USOM PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATIVES GUIDE

Prepared by the USOM Office for Rural Affairs

January 1963
SAIGON

PRINTED BY USOM'S GRAPHICS SECTION

UNITED STATES OPERATIONS MISSION

TO

VIETNAM

OFFICE FOR RURAL AFFAIRS

PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S GUIDE

SAIGON, VIETNAM

JANUARY

1963

The year which has just elapsed has, as I have just said, seen its essential expression in and by the vast movement of Strategic Hamlets.

.....

This vast movement born in the heat of the war is our preemptory reply to the Communist challenge. It brings us, along with the certainty of victory, the pride to live as free men today and tomorrow.

President NGO DINH DIEM

... Our hopes for a peaceful and prosperous Viet-Nam can best be realized through the join efforts of Americans and Vietnamese working side by side in the Hamlets, Towns and Cities, helping the people of the country to achieve their desires for Social and Economic Evolution ...

Joseph L. Brent
Director
USOM/Saigon

This guide is to familiarize USOM Provincial Representatives with their job in Vietnam. Its contents have been taken from official publications and from speeches of Vietnamese and American officials. Changes and additions may be necessary, therefore, pages have been left unnumbered and the guide placed in a loose leaf binder.

The guide is divided into seven chapters. The first six chapters provide information of a specific nature on the Counterinsurgency Program. Chapter Seven is a collection of significant reference information not included in other chapter headings.

Recommendations for future additions or changes for this guide are welcome.

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INTRODUCTION

You have the most important job in Viet-Nam. You have been selected as a Provincial Representative because you possess the necessary dedication, common sense and imagination to fulfill this difficult assignment.

Our Vietnamese friends have launched a nationwide strategic hamlet program which they wish to be a political, economic and social revolution at the grass roots. This revolution is based upon the basic right of the people to govern themselves and through this self-government to achieve progress, beginning at the hamlet level. The purpose of this program is to give the Vietnamese people something worth risking their lives to defend and in so doing to defeat communism. It will be your job to help the Vietnamese make their aspirations for a better life come true.

We have long since realized that this is a new kind of war and that a pure military solution is impossible. Unless military action is combined with social, political and economic improvements and, through these improvements, the rural people are given a stake in their community worth defending, there can be no permanent victory over communism.

In each province a joint civil-military plan for the creation of peace, security and prosperity through the establishment of strategic hamlets has been developed. These plans combine military actions with the political, social and economic improvements necessary to defeat communism. Within the flexible framework of this plan, it will be your job to help the Vietnamese civil and military agencies in carrying out the grass-roots political, economic and social improvements which are needed and which they desire. However, you must keep in mind that political, economic and social progress in a community depends upon that community having physical protection from the communists - whether by outside military units or by armed and trained militiamen from the community itself. This is why your assistance and support to the Vietnamese must be closely coordinated with the military security actions underway in your province. This is also why you must work in intimate coordination with the local MAAG advisors.

As one of our Provincial Representatives you will be working twenty-four hours a day with the Vietnamese Province Chief, his technical staff and his District, Village and Hamlet personnel as well as with the MAAG Sector Advisor, doing everything in your power to use all available resources to assist the rural population.

Your resources are many and include the full strength of the American Economic Assistance Program in all its technical fields. You will be backed up by the full USOM technical staff in Saigon. But you should rely on your own good judgment and the Provincial Government's Vietnamese technicians for carrying out project activities before calling for outside help

The USOM/GVN Assistance Program you will be administering and coordinating at Provincial and lower levels, should be visualized as a two-way street. First, our major, rural-population-impact, development

projects such as strategic hamlet establishment and improvement (schools, dispensaries, etc.), montagnard resettlement and improvement, farm credit, hog and livestock production and composting, fertilizer distribution, irrigation and insect and rodent control, will come from the top down. Second, the hamlet self-help projects - worthwhile social and economic development projects developed within the hamlets by the hamlet peoples themselves for which they will donate most or all of their labor and ask for Provincial help for the materials and technical advice - will come from the bottom up.

The Province Chief, the MAAG Sector Advisor and you will have the cash and material resources for immediate allocation to the Hamlet people to carry out these Hamlet self-help projects. It is your responsibility, working with the local Vietnamese officials, to see that rapid action is taken to insure the smooth, quick flow of these hamlet self-help project requests and their prompt review, revision if necessary, and implementation, from the Provincial level. The hamlet people must and can be convinced by your quick action that their government has become responsive to their needs.

You will also have to ride hard on the impact projects coming from the top down and insure that they are effectively implemented. The best plans in the world dreamed up in Saigon or Washington, won't mean a thing unless they really reach the rural population. We look to you to extend that reach. We expect you to keep us informed of urgent requests from your province to the ministries which have not received action and we will follow-up in Saigon.

You will be kept informed from Saigon of all of our plans and activities which may apply in your area and of the supplies and equipment available for your use. Use your judgement and imagination in determining what may apply in your area. The more you know, the better equipped you will be to understand and carry out our policies and your job. Don't hesitate to ask questions because you will need all the information available to make round, accurate decisions.

In most cases, you will be living with the MAAG Sector Advisor and his staff. This should eliminate most of your routine housekeeping and administrative problems. From personal experience I know that it is possible to live off locally available resources including the MAAG facilities. This should not pose any hardship on you nor should you be worried about being identified with our military advisors.

As pointed out earlier, they have as great concern with the need for and success of your work as you do; we are all in this together! Good day-to-day relations with the MAAG Sector Advisor will insure your own security and important help in such matters as transportation, radio communications, and even eating!

As to reports, we will give you simple standard forms or formats. Although we will want to know how you and the USOM Program are doing,

we don't want you to waste too much of your time on administrative details. Whenever possible, let the Vietnamese do the work and give them our helping hand and a push where they need it.

You should think positively at all times and make the seemingly impossible work successfully. It can be done although it may often require much patience and imagination. This is the American ideal, this is still our way of doing things and this is what is going to win here! Feel proud of yourselves as Americans and do your best to instill the "Can do" spirit in your Vietnamese allies so that their hopes for a better tomorrow will rapidly materialize.

This is your job in Viet-Nam; big, broad, full of responsibilities - and most important!

We expect big things from you in your Province! !

Rufus C. Phillips
Assistant Director for Rural Affairs

PURPOSE

Accelerated Economic and Social Development in Support of the Strategic Hamlet Program must:

-- involve the people of rural Vietnam more deeply in their own future by increasing their participation in the processes of government and economic development,

-- assist the people of rural Vietnam to participate in self-help activities which will realize hopes for a better life for them and their children,

-- make the Technical Services of the Government of Vietnam, and the US Aid Program immediately responsive to the wants and needs of the people of rural Vietnam,

-- by doing all these things, give the hamlet citizen a stake in Free Vietnam worth defending.

IMPLEMENTATION

I. Establishing Security

The provincial governments, with military assistance, are helping rural people establish strategic hamlets to defend themselves against communist Viet-Cong attacks and infiltrators. The hamlet people elect their own officials and organize their own militia-type units to protect themselves and their families and to track down the communist menacing their hamlets. This is a new idea; it is positive and offensive, rather than negative and defensive. Where the strategic hamlets are well organized, the rural people no longer fear the communists. Security is beginning to be reestablished in rural areas.

II. Bringing Democratic Economic and Social Development to the Strategic Hamlet

The implementation of these phases of the Program is based upon two fundamental Vietnamese Government structures, both new in organization and concept -- the Strategic Hamlet Council and the Provincial Strategic Hamlets Committee. Strategic Hamlet Chiefs and Councils are now being elected democratically by strategic hamlet dwellers all over rural Vietnam for the first time; and, as fast as these councils are set up, they will be called upon to represent the people in their hamlets to voice their wants and needs and express them in the form of self-help, development projects. The hamlet peoples will be expected to donate their labor and other locally available resources for these projects while technical assistance and any additional material support will be provided either from existing Provincial Government Services and Budgets or from special budgets available to the Province Chief and Provincial Strategic Hamlets Committee.

Hamlet Chiefs and their Councils may also submit to the Provincial Strategic Hamlets Committee assistance requests other than self-help development projects according to the felt needs of their people. These requests will be screened and referred to the concerned services for action and immediate reply.

The Strategic Hamlets Committee now consist of representatives of the Provincial Government Technical Services, the Army and other Provincial Security Services. This committee should be used with the concurrence of the Chief of Province as a committee for provincial development with which the local USOM representative will work: The committee ideally should contain all persons at the Provincial level interested in and able to accelerate development at the Hamlet level. First priority must be given by Province Chiefs to ensure that the Provincial Strategic Hamlet Committees are dynamic and active, ready to help the hamlet peoples solve their problems and move ahead. By constructive local actions USOM and other American representatives can encourage the rapid development of these committees and can help sustain their active operation.

The Provincial Strategic Hamlet Committees should also review existing, regular GVN and USOM activities relating to the hamlets in their Province and use the Committee and its members to solve problems that may be impeding progress or to otherwise strengthen these activities. Some of these existing projects may be reoriented to intensify assistance to the Strategic Hamlets and otherwise strengthened and coordinated with this new effort. Special funds made available to the Provincial Strategic Hamlets Committee in support of provincial plan can be used to augment these activities locally. Programs already developed by the Provincial Technical Services, which were not previously implemented because of fund shortage or technical difficulties, should also be reviewed by the Committee for possible implementation or modification in light of the new objectives of the accelerated Strategic Hamlet Program and its resources.

Locally suggested projects or programs which are obviously too large, too complicated technically or require overall policy decisions, should be referred by the Committee to Saigon for review. The USOM representative on the Committee is also empowered to seek such technical support or material assistance from Saigon as may be unavailable locally through USOM channels to be coordinated with the GVN centrally. He should also request USOM/Saigon follow-up on urgent unanswered requests for assistance directed by the province to the various ministries.

USOM is in the process of making available to province chiefs special piastre funds for implementing accelerated development activities within the context of Provincial Strategic Hamlets plans. These funds will be available first for those provinces which have established viable Strategic Hamlet Committees and Strategic Hamlet plans and which are going forward with their security programs and are now ready to implement development activities. However, before special funds are used, the Committee and their American representatives should satisfy themselves that all locally available GVN resources have been utilized. This determination should not result in undue delays, and, since quick action will be a key to the success of this new program, special funds should be utilized immediately when emergencies arise.

Authority to use special funds should depend upon the concurrence of the province chief and the USOM and other American representatives in the GVN/US provincial committee which established to authorize expenditures at special funds. Wherever possible, local procurement in the provinces and local contractual services should be utilized, i.e., purchase of tools, lumber, cement, cloth, foodstuffs, etc. hiring of skilled labor and services, etc. Provincial government officials must do the procurement, but the procurement system should be kept as simple as possible, Americans should advise to insure simplicity and results. For example, if it is necessary to procure farm tools and cloth or cement for immediate local operations or projects, this might be done by visiting several shops in the town closest to the point of use, and then asking interested merchants to submit samples and acceptable bids against those samples within an hour's time. Quick action and common

sense can keep the merchants from colluding in their simple bids, and strict supervision of delivery against acceptable samples can insure quality. The buyer can reserve the right to reject any bid for unspecified reasons should he suspect any collusion or be unsatisfied with the prices or commodity offered. Upon accepting the bid and the materials delivered against it in full, cash payment should be effected immediately in full. If this system is kept simple, it will be found that goods can be procured often at prices much lower than when more formal bidding systems are employed. It is emphasized that a little common sense and good judgment can result in a simple and effective procurement system.

Where needed commodities are unavailable in the Province, requests should be forwarded by the USOM representative to Saigon for procurement, where streamline procurement will be used for earliest possible delivery. Appropriate forms will be made available for USOM representatives for these procurement requests. Desired commodities should be kept simple.

CONCLUSION

The strategic hamlet program in its accelerated development aspects envisions a two-way flow of actions and help between the rural peoples and their provincial governments. It will draw upon the ideas, wants and labor of the local people and their resources as made known through their elected hamlet leaders to the Strategic Hamlets Committee and, in turn, the Provincial Committee will bring to them the technical services and resources of the GVN and American assistance. The program will also stimulate provincial government action and the plans of government services, drawing upon presently budgeted resources plus special funds, if justified, to accelerate development in rural areas, predominantly at the hamlet level. The program represents a concentration of resources and efforts for work at local levels, and is a natural follow-up to fulfill the hopes of the population for greater prosperity, which must be realized as soon as some measure of security has returned to the hamlet.

Lecture, Special Warfare School
Fort Bragg, N. C., 30 August 1962

SOLDIERS AND THE PEOPLE
By Edward G. Lansdale
Brigadier General, USAF

I.

To the man in the ranks, it seems that there is always someone figuring out a job for him to do.

The Roman legionnaire, in ancient times, as he wondered what aqueduct or road-building project the centurion was going to order him on next, is a close kin of today's man in uniform. And vice versa.

Today's man can't help wondering what you, his commander or his commander's advisor, are learning in this school -- which will mean more work for him to do. Since General Yarborough asked me to talk this morning on the topic of the "Military Support of Community Development Programs, "I presume that today's man in the ranks has cause to wonder.

So, let us dedicate the talk this morning to the person who will have to go out and do what we talk about here -- the man in the ranks. We owe it to him to take a hard, practical look at the subject... to make certain that what we have in mind for him makes good military sense. We must not be Pharaohs simply looking for cheap labor. We must not be fuzzy do-gooders simply satisfying a theory. And, above all, we must not become so engrossed in socio-economic activities that we ever forget that a fighting man must ever be ready for a fight... and that readiness had better include the ability to whip the enemy!

In other words, we owe it to him to help him be a good military man, with all that that implies.

II.

Let's start, then, by thinking of communities in terms of national security, to which you and your troops are pledged.

You are here studying counter-insurgency. In a Communist insurgency, the Communist goal is to win control of the people. When control of the people is gained, along with them go the land, its bounty, the independent life of the nation.

Since a community is basically a grouping of people, gaining control of it is vital to the success of the Communist guerrilla. When he wins enough communities, he wins the nation. Each community so brought under his control can help hide him from you and your troops,

can feed him, clothe him, help finance him, and give him reinforcements.

On your side, the community is every bit as vital to your success. Having its help, you can uncover the guerrilla enemy from his hiding place, start denying him his logistics base, get him moving along to exhaustion and defeat.

The Communists' task is much simpler than yours. His end goal justifies any means for him to get there. Your means must justify the end goal you seek.

The Communist goal is a nation wherein all resources, human and physical, are rigidly, undeviatingly controlled for the benefit of the state. The "state" is an euphemism meaning the Communist Party, and the Party elite in particular. Since the Communist subversive/guerrilla is going to wind up top dog in the state he is fighting to create, he uses any means to get there. He can afford to be completely ruthless in applying coercion by terror. (Incidentally, as you study the tactics expounded by Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara, just stop for a moment and reflect where they and their elite got to personally — and then what has happened to most of the poor boobs who helped them rise to power; they know now the cynicism of the earlier promises; they now know that terror does not end with Communist victory.)

The end goal you seek must be something quite different, or the people will have little to choose between you and the Communists. You are striving towards a future in which you will live, too, along with your troops, and your children, and their children, and the children's children. Therefore, the means you use in defeating Communist insurgency must be largely constructive means, on which that good future you want can be built. It requires much more than propaganda and the use of force.

III.

Let us say that you are the commander, or the commander's advisor, of a zone in which Communist insurgents are active. In your zone, you have communities — hamlets, villages, towns. Now, just because some of those communities support the Communist insurgents — are those communities to be treated as part of the enemy or are they to be treated as part of the nation which the troops are sworn to defend? The answer should be obviously the latter, although this doesn't always happen in the bitter hatreds of a counter-insurgency campaign. However, if you and your troops start making war on the very communities which make up the nation you are defending, then to whom and to what are you loyal?

Remember how Ramon Magsaysay described the attitude of his troops, in the Huk campaign in the Philippines, as being ready to offer either "all-out friendship or all-out force." This is a good precept to keep in mind as you go to work on communities you suspect are under the secret control of the enemy. Move in with military alertness, but also with brotherly concern.

The first priority need of the community is physical protection, and it's up to you to make sure that this is given. Protection must be not only from outside attack by a guerrilla band against the community, but also must be from inside attack or individual reprisal. If a man in the community helps you, and because of this has his head cut off by the enemy later, then the community isn't being protected and remains vulnerable to Communist control. Much the same is true of the production means of the community. If you cannot protect farmers and workers in their daily tasks, the economy stagnates, and your side is weakened further. All the fine strategy, planning, training, manpower, equipment, supplies, and fiscal help are meaningless, without this protection.

Let me illustrate with the case of a fishing village I noted not long ago, in an area where Communist guerrillas were active. The government's army patrolled the road past the village twice daily, in vehicles. One day, they were ambushed from sand dunes near the village. In after-action security work, the village head man, a fisherman, was picked up by the army for questioning. He told all he knew about the Communist guerrillas, who roamed down to the coast from hills some miles away. The army kept questioning this fisherman for two days, at its headquarters, then turned him to his village. While away from home, being questioned by the army, this poor man couldn't provide for his family. He lost two days work -- a fact noted and remembered by the villagers. Several nights later, the Communist guerrillas visited the village, accused him of helping the army, and then murdered him, as an object lesson.

The village receives economic aid from the government, in advice of fishing methods, some supplementary rice occasionally, a village medical kit, and even some help with boats and nets. The army patrols the road past the village and, every so often, works on it with propaganda against the Communist enemy. But, when night comes and the guerrillas are on prowl, which side do you think the villagers must help -- or else?

One solution, of course, is to provide the means for the community to protect itself, and then to back up this self-help with military force to meet a contingency larger than the community is able to handle on its own. This is the practical thought underlying the "strategic hamlet" program in Vietnam, which is reportedly starting to be so effective against the Communist Vietcong guerrillas.

As a community starts helping against the Communist guerrilla enemy, two series of activites open up. One is quite pragmatic, militarily. The second is of the spirit, in terms of motivation. The pragmatic consists of not only organizing the defense of the community, in earthworks, weapons, and citizen defenders, but also such things as will help the military come to the rescue: landing strips, helicopter pads, access roads, a radio receiver-sender.

The second series of initial activities come as the community starts seeking answers to the question: what is worth risking a man's life to defend? Often, this too, commences in a pragmatic way, by adding to the

material things in a community: improving the water supply with a new well or pump, drainage for the streets, a generator for village power, it latrines for public health, a kit of medical supplies. It is a short step from this to starting a school in the community, getting books for those who learn to read, creating an information center where news and advice from the capital is available. The community finds itself becoming linked up closely to the nation, a real part of something bigger. As it does so, the political life of the community grows also, demanding more meaning in answers to the question: what is worth risking a man's life to defend? As the community resolves these political factors at its grass-roots level, as the national government becomes responsive itself, and as the bond between the people and the soldiers grows stronger, the Communist guerrillas find themselves forced out of existence as their cause is exposed for the paltry thing it is.

Americans recently in Vietnam have told me that the "strategic hamlets" there are starting to elect their own village leaders by secret ballot, and are being encouraged in this by the national government. If this is true democracy, starting at the grass-roots level and becoming spread throughout the country, with the government responding, then this might well mark the vital turning point in the fight for Vietnamese freedom against the Communist Vietcong.

IV.

What I have been describing is the combat area of counter-insurgency.

Now, it is quite understandable that a military man, experiencing the realities of what happens when Communist guerrillas have actually hit a country, will start doing some thinking on the subject. I know that many of the military, and others, in the free world, have given thought to how to catch insurgency early, in its infancy, and how to prevent it. From this thinking has come many of the ideas and programs for civic action by the military -- or, if you will, " military support of community development programs."

My purpose in sketching in the community in an active counter-insurgency area was two-fold. I wanted you to see the community the way you must -- if you have to apply in combat the lessons you are learning in this school. And, I wanted you to start doing your own thinking on just when it is best for the military and the community to get together -- at a tragic, late hour or early on, when opportunities abound.

In order to stimulate your thinking on the subject, let me note briefly what two other military men have done about it.

V.

Do you remember, months ago, when journalists first started going into the Congo to write about the post-independence crisis there?

Many of these journalists made a point of the emphatic difference between Leopoldville and Brazzaville across the river, the differerence between the two congos. The flattering remarks about the French side of the river reminded me of an unusual French soldier serving there. He is Lt. General Le Pulloch, who commanded the Group Forces of what was then French Equatorial Africa, from Brazzaville.

Recruits for military service were taken straight out of tribal communities, usually knowing only their own local area and speaking only their own tribal dialect. So, as part of their basic training, they were given language instruction, taught French. General Le Pulloch added some instruction in old-fashioned "civics," on the rights and responsibilities of citizens. It resulted in not only a better military force, but in creating a whole new group of responsible citizens after their period of military duty.

Tribal chiefs, district officers, and other officials, were so struck by the results of this training in "civics," that they asked the military to start giving similar instruction in "civics" to classes of civilians in all villages. This was done, with far-reaching results.

Along these same lines are many other examples of the military helping a civilian education. The outstanding one which comes to mind for an American is the Philippines, where U. S. combat soldiers started teaching the three R's to Filipino children just before the turn of the century, and the U. S. War Department established the fine public school system of free education. Much of the noted Filipino resistance in World War II against the Japanese invader, the close comradeship with the American military, came from a shared devotion to the cause of liberty, which we mutually had learned young.

VI.

In Colombia is an unusual soldier, whom I hope to meet some day. Everything I know about him has come from others, with some fine compliments from people I respect as realists and practical do-ers. The soldier is Colonel Alvaro Valencia Tovar.

Colonel Valencia has been in command of Colombia Army operations at Vichada, Colombia, working towards bringing peace and stability to one of Colombia's noted areas of "violencia" or "violence," where the Communists might well have been going full-bloom by now in guerrilla operations, if it weren't for the inspired work of the Colombia military. Colonel Valencia uses his officers and men to start self-help projects in the region. They practically carry a gun in one hand and a text-book in the other. They've helped local people build bridges, construct river ferries, start schools, build villages, and establish small local industries. While he and his forces have become sort of "jacks of many trades" while helping the people of the region, they haven't forgotten that they are soldiers first. The bandits, the guerrillas of the region, have a real respect for them as top-notch fighting men.

VII.

I hope these two examples and the sketchy descriptions of the bond between the military and the community in counter-insurgency operations will serve as a take-off point for your thinking further about this subject. If our brief time together this morning has caused this, then our time has been well spent.

Just remember this. Communist guerrillas hide among the people. If you win the people over to your side, the Communist guerrillas have no place to hide. With no place to hide, you can find them. Then, as military men, fix them . . . finish them!

SUBJECT: Appointment of MAAG Sector Advisors as USOM Provincial Representatives

1. The Director of USOM (US Operations Mission) to Vietnam recently requested that MACV consider the appointment of MAAG Sector Advisors as Acting USOM Provincial Representatives until such time as USOM is able to assign members of its own staff to function in this capacity.

2. General Harkins in his reply to USOM (Incl 1), after discussions to determine more precisely just what would be required of MAAG Advisors acting in this capacity, has agreed that where USOM is unable provided, the MAAG Sector Advisors should assist in every way possible consistent with their other duties.

3. A Section Command Advisor has no requirement to assume responsibility for USOM interests until he is specifically instructed to do so. It is important, however, that he understands the nature and scope of the USOM Mission, especially in the province to which he is assigned. This will permit him to evaluate local conditions with respect to possible USOM assistance or support.

4. The following examples are given in order to clarify further the intent of designating Sector Advisors as USOM Representatives:

a. Example: In the conduct of a civil-military operation, where special funds have been provided by the U.S., some minimum control must be exercised over expenditures. In this case, the USOM Representative or designated Sector Advisor may be required to authenticate vouchers drawn against these funds. His signature would mean only that he recognizes the expenditure as valid and within the terms of the budget agreement. He would have no continuing accountability for the funds or for their use.

b. Example: Shipments of equipment or supplies provided by USOM to provincial projects may arrive in several increments. USOM may ask the representative to be alert to deliveries and report their times of arrival or condition in which received.

c. Example: An emergency situation may result in a request for USOM to provide assistance, such as rice, medical supplies or clothing. The USOM representative in the area may be asked to give an early estimate of the kind of supplies needed and the validity of the request received by USOM.

5. Most USOM programs now being carried out are executed by agencies of the GVN with funds and technical assistance provided by USOM. Many of these projects were organized and planned before the need for coordinated civil-military operations was fully recognized. Some of these programs are well into the execution phase and do not yet reflect

the increased emphasis on counter-insurgency support and recently established priorities for province rehabilitation. Increased appreciation for the immediate need to support combined civil-military operations according to a system of priorities will result in a better coordinated program, where all available resources can be concentrated in a given area for maximum effect.

6. USOM representatives have been instructed to call on Sector Command Advisors during their visits to the field and discuss USOM activities with them for better coordination and understanding of MAP and AID (USOM) program in the provinces. This should serve to alert advisors as to USOM's capabilities to meet counter-insurgency requirements which might not otherwise be known.

7. Information concerning USOM activities is also attached (Incl's 2-4). Since the 1961 Annual Report, USOM has added the following activities: (1) highlander relief program, (2) installation of village radios, (3) distribution of village health kits and (4) establishment of provincial counter-insurgency support programs. A new edition of the Annual Report is being prepared and will be forwarded as soon as it is available.

Address by Joseph L. Brent, Director, USOM, before the Saigon Lions Club
December 11, 1962

Thank you for the honor of letting me meet with you this evening, and for providing me with my first opportunity to speak publicly in Viet-Nam about USOM's work for the coming year, and particularly of our role in the Strategic Hamlet Program and the ultimate victory that program is sure to bring.

You are all now familiar with the name "strategic hamlet". It is a term that has become well known throughout much of the world. However, even here in Viet-Nam where the program originated, I often find that its basic concepts are not completely understood. This is even more true in the United States. Many people imagine that the program is primarily a defensive, military effort involving forced relocation in heavily defended hamlets of millions of people, with inevitable disregard for their social and economic needs. Perhaps the reason for this lack of information is that the USOM -- despite our deep and abiding concern with the social and economic well being of the rural population -- has been so busy planning our side of the hamlet effort that we have not taken the time to explain the new program often enough, or in sufficient detail.

Now is the time to assure you, and our many interested friends elsewhere, that, though quiet, we have not been thoughtless; for the Strategic Hamlet Program as it is now developed is, as the leaders of Viet-Nam have wished from the moment of its conception, the foundation for a far-reaching social and economic revolution. As a matter of fact, only a small percentage of the population is being relocated under the program, and even then movement is usually voluntary because the people themselves desire the comparative security and the considerable new benefits the strategic hamlets afford.

It is in this atmosphere of a better way of life that the people's hopes for social and economic evolution are beginning to take shape. It is the intention of th Government of Viet-Nam and of its collaborators in the USOM, to endeavor, in 1963, to cause the rural population to experience such feelings of fulfilled expectations that they will unreservedly pledge their loyalty to the Government of this new and courageous Republic and reject, once and for all, communist tyranny with its poverty and unbearable controls.

How can we be so optimistic -- so sure that this program will succeed?

Well, gentlemen, it is a program based on the people and is of them, by them, and for them. It is the absolute antithesis of everything that communism stands for. It starts, after military clearing operations--where necessary--have been completed, with the building of the strategic hamlet. Immediately thereafter, and for the first time in the history of Viet-Nam, the people then elect their own Hamlet Chief and council members, from among their own number, and form their own militia to defend their own homes. This protection is reinforced by the Army, the Civil Guard and the Self Defense Corps (who either live in the hamlet or are within a few minutes of an alarm passed by a USOM-provided radio).

Although USOM is involved in these first phases of the creation of a strategi hamlet in such ways as assisting families which may have had to be relocated in or to join the newly organized community, in administrative training for the civic ac teams which first indoctrinate the villagers in the new way of life, and later for elected hamlet leaders, and in helping with radio installations, our real work is assisting the Government of Viet-Nam help its people improve their crop yields, or catch more fish, or raise better chickens, pigs and cattle, and thus have more pia in their pockets quickly. This work it should be noted, has not yet begun in earne but is scheduled to start on a large scale early in January. Also, we are now com pleting final plans to start on the construction of the many new schools, markets, dispensaries, roads, wells--and all the other things the people want and need--and will have as a result of the Strategic Hamlet Program.

In addition to calling on the resources of the Government of Viet-Nam ministri and of the USOM technical divisions, with their years of experience in developing t country, the Government and USOM have jointly developed a new way of accelerating rural progress. This consists of asking the Province Chiefs and their staffs to du up Provincial Rehabilitation and Development Plans focussed on social and economic areas which, for one reason or another have been overlooked in the past, and which represent opportunities to achieve immediate developmental and psychological impact These plans differ from province to province, according to local need, and really constitute the heart of the Strategic Hamlet Program. They are reviewed in Saigon the Government of Viet-Nam's Interministerial Strategic Hamlet Committee, by the American Inter-Agency Committee and by USOM technicians. Upon approval, they are implemented immediately in the countryside. Many such plans are now underway with most encouraging results, and many more are in course of formulation. Plans for al 41 provinces will be completed in a few months.

To strengthen this effort USOM, at the request of the Government of Viet-Nam, is placing representatives and resources in most of the provinces to work directly the Province Chiefs and local inhabitants. They will also work closely with the l military commanders and the MAAG sector advisors, so as to achieve full coordinati between military and civil operations. These men have been chosen for their ability ingenuity, and past experience in programs of this kind. Many of them are former military officers, and many, also, have served in Viet-Nam or South East Asia befor Needless to say, they will be backstopped by USOM technicians from Saigon and will supported by the full strength of the American Economic Assistance Program.

Now let me say a word or two about some specific programs and what they will d for the people.

Twenty thousand tons of chemical fertilizers, sufficient to increase rice crop yields up to 250 per cent on the lands where they are applied, will be distributed families in strategic hamlets in the poorer provinces of Central Viet-Nam in the fi six months of 1963. This activity will be buttressed by intensive educational supp --both by the technicians of our Agriculture Division and by specially prepared aud visual material.

Hundreds of new schoolrooms will be built in strategic hamlets in 1963, and students will be provided with school books, pencils and paper. Special "crash" courses for teacher training are now being developed, and the use of radio as a teaching medium will soon be studied.

Plant insect and rodent control will be introduced countrywide, following up the successful experiences of this autumn, in Central Viet-Nam where bumper rice crops are attributed to the killing of sixteen million or more rats. Large additional crop increases are anticipated from this project.

Poorer farmers will be assisted to raise better grades of pigs, and to make compost in a program directed at improving the living standard of literally hundreds thousands of families.

New crop varieties will be introduced widely. For instance, sample tests just completed have shown yields of up to 22 tons per hectare of a Taiwan variety of sweet potatoes, as compared with an average five-ton yield from local varieties.

Loans will be made to over a thousand poor fishing families to permit them to motorize their sampans, and projects for the improvement of nets and fish landing facilities will be continued and expanded. In this connection it is interesting to note that motorized sampans, by being able to go farther out to sea, can catch five times as much fish as non-motorized sampans. This represents a formidable increase in income to the fishermen.

Rural dispensaries, to be established during 1963 at selected strategic locations will service many thousand hamlets which presently do not have facilities of this kind available.

To complement the above programs, which will come from the government to the people, that is to say from the top down, the government has decided to institute a program which will originate with the people and come to the government from the bottom up, as it were. This new approach to rural development is known as the Hamlet Self-Help Program, and it works in the following manner: The hamlet inhabitants hold mass meetings to discuss their own social and economic wants, and decide by vote what the most pressing needs are in their hamlet. The majority decision may be a water well, a market, a bridge, a road project, an irrigation ditch or almost anyth The Hamlet Council sends their decision to the Province Strategic Hamlet Committee, together with a cost estimate and request for materials, tools and perhaps technical advice, if those are unavailable in the hamlet but necessary to carry out the desired project. The Province Committee, with a USOM representative sitting in, provides immediate screening and makes available to the hamlet--from government and USOM resources--the materials and assistance which it determines to be necessary.

This Self-Help Program has already been started in several provinces and is stimulating great local interest and enthusiasm. It not only permits the rural population to raise its voice--and for the first time in history, with confidence--in matters affecting the local welfare, but it also draws the people into the processes of self-government, and gives them a personal stake in the future of what--now more than ever before--is becoming their own country--free and secure.

The Government of Viet-Nam and the USOM look to these new joint programs in support of the strategic hamlets to create substantial increases in agricultural production--and thereby to increase purchasing power--to increase, also, the volu and value of exports and to bring a new prosperity to the hamlets, villages and to We expect them to awaken a sense of civic responsibility and pride in the hearts people. We expect them, therefore, to give the people a confidence in themselves and in their country which will effectively cause them to resist the blandishments pressures of the VietCong. And, finally, we expect them to create a situation so attractive to the misguided Viet Cong, themselves, that we will see an increasing number of defections from their side to ours. In expressing these optimistic view however, I do not wish to create the impression that anyone believes that these ne programs alone can miraculously remove the danger of the communist threat. Obvious we must continue to rely on the increasingly brilliant performance of the armed forces--both military and para-military--not only for initial clearing operations make the establishment of strategic hamlets possible in the first place, but there after for the maintenance of local security for as long as the Viet Cong retain th will to fight. We feel, however--as does everyone these days--that the war in wh Viet-Nam is engaged is less one of a purely military nature than it is one of a psychological nature--the real target is plainly the hearts, minds, loyalties and motivations of the people of the country.

For these reasons we have, in conjunction with the Government of Viet-Nam, formulated the new approach, or the "new look", which our joint program is now beginning to assume--and which it will attempt to maximize in 1963. The fact that there is such a "newlook", however, does not mean that all the old elements of our program--with which most of you are familiar--will be discarded or abandoned. We recognize--as you must also--that when the war is won and peace returns to Viet-Nam there will be an even greater need for strong national institutions and an adequately developed economic infrastructure. That will be the moment when there can be no faltering, or no fundamental weakness. With that fact before us, therefo we have reserved, in future programs, sufficient resources--both human and material to continue our work with the Vietnamese Government in such vital fields as Public Administration, Public Works, Industrial Development, Communications and Public Security. We feel, in fact, that now for perhaps the first time in the history of US assistance to Viet-Nam, there has been developed a program that is deliberately focussed on both present and future needs. And in this connection, I must hasten t say that credit for this re-orientation of program emphasis should go to a relative few wise and determined officials in the Governments of Viet-Nam and the United Sta who saw the need for it--and created the flexibility to make it possible.

Returning for a moment to USOM support of the Strategic Hamlet Program, I woul like to leave the impression that, because I did not specifically mention it earlie we have made no provision for caring for the Montagnards. This is in from the ear Special programs have been developed--and are incorporated in the Province Plans wh we discussed earlier--either to improve the lives of those montagnards who have remained in their home villages and hamlets, or to provide shelter, food, clothing an guidance to those who have fled the Viet Cong and taken refuge in secure areas. Similar programs have also been designed to bring help and hope to those who were o refugees and have since been able to return to their traditional mountain areas.

This, in broad outline, is a preview of what we hope to accomplish in 1963, and how we will set about it. In essence, the joint program has been designed to accomplish the following fundamental objectives:

1. to render the technical services of the Government of Viet-Nam and the US Aid Program immediately responsive to the wants and needs of the people of rural Viet-Nam.

2. to assist the people of rural Viet-Nam to participate in self-help activitie which will realize hopes of a better life for them and their children, and

3. to involve the people of rural Viet-Nam more deeply in their own future by increasing their participation in the processes of government and economic developmen and by so doing to give them the will and the faith to achieve their destiny as free, proud and prosperous citizens.

In conclusion, I would like to take this opportunity to say that I consider it a rewarding pleasure to be able to work in Viet-Nam in this period of evolutionary progress and emerging victory. I am continually impressed by the whole-hearted cooperation and friendship my staff and I are receiving from the Vietnamese people in all walks of life--from the hamlets to the Presidency--and by your unswerving determination to defeat communism for all time. We in USOM share your confidence in ultimate victory, and we shall always consider it an honor to have the opportunity to work with you and to contribute our small part.

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This discussion of the Strategic Hamlet Program is translated from the original Vietnamese Government document. It outlines the basic concepts and indicates the present status and future objectives of the program.

The Strategic Hamlet is the keystone upon which the counter-insurgency program is based.

FROM STRATEGIC HAMLETS TO SELF DEFENSE VILLAGE
FOREWORD

This document is intended to explain the procedures for implementing the strategic hamlet policy, which has been proposed recently. Since it is impossible to cover fully, in this document, all the concrete measures to be applied, these will be furnished in a number of additional documents, i.e. :

At the present time, the strategic hamlet policy has the highest priority, and therefore it is necessary to publish a document that analyzes the specific measures required for organizing the government agencies, particularilyat the national level, to speed up the program. The document on this subject might be prepared by the Presidency, and then submitted to the Inter-Ministerial Council on Strategic Hamlets.

It is necessary to make a clear delineation of the region under dispute between us and our enemy, the regions under enemy control, and the regions transformed into war zones or into combat villages. It is necessary to estimate the existing and petential forces of our enemy in each region, and to understand the strategy and tactics there. The document on this subject might be studied by the Interior and National Defense Ministries, and then submitted to the National Internal Security Council for approval.

In the regions under enemy control, we must conduct offensive military operations, assemble the people, and establish fortified hamlets, as stipulated in the Thompson report. What are the tactics for offensive military operations, and what is the method of assembling the people and establishing fortified hamlets? The document on this subject might be drafted by the Military Operations Command and the General Commissariat for Land Development.

An important phase of the strategic hamlet plan is to conduct a series of supporting military operations designed to drive our enemy out of the regions, provinces, and districts, in order to guarantee security. What military tactics will be required to drive our enemy out of each area? The document on this subject might be drafted by the Armed Forces General Staff, after an examination of information from the various military zones.

When the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team organizes a strategic hamlet, it is most important to conduct a mopping up operation and to establish a system of controls to ensure that no Vietnamese Communist agents are planted there. What techniques of investigation and control must be applied by the security team in a strategic hamlet? The document on this subject might be entrusted to the Central Vietnam Operations Team for study and drafting.

A basic action of the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team in each hamlet is to establish civic organizations, for example, associations of these groups be? The document on this subject might be drafted by

the Civic Action Ministry (Directorates General of Information and of Youth).

Another important requirement in the defense of a strategic hamlet is to organize a system of emergency alarm and speedy liaison. How should this system be organized? How should the watch towars and signals system be organized? What should the secret signals be? How should the clandestine liaison system operate? The document on this subject might be drafted by the National Police and Security Services.

Finally, our mobile forces for military operations and our Strategic Hamlet Operational Teams, may become the Victims of enemy guerrilla attacks and ambushes. What is the best way of moving our forces to avoid enemy ambushes? This document might be entrusted to the Civil Guard General Directorate for drafting.

INTRODUCTION

The strategic hamlet policy at present consists of a plan for organizing strategic hamlets to ensure security and to establish our control in rural areas.

It is necessary at first that this policy be applied only in the regions under dispute between us and the Communists. But, in their war zones (D, Duong-Minh-Chau, Dong-Thap, Ca-Mau, U-Minh), or in the regions where our enemies have established control by organizing their combat villages, we need to apply another policy, as follows:

The national military forces, combined (by the General Staff or the Military operation command) with the central intelligency units, must organize destructive military operations.

A national government unit, such as the General Commissariat for Land Development or the General Commissariat for the Reconstruction of Flooded Areas, must join with the military forces to carry out a plan of assembling the people and establishing a hamlet. We must take violent measures, moving and reassembling people in selected localities in order to establish fortified hamlets. Then we will entrust the local districts and provinces with the task of transforming these into strategic hamlets in accordance with a policy, to be explained later.

Now, how do we carry out the above-mentioned policy of establishing strategic hamlets? Up to now, one has been under the impression that the authorities in charge of carrying out this policy, have not yet clearly understood the problem, for there is a lack of unity and many province and district chiefs have complained as follows: "A large quantity of documents relating to strategic hamlets, is sent to us from all sides. We have no time to read them all. Even when we read these documents, we do not understand them. We do not know where to begin and where to stop".

To remedy this state of affairs, the leaders have to enter into a discussion to give greater clarity to their thought, and explain all problems. But, what are the subjects to be discussed?

Before starting any job, a practical man must answer the following three questions:

What do I wish to accomplish?
What means do I have?
How do I do the job?
Here, it is the same. We must answer these same questions.

PART I

WHAT DO WE WISH TO ACCOMPLISH?

To answer this question, we must clearly understand our purpose. This question seems to be simple, but it is really very complicated, because our desires are often numerous, and we do not know how to classify them in order of priority. For instance, we wish to ensure security in rural areas, but, upon starting our job, we act as if we wish to "collect many taxes" or to "develop economically and improve agriculture," etc. Today, a district chief receives an order to "organize strategic hamlets and self defense villages" in order to ensure security in rural areas. Tomorrow, the district chief will receive orders to recover immediately the funds loaned by the Agricultural Credit Office to farmers, to help landowners collect rent, and to organize agrovilles and land development centers. A district chief receives too many orders, i.e., too many requests from higher authorities, and, in this position he is either unable to classify these according to priority or he is not courageous enough to do it. Of course, he is forced to execute all these orders in part, so that he will not be blamed by his superiors. Like a man operating in the dark, he does not know where to begin and where to end. He works without any program or plan, which is not his fault! Even his superiors are not fully agreed on which order is of primary importance and which is of secondary importance. Every ministry thinks that its own activities are the most important. Every ministry fears being blamed. Consequently, the general representative of the government in a regional unit in direct charge of applying government policy in his locality, for fear of being blamed by his superiors, seeks some way to satisfy every ministry to a certain extent!

Of course, our primary wish at the present time, is to organize strategic hamlets to ensure the security of the people in rural areas. Those who are directly responsible for this work are the district chiefs (we will explain the reason why in Part III). Therefore, during the period of time necessary for the local district chief to carry out the plan of organizing strategic hamlets in his entire district (for instance: 6 months, 8 months, or a year), all other orders must be considered of secondary importance. We cannot reproach him during the indicated period

of time, for the fact that taxes are not collected; that funds loaned by the Agricultural Credit Office are not fully recovered; that land development centers are destroyed; that notable in scattered villages are assassinated; and that paddy cannot be harvested. The duty of higher authorities is to study, revise if necessary, and approve the plan for the establishment of strategic hamlets submitted by the district chief, and then, they must help him execute the plan within the scheduled time. After achievement of this plan, the district chief will carry out objectives of secondary importance.

The aforesaid explanation seems to be very simple and logical, but, as a matter of fact, if higher authorities lack comprehension and definite agreement, the district chiefs will not be able to work.

P A R T II

WHAT MEANS DO WE HAVE AVAILABLE?

To answer this question, we have to check existing facilities rather than ideal ones. To carry out the policy of organising strategic hamlets, we are not permitted, for instance, to think along the lines of requiring 300,000 regular soldiers, 100,000 civil guards, and 4 billion piasters from the national budget.

Suppose we now have only 150,000 regular soldiers and 50,000 civil guards. What distribution must be made of these troops? What exact number should be in the eastern region of South Vietnam? What are the available weapons? Moreover, we must check the number of militiamen, youths, civic action, and information leaders, etc.

The Government representative and the commander of the military zone must check what is available for use directly in the military zone, excluding what has already been sent to various provinces. In the same way, the province chief must check what is available for him to employ directly, excluding what has already been sent to various districts. The district chief must check what is available for his immediate use, excluding what has already been sent to various villages. For example, the commander of the military zone and the representative of the eastern region have on hand one regular division, two companies of commandos, and five companies of civil guards. This does not include the special forces at the disposal of each province chief, - The Bien-Hoa Province chief has on hand one company of commandos and one company of civil guards at the disposal of each district chief in Bien-Hoa province. And so on.

After having checked our existing facilities, we must know how they are being used at present. Generally speaking, besides some changes in each locality, we can now sum up the use of these forces. One part is reserved for the defense of government areas, such as posts, public buildings, bridges, roads, factories, workshops, barracks, etc. Another part is used as a shock force, seeking our enemies and conducting military

operations on the basis of information received. After a military operation, this force returns to its base for a rest. It cannot conduct successive military operations to seek out our enemies, because the latter run away before our arrival; they habitually avoid meeting our forces, when they realize that they are weaker than we are. Our enemies appear to attack us only when they have a great hope in triumphing over us (owing to their greater strength, their geographical advantage, a surprise attack, etc.)

Finally, we also have to examine the present situation of our enemy forces. For instance, what present enemy forces are in the eastern region? Will these forces be increased or reduced? The security and intelligence units (G-2 of the Army, and security service) must discuss this matter, and answer these questions.

What are our enemies' plans for the use of their forces? The research sections of the above intelligence units must give a clear answer on guerrilla tactics, mass attacks, the means of moving troops, the means of inserting agents, means for defecting the masses, plans for organizing combat villages, etc. It is necessary to have a single document with a detailed explanation of each of these subjects.

We should know what we have available, so that we may draft a practical working plan.

PART III

HOW DO WE ACCOMPLISH THE TASK?

In order to achieve our purpose (as already mentioned in Part I), how do we use the data that we have on hand (mentioned in Part II) in order to have a better chance for success?

It is deemed necessary that we apply the following working methods:

A. At the national level. The central committee taking charge of the strategic hamlet project should:

1. Within the scope of Part I,

Work out an agreed-upon document, stipulating the basic policy of the strategic hamlet project, which different levels are to use as a basis for solving various contradictions that may arise due to differences of opinion among the ministries or to various separate orders dispatched to the localities from a number of central agencies; and solve different practical contradictions between central agencies during the period devoted to carrying out the strategic hamlet project. For example, the Civic Action Ministry wants to use its personnel to achieve its own anti-Communist propaganda program separately while the Civil Guard Directorate General wants to use the civil guards to garrison a number of military posts it considers necessary, etc.

2. Within the scope of Part II,

Determine in which regions the strategic hamlet project must be introduced initially, and the areas where such a project cannot be carried out so that we can destroy the enemy and then assemble the people and establish strategic hamlets.

Check various facilities available throughout the country (personnel, weapons, budgets, etc.) that can be used for the strategic hamlet project (and to provide oneself with additional means under any circumstances such as foreign aid, etc.) Then, those facilities must be distributed to each region according to its request as already mentioned above. For example, if region A is safe and does not need to establish strategic hamlets immediately, it should transfer part of its facilities to region B which needs to set up strategic hamlets right away.

Study different basic documents on the strengths and weaknesses of our present use of forces as well as on how the enemies use theirs (guerrilla tactics, organizational system, etc.)

3. Within the scope of Part III,

Study basic documents on the organization of a strategic hamlet and a self defense village (this will be explained later).

Study documents on how the deployment of our forces at the zonal, provincial and district levels can fit in with the strategic hamlet project (this will be explained later).

Inspect, urge, and control the proper execution of the strategic hamlet project by different lower levels.

B. At the regional level, Apart from being well aware of the policy through the study of various basic documents dispatched from the central government, and from helping to solve different interpretations, as well as by inspecting the execution of the project by various lower echelons, the Committee for the Establishment of Strategic Hamlets at the regional level (that is to say the commander in chief and the government representative) must assume the most important task which is as follows.

There exists in each region a certain amount of strength under the direct command of the commander in chief. This strength is almost entirely military: for example, the 5th Division in the eastern region, the 7th Division in the Tien-Giang zone and the 21st Division in the Hau Giang Zone. (Please observe that there are almost no political figures at this level. Therefore, if a few civilian political leaders are available, such as able National Assembly-men, let them accompany the army units during different military operations).

Now, how does the commander in chief use this military force which is on hand in executing the strategic hamlet project?

The problem set for the regional commander is as follows:

"With his available force (the national level will provide him with more force according to the situation, but this is not sure) can the commander map out a military operation plan to assure different provinces in his region that: thanks to the successive military operations he launched throught the period of time necessary for the execution of the strategic hamlet project in the entire military region, the enemy would definitely not be able to concentrate a strength of more than two companies (for example) to harass different provinces under his command?"

Before giving a clear-cut answer to the chiefs of different provinces, the commander must carefully:

1. Review the existing strength on hand.

2. Exclude the minimum force which is reserved for the protection of the government base (quarters, public buildings, military posts, factories, etc.) which the commander is directly responsible for (because there are some bases which are placed under the responsibility of the province).

3. Determine the size of the force remaining that the commander can permanently use to launch a long-range military operation. The answer to this question is very important; the commander must study carefully before giving it. With his remaining strength, can the commander preserve security in different provinces within his military region (as already mentioned above)? If security cannot be maintained in all the provinces (for example, each region has seven provinces), the commander may divide the region into two sectors in which he undertake to secure order one after the other, according to the local need for the organization of strategic hamlets. For instance, in the eastern region, if the commander in chief thinks that he has not enough strength to conduct a military operation throughout the region in an effort to keep all the provinces there from being subjected to different enemy concentrations of as much as two companies (or a battalion) during a six months period, for example, during which time various provinces in the region can set up strategic hamlets, he may maintain security and order first in the provinces of Binh-Duong, Bien-Hoa and Tay-Ninh, thus enabling these three provinces to carry out their strategic hamlet project while the other provinces continue to contain the enemy temporarily.

Once the commander in chief has completed his review and has reached a decision, he begins a series of military operations according to a new strategy which may be called driving out the enemy rather than looking for the enemy.

Up to the present time, the objective of many military operations has been to hunt for the enemy. Based on a specific piece of information, the commander guesses the position of the enemy in a certain locality or war zone. He then sends his troops to fight with the enemy. What is the result?

The result is sometimes negative because the enemy has already fled away (our troops are burdened while the enemy can assemble and disperse quickly), with some guerrillas killed and a maximum of a dozen rifles seized (of little significance as compared with the number of weapons captured by the enemy when they occupied our posts). When this happens, the troops are physically tired out, because they had to carry out the operation on schedule, and spiritually fed up, because they did not see any enemy when they were ordered to hunt for them, and returned empty-handed. On other occasions we have fought with the enemy and defeated them. Let us say that about 100 of the enemy are killed and many weapons seized. With regard to the enemy's tactics and strategy, such a loss does not affect him very much. Generally speaking, the enemy troops killed are not the regular ones or perhaps only a few of them are regular troops. Therefore, his units can be easily re-formed. The number of weapons seized by us is also insignificant, because he will capture our weapons during ambushes or attacks on our posts. After the victory, our troops withdraw, and although they are tired, their morale improves for the time being, but the territory is still actually controlled by the enemy. Sometimes, unfortunately, we have been defeated by the enemy, and this is disastrous.

