

THAILAND

PUBLIC SAFETY/BORDER PATROL POLICE
REMOTE AREA SECURITY DEVELOPMENT

AN APPROACH TO COUNTER-INSURGENCY
BY THE BORDER PATROL POLICE

APRIL 1971

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Chief-of-Party

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U.S. Operations Mission/Thailand
Agency for International Development
Bangkok

T H A I L A N D

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This is an internal staff document, not intended for publication. The content represents the viewpoint of the author and not necessarily those of the U.S. Operations Mission to Thailand.

A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T

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The concepts discussed in this paper are based on the following assumptions:

1. The insurgency in Thailand is directed and controlled by a communist subversive organization.
2. Within its present parameters, the insurgency can be controlled by the proper application of internal defense/development resources.
3. The Thai National Police Department (TNPD) has a primary role in internal defense.
4. The Royal Thai Government wishes to:
 - a. Neutralize the insurgent movement.
 - b. Eliminate the conditions fostering insurgency.
5. Utilization of accurate and timely intelligence is a pre-requisite to the foregoing.

REMOTE AREA SECURITY DEVELOPMENT

I. PURPOSE

Security Development is a concept of using constructive and meaningful interaction between policemen and a target population in order to collect, process, and utilize intelligence which will identify, locate, and neutralize a subversive and/or insurgent threat.

Remote Area Security Development (RASD) is a program within the Border Patrol Police (BPP), and assisted by USOM, of using Security Development concepts to develop a viable border control mechanism which will effect population stability along the borders of the Kingdom. The BPP is a unit-trained para-military police force responsible for internal security along the Kingdoms international borders. Organizationally a part of the Provincial Police, the BPP operate in the sensitive border districts under command and control of the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD). In time of national emergency (invasion from abroad) the BPP come directly under military control with the mission of delay and stay-behind operations.

The BPP is deployed in platoon-size units along the border; generally operating from a permanent base, the platoons send patrols throughout their area of responsibility. The current 124 line platoons of the BPP are responsible for an average of 450 square miles each. Various reserve and support elements are available to assist the line platoon operations, but it is readily apparent that the mission of border security primarily becomes one of intelligence and surveillance rather than physical occupation. In this setting of

remote jungled borders, often mountainous; inhabited by a population that is illiterate, economically deprived, and ethnically motivated; and under control of a government which is geographically, socially, and politically distant, the BPP frequently represent the only effective government presence.

In order to develop border security, the BPP must acquire and utilize detailed knowledge of the area and its people. Because of this operational requirement and because the mutual target of both the police and the insurgents is the people - the BPP, in addition to para-military operations, are engaged in numerous activities designed to provide mass contact with the border population. These special activities, referred to as Remote Area Security Development (RASD), include elementary education, medical assistance, village development, economic promotion, youth activities, and psychological operations. The objectives of these activities are to: extend and strengthen the local government; demonstrate to the people the government's interest (and strength); gather sufficient intelligence to identify and locate insurgents and their support structure; and assist in isolating the insurgents from the population. To accomplish this, the activities are directed towards: eliciting information; making detailed area and population surveys; assessing potential informants; covering contacts with agents and informants; influencing the attitudes and behavior of the people; and countering insurgent propaganda.

II. HISTORY

The RASD activities were initiated in 1955 in Northern Thailand when Area V of the BPP command received permission to initiate a hilltribe education program.* A modest program of conducting elementary education for Yao, Meo, Akka, Lahu, and Lisu was approved by the Public Welfare Hilltribe Affairs Division and started in that year. The school program continued, slowly expanding within these tribes, until the next activity, medical assistance, was initiated in 1963. In the period 1963-64, frequent indicators were detected of recruitment and organizational efforts by subversives in the tribal areas. At that time it was decided by the BPP to expand and intensify activities in the tribal areas to determine patterns and the extent of the subversive apparatus.

This next phase, while still primarily in hilltribe areas, saw an expansion of activities into Area VI, particularly the tri-province and southern Nan. Plans were made to establish development centers in each of the major tribal communication centers, and five-man tribal teams were recruited, trained at the Mae Taeng Mule-breeding farm, and deployed to 44 key tribal villages in Areas IV, V, and VI. The BPP school system was expanded throughout the seven BPP areas, and numbered approximately 120 at this time. Financial support up to 1965 consisted of a nominal TNPB budget and \$1,000,000 in project account counterpart funds.** The rapid expansion of these efforts

* See Map showing regional breakdown, Appendix 8.

** Counterpart funds are RTG funds allocated for local currency requirements of joint USOM/RTG project agreements.

was supported by US funds, particularly by; support for construction of STOL air strips, and air transport for re-supply and follow-up. At this point a large number of people (22 in the tri-province alone) were identified who had been recruited by the communists, trained externally, and re-inserted into tribal villages. With this apparent CT build-up, the BPP decided that a more intensive effort to counter the hilltribe subversion was needed, and with the CPT declaration of armed struggle that year, the TNPDP with USOM agreeing to provide support, decided on an expanded effort outside the hilltribe areas.

The RASD program was started in FY66. USOM provided selected commodities, training, and technical assistance. This included a contract with a consulting firm to provide five development technicians which was signed in early 1966, with the technicians arriving in the last quarter the same year. Two were assigned to Area V, one to Area VI, one to Area IV, one to Bangkok to work with BPP General Headquarters.

In November 1966, an agreement was signed by USOM to provide three U.S. Navy Seabee teams to train BPP development platoon personnel in village level high-impact skills of instruction, sanitation, STOL strip construction, medical treatment, and other self-help techniques.

In FY67, USOM made its largest contribution to the RASD program by: expanding the technicians contract to include medics, as well as technicians for Area III and the education program; providing a mass input of medical commodities; continuing the Seabee PASA; and providing funds for contracting air support. In FY70; also, the TNPDP, through counterpart funds, increased their support

significantly, to include hiring twenty-five Thai civilian specialists to assist in the RASD program. In all the above mentioned agreements the RTG provided the required local currency support.

From mid-1968 until mid-1969, the contract technicians were essentially the only technicians providing advisory assistance to the BPP. Contract technicians were unfamiliar with USOM program documentation, requirements, and policy. Working in an unfamiliar system, with no definite guidelines, little progress was made in developing support plans for the BPP, and bureaucratic problems frustrated the U.S. and Thai contract technicians. It was only in late FY69, when a Direct Hire Senior Advisor was provided that these administrative blocks were overcome, and the contract technicians were able to focus on Security Development. By October 1969, the RASD program was able to extend to mid-south and southern Thailand, and the number of Thai specialists was increased to 47.

In FY70, the present phase of RASD was initiated in the BPP. Concepts were defined, objectives were established, and training requirements were developed. A contract (with Joseph Z. Taylor and Associates*) was signed in February 1970 to provide for US technical assistance, and a contract with Devcon (Thailand) Ltd., was signed to provide for the 47 Thai specialists until the new RTG fiscal year started. In October 1970, Devcon (Thai) Ltd. signed a contract directly with the TNPD to provide for these services. As a result of the security development training courses, the TNPD has been encouraged by the potential for assisting

* See Appendix 8.

the Provincial Police as well, and plans are now being formulated to expand security development activities and training into priority Provincial Police areas.

