what we can from our warehouse, if you can really use it." When I am satisfied that the materials will be used wisely I make the necessary arrangements to have them transferred.

* * * *

A semi-autonomous unit was phasing out. We sold a truck to a department in the host government. The department made the down payment, but no additional payments. I called appropriate department officials several times asking about payments. I was told that if we refused to "write off" the truck, then he would see to it that nationals in rural areas "took care of" any of our vehicles that they could find. I wrote a letter to the Minister explaining the situation. Apparently the Minister acted, because no further threats were made and payments began.

* * * *

In closing down one of our special projects I followed a policy of giving employees benefit pay for a thirty day period. There are problems with this, however, people working to the last day will be discharged on the last day and cannot get the same thirty day benefit payments that others receive, because the Ministry will assume control over funds the day following the closing of the project. This injustice to some will cause bad publicity. A colleague suggested that a special fund be set up to pay these employees for "extra work". He pointed out, however, that such a procedure would be illegal and should not be advertised. I told the business manager to go ahead with this plan. This takes care of the problem for the personnel but will create a problem later on when the books are audited.

* * * *

5. Manages division participant training.

In carrying out this function the Division Chief is confronted with two of the most vexing problems pervading USAID activities: local politics, and the scarcity of qualified host nationals. United States policies and procedural regulations, and the determination of the types of training required are also problems, but these factors appear to be less difficult to handle. The overriding consideration appears to be the fact that the host government, while eager to reap the substantive benefits of participant training, would prefer to control the program as much as possible. Problems of non-cooperation, delays, requests for procedural deviations, or faulty information can usually be traced to this fact. The Division Chief is required to overcome such obstacles while adhering to established policy and procedure and while keeping sight of the fact that ultimate benefit of the program lies in the ability of the trained personnel to contribute to the long-range goals of the division projects.

a. advises on selection and administrative procedures

This function consists largely of determining qualification requirements, advising the host government on selection, reviewing the host government nominees, and preparing and expediting the paperwork necessary to implement the training. In most missions some of the paper-work and the routine processing of selected participants are handled by a Training Officer. (Determination of the number of trainees and the type of training required may or may not have been a part of the functions in section II - PREPARES PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS. This would depend upon the specificity with which these documents have been prepared.) Some Division Chiefs also attempt to maintain contact with the participants during their training to insure that the basic plan is being carried out.

Without a good training program this project cannot be successful since there will be nobody here to take over for us when we leave. The Minister failed to nominate qualified participants. To try to rescue the program, I went to the Minister and appealed to him to find a couple of qualified people to go. I personally made my case. He provided two high-level government people to take the training.

* * * *

This morning I had a meeting with a host official. One of the things I learned was that the Ministry would provide me a detailed list of training priorities for the next fiscal year, subject to funds available in AID/W. In view of this, I sent a cable to AID/W requesting a training specialist for TDY. I want him to get here as soon as possible and stay for about 6 weeks. He should be here just when all these new programs break. It would be useless to have a man here full time because once training starts there would be nothing for him to do. He would be very valuable in assessing the requirements for participants, developing background information, and maybe even assisting with selection in some cases.

* * * *

The Minister called me to nominate a man for training who was supposed to be an expert in a certain field. On the basis of what the Minister told me, I simply told him then and there that the man didn't qualify and the nomination would not be approved by me. In my judgment the man did not qualify with respect to having adequate background for this training. As a result the nomination was never formally made.

* * * *

When the time came to select participants to go for taining I visited the Minister to talk about who should be sent. The Minister indicated that he would approve of no one except his own relatives. When I explained that this could not be done and that only qualified people could be sent, the meeting broke up. Later, I was able to get a subordinate to the Minister to agree to a preliminary test for potential participants. The test was also approved by the Minister. When administered, only those with top scores on the test were allowed to go for training as participants.

* * * *

(From a Participant Training Officer) The Division Chief gave me a nomination for training and wanted my judgment. He was fairly new at his job. I asked him how he expected the team to get anything done if he took away 75% of their staff. He was very surprised. It was true however. There were 4 technicians in the field and he had nominated three for training. I remembered the number of people on that project. Consequently, only one was nominated. The team leader and I talked about his project some time ago so I knew his staff size and requirements.

* * * *

I usually talk over nominees for training with the Minister. On one occasion, I accepted the Minister's recommendation for a trainee in an industrial specialty. When the trainee arrived at the U. S. institution we learned that the trainee's experience was in agriculture. Since then I check the candidate's qualificatinns closely.

* * * *

An applicant for participant training came by my office to discuss training. The training desired by this applicant was only available at either of two universities. I told the applicant that the one university had a good program, and was going to add information about the other. However, the applicant interrupted me by saying that he would never go to the university suggested initially as he had had some unpleasant experiences there in the past. I told the applicant that if that was his attitude he might as well get out of the office. The conversation continued and the program offered at the other university was discussed.

* * * *

The names of a group of participants being considered for training in the U. S. were submitted to the political section of the Embassy for security clearance. The political section sent the list to me with forms to be filled out for their clearance. I instructed my subordinate to ask each potential participant for the data, which he did. This was sent to the political section. The participants, however, assumed they were actually going for training, although they had not received final approval. The Political Officer heard of this and called me in and told me it was against regulations to directly consult participants about their background information.

* * * *

I convinced a participant to go to the U. S. to study a specific course. Although he wanted to study something else, the participant agreed to what I had suggested. When the participant arrived in the U. S. he was assigned to train in the field in which he had expressed interest. This windfall made him happy. Upon

learning of the change, I immediately sent a cable to AID/W explaining that the participant should be assigned to his specified program. For some reason AID/W did nothing until the participant was about three quarters of the way through with his school year. Then they informed him that he would have to change his program. This upset the participant. He disappeared and no one has been able to determine where he is or what has happened to him.

* * * *

A well qualified girl was sent to the U. S. for one year. She was asked by the college to remain for a second year, which was granted. She returned to the host country with a BS and started work. Within a short time a cable came from AID/W saying that she had applied for a new visa to come to the States to be with her husband. I was asked to collect money from her equivalent to that spent on her training, or to see that her visa was not received . I spoke to the girl who said she didn't know she would fall in love. She had no money, so nothing could be collected. I decided nothing could be done and so the girl was granted the visa.

* * * *

I proposed a committee on higher education for all those in the mission dealing with participant training. The committee was formed but was subsequently disbanded and nothing came of it. I felt that training problems were common enough to the several divisions to have a joint committee. One problem for such a committee would be to cut down on the competition for funds.

* * * *

The Director wanted no more trainees for a project. He thought there were already too many trained. I went to the Director and had a 15 minute session with him giving him all the factual data at my

disposal about the two newly nominated people and why they should be sent. The Director changed his mind after this discussion and approved the sending of two more trainees.

* * * *

The biggest difficulty here is with the Vice-Minister of _____. Almost all nominated participants go through his office and then come here. One of the first things he asked me to do was to waive the English examination. Of course this is impossible. His next alternative was to administer the examination through his staff. It was obvious that the examinations would not be given at all under those circumstances and besides the tests are classified U.S. property and can't be given to another government. He was very adamant on this point and because of it our relationship became very strained. He felt superior to me and was insulted by my refusal to drop the English requirement or to place its responsibilities in his hands. He issued an order that none of his participants was to be tested by any outside agency. This order still stands and has for 7 months.

This, of course, almost halted the participant element of the CAP. I decided to humor the Vice-Minister so I asked him if he would choose a committee of two and I would come to the Ministry and administer the test with them and with their approval. He approved this because he could say his department administered the AID test.

* * * *

The Planning Commission called a meeting to discuss a list of nominees which had been submitted with respect to a particular program. The host government official announced that upon review, there were no persons available for training. I was surprised, since at four previous meetings, there

was no question about availability of persons. It appeared that the department official was trying to belittle the Ministry by sabotaging the entire plan. Another meeting was called at which time final steps were to be taken to approve the list. At this meeting, the department official announced that final approval of the names would have to be given by the scholarship committee. I said this was unnecessary since no such element was involved, but agreed to have the Scholarship Committee pass on the list if the department head accepted the list of names. The Director then reviewed the names and decided that certain features of the list would have to be corrected. I refused, saying that there had been enough discussion with respect to the names.

* * * *

b. evaluates participant training efforts

The Division Chief may attempt to follow up returned participants to help in assessing the ultimate contribution of the training program to broad USAID goals. Both formal and informal procedures are utilized. Problems were reported concerning the time required to complete the necessary forms and the reluctance of host government officials to provide information on post training utilization of the participants.

* * *

The host government frowns on outsiders talking to nationals and evaluating them. I tried to pave the way for the government to help us. I devised a form which requested information about participant trainees from the Ministry. It is supposed to be filled out one year after the participant returns by the government agency which governs the participant's area of work. I sent this form to

the Minister, called him to talk about it, and explained the need and the advantage to both our countries of an evaluation procedure such as this. He said he would think about it. He sent the form back completely rearranged and thought this was a better way to get and record the information. I didn't care because it would provide the data I wanted anyway so I thought it best to write him back congratulating him on devising a better form and thanking him for his assistance. They said they would provide us with these annual follow-ups.

* * * *

I accompanied two participants on their tour. They got a first-hand view of our approach. It was my hope that upon their return they would be involved in the selection process to train nationals in technical areas. After talking to them when we returned, I am sure their attitudes not only toward training but toward the U. S. have changed for the better. I make this judgment also because they have been very positive toward my attempts to get host cooperation, and toward any recommendations I make to the host government concerning implementation of the projects. They said they enjoyed the training, experience, and knowledge they gained during their 5 wekk trip.

* * * *

B. Provides Information Concerning Project Progress

The Division Chief informs host government officials, other nationals, and his supervisors on the status of projects. This is done by preparing reports and briefings and by speaking informally with U.S. and host officials about projects.

1. Prepares or reviews progress reports and correspondence

Generally, assignments are made to subordinates to prepare reports on their areas of project activity. Sometimes Chiefs prepare the entire reports themselves. Problems are similar to those found in connection with other editorial tasks.

> I recorded and reported to the hosts formally on everything I did from the moment I got here. Everything that was done physically at the project site has been explained in detail with graphs, drawings, pictures. This was done by my subordinate at my request. I had both my narrative and his technical reports bound into a single volume containing translations in both languages. This gives us not only a good reference for future similar projects but also thorough documentation of what we did and why.

* * * *

> I submit all reports to the Ministry for their review. The Ministry officials seldom if ever suggest a change, but the process gives them a feeling of participation. Since the Ministry officials return the documents the same day they are submitted, no delays result. The system began as a result of a Ministry meeting to which I was invited. At this meeting the Minister attacked the United States for not taking local nationals into their confidence. With this hint, I began routing documents to them. This procedure has visibly improved relations.

* * * *

The field reports were formerly submitted by me to our headquarters. The Vice-Minister heard of these reports and made an issue over the fact that the Ministry was not being allowed to see the reports. He held up a Project Agreement because of this. My subordinate came to me and told me that the Ministry wanted 25 copies of all field trip reports. I arranged to have the official receive the reports and the issue has died down.

* * * *

2. Gives formal and informal briefings

One political group had been displaced by another in one village. The old group was highly critical of the project. I asked one of the technicians to ride out to the village with me to check on things in general. When we got there the former chief of the village was escorting a powerful host government official, who was his relative, around the project. The chief was "showing" him all of the mistakes, and telling him why the project was not adequate. I joined the group and walked around with them. I was finally able to speak with the official and explained to him what and how we were doing and what was going on. I took him back to the site of the work and discussed all the things the chief was criticizing pointing out our reasons for doing certain things. Later that day, the official implored the local leaders to be patient and cooperate with us in the project. His intercession was a big help in getting the villagers to realize that we couldn't do everything at once and what we had already done was desirable. From that time on we had very little trouble of this sort.

* * * *

The Ambassador was very dissatisfied with the project. He met with the Director and me to discuss it. I explained the problems I had with personnel and told of my reorganization. The Ambassador and the Director both felt that my subordinate caused the project delay and that the man be sent home. I suggested that we give him limited office responsibilities in order to save face and maintain the confidence of the hosts. They agreed to try it.

IV. CONTRIBUTES TO MISSION MANAGEMENT

This function includes administrative duties which are not tied to the planning and carrying out of specific projects or which cut across specific projects. The chief concerns are with personnel and procedural problems within the division and the necessary interactions with AID/W in personnel matters. The Division Chief generally has considerable leeway in carrying out the duties of this function.

A. Directs the Technical Division

1. Supervises subordinates

Many aspects of supervision have been included in previous job functions; the portions remaining for inclusion here cover providing orientation and information, general evaluation, and handling individual idiosyncrasies. Problems in this function increase with the number of subordinates, with their lack of technical qualifications for their jobs, or with lack of qualifications for working and living overseas in general.

a. provides orientation and information

This involves both orienting new personnel about the program and operating procedures, and keeping all cognizant personnel informed about new administrative developments. The latter is reported to be a difficult function where the staff is geographically disbursed. Both tasks have potential impact on morale, and the skill with which they are being carried out varies widely. A frequent technique is to delegate the function to someone else, or to rely on the Executive Office to provide information to the division staff.

> A new staff member arrived. I wanted her to get together with another person who was

> leaving for vacation in a few days. I had another luncheon appointment and asked a visitor to the mission to take them both out to lunch, introduce them to each other, and get them acquainted.

b. evaluates performance

This function pertains to the formal AID/W system for performance evaluation. The Division Chief completes Efficiency Reports on his immediate subordinates and reviews the ER's completed by them on their subordinates. He may also serve on the review panel which evaluates the adequacy of other ER's completed in the mission. Problems cited in this function include the restrictive aspect of the form's numerical scale, and the second-guessing by AID/W officials. It was reported that at times the review panel may be dominated by one person, making objective review impossible. It was also reported that superiors are sometimes reluctant to make adverse judgments for fear of being traduced by the person being evaluated in case the Division Chief is being considered for work in another mission where the adversely rated subordinate may have preceded him. Another problem is the difficulty of evaluating subordinates who may be geographically remote or who may be working in a technical subspecialty in which the Chief may not be expert and where inadequate progress may be due to inadequate performance or to difficulties beyond the subordinate's control.

> I gave a very low rating to an employee. The employee was sent back to Washington. He went to the personnel office and protested the rating. Washington personnel sent a cable to the field asking for more justification. Shortly thereafter another cable came from Washington demanding documentary evidence of the negative statements which I had made in the efficiency rating. This problem went on for some time and it was so bad that I was actually afraid that

> I might get fired for having given this man a low efficiency rating. I am now reluctant to give low ratings.

* * * *

> I filled out an efficiency rating on my subordinate. He protested sections of the rating and asked for a review. I reminded him that the only appeal to be made was on the overall rating, not the breakdown. He dropped the issue.

* * * *

> A subordinate left for home. Personnel asked for an interim efficiency report. My colleagues had supervised this man for a very short time and asked me to review the efficiency report. I could have just concurred but instead I reviewed it carefully, and found that the narrative rating was lower than the numerical rating. I asked for a revision, got it and felt this was a much better picture of the man.

* * * *

c. develops skills; counsels

The Division Chief often needs to provide his subordinates with opportunities to obtain a wide range of experience and to assist them in correcting weaknesses which interfere with their performance or which would prevent them from taking over other jobs when necessary. The importance of this function lies in the fact that frequent shifts in assignment occur due to vacations, home leaves, TDY assignments, ineffectiveness of colleagues or subordinates, and the general vicissitudes of the overseas situation. The distinction between this function and the function III. A. 2. h (provides training) is that the latter pertains to specific project matters and usually involves host nationals.

> One subordinate does good work in reviewing project documents to insure compliance

with regulations, meeting deadlines, etc. However, he uses very poor grammar, which tends to be irritating. I met with him privately, pointing out his deficiency, but also praised him for the other things he does well. He indicated a desire to improve his grammar, and is making a conscious effort in that direction.

* * * *

I was committed to go on a field trip when news came from AID/W that two men from Washington would visit the mission, and that program briefings would be desired. Instead of cancelling my field trip, I continued with my own plans and assigned my deputy the responsibility of providing the briefing. This will give the deputy an opportunity to do a significant task on his own, with the zest and vigor demanded by the situation.

* * * *

A new deputy was assigned to me. He had a different theoretical approach to things. Soon after this deputy arrived I went to the States on leave. While in the States I heard nothing from the deputy but did hear complaints from some of his subordinates. When I returned from home leave I found that my deputy was not doing the job. He was doing what he wanted rather than what should be done. I assigned various tasks to him, such as writing reports, but he never did them. I had to do them myself. I should not have played along with him. I should have fired him at once or at least reprimanded him. Perhaps part of the reason I did not take the action I should have was because the deputy had a friend in Washington, D.C. Ultimately this deputy was transferred to another position.

* * * *

d. settles disputes

The Division Chief corrects interpersonal conflicts and rivalries by changing assignments or by acting as a mediator. Disputes concerning substantive matters are covered in section III MANAGES PROGRAM; this function pertains to "keeping the peace" when personalities or other non-project matters are at issue. Despite the relative lack of concrete examples, Division Chiefs and others indicated that trying to get people to get along with each other was a difficult task, and one which more often than not was abandoned on the grounds that it was easier to adjust to or allow for clashes than to try to remedy the situation. This problem can have widespread effects on the effectiveness of the division and although dramatic confrontations may not be frequent, the lingering or continuing effects of such hostility tend to permeate all of the work. Because the missions or sub-divisions of missions appear to constitute the usual primary social-cultural world of AID employees, altercations between employees or their families are reported to occur relatively often and to have impacts that are relatively more intense than they would be in the United States. Thus this function is not necessarily an ancillary activity, but may be central because it is inherent in the AID overseas situation.

