



# SOUTHERN SUDAN AT THE CROSSROADS

CITIZEN EXPECTATIONS, ASPIRATIONS AND CONCERNS ABOUT THE REFERENDUM AND BEYOND

Findings from Focus Groups with  
Men and Women in Southern Sudan

Conducted February 5 - March 16, 2010

By Andrea L. Levy  
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September 30, 2010

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs



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This map is illustrative only and its inclusion does not imply endorsement of specific geographical boundaries.

Source: The World Factbook, 2010.

## NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE

The National Democratic Institute (NDI) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, nongovernmental organization that responds to the aspirations of people around the world to live in democratic societies that recognize and promote basic human rights. Since its founding in 1983, NDI and its local partners have worked to support and strengthen political and civic organizations, safeguard elections, and promote citizen participation, openness and accountability in government. With staff members and volunteer political practitioners from more than 100 nations, NDI brings together individuals and groups to share ideas, knowledge, experiences and expertise. Partners receive broad exposure to best practices in international democratic development that can be adapted to the needs of their own countries. NDI's multinational approach reinforces the message that while there is no single democratic model, certain core principles are shared by all democracies. The Institute's work upholds the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also promotes the development of institutionalized channels of communications among citizens, political institutions and elected officials, and strengthens their ability to improve the quality of life for all citizens. For more information about NDI, please visit [www.ndi.org](http://www.ndi.org).

## PREFACE

An historic event for Sudan, indeed for all of Africa, is due to take place on January 9, 2011. On this day, Southern Sudanese citizens will be taking part in a referendum to decide whether or not to secede from the rest of Sudan or remain united with the 15 Northern States. Based on 63 focus groups conducted from February 5–March 16, 2010 with 779 participants in Southern Sudan,<sup>1</sup> this report seeks to understand the mindset of participants living in Southern Sudan as they head into this momentous vote. These Southern Sudanese are insistent that the vote take place as scheduled – any delay emanating from the Government of National Unity will cause massive disappointment and disruption – and, as has been the case with every NDI Southern Sudan study since 2004, the vast majority of participants indicate they will be voting for separation. They envision some roadblocks ahead related to the equitable and efficient operation of the Government of Southern Sudan after separation, but they also have high expectations for the rapid development of their new country. Participants worry, though, that insecurity, caused by competition for resources within Southern Sudan and even more so along the North-South border, will cast a shadow on their future.

**Focus Groups Results and Usage.** Focus groups are semi-structured group discussions directed by a moderator and following a pre-set guideline. Unless otherwise noted, the conclusions presented here represent views commonly and repeatedly cited during the groups. The interaction between participants in a focus group provides insight into how citizens think and feel and is an even more powerful means of understanding why those attitudes exist. Information gathered in this way reflects citizen values and needs and is critical in helping decision-makers test their assumptions and incorporate the will of the people into policy-making.

**A Snapshot of Public Opinion.** Any public opinion research, including focus groups, is only a snapshot of opinion at the moment the research is undertaken. Public opinion is dynamic and evolves as people experience and react to major events, particularly in conflict-affected environments such as Southern Sudan. Therefore, the conclusions of this report only represent opinions when the research was undertaken. NDI conducts focus groups in Southern Sudan approximately every six months and is thus able to capture changes in attitudes. Such attitudinal shifts can then be measured against baseline information from previous research.

**A Qualitative Research Tool.** Focus groups are a qualitative, not a quantitative, research instrument. Although focus groups are a superior research method for understanding the

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<sup>1</sup> The Southern Sudan Referendum Act allows southerners residing in northern Sudan to vote in the referendum. This study, however, was conducted only among Southerners living in the 10 states of Southern Sudan.

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meanings behind commonly-held attitudes, the total number of participants in focus group research is always relatively small and thus is not statistically representative of the larger population. This report reflects the opinions of the citizens of Southern Sudan who participated in this study. General terms, such as ‘people’ and ‘citizens’ may be used on occasion in this report as a convenience to represent the attitudes of those participants; however, the Focus Group Participant Demographics chart as well as the Methodology Notes appearing at the end of the report should be consulted by all readers to understand the sub-set of individuals interviewed for this study.

**Participant Perceptions vs. Political Realities.** The *perceptions* of participants in these focus groups do not necessarily reflect *reality*. In the context of Southern Sudan, for example, the perception of participants regarding progress in development may differ from the reality on the ground. The reasons for this are many. Communication is difficult in Sudan, and current information is not always available. Also, ordinary citizens often judge progress based on the change in their own lives. Improvements in areas outside their immediate interests (although important in the greater context) are not always viewed as progress by the average person. Participants in this study sometimes get their facts wrong and often form their opinions based on inaccurate or semi-accurate readings of the world around them. Even if they do not represent reality, however, there is power in people’s perceptions. Citizens make decisions based on what they believe. Without knowledge of these perceptions, policy-makers and other stakeholders will not be able to address them. Thus, the goal of this research is to report the perceptions and opinions of participants, regardless of their accuracy, to Sudanese political and civil society leaders so they may better understand and respond to the concerns of the general populace.

**Ethnic Designations.** Where possible, the focus groups are conducted among single ethnicity groups, and quotations are labeled with the tribe and section provided by the participant. In some areas populated primarily by smaller tribes, single ethnicity groups are not always possible or appropriate. In these cases, quotations will be labeled only with the gender and location of the participant.

NDI’s ongoing citizen participation program in Southern Sudan is funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) through a multi-year grant. The inclusion of regular public opinion research in NDI’s wider Sudan initiative is intended to help policy-makers better understand the views of citizens as they make important decisions that will shape the future of the region. This is the eleventh in a series of bi-annual studies NDI has conducted in Sudan since late 2004. The Institute plans to continue this research on a regular basis through 2012.

NDI would like to acknowledge USAID officials in Juba and Khartoum who provided guidance on topics of interest and shared their knowledge of Southern Sudan.

While part of this study covers the same ground as previous NDI studies in Southern Sudan, this is the Institute's first in-depth study on the upcoming referendum. Southern Sudanese citizens have high hopes that the referendum will result in political separation from the North and have great expectations that an independent Southern Sudan will eventually be prosperous. But the political environment surrounding the referendum is tenuous, and the threat of conflict should the referendum not proceed as planned or should the outcome be unacceptable to one of the parties is a major concern. NDI is pleased to share the views of citizens with government officials and other stakeholders as they work to create an environment for the referendum in which all are committed to a successful and peaceful outcome.

## THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE

Citizens in Southern Sudan are eagerly anticipating the referendum and the opportunity for self-determination, but they also recognize the many challenges that lie ahead. The quotations below reflect their hopes and concerns about the referendum and beyond.

*In the past, we have been victims of governance full of death and destruction. I don't want to hear the word unity again.*

*There would be no GoSS if the people vote for unity. That is why we hate those who want unity.*

*This [a referendum delay] will ignite a bitter war again. If the people do not fight because of this delay, it means the Southerners will never get their rights.*

*If Salva Kiir and his government announce the [referendum] delay, we shall know there is a genuine reason for it. He is our leader, and he knows the consequences of his decisions.*

*We would say that he [Kiir] has been bribed by the Arabs [if the referendum is delayed].*

*They [Southerners in the North] should be brought back [to the South] first because if they vote in Khartoum, Arabs will force them to vote for unity.*

*They [Southerners in the North] must be brought back to the South before the referendum because they will be slaughtered by the Arabs.*

*What will happen to the Northerners living in the South will depend on what will happen to the Southerners living in the North; for instance, if they are killed, then the Northerners will also be killed.*

*The Arabs have cheated us for so long, so we don't need to share [oil revenues]. It should be ours alone.*

*Corruption will be the biggest challenge [for an independent Southern Sudan]. Those in the government will think of fulfilling their own desires by using public funds.*

*The only thing and the major issue will be tribalism [in an independent Southern Sudan].*

*Unless the international community stays at the [North-South] border after separation, fighting will continue and death will be at hand.*

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report explores public opinion in Southern Sudan. It is NDI's eleventh focus group study in Sudan since 2004. Based on 63 focus group discussions with 779 Sudanese participants, the report examines attitudes and concerns of Southern Sudanese citizens about the referendum planned for 2011, as well as the April 2010 elections.<sup>2</sup> As with all NDI public opinion studies, participants were also asked about their views on government performance, development, security, corruption, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and related issues. Key findings are summarized below. The full results, along with selected quotations from participants, can be found in the Principal Findings section of this report.

### I. Referendum

- **Southern Sudanese participants continue to express an extremely strong yearning for separation from the North. Even the word “unity” has negative associations for them.** Since NDI's first public opinion study in 2004, Southern Sudanese participants have expressed a consistent desire for political separation from the North. That remains the case with this study. They commonly cite three basic reasons for their strong affinity for separation: the oppression and marginalization they say they have suffered under Northern domination, the desire to enjoy freedoms and rights in an independent Southern Sudan and the ability for the South to control its own resources. The majority of participants equate the term “unity” with domination by the North and gross mistreatment under its rule, including killing, slavery, Islamization, and economic exploitation. A number of participants note that unity will mean a return to war.
- **For most participants, “unity” means that the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) will no longer exist – a deeply disturbing prospect. The strong desire for secession is also being driven by belief that an independent South will be more prosperous.** For many, the prospect of there no longer being a semi-autonomous government in the South is a regressive and highly negative one – they talk of being “swallowed up in the Government of National Unity (GoNU)” and going back to “domination by the Arabs.” Also contributing to their desire for separation is their very favorable picture of Southern Sudan after independence. They feel that the South's controlling its own resources will fuel a boom

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<sup>2</sup> A full examination of South Sudanese participants' attitudes and expectations prior to the April 2010 elections is contained in NDI's September 2009 report: “Imagining the Election: A Look at What Citizens Know and Expect of Sudan's 2010 Vote.”

in development, and many believe that its economy will be on par with that of neighbors like Kenya and Uganda in 10 years.

- **Southern Sudanese participants support the right of Southerners in the North to vote in the referendum but want them to return “home” to cast their ballots.** Most feel a kinship with their Southern Sudanese brethren living in the North and believe they have a right to participate in the referendum. However, many attach a significant caveat: they want Southerners in the North to return to the South before voting in the referendum because they are very concerned that bribery and intimidation from Northern forces will result in votes for unity. Participants generally support the right of Diaspora to vote in the referendum.
  
- **Most Southern Sudanese participants are strongly opposed to a referendum delay, and importantly, many participants cannot conceive of a single credible reason for a delay.** If announced by GoNU, many assume a delay would be an unnecessary delaying tactic or trick by the North, and most would not accept a GoNU delay, even if the international community were in agreement with the recommendation. A referendum delay imposed by the GoSS is somewhat more acceptable, though participants say the government would have to provide a very strong rationale if it decided to impose a delay. Still, majorities in only about half the groups say they would accept a GoSS-supported postponement. The other half would consider a GoSS delay to be a sign that Salva Kiir had been bribed or was an incompetent leader.
  
- **Participants want the international community to play an active role in the referendum.** Participants envision four distinct roles for the international community: first and foremost, monitoring the vote to prevent any irregularities such as vote rigging; maintaining security at border areas; acting as a mediator between North and South when and if disagreements arise; and, fundamentally, making the referendum possible by providing education, funding and material support.
  
- **Participants express concern about the fate of Southerners living in the North after separation but are generally accepting of Northerners continuing to live in the South, unless Southerners are mistreated.** The majority assume that Southerners in the North will face mistreatment or be chased away at best (particularly if they voted for separation), or be killed, at worst. However, participants are generally accepting of Northerners continuing to live in the South after separation, as long as they don’t cause any disturbances and are not involved in politics. Nevertheless, many groups openly state that the fate of Northerners in

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the South will be inextricably linked to that of Southerners in the North. In other words, if the Southerners are mistreated or killed, the same fate will befall the Northerners.

- **Participants take an extremely hard line against the sharing of oil revenue with the North if the referendum vote is for independence.** Most participants feel that the North has cheated them out of their rightful share of oil revenue for too long and will simply continue to do so if revenue sharing is continued. When told or reminded that the only way for the South to export its oil is through the pipeline in the North, a few are more comfortable with a revenue deal being termed a fee rather than a “sharing” arrangement. But most participants do not change their opinion. They insist the South should build its own pipeline to run through neighboring countries, such as Kenya, Uganda or Ethiopia, rather than the North.
- **There is no consensus among participants about whether they would accept a four-year transition period after a vote for independence.** Participants are almost evenly divided about whether they would accept a four-year transition period before full independence, if it were announced by the GoSS. Many of those who would accept this scenario cite the unfinished issues of border demarcation, allocation of resources and IDP rights and relocation and say that they understand these matters will take time to resolve. Those who are opposed to a four-year transition period don’t believe there would be a compelling, honest reason behind it – that it would merely be the result of the North playing politics and would represent an incredible disappointment.
- **Most participants expect tribal relations to improve after Southern independence, though some say it depends on the GoSS.** Most participants believe that a common spirit will unite Southerners in an independent Sudan, in part because they feel the quality of life will improve, the rule of law will be more robust and the North will no longer foment tribal conflict. Some participants note they see the potential for peaceful relations among tribes, but that the state of tribal relations will ultimately depend on the government’s ability to complete disarmament and eliminate tribalism.
- **Despite the enthusiasm for secession, participants express strong concerns about challenges an independent GoSS would face: corruption, ethnicity-based hiring, and nepotism/tribalism. Apprehensions about the economy, as well as concerns about insecurity along the North-South border, are also widespread.**

## II. Elections

- **Participants in Southern Sudan were widely aware of the existence and date of the April 2010 elections.<sup>3</sup> Many were also schooled in and understood the relationship between the elections and good governance.** The vast majority of participants say they had received information about the elections, and a number of participants appear to have internalized the lessons of good governance related to the elections. They cite take-aways such as freedom to vote for whom you want; voting is your right; it's important to choose the right leaders; you should vote for leaders who will take the country in the right direction; and no one is allowed to vote twice.
- **Most participants felt voter registration for the April 2010 election was fair, but about half were apprehensive about the potential for election violence and corruption.** Participants said most people in their areas were informed about the importance of voter registration and that almost everybody they knew registered. Their major concerns about the elections were the threat of violence and the potential for corruption: rigging, bribery, and forced voting for a particular candidate. They saw the potential for violence largely stemming from the losing side expressing its disapproval of the outcome – whether it be the North or the South – although a few also mentioned the possibility of fighting among tribes in the South. Participants who had no concerns about the elections were assured by the presence of the international community and SPLA, believing that they would curb potential problems.

## III. Development, Security and Governance

- **More participants acknowledge progress in Southern Sudan than in 2009 but are still dissatisfied with levels of development and security as well as corruption within the GoSS.** Since NDI's last public opinion study, attitudes toward the region's progress have slightly improved, with about a third of the groups maintaining that the region is headed in the right direction. Nevertheless, lack of development and infrastructure continues to be a pressing issue for those living in relatively secure areas. In other areas, the most acute problem is insecurity caused by tribal fighting. Other factors contributing to discontent are concerns about corruption, tribalism and nepotism in government and the civil service; lack of educational and unemployment opportunities; and delay in the payment of public sector salaries. Although there is a slight increase in participants noting development gains, participants have high expectations for the GoSS to make considerable strides in this area.

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<sup>3</sup> This study took place from February-March 2010 – before the elections.

- **GoSS performance ratings remain in the “fair-to-good” range, but participants cite corruption, the slow pace of development and nepotism and tribalism as government failings.** The GoSS receives praise in four general areas: accomplishment of some progress in *development and infrastructure* (roads, communication networks, schools, health facilities, water, and electricity); achievement of *peace and its attending fruits* (security, freedoms and rights, no more fear); simply *its creation* (the opportunity to live under self-government, along with the decentralization of power to state and local governments); and the attainment of democracy through an *election and referendum*. But participants also mention four key problems hindering the government’s performance: corruption; nepotism and tribalism in government and the civil service; insufficient attention paid to development; and delayed salaries for civil servants and soldiers.
- **Participants have a higher opinion of the GoSS president Salva Kiir but nevertheless want to see him take a stronger stand against tribalism, fire weak subordinates, and continue to do more in the critical areas of development and security.** Participants rate Salva Kiir’s performance as “good” and praise him for bringing them the benefits of the CPA – peace, security, and freedoms and rights – and fulfilling John Garang’s vision. They also credit him with bringing some development to their areas and inviting foreign investment. Additionally, he gets recognition for reorganizing and strengthening the SPLA and maintaining security by deploying the army at borders. But there is also a desire for him to do more, specifically, attack the issue of tribalism in the government, improve the quality and effectiveness of his subordinates and work harder to improve development and security.
- **Southern Sudanese participants feel that the GoSS government is rife with corruption and that it occurs at the highest levels.** Asked how much of a problem corruption is in Southern Sudan’s government, participants overwhelmingly choose “very much,” the highest rating on the scale provided. Corruption continues to be defined primarily as nepotism and tribalism in government, embezzlement of public funds, and unpaid or delayed government and civil service salaries.
- **Perceptions of security have improved overall, although a third of participants still report that security in their area is poor or worsening. Most feel that security can only be improved by full disarmament and a better trained, equipped and paid police force and army.** In this study, about a third of participants indicate that security in their area is poor or getting worse, versus half, in the previous NDI study. Participants’ security assessments depend on where they reside. Those who report improved security tend to credit disarmament, withdrawal of the Sudan Armed Forces and the protection of the SPLA.

In areas where the security assessment is poor, the reasons differ by location. Crime appears to be the most widespread security issue; tribal clashes and police and army misconduct and/or incompetence are also cited in certain areas. In suggesting strategies for strengthening security, participants most often mention complete disarmament and a more professional (in reference to training, equipment and pay) police force and army.