At this time, five major obstacles to a successful security development program were identified:

1. There was no suitable system for transferring skills and experience of RASD technicians to the BPP.
2. There were insufficient numbers of trained personnel assigned to exploit the benefits of the program.
3. There was a lack of understanding and emphasis by senior TNPd and RTG officials.
4. There was no flexibility in the budget procedures to allow for changing security priorities.
5. There was no structure to collect, process, and utilize information at the operational level.

The first three obstacles were a matter of education and training. A training advisor was assigned, a course developed, and instructors trained. Senior Officials are now placing top priority on SD training, and the technicians experience is being transferred through the CI training system. A series of conferences/seminars were held with BOB, DTEC, TNPd, BPP and USOM, and budget procedures have been modified to allow more timely and effective use of funds. The last obstacle, the lack of an operating structure, will be solved with the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) at each company headquarters. Personnel will be assigned and trained to collect, process, and utilize the necessary information.

III. TRAINING

RASD specialists were trained as instructors, and in turn they drew upon years of experience to develop a Security Development (SD) program of instruction. This two week course was first given to 69 BPP junior officers in mid-1970. The instruction includes the concepts outlined in this paper, with strong emphasis on environmental analysis, elicitation, face-to-face communication, and motivation. Results of the training were encouraging, as each BPP Area Commander has commented upon the excellent performance of these officers.

A CI instructor cadre of 28 BPP have been trained by the specialists, and standardized programs of instruction for SD training in each of the regional training centers are being prepared.

Thus far, SD training has been given to the 69 officers, to 450 PF of SAF units, to twelve BPP platoons, and 500 BPP constables. The BPP has prepared a training schedule to train an additional 600 BPP (staff officers, unit commanders, teachers, development platoons, NCO's) in Security Development during 1971-72.

Instructor cadre have been trained to present a four week intell course, a two week PsyOps course, and the two week SD course. This eight weeks of instruction will be given to officers and senior NCO's attending the CI training, in addition to tactics, weapons, and other more standard CI instruction.

IV. PLANS

1. To complete programs of instruction for the regional training centers with the focus on local environmental/ethnic problems and courses of action.
2. To provide security development training to all trainees in the CI training system.
3. To expand security development activities into the provincial police tambol stations in critical areas.
4. To coordinate police SD activities with other RTG programs, such as Public Health, Community Development, Accelerated Rural Development, etc..
5. To train all TOC personnel in the mechanics of collecting, processing, and utilizing information, and the development and utilization of target folders in countering CPT efforts.
6. To focus advisory efforts at the national level of the TNPD to assist in establishing goals, priorities, and coordination.

V. CONCEPTS OF SECURITY DEVELOPMENT

A. SUBVERSION

The many facets of subversion are details stemming from the basic fact that the simple problem of any state is to come to terms with its people. Communist inspired subversion is well organized and directed effort to insure that the state and its people never come to terms. In a developing country, where a diverging scale of aspirations and obtainable objectives continues, an insipient revolution already exists. It remains only for a directed subversive element to exploit the widening gap, play on the weaknesses of the government, and kindle

the unfulfillable aspirations of the people in order to recruit a formidable army in support of the revolutionary cause. The communist proven method is to direct their divisive actions at the people, knowing that the state blindly directs its counter-actions at the invisible cadres hidden among the people. Much too often the actual result of the states reaction is that the people are inadvertently attacked by the state. The state fails to come to terms with its people, and the communists become the hidden state with which the people come to terms. At this point the state is forced to go to war against its own people. The insipient revolution is fostered into fusion by the lack of governmental control over manpower and material resources (or through the inept actions of governmental representatives) and the subversion has grown into insurgency.

B. INSURGENCY

An insurgent movement requires for successful and expanding operations, not popular support in the sense of attitudes of identification and allegiance, but rather certain supplies (food, recruits, arms, information) at a reasonable cost, interpreting cost to include expenditure of coercion as well as money. These costs may be reasonable without popular support for the insurgents; and, conversely, the costs may be raised considerably without popular support having been acquired by the government. Resources the insurgents need from rural areas may continue to be available at reasonable or even reduced cost, notwithstanding increased popular support for the government. Therefore, even if socio-economic improvement programs influence popular support, there may be no effect, or there may be perverse effect, on the cost and availability of resources the insurgents

require for their operations. (i.e. when the supply increases, the cost may decrease, notwithstanding increased popular support for the government.)

Consider then, an insurgent movement as an operating system. In general, the insurgency requires recruits, information, shelter and food from the local environment; and cadres, publicity, material, and funds which can often be provided from external sources. To obtain what is needed locally, the insurgency relies on coercive as well as persuasive techniques. Coercion may take many forms; threats, kidnapping, assassination, tax collection, destruction of property. Persuasion and inducements may be propaganda, money payments, village aid, training and education, and offering opportunities for affiliation with a worthy cause (as well as action and promotion).

The required inputs obtained through inducement and coercion are converted into outputs by the insurgent organization. Again, a combination of persuasion (recognition, promotion, reward) and coercion (criticism, isolation, physical punishment) is used in the conversion of inputs into outputs. When the insurgent system is small-scale, these functions will be compressed and consolidated. As the insurgency grows, they are likely to become separately identified and specialized.

C. INSURGENT CONTROL MEASURES

Subversion requires a directed effort to effect the divisive measures which lead to insurgency. To expand, the insurgency requires a supply of inputs, and an organizational ability to convert them into outputs that will ultimately threaten the existing government. This progression of effort, (operating the system) requires control of population resources.

To accomplish this, the insurgent:

1. Selects his operational environment; one which is politically unsophisticated, where social stratification and ethnic animosities exists, and where illiteracy and disease are prevalent.
2. Introduces organizers; hard core cadre who are usually ethnic to the area, trained extensively, dogmatic in approach; who teach that thought controls action, and who believe therefore to control thought is to control action. The organizers follow a pattern of three phases (identification, propagation, organization) as follows:

Identification - to establish with the people a feeling of joint aspirations, grievances, culture, background, ambition.

Propagation - has two distinct purposes, destructive and constructive. The destructive effort aggravates social ills and raises them to the surface, then transfers the cause of those ills to the government. The divisive effort begins. The constructive part of propagation educates the population that through cooperative action, unity and loyalty, aspirations can be achieved by overcoming the government authority. The divisive effort continues.

Organization - while in the propagation phase, the organizer spots and recruits cell members. Some recruits are sent for external training, others are formed into military bands, village support structure, and reserves.