> A host national employee of the division was accused of serious misbehavior on the job by his counterpart. I investigated and became convinced that the counterpart was just jealous. There is a lot of jealousy, since AID local employees are paid more than host nationals at the same level. I assigned my technician to a different task so that he would not have to have contact with his accuser.

* * * *

e. handles special behavior problems

Division personnel and their families create a variety of problems for the Chief. It is important that he keep the behavioral problems to a minimum and control his staff to avoid embarrassment to the United States or to avoid jeopardizing the on-going program. A frequently cited problem is the mission's lack of control over personnel actions, e.g., returning someone to the United States prematurely is often possible only through special influence with key persons in AID/W.

> One of my subordinates had no car so I offered him a project vehicle for weekend family business, i.e., attending church, shopping, or even a family picnic. However, I soon discovered that the subordinate's son was using the car for joy riding. If host government officials should see this, they would more than likely feel that we had a surplus of transportation and increase their requests for transportation. I decided it was necessary to put a stop to this. I went to the subordinate's home and told him that the son would have to stop driving the car. He objected. I finally threatened to refuse him use of the car unless he agreed to my demands. He agreed to be more responsible.
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> * * * *
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> A technician was reported to be drinking heavily. I discussed the situation with two USAID officials. It was decided that the officials would separately counsel the drinker. They both reported that the technician agreed to alter his behavior. I decided to give the man another chance.
>
> * * * *
>
> A Ministry official reported that one of my subordinates had been in a loud argument with a local national at a party. The

Ministry official suggested that this would "hinder" future project results. I investigated and verified the report, but because of AID procedures could take no immediate action. My only solution is to let his tour expire and at that time recommend that he not return to this post.

* * * *

2. Manages operations

a. interprets policies, regulations, and manual orders

This includes diverse topics affecting the administration of the division, such as personnel actions, travel or housing regulations, or employment policies. Ordinarily the Division Chief receives guidance on these matters from the Executive Office, but there are nevertheless frequent situations in which he is required to use his own judgment. Problems include communication delays and misunderstandings, difficulty in locating relevant information, and differences of opinion about policies or technical matters.

Host government office hours differed from new AID office hours. My office was in the Ministry building and away from AID offices. I didn't know which schedule to follow. I called my supervisor and was told that since I work with the Ministry I should work the host government hours. I disagreed with this, since I am not actually working with the local nationals; they never come to me for anything. I am working the original AID hours.

* * * *

Several months ago the Director received an airgram about my transfer. Neither of us had any previous knowledge of this. In the

> meantime the new AID post directed me to come for 90 days TDY. This was not agreeable to me and was also against regulations, since a mission has no authority to do this. I notified AID/W of this, and asked for clarification.

* * * *

b. assists in recruiting and selecting personnel

This function includes preparation of Staffing Pattern Action Requests (SPAR), interviewing potential employees, and recommending selection. In recruiting personnel, the Division Chief would ordinarily work closely with AID/W. However, it is reportedly difficult to specify the qualifications required in a nominee partly because of lack of knowledge about these and partly because of inability to express qualifications in unambiguous terms to AID/W. Furthermore, information available on nominees is often inadequate, sometimes consisting only of a very brief description of previous job experience, but containing no information bearing on how well the man will adapt to the mission or to the host country. Another major difficulty with Washington is the delay experienced before a list of nominees arrives with information, or following selection of a nominee, the length of time that expires before he actually arrives at the mission. Recruitment on a personal basis is reported to be far more effective than reliance on "channels." Some incumbents reported that one of the problems they must contend with in this regard is the attempt by AID/W to place nominees who are believed in the mission to be technically unqualified or otherwise troublesome. Incumbents have gone to such lengths as to return to the United States to speak to AID/W and to recruit personally in order to avoid taking unwanted candidates.

> I have to decide on how many technicians it takes to do a particular job once a project has been approved. This is a very

difficult job and there are not any very clear guide lines. For instance they are currently setting up a training program. This is going to be a very large program, involving some 12 training centers. The question is how many technicians should be hired to supervise these centers, or in other words, how many centers can be controlled by one technician?

* * * *

A group in the United States nominated a specialist who I felt was perhaps not qualified. I wrote a letter to the group describing the environment, the work required, and the interrelationships necessary. I indicated that a top quality person was needed. This letter put on record the mission's thinking on the position. They replied that the proposed candidate would qualify so the man was accepted. The letter made the group take notice of the local scene and perhaps motivated the specialist to live up to our expectations.

* * * *

A man was nominated for a position by Washington. I checked my staff members who had previously worked with this man. The staff members said that the nominee had undesirable personal characteristics, and was not able to get along with people. I cabled Washington that the man was not acceptable. Washington wanted to know my reasons and to justify them with evidence. I furnished the required information to Washington and they presented the nominee with it. He denied the accusation. I was then accused of making unfounded charges and was asked to retract them. The man refused to come here so we were not troubled with him.

* * * *

A SPAR was sent to AID/W to recruit a man to head a project. I asked for a man with long experience in a technical field, some in research, with overseas experience, and with an advanced degree. It was over a year before AID/W sent a nomination. The nominee was young, had no research experience, no overseas experience, had an advanced degree but not in our area, and his only work experience consisted of one year of professional experience. Money was still budgeted for the project, but none of it was spent because there was no one to do the work. I had to accept the nominated man or perhaps never get the project going.

* * * *

While on a visit to the United States, I visited a university to talk to personnel I felt would be qualified to work overseas. Narrowing the group to one man, I explained to him in detail what the work was like. I was able to interest the man in coming and arranged for him and the AID/W personnel officer to get together. Today the man is working for us and doing a tremendous job.

* * * *

B. Assists in Other Mission Activities

1. Receives visitors

The Division Chief represents his division to visiting officials and groups from the United States and other countries. He is often assigned this task by the Director or Deputy Director and is required to act as host to the visitors. He arranges details for the visit and prepares a schedule of activities for them which will provide the visiting officials and groups with information about his projects and their contribution to the total mission program. The Division Chief is able to do this with little difficulty when given enough time, but

very often the visitors have already arrived, or are on their way when the notice is received.

a. provides briefings

> A man was being assigned to the AID/W country desk. He was sent here to learn first hand what was going and why. He was given the grand tour by the Mission and I spent many hours briefing him and taking field trips with him to show him our projects. When the man returned to AID/W he was assigned to the desk of a different country, and a man without experience in our area was given the job. I regret having spent so much time and effort with a man who was not assigned to our area desk.

* * * *

b. develops itineraries and schedules conferences

> An official contacted me and requested my help in planning for two groups which would be visiting us. Each group, composed of about sixty persons, would be here for about four days. One group would arrive in the summer the other in early fall. I agreed to help. I suggested that the group observe the on-going USAID project, which I'm supervising, and visit the host facilities. I also agreed to have a subordinate work out a schedule for the two groups.

* * * *

c. accompanies visitors on field trips

2. Socializes with personnel from other U.S. agencies, other donor agencies and the diplomatic community

The Division Chief is required to establish and maintain relations with a variety of groups to facilitate information flow and coordination. Social contacts, such as dinners or parties, are reportedly often more important than the more formal contacts of conferences or briefings. The ability of the incumbent to relate favorably with the representatives of other agencies may be an important factor in his success as a mission officer and ultimately the success of his program. The chief difficulties appear to be the aloofness of certain American and foreign groups and in some cases conflicts with family affairs. Sometimes difficulties in social relations between incumbents' wives and the wives of other officials have made for difficult relations between the officials themselves.

V. WORKING RELATIONS WITH HOSTS

Two basic elements are covered by this heading: the steps taken primarily to develop and maintain interpersonal relationships, and the tasks involved in acting as a consultant or advisor to host individuals. Although the fundamental importance of cooperative and confidential personal relationships is almost universally recognized, it appears considerably easier to desire than to accomplish. Problems are highly variable inasmuch as they stem from the personalities of the incumbents and their hosts as well as from the characteristics of the joint work and the types of situations in which work is done. Problems range from minor altercations and the inability to gain respect for either side because of personal dislikes to the deliberate manipulation of the American advisor for personal or political purposes. A catalogue of difficulties could serve little purpose inasmuch as each problem may be the result, not of one overriding error, but of the particular combination of host and American personalities and the circumstances of their interaction.

It appears that most of the advising that Division Chiefs do is in connection with development and implementation of programs (and is covered under Sections I, II, and III). Relatively few incumbents reported that they were being utilized on matters not directly related to program planning or implementation. It appears that the Division Chiefs generally do not serve as personal advisors whose judgments, opinions and factual knowledge are sought by host officials on a day-to-day basis for the purposes of formulating policy, creating organizations, establishing procedures, and so forth.

A. Develops and Maintains Relations With Host Government Officials

This function includes participation in social activities, and the cultivation of personal relationships on which project success reportedly often depends. While adherence to "appropriate" cultural forms is an essential requirement, there is also suggestive evidence that some

departures from what is generally deemed proper by the American community have been highly effective.

1. Participates in social activities

> When I first came here and learned that it was not customary to take wives to parties, I took mine anyway. This put an obvious damper on the party. I don't take her any more but only go when it is absolutely necessary and then only for about 10 minutes to pay my respects.
>
> * * * *
>
> One custom is that no one leaves a party before the Minister. I had a recent illness and felt obligated to attend a party but wanted to leave early. I spoke to the Minister about this. He also wanted to leave early so he made a brief speech and we were both able to leave.
>
> * * * *
>
> An American official is encouraging American attendance at a club made up of nationals and Americans. I feel that since attendance is being forced, the atmosphere will be too formal. I think gatherings should be in homes, with groups that are personally chosen. I'm ignoring the official's suggestion and hope I won't be forced into going.
>
> * * * *
>
> I give an average of twelve "fair-sized" parties per year. These are attended by the Minister and vice-minister-level people. I also give many small parties or dinners for 4 to 8 people, also attended by local nationals, and people from other agencies. I have no program or routine for entertaining but do so when in the

mood. At social gatherings business is sometimes discussed, especially at the smaller gatherings.

* * * *

I came back from a staff meeting and asked my secretary to plan a series of luncheons. The Deputy Director had suggested that each division plan a series of luncheons which would include American personnel and appropriate hosts so as to spread AID's story further. The secretary sighed and said "Not again!" She said that they had tried to arrange luncheons before and that you "call them (hosts) up and they never call back, and they never come anyway." We nevertheless planned the composition of two different luncheons.

* * * *

One morning on my arrival at the office, my secretary informed me that the mother of a host official had died and the funeral was set for 3:00 the same day. I had to go to the funeral if good relations were to be maintained. My secretary had to cancel some other appointments for that afternoon.

* * * *

On a field trip, it became necessary to give a short speech. The occasion turned out to be very formal. The other speakers all read their speeches in the local language and this seemed to be the accepted practice. I had planned to speak in English and then have my talk translated. When I saw how formal the situation was, I drafted a short speech in English and handed it to my interpreter to translate into the local language. I then read my speech without help. Everyone enjoyed my effort and I received warm and hearty applause.

* * * *

2. Cultivates friendships

I took advantage of my friendship with the Minister when I proposed the idea of having a higher official attend our ground breaking ceremonies. I arranged for a family visit to the Minister's home with the intention of bringing up the matter during the evening. I brought it up informally, got good reception of it, and saw him informally two more evenings. By the third get-together it was settled and he had already gotten the official to agree to attend.

* * * *

I got to know an official quite well by personally visiting him when I could. It was necessary to promote a good relationship here because only through such leaders could the villagers be encouraged to cooperate. I successfully cultivated his friendship and he became our biggest booster in the government. He often loaned us vehicles or supplies when we were caught short. I think he realized that we were trying to do something. He has visited the project many times and I can walk into his office anytime. The result of our good relationship was that he often went out to the village with me to encourage the villagers to have patience and cooperate with us. This made the environment much better for us to work in.

* * * *

A conference was being held and the group decided coffee would be appropriate. To get waiter service in this region a person claps his hands very sharply twice. Without thinking of the implications, and in a joking manner, I clapped my hands for my secretary (a local national). She was obviously quite angry. I learned later

that such hand clapping was definitely reserved for waiters and other lower class workers. My secretary resented being called in such a manner and her resentment was obvious. She brought coffee to the group, but grudgingly. Afterwards I explained to the girl why I had done this, but I'm not certain that she was satisfied.

* * * *

A host government official visited me and we talked briefly. He told me that he was arranging for me to talk with the Minister so that my ideas could be discussed. I pointed out to him that the Minister had previously been too busy to talk. I was called in by the Minister. We talked since the host government official said we must talk. We talked about two hours, but not about the program. I was successful in establishing a basis for working together.

* * * *

The vice Minister asked to meet me when I first arrived. I wanted to meet him also so I went to his office at his invitation. After the formalities and small-talk, we began discussing participant training. Finally he point-blank asked me to make some drastic changes in training policies. He was very forceful. I told him I could not initiate changes until I knew what policy had been previously, why, and the consequences of these changes if they were made. When I did not immediately agree he began to argue and shout very loudly. I told him, I didn't have to take this behavior from him or his government. I don't take it from my own. If he wants to discuss this sensibly I would meet with him at my office. I spoke very quietly and calmly. With that I walked out of his office. The next day a messenger came from his office with a note saying how dis-

pleased the vice Minister was with my behavior. I sent a similar message back and again said that the next meeting would be in my office. He did come and he behaved as though nothing had ever happened. He couldn't have been more mannerly or courteous. He hasn't done it since. It was just a matter of showing him that I was going to do things the best way I could, not the easiest.

* * * *

I wrote to a host government official telling him to cooperate with me by having the participants which his office sponsors get their physical examinations taken care of on time. He was very upset over the wording of this letter. I probably shouldn't have been so direct.

* * * *

Unscheduled meetings, requiring two to three hours per week, are called by the Ministry official. He brings from two to five colleagues. I attend with my translator and subordinate. These meetings are usually of no consequence. The Ministry official calls for a meeting, then discusses petty issues, trying to get a commitment of money from me. He spends much time asking for such things as the donation of a typewriter. At another time he asked that a Ministry official be allowed to accompany one of my teams, and that he be paid per diem by the United States government while traveling. I must attend these meetings to maintain good relations, and must listen to all the requests, and then politely say "no".

* * * *

> I was soon to take a trip to the United States with a host government official. In order to attend certain meetings in the United States, the official had to be elected to associate membership in a professional society. I arranged this. First, I got a friend to agree to second my motion. Then I told the presiding officer of the meeting that I intended to make the motion. At the meeting, the motion went smoothly; it was unanimously passed by the membership.

* * * *

> One way that I "eased in" to become accepted was to get elected to an Advisory Board. At the meetings I occasionally made unobtrusive comments, which got my name into the minutes of the meetings. The Minister always reads these minutes, so I was able to become known without forcing myself or my advice on anyone. As a result of becoming known, I was appointed by the Minister to an increasing number of useful committees.

* * * *

B. Acts as Consultant or Advisor to Host Nationals

With increased success in function A above, Division Chiefs may find increased requests for their assistance. Whether advice is requested or offered spontaneously, however, the Division Chief who functions as an "Advisor" on non-project matters is the exception, rather than the rule.

> I was asked by a local official to advise on the final details of one of his projects. I outlined my plan on paper and it was adopted. Later a high government official was so impressed that he appropri-

ated an additional sum of money so that the plan could be applied to an extension of the project.

* * * *

I was on a committee to consider the formation of a central data office. Setting up a central office was the idea of the Planning Board. I opposed the idea, saying that data should be decentralized among the special management areas, with a central office used only for coordination to avoid duplication. I presented my views to the committee, convincing the representatives from the other Ministries.

* * * *

The Minister came into my office and told me that we should provide secretarial service to a European group which was coming soon to evaluate host needs. I suggested to the Minister that the incoming Europeans had different values than the host, therefore such an evaluation would not be beneficial. The Minister agreed and asked for my suggestions. I proposed that an evaluation group could be obtained from the United States. He agreed to do this.

* * * *

I suggested to host officials that a project be expanded. To do this would require more land, so I also suggested a source of land. The official later followed these suggestions but made no reference to me or to AID.

* * * *

I wanted the Ministry to give more attention to developing a program for nationals. I arranged for a weekly seminar taught by one of his technicians and attended by influential people within the Ministry. The purpose of

this seminar was to discuss how to develop the program.

* * * *

I act as an advisor to the Minister. The Ministry is organized into a number of departments. One of Minister's problems had been that department heads were withholding information from him. I recommended that a Minister hold weekly meetings with each department head individually, and then hold regular staff meetings later to increase the flow of information. The Minister has been doing this with some success.

* * * *

The Minister appointed me to be Chairman of a Municipal Committee. As Chairman, my main goals were to convince the officials to establish a community service center. The committee met several times and I was able to direct the meetings along the desired path. A report prepared by the secretary recommended that the officials accept and implement my proposal.

* * * *

Presidential elections are to be held soon. A former host government official invited my superior to his house to discuss a portion of his candidate's platform. I was taken along. My boss placed me to one side and took the major role in the conversation, virtually ignoring me. I tried to ask the local national a few questions in order to build rapport, to learn something of the man, and to try to establish myself. However, whenever I did so my supervisor would answer the questions, never allowing me and the local to communicate directly.