- **Participants generally have a positive opinion of the performance of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), but are more critical of the Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS).** Most participants have a positive assessment of the SPLA, with almost two-thirds of the groups deeming their performance “good.” They say the army is now more disciplined, is guided by military laws, doesn't engage in unlawful behavior, provides security during tribal attacks or attacks from Arabs and cooperates with the community. Nevertheless, they all believe there are certain factors that are hindering the SPLA from operating at its most efficient level: lack of salaries, proper training, and sufficient equipment and supplies. Only about a third of the participants rate the performance of the SSPS as “good,” with the rest giving the police a poorer assessment. Complaints center on two basic issues: *ineffectiveness* caused by lack of education and training, age (too old to do their job well), lack of equipment and supplies and insufficient troop strength; and *corruption/unlawful behavior*.

## PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

This study is both a continuation of previous research that has explored citizens' opinions of their government and their lives as well as an in-depth look at attitudes about one of the CPA's most important milestones, the referendum. Citizens' perceptions of their past and current situation have a direct bearing on their intentions for the referendum and their expectations for life post-referendum. To gain insight into these crucial issues, NDI conducted 63 focus groups with 779 participants throughout Southern Sudan. The findings, drawn from participants' comments, are below.

**1. Southern Sudanese participants continue to express an extremely strong yearning for separation from the North. Even the word “unity” has negative associations for them.**

In each of NDI's public opinion studies in Southern Sudan since 2004, a question has been asked about the 2011 self-determination referendum. Participants' answers have been remarkably consistent, more so than on any other question in the studies. Across different age and ethnic groups, they have never wavered in their strong desire for political separation from the North.

*Even if only two towns are identified as an independent Southern Sudan and the rest as the North, I'll choose to remain a Southerner.* (Dinka Twic Chief, Panyagor)

Notably, when participants are asked to choose the most significant part of the CPA from a list of six possibilities,<sup>4</sup> the option to separate from the North is deemed the most important aspect of the CPA by many participants, even more vital than the peace between North and South. (The five groups where *every* participant chose separation as their response were all with members of various Dinka tribes.)

Participants commonly cite three basic reasons for their strong affinity for separation: the oppression and marginalization suffered under Northern “domination,” the desire to enjoy more freedoms and rights under an independent Southern Sudan government, and the ability for the South to control its own resources and thus speed development. In past studies, the main driver of the desire for separation has been past oppression and marginalization, but this study

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<sup>4</sup>The list included: peace between North and South; the creation of the GoSS; elections/opportunity to choose new leaders; the right of the South to choose unity or separation; freedoms and rights; the promise of economic development.

demonstrates that people's expressed desire for separation is now taking on an economic tone as well.

*We need to be apart from the Arabs because we are tired of the mistreatment and [being] slaves. (Dinka Rek Man, Gogrial)*

*I want separation because it is better to die than be oppressed by Arabs. (Kuku Chief, Limi, Kajo Keji County)*

*[I want to] create a separate country because I simply want to enjoy my rights. (Toposa Man, Kapoeta)*

*I will vote for separation because once you fight with a brother, forgiveness is not a one-day issue, and if we unite, the North might want to accomplish their hidden agenda. (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)*

*I will vote for separation. The CPA was signed to see what would happen between the Northern Arabs and Southerners, but no cooperation is visible. Development is in full gear in Khartoum while in the South, what do we have? Dirty tin roofs and mud walls. (Madi Woman, Magwi)*

*I will vote for separation because Arabs took all our resources to develop the North. (Lopit Man, Lopa)*

*I will vote for separation because we want to utilize our oil resources properly. (Kuku Man, Kajo Keji)*

Participants were asked for their associations with the word “unity,” as it relates to unity with the rest of Sudan. In 56 of the 63 groups, either all or the majority of participants have extremely negative reactions to the term. They equate the term with domination by the North and gross mistreatment under its rule, including killing, slavery, Islamization, and economic exploitation. A number of participants note that unity will mean a return to war (a few groups cite as evidence the broken peace agreement of 1972).

*In the past, we have been victims of governance full of death and destruction. I don't want to bear the word unity again. (Nuer Jikany Woman, Guit)*

*I think of the previous enslavement of our brothers and sisters. (Man, Wau)<sup>5</sup>*

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<sup>5</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

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*I think of the suffering of the people of Southern Sudan because we will be marginalized.* (Dinka Rek Woman, Alek, Gogrial West County)

*Unity will definitely take us back to slavery because it's what we experienced in the past.* (Toposa Man, Kapoeta)

*You cannot stay in the hole with a snake. What comes to my mind is total separation.* (Dinka Rek Man, Kurluek, Thiet)

*[With unity,]Arabs will become first-class citizens because the sharia law will prevail, and hence democracy will vanish.* (Toposa Man, Kapoeta)

*What comes to my mind first is war. It means fighting will resume between the two sides, and Southerners will be taken as slaves once again by Arabs.* (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)

In only four groups is there a unanimous positive reaction to the term “unity,” as these participants note that unity means strength and will bring development. Two of the four groups were comprised of Muslim participants.

*You need to get experience from developed people. I want unity because we are all Sudanese.* (Muslim Man, Juba)<sup>6</sup>

*Unity will bring development to our country ... and the government will be able to help people.* (Christian Woman, Juba)<sup>7</sup>

- 2. For most participants, a vote for unity in the referendum means that the GoSS will no longer exist – a prospect that many consider deeply disturbing. Also contributing to the desire for secession is a belief that an independent South will be a more prosperous South.**

The vast majority of participants believe that the GoSS will not exist if the referendum vote is for unity.<sup>8</sup> For many, the prospect of there no longer being an autonomous government in the South is a regressive and highly negative one – they talk of being “swallowed up in the

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<sup>6</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

<sup>7</sup> Quotation is from a group of women from mixed tribes.

<sup>8</sup> Due to moderator error, this question was not posed to respondents in 14 groups.

Government of National Unity”<sup>9</sup> and going back to “domination by the Arabs.”<sup>10</sup>

*The government of Southern Sudan would not exist anymore because we will have one government, and that will be Arabs.* (Nuer Man, Nassir)

*The GoSS will not continue if Southerners vote for unity.* (Kuku Woman, Kajo Keji)

*The GoSS cannot exist because the Arabs’ government will take over the responsibility.* (Lou Nuer Chief, Waat)

*There would be no GoSS if the people vote for unity. That is why we hate those who want unity.*  
(Dinka Twic Chief, Panyagor)

*If we vote for unity, the GoSS will cease to exist. It will disappear completely.* (Madi Woman, Magwi)

*The GoSS will not be there because we shall be one country with one government.* (Dinka Chief, Maboktong, Aweil East County)

*The GoSS will not exist because the Khartoum government will replace it.* (Nuer Bul Chief, Mayom)

*We will go back to war if the GoSS is dissolved.* (Dinka Rek Woman, Thiet)

*Maybe Anyanya Three [rebellion] would happen because most of the Southerners are for separation.* (Fertit Woman, Wau)

Also contributing to the desire for succession is participants’ incredibly rosy picture of an independent Southern Sudan. Their optimism is fueled by their conviction that the South will be controlling its own resources upon separation. They say that the resulting revenue will fuel a boom in the development they feel was denied them under Northern rule: new infrastructure, better health care, new schools, development of the agricultural sector and more. They also talk about an explosion in business, both homegrown and through foreign investment, resulting in increased employment opportunities. Many talk about Sudan becoming as developed as Kenya or Uganda in 10 years.

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<sup>9</sup> Quotation is from a Lou Nuer man in Waat.

<sup>10</sup> Quotation is from a Toposa man in Kapoeta.

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*The South will develop faster because most of the resources will be under the control of the Southerners. Things will be much better. (Man, Wau)<sup>11</sup>*

*Development will be very fast because everything will be in our hands. (Lopit Woman, Mura Lopit, Lopa County)*

*There shall be many permanent buildings [in an independent Southern Sudan]. If things remain like this, in the next 10 years, our country will be like Kenya and Uganda. (Dinka Twic Woman, Khir, Twic East County)*

### **3. Southern Sudanese participants widely support the right of Southerners in the North and the Diaspora to vote in the referendum. However, many feel those in the North must return to the South to vote because of the possibility of bribery and intimidation.**

The majority of participants believe that Southerners who live in the North should be able to vote in the self-determination referendum.<sup>12</sup> They say that those in the North are their “brothers,” and it is their legal right under the CPA if they registered. Furthermore, many point out that they settled in the North not by choice, but because of the war. And a few indicate that allowing them to vote will increase the number of votes for separation. Importantly, though, many attach a large caveat: Southerners in the North must move back to the South first if they want to cast their vote. Participants fear if Southerners are allowed to vote in the North they will be bribed or intimidated to vote for unity; and some even worry that their brethren in the North have been brainwashed in Arab ways and will vote for unity if they remain there. These are the same reasons offered by the minority of respondents who reject the right of Southerners in the North to vote.

*They [Southerners in the North] should be allowed to vote because they are Southerners, and they have registered. (Dinka Rek Woman, Warrap)*

*They should vote ... they are in the North not because they want to be there but because of wars. (Lou Nuer Man, Waat)*

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<sup>11</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

<sup>12</sup> Most of the groups in Western Equatoria and Lakes states could not understand the question properly. They responded about whether they thought Southerners in the North “will” be able to vote, versus “should” be able to vote – thus their responses are not reflected here.

*Yes, they should be allowed to vote so that we win against the North.* (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)

*They should be allowed to vote, but they should first come to the South.* (Dinka Twic Man, Pager, Twic East County)

*We want the government to bring them back so that we vote together during the referendum.* (Dinka Muslim Woman, Jalhak, Renk)

*They [Southerners in the North] should be brought back [to the South] first because if they vote in Khartoum, Arabs will force them to vote for unity.* (Dinka Malual Woman, Malualkon)

*I'm afraid there would be rigging so they have to be brought back to the South so that they can vote.* (Shilluk Man, Malakal)

*They cannot be allowed to vote because they [have bought into] Arab ideology.* (Nuer Bul Chief, Mayom)

Participants are also accepting of the right of Southerners in the Diaspora to vote.<sup>13</sup> As with Southerners in the North, they say they feel a kinship with those in the Diaspora and that they were displaced not by choice, but because of the war. A few of these participants accept the Sudanese Diaspora's right to vote only if they have not become permanent citizens of other countries or if they move back to Sudan. Participants in only two of the 63 groups outright reject the Diaspora's right to vote, deeming them "foreigners" or suggesting that they are not knowledgeable enough about the current situation in Sudan.

*Our people are all over the world; they should be allowed to vote wherever they are. Our soil will make them vote for separation.* (Dinka Twic Woman, Khir, Twic East County)

*They [Diaspora] can vote because we are one people with them.* (Dinka Man, Malakal)

*Yes, [Diaspora] should be allowed to vote] because they were only displaced due to the conflict and therefore should be allowed to exercise their rights.* (Toposa Man, Kapoeta)

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<sup>13</sup> Again, most of the respondents in Western Equatoria, Lakes and, this time, also in Northern Bahr el Ghazal state did not understand the question properly. They responded about whether they thought Southerners in the Diaspora "will" be allowed, versus "should" be allowed to vote – thus their responses are not reflected here.

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*They [Diaspora] are people who were expelled from their home because of war, and they have the right to vote.* (Nuer Bul Chief, Mayom)

*That will depend on the law of the country they [Diaspora] are in because if they claim citizenship in that country, they are no longer Southerners or Sudanese, and hence they should not vote in the 2011 referendum.* (Dinka Rek Man, Kwajok)

*Those in the Diaspora should not vote unless they come to the South and vote here.* (Lopit Man, Lopa)

- 4. The vast majority of Southern Sudanese participants are adamantly opposed to a GoNU-imposed referendum delay, even if the international community were in agreement. A referendum delay announced by the GoSS is somewhat more acceptable. However, most participants cannot conceive of a single credible reason for a delay.**

Participants were asked how they would react if the GoNU announced that the referendum needed to be delayed by one year because preparations were behind schedule.<sup>14</sup> A delay in the referendum is unacceptable to most participants, across different age and ethnic groups. They say that the date of the referendum was enshrined in the CPA and agreed to by both sides so there would be no credible reason for it. Many assume a postponement of the referendum would be an unnecessary delaying tactic or trick by the North. Some respondents in a few groups believe that announcement of a delay would be tantamount to a declaration of war.

*It [the referendum] should be conducted as scheduled in the CPA. It must not be delayed.* (Christian Man, Juba)<sup>15</sup>

*That [a delay] will imply the violation of the CPA, and hence the South should be declared independence immediately.* (Toposa Man, Kapoeta)

*My reaction [to a referendum delay] will be negative because both sides signed the CPA to conduct the referendum in 2011. Why didn't they start preparation early and follow the CPA?* (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)

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<sup>14</sup> A one-year delay was tested due to participants' inability to distinguish between smaller increments, such as three or six months. However, participants' responses clearly demonstrate that any significant delay – and for some any delay at all – is not viewed positively.

<sup>15</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

*If the referendum is delayed, that means the CPA is violated. (Zande Man, Maridi)*

*No more extensions – enough is enough. (Nuer Bul Chief, Mayom)*

*I will not agree to a referendum delay because I am tired of the lies of the Arabs. They have signed two agreements and didn't implement them. If they ask for one year, we will consider it as a tactic dishonoring the agreement. (Lou Nuer Woman, Waat)*

*I will not accept [a delay in the referendum] because [this means] Omar wants to plan for a war again. (Dinka Malual Woman, Maluakon)*

*There is no reason for it [the referendum] to be delayed. (Shilluk Woman, Malakal)*

*I will be very annoyed [if the referendum is delayed]. I would protest to the international community. (Nuer Woman, Nassir)*

*This [a referendum delay] will ignite a bitter war again. If the people do not fight because of this delay, it means the Southerners will never get their rights. (Man, Wau)<sup>16</sup>*

*People will go back to the bush for war if it's [the referendum] delayed. (Dinka Rek Man, Warrap)*

*Once something is signed, there is no reason for delay if they don't want war. (Kuku Chief, Limi, Kajo Keji County)*

As a testament to the strength of Southerners' conviction about the referendum proceeding as planned, about three-quarters of the participants would not accept a GoNU delay even if the international community were in agreement with the recommendation. If the international community were to agree, many participants would take this as a sign that they are biased toward the North or have been bribed. Of the groups who would accept a delay based on the recommendation of the international community, many say the latter would first need to provide a very sound reason.

*No change [if the international community recommended a delay], I want the referendum to happen before I die. (Nuer Jikany Woman, Guit)*

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<sup>16</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

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*The international community has no right to get into domestic issues. By doing so, they will be violating the sovereignty of the people. (Shilluk Man, Malakal)*

*That would mean that the GoNU has bribed the international community. (Kuku Woman, Kajo Keji)*

*We shall say that the international community has been bribed by Khartoum. Why, then, did they agree to the six-year interim period and push it back? (Dinka Twic Chief, Panyagor)*

*If it's the decision of the North, then the international community might be siding with the North. (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)*

*The international community has to convince all the Southerners and give a guarantee that nothing will happen next. But how can the CPA be changed? That is not acceptable. (Man, Wau)<sup>17</sup>*

*We shall first find out if the reasons given by the international community for the delay of the referendum are just. (Toposa Woman, Narus, Kapoeta East County)*

A tiny minority could accept a GoNU-announced referendum delay, provided the GoNU offers a credible reason and the SPLM is in agreement. A few say they would accept a GoNU delay to avoid war.

*The [GoNU-imposed] delay should be based on reasonable reasons, and the international community has to witness that. (Man, Wau)<sup>18</sup>*

*I will only be okay if the two parties, that is NCP and SPLM, agreed to that, but if it's only NCP, then war will be declared. (Toposa Man, Kapoeta)*

*What we want is to put an end to the conflict between the North and South. I'll accept [a GoNU delay] just to prevent further war. (Dinka Twic Woman, Panyagor)*

Acceptance becomes more widespread if the recommendation of a delay were to come from the GoSS and Salva Kiir. Still, majorities in only about half the groups say they would accept a postponement under this scenario, and many say the GoSS would need to provide them with a very credible rationale.

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<sup>17</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

<sup>18</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

*If Salva Kiir and his government announce the [referendum] delay, we shall know there is a genuine reason for it. He is our leader, and he knows the consequences of his decisions. (Dinka Twic Man, Pager, Twic East County)*

*If the GoSS says so, we have no choice. We will agree accordingly with Salva Kiir, the president of the GoSS. (Nuer Jikany Man, Guit)*

*We will accept it if [Kiir] is the one who said let the referendum be delayed. He may come and tell his people that [the referendum] is going to be delayed due to some reasonable causes. (Lopit Woman, Mura Lopit, Lopa County)*

*If Kiir agrees to push the referendum back I will wait because he is the president, and he knows the problems facing the government better than we here. (Nuer Woman, Nassir)*

*We shall definitely question him or basically ask for proper reasons for the proposed delay. (Toposa Woman, Narus, Kapoeta East County)*

*There must be a reason why the GoSS or Kiir would accept that proposal. Kiir works for the people. He cannot accept something that can victimize us as his people. We will not keep quiet. Kiir as president will be asked why he accepted the agreement. (Dinka Agar Woman, Rumbek)*

*If there is a [substantial] reason that we could understand, then we will agree, but only if it comes from the GoSS and Kiir. (Dinka Rek Man, Gogrial)*

Among the other half of the groups, many say that the GoSS would need to consult the citizens before making such a proposal. Some would assume that Salva had been bribed by the North to take this position, and still others note that Salva's recommendation of a delay would indicate that he is not a competent leader and should therefore step down.