Therefore, it is thought that the operational plan of seeking out the enemy should be assigned to the General staff or to the Operational command. When it is supplied with a confirmed source of information on an enemy concentration at a certain locality or war zone, the general staff or the operational command will immediately use different national forces such as paratroops, marines, naval and air forces to attack the enemy. The more the enemy can be filled, and their weapons and food captured, the better. But, such an operation is not designed to occupy areas or to organize the masses.

As for the commander in chief of the region, he ought to study a new plan for using his regional forces by conducting a long-range campaign to drive out the enemy in order to assure different provinces within the region (or a number of provinces with the consent of their respective chiefs) that in the course of such a campaign, there would not be any enemy concentration of more than two companies or a battalion

The goal is to drive out the enemy. Thus, in order to prevent the enemy from concentrating more than two companies, different operational units of the region (the regular division which comprises several regiments, ranger units, and supporting units such as artillery and armored units) must be constantly on the move throughout the area to make surprise attacks. Of course, while moving about like that, the said units would fight the enemy whenever the latter were seen, but their basic aim still is not to seek out the enemy.

These military operations would not exhaust the soldiers physically, because whenever the commanding officer noticed that the soldiers needed a temporary rest he could order them to stop at some locality, or village (provided that wireless communication was still available with the commander of the operation). On the other hand, the soldiers also

would not get mentally tired for they would be aware that the operation was not designed to hunt for the enemy.

During their movement as already mentioned above, different army units could stop at some area where strategic hamlets are being set up to help the organization teams and people there for a few days. Thus, the troops would be carrying out the job of winning over the people in a practical way, and the people would feel sympathetic towards them.

Some people might think that such continual military operations are expensive. It is believed that the extra expenses for fuel, vehicles, etc., would be offset by the consumption of a smaller amount of ammunition.

Again, people might fear that the enemy would concentrate larger forces than ours to defeat our various operational units. Let us remember that we still have the national intervention forces (paratroops, marines, rangers and naval and air forces) placed under the direct command of the general staff or of the operational command. If the enemy dares to concentrate large forces it means he risks fighting a "position warfare" with us, and the national forces comprising the Army, Navy, and Air Force would interfere in time to defeat these forces.

C. At the provincial level. Since the region has assured, as already mentioned above, that the province does not have to cope with an enemy strength of more than two companies (or a battalion), what does the province do during this period of time? This refers only to the provinces that are to implement the strategic hamlet project.)

Above all, the province chief must check his forces to see what he has on hand. Generally, each province has a number of regular troops, some civil guards, and some rangers. The province chief must divide the strength into two parts, one passive and one acitive.

The passive portion, of minimum size, is designed to protect different government bases under the control of the province (besides the bases placed under the responsibility of the region mentioned above, and those of the district which will be discussed later) such as, public buildings, factories, billets, bridges, etc.).

The other portion, of maximum size, is organized into mobile operational forces. For example, the province chief has about one regular battalion and one company of civil guards or rangers left. Apart from this military force, the province chief also has a number of civic and administrative personnel such as civic action, information, youth, security agents, police, etc., besides the administrative personnel already sent to the districts for operations. By the way, it is proposed that a number of persons working in national agencies, ministries, directorates, and services be dispatched in rotation to the provinces for operational purposes. Each ministry, directorate, and agency would sponsor a province

by sending a number of its personnel to help this province. For instance, the Youth Directorate General would sponsor the province of Vinh-Long by sending some of its employees (about 30 persons) in rotation to help this province while the latter is establishing strategic hamlets. The Information Directorate General would sponsor the province of Bien-Hoa, etc.).

After checking the strength of his forces, the province chief must determine how to distribute and use the forces. Up to now, the province chief generally has used different civic and administrative personnel to organize receptions in honor of distinguished visitors, for ceremonies in the province, for propaganda, etc. During the period in which the province has been implementing the strategic hamlet project, such operations are considered of less importance and upper levels also must be aware of this. Consequently, the province chief needs only to maintain at the provincial chief town a small number of personnel to help the Provincial Committee for the Establishment of Strategic Hamlets conduct liaison with the upper echelons, cooperate with and inspect different districts, and find and distribute necessities to the districts. Thus, the province chief would dispatch the rest of his personnel to different districts, to be placed at the disposal of the district chiefs who would use them to help establish strategic hamlets. Therefore, the province chief could manage to send about 30 - 50 more persons to the districts.

The province chief will divide his military strength into two portions, one, the minimum force, to be considered as the provincial strength designed to protect different bases and one, a maximum force to be used as the mobile operational units (as already mentioned above).

The problem of the province chief is as follows:

"With such a mobile military strength (for instance, a battalion and a company of rangers), placed under his direct command (or that of the deputy province chief in charge of internal security), can the province chief assure different district chiefs in the province of the fact that they would not have to cope with an enemy strength of more than a platoon?".

He must study carefully before giving such an answer. If he cannot assure all the districts in the province, can he ensure security in half of them? This means, while the commander of the region is conducting military operations to deter the enemy from concentrating more than two companies (or a battalion) within the region, the province chief must launch military operations to prevent the enemy from massing more than a platoon within his province.

In so doing, the province chief must use the military strength on hand to carry out the tactics of driving the enemy out of the province (like the tactics adopted by the regional commander, the province chief should not send his troops to hunt for the enemy within the province, but with the help of speedy movement of his military forces, he would prevent the enemy from concentrating as much as a platoon to harass the districts.

Some people may be afraid of the fact that the enemy will face the situation by concentrating a stronger force (for instance, more than a battalion) to clash with the mobile force of the province chief or to attack a certain locality or agency in the province. Let him remember that the commander of the region has assured the province against such an event. In fact, it is necessary to establish close liaison between different units of the province chief and those of the commander of the region as well as close liaison between the tactical intelligence unit of the province and that of the region. These points are entirely technical, so the commander of the region and the province chief must study them before reaching a joint decision.

D. At the District level. We all understand that at the regional level, the passive force in charge of protecting different bases is of less importance and the agency directly responsible for the strategic hamlet project is also merely a committee, while the main force most necessary for the implementation of the strategic hamlet project (though it is an indirect factor) is the mobile operational force. At the provincial level, the unit directly in charge of the strategic hamlet project is made up of a single committee, too. However, the passive force responsible for protecting the various bases is more important (because there are in the province many more bases which need to be protected); nevertheless, the main force designed to implement the strategic hamlet project (though indirect) is still the mobile operational force.

Now, at the district level, we shall find that the proportions of the three elements will change. This proves that the key role in setting up strategic hamlets is that of the district chief. To solve the problem, let us review the position of a district chief to see what he should do.

1. Preparatory Period

Above all, the district chief must contact the province chief and the committee for the establishment of strategic hamlets of the province directly. He may bring with him his assistant or a few top collaborators such as the civil guard company chief, etc.; these people will participate in a conference on the strategic hamlets policy and on how to carry it out (already mentioned above and to be explained later). This does not mean that the province chief and the Provincial Committee for the Establishment of Strategic Hamlets must organize a training course for district chiefs. Actually, the province chief may confer personally with some district chiefs for a few hours and explain the policy to them. This will save time and money and will be more efficient. District chiefs may present their own problems to be discussed and settled on the spot.

Afterwards, the district chief returns home to check his existing forces: civil guard, militia, security agents, police, civic action and information personnel, rural youth, his own personnel,

weapons and means of communications and liaison, etc. For example, the district chief has under his command an average force of 300 men, of whom about 200 are armed. He must determine which bases need to be protected within his district, as well as studying the enemy situation in other villages of the district. Then, he will divide the above mentioned forces into three elements as follows:

Part I, of minimum strength, will be the passive force, in charge of protecting various bases within the district (billets, district chief town, post, bridges, etc.) about 70 armed men and 10 civic administrative personnel. Only the most important positions need be protected; scattered posts and small outposts of less significance which are garrisoned by a few civil guards each need not be included. The administrative personnel should be in charge of the permanent government activities, so that the administrative machinery operates smoothly. This task may be assigned to the district chief's assistant.

Part II, comprises about 70 armed men and some five political action personnel and public relations personnel. This will be the mobile force that conducts continuing and surprise military operations according to an established plan. Such military operations also are designed to drive out the enemy and discourage the concentration at any village in the district of a strength of more than a squad. During the military operations, this strength also will be in charge of conducting operations designed to win over the people. Naturally, we must maintain vigilance and study the situation carefully or we will be ambushed during our military operations. But this belongs to the military phase and the commander of this unit must be responsible for it. This mobile shock force may be placed under the command of the civil guard company chief.

Part III, comprises all the remaining troops and personnel, about 60 or 70 armed civil guards, 10 security agents, police and provost marshals, 30 civic action, information, administrative, agricultural credit service, public health personnel, rural reform youth, etc. This force will be organized into a strategic hamlet operational team and set up strategic hamlets in various areas. This team must be under the district chief (or under his assistant when he is absent). The civil guards forming part of this team may be placed under the command of the civil guard company subchief.

After having organized these three forces, the district chief must call a conference of various leaders for discussion and assignment of tasks. Then they are trained immediately in working methods and liaison techniques for the three forces both during peacetime and in response to an alarm. For instance, when the alarm is given and the district chief is out with the operational team, how does the district chief's assistant use the passive force to cope with the situation, or how does he manage to contain the enemy, or to disperse and preserve his force, and try to contact the mobile force which is conducting a military operation? All details must be studied and complied into a special top-secret document of the district, applicable to the local

situation. Then the said three segments must be trained so that the machine operates smoothly. (Of course, we also must prevent the activities of spies and maintain troop morale, etc. But, these points are always necessary and need not be mentioned here.)

Finally, the district chief must draft plans for the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team that he will head. First, he must organize a mobile office. He will have his seal, a portable typewriter, and necessary papers brought along during his survey trip in order to solve on the spot any problem that might arise in any village, thus saving the trouble of sending papers back and forth to the district office. The dismissal or the assignment of a member of a village council could be a problem to be solved on the spot.

Next, he must assign priorities to various villages within the district where the operational team will work. To do this, the district chief must study the map of the district to see which villages are of greater strategic military importance. For example, a district is composed of 12 villages. Among them, seven or eight can be considered as being more strategically important because they can be used to secure the main line of communication and prevent Communist penetration of the district. The district chief then selects seven villages, for instance, and plans that, within a period of a month or a month and a half, the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team will fulfill its task in one of these villages. Consequently, seven villages will be well organized after about seven to ten months and after about one year the district chief will have complete control over the whole district. The other district will follow the same pattern and the plan for establishing strategic hamlets will soon be fulfilled throughout the country. Only by following the above pattern can the district chief know where to begin his task and where to end it.

The district chief must then define the tasks and responsibilities of the civil guards, security and police force, and other personnel in setting up strategic hamlets. As soon as the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team reaches a specified village, the civil guards of the team, well aware of their responsibilities, will start their work immediately. These men will be deployed, as necessary, to defend the village. Their task will vary according to local circumstance and they must be ready for action and not have to wait for orders until after the operational team arrives at the target village.

The members of the security and police force within the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team must know what they will do when the team reaches a target village. They must know how to take a census of the local population for the purpose of eliminating clandestine Communist agents, and how to prepare documents. They must study local reports and have biographical information cards, family registers, etc., already prepared.

The youth, information, civic action and sanitation personnel must know what to do in order to draw the local people into their

respective organization, and how to train the local people to carry out activities peculiar to these organizations.

2. Operational Period

After reading the above explanation, it is easy to see why the district chief plays a decisive role in the plan for establishing strategic hamlets. At the national, zonal and provincial levels, the unit in charge of strategic hamlets is only a reduced committee charged with studying, coordinating, controlling, reaching decisions and distributing facilities. At the district level, however, the unit dealing with strategic hamlets is a most important force, more important than the provincial force for defending bases or the mobile force conducting military operations against the enemy.

The Strategic Hamlet Cooperational Team, under the command of the district chief, actually occupies one of the selected villages. A district includes, on an average, 12 villages, from which the district chief selects eight villages. He occupies the first village, Binh-Minh, for example, which has, on an average 6,000 inhabitants (a large village has nine or ten thousand inhabitants,(a large village has nine or ten thousand inhabitants, but a small village has two or three thousand) and is divided into four hamlets (a large village includes seven or eight hamlets, but a small village includes about two hamlets). As it is a medium sized village, the district chief estimates that the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team will allow a month to organize it. For a large village, this period of time may be increased to a month and a half, or two months, if necessary.

After occupation of the village, the civil guard team, well briefed on the operation beforehand, immediately undertakes the defense of the village (according to the local terrain). The civil guards will cooperate with the village militiamen to take turns on patrol, set up guard posts, build gun pits, dig shelter pits, and establish a system of alarm and liaison, so that our enemies may not penetrate any of the hamlets of the entire village while the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team is staying there. If facilities are available and adequate (bamboo and barbed wire), they will expedite the erection of a fence around each hamlet. Let us remember and understand that this fence is not intended to help the village offer resistance to our enemy's violent attack, but it is merely aimed at protecting the village from infiltration by our enemy. Provided with this fence, each hamlet has only a few known entrances and exits, all under constant control. What is said above does not mean that the barbed wire fence is not necessary. It only means that we should not consider the barbed wire fence as a decisive factor, while neglecting to perform the more important task, which is the internal organization of the village.

While the civil guard team is undertaking defense of the village, the security team cooperates with the village police commissioner, the village council and the hamlet chief for the following purposes:

To eliminate the remaining planted Communists. The genuine Communists must be liquidated. Suspected persons must be arrested, and sent to the provincial security service, as the method of unmasking them is a technical job and is not to be handled at the district level. (We may entrust a technical unit with the task of drafting a document setting forth this technique.)

To take a census of the population in each hamlet. It is necessary to complete a biographic background, to set up a household booklet for each family, and to take a photograph of each family, including men and women, and old young people. This file must be set up in three copies, one copy for the district chief, one for the family concerned, and one for the village council.

To control at the same time the quantity of paddy, rice, land, and cattle of each family in each hamlet. This must be clearly indicated in the household booklet of each family.

To expedite the immediate delivery of plastic identity cards to the people, if the facilities are available.

According to the opinion of some district chiefs, if the work is organized as set forth above, the purging and the control in a medium-sized village of four hamlets including from five to six thousand inhabitants, may be achieved within three weeks.

While the civil guards are ensuring village defense, and the security agents are establishing controls, the civic action, information, youth and public health teams are busy organizing the masses in each hamlet.

It is necessary to say first that organization of the masses does not consist of gathering the inhabitants to pass out anti-communist propaganda, laud our regime and our President, or give theatrical performances for entertainment. Later, when security is already ensured in the village, an information commissioner will have enough time to do these things. If these things are done now, people will become tired of them, and will say to themselves, "We see, so why repeat this constantly!"

Organization of the masses also does not consist in organizing the National Revolutionary Movement, or the Farmers Association, etc. It consists in organizing all the inhabitants of each hamlet into groups. For instance, each hamlet has a section for oldsters from 45 to 60 years old, a section for youths from 13 to 45 years old, a section for women from 18 to 45 years old, and a section for children from 14 to 18 years old. Each section is divided into platoons, squads, and small subcells (according to neighborhoods, lanes, and groups of households). The sections of the village form a group for instance, the Youth Group of Binh-Minh village, the Women's Groups of Binh-Minh village, etc. These organizations will conduct strictly democratic elections for the selection of leaders. (If civic action, youth, and information leaders are

prudent enough, the elections will have no unexpected or disastrous consequences, and people will elect the persons selected by us) All the files relative to the organization of groups are set up in three copies (one for the group concerned, one for the village council, and one for the district chief). This organization into groups may be achieved within two or three weeks.

After the organizational phase, we have to entrust the work to the groups concerned, and guide them as to what needs to be done. If the work consists only in holding frequent meetings to study vain theories, such as the international and local situations, Communism, Personalism, etc., it will be useless and the groups concerned will dissolve quickly. The training and guidance concerning the work to be done may be summed up as what must be done in peacetime, and what must be done in case of emergency. For example, in peacetime, the oldster's section is in charge of locking after houses, gardens, family sanitation, and children; the women's section, besides housekeeping, is in charge of collective actions, such as visiting and consoling families, organizing day-nurseries, etc.; the youth's section is in charge of guard and patrol duties; the children's section is in charge of spying, on the way to school, guarding buffaloes, catching fish, etc. In case of an alarm announcing a small attack, i.e., the Communists are few in number and may be resisted and beaten, where must the youths fight, how are women to handle liaison and supply, etc.? In case of an alarm announcing a violent attack, in what trenches must the youths take refuge, and by what gates must they go out? By what gate must the women flee? In what secret depots are rive and paddy to be stored? The organizers have to draft, for each hamlet of the village, a document concerning necessary work for the organization, including all the details in this paragraph, according to the situation in each locality; all groups are to follow the guidelines set forth in this document when accomplishing necessary work. This guidance and this effort will not promote dissatisfaction among the hamlet inhabitants who will realize that these actions are necessary for themselves and their families.

During this phase, the organizers must mobilize the groups of oldsters, youths, women and children to establish a defense and combat system in each hamlet of the part in building gun pits, digging shelter pits, and laying spiked boards in important areas. In peacetime, at the places where spiked boards and grenades are placed, it is necessary to put up signboards indicating the danger. Before the arrival of the Communists, the inhabitants of each quarter and each lane must remove these signboards.

Each house must be provided with a secret trench, so that, in case of emergency, people may take refuge there, and go out by another way. Rice, paddy, and poultry can be hidden there temporarily. The inhabitants can establish all this internal defense system. This requires a certain amount of labor, but not a large sum of money. People can set up this system within a few weeks. The inhabitants will not be discontented because they understand the utility of their jobs, and besides

they can work in their own houses, lanes, and quarters. Concerning this internal defense system, the organizers have to draw a detailed map for each hamlet of the village. This secret map must be drawn in one copy, to be kept on file by the district chief.

Finally, the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team must secretly organize for each village two small special operation subcells (each including about three persons. (One small subcell is in charge of sabotage. It may be composed of women or oldsters who must be courageous and particularly trustworthy. It is necessary to train them in handling grenades discretely and quickly. We have to turn over to them some grenades to be buried or hidden in a secret place. These women or oldsters will act only in case our enemies should arrive in large numbers and occupy the hamlet or the village as we will stipulate later. Another small subcell is in charge of liaison. It may be composed of women, youths, or youngsters who must be courageous, agile, particularly trustworthy, and well aware of all the trails and tracks of the hamlet, of the village, and even of the whole zone. The above persons will act only in case the hamlet or the village should be occupied by the Communists as we will stipulate later.

Moreover, each hamlet has to establish some guard towers (on high trees, if possible), and some signal towers outside the fence of the hamlet, on the roads by which our enemies may advance towards the hamlet. (For instance, these signal towers are looked after by day by boys who watch the cattle, and at night by fishermen). The watchers in the guard and signal towers must know how to use the alarms and secret signals to be devised for each locality (for example, a torch-lamp, whistle, tocsin, drum, etc.) Some secret signals indicate the presence of strangers in the village; others indicate the arrival of the enemy numbering about a squad; and others indicate the arrival of the enemy, numbering about a platoon.

3. Final Week of operations

After having completed the above security systems, the district chief may decide to carry out the following political and social activities:

The hamlet managing committee and a village council must be elected. If a democratic election is organized immediately upon the occupation of the village by the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team, it will be extremely dangerous, because the Communists never fail to infiltrate easily into hamlet managing committees and the village councils, to turn our hamlets and villages into their "combat villages". Three weeks after such detailed organizational procedures, however, it is not difficult to set up a democratic election. If the district chief is prudent enough the inhabitants will elect the persons selected by him. This type of election is very advantageous in the psychological field. Since these people will be different from the persons designated by the district chief (as in the case of the former village councils), those who are elected will not be influenced by the district chief to be dictatorial towards the inhabitants, and consequently the latter will like the village

authorities better. Moreover, people prefer, of course, to protect the persons they have elected rather than those who have been designated by the district chief, and who leave the village and the hamlet and go to the civil guard post or the district capital after office hours. This election is not absolutely free from danger. In certain cases, the Communists can also infiltrate the hamlet managing committee or the village council, but the district chief must not avoid organizing this election, merely because of its possible failure. At any rate, the district chief may use his right of veto by refusing to approve an elected person, and organizing another election (this is a rare case, and it is better to be careful beforehand). Report concerning these elections must be prepared in three copies (one for the village, one for the district chief, and one to be sent to the province). Provided with his seal and letter-head notepaper, the district chief can immediately take action to approve the election with legal documents.

Next, the district chief convenes the hamlet chiefs, the leaders of various groups and the village council to discuss the establishment of a communal regulation. This communal regulation may be changed according to each village, and need not necessarily be identical in all villages. Communal regulations should include the following points:

A legal and democratic rule must be conducted. This means that the village council (the police commissioner) is not allowed to arrest village inhabitants without reason. The village council may arrest strangers who enter the hamlet or the village illegally (without papers and guarantee), but the village council will have no right to arrest the inhabitants who are in the village after the controls have been established, unless they are caught outright, or unless their arrest is authorized by the district chief. If these inhabitants are arrested on suspicion, a report must be made and the subjects must report to the district headquarters within 24 hours. With respect to land, it is necessary to apply government regulations, i.e., lands which were wrongly distributed by the Communists must be given back to landowners, etc.

A community collective system must be established. The village inhabitants, according to age, must take turns working on the public projects of the hamlet or the village (road embankments, market repairs, schools, construction etc.). This means that duties and interests must be equal in organizations such as cooperatives, farmers associations, and village-managed lands (such as those lands whose cultivation is entrusted to the village by land owners living in the towns; tenants may not rely on the communists' illegal distribution to take possession of these lands).

A system of social justice must be established. This means that it is necessary to set up a new system of values for the hamlet or the village. The public facilities of the hamlet or the village (market, school, first aid station, maternity hospital, public rice fields and public lands) must be granted according to the following order of priority:

First, to those who fight our enemies with weapons and their families (those who resist Communism);

Second, to those elected by the people (village council, hamlet managing committee, and leaders of various groups) to assume public office (those who help unify the people); and

Third, to the productive elements of the hamlet or the village, i.e., to poor farmers and workers, etc., who struggle against underdevelopment (those who try to improve the development of the area).

This system of values must be applied strictly in order to put an end to the traditional privileges of powerful officials of the hamlet or the village. The communal regulation, drafted according to the above principles, must be signed by the hamlet chiefs, the leaders of various groups, and the village council. It must also be approved to propose modifications, if necessary, The file on this communal regulation must be made in three copies (one for the village, one for the district chief, and one to be sent by the district chief to the province).

Finally, the assignment of tasks must be accompanied by definite instructions. The district chief holds a meeting of the hamlet chiefs, the leaders of various groups, and the village council to entrust them solemnly with the task of defending and administrating the hamlet or the village, and to give them the following definite instructions:

If a few squads of the enemy come to terrorize, assassinate, etc., the armed forces of the hamlet or the village (village defense youths and militiamen equipped with about 20 rifles, daggers, scimitars, etc.) can defeat them. According to their operational regulations, the enemy is no better armed than we are: they have no machine guns or other automatic weapons. If some of them infiltrate as strangers into the hamlet or the village, it will be easy to unmask them immediately. We must arrest them, send them to higher authorities, or eliminate them.

If the enemy comes in large numbers, over a platoon for instance, (this eventuality may be gradually removed by systematic military operations to drive out the enemy conducted by the region, the province, and the district as explained above), the village defense force should oppose them. Another tactic must be used: as soon as those in the signal towers and the guard towers give the alarm, the village armed forces prepare to delay the progress of the enemy so that we may have enough time to preserve and disperse our forces in order to evade the attack. At that moment, in accordance with a scheduled plan, all provisions, paddy, and rice of each house must be hidden in a cache; youths must flee by one secret way, and women must escape by another. Only the old people and the children should remain in the hamlet (certainly, the Communists do not hate and kill them).

Thus, when the hamlet or the village is occupied by the Communists, it is almost deserted. The enemy must be very cautious while staying there, because he doesn't know where spiked boards and traps are located, etc. The enemy might take the following two measures:

First, the village might be turned and destroyed. Ordinarily the enemy does not adopt this measure, for fear of losing ground from a psychological standpoint because of the rancour of the people. An agroville or a land development center might be burned and destroyed, however, because it can be claimed afterwards that this was destroying the work of the Americans and Diem. In other cases, only the village council office, if it exists and is magnificent enough, might be detroyed. (For that reason, during the present stage, we should not waste money on the construction of a magnificent office for the village council).

Second, the inhabitants remaining in the hamlet in accordance with our plan might be assembled and threatened or given propaganda insulting the American imperialists and Diem, etc. In this case, the remaining inhabitants, including the old people, should obey, assemble, and make a political struggle against them (by saying, for instance, "We have to obey all your orders now, but after your departure, we will have to obey the government's orders. We are nothing but honest citizens who expect to earn their livelihood quietly, etc.") However, while the enemy is assembling the people, the special operations subcell for sabotage must infiltrate amongst the inhabitants to throw a grenade. It doesn't matter whether any of our enemies are killed, provided that the explosion of the grenade gives the people an opportunity to run away and forces the Communists to flee. At the same time, in the shelter pits, the youths, equipped with guns, fire from different places, not to kill the enemy but to create an unsafe situation for his troops. At that very moment, the special operations subcell in charge of liaison makes a quick preliminary investigation of enemy forces (strength, weapons, etc.), and submits an urgent report to the nearest of our units, for instance, to a regional or provincial unit which is carrying out a random military operation nearby, or to a district mobile unit which is conducting a military operation in a neighboring village. (If the enemy is too strong for the friendly local unit to resist, this unit must send signals to the provincial, zonal or national levels to ask for reinforcements, and specifically request air support.) When the friendly forces come to attack the enemy from outside of the village, the village armed forces (militiamen and youths) should furnish supporting fire from the inside.

Thus, enemy forces can occupy a village for 24 hours at most, and then must withdraw. Consequently, they do not have enough time to search for and take paddy and rice, or to terrorize and seize youths. Upon their departure, the hamlet or the village functions again as usual, and does not suffer heavy material and spiritual losses. (At most, the village council office is burned, and some guard towers are destroyed, but the village inhabitants can set them up again quickly.) Furthermore, when the enemy forces withdraw they cannot leave their spies behind them, because of our organization of the hamlet or the village, we can refer to our file and check the inhabitants, and so it is easy to unmask their spies for arrest or elimination. Therefore, the hamlet or the village always belongs to us. The enemy only occupies it temporarily and without safety. Their forces are on the defensive and

we take the offensive, whereas formerly enemy forces took the offensive and we were on the defensive-when our troops came, the village concerned belonged to us and, upon the withdrawal of our troops, the village was under the control of the enemy.

PART IV

WHAT ARE OUR PROBLEMS?

The accomplishments of the strategic hamlet project will not always be as simple as it has been explained here. We shall be faced with a number of difficulties such as the following:

a. Problems created by the enemy

The enemy will strive to plant agents in the various hamlets and villages we have established. Knowing that he can no longer penetrate the hamlets and villages which have already been organized by us, he will strive to infiltrate agents into our ranks and these agents will become the leaders of the hamlet or village, such as the leaders of different civic groups, managing board members, and village councilmen. If they succeed in taking such vital positions, our strategic hamlets and self defense villages will be gradually turned into enemy "combat villages". Consequently, the enemy gains a victory without any risk of battle and our efforts come to naught. In case the number of spies is small, the latter are assigned to draw sketches and collect detailed information on the internal defense system of the hamlet, as well as to detect the various anti-communist elements in the hamlet, who will be denounced to the enemy when the latter occupies the village. In order to prevent this danger, it must be realized that a large scale purge and control by the security group attached to the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team is of great importance. The security agents must study a technical investigation guide on eliminating spies. The Police and Security Directorate General or the Duong-van Hieu group may study this matter and write the guide.

The enemy may concentrate his forces in order to attack different hamlets and villages organized by us. If security is ensured by a series of military operations conducted by the regional, provincial, and district levels in order to drive out the enemy, such a danger will rarely occur. Should the enemy venture to attack and occupy our hamlets and villages with a large force, we also do not suffer heavy loses (because evasive tactics have been applied in the hamlets and villages). On the other hand, the enemy may sustain a great defeat like the recent battle of Mo Lang (Vinh Binh Province) due to our intervention force. However, in the event that the enemy succeeds in occupying and destroying a certain village, we must plan different measures to mett the situation. Such measures are called the pairing system. This means that we shall pair each village organized in the country-side under the strategic hamlet project with a strategic subquarter in a town (The strategic street and subquarter project in towns differs from the strategic hamlet project

in the countryside, and it needs to be spelled out in a separate document). In peacetime, each strategic subquarter in a town will give a helping hand to its twin strategic hamlet in the countryside by sending people and facilities to it. When some event occurs and a certain hamlet or village in the countryside is destroyed, however, the positive anti-Communist elements should flee and take refuge in the urban area, and the strategic subquarter in the town will receive and care for them.

The enemy might concentrate his forces in order to attack our various Strategic Hamlet Operational Teams. This danger will rarely happen, as security is ensured by systematic military operations conducted at the same time on the regional, provincial and district levels, as previously indicated. However, the national level must contemplate making every effort to provide itself immediately with more facilities (personnel, weapons, transportation and communication facilities, such as vehicles and radio sets) to be supplied to different Strategic Hamlet Operational Team and the mobile forces in various districts. These facilities are not dispatched to different hamlet and villages as many a locality has mistakenly believed. Rather they are designed to strengthen the district forces (especially the Strategic Hamlet Operational Teams and the mobile force). With regard to a village, initially it would only use its existing fire power (an average of 20 to 30 rifles of the Self Defense Corps), but afterwards, it would use as many weapons as it could capture from the enemy.

The enemy might concentrate his forces to conduct an attack on different important bases with a view to creating confusion and causing us to alter our operational plan immediately, for instance; the enemy may assemble his troops to attack the capital of a certain province. After that attack is over, we may become upset and try to place the blame on either the national, regional, or provincial levels. As a result, the region and province would not dare to continue their military operations to drive out the enemy by a joint plan, as previously stipulated, and would withdraw their forces to garrison the chief towns. Thus, the strategic hamlet project of the region and province would be frustrated, Strategic Hamlet Operational Teams in the various districts would be attacked everywhere by the enemy, and the situation would become disastrous. Actually, the higher levels must realize that the protection of important bases is assumed by the passive force of the province and region. When enemy is too strong, this protective force must quickly dispatch a signal to the national forces (paratroop or marines) asking them to come to the rescue. Therefore, each large base must establish a signal system with the national level. In case the counter-offensive ends in failure, it is the national forces and the passive forces of the province and region that are responsible. In the face of such a situation, we must not cause the active forces of the region and province to alter their plans by giving up their existing operations of driving out the enemy.

The enemy can organize political struggles and demonstrations,

can pass motions, and use a press campaign to spread lies to the effect that we use violence to force the people to do as we wish, setting fire to their houses, demolishing hamlet and assembling them behind the barbed wire fences of various camps. This certainly will happen. But, we need not worry about such a campaign provided we keep our basic policy in mind and can carry it out properly.

"Within the framework of the strategic hamlet project, it is absolutely forbidden to force the people to leave their houses and lands behind and go to establish new hamlets villages." The people can stay in their respective hamlets and villages and set up their own strategic hamlets and villages as already mentioned above. There may be a few minor exceptions such as an isolated house in a deserted area, when we should try to persuade the owners to move and settle in hamlets or villages, if we do not need them to stary at their former places and turn their houses into signal towers for the hamlets or villages.

B. Problems created by Government authorities

Different executive echelons are not aware of the policy of strategic hamlets and do not know how to carry out this policy. For this reason they mistakenly assume that the strategic subquarters in towns and the strategic hamlets in the countryside are the same. Therefore, the Central Committee for the Establishment of Strategic Hamlets and the Interministry Council must positively establish their respective characteristics:

In towns, the policy is aimed at setting up subquarters and strategic streets, and the organizational methods should be studied by means of a particular document. The deputy mayor lieutenant colonel in charge of internal security for Saigon might study this problem and write this document on the basis of experiences in Saigon. The persons responsible for executing this policy are mayors and district chief.

With reference to Communist war zones, military zones and controlled regions (combat hamlets and villages) the policy is to conduct military operations to destroy those zones and assemble the people to set up new fortified hamlets. The document on this problem may be worked out by the Land development Commissariate General. Those who are in charge of carrying out this policy in different areas already stipulated are the national military forces (the general staff or the operation command with its paratroops, naval and air forces, marines and rangers) and a responsible agency such as the Land Development Commissariate General (or the Commissariate General for the Reconstruction of Flooded Areas).

Furthermore, and for the remaining territory in the countryside over which we and the enemy are fighting, the policy is to set up strategic hamlets according to the methods already mentioned in this document. The responsible units are the Ministry of the Interior, the Central Committee for the Establishment of Strategic Hamlets, different government representatives, commanders of military regions and the strategic hamlet

regional committees, different chiefs of province and the strategic hamlet, regional committees, different chiefs of provinces, provincial committees, and most particularly the different district chiefs and the strategic hamlet operational teams of the district as already described.

Our different executive echelons all have complained that they are lacking in trained personnel, but actually these would not be lacking if different units, especially at the national level, knew how to distribute personnel more rationally. During this period of time, inasmuch as the strategic hamlet program is national policy, different national units that are directly responsible for implementing it must reduce their personne, give up a number unnecessary operations and send some of their employees and trained personnel to the strategic hamlet committee which in turn will send them to various districts. After all, what can the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Agency, the Land Reform office, the Land Development Office, etc., do when the countrysidehas no security?

They also complain that our personnel are of lower ability. This is not entirely true either. Actually, our personnel at the district level are relatively able, but they used to be seriously lacking in guidance. For instance, a certain chief of province would only order a district chief to step up the establishment of strategic hamlets in order to maintain security in the villages; when the establishment of strategic hamlets was under way, he would order that the youths and militiamen be trained to ensure village defense and to oppose terrorism; but he would also state the need to apply a new system of values by carrying out personalism and social justice. But, how was this to be done? Where did it begin and where did it end? This would not be explained. Truly speaking, the chief of province is not entirely responsible for this. His superiors have also not had a clear concept of the policy nor of the guiding principles which should be explained to the province chief. In order to avoid such a state of affairs, we must train our personnel. This does not mean we must organize a large training course. We know though experience that such training courses are both inefficient and expensive, partly because the instructors habitually give vague lectures on doctrines, politics, and a number of principles, and partly because the trainees are not psychologically attuned to the instructors, so that they become bored by what the latter try to teach them. Our training is a direct method which saves time and money. For instance, the Secretary of State for the Interior or of Civic Action, after having carefully studies the strategic hamlet project policy document must hold an intimate talk with a few province chiefs to explain the policy minutely them and to discuss with them the ways in which to solve their different problems. The province chiefs after having been well briefed, will explain the policy to their collaborators and to their districts chiefs. The district chiefs also will do the same with regard to their immediate subordinates, about five or six persons. Such a direct and intimate approach takes only a few hours. If the speaker is enthusiastic and decisive, his listeners can easily understand and remember what he says.

On the surface, this training is unobtrusive, but it is actually efficient.

Our different executive agencies also have complained that they are lacking in money. To meet this situation, the provincial and district levels formerly used a very simple method obliging the people to pay contributions of, for example 10 piasters per capita. Let us remember that the people have already made too many petty contributions without reference to the illegal ones they have paid to the Communists and the village bullies. To the people, 10 piasters is a large sum. If they are required to contribute, they will become more dissatisfied because they do not yet know what the final results of the policy will be, and so we had better ask them to furnish labor rather than money, especially to accomplish different projects of basic necessity such as the digging of shelter pits in their houses, the building of gun pits and the laying of spiked boards in their respective lanes and yards. In addition, different committees for the establishment of strategic hamlets at the provincial, regional, and especially at the national level, must look for more facilities (finaces, weapons, transportation and communications facilities such as vehicles, and radio sets, construction materials such as iron, cement, barbed wire, bamboo, timber, etc.) to be dispatched to different districts and readjust the allocation of the existing facilities of different units according to a new criterion, to wit, that the strategic hamlets have precedence, and to get additional facilities by asking for more foreign aid.

Our various existing civic groups, such as the National Revolutionary Movement, may complain that they are not permitted to participate in the strategic hamlet program under the terms of the policy described above. This really is a misunderstanding. These civic groups could lend an efficient helping hand if they would select and send volunteers to participate in different strategic hamlet committees at the national, regional, provincial, and especially at the district level, as members of strategic hamlet operational teams. Furthermore, different civic groups, such as the National Revolutionary Movement, should introduce their trained personnel into various village Organizations so as to make them more vigorous: the village council, the hamlet managing committee, the committees of the aged, the youth's, the women's and the children's groups of the village. If the National Revolutionary Movement, for instance, can assume this task, it will obviously lessen the burden of the strategic hamlet committee.

Some military units do not know how to conduct military Operations or refuse to assume the military operational task mentioned above. This can be solved by the National Internal Security Council only and a conference is necessary to discuss and spell out the tasks in writing on the basis of a new operational plan.

At the national level, the armed forces general staff (or the operational command can use a powerful shock force made up of paratroops, marines, and the naval and air forces and that part of the artillery

and armored vehicles not yet placed under the command of different regions. If the general staff (or the operational command) finds that this force is inadequate to carry out its task, it must seek ways in which to acquire more troops by, for example, withdrawing part of the infantry troops stationed in a certain area which is relatively safe or by establishing another ranger regiment, to be assigned to the national forces. This national force should be assigned the following tasks. A primary task is the protection of various national government bases. Its main task is to launch mopping up operations, looking for the enemy in enemy war zones and controlled regions (which have been clearly delineated) so as to enable the unit in charge of assembling the people to set up new hamlets. Its auxiliary task is to support and rescue different bases or units at the regional, provincial, and district levels when they send cables to the national level asking for help in case of heavy enemy attacks. (The paratroops and air force in particular would assume this task.)

At the regional level, the regional command generally has an infantry division and a few ranger units. Under certain circumstances, it may ask for permission to organize some more ranger units. The regional strength is assigned to protect different bases placed under the control of region. Its main task is to conduct military operations to break up enemy concentrations in the region (except those in enemy war zones and controlled regions as already mentioned above). Its auxiliary and extraordinary task is to launch military operations in support of the national forces, in case of necessity, when the latter are conducting an attack on an enemy war zone.

At the provincial level, the province chief has available, for example, a ranger unit and a few civil guard companies. Apart from protecting various bases, the task of the provincial force is to conduct military operations designed to break up enemy concentrations within the province (except enemy war zones and controlled regions as stipulated above).

Only by carrying out a clear division of responsibilities can we avoid contradictions, save time, and ensure systematic security, so that the districts may organize their strategic hamlets with ease.

While accomplishing our mission, we may be faced with extraordinary difficulties which cannot be foreseen. The essential requirement is that different executive echelons must draw upon experiences, analyze them in detail and send timely reports to the national level. This is aimed at exchanging experiences and learning lessons that may be of interest to other localities.

CONCLUSION

From the beginning, this document has dealt with the organization of strategic hamlets. However, the part concerning the execution of the program explain that: strategic hamlets in the villages (defense, control,

election, the communal regulations, and organization of the masses). There may be some confusion between the strategic hamlet and the strategic village.

At present, the term "strategic hamlet" is the most popularized one. However, we must not think of the organization of strategic hamlets as outside the village and beyond the village council system. The province chief or the district chief cannot send his strategic hamlet operational teams to occupy a number of hamlets to be turned into strategic hamlets while at the same time ignoring the village system and the village council. Such a procedure would create confusion and the organization would not actually score any good achievements.

Therefore, it is considered an absolute necessity to occupy each village and organize all the hamlets within a village; the organized hamlets called strategic hamlets constitute self-supporting units may be called self defense villages. Thus, the various strategic hamlets must be set up within the framework of the self defense village, and then we shall understand why it is called a "strategic hamlet".

First, because it has a strategic value relative to military security. After being organized, different hamlets are no longer a charge of the army and the civil guard, whereby the latter must garrison and ensure their defense. On the contrary, they become strong points for the army and civil guard when the latter are conducting military operations, because they are bases that can efficiently provide camouflage facilities, supplies, and information for our troops.

Second, because it has a strategic value relative to the political domain. Up to now, we have known only about what constitutes democracy through the press and parliament. At present, in different hamlets already organized, the government is presenting true democracy and the people enjoy different democratic rights directly by participating in the election of their representatives who look after public interest in the hamlets and villages.

Third, because it has a strategic value relative to economic and social spheres. We are still putting out slogans such as "Collective Progress of the Community" and "Social Justice". Through the strategic hamlet organization, the people can clearly see that these principles being carried out in the countryside under communal sanction, they can see too the development of a new system of values concerning the duties, rights, and interests of the citizens living in the hamlets and villages.

However, by setting up strategic hamlets, we have not yet completely solved all the problems of security and national defense. The Vietnamese Communist may continue to lay mines, carry out assassinations, rob passenger cars, sabotage railroads and destroy trains. The establishment of strategic hamlets is merely an appropriate first step towards the solution of different security problems related to national defense. If the policy is correctly carried out in conjunction

with the plan for attacking different enemy war zones and the assembling of the people therein in the newly established strategic hamlets we can hope that the country will be pacified within a period of two to three years.

The attached "Mission of Strategic Hamlet Construction Cadres" is a translation of a speech given at the Saigon Training Center for Civic Action Cadres as a part of the orientation course on the Strategic Hamlet Program. It is provided for information and a better understanding of the ultimate objectives of the Strategic Hamlet Program and its relationship to the overall counterinsurgency effort.

MISSION OF STRATEGIC HAMLET
CONSTRUCTION CADRES

History reveals that little interest was paid to techniques of instructions of the people. Present days techniques are the main subject being taught and this is a proper attitude. However, we should not think that techniques can solve all problems. Consequently, while paying attention to techniques, we should not neglect other national activities.

Vietnam is an under-developed country. When the sovereignty was recovered, we inherited a corrupt regime. The mission of cadre as well as of all citizens is to destroy that corruption. Consequently, cadre must not only be public servants but also teachers who are assigned an important historic mission. To become teachers, all cadre of the under-developed countries must first achieve a personal revolution.

The strategic hamlet is a good setting for the personal revolution.

This is so because the "Strategic Hamlet" national policy is actually a political, social and military revolution. The strategic hamlet must be considered as a change in the three above fields. The reason why our regime has been ineffective in facing the Communists is that in the rural communities, many unfair acts have been committed every day against citizens in the political, social and military fields.

Let us ask how does the strategic hamlet achieve the revolution?

answer:

1. Political revolution:

The strategic hamlet council will be elected by the citizens who themselves have the right to select cadre to assume the administration of the hamlet and protect the rights and privileges of the Hamlet:

Thus, the government must conduct an election at any price.

2. Social revolution:

In the old days in rural communities, the citizens could not enjoy any justice because they could not do anything except submit to the "preponderence" of power and money.

From now on in all strategic hamlets, we must adopt the following principles:

- democratic government: no illegal apprehension is authorized.

- collective development: The strategic hamlet from now on will serve the general profit of the people of the hamlet. Everybody has equal rights and privileges, thus equal opportunities.

- justice: preponderence is reserved for those who contribute the greatest manpower and resources to their hamlet in the fight against the Communists, disunity and under-development, that is the new value.

3. Military revolution:

The strategic hamlet is established to destroy the tactics of the communists.

We should remember that the present world is in the claws of the communists:

a. The tactic of the communists is to use a few individuals with rudimentary weapons but with enough capabilities to defeat a unit with larger strength and more modern weapons.

b. This tactic is a tactic of fighting without a battlefield.

Because the enemy adopts such tactics, we do not know who are our friends and who are our enemies. Consequently, our authorities, many times, made improper and illegal apprehension. Many friendly nations of the Free World sometimes criticized the Government of the Republic of VIETNAM because of this.

We must break the grip of the Communists or we must create a war with a battlefield so that we know who are our friends and who are our enemies.

That battlefield is the strategic hamlet.

Distinguishing our friends from our enemies is the mission of the strategic hamlet construction cadre.

x

x x

We just said that VIETNAM is an under-developed country and the strategic hamlet will solve that problem. Following are some more detailed explanations.

VIETNAM is not the only under-developed country, there are many other under-developed countries in the world.

Under-development is characterised by three factors:

1. State of poverty of the citizens:

The citizens are poor and lack everything. Because all citizens are in this state, they feel ashamed in front of citizens of more developed countries. This shame blinds them and many under-developed countries do not know which policies are most suited to the rights and privileges of their people.

2. Separation:

Moreover these under-developed countries are not united-almost all under-developed countries which were dominated for hundreds of years cannot know which is the right cause upon recovery of their sovereignty. Some of them think that the right cause is in Paris, others in Moscow, some others in Washington and some others do not know where it is and are hurrying to "embrace" Neutral policy.

In our country, during the present period our mission is to "concretize" our policy.

How should we "concretize" it?

The right cause is right in the heart of our citizens i.e. in the Strategic Hamlets. Building up the strategic hamlets is our way of concretizing our policy.

3. Influence of Communists in under-developed countries.

The population of under-developed countries from Asia to Africa and from Africa to South America includes two thirds of the world population. If the Communists hold this two thirds of mankind in their grip, they will be the master of the world. The objective of the Communists is to control and conquer these under-developed countries.

What is the technique adopted by the Communists?

Answer: The Communist technique include "Upper" policy, "Middle" policy and "Lower" policy.

- "Upper" policy is to win the sympathy of the enemy.
- "Middle" policy is to neutralize the enemy.
- "Lower" policy is to annihilate the enemy.

Winning the enemy's sympathy (under-developed countries are temporarily considered the Communist's enemy) is to transform the enemy cadre into Communist cadre. Neutralizing the enemy is to make the under-developed countries become indifferent and abandon their hostile policy against the Communists therefore forcing them to focus their attention on another problem thus destroying their alertness and helping the Communist cadre establish their bases in these countries for subversive activities. Annihilating the enemy is the end of the neutrality policy - at the same time the Communist can annihilate the under-developed countries by means of war and domination i.e. they attack and conquer under-developed countries.

The Communist policy to win the sympathy, neutralize and annihilate the under-developed countries as mentioned above is not only directed at the government but also at the people of these under-developed countries. If the policy of winning the sympathy and neutralization does not succeed, the Communists will adopt the policy of annihilation. Such is the case of Tibet.

To face the communists some under-developed countries have taken preventive measures. These measures vary from one country to the other but they do not prove to be effective in any country.

The policy of strategic hamlets adopted by Vietnam will be most effective. We say most effective because it is within our range and consistent with the situation of under-developed countries. Remember that the political social and military revolution we are conducting is only the revolution of an under-developed country facing the Communist danger. This revolution cannot take place in the developed countries such as the United States of America or Great Britain. But strategic hamlets are good for other under-developed countries and this national solution is capable of becoming an international one. This is the honour for Vietnam.

To succeed, do not raly too much on foreign aid but on our own means. At first we must look for self improvement but what does self improvement mean? Self improvement means revolution of our behaviour. Our national revolution will fail without the revolution of the cadre's behaviour and the cadre will become reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries.

The Cadre who knows how to improve himself is aware of his own mission. Perform your duties with a sense of responsibility. Do not drink too much. Try to improve your virtues and behaviour. Do not carry out an order from higher levels without thinking. Know how to think and take initiative. To comply with a policy we must know thoroughly this policy. As a result the purpose of the strategic hamlet course is to acquint the cadre with the technique for better service.

The strategic hamlet cadre must know that the policy of strategic hamlets is the policy of an under-developed country. But we do not have enough facilities and time. Lack of facilities requires us to make more and more efforts. Because of the lack of time, we must begin our mission in time to achieve quick success, if not we will be subject to slavery forever.

In the construction of strategic hamlets as mentioned above the cadre must know that the revolution in Vietnam is the revolution of the government, cadre and also of the people. There will be no revolution without the people. To succeed, the people must cooperate with the government and the cadre in the revolution. Consequently the cadre must know how to take advantage of the people.

Never say that fighting the Communists is "fighting the bandits". This is an erroneous concept. Fighting the bandit is not enough for us to launch a revolution. We must launch a revolution with the support of all the people. There will be no revolution without the people and the revolution is always in need of the people.

As a result, propaganda among the people is the cadre's main duty. The cadre must keep the people informed that democracy, freedom, and prosperity cannot be acquired easily. The people must struggle to acquire them. "Success without fighting" is an erroneous and dangerous policy, the cadre must destroy this policy. The strategic hamlet courses' purpose is to teach students the techniques of propaganda for application in their unit.

Effective date: 1 October 1962

PROVINCES AND CITIES	Number of hamlets to be built	Hamlets completed	Hamlets under construction	Total population	Population in hamlets
Southern Area:					
Vinh Binh	570	364	15	537,677	369,328
Vinh Long	247	155	20	536,671	332,235
Kien Tuong	67	59	7	57,940	29,984
Kien Phong	189	73	55	274,711	123,049
Dinh Tuong	259	65	65	668,409	293,049
Phuoc Thanh	111	8	11	19,414	6,669
Binh Tuy	47	20	26	45,728	17,065
Binh Duong	319	46	29	303,654	94,094
Ba Xuyen	646	162	154	659,242	198,758
An Giang	533	181	168	812,027	242,944
Phong Dinh	324	34	32	348,000	92,200
Tay Ninh	336	37	83	289,489	77,504
Binh Long	65	9	24	57,560	14,528
Gia Dinh	291	87	92	687,943	157,748
An Xuyen	48	15	22	276,650	51,316
Bien Hoa	100	26	63	263,600	32,620
Phuoc Long	69	14	54	44,324	5,443
Phuoc Tuy	162	24	64	143,100	17,389
Kien Giang	246	35	87	354.476	42,159
Long An	691	47	38	494,012	51,128
Chuong Thien	54	17	15	284,500	19,243
Kien Hoa	854	27	24	537,343	28,804
Saigon	433	105	115	1,275,000	261,470
Long Khanh	95	20	55	95,118	
. . Central Area:					
Ninh Thuan	125	105	10	136,739	106,288
Quang Tri	498	357	46	274,690	203,710
Quang Ngai	400	263	85	651,016	383,395
Phu Yen	351	153	81	345,622	221,889
Khanh Hoa	281	202	3	271,753	169,808
Binh Dinh	675	180	52	822,746	228,156
Binh Thuan	230	64	76	281,541	62,005
Quang Nam	537	89	140	572,975	118,134
Quang Tin	134	48	60	348,724	43,703
Thua Thien	350	27	117	456,021	115,100
Hue	22	0	7	106,102	
Da Nang	27	2	4	110,630,	2,182
High Plateau . Central Area:					
Quang Duc	82	8	1	30,158	9,682
Lam Dong	268	26	44	62,290	18,769
Darlac	314	12	70	180,792	42,713
Kontum	105	23	30	94,849	10,076
Pleiku	86	13	39	174,059	18,454
Tuyen Duc	33	10	14	57,463	2,962
Phu Bon	147	5	76	332,545	
Dalat	42	8	5	55,885	5,588

PROGRAM OFFICE

Liaison with GVN Directorate for Budget and Foreign Aid. Coordination of USOM activities relating to Development Loan Fund and other non-AID aid programs. Advice to Director and Country Team on General economic matters.