* * * *

An official asked me to look over sites tentatively selected for construction. He provided me with background information. We walked over the total area of the site, checking various factors. I asked the official if various tests had been made. On the basis of our visit I told the official that I approved the site as being logical and advantageous, and later wrote a report for the Minister.

* * * *

In an effort to get information from the Minister and to help establish rapport with him, I tried out a "dry run" of an orientation talk I was preparing to give at the Embassy. I prepared a set of flip charts showing the status and needs of the country technical areas, and AID's program to assist in their development. The Minister commented on some of the statistics I had on the chart, and gave me the corrected figures. He was so impressed with the flip chart technique that he planned to use it himself and asked me to help develop it.

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APPENDIX E

to

A Study of Some Key USAID Jobs

TRAINING SUGGESTIONS

American Institute for Research
Washington, D.C.

JUNE 1964

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SUGGESTED TOPICS FOR ORIENTATION AND TRAINING

The majority of the interviewed incumbents expressed the belief that Agency orientation and training should and could be improved. Those who disagreed with this position tended to be long-term employees, "old hands," as it were, who felt that training could not benefit them. Several of the key incumbents had had virtually no orientation; a number reported specific instances where they felt errors could have been avoided if they had had adequate training. In some instances incumbents felt that the training they had had was almost wholly inadequate.

As a rule, there is relatively little in the experience of new incumbents who have come from industry, academic life, or other non-governmental jobs to prepare them either for the special duties and problems associated with work overseas or for the special requirements of work in a large bureaucracy. Thus, it is highly desirable that AID provide training that will realistically bridge the gap between a new employee's prior experience and the requirements of his new job.

The training recommendations in this report cover topics that are common to all (or most) prospective incumbents in a particular position. While the training is aimed at individuals who have had little or no prior overseas experience, many topics would also be appropriate for persons who have had extensive experience abroad. In general, the suggested training is designed to be given before an incumbent takes up his duties in the field, although some of the topics could also be covered on-the-job. An underlying assumption for training of this kind is that teaching the trainee what to do in a realistic environment of simulated job situations will lead to greater effectiveness on the job, particularly during the initial portion of a man's tour.

It is also assumed that realistic orientation would not only increase understanding and permit adjustments to be made in advance of arrival -- it would also provide a sound basis for self-selection on the part of the incumbent and his family. It is recognized that training is not a panacea. Recruitment and selection will have a considerable effect on the benefits to be expected from training, as well as on the extent of training necessary to achieve maximum benefits.

The training which all incumbents (regardless of job) should receive is discussed briefly in the section immediately below. Training specific to each of the four key positions is discussed subsequently.

1. All incumbents should be made familiar with AID organization, history, policies, regulations, standards, and operating procedures. There is a very considerable body of information about the Agency's structure and functions which would provide the reasons for the decisions and actions of other people, as well as guides to the behavior of each incumbent. The Agency's relations with the Congress, the State and Defense Departments, and the other government offices which serve as AID resources should be included. Careful study of such topics by all persons in key positions would probably reduce the number of errors made by the incumbents, would give many of them greater freedom of action, and would perhaps eliminate the need for some of the current activities of many key people who spend considerable time trying to ensure that they, their subordinates, and others have not violated Agency policy, procedure, or constraints.

2. All incumbents should be given a description of the organization of the mission to which they have been assigned. The primary functions of each element of the organization should be explained, and current and recent projects, both successful and

unsuccessful, should be reviewed. In addition to providing a necessary background for the topics that follow, this part of the training program should provide the incumbents with information about difficulties which the mission has encountered in the past and which they should try to avoid.

3. Each incumbent should be given realistic opportunities to learn the mechanics of a functioning AID Mission, and the relative position of each incumbent in the decision-making processes for each aspect of the mission's functions in which he participates. This is an extremely critical requirement for a candidate having little or no prior AID experience. The data indicate that one of the most difficult adjustments for AID field officers to make (assuming little or no prior AID experience) was to place themselves and others in the proper position with regard to lines of authority, areas of responsibility, and channels of communication. Incidents of people "bucking the system" or "going over heads" proved to be extremely disruptive to mission operation. These occurrences can be generated by a basic misunderstanding of the bureaucratic system or by premeditated attempts by individuals to follow a course of action guided chiefly by their own interests.

4. All incumbents should know how AID/W interacts with the field. It is a source of frustration not to have a basic understanding of such matters as where communications of various kinds go, what time factors are involved, what may be done to expedite replies, and the various reasons for delays in Washington regarding such matters as programming, contracting, and procurement. Incumbents must often explain or cover up for such delays in dealing with host government personnel or representatives of other agencies. Communication delays also become morale problems if the causes are not understood by field officers.

5. All incumbents should be made aware of the kinds of relations that may exist between the mission and the Embassy. There may be a lack of social contact, a lack of contact on substantive matters, or both. There is often a sense of competition between the Embassy and AID, or status rivalries between individuals. Such feelings may be irrationally based, but they are nevertheless held by some individuals in both agencies and constitute a not insignificant factor in the working environment.

6. All incumbents should be informed regarding necessary interactions with other agencies, such as USIS, the Peace Corps, U.S. military units, the diplomatic corps, and nationals from other countries. Problems in this area were frequent; many of them could have been prevented if advance orientation had been provided.

7. The incumbents should receive orientation concerning the government, history, and economic status of the country to which they have been assigned. Coverage of government operations should include such matters as the system of decision-making, accessibility of officials, competition for aid, philosophy of government, personalities, and bureaucracy. A knowledge of the history of the host country would provide information regarding the origins and development of certain customs, philosophies and attitudes, and would enable sounder judgments to be made concerning future trends. Information on the objectives and efforts of other donor countries should also be included. All incumbents should learn that the decision-making process takes place at very high levels in the host government and the reasons for this should be explored (e.g., the lack of qualified civil servants, politics, etc.). This condition may result in major bottlenecks which require special adjustments or special methods.

8. All incumbents will receive a large volume of incoming and outgoing correspondence involving AID/W and the host government. Because of the volume of this task, it is viewed as burdensome and time-consuming. Training should be directed toward alleviating this burden, either by recommending effective systems of delegation, or by furnishing rapid reading training to key incumbents (if this has been found to be of value in the Agency's experience).

9. The incumbents will be required to forward many letters, reports, cables, and other correspondence to AID/W and to host officials. They must be able to transmit pertinent information in readable and concise form to prevent misunderstanding by the reader. AID should consider giving key incumbents some specific practical training in the preparation of the various types of documents they will need to prepare, e.g., airgrams, cables, and reports. It is likely that the costs of such training would be offset by a decrease in communication expenses and in the amount of time required in preparation and interpretation.

10. All prospective incumbents should be given a review of development theory. Such a review should include social and political as well as economic theory. Methods and examples of effective technical assistance projects, loans, and contract operations should also be covered. These matters should be presented in such a way that they serve as an introduction to the next topic.

11. All incumbents should be given a realistic picture of the programming cycle. It is impossible to over-emphasize the need for incumbents to have advance knowledge of programming. This cycle is currently the heart of assistance operations; lack of knowledge concerning it is a detriment to mission operations and, in a broad sense, to

United States foreign policy. With detailed programming instructions available from such sources as program guidance manuals, programming courses, and years of experience by many Agency officials, it is difficult to understand why problems should still exist in this area. However, major problems do exist, primarily because of lack of orientation and training. One of the most common complaints by mission administrative personnel was that incumbents and technicians, even those with years of experience, did not understand programming and were unable to produce satisfactory program documents. The study found, in almost every mission, that someone, usually from the Program Office, is required to edit, revise, correct, or create program documents because of incompetence in this area on the part of both technicians and higher-level administrative people. Such situations mean that efforts are duplicated, that responsibility is improperly shifted, and that an unequal workload is created. One of the most common complaints is that Division Chiefs and others do not know how to plan projects, while at the same time, AID/W requires specific and detailed plans. Specifically, all incumbents should know the role of each contributor in the development cycle, and particularly in the preparation of the CAP. If possible, prospective incumbents should be alerted to particular individual inclinations, strengths, and weaknesses of key people involved in the process at their assigned mission. At the very least, they should be alerted to determine these after arriving in the mission. To illustrate the results of faulty knowledge of the process: A Deputy Director reported that when he first arrived he became too involved in the programming cycle, thus failing to devote proper time to other duties. He did this because he did not have a clear picture of the workload and the personnel responsible for the various tasks. Later, after having misplaced his attention, this incumbent realized that he should have provided general supervision and allowed other personnel to cope with programming details.

12. Incumbents should be familiarized with such realities of the work situation as the probable workload and the probable caliber of U.S. and local personnel. Deputy Directors, Program Officers, and Executive Officers are frequently required to work many extra hours, often because of unforeseen developments, such as accidents, uprisings, arrests, etc. Extra hours are also necessitated because of personnel inadequacies. Training should include familiarization with management procedures designed to help develop the skills and capabilities of one's U.S. subordinates, counterparts, and local employees.

13. Incumbents should be well-informed about the relevant details of the culture and customs of the country to which they are assigned. Numerous examples could be cited in which lack of specific knowledge was reported to be detrimental to effective performance, or in which socio-cultural knowledge contributed to effective performance or to better understanding of specific events.

14. Emphasis should be placed on a knowledge of factors which often create difficulties between Americans and host nationals. Wherever possible, the factors which are most significant or prevalent in particular countries should be identified specifically. Some examples of factors mentioned by incumbents as sources of difficulty are:

a. American attitude of superiority to local nationals.

b. American distaste for local inefficiency.

c. American expectation that work will generally be up to U.S. standards.

d. Failure of Americans to realize that local nationals will usually not disagree or show lack of understanding.

e. Prejudicial treatment of local individuals as members of an inferior group rather than as individuals.

f. Rudeness, often through lack of tact, and sometimes through deliberate disregard for the welfare and feelings of local nationals.

15. All incumbents should be given information about geographic, climatic, and other physical characteristics of their assigned posts. While some of this information is readily acquired in the field, significant morale effects can and do result from the fact that one has or has not been forewarned.

16. All incumbents should be informed in detail on the conditions and availability of a variety of facilities. These would include transportation, automobile repairs, communication systems, housing and procedures for acquiring a home, furnishings, servants, shopping, education system and facilities, medical resources, and recreational opportunities. These and other similar items are all well-known orientation topics. However, it was discovered that many Agency personnel on overseas assignments received either no information or out-of-date information. For example, two secretaries shipped heavy china to their new post, thus using the bulk of their air-freight weight allowance. When they arrived at the post, they learned that the mission supplied dishes until sea freight arrived, so their own china was unnecessary. On the other hand, there were no dry-cleaning facilities available and clothing, including shoes, was very expensive locally. The secretaries were angry because they felt that if they had been properly informed, they could have brought the necessary surplus clothing instead of the unnecessary chinaware.

School facilities may be "available," but highly inadequate in parents' estimation. For example, officers in some posts learned there were school facilities to accommodate their children. Upon arrival, however, they learned that the curriculum was inappropriate, or that the teachers were unqualified. This became a negative morale factor for the families concerned and a serious one in two instances. Parents should be given an accurate picture of the

quality as well as availability of educational facilities in order that they may make appropriate arrangements to ensure proper education for their children. Being confronted with such situations with no prior knowledge has caused resentment towards AID on the part of arriving families.

17. An incumbent and his family should be prepared for cultural isolation, i.e., the absence of theaters, music, art, or libraries. Most underdeveloped countries lack one or more of these cultural outlets, and even current news is at times difficult to obtain. (From a Post Report: "The principle recreation here is photography.")

18. Incumbents should be informed of the extent and type of social interactions that will be required at the assigned mission. A high degree of social activity may serve as a disrupting factor in family life, but must be adjusted to or, at least, tolerated.

Other types of social conditions which are unique to certain posts may prove to be significant factors affecting the adjustment of the incumbent's family, such as social activities for wives or availability of playmates for children. Families assigned to certain missions must be made aware of drastic environmental changes, so that suitable preparations can be made, if possible.

Position-Related Training Topics

The following section presents training topics which are chiefly of importance to each of the specific positions. There is one position-related topic, however, that applies to all of the incumbents. This pertains to the principal tasks and functions of each job.

Each prospective incumbent should be familiarized with the general responsibilities, functions, constraints, and major difficulties of his position. Although this idea is so well accepted as to be a truism, it is incorrect to assume that it is generally put into practice. Since local conditions, such as program and personalities, affect the specific job so heavily, highly detailed information about the job in the assigned mission would be inappropriate. Rather, emphasis should be placed on the variety of tasks, responsibilities, problems, and methods of approach which have occurred in many missions, in order to provide the incumbent with an awareness of the total possibilities inherent in his position. He would then have the widest possible latitude in evolving his unique job in the most appropriate manner. Specific information should also be provided if it is available, as indicated in preceding and subsequent sections. Orientation within the mission would obviously serve to fill in many details on the local situation.

Deputy Director

1. The prospective Deputy should be familiarized with the duties that are usually reserved to the Director, but which he will be called upon to assume in the Director's absence. The prospective Deputy should be made familiar with such important issues as interpretation of policy and goals, major mission administrative problems and program problems, personal characteristics of key employees and host contacts, interpersonal relations and problems, pending decisions, and other business with host officials, the Embassy, AID/W, etc.

2. Relationships between Directors and their Deputies vary widely. Prospective Deputies should be made aware of the range of such variation, including the authority assigned to Deputies. If possible, the Deputy should be told about the incumbent Director's "style" for dealing with key subordinates, Embassy and other Country Team members, key host officials, and other foreign nationals. Similiarly, such matters as the inclinations, attitudes, or philosophy of the U.S. Ambassador should be discussed insofar as available information permits.

3. Expertise in international economics and finance may not be necessary, but some basic knowledge is required in order to facilitate management decisions. For example, technicians will propose development projects which may or may not be theoretically sound or practically acceptable. The Deputy Director may be assigned direct control over technical projects. As Acting Director, a position which the Deputy frequently must assume, he will have direct responsibility for the entire mission effort. The question to be answered is how much knowledge of development theory should any incumbent possess? As a minimum, he will need to know terminology, basic concepts and operations, and sources of information. For example, an incumbent should know which organizations are likely to lend money for specific purposes, types of loans possible and likely to be acceptable, and how foreign exchange affects development efforts.

4. The Deputy Director needs to have complete familiarity with AID policies. He must cope with, interpret, analyze, and explain policy almost every day, and, in some cases, every hour. AID attitudes toward dictators, nominal and actual democracies, operations through contract technicians, AID goals, knowledge of U.S. political aims vis-a-vis needs for economic development, and policies connected with the use of loans and grants are some examples mentioned.

A list of policies would be long, but not endless, and the Deputy Director must be aware of them. On frequent occasions he is required to represent the mission and the United States Government at conferences and meetings with other U.S. officials and with host national officials, and he is frequently assigned the task of final review of all outgoing mission correspondence. In both tasks he must assure compliance with policy. One incumbent stated that "knowledge of policy is basic to this job, and I must have intimate knowledge of all phases of policy in order to function effectively." Other Deputy Directors agreed with this attitude.

Policy is, of course, in constant flux, so any incumbent must work to stay informed. However, there are many policies that are relatively constant and should be learned in advance. For example, one Deputy Director was called upon to serve as Acting Director for an extended period within weeks after first reporting to his post. This incumbent reported that he was severely handicapped because of having been thrust into the job without knowing AID policies. A proper orientation, he reported, would have saved considerable time, money, and mistakes, and would have eliminated the need for frequent cables sent to clarify policy.

5. The Deputy Director should have a firm grasp of Agency standards and priorities. This includes the relative weight to be given to such factors as work, quality of personnel, costs, and schedules. For example, some incumbents reported lack of ability to judge project results because of a lack of information concerning the levels of success expected. The Deputy Director is often faced

with such questions as: "Should a mission make a supreme effort to complete a road construction project by an arbitrary date, even if the cost increases disproportionately?" or "Would it be feasible to accept a technician who does not meet every qualification but who is available immediately?"

6. One of the most important orientation subjects for this incumbent is the review of project details in the country to which he has been assigned. For this incumbent, and for a prospective Program Officer, this review should be far more detailed than the overview which should be given other key personnel. The incumbent should learn about such details as project budgets, scope of work, and working conditions at field projects, in order to approve correspondence, judge work output, manage the mission, and to provide information for official high-level visitors. Ordinarily there is insufficient time to learn these details properly after reporting for duty and advance preparation is necessitated by the fact that decisions are apt to be required almost immediately after arrival. Errors and delays would be avoided by providing the information which is readily available from such sources as the CAP, the desk officer, project agreements, project implementation orders, routine correspondence, and periodic reports.

7. Some Deputy Directors will need to be skilled in dealing with key host officials -- particularly in gaining cooperation and in negotiating. It is admittedly questionable whether an individual who has not already acquired such skills, or at least an aptitude for them, can benefit from training. However, careful consideration of the variety, complexity, and sensitivity of the problems associated with interactions with host officials in any country, but more particularly

in the specific host country to which he has been assigned, would enlarge the Deputy's span of potential actions during his early months on the job, and could prevent some very costly errors. In spite of the many years of operating overseas, both by the Agency and the officers concerned, it appears that a well-liked American who is respected and trusted, and with whom host nationals are willing to work, is the exception. As one local national said, "Too often a newly arriving American is met by other Americans. The new American is immediately invited to the homes of his countrymen. They tell him about the local country and how to deal with the local people. The new American, therefore, is unable to get out and learn about local nationals in an unbiased way."