3. Establishes control; the successful identification, propagation and organization results in four principal conditions of control:
 - a. In-group loyalty - sense of belonging
 - b. Insurgent terror tactics - fear
 - c. Personal comitment - relatives
 - d. Government terror tactics - retaliation

D. COUNTER-INSURGENCY

Counter-insurgency is the application of internal defense and development resources to:

1. Neutralize the insurgency by controlling inputs, disrupting the conversion of inputs to outputs, and limiting the outputs.
2. Eliminate the conditions which foster insurgency by coming to terms with the people, and by avoiding the divisive effect of indiscriminate retaliation, inept government officials, and non-responsiveness.

The control of inputs requires the application of population and material resources control measures, which implies, infact demands, coordination of the efforts of civil, police, and military authorities, with the execution responsibility primarily borne by civil authorities and the burden of enforcement on the police.

The control of outputs becomes a more costly measure because the insurgent has a choice of location, target, and time; consequently the government must provide security forces (police and military) to protect the entire country while maintaining ready reserve forces to do battle at any place or time.

If we accept the control of inputs as the measure that is least costly, and least likely to exacerbate the divisive effort of the insurgency, then some degree of resources control measures must be applied. A maxim for resources control is that measures are limited only to those considered essential and enforceable. In order to determine the threshold of necessity (when measures are applied or lifted), it is essential to have accurate and timely information on a target area - its resources, communications, weather, and topography - and its people; their moods and attitudes, allegiance, motivation, occupation, aspirations and grievances, their resources and mobility patterns.

To collect, process, and utilize the information required, a systematic procedure must be established and a mechanism must be programmed to centrally gather and process, then direct all government assets in a coordinated effort to maximize the impact of resources.

At the rural level, this must be translated into detailed operating instructions, with sufficient training to impart skills, awareness, and motivation down to the lowest level of government authority. In the BPP, this is the mission and function of the security development program.

Concepts alone cannot counter an insurgent movement; intelligence and area knowledge cannot counter the divisive action of subversion; and weapons, radios and airplanes, all skillfully maintained and operated, cannot alone maintain peace and order (by the same token, neither can bulldozers and outdoor privies). The airplane (or bulldozer), the radio, and the weapon must have technicians who keep them in operating condition for that moment when they are required; the skill

(or art) of counter-insurgency is to determine when, where, and how to use those resources. At the academic level, there are people who possess the knowledge necessary to apply those skills; at the operations level, the soldier, the policeman, or the tax collector does not have the education, the background, the vision, or perhaps not the supervision to apply these skills (or arts). Security Development attempts to systematically organize the day-to-day routine functions at this level, so that direction and guidance can be provided to properly target efforts of each activity, so that it contributes to a condition of security.

The BPP Security Development program provides the direction and training necessary to focus attention of the police on the numerous and various sources of information, to evaluate and select targets, and to plan activities which will gain access to those targets, through interaction with the population in a constructive and meaningful manner. If a project is responsive to the people's aspirations and; demonstrates the government's interest, demonstrates the government strength, explains the government programs and goals, counters CT propaganda, or sway the fence-sitter to support government interest, then the program is, in a security development sense, constructive. If the project, as well; provides a mechanism to cover covert collection activities, establishes communication between the police and people, or increases the cost of inputs to the insurgency, then it provides a measure of internal security, assists in isolating the insurgency and is meaningful.

The mechanism through which the BPP will plan, coordinate, the conduct security development activities is the Tactical Operations Center (TOC), located at the

BPP company headquarters. Fourteen TOC's will be organized and trained in FY72, the remaining twenty-six in FY73 and FY74. At the TOC, personnel will establish detailed target folders, to include CPT order of battle, personality files, suspect lists, and patterns of activity.

VI. APPENDICES

1. Funding
2. BPP Background, Organization
3. TOC Functions
4. Program of Instruction
5. Concept Charts
6. Physical Environment Relating to Insurgency
7. SD Activities
8. Contract Technician Deployment, Physical Environment (Terrain, Population Density, Ethnic Groups)
9. Glossary.

Appendix 1

The following table, in thousand of dollars, represents the USOM and RTG contribution (dollar equivalent) to the RASD program for the years FY66 through FY71. Omitted from the cost figures are USOM support for:

ONE UTILITY HELICOPTER	-	Funded under RASD FY66 ProAg, but Police Air Division.
RADIO BROADCAST STATION	-	Funded under RASD FY69 but utilized by USIS.
MEDICAL COMMODITIES	-	Funded in RASD ProAg FY67. Will be covered by indepth report on medical program.

The funding table indicates a high dollar input in FY67, and a declining input thereafter. The RTG has continued to increase its input to the program, through C/F, and relying heavily on trust fund procedures initially. As more flexible budget procedures were agreed upon, the project relied less upon trust funds, and in September 1970, project support through trust funds was terminated. Plans for expansion of security development into the Provincial Police are being made and the major funding will be in the TNPD regular budget, which has been and will continue to be, a goal pursued by the contractor in his advice to the TNPD.


REMOTE AREA SECURITY DEVELOPMENT

Funding (\$000)

	<u>FY66</u>	<u>FY67</u>	<u>FY68</u>	<u>FY69</u>	<u>FY70</u>	<u>FY71</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Contract	100	75	237	250	332	183	1,177
Commodities*	36	161	75	14	40	-	326
PASA	-	400	150	150	-	-	550
Participants	-	-	6	-	-	-	6
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\$ TOTAL	136	636	468	264	372	183	\$ 2,059
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Trust Fund	25	155	253	173	150	40	796
Project Acct	154	133	331	365	475	475	1,933
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\$ TOTAL	170	288	584	538	625	515	\$ 2,729
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* Does not include MEDICINE,** HELICOPTER, RADIO STATION.

** USOM has provided \$1.5 million in medical commodities, equipment and training aids, in the period FY64 through FY71, to the Police Department. Approximately 25% of this has gone into the Remote Area Security Development Program.



1. G-5 - General Staff Officer responsible for staff recommendations/activities of RASD program.
2. Field Contract Technicians for RASD assigned to Areas where CI Training sites are located.
3. TOC is the command function element of the Company Headquarters.

BACKGROUND, BPP

The TNPD is faced with an internal security mission which can be basically separated into two distinct efforts; the normal law and order activities which are long term in nature, and counterinsurgent activities which are more finite in time span but which require manpower, equipment, and expertise not normally institutionalized within a police framework. Because of the nature of insurgency, neither of the two efforts can be ignored, nor can they be tackled separately. When the insurgency attains a measure of power in a given area, the law and order activities are impaired, and it then becomes necessary to provide an influx of security forces to control the area until the insurgent forces are neutralized and the normal law and order forces can be developed to maintain control.

Training

To meet the additional training requirements necessary to develop CI expertise - unit tactics, command and control, logistics support, leadership, population and resources control - to identify, locate, and isolate the insurgents, the TNPD has established a CI training institution. The objective was to provide training that would be responsive to and help develop operational doctrines. The CI schools are still having growing pains - construction not complete, commodities still in pipeline, insufficient personnel - but the basic structure exists, skeleton cadres have been assigned, trained, and are providing training.