Program Development Section

Review and analysis of financial and economic implications of the proposed annual GVN military budgets.

Liaison with MAAG.

Development and preparation of the project aid and other sections of the annual MSP Country Program Book as directed by the Chief, Program Office.

Review on continuing basis of implementation of the project aid program.

Advice and assistance of substantive nature to project technicians in the preparation of project agreements.

Review of USOM technicians' end of tour reports.

Program Operations Section

Advice and assistance of procedural nature to project technicians in the preparation of E-1's, project agreements and PIO/Ts.

Statistics and Reports Section

Review and evaluation of surplus food distribution programs of U.S. voluntary agencies.

USOM ORGANIZATION AND PROGRAMS

AGRICULTURE

Extension Service

Provides and/or is the primary channel for direct technical and financial guidance, assistance and support necessary to the improvement and strengthening of a technically effective, administratively strong and financially sound agricultural extension service to rural people. Included within the scope of this service are the farmer education, home improvement, rural youth training and information activities.

Education and Research

Provides and/or is the primary channel for direct technical and financial guidance, assistance and support necessary to the improvement and strengthening of:

1. crop and livestock experimental field stations, testing centers and laboratories;
2. soils and soil fertility research;
3. plant and animal introductions, testing, multiplication and distribution;
4. plant and animal disease control;
5. agricultural education including the National College of Agriculture, Forestry and Animal Husbandry, the Vocational Agriculture Schools at Hue and Can Tho;
6. crop and livestock reporting and the agricultural statistics services.

Credit and Cooperatives

Provides and/or is the primary channel for direct technical and financial guidance, assistance and support necessary to the improvement and strengthening of agricultural production credit services and farmers' cooperative organizations including training for technicians and participating members.

Agricultural and Fisheries Resources

Provides and/or is the primary channel for direct technical and financial guidance, assistance and support to government, private organizations and rural people for the better and more effective development and sustained production of land, water, fisheries and forest resources.

COMMEDIA

Directs all communication media operations and maintains liaison with all other American Agencies for the purpose of coordinating communications activities with the host government.

Provides assistance to the host government in the dissemination of all communications media materials.

Advises and assists the GVN in the development of a National Radio Network consisting of 6 medium-wave stations located strategically throughout Viet Nam to provide the population with broadcasting facilities. This network is tied in with a short wave network and serves a dual purpose in the overall radio communication project.

Assists the National Film Production Center of the GVN Directorate General of Information in the development and production of 16mm motion picture materials for use in Viet Nam.

Assists in the development of the National Printing Plant in its mission of serving all elements of the GVN in matters pertaining to printed materials.

Assists in the development of a Centralized News Service, under the auspices of the GVN, for the purpose of providing national and international news service to all press facilities in Viet Nam.

Provides a complete graphics, printing and reproduction service for the operational needs of the USOM. Also provides printing and photography advisory services to the GVN.

Services USOM and USIS in support of their individual mission photographic requirements.

DISTRIBUTION OF SONY RADIOS

The Communications Media Division of USOM, as a part of its overall effort to provide listening radios for rural population, accomplished the procurement of 1,693 Sony TR-903 community listening center radio receivers. Following our usual procedure, we entered into discussions with the Directorate General of Information to determine the best pattern of distribution to the provinces and districts of the country. About 1,000 of these new radios were immediately assigned for distribution to strategic hamlets, and the remainder for special projects like relocation centers, Montagnard refugee centers, etc. By official letter from the Directorate General of Information on August 8, we received a detailed distribution list.

In the attached resume the provinces of the nation are divided into 3 regions, and the provinces within those regions are individually listed. Following the name of each province is the number of radios assigned effective September 1962.

REPORT ON COMMUNITY RADIO LISTENING CENTERS

(1) Province	(2) Old Listening Centers (AWA & Hallicrafter radios with loudspeakers	(3) New Sony Community radio Listening Centers	(4) Total
	MONTAGNARD AREA		
Phu Bon			2
Darlac	15	30	45
Pleiku	12	9	21
Kontum	23	10	33
	CENTRAL VIETNAM AREA		
Quang Tri	19	121	140
Thua Thien	22	15	37
Quang Nam	29	52	81
Quang Ngai	22	96	118
Binh Dinh	21	70	91
Phu Yen	23	38	61
Khanh Hoa	19	76	95
Ninh Thuan	17	39	56
Binh Thuan	20	27	47
Tuyen Duc	23	7	30
Lam Dong	15	12	27
Quang Duc	10	6	16
	SOUTH VIETNAM AREA		
Binh Tuy	20	11	31
Phuoc Tuy	26	12	38
Long Khanh	19	11	30
Phuoc Long	16	9	25
Binh Long	22	7	29
Binh Duong	19	22	41
Tay Ninh	20	15	35
Bien Hoa	22	12	34
Long An	28	20	48
Kien Tuong	25	23	48
Dinh Tuong	36	30	66
Kien Hoa	20	18	38
Kien Phong	22	29	51
Vinh Long	35	62	97
Vinh Binh	29	120	149
An Giang	31	61	92
Phong Dinh	33	14	47
Kien Giang	30	17	47
Ba Xuyen	32	47	79
An Xuyen	25	12	37
Phu Quoc	3	2	5

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DIVISION

Statement of Functions

To provide stimulation, technical advice and assistance to various ministries and agencies of the Government of Vietnam for the purpose of improving governmental operations by recommending appropriate training and changes in organizational structure, operating procedures and administrative practices.

To support and assist technical divisions of USOM on administrative problems in their counterpart ministries and agencies, particularly where these problems are impeding progress of substantive programs or projects.

Training. To improve the competence and efficiency of the civil servants through the development of pre-service and in-service training programs and of research, reference and library activities for the benefit of both civil servants and student-civil servants by:

- Advising the faculty and staff of the National Institute of Administration in the following areas:

  Review, evaluation and reform of public administration courses and the improvement of teaching and examination methods in the classroom and in in-service training courses.

  Improvement and extension of research activities in the field of public administration in Vietnam, and internationally, especially in connection with the Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration.

  Effective utilization of the library insofar as both the student body and the civil service are concerned.

  Maintenance of standards and the extension of education to higher levels into the graduate level.

  Improvement of administrative procedures and practices in the Institute.

- Advising the Department of Interior on a program of:

  Establishing Provincial Training Centers in each of the provinces.

  Establishing and developing training programs for provincial, district, village and hamlet administrative personnel.

  Cooperating with other Government of Vietnam agencies in the coordination and utilization of provincial training programs and facilities.

Local Administration. To advise and assist in the development and strengthening of local administration by:

Rearch in the area of local administration, especially in the area of strategic hamlet development and administration and their relationships to existing administrative patterns.

Advising on the development of appropriate formulation of statutory bases and procedures for implementing new concepts of hamlet administration, assuring proper integration and coordination into the broade sheré of local administration.

Statistics and Censuses. To assist the National Institute of Statistics and other statistical agencies in the development of a professional staff and work program by:

Aiding in the development of a coherent series of censuses, surveys and other programs on which can be built a permanent and continuous set of statistical series as required by international agencies, the government itself and the private sector.

Setting up modern statistical standards which will insure the accuracy and completeness of government statistics at minimum cost.

Aiding in the coordination of statistical programs so as to eliminate overlapping and omissions.

Advising in the development of statistical training facilities in the country and in the proper utilization of statistical educational opportunities abroad.

Taxation. To advise and assist in the planning and development of a sound tax system which will enable Vietnam to obtain higher revenues on a more equitable basis.

To advise and assist in the drafting of tax legislation, in the improvement of internal tax accounting methods and tax reporting forms, and in the organization of a division for the collection of taxes.

Accounting, Auditing and Budgeting. To advise and assist the GVN Directorate General of Budget and Foreign Aid and other agencies in the modernization of its accounting, auditing and budgeting functions and in the conduct of organization and management surveys.

Participant Training. To assist in the selection of participants for training in the United States and third countries for the purpose of developing a corps of trained personnel in the following public administration areas: pre-service and in-service training, personnel management, organizations and methods, auditing, accounting, budgeting and statistics.

EDUCATION

Higher Education & Teacher Training

Advise the Department of National Education on matters pertaining to the preservice and inservice education of teachers, and in the field of University education. Advisory service, participant training, commodities and equipment are provided for:

Normal schools and other one year elementary teacher education centers,

Inservice education centers and workshops at the elementary and secondary levels,

The Universities of Saigon and Hue in general, with major assistance to the Faculties of Pedagogy and Science, and specific assistance in the education of teachers of English.

General Education Division

Provide technical and financial assistance to the public elementary and secondary school departments of the Department of National Education through the construction of classrooms, elementary; construction of classrooms (Science) - secondary; instructional materials development - elementary textbooks and supplementary and secondary materials for all public schools of Viet Nam.

Trade & Industrial Teacher Training

Advise and assist the Department of National Education on all details in connection with the pre-service and in-service vocational teacher training programs. Advisory service on curriculum development, course construction and preparation of instructional materials, participant training, securing of commodities and equipment.

Provide funds for the completion of the construction of the three (3) Rural Polytechnic schools and securing commodities of various types to improve the physical facilities of laboratories, the scientific & professional supplies, and miscellaneous educational materials.

CONTRIBUTION OF THE USOM EDUCATION DIVISION TO PROVINCIAL REHABILITATION

Educational Programs for Provincial Rehabilitation

Existent Programs

During the past five years projects sponsored jointly by the USOM Education Division and the Department of National Education, GVN, have made valuable contributions to the current counter-insurgency program. Under the Elementary Education Project, classroom facilities for rural children have been expanded with the construction of and the provision of furnishings for over 3,000 classrooms. Under the Instructional Materials Project over three million textbooks for schools have been printed under the auspices of the Textbook Publication Center of the Department of National Education. New series of textbooks have been inaugurated in the elementary schools in Civics and in Health. Under the Teacher Training Project the technical assistance to provincial teacher in-service training workshops and the holding of annual summer workshops for elementary school teachers, have re-oriented and re-trained existent staff in modern elementary practices. The pre-service training of elementary school teachers is being strengthened with the services of the Southern Illinois University Contract which provides five specialists, who devote full time to the improvement of normal school instruction. The recent opening of two modern rural schools for the training of rural primary teachers is expected to play a significant part in supplying qualified instructors for the village and hamlet schools throughout Vietnam. Attention has also been given to the improvement of the training of teachers for the Montagnards. The above programs have had a limited impact on the rural population on account of the lack of finances for classroom construction and inadequate communication to rural areas.

Hamlet Education Program Proposed for CY 1963

The fundamental purpose of this program is to win over the rural population in the provinces to an active support of the war against the Communists by means of establishing, expanding, and/or improving the educational services furnished by local and national governments in the rural areas. It capitalizes on a major psychological drive of parents, namely, the desire for a better life through education for their children.

The program is to be launched in fifteen provinces and have a direct effect on the education of 300,000 children, or one-third of the pupils in rural schools. Priorities for assistance to strategic hamlets have

been established for rural schools. Priorities for assistance to strategic hamlet operations have been established for several provinces and this program will be implemented in those provinces first. implementation of this program in the remaining provinces will await their designation.

It should be noted that the program under discussion is wholly outside of USOM-financed education programs.

The program is divided into several parts, all of which supplement each other and are vital for the establishment of a basic and continuing system of primary education for rural youth.

Although there is a need for a large-scale program of primary school construction in all provinces due to the constant increase in the number of children of primary school age and a reported large number of this age not in school, this program is geared essentially to the number of teachers who can be adequately trained in a calendar year. This number has been set at one hundred and twenty per province, since existent facilities and available personnel for training are such that it is possible to train only forty teachers during each of the three months' sessions to be held in the provincial capitals. It is expected to hold three of such sessions during a calendar year. The program proposes, therefore, the construction of 1,800 classrooms and the furnishings therefor. At the average rate of 80 pupils per classroom, these facilities will accommodate approximately 144,000 pupils.

Since all the local resources of the hamlet inhabitants have been expended in various community enterprises connected with hamlet security, no funds remain for any co-operative effort in providing funds for the construction and furnishing of hamlet classrooms. It will be necessary, therefore, for this program to provide VN$40,000 per classroom for construction and for furnishings, with the labor for construction to be contributed by the hamlet. This construction will be coordinated with the hamlet self-help projects at the provincial level.

The impact of this program in the rural areas will be far-reaching. The 144,000 pupils represent an approximate total of 48,000 households which in turn represent about 300,000 persons.

PUBLIC WORKS

Office of Chief

Overall direction and coordination of the following Projects: Highways; Railroads; Telecommunication: Electric Power; Water Supply; Inland waterways.

Highway Division

Advise on all highway problems. Liaison with the GVN Minister of Public Works, the Contract groups.

Railroad Division

Guidance and advice on all matters pertaining to railroad equipment maintenance & administration. Selection of participants for training in theU.S.

Telecommunications Division

Technical assistance on rehabilitation of Telephone system. Overall guidance to GVN on the installation of new micro-wave and VHF systems . Technical review of specifications and the procurement of electric equipment.

Dredging Division

Overall advice to GVN on ports, canals and inland waterways. Technical assistance in preparing specifications and the procurement of new dredges.

Power Division

Overall advice on all phases of the host country Power Program. Guidance on procurement of generating equipment.

Architectural Engineering Division

Review of all plans and specifications for new building construction including: schools, hospitals, office buildings, etc.

Water Supply Division

Guidance and advice to GVN on all matters pertaining to potable water supply. Preparation & review of all specifications for commodity and equipment procurement.

Civil Aviation

Guidance and technical advice to the office of the Director of Air Bases, Director of Meteorology and the Director of Civil Aviation on the following operations: Air Traffic Control; Air Operations; Communications; Airport Construction; Meteorology; Electronics (general).

Detailed explanations of specific programs of particular significance to the Provincial Representative are discussed in some detail in the following pages.

VIETNAM RAILWAY SYSTEM

The railroad is narrow gouge - 1 meter - and varies from 25 kilograms to 30 kilograms per meter.

Present Help to the Railroad

For the past two years the railroad has been operating under war-like conditions with Viet-Cong sabotage and this is continuing to the present time.

It is necessary to devote all efforts to supporting continued important railroad transportation by overcoming damage to tracks, bridges, locomotives and rolling stock.

The Vietnamese Armed forces (RVNS) have assigned a battalion to protect the railroad from sabotage. MAAG has assigned several officers to advise and cooperate with the military. Regardless of the efforts to secure the railroad sabotage continues.

The railroad officers and personnel operating trains and maintaining the tracks and bridges have exhibited outstanding courage and devotion in carrying out their duties while harassed by derailments, mines, gunfire, and kidnapping of train and engine crews.

We have thru counterinsurgency funds FY 62 purchased additional commodities which include rail, ties, fastenings, motor inspection cars to patrol the tracks and transport workers and material, metal products to be used in repairs, couplers, buffers and draft gear parts, wheels and axles etc to enable the maintenance forces to repair locomotives and cars damaged by the Viet-Cong actions.

Future Plans to help the Railroad

The Chief Engineer of Tracks and Bridges has been provided through USOM under the original $4.4 million grant 1 modern ballast cleaning machine and 2 mechanical tie tampers which can upgrade 1 kilometer of main track per day but it is not possible to utilize this equipment because of the Viet-Cong activites. The machines cost about $250,000. This equipment will be invaluable to the maintenance of track when it can be utilized with security.

We have provided funds to purchase two 75 ton Railroad Wrecker Cranes which will provide expeditious clearing of wrecks (caused by sabotage) and rerailing of locomotives and rolling stock.

The purchase of repair parts for rolling stock in the amount of about $125,000 (contract will be let at once) by CPA will give the Mechanical Department the necessary parts to enable equipment to be repaired.


REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM
MAP SHOWING
VIETNAMESE RAILROAD SYSTEM
____PROPOSED BRANCH-LINE
COAL MINE NONG SON
17 TH PARALLEL
DONG-HA KM 620
QUANGTRI KM 633
HUE KM 688
DANANG (Tourane) KM 791
DUONG SON KM 802
BICH TRAM KM 807
KY LAM KM 815
CHIEM SON KM 821
NONG SON Coal mine
TAM KY KM 864
AN TAN KM 890
GIANG MAI KM 927
SA-HUYNH KM 990
TAM QUAN KM 1004
BONG SON KM 1016
DIEU TRI KM 1045
QUINHON KM 10
VAN CANH KM 1123
LA HAI KM 1154
PHONG NIEN KM 1165
TUY HOA KM 1197
MAO SON KM 1280
VAN GIA KM 1254
NINH HOA KM 1280
NHA TRANG KM 1314
HOA DA KM 1363
DA LAT KM 84
TOURCHAM KM 0 KM 1407
LOC NINH KM 140
THU DAU MOT
BIEN HOA KM 1668
GIA NGHIA KM 1630
MUONG MAN KM 1550
PHAN THIET KM 11
SA GON KM 1729
TAN AN
Saigon-Mytho abandoned July 1960
MY THO KM 70
PLATE I
SCALE
0 10 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 KM.

50 CITY WATER SUPPLY PROGRAM

Water supply systems in Vietnam are inadequate to support the development growth. The existing water systems fail to provide water to most of the population and the service to schools, hospitals, military establishments and industries is either non-existant or at best inadequate.

With the high population growth rate and the trend towards urbanization it is necessary to have a program sufficient in scope to make up for the prior deficiencies and also to provide for the requirements of the near future. The primary objective is to construct water systems and to set up operating procedures which will establish the water works on a self energizing and a self sustaining basis.

Improvements have been made in Vinh Long. It is expected that Vinh Long will be supplying water on a 24 hour a day basis very soon. Work on the new water treatment plant at Long Xuyen is nearing completion. Work on the elevated tank and distribution will begin very soon. More than 50% of the distribution system for Pleiku is now installed with completion of this expected by the first of the year. A contract for hauling materials to Blao is in process now and it is expected that work on the Blao water system will begin in December. Within the next few months work will begin in Banmethuot, Cao Lanh, Moc Hoa, Rach Gia, and Quang Ngai.

WELL DRILLING

The Vietnamese government operates well drilling machines in their Ministry of Public Works and in the Ministry of Rural Affairs. In the Ministry of Rural Affairs the well drilling activities are carried out by Land Development. They have four Stardrill Keystone Model 55 drilling machines. Three of these machines were supplied by our aid program and one machine was a gift from CARE. These are light truck mounted percussion type drilling machines. These are capable of drilling a 6" hole to 640 feet or an 8" hole to 300 feet. These machines are being used primarily in the Land Development Centers and other nearby projects. Materials such as tools, pipe and pumps are supplied by the project through the warehouse of the GVN Public Works.

The Ministry of Public Works operates their drilling machines with personnel in the well drilling section of the National Water Supply Agency. The drilling equipment and source is listed as follows:

Description	Capacity*
1 RC-100 Franks Speed Star (reverse circulation)	up to 60" diameter 600 depth
1 Star 71 Combination (percussion & rotary)	6" to 1385' 24" to 530'
1 Cyclone	
1 Star 55 combination (percussion & rotary)	4" to 620' 9" to 250'
1 Failing 1500 (rotary)	4" to 1500'
1 Mindrill (rotary)	6" to 150'
6 Star 55** (percussion)	4" to 1060' 8" to 300'

* Capacity is that specified by manufacture and is given to indicate size of equipment. All tools necessary to drill to the full capacity of each machine are not available in Vietnam.

** Five of these mchine have just arrived and are in the process of being assembled by the manufacture's agent in Saigon.

Through September 1962, there have been 1167 wells drilled in Vietnam by the GVN.

The drilling machines are scheduled by the GVN and requests are received by them for all wells which are to be drilled. Any request for wells to be drilled may be sent to Nguyen van Giang, Chief of well drilling Section, National Water Supply Agency, Ministry of Public Works and Communications.

With 15 drilling machines and only one American well drilling advisor, it is apparent that it is only possible to act in an advisory capacity. There is now a back log of many requests for wells to be drilled.

Records of the wells that have been drilled are on file in the USOM Public Works Division.

PUBLIC HEALTH

Office of Division Chief

Within the jurisdiction of AID/USOM policy, is responsible for providing advisory services to the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam and particularly to the Department of Public Health relative to all phases in the field of health, i.e. formulating and implementing programs to the extent requested and justified by means of technical, training, and commodity assistance in the fields of: public health administration, statistics, public health, preventive medicine, medical and nursing education both locally and abroad, environmental sanitation, sanitary engineering, hospital administration, eradication of malaria, control of other diseases, medical equipment maintenance.

Coordinates activities with WHO, UNICEF and similar agencies working in the health field.

Seeks to raise the standard of health through better health facilities, practices, preventive medicine, and education both technical and elementary.

Exercises general and specific guidance, supervision and coordination in the operation of the Division's four projects including two contract groups, within the jurisdiction of the established policy as stipulated under functional and operational directives and assignments.

Health Services Development

Provides technical assistance and financial support to the Department of Health primarily for the benefit of rural areas to reduce the incidence of preventable diseases.

Provides assistance, including supplies and equipment, to the curative services to reinforce preventive measures.

Trains rural health teams for each district.

Establishes district, village and hamlet health centers.

Provides drugs and supplies to and for the proper functioning of the health centers.

Provides selected equipment to GVN hospitals.

Provides advice and technical assistance to the National Institute of Statistics, the bureau of Statistics (Ministry of Health) and to elements of the USOM Public Health Division on matters pertaining to health and vital statistics.

Malaria Eradication

Provides technical assistance and financial support to GVN to eradicate malaria from Viet Nam and to establish effective measures to prevent its recurrence.

Expansion of Medical Education Facilities

Assists in developing adequate facilities for medical education in Saigon to increase the number of qualified physicians in Viet Nam.

Assists in providing the design and construction of a basic medical sciences building and related facilities and the preliminary design of a 500-bed teaching hospital.

Provides a contract with an American medical school to provide a maximum of 15 visiting professors a year by 1965.

Provides fellowships for medical training abroad.

Detailed explanations of specific programs of particular significance to the Provincial Representative are discussed in some detail in the following pages.

TYPES OF HEALTH PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

Bac-Si	Physician. Holder of an M.D. degree. Works for the government or in private practice.
Nha-Si	Dentist
Can-Su Y-Te	Health technician. Three years of professional training after nine years of school. Usually assigned as an assistant to the Medical-Supervisor in a provincial hospital or as a district health chief.

Nursing personnel

Can-Su Dieu-Duong	Nursing technician. A graduate since 1960 of a National School of Nursing (Saigon or Hue) Three years course after nine years basic education.
Y-Ta	Regular nurse or national nurse. A graduate before 1960 of a National School of Nursing (Saigon, Hue, or Hanoi) with a one, two, or three year course depending on the period of training. Basic education, nine years.
Ta-Vien Dieu-Duong	Assistant nurse. 8-12 months of training. They work as assistants to the above listed nurses in hospitals or district infirmaries. Basic education is 5 years.
Dieu-Ho Thon-Que	Rural nurse. Have received six months of training in a provincial hospital or at a special course for Montagnard health workers in Hue. They work as assistants in district dispensaries or work alone in village health stations. Basic education is usually five years.
Phu-Y-Ta	Nurse helper. In-service training only. Work as nurses assistants in hospitals and district dispensaries.
Can-Bo Y-Te Ap	Village health workers. Training from 2 weeks to six months in a provincial hospital.

Public Health Nursing Personnel

Can-Bo Y-Te Quan	District Health worker. A nurse with at least six months basic training plus a 2-month course in public health.
Can-Bo Y-Te So-Cap	Rural Health Worker. Six months of training in nursing including public health. These courses were given only in 1956 and 1957.

Sanitation personnel

Ky-Su Y-Te	Sanitary engineer. Their training includes three years as a public works engineer (university level) in Vietnam plus one year abroad in public health. So far they work only at the national level and for the city of Saigon.
Can-Bo Ve-Sinh	Sanitary agent. Formerly four months of training, now six after nine years of school. They work at the district level.

Midwifery personnel

Nu-Ho-Sinh	Midwife. Three years of professional training at the National School of Midwifery in Saigon (and formerly Hanoi) following nine years of basic education. Usually work in the large maternity hospitals in Saigon or in the maternity wing of a provincial hospital.
Co-Mu-Huong-Thon	Rural midwife. Training may be six months to one year in a provincial hospital or in a special course for Montagnards in Hue.

Pharmaceutical and laboratory personnel

Duoc-Si	Pharmacist. Five years of university level professional education. Most are in private practice. Some work for national or provincial level health services.
Duoc-Ta	Assistant pharmacist. Two years of training in Saigon after nine years of basic education. Most of them work in provincial hospitals for the distribution of drugs.
Phu-Ta Thi-Nghiem	Laboratory Technician. Two years of professional training at the National School of Medical Biology after nine years of school. They usually work in laboratories of provincial hospitals.
Dong-Y-Si	Oriental medical practitioner. Training is as an apprentice.

Social welfare personnel

Can-Su Xa-Hoi	Social worker. Three years of professional training after nine years of basic education. Usually assigned as chief of Social Service in Saigon hospitals.
Phu-Ta Xa-Hoi	Auxiliary social worker. One year of professional training after five years of basic education. Usually work in provincial hospitals.

LIST OF PROVINCIAL MEDICAL SUPERVISORS

(They can be located at Provincial Hospital or through Province-Chief)

PROVINCE	TOWN	NAME
An-Giang	Long-Xuyen	Dr. Nguyen Kiem Thinh
An-Xuyen	Ca-Mau	Dr. Pham Quynh Quy
Ba-Xuyen	Khanh-Hung	Dr. Le Ky Van
Bien-Hoa	Bien-Hoa	Dr. Vo Van Cuu
Binh-Duong	Phu-Cuong	Dr. Nguyen Quang Thai
Binh-Dinh	Qui-Nhon	Dr. Tran Duc Hop
Binh-Long	An-Loc	H.T. Nguyen Ba Chung
Binh-Tuy	Ham-Tan	H.T. Dinh Van Thai
Binh-Thuan	Phan-Thiet	Dr. Hoan Ba
Chuong-Thien	Vi-Thanh	
Con-Son		H.T. Le Van Trang
Dinh-Tuong	My-Tho	Dr. Huynh Ngoc Du
Darlac	Banmethuot	Dr. Ton That Niem
Da-Nang (City)		Dr. Truong Dinh Tri
Gia-Dinh	Gia-Dinh	Dr. Le Vinh Khai
Khanh-Hoa	Nha-Trang	Dr. Vinh-Luc
Kien-Giang	Rach-Gia	Dr. Nguyen Van Nam
Kien-Hoa	Truc-Giang	Dr. Le Van Hue
Kien-Phong	Cao-Lanh	Dr. Duong Thuc Huy
Kien-Tuong	Moc-Hoa	Dr. Dang Thuc Huy
Kontum	Kontum	Dr. Vuong Huu Tan
Lam-Long	Bao-Loc	Dr. Hoang-Khiem
Long-An	Tan-An	Dr. Le Si Ca
Long-Khanh	Xuan-Loc	Dr. Hoa Tien Su
Ninh-Thuan	Phan-Rang	Dr. Luong Van Phung
Phu-Yen	Tuy-Hoa	Dr. Nguyen Thanh Phuoc
Phong-Dinh	Can-Tho	Dr. Le Van Khoa
Phuoc-Long	Phuoc-Binh	H.T. Nguyen Ngoc Minh
Phuoc-Thanh	Phuoc-Vinh	H.T. Nguyen Phuc Ngan
Phuoc-Tuy	Phuoc-Le	Dr. Nguyen Dinh Luyen
Pleiku	Pleiku	Dr. Nguyen Huy Vong
Quang-Duc	Gia-Nghia	Dr. Nguyen-Buu
Quang-Nam	Hoi-An	Dr. Nguyen Van Quy
Quang-Ngai	Quang-Ngai	Dr. Hoang Trong Van
Quang-Tri	Quang-Tri	Dr. Buu-Ham
Tay-Ninh	Tay-Ninh	Dr. Tran Van Manh
Thua-Thien	Hue	Dr. Tran Kiem Khoan
Tuyen-Duc	Dalat	Dr. Nguyen Phan
Vinh-Binh	Tra-Vinh	Dr. Dao Tuan Kiet
Vinh-Long	Vinh-Long	Dr. Ho Kiem Ngoc

H.T. = Health Technician

VIET NAM
Provincial Hospitals

SOUTHERN REGION - Population 8,950,000

Province and Population	Hospital Location	No. Hosp Beds % Occupancy	Resident Physician	Comments
An Giang 802,500	Long Xuyen Chief City	250 114%	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962
"	Chau Doc 2nd City	240 60%	X	Surgical suite planned for 1963
"	Cai Son	70 140%	0	No assistance planned
An Xuyen 273,500	Ca Mau	50 110%	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962 Post-Op. Wardplanned for 1962
Ba Xuyen 638,900	Soc Trang Chief City	340 100%	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962 Post-Op. Ward planned for 1963
"	Bac Lieu 2nd City	200 110%	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962
Bien Hoa 234,000	Bien Hoa	350 110%	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962
Binh Duong 296,400	Thu Dau Mot	225 80%	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962
Binh Long 64,700	An Loc	44	0	Surgical suite and Post-Op. ward Planned for 1963
Binh Tuy 33,700	Ham Tan	0	X	Surgical suite and Post-Op. ward Planned for 1963
Chuong Thien (new province)	Vi Thanh	0	0	Surgical suite and Post-Op. ward planned for 1963
Con Son 4,918	Con Son Island	212	0	Surgical suite and Post-Op. ward planned for 1963
Dinh Tuong 656,000	My Tho Chief City	260 150%	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962
"	Go Cong 2nd City	??	X	Surgical suite planned for 1963
Gia Dinh 626,000	Gia Dinh	235 110%	X	Nursing Care equipment only 1962
Kien Giang 436,000	Rach Gia Chief City	300 100%	X X	Surgical suite constructed 1962
"	Ha Tien 2nd City	?	0	No assistance planned
Kien Hoa 550,000	Truc Giang	275 100%	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962
Kien Phong 270,000	Cao Lanh	98 54%	X	Surgical suite and Post-Op. ward planned for 1963
Kien Tuong 54,000	Moc Hoa	42 70%	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962
Long An 480,000	Tan An	130 15%	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962
Long Khanh 74,000	Xuan Loc	45 70%	X	Surgical suite and Post-Op. ward planned for 1963
Phong Dinh 500,000	Can Tho	400 110%	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962 Regional Hospital
Phu Quoc 18,000	Duong Dong Island	0	0	Surgical suite and Post-Op. ward planned for 1963
Phuoc Long 33,300	Phuoc Binh	24 110%	0	Surgical suite and Post-Op. ward planned for 1963

SOUTHERN REGION cont.

Phuoc Thanh 65,000	Phuoc Vinh	0	0	Surgical suite and Post-Op. ward planned for 1963
Phuoc Tuy 134,000	Phuoc Le Chief City	70 50%	X	Surgical suite planned for 1963
"	Vung Tau 2nd City	20 120%	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962
Tay Ninh 283,000	Tay Ninh	140 100%	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962
Vinh Binh 524,000	Phu Vinh	250 80%	X	Surgical suite contructed 1962
Vinh Long 525,000	Vinh Long Chief City	240 90%	X	Surgical suite planned for 1963
"	Sadec 2nd City	100 90%	X	Surgical suite renovated 1962
Saigon 1,500,000	City Hospitals Saigon Pref.	4,000 120%	X	Cho Ray is Nursing Education Center

CENTRAL COASTAL REGION - Population 4,300,000

Binh Dinh 300,000	Qui Nhon	300 95%	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962 Regional Hospital
Binh Thuan 155,000	Phan Thiet	200 50%	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962
Khanh Hoa 272,000	Nha Trang	350 100%	X	Surgical Building completed 1962 Regional Hospital
Ninh Thuan 124,000	Phan Rang	180 100%	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962 Post-Op. ward planned for 1963
Phu Yen 341,000	Tuy Hoa	130 90%	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962
Quang Nam 940,000	Da Nang 110,000 City	300 115%	X	Surgical building completed 1962 Regional Hospital
"	Hoi An Chief City	220	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962
Quang Ngai 665,000	Quang Ngai	200 90%	X	Surgical suite planned for 1963 (Medico Team here)
Quang Tin (New province)	Tam Ky	0	0	Surgical suite and Post-Op. ward Planned for 1963
Quang Tri 270,000	Quang Tri	200 110%	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962
Thua Thien 422,000	Hue Prefecture 103,000 City	1,100 110%	X	Hue is Nursing Education Center

PLATEAU and HIGHLAND REGION - Population 589,000

Darlac 141,000	Banmethuot	180 100%	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962 Post-Op. Ward planned 1962
Kontum 76,000	Kontum	60 75%	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962
Lam Dong 56,000	Bao Loc	20	X	Surgical suite and Post-Op. ward planned for 1963
Pleiku 183,000	Pleiku	200 110%	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962 Post-Op. ward planned for 1962
Phu Bon (New Province)	Hau Bon	0	0	No assistance planned
Quang Duc 24,000	Gia Nghia	0	X	Surgical suite and Post-Op. ward planned for 1963
Tuyen Duc 56,000	Dalat prefecture 50,000	220 111%	X	Surgical suite constructed 1962

HEALTH EDUCATION

The Department of Health has 12 audio-visual units in Vietnam, six with the Rural Health Program and six with the Malaria Eradication Program. Requests for special showings of health films can be routed through Provincial Medical Supervisors or Malaria Provincial Offices. Health films are also included in many of the Provincial Film Libraries of the Vietnamese Information Service.

Educational materials on health subjects are also available on request, in limited quantities.

The names and headquarters of the six Rural Health Controllers and the provinces in which they work are:

Mr. Duong Cong Kham (Hue)	- Quang Tri Thua Thien Quang Nam Quang Ngai Binh Dinh
Mr. Tran Van Song (NhaTrang)	- Kontum Pleiku Darlac Phu Yen Khanh Hoa
Mr. Pham Ngoc Tai (Phan Rang)	- Ninh Thuan Binh Thuan Binh Tuy Tuyen Duc Lam Dong Long Khanh
Mr. Tran Van Dong (Gia Dinh)	- Quang Duc Phuoc Long Binh Long Tay Ninh Binh Duong Bien Hoa Phuoc Thanh Gia Dinh Phuoc Tuy
Mr. Hoang Xuan Do (MyTho)	- Long An Dinh Tuong Kien Phong Vinh Long Vinh Binh Kien Hoa Kien Tuong
Mr. Tran Van Thuan (CanTho)	- An Giang Phong Dinh Ba Xuyen An Xuyen Kien Giang Chuong Thien

DISTRICT HEALTH CENTERS
Constructed or about to be Constructed by USOM

PROVINCE	DISTRICT
Quang-Tri	Dong-Ha
	Cam Lo
	Hai Lang
Thua-Thien	Hue City
	Lang Co
	Gia Hoi
	Quang Dien
	Huong Thuy
	Vinh Loc
Quang-Nam	Tam Ky
	Tien Phuoc
	Hoa Vang
Quang-Ngai	Duc Pho
	Binh Son
	Lyc-Son
Phu-Yen	Song Cau
	Phu Duc
Binh-Dinh	Tam Quan
	Bong Son
Pleiku	City (Le Thanh)
	Cheo-Reo
	Le Trung
Kontum	Dakto
	Kontum
Darlac	Lac Thien
	Buon Ho
Quang-Duc	Kien Duc
Tuyen-Duc	M'Lon Village
Binh-Thuan	Hai Lang
	Tuy Phong
	Hai Ninh
Ninh-Thuan	Thap Cham
	Thanh Hoi
Long-Khanh	Dinh Quan
Phuoc-Tuy	Dat Do
	Phuoc Hai
	Long Hai
Binh-Duong	An Thanh
	Bon Quan
	Lai Thieu
Bien-Hoa	Tan Phu
	Long Thanh
Tay-Ninh	Phu Chuong
	Long Hoa
Gia-Dinh	Hoc Mon
	Thu Duc
Long-An	Thanh Tien
Dinh-Tuong	Vinh Hoi
	Cai Lay
	Vinh Binh
	Long Dinh
Vinh-Long	Vung Lien
	Cai Nhum
	Tam Binh
	Cho Lach
Vinh-Binh	Tra Cu
	Tieu Can
	Tra On
Kien-Hoa	Mo Cay
	Huong My
Chuong-Thien	Kien Long
	Kien Hung
Kien-Phong	Hong Ngu
	Thanh Binh
Phong-Dinh	Phung Hiep
	Cau Ke
An-Giang	An Phu
Kien-Giang	Kien Tan
	Kien An
	Kien Binh
	Phu Quoc
Ba-Xuyen	Long Phu
	Thanh Tri
	Vinh Chau
An-Xuyen	Thai Binh
	Binh Hung
Phuoc-Long	Bo Duc

DISTRICT HEALTH SERVICES

The Dispensary-Maternity-Infirmary (Benh-Xa):

Most of Vietnam's 220 districts have a combination infirmary maternity and dispensary facility. Sometimes there is only an infirmary and a dispensary. The infirmary is apt to have eight beds and the maternity about twelve beds. The out-patient dispensary treats over 100 patients a day. Many of these facilities have been built with USOM funds in the past and many will be built in the near future (see enclosed list for exact location).

The Staff at the District Level:

The District Health Chief (Truong Y-Te Quan), is either a health technician (Can-Su Y-Te), or nurse (Y-Ta), each of whom has had two or three years of professional training. They may be assisted by an Assistant Nurse (Phu Y-Ta), who has eight to twelve months of training. The Maternity is staffed by one or two midwives, who may have had up to three years of training. In about half of the Districts there is also a Mobile Public Health team, consisting of three District Health Workers (Can-Bo Y-Te Quan), who are nurses with an additional two months training in public health, and a Sanitary Agent (Can-Bo Ve-Sinh), who has four to six months of training in sanitation. The function of the District Health Worker is to supervise the Village Health Workers, do health education for the prevention of disease, give immunizations, visit sick people in their homes, and arrange for medical or nursing care. The Sanitary Agent works intensively in villages to improve market and restaurant sanitation, public water supply, private water supply and privies, and schools and health center sanitation.

Transportation:

Ambulances have been given to about one half of the Districts by USOM to provide transportation of patients to the Provincial Hospital when necessary. Additional ambulances will be given soon.

All District Health Workers, Sanitary Agents, and some of the District Health Chiefs, have been given motor bikes so that they may easily visit the villages where they are expected to work. After four years, during which time the workers must provide the up-keep and maintenance and gasoline for the motor bikes, they become their personal property.

HEALTH SERVICES AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL

Over the last few years health services have been extended to about 3,000 villages. Now, with the growth of the Strategic Hamlet Program, it is foreseen that these services will be given eventually to each hamlet.

The Village (or Hamlet) Health Worker (Can-Bo Y Te Xa):

The Village Health Worker should be a young, healthy man or woman who is able to read and is liked by the rest of the village. His functions include surveying health needs, treating minor illnesses as described in the Manual for Village Health Workers, promoting village sanitation, educating the public about health, and making reports as necessary.

Training is given at the provincial hospital, usually in two-week courses, although some have training up to six months. A suggested training course is enclosed. Upon completion of the course the Health Worker receives a certificate and a badge. Any village wishing to have such a worker should recruit one, possibly by a village election. This person can certainly attend a course in the near future as they are being conducted almost continuously in many provincial health services.

Until June 1962, the pay of the Village Health Worker was entirely up to the Province, District or Village. Many were volunteers working as little as one hour per week, in order for the village to have a First Aid Kit and provide some care in an emergency. Now USOM can pay up to 600 piasters per month, through the Department of Health. The Village Health Worker must work full time and if he holds another position, he may get paid for only one GVN position, according to GVN regulations.

This worker receives supervision from the District Health Chief and District Health Workers.

The Village Health Station (Tram Y-Te)

The Village Health Station is usually small and is intended to treat patients on an ambulatory, out-patient basis only. Sometimes there is a bed for an emergency patient before he can be sent to the District Infirmary (Benh-Xa) or Provincial Hospital (Benh-Vien).

These stations are usually located near the Administrative Headquarters of a village and will usually be in the first Strategic Hamlet within a village. Additional hamlets will need new facilities. They will have to be built by labor and with materials available within the village.

The medicine and supplies used in the villages are provided by USOM through the Department of Health and the Provincial Health Services. There is an adequate supply of these medicines (see Manual for Village

Health Workers) in Vietnam. However, communications and transportation are sometimes difficult and each station may have temporary shortages. Any shortages should be brought to the attention of the district or provincial health authorities for prompt action. If requests for help to local health authorities get no results, then notify USOM Public Health Division, giving specific place, time, and names.

The Village Maternity (Nha Ho-Sinh Xa):

In some parts of the country there are also village maternities staffed by rural midwives (Co-Mu Huong-thon), who were usually trained in the Provincial Hospitals and who receive their supervision and supplies from the Provincial Hospital.

The Village Health Workers Manual:

This Manual is available in Vietnamese, English, and Rhade and will soon be available in other mountain dialects.

UNITED STATES OPERATIONS MISSION

PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

I. Program:

Aid to National Police (including Combat Police Harbor Police Airport Police the various Municipal Police Forces and the Rural Police) Customs Service Immigration Service Prison Rehabilitation Narcotics Control Unit Civil Security Telecommunications Directorate

II Type of Aid:

Reorganization training (local 3rd country U S) commodities (transportation communications weapons and ammunition) facilities (training buildings ranges administration buildings etc)

III U S Technicians:

44 specialists in various fields of Public Safety: Police Administration Criminal Investigation Narcotics Control Firearms Civil Disturbance Control Police Communications Identification Rural Police and paramilitary (including counterinsurgency) operations. (USOM/PSD has assigned counterparts in each of these agencies - e.g. Director General of the National Police, Chief Saigon Police, Chiefs of each of the other services and agencies listed. PSD advisors to the regional police directors are resident in Hue, BanMeThuot, NhaTrang PienHoa, MyTho and CanTho).

IV. Major Contributions to Counterinsurgency:

I.D. cards are printed on safety paper - contain basic data plus both index fingerprints and are laminated with a distinctive design in the plastic so that it is virtually impossible to forge. I.D. Cards are to be issued to every person over 18. (Estimated total of 7,500,000). The program is being carried out in every province. 400,000 cards were issued in September; 5,111,255 to date. The program is expected to be completed by 1 January 1963. As a result of the program 59 Viet-Cong have been discovered and arrested; 472 deserters picked up; and, 11,268 old ID irregularities discovered. Family identification is being tried out in Phu Yen Province. All members of a family are photographed in a single-group photo and one print is left in the house.

The Civil Security Telecommunications Network is established for the purpose of providing communications for the various civil internal security agencies listed above. The National Headquarters station is in operation and all five regional stations are in operation - three of these (Hue BanMeThuot, CanTho) have their radio teletype installed and in operation. In addition all 41 provincial radio stations are in operation (ANGRC-9) or (AUTODYNE Transmitter/Collins Receiver) HF, and all of the 226 district stations are in operation (ANGRC-9 or TR-20).

Installation of specially designed radios in 2,000 villages is underway, 1300 village radios have been installed and installation is going forward at the rate of 250 per month. Completion contemplated by the end of December 1962. These village radios (TR-20) were developed jointly by Public Safety Division personnel and the civilian radio manufacturer to fill a need not met by any existing military or civilian set. They are a simple push-to-talk VHF unit designed to provide two way voice communications up to 20 miles in rural areas where there is little man made noise. They are powered by either 120 V AC or by automobile batteries.

Installation of these village radios is being carried out by four teams headed by PSD technicians. Teams include personnel loaned by 39 Signal Battalion as well as Vietnamese members of the Civil Security Telecommunication Service. Installation is being carried out under extreme difficulties. Teams have been ambushed six times - have had to shoot their way in on at least one occasion, have had to walk up to 15 kilometers to reach some villages. Though no casualties have yet been suffered by Viet-Cong action, one helicopter was hit by ground fire on take-off after one installation, and three men (1 American and 2 Vietnamese) were drowned in a boat accident during an installation trip. These TR-20 radios are also being installed for various internal security uses, e.g. railroads, Police, Special Forces, etc. 250 installed for these purposes.

We are presently in the process of extending the network to 6,000 hamlets. For this we are utilizing two new radios, of less power but operating on the same frequencies as the TR-20. These are called the TR-5 and the HT-1. The TR-5 is a smaller, less powerful edition of the TR-20 having a range of 5-10 miles. The HT-1 is a 1/2 watt Handie Talkie with a range of 1-5 miles. The H-T-1 operates on 8 flashlight batteries. 3000 of each have been ordered - funded by MAP. 76 Signal Corps personnel have been brought to Viet-Nam for 6 months TDY and loaned to USOM/PSD to assist in the installation and maintenance of these radios. Battery recharging equipment has been installed at every district headquarters where feasible windchargers have been installed at the radio site. In An Xuyen Province, a newly installed village radio was used to call for evacuation of military wounded. A test was run some time ago in Gia Dinh Province utilizing the village radio to call for air support. It was reportedly taking six hours through normally used channels to get such a message to the Air Force. Through the village radio, the message was transmitted in 6 minutes. This civil security network is presently handling nearly a million words of traffic per month in and out of Saigon alone - 50% of the traffic is for other GVN agencies; Education; Railroads; Department of Defense; Land Development; Legal Department, etc.

Within the Strategic Hamlet/Rural Development Program in coordination with the Director General National Police, PSD technicians organized and trained a class of 42 Police Instructors in Civil Internal Security for Strategic Hamlets. The text is a basic manual prepared by a PSD technician. It has been printed in dual language English/Vietnamese edition.

These instructors have been multiplying this training to personnel who have been and are being detailed to population and material movement control to identification and others civil security type functions in strategic hamlets.

The Combat Police are a section of the National Police who have been three major functions:

1. Fight small unit actions against the Viet-Cong.
2. Attack the problem of insecurity on the travel ways: highways, waterways, railroads.
3. Conduct raids against known small concentrations of Viet-Cong or Viet-Cong headquarters or supply, meeting, or collection points.

PSD technicians, along with special forces personnel have been conducting training courses for the Combat Police. Four classes have been graduated.

An example of their activity was reported in the press on 14 October where it was stated that this was the first offensive action carried out by the Police in enemy territory. One Viet-Cong political commissar was killed and two captured along with a substantial amount of terrorist type ordnance, hand grenades, land mines, etc.

400 Saigon City Police are presently manning machine gun posts around the perimeters of the city. All 400 of these men have completed their weapons training (revolver, rifle, carbine, shotgun, submachine gun, 30 caliber machine gun) under PSD instructors. 10 pistol, carbine, shotgun and submachine gun instructors from each of the City's 10 precincts have been trained by PSD instructors and are in the process of multiplying this training throughout the police department.

Rural Police training classes of police instructors have been trained in Hue, NhaTrang and BanMeThuot. These instructors are already multiplying this training through their regions. Similar training classes are planned for BienHoa, MyTho and CanTho.

PSD personnel have trained 200 instructors representing all major units of the Army, Marines, Civil Guards, Gendarmerie, Presidential Guard; and the Police, in the technique of riot and civil disturbances control training. Each trained instructor is provided with a training manual and complete lesson plans upon graduation. A 400 man riot squad of the Saigon Police Department has been trained and equipment is on hand for this unit. 600 additional policemen have been trained to support this force. A standby unit of 300 men is on alert duty 24 hours a day.

With respect to planned future activities an organization training and equipping combat police unit will be formed. This was at the direction of the President, primarily to fill the gap left by making an Army out of the Civil Guard. It has the mission of 400 Saigon City Police are presently manning machine gun posts around the perimeter of the city.

A PSD Technician is presently working closely with the MAAG Navy Section to develop a Vessel Registry Activity of the Customs Service into an effective instrument of vessel identification and movement.

The development of Rural police will:

1. Present a favorable image of government.
2. Provide local civil security.
3. Gather the type of intelligence which should be gathered by a trained permanently assigned officer.

10/10/62

UNITED STATES OPERATIONS MISSION TO VIETNAM

PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

Priority - Village Radios

Province	No. Sets Planned	Date Installat. Started/Planned	Date Installat. Completed	No. Sets Installed
1. GIA DINH	44	1 Mar 62	15 Mar 62	44
2. AN XUYEN	47	8 Apr 62	24 Apr 62	41
3. TAY NINH	48	17 Apr 62	23 May 62	39
4. BINH DUONG	43	20 Apr 62	4 May 62	46
5. PHUOC TUY	30	24 Apr 62	2 May 62	30
6. KIEN GIANG	50	29 Apr 62	30 May 62	50
7. AN GIANG	64	14 May 62	2 June 62	62
8. KIEN PHONG	45	6 May 62	17 May 62	45
9. KIEN TUONG	33	24 May 62	30 May 62	33
10. QUANG NAM (1)	113	28 May 62	25 June 62	107
11. DINH TUONG	82	7 May 62	In progress	66
12. BINH LONG	25	7 June 62	20 June 62	25
13. LONG AN	82	7 June 62	14 July 62	82
14. QUANG NGAI	117	17 June 62	In progress	97
15. DARLAC (2)	37	1 July 62	15 July 62	5
16. QUANG DUC	19	1 July 62	8 July 62	19
17. PLEIKU	25	21 July 62	In progress	24
18. KONTUM	51	31 July 62	In progress	35
19. PHU YEN (2)	48	8 July 62	In progress	31
20. BINH THUAN	37	20 May 62	In progress	2

Province	No. Sets Planned	Date Installat. Started/Planned	Date Installat. Completed	No. Sets Installed
21. BINH DINH (2)	74	8 Aug 62	31 Aug 62	59
22. KIEN HOA	90	11 Aug 62	In progress	74
23. QUANG TRI	66	15 Aug 62	23 Aug 62	63
24. VINH BINH	62	14 Aug 62	In progress	48
25. PHUOC LONG	40	1 Aug 62	14 Aug 62	21
26. PHONG DINH	45	3 Sept 62	24 Sept 62	43
27. BA XUYEN	88	4 Sept 62	In progress	43
28. PHUOC THANH	28	6 Oct 62	In progress	6
29. BIEN HOA	55			
30. LONG KHANH	38			
31. BINH TUY	27			
32. NINH THUAN	40			
33. KHANH HOA	73			
34. LAM DONG	17			
35. TUYEN DUC	35			
36. THUA THIEN	89			
37. CHUONG THIEN	51			
38. VINH LONG	74			
39. CON SON	5	25 Nov 62		
	2,037			1,240

(1) New Provinces: (1) includes in QUANG TIN
(2) includes PHU BON

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Use such ingenuity and means as are available to encourage Vietnamese to invest their available piasters in industrial plants.

