

METHODOLOGY USED IN CALCULATING EGYPTIAN LABOR FORCE ESTIMATES

The purpose of these calculations was not so much to generate one specific set of AID/W labor force projections but rather to develop a sense of the ball park in order to determine whether it was reasonable to accept the GOE projections.

1. We started with 1976 population data by sex and age group.

Source: Egypt: The Effects of Population Factors on Social and Economic Development, Resources for the Awareness of Population Impacts on Development (RAPID), The Futures Group, 1979.

2. With the aid of age specific death rates, we aged the population to arrive at estimates for the years 1981, 1986, and 1991.

Source: Population Increase in the UAR and Its Deterrents for Development, Table 1.4: Death Rates for Different Age Groups 1947-1960; Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, Cairo, 1966.

We reduced the 1960 death rates by sex and age group by 25% to reflect the fact that in the aggregate the death rate declined from 16.9 in 1960 to 10.6 in 1978.

When aging the population group 0-4 years of age from 1976 to 1981, we used the death rates for the 0-4 age group for one year and the death rates for the 5-9 age group for four years to reflect the fact that in the second, third, fourth and fifth years of this age group there were no infants and progressively fewer young children. We recognize that in doing this we were probably underestimating the losses from the 0-4 age group but, on the other hand, we thought that this was counterbalanced by the fact that:

- (a) in aging the group 5-9 years of age we used the death rate for the 5-9 group for 5 years, even though members of this group were moving progressively into the 10-14 age group for which the death rate was lower;
- (b) for all age groups, all of the losses for deaths over 5 years were calculated against the same base figure for population rather than against a population base that was declining year by year.

3. We then applied 1975 labor force participation rates by sex and age group to our estimated working-age population for the years 1976, 1981, 1986 and 1991.

Source: 1978 Yearbook of Labour Statistics, International Labor Office, Geneva, 1978.

Using 1975 participation rates tends to bias downward our estimates of the labor force in future years because the participation rates have been rising over time.

4. Our labor force estimates also tend to be low because our working-age population includes the 15-65 age group rather than the group 12-65 years of age.

5. We arrived at the following figures for the Egyptian labor force:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Egyptian Labor Force (thousands)</u>		
	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>	<u>Total</u>
1976	8260	601	8861
1981	9598	700	10298
1986	11111	815	11926
1991	12856	942	13798

<u>Period</u>	<u>Compound Annual Growth Rates - %</u>		
	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>	<u>Total</u>
1976-1991	2.9	2.9	2.9

6. We then recalculated the labor force figures to take account of a gradual rise in female participation rates. We assumed that participation would double by 1991 (from the rates we used in calculating the 1976 labor force). We then calculated the compound annual growth rates implied by this change.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Egyptian Labor Force (thousands)</u> <u>(Female Participation Rates Doubled)</u>		
	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>	<u>Total</u>
1976	8260	601	8861
1991	12856	1886	14742

<u>Period</u>	<u>Compound Annual Growth Rates - %</u>		
	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>	<u>Total</u>
1976-1991	2.9	7.8	3.4

Attached is a section from a paper being written by Jerry Segal PPC/PB. It deals primarily with labor force projections and employment targets, and is relevant to the review of the CDSS employment annex.

C. Employment

The strategy which is being presented will place a major emphasis on employment. There are several reasons for this emphasis:

1. Egypt has significant underutilization of existing labor resources. These represent untapped potential for economic growth.
2. For the foreseeable future, Egypt's labor resources will be increasing at a very substantial pace. This increase should be viewed as a plus, as an expansion of productive inputs; however, it will be a challenge to take full advantage of this increase. If it is accomplished, increased labor resources will account for a substantial part of Egypt's future economic growth.
3. The prospect of increased unemployment raises dangers of political destabilization.
4. Employment, and especially employment in jobs with meaningful levels of productivity, is a powerful tool for promoting equity and for overcoming poverty. As such it can further enhance security objectives, as well as compliance with our legislative mandate.

5. The search for better jobs is the primary motivation for migration to major urban centers. Targeted employment creation/productivity enhancement can help in affecting migration flows.
6. In a tight labor market, more opportunities will be created for women. This is desirable both from the point of view of our population objectives as well as from our equity, and legislative compliance objectives.

In short, employment is central to our objectives of growth, equity, stability, and restraining population growth.

Labor Force Utilization

Labor force is a two edged-sword. On the one hand, labor is a productive input. Expansion of employment implies an expansion of economic output. Indeed, growth in employment is often the primary cause of growth in output. On the other hand, growth in labor force raises the possibility that employment will not be able to keep pace, and that as a result unemployment will expand, bringing with it well known personal, social and political problems.