Operations

In the process of developing training curriculums, it was soon evident that there were operational weaknesses, and that in order to have effective training which prepared the police for CI operations, operational plans must be made, defined, coordinated, and then taught.

In exploring this problem, the BPP determined that the weakest link in their operational effectiveness, the company headquarters, should be the strongest link - with a capability to receive, process, and utilize intelligence from all sources within the company area of responsibility - and effective targeting of assets could be attended only when the company headquarters were trained, in place, and functioning.

Availability of Resources

A test of the Company Headquarter's capability to function as a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) was conducted and the results indicate that it is feasible for a company to operate effectively with proper training and coordination. It became immediately apparent, however, that the TNPD (even with USOM support) had insufficient resources - money, people, equipment and could not develop fully all of their companies at one time. It therefore became essential that national priorities be established. The TNPD has done this, to be implemented within a three year time frame. New personnel, equipment, budget, and training will be re-focused into the 14 TOC locations selected for FY72.

The system of priorities utilized by the police includes the following type analysis:

- A. Determine a finite target area based on CT organization, strength, activity, and support.
- B. Structure a police task force with sufficient capability to cope with the insurgents.
- C. Train, deploy, and support that force.

In structuring the task force, the police are considered in three categories: permanent, semi-permanent, and temporary.

- A. Permanent: normal law and order forces, basically Amphur, Tambol, Muban, forces.
- B. Semi-permanent: the super-imposed task force elements of BPP, SAF's and their command and control and support elements. To remain until permanent forces are capable of controlling the area.
- C. Temporary: those reserve forces (such as PARU) which may be called in on specific operations, not a part of task force.

Conceptually, the Task Force will be structured to control an area, maintaining security until such a time as the permanent forces can be strengthened and the CT problem neutralized (or dissipated). Should the Task Force develop a situation calling for additional forces, then reserves (or Military) may be called in temporarily. The ultimate goal, however, is to strengthen the permanent forces, and once the situation is under control, the semi-permanent force can be shifted to a new priority or else be absorbed into the permanent forces.

Coordination

It is essential that national priorities be established. To make this determination, and to effect the necessary coordination of civil, police and military functions at the national level, a TNPD TOC will be organized to establish priorities, effect coordination, and allocate resources.

The next step required is a regional level, where coordination of regional and changwat assets must be effected.

At the Task Force level, coordination instructions must be developed in the form of standard operating procedures - for commo, air support, fire support, medical support, development assistance, reporting etc. - to avoid the mirriad problems existing because of differring rank structures within the various agencies.

Command and Control

At the Task Force level, it is not critical to be consistent throughout the country in selection of commander. The important thing - whether it be a policeman, a district officer, a soldier - is that there be one commander, reporting to one headquarters, who is equipped with SOP's agreed to and coordinated by all concerned agencies at the headquarters level. It is equally important, in order to operate effectively and timely, that the Task Force commander have authority to move forces and support them within the area of his responsibility, and within the scope of his instructions, without prior clearances from several different headquarters.

(For example, the BPP company commander now must report to, and receive approval from the BPP, PP, Governor, CSOC, and Army).

Training

This completes the cycle. In order to develop the plans, and to implement the concept above, requirements for training - of civil, police and military - have been, and will continue to be, identified. These requirements will necessitate continuing changes in CI training curriculums, they will require mobile training teams, seminars, and the cross-infusion of DOLA personnel into police training, police into military, etc..

Training must include an increased percentage of subject matter dealing with motivation, population and resources control, psychological operations, development, and communist terrorist methods of operation.

TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER (TOC)

The purpose of this program is to provide a system which will reserve as the central repository of all the information and data gathered on CT activities, movements, organizations, etc.. In addition, the system will analyze all the information gathered and will recommend any action required based on the information that it receives.

This wealth of information when analyzed should provide indicators which will reveal Communist Terrorists (CT) activities, organizational structure, personalities, modus operandi, so that the Border Patrol Police (BPP) can plan appropriate action. With proper allocation of the functions of the TOC, the BPP can more effectively fight the Communist Terrorists and the infrastructure of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). These functions require that the BPP gather information from such sources as informants, agents, the villagers themselves, and many others, and provide it to the TOC so that it can be collated. The gathering of information requires that the BPP coordinate within itself and constantly channel all the information back to the TOC so that proper analysis and action can be initiated. The collected and collated information should produce requirements which should guide the BPP platoons to the appropriate targets. Only through proper collection coordination, and collation can the BPP monitor and counter the insurgency effort and keep abreast of all their activities. In addition, the TOC will provide the BPP with intelligence information useable in operations, provide direction in operations requiring action, provide a system of files and records to support operations, and improve the quality and quantity of intelligence through more specific and realistic requirements levied upon the operating platoons.

The TOC should consist of the following elements:

- A. Message Center: this section records the flow of information into and out the TOC. In addition it will maintain files and provide clinical support to other sections as required.
- B. Collation and analysis Section: the responsibility of this section is to collate all intelligence reports and other information pertaining to CT activities, and maintain appropriate files and records to support the counter-insurgency effort and through proper analysis provide operating elements with enemy disposition, effects, and probable actions. Members of this section will eventually become the experts on the Communist Terrorist (CT) organization, method of operation, personalities, and activities, and will be able to provide the best local intelligence analysis on the CT available in the area.
- C. Political Order of Battle or Tactical Situation Section: it maintains the political order of battle and tactical situation files, enemy situation, charts, and maps, including the location of friendly operations.
- D. Operations Requirement Section: this section reacts to the intelligence provided and furnished after-action evaluations of the intelligence used and additional intelligence information.
- E. The number of personnel necessary to staff the TOC will vary according to the local needs and the availability of personnel.

FUNCTIONS

A. Message Center: it will maintain a Daily Report log of all incoming reports.

1. The log will include the following:

- a. The date
- b. The control number assigned to the report
- c. Name of the reporting unit
- d. Date of the report
- e. The reporting units evaluation of the information
- f. The subject of the report
- g. TOC comments (any comments made by the Collection and Analysis Section where the report is filed in the TOC and any used made of the report).

When action is taken on the basis of a report, the action taken and the results obtained should be noted in the Daily Report log under TOC comments. The Daily Report log is kept in two copies. The information on the log will be used in periodic management reports and may be arranged or revised in any way the commander sees fit.

2. Maintain a Chronological file of all reports, messages, and correspondence sent to and from the TOC.
3. Type reports, messages, and other correspondence initiated in the TOC.
4. Perform filing and other clerical tasks as required.