Promote joint ventures in which investors from overseas with manufacturing know-how can join forces with Vietnamese investors.

Provide engineering guidance, through the relevant GVN ministries, to industrial entrepreneurs.

Provide financial guidance, through the relevant GVN ministries, to industrial entrepreneurs.

Provide Economic Guidance, through the relevant GVN ministries, to industrial entrepreneurs.

Coordinate with the Program, Trade & Supply and Controller division of USOM, and Embassy Economic Section, for the purpose of developing recommended courses of action in the Industrial Development area for the Director.

Provide liaison service with the relevant GVN Ministries and the Saigon banks on behalf of investors, particularly from overseas.

Provide liaison functions in the area of investment guarantees between the investor and the Office of Private Enterprise AID/W.

PERSONNEL AND ASSIGNMENT
OF
UNITED STATES OPERATIONS MISSION TO VIETNAM
****

October 15, 1962

Name	Dt. Ass. Div.	Ext. DutyPhone	Title
ADAMS, Dick C.	F	587	ASST PROG ECON
ADKINS, Elmer	PS	403	IDENT/RECORDS ADV
ALGER, Lillian G.	A	23142	SEC
ALLARDYCE, Agnes I.	E	23122	TEACHER EDU ADV ENG
ALLEY, Dolores	PH	Can Tho St.	NURSE ADV HOSP
AMES, Edward M.	PS	427	TRNG ADV.
ANDERSON, Brooks D.	PS	451	COMBAT POLICE ADV
AUSTIN, Joan A.	PS	450	DETAILED
BAIRD, James T.	PH	22706	STAT PH
BARGNESI, Samuel J.	PW	20031	WELL DRILLER
BARON, Denis G.	F	561	ASST PROG ECON
BARTLETT, Robert H.	A	23142	HORT ADV TROP
BEIDLER, Paul	PW	555	ARCH ADV
BENEFIEL, Violet E.	PS	450	SEC
BENSON, William C.	PS	451	PRISON REHAB ADV
BILYEU, George F.	P	581	PERS OFF
BOGGAN, Janet M.	EX	448	SEC
BONDS, Thomas E.	A	23142	VET ADV
BORGES, Humberto B.	I	25651	INDL ADV
BOWER, James A.	PS	427	RURAL ADVISOR DARLAC
BOYD, Thomas F.	PW	20031/25391	GEN ENGR
BOYNTON, Willard H.	PH	22706	CHIEF, PH ADV PHYSN
BOYNTON, Ralph E.	RA		ADMIN OFFICER
BRASILE, Margaret T.	PE/S	574	SEC
BRENT, Joseph L.	D	500	DIRECTOR
BRESETTE, Henry N.	I	25651	INDL ADV TEXTILES
BRITTON, Dudley J.	PS	451	WPNS TRNG ADV
BRITTON, G. Leslie	A	23142	PLT PATH EXTN
BROCKMAN, Earl H.	A	23142	AGR COOP CREDIT ADV
BRUCKER, Herbert	PS	434/532	DETAILED
BURNS, Robert	RA		DEV OFF RURAL
BUSH, Robert N.	PS	451	RURAL POLICE SENIOR ADV
CALLAHAN, Helen	P	559	ASST PERS OFF
CARTWRIGHT, Gloria	RA	424	SEC
CASSEL, Russell N.	E	23122	TEACHER EDU ADV
CLARK, Marybeth	E	23122	SEC
CLARK, Teunison C.	E	23122	HIGHER EDU ADV

CLARK, Eileen	PA	60267	SEC
COFFEY, Frank	C	23961	AUDITOR
COHEN, Sultan G.	PW	20031	TRAN OFF
COLEMAN, Arthur	E	23122	TEACHER EDU ADV
COLLINS, Raymond	PH	Hue Station	MALARIA SPEC
CONREY, Davis W.	PW	20031	ELECT ENGR COMMO
COOPER, Kenneth	PW	25301	CHIEF CIV AVAI ASST
COPLEY, Thomas L.	A	23142	AGRON ADV CROPS
CORREL, Frank D.	PROG	578	AS T PROG OFF OPNS
COTTLES, William	PW	25301	AIR COMMO ENGR
CROFT, Albert J.	CM	24770	ADV UTIL TRNG.
CUNNINGHAM, Olevia	PH	Can Tho Stat.	MEDICAL TECH.
DAVIDSON, R.	RA		ASST DEV OFF AREA
DAVIS, Dwight W.	RA	446	ASST DEV OFF AREA
DAVIS, Ray E.	PA	425	TAX ADVISOR
DAVIS, Reginald S.	PS	554	COMMO ADV
DELORT, Rnen	PW	20031	ELECT ENGR COMMO
DEMPSEY, James M.	A	23122	AGRON ADV CROPS
DIMATTEO, Frank A.	PW	20031/25301	BRIDGE ENGR
DODGE, Glenn	PS		TECH POLICE ADV
DONELSON, Martin	PH	Can Tho Stat	
DORAN, Lawrence W.	A	23142	EATN ADV
DOUGHTY, Clarence	RA		ASST DEV OFF AREA
DROSDOFF, Matthew	A	23142	FOOD AGR OFF
EARL, Ralph F.	PS	403	RURAL POLICE ADV BIEN HOA
EASLEY, Beverley	PW	20031	SEC
EBERT, Kenneth	PH	Can Tho Stat.	NURSE ADV HOSP
EDWARDS, John W.	PW	20031	AUTO MAINT SPL
EVANS, William	PS	Hue Station	
EVANS, Richard	RA	446	DEV OFF RURAL
FARMER, Estell	EX	527	SEC
FEINSTEIN, Bernard	PH	NTrang Stat.	MALARIA SPEC
FIPPIN, William H.	DD	400	DEPUTY DIRECTOR
FORNEY, Edward H.	PS	422	ORGN ADMIN ADVISOR
FOX, Ellen E.	PH	22706	EXEC ASST
FRIEDMAN, Robert	RA		ASST DEV OFF AREA
FRUTCHEY, Frank B.	PH	P.Thiet Stat	MALARIA SPEC
GAGNON, Lillian E.	E	23122	EDU PROG ASST
GARNER, Clifford	RA		DEVL OFF AREA
GARNER, Jean K.	A	23142	AGR ENGR FARM MACH
GERE, Robert	PROG	540	ASST TRNG OFF
GIANNONE, Gloria	D	500	SEC
GIBSON, Woodrow F.	PS	Can Tho Stat.	RURAL POLICE ADV CAN THO

GILBERT, John T.	TS	576	INTL TRADE ADV
GILLIS, James	PS	547	DETAILED
GLASER, Sidney A.	RA		DEV OFF AREA
GLENN, Stanley	PH	36564	MALARIA SPEC
GNATT, Celia	PW	20031	SECRETARY
GOODMAN, William H.	TS	405	ASST SPL ADV PROCMT
GOTTLIEB, Lester J.	EX	448	EXEC OFF
GRANDON, Opal P.	PS	422	SECRETARY
GRAY, Frederick	C	564	CONTROLLER
GROSS, Martin L.	PS	427	MUNICIPAL POLICE ADVISOR
HAGER, Robert M.	E	23122	EDU ADV CONST
HALL, Ralph H.	E	23122	AUDIO VISUAL EDU ADVISOR
HAMILTON, Joseph	A	23142	HORT ADV SUB TROP
HAMMOND, Granville S.	E	23122	CHIEF EDU DIV
HANNON, Stuart	CM	24770	COM MEDIA OFF
HARATANI, Joseph	PH	22706	SANITARY ENGR
HARRIS, Douglas W.	E	23122	TEACHER EDU ADV
HAWES, Howard	RA		SUPPLY ADVISOR
HAY, Kitty	RA		ASST DEV OFF AREA
HIGH, Sidney	E	23122	VOCATIONAL EDU ADV
HILL, Patricia A.	PS	451	SECRETARY
HINSHAW, Fred E.	EX	412	TRANS OFFICER
HORGES, Paul W.	PS	450	DETAILED
HODSON, Jeremy	PROG	449	DEP. PROGRAM OFF
HOLBROOK, Richard	RA		ASST DEV OFF AREA
HOLLE, Henry G.	TS	441	INTL TRADE ADV
HOWELL, Thomas F.	PW	20031	MARINE ENGR DREDGE
IBBETSON, Henry B.	PW	25301	AIR OPNS ADV
JARANILLA, Ramon A.	TS	415	ASST SPL ADV
JAUANILLA, Suzanne	A	23142	SECRETARY
JOHNS, Edith E.	D	500	DIRECTOR'S SECRETARY
JOHNSON, Robert P.	E	23122	TRADE INDUSTRIES ADV
KARAM, Jalil S.	PH	36564	MALARIA SPEC
KATZ, Paul	PS	455	COMMO ENGR
KEIRSTEAD, Richard	PH	Qui Nhon	MALARIA SPEC
KELLER, Marie A.	E	23122	SECRETARY
KENNEDY, Robert	PA	60267	CIV AD ADV
KIBLING, Charles A.	CM	24996	ADV RADIO
KNOX, Newton B.	PA	420	A/C GEN STATISICAL ADV
KOHLMANN, William	PROG	431	TRNG ASST
KOVALCHUK, Paul N.	C	23961	AUDITOR
KRASK, Walter A.	PW	20031	ELECT ENGR COMMO

LAKIS, Cleo	DD	400	SEC TO DEP DIR
LANDGREN, Raymond H.	PS	422	NARCOTICS ADVISOR
LANGAN, Eugene F.	PS	450	DETAILED
LANIER, Verle E.	EX	416	EXEC ASST
LaPOINTE, Walter G.	PS	450	DETAILED
LeBLANC, Alphonse A.	C	23961	AUDITOR
LEE, Nina	PH	22706	NUR ED ADV
LEHOVICH, Vladimr	RA		ASST DEV OFF AREA
LEVORSON, Alton G.	A	23142	AGR ENGR FARM MACH
LORENZEN, John D.	PS	450	DETAILED
LUBIN, Harriet	PROG	437	STAT
LUCHE, Thomas C.	RA		ASST PROG OFF
LUFKIN, Shirley	PROG	449	SECRETARY
McDANIEL, Leah J.	PROG	562	TRAINING ASST
McDANIEL, Ray B.	A	23142	RURAL YOUTH ADV
McDONALD, George	CM	22170	ADV GRAPHIC
McDONALD, Lily	C	564	SECRETARY
McGARRY, James P.	PS	554	CONTO ADV OPNS
McKEAL, Wallace W.	C	23961	AUDITOR
McNERNEY, Daniel P.	RA		ASST SPL ADV
MAYNARD, Leonard	RA	446	DEV OFF RURAL
MELVIN, George H.	RA	446	ASST SPL ADV
MENKE, Walter E.	L	552	LEGAL ADVISOR
MERLO, Patricia	F	587	SECRETARY
MILLER, James	PW	25301	METEROLGST
MILLS, Mary L.	PH	Hue Stat.	NUR EDU ADV
MELVIN, George	RA	446	
MONTGOMERY, Allino	EX	596	ASST RECORDS SUPER
MOORHEAD, John S.	PH	22706	PUBLIC HEALTH PHYSN
MORGAN, Tirzah M.	PH	22706	NUR ADV
MURRAY, Ernest J.	PS	422	EXEC ASST
MURTHA, JohnF.	EX	416	ASST EXEC OFF
NASSE, Harvey	RA		ASST DEV OFF AREA
NELSON, Jack L.	PW	20031	HWY ENGR
NIESE, Carol E.	PA	421	SECRETARY
NIESE, William Jr.	PW	20031	HWY ENGR
NIGHSWONGER, William	RA	446	ASST DEV OFF AREA
NORDANSON, Bengt K.	CM	22264	ADV UTIL
NORFOLK, Sewell A.	C	579	AUDITOR
NORTON, Robert	PH	Can Tho	MED OFF
O'CONNOR, Charles	PH	Da Nang	MALARIA SPEC
O'DONNELL, John B.	RA		ASST DEV OFF AREA
O'KEEFE, Timothy	RA		ASST DEV OFF AREA

OTTLEY, Rex A.	A	23142	DEP FOOD AGR OFF
OWENS, Robert P.	PS	451	RURAL POLICE ADV MYTHO
PAIGE, Robert M.	F	501	PROG ECON
PAKCHAR, Nathan	C	569	ACCOUNTANT
PALMER, Alice H.	E	23122	EDU MATERIALS ADV
PALUBICKI, Barbara	PH	Can Tho Stat	NUR ADV HOSP
PAVLICK, S. Mary	PH	Hue	NUR ADV NUR SERV
PERRY, John T.	RA		DEV OFF RURAL
PHILLIPS, Eleanor M.	E	23122	BUS EDU ADV
PHILLIPS, Rufus C.	RA	526	ASST DIR FOR RURAL AFFAIRS
PHILPOTT, Gladys O.	E	23122	TEACHER EDU ADV ELMN
PIERCE, Margaret	EX	596	RECORDS CLERK
PIKE, Noel	PW	20031	ELECT ENGR POWER
PINKERTON, Frank H.	EX	414	HOUSING OFF
PRINGLE, Richard	A	23142	AGR ECON ADV
PUETT, Duncan A.	PH	36528	EQUIP OPN MAINT SPEC
PUETT, Grace G.	CM	24770	SECRETARY
RACZ, Margaret	PH	22706	HOSP NUR SV
REYNOLDS, Leonard C.	PW	20031	R R ADV
REUTER, Frederick	E	23122	TEA EDU ADV
RHINE, Earl R.	RA		ASST DEV OFF AREA
RICE, William A.	C	579	BUDGET ACCT OFFICER
RITCHIE, Fred	PE/S	574	INTL TRADE ADVISOR
ROBERTSON, Eloise	PH	22706	SECRETARY
RONSHAUSEN, Arlette D.	PH	22706	SECRETARY
ROOT, Sandra A.	I	25651	SECRETARY
ROSE, Dale L.	PA	420	TRAINING ADV
ROUSSEL, Robert W.	TS	578	INTL TRADE ADV
RUF, Helen	EX	596	RECORDS SUPER
SCHILLER, Irwin M.	PS	Can Tho	TRNG ADV
SCHLACHTER, Edward J.	PS	532	COMMO INSTAL TEAM CHIEF
SCHMIDT, Don	RA		ASST DEV OFF AREA
SCHOETTLER, Robert J.	A	23142	FISH ADV
SHAHPAZIAN, Vunagun	PW	20031	DEP TRANS OFF
SHANKEY, Richard A.	PW	20031	GEN ENGR
SHEA, James M.	PROG	429	ASST PROG OFFICER
SHUMATE, William M.	A	23142	AGR EDU ADV
SILVER, Solomon	PROG	401	PROGRAM OFFICER
SIMMLER, William	PS	423	DETAILED
SLOANE, Charles F.	PS	451	RURAL ADV HUE
SMITH, Leslie	A		HOME ECON ADV
STARR, Guy F.	I	25651	INDUSTDEV ADV
STENBERG, Hiram S.	A	23961	AGR COOP ADV
STOCKMAN, William A.	C	23961	ASST BLDG MAINT OFF
STREED, Nancy R.	P		PERS CLERK
STUHLER, George	EX	550	GEN SERVICES PROPERTY OFF

SWARTZ, William	EX	24959	ASST BLDG MAINT OFF
SWISHER, Cleo	PROG	441	SECRETARY
TAUB, Louis B.	C	23961	AUDITOR
TAYLOR, Edward W.	PW	20031	PUB WKS ENGR
TAYLOR, Edwin	EX	593	GEN SERV OFF
TAYLOR, John E.	PH	36564	MALARIA ADV
TAYLOR, Mary L.	PROG	401	SECRETARY
TAYLOR, William C.	TS	405	SPL ADV
THOMPSON, Thomas C.	PH	22706	HOSP EQUIP ENGR
TRIGG, William R.	PROG	449	ASST PROG OFF
TUCKER, Russell N.	PH	22706	HEALTH ADM ADV
TURKUS, S. Herbert	F	587	
TYSON, Robert C.	PH	22706	SANITARIAN
UTZINGER, Robert J.	PH	36566	HEALTH EDU ADV
VAUGHN, Guy V.	PS	554	COMMO ADV
VOULGAROPOULOS, E.	PH	22706	PH PHYSN
WILLIAMS, Ogden	RA	469	MONTAGNARD ADVISOR
WAGNER, Ella M.	PS	422	SECRETARY
WAGNER, LeRoy L.	PROG	443	PROG ANALYST
WALKER, William P.	I	25651	INDL ADV
WALTHER, Herbert K.	E	23122	DEP CHIEF, EDU DIV
WALTON, Frank E.	PS	586	CHIEF PSD
WARNE, William	RA		ASST DEV OFF AREA
WELBERT, Charles H.	TS	577	ECON ADV
WIENER, Emil C.	TS	434	DEP SPL ADV
WILDMAN, Quentin J.	PW	20031	SAN ENGR
WILSON, J. Carroll	RA	23142	EXTN ADV INFO
WORTHINGTON, Paul	RA		ASST DEV OFF AREA
WRIGHT, Doris B.	PH	22706	PUBLIC HEALTH NURSE
WRIGHT, Jeanne E.	RA		HEALTH EDU ADV
YOUNG, Earl J.	RA	424	DEV OFF
ZOIS, Frenchy L.	I	25651	SECRETARY

BRIEFING ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN RURAL VIET NAM DURING JULY, AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1962 AND A LOOK AT THE FUTURE

Prepared by USOM Rural Affairs

History may prove that the months of July, August and September 1962 marked the turning point in the struggle to keep South Viet Nam free for it was in those months that the Government of Viet Nam came to the full realization that its Strategic Hamlet Program, first conceived with security in mind, actually offered the opportunity for dynamic social and economic progress for its rural population, and it was in these months that the American agencies also made their plans and fielded a new USOM team with a new program fully oriented toward helping Free Viet Nam mount revolutionary social and economic progress in its countryside.

Though actual physical social and economic achievements were limited during the period, planning was most solid and changes in thinking dramatic, so that a firm foundation was laid for intensive progress in the months ahead. At the same time, the countryside was readied to undertake economic advances as pace of formation of strategic hamlets quickened and their populations democratically organized in an environment of improved security.

Significant rural field social and economic achievements during the period included:

Full implementation of the rat control program in the ten lowland provinces of Central Viet Nam in which 100,000 packages of rat poison were used free-of-charge by 150,000 farm families in three months and 8 million rat tails collected. Popular reaction was spectacular and the second phase of the program will be started immediately. It will go countrywide from the first of 1963. No wide scale rat control program previously existed.

Expansion of rural credit loans through the National Agricultural Credit Organization. Whereas in the similar period of January 1 to August 1, 1960 643 million piasters were loaned to farmers throughout the country only 244 million were loaned in 1961 due to deteriorated rural security conditions. 323 million was loaned in 1962 for the period, perhaps representing a slight improvement in security conditions as well as increasing efforts to extend loans. This program will be rapidly expanded in the next few months.

Continuation of the Malaria Eradication Program. Though this activity continues to be restricted by the security situation some improvement in general security conditions was reported during the period. Also, work was expanded due to sprayings arranged for completed strategic hamlets and for montagnard resettlement areas where populations were concentrated under secure conditions. Expansion of activities is envisioned in the months ahead.

Extension of education in rural areas. With several new U.S. financed technical and teacher's training schools opened during the period in the provinces. The following table gives figures on elementary and secondary educational facilities as well as our plans for expanding elementary facilities in strategic hamlets in the months ahead.

Elementary Schools (Public)

	1961-62	1962-63
Number of Schools	3,839	4,156
" " Pupils	1,033,429	1,111,973
" " Teachers	18,684	20,012
" " Classes	21,016	22,348
" " Classrooms	15,278	15,350

Secondary Schools (Public)

Number of Schools	101	118
" " Pupils	85,700	98,700
" " Teachers	2,476	2,816
" " Classes	1,604	1,830
" " Classrooms	802	915

In addition, the proposed construction of 1,800 classrooms for strategic hamlets in CY 1963 will permit the addition of 144,000 additional pupils (elementary).

Continued expansion of strategic hamlet health facilities and backup for future new hamlets through training of health workers, etc.

Three USOM Provincial Representatives were appointed and in place during the period. In addition, MAAG Sector Advisors were appointed

as Acting USOM Provincial Representatives where required. Province Development Plans were signed for Phu Yen, Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces.

In addition to the above achievements during the period, more important were the plans made for the months ahead which are summarized below:

Reorienting, developing and presenting to Washington the new USOM Program for carrying out intensive social and economic rural progress.

Actual placing of some of the key members of the new USOM team in Viet Nam to man this program.

Development of some of the basic projects for the new program and submission of procurement documents to Washington for them. These projects are being developed to bring the quickest possible improvements in rural living standards and programmed so as to commonce in large scale from January 1, 1963 which is our target date for kickoff of our intensified rural development program. These projects include:

Montagnard Relief and Rehabilitation for all montagnards being resettled throughout the country as well as plans for improving educational facilities and agricultural production capabilities for montagnards generally.

Hamlet Self Help Program which is our key program for fostering democratic processes in the hamlets and harnessing hamlet energies for improving social and economic conditions through Self Help. The program is based upon hamlet citizens selecting by ballot small social and economic improvement projects they wish to carry out in their hamlets donating their own labor but requesting locally unavailable materials and technical advice from provincial levels where Provincial Development Councils (Strategic Hamlet Committees) approve the requests and make the necessary materials available to the hamlet citizens through immediate grants. USOM is providing money and resources for this program at provincial levels to insure immediate response to hamlet requests. All provinces will participate.

Hog, Poultry and Organic Fertilizer Production Programs are being implemented countryside to includo approximately 300,000 farm families. U. S. surplus corn will be sold as feed at low cost; improved breed piglets will be made available on loans and cement will be given to poor farmers to build pig stys and compost pits under this program. Proceeds from corn sale will cover internal handling costs and be used as capitalization for farmers cooperatives. This program has already started on a pilot basis and has been warmly received. The VC have responded by announcing a similar program in certain areas and raiding the first hamlet to receive piglets and corn. This program is based on the premise that the quickest way to increase rural income is through encouraging livestock production and developing organic fertilizer source from compost.

A fertilizer Distribution Program is under way which chemical fertilizers will be distributed commencing from January 1, 1963 to 150,000 farm families in the poorest provinces of Central Viet Nam free as partial reward for good work on strategic hamlet construction. Big extension program will augment this effort.

The use of U.S. surplus foods for augmenting diets of dependents of Civil Guard and Self Defense Corpsmen will commence from about January 1 with 600,000 packages of U.S. surplus foodstuffs given directly to 600,000 CG and SDC dependents throughout Viet Nam once each three months.

Rodent control and insect control Programs of which rodent control was discussed earlier herein and together with insect control will really kick-off from next January 1 countrywide for the first time. Insect control is aimed at controlling plant pests and giving higher crop yields quickly.

Putting in place USOM Provincial representatives in as many provinces as possible, probably 15-20 by next January 1, to work with MAAG advisors, Province Chiefs and their heads of Technical Services to speed and coordinate rural development.

Developing centralized warehousing and supply distribution system for USOM rural development supplies to insure efficient and cheapest movement from ships tackle to recipients throughout the country. Preliminary studies indicate feasibility of this action based on similar systems used in other countries and in Viet Nam by Catholic and Mennonite Relief Services. One Vietnamese Government Agency will be designated to handle this with assistance from one USOM

advisor. This will insure rapid movement of all supplies in the country and their receipt when needed by the rural peoples.

Development of coordinated informational support activities incorporating full PsyWar possibilities for our January 1, 1963 kick-off is underway by concerned country team staff and the GVN. Since the program is envisioned as the inception of the Social and Economic Revolution for the Rural Peoples, it is hoped to have it supported by appropriate GVN announcements, symbols and the full media of communications, all tied to the necessary information materials required for acquainting the rural citizenry with it and its elements, technical and otherwise. Tremendous informational and PsyWar opportunities exist which we hope to capitalize upon.

For the above outlined plans, Washington Assistance is requested to expedite approval of those activities requiring U.S. surplus Agricultural Commodities under Sections 201 and 202 of Title II, P.L. 480. Project requests for these supplies have already gone forward to AID/Washington. It is important that the U.S. Department of Agriculture give them quickest possible approval so that commodity arrivals will permit implementation of our grand program from January 1, 1963 as now conceived. We believe this program is the Prelude to Victory in Viet-Nam.

THE HAMLET SELF-HELP PROGRAM IN VIETNAM AND THE FUNCTION OF THE PROVINCIAL STRATEGIC HAMLET COMMITTEE AS A DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

The Hamlet Self-Help Program is the foundation of the new, intensive, rural, social and economic development effort in Vietnam.

It is a program originating from the decisions of the hamlet citizens themselves on development activities they want to carry out in their own hamlets communicated through the Hamlet Councils to Province level for necessary material and sometimes, technical help. It is an action program working from the bottom up depending for success on the management and labor contributions of the hamlet dwellers themselves and on the quick response of the provincial authorities with the necessary materials and technical resources not available in the hamlets. This program is designed to give the hamlet people a stake in their own hamlets which is worth defending.

Examples of small Self-Help Projects that hamlet citizens may suggest are improved, hand-dug wells, markets, roads, village gardens, drainage ditches, small irrigation and water conservation dikes, digging fish ponds, etc. There are many others, and anything the hamlet peoples suggest which has social or economic benefits and is within their capacity to carry out and provincial budgetary and technical limits should be considered favorably. No school classrooms should be built unless school teachers will definitely be available.

The concept of this Program is rather new in Vietnam and USOM Provincial Representatives should help it get started as follows:

1. After understanding the concept completely yourself, explain it to the Province Chief, the MAAG Sector Advisor and the Chiefs of the Vietnamese technical services at provincial level.

2. Explain to the Province Chief our new, two-way street concept of intensive rural development; that is, one way, the hamlet self-help projects originating with the hamlet citizens themselves speeding social and economic development from the bottom up and, the other way, intensive impact programs designed to rapidly increase rural production and income originating from the top down such as hog, livestock and poultry raising; the fertilizer and compost program; insect and rodent control, etc.

3. Ask the Province Chief to think in terms of a Provincial Development Council consisting of his chiefs of technical services, etc., yourself and the MAAG Sector Advisor, to coordinate and expedite the new, intensive social and economic development effort in his Province. Since this effort is designed to back up the Strategic Hamlet Program with social and economic improvements, the Province Chief's existing Strategic Hamlet Committee should serve as the Provincial Development Council.

4. The Provincial Development Council may immediately appoint a self-help Program Committee consisting of four or five regular members, including the USOM representative, to consider and implement self-help Projects suggested from the Hamlet Councils. Concerned Provincial Technical Services may be called in by this committee for advice and action as required.

5. Descriptive materials and information on the Hamlet Self-Help Program will be prepared for you in Saigon and should be made available through the Committee to the hamlet peoples by every means possible including, Civic Action teams, District and Village Chiefs; pamphlets, posters, radio and hamlet newspapers, etc. Hamlet Self-Help Project Application Forms should be made available to the Hamlet Councils for completion and submission to the Provincial Development Council and its Self-Help Program Committee. The method for actual introduction of the Self-Help Project technique to the hamlet citizens is extremely important and should be similar to the following pattern:

The introducing personnel who may be District Chiefs, Civic Action cadres or Provincial Development Council Self-Help Committee members, etc., should go to the hamlet and ask the Hamlet Council to convene a meeting of all hamlet citizens. At this meeting the Self-Help concept should be explained and five or six simple development projects suggested as examples. The hamlet citizens should then be asked to discuss their own needs and wants as possible Self-Help projects. Their suggestions should be written on a blackboard, and after full discussion, they should take a vote on those they are willing and able to support with their own labor and locally available materials such as sand, gravel, bamboo, etc., but require additional resources from the Self-Help Program. The first choice project of the hamlet may be written up with the help of the persons introducing the program and submitted (mailed if necessary) to the Provincial Development Commission for immediate implementation!

Remember! Self-Help Projects should be the product of democratic action by the hamlet citizens and a main tool in introducing them to democratic action processes! The main purpose of this program is to develop community spirit and a knowledge of and love for the democratic process as well as to actually improve the hamlet. Therefore, you should participate where possible in introducing the Self-Help concept to them, using your discretion on the best means of making the program a real democratic experience resulting in quick government response!

6. The Hamlet Self-Help Project comoletion procedure should be simple. When a project is completed, the hamlet citizens may wish to hold a small ceremony to be attended by village leaders or the District Chief or even representatives from the province level. Photographs of completed Self-Help Projects may be made and as soon as one project is completed, the hamlet citizens can start another; proof of project completion may be established by letter from the hamlet, photographs or field inspection. The USOM Provincial Representative should keep a simple record in triplicate of Hamlet Self-Help Projects showing each project approved by chronological number, the amount of resources provided and the completion date. One copy of this record should be forwarded each month to Rural Affairs in USOM/Saigon for central records.

7. In principle, the Provincial Development Council should consider favorably support of all worthwhile Hamlet Self-Help Projects whose cost falls within whatever reasonalle limit established for that Province. Speed in approval of Hamlet Project Applications and Project implementation is vital in order to demonstrate sincere government concern and response to village needs. In general it should be possible to screen, approve and provide the necessary provincial support to most hamlet Self-Help Projects in one week after their receipt!

8. Money and materials for support in kind of Hamlet Self-Help Projects will be made available at provincial levels to the Province Chief thru USOM sources as revolving funds for operating this program. Adequate resources are available now and await your and provincial implementation of this Program.

9. In addition to the resources mentioned in 7 and 8 above, approximately 50 M/T of foodstuffs and quantities of one gallon tins of cooking oil will be made available in each province each month to the Self-Help Program Committee as an additional resource

for stimulating and aiding Hamlet Self-Help activities. These commodities should be used as payment in kind to hamlet citizens working on social and economic development projects or on improving hamlet defences. They can be used in particular on Self-Help Projects which require amounts of labor beyond the normal capacity of the hamlet civilians to provide voluntarily. For instance, if a Hamlet Self-Help Project requires one man to give so much voluntary labor that his regular source of income is decreased, he might receive foodstuffs to offset his loss and hardship. Care should be exercised by the Provincial Self-Help Committee to insure that these food resources are not used in such a way as to damage or destroy the citizens self-help spirit of voluntary contribution. The maximum amounts of foodstuffs that should be paid for one day's labor are as follows:

500 grams of grain per day for a single man or woman and two ounces of cooking oil, plus 500 grams of grain and two ounces of oil for each direct dependent (wife, husband, children) up to a maximum of three dependents so that the most any laborer should receive is 2000 grams of grain and eight ounces of cooking oil for one day's work if he has a family of three or more direct dependents.

10. It is also envisioned that the Provincial Development Council will serve as a coordinating and planning body for social and economic development other than Hamlet Self-Help. All worthwhile Social and Economic Development Projects coming before the Provincial Development Council should be coordinated and implemented with existing provincial resources. If sufficient provincial resources do not exist and yet the project is a worthy one, it should be referred to the concerned Ministry in Saigon, with copies to USOM/Rural Affairs, for study and possible implementation.

The food discussed in 9 above may be utilized by the Provincial Development Council as a locally available resource for assisting these projects with the concurrence of the USOM Representative using the same standard of payments as previously outlined. For larger, worthwhile, labor-intensive projects such as earthmoving for roads, ditches and dykes, and land-clearing where local food resources are insufficient, additional supplies may be ordered through USOM/Rural Affairs - Saigon.

11. Attached for reference is a sample Self-Help Project Application Form to be filled and submitted by the Hamlet Council.

INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FOR STRATEGIC HAMLETS

****

SUB-COMMITTEE OF RURAL AFFAIRS

****

HAMLET SELF-HELP PROJECT FORM

Date _____

Application Number to be filled in by Provincial SELF-HELP COMMITTEE _____ PROVINCE _____ TACTICAL ZONE _____ SYMBOL

Hamlet _____ Village _____ District _____

I. PROJECT DESCRIPTION (Use extra space on back of page if necessary)

a. Purpose:
b. Location in Hamlet:
c. Number of citizens benefitted:
d. Size of project;
e. Number of mandays required and desired starting and finishing dates:
f. Other information Hamlet wishes to include maps or plans if necessary:

II. List of materials and tools required for project

(Supplied by Hamlet Citizens): (Value, Remarks)	Requested by citizens from Provincial Self-Help Sub Committee (Value, Remarks)
1	1
2	2
3	3
4	4
5	5
6	6
7	7
8	8
9	9
10	10
Total	

III. a. What is best way to transport materials from Province Capital to your village?

b. To what village shall materials be transported _____ village

Signature of Hamlet Council Members _____ _____

_____ _____

Hamlet Chief

IV.

Date Project Received at Province Level	Date Approved by Provincial Self-Help Committee	Date Provincial Materials shipped to village

Signature _____

Chairman-Provincial Strategic Hamlets Committee-Self-Help Sub-Committee

I - Extra space for Project Description

From _____
Hamlet

_____
District

_____
Province

Stamp

Symbol

TO

_____

Province Chief

Chairman Strategic Hamlet Provincial
Committee Self-Help Sub-Committee

VIET-NAM

SPECIAL LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Brief Analysis of the Current Situation.

Traditionally, many farmers in Viet Nam have raised a few hogs, and pork is an important item in the diet of the total population. One estimate, in the year 1960, indicated that Viet Nam produced 222 hogs per 1,000 inhabitants, as compared with 350 hogs per 1,000 inhabitants in Taiwan and 320 hogs per 1,000 inhabitants in U.S.A. Although much improvement in breeding, feeding and disease control has been accomplished within the last few years, under the direction of USOM advisors and VN Directorate of Animal Husbandry, there is still room for much improvement.

General description of the Project.

Pursuant to the expanded authority of the "Food for Peace" Program, under PL 480 - Title II - Section 202, we propose to utilize US surplus agricultural commodities as a means of developing a sound livestock program with compost making, to improve the living standards of low income farmers and provide capital for Cooperatives. The Title II corn and other commodities will be sold or loaned to farmers by the cooperatives for cash at prices calculated to pay operating costs plus a substantial contribution to the capital of the cooperatives. Distribution of these cash proceeds will be subject to periodic CGCAC/USOM review.

The proposed program is an important part of the GVN/USOM Counter Insurgency Plan to provide low-income farm families, within the Strategic Hamlets and otherwise, a quick source of income and organic fertilizer and fits into the long-term plans aimed at improving the National Economy and helping to remedy the traditional single-crop pattern of farming.

Providing U.S. surplus commodities as supplementary feed for livestock and poultry now on farms at a reasonable price. Present supplies of feed are not adequate to maintain a reasonable production level of poultry and livestock products for local consumption and for available export demand. It is planned that this phase of the program will continue for two to three years or until the feed supply situation is corrected. Compost making will also be encouraged.

The Pig-Compost Program for 100,000 poor farm families for 5 years or less:

For each family: Eight bags of cement for pigsty and compost area, as a Counter Insurgency Grant in Aid. One breeder pig, of improved quality and two market pigs (meat hogs) and six to eight month's feed supply, as a loan-in-kind from NACO.

Schedule of Implementation
(five years or less)

Yr.	Period	Hamlets	Farm Families	BreederPigs Male	BreederPigs Female	Market Pigs	Total
1963	1st. Qtr.	40	1,000	960	40	2,000	3,000
1963	2nd. "	120	3,000	2,880	120	6,000	9,000
1963	3rd. "	120	3,000	2,880	120	6,000	9,000
1963	4th "	120	3,000	2,880	120	6,000	9,000
Tot. 12 months		400	10,000	9,600	400	20,000	30,000
1964	Tot. 12 mos.	720	18,000	17,280	720	36,000	54,000
1965	Tot. 12 mos.	960	24,000	23,040	960	48,000	72,000
1966	Tot. 12 mos.	960	24,000	23,040	960	48,000	72,000
1967	Tot. 12 mos.	960	24,000	23,040	960	48,000	72,000
Total 5 years		4,000	100,000	96,000	4,000	200,000	300,000

Comments

The forty eight farmers' Associations have already had limited experience with the "Swine Compost-making" Program. Nearly 600 farm families were provided with pig projects in the year 1961 and 3,000 farm families programmed for 1962. As we proceed with this program the above projected number of farm families will be adjusted to meet existing circumstances from month to month and year to year.

Geographic Area: Under the direction of the Commissariat General for Cooperatives and Agricultural Credit (CGCAC) and through the National Federation for Agricultural Cooperatives (NFAC), one hundred thirty Farm Associations and Commodity Cooperatives will extend the program to all of the important livestock producing Provinces of Viet Nam; initially in sensitive target areas.

Feed Supplies: By-products from the Rice Mill Industry, supplemented with farm produced vegetables and other miscellaneous items, but without proper balance of protein and mineral supplements, have been the normal hog feeding pattern. On account of other demands for the rice by-products and the general "security" situation, prices of rice by-products have become too high for profitable hog production. As a consequence of these unfavorable conditions, hog production in Viet Nam has registered a substantial reduction in the past two years, whereas local and export demand would justify a substantial increase.

Facilities: With the technical and financial assistance of USOM, the GVN Directorate of Animal Husbandry has already established Poultry and livestock Stations in twelve provinces, fairly well situated throughout Viet Nam. Most important of these is twenty hectare Tan Son Nhut livestock and Poultry Experiment Station near Saigon which is equipped with modern buildings, laboratory facilities and feed mixing equipment. Other similar stations are located in eleven of the 40 provinces. The VN Directorate of Animal Husbandry also owns and maintains a Central Hog receiving, marketing and quarantine station at Saigon which accommodates two to three thousand weaner pigs or one to two thousand market hogs.

The objectives to be accomplished are:

To develop and improve Swine Production Practices.

To improve Soil Management Practices by making and using compost (Organic Fertilizer) in connection with the livestock production program.

To improve and increase the production of feed grains to a point where more livestock can be produced.

To improve the Operating and Capital Position of Cooperatives and Farmers' Associations.

To extend the services of Farm Cooperatives to many more Farm Families.

It is planned to distribute sufficient quantities of U. S. surplus commodities to level off and, more or less, stabilize feed costs for all poultry and livestock producers. If this can be accomplished, all livestock and poultry producers in the nation will benefit, directly or indirectly.

We plan to provide one hundred thousand low-income farm families with facilities and finances to establish themselves in the swine business and the production of compost.

Although no definite annual increase in hog numbers has been calculated, we would estimate that the two phases of this program would stimulate pork production at about the rate of ten percent per year for three to four years.

Present Vietnamese per annum pork consumption is indicated at only 6.8 Kg. per capita. With increased hog production and consequent additional income to farmers, VN authorities estimate substantial increase in pork consumption. Any surplus hogs can be profitably exported to HongKong where better than one million hogs are imported annually from several Asian countries. With the improved breeding, feeding and management practices contemplated within this program and with planned increased production of corn and other feed items in Viet Nam, we anticipate that Viet Nam hog producers can compete for the export demand. Also, there is an excellent demand for weaner pigs for export to nearby Asian countries.

Plan of Operation

In cooperation with GVN and USOM Animal Husbandry officials and Technicians, courses in all phases of hog production, including breeding, feeding, sanitation and management are being planned for the management and field personnel of the Farm cooperatives. GVN and USOM Extension Technicians and Advisors will also be involved in this program at National, Provincial and local levels.

Selection of Cooperators: For the most part, lower-income farm families will be selected for this project many of them tenant farmers. Within the thousands of Strategic Hamlets now being organized and protected, and within the normal villages, the National Agricultural Credit Office and the Directorates of Cooperatives and Farmers' Associations are now making plans for selection of farm families, for this program, well in advance of the first deliveries of pigs and

Title II feed commodities. The forty eight "Pilot" Farmers' Associations have already had two years experience with the "Swine Compost-Making" program as program as pointed out in "comment".

On Farm: Eight bags of cement will be provided as a grant from USOM Counter Insurgency funds, to each cooperating, new pig-raising farm family for use in constructing a pigsty 3 meters by 3 meters, and compost making area 2 meters by 3 meters. Loans will be available, to each cooperating farm family, for the purchase of local material to complete the pigsty.

District (County) Facilities: Small Pig holding facilities and grain storage facilities need to be provided as the Program progresses. Also, Feed Milling equipment and facilities will need to be provided for at least some of the one hundred cooperatives participating in the program. As the program progresses and some or all of the cooperatives prove their ability to make a success of the program, supplementary provisions for commodities will be programmed.

Central and Area Pig Receiving, Marketing and Quarantine Stations: In cooperation with the VN Directorate of Animal Husbandry, the principal livestock and Poultry Experiment Station at Tan Son Nhut and the Central Hog Marketing, Receiving and Quarantine Station at Saigon will be fully utilized in the program. Likewise some of the eleven smaller Provincial livestock and poultry stations will be improved and utilized, as area receiving, marketing and quarantine stations. As the program progresses and the need arises, additional stations will be provided.

How the Source of Protein, Mineral and Vitamin Supplement is financed: Course ground corn meal, at the rate of forty kilograms per pig per month and 44% soybean oil meal, at the rate of five kilograms per pig per month, are being requested, during the first two years of this program, under "Food for Peace", PL 480, Title II, Section 202 and Title IV PL 480 Loans respectively. Commencing the third year, it is planned that quantities of PL 480 corn and soybean oil meal will be gradually reduced and locally produced feed supplies substituted therefore.

Minerals: Through the VN Directorate of Animal Husbandry, local supplies of minerals (calcium, phosphorus and trace minerals) have been developed and proved adequate for needs here in Viet Nam. These minerals will be purchased by the Federation of Cooperatives and

distributed, as loans in-kind to the farmers, through the District Cooperatives.

Vitamin: With supplies of corn meal, to be supplied under the program, together with local supplies of rice by-products, farm supplied green feeds, root vegetables and plenty of sunshine in this country, GVN and USOM livestock Specialists assure us that additional vitamins will not be necessary.

The schedule of prices to be charged producer for PL 480, Title II, Section 202, course ground corn and 44% soybean oil meal are:

	First two years 1963-1964	Tentative Schedule for future years 1965	1966	1967
Ground corn p/Kg	VN$2.00	VN$2.50	VN$3,000	VN$3.50
Equals p/lb.	US$0.0124	US$0.0155	US$0.0186	US$0.0217
SoybeanMeal p/Kg	VN$4.00	VN$5.00	VN$6.00	VN$7.00*
Equals p/lb	US$0.0248	US$0.031	US$0.0372	US$0.0434*

After the payment of all cost of operation, under this program, all Net Proceeds generated within each participating cooperative and each farmer's association shall accrue to its Capital Structure and Net Worth, along with the Net earnings from other operations.

Under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Commissariat General for Cooperatives and Agricultural Credit, from time to time, each cooperative and each farmer's association may use such Capital Funds for any necessary purpose.

Comments

This Schedule of prices is calculated on the basis that the corn and soybean oil meal will be made available to the National Federation of Cooperatives, CIF Saigon, on a grant basis.

The gradual increase in prices to Farmers, over the period of

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*Full landed costs plus inland handling will be charged for soybean meal or other U.S. protein feed if only available under Title IV loan

five years, is subject to adjustment on a basis that will result in prices approximately equivalent to probable locally produced or purchased feeds at the end of the five year program.

Plan for the development of a permanent source of food:

Corn Production: GVN officials and USOM Extension Advisors are encouraging corn production and each of the cooperatives, participating in this pig program, is sponsoring increased corn production.

Rice By-products: Increasing supplies of rice by-products will be available as rice production is increased from improved practices and the use of more fertilizer.

Technical assistance required and how it is to be provided:

GVN Veterinary Service: With the financial and technical assistance of USOM, the GVN Directorate of Animal Husbandry has made substantial progress toward providing personnel and facilities to control livestock diseases and establishing standards for improved breeding and feeding practices. Vaccines for hog cholera and swine plagues are being produced in their project vaccine production laboratory and administered through the central office at Saigon and branch veterinary offices in nearly all of the provinces.

Cooperative Field Service: Each of the Cooperatives participating in this program maintains a field service department. Already some of these field men have had experience with livestock production problems and will receive training under the VN Directorate of Animal Husbandry.

Transportation, Warehousing and Marketing of Pigs and Hogs:

In the beginning transportation, warehousing and marketing of weaner pigs and market hogs will be accomplished through normal market channels, already fairly well developed throughout the Nation. It is planned, however, to commence developing local district and provincial market "pools", where such pools of weaner pigs and market hogs will be sold to independent buyers on a "bid" or "bargaining" basis.

As the program proceeds, consideration will be given to the proposition of a more direct marketing program, which would involve additional facilities and finances therefor.

Estimated Date for Initiation of the Project and Time Required for Completion: The program for providing supplementary feed for livestock and poultry now on farms, will commence early in 1963 and continue for two to three years or until the feed supply situation is corrected. The Pig-Compost Program for 100,000 farm families is scheduled to commence late in 1962 and continue for 5 years or less, depending on the ability of the cooperatives to complete the program.

The Chronological Schedule for implementation of the Pig-Compost Program is as follows:

On or before sixty days before delivery of pigs to farmers, selection of farm families to participate in the program in each area and approval of NACO loan committment is approximately as follows:

	Maximum
For one breeder and two market pigs	VN$1,800.00
For local material for pigsty	VN$1,000.00
For feed for the first six months	VN$1,800.00
Total loan committment	VN$4,800.00

On or before forty days before delivery of pigs to farmers - delivery of 8 bags of cement and loan proceeds or local material for construction of pigsty and compost area. Supervise the construction of same.

On or before thirty days before delivery of pigs to farmers - contract for purchase of pigs.

On or before fifteen days before delivery of pigs to farmers - assembly of pigs at quarantine station for vaccination, and other needed treatments.

Delivery of pigs to farmers - pigs and one month of food will be delivered to the participating farmers by the Cooperatives and Associations.

Estimated Costs

(itemized by categories of use and source of funds as follows:)

Commodities	1963 Units	1963 Amount	1964 Units	1964 Amounts
Cement(at $1.25)	80,000	$100,000(PA/PR)	144,000	$180,000
*Trucks	5	25,000	5	25,000
*Jeeps	50	150,000	50	150,000
Boars (Purebred)	100	10,000(PA/PR)	100	10,000
Feed Supplements	-	10,000(PA/PR	-	10,000
Total		* $295,000		$375,000

Commodity requirements for years succeeding 1963 and 1964 will be computed as the program progresses.

Schedule of PL-480-202 Commodity requirements

	Rate of Usage	
	Corn	Soybean Meal
1963/1964 Per Pig-per month	40 Kg.	5 Kg.
1965 " " " "	30 Kg.	5 Kg.
1966/1967 " " " "	20 Kg.	3 Kg.

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*Vehicle requirements are tentative and every effort is being made locally to utilize existing government and commercial transport.

Requirements and sales value

Year	Period	Ground Corn Qty M.T.	Ground Corn *Sales Value (VN$000)	Soybean Meal Qty M.T.	Soybean Meal *Sales Value (VN$000)	Total *Sales Value (VN$000)
1963	1st qtr.	9,000	18,000	6,000	24,000	42,000
	2nd qtr.	9,000	18,000	6,000	24,000	42,000
	3rd qtr.	9,000	18,000	6,000	24,000	42,000
	4th qtr.	9,000	18,000	6,000	24,000	42,000
	Total	36,000	72,000	24,000	96,000	168,000
1964	12 months	48,000	96,000	24,000	96,000	192,000
1965	" "	60,000	150,000	24,000	120,000	270,000
1966	" "	80,000	240,000	16,000	96,000	336,000
1967	" "	100,000	350,000	15,000	105,000	455,000
Total 5 yrs.		324,000	908,000	103,000	513,000	1,421,000

GVN Financial Participation

Loans to farm families - National Agricultural Credit Office.

Under the supplementary feed program it is anticipated that some 300,000 farm families will be buying this supplementary feed and that 150,000 of them would purchase this feed from the Cooperatives as loans in-kind each year.

The estimated loans for 150,000 farm families at VN$1,000.00 - for one year, VN$150,000.000; for three years VN$450,000.000.

Under the Pig-Compost Program each participating farm family: - 8 bags cement - (no charge); local construction material (cash) - VN$1,000: three pigs at VN$600 (in-kind) - VN$1,800: feeds (6 months) - (in-kind) - VN$1,800: Total, VN$4,600.

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*VN$ Sales Value indicates: "Sales Price to Farmers and Income to Cooperatives".

Annual Loan Committments

Year	Families	Loan per family	Loan Total
1963	10,000	VN$4,600	VN$46,000,000
1964	18,000	4,600	82,800,000
1965	24,000	4,600	110,400,000
1966	24,000	4,600	110,400,000
1967	24,000	4,600	110,400,000
5-yr Total	100,000	-	460,000,000

These committments for loans will be the Normal Short-term loans made by NACO:

Interest Rate: One per cent per month on the unpaid balance.

Maturity Date: Advances repayable on or before eighteen months from date of advance.

Borrowers pledge their assets as security for repayment of loans.

Contribution to the Capital of NACO: Five percent of each loan advance is retained by NACO as the borrower's savings deposited in the Capital of NACO.

Text of Document Explaining Pig Program
to Viet Nam Farmers

In the next few weeks, many farmers in this area will start in the pig business. Through their Farmer's Association, they will receive, free, enough cement to build a pigsty and compost shelter. With a loan from the National Agricultural Credit Office, they can buy pigs and food. The pigs will be a mixture of purefred Yorkshire and Berkshire breeds and the local pigs. This mixed breed frows to market weight and produces offspring at an earlier age than the local pigs. Greater profits are realized because of this faster weight gain and earlier maturity, even though they need more feed than the local pigs. The best and greatest numbers of pigs are grown in the My Tho area. Because the typhoon and floods in Hue and Nha Trang have killed many pigs, there are few pigs in the market there.