The first question to answer is: "How well is Egypt using its existing labor resources?" I would suggest that the short answer is "poorly."

Failure to make full use of a country's labor supply emerges in a variety of ways. The most basic are:

- overt unemployment
- widespread part time unemployment
- disguised unemployment (e.g., redundant workers, make work jobs)
- low participation rates (potential labor does not enter the job market and thus is not even categorized as unemployed)
- underemployment (e.g., full time employment making minimal use of workers productive potential).

There is more agreement about the general picture of labor force utilization in Egypt than there is about the actual numbers. But even the general picture is sometimes unclear.

1. The Egypt country profile prepared by the U.S. Department of Labor in 1979 presents a rather dismal picture.

The Report states:

"Unemployment has not been measured accurately in Egypt. The Ministry of Planning estimates the unemployment at 1.5 million, or 11.5% of the labor force. Total unemployment and underemployment are estimated as high as 30 percent. For rural areas, one half the workers work an estimated average of 180 days per year."

"In the large cities, millions make a living by casual, unskilled labor, as street vendors, part time construction workers or in other marginal activities. The problem has become worse as population and labor force have grown faster than jobs."

"An estimated 350,000 new jobs would be needed each year to keep unemployment from rising. The Government has tried to avoid the problem of educated unemployment by guaranteeing a job in government or the public sector to all university graduates. In government and the public sector enterprises, employment is estimated at 20 percent to 25 percent above actual need."

Thus, there is disguised unemployment of major magnitude in the public sector, open unemployment on a major scale, and significant part-time-only employment in the rural sector. In addition, there is extensive very low productivity employment.

The report also notes that there are shortages in some skilled and technical areas and that seasonal agricultural shortages have been reported.

2 The Egyptian Government's 5 year plan 1978-82 shows the 1976 labor force at 11,107,000, and employment at 9,628,000. This implies unemployment of 1,479,000 persons. However, the plan also shows this same number (1,479,000) for overt and disguised unemployment. Because they do not explain what

by "disguised unemployment" it is hard to tell what they have in mind.

3. The World Bank's recent study puts 1976 employment at 9,628,000, the same number which appears in the 5 year plan. However, the Bank works with a much lower labor force number and reaches the conclusion that there is almost no overt unemployment. However, the study goes on to say of unemployment numbers, "They represent only the tip of the iceberg of the underutilization of labor, which is manifested more seriously in low-productivity employment and low rates of participation in the labor force, particularly among women." The report points out that "the labor force participation rate, unusually low by world standards, was actually on the decline in Egypt between 1947 and 1972, from 37 percent to 27 percent. In the 4 years to 1976 it staged a recovery, but at 31.5 percent it is still below participation rates for countries at a similar stage of development."

Labor force participation rates presented in the Bank study are: (on following page)

Table 1.5: LABOR FORCE ^{1/} PARTICIPATION RATES

Percent

Year	Females %	Males %	Total %
1937	7.9	65.1	37
1947	7.8	62.8	37
1960	4.8	55.2	30
1966	4.2	50.8	28
1970	3.5	49.5	26
1972	4.0	50.7	27
1976	9.2	52.9	31.5

Sources: Population Census 1937, 1947, 1960, 1966 and 1976, and Labor Force Sample Surveys, CAPMS.

1/ Defined as people age 6 and over.

Though somewhat overdramatic because it ignores non-civilian employment, the age distribution of the population and the fact that more children are in school, it remains the case that between 1947 and 1976 population grew 100 percent and total employment went up by only 38 percent. In agriculture there was almost no increase over the last 30 years.

Our conclusion then is that Egypt makes considerably less than full use of her most abundant resource: labor. Capturing these wasted resources should be a major source of growth.

Future Labor Supply

Egypt's potential labor resources are not static. Quite the contrary, they are growing rapidly. From our various points of view: growth, stability, equity, it is important to have a relatively good fix on just how great an expansion is taking place and of whether or not development policies will result in an increasing failure to utilize these resources.

A central point to focus on is the increasing number of people that will be entering the labor force. However, we should remember that the flow of people into the labor force is itself, in part, a function of

employment opportunities. The caveat to bear in mind is that labor force should not be equated with potential labor supply. Only when there are ample good employment opportunities will the labor force approximate potential labor resources.