B. Collation and Analysis Section:

1. Collate incoming reports with available information and analyze the results to insure that each report is as complete and accurate as possible. All members of this section take part in this procedure on each report so as to arrive at a group conclusion or judgement. Any comments included during the procedure should be TOC comments. A method must be established to perform this function rapidly so that appropriate action can be taken on perishable intelligence.
2. Maintain a card on each source providing information to the TOC as a basis for establishing the sources' credibility. This record will identify the Source "only" by a control symbol. True names of Sources will not be kept anywhere in the TOC.
3. Maintain files and records necessary to support the attack on the CT organization. These files will include the following:
 - a. A card file on all CT or suspected CT. These cards will contain all available information on each CT until positive identification is made. When positive identification is made, a dossier will be opened on the person and the card will annotated as a cross-reference to the dossier. This card will also indicate the area where the CT or suspected CT lives. Finally, the card must contain all information that will help identify and locate the individual CT or suspected CT.
 - b. A dossier on each CT who has been positively identified. Each dossier will be given a serial number, with a prefix to identify

the district and both file cards will reflect that a dossier has been established. The dossiers will be stored in numerical order. All information obtained concerning an individual CT will go into his dossier including copies of intelligence reports, interrogation reports, CT documents, photographs, and any other documents containing information about the person. The basic purpose of the dossier is to collect sufficient information about an individual CT to identify, locate, recruit, defect, capture, eliminate, or compromise him. In the attack against the CT organization, priority will be given to political CT personnel and key CT organizational members, who form the tough and fanatic hard core of the CT insurgency movement.

- c. Area Subject files covering the entire area of responsibility. These will include one file for the Amphoe, one for the Tambon, and one for each Muban in the Tambon. Into these files will go a copy of each report or document which contains information on the particular area. The purpose of these files is to maintain all information on CT organizations and activities by area. These files will enable the Collation and Analysis Section to make area studies in support of various exploitation operations and provide background material against which to check incoming reports.
- d. Source Record Cards on all sources reporting information to the TOC. These cards will be maintained by code symbol to protect the identity of the source. On the card will be located the following:

1. Control number of each report
2. Date of the report
3. Brief summary of the information
4. Brief comment by the TOC on the report.

Comments should confirm or contradict the information on the report.

The purpose of the Source Record Card is to help establish the reliability of all sources whose reports reach the TOC from within the Amphoe or outside. It is also intended to uncover and prevent duplicate use of sources.

- e. Charts that diagram the CT political organization in the Tambon and Mubans as they are identified and included with the names of known CT and listed by position on the chart. Those charts can be used for studies, briefings, targeting, and measuring progress against the CT organizational structure.
- f. Books containing pictures of known or suspected CT. These pictures will be used for targeting against an individual CT, and for use in interrogations, debriefing of captured CT's, CT suspects, or anyone knowledgeable of local CTs. Photographs in the books should be kept by number keyed to a separate list of identifications, so that an individual being interrogated cannot see the names.
- g. A card file on potential guides who can be used on operations or to identify captured CT and suspects. The Card must contain the persons name, basic biographic data, area of knowledge, present location,

- and basis for willingness to cooperate. Persons listed in this file will include anyone willing to help the Government of Thailand.
- h. A general file for reports and other documents which do not fit into any of the above files. An example of such a report is a study of a province or a background report.
4. Determine what intelligence gaps exist and levy requirements on any or all collecting units having the capability to fill them. Such request must indicate the specific information desired and whenever possible suggest a possible source of the information or a method of obtaining it.
 5. Prepare reports in standardized format with TOC comments included and disseminate them to all units in the Amphoe which should take action or must have the information to take proper protective/defensive measures. Action taken on the basis of a TOC report and the results obtained should be noted in the Daily Report log and on the appropriate Source Record Card.
 6. Analyze captured documents of the CTs, collate with other available intelligence and prepare the information in report format and disseminate as appropriate. The intelligence from captured documents must also be filed in the TOC.
 7. When the capability exists among members of the Collation and Analysis Section, all knowledgeable ralliors and CT captives should be interviewed or interrogated for information. Useful information obtained should be processed and disseminated in the prescribed manner.

C. Political Order of Battle and Tactical Situation Section:

1. Maintain CT unit listings.
2. Maintain up-to-date situation maps on the CT in the Amphoe.
3. Maintain charts and other materials as required by S-2 and/or S-3.
4. Maintain maps on the CT camps.
5. Maintain maps on the CT activities.
6. Maintain maps showing the routes used by the CTs.
7. Maintain maps of the CT movements in the different areas.
8. Maintain maps showing the locations of friendly troops.
9. Maintain maps showing the locations where the CT have assassinated village chiefs or other political figures.
10. Maintain maps showing the locations of villages which help the CT.
11. Maintain maps showing the supply routes used.
12. Maintain charts and graphs showing the CT organization and personalities with their political positions.
13. These maps should provide the following indicators:
 - a. Method of operation.
 - b. An indication of their future movements.
 - c. Indicate their next target.
 - d. Expose or leads to the political leadership.
 - e. Indicate whether the CT are establishing patterns of movements.
 - f. Indicate their weakness.

D. Operations/Requirement Section:

1. Prepare plans and give recommendations based on intelligence information.
2. Levies requirements as necessary.
3. Prepares plans of action against local CT military units and against members of the CT organization, particularly key political members.
4. Indicates what effect schools and other civic action projects might have on the village, the CT, and the collection effort against CT information, etc..
 - a. Will the village appreciate the school and provide information?
 - b. Is the school in the area where good information could be obtained?
 - c. Provide recommendations as to the response of such an action by the CT.
5. Provide information and guidance as to the ability to:
 - a. Recruit a CT in place
 - b. Capture
 - c. Kill or wound
 - d. Compromise.
6. Coordinates the implementation of actions against the CT military and organizational targets after receiving appropriate approval.
7. Plan and coordinate within the BPP the implementation of operations for the purpose of collecting and confirming information.
8. Furnish after-action reports to update the name index, organizational charts, and Political Order of Battle files.

TNPDSECURITY DEVELOPMENT TRAINING COURSE IFOR OFFICERS

Subject	Hours	Scope
Program Orientation	1	An introduction to Security Development, the organization, the structure, mission, and responsibility, purpose, training course.
TNPD Organization	1	An explanation of the structure and organization of security development within the TNPD.
Government Agencies Operating in Rural Thailand	3	An explanation of internal development including a brief explanation other government agencies working in rural Thailand i.e. Ministry of Health, DOLA, ARD, CD, etc..
Environmental	10	An explanation of the anthropological and environmental characteristics of ethnic peoples of Thailand. How to discern changes in patterns?
CT Organization and Operations	6	An explanation of CT objectives, organizations, and operations as practiced in rural Thailand i.e. Meo thought, formation of political cells, supporters, jungle fighters, methods of communication, propaganda, combat tactics, and basic weak points.
Security Development Concept and Mission	2	Explanation of the concept and mission of security development, its progression to area surveillance from targeting. Include the criteria for evaluating field operations.
Targeting	2	An explanation of what targeting is the system of how target populations are determined.
Security Development Activities	2	An explanation of how all SD activities contribute to area surveillance.
Tactical Operation	3	An explanation of how TOCs plan, conduct, and utilize SD activities.
Police Schools	3	An explanation of the Police School as an element of SD including youth activities. Movie: role of BPP Schoolteacher.