For these reasons, My Tho pigs will be bought for districution. They are being taken to a central quarantine section where they are given medicine to get rid of worms and then vaccinated for hog cholera before they are sent to the Central provinces.

In the beginning of this program, some difficulties have already arisen. Because the pigs are very young and the distance they must be shipped is great, some piglets have died. This was expected and replacement pigs have been sent to those farmers who have suffered losses.

The piglets have now recovered from the hardships they have experienced and are eating and growing at a satisfactory rate. The farmer can expect continued rapid growth and will rejoice when the mother pig produces young and the fathers are sold in the market. Too, the soil will be greatly enriched by the use of the fertilizer produced by the pigs. This will enable the farmer to grow more of the feed for his pigs and piglets.

OUTLINE OF PL 480 TITLE II PROJECTS FOR USOM/VIETNAM RURAL AFFAIRS PROGRAM

Below are listed details, requests and opinions regarding Title II Projects for USOM/Saigon as well as initial shipping instructions for all of the projects which the Mission hopes to implement as early as possible as integral parts of our Counter-Insurgency effort:

Government to Government Projects

Supply of Grains and Oil for Relief and Rehabilitation of Montagnards: (Section 201):

250 m/t of corn, 50 m/t of corn meal and 150 m/t of beans are already enroute and will arrive before November 20, 1962.

An additional 500 m/t of corn, 100 m/t of corn meal and 300 m/t of beans are listed in our FY 63 Program Presentation dollar amounts with the thought that Title III supplies may be utilized through the volagencies for subsequent needs. However, our latest experience shows that Bulgur is more acceptable, even for Montagnards, than corn and corn meal so that bulgur should be substituted for the corn and corn meal remaining to be shipped in our FY 63 program, and also for the beans if they are no longer available. Arrival of these subsequent shipments should be before the end of January 1963. 100,000 one-gallon tins of cooking oil are also requested as an additional item for these subsequent shipments since fats and oils are needed critically by the Montagnards now being resettled.

Support of Rural Development Projects and Rural Self-Help Activities: (Section 202):

Under this project commencing from January 1, 1963 a supply of approximately fifty metric tons of Title II - Section 202 grains, (initially 30 m/t of bulgar and 20 m/t of cornmeal or corn), plus 1500 one-gallon tins of cooking oil, will be made available to each of the 40 provinces of Vietnam each month for payment of wages to poor and underemployed peasants working on village and hamlet social and economic development projects, and, where warranted by difficult or onerous working conditions, on self-help activities where free labor contributions could not be reasonably expected.

These village and hamlet development projects will be suggested and generated at local levels on simple standard project forms and presented to Provincial Development Commissions which will include the USOM Provincial Representative and the MAAG Sector Advisor Representative for screening and allocation of Title II foodstuffs as well as other USOM materials and cash resources made available from our Counter-Insurgency Program. In other words, Title II commodities under this project will provide an important additional resource for mounting our intensified rural development effort! For the forty provinces of Vietnam this will require 1200 m/t of bulgar, 800 m/t of corn or cornmeal, depending on which is easiest to supply from the US, and 60,000 one-gallon tins of cooking oil each month. Since we hope to have these supplies in place in the provinces and ready for allocation from January 1, 1963, we must have the first quarter CY 63 shipment in Saigon by 15 December 1962 and regular quarterly allocation arrivals thereafter by March 1, 1963, June 1, 1963 and so on at three-month intervals. If you cannot get the first shipment here before 15 December 1962, we may be able to start the program by borrowing against local Title III stocks from NCWC/CRS, an E-1 describing this project in full will be forwarded.

Animal Production Project: (Section 202):

Title II feedstuff requirements for this project are presented in the E-1 attached to this memorandum. The initial quarterly shipment of cornmeal consisting of 9000 tons should arrive in Vietnam before December 15, 1962. Provision should be made in shipping contracts to permit its discharge in Tourane or Qui Nhon if so directed by USOM/Saigon. It may be shipped in bulk with accompanying 100 kg empty bags if desired.

Supplementary Feeding For Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps Dependents: (Section 201):

Due to very limited accurate statistics on the numbers and location of the dependent recipients to be covered by this project, we plan to start it on a rather modest, trial basis with a simple distribution once every three months of a single bag containing approximately 30 kilograms of bulgur and 2 one-gallon tins of cooking oil to each of approximately 175,000 Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps families. As now envisioned, these bags of rations will be distributed to each family thru the Province Chief and his District

and Village Chiefs. This is because the CT and SDC are para-military organizations responsible to the Province Chiefs and because while the CT frequently do not serve in their native Provinces or Districts, their dependents remain in their home areas, whereas, the SDC usually serve in the vicinity of their own homes and families. Thus, only the home province authorities appear to have the capability to get these ration bags into the hands of the dependents. Hopefully, the bags for this bulgur and cooking oil tins will be made specially in the United States of cloth similar to good flour bag material which can then be reused by the dependents for making clothing; cotton print cloth might be used! Also, the bags should have printed on them, on one small portion, in addition to a small AID shield, instructions on use of bulgur in Vietnamese as well as the appropriate symbols and slogans of our major rural development effort, scheduled to commence on January 1, 1963. Psychological impact is a most important consideration of this project.

The bulgur may be shipped in bulk and the cans of oil in separate cases together with empty bags for subsequent packing here of the two items in a single bag for distribution if Washington so desires. Instructions for the Vietnamese printing on the bags and the symbol will be airpouched in the next few days.

It is hoped to have the bulgur, oil and bags here for this initial distribution before December 15, 1962 so that the first quarterly allocation can be made to the dependents before the Vietnamese New Year in February 1963. Subsequent shipments for quarterly distribution should arrive March 1, 1963 and at three-month intervals thereafter. As presently envisioned, the first and second quarterly shipments should each consist of 5,250 m/t of bulgur, 350,000 gallon tins of cooking oil and 175,000 plus bags for bagging the above, plus needles and sewing twine.

Voluntary Agency Projects

CRS/Saigon Pig Feeding Project (Section 202):

This project was forwarded to AID/W by USOM/Saigon Airgram TOAID 537 on August 21, 1962. CRS has the facilities for warehousing and distributing it and we are anxious to see it implemented as a

a contribution to quickened social and economic development and as evidence of our interest in volagency activities here which will promote ever stronger cooperation with our own programs.

Other Volagency Title II Projects:

CRS/Saigon has indicated interest in implementing additional Title II activities other than feed projects and we will be working with them to get them started and will advise AID/W of our actions shortly.

STATUS OF MONTAGNARD PROGRAM Aug. 31, 1962

1. Funding and Administrative Arrangements.

Responsibility for Montagnards within the government of Vietnam has been assigned to the Commissariate General of Agriculture and Development (CGALDAA). On Feb. 7, 1962, VN$20 million was advanced to the CGALDAA from the President's funds. All expenditures to date have been from this amount. On August 17, 1962, the US approved, from counterpart funds reserved for counterinsurgency purposes, an amount of $VN50 million for Montagnard projects from which the VN$20 million will be repaid. Counterpart funds will be disbursed according to work plans and budgets contained in Memoranda of Agreement between the individual Province Chiefs, the CGALDAA and the USOM. The Memoranda are developed by the Province Chiefs in accordance with an over-all Project Agreement. One Memorandum of Agreement has been signed -- with Kontum Province in the amount of VN$6,479,000, 12 other Memoranda have been received in draft and are being processed.

2. Program Operations.

The program is intended to assist in relocating and caring for, on a temporary basis, Montagnards who have come out of Viet Cong infested areas seeking security. According to present plans, the VN$50 million in counterpart funds will be used primarily for food--rice, fish and salt; shelter--housing materials, fencing, blankets, sleeping mats, etc.; crop production--hand tools, seeds, fertilizer and for medical aid. In addition, where Provincial funds are not available in adequate amounts, counterpart may be used in the payment of salaries, per diem and travel expenses of cadre who will be working with the Montagnards, including health personnel and teachers.

All arrangements have been completed between the US and the GVN for the acquisition of 1350 tons of surplus US food thru Title II of PL 480. The items consist of 750 tons of whole corn, 150 tons of corn meal and 450 tons of dried beans. These will be shipped from the US in three equal shipments; the first shipment is now on the high seas and should arrive in Vietnam before the end of November.

MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

October 1, 1962

Mr. Chairman,
Honorable Deputies,

If your assembly has ever gathered at a time filled with stirring events and dramatic episodes, it is surely today, as the year 1962 which is drawing to an end, has clearly assumed an aspect which the annals of history will record forever - that of a dynamic, general expansion of our national resistance.

Who can doubt that the era of the Strategic Hamlets has opened one of the most decisive phases of the history of Viet-Nam?

In its beginnings this movement, in its technical materiality, appeared to the world as a sort of enigma. Indeed, at that stage we had to concert our efforts with the people and it is not with ordinances that revolutions are carried out. With a scattered and gradual beginning, becoming confident gradually as the spirit penetrated from man to man from village to village, from province to province, the crusade of liberation revealed its main outlines.

In this crusade, the objectives - originally outlined by the government - have spontaneously become the objectives of the Nation itself; the spot of oil of patrotism, civic conscience and social solidarity has irresistibly spread under the cover of what was originally a tactical operation.

Thus, using difficulty as a springboard, the soul of the nation is forging its unity in the trials of war.

The defense work of the Strategic Hamlets was not long in leading to our political, social and economic revolution which is as well the essential revolution for all underdeveloped countries.

It is in this context and under these circumstances that we shall review together, if you will, the tasks accomplished during the past year for the reconstruction of our country and the welfare of our Vietnamese nation.

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The proclamation of the state of emergency, the concentration and the mobilization of all the living forces of the nation are barely realities of yesterday. For in this struggle as I said in my message of last year, if the solidarity of our friends brings us a precious comfort, still we must depend above all on ourselves. In spite of obstacles, lack of understanding and determinisms, we have thus untiringly sought our common goal: the building of a democracy, made of courage, imagination and heroic fraternity. We had to restore to the citizen the plenitude of his dignity, his responsibility and his liberty; taking into account all economic and social factors bound to his human condition. For our militant and vigilant personalism imposes upon us the double necessity of maintaining the fundamental moral values and of achieving the revolutionary transformations required by History. This personalism is at the same time at the service of man and of the Revolution. The year which has just elapsed has, as I have just said, seen its essential expression in and by the vast movement of Strategic Hamlets. There will soon no longer be room for doubt that the pre-organized and fortified agglomerations are realizing the threefold political, social and military revolution of an underdeveloped country rising toward the light. This must be said once and for all and I want particularly to emphasize it here with solemnity.

This vast movement born in the heat of the war is our pre-emptory reply to the Communist challenge. It brings us, along with the certainty of victory, the pride to live as free men today and tomorrow.

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM

The troubles in Laos very manifestly served as a pretext for the massive infiltration of Viet Cong troops who, coming from North Viet Nam, and passing through the Laotian territory, penetrated into the Highlands of Viet Nam through the long open frontier between the two territories.

These infiltrations were the primary cause of the sharp, renewed outbreak of rebel attacks, marked by the entry into action of regular Viet Cong units with normal officer command and equipped with powerful and modern weapons. The multiple evidence of this situation, brought to the attention of the ICC by the Vietnamese Mission in charge of Liaison with this organization, cannot leave the slightest doubt, not only of the

direct intervention of the authorities of Hanoi, but also of the active participation of the Soviet Union and Red China in the aggression against our Nation.

With increased support of their allies of the Free World, the Vietnamese people have intrepidly coped with this recrudescence of aggression. That was, in the year 1961, inscribed in letters of blood in our history.

Using the power conferred on me by Article 44 of our Constitution, I thus decreed on October 15, 1961 a state of emergency in the whole territory. At the same time your Assembly, interpreter of the popular will, voted unanimously in urgent proceedings for the law which confers on the President of the Republic exceptional powers to take, by decree-laws, all the decisions necessary in the field of national security and for the mobilization of all the resources of the nation.

I am pleased to stress that, in accepting all these important measures with calm and discipline, the Vietnamese Nation has shown not only that it was fully aware of the particular exigencies of the situation but, further, that it considers this war as one of all Vietnamese patriots and not a war solely of the government and armed forces.

In this war where the front is everywhere, and nowhere where ideas play a role as decisive as arms, it is in the heart of each citizen it is in the home of each family in each cell of our society, in a word, that it is well to maintain this faith in the future and this pride of a people who, for milleniums have meant to remain master of their own destiny.

Conscious of their historical mission, our Republican Youth have quickly and vigorously assumed their responsibility. Taking in hand the defense of villages and hamlets, boys and girls beside their resolute elders are heroically protecting the population against Communist terrorism and subversion. Henceforth, thanks to the revolutionary system of strategic hamlets, our Republican Youth are contributing in great measure to relieving our military and paramilitary forces from their heavy obligations of static defense in order that these may return to their operational missions; forces the revalorization and reinforcement of which have been particularly noticeable in the course of these last months.

The staffing of the army with an officer corps, a primordial problem in this kind of war, has been noticeably improved. The Special Military Schools for the Army, Navy and Air Force and the Advanced Military School continue at an accelerated rate to train and to perfect regular officers; the Dalat Military Academy, in particular, has shortened its training schedule from a four year peacetime program to a two-year wartime program.

To the recall to the colors of the reserve officers has been added the incorporation of young intellectuals into the Reserve Officers School of Thu Duc, which continues the training of new and vigorous classes. The enrollment per class has increased from 750 last year to 1,500 this year. The present to graduate exceeds 2,000 cadets, almost half of whom - a fact which I know inspires your pride.

At the Cadre School in Nha Trang which trains commissioned and non-commissioned officers from the ranks, the enrollment of each class has been doubled. We can affirm that the command now has at its disposal, from the point of view of both quality and quantity, the phalanx of competent, dynamic and enthusiastic young officers needed at the echelons of section and of company.

Parallel to this not negligible increase in the total strength of the Armed Forces of the Republic, the paramilitary forces of the Civil Guard and the village Self Defense Corps like the paramilitary youth and women's corps have recorded an important extension, attested to by spectacular progress in the provision of arms and particularly in training. These forces will soon be capable, with or without the support of regular units, of assuming the responsibilities of maintaining territorial security.

Finally, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force have benefitted by a substantial reinforcement of their combat potential: the replacement of outdated equipment, the supply of appropriate weapons and equipment such as helicopters and amphibious armored cars, the important improvement of the communications network and roads system - such an extent of progress in the material field as to have permitted the three branches of our armed forces to adopt a strategy resolutely turned to the offensive.

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All these factors of improvement are dramatically reflected in the present military situation. To measure the progress made, it is sufficient to recall certain prophecies of doom which spread about at this same time two years ago.

The situation is today, I can affirm, reversed. Everywhere,we are recovering the initiative and this even during the rainy season which heretofore the enemy has considered as favorable him. Everywhere, we are passing to the offensive, sowing insecurity in the reputedly impregnable Communist strongholds, smashing their regular units one after another.

The successive victories won, notably in the Plain of Reeds and in the Camau area, and in their bases in the Annamite Chain have striken a severe blow at the potential of the enemy and dismantled a great measure of the enemy forces.

These victories mark an incontestable turn in the insidious war with which we have had to cope.

These military successes have had appreciable repercussions on the economic situation of the country. For the first time in 15 years, in this present period of transition, the price of rice has decreased; during these last months, a clear improvement has been noted in commerce namely in those remote zones which were practically abandoned two years ago.

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From whence comes our success?

First of all, as I have already pointed out, from the entire people who, in the face of the national peril, have found their footing and stood as one man.

Further, great efforts have been made by the government to perfect methods of combat, particularly in the field of combined operations. The rational distribution of missions that devolve on different echelons and the close coordination between military chiefs and the civilian territorial authorities have ensured an increasing efficiency in our war machinery.

Finally, we must mention the high morale of our combattants who benefit by multiple measures taken in the framework of the social program of the army with a view to improving their welfare, to helping and supporting their families whether they be in active service - off active service as wounded or disabled, or demobilized.

The families of the heroes fallen on the field of honor are the object of a special and respectful solicitude.

Numbers speak: the increase of pay for the regular troops and the Civil Guard costs a supplementary half a billion piasters a year.

The system of military cooperatives which provides basic necessities at moderate prices is developing intensively. Since the beginning of this year, the volume of turnover of the cooperatives has increased tenfold.

The housing conditions of married soldiers are noticeably improved. In the numerous camps for married soldiers, each family is entitled to decent lodging, exempt from rentwhich would be a heavy burden on the family budget. In some cases, included with lodgings is a piece of land to improve the living conditions of the soldier's family. The most remarkable progress is ensured by thousands of prefabricated houses built for the Divisions. Each Division will, upon the imminent completion of the project, dispose of 2,000 of these houses.

Then disabled to whom the nation fulfills a duty of solidarity and justice, and not a mere exercise of charity, are entitled to priority employment and to care at the Orthopedic Center, which has been the object of considerable development with a view to ensuring the necessary supply of artificial limbs.

War windows, thanks to an extreme simplification of administrative procedure, are able to receive assistance and see their pensions settled in the shortest delay, a maximum of two weeks.

The children of the combattants are admitted to the School for Children of the Military which, previously reserved only to the regular army, now admits the children of the Civil Guards and the Village Self Defense Corpsmen who have died for the nation.

The war orphans retain greatest attention. The National Assembly voted, at the beginning of this year, the law creating an Office for Wards of the Nation. Among the measures provided for, a boarding school with accomodations for a thousand war orphans is under construction with the aid of the government and contributions of private individuals. Later, a day-school will be reserved to the children of soldiers fighting on the front.

Over and above all these measures, the establishment in the Strategic Hamlets of a new scale of social values where the first place is reserved to the combattants and their families shows in a concrete and realistic way the will of the government and the people to improve the lot of our combattants, military or civilian, whether they be in the regular army, in the Civil Guard, in the Self-Defense Corps, whether they be village notables or members of paramilitary organizations.

Everyone realizes now that, if they are risking their lives in the service of the nation, the government and the people are grateful to them for it, and that if they make the supreme sacrifice in the service of the nation and of liberty, their widows and children need not fear for the future.

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Recognizing the determination of our people in the fight against Communism, the allies of the Free World are bringing us steadily increasing support.

The Government and the great people of the United States have fully understood the meaning and the importance of the struggle Vietnam is waging for the cause of freedom. Since the visits of Vice President Johnson and of General Maxwell Taylor, the engagement of the United States at our side has been confirmed by significant acts.

The exchange of letters between President Kennedy and myself concerning measures designed to reinforce the defensive capacity of Vietnam was followed on January last by the joint communique of the two governments, American and Vietnamese, setting forth a vast economic and social program aimed at providing our people with the means of raising their standard of living.

That increased support of our allies took concrete form in the creation of the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam last February, a decision which marked the determination of the U.S. to fight beside us to a finish.

Three other countries have as well brought us precious aid: Malaya allows our combattants to benefit from training in its anti-guerilla training centers. The United Kingdom has put at our disposal the competency of administrative and police specialists. The Commonwealth of Australia has just sent to Vietnam the first group of thirty highly qualified military instructors.

II. THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS

One of the essential factors in the recovery of our present situation is, as I have just pointed out, the realization of the Strategic Hamlets.

The Strategic Hamlets seriously upset Communist tactics depriving them of the advantages of the absence of a traditional front and of those attacks which they so easily staged not so long ago, with the tactics of dispersion and surprise. By delimiting a continuous line of fire at hamlet level as well as in the complex of hamlets, as solidarity has been developed between them and encouraged at the central level, the new organization forces the Communists into fighting on this well-defined line, behind which the riposte is prepared by well entrenched local elements. In short, tactics are now reversed: the local elements, supplemental as they were, become the principal elements and the regular units of the Army which were formerly dispersed to meet the needs of defense of the villages now have only a mission of intervention and are thus relieved for large scale operations against the regular communist troops. Better still, under the pressure of our active and articulate defense which takes its pattern from certain pitfalls of guerilla warfare, the Communists find themselves forces into an improvised counter-guerilla action. It may be said that the battle has changed, not only in apparatus but in its spirit also.

And it is precisely this change which makes the Strategic Hamlets a military revolution, although the most important and the most significant aspect must be found beyond the purely military field.

The Strategic Hamlet is indeed also and primarily the poit of impact of a political and social revolution which will serve as a foundation for our economic revolution.

On the political level, as security is restored by the defense system of the Strategic Hamlets and the careful screening of the local enemy elements, democracy and the guarantees of the law can be implemented. The hamlet, with the representative system of government prevailing in civilized societies, enjoys communal liberties, the more concrete and the more evident as they are practised within the framework of an administrative and financial autonomy in constant expansion.

On the social level, moreover, the strategic hamlets hencefort form the base of a new scale of values, founded essentially on civic virtues and dedication to the common good. The two-fold personalist principle of collective progress and individual advancement, offers virtually boundless opportunities to the man of courage, if he is also a good man.

A political, social and military revolution, such then is the heroic tryptich which our people, with our youth in the forefront, are now building in the Strategic Hamlets. Our solution of the double problem of the economic revolution and of the development of Man in his well being, in freedom and justice, is inscribed in the most certain future, whatever communism, the enemy of mankind, may do.

I amable to tell you that to date the total number of people living in security and in revolution within the established hamlets (3,074 hamlets) or in those being established (2,679 hamlets) has reached 7,267,517. It is expected that with an average of 600 new strategic hamlets established every month, this number by the end of 1962 will have reached the figure of 9,253.000 people, representing two thirds of the population.

III. NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

Our primordial objective, which is the struggle against Communist subversion, does not allow us to neglect the urgent needs for national reconstruction in all domains - where our progress is the more meritorious, since the enemy is bent on slowing it down if not entirely preventing its development.

From the standpoint of economic and social development, this year is particularly worthy of our attention since it constitutes a link between the completion of the first Five-Year Plan(1957-19661) and the beginning of the second Five-Year Plan (1962-1966).

A. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

1. Agricultural Sector

In agriculture, the Government has maintained a special top priority to the development of the rural sector, which comprises 80 per cent of our population.

As the second Five-Year Plan begins, we can rejoice at having laid, during the seven years, solid foundations for a steady and continued development of our rural economy.

By putting under cultivation abandoned land and by the conquest of virgin land within the framework of Agricultural Development, whether in the Highlands or on the southern plains, we have increased between 1955 and 1961, the cultivated areas planted in rice by 15% and those planted in rubber by 32% including the family plantations of the Agricultural Development Service, to mention only the two main crops, aside from other new crops such as keenaf, lacquer trees, potatoes, and so forth.

On the other hand, the Land Reform Program has brought 110,000 rural families, formerly proletarian, to the status of land owners of a total of 430,000 hectares of rice fields, belonging entirely to them. As for tenant-farmers as a whole, a law had been enacted which considerably reduces the tenant farming rents, that is to say, an appropriation to their profit.

Finally, an efficient system of agricultural credit has enabled us, from 1957 to date, to loan three and a half billion piasters to 1,250,000 farm families, either directly or through 320 cooperatives and 760 farmers' associations. With the revolutionary creation of the Strategic Hamlets, Agricultural credit is undergoing a new development both in amount and in duration, by increase in number of medium and long-term loans.

It is thanks to these far-reaching structural, technical and financial reforms that, despite the particularly difficult living conditions of a country which is both underdeveloped and ravaged by Communism, we have been able to achieve during the past seven years an average rate of agriculture development which, on the whole, exceeds by far the rate of increase of our population.

But to attain the complete economic independence anticipated, we must strive for a full development of our immense agricultural potential within the framework of collective progress and the raising of the living standard of the rural population.

To this end, the second Five-Year Plan, which includes the program of rural projects for the year 1963, has the following principal objectives:

First, to raise the annual production of paddy to 5,500.000 tons, thus effecting an increase of 18% in five years as compared to the production of the 1960-61 season. This result will be obtained by simultaneous implementation of various interrelated projects: intensification of use of chemical fertilizers, expansion of the plants protection program which began this year, festering the use of selected seeds, execution of large-scale projects of agricultural hydraulics aimed at increasing the irrigated areas in Central Vietnam and the double-crop areas in the South.

In the field of rubber production and within the framework of the Agricultural Development program, the total area of family plantations, which already covers 35,000 hectares, will be increased to a minimum of 100,000 hectares, not including the new or replanted areas of existing large and medium - sized plantations.

As to animal husbandry, hog raising which is a natural complement to our rice production, will be intensified in order to satisfy the needs of local consumption, and for the development of exportation, for which Vietnam is particularly well suited. This program is designed not only to absorb all the by-products of our rice production, but also to utilize the excess manpower in the countryside.

With regard to forest resources, the outdated legislation and taxation regime will gradually be overhauled with the aim of safeguarding the national forest reserves and encouraging full utilization of available products through technological improvements. Also, the reforestation and fire protection campaign will be intensified in order to preserve the existing stands for future generations.

For the implementation of this vast program, the regrouping of means and responsibilities under one single Department, the Department of Rural Affairs, has resulted in better coordination and greater efficiency of the regrouped services.

Without doubt, great obstacles to the implementation of this development plan will be posed by reactionary maneuvers of the Communists. We will overcome these obstacles, however, by linking all of these projects to the mechanism of the Strategic Hamlets.

2. Industrial Sector

The State has played an important role in industrial development, by helping and encouraging investments, by associating itself with private national and foreign capital, and by itself creating industrial enterprises the stocks of which will later be sold to individuals. In this last category are the Nong Son Mines, theHatien Cement Factory, the Tan Mai Sawmill.

The textile industry has made as tonishing progress. Several plants, equipped with the most modern machines, are producing fabrics of excellent quality and in sufficient quantity to meet a large part of local needs. This has permitted a substantial reduction in imports. And before long, Sicovina, a company entirely capitalized with Vietnamese funds will be functioning in Tourane.

The Hiep Hoa sugar factory has attained a production of 10,000 tons yearly, and the modernization of the Khanh Hoi refinery has been completed. The COGIDO paper factory has just been inaugurated.

The industries which manufacture aluminium and cast iron items, nails and pins, agricultural tools and bicycle accessories, are now in full swing; their overall production having now reached 5,000 tons per year.

The manufacture of plastic articles is satisfying, local needs for the present, while the rubber industry is making steady progress.

A certain number of pharmaceutical products, including those in greatest demand by the public, are being prepared in the country. As to oil, the Government has signed an agreement with the Shell and Esso companies for the construction of a refinery.

The development of handicraft has received special support from the Government. It has shown remarkable progress, both in the techniques of production and in the creation of original designs,

and handicraft articles such as embroideries, carpets, objects made of shell, ivory, mother of pearl, pottery, lacquer paintings and furniture among others have, during recent years scored flattering success at the international fairs of Paris, Brussels, London, Tokyo, Osaka, Bangkok, New Delhi, Washington, Seattle, Casablanca, and Bari.

The progress of industrialization has been upheld by a steady increase in production of basic energy.

The Nong Son coal mines have raised their production from 55,000 tons for the period 1956 to 1960 up to 100,000 tons in 1962. In 1965, they will be producing 250,000 tons and will be able to support the various activities of the An Hoa industrial complex the construction of which is planned for completion in 1964.

Completion of the first stage of the Danhim project, in 1965 will permit an 80% increase in the production of electric power. By that time, theHa Tien cement factory will also begin production.

Evidence of the steady progress of our industry can be given in terms of new investments totalling 5,589,810,000$ Having benefit from tax exemption privileges for the period between February 1958 and June 1962.

3. Public Facilities

Public facilities have seen spectacular progress in many sectors.

The road network has been considerably improved, especially with regard to the access roads to the Highlands. In spite of certain difficulties relative to funds and materials, we have undertaken the construction of 255 of the 850 kilometers of roads originally planned.

The North-South railway maintains its passenger and freight service despite sabotage and attacks by the Viet Cong.

Efficiency will be mush improved by the use of Diesel electric locomotives and new freight cars presently on order. To the prospects of substituting Diesel engines for steam engines are added those of the electrification of certain parts of the Dalat line.

The Tan Son Nhut Airport has been modernized, becoming a Class A international airport with a 3,000 meter runway suitable for long range jet airliners. Eighteen Class G airstrips are in use.

At Saigon the Bus Company has considerably enlarged its rolling stock: 105 new vehicles have recently been ordered in components for assembly in Saigon by our skilled workers. The total number of buses has increased from 75 in 1958 (when the Company was bought from the French public transportation company and when the public transportation administration was organized to 204 at present. During the same time the number of passengers has increased from 20 to 70 million a year, while the network has been extended to the suburbs. The government established fares are the lowest in the world.

With respect to electric power equipment, while waiting for the output of the Danhim, ONDEE has built and is temporarily operating seven power houses with a total output of 6,500 kws. ONDEE is also supervising provincial installations and operations of small concessionaires which have been multiplying in rural areas during the past years.

As for water supply, 12 water plants have been built while 410 deep wells have been dug in 22 provinces. The supply of water from the Dong Nai River, for which work is being undertaken, will in the first stage increase the water supply for each inhabitant of the capital from 60 to 200 litres per day. The digging of new wells for potable water will be actively pursued in the villages.

B. Social Progress

Parallel to the economic reconstruction of the country, great efforts have been made to achieve social progress for the masses.

1. National Education

In the field of National Education these efforts are illustrated by the constant increase in budget appropriations: for the year 1961-1962 the increase was 18%; for the year 1962-63 provisions are made for a new increase of 13.5 per cent.

In higher education the number of students in 1961-62 was 14,751 as against 11,708 in 1960-61, thus making an increase of 25%. The Faculty of Medicine at Hue is completing its first stage of construction with a credit of 12 million piasters.

In public secondary education, the total enrollment has increased from 73,701 in 1960-61 to 85,554 in 1961-62, while the number of teachers has increased from 1,829 to 2,106. School construction has been carried out at a satisfactory rate: the number of public lycee has increased from 82 to 101, and the number of classrooms from 1,374 to 1,605.

As to public primary education, the total enrollment is 1,092,400 as against 1,021,061; the number of classrooms has increased from 20,660 to 21,817, despite the closing of a certain number of school in zones of insecurity.

Community education has seen its enrollment double this year 18,671 as against 9,114 in 1960-61 - with the transformation of 20 primary schools into community schools, bringing the total number of community schools to 43 in 1961-62.

Private education has recorded similar developments: 411,873 students (primary and secondary education) as against 368,334 in the preceding year.

Technical education deserves special mention with the expansion of the National Technical Center of Phu Tho, the creation of the vocational school of Banmethuot, and especially the completion of the building of the technical schools of Da Nang, Qui Nhon and Vinh Long. The transfer of institutions for agricultural instruction to the Department of National Education marks an important step toward the standardization of technical training.

To consolidate this progress, other important projects have been planned for the new school year: building of a medical center in Saigon, execution of the first stage of the construction of the new University at the Thu Duc magnificent site, opening of a school of industrial chemistry at Phu Tho, creation of a Training Center for teachers of secondary technical education, and the opening of a National School of Music at Hue, among others.

These achievements establish in eloquent fashion the objectives of the government's policy with regard to education. They tend to satisfy a two-fold objective: the training of qualified

personnel to participate in the economic development of the country and the integral development of the human person.

2. Public Health

In the field of Public Health, noticeable achievements have been obtained in various sectors of activity. During 1962, 25 surgical centers for provincial hospitals have been built, 10 of which will be fully equipped; 34 dispensaries and district maternity hospitals have been constructed or renovated, while important funds have been allocated for the enlarging and renovating of provincial hospitals and of numerous sanitary units throughout the country.

Refresher and in-service training courses have been organized for training at all echelons: doctors, surgeons, health technicians, nurses, laboratory technicians, and so forth. The training of rural health specialists is being actively carried out at the Gia Dinh Center.

In addition to the malaria eradication campaign, other campaigns of preventive medicine, disease detection, and instruction in prenatal, postnatal and infant care are being vigorously conducted.

Particular mention should be made of the installation, since the beginning of 1962, of 213 new rural health units in the villages. The organization of the Strategic Hamlets has given a new impetus to the rural health program, providing the best conditions for its widespread development.

To remedy the lack of qualified personnel, especially of doctors, a law has been enacted which will permit the drafting of new graduates from the faculties of medicine and pharmacy as well as private doctors. It is to be hoped that the medical profession will fully appreciate the necessary and sacred character of this cooperation in the name of national solidarity.

3. The Labour World

In the labour world, the strengthening of the trade union movement has been greatly encouraged, especially by the sending abroadfor recipients of trade union scholarships.

In spite of the proclamation of the state of emergency, there has been no impediment to the normal functioning of trade unions.

Cooperation between the management and their employees more active and fruitful. The collective agreement of the rubber plantations has been followed by that of the banks and many others.

On the national level, the participation of workers' representatives in the elaboration of economic plans for the country has been consecrated by the appointment of numerous trade union leaders to the National Economic Council.

Recently, when the economic development and national defense surtax was instituted and when the customs tarifs were revised, appropriate measures were taken so that the new sacrifices asked of the country would have the least effect on the prices of products which figure on the list of the laborers' daily consumption. Thus, if there has been any raise in the cost of living of the laboring class, it is limited. On the other hand, many enterprises disposing of the adequate financial means have been encouraged to raise the salaries of their employees. In addition, the guaranteed minimum wage rate in categories warranting it will be reexamined in function of the slight but fatal raise in the cost of living - the price of Viet Cong aggression.

The industrial development achieved by the first Five-Year Plan has resulted in a 3% increase in the rate of employment. The implementation of the Second Five-Year Plan will likely result in solving in large part the problem of underemployment.

Lastly, the strategic hamlets system, by its contribution to security and by the establishment of its new scale of values ensuring an advantageous status to workers, will be able in addition to bring decongeation of the overpopulated urban areas thus bringing the best remedy to the sufferings caused underemployment and social injustice.

Such, briefly, is the economic and social situation of our country in all domains, as the first Five-Year Plan comes to an end.

C. <u>The 1961 Floods and the Exodus of the Highlanders</u>

But this balance sheet, to be complete, must include two additional events which have greatly affected the life of the nation, bringing a surplus of difficulties to the courageous efforts of our people.

The first of these events was the floods of 1961 which hit, more or less gravely, twelve of our provinces. The combined action of the Commissariat General for Relief and Reconstruction of Flooded Areas and of the National Movement for Mutual Aid permitted, with least delay, repairing a part of the damages and helping the victims with their most urgent needs.

Just recently, hardly two weeks ago, a violent typhoon swept across the provinces of Quang Tri, Thua Thien and Hue, occasioning floods and serious damages to the harvests, houses, public buildings and roads. The destruction mounted to a value of 200 million piasters.

Before the effects of this natural disaster had been entirely overcome, national solidarity was once again been called upon by an historic event: the exodus of our Mountaineer compatriots of theHighlands. These courageous men and women are writing a true epic which is similar, if not in its magnitude, at least in its significance, to the admirable exodus of the refugees from the North in 1954.

The causes of this movement are well known: the National Government, anxious to relieve our Highlander compatriots of the difficult conditions of their secular isolation, had since 1954 made great efforts and spent large sums to help improve their existence in all fields.

On the other hand, the Communists strove to dominate this Highland region which, in their scheme of aggression, is of great strategic value. They therefore conducted intense subversive action consisting of political indoctrination, false promises and ruses.

But little by little they learned that the majority of Highlanders had no ears for their entreaties and were irresistably taking the way of the national community. Then, to our compatriot Highlanders, came a time of terror, extortions, pillaging and forced conscription.

The intensification of Viet Cong terrorism brought about a result which was exactly the reverse of their objective: the Highlanders viewed such terrorism as proof of the essential weakness of the Viet Cong and, attracted by the revolutionary regime of the Strategic Boun (hamlets) decided to leave their ancestral lands to join the camp of the just cause. By entire villages, they began

at the end of 1961 their long east-war march, bringing along their meager belongings, and often the relics of their ancestors, not fleeing from the war, but to claim their place in the national resistance against Communist invasion.

We all know how the movement has spread, now exceeding 130,000 persons. We also know how bravely and how well Mountaineer boys and girls are now fighting the war of the Highlands against the enemy of the Vietnamese nation.

This huge exodus, the indescribable physical and moral sufferings which accompanied the dogged determination with which our Highlander compatriots seek their salvation in the struggle and the victory, constitutes for world opinion a terrible condemnation of the inhuman tyranny of Communism, and gives to all of us a great lesson in patriotism and in confidence in the destiny of the Vietnamese Nation.

How can we but believe that public opinion in the capital and in the provinces, witness of the silent calvary of the refugees, will respond during the coming days with even more generosity to the call of the National Movement for Mutual Aid.

Mr. Chairman;
Deputies to the National Assembly.

The year which has just passed, women in cruel trials, glorious struggles and stubborn efforts, has harshly confronted our people with its proud conscience, unchanging values and great mission. The present generations has magnificently demonstrated its tenacious will to follow without fault on the path of honour and heroism traced by our ancestors.

For its part, the Free World has more fully realized the deep significance and immense impact of our fight. From our allies we have received increased support which, by strengthening our own action, makes the certitude of victory not only sure but imminent.

Against the complex of systematic conciliation, non-resistance to evil and of submission to events, we will react with inextinguishable ardor. To our youth, our whole people let us propose an ideal of courage; if men do fail and fall sometimes, it is not because they have dared too much - but because they have dared too little.

The rejection of heroism, shown by delayed decision and excessive deliberation in combat, dooms the individual as well as peoples to decline and annihilation. The unmerciful law of biological nature is that weak species are devoured by stronger ones. Let us become stronger every day: let us close our ranks; shoulder to shoulder; let us learn to surpass ourselves - and we will win.

For a better society, open to the Good as well as to theJust, and for a Vietnamese fraternity forged in struggle spiritualized by sacrifices, and dedicated to the most brilliant victory, let us all rise to the heights of our destiny.

May the Almighty help us !

Organization of The Armed Forces of Vietnam

The president is the commander-in-chief of the Vietnamese armed forces; he is also Secretary of State for National Defense. Nguyen Dinh Thuan is Assistant to the Secretary of State for National Defense.

Below the Ministry of National Defense, the highest military level is the office now known as the Office of the Joint Chief of Staff (Bo Tong Tham Muu Lien Quan Hon Hop); before the December 12, 1962 reorganization it was known as the General Staff of the Armed Forces (Tong Tham Muu). The present Joint Chief of Staff is Lt. Gen. Le Van Ty. His deputy is Brigadier General Tran Thien Khiem whose title is Executive Officer; General Khiem, former CO of the 33rd Tactical Zone and commander of the 21st Division, replaced Brigadier General Nguyen Khanh in the recent reorganization; Khiem was promoted from Colonel at the same time.

(It should be noted that the Vietnamese army has no one-star generals, following the French system. The ranks, with star designations are: brigadier general two stars, major general three stars, lieutenant general four stars, general five stars and marshal seven stars. There are no full generals or marshals in the Vietnamese armed forces at the present time)

Under the Joint Chief of Staff are the Gee-sections, i.e. G-1, G-2, etc. along with the Vietnamese Navy Command, under Captain Ho Tan Quyen and the Vietnamese Air Force, under Col. Huynh Huu Hien, the Paratroop Command under Col. Cao Van Vien, the Ranger Command under Col. Ton That Xung, and the newly created Special Forces Command under Col. Le Quang Tung, newly promoted. These officers can be equated, in a rough way, to the joint chiefs of staff in the American defense establishment.

Below this level, formerly, was the Field Command or Command Operations (Bo Tu Lenh Hanh Quan) which has now been redesigned as the Army Command (Bo Tu Lenh Luc Quan). It is now headed by Major Tran Van Don, who replaces Major General Duong Van Minh (often known by the nickname "Big Minh"). General Minh has now been named to a newly created post, Military Advisor to the Presidency.

Geographically, Vietnam is divided into four corps areas (previously it was three) plus the special Capital zone.

The First Corps is commanded by Brigadier General Le Van Nghiem (vice Maj. General Tran Van Don). This zone covers four provinces (Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, and Quang Tin) and, in turn is divided into two tactical zone -- the 11th T.Z. headquartered at Hue and now commanded by Col. Do Cao Tri (vice Col. Nguyen Van Thieu), who is also commander of the First Division, and the 12th T.Z. headquartered in Da Nang under the command of Col. Lam Van Phat.

The II Corps is now reduced from an area encompassing twelve provinces to one that includes only five (Kontum, Pleiku, Binh Dinh, Phu Bon and Quang

Ngai). It is commanded by Brig. Gen. Nguyen Khanh (vice Brig. Gen. Ton That Dinh). Three divisions are stationed in the area: the 25th Division with headquarters in Quang Ngai, now under the command of Col. Lu Mong Lan (vice Col. Nguyen Van Chuan) (the 25th previously was assigned to I Corps); the 22nd Division under Col. Nguyen Bao Tri headquartered at Kontum and the Ninth Division under Col. Bui Dzinh, with headquarters at Qui Nhon. An additional division for II Corps is now being formed.

The III Corps includes two former tactical zones, the 23rd (Darlac, Quang Duc, Tuyen Duc, Lam Dong, Phu Yen, Binh Thuan, Ninh Thuan, and Khanh Hoa) and 31st (Phuoc Long, Binh Long, Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, Phuoc Thanh, Bien Hoa, Long Khanh, Phuoc Tuy and Binh Tuy). It is commanded by Brig. Gen. Ton That Dinh (vice Brig. Gen. Le Van Nghiem). Also in the III Corps are the Fifth Division, headquartered in Bien Hoa under the command of Col. Nguyen Van Thieu (vice Col. Nguyen Duc Thang) and the 23rd Division, with headquarters in Ninh Hoa under Col. Le Quang Trong.

The newly created IV Corps includes the old 32nd and 33rd tactical zones (i.e. Long An, Dinh Tuong, Kien Phong, Kien Tuong and Kien Hoa; and An Giang, Vinh Long, Vinh Binh, Phong Dinh, Kien Giang, Chuong Thien, Ba Xuyen, An Xuyen and Con Son, respectively). It is commanded by the recently promoted Brig. Gen. Huynh Van Cao. Also in the IV Corps is the Seventh Division under Col. Nguyen Van Dam and the 21st Division under Col. Bui Huu Nhon (vice Brig. Gen. Tran Thien Khiem).

The Special Capital Zone is under the command of Brig. Gen. Nguyen Van La. This is unchanged in the reorganization.

A new special zone has been created, called the Phuoc-Binh-Thanh Special Zone (a contraction of Phuoc Long, Binh Long and Phuoc Thanh) which corresponds roughly to the famed Viet Minh and now Viet Cong Zone D. Headquarters for the new command is Phuoc Long; it is commanded by the Phuoc Long province chief, Lt. Col. Do Van Diem.

Another new command created in the reorganization is the Special Forces Command under the newly promoted Col. Le Quang Tung. He also is chief of ARVN Office of Counter-Espionage.

Four new battalions have also been created: the 10th Bn. at Hoa Cam, Quang Nam province; the 20th Bn. at Tan Canh, Pleiku province; the 30th Bn. in Phuoc Long province and the 40th Bn. in Camau under the command of Father Nguyen Lac Hoa.

I CORPS

SA, I Corps	Col Denno	Danang
SA, 1st Inf Div	Lt Col Olson, R. B.	Hue
SA, 2nd Inf Div	Lt Col Rice, J.P.	Danang
SA, 25th Inf Div	Lt Col Gorecki	Danang
SA, I Corps Log Cmd	Lt Col Loomis, P.A.	Danang
SA, I Corps CTC	Lt Col Oliver, T.W.	Phu Bai

SECTOR COMMANDER ADVISORS, I CORPS

Province	Inf Div	Sector Advisor
Hue (Hue)	1st	Maj McCugh
Quang Tri (Quang Tri)	1st	Maj Wadsworth
Quang Ngai (Quang Ngai)	2nd	Maj Rupert
Quang Nam (Danang)	2nd	Maj Dwyer
Quang Tin (Tam Ky)	2nd	Maj West
Thua Thien		

II CORPS

SA, II Corps	Col Wilson, W.	Pleiku
SA, 9th Inf Div	Col Wallace, V.M.	Qui Nhon
SA, 22nd Inf Div	Lt Col Sweet	Kontum
SA, 23rd Inf Div	Lt Col Billado	Ban Me Thuot
SA, II Corps Log Cmd	Lt Col Durham, J.T.	Nha Trang
SA, II Corps CTC	Lt Col Cantor	Duc My

SECTOR COMMANDER ADVISORS, II CORPS

Province	Inf Div	Sector Advisor
Ninh Thuan (Phan Rang)	23rd	Maj Ensley
Lam Dong (Bao Loc)	23rd	Maj Hand
Darlac (Ban Me Thuot)	23rd	Maj King
Tuyen Duc (Dalat)	23rd	Maj Frazier
Khanh Hoa (Nha Trang)	23rd	Maj Hackett
Kontum (Kontum)	22nd	Maj Brady
Binh Thuan (Phan Thiet)	23rd	Maj Brown
Quang Duc (Gia Nghia)	23rd	Maj Greene
Phu Yen (Tuy Hoa)	22nd	Maj Cronia
Binh Dinh (Qui Nhon)	9th	Maj Davis

Pleiku (Pleiku)	22nd	Maj Peters
Phu Bon (Cheo Reo)	22nd	Maj Will

III CORPS

SA, III Corps	Col Porter, D.B.,Jr.	Saigon
SA, 5th Inf Div	Lt Col Miller, K.J.	Bien Hoa
SA, 7th Inf Div	Lt Col Vann	My Tho
SA, 21st Inf Div	Lt Col Moore, G.H.	Can Tho
SA, III Corps Log Cmd	Lt Col Hoplin	Saigon
SA, III Corps CTC	Lt Col Newman	Baria

SECTOR COMMANDER ADVISORS, III CORPS

Province	Inf Div	Sector Advisor
Dinh Tuong (My Tho)	7th	Maj MacSlarrow
Kien Giang (Rach Gia)	21st	Maj Radcliff
Ba Xuyen (Soc Trang)	21st	Maj Hagan
Phong Dinh (Can Tho)	21st	Maj Ryan
Vinh Long (Vinh Long)	21st	Maj Campbell
An Xuyen (Cau Mau)	21st	Maj Staples
Kien Hoa (Ben Tre)	7th	Maj Scoles
Kien Phong (Cao Lach)	7th	Maj Norvell
Kien Tuong (Moc Hoa)	7th	Maj Poston
Long An (Tan An)	7th	Maj Kent
Vinh Binh (Vinh Binh)	21st	Maj Rawn
Phuoc Long (Song Be)	5th	Maj Primm
An Giang (Long Xuyen)	21st	Maj Howard
Binh Duong (Thu Dau Mot)	5th	Maj Peterson
Tay Ninh (Tay Ninh)	5th	Maj Hale
Bien Hoa (Bien Hoa)	5th	Maj Houchin
Gia Dinh (Saigon)	5th	Maj Heilmen
Phuoc Tuy (Vung Tau)	5th	Maj Mitchum
Phuoc Thanh (Phuoc Binh)	5th	Maj Morrison
Binh Long (An Loc)	5th	Maj Larson
Long Khanh (Gia Ray)	5th	Maj Crisp
Binh Tuy (Ham Tan)	5th	Maj Rivera
Chuong Tien (Vi Thanh)	21st	

FIELD COMMAND

SA, Fld Cmd	Col Black	Saigon

International Voluntary Service (IVS) is a non-profit organization chartered in 1953. It is committed to the idea that American youth could make an important contribution to US foreign policy by establishing person-to-person contacts with people of another country, through a service program which the people of the host country would want and in which they would participate. The team in Vietnam is financed under contract with the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), through their USOM Division of Agriculture in Viet-Nam. It is working on a program with the Vietnamese Ministry of Agriculture.

IVS/Viet-Nam is now in its fifth year of operations. Although it has altered its emphasis and scope at various times in an attempt to adjust to current demands of the country, its basic principles and ideals have remained the same. The IVS team in Viet-Nam feels that it has found a useful purpose in assisting the US economic aid program to more effectively reach the Vietnamese farmers. IVS team members rely on experienced technitians both in the Ministry of Agriculture and in the USOM Agriculture Division for technical guidance. On the other hand by coming a part of the provincial communities in which they live and by learning to know the people, their customs, their agriculture, and their language, they can apply some of the knowledge which might otherwise not be utlized.

From a six man team living and working directly with one refugee village in 1957, IVS efforts were diverted in 1958 to building an agricultural improvement station which would serve hundreds of resettled villages in a land development program. As a result of the work on this highland station, IVS was asked to assist the Ministry of Agriculture and USOM in the development of a series of Agricultural Stations located in various farming areas throughout the country. The team was gradually expanded to eight, fourteen, and finally, twenty men.

Presently the twenty man team is divided into groups of one, two, or three, living in eight general areas. Work in these areas include two agricultural schools, six crop improvement stations and five livestock improvement stations, which serve as "centers of agriculture" where experiments are conducted, seed and stock is multiplied and distributed, information is disseminated, and agents, technicians and farmers are trained. This offers IVS team members the opportunity to apply specific skills while gaining information and material which will benefit farmers.

Although major IVS emphasis is presently directed towards improving the functions of these centers, team members are not confined to them. There is always the danger of a station becoming an end rather than a means to an end; bigger and more beautiful, rather than useful. Until the farmer has actually benefited, success cannot be claimed. IVS feels that it must take an active part in determining the farmer's needs and directing the station's activities toward fulfilling those needs. Team members are encouraged to make contacts in the community around them, find out the problems which prevail, and apply results from the station to where they are needed. In activities of this nature they have fortunately been able to work with provincial agents or station technicians

as counterparts. Thus it has been possible to couple IVS skills with the skills of technically trained people in Viet-Nam. It is a challenge to emphasize the training of personnel who will extend their services to many more villages than IVS could ever influence alone. Working in this manner enables IVS to extend its influence, and help set in motion forces that will continue long after the team members leave Viet-Nam.