8. Coverage of the economic status of the prospective host country is crucial for this incumbent. For example, it would be important to know what, if any, economic planning facilities were in existence, including their effectiveness. Government control of the economic system, host national ability to meet international financial commitments, and willingness to participate in development via self-help measures, should also be covered in detail.

9. Finally, all prospective Deputy Directors need a careful and thorough schooling in the details of the types of problems they are likely to encounter in the subject areas cited above. Methods could range from a handbook of readings through discussions of realistic cases to situational gaming. The problems are many and varied; typical categories include communications, AID organization and policy, relations with others, coping with inadequacies of subordinates, host national policies and practices, effective use of men and materials, personal differences among staff members, motivation and morale. Typical examples are presented below:

a. Considering ways to make a host country planning board more effective.

b. Making program or administrative decisions when no response to an information request has been received from AID/W.

c. Responding to unreasonable host government requests and/or pressures when the Director is absent.

d. Maintaining mission morale in spite of an unusually heavy workload and inadequate facilities.

e. Criticizing a valuable technician who has offended a host Ministry official.

f. Organizing an effective system for exchange of information between AID officers and host country planning board officials.

g. Delegating various administrative duties to subordinates.

h. Smoothing conflicts or settling disputes between Division Chiefs or between a key officer and his subordinates.

i. Resolving disputes over fund cuts between the Program Officer and Division Chiefs.

j. Reviewing personnel evaluations.

k. Preparing and delivering a briefing for the Ambassador.

l. Briefing host country Ministers on AID policy.

m. Evaluating the Program Officer's plans and opinions.

n. Evaluating budgets submitted by the Executive Officer, the Program Officer and the Division Chiefs.

o. Resolving different interpretations of Manual Orders or other regulations.

p. Establishing or repairing working relations between the mission and a host Ministry.

q. Preparing understandable written documents for host government officials.

r. Establishing and chairing meetings of joint committees composed of representatives from various agencies.

s. Explaining unexpected policy or program decisions from AID/W to host government officials.

Program Officer

1. See Item 4 under Deputy Director.

2. See Item 5 under Deputy Director.

3. See Item 6 under Deputy Director.

4. See Item 8 under Deputy Director.

5. All prospective Program Officers should make an extensive study of the Manual Orders and receive practice in searching and interpreting them to answer a variety of procedural questions.

6. A detailed operational picture of a program cycle and the component parts of the CAP should be thoroughly examined. The Program Officer should study in detail AID/W directives concerning the writing and revision of an annual CAP. He should understand the chronological development of the CAP as governed by AID/W guidelines. He must have a basic understanding of the types of factors and conditions which contribute to the decisions concerning the specific programs to be pursued in specific countries. He should be made aware, in addition, of the types of considerations used by AID/W in approving or rejecting project proposals submitted by the field, including both AID/W and field factors. The Program Officer should also become familiar with the people in AID/W departments that become involved in passing on and amending specific country programs.

7. The Program Officer must be given a genuine understanding of the existence, significance, and effects of "political" decisions, i.e., policy decisions based on political rather than economic considerations. The Program Officer will be in a position in the field where he must justify such decisions to Division Chiefs and technicians, and perhaps even to host government officials.

8. The Program Officer must have a thorough working knowledge of the economics of a developing country. He must understand how the AID program as a unit and as separate projects can contribute to the development of a country. He must be able to view realistically the contributions which AID can make to a host country and be fully aware of the program's limitations.

9. The Program Officer will never have the kind of comprehensive, detailed, reliable, quantitative information he needs in order to develop a confident understanding of the economic situation in the country to which he is assigned. Such information is simply not available to him. The principal task for which he should be trained, therefore, is the collection, validation and interpretation of economic information which will help him approach the ideal level of knowledge.

For the collection of information, he should learn how to develop as many sources as possible. One Program Officer, for example, obtained some useful commodity import data from the Public Safety Advisor who was assisting the local customs bureau. The Program Officer should be alerted to the possibility that sources of economic information may be located in obscure offices of the host government, and that low-level officials may have useful data that they have not passed upward. The Program Officer should be oriented toward seeking as many contacts as possible with visiting officials from the U.S. or other countries. These experts can frequently make useful quantitative estimates of resources or productivity for the Program Officer.

The Program Officer should be trained in the techniques of storing, validating and interpreting the information which he collects. The reliability of many sources can be tested over a period of time. For example, estimates of agricultural productivity may be obtained from several local sources as well as within the mission. These estimates can be re-examined for reliability at later dates, and the sources can then be evaluated appropriately.

10. He must be given an appreciation of his unique role in the mission organization. His status as "first among equals" with Division Chiefs must be functionally understood, i.e., he should know where he may assert authority over Division Chiefs and where not, how he relates to the Director and Deputy Director, and what role he plays in approving, amending, or rejecting proposals of Division Chiefs. If possible, he should be informed of his probable position in regard to these topics for the specific mission to which he is assigned. He should be alerted to the fact that staff people often do not follow organizational channels of communication, i.e., they seek out "persons" rather than "offices" for discussing, informing, or inquiring about program matters. Such breaks in communication make the Program Officer's job more difficult, since effective coordination of planning and operations depends upon timely receipt of accurate information.

11. To the extent that it is possible, the Program Officer should be trained to evaluate projects. He does not need a technician's knowledge of project implementation, but he must be able to question implementation procedures and requirements intelligently.

12. All Program Officers should receive practical experience in dealing with many of the operational and substantive aspects of AID/W programming. Such experience may be gotten by working at a country Desk for a two- or three-month period. Experience at any Desk will provide insight into the types of problems and considerations with which a field Program Officer must concern himself. However, the most applicable training would be received by working at the Desk of the country to which the Program Officer is assigned.

13. In addition to the foregoing topics, it may be advantageous to provide prospective Program Officers with information about the types of problems which other Program Officers have encountered. Training could range from a written handbook of examples through case studies to situational gaming exercises. One example of such a training case is given below. Following it are other topics for such training.

Following or during his work at the country Desk, the Program Officer can be given several project proposals which fit into the program of that country. The proposals could be ones which were actually submitted by the AID mission.

Given the history of the program in the country (to the extent that it is known) and the present conditions which apply therein (learned by specific orientation and Desk experience), the Program Officer should evaluate each project in detail, considering the budget, commodities, personnel, and feasibility. He should then draft a series of inquiries which should be made in order to provide the necessary information which would allow an accurate judgment of the acceptability of the proposals. Following his appraisal of the individual projects, he could assign priorities to the projects in terms of economic, technical and political feasibilities with appropriate justification.

Complicating circumstances can easily be added to the Program Officer's considerations, such as prevailing political conditions, technical competence of the division, AID/W budget allotment, or probable effects on existing staff and projects.

The Program Officer will have to recognize and consider the same basic programming factors which would confront him in the field. His thoroughness and perceptiveness could be thus realistically measured.

Many of the conditions present in the Program Officer's environment can be simulated through situational cases such as the following:

a. Determining and locating the type of information which may be brought to bear on a particular issue discussed at a Country Team or Division Chiefs' meeting.

b. Familiarizing an individual technician regarding his responsibilities and the requirements relating to operational effectiveness.

c. Explaining and justifying mission activities to critical Ministers.

d. Planning a smooth phase-out for an unsuccessful project.

e. Developing guidelines for implementation of a project in a new area.

f. Evaluating an on-going mission project with specific established criteria.

g. Rewriting CAP narrative sections, in view of changing local conditions and new AID/W guidelines.

h. Transmitting Mission Director's viewpoints on a project to an appropriate technician.

i. Briefing visiting Congressmen on the advisability of initiating new programs, such as PL 480, or land reclamation, based on existing and predicted future economic conditions.

j. Evaluating economic statistics in view of past reliability and presently known facts relating to conditions described by the statistics.

k. Making judgments of the economic conditions in the host country based on diverse but unrelated and unevaluated information as well as known factors.

l. Developing tools and criteria with which to measure the validity of government-released statistics.

m. Identifying aspects of a division program which may reflect technicians' bias rather than technical feasibility.

n. Evaluating the merits of a proposed project with an ineffective Division Chief.

o. Documenting a project change to AID/W in terms of its feasibility, goals, desirability, need, risk, etc.

p. Evaluating proposals from host Ministries on the basis of divisional capabilities as reflected by a realistic appraisal of past performance, and complicated by subtle host country political considerations.

q. Communicating decisions concerning item(s) above to USAID and host government personnel.

Executive Officer

1. The prospective Executive Officer should make an extensive study of the Manual Orders, including their use and their importance as the basic operating document. Sections of greatest relevance to the type of post to which a candidate will be sent should be treated as a basic study textbook during orientation and training, and considerable practice should be provided in locating and interpreting all material pertinent to a given problem.

2. He should learn the special problems peculiar to his new post. For example, in one mission, it was extremely difficult to acquire housing for technicians in the field due to a housing shortage in the outlands and poor cooperation by appropriate host Ministries. In another post, the host government evicted host nationals in order to provide housing for U.S. technicians. Both cases provided special problems which were potentially serious. The Executive Officer should come to his post with a knowledge of these problems and with possible

solutions or approaches at hand. He should also be oriented with regard to the anticipated future course of the assigned mission, such as phase-outs, expansions, shifts to contract work, rate of change, etc. The specific implications of such changes could be explored, thus providing training with practical content.

3. If the prospective Executive Officer is to be assigned to a small mission, he should be taught certain basic technologies (perhaps through reading of appropriate texts). At a small mission he must have at least superficial knowledge of some technical areas such as accounting, construction, or transportation, since he will have fewer experts to call on than he would have in a larger mission.

4. The Executive Officer should be given an overview of the programming cycle, and detailed orientation on development of the administrative budget, including practice in completing the necessary documentation. He should also be made aware of the relation between the administrative and program budgets and the types of situations which necessitate particularly close coordination in their formulation.

5. The prospective Executive Officer should be made realistically aware of the following characteristics of the job:

a. The diversity of his job, i.e., the many issues and tasks with which he may have to deal. This should include contingencies such as arranging for and implementing insurance payments to a local injured on the job, contracting with locals to do specific rush jobs, or negotiating personally with landlords in an effort to secure lower rentals.

b. The nature of the work environment. One of the basic conditions of the Executive Officer's job is that he must work with constant interruption, frequently on trivial matters. All Executive Officers are focal points for general inquiries, personal complaints, or suggestions. Since the Executive Officer deals with personal services, he must be available to anyone who has need of any of the functions of his office. In all missions, the number of daily personal and phone calls received by Executive Officers is very large. The Executive Officer is often employed as a general operations assistant by the Mission Director, and in effect he must be at the Director's beck & call, which may additionally complicate his schedule.

c. The Executive Officer must be prepared to eliminate sectors of his budget on short notice. This calls for the establishment of a realistic priority system of funding so that spending can be reduced or curtailed in the least critical areas of the Executive Officer's operations. It is to the Executive Officer's advantage to know, prior to going to the field, what areas he is most likely to assign low priority. The cuts he makes must be justified to those Division Chiefs directly concerned in a logical and diplomatic manner, since cutbacks are rarely viewed with sympathy by those who are immediately affected.

d. Especially at larger missions, he will often be interrupted by untimely visits of VIPs, or AID/W officials, for whom the Executive Officer is generally responsible. The amount of time required to prepare for, meet, escort, or entertain visitors may be considerable.

e. He will receive requests from AID/W, the Mission Director, or the Deputy Director to prepare reports, document a statement, or research a problem at very busy times. Such requests,

as in the case with visitors, will occur at peak work periods as well as slack periods. The potential Executive Officer should be given training in the planning and scheduling of work in his office, in the delegation of work, and in upgrading the capabilities of subordinate personnel.

f. He is subjected to criticism at all times. Since his office deals with services, he can be held responsible for virtually any negative aspect of post conditions. He may be blamed for crowded offices, poor plumbing in residences, vehicle scarcity, limited recreational facilities, or mission morale. The Executive Officer may, in fact, be partly or entirely responsible for such negative conditions. However, he must work under constant criticism concerning such areas whether the fault is his or not.

g. He is often suspected of taking advantage of his position to receive more and better personal services. This is an obvious source of resentment within the American AID community. Any appearance of such a situation must be carefully avoided. The Executive Officer must be able to tolerate this type of suspicion among the American community and to take steps to allay it.

h. He is often in a position in which it is advisable to explain orally or in writing to the AID community the legal terms which regulate benefits received by other U.S. agency personnel, such as USIS or the Embassy. Jealousy on the part of some individuals, especially wives, concerning what personnel in other agencies receive, is a typical source of resentment and a factor contributing to low morale. In several cases, mission personnel were not aware of the legal restrictions placed on the Executive Officer in disseminating personal services.

i. The Executive Officer must be resourceful in working with or around ineffective or incompetent subordinates while continuing to maintain good personal relations with them.

j. There is a need to be constantly on guard against a "superior" attitude on the part of American clerical and administrative staff which may lead them to treat locals superciliously in personal contact. Most missions have some staff members who exhibit such behavior quite frequently, contributing to low morale and resentment on the part of the local staff.

k. Technically qualified locals often are not available. Marginal ability is sometimes the most that can be expected of a new local employee. A period of time must be allowed for on-the-job training before efficient output can be anticipated. The Executive Officer should be prepared to plan his projects so that these extra efforts and delays fit into the schedule.

l. Executive Officers must be tolerant of the quality of available local services and the slowness with which they are rendered. These factors will influence his calculations of what and how much can be provided in the way of personal services for the AID community.

m. Close social contact encourages cooperation between the Executive Officer and his subordinates. Yet subordinates must be directed, corrected, disciplined when necessary, and honestly rated for efficiency. Friendships should not be allowed to interfere with efficient and objective operations.

n. There is the possibility that he may be put under political pressure to hire the relatives or friends of local officials. Such instances are common and require tactful and diplomatic handling.

o. Local national employees will often not question superiors. Local subordinates will, as a rule, tend to say "yes" to questions directed to them whether they mean "yes" or not. The question "Do you understand?" is seldom answered "no." It requires a perceptive Executive Officer to recognize a lack of understanding by locals and special skills to provide clear and concise directions. Furthermore, he should realize that continuous contact with an individual can lead to the unwarranted belief that communication is improving.

p. The attitudes of local employees concerning punctuality and organization may differ sharply from those of Americans. For this reason, local subordinates must often be closely directed and supervised. It should not be expected that the quality of their performance will equal that of American workers in similar positions.

q. Allowances must be made for individuals whose morale is low due to particular on-job or personal circumstances. It appears that receiving a special favor in the way of personal services sometimes prevents an individual from becoming completely dissatisfied or unhappy with his situation. The morale of U.S. secretaries poses a particularly difficult problem. Many secretaries, especially those on their first tour, become disillusioned by the realities which they encounter in overseas

life. The Executive Officer must attempt to promote and maintain high morale among secretaries, by being sensitive to their problems, and responsive to their requests.

6. It is recommended that prospective Executive Officers be given detailed knowledge of the types of situations and problems with which they are likely to be confronted and that they be given opportunities to attempt to solve typical problems. Training procedures could range from consideration of problems presented in a written manual through classroom discussion of cases to situational gaming exercises. Below is one example of such a problem. Following it is a set of additional problem types which should be included in the training.

A technician phones the Executive Officer after midnight, informing him that his mother is dying and he wants to leave on the next afternoon's flight to New York. The technician requests that his home leave be given to him now rather than in two weeks, when it is officially due, thus allowing him to reach his family quickly without having to bear the cost of the trip. From the technician's point of view, this is perfectly reasonable, especially in the emergency situation in which he finds himself. A further condition: The Executive Officer is scheduled to meet some arriving dignitaries on an early morning flight. A problem of this kind confronts the Executive Office with many of realities of the job, such as time, availability of regulations, morale problems, conflicting tasks, reliance on one's own judgment, the necessity for justifications, the need for rapid decisions, etc. Thus, the candidate will be placed in a realistic, meaningful, and fairly typical situation.

The candidate should also be placed in face-to-face situations. For example, he may be given an efficiency rating form on which to rate his training course instructor realistically, using predetermined criteria. He should judge the instructor's effectiveness, numerically and narratively. The candidate would know his rating would have to be justified to the instructor. The instructor could challenge a low rating which the candidate would have to explain to the instructor's satisfaction. The candidate would be subjected to a situation similar to an actual circumstance. Not only would he have to rate honestly and with forethought, but he would be subjected to the same type of pressure he would find by low-rating a subordinate. Accuracy, importance, and difficulty of proper efficiency rating could be stressed.

7. Training in situational problems may be given in almost any area of the Executive Officer's concern. Some typical samples follow:

a. Making a decision based on ambiguous information.

b. Shifting work from an incompetent subordinate to one who is unfamiliar with the task.

c. Determining the relevance of many communications in a relatively short period of time.

d. Locating Manual Orders governing specific procedures.

e. Determining alternative solutions or approaches to a mission-wide morale problem.

f. Working with a complex set of facts while being constantly interrupted.

g. Creating a better environment for an unhappy secretary.

h. Conferring with an American who is dissatisfied with repair facilities.

i. Drawing up itineraries for visiting Congressmen based on a busy mission schedule.

j. Interpreting regulation changes by AID/W and circulating an appropriate memorandum.

k. Scheduling the work of local mission mechanics during an especially busy month (accidents, overhauls, etc.)

l. Receiving and rapidly digesting information which concerns numerous aspects of Executive Office operations.

m. Explaining a complex directive to locals who speak poor English.

n. Dealing with an American officer berating a local messenger.

o. Assigning work of a departed staff member and of one who is ill to the remaining staff.

p. Adjusting flexible regulations in favor of or against an employee's request for personal consideration.

q. Discussing mission employment conditions with a local candidate who holds political "strings."

r. Handling a request for special favors from a Deputy Director.

s. Developing a cost-per-mile report on the efficiency of Motor Pool operations.

t. Establishing a committee to discuss and act on a problem of inadequate education facilities for dependents.