Subject	Hours	Scope
Development Centers	1	An explanation of the development centers as an element of SD.
Development Platoons	1	An explanation of the role of the security development platoon and its use in security development.
Medical Services	3	An explanation of medical security development including the flying doctors program.
Border Security Volunteer Teams	2	An explanation of the BSVT as an element of security development.
Border Crafts of Thailand	1	An explanation of the BCT as an element of security development.
Psychological Operations Techniques	4	An explanation of PsyOps as an element of security development.
Civilian Specialists	1	An explanation of civilian specialists as an element of security development.
Identifying Village Informants	2	An explanation of spotting potential village informants.
Recruiting Village Informants	2	An explanation of recruiting reliable village informants.
Elicitation	8	An explanation of how information is obtained from the source and the steps of elicitation.
Information Collection	13	An explanation of subversive patterns and indicators.
Reporting and Recording	2	An explanation of briefing, debriefing, written information reports and sourcing.
Area Surveillance	2	An explanation of information needed for total area surveillance, including TOC and Area Headquarters data bank.
Logistics and Finances	2	An explanation of SD Logistics and Finances.

Subject	Hours	Scope
Operational and Administration Reporting	2	An explanation of SD Reporting for future security development planning.
Training	1	An explanation of SD CI Training at the TNPD National Center and at the four sub-centers, and area re-training.
Examination	10	Will be given at various intervals, critiques follow each exam.

S E C U R I T Y D E V E L O P M E N T

is a means to

I D E N T I F Y, L O C A T E and I S O L A T E

Communists subversives, insurgents, and their support structure

through

C O N S T R U C T I V E and M E A N I N G F U L I N T E R A C T I O N

between a security force and a target population

CONSTRUCTIVE and MEANINGFUL INTERACTION

DEMONSTRATES GOV'T INTEREST

PROVIDES COVER SECURITY

DEMONSTRATES GOV'T STRENGTH

INCREASES CT INPUT COST

COUNTERS CT PROPAGANDA

ESTABLISHES COMMUNICATION

EXPLAINS GOV'T PROGRAMS

PROVIDES INTERNAL SECURITY

SWAYS FENCE-SITTERS

ISOLATES INSURGENTS

INSURGENCY REQUIRES I N P U T S

of

PERSONNEL - EQUIPMENT - SUPPORT - MOTIVATION

~~and~~

R E A S O N A B L E C O S T

which can be

CONVERTED into O U T P U T S

of

ORGANIZATION - SUBVERSION - INSURGENCY - PSYCHOLOGICAL

INPUT COST TO INSURGENTS

includes

COERCIVE EFFORT AS WELL AS FUNDS

INPUT COST MAY BE INCREASED EVEN THROUGH

POPULAR SUPPORT FAVORS INSURGENTS

conversely

INPUT COST MAY BE DECREASED EVEN THOUGH

GOVERNMENT WINS AND MAINTAINS POPULAR SUPPORT

COUNTER-INSURGENCY

REQUIRES

1. CONTROL of INPUTS
 - A. DECREASE AVAILABILITY
 - B. INCREASE COST

2. CONTROL of OUTPUTS
 - A. STRENGTHEN SECURITY FORCES
 - B. STRENGTHEN GOV'T INFRASTRUCTURE

3. DISRUPT CONVERSION OF INPUTS TO OUTPUTS

through

POPULATION AND MATERIAL RESOURCES CONTROL MEASURES

TARGET AREA ANALYSISAREAPEOPLE

GEOPHYSICAL ALLEGIANCE

COMMUNICATION ATTITUDES

RESOURCES MOTIVATION

CLIMATE GRIEVANCES

ASPIRATIONS

ECONOMICS

MOBILITY PATTERNS

-----then-----

RECEIVEPROCESSUTILIZE

MAPS

RECORD

PLACE REQUIREMENTS

OFFICIAL RECORDS

SUMMARIZE

DEVELOP OPERATIONS

STATISTICAL PUBLICATIONS

COLLATE

ANTICIPATE TARGETS

SURVEYS

ANALYZE

CONDUCT PSYOPS

ELICITATION

DISSEMINATE

EFFECT P&R CONTROLS

INTERROGATION

BRIEF

DEBRIEFINGS

INFORMANTS

CONSIDERATIONS OF
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT RELATING TO
COUNTER-INSURGENCY

Insurgent activities and the measures taken by security forces - counter-insurgency operations - are affected and often controlled by influences of the physical environment in which they take place. Physical environment includes the terrain, the weather, and the people; their attitudes, resources, capabilities, and limitations.

I will discuss the physical environment from two viewpoints; one, from the CT viewpoint, and two, from the viewpoint of suppression forces in planning and implementing CI operations.

Looking at environmental factors, I will place them into three general categories for convenience of presentation: one, physical necessity - considerations which are essential for life -; two, physical considerations other than people; three, population considerations.

1. Physical Necessities -

- A. Water - water is essential to life. There are few places in Thailand where an individual cannot find enough water to sustain life. However, when a large number of people are co-located, sufficient supply of water must be available for drinking, cooking, washing, etc. The CT camp must be located near a source of water, either a well or surface water, and close enough so that water

collection does not become a major effort. When planning for a CI operation, plans must be made for sufficient supply of water to suppression troops.

- B. Food - food also is essential to life, and as with water, when a large group of people are placed together they cannot sustain themselves on wild fruit and game. The CT camps must have access to rice, meat, vegetables, and condiments. They must either be provided food in kind or purchase it. In a few instances they may grow some food for their own consumption or for sale. By the same token, CI operations planning must consider provisions for the men involved. The number of men involved and the length of time of the operation must determine whether food can be purchased or must be provided; and if to be provided will it be carried, resupplied periodically by vehicle or by air?
- C. Shelter - for a group of men to exist long periods of time, with stores of food and equipment, some sort of shelter must be provided. Shelter may be temporary or permanent, but it must protect people and supplies from the elements of cold, heat, rain, and many times from insects and wildlife. To the CT this is an additional problem because his shelter must also be protected and concealed from suppression troops. For the suppression troops, a permanent shelter is normally provided and operations are normally of such duration that tents, ponchos, or other temporary shelter is sufficient in this climate.

2. Physical Consideration -

- A. The first consideration, naturally, is the availability or the provision of the necessities; water, food, and shelter. Unless the necessities are available, a CT band cannot subsist and neither can suppression forces operate.
- B. Weather - one of the most critical aspects of weather which affects both CT and security forces is rain. For example, camps located near a small stream may become flooded in the rains; stream crossings may not be fordable in the rains; roads may be impassable and boats must be used; cached supplies may be ruined; or rain clouds may prevent air operations, observation, or resupply. Weather conditions, and climatic effects, influence availability of food (growing season) disease (insect and water borne) visibility (hours of daylight, cloud cover, moon phase, etc.) and sustenance requirements (clothing, shelter, transportation). All of these considerations are particularly important to security operations to plan operational movements, logistic support, timing, and to determine enemy capability and courses of action.
- C. Terrain - terrain considerations include routes of communication, concealment, obstacles, proximity to other areas, and trafficability. Routes of communication include foot travel, vehicle travel, boats, or aircraft, yet they must have supply routes, escape routes, and courier traffic to contact points.