*In fact, we are living in a democracy, not a dictatorship. It means they [the GoSS] should not do anything according to their own will. They should consider the opinions of the citizens. (Fertit Woman, Wau)*

*He [Kiir] is a leader because of us; we shall tell him he is wrong. We should be consulted about the delay, so that the majority agrees. (Dinka Twic Man, Pager, Twic East County)*

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*I don't think Salva Kiir can decide on his own without our concerns; he has no right to decide on his own.* (Dinka Malual Woman, Aweil)

*We would say that he [Kiir] has been bribed by the Arabs [if the referendum is delayed].* (Lou Nuer Man, Waat)

*It means they [the GoSS] have some polices behind that, like buying people [bribing].* (Zande Woman, Maridi)

*Salva Kiir [would have] to step down, and somebody [should take over] from him because we don't want war again.* (Kuku Woman, Kajo Keji)

In fact, most participants do not feel there would be any good reason to delay the referendum. Other participants offer only three potentially credible reasons for a delay: finishing negotiations on border demarcation/oil sharing issues; allowing time for Southerners in the North and the Diaspora to return to the South (presumably, based on previous responses, to increase the numbers voting for separation and to assure the safety of those currently in the North); or insecurity/fighting (thereby complicating the environment for a vote).

*There is no reason for delaying the referendum.* (Kuku Woman, Kajo Keji)

*I don't think there is any reason from our side that would lead to the delay of the referendum. Such excuses may come from the North. Otherwise, the referendum has to [take place] as it was agreed.* (Jur Chol Chief, Bariar, Wau County)

*The last day of the six-year interim period is referendum day, without question. No reason to delay.* (Dinka Twic Chief, Panyagor)

*There is no point; I don't see any reason to delay.* (Nuer Bul Chief, Mayom)

*We don't see any reason for the referendum to be postponed.* (Nuer Woman, Nassir)

*The issue of border demarcation will be a reason to delay the referendum.* (Shilluk Man, Malakal)

*[Possible reason for referendum delay:] The issue of borders like the Abyei, Aweil borders with Arabs and Southern Blue Nile.* (Dinka Malual Man, Aweil)

*The only reason that can delay the referendum should be to bring back the people in the Diaspora. (Lou Nuer Chief, Waat)*

*[Possible reason for referendum delay:] To give the Southerners in the North a chance to return home. (Toposa Woman, Narus, Kapoeta East County)*

*Those in the Diaspora and IDPs – if they are delayed in coming home, this would be a good reason to delay the referendum. (Lopit Man, Lopa)*

*[Possible reason for referendum delay:] Only if there is fighting or war again between South and North. (Moru Chief, Mundri)*

**5. The international community has multiple crucial roles to play in the referendum as monitor, mediator, educator and funder, say Southern Sudanese participants.**

Practically every Southern Sudanese participant in this study believes the international community has a number of important roles to play with respect to the referendum. Overall, they see the international community as protectors of the CPA, particularly those who were witnesses to the signing. Participants mostly envision the international community playing four distinct roles: first and foremost, monitoring the vote to prevent any irregularities such as vote rigging; maintaining security at border areas; acting as a mediator between North and South when and if disagreements arise; and, fundamentally, making the referendum possible by providing education, funding and material support.

*They [international community] must have a role to play in the referendum because they were witnesses at the time of the signing of the CPA. (Kuku Man, Kwajok)*

*They [international community] should be the monitors of the referendum process. The voting should be under their supervision. (Jur Chol Chief, Bariar, Wau County)*

*The international community should be there to observe so that the referendum will be free and fair. If they're not there, there may be forced voting and cheating. (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)*

*They [international community] should be monitoring both sides, the North and the South, during the referendum. (Moru Man, Lui, Mundri)*

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*Let them [international community] maintain peace between North and South during the referendum.* (Kuku Woman, Kajo Keji)

*They [international community] will have a role. If there is going to be fighting because of the referendum result, they will protect us. If there is no fighting, they will help in monitoring of the referendum voting.* (Dinka Agar Woman, Rumbek)

*They [international community] shall intervene in any violation made by any of the parties.* (Nuer Bul Woman, Mayom)

*The international community should fund the whole process of the referendum such that it's not delayed by the Arabs.* (Nuer Man, Nassir)

A few participants want the international community to play a partisan role by actively supporting separation.

*They [international community] should also support our right – that is to vote for separation.* (Lou Nuer Man, Waat)

*They [international community] have a role to play; they should support our idea of separation.* (Nuer Woman, Malakal)

**6. There is a pervasive belief that Southerners living in the North will be in a perilous situation if the South chooses separation. However, participants claim acceptance of Northerners continuing to live in the South after separation but note their fate will be linked to Southerners' fate in the North.**

Participants were asked what they envision will happen to Southerners living in the North should the South vote for separation. The majority assume that they will face mistreatment or be chased away at best (particularly if they voted for separation), or be killed, at worst. Many suggest that Southerners return home prior to the vote. Only three of the 63 groups are united in their belief that Southerners who remain in the North will be safe, either because they have been co-opted by the North or because their fate will be entwined with that of Northerners in the South. A minority express a sense of resignation or even resentment, saying that Southerners in the North should stay there if they want to or that they have “refused us” and therefore, these participations say they will not concern themselves with the fate of their brethren living in the North.

*They [Southerners in the North] will be oppressed by the Northerners [after the referendum].* (Kuku Man, Kajo Keji)

*They [Southerners in the North] will face a lot of problems. The Northerners will not be happy with them anymore if we vote for separation.* (Nuer Jikany Man, Guit)

*The Southerners who are in the displaced camps outside Khartoum will be the ones to be mistreated.* (Fertit Woman, Wau)

*The government of Khartoum will kill Southerners there.* (Moru Man, Lui, Mundri)

*They must be brought back to the South before the referendum because they will be slaughtered by the Arabs.* (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)

*The Southerners staying in the North have refused us.* (Dinka Malual Man, Aweil)

*That is not our concern; they wanted to stay in the North. If they want safety, they must come to the South.* (Dinka Rek Man, Kurluek, Tonj South County)

Similarly, participants were asked to speculate about the fate of Northerners living in the South if the South chooses separation. The majority say they will accept Northerners living peacefully in the South but note they must not cause any problems. A few offer an additional caveat that the Northerners should not try to get involved in politics. A number of participants note that the issue is not problematic because most of the Northerners here are traders and thus are not political.

*The Northerners who are in the South here have money. They will live peacefully with any government.* (Fertit Woman, Wau)

*Those [Northerners] that are here will be Southerners [after the referendum], and we shall let them stay.* (Lou Nuer Man, Waat)

*If they [Northerners] would like to be citizens, they can live here with no problems.* (Nuer Jikany Man, Guit)

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*Those Northerners will not be given a chance to make decisions about government laws, but they will stay here with no problems.* (Lopit Man, Lopa)

*They [Northerners] are free to stay with us so long as they don't interfere with political affairs.* (Kuku Chief, Limi, Kajo Keji County)

*Those Northerners here are traders; they have a reason to be here even after separation.* (Dinka Twic Woman, Panyagor)

Despite the generally positive feelings about Northerners remaining in the South after the referendum, many groups openly state that the fate of Northerners in the South will be inextricably linked to that of Southerners in the North. In other words, if the Southerners are mistreated or killed, the same fate will befall the Northerners; however, if the Southerners do not face problems, neither will the Northerners. This sentiment crosses all gender, ethnicity and age groups.

*They [Northerners in the South] will be safe depending on what will happen to Southerners in the North.* (Kuku Woman, Kajo Keji)

*The same thing that would happen to the Southerners in the North would replicate itself for Northerners living in the South.* (Jur Chol Chief, Bariar, Wau County)

*What will happen to the Northerners living in the South will depend on what will happen to the Southerners living in the North; for instance, if they are killed, then the Northerners will also be killed.* (Toposa Woman, Narus, Kapoeta East County)

*If we heard they are killing our people in the North, we will kill them here, also.* (Zande Woman, Maridi)

At least a few participants in 15 groups believe Northerners living in the South are poised for a much more unpleasant fate after the referendum, regardless of how Southerners are treated in the North. These participants say, at best, the Northerners should be forcibly repatriated to the North, or at worst, Southerners will fight with and kill them.

*These few Northerners here should be repatriated back to the North.* (Dinka Twic Chief, Panyagor)

*They [Northerners living in the South] have to go back to the North because they are terrorists, and if left in the South, will be agents of terrorism.* (Toposa Man, Kapoeta)

*It will be us Southerners who will mistreat them. Others might even be killed, because before the peace, they killed our people, and now if the security is like this and people are disappearing, how about when we separate? They'll [Northerners in the South] all be hunted down.* (Muslim Man, Juba)<sup>19</sup>

*They [Northerners in the South] would be killed by the angry Southerners.* (Man, Wau)<sup>20</sup>

**7. There is no consensus about the impact of separation on trade between North and South, but many believe it will depend on the nature of the relationship between the two. The expectation is that travel between North and South will be the same as travel between any two different countries, requiring a passport and fees.**

Participants express very mixed views about the impact of separation on trade between North and South. About one-third of participants believe that trade will not be affected and will continue as it does now.

*The trade will not be affected; it will be promoted instead.* (Toposa Man, Kapoeta)

At the opposite end of the spectrum, some participants either don't want further trade with the North after separation or believe it won't be possible. They want Sudan to focus on Kenya and Uganda as trading partners.

*We shall close the border and open toward the East African community.* (Lou Nuer Man, Waat)

*When we are separated, trade will go to the Kaya border in Uganda.* (Dinka Malual Woman, Malaulkon)

*In my opinion, we shall be trading with other nations but not Northern Sudan.* (Dinka Chief, Maboktong, Aweil East County)

Other participants believe North-South trade after separation will result in high taxes at the border, thus increasing the cost of goods coming from the North. And participants in six groups express concern about sabotaged goods coming from the North – poisoned food or electronic goods containing bombs.

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<sup>19</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

<sup>20</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

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*There will be high taxes, and it will affect business profits. (Christian Woman, Juba)<sup>21</sup>*

*The customers will be taxed twice as Northerners will tax and Southerners will tax as well. (Lopit Man, Lopa)*

*There will be high taxation at the border. (Moru Chief, Mundri)*

*The Arabs will poison the food that comes to the South so that will greatly affect trade. (Kuku Woman, Kajo Keji)*

*Materials, especially food items from the North, will have to be checked properly because it's well known about food poisoning. (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)*

However, many participants say that the impact of secession on trade will ultimately depend on whether the relationship between North and South is friendly or acrimonious after separation.

*[Trade] will be affected if a conflict happens between the South and the North. If there is no conflict, it will not be affected. Movement will be normal. (Fertit Woman, Wau)*

*Continuation of trade will be determined by the referendum. If there will be violence, trade will not continue. (Lou Nuer Woman, Waat)*

When asked specifically whether people would be able to travel freely between North and South as they can today, most people assume that passports would be necessary, as in the case of any other border between separate countries. Some also note that travelers on both sides will be required to pay money in order to cross the border. When discussing these possible new requirements, there does not appear to be a great deal of concern about how they may impact free movement between North and South. A few participants express their vehement view that they will have no desire to ever travel to the North again.

*People should pay some money when crossing the border. (Muslim Man, Juba)<sup>22</sup>*

*People should not travel freely – they should pay money which will be a source of revenue to the government. (Kuku Woman, Pamojo, Kajo Keji County)*

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<sup>21</sup> Quotation is from a group of women from mixed tribes.

<sup>22</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

*I think that if the separation of Southern Sudan happens, it will require the Southerners to use passports to travel to the Northern places. (Woman, Wau)<sup>23</sup>*

*The use of passports and travel permits will emerge. The Arabs will use these documents when they want to come to the South, and the same for Southerners who want to get to the North. (Dinka Twic Chief, Panyagor)*

*People will not move freely. We don't want to go to the North, and they should not come here, either. (Nuer Woman, Nassir)*

**8. Participants take an extremely hard line against the sharing of oil revenue with the North if the referendum vote is for independence. Even the prospect of paying fees to the North for use of the pipeline is unacceptable to many.**

The vast majority of participants believe the South should discontinue sharing its oil revenue with the North upon separation. They feel that the North has cheated them out of their rightful share for so long and will simply continue to do so if the post-referendum arrangement calls for revenue sharing.

*The Arabs have cheated us for so long, so we don't need to share [oil revenues]. It should be ours alone. (Kuku Woman, Kajo Keji)*

*If the South separates, everything will now be divided between North and South, so what reason will there be for the South to ... again share our resources? Are we still under colonization? No, that is not acceptable. (Man, Wau)<sup>24</sup>*

*They have cheated us in the past. We can't share our resources. (Lou Nuer Man, Waat)*

*The reason why we voted [in the group] for separation of South from North is because we do not want to share our resources with the North. (Dinka Twic Man, Pager, Twic East County)*

*Separation will mean two different countries so there will be nothing to share. The oil is ours. (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)*

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<sup>23</sup> Quotation is from a group of women from mixed tribes.

<sup>24</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

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*There is no way we shall share our oil with them because the oil is on our land.* (Dinka Malual Chief, Maboktong, Aweil East County)

The idea of paying a fee to transport oil through the North is more palatable to participants than the concept of sharing revenue. However, even in this case, at least some or all participants in half the groups remain firm that the South should not pay a fee. When told or reminded that the only way for the South to sell its oil is through the pipeline in the North, few respondents change their opinion. Most state that the South should simply build a new pipeline that would run to neighboring countries such as Kenya, Uganda or Ethiopia.

*Port Sudan was not made by God but by man. We can have our [own] port in the South rather than pay for our oil to be [exported] through the route that goes [through the North].* (Dinka Rek Man, Kwajok)

*We shall cut the pipeline and also change the port.* (Lou Nuer Woman, Waat)

*We should find an alternative route – why do you invite problems? Like fighting, if they steal from us.* (Dinka Twic Man, Pager, Twic East County)

*The pipeline in their land should be closed, and we should build a pipeline here.* (Zande Man, Maridi)

*It [oil] should not be taken through the North. We don't want anything connecting us with the North.* (Jur Chol Chief, Bariar, Wau County)

*I still don't accept the concept of sharing the oil revenues. In fact, the best advice I can give is for the pipeline to be diverted to Kenya.* (Toposa Woman, Narus, Kapoeta East County)

*The Government of Southern Sudan will build its own pipeline for our oil. Let that pipeline in Port Sudan be closed down.* (Dinka Gok Chief, Cueibet)

### **9. There is no consensus among participants about whether they would accept a theoretical four-year transition period after a referendum vote for secession.**

Participants are almost evenly divided about whether they would accept a theoretical four-year transition period before full independence, if it were announced by the GoSS. Many of those who would accept this scenario cite the unfinished issues of border demarcation, allocation of resources and IDP relocation and say that they understand these matters will take time to

resolve.<sup>25</sup> These participants indicate that as long as the two states are truly separated and the South has begun ruling itself, they can wait for these issues to be fully negotiated and that in the face of 21 years of civil war, four years does not sound so threatening. A few participants note that the South will need this time for development and capacity building and to prove that it can rule itself.

*We will wait, because the issues of IDPs and border demarcation need time.* (Muslim Man, Juba)<sup>26</sup>

*I will wait for the four-year transition period for the government to settle the issues of demarcation, IDPs and citizenship.* (Nuer Bul Chief, Mayom)

*I think is good for the government leaders to make that time of transition. Why? Because we are still having a big problem with the border. If we separate, this needs to be solved within this period of transition.* (Woman, Wau)<sup>27</sup>

*Provided that we are separated, it is very easy to wait those four years.* (Dinka Rek Man, Warrap)

*I agree for even more than four years because a child cannot be born now and begin walking immediately. It takes time.* (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)

*Maybe there other things they want to put right, and we may have certain things in the North which need time to be settled. And to build capacity about how to stay on our own to rule ourselves.* (Zande Man, Maridi)

*I think it is okay, because it will give a chance to the Southerners to start establishing companies and constructing factories.* (Shilluk Woman, Malakal)

Those who are opposed to a four-year transition period don't believe there would be a compelling, honest reason behind it. They view a transition period as 'playing politics' and say it would represent an incredible disappointment; they're tired of being ruled by the North and want

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<sup>25</sup> If participants were unable to understand why there would be a transition period, the moderator was instructed to present them with the issues that will need to be negotiated between the North and the South, and then get their reaction.

<sup>26</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

<sup>27</sup> Quotation is from a group of women from mixed tribes.

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their independence now. Many believe any outstanding issues can be negotiated after full independence.

*A vote for separation will be meaningless if a four-year transition period is allowed.* (Kuku Chief, Limi, Kajo Keji County)

*Four years more is too much. Citizens are like children; if you don't fulfill your promise to them, they will not be happy. Citizens are eager for self-determination, and if the time for that self-determination is delayed, the citizens would be bored. And within this period, there would be some games played, or cheating will occur. The citizens will be suspicious.* (Fertit Woman, Wau)

*I need immediate declaration of Southern independence to avoid suspicious tricks to [force us into] unity.* (Kuku Woman, Kajo Keji)

*No. This transition should start and end before the referendum. IDPs should be resettled before the referendum in 2011.* (Dinka Twic Chief, Panyagor)

*What are we waiting for? We have our oil, and areas for agricultural plantations, like rice here in Aweil, maize and coffee. I will not accept [a transition period]. We are tired of the Arabs.* (Dinka Malual Woman, Malualkon)

*I don't accept a four-year transition period. We are already a government – no need to go back.* (Nuer Bul Chief, Mayom)

**10. Despite the enthusiasm for secession, participants express strong concerns about corruption, ethnicity-based hiring and nepotism in the GoSS post-referendum. Apprehensions about the economy, as well as concerns about insecurity along the North-South border, are also widespread.**

In response to a specific question about challenges the GoSS will likely face if Southerners vote for separation, corruption, tribalism and nepotism top the list. Participants complain of corruption, where public funds are expropriated by officials for their personal use; ethnicity-based discrimination with respect to government and civil service employment; and nepotism, where people favor their relatives, regardless of merit. Many participants express apprehension that ethnicity-based discrimination in the government and civil service will continue to exist even 10 years after independence.