Labor force numbers are a function of two factors, population size, and the rate of participation of the population in the labor force. Since entrants into the labor force over the next 15 years have already been born, we can get a relatively good fix on the population side. With respect to participation rates, we can be less certain. We do have age and sex specific participation rates; thus, we can deal with the fact that different groups in the population have markedly different participation rates. We also know that female participation levels have been increasing and we can expect this trend to continue. As economic projections go, labor force numbers are usually fairly solid. Thus, it might seem possible to get a rough consensus with respect to labor force size in the coming years.

Unfortunately, with respect to this crucial variable, growth in the labor force, the estimates jump all over the map. On one hand we have the U.S. Department of Labor profile which states that, "Because the population contains so many young people, the labor force is growing

rapidly, about 5 percent a year; double the population growth." On the other hand, the 1982 CDSS cites a figure of 2.2 percent as the level for projected labor force growth. It would be hard to overemphasize the importance and the extent of this difference. At a 5 percent rate of increase the labor force would double in 14 years. At a 2.2 percent rate it would double in 32 years. Starting from a present level of around 11 million, at 5 percent rate of growth, in ten years, the labor force would be 18 million; with a 2.2 percent rate it would be 14 million.

A development strategy based on the lower number and in fact generating only that number of new jobs, would be disastrous if in fact labor force expanded to 18 million. The implication would be overt unemployment of 20-30 percent.*

Upon reflection, it appears that both numbers are seriously wrong. A more accurate figure can be obtained from the GOE 5 year plan. It showed the following projected levels of labor force: (on following page)

*In fact, this would not happen. Instead, large numbers of workers would find marginal forms of employment. While others would simply drop out of the labor force altogether.

LABOR FORCE (1,000's

		<u>Percentage Increase From Previous Year</u>
1976	11,709	
1977	12,081	3.2
1978	12,463	3.2
1979	12,853	3.1
1980	13,250	3.1
1981	13,699	3.4
1982	14,152	3.3
1983	14,622	3.3
1984	15,093	3.2
1985	15,577	3.2
1986	16,071	3.2
1987	16,612	3.4

In order to test these numbers we have made our own projections using the following procedures:

1. We started with 1976 age and sex data on the population.
2. With the use of age specific death rates, we aged the 1976 population so as to get an age/sex specific population for the group 15-65, for the years 1981, 1986 and 1991.

3. We then utilized age/sex specific participation rates for Egypt for 1975 (this tends to bias the totals downwards since rates have been rising and rose significantly between 1972 and 1976.)*

We arrived at the following figures for total labor force:

		<u>Compound Rate of Change</u>
1976	8,861	3.0%
1981	10,298	2.9%
1986	11,926	2.9%
1991	13,798	

We then recalculated the numbers assuming growth in the female participation rate (a doubling of the female participation rate by the end of the period). This is not as ambitious as it sounds. Our 1975 participation rates averaged 4.1 percent for women, as opposed to the 9.2 percent figure reported by the World Bank for 1976. Even a tripling of the 4.1 percent level is within the range of possibility for the period to 1991. Our results were: (see following page)

*Our numbers are also somewhat lower in absolute terms because we are using the 15-65 year age group rather than the 12-65 group used in the 5 year plan. This however, should not significantly affect the rates of change.

Doubled Female Rate

1976	8,861
1991	14,742

The impact of this growth in female participation is striking. Between 1976 and 1991, with a doubling of female participation, the total labor force grows at a compound rate of 3.4 percent.

Thus, depending on the assumption with respect to female participation, our labor force growth estimates range from 2.9 percent to 3.4 percent. The GOE estimate is 3.2 percent. They worked with a somewhat slower increase in female participation than we did with our high side estimate (3.4%).

Their numbers also assumed growth in the percentage of young people in school. While we recognized that there will be increases in absolute numbers of students in school, we did not assume increased percentages. All in all, we feel that our estimates provide a general confirmation of the GOE numbers as found in the 1978-82 five year plan. For our purposes then, we will accept their projection of 3.2 percent growth as a reasonable basis for strategy development.

The difference between 3.2 percent and 2.2 percent is quite significant. At 3.2 percent the labor force will double in 22 years; at 2.2 percent it will double in 32 years. As a final confirmation of the reasonable-

ness of the 3.2 percent level we note that the rate of natural increase of the population has been 2.3 to 2.8 percent in the last few years. It is not at all surprising that labor force growth will be somewhat higher.