Division Chief

1. See Item 3 under Deputy Director.

2. See Item 4 under Deputy Director.

3. See Item 5 under Deputy Director.

4. See Item 6 under Deputy Director.

5. See Item 7 under Deputy Director.

6. See Item 9 under Program Officer.

7. The Division Chief should be made familiar with the programming cycle, but perhaps with less emphasis on total mission efforts and priority considerations than the Program Officer. It is important that the Division Chief understand:

a. The necessity for planning.

b. The minimal requirements of an acceptable plan.

c. The mechanics of documentation.

d. The role of the Program Officer in programming.

e. The role of host government officials during the several phases of the cycle.

f. The necessities for and the realities of fund cuts and shifts affecting on-going or planned division activities.

g. The relation between his specialty area and the entire mission program.

Understanding of these basic topics would not only increase the effectiveness of USAID activities in the host country, but would also diminish the workload of the Program Officer and eliminate many sources of interpersonal friction in the mission.

8. The Division Chief should be trained in methods for evaluating on-going projects in his specialty. Depending upon the information available to the Agency, this could range from merely making the Division Chief aware of the relevant cues to look for, to training him in the use of a standardized procedure with objective evaluation criteria. (A likely source of information on which such a procedure might be based is the mass of material on past projects which has been

accumulated over past years of U.S. technical assistance efforts). Sources and methods for obtaining reliable evaluative information in the assigned country should be included, along with indications of potential obstacles, biases, and other specific factors which would tend to make evaluation difficult. Practice in making inferences from incomplete data should also be provided, although it is likely that this ability can be more easily selected for than instilled by training.

9. Division Chiefs should become familiar with the contracting system, particularly with the position of the Division Chief regarding supervisory responsibilities, "monitoring," and liaison activities. To many incumbents in the field, these are empty terms. One Division Chief stated that his job was to perform liaison with contract groups and to monitor them, but he did not know how frequent contacts should be, how deeply he should become involved in project details, to what extent he was supposed to participate in planning, or how much control was at his disposal. Guidance on these matters was not readily available in the mission.

10. The Division Chief should be instructed on the duties and responsibilities of a Program Officer, and the frequently anomalous position this Officer occupies in the mission structure. The most frequent type of friction among the key positions studied was between the Division Chief and the Program Officer. The typical difficulties are summarized in the following remarks made by a Program Officer:

"There is a good deal of difficulty around here in getting to understand who is responsible to whom for what. In general, the technicians consider the Program Officer, in doing his job, as getting in the way, by asking questions regarding their work, wanting things written, wanting them to clear everything with the Program Office, etc. They seem to minimize the importance of the planning process. They are oriented only toward simple implementation, and while implementing, they interpret the Manual Orders as hindrances.

"The Division Chiefs do not realize that there are distinct lines of authority between them and the Program Office. Grade and rank have nothing to do with it; it is the procedure which must be followed. A technician is responsible to the Program Officer even if the technician outranks him. That's just the way USAID has to operate. I don't want them to think they work for me, but through me, for the mission.

"These unclear relationships create day-to-day difficulties in that they interpret any request by me as being additional work for them which they don't consider necessary.

"People have a natural tendency to resent anyone else returning their work or making corrections in their work. This is compounded if they don't realize to begin with that the Program Officer has the right to do this and it is a requirement of his job. It's not a question of style but of content, clarity, and directness. But they don't see it that way. It becomes a matter of personality with them. I send things back and they are returned virtually unchanged. This is because they don't take seriously enough their responsibility to the Program Office."

11. The Agency's expectations concerning the Division Chief's role as an "advisor" should be clarified and communicated to prospective incumbents during training. Areas of uncertainty include such questions as:

a. To what extent should a Division Chief attempt to pursue the advisory role?

b. What are the limits in playing this role?

c. Does it involve conflicting interests?

d. Does one take active steps to become involved in this function or does one wait passively for requests for help?

e. What are the appropriate techniques for advising?

Orientation or instruction on this topic would be most effective if it is based on the specific characteristics of the country of assignment.

12. This incumbent is the "line officer" and thus is likely to have more working contacts with host nationals than the other senior personnel included in this study. These contacts vary in frequency from country to country, but all are crucial. Relations with the host nationals can make or break projects and programs. An incumbent, therefore, should be supplied with extensive information concerning important host national officials with whom he will be working. For example, several incumbents reported that six to eight months were required before they were able to gain the confidence of counterparts and establish the degree of rapport necessary for project implementation. Such delays should be shortened if possible by providing adequate orientation and training. A newly assigned incumbent, especially someone new to the foreign service, may become frustrated and disillusioned if he is not aware of the importance of establishing effective contacts and the delays which may result from their absence.

The Division Chief should also be provided with orientation on the methods for establishing effective personal relations with host government officials and other influential host national individuals. In many underdeveloped countries,"the man makes the job," and host nationals will expect to deal with the Chief as an individual personality rather than with his office or his title. Several reports from Division Chiefs saying that they had been bypassed by host government officials may well represent a lack of understanding of this point.

13. The Division Chief requires more familiarity with the local language than other senior personnel. His contacts are more apt to be with host nationals who speak little or no English, and his knowledge of the language can have a significant bearing on the progress of on-going projects. It is suggested that basic instruction should be given during U.S. training and that intensive study should be continued overseas on a mandatory basis. Pre-arrival training should also stress the importance of language knowledge, using concrete illustrations.

14. Examples of problem situations that might be utilized in training are as follows:

a. Explaining to a contractor the contractor's relationship to the division and his responsibilities to the mission.

b. Explaining to an impatient host minister the reasons for delay in the arrival of equipment from the United States.

c. Determining whether a slow-moving project should be phased out or pushed ahead by adding new staff or equipment.

d. Estimating the staff and commodity needs of hypothetical projects having specific goals, in the context of specified country conditions.

e. Justifying to a host planning board the high cost of U.S. technical specialists on a project.

f. Developing ways to make U.S. presence felt in spite of host national hostility.

g. Coping with a situation in which the economic or social needs of the host country demand one effort, while U.S. political considerations demand a different effort.

h. Dealing with a Program Office staff which is trying to become over-involved with technical operations (e.g., demanding unnecessary paperwork).

i. Evaluating a project's effectiveness with regard to host country development; determining whether it is really helping to move the host country forward; deciding if one project is more worthwhile than another (e.g., which is more valuable, teacher training or primary education).

j. Supervising American staff ill-suited for overseas work (e.g., no desire to learn the indigenous language or culture, dislike of host nationals, desire to return to the U.S., physical handicaps, etc.).

APPENDIX F

to

A Study of Some Key USAID Jobs

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES FOR CONSIDERATION IN RECRUITMENT, SELECTION AND EVALUATION

American Institute for Research
Washington, D. C.

JUNE 1964

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES FOR CONSIDERATION IN RECRUITMENT, SELECTION AND EVALUATION

Introduction

This appendix contains information on personal characteristics which may be desirable or essential for incumbents in the four key jobs covered in this study. This appendix is divided into two major sections. In the first is a set of personal qualities which have been derived qualitatively from the functions and tasks that are performed and from the behaviors that are reported to overcome difficulties effectively. The second section is devoted to tables of information about experience, training and education, and foreign language ability that incumbents possess, compared with those they considered to be desirable for their jobs.

The personal qualities discussed in the first section are divided into four groups: Talents, Aptitudes and Skills (further divided into intellectual, social and organizational factors); Personal Motivational Characteristics; Areas of General Knowledge; and Physical Factors. Each quality under the foregoing headings represents a highly qualitative core concept which is factorially unrefined because of the absence of quantitative data. The qualities are generally expressed in clusters of related terms, each of which is hypothesized to reflect at least some aspect of a central concept of a particular personal characteristic. The available data are insufficient to permit determination of the relative importance among the characteristics within each job, or in one job as contrasted with any of the other three.

Although each quality is expressed in positive terms, and is probably desirable or essential at least to some extent, it should be conceived as

representing a continuum or a continuously variable dimension of personality, and it should be recognized that a person may possess too little, too much or just enough of that quality for a particular job situation(s). Thus, for example, an individual could have (at least theoretically) either too much or too little numerical skill in a particular job; or too much or too little initiative (too much of the latter in certain persons could interfere with mission leadership).

It should be recognized that although the proposed qualities are highly tentative in formulation, they (or more factorially pure versions of them) are nevertheless very probably required for effective service in the four jobs. If the appropriate quantitative-empirical study of them were to be done, the number of factors might be reduced to something fewer than 54. (However, situational-personal interactions might very well raise the number of individual requirements to be considered in selection well beyond this figure.) However, at this time, we are not justified in arbitrarily reducing the number for conceptual, administrative, or editorial convenience. The tendency to think of the four major headings as if they represented four general major factors should be assiduously avoided. These headings are merely linguistic conveniences which represent a great many more separately identifiable qualities.

Feasible means for measuring the degree to which a prospective incumbent possesses some of the requisite characteristics may not be currently available to AID. However, the inability to measure the characteristic within the constraints that now bind the Agency should not be confused with the issue of whether or not a characteristic is essential to do a job effectively. If the characteristic is needed, and AID chooses and places a candidate lacking it in the appropriate degree, the aspects of the job in which the characteristic is required cannot be performed effectively.

Many of the characteristics can probably be measured at least in crude qualitative terms, or indirectly through references, appropriately structured interviews, suitable situational tests, and available background data such as academic grades. Each of the proposed qualities should be examined with these practical selection methods in mind.

In the absence of specific performance data or as a supplement to them, some or all of the proposed qualities should be considered for inclusion in an Evaluation procedure. An Evaluation procedure, however, should take account of the fact that performance requirements can vary both with specific tasks within the job and with the situation, and that mitigating circumstances may affect even those requirements which are clearly requisite for a given task. This calls for a flexible Evaluation instrument which would allow the evaluator to identify the specific requirements involved in performing the set of tasks actually accomplished during the evaluation period, and then to rate the incumbent in terms of these requirements rather than on a set of highly abstract and perhaps fictitious variables. The evaluator should also be permitted to consider circumstances affecting performance.

Personal Characteristics Possibly Related to Performance

I. Talents, Aptitudes and Skills

The following characteristics relate both to the intelligence and training the individual possesses and to his personal style of behavior. Each subcategory represents an attempt to conceptualize a characteristic which can be recognized independently of the others, although each is related to the others to a greater or lesser extent. Following each category is a description of the situation(s) in which the quality might be particularly important. These examples are by no means exhaustive of the possible circumstances in which the characteristic might be drawn upon, but are intended rather to tie the abstract concept of the requirement to instances of concrete job performance.

A. Cognitive, logical, and intellectual characteristics

1. Judgment, sense of fitness, sense of proportion, common sense. These qualities are necessary when policy is lacking or vague, or when an incumbent is faced with alternative courses of action; for example, in determining whether or not the Director should be informed of a development of dubious significance; whether new information on a proposed project should be communicated to the host government before final AID/W approval is received; whether complaints about mission services should be treated seriously or dismissed.

2. Ability to form and understand abstract general concepts, to formulate classes or categories, to determine when individual items or events are members of a class; to discriminate differences in concepts and classes. This ability is important in understanding, defining and applying policy; when an event must be fitted into the framework of the Manual Orders or other general instructions; when unusual situations

arise which must be acted upon within the established procedures; when jurisdictional disputes arise (for example, should an agricultural education project be supervised by the Agriculture Division or the Educational Division?).

3. Ability to solve problems, to reason, to deduce from premises to conclusions. This capacity for logical reasoning is particularly important in deciding on program content and priorities, in allocating funds, people, and materials; and in correlating information from a variety of sources, i.e. producing planning documents or writing reports in response to a special AID/W request. It also is drawn upon when resolving conflicting policies, in interpreting regulations, and in surmising the outcomes of various courses of action.

4. Ability to perceive and understand subtle relationships and events; to induce an accurate concept or picture of things from few cues. This is the capacity that permits people to develop a "feel" for a new situation and to judge or sense incongruities or malfunctions in the new situation; it is probably necessary in monitoring overseas projects, particularly in order to discern potential problems as well as to analyze those which already exist. This necessity is found in many diverse areas of job performance, such as predicting the probable results of a proposed project, analyzing the effects of a proposed reorganization of the mission, investigating the circumstances underlying a violation of regulations, etc.

5. Ability to learn and think quickly. The overseas setting is so full of contingencies, problems, errors, new political developments, new organizational developments, new professional developments, new policies, regulations, laws, etc., that a person who fails to learn quickly is soon out of touch with events that bear on program or organizational matters. Furthermore, it is often necessary for an inexperienced incumbent to deal with problems soon after he arrives at a

new post, or to take over the position of another with whose job he is quite unfamiliar, requiring that he rapidly become acquainted with new procedures or substantive material to avoid delay in operations and communications. A request by the host government for a project in a new technical area requires that the AID personnel concerned learn enough about the area in order to make a reasonable decision within a short time. A question from a host minister on a sensitive matter requires quick thinking on the part of the AID representative in order to avoid offending the host without revealing classified information. An unexpected question from the Director in a staff meeting requires fast reorganization of information on the part of the individual to whom it is directed. Many other examples of this requirement could be cited.

6. Ability to read and interpret abstruse, ambiguous, or highly technical material, often on topics outside one's own special area of competence; to read rapidly; to interpret from abstract, general language to the real world of concrete things and events. This requirement exists in all situations where technical documents must be read for information, approved, edited, or rewritten. Sometimes relevant information will be available only in a foreign language, which adds to the difficulty. This requirement applies particularly to program planning activity, although it also arises in such contexts as the monitoring of contract activity, the evaluation of the progress of projects, and the preparation of reports on the status of the host country economic, political, or social situation. This requirement is sometimes felt when regulations or instructions from AID/W must be interpreted. The necessity for rapid reading exists when a heavy flow of routine communications must be handled in addition to the reading required for general and technical information, which is usually the case for all four key incumbents.

7. Ability to write clearly, to review, edit, and rewrite the the work of others (often on technical topics outside one's own area of competence). This requirement is found most often in those positions where technical documents must be reviewed for content and clarity. It also exists for those who must write reports dealing with progress or evaluation, justification for proposed projects, or special requests for information from AID/W. In addition, clear, concise writing is important in drafting cables and airgrams, in order to avoid the confusion and misunderstanding which so often occurs between AID/W and the field, and in preparing documents for host national consumption, where the language barrier increases the necessity for accurate expression.

8. Numerical skills, primarily in understanding and manipulating fiscal quantities, descriptive and comparative statistics and extrapolation. Budgets and the attendant necessity for keeping track of costs, juggling funds, and calculating future expenditures are a reality with which all incumbents must contend at one time or another. The manipulation of statistical data can occur at any point in the programming cycle, or in response to special requests from Washington, but is most in evidence during the planning stage in the Program Office and the technical divisions.

9. Ability to communicate well orally; to choose appropriate levels of discourse and to choose themes and a vocabulary which will be understood by the listener(s). This includes the ability to communicate by indirection or implication when necessary. These abilities are utilized in giving instructions and directions to subordinates, in public speaking (sometimes with little or no time for preparation), in informal reports and explanations, and in more formal briefings. Included here is the skill required to prepare materials for presentation in the more formal situations. Often briefings must be given to visitors, both official and unofficial; to the press; to host government officials

(which can occasion special problems because of the language barrier and cultural differences); to subordinates or new staff members, etc.

10. Memory for complicated or detailed qualitative and quantitative material. Incumbents in all four positions deal with very wide varieties of subjects, people, organizations, etc., and with vast amounts of information. Faulty memory is costly in time, work, money and prestige. Nearly all official and semi-official interaction involves questions about operations of specific projects, status of budgets, justifications for program decisions, for ordering equipment, etc., all of which require that the incumbent have a great deal of information at his command from moment to moment. Also, in situations in which technical documents must be prepared under pressure, there often is not time for the review of supporting material which has been read in the past; the information is either recalled by the incumbent or not included at all.

11. Flexibility; the ability to perceive and utilize alternative ideas, methods, techniques, equipment, plans, etc. The isolation from the major source of supply (the United States), the relatively limited resources available in the host country, extensive delays in communication, objections to originally proposed plans, and the frequent need to generate new, more suitable or more current information about goals or means -- all make it necessary that incumbents remain open to suggestions and alternatives. The Executive Officer and the Deputy Director, especially, must be able to move quickly and frequently from activity to activity.

12. Creativity, resourcefulness, imagination, inventiveness, ability to devise new things or methods, to adapt existing ideas and things to new situations, to devise alternative plans, courses of action, etc. This implies a lack of rigidity not only in the perception and choice of alternatives, but in the mode of thinking about things

and events. Unlike category (3) above, which involves the logical solution of problems, this characteristic includes the "inspirational" solution. It is the quality that permits incumbents to devise essentially new or better adapted solutions once problems are perceived. It is a quality which can be useful in organizational changes, in the invention or adaptation of equipment, or in devising methods or procedures.