- D. Source of supplies - the CT must locate near, or have access to, a source of supplies to include water, food, weapons, ammunition, and personnel. The security forces have a distinct advantage in that logistic support can be mobilized for short periods of time to accompany the forces to any location, however, a complete knowledge of road networks, seasonal trafficability of roads, location of airstrips and LZ's, and terrain obstacles is required for the logistical planning.
- E. Proximity to people - physical location of camps, patrols, and operations are influenced by their proximity to people. The CT need people and they need support from the people. The security forces exist only to protect the people, and suppression operations should avoid endangering innocent villagers.
- F. Security - physical security precautions must be undertaken by both the CT and security forces. For the CT it means operating initially in remote, inaccessible areas until their influence is established; for security forces it means that larger numbers of personnel are required to protect facilities, routes of communication, and supply lines.

The CT must concern himself with aerial observation, isolation from wandering villagers, and terrain which affords in-depth protection from suppression patrols. The security forces must be aware of ambush sites, non-protected camp sites and isolated outposts, but is concerned with concealment only on surprise operations.

3. Population Considerations -

A. Ethnic and religious background - people of the same ethnic origin and same religious background tend to be clannish, or group-centered for protection from "outsiders." This is a survival instinct stemming from a normal fear of the unknown, which is the "outsider." Mountain-dwelling people and low-land people have traditionally mistrusted and misunderstood each other; the problems between people of different races, of different religions, of different language are well known. When the people of a certain ethnic or religious group are a minority, they are normally the object of acts of presecution, either real or imagined. Because of this built-in abrasive factor, the communists have traditionally made their initial efforts through an ethnic group (such as the Chinese) who are already sympathetic to their aims, or else through an ethnic minority who has many real or felt grievances towards the government in power.

Thus, the CT will be seeking ways to infiltrate and subvert the minor ethnic groups. They make every effort to use a member of the target group, and if not possible, they will spend many hours befriending the people, studying their habits, and learning of their grievances so that these points may be exploited. The security forces must also consider the same factors to avoid exacerbating existing problems and to assist in overcoming communist propaganda.

B. Population history - closely associated with ethnic and religious background, a history study of a population can tell you probable reactions

of the people - some people have traditionally resisted strong government control - while others have traditionally accepted any show of authority; some people recognize no authority other than their own tribal allegiance, while others recognize an ethnic or religious tie as more binding than political authority.

- C. Attitudes and motivation - the attitude of a group of people towards a government may vary according to the price of produce, the change in cost of living, the impact of changing laws; or the attitude may be relatively constant if the people are living at a subsistence level or if they are affluent enough to be undisturbed by changing politics and economy. It is important to understand the motivation which prompts attitudinal changes or instability. Once this motivation factor is determined by the CT, he can then chart a course of action to exploit it and effect an attitude change detrimental to the government; once determined by the government, it can chart a course of action by security forces to nullify the communist effort and to strengthen the people support of the government.
- D. Resources - it is important to know the resources of the people and the source of these resources. The CT need recruits for their armed bands, so they must have manpower resources; they need food so they must have a source for food in kind or for money to purchase; they must have weapons and ammunition, so they must have a local source and they must have means of transportation for their supplies. The security forces must know what resources are available to determine who can support the CT with food,

transportation, meeting places, money. Knowledge of the resources, complete records of people, facilities, food transportation, weapons, and mobility patterns is necessary before security forces can implement resources control measures.

4. Summary -

We know that the CT needs food, water, and shelter to survive. To operate he needs additional support such as clothing, weapons, ammo, medicine, and transportation. He needs access to people yet he must be concealed and protected from security forces. He must start on very insecure ground so he attempts to exploit existing government weaknesses and to do this he must expose himself to the people.

The security forces have a logistics advantage in that they do not have to worry about continual survival efforts - yet they must protect the people from an unidentified, un-located element which can appear at any place at any time. To do this, they must isolate the CT from the people which is their source of support. This isolation can only be accomplished by recognition of all the physical factors relating to the environment. From psychological operations, to population and material resources controls, to armed combat, all planning should be based on complete consideration of all these environmental factors.

ELEMENTS OF TNPD SECURITY DEVELOPMENT

1. Training
2. Logistics and Administrative Support
3. Financing
4. Operational and Administrative Reporting System
5. Organizational Plan
6. Operational Plan
7. Security Development Activities:
 - a. Field Operation Centers and Units
 - b. Border Police Schools and Youth Programs
 - c. Medical Program and Volunteer Doctors
 - d. Development Centers and Key Villages
 - e. Development Platoons
 - f. Border Crafts of Thailand
 - g. Border Security Volunteer Teams
 - h. Psychological Operations
 - i. Specialists

Prior to engaging field units in security development activities a national operational plan should be developed. This plan should consider the following:

- a. Identification of target area and population.
- b. Analysis to determine the most suitable activity to reach the target.
- c. Analysis to determine which TNPd element can best implement the activity.
- d. Training and resources of the element selected.
- e. Specific objectives the activity is to accomplish.

Security Development - Criteria for Evaluating Field Operations

I. Constructive and Meaningful Interaction

1. The activity initially aims toward mass contact with the target population.
2. Local population suggestions (felt needs) are used as a basis for determining the activity.
3. The local recognized organization is used and respected.
4. Local population resources (manpower and/or material) are considered and contributed to the activity.
5. A contribution is made by the TNPD (and by extension, the RTG).
6. The TNPD considers its own resources and their limitations.
7. Local population commits themselves to an effort which is important to them and which represents the Royal Thai Government interests.

II. Field Unit Operational Procedures

1. Field units maintain regular activity-related contact with the target population and informants within that population.
2. Field units study and respect normal social characteristics of target population.
3. Field Operation Center (FOC) fully briefs field units on objectives of population contacts and provides specific tasking instructions.
4. FOC maintains detailed maps of terrain, enemy order of battle, and RTG assets in target area.
5. Field operation center maintains a permanent record at field operation center of all TNPD interactions with target population.

6. Field unit develops and maintains a constructive and meaningful interaction between itself and the local target population.
7. Field unit determines which persons in target population are willing to work and cooperate with the TNPD.
8. Field unit elicits information from target population.
9. Field unit selects reliable village informants from target population.
10. Field operation center fully debriefs field unit immediately after each contact with target population and area.
11. Field operation center reports in detail all required information to higher headquarters.
12. Field operations unit maintains data of the opposition's activities in target area of briefing field units.
13. Target population is prepared for possible insurgency threat to their village.
14. Target area usefulness to TNPD is periodically reassessed.

Security Development activities which meet the above criteria will, if properly implemented, satisfy national security objectives by:

- a. Identifying, locating, and neutralizing the control element in this case the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and its support mechanism.
- b. Providing RTG physical presence the village level and thereby demonstrate the strength of the national government.
- c. Reinforcing and strengthening the local village structure which is the "grass-root" of the RTG.
- d. Demonstrating the RTG interest in the people's aspiration.