*What will face our government is corruption. For example, now people are campaigning for leadership, and later on, if they get the positions, they will never work for the interests of the citizens who will elect them but will only think of their families and relatives to enjoy the fruits of their work.* (Dinka Agar Woman, Rumbek)

*Corruption shall be the headache for the GoSS unless the present leaders are changed.* (Nuer Bul Chief, Mayom)

*Corruption will be the biggest challenge [for an independent Southern Sudan]. Those in the government will think of fulfilling their own desires by using public funds.* (Dinka Rek Man, Kurluek, Thiet)

*There will be fighting between two tribes of the South, the Nuer and the Dinka, because the Dinka will always want to dominate all the governmental posts.* (Lou Nuer Man, Waat)

*The only thing and the major issue will be tribalism [in an independent Southern Sudan].* (Zande Man, Maridi)

*The threat of Dinka marginalizing the other tribes in Southern Sudan [will be the biggest challenge].* (Madi Woman, Magwi)

Economic concerns are also paramount. Many participants worry about the low level of capacity that currently exists in the South (lack of education, intellectuals and qualified manpower as well as widespread illiteracy), particularly with respect to managing the country's resources and business affairs. Many participants also mention an undeveloped industrial base and lack of development, in general. Lack of salaries for civil servants and unemployment are also noted as concerns.

*Southern Sudan will depend on foreign powers to exploit its resources as it does not have qualified manpower since most Sudanese are illiterate.* (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)

*Lack of intellectuals will be the challenge.* (Dinka Muslim Man, Renk)

*Lack of engineering to drill oil. Lack of professors in education (universities, college) [will be a challenge post-referendum].* (Dinka Rek Man, Warrap)

*I think the GoSS will face problems in establishing industries to produce products within the country.* (Kuku Woman, Kajo Keji)

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*Another challenge will be the management of oil. Foreign experts now do the drilling.* (Dinka Twic Man, Pager, Twic East County)

*Unemployment of the youth will be a big problem.* (Dinka Malual Man, Madhol, Aweil East County)

Another significant post-referendum concern is insecurity along the North-South border, particularly if border demarcation issues have not been settled prior to the vote. Although most claim that the insecurity will emanate from the North – aiming to seize more territory to get a share of the oil, or Arab nomads choosing to graze their cattle in the South – some feel that either the North or South could ignite a conflict by claiming more territory. Many want the international community or soldiers to patrol the border to control any potential conflicts.

*The [North-South] border issue will get worse after separation.* (Dinka Twic Man, Pager, Twic East County)

*I believe there will be a lot of corruption along [the border] because the Northerners have always claimed all the land around the various borders due to the availability of oil resources.* (Toposa Woman, Narus, Kapoeta East County)

*If one of the governments wanted to take or cross to the other territory by force, that is what will bring problems or a border war.* (Jurbele Woman, Gadiem, Wulu County)

*The border will be affected by the nomadic Arabs because they will be grazing their cattle in the South, and this will cause problems.* (Nuer Bul Woman, Mayom)

*UN peace monitors must be [posted at] the borders to avoid conflicts.* (Dinka Rek Man, Kwajok)

*Deploy UN peacekeepers, who are non-Arabs and non-SPLA.* (Lou Nuer Chief, Waat)

*Unless the international community stays at the [North-South] border after separation, fighting will continue and death will be at hand.* (Christian Man, Juba)<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

Political problems following a vote for secession – namely, a leadership struggle – do not appear to be a significant concern for participants, but are mentioned by a few.

*Transfer of power from one leader to the succeeding one in peaceful elections [will be the biggest challenge]. The GoSS should do enough to ensure no leadership struggle.* (Dinka Twic Woman, Panyagor)

*Many political parties may compete for leadership [after the referendum].* (Dinka Rek Woman, Alek, Gogrial West County)

*Leadership competition [will be a post-referendum challenge] – everyone may claim leadership.* (Dinka Rek Woman, Warrap)

**11. Most expect the relationship between Southern Sudan tribes to improve after secession, though some say it depends on the GoSS.<sup>29</sup>**

Most participants feel the relationship between tribes in the South will improve once separation occurs. Their views are generally based on four beliefs: (1) the North was the root cause of the conflict (and so after secession they can no longer foment instability among tribes); (2) a common spirit will unite the people of Southern Sudan after separation; (3) citizens will be bound by the rule of law in a newly independent Southern Sudan; and (4) the quality of life for Southerners will improve, thereby reducing the need to resort to unlawful behavior. Some participants note, however, that peaceful relations among tribes will depend largely on the government's ability to complete disarmament and eliminate tribalism.

*Southerners have been confused. They used to be hired against themselves. But if we are left alone, we would be like bread and butter [there will be no problems between us].* (Jur Chol Chief, Bariar, Wau County)

*It is Arabs that are using Southerners against their own people. The relationship will be very [good] if we are separated.* (Dinka Gok Chief, Cueibet)

*[The Southern Sudan tribes] will unite and cooperate after separation because of the independence of their country.* (Dinka Rek Woman, Warrap)

*[The relationship between tribes] will improve. Now, people fight because of hunger. After a while, [hunger] will end, and we will have the spirit of one people.* (Lou Nuer Woman, Waat)

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<sup>29</sup> The fieldwork for this research was conducted prior to the national elections and the post-election conflict that occurred in several areas in Southern Sudan.

*The tribal relationship will improve because people will be governed by the rule of law. (Lou Nuer Man, Waat)*

*Government should reduce tribalism and if not it will affect us after separation and will people will go back to war. (Christian Woman, Juba)<sup>30</sup>*

The minority of participants who take a pessimistic view of post-secession tribal relations in this study are primarily in Central and Eastern Equatoria and in Western Bahr el Ghazal. Their concerns mainly focus on the persistent problem of cattle raiding and continued tribalism in government.

*The relationship between tribes will worsen because the Dinka are the ones occupying the top positions, so the other tribes will not feel happy about that. (Kuku Woman, Kajo Keji)*

*I think by a percentage of 75% the relationship will not improve because some tribes assume that they are the only ones who fought for the freedom of the people of Southern Sudan. (Fertit Woman, Wau)*

*There will be no good relationship unless a different leader other than a Dinka or Nuer takes on the leadership of Southern Sudan. (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)*

*The relationship between tribes will worsen because the cases of cattle raiding among the Mundari, Dinka, Nuer and Murle happen frequently. (Kuku Chief, Limi, Kajo Keji County)*

### **12. Most participants say they received basic information about the April 2010 elections and the criteria for choosing a leader, with radio as the most important source of that information.**

The vast majority of participants say they had received information about the elections. Only in two groups did all the participants say they had received no information at all.

With respect to specifics, participants were most likely to know that the elections were to be held in April 2010.<sup>31</sup> Additionally, a number of participants appear to have internalized the lessons of good governance related to the elections. They cite take-aways such as freedom to vote for whom you want, voting is your right, it's important to choose the right leaders, you should vote

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<sup>30</sup> Quotation is from a group of women from mixed tribes.

<sup>31</sup> The fieldwork for this research ended three weeks prior to the election.

for leaders to take the country in the right direction, and no one is allowed to vote twice. Participants in three groups also noted they had been warned about the potential for being bribed to hand over their voting slip in exchange for money. And many participants mentioned the importance of retaining their voting slip in order to be able to vote.

*Yes, I heard that I should vote for a good leader who I know can [offer] good governance.* (Nuer Jikany Man, Guit)

*Yes, I heard from Catholic Relief Services that voting is our right as citizens.* (Toposa Man, Kapoeta)

*Yes, we have received information that we are to vote for someone who will come and rule without favoritism or tribalism.* (Lou Nuer Man, Waat)

*Yes, I have received information; we were told that some people will come around asking for your slips in exchange for money.* (Lou Nuer Woman, Waat)

Participants were most likely to mention they had received information about the elections from the media (mostly the radio, with a few noting the newspaper or TV) or the registration process. Other information sources cited were state election committees or other government officials, posters, community meetings, word-of-mouth, and NGOs.

*Yes, I heard it [election information] through Miraya FM 101.* (Jurbele Man, Wulu)

*I heard that all the governments of Sudan and the GoSS will be dissolved and a new one would be elected. I heard this from the radio.* (Muslim Man, Juba)<sup>32</sup>

*I heard from political leaders during a rally that elections will be held in 2010.* (Kuku Woman, Kajo Keji)

*Yes, we received information from the election committee from the state.* (Lou Nuer Man, Waat)

*We heard the information from our commissioner of Mundri West.* (Moru Chief, Mundri)

*Yes, [received information on the elections] from FM radio Miraya and Bakbita.* (Zande Woman, Maridi)

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<sup>32</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

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*I heard that elections are in April, and this was from tapes and posters distributed by government officials. (Toposa Man, Kapoeta)*

*I heard [about the elections] through Southern Sudan TV. (Nuer Bul Woman, Mayom)*

*I read about [the elections] in one of the newspapers, urging people to register so that they can vote. (Shilluk Woman, Malakal)*

**13. Participants in Southern Sudan generally believe that the registration process for the elections was conducted fairly. The most common concerns noted are that certain groups were left out and that, in some areas, there was inadequate education about the process.**

A majority of participants believe that registration for the elections took place in a fair manner. Nevertheless, in 26 of the 63 groups, at least a few participants deem the process unfair.

Those who believe the process was fairly conducted say that people in their area were informed of the importance of registration, that almost everybody registered, and that the registrars were efficient by traveling to various locations. Those who say the process was unfair most often cite the fact that certain people were left out of the process: people in remote villages and cattle camps, and the old and sick. They say that to cover a wider area, either more registrars were needed or the registrars needed better means of transport. A few also note that the period for registration should have been longer to allow more people in remote areas time to participate and that registration forms ran out in some areas.

*Not all people were registered. For instance, those in the cattle comp were not registered. (Dinka Agar Woman, Rumbek)*

*It was not well done because registration forms [ran out]. In addition, registrars were far apart from each other, and transport was inadequate. (Dinka Malual Man, Madhol, Aweil East County)*

Participants in nine of the groups note irregularities or outright corruption that occurred during registration, such as selling of voter cards, NCP-sympathetic registrars registering only NCP members and registration of under-age people.

*The agents of the Northerners were buying voters cards from individuals. (Toposa Woman, Narus, Kapoeta East County)*

*It [voter registration] was not fairly conducted. In some places, young people below the age of 18, including those absent, were also registered while some people sold their registration receipts. (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)*

*It [voter registration] was not totally fine because newly-born babies were registered, too. Look at that three-year old child; he was registered, too. I will bring you their cards. We are telling the truth. (Christian Man, Juba)<sup>33</sup>*

*There were some forgeries in the registration process. Some registrars increased the number of the people of their tribe. Sometimes people who were not qualified to register were registered. For example, any male person [Nuer] who has facial markings is considered to be an adult even though his age may be under 18. This is not good for such things [as registration]. (Shilluk Man, Malakal)*

Participants in three groups mention the issue of insecurity, as they feel it deterred some people from coming to register.

*It was not fair because of insecurity. It was conducted when people were still retaining their guns so the exercise didn't go smoothly. (Lou Nuer Man, Waat)*

*In some places [registration didn't go well] due to insecurity. People there registered very late, and a lot did not register at all. (Shilluk Man, Malakal)*

**14. Most participants were satisfied with the SPLM's method of candidate selection, although a sizeable minority feel that the SPLM usurped the process and disenfranchised citizens.**

Most participants approve of the way SPLM candidates were selected for the elections.<sup>34</sup> They felt that they had the opportunity to participate, and the candidates met their expectations. Some of these participants mention, in particular, they had no issue with the SPLM's picking of candidates as they feel the party knows best who are the right people for the positions. Women are much more likely than men to be satisfied with the process, although they also tend to have less knowledge and information.

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<sup>33</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

<sup>34</sup> Although the question was asked about candidate nominations in a general sense, participant responses largely focused on the SPLM nomination process.

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*Those nominated were nominated well because those who did so saw good qualities in them. For example, nominee Eng Chol Tang of the SPLM is a person of good personality. (Dinka Agar Woman, Rumbek)*

*All those who have been selected are good for their positions because they are going to serve us well. (Jurbele Woman, Gadiem, Wulu County)*

*This way was good because each party knows which of its candidates can do a good job for the people; that's why they nominated them. (Shilluk Woman, Malakal)*

*The nomination was good. The people we have selected to represent our constituency are the right people to run for the election. (Nuer Jikany Woman, Guit)*

*Anyone nominated by the SPLM, no matter what he will be, that is to say lame or blind, we will vote for him. (Dinka Rek Man, Kwajok)*

A sizeable minority of participants, however, mostly express their disapproval about the SPLM candidate nomination process. These participants complain that the SPLM essentially hijacked the system, thereby disenfranchising the people, and express their desire to have more input into which candidates were selected. The more educated among them specifically mention that a primary election was needed. Many of those unhappy with the process also say the requirement that each SPLM candidate have at least five years' tenure with the party was unfair.

*It [the candidate nomination process] was not done well, because the candidates whom the people want have not been nominated. (Muslim Man, Juba)<sup>35</sup>*

*SPLM candidate nominations were based on the interests of the party, not the people. (Lou Nuer Man, Waat)*

*The SPLM in Upper Nile have disappointed the people. A committee was formed to select some nominees from which the SPLM political bureau would nominate only one, surprisingly; the candidate nominated was someone unknown to the people. He was not even known to most of the SPLM members in the state here. (Shilluk Man, Malakal)*

*Candidates were nominated badly because the citizens were not given the right to choose their own leader; rather, they were nominated in the hotel in Mading by only four people. (Dinka Man, Madhol, Aweil East County)*

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<sup>35</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

*It [the candidate nomination process] was unfair because ... it should be a public process to nominate the candidates. (Dinka Rek Woman, Alek, Gogrial West County)*

*The SPLM made a condition that any person who has fewer than five years' tenure with the SPLM cannot be nominated for the post of governor. But the people may choose to support someone who has less than five years' tenure. So this means there is no freedom of the people. The opinion of the people is not yet considered. This is a decree; it is no more a democracy. (Jur Chol Chief, Bariar, Wau County)*

**15. Participants queried in late February or March reported seeing a lot of candidates from a variety of parties campaigning in their community.**

Participants were asked if any candidates had campaigned in their community. The response differs depending on when the focus groups were conducted. Those states in which focus groups were conducted in early-mid February (Central Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes, Warrap, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal) saw no candidate activity whatsoever, with the exception of Juba, Waat, Kwajok and Gogrial where participants in a small number of groups in these places reported seeing one SPLM candidate. The three states in which focus groups were conducted in late February or March (Western Equatoria, Upper Nile and Unity) reported much more candidate activity from a variety of parties, including visits from independent candidates.

**16. About half of Southern Sudanese participants were apprehensive about the potential for violence and corruption in the elections, but the others were reassured by the presence of the international community and SPLA.**

In the two months prior to the April 2010 elections, participants' major concerns about the elections were the threat of violence and the potential for corruption: rigging, bribery, and forced voting for a particular candidate. Participants saw the potential for violence largely stemming from the losing side – whether it be the North or the South – expressing its disapproval, although a few also mentioned the possibility of fighting among Southerners. Those concerned about rigging and bribery thought it would mostly be committed by the North, but those who believed forced voting would be a problem thought it would mostly be perpetrated by the SPLM. Other election concerns noted by fewer people were poor turnout in certain areas due to the distance of voting centers or the rainy season or the election of unsuitable leaders.

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*The Northern government doesn't want us to rule ourselves because we have all the resources. During the election, they will lead people toward fighting. (Dinka Agar Man, Akonbuoi, Rumbek)*

*Yes, I have fears because if the NCP wins the election, their agents here will not be secure, and the SPLM may not go for the referendum but instead go for war. (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)*

*Yes, I have fear because with the election there is the possibility of war. Sometime when one person wins, the other one will cause a fight. (Zande Man, Maridi)*

*My fear about the elections is that rigging may occur. (Kuku Woman, Kajo Keji)*

*We are fearing that Omar will buy us. (Dinka Malual Woman, Maluakon)*

*We have fear that people may be bribed, and they might give their slips out or vote for the wrong candidate. (Lou Nuer Woman, Waat)*

*The issue is if you don't vote for the SPLM, you might be slaughtered, because they would consider you an enemy. (Jur Chol Chief, Bariar, Wau County)*

*My fear is about the distance of the voting centers from the people which will make them not vote. (Kuku Woman, Pamojo, Kajo Keji County)*

*My fear is that the person whom we shall vote for may not be helpful to us. (Christian Woman, Juba)<sup>36</sup>*

Although a large number of participants expressed their concerns about conflict and corruption, an almost equal number noted that they had no fears about the upcoming election – either because the international community would be monitoring, the SPLA would control the situation or their faith that God would take care.

*There are no fears because the international community will be there to observe the elections. It will be free and fair. (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)*

*There will be no fear because the SPLM is in power, and it also has the army that will monitor the situation during the elections. (Dinka Gok Chief, Cueibet)*

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<sup>36</sup> Quotation is from a group of women from mixed tribes.