13. Foresight, ability to envision outcomes, to anticipate requirements or contingencies. A great deal of the mission's business is transacted under conditions involving uncertainty. Program and project planning must take into account a great many routine details that might be taken for granted in a U.S. operation, and many more contingencies arise than are likely to occur in the United States.

14. Ability to work effectively and efficiently under pressure. A large proportion of the most important administrative documents, particularly those in the areas of planning and implementation, are usually prepared under extreme pressure of time. If this urgency tends to stall an incumbent or to otherwise reduce his efficiency, an additional complication is introduced into an already difficult and irritating situation.

B. Social Skills

1. Ability to motivate others, to convince, to persuade, or to gain cooperation by other means. The larger the staff of subordinates with whom the incumbent must work, the more important this requirement becomes. It is also important that the cooperation of colleagues, superiors and subordinates be obtained in such matters as program planning, organizational changes, changes in procedure, or fund allocation in times of shortage. A significant application of these skills is in dealing

with host nationals, particularly if they are dubious about the value of reforms, a project, etc., to which the mission is strongly committed.

2. Ability to stimulate new ideas, to help others to explore and develop their ideas. This is a particularly important aspect of program planning, and is more probably a major requirement for the three officers who are most heavily engaged in planning than for the Executive Officer. It is probably a most important requirement of the Deputy and the Division Chief in helping subordinates to plan and carry out projects.

3. Ability to perceive and interpret subtle responses, to understand the social implications of one's own behavior, to determine motives and purposes, to understand habits of thought and action. This quality, which also might be termed "empathy" or "sensitivity," is important in virtually all interaction, but particularly in relationships such as those between a technician and his counterpart, between the Director and his Deputy, and the USAID and host government representatives whom they are advising or with whom they are negotiating. Empathy is frequently defined as the ability to put oneself in the position of another, to see a situation from the other's point of view. This quality is particularly important in overseas work, where the points of view are often more divergent than is the case in the United States, both between AID personnel and hosts that they are trying to help, and between personnel in the field and their colleagues in Washington. It was found, for example, that field personnel who had worked previously in AID/W and were familiar with procedures in Washington were more tolerant of delays and reversals than those without such experience. This might be interpreted as indicating that the capacity of those who had worked in AID/W to understand the reasons for action in Washington had been increased.

4. Tact and diplomacy in personal interaction; ability to deal with distasteful issues, to refuse benefits without creating ill feeling, resistance or hostility; to criticize constructively; to teach without appearing to demean. This is a prime requirement of all who deal with host nationals as well as with other American personnel. Executive Officers must abolish positions and refuse to distribute special favors; Deputy Directors and Program Officers must turn down proposals for projects from the host government; Division Chiefs must correct poor procedures and ineffective performance by technicians and contractors -- these and many other examples are illustrations of the requirement for diplomatic handling of potentially disruptive situations.

5. Friendliness; ability to establish and maintain rapport, to allay fears, to dispel suspicion, to mollify. Friendliness, as the term is used here, is not necessarily synonymous with geniality. It requires that an incumbent inspire the confidence and perhaps affection of his associates, both Americans and host nationals. The establishment of rapport, often referred to as "a good working relationship," with host officials, colleagues, and subordinates is probably a vital prologue to the accomplishment of substantive work. Situations in which reassurance is required in order to maintain rapport and morale include such cases as that of the subordinate whose second tour is expiring with no new position yet available for him; the irate superior whose instructions the incumbent has failed to understand and implement; the often-disappointed host government official who is thoroughly committed to a project which AID/W refuses to approve; the Minister who is convinced that USAID personnel are spies; the Embassy Administrative Officer who is angry at criticism for the quality of his support services to AID; and many others.

6. Ability to negotiate; to adduce telling issues, to create a consistently tenable position, to recognize inconsistencies, to discover and manipulate potential benefits and losses, to compromise without major loss, etc. This requirement is of particular importance to incumbents who will be responsible for conducting project negotiations with host national officials. Effective negotiating requires a complex of skills, many of which have already been mentioned above and, in addition, thorough knowledge of the substance of the negotiations.

7. Ability to advise, counsel. The ability to advise is not well understood. It derives, perhaps, in part from the ability to engender confidence, in part from maturity and balanced wisdom in a substantive field, and in part from a knack of suiting ideas to the idiosyncrasies of the person to whom advice is offered. It is probably an especially desirable talent in Deputy Directors and Division Chiefs, who may have opportunities to influence major host policies and programs through their host counterparts. A variant of this kind of ability may be what is generally termed counseling, which may be desirable in situations involving conflicts among mission personnel, upsetting environmental or social conditions in the host country; or individual personal problems on which advice is needed. Whereas the Executive Officer is the incumbent most likely to fulfill this role, the Deputy Director or the Program Officer may also become involved occasionally, and the Division Chief may handle the difficulties which arise within his division.

D. Organizational Skills

The following characteristics are usually composed of more fundamental intellectual and social skills, tempered by motives and attitudes. Thus, they represent some of the ways in which the qualities described above might be translated into broader aspects of job performance. However, there is no assurance that the social and intellectual

characteristics above represent an exhaustive list of the components of the organizational skills, which may contain elements other than those that have been mentioned previously. One such element is probably a capacity to comprehend global patterns of organization and action, both within the mission and between the mission and other organizational units with which it interacts. This capacity is basic to all of the more specific skills below.

1. Ability to plan organization, procedures, and sequences of activities realistically; to schedule work, expenditures, etc. This is a requirement for almost any management job. It is particularly important in the overseas setting because of the fluidity of conditions. It is probably most prominently a requirement for Deputy Directors, but is also drawn upon heavily in the other three positions.

2. Ability to delegate responsibility and authority. This is a routine requirement in jobs where subordinates must be supervised, and is particularly important when workload is heavy and responsibilities are many. However, more than a few cases were encountered where highest level executives failed to delegate responsibilities, or when having done so, proceeded to occupy themselves with the same duties in minute detail, to the neglect of functions of broader scope.

3. Ability to coordinate diverse people and activities. This requirement is felt in situations which range from the need to prevent duplication of effort by AID and other development agencies in the host country to the need to prevent all the Division Chiefs from taking vehicles on field trips on the same day. Such coordination takes on particular importance when several different people, perhaps at different locations, contribute to a single and product, e.g., the CAP.

4. Ability to monitor progress quantitatively and qualitatively; to assess personal capabilities realistically; to evaluate performance. This is especially difficult overseas, where the cues concerning capabilities of local nationals may be quite different from those that are useful in evaluating U.S. personnel. The monitoring tasks are particularly troublesome when the criteria of successful performance are lacking or unclear, when personnel in technical areas other than one's own are involved, and when the frequency of low grade performance is great. Successful performance may provide its own criteria in new situations.

5. Ability to perceive relationships among activities, people, progress, and organizational factors which promote or constrain events; to reorganize so that basic goals are facilitated. This is especially a requirement for Deputy Directors (and Directors). It involves the insight to know when reorganization, or changes in procedures or person nel are needed and the creative ability to institute appropriate changes so that a moderately successful enterprise can be improved or an unsuccessful one can be made viable. The particular requirements of individual mission organization and procedure should probably be tailored to meet local conditions and should be open to change with changes in conditions in and out of the missions. Such concerns are generally the responsibility of top management.

II. Personal Motivational Characteristics

Many of the characteristics listed below may have deep-seated emotional value for some individuals but not for others. If they are of relatively superficial importance to an individual, they can be expected to change with training or stronger motivation. Superficial or not, as long as they are operative, they generally shape behavior under a wide variety of conditions which are unrelated in content and in situation. For example, an insecure individual with little self-confidence may find it difficult to assume responsibility, to act with initiative, to be flexible, etc., whether he is dealing with Americans or host nationals, superiors or subordinates, ideas or materials.

A. Initiative, willingness to act without direction or instruction. Since all four of the key incumbents hold positions of great responsibility, initiative on their part is necessary to a dynamic operation. This quality may be especially important for Division Chiefs. Depending on the personalities of Mission Directors, all four incumbents must be prepared to temper initiative with a willingness to pursue the wishes of the Director. There is some indication that this qualification is particularly important for Deputies and Program Officers inasmuch as both must be prepared to serve, each in his own sphere, as "alter egos" to the Director.

B. Responsibility, willingness to assume and discharge duties; unwillingness to produce either too little, or low quality results. This requirement relates to the pride which the incumbent feels in his work and the degree to which he becomes personally involved in it as something beyond a mechanical task to be minimally accomplished. Often overseas there is little external motivation for good job performance. To the contrary, there are often a great many discouraging factors and sometimes pressures to do well only nominally at the cost of substantive quality. Intrinsically, high personal standards of excellence may be the Agency's only safeguards in certain situations.

C. Decisiveness, willingness to make decisions in time. The qualifications related to making a sound decision were covered earlier under Section I, (2), (3) & (4). This characteristic has to do with the ability of the incumbent to avoid over-long deliberation, and to take action when it is required, possibly despite lack of certain relevant information. In some respects, this is related to the willingness of the incumbent to take risk. It may be mandatory to make decisions more or less quickly, for example, when the deadline for obligation of funds is approaching, when a host national official delivers an ultimatum, when political crises occur, and in many other contingencies where inaction would be more detrimental than action. This quality may be most important for the Deputy and the Executive Officer and least important for the Program Officer.

D. Skepticism; willingness to suspend judgments or conclusions until proper consideration has been given to the evidence. A skeptical outlook may be of special service in the relatively unstructured overseas situation. Working in foreign cultures, under the disadvantage of a general paucity of reliable information, there may be a tendency to rely on apparently knowledgeable people, etc., for such information as project progress, or for advice about political intentions of government officials. A good many incidents were reported in which incumbents in all four positions drew conclusions and acted prematurely on the basis of information from inadequate or uninformed sources.

E. Self-assertion; self-confidence; willingness to maintain one's sense of rightness; ability to resist pressure. This quality is mentioned because of the reports by several incumbents of situations in which they acted contrary to their own best judgment out of expediency and at the expense of program quality (usually to keep from developing a reputation for being difficult). This quality, must of course, be associated with good

judgment and sound technical knowledge if it is not to be obstructive. It should be recognized that some overseas incumbents, particularly technical Division Chiefs, are subject to pressures in this regard that are rarely or never found in similar jobs at home, e.g., the host government official who wants an AID job for a political supporter; a superior who wants a report or other document for AID/W or a technical decision despite a lack of necessary information.

F. Willingness to subordinate personal wishes to the desires of leadership. An individual who feels personally threatened if his opinion is challenged, or someone who refuses to back down in the face of reasonable or justified argument is a threat to the unity of the mission position in dealings with host officials as well as to an effective program. Emotional or stubborn adherence to a position has been reported to cause resentment among colleagues, and a too-forceful approach can alienate them. An example of a case where compromise is necessary is in the area of political considerations in program planning. There is reported to be a tendency on the part of some Program Officers and Division Chiefs to resent the necessity for taking account of political factors. The Deputy Director and the Director, however, must respond to the political as well as to the economic and social considerations involved in planning. This clearly requires compromise if planning documents are to be produced.

G. Willingness to assume "reasonable" risks. This implies neither timidity nor rashness. It also implies the ability to assess probabilities of outcome, and to weigh the relative magnitude or value of whatever is being risked. The primary reference here is to personal risks or to impersonal risks that have personal consequences. An example of such a situation is provided by the Deputy Director who had to execute an agreement with the host government in accordance with draft procedures, since regular procedures had not yet been set up. If the agreement later turned out to be incorrectly done, or illegal, the incumbent claimed he had no recourse; his job was at stake. Several others who faced such situations pointed out

that it was a temptation not to do anything under such conditions, since the risk involved was so great. This willingness to take risks extends to attempts to accomplish an undertaking when its outcome is intrinsically ambiguous, such as a program with no visible end-product and no precedent, as is the case with some pilot education projects.

H. Persistence; reasonable tolerance for negative reinforcement, for lack of reinforcement, or for long-delayed reinforcement. As was pointed out earlier, the incumbent in any one of the four positions must be able to generate his own reinforcement under many circumstances. The protracted length of time it may take to receive instructions, acknowledgements, decisions, personnel, and equipment from the United States means that an incumbent must be able to tolerate set-backs and delays.

Many obstacles other than delays can arise in the process of accomplishing necessary action, such as changes in program priorities or goals by Washington, unavailability of people with particular technical skills, equipment breakdowns, blocks by colleagues or superiors, and delay or noncooperation within the host government. If the incumbent is easily defeated by such obstacles, if he is unable to go on with plans in the face of adverse circumstances (often including opposition by his co-workers), he may be reduced to inaction. This quality must be coupled with a sense of responsibility if it is not to be misdirected.

I. Adaptability, willingness to trade off different forms of reward, to accept certain types of reinforcement in substitution for others. This implies the ability to move certain aspects of work forward although others may have been impeded. This ability to compromise with one's own aims and goals is illustrated in the following reaction of a Division Chief to a set-back: "If equipment for well-drilling cannot be obtained

this year, perhaps we can get it next year, and in the meantime, let's start an immunization campaign, or a sanitation program in that village that had a typhoid epidemic last year." This characteristic is in some ways akin to the flexibility discussed earlier, but it makes explicit the motivational element -- for example, in the individual who is able to function constructively despite his own disappointments, who is able to substitute other activity or goals for the original ones.

J. Pragmatism; a practical as opposed to an academic approach to work and problems. Academic approaches are believed, by most incumbents who have given it thought, to be luxuries that the missions and AID cannot afford. However, what is pragmatic and what is academic appears to be debatable. Cases were cited of persons who were too prone to act hastily, without sufficient background work, and conversely of persons who were occupied by issues that could not come to fruition in AID, in a particular mission or a particular situation.

K. Thoroughness; willingness to attend to detail (sometimes on personally uninteresting topics). This is important in monitoring the work of poorly qualified subordinates. Numerous instances of error, attributable to failure to plan or to check in detail, were reported.

L. Integrity, honesty; also willingness to withhold information -- to speak with discretion.

M. Objectivity, impartiality, willingness to view matters in terms of extrinsic standards rather than personal interests. This characteristic is involved, for example, in the allotment of housing or in rendering services impartially; in assigning unpleasant tasks fairly; in lack of favoritism among the various divisions despite friendship with some and aloofness with other division people. It applies also to personnel evaluation, and to the determination of the relative value of various types

of projects regardless of one's own prejudice or philosophy of development.

N. Concern for the well-being of other people. Mission morale is heavily influenced by this quality or the lack of it, particularly on the part of Executive Officers. Effectiveness of American-host personal relations appear also to be related to this quality.

O. Open-mindedness and respect for the local people, their customs and culture. This quality is mentioned because more than a few instances of rudeness toward local nationals were reported and observed. Furthermore, there appears to be little interaction with hosts commensurate with certain of the tasks incumbents are trying to accomplish. All four incumbents are required to deal with host nationals on more or less complicated matters where favorable host attitudes are a prerequisite to success.

P. Willingness to keep up with new developments. This applies both to developments in one's own technical area and to the day-to-day changes in AID policy, national and international political events, the mission program as a whole and individual projects, impact of the program on the host country, and new theoretical and practical approaches to economic and social development, etc. Incumbents find it difficult to maintain currency because of the press of day-to-day business, social and ceremonial activities. Also, information sources are usually meager compared to those available in the U.S. This quality is probably desirable in all four positions, although the variety of matters which the Executive Officer must keep up with is probably smaller than it is for the other positions.

Q. General curiosity, interest in a wide range of subjects and events. This is a characteristic which may be required to compensate for the general paucity of all aspects of the overseas environment. Incumbents appear to have many opportunities to acquire information adventitiously, and to suggest ideas on projects and issues other than

those that they are primarily concerned with. The Deputy Director, the Program Officer and the Executive Officer, especially, are often called upon to deal with a very wide variety of matters that are not related to their formal schooling or past job experience.

III. Areas of General Knowledge

In addition to the technical managerial knowledge which prospective Division Chiefs, Program Officers and others should have upon entering service, there are general areas of information which would permit an incumbent to accomplish his job more effectively and with a shorter delay than would otherwise be possible. Second knowledge (of almost any kind) may be more readily determined during selection interviews than other qualities. Furthermore, it is possible that sophistication in certain areas may tend to reflect other desirable characteristics. It is not possible to say at this time whether profound knowledge in any of these areas can compensate for deficiencies in other qualities, e.g., flexibility,or vice versa. However, it is a practical selection question which should be asked and, if possible, answered both in general and for each instance when a key incumbent is being considered.

A. Broad general knowledge in various substantive areas, but especially familiarity with one's own technical specialty. This quality is the complement of the previously mentioned one -- general curiosity. In practical selection terms, general information is one of the components of general intelligence, a quality which is most desirable in these jobs. It is a relatively easy component to determine in a job candidate.

B. Extensive and accurate English vocabulary. In all four key positions, reading, writing and editing are involved in major job functions. Much of the difficulty within missions and between missions and other agencies stems from poor expression. An extensive vocabulary

is generally associated with writing ability; it is also generally one of the easiest to measure.