Defination of Terms

1. Target area and population - that area and population where insurgent or subversive elements are operating, suspected operating or could potentially operate.
2. Security Development activities - any overt means for interaction between the TNPd and the target population.
3. Local population - that population which is normally found in the target area.
4. Resources - personnel and/or material available from RTG or population for use in a target area.
5. Field unit - any unit which comes into direct contact with target population.
6. Field operation center - that leadership which is directly responsible for planning and implementing the activities of a field unit in a target area.
7. Specialists - skilled and trained civilian Thai employees, contracted to advise the TNPd in security development operations and training.

OUTLINEOPS Plan - SD Activity

SITUATION -

- a. Iden of target - Area and Population
- b. Iden of CPI, CI, activity in target
- c. Iden of RTG Assets in Target Area
- d. Other - unique ethnic or seasonal effects.

MISSION -

- a. Tasking element and activity
- b. Objectives
- c. Time Frame

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS -

- a. Organization
- b. Training
- c. Role of each element or agency
- d. Supporting roles of each element or agency
- e. Coordination required.

ADMIN AND LOGISTICS -

- a. Reports - format, timing, from whom, to whom
- b. Manpower, who, when, where
- c. Material - what, when, where, by whom
- d. Finances - from whom, how much, when.

COMMANDER AND SIGNAL -

- a. Command chain
- b. Method(s) of communication
- c. Follow-up
- d. Coordinating instruction.

Specialists

Security development specialists are an asset to the TNPDP who are drawn from the pool of skilled technicians outside the RTG civil service structure and utilized to fill short-term requirements for those skills not currently available within the TNPDP or for which the TNPDP has no long-term requirement.

The role of the specialist is to assist the TNPDP commander by advising him in security development operations and training.

To properly assist the TNPDP, specialists should meet certain minimum qualifications, which are:

- a. A four-year university educational level.
- b. Have a security clearance.
- c. Meet TNPDP junior-grade officer physical requirements.
- d. Speak the local language or dialect (English language capability is beneficial but not essential except in certain training positions).
- e. Previous experience is not necessary, but desirable, particularly experience with the RTG civil or military agencies.

Security Development Centers and Border Patrol Police Security Development

Schools

In support of the TNPDP Security Development mission and objectives, the security development centers and the Border Patrol Police Security Development schools play an important role. There are certain target areas and populations where it is desirable for TNPDP to have police personnel assigned for an extended period of time. These specific target areas exist in addition to and in support

of permanent line platoons and permanent field operations centers in conducting security development operations.

They are fixed outposts in various key villages and on isolated border crossing points. They allow a day by day contact with and a meaningful interaction between TNPB personnel and the local population by conducting security development activities. They are useful police information centers because they retain a flexibility to move to new areas where insurgent or subversive elements are operating, suspected of operating or could potentially operate.

Security Development Platoons

The Security Development teams provide technical support for all elements of security development activities. These TNPB personnel have either been trained or will be trained in:

- A. Construction projects both masonry and woodworking
- B. Agriculture
- C. Animal husbandry
- D. Water purification and sanitation
- E. Rudiments of road construction and bridge construction
- F. Psyops (support of psyops activity).

Security Development Psychological Operations

Psychological Operations are an important element of TNPB security development activities. It includes the planned use of propaganda and other measure to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile, neutral or fiendly groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national

internal security objectives. These PsyOps operations are directed toward the target population with the objectives of:

- A. Inducing defection and dissatisfaction among insurgent elements.
- B. Eliminating and reducing civilian support of insurgent forces.
- C. Gaining, preseving, and strengthening civilian support for the Thai Government.
- D. Building and maintaining the morale of TNPĐ forces.
- E. Influencing Hilltribe groups to support Thai Government efforts and to withhold support from the insurgent movement.

Medical Program

The TNPĐ Field Medical Service Program has two basic purposes; to provide basic medical care for policemen and their dependents in the field elements, and to assist the TNPĐ security efforts by providing low level treatment to villagers which will assist the TNPĐ in making meaningful periodic contacts with the population.

A medical school is being established at Hua Hin with a student capacity of 480 aid-man graduates annually. The course is eight weeks and covers administration, logistics, treatment, and evacuation all geared to operational requirements.

Training of police officers will include techniques of utilizing the medical program as a means of police-people interaction and as an information collection tool. Ancillary projects such as the Princess Mother's Volunteer doctors and a village medical self-help program are being considered.

Border Crafts of Thailand

The Border Crafts of Thailand (BCT) is a merchandising outlet for hilltribe handicraft and artifact work. The outlet provides numerous contacts with the hilltribes as approximately 3,000 are engaged in providing merchandise to BCT. The supervisors, who collect, sort, and pay the workers, can travel into areas where regular police patrols cannot go, and consequently they are a valuable source of information.


Border Security Volunteer Team

The Border Security Volunteer Teams (BSVT) are thirty-man hilltribe village defense units. They are currently funded by CSOD, and their selection, training, equipment, and control is a responsibility of the BPP. The BSVT are primarily and preferably deployed in their own village. A four-man BPP Ratsami team is attached for command and control. There are currently 21 teams (of Yao, Meo, Thin) and the projection is 57 teams by FY73.

The U.S. technicians for the RASD program were provided initially under contract csd-1155 by Community Development Counselling Service, Inc. (CDCS) a Virginia corporation. In 1967, Development Consultants International, (DEVCON), a Washington D.C. corporation purchased CDCS, and contract csd-1847 was negotiated to continue providing technicians to the RASD program. On 10 February 1970, DEVCON and USOM signed a two-year contract (AID-493-559) to provide technical services through February 1972. In 1970, the DEVCON company name was changed to Joseph Z. Taylor and Assoc., Inc.


The attached chart shows the present deployment of the 8 U.S. technicians and the 47 Thai technicians.

LOCATIONS OF CONTRACT TECHNICIANS AS OF APRIL 1971






ETHNIC GROUPS



Appendix 8d



GLOSSARY

1. BOB - Bureau of the Budget (RTG)
2. BPP - Border Patrol Police
3. CI - Counter-insurgency
4. CSOD - Communist Suppression Operations Directorate.
(Coordinating office of all civil, police, and
military elements in suppression activities.)
5. DTEC - Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation
(RTG)
6. PARU - Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit. National
reserve (airborne) of the TNPd.
7. PP - Provincial Police
8. PsyOps - Psychological Operations to effect changes in
the attitudes or behavior of a target population.
9. RASD - Remote Area Security Development. A security
development project between USOM and the TNPd.
10. RTG - Royal Thai Government
11. SAF - Special Action Force - 50-man provincial police
reserve unit.
12. SD - Security Development
13. SOP - Standard Operating Procedure
14. STOL - short take-off and landing
15. TNPd - Thai National Police Department
16. TOC - Tactical Operation's Center
17. USOM - Agency for International Development (Thailand)