*I have no fear [about the elections] because I am leaving that in the hands of God. (Nuer Woman, Malakal)*

**17. More participants acknowledge progress in Southern Sudan than in 2009, but the pace and level of development continues to be a leading contributor to discontent. Concerns about corruption, tribalism and nepotism in government are also reducing citizens' satisfaction with and faith in the GoSS.**

Since NDI's last study of Southern Sudanese public opinion in early 2009,<sup>37</sup> attitudes toward the region's progress have improved slightly, with about a third of the groups maintaining that the country is headed in the right direction. These participants commonly cite security, increased development in their area, improved freedoms and rights, and the promise of elections and democracy<sup>38</sup> as the reason for their positive views. Some women note the increased opportunities currently available to them with respect to education and work. A few participants couch their optimism in terms of the promise of separation and the positive outcomes they believe will result.

*[Things are going in the] right direction, because the roads are now open for free movement. For example, the road to Aweil is now open, and even the security situation has improved compared to the past, especially in Eastern Equatoria. (Toposa Man, Kapoeta)*

*Things are going in the right direction because roads are connected all over town, health centers have been built, our government is [a democracy], education is a bit okay, schools are in town, the communication network is improving and water boreholes are available. (Dinka Rek Man, Warrap)*

*Things are going in the right direction. We have schools, safe drinking water, hospitals and roads. (Nuer Jikany Man, Guit)*

*Things are going in the right direction. Nowadays, we have girls who are in school. (Dinka Agar Woman, Rumbek)*

Still, many offer caveats along with their optimism, and almost half the groups say that Sudan is moving in the wrong direction, with the remaining groups exhibiting mixed opinions. There is no particular pattern evinced by region or gender with regard to this sense of pessimism.

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<sup>37</sup> Traci D. Cook and Dan Vexler, *Imagining the Election: A Look at What Citizens Expect of Sudan's 2010 Vote*, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, September 2009.

<sup>38</sup> The research was conducted prior to the April 2010 elections.

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For those living in relatively secure areas, lack of development and infrastructure continues to be the most pressing issue. Participants remain extremely thankful for an end to the fighting between North and South, and the freedoms and rights that emerged, but without access to good health care, education, clean water or roads, they feel cheated out of the vision for the South that the SPLM created for them.

*Things are not fine; development has died completely. No salary payment to teachers, no future for our children. The rich are taking their children outside to study. There is tribalism. There are people who have [reaped] the goodness of Sudan, but we have not yet found good things in Sudan. (Woman, Juba)<sup>39</sup>*

*[Things are going in the] wrong direction, because there is no development here in Narus. For example, there are no drugs at the hospitals, and hence people are dying. (Toposa Woman, Narus, Kapoeta East County)*

*Things are not right because there is no proper education, and our town here is not developed like Khartoum. (Dinka Agar Man, Rumbek)*

In certain areas of Southern Sudan, notably Jonglei, Lakes and Warrap states, the most acute issue causing discontent is lack of security caused by tribal fighting.

*Things are totally bad due to tribal clashes among communities of Southern Sudan, for example, Jurbele and Dinka Agar, among others. (Jurbele Woman, Gadiem, Wulu County)*

*Things are going in the wrong direction because tribal conflict is at the maximum. Also, the civilians have guns, and we do not know who is arming them. (Dinka Rek Man, Gogrial)*

Less immediately pressing issues, but still strong contributors to dissatisfaction are: (as noted earlier) concerns about corruption, tribalism and nepotism in government and the civil service; lack of educational and employment opportunities; and delay in the payment of public sector salaries. Participants claim that limited educational and employment opportunities lead to insecurity because hungry and idle people (especially youths) are more likely to resort to disorderly conduct and crime. Delay in the payment of public sector salaries leads to strikes by teachers and health workers and causes soldiers to solicit bribes and turn to harassment and crime.

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<sup>39</sup> Quotation is from a group of women from mixed tribes.

*Things are not going well [with] our leaders, especially in Eastern Equatoria; there is weak leadership as well as tribalism.* (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)

*Tribalism is too common, and [as a result], educated people are not getting jobs.* (Christian Man, Juba)<sup>40</sup>

*Young people have no job so they are [becoming drunkards].* (Dinka Rek Woman, Majakamal)

**18. There is a slight increase in participants noting development gains in their area, but they feel the job is far from complete. Participants have high expectations for the GoSS to make considerable strides in this area.**

The situation noted in the last NDI study in 2009<sup>41</sup> with respect to participant attitudes toward development continues. This is only the second time, since the inception of NDI research in Southern Sudan in 2004, that a majority of participants note improvements in development. They typically cite improvements in roads, health care, access to water and the building of schools. Participants in some areas also note the development of communications networks, electricity, the building of houses and offices and the development of commerce.

*[The development situation] is excellent. We have learned carpentry skills, cultivation with an ox-plough and driving. Now, when I want to travel to Barpakeny in Rumbek, I can reach there within a few minutes.* (Dinka Agar Man, Akonbuoi, Rumbek)

*Our government is performing well. As you can see, there are roads that are connecting us.* (Jurbele Woman, Gadiem, Wulu County)

*The road from Kapoeta to Juba is very safe, and there is a lot of development in Juba.* (Toposa Man, Kapoeta)

*The GoSS is doing well because roads are being constructed, and small clinics are available.* (Dinka Rek Man, Gogrial)

*[The development situation is good] because they have built schools and transport of people is available.* (Dinka Muslim Woman, Jalhak, Renk)

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<sup>40</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

<sup>41</sup> Cook and Vexler, op. cit.

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*The GoSS is doing an excellent job because there are roads and even telephones now.* (Dinka Malual Chief, Maboktong, Aweil East County)

*The GoSS government in Juba knows how we are suffering and provided us with health facilities which cure us from diseases.* (Nuer Jikany Woman, Guit)

At first glance, participants' positive outlook on development contradicts their complaints about development when they discuss the direction of the country. However, as seen in NDI's last report, attitudes about the pace of development may be in the eye of the beholder, as participants from the same area can hold differing views. In just about a quarter of the groups, participants note either no change or worsening conditions with respect to development, while other participants in some of the same locations note development progress.

What is abundantly clear, however, is that all participants have high expectations for the GoSS to improve the pace of development; as noted above, everyone clamors for increased development in their area.

Participants have a long list of needs they would like the GoSS to address:

*Education, health, water and sanitation.* (Toposa Man, Kapoeta)

*Strengthening agricultural activities in Renke, construction of roads, electricity and increase in boreholes.* (Dinka Man, Malakal)

*Open free primary education, bring companies to the area, bring factories for mango processing.* (Zande Man, Maridi)

*Law to protect against early marriages, health centers, education for girls and women, network for communication.* (Dinka Malual Woman, Malek Alel, Aweil)

*For us to develop, the GoSS should work on roads for easy access to many areas.* (Madi Woman, Magwi)

*The GoSS should improve the health sector by employing qualified doctors and nurses to treat patients.* (Kuku Chief, Limi, Kajo Keji County)

*The government should construct roads, a communications network, schools and a clinic and provide safe drinking water.* (Nuer Bul Woman, Mayom)

**19. GoSS performance ratings remain in the “fair-to-good” range. Lack of development, and complaints about corruption, nepotism and tribalism are impeding a more positive evaluation.**

GoSS performance ratings, as seen in NDI’s last two studies in 2007<sup>42</sup> and 2009,<sup>43</sup> remain in the “fair-to-good” range, with about a third of respondents deeming its performance “good.”<sup>44</sup> Those who give the highest ratings are Dinka from Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile and Lakes states.

Those with the highest opinion of the GoSS cite reasons such as the peace and freedoms they now enjoy, the promise of elections, as well as the beginnings of development. However, even these participants are not fully satisfied with what the government has brought them because tribalism remains a problem and development has not yet reached satisfactory levels.

*The GoSS is working hard to improve the situation in the South. They are constructing roads to connect the whole of Southern Sudan. Their work is good.* (Man, Wau)<sup>45</sup>.

*[They’re doing an] excellent [job] because new roads have been constructed in Renk, the Internet was also brought in 2006, and [they have built] 47 schools in Renk town and payam and bomas.* (Dinka Muslim Man, Renk)

*The GoSS is doing well, but sometimes there is tribalism in employment.* (Muslim Man, Juba)<sup>46</sup>

*Freedom is very important, so the GoSS is doing a good job because we are separate from the Arabs, though hunger is [still a problem].* (Dinka Rek Man, Gogtrial)

*The work the GoSS is doing in Southern Sudan is good, but the problem is that we fight among ourselves.* (Dinka Agar Woman, Rumbek)

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<sup>42</sup> Traci D. Cook, *A Place to Call Their Own: Southern Sudanese Comment on the Hard Work and Struggles of Self-Governance*, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, September 2007.

<sup>43</sup> Cook and Vexler, op. cit.

<sup>44</sup> Participants were asked to rate the job performance of the GoSS using a specific scale of excellent, good, fair or poor.

<sup>45</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

<sup>46</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

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*The job the GoSS is doing is fair because there is no full development in Southern Sudan. (Jurbele Man, Wulu)*

Those who give less positive ratings have a litany of complaints, with the most oft-repeated concerns being lack of development, delayed salaries for civil servants and soldiers, and corruption, nepotism and tribalism in government and the civil service.

*GoSS performance is very poor because of tribalism. The paysheet in most government ministries is full of family names, and recruitment is not based on your qualifications but on whom you know. (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)*

*We have a poor communications network and poor roads which the GoSS hasn't taken care of; therefore, we in Kajo Keji are the ones suffering the most, and the job the GoSS is doing in governing Southern Sudan is poor. (Kuku Woman, Kajo Keji)*

*The job the GoSS is doing in governing Southern Sudan is poor because civil servants are not paid their salaries. (Kuku Chief, Limi, Kajo Keji County)*

*The GoSS is just concentrating their work in Juba, so how can I rate the job they're doing? I have not seen anything done by the GoSS here in Wau. Their work here is very poor. (Man, Wau)<sup>47</sup>*

*Their performance is not satisfactory because there is a lot of corruption. (Shilluk Woman, Malakal)*

Participants also were asked what the GoSS has done well. Responses fall into four basic categories. Some cite specific examples of *development and infrastructure*: roads, communication networks, schools, health facilities, water and electricity. Others mention *peace and its attending fruits*: security, freedoms and rights, no more fear. For some participants, the greatest achievement of the GoSS is simply its creation: the opportunity to live under *self-government*, along with the decentralization of power to state and local governments. Others mention the securing of democracy through an *election and referendum*. Some women mention the requirement that 25% of the legislature be female, and a few mention trade and commerce – the promotion of trade with Uganda and Kenya, and the availability of imported foodstuffs, soap, sugar, etc. – as achievements of the GoSS.

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<sup>47</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

*The GoSS has brought us the ox-plough which was one of the best things. It has also created state governments. And then there is overall, the Government of Southern Sudan.* (Dinka Man, Rumbek Akonbuoi, Rumbek)

*The GoSS has done well because it has liberated us from the Arabs.* (Dinka Gok Chief, Cueibet)

*There is improvement in security and communication. People are now free to move without being attacked on the way. And communications network including FM Radio stations are found in most state capitals.* (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)

*[There's been] improvement in education by sending new teachers to the schools.* (Kuku Man, Kajo Keji)

*They gave us a chance to participate in the election for us to choose good leaders who will develop our country.* (Nuer Woman, Nassir)

*[What the GoSS has done well:] Connection of all ten Southern states with roads and telecommunications.* (Dinka Rek Man, Kurluek, Tonj South County)

*The government has done well in monitoring the CPA, that is [providing for] the census and the election.* (Lou Nuer Man, Waat)

*The GoSS has created external relationships with other countries like Uganda and Kenya. This has promoted trade and entrance of different goods into Southern Sudan.* (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)

Although the vast majority of groups can name some accomplishments they associate with the GoSS, a handful say they feel the government has done nothing of significance so far.

*The GoSS has done nothing. There are no good roads, no water for people to drink, and we lack a hospital. And there's still insecurity. Toposa are coming from a far distance to kill us and raid our cattle while other people [in Sudan] are staying peacefully with no insecurity.* (Lopit Woman, Mura Lopit, Lopa County)

*They have done nothing well here. Most of the things here were constructed before the CPA.* (Man, Wau)<sup>48</sup>

In discussing how the GoSS could improve, participants' answers basically fall into two categories. Not surprisingly, the first category is *more development and infrastructure*. Along with the

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<sup>48</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

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development issues already outlined in the report, participants want assistance with agricultural development, including provision of tools and flood control. They also want more and better-qualified teachers, medical personnel and police. The second category is *better government functioning and accountability*. Many participants want the government to attend to the issue of delayed salaries for civil servants, the police and army. They also seek an end to nepotism, tribalism and corruption. Furthermore, many wish for the government to be closer to the people. They are clamoring for government officials to come to their area to hear from them and understand their needs.

*Construction of roads to link counties and states. Agricultural farming should be introduced [to improve the work of the GoSS].* (Dinka Muslim Man, Jalhak, Renk)

*What destroys our government performance now is corruption. A [government official] leads a good life and his/her children are in school while problems of poor children and orphans are not attended to. If our government wants to improve, let it open a free school for orphans.* (Dinka Agar Woman, Rumbek)

*[For the GoSS to improve] employment should be based on merit and qualifications rather than nepotism and tribalism where uneducated relatives are brought from cattle camps to the office.* (Madi Woman, Magwi)

*The GoSS should pay civil servant salaries on time to avoid strikes.* (Zande Woman, Maridi)

*The work of our government will improve when our President visits and supervises the work of each and every state of Southern Sudan.* (Dinka Gok Chief, Cueibet)

In more rural areas, there is a big concern that development is concentrated only in state capitals or urban areas, and participants from these areas are very anxious for development to come to their region.

**20. Participants have a more favorable perception of Salva Kiir's performance than of the GoSS as a whole. Nevertheless, they want to see him take a stronger stand against tribalism, replace weak subordinates with qualified people and continue to do more in the critical areas of development and security.**

As in NDI's last report in 2009,<sup>49</sup> Salva Kiir's performance ratings in this study are higher than for the GoSS as a whole. The majority of participants rate his performance as good. The most positive assessments of his performance come from Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap states.

Participants with positive assessments laud him for bringing them the rewards of the CPA – peace, security and freedoms and rights – and fulfilling John Garang's vision. They also credit him with bringing some development to their areas and inviting foreign investment. Additionally, he gets recognition for reorganizing and strengthening the SPLA and maintaining security by deploying the army at borders. Some also note their satisfaction with his negotiations over Abyei.

*Kiir Mayardit brought peace among the Southerners and maintains the peace between the North and the South.* (Nuer Bul Woman, Mayom)

*He has brought peace, security and food security to people.* (Dinka Malual Woman, Maluakon)

*Salva maintains the SPLA army; the families are fed, and the army is happy now.* (Nuer Jikany Man, Guit)

*He has brought good roads from Malek-Aweil to Mading-Aweil up to Wau as well as the interaction of Southerners – [for example], people from Juba are here with us. Unity has prevailed in the South. Also, seeds [for agriculture] have been brought to us.* (Dinka Malual Woman, Malek Alel, Aweil)

The most common criticism of Kiir, even among those who rate his performance as good, is that his subordinates are weak and he allows them to stay in power with impunity. Beyond that, participants want him to demonstrate his concern for them and their needs by visiting their area. And after he visits, participants want him to put actions behind his words when he returns to Juba. Another criticism leveled by some non-Dinka is that Salva Kiir contributes to tribalism by favoring Dinka within the government. Almost all participants also want to see him do more in the critical areas of development and security.

*Salva Kiir has done well as President. His keeping of ineffective subordinates is the only mistake he has made.* (Dinka Agar Man, Akonbuoi, Rumbek)

*Salva is okay; his ministers in Juba are the ones spoiling his work. For example, the former Minister of Finance was proved to have embezzled public funds. The same scenario happened in the Ministry of Education.* (Jur Chol Chief, Bariar, Wau County)

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<sup>49</sup> Cook and Vexler, op. cit.

*What is making the name of President Salva Kiir look bad is the people behind him. The Dinka people think that this is the government of Dinka only. We want [Salva] to move ahead with the vision and the mission of the SPLA, but he should clear all those Dinkas behind him, complicating his government. We want him, and he is a good leader, but he should mix up his government with different tribes of Southern Sudan. (Moru Chief, Mundri)*

*Salva Kiir has never come to Maridi to give a promise of development to the people here. Also, Salva should send to Maridi beds for the hospital and cars for the police. (Zande Woman, Maridi)*

*When [Salva] came for a tour in 2007, we were happy and warmly welcomed him. He promised to give us roads, hospitals and water, but since then, nothing has been communicated to us. (Lou Nuer Woman, Waat)*

*He is doing well, but we want him to visit us. A leader should travel to see his people. (Dinka Man, Pager, Twic East County)*

**21. Southern Sudanese participants feel that the GoSS is rife with corruption, that it occurs at the highest levels and that it siphons off funds meant for development and salaries. Participants also view nepotism and ethnicity-based discrimination as significant corruption problems.**

Echoing the results of NDI's 2009 study,<sup>50</sup> the majority of participants feel that financial corruption is rampant within the GoSS. Out of 63 groups, the majority in 44 say that corruption within the GoSS is "very much" a problem, the highest rating on the scale used.<sup>51</sup> Most of the other groups indicate that GoSS corruption is a problem to a lesser degree; and only two groups feel that there is no corruption problem at all.