IVS TEAM MEMBERS IN VIETNAM

Team Member	Station	Field of Interest
Alan S. Berlet	Can Tho: 2 Nguyen Du	General Agriculture
William F. Gerdes	Vinh Long: Truong Su Pham	English
Thomas E. Croope	My Tho: Box 22	Agricultural Engineering
James L. Kelly	Saigon: 176 Hai Ba Trung	Livestock - IVS Administrative
Robert K. Plummer	Saigon: 176 Hai Ba Trung	Agricultural Education
Arnold K. Dimmitt	Saigon: 176 Hai Ba Trung	Agricultural Engineering
Donald C. Brewster	Saigon: 176 Hai Ba Trung	Phu Tho English-Engineering College
Vaughn C. Stapleton	Saigon: 176 Hai Ba Trung	Science Teacher - Team Leader
Geraldine M. Stapleton	Saigon: 176 Hai Ba Trung	English
Ann L. Jacobs	Saigon: 176 Hai Ba Trung	English
Donald S. Luce	Saigon: 176 Hai Ba Trung	Agricultural Economics
Phillip E. Schreiber	Xuan Loc: 88/2 Duong Cong Hoa	Agricultural Engineering
Manfred R. Armbruster	Xuan Loc: 88/2 Duong Cong Hoa	Horticulture

Team Member	Station	Field of Interest
Mary E. Cling	Saigon: 176 Hai Ba Trung	Program Assistant, Malaria Control
Robert A. Knoernschild	Blao c/o Truong Quoc Gia Nong Lam Muc	Horticulture
Ted D. Lingren	(same as above)	General Agriculture
Don F. Wadley	Da Lat 3 Nguyen Thuong Hien	Horticulture
Daniel L. Leaty	(same as above)	Horticulture
Mark E. LaRue	Thap Cham 555 Doc Lap	Agricultural Engineering
Charles E. Fields	(same as above)	Livestock
Dale W. Wagner	Ban Me Thuot Box 16, 62 Ton That Thuyet	General Agriculture
Robert W. DuByne	(same as above)	Agricultural Engineering
Roger R. Sweeney	(same as above)	Livestock
Robert M. McNeff	Tuy Hoa c/o Toa Hanh Chanh	General Agriculture
Larry L. Laverentz	Qui Nhon 115 Vo Tanh	General Agriculture
John J. Witmer	(same as above)	Biological Sciences
Bette Gau	(same as above)	English
Billie Lee Langley	(same as above)	English
Thomas C. Neal	Quang Ngai Hotel Cong Hoa, Duong Vo Tanh	Agricultural Education

Team Member	Station	Field of Interest
R. Charles Stevens	Da Nang Box 53, 43A Hoang Dieu	Tech Vo-Education
Fletcher H. Poling	(same as above)	English
Jimmie C. Green	Hue Box 115, 6 Tran Thuc Nhan	Agricultural Education
Danny J. Whitfield	(same as above)	Livestock
Donald C. Fortner	(same as above)	Entomology
Katherine A. Wright	(same as above)	English
Vincent P. McGeehan	(same as above)	Science
John S. Parsons	(same as above)	English
Clarence M. Shubert	My Tho Box 1522	English
Marilyn M. Pallys	Can Tho 2 Nguyen Du	English
Leslie E. Small	Kien Giang	General Agriculture
Stephen A. Szadek	Language Study	General Agriculture
Herbert W. White	Language Study	forestry
Thomas L. Cooper	Language Study	Livestock

EMERGENCY RELIEF & THE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

USOM Provincial Representatives will frequently encounter local situations which will require emergency relief and rehabilitation. Examples are - natural disasters such as floods typhoons, and tornados and other disasters such as fires or flights of refugees from communism, etc.

Attempts to bring quick relief for these events should first be made at the province level in consultation with the Province Chief and his staff, the MAAG Sector Advisor and church leaders since the latter often have stocks of U.S. surplus foodstuffs on hand. The Province Chiefs also usually have reserve stocks of rice which can be drawn upon to meet emergency relief needs, as well as the rehabilitation requirements of those being relieved. Requests for help should be transmitted immediately to USOM/Rural Affairs, Saigon, outlining the problem, its magnitude and the suggested plan of action for its solution.

An Emergency Relief Committee has been established in Saigon, Chairmanned by the Chief Civil Affairs Advisor of MAC/V, and consisting of representatives of concerned agencies such as USOM the U.S. Embassy, the Government of Viet Nam and American Voluntary Agencies. This Committee has already demonstrated its ability to act quickly and deliver relief when and where needed throughout the country.

It should be pointed out that whereas quick relief in times of disaster and other emergencies is of the utmost psychological and practical value for the suffering, we are equally interested in helping them to rehabilitate themselves and become self-sufficient again as quickly as possible.

USOM/Rural Affairs is, therefore, anxious and willing to consider any type of rehabilitation plan for disaster sufferers which is within the limits of our resources, and you should guide your thinking toward developing such plans, utilizing as far as possible locally available resources and programs, when bringing assistance after disasters.

AMERICAN VOLUNTARY AGENCIES IN VIET-NAM

There are several very active American Voluntary Agencies in Viet-Nam who, in addition to helping in times of disaster carry on regular programs of aid and assistance to the needy and poor Among these agencies are organizations such as CARE, Catholic Relief Services, and the Mennonite Central Committee all with offices in Saigon. Catholic Relief and the Mennonites operate large relief programs which include the distribution of thousands of tons of U.S. Surplus Agricultural Commodities each year throughout Viet-Nam. They and CARE also operate extensive relief and rehabilitation activities using their own resources. They and other American groups also operate many schools hospitals and other socially oriented institutions.

It is definite U.S. Government Policy to work closely with our American Voluntary Agencies and to cooperate and assist them if possible in their relief, rehabilitation and social activities. They, in turn, stand ready to cooperate with us where mutual interests are involved, and like us, their interests are essentially - people. You will find their experience and capabilities most valuable resources and you should acquaint yourself with their activities in your area so as to insure that our efforts are coordinated.

DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN VIETNAM*

By President Ngo Dinh Diem

In observing the crises probing the foundations of democracy in various countries of the world today, we may well ask the question, what is the possibility of establishing a democracy in Vietnam? Do our ancient traditions and institutions contain elements that would favor the development of genuine democracy under modern form? And what pattern should that democracy follow in its relations with neighboring countries and with the West?

First let us recall that Vietnam, after having been under the dominance of China, for over a thousand years, recovered and maintained its independence for another thousand years, until the late 19th century. Profoundly molded by Chinese culture, education and institutions, Vietnam is a land of marked cohesion, unity and homogeneity, conscious of its own personality, grateful to China for what China has given it, yet tenaciously retaining its own way of life. Among other things, foreign historians have noted that the Code of the Le dynasty (15th century) is more characteristically Vietnamese and has borrowed less from Chinese Codes than that of the Gia Long dynasty (beginning of the 19th century). It does not surprise us that these characteristics should evidence themselves more in jurisprudence than elsewhere. Deriving its inspiration from equity, our jurisprudence has evolved in sensitive consideration of the social milieu and custom.

As to modern democracy, our institutions, customs and the principles underlying them are democratic facts. They have grown out of the past and are the product of an historical evolution. They have operated even under the occupation despite blurrings brought on by extraneous innovations and interferences. But they were more clearly expressed under pre-occupation conditions.

Briefly some of the basic principles universally accepted by the people of Vietnam are:

The moral norms bind the Sovereign as well as officials and the

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*Originally written in French before the author's assumption of the Vietnamese Premiership.

common people;

The State is founded on the people;

The mandate of Heaven held by the Sovereign was revocable if he proved himself unworthy thereof;

The voice of the people was the voice of Heaven;

The magistrate in his official capacity must conduct himself as one participating in a religious rite.

These ideas were not mere formalities. They were part and parcel of the very institutions themselves.

INSTITUTIONS

The Council of Censors

This Council was made up of well known scholars and officials of unimpeachable integrity. They passed judgment on the official acts of the Ministers and other important officials. It was their duty to call the Sovereign's attention to the morality involved in public acts. Should the need arise their reminders were made to the Sovereign directly by way of remonstrance.

Ministers of Government ("Cabinet")

The Ministers reported to the Sovereign, sometimes simply to inform him (on affairs involving their decisions), sometimes to ask his sanction. If the Sovereign approved, the Ministers then notified the provinces or organism concerned. Should the matter require the form of Imperial Edict the Ministers submit an outline for the Imperial signature (which took the form of a Red Dot), preceded by a report of presentation, which included an exposé of the question, the proposals of the organism (provincial authority, etc.) raising the question, references to the law or precedents, a resume of the pros and cons, and the conclusions of the Ministers. Should the Sovereign, instead of sanctioning, make marginal comment or recommendations, the Ministers proceed to a new study of the matter. If the Sovereign's annotations are accepted without change the Ministers submit a new outline incorporating the recommendations. This procedure exemplifies the saying: Law derives from joint action of Sovereign and Minister.

Imperial Secretariat

The Imperial Secretariat had no powers of its own. The Secretariat presented the reports of the Ministers to the Sovereign, after previously submitting them to the Council of Censors for verification or observation. After receiving the Sovereign' annotations or sanction the reports returned to the Ministers through the same channels. The original document, signed or annotated by the Sovereign, was carefully preserved in the archives for reference.

Standing Committee of Ministers and Censors

To guard the prestige of the Sovereign and to assure the prompt despatch of affairs, delegates of the Ministers and of the Council of Censors formed a standing group, rotating in turns, on twenty-four hour duty. They had office space in a room in the Imperial Enclosure, near the residence of the Emperor. It was their duty to give a summary review of the documents submitted to the Sovereign, check for errors and add their own signature before passing them on to the Imperial Secretariat for presentation to the Sovereign. Special chamberlains, appointed for the purpose, carried the document from Secretariat to Sovereign. On the return journey they reviewed the annotations of the Sovereign and attached their signature on a separate slip before forwarding them to the Ministers. The purpose of reviewing the Sovereign's annotations, was to eliminate obvious errors or inexactitudes or formulae contrary to the norms. It was their duty to call respectfully the Sovereign's attention to any such failing which they considered blameworthy. The Sovereign accepted urgent reports even at night. The Standing Committee was charged particularly with forwarding reports on urgent matters, reports from distant provinces, frontier reports bearing on national security, etc. The Sovereign would send back urgent documents even late at night, and if thought advisable would convoke the Standing Committee for consultation.

This reflected the commonly-accepted view that the Sovereign ought always to be at the disposal of the people.

Court Assemblies

Court Assemblies, comprising not only the Ministers but numerous civil and military officials above a certain grade, convened as a rule at least once a month. The Sovereign attended, assisted by the Imperial Secretariat and under the eyes of the Council of Censors. The agenda was prepared in advance. Questions were brought up and

discussed. Any observations by the Sovereign were noted, particularly by the Secretariat and the Censors. Should need arise the Censors intervene. On conclusion of the deliberations, the Ministers, after further study, would submit proposals according to the procedure, already described, to the Sovereign for executive action.

The Sovereign

In general the Sovereign, in his annotations on documents or in verbal observations in Court Assemblies, intervened to call attention to the norms, to recommend clemency, scrupulous review of judicial decisions, care of the people, to comment on or rebuke negligence, failure in public administration, or other reprehensible conduct of public officials.

This illustrates the role of father, conceded to the Sovereign vis-a-vis the people, who are the object of his constant solicitude.

It is interesting to note that verbal orders of the Sovereign are limited to minor matters concerning his own residence. There was no such thing as verbal orders of the Sovereign notarized and counter-signed by the Imperial Secretariat and having executive force.

Person of the Sovereign

A sacred respect is due the person of the Sovereign. He is the mediator between the people and Heaven as he celebrates the national cult. Every three years he mounts the triple terrace of the Nam Giao (South Corner) esplanade and under a great blue tent prays to Heaven for the people. It is conceded that he enjoys the mandate of Heaven to rule the people so long as he remains worthy thereof. (Numerous dynastic changes in the course of history prove that the mandate is not irrevocable.) Everyone recognizes it as fitting that the Sovereign should enjoy spectacular pomp and honor. He personifies the grandeur, glory, and prosperity of the Empire.

Royal Audiences

In addition to the periodic Court Assemblies there were other State audiences: at New Year's, on the National Anniversaries, on the King's birthday, the birthday of the Queen Mother, on the occasion of some extraordinary occurrence (for example, the accession to the Throne, proclamation of the Code, a great victory, etc). These gave

occasion for the proclamation of Edicts, such as the proclamation of accession to the Throne, edicts of grace, etc. Such Edicts were prepared by the Court. The style was hieratic. Quotations from the ancient books and teaching and historical allusions were abundantly interspersed.

In preparing a proclamation of accession to the Throne the Court would take its inspiration from circumstances of the time and the personality of the Sovereign, if he were of age. In which case consultation with him was obligatory. The edict then reflected the ideas or tendencies of the new Sovereign. If he were a minor, the Court emphasized what it considered to be the promise of the new era. In the case of a new dynasty, obviously, the part played by the Sovereign was preponderant. He would underscore particularly the reasons impelling him to accept the Throne - decadence of morals, abuses on the part of preceding rulers, the will of the people - in short, the justification of his action in view of traditional norms. Even in the case of normal accession, his taking of the Throne was not looked upon as automatic.

Executive Power

The Sovereign, by his Red Dot or equivalent remark, approved proposed Edicts, Ordinances, etc., but it was the Court and the Ministers who gave notification for Executive action. The Sovereign could not directly notify an order to the provinces, the generals, or a government organism. Should the case occur, e.g., an appeal to the provinces for armed assistance, it was considered a coup d'etat, an attempt on the part of the Sovereign to act independently of the Court, with which he then would be in conflict. This would be against constitutional procedure. Should he fail in the attempt he is deposed.

State and Sovereign

It is to be noted that the word 'State' often occurs in public acts while the power of the Sovereign, when it is mentioned, is in general terms and accompanied by such expressions as, "holy, august, Son of Heaven," thus linking the role of the Sovereign to traditional norms.

Grand Council, Privy Council

There were other Councils in addition to those already mentioned. Emperor Gia Long in particular created the Grand Council (Cong Dong). It had its own seal. It deliberated on major affairs of state and appended its seal to the report of its deliberations.

The Privy Council (Co Mat), created under Ming Mang, deliberated in secret session on matters of foreign affairs, military questions and internal security. Under the Emperor Tu Duc its status was greatly expanded and reinforced. It continued in vital functioning over a long period. In time it became a sort of 'inner circle', composed of certain Ministers and picked officials. Their office quarters were located near the imperial residence. The Emperor was kept informed of their work and ordinarily consulted with them.

Providing against Abuses

Ming Mang, despite his tendency towards personal authority, insisted on strengthening the authority of the Court Assembly. He made it a constitutional regulation that all affairs of grave importance be obligatorily submitted to the deliberations of the Court, assembled in special session (Dinh Nghi). This implied the conferring of special authority on the resolutions taken by these solemn assemblies. The Sovereign was morally obliged to give his sanction. Ming Mang also took the initiative in prescribing that the head of the Imperial Secretariat should be an official not higher than the third rank, saying in substance: "We are led to make this regulation by reason of the history of China, which shows examples of officials close to the Sovereign abusing their power. We will that it be scrupulously observed by our successors." Ming Mang also concerned himself with possible abuses on the part of the Sovereign's relatives. He abolished the title of "Empress" and for it substituted "First Spouse". "The history of China bears witness to the grave crises brought on by the Empresses and their relatives." He also decreed that collateral branches of the royal family might hold provincial office but that his own descendents might not.

Responsibility of Subordinates

Collegial action among the Ministers was the norm. The authority of the Minister was predominant, yet the minutes of reports to the Throne, and the letters or instructions to various Councils, governmental organisms, or governors of provinces, must be initialled by the

high collaborators who had taken part in their preparation. Should an Assistant decline to sign a report to the Throne, mention thereof must be made at the end of the report, and his reservations, or the reasons for his refusal to sign be stated. Provincial governments followed the same system. The Governor was the acknowledged head. He had one Assistant for civil affairs and general administration, one particularly for judicial matters, and a commander of the military garrison.

Nomination to Office

Royal approval was required for nomination to any position of authority, including the educational system. The nominee was notified immediately, the official documents following in due course. All imperial warrants or commissions begin with the words: "We, Emperor by the Mandate of Heaven, ordain that..."

Civil Precedence over Military

Civil rank of the same grade takes precedence over the military, indicating the predominance of the civil power. In Court Assemblies the civil corps sits to the left (the position of honor), the military to the right of the Throne. Apart from very minor local positions, access to public office is reserved to those who have successfully passed the national examinations and been granted degrees. Selection therefore is based primarily on ability and merit. It is observable from history that the majority of our statesmen and generals have come from the people.

Nobility

There are five titles of nobility, closely approximating duke, marquis, count, viscount and baron. They are honorary titles only and do not involve fiefdom or territory. The State assigns a few acres of land in lieu of fiefdom. Titles diminish by one grade with each generation. A duke's son will be a marquis, etc. A title goes only to the eldest son and disappears after five generations. Nor does the title give any right to public office.

Privileges of Birth

Birth confers privileges of a very minor order only. Thus the son of a high dignitary will inherit an honorary title, provided he

passes certain examinations. He thereby gains in seniority within his grade at the outset of his career. However, this does not help him to any office of authority, which is predicated on success in the national examinations. Graduates, risen from the people, thus receive incontestable consideration over the sons of noble families who brilliantly pass the national examinations and are often given preference for the position of "attache" to the privy Council or to the Ministers. They become bearers of important documents or liaison officers between high organisms. They might even be appointed editors of delicate state documents, by reason of the asset they enjoy from the traditions of their families, who are familiar with affairs of state.

Financial Status

Decency required that officials, even the highest, remain in a mediocre station financially. The reward of the descendant consisted in the renown of the ancestor, a moral advantage which he was expected to preserve and, if possible, enhance.

Retirement

There was no precise rule for retirement. Custom prescribed that high officials voluntarily ask for retirement on reaching the age of fifty, fifty-five or sixty. The first or second request was generally refused, the third accepted. Such officials became "elder statesmen".

Judiciary

Justice was administered by the District Heads (as courts of first instance) and by the Governor's two Assistants, one for civil and the other for criminal matters (as courts of appeal). These officials also exercised administrative functions in addition to judicial. For certain matters and, according to their jurisdiction, judgments rendered in courts of the first instance or appellate courts are executory. For most matters, judgments rendered in courts of first instance must be submitted to the higher jurisdiction for verification, approbation, rejection, or revision. For some matters, and for nearly all judgments in civil matters, the tribunal of the second degree must submit its judgments to the Ministers. In general this would be the Minister of Justice for criminal, the Minister of Finance for civil cases, and, in particular instances, other Ministers in matters relevant to their competence.

To avoid delay a time limit is fixed for preliminary inquiry and verdict, the time limit varying according to the importance of the matter and the complications of the case. A judge desiring more time must request an extension, giving his reasons therefor. Too frequent delays cause judges to be black-marked. Sanctions are provided for cases of negligence, abuse or error. Appeals are received by the next higher jurisdiction. Certain judgments, e.g., those involving capital punishment or community-owned property, must be submitted for approval to the Sovereign. In the days of independence the Autumnal Assizes at times reviewed judgments comporting the death penalty. This procedure concurs with the traditional principles of respect for human life. Strictly speaking, any person could appeal a case, even to the Higher Tribunal (several organisms sitting as a Special Court,) or even to the Sovereign. However, the authors of groundless claims are liable to an increase of penalty.

Such a rigid system, designed to assure the greatest guarantee of justice, carried with it an exceedingly severe surveillance. It rendered the office of magistrate excessively onerous. However, in practice, it tended to lessen litigation. The magistrate had both administrative and judicial functions. His ideal was to bring about the 'reign of harmony' (poetic and literary language often ascribed the harp to his office as emblem.) As 'father and mother' of the people he must try by his sagacity and by wise, competent, and understanding conduct of his office to raise the moral tone of the people and to effect that crime become rare and misdemeanors less frequent. The system was a challenge and an invitation to induce harmony.

In case of murder or banditry the judge of the first instance must use all diligence in the preliminary inquiry to discover the culprits and render judgment. The higher jurisdiction lends all attention to such a case. In every case involving death the magistrate is obliged personally to appear on the scene of violence and proceed with the investigation. In case of suicide, inquiry must be made to establish if the motive be imputable to any oppression.

In cases of imprisonment awaiting trial, the time limit calls the attention of superior judges thereto. Hence follows notification on such as are delayed, with a request for explanation. This occurs especially if complaint is made, and may give rise to official inquiry on the judge's conduct.

Should a magistrate be inclined to abuse short pre-trial imprison-

ment as an expeditious means to dispose of light cases, or as a means of intimidation to accelerate the course of inquiry, it behooves him to think twice on the matter. Detention is considered a great dishonor. Stain attaches to the family as well as to the individual involved. In virtue of family solidarity and by acknowledged right the family can file protest in place of the detainee.

Arrest

Arrest must be made according to established formalities (judge's warrant, assistance from the notables of the village).1

An individual who cannot write may have his deposition or complaint made out by one who can, who then must sign the document with him (the 'signature' of one who cannot write consists of finger outline). Magistrates prefer written declarations to oral interrogations. The interrogations of a person who cannot write must be made in the presence of a parent or near relative or the mayor of the village, or one or two notables of a neighboring locality. Such witnesses must co-sign the interrogation, to make it legal. If a literate person refuses to sign his interrogatory, a verbal process must be drawn up, signed by witnesses, e.g. village notables or other established person (the village head, for instance). A complaint of falsification or change in the interrogation brings on an inquiry into the conduct of the magistrate and his assistants which may lead to degradation or even condemnation.

Filial Piety

Filial piety is held in high honor. It derives from the Confucian ethic of respect for elders and ancestors. It has special provision in the law, which suspends the normal rules of procedure. A father, theoretically, can cite his son for lack of filial piety and the judge will forthwith condemn him without further ado.

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1. Under the French occupation the authorities took over indirect taxes, particularly the tax on alcohol, and gave to certain French companies for a considerable time a monopoly over the manufacture of alcohol. Cases of illegal distillation or sale of alcohol were tried in French courts. Arrests, however, made by French tax officials in virtue of their quality of 'sworn agents', i.e. on their individual sworn warrants, aroused such opposition from people who considered this contrary to their traditional guarantee of justice, that the French were forced to agree not to make arrests except in the presence of village authorities as witnesses.

has scarcely ever been known, if ever, but the provision is there. Such a father, in avowing his own failure to rear his offspring properly, dishonor himself by publishing the family's misfortune in having so unnatural a son. "Merciless father, unfilial son", a common adage would condemn him.

The Study of the Law

Study of the Code and of the laws was widespread. It was incorporated into the examination program for the bachelor's degree. There was a common saying: "No knowledge is better than a knowledge of the Code."

Civil Law vs. Natural Law

In a country where the postulates of the natural law are deeply respected, civil law and legal dispositions have a relative value.[2] Not too much weight is put upon the stark act in itself, although in a very literal sense proofs and testimonials are examined in every civil process and figure essentially and integrally in the expose of the facts. The judge bases himself on the law, but with constant reference to equity.

Every penal judgment comports an expose of the facts, declarations, depositions, magistrate's inquiry, examination of the proofs, statement of the case, citation from the Cide and later laws, and the verdict. In his statement of the case, and before weighing the offense in the light of positive law the judge first recalls the moral norms, cites or rather alludes to the teachings of the sages, and then indicates their relevance to the case in hand. Positive law enters in as a complement of the moral. To persuade assent to the order willed by reason and by Heaven is to perform an act of high morality. This is

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2. The sovereigns in their annotations recall that justice, in its essence is designed for the observation of the natural law, already found in the heart of man, and that this principle transcends juridic considerations. As occasion arises to modify or adapt a law the sovereigns insist that laws vary with time and place.

the aim of the magistrate's statement of the case, for he 'holds the scales between his hands.'[3]

When pronouncing the verdict, the judge justifies an indulgent sentence by some such statement as: "With a view to giving the condemned an opportunity to amend..."; or, when he applies the full rigor of the law: "to make an example of..."; "to satisfy public indignation..."; and, for cases of odious crime: "to halt a spreading evil...".

The law must punish certain acts. It is necessary to asure the regular functioning of institutions. The threat of punishment and its application being of a nature to impede the committing or repeating these acts, the law can and ought to punish them, but only if that is conformable to justice and only within the limits of justice: not more than is necessary, not more than is just.

In public acts, ordinances, annotations of the Sovereign, the concept of justice is frequently recalled to mind: "Justice - a contribution to the work of moral improvement"; "Punish so as not to have to punish further." In certain circumstances, when several possible dispositions are envisaged: "The best fruit of the Code is to stifle evil designs in the heart."

Society in Action

Administrative acts (reports, instructions, decisions), disciplinary sanctions against functionaires, annotations of the Sovereign, royal ordinances, mutual cooperation between governmental organisms and the Sovereign, acts involving remission of imposts or taxes, amnesties, individual or collective requests, appeals for redress or reform made to the authorities or even to the Sovereign by the educated elements (on their own initiative or in response to the periodic invitation of the authorities, the Court, or even the Sovereign himself), successive legal dispositions modifying the Code or previous dispositions and adapting the law to circumstances--all this obviously gives a fuller and more objective idea of the workings of Vietnamese society than a

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3. The same principle holds in politics. The State does not attempt to arrogate to itself an absolute value. Politics do not outweigh morality in the order of importance and dignity. Moral development remains the end of all rational activity; politics is only a means.

cold reading of the Code, weighed down as it is with technical, often abstruse, Chinese terms and archaic dispositions, or a dry reading of the Annals.

Public Works

Administrative authorities were admonished to lend particular attention to the matter of obligatory service or voluntary contribution in money or labor for the erection or upkeep of public works outside the village area. (After notice or upon request of administrative authority, the village takes responsibility for its own personnel.) It is always required that the District Head submit any such projects to the provincial authorities. In matters of greater importance the provincial authorities in turn must refer to the Ministers. On the administrative acts there will appear some such expression as: "Matter relating to contribution in money or labor on the part of the population." A prior condition is the desire on the part of the people for the proposed project, or at least their assent to the utility of the works contemplated.

Expropriation of property, private or communal, is indemnified by the State.

Women's Status

The woman's role is far from negligible. The law prescribes that inheritance goes in equal parts to all the children, girls as well as boys, though in practice the boys are favored by receiving immovable goods, the girls jewels and liquid cash. It is recognized that a will may dispose of part of the inheritance to assure the cult of ancestors (upkeep of the temple, care of the graves expenses of the annual ceremonies); assigning this to the care of the eldest son. A widow may retain an inheritance or divide it after consultation with her grown-up children, or if the children are minors, with the brothers of her deceased husband, retaining a share for her own support. In marriage, in practice there is community of goods. In all acts relating to the acquisition, alienation, rental of property, and to loans, the wife shares title with the husband. The mother is queen of the home. Often she controls the purse. She is responsible for the education of her daughters. The husband's sphere of interest is the 'forum'.

Public Assistance

Generally speaking, the family or the village is responsible for its own sick, handicapped, old or infirm. In ancient times the State created institutions for the care of such cases if they had no family to be responsible for them. Vagabonds without family are committed to the charge of the village. 'Difficult' cases who do not get along with their family are brought back and turned over to the family or the village.

Village Autonomy

An element of equilibrium in the institutions of the country, much remarked by foreign authors, is Vietnam's village or community autonomy. All villages honor their founders. Villages retain their local customs, as recorded in their founding documents, without prejudice to a deep national and cultural unity. Such customs come to light in appeals to moral observances, feasts, common anniversaries, individual labor or cooperation expected in times of danger - a break in the dykes, fire - with sanctions in case of failure to respond, mutual assistance, commemorations of community benefactors whose names are inscribed in the founding documents, arbitration of disputes, sanctions for contravening established regulations, etc., etc. These customs do not contradict the laws of the country and do not prevail against them (the Code provides punishment for abuses by community authorities).

The common saying: "The King's law does not override village custom," is simply small town boastfulness, indicating local pride in their own way of doing things, and not made in a spirit of contempt for royal authority. Persons honored for services to the State have rank of precedence in the village and are highly esteemed by the inhabitants. Every inhabitant owes service to the State. The village makes an annual declaration of the names and the number of its adult able-bodied inhabitants. It is to the village that the State addresses itself when requisitioning its quota of military recruits. It is to the mayor of the village that the Administration sends its official acts. The mayor's seal is conferred by the Administration. The mayor, however, is above all the representative of the village and the spokesman of its rights. The choice of mayor is made by the village, with sanction given by the Administration. For community affairs the mayor plays rather the role of executive agent of the deliberations of the ancients, the notables, the representatives of the inhabitants (this apart and distinct from his proper competence, which is to draw up

attestations and certifications. Sale of property between individuals, for example, is certified by the mayor, who stamps the document with his official seal).

The mayor and the village notables receive no pay.

Community Land

Community land already under cultivation is inalienable. Any proposed change must be sanctioned by the Sovereign. The use of community land or important revenue thereof requires the general consent of the inhabitants.

A particular institution in Vietnam, much remarked by outsiders, is the re-division of community land every three years, in equal lots, among all the inhabitants, with an area reserved for community expenses (including education, award to outstanding students, recognition of particularly meritorious examples of filial piety or other virtues). Widows, old men, the infirm, are assigned lots of lesser importance. In this way the able-bodied, upon whom falls the weight of taxes and service to the State, are able to group their lots and rent them out in common to pay their taxes and cover their services. In many cases there still remains something for personal cultivation and income. This institution exists nearly everywhere in the country. In many villages the land under common cultivation since early times is much more important than privately owned property. In the South, which developed in more recent centuries, consequent on official encouragement to individuals who are willing and able to open new areas, it was prescribed under Ming Mang that at least one tenth of the land already privately owned revert to community ownership.

Founding Villages

A Vietnamese dream is to become the founder of a village. This requires money and followers to join in the venture, if official sanction is to be obtained. This in turn implies moral authority and qualities of leadership on the founder's part. The pioneer[4] aims to

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4. The predonimant aim of the pioneer was the establishment of a new community for the honor it brought, rather than the opening of new country for personal gain. We speak especially of the period since Gia Long. For the South, where population was sparse and land was fertile, individuals sought to better themselves, without much thought of new communities. Taxes on newly opened land were very light at first. In general, taxes on community-owned land are higher than those on private land. They are easier to collect and the weight bears less heavily on the individual.

bring a new area under cultivation to the profit of a future community, which community, he hopes, will be officially erected into a village after bringing a minimum number of inhabitants settled in residence. If he succeeds, the founder's name will be held in perpetual memory, the State will accord him honor while alive and grant him honorary title after his death. The register containing data on the origin of the village, the signature of the founder, authorization of the Government, etc., is preserved as a precious relic by the village. It is the Liberty Bell of the village. The notable who guards it is held in higher esteem than the mayor. A copy is deposited in a special section of the Government's Pavilion of the Archives in the Capital City.

Private initiative encouraged by the State has thus been responsible for wide open spaces under cultivation, contributing to the settlement of the country and its progress. The system called for qualities of initiative, a communal sense, ability to organize, mutual assistance, discipline, recognition of merit, self-policing and defense against robbers and brigands. From this arises the sense of village personality, tracing its foundation to its own efforts, and owing its identity to no one else. The custom has also contributed to the homogeneity and binding of the country.

Education

Education in Vietnam is based on the humanistic teachings of Confucius. Great schools were established in the Capital and in the larger centers. Each province had its central educational establishment as did each district. Scholars of renown were much sought after as masters. State sanction was given by public examinations held in preparation for the triennial concourses in the Capital, at which bachelor diplomas (two degrees) and the doctorate were awarded. In general the system of education was that of private schools supported by the family, with examinations held under public supervision and degrees awarded by public authority. For the lower grades certificates were issued by the district or provincial centers. Stress was laid on different studies in different localities. Some, as in the capital, tended to stress politics and administration, others rhetoric or poetry, still others philosophy (cf. the study of the I chingin the region between north and center). The national examinations took these tendencies into account and were more exacting in the favorite branches of the region. The choice of examiners was a delicate job Unpopular choice might result in agitation, pamphleteering, or even boycott. Politicians had a healthy respect for student opinion.

Opposition on the part of the student class and educated opinion often led to the removal of Ministers, the fall of Cabinets, or even revolution.

In 1920 the French authorities objected to the traditional educational system and abolished the national examination. They had already subjected it to modification previously.

Public Opinion

Periodically the Sovereign or the various government departments would ask the inhabitants of the country, without distinction, to make recommendations on public affairs. Sometimes, even without invitation, it was done by capable and energetic individuals. Recognized scholars, even though not holding public office, were accepted as confreres by government officials and were consulted on public matters.

Needed Modern Renovation

That the traditional institutions in this and other matters were not perfect the people freely recognized. A well known adage points up their relative skepticism: "Rare indeed it is to have an enlightened Sovereign and a capable Minister at the same time." The Sovereign was expected to provide leadership in collaboration with the Court, which rose from the people by way of the national examinations and was considered to represent the elite of public opinion. The Court, however, is at the same time an organized opinion and a body of hierarchic functionairies. Admittedly the Sovereign recognized that his conduct was subject to judgment according to the opinion of the people. Should the Court, however, oppose the will of the Sovereign and find itself meeting a resolute attitude, the result is conflict. Harmony would be in jeopardy also if the Sovereign sided with one faction of the Court. Likewise, if some strong personality or powerful Court faction were to impose its will upon the Sovereign. There is also the matter of over-long tenure of office. How to secure governmental stability and make use of experience while avoiding the disadvantages of over-long tenure were not unknown (for example, in ancient times, even Sovereigns resigned, to become advisers to their successors).

It may be that heretofore conditions did not favor a more representative form of government, one that would more faithfully and more rapidly reflect the aspirations and opinions of the moment, even had

such form been contemplated. (The ancient books speak of the first sovereigns of China acceding to the supreme function by selection and not by birth, and teach that this is the best form of government.) Under present world conditions the adoption of modern democratic institutions of government appears mandatory.

The revolutionary heroes who, under the French occupation, made themselves emigres in order to fight for independence saw this clearly enough. While continuing to fight French oppression, they became convinced of the need to introduce modern reforms after the pattern of what they saw agitated for or applied in China and Japan, and incorporated them in their programs.

A further influence tending to give weight to this view was the necessity the Vietnam Government felt under the French Protectorate to win and keep the people's support in the fight to defend the country's rights.

We recall the dramatic scene preceding the signing of the French-Vietnamese Convention of November 6, 1925. Bao Dai, then a child, was about to succeed his father on the Throne. He was also destined to continue his studies in France. The French came up with the idea that the first function of the Sovereign was of a ritual order and that during the King's minority the French Representative would sign decrees having the validity of royal ordinances. The Vietnamese president of the Council of Ministers, Nguyen Huu Bai, rejected the proposal as a displacement of the national sovereignty. In the absence of the Sovereign, said he, the rights of sovereignty devolve upon the people. Therefore it would be requisite that the then functioning consultative Assembly become a chanber of representatives having deliberative power. To French opposition he replied that their demands rendered the fulfillment of his office of chief of government utterly impossible. In the end a compromise was agreed upon, according to which all important affairs were to require the opinion of the consultative Assembly (to be denominated a chamber of representatives) and that all measures before becoming executory were to be deliberated upon by the Council of Ministers and were to require the agreement of the Council. The Council thus would hold the ultimate power of decision.

In 1933 the French promoted a new 'reform'. The Council of Ministers was no longer to be a collective organism representing the Government of Vietnam vis-a-vis the French, but was to become a sort of joint committee presided over by the French Representative, with individual voting in which the French chairman would also take part.

Ironically enough, this was supposed to promote the idea that the Sovereign holds personal authority. The French Representative moreover was to render public acts executory. He thus became in fact the head of Government and the head of State.

The author of this article, then Minister of the Interior, protested against this destruction of institutions as being in effect the termination of national sovereignty. He held out for a chamber of representatives having deliberative power. French refusal even to discuss this proposal determined him to resign. He had already fought with success against the incipient communist movement and saw the danger of such emasculation of the country's sovereignty, as well as the necessity for democratic reforms.

Vietnam has a right to independence. Through long centuries she has shown the will to live, has surmounted severe crises, and has demonstrated as much political maturity as her neighbors who in fact enjoy real independence. She ought not to be entrammelled in a French 'union' or 'association' that renders the functioning of government more arduous than it is in completely free countries. On the other hand, the British Commonwealth, for example, while maintaining certain definite ties on the basis of complete equality, eliminates centralized control. It respects the personality proper to each of its members. It permits moreover the free play of democratic institutions in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, which itself recommends the promotion of democratic institutions.

The Future of Democracy in Vietnam

To promote true democracy in Vietnam we must enhance the idea of the human dignity, and reject those false ideologies which would bring us to agnosticism, indifferentism and ultimately nihilism. Certain educated elements have already allowed themselves, perhaps unwittingly, to be impregnated with these flase ideas. Alert to defend the notion of the value and dignity of the human person, we must promote the idea of the common good, and acknowledge the supreme authority of a personal God.

In education the Government should encourage the founding of free universities in various parts of the country, free to adapt themselves

to the intellectual needs and artistic tendencies of each local area.

We should seek neighborly collaboration with other countries in sharing a common culture and in solving common problems. Asiatic countries have a profound sense of the appreciation of the spiritual value. By such meeting of minds, wills and deeds, we should be able to contribute to and gain from the maintenance of the security indispensable to the existence of democracy. By such meeting we would also have opportunities to deepen the appreciation of the value of other civilizations as well as the work of our own traditional culture.

A ROMAN GENERAL'S OPINION OF MILITARY CRITICS

LUCIUS AEMILIUS PAULUS, A Roman Consul, who had been selected to conduct the war with the Macedonians, B.C. 168, went out from the Senate-House into the Assembly of the people and addressed them as follows:

In every circle, and, truly, at every table, there are people who lead armies into Macedonia; who know where the camp ought to be placed; what posts ought to be occupied by troops; when and through what pass that territory should be entered; where Magazines should be formed; how provisions should be conveyed by land and sea; and when it is proper to engage the enemy, when to lie quiet.

And they not only determine what is best to be done, but if any thing is done in any other manner than what they have pointed out, they arraign the consul, as if he were on trial before them.

These are great impediments to those who have the management of affairs; for every one cannot encounter injurious reports with the same constancy and firmness of mind as Fabius did, who chose to let his own ability be questioned through the folly of the people, rather than to mismanage the public business with a high reputation.

I am not one of those who think that commanders ought at no time to receive advice; on the contrary, I should deem that man more proud than wise, who regulated every proceeding by the standard of his own single judgment.

What then is my opinion?

That commander should be counselled, chiefly, by persons of known talent; by those who have made the art of war their particular study, and whose knowledge is derived from experience; from those who are present at the scene of action, who see the country, who see the enemy; who see the advantages that occasions offer, and who, like people embarked in the same ship, are sharers of the danger.

If, therefore, any one thinks himself qualified to give advice respecting the war which I am to conduct, which may prove advantageous to the public, let him not refuse his assistance to the state, but let him come with me into Macedonia.

He shall be furnished with a ship, a horse, a tent; even his traveling charges shall be defrayed.

But if he thinks this too much trouble, and prefers the repose of a city life to the toils of war, let him not, on land, assume the office of a pilot.

The city, in itself, furnishes abundance of topics for conversation; let it confine its passion for talking within its own precincts, and rest assured that we shall pay no attention to any but such as shall be framed within our camp.

*Titus Livius, born 59 B.C., died A.D. 17.

"A REPORT ON SOUTH VIETNAM", REMARKS BY THE HONORABLE ROGER HILSMAN, THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AT THE AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION MEETING, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS.

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In the period when Mr. Acheson was Secretary of State and General Marshall was Secretary of Defense, it is said that the two men had a special understanding.

Whenever anyone said, "This is a purely military problem," or "This is a purely political or diplomatic problem," then whoever said it had to leave the room.

In South Vietnam we are confronted with an extraordinary example of the way military decision and action are interdependent with many other decisions and enterprises. The war there is a guerrilla war, any successful means on countering guerrilla war are as much political as military, for the long-run task is nation-building.

This guerrilla war is a form of hidden communist agression, an internal war, if you will. As President Kennedy has said, "Their aggression is more often concealed than open. They have fired no missiles and their troops are seldom seen. They send arms, agitators, aid, technicians and propaganda to every troubled area. But where fighting is required, it is usually done by others -- by guerrillas striking at night, by assassins striking alone -- assassins who have taken the lives of four thousand civil officers in the last twelve months in Vietnam alone -- by subversives and saboteurs and insurrectionists, who in some cases control whole areas inside of independent nations."

This war in the shadows may well be one of the most decisive battles of our time. My subject is a report on one of these shadow wars, the one in South Vietnam, and I would like to start by giving you my outline: There is a guerrilla war in South Vietnam so I would like, first, to say something about guerrilla warfare in general -- the conditions in which it arises and a strategic concept for fighting against it. Second, I would like to tell you how these ideas are being applied in South Vietnam. And, finally, I'd like to give you a report on how things are going there in South Vietnam.

There is something about guerrilla warfare which gives rise to legends. It is part of the operation, in fact, to see that the enemy if full of rumors which keep him in the dark as to facts.

But in appriasing the uses of guerrilla tactics we should certainly try to separate legends from realities.

So it seems useful to begin with the elementary observation that guerrilla warfare is possible only in two very special sets of circumstances:

The first is, when the main body of the enemy is otherwise engaged. When France was occupied by the Germans in World War II, virtually the entire population hated the Mazis. There was a well-organized and supplied guerrilla movement -- the Maquis. But so long as the German Armies had nothing else to do, the French guerrillas could not be effective. There were many individual acts of sabotage and violence, but not much else. At any time that a small guerrilla band attacked, the Germand could counter with overwhelming force.

But after D-Day, when the German Divisions were fully engaged in fighting the Allies, the Maquis became a formidable and effective force.

The second set of circumstances is now the more usual setting for guerrillas when they operated in the emerging, still developing countries of the world. In much of the world today, the different communities that make up what we think of as Nation-States are isolated from the Central Government -- isolated by lack of communications or by the terrain, as in mountains, islands, or the desert, but more importantly isolated in psychological and political sense.

The basic situation in many underdeveloped areas is that the villages are turned inward on themselves. The people are living there as they have for hundreds of years, with few ties to their Government. They appear rarely to have strong political convictions one way or another. In my personal experience in Southeast Asia during World War II where a few of us in the OSS were sent behind the enemy lines to organize bands of guerrillas against the Japanese, it seemed to us that perhaps ten percent of the people had some sympathies for our side and perhaps ten percent had some sympathies for the Japanese but eighty percent of the populace did not have much awareness of the struggle being fought out in their country. Much less did they have ideological convictions. Even with white faces we recruited a guerrilla force that was larger in numbers than the Communist guerrilla force in South Vietnam today.

My point is that in these underdeveloped, but at the same time

ancient cultures, the villagers are isolated from each other and from the Central Government in a way that we in the West are not equipped by our experience to understand. The villagers are turned inward on themselves and identify not with the Nation but often only with their family, clan, and village.

Let me illustrate my point.

Recently some friends of mine made a tour of the border areas of such a country. They visited forty villages. In ten of those villages no one had ever seen a Government Official of any kind -- neither the District Chief nor the Province Chief, much less a Representative of the National Government. They also visited a town, where one would expect the people to be better informed than those in the villages. There they talked to a shopkeeper, and one would expect a shopkeeper to be better informed than, say, a laborer. They asked the shipkeeper who the King of the Country was and he proudly named him and pointed to a picture on the wall -- which had, incidentally, been furnished by the United States Information Service. He was asked who the Prime Minister was, however, and inexplicably named not the Prime Minister of his own Country, but the Prime Minister of a nearby country. It seems that the nearby country had radio broadcasts which he could pick up on his transistor radio and he naturally assumed that since he could hear the broadcast the Country must be his own.

What happens when a village with people as isolated as these is visited by tough band of armed marauders? The villagers are unarmed and the guerrillas are armed. It is not surprising that the villages give or sell the guerrillas rice. It is not surprising that the guerrillas can recruit a few youhg men to join their guerrilla band with promises of adventure and good things to come. In such circumstances the people do not have to be "against" the Government for a guerrilla unit to thrive. The people do not have to support the guerrilla for a guerrilla movement to thrive.

(Any comparison with our own world must be far fetched, but one may ask whether the citizens of Chicago supported the gangs which flourished in the twenties? The shopkeeper who was hit by "protected you" racket did not "support the gangs", but he often had no choice but to go along with them. Government protection seemed far away, and the threat from the hoodlums was close by. The same is true in the underdeveloped areas of the world, where the villages are not only isolated, but also both unarmed and unprotected.)

Against this background, I would suggest two principles as a strategic concept for countering guerrilla warfare in the underdeveloped regions of the world.

The first principle is that fighting a guerrilla war in an underdeveloped nation requires as much political and civic action as it does military action. President Roosevelt once said that "Dr. New Deal had been succeeded by Dr. Win The War", but in guerrilla wars in underdeveloped Nations both Doctors are needed. Military action and a Social New Deal have to proceed together. The isolated villages must be tied into the governmental structure -- at District, Province and ultimately the national level. The goal is to create a network in which information about the needs of the villagers can flow upward and Government Services can flow downward.

This flow of services from the Government must go all the way across the board -- feeder roads so the villagers can get their products to markets; radios and radio stations so their minds can be opened up to the outside world; food from a prosperous part of the country when famine strikes in another part of the country; education for the young; books and magazines for the old so that they will not lose their literacy for lack of something to read as so often happens; and medical services.

I know that it is familiar to those of you in this audience, but it is not familiar to most Americans just how heavy some of the ancient but now controllable scourges of mankind weigh on the peoples of the world. In parts of Thailand, 80 percent of the people are infested with the liver fluke. Hookworm devilitates the populations in most of Asia. The World Health Organization, our own Aid Programs, and the efforts of many of these countries in their own behalf have made enormous strides in controlling Malaria. But countless millions of people are afflicted with controllable diseases against which no progress has really been attempted.

You in this room could list these diseases and their consequences much better than I. But let me make two points.

The first is that controlling many of these diseases is not only a question of hospitals, X-Ray equipment, and a high proportion of Doctors to total population. Much can be done by teaching the villagers the elementary facts about sanitation, by Medical Technicians trained to deal with one or two particular diseases, and by an adequate supply of modern drugs.

The second point is that it is often these one or two endemic but controllable diseases that stand in the way of economic progress and development, and hence contribute greatly to Communist opportunities for subversion and aggression by guerrilla warfare.

To sum up this first principle -- that the villages must be tied into the governmental and national fabric -- let me say that it is well for us to remember that in these parts of the world it is a revolutionary idea that the people of a country can expect their Government to help them, protect them. They have never asked what their country can do for them, much less what they can do for their country. Indeed, there are millions of people who do not know what a country or Government is. If we are looking for a revolutionary appeal to excite and inspire these people, it is the simple concept that Government exists to serve and protect them.

My second principle concerns the military side of fighting guerrillas, but in a peculiarly political way. The principle is that in fighting guerrillas, military operations must be so conducted as to achieve political ends. Stated another way, the principle would be that to fight guerrillas you must adopt the tactics of the guerrilla himself.

Orthodox military tactics are aimed at taking and holding territory. Military formations designed for these purposes are large and slower moving. The guerrilla on the other hand, does not aim to take territory, but to win recruits and alienate the people from their Government. The guerrilla's purpose is well served when large military formations sweep the countryside, for this tends to make life difficult for the villagers and, hence, to make the villagers turn against their Government. Thus, for political reasons the military tactics used against guerrillas should be those of the guerrilla himself -- small roving units constantly patrolling and ambushing. Finally, these tactics should be designed to cut the lines of communication between the guerrilla and the thousands of villages to which he goes for food and recruits.

You have heard of the so-called strategic hamlets and villages that are now being built in South Vietnam. This is a concept that was developed in Malaya during the Communist Guerrilla War there, and is now being applied in South Vietnam.

You remember my earlier point that in underdeveloped areas the

villagers are not necessarily pro-guerrilla. But unless there is some way of protecting them from Maurauding Guerrilla Bands they will be obliged to give or to sell food to the guerrilla and to listen to his propaganda.

One purpose of the strategic village is to give villages this protection -- or, rather, to help the villager to protect himself. Without arms or protection the villager cannot refuse to give or sell his rice to the Communists, for fear of retaliation. Without protection, the villager is afraid to pass on information about the Communist guerrillas to the Government.

A second purpose of the strategic village is to control the movement of people and supplies. Identity cards are issued; and curfews are imposed. Thus anyone on the roads and trails at night can be assumed to be a Communist.

Through the use of Identity Cards and intelligence from the people, the small group of hard-core Communists in a village of several hundred people can be identified and arrested. The barbed wire and curfews deny the guerrillas easy access to the villages. If the guerrillas need rice, they must attack a defended village. Thus the whole war is turned around. Instead of the Government forces chasing the Communists and falling into ambush, the Communists must attack the villages and so fall into ambushes themselves.

It should be stressed that the stretegic hamlets are not concentration camps. The purpose is to keep the guerrillas out of the villages, rather than keep the villagers in. Inevitably, of course, when one throws a barbed wire fence around a village there is a degree of regimentation. But this is a type of war and some form of regimentation cannot be avoided. There is a parallel in our own history. The early settlements of America had stockades around them and life went on behind the stockades for a long time. Our ancestors did not like the rule that everyone had to be inside the stockade at sundown. They did not like to bring up their children in such an atmosphere, but they built the stockades as a first step towards a way of life in which stockades were no longer necessary.

Now let us see how the South Vietnamese Government is applying these principles against the Communist guerrillas.

There are 15,000 - 20,000 hard-core, full-time Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam, and many thousands more sympathizers, part-time Communist guerrillas, and political and propaganda agents.

South Vietnam is a nation of about 14 million, so this does not represent a mass movement.

But in an underdeveloped country with poor communications, with mountains and jungles, terrorists and subversive agents in these numbers can cause much damage.

The major concentrations of the Communist guerrillas -- who are commonly called the Viet Cong -- are in the mountains near the Laotian border in the North; in the mountains extending eastward toward the coast in the central region of South Vietnam and southward toward Saigon; and in the Meking River Delta area, including the plain of reeds, West and South of Saigon.

The Communists try to maintain the fiction that this is a civil war arising spontaneously from within South Vietnam.

This is not true. The Communists in North Vietnam are directing this guerrilla movement. For years, they have been sending in trained men to be the cadre for the Communist Viet Cong battalions. These trained men slip into South Vietnam over various overland infiltration routes that lead from North Vietnam through mountains and jungles and by junk landings along the South Vietnamese coastline. And let me make this clear -- by using these infiltration routes and conducting a guerrilla war the Communists are committing aggression. The guerrilla movement in South Vietnam is directed from outside by an enemy nation. It is interference by military force in the affairs of another nation.