Employment Targets

Given our expected expansion of the labor force, we can proceed to develop employment targets for the coming years, and then raise questions about policies that will be needed to reach those targets. In developing targets we should bear in mind the following:

1. In order that overt unemployment does not expand, the growth in employment must, at a minimum, equal the growth in the labor force.
2. If we start from a position of significant overt or disguised unemployment and, if we want to impact on these problems, employment growth must be greater than labor force growth.
3. As part of our approach to population problems we are looking forward to sufficient tightness in labor markets so as to pull large numbers of women into the formal sector.

With the partial exception of the 3rd factor, these have been built into the employment projections found in the 5 year plan. However, from our point of view, these cannot be viewed as realistic projections.

Rather they must be viewed as targets, the achievement of which would promote key objectives of equity, growth and stability.

Our targets, the employment levels "projected" in the 5 year plan are as follows:

		<u>Percentage Increase from Previous Year</u>
1976	9,628	
1977	9,988	3.73%
1978	10,350	3.62%
1979	10,738	3.74%
1980	11,135	3.70%
1981	11,642	4.55%
1982	12,160	4.25%
1983	12,729	4.67%
1984	13,325	4.68%
1985	13,957	4.74%
1986	14,617	4.70%
1987	15,324	4.80%

Employment at these levels would be sufficient to reduce substantially the level of obvious and disguised unemployment cited in the plan. Note, however, that these numbers are for domestic employment. They assume modest expansion of the number of Egyptians working abroad. If for some reason these workers had to return to Egypt, then it would be necessary to raise the employment

targets. The GOE numbers between 1980-87 assume an increase in women in the work force at an annual rate of 4.5 percent. They are also based on the assumption of substantial increases of the numbers of young people in school and not working.

While it might be possible to refine these numbers further, they will serve quite well as reasonable employment targets. They call for growth in employment between 1976 and 1986 of 5.7 million, or about 60%. On an annual, compound basis this is growth at 4.3 percent.

At the beginning of the period an annual increase of 350,000 employed is called for. By the end of the period this has risen to 700,000 a year.

The key question is "can Egypt achieve this level of employment?" To put this into perspective, we should realize that in the 5 year plan, it was believed that this level of employment could be attained because of a very high growth rate.

In the plan the annual rate of growth of GNP was put at about 12 percent. In a recent paper presented to the Consultative Group, the GOE has revised downward its predicted growth rates for GNP. For the 1980-84 period the new figures show a 9.5% annual rate of growth.

Accordingly, the Consultative Group paper backs off significantly from the employment gains predicted in the 78-82 plan. The new figures are:

<u>Employment In New Paper</u>		<u>Employment Projected in 78-82 Plan</u>	
1979	10.4 million (actual)	1979	10.7
1984	11.9	1984	13.3

In the new paper, employment is expected to grow 1.5 million between '79 and '84, as opposed to the earlier prediction of a growth of 2.6 million. One might expect that the more limited rate of growth in employment (2.7 percent) would signify increasing unemployment in the face of labor force growth that was predicted at 3.2 percent. However, the new paper speaks of an average annual increase in the labor force for the 5 year period of 225,000 a year. This represents a labor force growth rate of 1.8 percent. Needless, to say, this is a phony number, significantly below population growth. The new employment projections represent the implicit prediction of a failure to keep up with growth in the labor force. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the GNP growth rate now being predicted for the coming five years, may itself prove to be overly optimistic. After all, 9-10 percent growth in real GNP is quite impressive!

In fact the current CDSS (1982) suggests that 8 percent growth would be more realistic. If this is so, then employment growth will be even lower.

From all this we reach the conclusion that Egypt is going to have to make very special efforts at job creation if it is to accomplish its objective of fuller utilization of the labor force. Indeed, special efforts will have to be made just to prevent a serious growth in unemployment. Left to itself, even with substantial economic growth the economy simply will not produce enough jobs.

"Employment Focus"

It is important to make clear that in calling for an "employment focus" we are not advocating a single objective, say, job creation, as the be all-and end all of development. Rather, we are urging that employment be seen as a central nub which is at the heart of economic/social activity and which will connect up with the central problems of the society. Our concern is with what might be termed "the employment pattern" (the number of jobs, the type of jobs, their geographic dispersion, who gets them, the relation between employment and education, the income streams derived from employment, etc.)

It should be clear that there are several different objectives:

1. increasing the number of jobs,
2. raising the productivity of existing jobs/
insuring that new jobs are at reasonable levels
of productivity,
3. insuring that all jobs provide an income stream
sufficient to keep a small family above the
poverty line.
4. reducing the income gap that exists between
urban and rural areas, and between large urban
centers and small towns,
5. achieving a general improvement in the equity of
the overall distribution of income.