Participants are most concerned about the corruption that occurs at the highest levels of government; there are few references to corruption in daily life, such as bribes to policemen. They say that government officials, as well as army brass, have their hand in the public till and are expropriating the money to build themselves fancy houses, buy expensive cars and send their children to school abroad. They feel that this stolen money is at the root of the delayed or non-

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<sup>50</sup> Cook and Vexler, op cit.

<sup>51</sup> Participants were asked to rate how much of a problem corruption was in the Southern Sudan government on the following scale: very much, somewhat, a little or not at all.

existent salaries to civil servants, the police and army as well as the lack of development they see around them.

*There is a lot of corruption. Even when people were in the liberation struggle era, it was not like as it is now. And the cause is that people emerged from the war era, and everybody wants to get rich first before others.* (Dinka Agar Man, Akonbuoi, Rumbek)

*[There is a lot of] corruption because the officials embezzled public money and are building [themselves] big houses.* (Lopit Woman, Mura Lopit, Lopa County)

*Corruption is at a high rate, especially in the army. As you people could see, the SPLA soldiers go for more than five to eight months with no salaries.* (Jurbele Woman, Wulu Gadiem, Wulu County)

*[There is] very much [corruption] because it's only the bosses who are eating large sums of money. For instance, in the military, high-ranking officers consume the salaries of non-commissioned officers.* (Toposa Man, Kapoeta)

*There is clearly corruption in the GoSS. Most of the big people in the government are those who fought during the war. They are now trying to get some money to construct for themselves houses, because they are saying they might die at any time from now. There are a lot of graduates who are not employed. The people in government always ask them, "Where were you when we were fighting in the bush?"* (Jur Chol Chief, Bariar, Wau County)

Participants also consider nepotism, where relatives of those in power are offered the best government and civil service positions, and tribalism, where one's ethnicity determines one's ability to secure government and civil service employment, as serious corruption problems. Furthermore, they cite the issue of "ghost" workers on the payrolls – people who receive a job/salary through connections but don't actually exist or show up for work – as a corruption concern.

*Tribalism should be eliminated. In a ministry, you'll see that if the minister is a Dinka, then down to the security guard, everyone will be a Dinka.* (Muslim Man, Juba)<sup>52</sup>

*There is a lot of corruption because government officials use their positions to misuse public funds and employ relatives. They leave a lot of ghost names on the government payroll.* (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)

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<sup>52</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

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*Some staff are given open leave with pay. They don't come to work, but their salaries are taken to them. Such people are the wives of the director. (Fertit Woman, Wau)*

### **22. Perceptions of security have improved somewhat in certain areas. These regions tend to credit disarmament, withdrawal of the Sudan Armed Forces and the protection of the SPLA. However, other areas continue to report tribal clashes.**

There is some favorable movement on perceptions of security since NDI's previous report<sup>53</sup> in 2009.<sup>54</sup> Currently, about a third of the groups indicate that security in their area is poor or getting worse, versus half, in the previous study. Slightly less than half the groups feel the security situation is good or improving. (The rest exhibit mixed views.) However, as in the past, participants' security assessments depend on where they reside. Residents of Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Western Bahr el Ghazal states are most likely to say security is good or improving, while those in Lakes and Jonglei states are most likely to say it is bad or getting worse. Towns that report the best security include Kajo Keji, Wau and Aweil.<sup>55</sup>

Participants with positive security assessments base their perceptions on increased freedom of movement (particularly at night), freedom from attacks from the North, reduced crime (robbery, kidnapping and rape) and decreased tribal conflict. They tend to credit disarmament, withdrawal of the Sudan Armed Forces and the protection of the SPLA for the security improvements. Those in Kajo Keji point to the disappearance of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and those in Jonglei and Upper Nile state cite disarmament of the White Army.

*[The situation is] improving because since 2008 there have been drastic changes. For example, the locals have been disarmed of their illegal weapons. (Toposa Man, Kapoeta)*

*The security situation is improving because [we can move around] even at night without being attacked or robbed on the way. (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)*

*The security is improved because LRA rebels have stopped killing people. (Kuku Woman, Kajo Keji)*

*The security is improving because I can see people move around late at night without being attacked by*

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<sup>53</sup> Cook and Vexler, op. cit.

<sup>54</sup> Fieldwork for this report occurred prior to the incidents of conflict that occurred in the post-election period.

<sup>55</sup> These were towns where NDI conducted multiple groups, and most or all of them reported a favorable security situation.

*robbers. There are no more thieves. (Man, Wau)<sup>56</sup>*

*The recent disarmament has brought relative calm to the area. (Dinka Muslim Woman, Jalhak, Renk)*

*Things are going in the right direction because the White Army has been disarmed, and people no longer die as before. (Lou Nuer Woman, Waat)*

In areas where the security assessment is poor, the reasons differ by location. Tribal conflicts (including cattle raiding, disputes over land, killing, kidnapping and rape) are often cited in Jonglei and Lakes states, as well as some areas of Eastern Equatoria, Western Equatoria, Unity and Warrap states. An issue, particularly in Jonglei, is partial disarmament – certain tribes (such as the Lou Nuer) say they were disarmed while their adversaries (in this case, the Murle) were not. Some participants in three states – Eastern Equatoria, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Unity – note continuing conflicts with the nomadic Arab populations or instigation of tribal conflict by the North. Certain areas – Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile states – mention infighting within some Dinka and Nuer tribes.

*Security is getting worse because there are still hostilities between civilians. These hostilities happen outside the town. For example, what happened in Akot could have not happened if there were good security. Civilians are dying. If the government were working as in the Old Sudan, guns would have not been freely roaming in the hands of civilians. (Dinka Agar Man, Akonbuoi, Rumbek)*

*[The security situation] is still the same as some communities like ours can't enjoy peace due to the hostilities between the Dinka Agar and other communities who are not peacelovers. (Jurbele Woman, Gadiem, Wulu County)*

*The security situation has never changed. As we are in this room, all herds of cattle of the Dinka Gok have been raided by the Dinka Rek. Also, the day before yesterday, the Dinka Agar had raided another herd from the Dinka Gok. In such a situation, how do you expect security to be improving? We ladies still worry about how the life of our children in the cattle camp will be. (Dinka Gok Woman, Abiriu, Cueibet County)*

*The only insecurity is tribal conflict. (Dinka Rek Woman, Thiet)*

*The security situation is getting worse because if you go to the forest to collect vegetables, firewood, or you go to your farm, you will be killed by the enemy. (Lopit Woman, Mura Lopit, Lopa County)*

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<sup>56</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

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*Our major problem is the Murle. Insecurity is also being caused by the Dinka Duk. (Lou Nuer Chief, Waat)*

The unfulfilled promise of full disarmament also is contributing to crime, according to participants who cite it as a cause of insecurity in seven of the ten states. Many participants mention the effect that unemployment, hunger and alcoholism have on crime rates, especially when guns are so readily available. Participants in Eastern and Central Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal states also cite the problems caused by gangs of youth.

*Insecurity is getting worse because unemployed youths are robbing people on the roads and in Torit. (Madi Woman, Magwi)*

*Security is getting worse. For example, children who were driving boda bodas were killed last week, two boys. These are Dinkas doing this, and they are commandos. So security is going from bad to worse. (Christian Man, Juba)<sup>57</sup>*

*The security is not okay because there are no police. Most of the people drink alcohol; we also have prostitution and thieves. (Dinka Rek Man, Gogrial)*

Some participants in Eastern, Central and Western Equatoria, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, Unity and Upper Nile states also cite police and army misconduct and/or incompetence. The LRA remains a problem in some areas of Central and Western Equatoria states.

*When those people [the SPLA] came in, they replaced most of the capable police officials with incompetent ex-SPLA officials who don't know anything about the law or the proper role of police forces. (Shilluk Man, Malakal)*

*The government should negotiate in a peaceful manner with the LRA to get them to leave Sudan. They should return to Uganda. (Zande Woman, Maridi)*

**23. Participants feel that security is the responsibility of the GoSS and can only be improved by full disarmament and a better-trained and better-remunerated police force and army. Some suggest a communal approach to security would be most effective.**

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<sup>57</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

Participants express mixed opinions about which organ of government should be responsible for improving security (the GoSS, state or county), but there is no disagreement that security is an important GoSS responsibility. Participants believe the best government strategy for improving security would be complete disarmament and a larger, better-trained and better paid police force and army in order to increase the number and quality of patrols, particularly at night.

Although participants clamor for full disarmament, there is some degree of skepticism that it will be achieved because of bribery and corruption in the ranks of the security forces. Most think that the GoSS, rather than local or state authorities, needs to take the lead on disarmament so that local/state favoritism doesn't take hold and groups or particular people are not discriminated against unfairly.

*The GoSS is responsible for improving the security situation.* (Kuku Woman, Kajo Keji)

*It is Salva Kiir Mayardit who needs to improve the security by disarming civilians. Only the President of the GoSS [can] improve [the situation].* (Dinka Gok Chief, Cuiebet)

*The President of the Government of Southern Sudan [should be responsible for security] because he has all the power to command the army to disarm the people like the Murle and Dinka Duk.* (Lou Nuer Chief, Waat)

*If [the task of disarmament] is to be given to the state authorities, there will be no proper collection of guns in the hands of civilians. They have relatives who are working in the state government; therefore, they will be pardoned.* (Jurbele Woman, Gadiem, Wulu County)

*The SPLA will disarm the Nuer but will keep the guns and then re-sell them illegally back to civilians.* (Dinka Man, Warrap)

Many participants note that the police force in their area is composed of elderly and uneducated people and is therefore ineffectual. Participants also believe the security can be improved by regularly paying and/or increasing salaries of security forces, as a lack of wages contributes to wayward behavior among soldiers and police. Increased patrolling by security forces is another desire of many participants, particularly at "hot" borders between disputing tribes.

*The police should be properly trained and equipped.* (Toposa Man, Kapoeta)

*The police forces have to be well-trained, and their salaries should be paid regularly, because if not, they will be*

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*the ones to cause insecurity.* (Man, Wau)<sup>58</sup>

*Police are supposed to be trained to know the laws, rules and regulations. This can help avoid bribery.*  
(Dinka Rek Man, Gogrial)

*The border is a problem, so the army should be posted at the border between Renk and the rest of Southern Sudan.* (Dinka Muslim Man, Renk)

Furthermore, a number of groups suggest a communal approach where chiefs, community elders and the civil administration work together to strategize how to improve security.

*Security will improve if the traditional authorities [chiefs] and the civil administrators work together to find a solution to the problem of insecurity.* (Dinka Agar Man, Akonbuoi, Rumbek)

*The government should bring together the governors of the two states and the chiefs and community elders from both the Dinka and Nuer to solve [the insecurity] issue.* (Nuer Bul Woman, Mayom)

### **24. Participants generally have a positive opinion of the performance of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) because they feel the army has become disciplined and cooperative. But they feel it is impeded by lack of salaries, training and equipment.**

Job performance ratings for the SPLA are generally positive, with almost two-thirds of the groups deeming their performance “good.”<sup>59</sup> Most of the other groups have mixed, but not outright poor, reviews.

Participants who are the most positive about the SPLA note the improvements they've witnessed: the army is now more disciplined, is guided by military laws, doesn't engage in unlawful behavior (looting, robbery, rape), provides security during tribal attacks or attacks from Arabs and cooperates with the community. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, participants believe there are certain factors that are hindering the army from operating at its most efficient level, including a lack of salaries, proper training and sufficient equipment and supplies (transport, water).

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<sup>58</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

<sup>59</sup> Participants were asked to rate the job performance of the SPLA using a scale of excellent, good, fair or poor.

*The SPLA is doing a good job because they intervene to solve problems among the youth, and also they don't take people's property [anymore].* (Nuer Jikany Woman, Guit)

*The SPLA is doing well because they are performing their duties of defense and protection here in Aweil town.* (Dinka Malual Man, Aweil)

*The SPLA is performing well because they are able to control problems within and outside [the South].* (Nuer Man, Nassir)

*Three months ago, things were not going well, but now the SPLA is doing well because the attacks on lorries have stopped.* (Dinka Muslim Man, Renk)

*The SPLA's performance is going well because they follow the system of law and order.* (Kuku Woman, Kajo Keji)

Those few groups who have unequivocally poor views of the SPLA's job performance cite the hampering factors noted above and have not perceived an improvement in the SPLA's behavior. They cite forceful comportment at borehole sites and unlawful conduct like taking bribes, abducting women, administering beatings, looting, selling guns back to citizens after disarmament and fomenting tribal conflict by providing ammunition to tribes. Some participants also mention shooting/killing without cause.

*This SPLA are not organized soldiers. You can be accused of spying if they get an ID card from you written in Arabic. Two days ago, they beat someone who was just smoking a cigarette made in Khartoum. They considered him to be a Jallaba [a Northerner].* (Shilluk Man, Malakal)

*The SPLA performance is not good because when they receive their salaries, they drink and shoot people in the market. They don't know what they are doing.* (Dinka Rek Woman, Warrap)

*The performance of the SPLA here is poor because they scare and intimidate the community since they are always allowed to come with their ... guns while on leave.* (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)

**25. Participants are less satisfied with the performance of the Southern Sudanese Police Service (SSPS) than the SPLA. Many see the police force as ineffective, undisciplined and corrupt.**

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Job performance ratings for the SSPS are less positive than for the SPLA, with only about a third of the groups deeming their performance “good.”

The least favorable ratings are offered by participants in Eastern Equatoria, Lakes and Warrap states. As seen earlier in this report, complaints center on two basic issues: *ineffectiveness* caused by lack of education and training, age (too old to do their job well), lack of equipment and supplies and insufficient numbers and *corruption/unlawful behavior* – beating people, drinking to excess and misbehaving, keeping people in prison without investigation and taking bribes.

*The Southern Sudan Police are not performing well. They are not properly selected or trained. For instance, if a person is accused of a crime and put in prison, the next day he will be lingering outside as a result of [having bribed the police].* (Dinka Agar Man, Akonbuoi, Rumbek)

*[The performance of the SSPS] is poor [and shameful] because they drink a lot of alcohol while on duty and basically end up sleeping by the roadside in their uniforms.* (Toposa Woman, Narus, Kapoeta East County)

*The police here do not know their roles and duties. Most of them were ex-soldiers who were then recruited into the police force. They are not able to perform their duties since they are not well-trained and not informed about the law.* (Acholi Man, Obbo Boma, Magwi County)

*The Dinka police are mistreating people in Nimule, especially the Madi, while they give favorable treatment to their own people.* (Madi Woman, Magwi)

*Police were brought in to guard the civilians, but they have performed very badly. They're weak – they're either old or women – there are no young people.* (Dinka Rek Man, Gogrial)

*Many policemen spend their time drinking, and the few sober ones try to settle disputes but are threatened, and sometimes shot, by gunmen. This has made them fear handling matters.* (Dinka Twic Woman, Panyagor)

*Most police here in Maridi are old. They don't know how to read or write and are always drunk.* (Zande Woman, Maridi)

Those who express positive opinions about the SSPS note their ability to successfully and quickly intervene in conflicts and keep the peace, but even they cite the need for more police to be deployed and for them to be better equipped.

*The police follow and implement the law and are doing well here in Wulu. They control crimes and keep order. (Jurbele Woman, Wulu Gadiem, Wulu County)*

*The police force has just been formed – in the past, all disputes were taken to the army to solve. Now they are doing their work well; they're even getting more organized than the army. (Man, Juba)<sup>60</sup>*

*The SSPS controls conflicts in the area. (Nuer Jikany Man, Guit)*

*The police are doing a good job; they're controlling the communities. (Nuer Bul Woman, Mayom)*

*They are doing well, but they are very few in number. Some other payams have no police at all. (Dinka Rek Man, Warrap)*

*The police are doing a good job, but they are trained and then sent out without a gun or equipment like vehicles. (Moru Chief, Mundri)*

*The police are doing a good job, but they are few in number. For example, here we only have six policemen, and we have three boma. (Nuer Man, Waat)*

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<sup>60</sup> Quotation is from a group of men from mixed tribes.

## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Southern Sudanese participants have strong feelings about and high hopes for the 2011 Southern Sudan self-determination referendum. They view the vote as a long-awaited right that was achieved through immense pain and sacrifice. The vast majority states a clear preference for separation, but at the same time many hold what may perhaps turn out to be unrealistic expectations for the referendum and the post-referendum period. With the referendum, the stakes for Sudan and the region are extremely high. A concerted effort by the parties to the CPA, neighboring countries and the international community will be necessary to guide the process to a successful and peaceful conclusion. Participants' responses in this study offer some direction to aid that effort.

### Invest in and Provide Time for Voter Education

Participants' responses in this study demonstrate the value of voter education for the Southern Sudan population: during the elections, many absorbed important lessons about democracy, fairness and good governance. But the elections also demonstrate the cost of truncated voter education efforts, as some participants labeled the voter registration exercise as unfair because not enough people were informed about the process. The referendum presents even more opportunities for the population to misunderstand or misinterpret the process and for misinformation to spread quickly through rumors. Thus, voter education will prove critical and with emotions running high, giving it short-shrift could result in dire consequences.

#### **Recommendations:**

- Build in time to the referendum process for adequate voter education prior to voter registration and polling to increase the legitimacy and credibility of the vote in the eyes of the public.
- Place an emphasis on educating the public about rules and regulations – especially voter eligibility – to clarify who will be voting and where to prevent potentially violent misunderstandings.
- Clarify misperceptions about the existence of the GoSS post-referendum to prevent an uninformed reaction after the vote.
- Publicize rules about counting and tabulation procedures to increase confidence in the credibility and legitimacy of the process.
- Provide information about the status and protections for Southerners living in the North and Northerners living in the South when it becomes available.