What comes over these infiltration routes? The answer is -- largely trained men. These are jungle trails -- not roads -- and the men must walk. They can carry food for their journey. They can carry arms and ammunition. They can carry medical supplies. They can carry money. And they can carry specialized equipment, such as radios and perhaps some light automatic weapons.

The food for the guerrillas in South Vietnam must be obtained in South Vietnam itself. Moreover, by hitting army, security, and police units suddenly and in superior force, the guerrillas are able to assure themselves a local supply of arms and ammunition and reduce their dependence on long supply lines from the North. This is demonstrated by analyzing the equipment captured from the Communist Viet Cong. The arms captured from the Communists are old weapons left over from the

days when Vietnam was a French Colony, those that the Communists have captured from the South Vietnamese forces, or homemade guns, mines, grenades and even crossbows with poison arrows.

Thus there are two lines of supply for the Communist Viet Cong. The first is the infiltration routes which supply largely trained men -- officers, and non-commissioned officers -- and specialized equipment and supplies. The second are the hundreds of jungle trails leading into thousands of South Vietnamese villages, like spokes on a wheel. It is from these villages that the Communists get food, recruits, and the raw materials from which to manufacture arms and ammunition. As I said before, the villagers do not necessarily support the Communists, but when the Communists have access to the villages they can obtain the supplies by both intimidation and purchase.

This, then, is the enemy situation. The South Vietnamese Program for dealing with this situation has three objectives:

The first is to strengthen the regular army and security forces and increase their mobility.

Here the United States Aid is vital, and the vigorous program instituted by Secretary of Defense McNamara has been having magnificent results. As you have read in the papers, the United States has furnished arms and equipment and, most importantly, helicopters which give the regular South Vietnamese Army lightning mobility to reinforce people attacked by the Communists, and to seek out and pursue the Communists in the mountains and jungles.

The second objective of the program is to cut the infiltration routes.

The Geneva Agreements neutralizing Laos specify that the territory of Laos shall not be used for these purposes. Whether the North Vietnamese will keep their word remains to be seen. But in any case the South Vietnamese are not powerless. As you can see from a glance at the map, these infiltration routes must in some instances wind their way for long distances inside South Vietnam before reaching the areas of Viet Cong concentration, and the South Vietnamese are taking measures to cut these routes inside South Vietnam itself.

An important part of the measures to cut the infiltration routes

is the recent decision to arm the Montagnards. The Montagnards are the mountain peoples of South Vietnam -- hardy, courageous men. Recently thousands of Montagnards have gled into the lowlands to get away from the Viet Cong whose modern arms were too much for the only weapons the Montagnards had -- spears, and bows and arrows.

The South Vietnamese Government decided to equip the Montagnards with modern weapons, furnished by the United States. The Montagnards are trained in the use of these weapons, and sent back into their home territories to establish strategic villages of their own in the mountains through which the infiltration routes pass. Our special forces training officers estimate that about 23,000 square miles are already under the Montagnards' protection and that in four months the total may be 40,000 square miles. According to reports, 7,000 Montagnards have already been trained and given weapons and another 3,000 are being trained.

The third objective of the South Vietnamese is the strategic village program I have mentioned, which is designed to cut the major routes of supply and deny Communist access to thousands of unprotected villages.

This program calls for putting defenses around existing villages -- barbed wire, watchtowers, and ditches filled with bamboo spikes and booby traps. It calls for giving each village a radio which the villages can use to call for reinforcements by helicopter if they are attacked by a Viet Cong force too large for them to handle. It calls for arms for the villagers to use themselves when attacked.

There is one misconception about this program I would like to correct. These plans, unlike those in Malaya, do not call for relocating villages except in rare circumstances. In general, the defenses are to be put around existing villages. Although there are one or two places in heavily penetrated regions where villages have actually had to be regrouped, these are the exception, not the rule.

The strategic villages will provide protection. At the same time, the South Vietnamese plan to use the strategic village idea as a way to tie the villagers into the governmental structure and to provide the villages with Government Services -- Health, Education, Agricultural Services, Police Protection, and good village Administration.

South Vietnamese Government Plans call for civic action teams sent by the provincial and national governments which will not only help the villagers in setting up their defenses, but will also expand the political, social, and economic base for integrating of the villages into the national fabric. For example, these teams include a medical technician, a school teacher, an agricultural credit representative, a public information representative, two or three public administration advisors, and a youth activities representative, as well as a Police Advisor, a Civil Guard Liaison Officer to man the radio that calls for reinforcements if attacked, and a squad of soldiers to issue weapons to the villagers and provide training in their use.

When this program is completed, in addition to the protection afforded, the South Vietnamese should have a much improved structure that will permit information about the needs of the villagers to go up the ladder of Government and services to meet their needs to come down.

On the military side, it will provide hedgehod of defended villages, zones of defended villages which will act as a meat grinder when the Communist guerrillas venture into them. Each of the villages will have its own self-defense corps to resist attack. In the empty spaces between the villages, Civil Guard Units will patrol and lay ambush during curfew hours. If the Viet Cong come into the zone, they are very likely to run into a Civil Guard ambush. Even if the Viet Cong do not run into an ambush, sooner or later they will run out of food and be forced to attack instead of being chased. The guerrilla is ambushed rather than ambushing.

This then is the theory, and the program for putting theory into practice. The final question is now, how is it working out in South Vietnam.

So far we have grounds for guarded optimism.

Vigorous support for Secretary McNamara and the Department of Defense has given the South Vietnamese Army new confidence. It is attacking the Viet Cong and has been having gratifying success.

Over 2,000 strategic hamlets have been built, and 1,000 of these are now equipped with radios as a result of United States Aid.

Not all of these strategic villages are perfect. Some do not have enough arms and equipment. In some places, too, there has not yet been

enough money to pay the villagers for the time they have spent on building the village defenses and inevitably in some villages there is some resentment.

On the other hand, the early returns seem to indicate that the villagers' morale and their attitude toward their Government are much better than some press reports might lead us to believe.

There have been some very positive press statements that the Government of South Vietnam is unpopular with the villagers. But how can one generalize about the attitude of some 12 million villagers? There are no gallup polls. I myself do not know the answer to this question and I doubt seriously that anyone does.

I can, however, give you a few hard facts that may be at least straws in the wind.

First, one would expect that if the villagers were anti-Government and pro-Viet Cong they would defect to the Communists when they were given arms. Of the villages that have been armed so far, I know of none that has gone over to the Communist side.

Second, if the villagers were merly indifferent to their Government they would sell their arms to the Communists -- and the Communists have offered very high prices for these arms. But of the villages that have been armed so far, I know of none where the arms have been sold to the Communists.

In fact, the villages have used their arms to fight the Communists. Of the villages that have been armed so far, only a few as yet have been attacked, but all of them have fought when attacked and fought well. Only five percent of the village radios have been lost as a result of Viet Cong action, and we really expected the rate to be much higher. More than this, in the last few weeks a high percentage of the Viet Cong killed have been killed by villagers resisting Viet Cong attack.

Let us take one week as an example. During one week in August, over 600 Viet Cong were killed as against less than 100 killed among the pro-Government forces. And of these 600 Viet Cong killed, two-thirds were killed not by the South Vietnamese regular Army, but by villagers armed through the strategic village program. This, I think, is an encouraging indication of the attitudes of the villagers.

In sum then, although the plans are just beginning to be implemented, the results are encouraging. The defection rate of the

Viet Cong has risen and the recruitment rate has gone down. Just in the last two months there are areas of South Vietnam that are now safe that only last spring could not be entered without a company of armed guards.

There is a long way to go. It took seven years to eliminate guerrillas in Malaya. It may take less than this in Vietnam or it may take more, but it stands that we have reason to feel confident that in the end the South Vietnamese -- with our help -- will win. Item.

THE INSURGENT BATTLEFIELD

(Talk at Air Force Academy by Brig. Gen. E. G. Lansdale, USAF 25 May 1962)

I.

This is a little talk on some "facts of life." It's not the usual one about the bees and the flowers. It concerns some hard facts you should know for your life, as an American military man, on today's Communist insurgent battlefield. You'll need your eyes wide open when you get there.

Today's battlefield is the result of a strategic flanking movement. For some time now, the Communist leaders have made it plain that they expect to conquer the world. The short road to conquest could only be taken by making full use of military power. Our own great and alert strength has served as a military deterrent, which has forced the Communists to take the long way around in trying to reach their goal.

This "long way" is conquest by subversion in all of its aspects, supported by guerrilla forces when needed. The Communist guerrilla operations increasingly have involved American military men. Our military advisors, in assisting the armed forces of free foreign nations, simply have had to learn how to give practical advice on fighting Communist guerrillas, or else. The "or else" is the penalty of seeing an ally go under.

Our military effort along these lines, in what we now call "counter-insurgency," has been greatly heartened by the personal interest of President Kennedy. The U. S. military establishment is responding with tremendous vitality. The top echelon, including Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General LeMay definitely, are dedicated to making our effort succeed. You probably have noted that they get out to the critical areas, in person, to make it count most where it's needed most. Further, in "counter-insurgency," we have new military doctrine, new staffs in the Pentagon, new command structures in the field, special units, and new courses on the subject in our military schools and colleges.

All of this splendid effort, its organization, its training, its equipment, are working towards having what it takes to win...at the point of decision...on the insurgent battlefield. It boils down to a

pretty lonely spot. At some place, on the insurgent battlefield, it comes to a unit of an allied military force, with an American military advisor, right up against the enemy. That American had better know his stuff. One day, that American might be you.

You'll be key man, on the spot.

In case it is you, let me help you get prepared for that moment. The best start I know is to get oriented to the insurgent battle and to its battlefield. When you locate your own vital part in these surroundings, all your heritage, and training, and equipment will start clicking into place.

What, then, is this battle?

What does the insurgent battlefield look like?

II.

The battlefield is a whole country, when Communist guerrillas are active.

If we were to map it truly, to show what it really looks like as a Communist insurgent battlefield, we would have to put in all the people in the land. They are the dominant feature of this battlefield, above all else. We would see the battle for what it is: to win these people. When the people are won, along with them go the terrain, the wealth of the land, the whole existence of the nation.

The strategy and tactics which take place on this battlefield are based on winning the people. As long as they are, the battle starts getting won. When strategy and tactics are used which don't contribute to winning the people, the battle starts getting lost.

Thus, on our true map of the battlefield, we would see a nation's entire population. Among the people, from one side, we would see the Communists hard at work, attracting and coercing, to gain control of this population. Among the population, from the other side, the government side, we would see the adherents of the government at work to maintain the loyalty and support of the people. When these two polarizing forces are thus competing, it's the one that can build up and maintain the strongest attraction force that wins. If the force on the government side is weakened, by diffusing the polarization, by shutting off vital parts of it, the government loses.

On a Communist insurgent battlefield, the military man is most often the government representative who is out among the people. The armed forces usually are the largest organization in the government. When the shooting's on they're out in the countryside where the enemy is. Their uniforms tell the people plainly that these are government men.

Magsaysay gave a dynamic role to the Philippine citizens in uniform during the Huk campaign. This dynamic role was called "civic action." In it, the soldier citizen became the brotherly protector of the civilian citizen. Meaningful help to the people, a regard for the dignity of man, and tru military courtesy were the essential elements. Civic action formed a bond of brotherhood between soldiers and civilians. When the soldiers and the people joined together, the Communist guerrillas could no longer hide among the people, and were defeated.

This polarizing force is not new to warfare. Those of you who crack your books will recognize it as Sun Tzu's first "constant factor" in the art of war. This practical soldier of 2,000 years ago called it the Moral Law. Mao Tse Tung put this into a code for the 8th Route Army. The code was known as the "Three Rules and the Eight Remarks." Essentially, this code implemented the concept of the people as the water where live the troops as the fish. In Communist North Vietnam, this same forceful principle is used. It is known as the "three recommendations" and is Point 9 of the Military Oath of Honor. General Giap, the Communist commander, stressed the "profound significance" of this code in the defeat of the French.

III.

The Communists put a lot of patient, long work into preparing the insurgent battlefield. They have a lot of resources in place, by the time they field a guerrilla force. Not all of these resources are surfaced when the insurgency is initiated. Significant action elements have a clandestine role, to weaken the government side, up close. Thus, the location of Communist forces would look quite different ona Communist operation map from the Communist order of battle seen on the usual government intelligence map. It's only when a massive intelligence effort is made by the government that the two maps start looking the same.

The Communist preparation of the battlefield in Vietnam began about 40 years ago. That is, it took about 20 years of preparation before the Communists started to field guerrilla forces.

The Japanese invasion and occupation gave the Communists the popular resistance cause they sought. However, the Japanese mostly behaved themselves in Vietnam, due to their deal with Vichy. So, the anti-Japanese war wasn't much of a Communist guerrilla effort, except in gaining experience which paid off after that war in organizing and leading a later guerrilla war for a more dynamic popular cuase, freedom from French rule. Many non-Communist Vietnamese fought for their country's freedom from the French, under Communist leadership, without being aware that the leadership was Communist. When they caught on that they weren't fighting for freedom, but to impose Communism on their country, they quit the Communist guerrilla ranks by the thousands. Many of the hardest fighters against the Communists in Vietnam today were once on the other side. A million of them moved South, when North Vietnam was given to the Communists.

If these Vietnamese sound naive, remember that there were many people who once believed that the Chinese Communists were only "agrarian reformers." Even closer home and more recently, remember the people who thought Fidel Castro was merely a liberal reformer. The Communists run an expert confidence game

Incidentally, in Vietnam, the preparation of the battlefield began with the entry of a tiny handful of Communist agents in the 1920's. They joined in with laborers brought from Singapore by French plantation owners, to build the railroad in Central Vietnam. The U. S. Army Special Forces now have a camp in Vietnam, close to where the first Communist cells were located. As these first Communist agents recruited local Vietnamese cadres, they picked up Ho Chi Minh, who received his higher Communist training later in Paris and Moscow.

The Communist insurgent battlefield in the Philippines got its first preparations at about the same time. The first agents were Malay-Chinese. Later, there was help not only from the Chinese Party, but considerable help from the American Communist Party. The American Communists were mostly merchant seamen in the early days. During the Huk campaign, one of the American Communists -- his name was William Pomeroy -- sneaked up into the hills to join the Communist guerrillas. They wouldn't have him as a fighting man. Instead, they assigned him to teach in one of their jungle schools, which they called "Stalin Universities." As he prepared to teach a class in local Communist history, he found that all reference to help from the American Party had been deleted in the local history given him. When he protested that there wouldn't have been a Philippine Party unless the American Party had helped so generously, he was disciplined. The enemy, the

newly independent Philippine Republic, was being smeared as the puppet of the United States. It would hardly do to have the Philippine Communist history vulnerable to the same charge! In reality, the hard driving force behind Communism in the Philippines has been Chinese right along.

IV.

In the years of building an organized force below the surface, the Communists use patience and masterly guile, supported by a highly effective international system. The system was originated by Lenin. It is the well-known complex of international and national "fronts," which Lenin thought of an "transmission belts," running power and resources from the international to the national.

Most people don't recognize one of the hard-core Communist cadre when they see him. Sometimes, the disguise is helped by overly enthusiastic anti-Communists, unwittingly. As part of the enthusiasm, Communists are portrayed as having a Stalin mustache, if not Krushchev's bald head. They are given the look of a crafty "muzhik." Helpfully, they wear red stars on a cap or peasant blouse. Some of them are even said to eat babies for breakfast.

So, when a softly-spoken person, looking much like one of the neighbors, moves in on a social structure, as a Communist agent, it is small wonder that he is hard to recognize. He uses local issues in his persuasion, as he carefully recruits and readies others to be as he. In some countries, the Communist cadres even praise U.S. aid when it is popular to do so.

In Vietnam, some of the mountain tribes file their teeth. So, when the Communist agents were selected to work with the tribes a few years back, the first ones in had their own teeth filed.

We have noted, then, that the battlefield is prepared by the Communists over a long period. This is going on today, in nation after nation. If you are assigned to one of our 40-odd MAAGs and military missions in friendly countries, you would do well to be concerned about what your opposite number among the Communists is doing. The chances are more than good that there is such a person, quietly teaching proletarian military science to the cadre, or quietly running a secret logistics system. Will you be doing a better job for the Free World than he is for his?

V.

With the Communist apparatus in place on the battlefield -- which is a nation, remember -- the Communists then play the breaks for a chance to win that nation. They are set to use political action, or military action, or a combination of both, to win their goal. War has been declared all along, from the time the first cadres were in place.

The political action is known as "the legal struggle." It has all the legality of an Al Capone running for mayor of Chicago, plus skilled use of inflammatory local issues. Some artful murders, with the victims usually meeting "accidents," some skillful character assassinations, applied terror, loud noises from "front" organizations, and a timed coup to seize the key spots -- these are the ingredients of "the legal struggle" at its climax.

If the political action doesn't go too well, then the military action is added, to apply naked power to the campaign. Or, if a really patriotic national rebellion gets started, the Communists move in fast with their military cadres, to capture its leadership.

When the Communists surface their guerrillas on the battlefield, we come to the "counter-insurgency" phase with which our military establishment is rapidly becoming so familiar.

The practices of Communist guerrilla war fare are varied enough for days of talk. To give you a "feel" for this enemy, here are some brief comments on three topics: population control, fiscal support, and troop discipline.

Population control: Communist guerrillas control the population by using both salesmanship and intimidation. The political officers with the guerrilla units are usually younger men. They use the "hard sell," reminiscent of our brasher door-to-door salesmen. They sell the joys of Communism, including the joy of bumping off the landlord, along with the sureness that Communism is coming anyhow, so join now.

The guerrilla unit's political officer has aprimary aim. He needs a secret organization within the village, to help support his unit. He usually establishes means for justice, policing, and the collection of supplies and intelligence.

In an insurgency, when it is said that the Communists rule the

village at night, it is this apparatus at work. The magistrate holds a court. Marriages are performed. Sentences are carried out. Taxes and other supplies are collected. It becomes the village secret, often totally unknown to the government.

When there isn't time for the political officer to work in the village, or when the village is hostile, terror is used. A quick, brutal lesson is given to the villagers. Senior villagers are often the victims. They are kidnapped from their homes at night. The next morning, their severed heads adorn poles on paths to the village. Next time the Communist guerrillas come around, the scared people give help. A villager who assists the government troops is sure of some punishment. If a village has a police force which is too active in patrolling the neighborhood, hunting guerrillas, it is lured out into the countryside. While the police are out of the village, the guerrillas slip in and murder the police families. Other police, in other villages, get the idea, and are afraid to go out on patrol and leave their families unprotected.

Fiscal support: Although the Communist agent apparatus is supported largely by outside, or international funding, the Communist guerrilla lives off the land. At times, he grows his own food. Mostly, however, he depends on the systematic collection of food and supplies in the villages. At harvest time, a farmer is told what share of his crop must be put aside for Communist collection. Villages not only provide funds and food, but also boats, vehicles, and cargadore labor.

Crime pays, for the Communist guerrillas. One method they use is kidnapping, for ransom. Another is highway robbery, although it is more normal for them to collect toll. They set up a chefkk point, stop busses, trucks, and private vehicles, and collect a head tax. If any of their victims look suspicious to them, they are apt to be taken prisoner or killed on the spot.

Bank robbery is resorted to, at times. However, it is easier to collect money for "protecting" the bankers, gangster style. In Asia, the banker or money-lender out in the countryside is usually the local Chinese merchant. Paying "protection money," for him, is just a normal way of life, a form of "squeeze."

Kidnapping, highway robbery, and squeezing the money-lender are all current practices of the Communist guerrillas in Vietnam. In the Huk campaign in the Philippines, the Communist guerrillas staged some

melodramatic train robberies, in real Jesse James style. In Vietnam, the Communist guerrillas simply blow up the tracks, wreck the train, and strip the bodies of the victims.

Troop discipline: When a village youth is recruited by Communist guerrillas, there is a romantic appeal to it. He is going to get away from daily chores and live a roaming life of fun and excitement.

The youth quickly finds that the Communist guerrilla unit is run with iron discipline, political indoctrination, and conditioning through "self-criticism." Once in, the only sure way of leaving the unit is death. If captured by government forces, he can be sure that he will have to answer for it to his Communist masters, later.

"Iron discipline" means prompt and severe punishment for any infraction of the rules. Death is as common a punishment as it was in the Middle Ages. A new recruit is often taught the rules dramatically. He is given the assignment of dealing out the punishment. I recall one case. Two village boys joined a Communist unit which was passing through. A few days later, it returned to the neighborhood of this village. One of the boys sneaked off to say hello to his parents. When this was discovered, the other boy was ordered to go to his friend's house and kill him in front of his parents. He did so. If he hadn't, he would have received the same punishment. This act, of course, cut him off from family, friends, and village. All he had left to him was his guerrilla unit and the Communist leaders. He had taken a big step forward, towards becoming one of the "hard core."

Political indoctrination is a Communist guerrilla strength. It is "troop I&E" that never stops. There is at least one formal session every day. During the day, there are quick, informal sessions. The political officer conducts these sessions, and goes right along with the troops on all operations. If you watch a Communist guerrilla unit on the march, when it stops to "take ten," you will see the political officer use the time to give a lecture.

The political officer also is responsible for the "self-criticism" sessions. The French have given the name "auto-intoxication" to the act of "self-criticism," and this is quite descriptive. It's an act in which the military man publicly confesses his weaknesses, particularly any form of selfishness.

For example, after a successful raid, the guerrillas return to their base tired but jubilant. After they've had their rest, the

political officer conducts a "self-criticism" session on the raid. The commander must state where he had a wrong or selfish thought -- in the planning and during the action. The key is, he must see himself as imperfect, state these imperfections openly in public, and vow to overcome impurity of thought or behavior next time. Each of the men goes through the same procedure, publicly. Serious deviations, of course, are punished.

The steady, day-in, day-out psychological conditioning of the "self-criticism" process makes the Communist guerrilla a fanatic. He automatically starts thinking of the group first, himself last.

VII.

Admittedly, this "guided tour" of the Communist insurgent battlefield has been a quick one. I hope the main points will stick with you. They are:

1. The enemy's objective is to win control of the people living on the battlefield. When he wins them, he wins all else.

2. The enemy prepares the battlefield carefully, over a long time. His battle line probably looks different than the government's.

3. Although the enemy tries to give his guerrillas a local appearance, often they have international strengthening. Cut off this outside support, and they would start failing.

4. The Communist guerrilla is a tough, resourceful, and fanatic enemy. He trains long and hard. He is conditioned psychologically.

It is only natural, when describing a tough enemy, to picture him as a little larger than life size. He will picture you the same way, when you are out on the battlefield yourself and become effective.

If you recall, I pointed out earlier that all of our massive effort finally comes down to some small, lonely point on the Communist insurgent battlefield. This is where the final decision comes. This is where the American, when he is true to the spirit of his heritage, is more than a match for the fanatic Communist.

What is it, really, that you, and I, and other Americans find so precious to defend? What we defend are the principles of free men. These principles are clearly set forth in the Bill of Rights in our

Constitution, to fulfill the promise in our Declaration of Independence. So, we have man the way we see him -- an individual, born to be free, endowed by the Creator with "certain unalienable Rights." And, we have man the way the Communists see him -- a cipher, a zero man, born to be one of the mass slaves of the State.

One final story. A true one. It happened several years ago in Vietnam, before we had MAAG advisors out with the Vietnamese units. President Diem saw one of the MAAG advisors and asked him to go out and stay for some days with a Vietnamese general. The general was commanding an operation against insurgents, near the Plaine des Joncs.

President Diem pointed out that the Vietnamese general was a good fighting man. He needed little advice on how to fight and win. But, said President Diem, this highly moral soldier is an aloof man. So please teach him how to love the people. You know, the way you do, as an American.

I appreciate that this sounds highly idealistic and, perhaps an unusual chore for a military man. However, even President Diem's enemies admit that he is a tough and practical realist. He was right on the vital dynamic bean of successful counter-insurgency, when he asked this American's help.

Similar stories are being lived every day in Southeast Asia, by Americans who are giving of themselves, not just doing another tour of duty. Each place these Americans are, the cause of freedom grows. One of them is worth a hundred others who don't live up to the American spirit.

When your turn comes, be like them. Serve in the spirit of American principles. As you do so, you will be right in the forefront -- of giving the Communists a memorable licking -- of helping the cause of freedom, everywhere!

MOUNTAIN TRIBES OF SOUTH VIET NAM

Languages and Dialects

Linquistically, Southeast Asia does not form any sort of a natural entity. This is also true in the case of the mountaineer dialects. Although there is some difference of opinion among linquists as to proper grouping of the languages, most authorities classify mountaineer dialects into three broad divisions according to the degree in which they have been modified by the tongues spoken by neighboring peoples who have advanced to a higher stage of civilization. The three are:

Dialects of the Malayo-Polynesian origin, one of the most widespread linquistic families in the world, spoken in the Indochinese peninsula, in the Malayan Peninsula and the Philippines. They are polysyllabic, non-tonal.

Dialects of Mon Khmer origin, sometimes grouped under the term Austro-Asiatic. This family is represented in parts of Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and Malaya, as well as in Viet Nam. These dialects are monosyllabic and tonal.

Dialects of Tibeto-Chinese origin, which include Burmese and Thai. They also are monosyllabic and tonal.

However, in many cases there is a transfer of words from one language to another, making neat, firm classifications impossible. Vietnamese, for example, is pre-dominately a Thai language but contains so many Non-Khmer elements that some linquists place it in that group; in addition, Vietnamese has been enriched by a vocabulary of Chinese administrative, military, literary and philosophical terms.

In the Highlands, language is the greatest distinction that can be made between tribes. For the most part, each dialect is mutually unintelligible to members of other tribes. Since the development of a language follows its people's cultural evolution it is only through contacts with foreigners that these dialects expand. Most of the mountaineer languages belong either to the Mon-Khmer or the Malayo-Polynesian families. Mountaineer speaking Tibeto-Chinese dialects are represented by refugees from the North speaking Tai, Muong, Miao-Yao and Kadai. The Mon-Khmer languages of the Highlands have been divided into three groups:

The southern area: Koho, Chrao, Mnong.

The Kontum area: Halang, Bahnar, Sedang, Rongao, Bonom, Hrey, Jesh.

The central area: Katu, Pokoh, Tauoi, Bru.

Since the dialects are innumerable, there is virtually only one method, employed by all the groups, of communicating ideas or transmitting thought among them. It consists of the use of certain conventional signs. The more common of these are triangular or hexagonal figures of bamboo or rattan, measuring one foot eight inches in their greater dimension and hung in some conspecuous place. These geometrical forms warn the traveler of impending danger or notify a prohibition against crossing the boundary of a "taboo" village.

Another method of communication is by means of a string with a series of knots. This practice recalls the quipos which were in use among the Peruvians and Mexicans to record important events and as a medium for the transmission of thought. Suppose two friends want to arrange an appointment to meet in several day's time. They present each other with threads which have the same number of knots, as many knots as there are days to elapse before the meeting. Every day at sunrise each of them unties one of the knots. When at last there are no knots left, they know that the appointed day has arrived.

Chief Tribes

Bahnar (Subgroups: Tolo, Golar, Alakong) - Est. pop. 75,000.

Found mainly in Kontum and Ankhe; some in Pleiku and Binh Dinh provinces. Are located South of the Rogao, and Bunom, northeast of the Jarai, east of the Song (in the Phuong Long area) in Binh Dinh province... The Bahnar have a bilateral kinship system, the type of family found in the United States. Apparently they do not have a clan organization, the village being the social unit withh elders (kha) exercising great authority and responsible for electing a head man as administrator. Their language is of Mon-Khmer stock, but many understand Jarai, Sedang, Vietnamese and French. Import tribe.

BIH - Estimated pop. 20,000. Found south of Ban Me Thuot, between the Rhade and the Muong. Language is Malayo-Polynesian, similar to Rhado; many understand Rhade.

BONG MIEU - A small group of villages (est. pop. 500) in Bong

Mieu district in southern Quang Nam. Located between the Katu and Cua. Language family unknown.

BONOM (subgroups: Monom, Menam) - A fairly small group (4,000) in Kontum province (Plateau G. Vilum, Pomplong and Konbrait areas). Located between the Bahnar, Sedang and Hrey. Sometimes are called Bahnar, but appear to be a separate group.

BRU (subgroups: Brou, Baroo, Muong, Leong, Leung, Kalo, Leu Van Kiu) - A fairly large group (40,000) in Quang Tri province with main centers around Khe Sanh (Huong Hoa: 20,000) and Cam Phu (10,000) along the Quang Tri-Savannakhet highway. Group is also found on northern side of 17th parallel and west into Laos. Language is of Mon-Khmer family.

BUDIP - Moang Diep - The so-called feather people in Budang (Phuoc Tam area of Phuoc Long province). Located south of tho Mnongs. Their language is similar to Mnong, but is not mutually intelligible.

BULACH - A small (5,000) and little known group in Phuoc Long province. Located north of the Budip. The group is accessible only via a single dirt road in poor condition. Language is similar to Mnong and Budip.

CHAM - Remnants of a highly civilized nation that once dominated the entire Indochinese peninsula, group was conquired by the Vietnamese and almost disappeared. They are not mountaineers. Present population estimated at between 20,000 and 80,000. Located between Phan Rang and Phan Ri with some down the coast near Binh Tuy (Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan Provinces). Have a matriarchal tribal organization; civilization is in a state of decline. About 6,000 Cham in Viet Nam are Moslem; the rest practice a degenerate form of Brahmanism. Language is Malayo-Polynesian but most speak Vietnamese well.

CHRAC - Estimated pop. 15,000. Located in southern Long Khanh and southwestern Binh Tuy, probably some in northern Phuoc Tuy. They live south of the Lagna River and east of the Tahy Linh road; south of the Koho group.

CHRAO (subgroups: Ro, Bagieng) - Fairly small group found in Long Khanh and Binh Tuy provinces. Little information available about them.

CHURU - A fairly small (18,000) group in southeastern Tuyen Duc Province (in the Dran east of Dalat). They are closely related to the Cham and sometimes call themselves Cham. Language is Malayo-Polynesian, similar to Roglai: most speak Vietnamese.

GAR (subgroups: Mnong Gar, Pnom Gar) - A group estimated at 10,000 found in the La Thiet district in southeastern Darlac province and in the Dakao area of Tuyen Duc province. Similar to, yet apparently distinct from, the Mnongs.

HALANG - A group estimated at 4,000 living in the very rugged, roadless mountain area west of Dakto in Kontum province. Located west of the Sedang, south of the Jeh and north of the Jarai. Many speak Jarai.

HREY (subgroups: Hre, Dvak, Bavak, Kare, Tava) - a large (120,000) group in Quang Ngai province and parts of Kontum (extending from west of Quang Ngai to west of Bong Son). Language is of the Mon-Khmer family; many speak Bahnar and Vietnamese.

HROY (Bahnar Cham) A fairly small group in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen provinces. Sometimes regarded as Bahnar, but language appears to be Malayo-Polynesian rather than the Mon-Khmer of the Bahnar.

JARAI (sometimes spelled Jorai, Djarai or Djirai subgroups: Puan, Hodrung, Hrue) - Estimated population 150,000. A powerful and bellicose group, considered very important mountaineer tribe. Found mainly in Pleiku province; smaller groups in Kontum and Darlac provinces; others in Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa. Located south of the Bahnar and north of the Rhade; centered around Pleiku and Cheo Reo. Language is of the Malayo-Polynesian family similar to Rhade. The Jarai do not have a clan system, but a matrilineal kinship system.

JEH (subgroups: Die, Yeh, Jeh Perak, Jeh Brilar) A fairly large (15,000) group living in southwestern Quang Nam province, between the Sedang and Katu groups. Mon-Khmer stock.

KATU (subgroups: Attouat, Kao, Khac, Thap, Ngung Ta, Ngung Huu) A large (30,000) group found in Quang Nam and Thua Thien provinces centered in the An Diem region. Located in a 100 by 100km. area south of the Polo, north of the Jeh. Area very inaccessible. Mon-Khmer language family.

KOHO (subgroups: Chil, Lat, Tring, Sre, Maa, Rion, Nop) An estimated 100,000, found mostly in Tuyen Duc and Lam Dong provinces, but also in Binh Tuy, Quang Duc and Long Khanh provinces. Main centers are around Dalat (20,000), Djiring (30,000), Fyan (10,000) and Blao (40,000) with a few at Song Pha and Dran. The Maa live near Blao; the Rion near Fyan, the Sre near Djiring; the Tring, Lat, Chil near Dalat, and the Song Pha, Dran and Nop between Djiring and Phan Thiet. Their language is of the Mon-Khmer family; many of them understand Vietnamese. The Education Ministry has published a Koho dictionary as well as texts in Koho. Increasingly important tribe.

KUA (Kor, Traw) A fairly small (20,000) group known chiefly as suppliers of cinnamon. Found in the Trabong area of Quang Ngai province and the Bong Mieu area of Quang Nam province, located between the Jeh and Hrey groups; some speak Vietnamese.

LANGYA - Population estimated at 9,000. Live in some 60 villages (with one long house per village) near Phuoc Son in Quang Nam province. May be related to the Jeh. Language is Mon-Khmer.

MAN (subgroup Yao) - A very large (2-4 million) group, found for the most part in northern North Viet Nam and in China. Some came south as refugees and are now located 20km north of Ban Me Thuot. Most speak Chinese and some speak Vietnamese. Theirs is a totem religion and they have a strong family system. In the north they are nomads who live by themselves in distant mountain reaches.

MNONG (subgroups Nong, Rolam, Preh, Biet) - An estimated 20,000 in the Highlands, spread over a large area. Largest centers are in the Ban Don area west of Ban Me Thuot and in the Dak Song area of the Bih. Generally located south of tho Rhade. Language is Mon-Khmer, most closely related to Koho. Some understand Rhade and Vietnamese.

MUONG - Another large tribe found mainly in the North, with an estimated population of 211,000. Some 5,000 Muong refugees live a few miles from the leprosarium near Ban Me Thuot; another group, estimated at 3,000 live near the Pleiku airport. Their language is related to Vietnamese and almost all of them speak Vietnamese; they have a Quoc-Ngu script. The Muongs share almost all the basic religious concepts of the early primitive Vietnamese; their social organization has often been described as a replica of Vietnamese society before the advent of Chinese influence in Viet Nam.

NUNG - A tribal group found in North Viet Nam. About 1,000 came south as refugees and are now located in Tung Nghia, near Pleiku and

Song Mao. Their language belongs to the Thai family, closely related to Tho. Most of them speak Vietnamese.

POKOH - An estimated 10,000 living in Thua Thien province near the source of the Mekong river; located north of the Katu. A distinctive group that plucks eye-brows and tattoos dots on the body. Often live in villages immediately adjacent to the Tau-oi groups.

RANGAO - A group estimated at 10,000 living in northeastern Kontum province, between the Bahnar and the Sedang. Sometimes classed as Bahnar or Sedang, but appear to be a separate group.

RHADE (sometimes apelled Rade or Thode: subgroups; Mdhur, Adham, Blo, Kodrao, Krung) - Most influential mountaineer tribe in the Highlands. Estimated population 100,000. Found throughout Darlac province and part of Khanh Hoa province; also southward along Cambodian border. Located south of the Jarai, north of the Bih and Muong, centered around Ban Me Thuot. The Rhade have a matrilineal kinship system, i.e. the females own the house, tools, gongs, jars and other important family items. After marriage the husband goes to live in the wife's home. Children take the mother's family name; daughters inherit the mother's possessions. Lineages form into clans and it is forbidden to marry within the same clan. Land is owned by the clan; land administration is handled by a represantative called the Po Lan whose duties are specifically prescribed by Rhade custom.

ROGLAI (apparently often spelled Raglai; subgroups Rai Seyu) A large (40,000) group found north of Nha Trang and south of Binh Tuy in the Ban Goi district of Khanh Hoa province; also found in Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Lam Dong, closely related to the Cham and the Chru. Language is Malayo-Polynesian apparently with southern and northern dialects; some dialects mutually intelligible with Cham. Many speak Vietnamese.

SEDANG - A large (40,000) group found in the northern half of Kontum province also Quang Nam and Binh Dinh. Considered to be mainly significant Highland group live in independent villages. Social organization similar to Bahnar, but, more individualistic. Are similar to the Steng, located south of the Jeh, east of the Hrey, centered around Dak Gle and Dak Sut. Language is Mon-Khmer family; many understand Bahnar, Vietnamese and French.

STIENG - A fairly large (23,000 in Viet Nam) group, fairly significant. Very numerous in Cambodia. Live in some 650 villages centered in Phuoc Long and Quang Duc provinces; found west of the Koho, south of the Mnong. Bulos are a subgrouping. Are individualistic and independent minded. Some speak Vietnamese.

TAU-OI - A fairly small (5,000) group in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces; centered around Cho Fuan and along the upper Sekong River northwest of the Pokoh group. Language is Mon-Khmer; some understand Vietnamese.

THAI (White and Black) - Montagnards of North Viet Nam. Some 6,000 have come south as refugees and settled in Tung Nghia; an estimated 500 are in the Ban Me Thuot area. The Thai are the most important Montagnard group in North Vietnam. The name however is hardly more than a linguistic classification so heterogeneous is the group. Language is related to the Lao-Thai-Shan family; most of them understand Vietnamese.

THO (sometimes called Thoma, subgroup: Embree) - Originally from northern North Viet Nam along the China border. An estimated 5,000 came south as refugees and settled near Bangoi and Song Mao in Phan Ri province; a few are near Tung Nghia. Their language is of the Thai family, closely related to Nung. Most of them speak Chinese and Vietnamese.

Mountaineers in North Vietnam: Among the northern tribes whose names may be encountered are: the Kelao or Kalao, the Laqua, the Lati, the Lolo (sub-group Ho), the Meo (including the Black, White and Striped Meo - socalled fot the design on their clothing) and the Nhang or Nyung.

(USIS)

PROVINCES OF VIETNAM

(Alphabetical listing with names of subordinate districts and cantons and numbers of villages in each)

USOM/Public Admin. Div. Unofficial as of Feb. 1, 1962

Province (Tinh) (Chief town in parentheses)	District (Quan) (District Hq. in parens.)	Canton (Tong)	No. Vill.	Reg. #	Pop. & Area (est.)
AN GIANG (Long Xuyen)	An Phu (Phuoc Hung)		11	SVN-W	812,737 3,833 sq. kms.
	Chau Phu (Chau Phu)	Chau Phu	6		
		An Luong	9		
	Chau Thanh (Phuoc Duc)	Dinh Phuoc	6		
		Dinh Thanh	7		
	Cho Moi (Long Dien)	An Binh	5		
		Dinh Hoa	7		
	Hue Duc (Ba The)	Dinh Phu	5		
	Tan Chau (Long Phu)	An Thanh	4		
		An Lac	4		
	Thot Not (Thanh Hoa)	Dinh My	8		
	Tinh Bien (An Phu)	Qui Duc	5		
		Thanh Tin	3		
	Tri Ton (Tri Ton)	Thanh Le	4		
		Thanh Y	5		
		Thanh Ngai	3		

CVN-H Central Vietnam Highlands, CVN-L Central Vietnam Lowlands. SVN-E South Vietnam East, SVN-W South Vietnam West

For further information, call Mr. Lien, USOM/PAD, Ext. 425

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop.& Area
AN XUYEN (Quan Long)	Cai Nuoc (Cai Nuoc Ngon)		6	SVN-W	275,001 4,952 sq. kms.
	Dam Doi (Tan Duyet)		4		
	Nam Can (Nam Can)		2		
	(Quan Long) (Quan Long)		4		
	Song Ong Doc (Cua Song Ong Doc)		3		
	Thoi Binh (Thoi Bihh)		4		
BA XUYEN (Khanh Hung)	Gia Rai (Phong Thanh)	Long Thuy	6	SVN-W	581,400 5,571 sq. kms.
	Ke Sach (Ke An)	Dinh Tuong	4		
		Dinh Khanh	7		
	Long Phu (Long Phu)	Dinh My	5		
		Dinh Phuoc	3		
		Dinh Hoa	7		
	My Xuyen (Bai Xau	Nhieu Khanh	5		
		Nhieu Hoa	5		
	Thanh Tri (Cho Nga Nam)	Thanh An	5		
		Thanh Loc	5		
	Thuan Hoa (Nga Tu Cho My Tu)	Thuan My	3		
		Thuan Phy	4		
	Vinh Chau (Binh Chau)	Thanh Hung	5		
	Vinh Loi (Vinh Loi)	Thanh Hoa	5		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop.& Area
BIEN HOA (Bien Hoa)	Can Gio (Can Thanh)		5	SVN-E	242,397 1,403 sq. kms.
	Chau Thanh (Binh Truoc)	Phuoc Vinh Thuong	9		
		Phuoc Vinh Trung	5		
		Long Vinh Thuong	4		
	Di An (An Binh Xa)	Chanh My Thuong	4		
		An Thuy	4		
	Long Thanh (Phuoc Loc Xa)	Thanh Tuy Thuong	8		
	Nhon Trach (Phu Thanh)	Thanh Tuy Trung	7		
		Thanh Tuy Ha	6		
	Quang Xuyen (An Thit)	An Thit	4		
BINH DUONG (Phu Cuong)	Ben Cat (My Phuoc)	Binh Hung	6	SVN-E	297,842 1,672 sq. kms.
		Binh An	4		
	Chau Thanh (Phu Cuong)	Binh Dien	7		
		Binh Phu	5		
		Binh Thien	2		
	Cu Chi (Tan An Hoi)	Long Tuy Ha	7		
		Long Tuy Trung	7		
	Dau Tieng (Dinh Thanh)	Binh ThanhThuong	8		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop.& Area
BINH DUONG (cont'd)	Lai Thieu (Tan Thoi)	Binh Chanh	10		
BINH DINH (Qui Nhon)	An Lao (An Hoa)		20	CVN-L	809,345
	An Nhon (Nhon Hung)		13		
	An Tuc (An Khe)		32		
	Binh Khe (Binh Phu)		9		
	Hoai An (An Duc)		7		
	Hoai Nhon (Bong Son)		11		
	Phu Cat (Cat Trinh)		11		
	Phu My (My Quang)		15		
	Van Canh (Canh Thinh)		10		
	Vinh Thanh (Vinh Quang)		20		
	Tuy Phuoc (Phuoc Nghia)		18		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop.& area
BINH LONG (An Loc)	An Loc (Tan Lap Phu)		21	SVN-E	65,422 2,334 sq. kms.
	Loc Ninh (Loc Ninh)		10		
BINH THUAN (Phan Thiet)	Hai Long (Knahh Thien)		7	CVN-L	259,611 4,404 sq. kms.
	Hai Ninh (Song Mao)		8		
	Ham Thuan (Phan Thiet)		10		
	Hoa Da (Phan Ri Thanh)		6		
	Phan Ly Cham (Huu An)		10		
	Thien Giae (Hoa An)		10		
	Tuy Phong (Lien Huong)		7		
BINH TUY (Ham Tan)	Ham Tan (Tan Tan)		6	SVN-E	36,596 4,030 sq. kms.
	Hoai Duc (Kiem Duc)		6		
	Tanh Linh (Lac Tanh)		6		
CHUONG THIEN (Vi Thanh)	Duc Long (Vi Thanh)	An Ninh	7	SVN-W	304,283

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop.& area
	Kien Hung (Go Cuao)	Kien Dinh	10		
	KienLong (Vinh Thuan)		6		
	Long My (Long Tri)	Thanh Tuyen	9		
	Phuoc Long (Phuoc Long)	Thanh Binh Thanh Yen	4 4		
CON SON Island (Con son)				SVN-W	1,231 64 sq. kms.
DARLAC (Ban Me Thuot)	Ban Me Thuot	Ea Tam	10	CVN-H	146,949 12,808 sq. kms.
		Cu Kek	4		
		Cu ewi	6		
		Drai Sap	5		
		(No canton)	2		
	Buon Ho	Cu Kuk	3		
		Cu Kti	5		
		Cu Dlieya	4		
	Lac Thieu	Dak Lieng	3		
		Yang Lak	3		
		Krong Ana	4		
		Krong Bong	4		
		Dak Phoi	2		
		Dak Rohhyo	2		
		Nam Ka	2		
DINH TUONG (My Tho)	Ben Tranh (Duong Hoa Lac)	Hung Khon	8	SVN-W	674,773 2,220 sq. kms.
		Thanh Quon	7		
	Cho Gao (Binh Phan)	Thanh Phong	6		
		Hoa Hao	7		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop.& Area
	Giao Duc (An Huu)	Phong Phu	5		
		An Phu	5		
	Go Cong (Long Thuan)	Hoa Lac Thuong	8		
		Hoa Lac Ha	7		
	Hoa Dong (Dong Son)	Hoa Dong Thuong	9		
		Hoa Dong Ha	7		
	Khiem Ich (Thanh Hoa)	Loi Trinh	11		
		Loi Hoa	9		
	Long Dinh (Long Dinh)	Thuan Tri	11		
		Thuan Binh	13		
	Sung Hieu (Dong Hoa Hiep)	Phong Hoa	5		
		Loi Thuan	6		
GIA DINH (Gia Dinh)	Binh Chanh (Binh Chanh)	Long Hung Trung	6	SVN-E	654,202 706 sq. kms.
		Long Hung Thuong	5		
		Tan Phong Ha	4		
	Go Vap (Hanh Thong)	Binh TriThuong	7		
	Hoc Mon (Thoi Tam Thon)	Binh Thanh Trung	6		
		Long Binh	6		
	Nha Be (Phu Xuan Hoi)	Binh Tri Ha	7		
	Tan Binh (Phu Nhuan)	Duong Hoa Thuong	6		
	Thu Duc (Linh Dong)	An Dien	6		
		Long Vinh Ha	4		
		An Dinh	5		
KHANH HOA (Nha Trang)	Cam Lam (Cam Loc)		15	CVN-L	271,749 5,536 sq. kms.
	Dien Khanh (Dien Thanh)		29		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop.& Area
	Khanh Duong (Ea Ksung)	Krong Jing	2		
		Krong Hing	3		
	Ninh Hoa (My Hiep)		20		
	Van Ninh (Van Gia)		9		
	Vinh Xuong		12		
KIEN GIANG (Rach Gia)	HaTien (My Duc)	Ha Thanh Binh	2	SVN-W	345,944 6,828 sq. kms.
		An Thanh	3		
	Kien An (Dong Yen)	Thanh An	5		
		Thanh Bien	4		
	Kien Binh (Thanh Hoa)	Thanh Tan	3		
		Ngoc Hung	5		
	Kien Luong (An Binh)		5		
	Kien Tan (Tan Hiep)		5		
	Kien Thanh (Vinh Thanh Van)	Kien Hoa	4		
		Kien Tuong	4		
	Phu Quoc (Duong Dong)		2		
KIEN HOA (Truc Giang)	Ba Tri (An Duc)	Bao An	4	SVN-W	551,055 2,155 sq. kms.
		Bao Thuan	6		
		Bao Tri	5		
	Binh Dai (Binh Dai)	Hoa Quoi	6		
		Hoa Thinh	7		
	Giang Trum (Binh Hoa)	Bao Loc	5		
		Bao Phuoc	6		
		Bao Thanh	7		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop.& Area
	Ham Long (Tien Thuy)	Bao Duc	6		
		Bao Ngai	7		
	Huong My (Huong My)	Minh Hue	4		
		Minh Quoi	5		
		Minh Phu	4		
	Mo Cay (Da Phuoc Hoi)	Minh Dat	5		
		Minh Dao	3		
		Minh Ly	4		
		Minh Thien	4		
		Minh Thuan	4		
	Thanh Phu (Thanh Phu)	Minh Tri	7		
	Truc Giang (An Hoi)	Bao Huu	8		
		An Hoa	8		
KIEN PHONG (Cao Lanh)	Cao Lanh (My Tra)	An Tinh	4	SVN-W	267,137 2,615 sq. kms.
		Phong Thanh	8		
	Kien Van (Binh Hang Trung)	Phong Nam	7		
	Hong Ngu (An Binh)	Hong An	3		
		Hong Phuoc	2		
		Hong Quang	6		
	My An (My An)	My Duc	3		
		My Phuoc	2		
	Thanh Binh (Tan Phu)	Thanh Liem	5		
		Thanh Khiet	3		
KIEN TUONG (Moc Hoa)	Chau Thanh (Tuyen Thanh)	Moc Hoa Ha	2	SVN-W	54,968 2,297 sq. kms.
		Moc Hoa Thuong	3		
	Kien Binh (Tan Hoa)	Kien Binh Dong	3		
		Kien Binh Tay	2		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop.& Area
	Tuyen Nhon (Thuy Dong)	My Binh Ha	3		
		My Binh Thuong	3		
	Tuyen Binh (Binh Thanh Thon)	Tuyen Binh Ha	4		
		Tuyen BinhThuong	3		
		Tuyen Binh Trung	2		
KONTUM (Kontum)	Dak Sut	Dak Rolong	4	CVN-H	83,731 11,231 sq. kms.
		Halong	5		
		Die Sud	4		
		Dak Pek	1		
		Die Nork	4		
		Bong Tul	5		
	Dak To	Dak To	4		
		Dak Brong	3		
		Kou Hring	6		
		Dak Mot	3		
	Kontum (Plei Mang La)	Kong Tum	4		
		Ya Ty	4		
		Plei Krong	5		
		Halang	4		
		Kon Sotin	4		
		Kon Monay	7		
		Ha Mong	14		
	Tou Mrong	Tou Morong	8		
		Vir-Ngieo	2		
		Mang Buk	1		
		Kou Kleang	2		
LAM DONG (Bao Loc)	Bao Loc (Bao Loc)	Dai Hoa	4	CVN-H	58,634 4,726 sq. kms.
		Dai Thuan	3		
		Tan Ma	4		
		(No canton)	1		
	Di Linh (Di Linh)	Chau Thuan	2		
		Dan Tuc	3		
		Truong Hiep	2		
		Thuong Lien	4		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
LONG AN (Tan An)	Ben Luc (Long Phu)	Long Hung Ha	8	SVN-W	493,191
		An Ninh Trung	4		2,332 sq. kms.
	Binh Phuoc (Duong Xuan Hoi)	Tan Thanh	6		
		Thanh MucThuong	5		
		Thanh Muc Ha	4		
	Can Duoc (Tan An)	Loc ThanhThuong	5		
		Loc Thanh Trung	4		
		Loc Thanh Ha	5		
	Can Giuoc (Truong Binh)	Phuoc Dien Trung	9		
		Phuoc Dien Ha	6		
		Duong Hoa Ha	5		
	Duc Hoa (Duc Hoa)	Duc An Thuong	6		
		Duc An Ha	4		
	Duc Hue (My Qui)		3		
	Tan Tru (Tan Tru)	An Ninh Ha	6		
		Chu Cu Ha	6		
	Thu Thua (Binh Phong Thanh)	An NinhThuong	5		
		Cuu Cu Thuong	4		
LONG KHANH (Xuan Loc)	Dinh Quan (Dinh Quan)		3	SVN-E	86,683
					2,971 sq. kms
	Xuan Loc (Xuan Loc)	Binh Lam Thuong	7		
		Binh Lam Ha	7		
NINH THUAN (Phan Rang)	An Phuoc (Hau Phuoc)		4	CVN-L	137,238
					3,498 sq. kms.
	Buu Son (An Son)		8		
	Du Long (Cam Ly)		4		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop.& Area
	Thanh Hai (Khanh Hai)		12		
PHONG DINH (Can Tho)	Chau Thanh (Truong Thanh)	Dinh Bao	8	SVN-W	378,507 2,500 sq. kms.
		Dinh An	7		
	Phong Phu (Thoi Thanh)	Thoi Bao	7		
		Dinh Thoi	5		
	Khac Trung (Co Do)	Phong Thuan	4		
	Khac Nhon (Bay Ngan)	Phong Da	6		
			4		
	Phung Hiep (Phung Hiep	Dinh Phuoc	4		
		Dinh Hoa			
PHU BON (Hau Bon)	Phu Thien (Plei Mang)	Chutse	3		
		Ia Sol	3		
		Ia Hiao	5		
		Ia Piao	2		
		Tolo Tonia	3		
	Phu Tuc (B. Ban La)	Duc Binh	8		
		Phu My	5		
	Thuan Man	Trung	4		
		Ia Robol	3		
PHU YEN (Tuy Hoa)	Dong Xuan (La Hai)	-	7	CVN-L	346,348 7,169 sq. kms.
	Phu Doc (Tuy Binh)	Phu Hoa	3		
		Phu Trung	4		
		Phu My	5		
		(No canton)	1		
	Hieu Xuong (Hoa Phong)		7		
	Son Hoa (Cung Son)		13		
	Song Cau (Song Cau)		5		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop.& Area
	Tuy An (Chi Thanh)		14		
	Tuy Hoa (Tuy Hoa)		17		
PHUOC LONG (Phuoc Binh)	Bo Duc (Phuoc Le)	Phuoc Le	1	SVN-E	32,308 4,764 sq. kms.
		Dag-Huyt	1		
		Bu Yam Phut	1		
		Bu Yu	1		
		Bu Prang	1		
	Don Luan (Doan Duc	Bu Yum	1		
		N'Dreng	1		
		Tan Thuan	1		
		Thuan Loi	2		
	Duc Phong (Bu Dang)	Bu Dang	2		
		Bu R'Lap	1		
	Phuoc Binh (Son Giang)	Khun-Narr	2		
		Xor-Nuk	1		
		Khun Klenh	1		
PHUOC THANH (Phuoc Vinh)	Hieu Liem (Song Be)		2	SVN-E	65,255 2,947 sq. kms.
	Phu Giao (Bo La)	Chanh My Ha	5		
	Tan Uyen (Tan Uyen)	Chanh My Trung	11		
		(No canton)	3		
PHUOC TUY (Phuoc Le)	Long Le (Hoa Long)	An Phu Ha	3	SVN-E	143,108 2,784 sq. kms.
		An Phu Tan	4		
	Dat Do (Phuoc Tho)	Phuoc HungThuong	3		
		Phuoc Hung Trung	2		
		Phuoc Hung Ha	3		
	Duc Thanh (Ngai Giao)	Co Trach	4		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region Pop.& Area
	Long Dien (Long Dien)	An PhuThuong	6	
	Xuyen Moc (Xuyen Moc)		5	
	Vung Tau (Bung Tau)		5	
PLEIKU (Pleiku)	Bon Huing*	Trung	4	
	Le Trung (Le Can)	Dak Doa	4	
		Lac	4	
		Plei Bong	3	
		Plei Brel Dor	4	
		Plei Ngo	4	
		Plei Pion	3	
		Plei Roh	5	
		(No canton)	10	
	Degroi*	Dak Bot	2	
		Degroi	2	
		Mang Yang	2	
		(No canton)	2	
	My Thanh*	Plei Dolim	3	
	Phu Nhon (Don Hoa)	Plei Kly	3	
		Phu Tai	3	
		Plei potau	3	
		Cu Dre	2	
		Plei You	2	
		Prong	4	
		(No canton)	2	
	Plei Grut*	Plei Tell	8	
	Le Thanh (Duc Hung)	Plei Del	6	
		Plei Ponuk	5	
		(No canton)	2	

*These are "Administrative Offices" under the jurisdiction of a large district to supervise a certain number of cantons administratively.