C. Foreign language. Tabulation of the incumbent's responses to the foreign language requirement is presented on page 37 of this Appendix. The interview data indicated that the Executive Officer and the technical staff are likely to have frequent, day-to-day contact with host nationals, making a command of the language important for them. Knowledge of the host language may be a critical requirement for Deputy Directors because of the intricacy of the tasks that they are sometimes involved in with host nationals, e.g., negotiation of Project Agreements. Serious disagreements resulting from subtle misunderstandings were reported. The importance of knowing some of the local language in establishing rapport and in making friends among host nationals can hardly be overestimated for an incumbent in any position.

D. Knowledge of practical political processes. Much of the activity which influences mission operations is political in nature. American government and nongovernmental political processes which affect the timing of foreign aid appropriations are usually known to incumbents who have been in the field. However, many other political factors must be routinely considered. The practical (as opposed to the nominal) form of government in the host country is of primary importance, as is an understanding of some of the less obvious operative aspects of American government. The major reason for the introduction of the term "practical" into this requirement, however, is that some of the most important political factors are not to be discovered in academic texts, but appear to be apprehended through practical experience of the roles that patronage, personal friendships and loyalties, bribery, private interests of high officials, and other extra-institutional factors play in political decision-making. More than one incumbent has discovered, to his dismay, that a host government official

was using AID money or equipment or the prestige or naivete of the incumbent himself to further his own political ends.

E. Knowledge of bureaucratic processes, procedures, and constraints. For selection purposes, it is not really necessary that prospective incumbents know the substance of the regulations, constraints, organizations and procedures of AID, but it would probably be desirable for them to know realistically how their decisions and actions will be affected by these matters. They should know, for example, that clearances must be obtained informally from certain offices before any major effort is made if action is not to be blocked, that the handling of funds is highly circumscribed, etc.

F. Knowledge of current international affairs. International politics, diplomacy, and the state of international trade, currency exchange, travel regulations, etc., are all germane to program development and implementation, and some are relevant to mission operations. Sophistication in these matters may indicate that a candidate for the job of Division Chief will be able to appreciate many of the complex interdisciplinary problems he may encounter. This may also be a relatively easy quality to assess during interviews with candidates.

G. Knowledge of the recent history of the host country. This may be desirable in order to understand the events which have led to the present distribution of wealth and power, the probable political future in the country, the ideological basis for political factors, the origins of positions taken by local ethnic and religious groups and social classes, and many other considerations which may affect the nature or success of a program or project. Many issues are likely to be clarified which might otherwise not even have been perceived as issues, or might have been brushed aside with a lack of recognition of their importance.

IV. Physical Factors

Beyond the basic prerequisites for good physical health which all incumbents must meet, the following physical characteristics appear to be important in performance due to the nature and number of the tasks for which the incumbents are responsible, and due to the amount of personal contact involved their performance and the consequent importance of the impressions they make upon others.

A. Physical or mental energy and stamina. The workload borne by the incumbents may be very heavy, particularly when it is supplemented by a heavy social schedule. Considerable "drive" is necessary in order to work nine or ten hours a day (as many incumbents must). Executive Officers routinely, and others at various periods in the program cycle, must have enough energy to work long hard hours, and still remain calm, reasonable, and pleasant in dealing with colleagues, subordinates, host officials, visitors, and telephone calls. Often trips across the city in heat and traffic are necessary; periodic visits to the Embassy must be made; and field trips to remote areas can be very demanding, particularly if the climate is uncomfortable. Instances were reported and observed of incumbents who lacked the energy (and in some cases the good health) to accomplish their tasks.

B. Social presence, appearance, and manner. Much of the activity of the key incumbents is interaction with others; very little is truly independent effort. However, with the exception of the Americans with whom he works, few of his associates are likely to know him well. Under such conditions, his appearance and manner is perhaps the most important factor in "what is known" about him. Regardless of their validity as indicators of what the "real person" is like, appearance and social presence are likely to be more influential in interaction than other

qualities which are patently impossible to become familiar with in brief, superficial, or formal contact. Thus, insofar as an incumbent is subject to such contact with people whose lasting impressions are important, his appearance and manner should be such that a favorable impression is likely. Through his manner and social presence, he may communicate the concern for others, the ability to perceive subtle relationships, the sophistication, and his other substantive capacities which, unaccompanied by translation into overt social behavior, will remain unrecognized by all but his close associates.

Actual and Desirable Levels of Education and Experience

The following tables summarize the educational and experiential backgrounds of the incumbents in the four key AID positions who participated in this study. The tables also indicate types and amounts of education and experience the incumbents felt to be desirable as job requirements. The numbers recorded in each column refer to number of interviewees in the specified category, or the number of interviewees responding to a question or offering information. Numerical data presented here is based on an extremely small sample (forty-nine incumbents in all four positions) and thus cannot be considered valid for the entire Agency.

One of the twelve incumbents included in the Deputy Director columns was an Acting Deputy Director, and one was a Mission Director. Among the twelve Executive Officers, there was one Acting Executive Officer. The thirteen Division Chiefs included one Deputy Division Chief and one Training Officer with Division Chief responsibilities.

Table 1 compares the actual education of incumbents to the education levels they felt to be minimum prerequisites for their jobs. It is noteworthy that, overall, an education level lower than that of the current incumbents was considered acceptable. This difference was most pronounced among Executive Officers, one-third of whom saw their jobs as requiring no college training, and the balance indicating that no more than a bachelor's degree was necessary.

Entries for Table 2, "Special Training Considered Desirable," reflect the voluntary responses of incumbents. The incumbents were not given a list from which to make selections.

Tables 3 and 4 describe AID work experience abroad and in AID/W, as listed in the Department of State Biographic Register, and supplemented by up-to-date information supplied by interviewees. This work time includes both that accomplished for the current Agency for International Development and for predecessor organizations. In Table 4, the category "1 year or less" refers to any amount of time, however insignificant, that was spent in AID/W. Included in this category are orientation, language training, and schools. These two tables highlight the fact that the incumbents participating in the study have spent only small portions of their careers in AID/W, with Executive Officers and Division Chiefs having practically no experience with the Agency in the United States.

The results in Table 5 indicate that Executive Officers have had the most experience in United States Government service, and Division Chiefs have had relatively little experience in working for the federal government beyond their overseas experience.

Table 6 further stresses the point that Division Chiefs have spent more years in non-government service than incumbents in the other three positions. This is as might be expected, since Division Chiefs are considered established experts in technical fields, frequently having taught their specialties for several years before being recruited for work in the Agency.

Entries for Table 7, "Experience Recommended by Incumbents as Job Prerequisites," reflect the voluntary responses of incumbents. They were not given a list from which to make selections.

Data in Table 8 concerning language proficiency represent the skill level reported by incumbents concerning their own capabilities, based on the Department of State rating system for speaking and reading proficiency. No attempt was made to independently verify the degree of proficiency. The table is not intended to reflect capabilities in all

languages, but only those relevant to the post to which they were currently assigned. As of the time this study began, in the summer of 1962, three of the missions visited had no foreign language requirements for Americans. Since the four incumbents serving in these three posts, totaling twelve persons, were not using a foreign language in their current post and had developed no skills, they were included in the table in the same category as those personnel who needed foreign language proficiency, but had developed no skills. The disparity in response between speaking and reading proficiency is due to the number of interviewees having different skill levels in the two modes, e.g., ability to speak at a "2" level and to read at a "3" level. Only twelve incumbents out of thirty-seven needing foreign language, or roughly one-third, could speak at the "3" level, or better. Division Chiefs, although theoretically having the most working contact with host nationals, reported less foreign language skill usable in their current post than the incumbents in other positions.

TABLE 1

Actual and Desirable Education

Educational Degree	Deputy Director		Program Officer		Executive Officer		Division Chief		Totals	
	A*	D**	A*	D**	A*	D**	A*	D**	A*	D**
Ph.D., Ed.D., M.D.	2	2	3	2	0	0	8	7	13	11
LL.B.	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0
M.A., M.S., M.B.A.	4	0	7	3	1	0	2	2	14	5
B.A., B.S., B.E., B.B.A.	3	5	1	3	7	7	3	1	14	16
Two to three years of college	1	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	5	0
No college	1	1	0	0	0	4	0	0	1	5
Data not available	0	4	0	4	0	1	0	3	0	12

* Actual education

** Education considered desirable by incumbents for their job

TABLE 2

Special Training Considered Desirable

Courses	Deputy Director	Program Officer	Executive Officer	Division Chief	Totals
Agriculture	2	0	0	1	3
Business Administration	1	1	2	3	7
Accounting and Finance	1	2	5	1	9
Executive Management	1	2	1	0	4
Office Operations	0	0	2	0	2
Engineering	2	1	2	0	5
Humanities (general)	0	1	0	0	1
Area Studies	1	0	0	0	1
History	1	1	0	0	2
Writing	0	0	1	0	1
Social Sciences (general)	1	1	0	1	3
Anthropology	2	2	0	1	5
Economics (general)	0	7	0	2	9
Development Economics	1	3	0	0	4
International Economics	0	3	0	0	3
Money and Banking	0	1	0	0	1
Administration	0	0	0	3	3
Comparative Education	0	0	0	3	3
Educational Psychology	0	0	0	1	1
Vocational Education	0	0	0	3	3
Government (general)	2	1	0	0	3
International Relations	1	1	0	0	2
Political Science	2	5	0	0	7
Public Administration	2	3	1	0	6
U.S. Government	0	1	0	0	1
Psychology (general)	1	1	0	1	3
Personnel Management	0	0	2	0	2
Sociology (general)	1	2	0	1	4
Law	1	0	1	0	2
Mathematics (general)	1	1	0	0	2
Statistics	0	0	0	1	1
Philosophy	0	0	0	1	1
AID Operations	0	0	0	2	2
AID Programming	0	0	2	1	3

TABLE 3

Work Experience with AID Overseas

Number of Years	Deputy Director	Program Officer	Executive Officer	Division Chief	Totals
1 year or less	2	1	0	0	3
2 years	2	1	2	1	6
3 years	0	0	0	0	0
4 years	1	0	0	0	1
5 years	1	2	1	4	8
6 years	1	1	1	4	7
7 years	1	3	2	0	6
8 years	0	0	2	1	3
9 years	1	0	0	0	1
10 years	0	0	1	2	3
11 years	1	2	0	1	4
12 years	0	0	1	0	1
13 years	0	0	0	0	0
14 years	1	0	0	0	1
15 years	0	1	0	0	1
20 years	0	0	1	0	1
No Data	1	1	1	0	3
Total Interviewees	12	12	12	13	49
Total Years of Experience	62	77	87	85	311
Average Years of Experience	5.63	7.00	7.90	6.54	6.76

TABLE 4

Work Experience with AID in the United States

Number of Years	Deputy Director	Program Officer	Executive Officer	Division Chief	Totals
1 year or less	5	4	10	10	29
2 years	1	1	0	1	3
3 years	2	3	0	1	6
4 years	1	1	0	0	2
5 years	0	1	1	1	3
6 years	1	1	0	0	2
7 years	1	0	0	0	1
No Data	1	1	1	0	3
Total Interviewees	12	12	12	13	49
Total Years of Experience	30	30	15	20	95
Average Years of Experience	2.73	2.73	1.25	1.54	2.07

TABLE 5

Work Experience with United States Government
Other than with AID

Number of Years	Deputy Director	Program Officer	Executive Officer	Division Chief	Totals
None	1	1	2	5	9
1 year	0	0	0	1	1
2 years	1	1	0	2	4
3 years	2	3	2	0	7
4 years	1	0	1	1	3
5 years	1	1	0	0	2
6 years	0	1	0	0	1
7 years	2	1	1	0	4
8 years	1	0	0	1	2
9 years	1	0	1	0	2
10 years	0	1	1	0	2
11 years	1	0	0	1	2
12 years	0	0	0	1	1
13 years	0	0	1	0	1
14 years	0	0	1	1	2
16 years	0	1	0	0	1
24 years	0	0	1	0	1
No Data	1	2	1	0	4
Total Interviewees	12	12	12	13	49
Total Years of Experience	59	55	87	54	255
Average Years of Experience	5.36	5.50	7.90	4.15	5.67

TABLE 6

Significant Work Experience - Non-Government

Number of Years and Type of Experience	Deputy Director	Program Officer	Executive Officer	Division Chief	Totals
BUSINESS					
None	7	6	6	12	31
1 year	1	0	0	0	1
2 years	0	1	0	0	1
3 years	1	0	0	0	1
5 years	0	0	0	1	1
8 years	0	0	1	0	1
9 years	0	1	0	0	1
10 years	0	0	1	0	1
11 years	0	1	0	0	1
20 years	1	0	0	0	1
No Data	2	3	4	0	9
RESEARCH					
None	8	8	8	12	36
1 year	0	0	0	0	0
2 years	1	0	0	1	2
No Data	3	4	4	0	11
TEACHING					
None	6	6	8	4	24
1 year	2	1	0	0	3
2 years	0	0	0	1	1
4 years	1	0	0	0	1
6 years	0	1	0	0	1
7 years	0	0	0	1	1
13 years	0	0	0	3	3
14 years	0	1	0	0	1
17 years	0	0	0	2	2
18 years	0	0	0	1	1
20 years	0	0	0	1	1
No Data	3	3	4	0	10

TABLE 6 (Continued)

Significant Work Experience - Non-Government

Number of Years and Type of Experience	Deputy Director	Program Officer	Executive Officer	Division Chief	Totals
ADMINISTRATIVE OR TECHNICAL					
None	3	3	3	3	12
1 year	1	0	3	0	4
2 years	0	2	0	0	2
3 years	2	1	1	1	5
4 years	1	1	0	1	3
5 years	0	1	0	0	1
6 years	0	0	1	0	1
8 years	0	0	0	1	1
9 years	1	0	0	2	3
11 years	0	0	1	1	2
15 years	1	0	0	2	3
19 years	0	0	1	0	1
28 years	0	0	0	1	1
No Data	3	4	2	1	10
Total Interviewees	12	12	12	13	49
Total Years of Experience	67	59	60	229	415
Average Years of Experience	1.81	1.73	1.77	4.49	2.66

TABLE 7

Experience Recommended by Incumbents
As Job Prerequisites

Type of Experience	Deputy Director	Program Officer	Executive Officer	Division Chief	Totals
Research	1	0	0	0	1
Teaching	1	0	0	0	1
Management	4	1	3	1	9
Executive	1	0	0	0	1
Administration	2	0	1	2	5
Government	1	2	1	0	4
Personnel	1	0	4	0	5
General	1	0	0	0	1
Budget and Fiscal	1	0	2	0	3
Desk Officer	0	2	0	0	2
Programming	0	1	0	0	1
Lower Program Office Positions	0	5	0	0	5
Lower Executive Office Positions	0	0	4	0	4
Lower Education Division Positions	0	0	0	2	2
Elementary Teaching	0	0	0	2	2
Teacher Education	0	0	0	2	2
Education Administration	0	0	0	3	3
All Fields of Education	0	0	0	2	2
Vocational Education	0	0	0	1	1

TABLE 8

Foreign Language Proficiency
As Reported By Incumbents

Proficiency Level, Language of Post	Deputy Director	Program Officer	Executive Officer	Division Chief	Totals
S-0	2	4	3	6	15
R-0	2	4	3	6	15
S-1	0	1	0	0	1
R-1	0	1	0	0	1
S-2	0	0	0	1	1
R-2	0	0	0	0	0
S-3	3	3	1	1	8
R-3	1	3	1	2	7
S-4	0	1	1	1	3
R-4	2	1	1	1	5
S-5	0	0	1	0	1
R-5	0	0	1	0	1
No Data	7	3	6	4	20

APPENDIX G

to

A Study of Some Key USAID Jobs

POLICY AND PROCEDURE CONSIDERATIONS

American Institute for Research
Washington, D. C.

JUNE 1964

POLICY AND PROCEDURE CONSIDERATIONS

This appendix reports the responses of incumbents to questions which dealt with their attitudes and opinions about the general policies and procedures of the Agency for International Development. It was originally intended to correlate differences in incumbents' philosophies, opinions and attitudes with mission characteristics and overall mission effectiveness. The curtailed scope of the project prevented this; however, inasmuch as these materials indicate the attitudes of senior mission staff toward some major problems, it was judged that these materials might be of value to AID administrators and others in the qualitative form in which they are here presented.

The first topic covered below delineates the policy areas in which disagreement or difficulty are most often reported to occur within the mission or between the mission and Washington; the second area deals with conflicts in and confusion over policy among the incumbents interviewed. The problem of communication between Washington and the field is also treated here because of its pervasiveness and its influence on policy implementation. Within the curtailed scope of the study, there was no way to determine with confidence how widespread these various difficulties are among the missions. However, a considerable number of incumbents reported several such difficulties and this evidence, combined with the near-universality of communication barriers between Washington and the field, indicates that these are probably significant problem areas in the foreign assistance effort.

Philosophy of Foreign Aid: Reactions to general policy

The issues most often mentioned in this connection were: 1) political vs. economic justification for foreign aid; 2) human resources vs. capital development; 3) scope of AID efforts; 4) policies and procedures which affect relationships with the host

government and the "American image." In addition, there were numerous miscellaneous comments dealing with the general social and humanitarian goals of the United States in its foreign aid program. Executive Officers were less likely to discuss policy issues in detail than were other incumbents; Program Officers and Deputy Directors seemed most concerned about general AID policy.