## Manage Expectations about the Referendum and Post-Referendum Process

The strong emotions surrounding the referendum make the Southern Sudanese participants in this study less open to change and compromise and more likely to hold unrealistic expectations. They are decidedly opposed to a referendum delay, take a hard line against any oil revenue sharing and believe life in an independent Southern Sudan will be far better than is achievable in the short-term. More than any other time since the CPA, there is a need for skillful management of the population's expectations to maintain peace and stability.

### **Recommendations:**

- Engage in an ongoing dialogue with the public about the referendum process, its timeline and if necessary, the possibility of a delay.
- If a delay is necessary, undertake a Southern Sudan-wide discussion, with GoSS officials prominently featured, about the reasons for the delay, the proposed new timeline and the retained guarantee of self-determination.
- Underscore the importance of a mutually beneficial North-South relationship.
- Educate Southern Sudanese about the necessity of post-referendum compromises to maintain peace and to ensure a politically and an economically viable South.
- Share with the public the benefits of a positive business relationship – particularly with regard to oil – the South will need to maintain with the North and explain the economic reasons for it.
- Paint a more realistic picture of the timeframe necessary to improve the quality of life in post-referendum Southern Sudan.

## Create a Secure Environment around the Referendum

It will be important to keep the strong feelings about the referendum in mind as preparations begin for this critical CPA milestone and as negotiations for post-referendum arrangements intensify. The research identifies potential flash points before, during and after the referendum (should the South vote for separation) that could be a source for major instability. In addition to the GoSS and GoNU being mindful of Southern Sudanese concerns, the international community has a clear mandate from participants to play a significant role in monitoring the referendum and maintaining security.

## SOUTHERN SUDAN AT THE CROSSROADS

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### *Potential flash points*

#### Pre-referendum:

- A GoNU-imposed delay; and
- A GoSS-imposed delay, without a cause regarded as highly credible.

#### During the vote:

- Any reports that Southerners in the North have been bribed or intimidated to vote for unity; and
- Any reports of violence perpetrated against Southerners in the North.

#### Post-referendum (under a separation scenario):

- Any reports of violence perpetrated against Southerners in the North;
- Insecurity along the border;
- An unexplained decision to share oil revenue with the North; and
- In the longer term, a pace of development in the country that does not meet citizens' high expectations.

### **Recommendations:**

- All of the recommendations under the previous section apply, though specific actions are necessary from the GoSS:
  - The GoSS must work in tandem with GoNU to reassure the public about security along the border and the safety of Southerners living in the North and Northerners living in the South.
  - The GoSS must convince Southern Sudanese citizens that, both from an economic standpoint and a security perspective, moving oil through the North is necessary at least in the short-term and must also persuade citizens that any deal does not unduly favor Northern interests.
  - The GoSS will need to provide citizens with a roadmap for development, including descriptions of development plans, communicate realistic timeframes and honest assessments of what can be accomplished within the government's budget constraints and reassure the population that development is being undertaken in an equitable manner.

## Creating a More Representative and Responsive Government

There is a slight positive trend, compared to previous NDI studies, in perceptions regarding the direction of the region, the pace of development and the level of security. Nevertheless, Southern Sudanese want and expect much more advancement to be made and under a separation scenario, expectations for progress will be magnified exponentially. Additionally, financial corruption, tribalism and nepotism remain the source of significant citizen dissatisfaction with GoSS performance. Regardless of the outcome of the referendum vote, the GoSS should develop and publicize a plan that addresses the recommendations noted below.<sup>61</sup>

### **Recommendations:**

- Discuss the problem of tribalism in government openly with the public and communicate plans for addressing it.
- Promote and enforce merit-based hiring rules in civil service employment.
- Conduct an audit of employment in government, address any imbalances caused by tribalism or nepotism and make the results public.
- Consider the adoption of tribal representation guidelines for public employment and ensure any adopted policy is publicized widely.
- Explain the reason for any delays in public sectors salaries and/or cuts in the workforce to address perceptions of corruption.
- Demonstrate a strong commitment to anti-corruption efforts through the creation of robust investigative and enforcement mechanisms.
- Demonstrate that the government has a strategy to address inter- and intra-tribal conflict and can respond quickly to escalating situations.
- Explore new strategies for peaceful civilian disarmament and develop a plan to address areas where citizens believe disarmament has failed.
- Place training and deployment of police on a fast track and prioritize deployments to troubled areas.
- Develop a plan for further professionalization of the police and army, including sufficient equipment and pay to do their jobs effectively.
- Expand efforts to engage in dialogue with citizens including through increased travel by the GoSS president and other high-ranking officials and more regular use of radio.

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<sup>61</sup> Most of these recommendations were provided in NDI's 2009 report; as they still remain valid, we have chosen to reiterate them here.

## Appendix A: Focus Group Participant Demographics

### SOUTHERN SUDAN FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS

| DATE      | GROUP SIZE | GENDER | STATE             | LOCATION           | ETHNICITY <sup>62</sup> | RELIGION                | AGE GROUP <sup>63</sup> | EDUCATION                   |
|-----------|------------|--------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 2/5/2010  | 12         | Male   | Central Equatoria | Juba Town          | Mixed                   | Mixed <sup>64</sup>     | Younger                 | Pri-Secondary <sup>65</sup> |
| 2/9/2010  | 13         | Female | Central Equatoria | Juba Rural, Gudele | Mixed                   | Christian               | Younger                 | None-Early Primary          |
| 2/10/2010 | 7          | Male   | Central Equatoria | Juba Town, Gusene  | Mixed                   | Christian <sup>66</sup> | Middle                  | Secondary                   |
| 2/11/2010 | 11         | Male   | Central Equatoria | Juba Rural, Gumbo  | Mixed                   | Muslim                  | Mixed <sup>67</sup>     | Primary <sup>68</sup>       |
| 2/13/2010 | 15         | Male   | Central Equatoria | Kajo Keji          | Kuku <sup>69</sup>      | Christian               | Younger                 | Secondary                   |

<sup>62</sup> Names of ethnic groups and /or tribes are listed as recorded by Sudanese moderators, but alternate spellings may exist.

<sup>63</sup> “Younger” refers to participants up to age 25; “Middle” refers to participants ages 26-40; “Older” refers to participants with ages of 40+.

<sup>64</sup> One participant was Muslim.

<sup>65</sup> This is an abbreviation for a mixed primary and secondary group.

<sup>66</sup> One participant was Muslim.

<sup>67</sup> Two participants were younger, five were middle-aged and four were older.

<sup>68</sup> One participant had university level education.

<sup>69</sup> Two participants were Dinka, one participant was Nuer, and one participant was Kakwa.

| DATE      | GROUP SIZE | GENDER | STATE             | LOCATION             | ETHNICITY <sup>62</sup> | RELIGION                | AGE GROUP <sup>63</sup> | EDUCATION                   |
|-----------|------------|--------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 2/13/2010 | 11         | Female | Central Equatoria | Kajo Keji            | Kuku                    | Christian               | Middle <sup>70</sup>    | Primary <sup>71</sup>       |
| 2/15/2010 | 7          | Male   | Central Equatoria | Kajo Keji, Limi Boma | Kuku                    | Christian               | Chiefs                  | Any <sup>72</sup>           |
| 2/15/2010 | 13         | Female | Central Equatoria | Kajo Keji, Pamojo    | Kuku                    | Christian               | Younger                 | Pri-Secondary               |
| 2/10/2010 | 13         | Female | Jonglei           | Waat                 | Lou Nuer                | Christian               | Younger                 | Primary                     |
| 2/10/2010 | 12         | Male   | Jonglei           | Waat                 | Lou Nuer                | Christian               | Middle                  | Pri-Secondary <sup>73</sup> |
| 2/12/2010 | 17         | Female | Jonglei           | Waat                 | Lou Nuer                | Any <sup>74</sup>       | Older                   | None                        |
| 2/13/2010 | 7          | Male   | Jonglei           | Waat                 | Lou Nuer                | Christian <sup>75</sup> | Chiefs                  | Any <sup>76</sup>           |
| 2/15/2010 | 11         | Male   | Jonglei           | Waat                 | Lou Nuer                | Christian <sup>77</sup> | Younger                 | Pri-Secondary               |

<sup>70</sup>Two participants were younger, at the ages of 20 and 22.

<sup>71</sup>Four participants had some secondary level education, and one participant had no formal education.

<sup>72</sup>One participant had some secondary level education, and six participants had no formal education.

<sup>73</sup>One participant had college level education.

<sup>74</sup>Fourteen participants were Christians, and three participants held traditional beliefs.

<sup>75</sup>Two participants held traditional beliefs.

<sup>76</sup>One participant had primary level education, and six had no formal education.

<sup>77</sup>Two participants held traditional beliefs.

## SOUTHERN SUDAN AT THE CROSSROADS

| DATE      | GROUP SIZE | GENDER | STATE   | LOCATION                | ETHNICITY   | RELIGION                                | AGE GROUP             | EDUCATION         |
|-----------|------------|--------|---------|-------------------------|-------------|---|-----------------------|-------------------|
| 2/15/2010 | 6          | Male   | Jonglei | Panyagor Town           | Dinka Twic  | Christian                               | Chiefs                | Any <sup>78</sup> |
| 2/16/2010 | 12         | Female | Jonglei | Panyagor Rural, Khir    | Dinka Twic  | Christian                               | Older <sup>79</sup>   | None-Early Pri    |
| 2/16/2010 | 11         | Male   | Jonglei | Panyagor Rural, Pageer  | Dinka Twic  | Christian                               | Younger               | Primary           |
| 2/16/2010 | 13         | Female | Jonglei | Panyagor Town           | Dinka Twic  | Christian                               | Younger <sup>80</sup> | Pri -Secondary    |
| 2/12/2010 | 7          | Male   | Lakes   | Cueibet                 | Dinka Gok   | Christian/<br>Traditional <sup>81</sup> | Chiefs                | Any <sup>82</sup> |
| 2/12/2010 | 14         | Male   | Lakes   | Rumbek Center, Akonbuoi | Dinka Ajaar | Christian <sup>83</sup>                 | Middle <sup>84</sup>  | Primary           |

<sup>78</sup> One participant had primary level education, one had secondary level education, and four had no formal education.

<sup>79</sup> Four participants were younger: two were 35, and two were 38.

<sup>80</sup> One participant was younger, at the age of 13.

<sup>81</sup> Four participants held traditional beliefs, and three participants were Christians.

<sup>82</sup> Six participants had no formal education, and one participant had primary level education.

<sup>83</sup> One participant held traditional beliefs.

<sup>84</sup> Seven participants were younger: three were 20, two were 21, one was 22 and one was 24.

| DATE      | GROUP SIZE | GENDER | STATE  | LOCATION                | ETHNICITY                 | RELIGION                                | AGE GROUP             | EDUCATION                    |
|-----------|------------|--------|--------|-------------------------|---------------------------|---|-----------------------|------------------------------|
| 2/13/2010 | 17         | Female | Lakes  | Cueibet, Abiriu Payam   | Dinka Gok                 | Christian/<br>Traditional <sup>85</sup> | Middle                | None-Early Pri               |
| 2/14/2010 | 12         | Female | Lakes  | Wulu Gadiem             | Jurbele                   | Christian <sup>86</sup>                 | Mixed <sup>87</sup>   | None-Early Pri               |
| 2/14/2010 | 12         | Male   | Lakes  | Wulu                    | Jurbele                   | Christian                               | Younger <sup>88</sup> | Primary                      |
| 2/15/2010 | 10         | Female | Lakes  | Rumbek Center           | Dinka Mixed <sup>89</sup> | Christian <sup>90</sup>                 | Younger               | Secondary                    |
| 2/11/2010 | 15         | Male   | Warrap | Kwajok Town             | Dinka Rek                 | Christian                               | Younger <sup>91</sup> | Primary <sup>92</sup>        |
| 2/12/2010 | 15         | Female | Warrap | Kwajok Rural, Majakamal | Dinka Rek                 | Christian                               | Mixed <sup>93</sup>   | None-Early Pri <sup>94</sup> |

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<sup>85</sup> Two participants held traditional beliefs.

<sup>86</sup> One participant held traditional beliefs.

<sup>87</sup> Six participants were middle-aged and six were older.

<sup>88</sup> One participant was older, at the age of 30.

<sup>89</sup> Five participants were Dinka Agar, four participants were Dinka Ciec and one participant was Dinka Gok.

<sup>90</sup> One participant held traditional beliefs.

<sup>91</sup> Four participants were middle-aged: one was 26, two were 27, and one was 28.

<sup>92</sup> Twelve participants had secondary level education.

<sup>93</sup> Eight participants were middle-aged and seven were older.

<sup>94</sup> Three participants had secondary level education.

## SOUTHERN SUDAN AT THE CROSSROADS

| DATE      | GROUP SIZE | GENDER | STATE        | LOCATION                  | ETHNICITY | RELIGION                 | AGE GROUP             | EDUCATION                     |
|-----------|------------|--------|--------------|---------------------------|-----------|--------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| 2/13/2010 | 13         | Female | Warrap       | Gogrial Rural, Alek Payam | Dinka Rek | Christian                | Mixed <sup>95</sup>   | Mixed <sup>96</sup>           |
| 2/16/2010 | 12         | Female | Warrap       | Thiet Town                | Dinka     | Christian <sup>97</sup>  | Middle <sup>98</sup>  | None-Primary                  |
| 2/16/2010 | 15         | Male   | Warrap       | Thiet Rural               | Dinka     | Christian                | Older                 | None-Early Pri <sup>99</sup>  |
| 2/13/2010 | 16         | Male   | Warrap       | Gogrial Town              | Dinka Rek | Christian <sup>100</sup> | Older                 | Mixed <sup>101</sup>          |
| 2/18/2010 | 14         | Male   | Warrap       | Warrap Town               | Dinka Rek | Christian                | Mixed <sup>102</sup>  | Primary <sup>103</sup>        |
| 2/19/2010 | 17         | Female | Warrap       | Warrap Town               | Dinka Rek | Christian                | Middle <sup>104</sup> | None-Early Pri <sup>105</sup> |
| 2/19/2010 | 15         | Female | E. Equatoria | Magwi Town                | Madi      | Christian                | Older                 | None-Early Pri                |

<sup>95</sup> Seven participants were younger and six participants were middle-aged.

<sup>96</sup> Five participants had primary education, two participants had secondary level education, three participants had some adult education and three participants had no formal education.

<sup>97</sup> One participant held traditional beliefs.

<sup>98</sup> Two participants were younger, at the ages of 20 and 22.

<sup>99</sup> Two participants had secondary level education.

<sup>100</sup> Eight participants held traditional beliefs.

<sup>101</sup> Seven participants had no formal education, four had primary level education and five participants had an intermediate level education.

<sup>102</sup> Nine participants were younger and five were middle-aged.

<sup>103</sup> Six participants had secondary level education.

<sup>104</sup> Three participants were older and three were younger.

<sup>105</sup> Twelve participants had no formal education.

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| DATE      | GROUP SIZE | GENDER | STATE                   | LOCATION                | ETHNICITY                   | RELIGION  | AGE GROUP             | EDUCATION                |
|-----------|------------|--------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------|-----------------------|--------------------------|
| 2/20/2010 | 15         | Female | Eastern Equatoria       | Mura Lopit, Lopa County | Lopit                       | Christian | Middle <sup>106</sup> | None-Early Pri           |
| 2/20/2010 | 13         | Male   | Eastern Equatoria       | Magwi Rural, Obba Boma  | Acholi                      | Christian | Younger               | Secondary <sup>107</sup> |
| 2/21/2010 | 13         | Male   | Eastern Equatoria       | Kapoeta Town            | Toposa                      | Christian | Older                 | Pri-Secondary            |
| 2/21/2010 | 16         | Male   | Eastern Equatoria       | Lopa                    | Lopit                       | Christian | Middle <sup>108</sup> | Pri-Secondary            |
| 2/23/2010 | 10         | Female | Eastern Equatoria       | Kapoeta Rural, Narus    | Toposa                      | Christian | Younger               | Primary                  |
| 2/11/2010 | 15         | Female | Northern Bahr el Ghazal | Awiel Town              | Dinka Malual <sup>109</sup> | Christian | Younger               | Primary <sup>110</sup>   |

<sup>106</sup> Six participants were younger: two were 16, two were 17, one was 18, one was 20, and two were older, at the age of 50.

<sup>107</sup> One participant had primary level education.

<sup>108</sup> Two participants were younger, at the ages of 18 and 19.

<sup>109</sup> One participant was Jur Chol.

<sup>110</sup> One participant had secondary level education.

## SOUTHERN SUDAN AT THE CROSSROADS

| DATE      | GROUP SIZE | GENDER | STATE                   | LOCATION                    | ETHNICITY    | RELIGION                                 | AGE GROUP | EDUCATION            |
|-----------|------------|--------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------|--|-----------|----------------------|
| 2/12/2010 | 13         | Male   | Northern Bahr el Ghazal | Awiel Town                  | Dinka Malual | Christian <sup>111</sup>                 | Older     | Late Pri-Sec         |
| 2/13/2010 | 15         | Female | Northern Bahr el Ghazal | Awiel Rural, Malek-Alel     | Dinka Malual | Christian <sup>112</sup>                 | Middle    | None-Early Pri       |
| 2/15/2010 | 15         | Male   | Northern Bahr el Ghazal | Malualkon Rural             | Dinka Malual | Christian <sup>113</sup>                 | Middle    | Mixed <sup>114</sup> |
| 2/16/2010 | 15         | Female | Northern Bahr el Ghazal | Malualkon Town              | Dinka Malual | Christian <sup>115</sup>                 | Older     | Primary              |
| 2/16/2010 | 9          | Male   | Northern Bahr el Ghazal | Malualkon Rural, Mabongtong | Dinka Malual | Christian/<br>Traditional <sup>116</sup> | Chiefs    | Any <sup>117</sup>   |

<sup>111</sup> Two participants held traditional beliefs.