In addition one could list several systematic objectives:

- ensuring that there is equality of opportunity
(access to necessary training including financial
means, openness to job entry, etc.)
- ensuring that there is a reasonable fit between
the kinds of labor skills in demand and the kind
of training/education received.

It is important to remember that some of these objectives may compete with other objectives. Thus, it is not the case that for anyone of them we are interested in maximization. For instance, by spreading available

capital thinner and thinner, one could increase to higher and higher levels the quantity of labor required to perform a given task. To take an absurd example, by reducing the size of shovels or by making the cost of large shovels ten times as expensive as small ones, one could increase the number of workers, (or man-years) demanded. This, of course, would be foolish. The objective is not to use less and less capital; rather, it is to distribute the available capital in a manner which most successfully meets a range of social and economic objectives. Thus, alternatively, while one could raise the productivity of particular groups of workers to very high levels, this would reduce the average amount of capital available for the remaining members of the labor force, and would have detrimental implications for their income levels and for the overall distribution. In short, "job creation" "improving productivity" "achieving equity" are terms which indicate objectives, but they cannot be pursued blindly without awareness of interactions.

Secondly, it should be realized that while trade offs do exist and have to be made, it is often the case that two or more objectives can be advanced by a given decision. For instance, when factor prices are distorted as in Egypt, (capital is priced below its real cost to the economy, and labor is priced above its real cost),

the decisions that are made in the marketplace are not going to maximize the level of outputs. Correcting for distorted factor prices will result not only in increasing employment, it will also result in increasing output.

Thirdly, it should be recognized that the market, even when factor distortions have been eliminated does not automatically produce "correct" allocations of resources. This is so for two very different kinds of reasons. First, given a range of different objectives to be pursued, and a range of different views about their relative importance, there is no agreed-upon hierarchy of outcomes, and thus, there can be no "correct" allocation in principle. This is not to say that there cannot be widespread agreement that some results are superior to other results, but rather that given a significant range of differences in values (e.g., how important is equity? how important is economic growth once absolute poverty has been overcome?) There will be different "preferred" allocations. Secondly, there are a range of concerns of a political, social and economic sort which are often not taken into account in marketplace decisions because the relevant benefits or burdens do not impact on the marketplace decision makers. These are generally referred to as "externalities". The favorite textbook example of an

externality is pollution, the cost of which the society as a whole has to bear, but which does not enter into the industrialist's decision when he does his cost/benefit analysis in determining whether or not to make an investment. With respect to employment creation in Egypt, many of the most important social and political factors do not enter into marketplace decisions.

These include impacts on political stability, impacts on migration, impacts on overall distribution and impacts on population growth. The policy maker who wants to emphasize these concerns and sees them as importantly affected by specific employment/investment configurations will have to find policy tools for promoting the outcomes he seeks. They will not be achieved by the marketplace automatically.*

*This is not to say that the marketplace cannot be used as a device for achieving desired outcomes. Economists speak of "internalizing the externality" of making a societal cost or benefit relevant to a marketplace decision maker. For instance, in the pollution example, text books point out that one could tax the polluter at a level commensurate to the burdens placed on the community from the additional pollution. Thus, his costs and benefits are brought into line with the society's costs and benefits. With respect to creating employment, if the society gets an extra benefit from additional employment, to some extent, one could seek to adjust the factor prices faced by the potential employer so as to skew his decisions towards activities which utilize relatively more labor, or towards an investment in certain regions rather than in others.

It is important to bear these considerations in mind because in Egypt we have been trying to promote private sector activity; we are keenly aware of the inefficiencies that have been associated with the public enterprises, and there may be a tendency to imagine that private sector decision making will automatically result in appropriate allocation decisions. This does not occur even if we have perfectly competitive, distortion free markets.

EGYPT
POPULATION / LABOR FORCE
1976

POPULATION		WORKING AGE GROUP				LABOR FORCE		FEMALE		LABOR FORCE		TOTAL LABOR FORCE
AGE	(000s)	AGE	(000s)	MALE	FEMALE	Male Labor Force	% Labor Active	(000s)	%	Labor Force		
0-4	6183	15-19	3754	1877	1877	15-19	703	79	42			
5-9	5079	20-24	3202	1601	1601	20-24	1050	189	118			
10-14	4443	25-29	2760	1380	1380	25-29	1296	145	105			
15-19	3754	30-34	2355	1178	1178	30-34	3674	136	82			
20-24	3202	35-39	1987	994	994							
25-29	2760	40-44	1693	847	847	50-54	1040	26	24			
30-34	2355	45-49	1399	700	700							
35-39	1987	50-54	1178	589	589	50-54	297	6	16			
40-44	1693	55-59	957	479	479	60-64						
45-49	1399	60-64	736	368	368							
50-54	1178											
55-59	957											
60-64	736											
65-69	552											
70-74	348											
75+	278											
TOTAL	36704		20021	10011	10011		5260	601				5861