The issue which drew most comment was the problem of reconciling political and economic aims. Most incumbents discussing this problem indicated that both considerations are and should be operative in program planning; the difficulty arose from the frequent necessity of justifying political aid on economic grounds. The general tenor of the comments indicated that incumbents felt that politically motivated aid should be justified candidly on political grounds. A Deputy Director summarized the conflict, adding his own solution: "There are two schools in AID: Soft -- use aid with a big shovel, use it for political purposes, don't try to accomplish much. Hard -- restrict aid, control its administration, try to get results. People tend to be consistently hard or soft. AID policy should be liberal in amount and purpose, but hard in action and administration."

Many incumbents had comments about the current program emphasis in their own missions. While some of these observations were meaningful only in the context of the particular country, others took the form of a broader conflict between human resources and capital development and, in a few cases, between industrial and agricultural development. There was no consensus on the latter issue. But, by and large, incumbents tended to favor emphasis on human resources and education against capital development. (However, most who discussed this issue were Education Division Chiefs, and thus this attitude may not be representative of the climate of opinion in the mission as a whole.) One Division Chief, after expressing his conviction that the mission was not giving sufficient

emphasis to education, particularly general education, said that "the probable reason is that education doesn't have a visible end product you can point to like a road or a dam." Another Division Chief pointed out, "There are no trained people here, so with industrial development, the people involved won't even be able to read the instructions on the machinery. Education is long and slow, but there is no other way to develop a country." Another incumbent said that "it is possible to have good economic development under communism. We need a balance of both economic and social development." Representing the other general opinion, however, was the supporter of capital development who said, "Get the viable economy and that will develop the human resources."

Another problem in program emphasis was pressure to consider projects which are presented by host officials, AID/W, and visiting dignitaries. A comment by a Program Officer typified the problem: ".... each one believes his specialty to be the most fundamental. Education experts, community development experts, public health experts, all believe that their fields are indispensable."

On the matter of the scope of AID's development efforts, a few incumbents suggested that perhaps AID should be more selective in its programs, focussing on specific goals and concentrating, as the Clay Report recommends, in fewer areas. Another matter of concern to some incumbents was that of long-range vs. short-range planning. Majority opinion favored long-range planning. One incumbent suggested that more stability in direction and policy were needed, adding that while some changes are forced upon the Agency by Congress, many others are needlessly generated from within. Another incumbent suggested that Country Assistance Programs be put on a continuing basis instead of "the current year-to-year uncertainty." On the other hand, a few incumbents tended to

favor short-range programs. One Executive Officer noted that "you can set up long-range plans but have to realize that you can't implement them immediately and may not be able to for years. You have to be able to change with the situation." From a Program Officer: "The advantages of crash programs are difficult to communicate to Division Chiefs .... They can't build as large an empire with crash programs and they don't go on as long."

On the matter of policy as it affects relations with the host government, several problem areas were mentioned. Incumbents displayed concern over the effects foreign aid is having, and can have, on the host country and on the hosts' confidence in the United States.

The concept of "self-help" and active involvement by the host country in development was strongly favored as a means of increasing the effectiveness of the aid effort by all who mentioned it. One incumbent suggested that technical assistance be put on a loan rather than a grant basis: "Loans could be very soft, but such a basis would reduce a lot of waste and the host governments would take much stronger interest in them." Another suggested that there should be a "more flexible assistance category" between grants and development loans. "These would be grants, plus loans where the host government would repay percentages of the total amount depending on ability to pay." A Deputy Director said that he would like to set up a program so that "each man in the mission is part of a bilateral agreement, rather than being supported under a unilateral technical support budget. When the host signs an agreement saying that a man is needed for a particular kind of project, then you can be sure he really is needed."

A number of incumbents noted conditions within the host government which prevented programs from being fully effective. A few suggested that some degree of coercion (withdrawal of funds) or "internal interference" be employed to correct conditions such as graft or fiscal

disorder, in contrast to the present policy of noninterference. It was also pointed out that "big economic aid" (loans or grants) makes it easier for people within the host government to "get a cut," whereas technical assistance "(affects) the common people at the bottom of the list." It was felt by a few incumbents that AID's tendency to respond to the desires for "big aid" on the part of the host government had the effect of supporting "the established in-group," whereas "technical assistance helps the other 95% of the people in the country."

Several problems were mentioned in connection with the impressions which certain aspects of AID's activity made on the image of the United States in the host country. A few of these were apparently founded on what some incumbents perceived as a misplaced effort by AID to get credit for its development efforts by over-emphasizing the effect of its contributions both in terms of their influence upon the host economy and in terms of the dollar amount expended by the United States in relation to other countries involved in development. It was mentioned that United States foreign aid sometimes tends to be viewed by the hosts as being more important than it actually is, and some incumbents also believed that U.S. aid is a primary factor in the economies of some of the least advanced countries. One incumbent felt that "AID virtually controls the economy; so the country's future rests on the success of our mission." This means, of course, that AID gets credit for the various problems encountered by the host country in its efforts to advance, as well as for the progress it makes.

It was also pointed out that emphasis on AID's accomplishments in terms of the dollar amount expended is not necessarily a valid index of the influence being exerted by the United States relative to other contributors. A Program Officer pointed out that "the amount of aid being given by other countries cannot be compared with that of the United States in dollars. Another country may be able to train a participant

at half the cost of the United States, but AID/W tries to give credit to the mission for getting donations to this country on a dollar basis." Some incumbents felt that such overemphasis upon the significance of U.S. aid can damage the hosts' confidence in the United States.

The policy vacillations mentioned previously also have an adverse effect upon the impression made by the United States. These changes, which are often due to internal or Congressional pressures, may appear to the host government to be motivated instead by self-interest. An example of the influence of a policy change upon the host government's confidence is provided by the case where the preliminary negotiations for a loan or project agreement have been completed, and the document has gone to Washington for approval. After a long delay, it is sent back, with certain conditions changed or added. "The host government frequently feels that their expectations, developed in discussion with AID/local, are crushed....In many instances, AID/local felt that AID/W had given a go-ahead signal on one set of conditions and then changed its mind. This, of course, irritates the host government as well as AID/local."

Confusion over policy and its implementation

The problem caused by policy vacillations in maintaining host government confidence has already been mentioned. Another difficulty is that the mission personnel themselves are often not clear on policy matters. Several Deputy Directors and Program Officers noted that there was some confusion in their own minds over such things as "why certain objectives were initially established here"; "Do they want any planning at all?" "What are AID/W goals and what will they be tomorrow?" A State Department employee commented to an interviewer, "Everyone in AID is in doubt about major policy. Each asks, 'Why are we doing this?' or 'Why don't we spend more on that?'" One Deputy Director noted that instability of policy was "creating difficulties" in field operations, and that he had not been sufficiently informed of the ambiguities before he left Washington for the mission.

Such confusion stems from several sources: Changes in orientation with changes in top administration within AID/W, "leading to conservative programming until people know what new policies will be"; poorly written or ambiguous policy documents; contradictory inputs from AID/W on policy matters ("Washington should make up its mind as to who knows best what should be done"); general changes in policy without specification of the procedures to be followed in implementing the change; and contradictions among well-established existing policies.

Examples of conflict in established policies were provided by several incumbents. One said, regarding the self-help policy vs. the unwritten rule that a "good" program must show concrete results: "We want countries to do things for themselves, but you have to take things out of their hands to get them done. The host government is inefficient, it takes time to get things done, you have to teach, but it takes so long this way, and since we want to see results, we do it ourselves." Another was of the opinion that the Latin American policy in regard to capital development vs. human resources development was frequently in conflict with the policy established by the Organization of American States at the Bogota Conference, to which the United States was a party. One man noted that AID preferred to put resources where there was the greatest potential for growth; however, the greatest need for development was frequently not in the place with the greatest potential, causing conflict between practical development goals and the humanitarian aspect of foreign aid which several incumbents felt to be of great importance.

The problem of changes in general policy without designation of the procedures to be followed in implementation seemed to be particularly acute in connection with contracting, development loans, and letters of credit, perhaps because these are recent additions which have not yet crystallized into standard procedures. The following paraphrased narrative by a Deputy Director sums up the difficulty: "Perhaps part of the

problem is that there is too much pressure for speed. There are periodic crises in AID/W caused by Congressional interests, reorganization of a particular division, the host government, or the Regional Director. When a policy change results from this, often there are no procedures, or only draft procedures (an instrument that you can't rely on, nor argue against if anyone raises a question). At the same time, the mission must initiate and proceed with a program and show that it is doing something. The way you find out what you can do is to proceed and take the chance on correction. One must be willing to take risks, and the job is at stake; there is no recourse against dismissal. The situation could make one decided not to start anything."

On the matter of the overall policy which determines the program, one Program Officer pointed out that Washington perhaps did not take enough care to clarify issues which were not tied to concrete legislation. "AID/W should let us know the basic assumptions which create our program and keep it in the form that it is." It was also pointed out that explaining <u>why</u> policies are in effect (for example, "Buy American") is a good way to reassert the policy when it is violated. This is clearly impossible when the reasons for a policy are not communicated to the field.

Finally, in missions where general policy guidelines are almost lacking, it is felt as a severe handicap; when one Program Officer was asked what was the worst problem he faced, he said it was the lack of definition of United States aims in the host country. "While they are stated in general terms, there are still conflicts, vacillating between 'It's about time to phase out operations' and 'The health of this country is <u>vital</u> to U.S. interests.' The host nationals also hold conflicting views -- that we are not doing enough, or that what we are doing is too diffuse, or that all aid should be withdrawn."

Communication between Washington and the mission

A large number of the problems encountered by incumbents in all four positions converge under the rubric of communication. The difficulties encountered in this area are very similar for incumbents in all positions, though Division Chiefs, since they have less direct communication with Washington, are somewhat less affected than the other incumbents. The difficulties are of four general types: delay, lack of clarity in written communications, lack of personal contact, and divergent frames of reference.

Delays

An enumeration of the frustrations caused by delayed response to urgent communications from the field is impossible because of the number of such instances encountered. The Executive Officer, who deals more directly with the Manual Orders which he has at his finger tips, appears to feel the problem less acutely than Deputy Directors and Program Officers, who are more often forced to grapple with unclear policies and procedures. A primary area of complaint is lack of feedback on the CAP after it has been submitted, making the obligation of funds impossible. The role played by Congress in approving foreign aid in this connection was noted, some incumbents suggesting that Congress be persuaded to appropriate assistance money on a multi-year basis.

Other time lags are encountered which are attributable to internal processes -- responses to requests for clarification of messages, to reports requiring further action, to requests for authorization of counterpart funds, to requests for approval of project agreements or loans and to many other types of communications are frequently delayed. Often two or three follow-up messages are required before a response is received. There is some evidence to indicate that adapting to this situation is one of the major adjustments a new man has to make in accommodating to his position in AID. One Program Officer said the problem was that "Washington feels absolutely no sense of urgency."

Whereas this situation is world-wide in scope, many incumbents who mentioned delays as a problem did not appear to be particularly upset about them. For example, one old "field hand" said he was so used to delays that organizational policies and procedures which bothered others did not bother him in the least; he had learned not to be irritated at long lags in reply from Washington, but simply to expect and accept them. In the words of one Program Officer, AID/W is not thought of as a real problem because the mission personnel have developed such a low expectation regarding performance by AID/W that "long delays, errors and unrealistic demands are regarded as routine." It is not difficult to understand how such low expectations could develop, in light of the frequency of protracted delays, but this tendency to adapt to the situation may be an impediment to the program if unreasonable time lags become a major factor in the planning and scheduling of operations. Another related area, which often has a strong influence on the incumbent's morale, is the lack of response to suggestions, ideas, and proposals sent to Washington for consideration. Not only are reactions to the suggestion not forthcoming, but sometimes its receipt is not even acknowledged.

Lack of clarity in written communications

This problem appears to be felt most keenly by Program Officers and Division Chiefs, since they are most likely to receive both policy statements and decisions, and the frequent requests for special information, justification, or additional details. Cables are particularly likely to cause difficulty "because they must be brief, because questions can only be raised at a later time, because they can be easily misunderstood and can be garbled....Difficulties occur daily." No suggestions were offered for solving this problem, which appears to be a combination of inadequate or incomplete formulation of messages plus "noise" introduced by the transmission system.

Lack of personal contact

In some missions, periodic direct contact with AID/W has been arranged using telephone or ham radio. In other missions, such contact is impractical or impossible, and even in those missions where it has been instituted, it is not always entire satisfactory. Thus the problem of establishing personal, day-to-day contact with Washington is felt to some extent by all missions, the degree being dependent upon how satisfactorily these devices are employed. "In U.S. bureaucracy, when blocks or delays are encountered, it is possible to phone someone you know in another department and find out the reasons. Overseas, there is no access to such information," one Deputy told the interviewer. A Program Officer said: "It is frustrating to get no answer from Washington, because you feel as if you could get them to change a decision if you were there and knew the person who made it and could argue with him." This Program Officer said that this was the greatest single frustration in his job.

The importance of personal contact is attested to by numerous incidents in which a visit to AID/W by a member of the mission staff served to clear up a great deal of unfinished business, including such things as project approval, contracting, recruiting new staff members, and extension of contract deadlines. In one case, the interviewer observed that the Deputy Director had his briefcase full of items -- thirty or forty -- to take care of in Washington on a pending trip. Sometimes a staff member leaving for the U.S. will routinely call every officer and chief in the mission to find out what they want him to expedite for them. Another indication of the importance of personal contact is the number of incidents in which "guardian angels" (personal friends in AID/W) are contacted outside of the regular channels to push urgent business.

Divergent frames of reference

The differences in the working situations of field vs. Washington personnel, different objectives, and in many cases different perceptions of what the relationship between Washington and the field should be, all serve to complicate the communication problem. Deputy Directors and some Program Officers tended to mention the problem arising out of AID/W's failure to delegate sufficient decision-making authority to the field, while other Program Officers and Division Chiefs tended to mention AID/W's lack of understanding of certain aspects of the hosts' political or economic systems.

Several incumbents commented that more delegation of authority to the field, particularly in the area of minor decisions, would make the job easier. One Executive Officer said, "No one knows how much autonomy a mission has. The mission should have weight and responsibility, but instead we have to turn to AID/W for even tiny, unimportant bits of information." One Deputy noted that "an over-the-shoulder feeling in all decision-making" was a source of irritation. This leads to the general problem of the justification of decisions to Washington. One Program Officer noted that this was his most difficult type of communication. "Trying to justify what cannot be evaluated in quantifiable terms -- or in any terms for 50 years -- is impossible," he said. Several incumbents mentioned that Washington requires too much detailed information from the mission before making a decision. This is perhaps related to another problem perceived by several incumbents -- that of lack of immediate, "one-the-scene" knowledge on the part of people in Washington. "They can't know all the things we know here -- it has to be absorbed through the pores." Several Program Officers were aware of this difficulty, and commented upon problems they had encountered in trying to communicate special conditions affecting the host country to the AID/W staff. This

problem is felt particularly keenly when a project to which the mission personnel have given high priority is disapproved in Washington, perhaps due to a general policy: "AID/W thinks this is a community development project, which it is not, and they are against community development projects"; or perhaps attributed to "second-guessing the field," which is a major irritant for many incumbents.

The role of Desk Officer in this connection was mentioned by several incumbents. A Program Officer said, "The AID/W Desk should be a lateral service agency for the mission, with both the mission and the Desk being in the service of the regional office. However....Desk officers see themselves in a superior position and tend to make decisions that can be better made in the field." A Deputy Director noted that the Desk Officer's role "should be to amalgamate mission and AID/W's views to form a common, united front on issues and problems" rather than to dictate AID/W decisions to the field. One Program Officer, who had a project designed to improve the host's confidence in the United States turned down, pointed out that the Desk Officer "should be sensitive to country priorities as well as regional ones."

This problem of the disparity in the point of view taken by Washington and that arising from the on-the-scene knowledge of the overseas mission personnel might be resolved to some extent, one incumbent suggested, by transferring the Program Officer to the Desk of the country in which he had just completed a tour of duty. "However," he added, "this is seldom actually the case." Another incumbent made an effort to overcome this problem by getting AID/W personnel to come to the mission on TDY. (It was noted by one Program Officer that this was easier to accomplish in a mission with a resort area or other tourist attractions nearby, and that "official isolation" can be a serious problem in the less attractive posts.) Two Program Officers pointed out the value of duty tours in Washington plus in-between trips for program presentation in improving communication.

The communication problem appears to be somewhat different for the Division Chiefs. They tended to object to the amount of documentation required by AID/W rather than to their own lack of authority or to disparate points of view, perhaps because in their position, much of the contact with Washington is mediated by the Program Officer, the Deputy Director, and the Director. There was some manifestation of concern, however, that Washington was not receiving enough information about day-to-day project activities to keep abreast of "current opinions". Another problem for a minority of Division Chiefs was that of communicating disagreement with the general mission policy (as set by the Director, Deputy Director, and Program Officer) to their backstop officers in Washington. One Division Chief reported that if he wrote a letter of complaint to AID/W he wouldn't know whether or not it would be sent right back to AID/local for use against him; he knew of no one he could turn to in AID/W when things in the field deserved comment. Since communications often have to be cleared through the Director's Office, even getting such a complaint to Washington can be a problem. This did not seem to occur frequently, however.

The relative infrequency of communication between Division Chiefs and Washington was mentioned as a negative factor in division morale. In addition, it may be a contributing factor in the divergence of points of view between Washington and the field, since the individuals most concerned with operational considerations are unlikely to communicate these considerations directly to those in policy-making positions.