<sup>112</sup> Three participants held traditional beliefs.

<sup>113</sup> One participant held traditional beliefs.

<sup>114</sup> Six participants had primary level education, five had no formal education and four participants had secondary level education

<sup>115</sup> Five participants held traditionalist beliefs.

<sup>116</sup> Five participants held traditional beliefs.

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| DATE      | GROUP SIZE | GENDER | STATE                  | LOCATION          | ETHNICITY | RELIGION  | AGE GROUP             | EDUCATION                   |
|-----------|------------|--------|------------------------|-------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|
| 2/11/2010 | 11         | Female | Western Bahr el Ghazal | Wau Town          | Mixed     | Christian | Younger               | Secondary                   |
| 2/12/2010 | 10         | Male   | Western Bahr el Ghazal | Wau Town          | Mixed     | Christian | Middle                | Late Pri-Sec <sup>118</sup> |
| 2/13/2010 | 14         | Male   | Western Bahr el Ghazal | Wau Rural, Bariar | Jur Chol  | Christian | Chiefs                | Any <sup>119</sup>          |
| 2/13/2010 | 10         | Female | Western Bahr el Ghazal | Wau Town          | Fertit    | Christian | Middle                | Primary <sup>120</sup>      |
| 2/24/2010 | 14         | Male   | Upper Nile             | Malakal Town      | Shilluk   | Christian | Middle                | Secondary                   |
| 2/24/2010 | 12         | Male   | Upper Nile             | Malakal Town      | Dinka     | Christian | Middle <sup>121</sup> | Late Pri-Sec                |

<sup>117</sup> No participants had any formal education.

<sup>118</sup> Two participants had no formal education.

<sup>119</sup> Twelve participants had no formal education, and two participants had secondary level education.

<sup>120</sup> Two participants had secondary level education.

<sup>121</sup> Three participants were younger: two were 23, and one was 24.

## SOUTHERN SUDAN AT THE CROSSROADS

| DATE      | GROUP SIZE | GENDER | STATE      | LOCATION              | ETHNICITY   | RELIGION                 | AGE GROUP | EDUCATION                    |
|-----------|------------|--------|------------|-----------------------|-------------|--------------------------|-----------|------------------------------|
| 2/25/2010 | 13         | Female | Upper Nile | Malakal Town          | Shilluk     | Christian                | Younger   | Secondary                    |
| 2/27/2010 | 15         | Female | Upper Nile | Renk Rural,<br>Jalhak | Dinka       | Mixed <sup>122</sup>     | Younger   | Primary                      |
| 2/27/2010 | 15         | Male   | Upper Nile | Renk Town             | Dinka       | Muslim <sup>123</sup>    | Older     | Primary <sup>124</sup>       |
| 3/15/2010 | 12         | Female | Upper Nile | Nassir Town           | Nuer        | Christian                | Middle    | None                         |
| 3/15/2010 | 12         | Male   | Upper Nile | Nassir Rural          | Nuer        | Christian                | Younger   | Pri-Secondary                |
| 3/16/2010 | 9          | Female | Upper Nile | Malakal Town          | Nuer        | Christian                | Middle    | Late Pri- Sec                |
| 2/24/2010 | 12         | Male   | Unity      | Guit Town             | Nuer Jikany | Christian                | Middle    | Pri-Secondary <sup>125</sup> |
| 2/25/2010 | 11         | Female | Unity      | Guit Rural            | Nuer Jikany | Christian <sup>126</sup> | Older     | None- Early Pri              |
| 2/27/2010 | 11         | Female | Unity      | Mayom Town            | Nuer        | Christian <sup>127</sup> | Younger   | Primary <sup>128</sup>       |

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<sup>122</sup> Seven participants were Christian and five were Muslim.

<sup>123</sup> One participant was Christian.

<sup>124</sup> One participant had an intermediate level education.

<sup>125</sup> One participant had no formal education.

<sup>126</sup> One participant held traditional beliefs.

<sup>127</sup> One participant held traditional beliefs.

<sup>128</sup> One participant had secondary level education.

| DATE      | GROUP SIZE | GENDER | STATE                | LOCATION     | ETHNICITY           | RELIGION                                 | AGE GROUP              | EDUCATION          |
|-----------|------------|--------|----------------------|--------------|---------------------|--|------------------------|--------------------|
| 2/27/2010 | 11         | Male   | Unity                | Mayom Rural  | Nuer                | Christian/<br>Traditional <sup>129</sup> | Chiefs                 | Any <sup>130</sup> |
| 2/22/2010 | 12         | Male   | Western<br>Equatoria | Mundri Rural | Moru                | Christian                                | Younger <sup>131</sup> | Primary            |
| 2/23/2010 | 5          | Male   | Western<br>Equatoria | Mundri Town  | Moru <sup>132</sup> | Christian                                | Chiefs                 | Any <sup>133</sup> |
| 2/24/2010 | 11         | Male   | Western<br>Equatoria | Maridi Town  | Zande               | Christian                                | Middle                 | None-Early Pri     |
| 2/25/2010 | 15         | Female | Western<br>Equatoria | Maridi Town  | Zande               | N/A <sup>134</sup>                       | Younger <sup>135</sup> | Pri-Secondary      |

<sup>129</sup> Six participants held traditionalist beliefs.

<sup>130</sup> Nine participants had no formal education, and two participants had secondary level education.

<sup>131</sup> One participant was older, at the age of 26.

<sup>132</sup> One participant was Mundari.

<sup>133</sup> Three participants had primary level education, one participant had secondary level education and one had no formal education.

<sup>134</sup> The religion of these participants was not recorded on the participant sheets.

<sup>135</sup> Three participants were middle-aged.

## APPENDIX B: METHODOLOGY NOTES

**Focus Group Research:** Focus groups are open-ended group interviews directed by a moderator and following a pre-set guideline. The purpose of focus group research is to understand the attitudes, opinions and experiences of participants who are recruited for the exercise. Focus groups are particularly useful in gaining a deeper appreciation for the motivations, feelings and values behind participants' reactions. In addition, the group format enables respondents to participate in an exchange of ideas – thus revealing a more in-depth understanding of why opinions are held – that may not emerge in individual in-depth interviews or quantitative surveys. Focus group discussions are comprised of a small number of participants, typically 8-12 per group. However, depending on the situation, groups may be slightly smaller or larger than the ideal. In the Southern Sudan context, a chiefs' group, for example, may work better with a smaller number because they are generally well-informed and have strongly-held opinions. A women's group in a more isolated area may benefit from being larger because it is likely that one or more of the participants will refuse to speak at length, even if pressed.

Focus groups are recruited to be homogeneous – so, for example, men's and women's groups are conducted separately – to enhance the comfort level of the participants and to clarify the views of a particular sub-group. The number of groups conducted varies widely based on the goals of the research, but the total number of participants is always relatively small and cannot be considered statistically representative of the larger population. It is important to always be aware that focus groups are a qualitative, and not a quantitative, research tool.

**Group Composition:** The focus groups in this report are stratified by gender, ethnicity, age and education. Single ethnicity groups are conducted where possible. However, in areas where smaller tribes reside, mixed groups are sometimes held.

**Age:** Based on experience from past research in Sudan, the age categories used are broadly defined as “younger,” “middle” or “older.” Younger refers to participants up to age 25, middle refers to participants ages 26-40 and older refers to participants over age 40. Given the difficulty of gathering participants in largely rural areas and since some people in Southern Sudan do not know their ages, the categories are used as a general guideline rather than a strictly enforced criterion.

**Religion:** Groups are normally conducted separately with different religious groups. In Southern Sudan, most participants identify themselves as Christian or as holding traditional beliefs or both, and they are allowed to participate in the same group. In a few areas, where a mix of Christians and Muslims reside, mixed groups are held, though Christian participants were the majority. Two Muslim-only groups were held: one in Renk in Upper Nile and one in Juba in Central Equatoria.

**Education:** Participants sampled in the groups had widely varying degrees of education, ranging from none through university. As much as possible, the groups were stratified to include participants with relatively similar educational backgrounds. We did not attempt to stratify by education when we were recruiting special groups, such as chiefs, since in that case the category of participant was the more important criterion.

**Leadership Roles:** Groups are conducted separately with area leaders and ordinary citizens to prevent undue influence. In addition, traditional authorities and government officials are not allowed to sit in on discussions with ordinary citizens, even as observers. On the rare occasion when an area leader demands to be part of a group in which they were not meant to participate, that data is either excluded from the analysis or compared to the data from other groups to see if it is at variance.

**Ethnic Locations and Designations:** In Southern Sudan, participants in the focus groups were generally from the largest ethnic population of a particular area. In areas where there was a large population of different ethnicities, we attempted to hold groups with each of those, such as Nuer, Shilluk and Dinka in Upper Nile.

**Logistics:** The logistical challenges of conducting research in Southern Sudan are immense. Travel outside of the major towns is difficult and sometimes impossible due to poor road networks and insecurity. Pre-planning for the groups requires labor-intensive coordination to organize transport and accommodation in each location. These difficulties occasionally impact the number and type of groups that can be conducted.

**Staffing:** It is a challenge to find moderators in Southern Sudan who are fluent in English and local languages. As a result, some of the women's groups were conducted by male moderators, but the data for those groups did not differ from the ones in which female moderators conducted the groups.

## SOUTHERN SUDAN AT THE CROSSROADS

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**Group Locations:** The 63 focus groups outlined in this report were conducted in 48 locations throughout Southern Sudan. (See Appendix A for a list of focus group locations.)

**Facilities:** In more rural areas, there are few structures appropriate for focus group discussions. As a result, groups were sometimes conducted in open-air settings, although this reduces the privacy of the group.

**Remote Areas:** Groups were primarily conducted in locations that are accessible by air and/or vehicle. Efforts are made to penetrate deep into rural areas, but due to poor road networks and insecurity, groups conducted in very remote locations are limited.

**Outside Influence:** In some cases, local authorities are informed of the research activities before they begin. However, every effort is made to ensure there is no undue influence exerted on the participants in the groups. The focus group guideline is not shared with local authorities prior to the group, except in the rare cases when disclosure is required to proceed with the research. Also, in the majority of instances, the participants are gathered in some random fashion. In this study, there was no case in which the findings from one or more groups differed radically from findings in the groups overall, which suggests that any local influence that may have occurred did not impact the research.

## APPENDIX C: MODERATOR'S GUIDELINE

### Moderator's Guideline

#### Southern Sudan Focus Groups

February-March 2010

### I. INTRODUCTION

Hello, my name is \_\_\_\_\_, and I work for the National Democratic Institute, a non-governmental organization (NGO) based in Juba that is trying to learn more about what citizens of Southern Sudan think about the important issues in this area. I am neutral and am **NOT** working for the government or any political party. I am the facilitator for today's discussion.

- There are no right or wrong answers.
- Everyone's opinion is equally important. We want everyone to speak.
- If you disagree with someone, that is okay.
- This discussion is only between those of us here.
- I have this recorder to help me when I write the report. Your name will not be used in the report. The report will only say a [Woman/Man] from [location] said this or that.
- The person here is taking notes to help with the report.
- Please speak loudly so the recorder can pick up your voice.

Thank you. Now let us begin.

## SOUTHERN SUDAN AT THE CROSSROADS

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### II. GENERAL

1. How are things going in Southern Sudan these days? Are they going in the right direction or wrong direction?
2. In your opinion, what is the most important aspect of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement? [GET AT LEAST THREE OPINIONS, AND THEN ASK:]
  - a. Choose which of the following is most important to you and explain your choice:
    1. Peace between North and South
    2. The creation of GOSS
    3. Elections/opportunity to choose new leaders
    4. The right of the South to choose unity or separation
    5. Freedoms and rights
    6. The promise of economic development

### III. DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY

1. Tell me about the development situation in this area. Is it improving, staying the same OR getting worse. What is the reason for your answer?
2. Is the security situation improving, staying the same OR getting worse? What is the reason for your answer?
3. Who is causing insecurity in your area?
4. What should be done to improve the security situation here?
  - a. Who should be responsible for improving security? [Wait for responses, and then prompt for whether it should be the government in Juba, the state government or the country government or someone else IF participants haven't been specific.]
5. What is your opinion of the SPLA's performance today in your area?
6. What is your opinion of the performance of the Southern Sudan police in your area?

#### **IV. GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE**

1. What do you think of the job the GOSS is doing in governing Southern Sudan – is it Excellent, Good, Fair or Poor? Why?
  - a. What has it done well?
  - b. Where can it improve?
2. Salva Kiir has been President of Southern Sudan for four years. What do you think about the job he has done as President so far?
3. Tell me how much of a problem corruption in government is in Southern Sudan – Very Much, Somewhat, A Little, Not At All. What is the reason for your answer?

#### **V. ELECTIONS**

1. Was the registration process that took place in November and December last year conducted fairly? Why or why not?
2. Have you received any information about the elections? If so, what have you heard, and where did you hear it?
3. What did you think about the way in which candidates were nominated for their positions?
4. Have any candidates campaigned in your community? If so, from which parties?
5. Do you have concerns or fears about the elections?

#### **VI. REFERENDUM**

1. Before today, did you know that Southern Sudan will have a referendum, which is a vote on whether to separate from the North or stay united as one country? [COUNT]
  - a. When is the referendum due to be held? [COUNT HOW MANY KNEW THE ANSWER INDEPENDENTLY.]

## SOUTHERN SUDAN AT THE CROSSROADS

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2. There are many Southerners living in Khartoum and other locations in the North. Do you think they should be allowed to vote in the referendum? Why or why not?
  - a. What about Southerners living in the Diaspora?
3. When I say “unity of Sudan,” what are the first things that come to your mind? Why?
  - a. Would the GoSS continue to exist in the future Sudan if Southerners were to vote for unity?
4. If the referendum on self-determination were held today, would you vote to stay united with the North OR create a separate country? What is the reason for your vote?
5. What will happen to Southerners living in the North if there is a vote for separation?
  - a. What about Northerners living in the South?
6. If the vote is for separation, how will the North-South border be affected?
  - a. Do you think people should be able to travel freely between North and South as they can today?
  - b. There is a lot of trade and a lot of goods that pass through the North-South border. How will trade be affected by a vote for separation?
7. What would your reaction be if the Government of National Unity in Khartoum announced that the referendum needed to be delayed by one year because preparations were behind schedule?
  - a. What if the international community agreed with this recommendation? Would that affect your reaction?
  - b. What if it was the GoSS and Salva Kiir, rather than the Khartoum government, that announced that the referendum needed to be delayed because preparations were behind schedule? Would that affect your reaction?

- c. Are there any reasons you can think of that would be good ones to delay the referendum?
8. Should the international community have a role in the referendum? If so, what should it be?
9. What would your reaction be if the SPLM or the GoSS announced that the referendum would go ahead as planned in 2011, but that after the vote, there would be a four-year transition period before the South became a fully independent country?  
  
[If participants say they can't understand why there would be a transition period, talk with them about the many issues, such as border demarcation, citizenship and IDP rights, that will need to be negotiated between the North and the South, and then get their reaction.]
10. Some people believe that the best way to maintain peace in Sudan if Southerners vote to separate is for the SPLM or the GoSS to agree with the NCP or the government in Khartoum to continue sharing revenue from the South's oil resources. How do you feel about this?
  - a. The South has many oil producing areas but the only pipeline to take that oil to ports, and therefore the only way for the South to sell its oil, is through the North. Does this change your views about the need to share oil revenues with the North?
  - b. What if the South doesn't share oil revenues with the North, but instead pays them fees to transport the oil to the port?
11. Suppose Southerners voted for separation. Looking ten years into the future, how do you think Southern Sudan will have changed? [Ensure participants understand that we are asked what they *think* will happen; not what they *hope* will happen. We want realistic assessments.]
12. Every government faces challenges. If Southerners vote for separation, what will be the biggest challenges the GoSS will face in governing Southern Sudan after the referendum?
  - a. How well do you think the GoSS will perform in meeting these challenges?
13. Will the relationship between tribes in Southern Sudan improve, worsen or stay the same if Southerners vote for separation in the referendum?

## APPENDIX D: ABOUT THE AUTHORS

**Andrea L. Levy** is the Interim Program Manager for the National Democratic Institute's public opinion research program in Sudan. Andrea has worked in the research field for 19 years and has managed research studies for NDI in Somalia and Burundi, in addition to Sudan. Her international research experience includes projects implemented for the governments of Poland, Bolivia, Colombia, Wales, Indonesia and the Bahamas. Previous to working with NDI, she was senior vice president and director of research at SS+K in New York, where she managed and conducted opinion research for Fortune 500 companies from a variety of industries. She holds a master's degree in international relations from Georgetown University.

**Traci D. Cook** is Resident Director for the National Democratic Institute's Southern Sudan program. An experienced opinion research who has done similar work elsewhere in Africa and the Caribbean, she previously served as the senior director for strategic and corporate communications at the Women's National Basketball Association and as vice president of marketing communications at SS+K in New York, where she supervised and analyzed focus groups research for Fortune 500 companies. As country program director for NDI in Malawi between 1993 and 1996, she also designed and conducted a series of focus groups on democracy and governance. Complementing her work in the field of international development and in the private sector is her experience as the political director for the Mississippi Democratic Party, legislative work on Capitol Hill and research work for various U.S. House and Senate races. This is Ms. Cook's eleventh study of citizen opinions and attitudes in Sudan.





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