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EGYPT
PROJECTED WORKING AGE GROUPS
ADJUSTED FOR DEATH RATES FOR DIFFERENT AGE GROUPS

AGE GROUP	POPULATION 1976 (000s)			AGE GROUP	POPULATION 1981 (000s)			AGE GROUP	POPULATION 1986 (000s)			AGE GROUP	POPULATION 1991 (000s)		
	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE												
0-4	6183	3092	3092	5-9	5858	2927	2931	10-14	2899	2910	15-19	2276	2278		
5-9	5077	2540	2540	10-14	5038	2576	2522	15-19	2476	2508	20-24	2472	2492		
10-14	4443	2222	2222	15-19	4414	2204	2210	20-24	2183	2176	25-29	2159	2179		
15-19	3754	1877	1877	20-24	3724	1859	1865	25-29	1838	1851	30-34	1518	1537		
20-24	3202	1601	1601	25-29	3172	1583	1589	30-34	1536	1577	35-39	1540	1507		
25-29	2760	1380	1380	30-34	2734	1364	1370	35-39	1341	1353	40-44	1317	1336		
30-34	2355	1178	1178	35-39	2322	1159	1163	40-44	1140	1148	45-49	1107	1128		
35-39	1987	994	994	40-44	1960	978	982	45-49	950	965	50-54	922	929		
40-44	1693	847	847	45-49	1655	822	833	50-54	798	819	55-59	746	771.6		
45-49	1399	700	700	50-54	1368	680	688	55-59	637	646	60-64	577	585		
50-54	1178	589	589	55-59	1122	552	570	60-64	517	552					
55-59	957	479	479	60-64	913	449	464								
60-64	736	368	368	65-69	666	324	342								
65-69	552	276	276	70-74	499	243	256								
70-74	398	174	174	75+	210	107	103								
75+	278	137	159		168	86	82								
	36904														

AGE GROUP	DEATH RATES 1960		EST. DEATH RATES (REDUCED BY 25%)	
	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE
0-4	6.1	6.2	4.6	4.6
5-9	2.5	1.9	1.9	1.4
10-14	2.2	1.5	1.6	1.1
15-19	2.5	1.8	1.9	1.3
20-29	3.0	2.1	2.2	1.5
30-39	4.4	3.3	3.3	2.5
40-45	7.8	4.5	5.8	3.4
50-59	16.5	8.4	12.4	6.3
60-69	32.0	19.1	24.0	14.3
Tot	102.4	109.5	72.8	82.1

EGYPT
PROJECTED LABOR FORCE
ADJUSTED FOR AGE SPECIFIC DEATH RATES

AGE GROUP	TOTAL	AGE GROUP		MALE LABOR FORCE	% ELON ACTIVE	FEMALE LABOR FORCE		TOTAL LABOR FORCE
		MALE	FEMALE			(000s)	%	
1981								
15-19		2204	2210	1060	44.1	93	4.2	1099
20-24		1859	1865	1219	65.2	220	11.8	1229
25-29		1583	1589	1486	93.9	167	10.5	1653
30-39		4323	4348	4271	98.8	188	4.2	4459
40-49		1232	1258	1200	97.4	30	2.4	1230
50-59		449	464	362	80.7	7	1.6	369
60-64				9598		700	1400	10998
1986								
15-19		2496	2508	1201		105	2.1	1296
20-24		2183	2190	1432		259	5.8	1691
25-29		1838	1851	1726		194	3.8	1920
30-39		4977	5043	4937		212	4.2	5149
40-49		1435	1485	1399		36	2.4	1435
50-59		517	552	417		9	1.8	426
60-64				11111		815	1631	11926
1971								
15-19		2876	2894	1383		121	2.4	1504
20-24		2472	2492	1622		294	5.8	1916
25-29		2059	2179	2027		229	4.5	2256
30-39		5784	5858	5715		246	4.2	6000
40-49		1670	1742	1627		42	2.4	1669
50-59		597	645	462		10	2.1	472
60-64				12856		942	1886	13798