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop.& Area
	Plei Donao*	Plei Donao	6		
		No canton	2		
QUANG DUC (Gia Nghia)	Duc Lap (Tu Minh)		8	CVN-H	29,598 5,743 sq. kms.
	Khiem Duc (Ta monng)	Son Khe	5		
	Kien Duc (Sung Duc)	Kien Minh	5		
		Kien Dao	2		
QUANG NAM (Hoi An)	Dai Loc (Xa Loc Xuan)		9	CVN-L	601,450 9,902 sq. kms.
	Dien Ban (Binh Dien)		31		
	Duy Xuyen (Xuyen Chau)		17		
	Hieu Duc (Giao Tri)		14		
	Hoa Vang (Thuan Nam)		21		
	Thuong Duc (Kim Xuyen)		21		
	Que Son (Son Thanh)		17		
QUANG TI (Tam Ky)	Hau Duc (Tien Tra)		14		335,400 1,409 sq. kms.
	Hiep Duc (Dong An)		6		
	Tam Ky (Tam Ky)		27		
	Thang Binh (Binh Nguyen)		20		

* See preceding page

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop.& Area
	Tien Phuoc (Phuoc My)		14		
QUANG NGAI (Quang Ngai)	Ba To (Ban Thuan)		24	CVN-L	658,348 4,359 sq. kms.
	Binh Son (Binh Van)		24		
	Chuong Nghia (Thuong Uyen)		10		
	Duc Pho (Pho Dai)		15		
	Ming Long (Minh Tam)		14		
	Mo Duc (Duc Vinh)		12		
	Nghia Hanh (Nghia Chanh)		8		
	Son Ha (Ha Trung)		14		
	Son Tinh (Son Long)		20		
	Tra Bong (Tra Khuong)		13		
	Tu Nghia (Tu An)		14		
QUANG TRI (Quang Tri)	Ba Long (Ba Luong)		7	CVN-L	276,551 4,741 sq. kms
	Cam Lo (Cam Nghia)		13		
	Gio Linh (Gio Le)		6		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop.& Area
	Hai Lang (Hai Tho)		23		
	Huong Hoa (Huong Van)		14		
	Trieu Phong (Trieu Thanh)		18		
	Trung Luong (Trung Giang)		3		
TAY NINH (Tay Ninh)	Hieu Thien (Thanh Phuoc)	Giai Hoa My Ninh Triem Hoa	6 6 3	SVN-E	287,373 4,064 sq. kms.
	Khiem Hanh (Bau Don)	Thanh Binh	5		
	Phu Duc (Gia Loc)	Ham Ninh Ha	5		
	Phu Khuong (Phuoc Hoi)	Ham NinhThuong Loc An	8 3		
	Phuoc Ninh (Ninh Dieu	Hoa Ninh Phuoc Hung	8 6		
THUA THIEN (Hue)	Huong Dien (Dien Hai)		8	CVN-L	452,598 4,876 sq. kms.
	Huong Thuy (Thuy Chau)		14		
	Huong Tra (Huong Son)		9		
	Nam Hoa (Thuong Bang)		13		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop.& Area
	Phong Dien (Phong Nguyen)		7		
	Phu Loc (Loc Tri)		8		
	Phu Vang (Phu Duong)		15		
	Quang Dien (Quang Phuoc)		7		
	Vinh Loc (Vinh Hung)		11		
TUYEN DUC (Dalat)	Don Duong (Don Duong)	Xuan Lac	2	CVN-H	56,109 4,773 sq. kms.
		Lac My	2		
		Linh Nhan	2		
		Tu Trang	3		
	Duc Trong (Tung Nghia)	Ninh Thanh	3		
		Son Binh	2		
		My Le	3		
		Dinh Tan	3		
	Lac Duong (Binh Ninh)	Phuoc Tho	2		
		Da Tan	3		
		Nha Lac	2		
VINH BINH (Phu Vinh)	Cang Long (Binh Phu)	Binh Khanh	3	SVN-W	535,378 2,880 sq. kms.
		Binh KhanhThuong	4		
		Binh Phuoc	2		
	Cau Ke (Hoa An)	Tuan Gia	8		
	Cau Ngang (My Hoa)	Binh Tri	4		
		Vinh Loi	4		
	Chau Thanh (Phu Vinh)	Tra Nhieu	3		
		Tra Binh	3		
		Tra Phu	4		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop.& Area
	Long Toan (Long Toan)	Vinh Tri	5		
	Tieu Cau (Tieu Cau)	Ngai Thanh	5		
	Tra Cu (Ngai Xuyen)	Ngai HoaThuong	4		
		Ngai Hoa Trung	3		
		Thanh HoaThuong	2		
	Tra On (Tan My)	Binh Le	3		
		Thanh Tri	5		
		Binh Thoi	3		
	Vung Liem (Trung Thanh)	Binh Hieu	3		
		Binh Trung	3		
		Binh Quoi	3		
VINH LONG (Vinh Long)	Binh Minh (My Thuan)	An Truong	3	SVN-W	550,540 1,900 sq. kms.
		An Ninh	4		
	Chau Thanh (Long Chau)	Binh Long	4		
		Binh An	3		
		Long An	4		
		Phuoc An	3		
	Duc Tan (Cai Tan Ha)	An My Dong	4		
		An My Tay	4		
	Cho Lach (Son Dinh)	Binh Hung	3		
		Binh Xuong	3		
		Minh Ngai	3		
	Duc Thanh (Hoa Long)	An Khuong	2		
		Ti Thieu			
		Tien Nghia			
	Lap Vo (Binh Thanh Dong)	Phu Thuong	5	SVN-W	
		Phong Thoi	2		
	Minh Duc (Chanh Hoi)	Thanh Thieng	4		
		Binh Thieng	4		

Province	District	Canton	No. of Vill.	Region Pop.& Area
	Sa Dec (Tan Vinh Hoa)	An Thanh	6	
		An Trung	5	
		An Thoi	2	
	Tam Binh (Tuong Loc)	Binh Thuan	3	
		Binh Phu	2	
		Binh Dinh	3	

41 Provinces 229 Districts 322 Cantons 2,542 Vill. 12,359,136*

*Excludes the populations of the following autonomous cities:

Saigon Prefecture	1,400,000
Da Nang (Tourane)	104,797
Hue	103,367
Da Lat (Dalat)	48,843

Grand total of population of the Republic of Vietnam 14,016,643

Source of information: - Official Journal of the R.V.N.
- National Institute of Statistics(for pop.)

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Provinces

Names	Region	Chief Towns	Population	Province Chiefs
1. An Giang	SVN-W	Long Xuyen	812,737	Major Nguyen Van Minh
2. An Xuyen	SVN-W	Quan Long	275,001	Lt.Col.Pham Van Ut
3. Ba Xuyen	SVN-W	Khanh Hung	581,400	Lt.Col.Nguyen Linh Chieu
4. Bien Hoa	SVN-E	Bien Hoa	242,397	Major Tran Van Dinh
5. Binh Duong	SVN-E	Phu Cuong	297,842	Major Tran Van Minh
6. Binh Dinh	CVN-L	Qui Nhon	809,345	Mr. Bui Thuc Duyen
7. Binh Long	SVN-E	An Loc	65,422	Major Nguyen Duc Mai
8. Binh Thuan	CVN-L	Phan Thiet	259,611	Lt.Col.Nguyen Quoc Hoang
9. Binh Tuy	SVN-E	Ham Tan	36,596	Major Le Duc Dat
10. Chuong Thien	SVN-W	Vi Thanh	304,283	Major Nguyen Hien Diem
11. Con Son	SVN-E	Con Son	1,231	Major Le Van The
12. Darlac	CVN-H	Ban Me Thuot	146,949	Major Hoang Thong
13. Dinh Tuong	SVN-W	My Tho	674,773	Major Lam Quang Tho
14. Gia Dinh	SVN-E	Gia Dinh	654,202	Major Nguyen Duc Xich
15. Khanh Hoa	CVN-L	Nha Trang	271,749	Major Le Tap
16. Kien Giang	SVN-W	Rach Gia	345,944	Major Nguyen Van Que
17. Kien Hoa	SVN-W	Truc Giang	551,055	Lt.Col.Tran Ngoc Chau
18. Kien Phong	SVN-W	Cao Lanh	267,137	Lt.Col.Dinh Van Phat
19. Kien Tuong	SVN-W	Moc Hoa	54,968	Major Le Thanh Nhat
20. Kontum	CVN-H	Kontum	83,731	Capt. Hoang Van Dinh
21. Lam Dong	CVN-H	Bao Loc	58,634	Major Nguyen Van Tai
22. Long An	SVN-W	Tan An	493,191	Major Nguyen Viet Thanh
23. Long Khanh	SVN-W	Xuan Loc	86,683	Major (Nhuyen Huynh) Huynh Van Du (Actg)
24. Ninh Thuan	CVN-L	Phan Rang	137,238	Lt.Col.Nguyen Kim Khanh
25. Phong Dinh	SVN-W	Can Tho	378,507	Major Le Van Tu
26. Phu Yen	CVN-L	Tuy Hoa	346,348	Major Duong Thai Dong
27. Phuoc Long	SVN-E	Phuoc Binh	32,308	Major Do Van Dien
28. Phuoc Thanh	SVN-E	Phuoc Vinh	65,255	Major Ho Trung Hau
29. Phuoc Tuy	SVN-E	Phuoc Le	143,108	Major Le Qui Do
30. Pleiku	CVN-H	Pleiku	124,508	Mr. Ton That Chu
31. Quang Duc	CVN-H	Gia Nghia	29,598	Col. Ho Nghia
32. Quang Nam	CVN-L	Hoi An	601,450	Major Vo Huu Thu
33. Quang Ngai	CVN-L	Quang Ngai	658,343	Mr. Nguyen Van Tat
34. Quang Tri	CVN-L	Quang Tri	276,551	Mr. Nguyen Ngoc Quynh
35. Tay Ninh	SVN-E	Tay Ninh	287,373	Major Vu Duc Nhuan
36. Thua Thien	CVN-L	Hue	452,593	Mr. Nguyen Van Dang
37. Tuyen Duc	CVN-H	Dalat	56,107	Major Ngo Nhu Bich
38. Vinh Binh	SVN-W	Phu Vinh	535,378	Major Le Hoang Thao
39. Vinh Long	SVN-W	Vinh Long	550,540	Major Le Van Phuoc
40. Quang Tin	CVN-L	Tam Ky	335,400	Major Than Ninh
41. Phu Bon	CVN-H	Hau Bon (Cheo Reo)	325,000	Major Pham Dinh Chi

Total population: 14,016,643

PLANT PROTECTION IN VIETNAM

The Plant Protection Service of the Government of Vietnam (Directorate of Rural affairs) is composed of Five Divisions as follows:

1. Entomology Laboratory.
2. Plant Pathology Laboratory.
3. Domestic and Foreign Plant Quarantine.
4. Regulatory.
5. Field Control.

The Field Control Division is by far the largest Division and has received much more emphasis than the other four Divisions.

This Service was newly created this year from existing small fragmented units of two Directorates. Additional personnel have been hired and trained during the current year. The total personnel employed is 120 people, the larger number being Provincial Plant Protection Agents. There are 40 of these agents, one in each province. (USOM Provincial Representatives should contact these agents locally and discuss their programs and problems)

Due to the urgent need at the farmer level for insect, rodent and plant disease control facilities and work, the major objective of this project is to reduce the existing crop losses caused by these pests by at least 50% by the end of 1963.

Other objectives are the normal type of development of the remaining four Divisions. This development will be slow due to the heavy emphasis on the field control operations.

The following information on rat control operations in Central Vietnam will suffice to illustrate the type of field operations planned and the rural population reaction that is anticipated.

Field Rat Control

Field rats are a major problem all over Vietnam. The rat population in the ten lowland provinces of Central Vietnam has been increasing at a rapid rate for the past two years. By June of this year the problem was so serious that widespread appeals were being made for help by the rural population. The Government at Provincial level was in turn appealing to the National Government who was urging USOM for assistance. It is estimated that 35 - 40% of all agricultural production in these ten provinces was being lost due to the action of the rats. At least one province reported a total crop loss of 70 - 80%. The situation was such that in some districts the farmers were refusing to plant new crops as they felt it was useless in face of the heavy rat population.

These ten provinces are the poorest in Vietnam. The food situation

was acute even before the large rat build-up. As a result, following the rat population explosion, widespread hunger and near famine conditions were quite widespread.

The Vice President of Vietnam considered the situation serious enough to call and preside at a high-level meeting to consider what could be done. The Director of USOM along with others were invited to this meeting. A course of action was agreed to by both sides.

USOM was to purchase 30 S.T. of rodenticide, of which 10 S.T. was to be air shipped. The GVN was to negotiate with the French Aid Mission in an attempt to obtain an additional 18 M.T. of rodenticide.

The ten tons of rodenticide from the USA arrived by air in May. This was quickly repackaged locally in 100 gram plastic bags. Farmers leaflets were printed giving precautions in using, mixing and baiting instructions etc. Posters were prepared, printed and distributed throughout the control area. Training classes were held for villagers throughout the ten Provinces. Widespread newspaper and radio coverage was also given to the coming control campaign.

It was decided to conduct the control operations in three phases. Each phase to follow the preceeding one by roughly three months. All agencies of Goverment at Provincial level were mobilized to assist in the campaign.

The first phase was to use the ten tons of zinc phosphide rat poison airlifted from the USA. The second phase would use the 20 tons coming by surface from the USA. The third phase is to use the 18 tons coming from French Aid.

In June the repackaged ten tons were distributed to farmers in the control area. The baiting period covered a ten day period. All ten provinces started baiting on the same day. Spectacular results were immediately obtained. Huge numbers of rats were piled up throughout the area. Large pits were dug to bury the dead rats. Tails were cut from all rats and saved for counting purposes.

Prizes were to be awarded to those killing the most rats. The prizes awarded at provincial level were quite valuable, the most common one being a mature buffalo.

During the ten days of baiting between 12 and 15 million rats were killed. The population participated in the campaign wholeheartedly with the result that tremendous good will was generated due to the Government help. All rat poison was distributed free with the farmers themselves providing the materials to be mixed with the poison.

Each package of poison was labeled as a free gift to the farmers from the Government of Vietnam and USOM. During an extensive field trip while the baiting was in progress it was noted that the rural population was highly appreciative and pleased.

At this time the second phase of the program is now in operation. It is being conducted exactly as the first phase except that 20 short tons of poison is being used instead of ten. The number of rats killed will probably be smaller this time due to the great reduction of the rat population following the first phase. The third phase will follow in a few months. At the completion of the third phase the rat population in these ten provinces is expected to be at an all time low.

Many such campaigns as this one will be carried out in the future against rats, insects plant diseases in all sections of the country.

LIST OF MAAG RADIO STATIONS

AN KHE
AN LOC
BAC LIEU
DAD LOC
BAN ME THUOT
BARIA
BA TO
BEN CAT
BEN TRE
BIEN HOA
BINH DINH
BINH TUY
CAN THO
CAO LANG
CAO LANH
CAU MAN
CA MAU
CHAN PHU
CHEO REO
DAK ROTAH
DALAT
DA NANG
DA NINH
DI LINH
DONG HA
DRAN
DUC MY
GIANGHIA
GIA RAY
GIAENGIA
GO CONG
HA TAN
HA THANH
HAM TAN
HIEP KHANH
HOI AN
HUE
KHAM DUC
KHANH HOA
KHANH HUNG
KIEN HOA
KON BRAI
MOC HOA
MY THO
NHA TRANG
O MON
PHAN RANG
PHAN THIET
PHU BAI
PHU CAT
PHU CUONG
PHUOC LE
PHUOC TUY
PHUOC DIEN
PHUOC THANH
PHUOC VINH
PHUOC LONG
PLEIKU
QUANG NGAI
QUANG TRI
QUANG TRUNG
QUAN LONG
QUI NHON
RACH GIA
SADEC
SOC TRANG
SONG BE
SONG MAO
TAN AN
TAN CANH
TAN CHAU
TAMA
TAM KY
TAY NINH
THU DAU MOT
THU DUC
TIEP KHANH
TRA VINH
TRUC GIANG
TRUNG LAP
TUY HOA
UI THANH
VINH LONG
VI THANH
VUNG TAU

INFORMATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT FOR
RURAL PROGRAMS

The Government of Vietnam's new Rural Programs which are centered on Strategic Hamlet concept offer an excellent opportunity forpsychological exploitation and at the same time require a great amount of informational support.

Informational support for the Programs is being developed centrally by the concerned GVN Ministries assisted by their USOM counterparts and especially our Agriculture Information Officer. The USOM Commedia Division and USIS are also assisting in preparing these materials which take the form of pamphlets, posters, labels, films, radio-tapes, newsstories, etc. Existing GVN and US distribution channels will be used for getting these centrally prepared materials to the countryside.

You should also familiarize yourself with all information activities in your province and the personnel responsible for them to insure that you get good local back up for Rural Programs. Please keep us advised of any additional support you may require for this work.

The psychological aspect is lost if not properly done. Since our Rural Programs are aimed at improving the lot of village people and providing them the basic necessities to rapidly enhance their social and economic conditions, the informational materials should always indicate this and that it is the GVN which is worried about them and doing something for them.

The Strategic Hamlet Symbol which appears on the front of this guide connotes "building a new society and a better life"; it should appear on everything reaching the people and should be with us everywhere!

It is expected that you, working at local levels, will develop with your Vietnamese associates ideas and methods for getting them across to support the psychological aspects of the rural effort you are making. We ask you to share these ideas with us since they may be something which can be used elsewhere in the country.

For instance, pamphlets can be printed locally, local newspapers can carry the message, prizes and awards can be given, lotteries can be held; the opportunities are endless if you will explore them. The MAAG Psywar advisers can help you too and will be interested in the chances for intelligent exploitation provided by the Rural Programs.

We consider this work of vital importance and will help you whenever you ask...

cc: Carroll Wilson, Agriculture Div.
Stuart Hannon, Commedia Div.
Eberhart, USIS

Civic Action and Counter-Insurgency

What should an American military man or civilian do when stationed in a rural area during a counter-insurgency campaign?

John T. Little, Lt-Col Inf., came up with an impressive answer last year when he was in Laos. He commanded a Mobile Training Team of Army Special Forces, whose officers and men were stationed with Laos military units throughout the country. Taking a number of standing instructions and the lessons learned in Laos, the Philippines, and Vietnam, he compiled a set of instructions on Civic Action for his officers and men in simple, every day language.

Although these instructions are tailored to conditions in Laos, they contain many points worth heeding elsewhere. With Lt-Col Little's permission these instructions are being passed along. They are to be found on the following pages and deserve wide reading and understanding by all Americans concerned with counter-insurgency.

HEADQUARTERS
WHITE STAR MOBILE TRAINING TEAM
Vientiane, Laos

22 September 1961

SUBJECT: Civil Assistance

TO: Commanders
All Field Training Teams
White Star Mobile Training Team
Military Assistance Advisory Group to Laos

1. In an insurgency condition, the guerrilla is dependent on a sympathetic population. Counter-guerrilla operations must, therefore, have as one objective winning the population's cooperation and denying the enemy their sympathy. This can be done by psychological operations in many forms.

2. An imaginative program of village assistance properly backed in the military and civil authorities is one form of psychological operation which will contribute significantly toward this objective and achievement of U.S. goals in Laos.

3. The attached outline for a civil assistance program which can realistically be applied by operational detachments is forwarded for team use in establishing a positive civil relations program. The ideas expressed have been field tested and are practical. Use them as a guide for your actions in this field. Start at once.

4. You are not in competition with other U.S. agencies; USIS and USOM; you are the spearhead of these activities and a focal point for inhection of these activities until Laos civil assistance teams are trained and in use. Your primary mission is training and operations with FAR; this is secondary to that mission but has an important impact on it.

5. Those teams operating from villages in which USIS and USOM representatives are not permanently represented are expected to initiate action in this field and keep this headquarters informed of progress

s/ John T. Little

JOHN T. LITTLE
Lt. Col., Inf.
Commanding

1 Incl
Outline of a Civil Assistance Program
Copies furnished:
Chief Each Military Region
American Embassy

OUTLINE OF A CIVIL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

1. Actions prior to commencement of civil assistance program in Lao villages.

a. Become acquainted with key members of the district. These include:

(1) The Chao Muong - political boss of the district (has absolute authority over villagers).
(2) The High District Judge and his staff - this official is second in authority to Chao Muong.
(3) The Chief Buddhist (Bonze) of the district
(4) The Police Captain and his staff.
(5) The Village Headmen.
(6) The Schoolmaster and School Teachers.
(7) Leading business men including shop owners and restaurant owners.

b. Gather background data on key personnel of district to include:

(1) Nationality.
(2) Date and place of birth.
(3) Education and Religion.
(4) Knowledge of foreign languages.
(5) Special skills or abilities.
(6) Military service.
(7) Travel background.
(8) Past activities in government.
(9) Present job and salary
(10) Details of family - how many wives and children.
(11) Character and personality - is he honest, is he loyal, is he a doer and not just a talker, does he have initiative drive, imagination?
(12) Is he pro-F.R, pro-American, pro-French?

c. Gathering this information will be a continuing process. Record it and pass it on to the succeeding team.

2. Recommend activities for civil assistance program.

a. Medical Support: Have team medic assist village doctor in sick call. If there is no doctor, team medic should run sick call himself. Team medic will visit all villages in area and make occasional visits to remote villages out of the area. From among the more intelligent of the villagers the team medic should choose an assistant aidman with the object of training him to eventually become the village doctor. The Village should be persuaded to build a hospital with the theme, "this will be for your village and your people. If the people want continued team medical support tell them to build a hospital." Note:

Doctors are paid by government so team need not worry about depriving village doctor of livelihood.

b. Aid to Education: By the team encouraging and helping the children the parents can be made aware of the importance of education. School supplies to be furnished include blackboards, chalk, erasers, pencils pencil sharpeners, writing paper, tablets, multiplication tables, rulers, books, globes, atlases, charts on anatomy, chemistry, physics and biology and nature subjects. Get the material in front of the children. Teach the schoolmaster to be responsible and accountable for the equipment - to take the books up at the end of the semester and reissue them at the beginning of the term. Use the school aid program as a lever to get the village to repair and expand the school. Require the village to send all their children to school. This can be done through the Chao Muong. The children must be taught the world is not flat, that Laos is not the only country, that America is a powerful friend and what the Communists are.

c. Sanitation: This field offers the greatest possibilities for achievement and improvement. Persuade the people to police the streets, cut the grass, burn and bury the rubbish, rake under the houses. Encourage village authorities to destroy homeless, vicious and unwanted dogs. Start a DDT program. Teach the natives how to use the sprayers and mix the solution. Put rat poison in villages placing it high enough to be unreachable by children and chickens. Start a war a on bed bugs. Use oil to stamp out mosquito breeding areas. Put the villagers on chloroquin. In the dry season have family latrines dug. Instruct natives on covering waste. Get villagers to dig wells for drinking water. Instruct families on fly control - distribute swatters. Action should be taken to prevent livestock from over running living areas. Work all projects through the Chao Muong. When he issues the order the people will take action.

d. Aid to Agriculture: Get assistance from USOM. To start program persuade a few farmers to try crop rotation, proper spacing, fertilizing and spraying. This is a long-range project taking patience, time and skillful persuasion. A Lao farmer puts all his earnings into his crop and he is very hesitant about making experiments. But once he has been shown the results of this new method of rice growing he will be an eager participant. In many areas the irrigation system could be improved, small streams could be dammed, etc.

e. Transportation Improvement: All roads in Laos need improvement. Get villagers to build bridges, repair washouts, fill holes, make detours. Use whatever labor is available whether it is three men or three hundred men. Have village construct an airfield. Sell Chao Muong on the advantages in trade and business. Have villagers construct flat-bottom boats to haul goods on the rivers.

f. Children's Playground: This represents an opportunity to influence, educate, and take part in raising children for a better Laos. Stock the playground with swings, teeter-totters, sliding boards,

monkey bars, parallel bars. Set up volley ball, basket ball, soccer, baseball and just plain ordinary tag ball. Set up relay races, obstacle races and jumping contests. Teach them sportsmanship, teamwork, how to win and how to lose. Teach them fair play and get them in top physical condition. To help all this the team captain could write to his favorite town in the United States informing them that the Lao village where the team is stationed wants to be a sister city with them and learn about the American way of life. Through civic organizations in the US town many items for the children could be obtained such as clothes, candy, toys and educational games.

g. Special Tools: Through USOM try to borrow, lease or directly obtain a circular saw. All lumber is cut by hand. This takes hours of time and delays the building program. In addition to the saw, obtain fuel, lubricant, extra blades and maintenance instructions. Also a chain saw is ideal for clearing land.

h. Market Place: If the market place is in a typically rotten condition, interest the Chao Muong in building a new one. Get it centrally located for the people. If you furnish tin for the roof you can demand that they clean the market up after each day's use.

i. Movies: You can obtain a generator and projector from USIS and show Lao and American movies. There are many excellent propaganda movies in the USIS warehouses. Show American films also-- particularly those with a simple direct theme showing us at our best. (e.g., war pictures, cowboy pictures, adventure pictures and light comedies. Avoid films which degrade us or are extremely sophisticated and complex.) The villagers love to watch American films even when they cannot understand a word. A portable PA speaker which would enable the interpreter to give the general plot line would be a big asset when showing US films.

j. Electric lights: Interest the Chao Muong in trying to start a light plant if one is not in operation. Possibly the better-off citizens can be persuaded to pool their money to finance the operation particularly if they can see how they can make a profit in the future. Get USOM help on this one.

k. Local Restaurants and Markets: Try to get the local bars and restaurants to clean up their kitchens and their premises and dispose of their food waste in sanitary fashion. This can be handled through the Chao Muong. Do not patronize below-standard places. If it is a small town try to interest the local people in building new buildings and attracting more people and more business.

l. As a final word on these recommended activities remember that any program you undertake will be secondary to your mission of training FAR. The time for project planning and team participation is at night and during off duty time. Before starting any work see the people at USOM and USIS and find out what kind of support they can

actually give you. These civic projects will take up many hours but they will be hours well spent in the achievement of the United States objectives of building a greater and stronger free Laos.

3. Tips on conduct of a civil assistance program.

a. Upon arrival in the village pay a courtesy call on the Chao Muong. Do not talk shop on the first meeting, just make friends.

b. Deal directly with the Chao Muong. Do not work through his subordinates. Always work through one man - the chief.

c. Make a statement on graft. Let the Chao Muong know that under no circumstances will you tolerate graft and if you detect it all aid will stop. If corruption starts the villagers will tell you. You do not need to search for it.

d. Do not stockpile supplies - get them distributed promptly. You must have a system of control. Make the Chao Muong sign for everything you give him and see that he signs out the equipment to his subordinates. Since it is impossible for everyone to have a pick, shovel, grub hoe and axe, the tools should be issued from a central point on a loan basis. When a farmer finishes with a piece of equipment he returns it to the village chief. The chief must be taught how to run this system.

e. Always make the villagers share the work load. Let them know that all these projects are village projects not US help for the helpless. Once you do one project all by yourself the villagers will forever after expect this from your team. Do not give them something for nothing. For example a good approach could be "I will try to get a tin roof for this school house if you will build the school and furnish all the other materials and labor."

f. Try to present your ideas to the Chao Muong in such a fashion as to make him think it was his idea in the first place. Let him win full credit for the completion of any project. Do not issue orders to him or demand an instant decision. When you approach him with an idea let him have a night to think about it. But the next day be sure to gently push him toward a decision.

g. Do not start anything you cannot fully support. Never promise anything. Remember you can be moved out at a moment's notice. Have all the material on hand before you start any project. Check it out with your superiors before you begin.

h. Initially your weapon is talk. It must be interesting, arousing, intelligent. You are a master salesman for the United States. Some pitfalls for newcomers; drinking too much at social functions (keep your mind clear for business), getting involved with the native women (creates jealousy and hate and makes you a set up for anti-US propaganda), being arrogant, sarcastic or be-littling in your conversation (these

people are hypersensitive and proud and you will come to a dead end if they dislike you). Some positive tips are: avoid anything that reminds t the people of French control. For example the French required that every man in the village contribute one day's work or a couple of pieces of lumber to each building project. The Lao do not even like to talk about it. Maintain the proper team attitude of good natured willingness and endless patience in the face of resentment to change and complete apathy. Be tactful, be tolerant. Show exceptional kindness to the children and the very old. Be courteous, be relexed and do not be in a hurry.

i. Do not worry if they do things differently from what you propose. If they achieve the end result that is all that counts.

j. For success on this mission observe the native customs. For example when you are visiting a different village inform the villagers that you are coming so that the people can assemble. The district headman (the Chao Muang) always makes a political speech on these occasions. Never force your way into a village where the broken branches across the trail indicate a closed celebration. Follow the native custom of removing your footgear when going into a village house. Learn the customs of your region.

k. Make sure the United States gets credit for all U.S. items distributed. If possible equipment should be stamped with a U.S. flag. When the Chao Muang makes a speech to the citizenry about the tools and supplies they are to receive make sure he tells the villagers that the equipment comes from America.

l. Do not give away U.S. items for nothing. For example if you give picks demand they dig a well or ditch the streets. If you give school supplies, make them either build a school or repair the old one.

4. In conclusion: The sky is the limit in what you can achieve. You cannot make a new Laos in one day but it only takes one day to start. Now is the time to start beating the enemy at his own game - the winning of men's minds, emotions and loyalty to the concept of freedom, justice, individual human rights, equality of opportunity and a higher living standard.

Interdepartmental Course on Counterinsurgency
Foreign Service Institute
26 September 1962

LESSONS LEARNED

THE PHILIPPINES: 1946 - 1953

By

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I.

A Communist insurgency, like a civil war, can seem to be a most intimate, family matter for a nation. As in other family quarrels, the outsider -- even a well-meaning friend of the family -- had better stay out of it, unless he can move in to help with great skill and understanding.

This "family quarrel" aspect, of a Communist insurgency in a foreign country, poses the thorniest challenge ever faced by free Americans. We cannot look on, aloof, while a people are enslaved or murdered, and still have our own freedom bright and clear. Yet if we move in on a foreign people to help them, and see this only as a pragmatic exercise, equating full bellies with man's liberty, or compromise our principles in the name of expediency, or let the egos of some turn Americans into big frogs in little ponds, then we can stifle that very precious spark of true national life we seek to help protect and guide towards strength.

The Communists' task is the easier one of tearing down, of employing fear, so that they can impose their will on the weak. Our task is the harder one of building up, of employing wisdom, so that we can be brothers to a world family of free people.

During the long campaign against the Huks in the Philippines, we found a way as a nation to give true help to the Filipinos. Among the 22 million people living on the seven thousand islands which are the Philippines, there were Filipinos who had the courage to stand up -- to pledge their lives, their fortunes, their sacred honor -- to the cause of man's liberty. As we recognized these Filipinos and concentrated on helping them grow strong, within the spirit of our own heritage, we then found the vital, determining basis upon which the victory was constructed.

It wasn't the number of dead Huks. It wasn't even money or hardware. It was the ever increasing number of Filipinos dedicated to making their democracy live.

There were Americans who believed in these dedicated Filipinos and acted upon that belief. As they did, such Americans were accepted as brothers, not outsiders.

II.

As I noted, the Huk rebellion was a long one. Its genesis was back in the 1920's. Its postlude is still in the air.

The so-called "armed struggle" ... the open attempt to overthrow the Constitutional Government of the Philippines by armed force ... lasted from 1946 until 1953, or about 8 years. It reached a peak in mid-1950, when the Communists had some 15,000 organized guerrillas in the field, and about a million supporters and sympathizers in the population. Against them were the Philippine Armed Forces, which totalled about 50,000.

The Communist strategy was run by a Politburo, composed mostly of Filipino intellectuals. Politically, the insurgency was shaped to appear as a fight between landless peasants and wealthy landlords. The landlords, of course, were seen as being helped by the Yankee "imperialists," who supplied weapons to the Filipino "lackeys" in uniform who did the bidding of a government controlled by landlords. The 1949 Philippine Presidential campaign, with its bitter charges of ballot box stuffing and intimidation of voters by the incumbent Administration, led the Politburo to broaden its political attack. The Filipino masses were told they were being cheated out of their franchise, the Constitution had turned out to be merely a scrap of paper, so the masses could only have their own government if they imposed their will by force. Thus, the slogans of the Huks: "Bullets Not Ballots" and "Land for the Landless."

The military arm, the Huk guerrilla force, was organized in squadrons and led by a Supremo, Luis Taruc. The military, including the Supremo, was under the tight control of the Politburo. Political indoctrination was carried on at schools hidden in the jungles and hills, the so-called "Stalin Universities," in troop units by political commissars, and through the use of "Self Criticism." This continual political indoctrination, coupled with "iron discipline," turned a movement which had started out with an old-time Robin Hood and Agrarian Socialist flavor into a tough, ruthless force that had hope and intent -- by mid-1950 -- of winning the Philippines by 1952.

Against these Communist forces was a government much like our own, with Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary branches. Initially, the responsibility for coping with the Huk rebellion was largely left up to the Secretary of the Interior, whose militant arm was the national police force, the Philippine Constabulary. Local control of the Constabulary was mostly the political prerogative of the Governor of the Province where the troops were assigned. All too often, the provincial capitol, the governor's residence, and the property of the governor's major political supporters could be recognized by the number of Constabulary troops mounting guard there. The Philippine Army, Navy, and Air Force, under the Secretary of National Defense, and assisted by MDAP and the U.S. military advisors of JUSMAG, devoted almost full-time in readying themselves to resist an invasion by external forces, and paid scant attention to the internal threat of the Huk rebellion.

In 1950, this was changed. The Armed Forces were reorganized, to include the Constabulary as part of the military establishment under the Secretary of National Defense. Defense took over the main responsibility of the fight against the Huks. The Constabulary force of company-size units was replaced by battalion combat teams. A former guerrilla leader, Ramon Magsaysay, gave up his seat in the House of Representatives to become Secretary of National Defense. He brought with him a deep understanding of guerrilla life from personal experience, an impatience with the status quo, and a devotion to the principles of democracy.

Little more than a year later, in November 1951, the Huks had lost the initiative and were on the run. In that period, the Armed Forces had become the protectors of the people and had started restoring the people's faith in the Constitution, in the Electoral Code, in the real meaning of democracy. The critical changes took place in fourteen action-filled months. What happened in those months holds many a lesson for those whose freedom is threatened, and for Americans in a position to help. I will sketch in some of the events and lessons for you.

III.

The first lesson is rather basic: there is no substitute for first-hand knowledge. Let me illustrate.

In 1950, when I returned to the Philippines, for duty with JUSMAG, I did what any of you would have done -- I made myself as current on the situation as I could, by reading reports and having talks with

officials "in the know." I did this, both in Washington and Manila. From this quick study, the Huks and the Filipinos among whom the Huks were based emerged in a conventional two-dimensional picture. It had no depth -- yet it was the best there was, for decision-making, in both Washington and Manila.

The "Makabulos Massacre" had just happened. The reports and the Manila press said that there was a strong tide of popular revulsion against the Huks for the wanton savagery of the massacre. The story of the Huk action seemed proof enough that decent Filipinos would be revolted. The Huks had attacked the small station hospital at Makabulos, killed the staff of administrators, doctors, and nurses, and the patients, including helpless ones in bed. Ammunition was precious, so bolos and bayonets had been used. It was butchery.

Shortly after arrival in the Philippines, I visited Makabulos, which is on the outskirts of Tarlac town. My old friends in Tarlac explained their feelings. Yes, they regretted the killing, but this was war. The soldiers had been on the government side, not the people's. Their most vivid memory was of how polite and thoughtful the Huk guerrillas had been! The Huks had started filtering into town in the early afternoon. Some had even gone to the movies to await H-hour. Then, at first dark, the Huks had quietly taken over the streets, asking the people to please remain indoors so they wouldn't get hurt when the government troops started firing. They explained that they were going to destroy the military fort on the outskirts of town, to demonstrate how strong the people's army was becoming. The words of these armed Huks, many of them relatives of local folks, are what the people remembered -- not the words of politicos or editorial writers or officials in the safe remoteness of Manila.

The conclusion was a stark one. The Philippine government had lost the people, at least in Tarlac Rapid visits elsewhere confirmed this same finding, in other towns, other provinces. Later, captured documents gave even further proof of how much had been lost. Yet, only exceptional individuals in the Philippine government, among the U.S officials in the Philippines, seemed to have any inkling of the real truth in the provinces.

One of the exceptions was Magsaysay, who had just become Secretary of National Defense. As a friend from my past service in the Philippines, I was assigned as liaison with him for JUSMAG and we shared much of the next 18 months together. Let me sketch in a few scenes from that time, to let you glimpse some of the depth factors that went into the decisions

There were the charcoal cooking fires, in the nipa huts up in the provinces, where the meals for farmers' families were being prepared. Magsaysay would wander away from where the troops were deployed, to the neighboring huts and their cooking fires. Invited in, he would ask question after question, about the family, the crops, their income, the debts to money lenders. It would wind up with him peering into the pot on the fire, to see what they had for dinner. A deep anger would take him as he saw the scanty food, the poverty. Then, his eyes would moisten, sadden -- an arm go around shoulders in mute reassurance -- and he would leave.

There was the day in Aglao, his home barrio, just after a Huk raid, as he looked at the bodies of women and children he had known -- murdered to intimidate him into resigning as Secretary. It was the first time that the real savagery of the Huk guerrillas came home to him, and gave his later compassion for prisoners a poignant humanity that was deeply, movingly, real.

There were his constant surprise visits to the troops. The soles of shoes worn through on boots, a medium tank breaking down in combat due to faulty spark plugs (with the Secretary, under fire, trying to fix it), officers at their CP's sleeping off a night of poker or mah-jongg. First-hand evidence of any army not on its toes -- and quickly followed by actions to remedy. As he went from the combat areas to his office, to Cabinet meetings, to Congressional hearings, to staff councils, he commenced to think and speak and decide with more sureness, with the authority of someone who knows whereof he speaks, of someone who has been there.

IV.

Another lesson from those days is that some of the most significant help came, not from the U.S., but when Filipinos started helping themselves. I will mention just two examples.

The first was the so-called Peace Fund. About a million dollars worth of pesos were raised by a fund-collecting drive, much as in a Community Chest or United Givers Fund drive, under the chairmanship of Vice President Lopez. These became Magsaysay's contingency or confidential funds -- used for rewards for actions against Huk leaders, for purchasing firearms in the provinces to prevent them falling into the hands of the Huks, and for operational intelligence. These Peace Funds put a weapon of great practicality into the hands of a man who knew how to use it well.

The second example was a series of informal war councils, in which the real do-ers among the Philippine military participated. By "do-ers," I mean combat commanders of all ranks and some staff officers, men who had been in the thick of the fight, men of imagination and energy, men who wanted to win and who were not content to merely go through the motions just because the book said so. We, as American advisors, only used our "good offices" as interested friends to bring these men together in an informal atmosphere, provided plenty of coffee -- and then let them alone to do a "re-think" on their campaign. These sessions sparked many of the ideas which were later developed into the winning tactics which became famous. Magsaysay attended many of these sessions, as did some civilians who wanted to help -- such as leaders of the Philippine Veterans Legion and the Jaycees. It was a bit rough on some of the lieutenants and junior captains who would jeep in from combat for the sessions, but they spoke up and were listened to in this atmosphere. I commend this method as a prized way of getting ideas on how to win.

V.

Another lesson from those days also is a rather basic one: since the objective in a counterinsurgency is to win over the people to our side, the political-psychological appeal is a most vital element in winning. In this, the old truism that "actions speak louder than words" must be heeded.

When Magsaysay became Secretary of National Defense in September 1950, he recognized the need for psychological action by appointing an assistant, Colonel Mike Barbero, for psychological warfare. Later, Barbero was succeeded by Major Joe Crisol. The function was given the name of "Civil Affairs," and "Civil Affairs Officers" were put in the chain of command down to include the battalion combat teams. They handled psychological warfare, troop information, and relations between the military and the people. However, psychological operations were stressed as a command function, and the whole Philippine Armed Forces adopted them as a weapon in this combat.

Let me list some of the actions that "spoke louder than words":

- When Huk prisoners were taken to the compound for interrogation and processing, the Army would notify the closest relatives, suggesting a visit. If the family was poor, as was often the case, bus fare would be provided and rice and other help given to the family. This was the first step towards the policy which became known later as offering the Huk enemy either "all-out friendship or all-out force."

- Huk prisoners who sincerely desired to "turn over a new leaf" were given the opportunity, through EDCOR - a project run by Defense. This started originally as a carpenter shop, where selected prisoners were set up in business to make barracks furniture, which was purchased by Defense. Later, farm projects were started in Mindanao where Army veterans and Huk prisoners pioneered new farm communities, clearing out the virgin jungle to get the land. The former Huks earned title to their own land, through their labor. This was a powerful action to counter the Communist cry of "land for the landless." The word-of-mouth "bamboo telegraph" not only carried word of this up into the Huk camps in the hills, but also all over Asia. The British in Malaya told me that people being relocated there asked for electric lights in the new villages, because they had heard there were electric lights at EDCOR. The Burmese Army set up similar farm communities for their Communist guerrilla prisoners. I ran into word of EDCOR, time after time, out in the boondocks of Asia. It was a smash hit!

- As a means of bringing the people and the Armed Forces closer together, arrangements were made so that anyone who wanted to could send a telegram to the Secretary of National Defense for 10-centavos. Information about the Huk enemy, misbehavior of the military, exemplary actions noted by civilians, gripes, praise, and suggestions all came flooding in as hundreds of telegrams daily. A staff section in the Secretary's office was established to handle these. Each telegram was checked out quickly for accuracy, and was acted upon. The people started feeling that the military was really their own.

- In an insurgency, where the guerrillas hide in among the people, there are often casualties of civilians caught in the cross-fire between troops and guerrillas. Prior to 1950 in the Philippines, these civilian casualties were mostly left to shift for themselves. Under Magsaysay, who believed that the military must act as the brothers and protectors of the people, these civilian casualties were given the same prompt treatment as military casualties -- at military aid stations, in military hospitals. The people started feeling that the Army really <u>cared</u>. And, you know, the Army found that it really did care. As its heart grew -- so did its will, to win.

- Most of the Communist Huk recruits came from families of tenant farmers. To these families, the government had seemed something pretty remote, usually an entity wanting tax money or sending in soldiers who always were ready to shoot. When they had an argument with the landlord, the case would be settled in an Agrarian Court -- with a government judge presiding, with lawyers representing the landlord, and with the tenant farmer pleading his own case, usually to his loss. As a means to end this inequity, Magsaysay asked for volunteers among the Judge Advocate lawyers, and sent them to the provinces -- out of uniform -- to act as attorneys for deserving tenant farmers in the Agrarian Courts, gratis.

- As noted earlier, the Communist Politburo had made effective use of charges of fraud in the 1949 Philippine Presidential Election; the publicity gave vitality to the Huk slogan of "Bullets Not Ballots" as the means the people should use in changing their government. Thus, when the next national election, of November 1951, for certain Senate and House seats, for Provincial Governors, came around, the Armed Forces were asked by the Commission on Elections to help make the provisions of the enlightened Philippine Electoral Code come true. The Armed Forces, using ROTC students mostly, but backing them with troops when necessary, protected the right of free speech for candidates, policed the polling booths to ensure secret balloting, kept the political goons from intimidating the electorate, and helped supervise an honest count. This public service by the Armed Forces quite openly gave the government back to the people, and earned their full trust. The Huk Supremo, Luis Taruc, later said ... after he came in and surrendered ... that this electoral service by the Armed Forces broke the back of the Huk rebellion. Since the troops represented the government, and the government belonged to the people, the Communist Huks suddenly found the entire nation against them.

VI.

There is room for one more lesson, suggested by the 1951 Philippine election. This lesson might be expressed as: Americans, when we are true to our heritage, have a real duty to speak up for our belief in liberty.

In the Philippine Election of 1951, the United States officially reiterated its dedication to the sanctity of a free election. This was done both in Washington and in Manila. These strong statements, timed just before the November elections in the Philippines and noting the guarantees to the electorate in the Philippine Constitution and Electoral Code, did much to hearten those fighting to maintain their freedom. As a final touch, the U.S. Ambassador, Myron Cowen, talked openly and staunchly on the subject at a mass meeting of Filipino voters right in the heart of the Communist dominated province of Pampanga. He received standing cheers.

Later, in the 1953 Philippine Presidential campaign, another U.S. Administration and another U.S. Ambassador, Raymond Spruance, came out just as strongly for the same political principles. These statements were warmly welcomed by the overwhelming majority of the Filipino people.

VIII.

In the days to come, in other critical areas of insurgency, you will be facing problems which will be pressing for solution. Perhaps then, some of these lessons from the Philippines will come to mind and will suggest actions to fit your own needs. I hope so.

At such a time, also, I hope you realize that we Americans aren't sitting up in the grandstand, in choice seats on the 50-yard line. We are right down there on the playing field as far as the rest of the world is concerned. The stakes are for a people's freedom. Those are big stakes, worthy of the biggest and best we have and do as a people, as a nation.